NEUVA ECIJA ELECTRIC COOOPERATIVE
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION v. NLRC and NUEVA
ECIJA COOPERATIVE
Right to Self-Organize | January 24, 2000 | Quisumbing, J.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners Reynaldo Fajardo, Ernesto Marin, Ever Guevarra,
Petronilo Baguisa, Victorino Carillo, and Erdic Javate were
permanent employees of respondent Nueva Ecija were permanent
employees of private respondent Nueva Ejica Electric
Cooperative, and are members of the NEECO Employees
Association – a labor organization established for mutual aid and
protection of its members.
2. Respondent Nueva Ecija Cooperative (NEECO) is an electric
cooperative under the general supervision and control of the
National Electrfication Administration.
3. The Board of Directors adopted policy 3-33 which set the
guidelines for NEECO retirement benefits. All regular employees
were then ordered to accomplish a “Form 87” which were
applications for either retirement, resignation or separation from
service.
4. The application form of 2 of the Baguisa and Guevarra were
approved and the two were given separation pay.
5. Because of this, which was also followed by the promotion of
certiain union officers, the union held a “snap election” of officers.
Petitioner labor associated passed a resolution withdrawing the
application for retirement for all its members.
6. Marin, Fernando and Carillo were then compulsorily retired by the
management, and Javate was terminated from employment.
7. Hence, a complaint for illegal dismissal was instituted against
private respondent NEECO. LA ordered the reinstatement and
awarded moral (30,000 each), exemplary (120,000 in total),
atorney’s fees and cost of litigation in favor of NEECO EA. The
damages and other costs awarded by LA were removed by the
NLRC on appeal.
8. Hence, this case.
ISSUE: WON there should be moral and exemplary damages
HELD:
1. To warrant an award of moral damages, it must be shown that the
dismissal of the employee was attended to by bad faith, or
constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
2. The SC recalled that LA found NEECO to have violated unfair
labor practice when petitioners were singled out in the list because
of their being union officers.
3. Unfair labor practices violate the constitutional rights of workers
and employees to self-organization, are inimical to the legitimate
interests of both labor and management, including their right to
bargain collectively and otherwise deal with each other in an
atmosphere of freedom and mutual respect; and disrupt industrial
peace and hinder the promotion of healthy and stable labor-
management relations. As the conscience of the government, it is
the Courts sworn duty to ensure that none trifles with labor rights.
4. For this reason, we find it proper in this case to impose moral and
exemplary damages on private respondent. However, the damages
awarded by the labor arbiter, to our mind, are excessive. In
determining the amount of damages recoverable, the business,
social and financial position of the offended parties and the
business and financial position of the offender are taken into
account. Under these circumstances, we deem it proper to reduce
moral damages to only P10,000.00 payable by private respondent
NEECO I to each individual petitioner. We also deem it
sufficient for private respondent NEECO I to pay each individual
petitioner P5,000.00 to answer for exemplary damages, based on
the provisions of Articles 2229 and 2232 of the Civil Code.
5. Having been illegally dismissed, individual petitioners are entitled
to reinstatement from the time they were illegally dismissed, until
they were reinstated on March 16, 1993. For that period they are
likewise entitled to backwages minus the amount petitioners were
forced to receive as "retirement" pay.
FEU-DR. NICANOR REYES MEDICAL FOUNDATION, 2. Since AFW complied with the requirements provided by law for
INC. v. HON. CRESENCIO TRAJANO and RICARDO calling a certification election, it was incumbent upon the director
CASTRO, FEU DR. NICANOR REYES MEDICAL to conduct such certification election to ascertain the bargaining
FOUNDATION, INC. ALLIANCE OF FILIPINO representative of petitioner’s employees.
3. Quimpo v. Dela Victoria: In order that pendency of action
WORKERS (AFW)
between the same parties for the same cause may be availed as ag
Right to Self-Organize | July 31, 1987| Paras, J.
round to dismiss a case, there must be, between the action under
consideration and the other action: (1) identity of parties; (2)
FACTS:
identity of right asserted and reliefs prayed for; (3) the identity on
1. Petitioner FEU-DNRMF has 350 employees, majority of whom
the two preceding particulars should amount to res judicata.
are members of private respondent Alliance of Filipino Workers
4. In the instant case, any judgment which may be rendered in the
2. Private respondent field a petition for Consent and/or Certification
petition for certiorari pending before the Supreme Court not
Election with the Ministry for Labor and Employment. The
constitute res judicata in the petition for certification election
petitioner opposed the petition on the ground that a similar petition
under consideration. While in the former, private respondent
involving the same issues/parties is already pending in the
questioned the constitutionality of Article 244 of the Labor Code
Supreme Court.
before its amendment, in the latter, private respondent invokes the
3. Private respondent, in its position paper, admitted having filed a
same article as already amended.
similar petition for certification election with the Ministry but the
5. Petitioner, however, has pointed out that respondent Director
petition was denied by the Arbiter and the Secretary of Labor on
should not have arrogated upon himself the power to declare the
appeal on the ground that petitioner was non-stock, non-profit
aforesaid petition for certiorari (G.R. No. L-49771) moot and
whose employees are not allowed to organize a union. That while
academic, as the same is sub-judice and only the Supreme Court
the case is pending in the SC, Article 244 was amended and now
can decide the matter.
allows employees of non-stock, non-profit institutions the right to
form, join and organize labor unionts.
4. Med Arbiter granted the petition and decalred that a certification
elected be conducted. Respondnet Director affirmed. Hence, the
present case.

ISSUE: WON the petition for certification election be granted despite

the pending case in the Supreme Court involving the same parties -
Yes

HELD:
1. At the time AFW filed its petition for certification election, the
Labor Code was already amended to allow employees of non-
stock and non-profit institutions to form, join and organize labor
unions for purposes of collective bargaining.
 HOLY CHILD CATHOLIC SCHOOL v. HON. STO.
TOMAS and HCC-TELU-PIGLAS
Covered Employees/Workers | July 23, 2013| Peralta, J.
FACTS:
1. A petition for certification election was filed by private respondent
Pinag-Isang Tinig at Lakas ng Anakpawis – Holy Child Catholic
School Teachers and Employees Labor Union (HCCS-
TELUPIGLAS), alleging that PIGLAS is a legitimate labor
organization registered with the DOLE representing HCCS-
TELU-PIGLAS, and that there are 120 teachers and employees
comprising the proposed appropriate baragaining unit.
2. Petitioner HCCS, in its comment and position paper, noted that it
is a parochial school with a total of 156 employees and argues that
members of private respondent do not belong to the same class as
it is a mixture of managerial, supervisory and rank-and-file
employees. Hence, it is not in accord with Article 245 of the Labor
Code being an illegitimate labor organization without the
personality to file a petition for certification election.
3. HCC-TELU-PIGLAS countered that petitioner failed to
substantiate its claim that some of the employees included in the
petition for certification holds managerial and supervisory
positions. However, even if its true, Section 11(II), Rule XI of DO
No. 9, Series 1997, provided for specific instances in which a
petition filed by a legitimate organization shall be dismissed by
the Med-Arbiter and that “mixture of employees” is not one those
enumerated.
4. Med-Arbiter denied the petition for certification elecotion on the
ground that the unit which private respondent sought to represent
is inappropriate. According to the Med-Arbiter, a certification
election directly involves 2 issues: (a) proper composition and
constituency of the bargaining unit; and (b) the validity of majority
representation claims. It is incumbent upon the Med-Arbiter to
rule on the appropriateness of the bargaining unit once its
composition and constituency is questioned. In the case at bar, the
employees of petitioner can be classified into 2 general classes:
(1) the teaching, and (2) the non-teaching staff. The community or
mutuality of interest is wanting between the teaching and the no-
teaching staff.
5. The SOLE agreed with the Med-Arbiter that there are differences
in the nature of work, hours and conditions of work and salary
determination between the teaching and non-teaching
6. However, the SOLE did not agree that these differences are
substantial enough to warrant the dismissal of the petition
a. Inappropriateness of the bargaining unit sought to be
represented is not a ground for the dismissal of the
petition. As cite din the case of University of the
Philippines v. Ferrer-Calleja, the SC did not order the
dismissal of the petition but ordered the conduct of a
certification election, limiting the same among the non-
academic personnel of the University of the Philippines.
7. Petitioner filed with CA a petition for Certiorari with prayer for
TRO and Preliminary injunction. CA dismissed the petition. MR
denied.
ISSUE: WON a petition for cerrtificaiton election is dismisslbe on the
ground that athe labor organization’s membership allegedly consists
of supervisory and rank-and-file employees.
HELD:
1. Toyota case: When the issue of the effect of mingling was brought
to the fore in the Court, citing Article 245 of the Labor Code, as
amended by R.A. No. 6715, a labor organization composed of
both rank-and-file and supervisory employees is no labor
organization at all. It cannot, for any guise or purpose, be a
legitimate labor organization. Not being one, an organization
which carries a mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory
employees cannot possess any of the rights of a legitimate labor
organization, including the right to file a petition for certification
election for the purpose of collective bargaining.
2. Dunlop case: Labor organization that filed a petition for
certification election was one for supervisory employees, but in
 which the membership included rank-and-file employees, the the Supreme Court in the U.P. case prohibits us from commingling
Court reiterated that such labor organization had no legal right to teaching and non-teaching personnel in one bargaining unit, they
file a certification election to represent a bargaining unit have to be separated into two separate bargaining units with two
composed of supervisors for as long as it counted rank-and-file separate certification elections to determine whether the
employees among its members. employees in the respective bargaining units desired to be
3. (The petitions for certification election involved in Toyota and represented by private respondent.
Dunlop were filed when the 1989 Rules applied.)
4. Tagaytay Highlands Int'l. Golf Club, Inc. v. Tagaytay Highlands
Employees Union-PTGWO: This time, given the altered legal
milieu (1997 Amended Omnibus Rules), the Court abandoned the
view in Toyota and Dunlop; the inclusion in a union of
disqualified employees is not among the grounds for cancellation,
unless such inclusion is due to misrepresentation, false statement
or fraud under the circumstances enumerated in Sections (a) and
(c) of Article 239 of the Labor Code.
5. Air Philippines Corporation v. Bureau of Labor: Reiterated its
ruling in Tagaytay Highlands.
6. In case of alleged inclusion of disqualified employees in a union,
the proper procedure for an employer like petitioner is to directly
file a petition for cancellation of the union’s certificate of
registration due to misrepresentation, false statement or fraud
under the circumstances enumerated in Article 239 of the Labor
Code, as amended.
7. Membership in bargaining unit vs. membership in a union: A
bargaining unit is a group of employees sought to be represented
by a petitioning union. Such employees need not be members of a
union seeking the conduct of a certification election. A union
certified as an exclusive bargaining agent represents not only its
members but also other employees who are not union members.
8. In the same manner, the teaching and non-teaching personnel must
form separate bargaining units. Thus, the order for the conduct of
two separate certification elections, one involving teaching
personnel and the other involving non-teaching personnel. It
should be stressed that in the subject petition, private respondent
union sought the conduct of a certification election among all the
rank-and-file personnel of petitioner school. Since the decision of
 PAPER INDUSTRIES CORPORATION OF THE 1. United Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Union v. Laguesma: Managerial
PHILIPPINES v. HON. LAGUESMA, HON. PABEL, PCOP- employees are ranked as Top Managers, Middle Managers and First line
BISLIG SUPERVISORY AND TECHNICAL STAFF UNION, Managers. Top and Middle managers have the authority to devise,
ASSOCIATED LABOR UNION and FEDERATION OF FREE implement and control strategic and operational policies while the task
of First-Line managers is simply to ensure that such policies are carried
WORKERS
out by the rank-and-file employees in the organization.
Excluded Employees/Workers – Managerial Employees | April 12, 2000 |
a. Under this distinction, “managerial employees” fall into two
De Leon, Jr., J.
categories: (1) “managers” per se composed of top, middle
managers, and (2) the “supervisors” composed of First-Line
FACTS:
Managers. The mere fact that an employee is designed
1. Petitioner Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines is engaged in
“manager” does not ipso facto make him one.
the manufacture of paper and timber products. It has over 9,000
2. In the instant petition, a thorough dissection of the job description of the
employees, 944 of whom are supervisory and technical staff employees.
concerned supervisory employees and section heads indisputably show
More or less 487 of these are signatory members of private respondent
that they are not actually managerial but only supervisory employees
PICOP-Bislig Supervisory and Technical Staff Employees Union
since they do not lay down company polices.
(PBSTSEU)
a. PICOP’s contention that the subject sections heads and unit
2. PBSTSEU instituted a Petition for Certification Election to determine the
managers sexercise the authority to hire and fire is ambiguous
sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the supervisory and technical staff
and quite misleading for the reason that nay authority they
employees of PICOP for CBA purposes.
exercise is not supreme but merely advisory in characters.
3. Med-Arbiter issued an order setting the holding of certification election
b. Theirs is not a final determination of the company policies
among PICOP’s supervisory and technical staff with 4 choices: (1)
inasmuch as any action taken by them on matters relative to
PBSTSEU, (2) FFW, (3) ALU, and (4) No union.
hiring, promotion, transfer, suspension and termination of
4. During the pre-election conference, PICOP questioned and objected to
employees is still subject to confirmation and approval by their
the inclusion of some section heads and supervisors in the list of voters
respective superior.
whose positions were reclassified as managerial employees. Considering
3. When such power, which is in effect recommendatory in character, is
the alleged present authority of these section managers and unit
subject to evaluation, review nad final action by the department heads
managers to hire and fire, they are classified as managerial employees,
and other higher executives of the company, the same, although present,
and hence, ineligible to form or join any labor organization.
is not effective and not an exercise of independent judgment as required
5. Med-Arbiter issued an order holding that supervisor and sections head of
by law.
the petitioner are managerial employees and exclude din the list of voters
for purposes of certification election. PBSTSEU appealed the order of
Med-Arbiter to the Office of the Secretary, DOLE.
a. Hon. Laguesma, then Usec. Of Labor, issued an order setting
the aside the order of the med-arbiter and holding that the
subject supervisors and section heads are supervisory
employees eligible to vote in the certification election.

ISSUE: WON the supervisors should be excluded - NO

HELD:
 TUNAY NA PAGKAKAISA NG MANGAGAWA SA ASIA
BREWERY v. ASIA BREWERY, INC.
Excluded Employees/Workers – Confidential Employees: Doctrine of
Necessary Implication | August 3, 2010| Villarama, Jr., J.
FACTS:
1. Respondent Asia Brewery, Inc. is engaged in the manufacture, sale and
distribution of beer, shandy, bottled water and glass products.
2. Respondent entered into a CBA effective for 5 years with Bisig at Lakas
ng mga Manggagawa sa Asia-Independent (BLMA-INDEPENDENT),
the exclusive baragaining representative of respondent’s rank-and-file
employees.
a. In the renegotiated CBA, it was stipulated that while the
company recognizes the union as the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative of all regular rank-and-file daily paid
employees, the UNION shall not represent or accept for
membership employees outside the scope of the bargaining
unit.
b. It also stipulated that Confidential and Executive Secretaries
as well as Purchasing and Quality Control staff are excluded
from the bargaining unit.
3. A dispute arose when ABI’s management stopped deduction union dues
from several employees because their membership violated the CBA
because they were Quality Control and Secretaries.
4. BLMA0INDEPENDENT claimed that ABIs actions constrained the
employees right to self-organization and brought the matters to the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board, after they failed to settle
amicably. They then both agreed to submit the case for arbitration.
5. The Arbitrator sustained the BLMA-INDEPDNENT after finding that
the records submitted by ABI showed that the positions of the subject
employees quality under the rank-and-file category because their
functions are merely routinary and clerical. Hence, they should be
included within the bargaining unit represented by BLMA-
INDEPENDENT.
6. CA reversed. BLMA-INDEPENDENT filed for MR. In the meantime, a
certification election was held wherein petitioner Tunay na Pagkakaisa
ng Mnagagawa sa Asia won. CA eventually denied MR.
ISSUE: WON a petition for certification election is dismissible on the ground
that the labor organization’s membership allegedly consists of supervisory
and rank-and-file employees.
HELD:
1. The Court held that although Article 245 of the Labor Code limits the
ineligibly to join, form and assist any labor organization to managerial
employees, jurisprudence has extended this prohibition to
confidential employees or those who by reason of their positions or
nature of work are required to assist or act in a fiduciary manner to
managerial employees and hence, are likewise privy to sensitive and
highly confidential records.
2. The rationale for their separate category and disqualification to join any
labor organization is similar to the inhibition for managerial employees
because if allowed to be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be
assured of their loyalty in view of evident conflict of interests and the
Union can also become company-denominated with the presence of
managerial employees in the Union membership.
a. Having access to confidential information, confidential
employees may also become the source of undue advantage.
Said employees may act as a spy or spies of either party to a
collective bargaining agreement.
3. Philips Industrial Development, inc. v. NLRC: Court held that
petitioners division secretaries are confidential employees not
included within the rank-and file bargaining unit.
4. Pier 8 Arrastre & Stevedoring Services, Inc. v. Roldan-
Confessor: Legal secretaries who are tasked with, among others,
the typing of legal documents, memoranda and correspondence,
the keeping of records and files, the giving of an receiving notices,
and such other duties as required by the legal personnel of the
corporation, fall under the category of confidential employees and
hence, excluded from the bargaining unit composed of rank-and-
file employees.
5. In the present case, the CBA expressly ecluded Confidential and
Executive Secretaries from the rank-and-file bargaining unit, for
which reason ABI seeks their disaffiliation from petitioner.
6. However, the Court looked into the job descriptions of affected
secretaries/clerks and found that their duties and responsibilities
 involved routine activities of recording and monitoring, and paper c. The exclusion from bargaining units of employees who,
works for their respective departments while secretarial tasks such in the normal course of their duties, become aware of
as receiving telephone calls, and filing of office correspondence management policies relating to labor relations is a
appear to have been commonly imposed as additional duties. principal objective sought to be accomplished by the
7. Respondent failed to indicate who among the numerous confidential employee rule.
secretaries/clerks have access to confidential data relating to 12. There is no showing that the secretaries/clerks and checkers
management policies. assisted or acted in a confidential capacity to managerial
8. Hence, the rational under the previous ruling for the exclusion of employees and obtained confidential information relating to labor
executive secretaries or division secretaries would have little or no relations policies.
significance considering the lack of or very limited access to 13. Not being confidential employees, the secretaries/clerks and
confidential information of these secretaries/clerks. Court held checkers are not disqualified from membership in the Union of
around 40 secretaries to be rank-and-file employees. respondent’s rank-and-file employees.
9. As for the Quality Control Staff, though the CBA expressly
excludes them from the bargaining unit, the Court disagreed that NOTE:
the 20 checks are confidential employees being quality control Not unfair labor practice because ULP must be motivated by ill will,
staff entrusted with the handling and custody of company bad faith, or fraud, or was oppressive to labor, or done in a manner
properties and sensitive information contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. In this case, ABIs
10. The Court also looked into the job description which showed that act in discontinuing the union dues deduction were due to their
they perform routine and mechanical tasks preparatory of the interpretation of the CBA agreement and cannot be said to have
delivery of the finished products. No evidence was presented by committed unfair labor practice.
the respondent to prove that the daily-paid checks actually form
part of company’s Quality Control Staff exposed to sensitive, vital
and confidential information about the company products. Court
held that 20 checkers may not be considered as confidential
employees.
11. The Court then defined Confidential Employees.
a. Confidential employees are those who (1) assist or act in
a confidential capacity, (2) to persons who formulate,
determine and effectuate management policies in the field
of labor relations.
b. The 2 criteria are cumulative, and both must be met if an
employee is to be considered a confidential employee that
is, the confidential relationship must exist between the
employees and his supervisor, and the supervisor must
handle the prescribed responsibilities relation to labor
relations.
 INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC IMMIGRATION
COMMISION v. CALLEJA and TUPAS
FACTS:
1. ICMC was one of those accredited by the PH Government to
operate the Vietnamese refugee processing center in Morong,
Bataan. It was incorporated in NY, USA, at the request of the Holy
See, as a non-profit agency involved in international humanitarian
and voluntary work. It is duly registered with the UN Economic
and Social Council and enjoys Consultative Status, Category II.
As an international organization rendering voluntary and
humanitarian services in the country, its activities are parallel to
those of the International Committee for Migration and the
International Committee of the Red Cross
2. On July 14, 1986, Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied
Services (TUPAS) filed with the then Ministry of Labor and
Employment a Petition for Certification Election among the rank
and file members employed by ICMC. ICMC opposed the petition
on the ground that it is an international organization and, hence,
enjoys diplomatic immunity.
3. On Feb. 5, 1987, Med-Arbiter Anastacio L. Bactin sustained
ICMC and dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. On
appeal by TUPAS, Director Pura Calleja of the BLR reversed the
Med-Arbiter's Decision and ordered the immediate conduct of a
certification election. At that time, ICMC’s request for recognition
as a specialized agency was still pending with the DFA
4. On July 15, 1988, the Government, through the DFA, granted
ICMC the status of a specialized agency with corresponding
diplomatic privileges and immunities, as evidenced by a MOA
between the parties.
5. ICMC then sought the immediate dismissal of the TUPAS Petition
for Certification Election invoking the immunity expressly
granted. This was, however, denied by Calleja, who again ordered
the immediate conduct of a pre-election conference.
6. ICMC’s two Motions for Reconsideration were denied despite an
opinion rendered by the DFA on Oct. 17 that said BLR Order
violated ICMC's diplomatic immunity. Thus, on Nov. 24, ICMC
filed the present Petition for Certiorari with Preliminary
Injunction assailing the BLR Order.
7. On Nov. 28, the SC issued a TRO enjoining the holding of the
certification election.
8. On Jan. 10, 1989, the DFA, through its Legal Adviser, filed a
Motion for Intervention alleging that, as the highest executive
department with the competence and authority to act on matters
involving diplomatic immunity and privileges, and tasked with the
conduct of PH diplomatic and consular relations with foreign
governments and UN organizations, it has a legal interest in the
outcome of this case.
IRRI case
9. On Dec. 9, 1959, the PH Government and the Ford and
Rockefeller Foundations signed a Memorandum of Understanding
establishing the IRRI at Los Baños, Laguna. It was intended to be
an autonomous, philanthropic, tax-free, non-profit, non-stock
organization designed to carry out the principal objective of
conducting basic research on the rice plant, on all phases of rice
production, management, distribution and utilization with a view
to attaining nutritive and economic advantage or benefit for the
people of Asia and other major rice-growing areas through
improvement in quality and quantity of rice.
10. Initially, IRRI was organized and registered with the SEC as a
private corporation subject to all laws and regulations. However,
by virtue of PD 1620, IRRI was granted the status,
prerogatives, privileges and immunities of an international
organization.
11. Organized Labor Association in Line Industries and Agriculture
(OLALIA) is a legitimate labor organization with an existing local
union, the Kapisanan ng Manggagawa at TAC sa IRRI
(Kapisanan) in IRRI
12. On April 20, 1987, the Kapisanan filed a Petition for Direct
Certification Election with the DOLE
13. IRRI opposed the petition invoking PD 1620 conferring upon it
the status of an international organization and granting it
immunity from all civil, criminal and administrative proceedings
under PH laws.
14. On July 7, Med-Arbiter Leonardo M. Garcia, upheld the
opposition and dismissed the Petition for Direct Certification. On
appeal, the BLR Director set aside the Med-Arbiter's Order and
authorized the calling of a certification election among the rank-
and-file employees of IRRI. He relied on the then Art. 243, LC,
and Article XIII, Section 3 of Constitution, and held that the
immunities and privileges granted to IRRI do not include
exemption from coverage of the PH Labor Laws. Reconsideration
sought by IRRI was denied.
15. On appeal, the SOLE set aside the BLR Director's Order,
dismissed the Petition for Certification Election, and held that the
grant of specialized agency status by the PH Government to the
IRRI bars DOLE from assuming and exercising jurisdiction over
IRRI. Hence, the present Petition for Certiorari filed by Kapisanan
16. The SC Third Division, to which the case was originally assigned,
required the respondents to comment on the petition. In a
Manifestation filed on Aug. 4 1990, the SOLE declared that it was
not adopting as his own the decision of the BLR Director in the
ICMC Case as well as the Comment of the SolGen sustaining said
Director. The last pleading was filed by IRRI on Aug. 14. Instead
of a Comment, the SolGen filed a Manifestation and Motion
praying that he be excused from filing a comment, it appearing
that in the earlier case of ICMC v Calleja, the Office of the SolGen
had sustained the stand of Calleja on the very same issue. The
Court acceded to the SolGen’s prayer.
ISSUE: WoN the grant of diplomatic privileges and immunities
extends to immunity from the application of PH labor laws – YES
HELD:
1. Article II of the Memorandum of Agreement between the
Philippine Government and ICMC provides that ICMC shall have
a status "similar to that of a specialized agency." Article III,
Sections 4 and 5 of the Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of Specialized Agencies, adopted by the UN General
Assembly on 21 November 1947 and concurred in by the
Philippine Senate through Resolution No. 19 on 17 May 1949,
explicitly provides:
2. Art. III, Section 4. The specialized agencies, their property and
assets, wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy
immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as in
any particular case they have expressly waived their immunity. It
is, however, understood that no waiver of immunity shall extend
to any measure of execution.
3. Sec. 5. — The premises of the specialized agencies shall be
inviolable. The property and assets of the specialized agencies,
wherever located and by whomsoever held shall be immune from
search, requisition, confiscation, expropriation and any other form
of interference, whether by executive, administrative, judicial or
legislative action. (Emphasis supplied).
4. IRRI is similarly situated, Pres. Decree No. 1620, Article 3, is
explicit in its grant of immunity, thus:
5. Art. 3. Immunity from Legal Process. — The Institute shall enjoy
immunity from any penal, civil and administrative proceedings,
except insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived by the
Director-General of the Institute or his authorized representatives.
6. It is a recognized principle of international law and under our
system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is
essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look
beyond a determination by the executive branch of the
government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is
recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the
government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to
accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the
principal law officer of the government . . . or other officer acting
under his direction. Hence, in adherence to the settled principle
 that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction . . . as to
embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting
foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that in such cases the
judicial department of (this) government follows the action of the
political branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an
antagonistic jurisdiction.
7. The term "international organization" is generally used to
describe an organization set up by agreement between two or
more states. Under contemporary international law, such
organizations are endowed with some degree of international
legal personality such that they are capable of exercising
specific rights, duties and powers. They are organized mainly
as a means for conducting general international business in
which the member states have an interest.
8. The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to ICMC and IRRI
is clearly necessitated by their international character and
respective purposes. The objective is to avoid the danger of
partiality and interference by the host country in their
internal workings. The exercise of jurisdiction by the
Department of Labor in these instances would defeat the very
purpose of immunity, which is to shield the affairs of
international organizations, in accordance with international
practice, from political pressure or control by the host country
to the prejudice of member States of the organization, and to
ensure the unhampered performance of their functions.
9. ICMC's and IRRI's immunity from local jurisdiction by no means
deprives labor of its basic rights, which are guaranteed by the
Labor Cod eand the Constitution.
a. For, ICMC employees are not without recourse whenever
there are disputes to be settled. Section 31 of the
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
Specialized Agencies of the United Nations 17 provides
that "each specialized agency shall make provision for
appropriate modes of settlement of: (a) disputes arising
out of contracts or other disputes of private character to
which the specialized agency is a party." Moreover,
pursuant to Article IV of the Memorandum of Agreement
between ICMC the the Philippine Government, whenever
there is any abuse of privilege by ICMC, the Government
is free to withdraw the privileges and immunities
accorded.
b. Neither are the employees of IRRI without remedy in case
of dispute with management as, in fact, there had been
organized a forum for better management-employee
relationship as evidenced by the formation of the Council
of IRRI Employees and Management (CIEM) wherein
"both management and employees were and still are
represented for purposes of maintaining mutual and
beneficial cooperation between IRRI and its employees."
The existence of this Union factually and tellingly belies
the argument that Pres. Decree No. 1620, which grants to
IRRI the status, privileges and immunities of an
international organization, deprives its employees of the
right to self-organization.
10. The immunity granted being "from every form of legal process
except in so far as in any particular case they have expressly
waived their immunity," it is inaccurate to state that a certification
election is beyond the scope of that immunity for the reason that
it is not a suit against ICMC. A certification election cannot be
viewed as an independent or isolated process. It could tugger off
a series of events in the collective bargaining process together with
related incidents and/or concerted activities, which could
inevitably involve ICMC in the "legal process," which includes
"any penal, civil and administrative proceedings." The eventuality
of Court litigation is neither remote and from which international
organizations are precisely shielded to safeguard them from the
disruption of their functions. Clauses on jurisdictional immunity
are said to be standard provisions in the constitutions of
international Organizations. "The immunity covers the
organization concerned, its property and its assets. It is equally
applicable to proceedings in personam and proceedings in rem.

CENECO v. DOLE SECRETARY, and CENECO UNION OF
RATOINAL EMPLOYEES (CURE)
Excluded Employees/Workers – Workers-Members of a Cooperative |
September 13, 1991 | Regalado, J.
FACTS:
1. CENECO entered into a collective bargaining agreement with CURE, a
labor union representing its rank-and-file employees, providing for a
term of three years. CURE wrote CENECO proposing that negotiations
be conducted for a new collective bargaining agreement.
2. CENECO denied CURE’s request on the ground that, under applicable
decisions of the Supreme Court, employees who at the same time are
members of an electric cooperative are not entitled to form or join a
union.
3. Prior to the submission of the proposal for CBA renegotiation, CURE
members, in a general assembly approved Resolution No. 35 where it
was agreed that all union members shall withdraw or recall the union
members’ membership from the Central Negros Electric Cooperative,
Inc. in order to avail of the full benefits und r the existing CBA entered
into by and between the CENECO and CURE.
a. Ratified by most of the members of the union.
4. The withdrawal form membership was denied by CENECO through a
resolution “for the reason that the basis of withdrawal is not among the
grounds set in a previous board resolution, and violates another.
5. Since CENECO refuses to renegotiate a new CBA, CURE filed a petition
for direct recognition or for certification election. CENECO filed a MTD
on the ground that there are legal constraints to the filing of the
certification election, citing Batangas I Electric Cooperative Labor
Union v. Young to the effect that “employees who at the same time are
members of an electric cooperative are not entitled to form or join unions
for purposes of collective bargaining agreement, for certainly an owner
cannot bargain with himself or his co-owners.”
6. Med-Arbiter issued an order granting the petition for certification of
election. CENECO appealed to the DOLE who declared the projected
certification election unnecessary and directing petitioner CENECO to
continue recognizing private respondent CURE as the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative of all the rank-and-file employees of
petitioner’s electric cooperative for purposes of collective bargaining.
7. CENECO: respondent Secretary committed a grave abuse of discretion
in not applying to the present case the doctrine in Batangas that
employees of an electric cooperative who at the same time are members
of the electric cooperative are prohibited from forming or joining labor
unions for purposes of a collective bargaining agreement. While
CENECO recognizes the employees’ right to self-organizaiton, it avers
that it is not absolute. Thus, it opines that employees of an electric
cooperative who at the same time are members thereof are not allowed
to form or join labor unions for purposes of collective bargaining.
ISSUE: WON the employees of CENECO who withdrew from their
membership from the cooperative are entitled to form or join CURE for
purposes of the negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement proposed
by the latter.
HELD:
1. CENECO: the withdrawal form membership in the cooperative cannot
be allowed for the following: (1) it was made as a subterfuge or to subvert
the ruling in the Batangas case, (2) to allow the withdrawal of the
members of CENECO from the cooperative w/o justifiable reason would
greatly affect the objectives and goals of petitioner as an electric
cooperative, (3) the Labor Secretary has no jurisdiction over the issue of
the withdrawal form membership which is vested in the NEA which has
direct control and supervision over the operations of electric
cooperatives, (4) CURE failed to exhaust administrative remedies by not
referring the matter of membership withdrawal to the NEA.
2. The Batangas case merely declared the employees who are at the
same time members of the cooperative cannot join labor unions
for purposes of collective bargaining. However, nowhere in said
case is it stated that member-employees are prohibited form
withdrawing their membership in the cooperative in order to join
a labor union.
3. Article I, Section 9 of the AOI and by-laws of CENECO provides
that “any member may withdraw from membership upon
compliance with such uniform terms and conditions as the Board
may prescribe” The same section provides that upon withdrawal,
the member is merely required to surrender his membership
 certificate and he is to be refunded his membership fee less any members could diversely affect the business so concerns and
obligation that he has with the cooperative. operations of CENECO.
a. No condition or requirement was imposed upon a 8. The Director certification ordered by respondent Secretray is not
withdrawing member. Hence, no just cause for proper. By virtue of EO 111, the direct certification originally
petitioner’s denial of the withdrawal from membership of allowed Art. 257 has been discontinued as a method of selecting
its employees who are also members of the union. the exclusive bargaining agnet of the workers. It is not sufficient
4. The alleged board resolutions relied upon by petitioner in denying that a union has the support of the majority. What is equally
the withdrawal of the members concerned were never presented important is that everyone be given a democratic spcace in the
nor their contents disclosed either before the med-arbiter or the bargaining unit concerned. The most effective way of determining
Secretary of Labor if only to prove the ratiocination for said which labor organizaotin can truly represent the working force is
denial. by certification election.
5. CENECO never averred non-compliance with the terms and
conditions for withdrawal. The AOI does not provide for any
ground for withdrawal form membership which accordingly gives
rise to the presumption that the same may be done at any time and
for whatever reason. Furthermore, membership in the cooperative
is on a voluntary basis. Hence, withdrawal cannot be restricted
unnecessarily. The right to join an organization necessarily
includes the equivalent right not to join the same.
6. Right to self-organization is a compelling reason why their
withdrawal from the cooperative must be allowed. The resignation
of the member-employees of CURE is an expression of their
preference for union membership over that of membership in the
cooperative. The avowed policy of the State to afford full
protection to labor and to promote the primacy of free collective
bargaining mandates that the employees’ right to form and join
unions for purposes collective bargaining be accorded the highest
consideration
7. Membership in an electric cooperative which merely vests in the
member a right ot vote during the annual meeting becomes too
trivial and insubstantial vis-à-vis the primordial and more
important constitutional right of an employee to join a union of his
choice. The 390 employees of CENECO, some of how have never
been members of the cooperative, represent a very small
percentage of the cooperative’s total membership of 44,000. It is
inconceivable how the withdrawal of a negligible number of
 SINGER SEWING MACHINE COMPANY v. DRILON,
CHAGUILE, and SINGER MACHINE COLLECTORS
UNION-BAGUIO (SIMACUB)
Excluded Employees/Workers – Managerial Employees | January 24, 1991 |
Guttierez, J.
FACTS:
1. Respondent Singer Machine Collectors Union-Baguio filed a petition for
direct certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all
collectors of the Singer Sewing Machine Company. Petitioner opposed
the petition on ground that union members are actually not employees
but. Are indepdnet contractors as evidenced y the collection agency
agreement they signed.
2. Respondent Med-Arbiter Chaguile found that there exists an EE-ER
relationship so he granted the petition for certification of election.
Affirmed by Sec DOLE Sec. DdDrilon. MR denied.
3. Respondents insist that the provisions of the Collection Agency
Agreement belie the company’s positions that the union members are
independent contractors. To prove that union members are employees, it
is asserted that they “perform the most desirable and necessary activities
for the ocntinuos and effective operation os th business fo the petitioner
Company.”
4. The present case mainly calls for the application of the control test which
would determine WON the union members are not employees with no
right to organize for purpose of bargaining.
5.
6. Defendant Cebu Shipyard and Associated Labor Union entered into a
CBA with a stipulation on profit-sharing bonus to its employees to bake
taken from 10% of its net profits or net income derived from the direct
operation of its shipyard and shop (after deduction of income tax and
bonus) – payable in 2 installments. The CBA also contained the terms as
to how the profit sharing incentive is delivered to the workers.
7. In compliance with the said collective bargaining agreement, defendant
Cebu Shipyard & Engineering Works, Inc. delivered to the ALU for
distribution to the laborers or employees working with the defendant
corporation the profit-sharing bonus corresponding to the first
installment for the year 1965. Then on another date, Defendant
corporation delivered to the Associated Labor Union the profit-sharing
bonus corresponding to the second installment for 1965.
8. The members of the Mactan Workers Union failed to receive their
shares in the second installment of bonus because they did not like
to go to the office of the ALU to collect their shares. In accordance
with the terms of the collective bargaining after 60 days, the
uncollected shares of the plaintiff union members was returned by
the ALU to the defendant corporation.
a. At the same time the defendant corporation was advised by the
ALU not to deliver the said amount to the members of the
Mactan Workers Union unless ordered by the Court, otherwise
the ALU will take such step to protect the interest of its
members.
b. Because of this warning given by the intervenor union the
defendant corporation did not pay to the plaintiffs the sum of
P4,035.82 which was returned by the Associated Labor Union,
but instead, deposited the said amount with the Labor
Administrator. For the recovery of this amount this case was
filed with the lower court.
9. CFI ordered the defendants to deliver to the ALU the sum of P4,035 for
distribution to the employees of the defendant corporation who are
members of the Mactan Workers Union and ordered ALU to pay the
members of the Mactan Workers Union their corresponding shares in the
profit-sharing bonus for the second installments.
ISSUE: WON the CFI erred in ordering the defendant corporation to deliver
to ALU the corresponding shares of the Mactan Workers Union members.
HELD:
1. A thorough examination of the facts of the case leads us to the
conclusion that the existence of an employer-employee
relationship between the Company and the collection agents
cannot be sustained. The plain language of the agreement reveals
that the designation as collection agent does not create an
employment relationship and that the applicant is to be considered
at all times as an independent contractor. This is consistent with
the first rule of interpretation that the literal meaning of the
stipulations in the contract controls (Article 1370, Civil Code; La
Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory v. Director of Bureau of Labor,
Relations, 123 SCRA 679 [1983]). No such words as "to hire and
employ" are present. Moreover, the agreement did not fix an
 amount for wages nor the required working hours. Compensation
is earned only on the basis of the tangible results produced, i.e.,
total collections made
2. The Court finds the contention of the respondents that the union
members are employees under Article 280 of the Labor Code to
have no basis. The definition that regular employees are those who
perform activities which are desirable and necessary for the
business of the employer is not determinative in this case. Any
agreement may provide that one party shall render services for and
in behalf of another for a consideration (no matter how necessary
for the latter's business) even without being hired as an employee.
This is precisely true in the case of an independent contractorship
as well as in an agency agreement. The Court agrees with the
petitioner's argument that Article 280 is not the yardstick for
determining the existence of an employment relationship because
it merely distinguishes between two kinds of employees, i.e.,
regular employees and casual employees, for purposes of
determining the right of an employee to certain benefits, to join or
form a union, or to security of tenure. Article 280 does not apply
where the existence of an employment relationship is in dispute.
3. The last and most important element of the control test is not
satisfied by the terms and conditions of the contracts. There is
nothing in the agreement which implies control by the Company
not only over the end to be achieved but also over the means and
methods in achieving the end
4. The Court finds that since private respondents are not employees
of the Company, they are not entitled to the constitutional right to
join or form a labor organization for purposes of collective
bargaining. Accordingly, there is no constitutional and legal basis
for their "union" to be granted their petition for direct certification.
MACTAN WORKERS UNION and FERRER v. DON RAMON
ABOITIZ, EDDIE LIM, JESUS DIAGO, WILFREDO VIRAY,
and CEBU SHIPYARD ENGINEERING WORKS INC.
Excluded Employees/Workers – Managerial Employees | June 30, 1972 |
Fernando, J.
FACTS:
1. Defendant Cebu Shipyard & Engineering Works is employing laborers
and employees belonging to two rival labor unions. 72 of these
employees whose name appear in the complaint are affiliated with the
Mactan Workers Union, while the rest are members of the Associated
Labor Union.
2. Defendant Cebu Shipyard and Associated Labor Union entered into a
CBA with a stipulation on profit-sharing bonus to its employees to bake
taken from 10% of its net profits or net income derived from the direct
operation of its shipyard and shop (after deduction of income tax and
bonus) – payable in 2 installments. The CBA also contained the terms as
to how the profit sharing incentive is delivered to the workers.
3. In compliance with the said collective bargaining agreement, defendant
Cebu Shipyard & Engineering Works, Inc. delivered to the ALU for
distribution to the laborers or employees working with the defendant
corporation the profit-sharing bonus corresponding to the first
installment for the year 1965. Then on another date, Defendant
corporation delivered to the Associated Labor Union the profit-sharing
bonus corresponding to the second installment for 1965.
4. The members of the Mactan Workers Union failed to receive their
shares in the second installment of bonus because they did not like
to go to the office of the ALU to collect their shares. In accordance
with the terms of the collective bargaining after 60 days, the
uncollected shares of the plaintiff union members was returned by
the ALU to the defendant corporation.
a. At the same time the defendant corporation was advised by the
ALU not to deliver the said amount to the members of the
Mactan Workers Union unless ordered by the Court, otherwise
the ALU will take such step to protect the interest of its
members.
b. Because of this warning given by the intervenor union the
defendant corporation did not pay to the plaintiffs the sum of
P4,035.82 which was returned by the Associated Labor Union,
but instead, deposited the said amount with the Labor
Administrator. For the recovery of this amount this case was
filed with the lower court.
5. CFI ordered the defendants to deliver to the ALU the sum of P4,035 for
distribution to the employees of the defendant corporation who are
members of the Mactan Workers Union and ordered ALU to pay the
members of the Mactan Workers Union their corresponding shares in the
profit-sharing bonus for the second installments.
ISSUE: WON the CFI erred in ordering the defendant corporation to deliver
to ALU the corresponding shares of the Mactan Workers Union members.
HELD:
1. The terms and conditions of a collective bargaining contract
constitute the law between the parties. Those who are entitled to
its benefits can invoke its provisions. In the event that an
obligation therein imposed is not fulfilled, the aggrieved party has
the right to go to court for redress.
2. Nor does it suffice as a defense that the claim is made on behalf
of non-members of intervenor Associated Labor Union, for it is
well-settled doctrine that the benefits of a CBA extend to the
laborers and employees in the collective bargaining unit, including
those who do not belong to the chosen bargaining labor
organization. Any other view would be a discrimination on which
the law frowns.
3. It is quite understandable that labor unions in their campaign for
membership, for acquiring ascendancy in any shop, plant, or
industry would do what lies in their power to put down competing
groups. Nevertheless, it is not to be forgetting that what is entitled
to constitutional protection is labor, or more specifically, the
working men and women, not labor organizations. The latter are
merely the instrumentalities through which their welfare may be
promoted or fostered. That is the raison d’etre of labor unions.
4. Utmost care should be taken then, lest in displaying an unyielding,
intransigent attitude on behalf of their members, injustice be
committed against opposing labor organization.
5. In the final analysis, they lone are not the sole victims, but the
labor movement itself, which may well be the recipient of a
crippling blow.
 VALENTIN GUIJARNO v. CIR & CENTRAL SANTOS
LOPEZ CO., INC. and USW UNION
Labor Organization – Union Rationale | August 27, 1973 | Fernando, J.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners are employees of respondent Company before a CBA with a
closed-door provision was ever entered into by the company and the
union. Said petitioners were subsequently expelled from the union.
Hence, respondent Central Santos Lopez assumed that it had to dismiss
them.
2. Cases for unfair labor practice for unlawful dismissal were filed against
respondent Central Santos Lopez Co., Inc and respondent United Sugar
Workers Union.
3. CIR held that the dismissal was justifiable under the closed-shop
provision of the CBA. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON CA erred – YES
HELD:
1. The authoritative doctrine that a closed-shop provision in a CBA is not
to be given a retroactive effect so as to preclude its being applied to
employees already in the service is traceable to the case of Confderated
Sons of Labor v. Anakan Lumber Co.
a. Justice Concepcion said that “in order that an employer may be
deemd bound, under a CBA, to dsmiss employees for non-union
membership, the stipulation to this effect must be so clear and
unequivocal as to leave no room for dobut thereon.
b. An undertaking of this nature is so harsh that it must be strictly
construed, and doubts must be resolved against the existence of
“closed shop.”
2. Freeman Shirt Manfacturing Co. v. CIR: the closed-shop agreement
apply to persons to be hired or to employees who are not yet members of
any union. It is inapplicable to those already in the service who are
members. To hold otherwise would render neugatory the right of all
employees to self-organization and to form, join or assist labor
organizations of their own choosing.
3. Salunga v. CIR: generally, a state may not compel ordinary voluntary
associations to admit thereto any given individual, because membership
therein may be accorded or withheld as a matter of privilege.
Consequently, it is well settled that such unions are not entitled . If said
unions may be compelled to admit new members, who have the requisite
qualifications, with more reason may the law and the courts exercise the
coervice power when the employee involved is a long standing union
members, who, owing to provocations of union officers, was impelled to
tender his resignation, which he fortwith withdrew or rovked.
4. The Court looks with disfavor a closed-door provisions being
utilized as an excuse for the termination of employment.
5. The obligation of the state under the 1935 Constitution to “afford
protection to labor, especially to working women and minors”
6. It is then the individual employee, as a separate, finite human being, with
his problems and his needs, who must be attended to. He is the
beneficiary o fthe concern made manifest by the fundamental law.
7. The principle of the State, in the current Constitution, shall be to promote
social justice based on the concept of insuring “the dignity, welfare and
security of all the people.” In the same constitution, it is said that the state
must “promote full employment and equality in employment, ensure
equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate
the collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and huane working
conditions.
8. The labor union is nothing but the means of assuring that such
fundamental objectives would be achieved. It is the instrumentality
though which an individual laborer who is helpless as against a powerful
employer may, through concerted effort and activity, achieve the goal of
economic well-being.
9. Workers unorganized are weak; workers organized are strong. It is
necessarily then that they join labor unions.
10. To further increase the effectiveness of such organizations, a closed-shop
has been allowed. It could happen though that such a stipulation which
assures further weigh tt o a labor union at the bargaining table could be
utilized against minority groups or individual members thereof.
11. Respondent Court was not sufficiently alert to such danger. It paid no
heed to the controlling doctrine which is merely a recognition of a basic
fact in life, namely that power in a collectivity could be the means of
crushing opposition and stifling the voices of those who are in dissent.
The right to join others of like persuasion is indeed valuable. An i
12. In the labor field, the union under such circumstances may no longer be
a haven of regue, but indeed as much of a potential foe as management
itself.
Under this distinction, “managerial employees” fall into two
 UST FACULTY UNION (USTFU) v. DIRECTOR BITONIO
Union – Member Relations | November 16, 1999 | Panganiban, J.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners are duly elected officers of the UST Faculty Union that has a
subsisting five-year CBA with its employer, UST. The CBA was duly
registered and was set to expire on May 31, 1998.
2. Collantes, in her capacity as Secretary General, posted a notice addressed
to all USTFU members announcing a general assembly for the election
of the next officers. A Committee on Elections was formed to oversee
the elections
3. Some appellants filed a case with the Med-Arbiter against the appellees
and the COMELEC members alleging that the COMELEC was not
constituted in accordance with the constitution and bylaws of USTFU
and that no rules had been issued to govern the conduct of the election.
a. Med-Arbiter issued a temporary restratining order against
officer and COMELEC
4. The Secretary General, upon the request of various UST faculty club
presidents, issued notices allowing all faculty members to hold a
convocation denominated as a “general factuly assembly” to discuss the
state of the unratified UST-USTFU CBA and status and election of the
USTFU officers.
a. The assembly was attended by members of the USTFU and
non-USTFU members, and an election of the “new officers”
came about upon a motion of Atty. Lopez, not a member of
USTFU, that the USTFU CBL and the rules of the election be
suspended and that the election be held on that day.
b. Hence, petitioners were elected as USTFU’s new set of officers
5. The new officers entered into a CBA with UST and was ratified by
majority of UST’s academic community
6. Private respondents filed the instant petition seeking injunctive reliefs
and the nullification of the results of the election alleging that it is
spurious for violating the USTFU’s CBL.
a. Med-Arbiter declared the election null and avoid. Affirmed by
BLR.
ISSUE: WON the USTFU Officers election held during the assembly was
valid – NO. Done in violation of the CBL, and hence, void.
HELD:
Constitution and By-Laws:
1. On joining a labor union, the constitution and by-laws become a
part of the members contract of membership under which he
agrees to become bound by the constitution and governing rules
of the union so far as it is not inconsistent with controlling
principles of law.
2. The unions CBL is the fundamental law that governs the
relationship between and among the members of the union. It is
where the rights, duties and obligations, powers, functions and
authority of the officers as well as the members are defined. It is
the organic law that determines the validity of acts done by any
officer or member of the union.
3. Without respect for the CBL, a union as a democratic institution
degenerates into nothing more than a group of individuals
governed by mob rule.
Union Election vs. Certification Election:
4. A union election is held pursuant to the unions constitution and
bylaws, and the right to vote in it is enjoyed only by union
members. In a certification election, all employees belonging to
the appropriate bargaining unit can vote. Therefore, a union
member who likewise belongs to the appropriate bargaining unit
is entitled to vote in said election.
5. However, the reverse is not always true; an employee belonging
to the appropriate bargaining unit but who is not a member of the
union cannot vote in the union election, unless otherwise
authorized by the constitution and bylaws of the union. Verily,
union affairs and elections cannot be decided in a non-union
activity.
ISSUE: WON the USTFU’s Constitution and Bylaws were violated -
YES
6. The SC looked into the CBL particularly Article VII and IX and
found that these were violated
7. The assembly was not called by the USTFU. It was merely a
convocation of faculty clubs which memo was sent to all faculty
members.
8. There was no commission on elections to oversee the election as members first. Then follow procedures for amendment of
mandated by the CBL. provision of by-laws.
9. The election was not done by secret balloting in violation of the
CBL.
10. The foregoing infirmities considered, we cannot attribute grave
abuse of discretion to Director Bitonios finding and conclusion.

ISSUE: WON the suspension of the CBL was proper – NO

11. Petitioners: The suspension and the election were in accordance
with their constituent and residual powers as members of the
collective bargaining unit to choose their representative
12. The Union’s CBL could not have been suspended to validate an
otherwise void election. A union CBL is a covenant between the
union and its members and among members.
13. Where ILO Convention No. 87 speaks of a union’s full freedom
to draw up its constitution and rules, it includes freedom from
interference by persons who are not members of the union. The
democratic principle that governance is a matter for the governed
to decide upon applies to the labor movement which, by law and
constitutional mandate, must be assiduously insulated against
intrusions coming from both the employer and complete strangers
if the 'protection to labor clause' of the constitution is to be
guaranteed.
14. By petitioner’s own evidence, the general faculty assembly of 04
October 1996 was not a meeting of USTFU. It was attended by
members and non-members alike, and therefore was not a forum
appropriate for transacting union matters.
15. The person who moved for the suspension of USTFUs CBL was
not a member of USTFU. Allowing a non-union member to
initiate the suspension of a unions CBL, and non-union members
to participate in a union election on the premise that the unions
CBL had been suspended in the meantime, is incompatible with
the freedom of association and protection of the right to organize.
16. If there are members of the academic community who are not
members of the USTFU and who would want a have a handin
USTFU’s affairs, the approrpaite procedure would be to become
 UNIVERSITY OF STO. TOMAS v. SAMAHANG
MANGGAGAWA NG UST (SM-UST)
Union-Member Relations | September 14, 2009 | Ynares-Santiago, J.
FACTS:
1. Respondent Samahang Manggawa ng UST was the authorized
bargaining agent of the non-academic/non-teaching rank-and-file
daily and monthly-paid employees of petitioner UST
2. During formal negotiations for a new CBA, petitioner offered per
moth salary increase and a signing bonus of P10,000. However,
respondent insisted on its reduced demand of a P7,000 monthly
salary. Increase and a P60,000 signing bonus for the same period.
As a result, respondent declared a deadlock.
3. DOLE Secretary issued an order which provided, among others:
(a) P1,000 monthly increase, (b) P10,000 signing bonus
4. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which
affirmed the order and modified it, increasing the signing bonus
from P10,000 to P18,000, as well as including several fringe
benefits.
a. Petitioner alleges that 526/619 members of respondent
had decided to accept the award provided by the DOLE
Secretary
1. In the first place, it is unnecessary to decide on whether the
sourcing of the award of fringe benefits from petitioner’s non-
tuition income was unlawful. The said benefits are included in the
DOLE Secretary’s award, which petitioner seeks to affirm.
2. It is only because petitioner seeks to affirm the award that the
Court allows the signing bonus, which is otherwise unwarranted.
Since no CBA was successfully negotiated, petitioner is
considered to have agreed to grant the original bonus of P10, 000.
DOCTRINE:
1. A labor union exists in whole or in part for the purpose of collective
bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning terms and
conditions of employment. What the individual employee may not do
alone, as for example obtain more favorable terms and conditions of
work, the labor organization, through persuasive and coercive power
gained as a group, can accomplish better. Since the will of the
members of the union is personified by the union’s board of directors
or trustees, the decisions it makes should accordingly bind them.
2. Definition of signing bonus: A grant motivated by the goodwill
generated when a CBA is successfully negotiated and signed between
the employer and the union.

ISSUE: WON respondent members’ individual acceptance of the

award and the payments made by petitioner University of Sto. Tomas
operate as a ratification of the DOLE Secretary’s award - NO
HELD:
1. The 526 members who accepted the award were merely
constrained to accept payment as they needed funds for the
Christmas Season.
2. As individual components of a union possessed of a distinct and
separate personality, the decisions of the union’s board of
directors or trustees necessarily binds them.

ISSUE: WON the signing bonus should be increased to P18, 000 -

NO
 DOLORES VILLAR, ET. AL v. HON INCIONG, AMIGO
MANUFACTURING INCORPORATED and PHILIPPINE
ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PALFU)
Union Member Relations – Admission and Discipline of Members | April
20, 1983 | Guerrero, J.
SUMMARY: After their failed attempt to establish their own union
and file petition for certification election, petitioners instead tried to
disaffiliate themselves with the mother union. For these acts of
disloyalty, they were expelled from the union and were dismissed by
the employer in accordance with the union security clause in the
existing CBA.
DOCTRINE: A closed-shop is a valid form of union security, and a
provision therefor in a collective bargaining agreement is not a
restriction of the right of freedom of association guaranteed by the
Constitution. Where in a closed-shop agreement it is stipulated that
union members who cease to be in good standing shall immediately
be dismissed, such dismissal does not constitute an unfair labor
practice exclusively cognizable by the Court of Industrial Relations.
When a labor union affiliates with a parent organization or mother
union, or accepts a charter from a superior body, it becomes subject to
the laws of the superior body under whose authority the local union
functions.
FACTS:
1. Dionisio Ramos, Recitation Bernus, Dolores Villar, Romeo
Dequito, Rolando de Guzman, Anselma Andan, Rita Llagas,
Benigno Mamaradlo and Orlando Acosta (Petitioners) were
members of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU, a duly
registered labor organization which, at the time of the present
dispute, was the existing bargaining agent of the employees in
private respondent Amigo Manufacturing, Inc.
2. On January 5, 1977, upon written authority of at least 30% (96 out
of 234) of the employees in the company, including the
petitioners, the Federation of Unions of Rizal (hereinafter referred
to as FUR) filed a petition for certification election. The petition
was, however, opposed by the Philippine Association of Free
Labor Unions (PAFLU) with whom, as stated earlier, the Amigo
Employees Union was at that time affiliated.
3. The same employees who had signed the petition filed by FUR
signed a joint resolution entitled “Sama-Samang Kapasiyahan”
effectively disaffiliating themselves from Amigo Employees
Union-PAFLU and establishing their own union Amigo
Employees Union (Independent), appointing Dolores Villar as
their president who, almost immediately after, filed a petition for
certification election. This petition was later on denied by the
Med-Arbiter.
4. The PAFLU, through its national President, formed a Trial
Committee to investigate the local union's charges against the
petitioners for acts of disloyalty inimical to the interest of the local
union,
5. At the same time, the Amigo Employees Union- PAFLU and the
Company concluded a new CBA which, besides granting
additional benefits to the workers, also reincorporated the same
provisions of the existing CBA, including the union security
clause reading, to wit: “All members of the UNION as of the
signing of this Agreement shall remain members thereof in good
standing. Therefore, any members who shall resign, be expelled,
or shall in any manner cease to be a member of the UNION, shall
be dismissed from his employment upon written request of the
UNION to the Company.”
6. Subsequently, petitioners were summoned to appear before the
PAFLU Trial Committee for the aforestated investigation of the
charges filed against them by the Amigo Employees Union-
PAFLU which are as follows:
7. Disaffiliating from PAFLU and affiliating with the Federation of
Unions of Rizal (FUR).
8. Filling petition for certification election with the Bureau of Labor
Relations and authorizing a certain Dolores Villar as your
authorized representative without the official sanction of the
mother Federation- PAFLU.
9. Maligning, libelling and slandering the incumbent officers of the
union as well as of the PAFLU Federation.
10. By spreading false propaganda among members of the Amigo
Employees Union-PAFLU that the incumbent union officers are
'merely appointees' of the management.
11. By sowing divisiveness instead of togetherness among members
of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU.
12. By conduct unbecoming as members of the Amigo Employees
Union- PAFLU which is highly prejudicial to the union as well as
to the PAFLU Federation.
13. Not recognizing PAFLU's jurisdiction over their case, petitioners
again refused to participate in the investigation. The complainants,
all of whom were the then incumbent officers of the Amigo
Employees Union-PAFLU, however, appeared and adduced their
evidence supporting the charges against herein petitioners.
14. Based on the findings of the trial committee, the PAFLU president
expelled the petitioners from the Amigo Employees Union and
requested the company to terminate their employment pursuant to
the security clause in the CBA.
15. The company filed request for clearance to terminate the
petitioners which was granted by the Department of Labor.
ISSUES: WON the dismissal by the company was valid? YES.
(MAIN)
HELD
1. This Court has laid down the ruling that a closed shop is a valid
form of union security, and such provision in a collective
bargaining agreement is not a restriction of the right of freedom of
association guaranteed by the Constitution.
2. The stipulation for closed-shop is clear and unequivocal and it
leaves no room for doubt that the employer is bound, under the
CBA, to dismiss the employees, herein petitioners, for non-union
membership. Petitioners became non-union members upon their
expulsion from the general membership of the Amigo Employees
Union – PAFLU pursuant to the decision of the PAFLU national
president
3. A closed-shop is a valid form of union security and a provisions
therefor in a CBA is not a restriction of the right of freedom of
association guaranteed by the Constitution. Where in a closed-
shop agreement it is stipulated that union members who cease to
be in good standing shall immediately be dismissed, such
dismissal does not constitute an unfair labor practice exclusively
cognizable by the CIR.
4. W/N the expulsion by the union was valid? YES (MAIN)
W/N the charges against them (being intra-union problems), should
have been investigated in accordance with the constitution and by-
laws of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU and not of the PAFLU?
NO
When a labor union affiliates with a parent organization or mother
union, or accepts a charter from a superior body, it becomes subject to
the laws of the superior body under whose authority the local union
functions. The constitution, by-laws and rules of the parent body,
together with the charter it issues pursuant thereto to the subordinate
union, constitute an enforceable contract between the parent body and
the subordinate union, and between the members of the subordinate
union inter se.
Inherent in every labor union, or any organization for that matter, is
the right of self-preservation. When members of a labor union,
therefore, sow the seeds of dissension and strife within the union;
when they seek the disintegration and destruction of the very union to
which they belong, they thereby forfeit their rights to remain as
members of the union which they seek to destroy. Prudence and
equity, as well as the dictates of law and justice, therefore, compelling
mandate the adoption by the labor union of such corrective and
remedial measures in keeping with its laws and regulations, for its
preservation and continued existence; lest by its folly and inaction, the
labor union crumble and fall.
Correctly and legally, therefore, the PAFLU acted when, after proper
investigation and finding of guilt, it decided to remove the oppositors
from the list of members of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU, and
thereafter, recommended to the Amigo Manufacturing, Inc.; the
termination of the employment of the oppositor.
Petitioners insist that their disaffiliation from PAFLU and filing a
petition for certification election are not acts of disloyalty but an
exercise of their right to self-organization. They contend that these acts
were done within the 60-day freedom period when questions of
representation may freely be raised. Under the peculiar facts of the
case, We find petitioners' insistence untenable.
ON DISAFFILIATION: had petitioners merely disaffiliated from the.
Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU, there could be no legal objections
thereto for it was their right to do so. But what petitioners did by the
very clear terms of their "Sama-Samang Kapasiyahan" was to
disaffiliate the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU from PAFLU, an act
which they could not have done with any effective consequence
because they constituted the minority in the Amigo Employees Union-
PAFLU. Extant from the records is the fact that petitioners numbering
ten (10), were among the ninety-six (96) who signed the "Sama-
Samang Kapasiyahan" whereas there are two hundred thirty four (234)
union members in the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU.
ON 60 DAY FREEDOM PERIOD: Neither is there merit to
petitioners' contention that they had the right to present representation
issues within the 60-day freedom period. It is true, as contended by
petitioners, that under Article 257 of the Labor Code and Section 3,
Rule 2, Book 2 of its Implementing Rules, questions of exclusive
bargaining representation are entertainable within the sixty (60) days
prior to the expiry date of an existing CBA, and that they did file a
petition for certification election within that period. But the petition
was filed in the name of the Amigo Employees Union which had not
disaffiliated from PAFLU, the mother union. Petitioners being a mere
minority of the local union may not bind the majority members of the
local union. Moreover, the Amigo Employees Union, as an
independent union, is not duly registered as such with the Bureau of
Labor Relations
It is true that under the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
Labor Code, in case of intra-union disputes, redress must first be
sought within the organization itself in accordance with its
constitution and by-laws. However, it has been held that this
requirement is not absolute but yields to exception under varying
circumstances
Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa MRR vs. Hernandez: In the case
at bar, noteworthy is the fact that the complaint was filed against the
union and its incumbent officers, some of whom were members of the
board of directors. The constitution and by-laws of the union provide
that charges for any violations thereof shall be filed before the said
board. But as explained by the lower court, if the complainants had
done so the board of directors would in effect be acting as respondent
investigator and judge at the same time. To follow the procedure
indicated would be a farce under the circumstances, where exhaustion
of remedies within the union itself would practically amount to a
denial of justice or would be illusory or vain, it will not be insisted
upon, particularly where property rights of the members are involved,
as a condition to the right to invoke the aid of a court.
The facts of the instant petition stand on all fours with the aforecited
case that the principle therein enunciated applies here as well. In the
case at bar, the petitioners were charged by the officers of the Amigo
Employees Union- PAFLU themselves who were also members of the
Board of Directors of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU. Thus,
were the petitioners to be charged and investigated according to the
local union's constitution, they would have been tried by a trial
committee of three (3) elected from among the members of the Board
who are themselves the accusers. (Section 2, Article 11, Constitution
of the Local Union). Petitioners would be in a far worse position had
this procedure been followed. Nonetheless, petitioners admit in their
petition that two (2) of the six (6) charges, i.e. disaffiliation and filing
a petition for certification election, are not intra-union matters and,
therefore, are cognizable by PAFLU.
BUGAY v. KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGAGAWA SA
MANILA RAILROAD CO.
February 28, 1962 | J. Bautista Angelo. | Due Process
SUMMARY: Bugay was expelled by union. CIR, affirmed by SC,
found that his expulsion was illegal because he was not given an
opportunity to be heard and it violated the procedure required by the
union’s constitution and by-laws. Bugay filed a complaint for damages
before the lower court. The union filed a motion to dismiss arguing
that CIR and SC’s ordering Bugay’s reinstatement was merely based
on procedural defects— the charges were not fabricated— hence,
Bugay is not entitled to damages. Lower court dismissed complaint.
SC reversed and remanded the case to lower court for further
proceedings.
DOCTRINE: ULP by union even if it involves only the violation of
member’s right to procedural due process entitles the latter to award
of damages.
FACTS:
1. Bugay was formerly an auditor of the Kapisanan. He was the
payroll clerk of the company.
2. He was requested by the secretary-treasurer of the company to
deliver certain documents which were in his possession belonging
to the union and in compliance therewith he delivered them
without consulting the other officers of the union.
3. The mgt. of the company made use of these documents and filed
a charge for falsification of commercial document against the
Pres. of the union.
4. Charges for disloyalty and conduct unbecoming of a union
member were filed against Bugay and after investigation he was
expelled from the union.
5. Bugay filed a charge for ULP against the union before the CIR
which after due hearing held that Bugay’s expulsion was illegal it
appearing that it has not been approved by the majority of the
chapters of the union as required by its constitution and by-laws.
CIR ordered reinstatement of Bugay as union member. This was
affirmed by the SC.
6. CIR made the following comment: In both the investigation and
board meeting where the report recommending Bugay’s expulsion
was approved, Bugay was not present. The investigation
committee failed to serve notice upon him. Bugay did not have the
sufficient opportunity to defend himself. Besides, the contention
that the majority of the chapters voted in favor of Bugay’s
expulsion is not borne by the evidence. The constitution and by-
laws of the union also provides that a resolution of general
application (such as a resolution terminating union membership)
must receive sanction of the majority of the chapters within 10
days. An examination of the chapters to the Kapisanan shows that
all of the votes except of two were not validly cast.
7. Bugay filed an action for moral damages before the CFI of Manila
based upon the allegation that "having become the victim of an
unfair labor practice act by the officers of the defendant under
Republic Act 875 as found by the Court of Industrial Relations
and the Supreme Court, plaintiff has suffered moral damages for
mental anguish, anxiety, social humiliation and besmirched
reputation specially among the thousands of employees of the
Manila Railroad Company, amounting to P20,000.00.”
8. Kapisanan filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action in that neither the decision of the Court of Industrial
Relations nor that of the Supreme Court contain any statement that
the unfair labor practice act imputed to the defendant was false or
fabricated as in fact the decision of the Supreme Court ordering
Bugay’s reinstatement was merely based on procedural defects. In
 fact, he was not awarded damages by CIR and SC. Furthermore,
he did not lose his employment nor did he suffer any change in
status.
9. Lower court dismissed complaint. Bugay appealed to SC.

ISSUE: WON Bugay has a cause of action against Kapisanan for

damages arising out of ULP - YES

RATIO:
1. It is true that the decisions both of the Court of Industrial Relations
and the Supreme Court do not contain any statement that the
charges preferred by the officers of the union against him which
resulted in his expulsion were "trumped up" or fabricated, or that
said officers acted maliciously or in bad faith, but the fact remains
that the two courts have found that his expulsion was illegal
because of the irregularities committed in his investigation.
2. In effect, it was found that not only has he not been given an
opportunity to defend himself but his expulsion was not submitted
to the different chapters of the union as required by its constitution
and by-laws. The result was that because of his expulsion he was
subjected to humiliation and mental anguish with the consequent
lose of his good name and reputation. This is especially so
considering that the members of the union from which he was
expelled amounted to around 20,000 more or less.
3. It is, therefore, an error for the lower court to hold that the
complaint does not state sufficient cause of action for the relief
claimed by appellant.

ATTY. ALLAN S. MONTAÑO v. ATTY. ERNESTO C.
VERCELES
July 26, 2010 | Del Castillo, J. | Election of Officers >
Qualifications/Disqualification
SUMMARY: Petitioner Atty. Allan S. Montaño, who had worked as
a legal assistant for the Federation of Free Workers (FFW), was
nominated for the position of National Vice-President. The FFW
COMELEC informed him that he is not qualified for the position as
his candidacy violates Art. XIX, Sec. 76 and Art. VIII, Sec. 25(a) of
the FFW Constitution and By-Laws. However, he was still nominated
and elected as National Vice-President. Respondent Atty. Ernesto C.
Verceles filed a petition before the BLR to nullify Atty. Montaño’s
election. The BLR dismissed the petition on the ground that it is Sec.
26 of Art. VIII of the FFW Constitution and By-Laws which is
applicable. However, the CA set aside the BLR’s decision on the
ground that Atty. Montaño does not qualify under the said provision.
DOCTRINE:
1. Under the Rules Implementing the Labor Code, the FFW
COMELEC shall have the power to prescribe rules on the qualification
and eligibility of candidates and such other rules as may facilitate the
orderly conduct of elections. The Committee is also regarded as the
final arbiter of all election protests.
2. Art. XIX, Sec. 76, FFW Constitution and By-Laws: No member of
the Governing Board shall at the same time be an employee in the staff
of the federation.
3. Sec. 232, Labor Code. [226] Bureau of Labor Relations. – The
Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor Relations Divisions in the
regional offices of the Department of Labor, shall have original and
exclusive authority to act, at their own initiative or upon request of
either or both parties, on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and
all disputes, grievances or problems arising from or affecting labor-
management relations in all workplaces, whether agricultural or non-
agricultural, except those arising from the implementation or
interpretation of collective bargaining agreements which shall be the
subject of grievance procedure and/or voluntary arbitration.
The Bureau shall have fifteen (15) working days to act on labor cases
before it, subject to extension by agreement of the parties. (As
amended by Section 14, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989).
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Atty. Allan S. Montaño, who had worked as a legal
assistant of the Federation of Free Workers (FFW) Legal Center,
was nominated for the position of National Vice-President at the
21st National Convention and Election of National Officers of
FFW. In a letter dated May 25, 2001, however, the FFW
COMELEC informed him that he is not qualified for the position
as his candidacy violates the 1998 FFW Constitution and By-
Laws, particularly Sec. 76 of Art. XIX and Sec. 25(a) of Art. VIII,
both in Chap. II thereof.
2. Despite Atty. Montaño’s pending motion for reconsideration with
the FFW COMELEC, as well as a strong protest from respondent
Atty. Ernesto C. Verceles, Atty. Montaño’s candidacy was
allowed, and he was elected National Vice-President
3. On July 13, 2001, Atty. Verceles filed before the BLR a petition
to nullify Atty. Montaño’s election as FFW National Vice-
President. Atty. Verceles alleged that Atty. Montaño is not
qualified to run for the position as Art. XIX, Sec. 76 of the FFW
Constitution and By-Laws prohibits federation employees from
sitting in its Governing Board.
4. On May 8, 2002, the BLR dismissed the petition. It held that the
applicable provision in the FFW Constitution and By-Laws is Art.
VIII, Sec. 26, and that Atty. Montaño had complied with the
requirements of the said provision.
5. Atty. Verceles elevated the case to the CA, which set aside the 4. The FFW Constitution and By-Laws are clear that no member of
BLR’s decision on May 28, 2004. While the CA agreed that the the Governing Board shall at the same time perform functions of
applicable provision was Sec. 26 of Art. VIII, it ruled that Atty. the rank-and-file staff.
Montaño did not qualify under the said provision. According to
the CA, as a legal assistant Atty. Montaño is considered as a
confidential employee, and is thus ineligible to join the FFW Staff
Association, the rank-and-file union of FFW.

ISSUES: WON the BLR has jurisdiction over the election protest as
an intra-union dispute - YES

HELD:
1. On the first issue: Sec. 226 of the Labor Code (now Sec. 232)
provides that the BLR and the Regional Directors of DOLE have
concurrent jurisdiction over inter-union and intra-union disputes.
Such disputes include the conduct or nullification of election of
union and workers association officers. Furthermore, pursuant to
Sec. 226, the BLR exercises original jurisdiction over intra-union
disputes involving federations such as the FFW.

ISSUE: WON the election of Atty. Allan S. Montaño as FFW

National Vice-President should be annulled - YES
1. The FFW Constitution and By-Laws vest the FFW COMELEC
with the authority to screen and determine qualifications of
candidates and promulgate rules concerning the conduct of
elections.
2. The same powers are provided by the Rules Implementing the
Labor Code, under which the FFW COMELEC can prescribe rules
on the qualification and eligibility of candidates and such other
rules as may facilitate the orderly conduct of elections. The
Committee is also regarded as the final arbiter of all election
protests.
3. It is clear, therefore, that the FFW COMELEC is empowered to
interpret the provisions of the federation’s constitution, and its
decision will not be interfered with.
TANCINCO, BARTOLO, DE LEON, POE, SAN PEDRO,
QUIBIN, MUDLONG and MADRIAGA v. CALLEJA,
LACANILAO, DALMACIO, ESGUERRA,
GATCHALIAN, CUDIA and PAGAYON
Election of Officers - who may vote | January 20, 1988 | Gancayco, J.
FACTS:
1. Private respondents are the primer organizer of Imperial Textile
Mills Inc. Monthly Employees Association (ITM-MEA).
2. While said repsondenrs were preparing to file a petition for direct
certification of the Union as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of ITM’s bargaining unit, the union’s Vice-President, Carlos
Dalmacio was promoted to the position of Department Head
which disqualified him for union membership.
a. This led to a strike spearheaded by Lacanilao group and
respondents.
3. Another group, led by petitioners, staged a strike inside the
company premises. After 4 days, the strike was settled.
4. An agreement was entered into by representatives of the
management, Lacanilao group and the Tancinco group
a. All monthly-paid employees shall be United under one
union, the ITM-MEA, to be affiliated with ANGLO
b. The management of ITM recognizes ANGLO as the sole
and exclusive bargaining agent of all the monthly-paid
employees
c. That an election of union officers shall be held
d. That the last day of filing of candidacy will be
e. That a final pre-election conference to finalize the list of
qualified voters shall be ehld
5. A pre-election conference attended by MOLE officers was held
but the parties failed to agree on the list of voters.
6. ANGLO made a unilateral ruling excluding some 56 employees
consisting of Manila office employees, members of INC, non-time
card employees, etc..
7. Prior ot the holding of the election of union officers, petitioners,
through a letter addressed ot the Election Supervisor, protested
said ruling but no action was taken.
8. Election of officers was conducted under the supervision of
MOLE wherein the 56 employees in question participated but
whose votes were segregated without being counted. Lacanilao’s
group won.
a. Tancinco group protested. Filed a formal protest with
MOLE claiming that the determination of the
qualification of the 56 votes is beyond the competence of
ANGLO.
i. Private repsondnets maintain the contrary on the
premise that definition of union’s membership is
solely within their jusridiciton
9. Med Arbiter issue dorder directing the opening and counting of
the segregated votes.
a. Respondents appealed to the BLR justifying the
disenfranchisement of the 56 votes, saying that allowing
these groups to vote will be anomalous since it is their
policy not to participate in any form of union activities
and that some are either managerial employees or non-
ITM employees.
b. BLR held that the exclusion was arbitray,w himsical and
without elgal basis. However, BLR set aside the order but
only because 51/56 challenged voters were not yet union
members at the time of the election as per the list
submitted before the BLR. MR denied.
ISSUE: WON segregation was without any basis – YES
HELD:
1. Record shows that public respondent categorically declared as
arbitraray, whimsical and without legal basis the grounds relied
upno by ANGLO in disenfranchising the 56 voters in question.
Despite this, Hon. Calleja still rueld to set aside the Resolution of
the Med-Arbiter based on its findins that the disenfracheised
 voters were not yet union members at the time of the election of
union officers.
2. The finding does not have a leg to stand on. Submission of the
employees names with the BLR as qulalfieid mebmers of the
union is not a condition sine qua non to enable said members to
vote in the election of union officers. It finds no support in fact or
law.
a. If the list is to be the basis as to who the union members
are then public respondent should have also diqulified
some 175 of the 333 voters.
b. It is true that under Article 242 (c) of the Labor Code, only
members of the union can participate in the election of
union officers. The question however of eligilbity to vote
may be determined through the use of the applicable
payroll period and employee’s status during the
applicable payroll period. The payroll fo the month next
prceeding the albor dispute in case of regularl employees
nad the payroll period at or near the peak of oeprations in
case of employees in season industries.
3. Consideraing that none ofhte parties insisitues on the use of the
payroll period list as voting list and considering that the 51
remaining emplyees were correctly ruled to be qualfieid for
membership, their act of joining the elction by casting hteir votes
ais a clear manifestation of their intention tojoin the union.
a. They musttherefore be considered ipso facto members
thereof
4. Their names could not have been included in the list of employees
submitted on April of the relevant year since the agreement to join
the union was only entered into the following month. Private
repsondents never challenged the right of the 56 voters to vote
during the election supervised by Deparmetnt of Labor.
 MANALAD, ROMERO, SANTOS, TUICO, LEANO,
PUERO, NAVARRO, ERNACIO, BENCITO, ROXAS,
RAMOS, MUNOZ, FRACO and LOPEZ v. DIRECTOR
TRAJANO, BABULA, DUYAG, ET. AL
Election of Officers - who may vote | January 28, 1989 | Regalado, J.
FACTS:
1. The parties in this case are employees of United Dockhandlers,
Inc. belonging to rival groups in the Associated Port Checkers and
Workers Union.
a. The petitioners were led by petitioner Manalad while
respondents were led by Babula
2. Sometime in 1982, petitioners were disqualified from running as
candidates in the election of APCWU officers by the Med-Arbiter,
which election had theretofore been scheduled but was reset.
a. On appeal, set aside by Director of BLR.
3. The election of officers and board members of the union was held
with the candidates of petitioners winning over those of
respondents. As a consequence, the respondents filed a petition for
review with the SC assailing the order of the BLR declaring the
petitioners eligible to run for the union offices.
4. The Court promulgated a resolution which
a. dismissed the case for lack of merit.
b. declared vacant the offices of the APCWU, ordered the
officers to cease acting as such upon receipt of the
resolution, and to turn over the management of the union
to the Director
c. and ordered the holding of a special election of union
officers.
5. Director of BLR issued an order saying that he was taking over
the management of the union, and ordering respondents Babula
and all other persons to cease and desist from acting as officer and
requiring them to turn over union funds.
6. A motion was filed with the SC asking that the private respondents
be cited in contempt and for their disqualification from running
due to the alleged refusal to comply with the resolution.
7. The scheduled special election was held resulting in the victory of
the candidates of private respondents as the winners in the special
election and duly elected officers of APCWU.
a. Petitioners filed a motion with the Court for the
annulment of the special election, repeating hteir
allegation that there was non-compliance with the
Court’s resolution by private respondents.
8. Director issued a resolution proclaiming private respondents as
the winners in the special election and duly elected officers of
APCWU.
a. With the observation that the submission that Mr. Babula
failed to completely turn over management of the union
to the Director is within the competence and authority of
the Supreme Court to pass upon considering that the
mandate for such a turn-over came from the court
9. Petitioners filed MR with director seeking reversal of the
resolution. Denied.
10. Court issued resolution where it denied motion of petitioner to
annul special elections.
ISSUE: WON segregation was without any basis – YES
HELD:
1. In an urgent motion, petitioners prayed that in the event that they
win the present case, that the Supreme Court this Honorable Court
upholds the November 24, (sic) 1984 election, the three-year term
of office of petitioners should commence only after the finality of
the resolution/decision to be rendered in the case at bar; that a
restraining order be issued enjoining the holding of the new
election of union officers until the final disposition of the instant
case so as not to render the issue raised herein moot and
academic." We denied this motion on May 25, 1988 for lack of
merit, considering that "(w)hen this Court, through its First
Division called for the holding of special elections of union
officers in G.R. Nos. 69684-85, there was an implied nullification
 of the refusal of the November 26, 1984 elections. This being the
case, and petitioners having participated in the special elections
held on July 20, 1985, they cannot now claim a right to the
positions under consideration on the basis of said voided
November 26, 1984 elections.
2. Meanwhile, the three-year term of the private respondents under
the disputed July 20, 1985 elections expired. Hence the Court
required the petitioners to show cause why these cases should not
be dismissed for being moot and academic.
a. Petitioners reiterated their position stated in their urgent
motion, dated November 27, 1987, that they be declared
the winners is said election with their terms of three (3)
years to commence from the time they assume office in
execution of a final and executory resolution this Court.
17 On November 17, 1988, petitioners filed a motion to
restrain the holding of a new election of officers of the
union scheduled on November 28, 1988. However, before
any action could be taken on said motion the election was
held as scheduled, hence the petitioner filed a motion,
dated December 1, 1988, to annul said election.
3. The Court held that the expiration of the terms of office of the
union officers and the election of officers on November 28,
1988 have rendered the issues raised by petitioners in this case
moot and academic.
a. It is pointless and unrealistic to insist on annulling an
election of officers whose terms had already expired.
b. We would have thereby a judgment on a matter which
cannot have any practical legal effect upon a controversy,
even if existing, and which, in the nature of things, cannot
be enforced.
c. We must consequently abide by our consistent ruling that
where certain events or circumstances have taken place
during the pendency of the case which would render the
case moot and academic, the petition should be dismissed.
4. Moreover, it is better and more pragmatic in this case to respect
the will of the majority of the workers who voted in the November
28, 1988 elections.
a. Although decreed under a different setting, it is apropos
to recall in this case Our ruling that where the people have
elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did
this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they
disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had
been guilty of any.
5. We agree with the petitioners that disobedience to a resolution of
this Court should not be left unpunished. However, before the
alleged disobedient party may be cited for contempt, the
allegations against him should be clearly established. The
contentions of petitioners do not adequately establish the basis for
contempt. On the contrary, respondents have satisfactorily
answered the averments thereon.
6. The Court then reminded petitioners that even if the
disqualification of private respondents could be justified, the
candidates of petitioners certainly cannot be declared as the
winners in the disputed election.
a. The mere fact that they obtained the second highest
number of votes does not mean that they will thereby
be considered as the elected officers if the true winners
are disqualified.
 MIRANDA v. ASIAN TERMINALS INC and CA
Election of Officers - who may vote | June 23, 2009 | Puno, J.
FACTS:
1. Miranda was employed by respondent Asian Terminals Inc. as
Checker I. he became a member of the Associated Port Checkers
and Workers Union or the APCWU.
2. The petitioner, who was then Vice President of the union, was
appointed to the position of Shop Steward which is a union
position under the payroll of the company.
a. The CBA between the union and ATI provided for the
appointment of a Shop Steward from among the union
members, upon the recommendation of the union
president.
b. The Steward is a field representative of both the company
and the union and acts as an independent arbiter of all
complaints brought to his attention.
3. Roger Silva, the President of APCWU, wrote a letter to the
petitioner regarding the recall of his designation as the union Shop
Steward. The president explained that the petitioner was recalled
due to loss of trust and confidence in him for refusing to heed the
reminders by the president about his chronic absenteeism that is
hurting the interest of the union members.
a. President said that this went through a series of dialogues
and after petitioner was given ample time to perform the
duties and obligation of a Shop Steward.
b. President gave petitioner 5 days fromreceipt to explain
why he should not be recalled for chronic absenteeism.
4. Petitioner and some members of APCWU sent an undated letter
to ATI protesting the manner in which APCWU leadership
handled the affairs of union.
a. This led to the formation of a grievance committee to
investigate the complaints against the officer. Petitioner,
however, refused to participate in the investigation.
5. Upon conclusion of the investigation, the grievance committed
issued its report recommending to ATI the recall of the petitioner
as a Shop Steward and for reversion to his former position of
Checker 1, in accordance with the CBA.
a. Petitioner questioned his recalled and President answered
that this was pursuant to the agreement in the CBA which
required that the term of office of the Shop Steward be
based on trust and confidence and favorable
recommendation of the duly elected president of the union
6. ATI issued a Memo to petitioner regarding his transfer citing the
provision in the CBA which states that upon recall of the
designation as Shop Steward, the party concerned shall revert back
to his position occupied prior to the designation
7. Petitioner filed a complaint against Silva as President of APCWU
with the DOLE, praying for his reinstatement.
a. Med-arbiter ordered the reinstatement to the position of
Shop Steward after finding that union president did not
have authority to recall for lack of approval of the Board
of Directors
b. Affirmed by Secretary
8. Petitioner filed another complaint before the Med-Arbiter
involving money claims in the form of allowance, 13th month and
attorney’s fees.
a. Dismissed for having no jurisdiction money claims
9. Petitioner filed series of complaints with the NLRC for unfair
labor practice (amended to illegal demotion.)
a. Dismissed by LA for lack of cause of action saying that
petitioner should institute the charges against the erring
union official or leadership.
b. But since Petitioner has already obtained a favorable
decision from the secretary, he should have the said
judgment enforced and compel union president to have
him designated as Shop Steward under pain of contempt.
10. During the pendency of the cases, petitioner was reassigned to
Checker I mobile – a position lower in rank than Checker I. He
was later reassigned to Vessel Operation Checker.
11. Petitioner filed second complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal
demotion and reduction and diminution of pay.
 a. Dismissed by LA because the case pending before the
other LA involved same parties and same cause of action
12. A third complaint of Unfair Labor Practice and Illegal Demotion
amounting to constructive dismissal was filed by petitioner
against President Silva, President of ATI Richard Barclay, and the
Operations Manager.
a. Dismissed by LA on the ground that same is barred by
prior judgment from the decision of the two other Las
which were not appealed and have become final.
b. Upon appeal to NLRC, NLRC remanded the case saying
that res judicata cannot be applied because the earlier
decision were not decided on the merits but dismissed
based on jurisdictional grounds.
13. LA rendered a decision which ruled that the demotion from Shop
Steward to Checker 1 was for cause but was effected without due
process. Hence, he ordered the respondent to pay petitioner
indemnity in consonance with the Wenphil Doctrine.
a. However, the dispositive portion was confusing for
declaring petitioner to be constructively dismissed.
b. Upon motion to be reinstated, another LA ruled in favor
of petitioners and ordered to execution of the properties
of respondent. Respondent filed a TRO.
14. LA issued an order denying the motion to quash the writ of
execution and ordered the sheriff to proceed with the execution.
15. Respondent appealed the LA arguing the controversy between the
petitioner and the other officers and members of the union is an
intra-union dispute that must be resolved within the union itself.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is entitled to claim reinstatement as Shop
Steward ans well as payment
HELD:
1. The Court first clarified that Shop Steward is not a company
position. A cursory look at the responsibilities of a shop steward
leads to the conclusion that it is a position within the union, and
not within the company. A shop steward is appointed by the union
in a shop, department or plan, and serves as representatives of the
union, charged with negotiating and adjustment of grievances of
employees with the supervisor of the employer. He is the
representative of the union members in a building or other
workplace.
2. The position of the shop steward has been acknowledged to be a
position within the union and even the Labor Code understands
the shop steward as a union officer who plays an important role in
grievance procedure. The shop steward is responsible for
receiving complaints and grievances of the employees and for
bringing these complaints to the immediate supervisor of the
employee concerned. If the grievance is not settled through the
efforts of the shop steward, it is referred to the grievance
committee.
3. Santa Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union v. Coca Cola
Bottlers Philippines: Section 501 and Section 3 of the Landrum
Griffit Act were used as the bases to conclude that the Shop
Steward is an officer of the union. These provisions confirm that
the Shop Steward occupies a position of trust within the union. It
may be an elective official within the union or key administrative
personnel, and it is considered to be within the same class as union
officers, agents and representatives.
4. In the case at bar, the duties and responsibilities of the Shop
Steward stated in the CBA between the union and the respondent
company, as well as the manner of the appointment and
designation of the Shop Steward show that the shop steward is a
union position and not a position within the company.
5. Since the Shop Steward is a union position, the controversy
surrounding his recall form his position as Shop Steward becomes
a dispute within the union.
6. An “internal union dispute” refers to a conflict within or inside a
labor union. It includes all disputes or grievances arising from any
violation of or disagreement over any provision of the constitution
and by-laws of a union, including any violation of the rights and
 conditions of union membership provided for in the Code. is for the union, not the respondent company to make. Respondent
Jurisdiction is conferred on the BLR . cannot conduct its own investigation to determine WON union
7. The Records show that sometimes after the appointment of the had cause to recall the petitioner.
petitioner to union Shop Steward, the petitioner, along with the
other union members, had complaints with the manner in which ISSUE: WON petitioner can be reinstated - NO
the union leadership was handling the affairs of the union. At the HELD:
same time, there were also complaints about the petitioner’s 1. The petitioner cannot be reinstated to the position because his
habitual absenteeism and his inability to perform his duties as eventual separation from respondent ATI made reinstatement
union Shop Steward. When a grievance committee was created to unfeasible. Employment with respondent ATI and membership in
investigate these complaints, the petitioner refused to participate. the union are required in order to occupy the position of Shop
This led to the recall of petitioner as the union Shop Steward. Steward. But the petitioner is neither a member of the union nor
8. The actions bolster the conclusion that the grievances were employed with ATI since he was already retrenched for several
directed against the union and not the respondent company, months and was settled through a quit claim in consideration of
making it an intra-union dispute. P367,500.
2. The events which have taken place during the pendency of the
ISSUE: WON the Recall was valid - NO case have rendered the present petition moot and academic.
HELD:
1. Med-Arbiter is affirmed by the Secretary of Labor when it ruled
that there was neither cause nor due process in the recall of the
petitioner from the position of union Shop Steward. He found that
the claim of loss of trust and confidence due to the petitioners
alleged absenteeism was not substantiated and that the recall was
not approved by the Board of Directors, as required by the
Constitution and By-Laws.
2. The ruling of the Med-Arbiter and Secretary are generally
conclusive on appeal since the SC is not a trier of facts.

ISSUE: WON LA has jurisdiction - NO

HELD:
1. The LA incorrectly assumed jurisdiction over the case due to his
confused understanding of the relationship between and among
the petitioner, respondent company and the union. His decision on
the merits of the case is void for lack of jurisdiction.
2. The requirements imposed on an employer for the valid demotion
of an employee do not apply to the reversion of petitioner from
union shop steward because the decision to recall the petitioenrs
 HALILI v. CIR
April 30, 1985 | Makasiar, J. | Union-Member Relations > Major
Policy Matter
SUMMARY: Following a successful claim for overtime by the Union
against the employer Halili, Atty. Pineda sold a parcel of land
belonging to the Union he ‘represents’. Atty. Pineda also sought the
distribution of the proceeds of the sale to the Union members as well
as tried to enforce his attorney’s lien from the said transaction on the
strength of a retainer’s contract he had with the union, the legality of
which was disputed in this case. The SC held that the contract was
anomalous as it violated then-Art 242 of the LC. The retainer contract
was executed only between Atty. Pineda and Union officers who were
chosen by ONLY 125 members only, so it was not a contract with the
general membership as in fact only 14% of the total membership of
897 was represented. For not complying with the SC’s orders, Atty
Pineda was held in contempt.
DOCTRINE: Article 242 (d) of the Labor Code: "The members shall
determine by secret ballot, after due deliberation, any question of
major policy affecting the entire membership of the organization,
unless the nature of the organization or force majeure renders such
secret ballot impractical, in which case the board of directors of the
organization may make the decision in behalf of the general
membership."
FACTS
1. Litigation initially commenced with the filing of a complaint
for overtime by the Union vs. Halili with the Court of
Industrial Relations on August 20, 1958. The disputes were
eventually settled when the contending parties reached an
Agreement: (1) that the employees get title to that tract of land,
33,952 square meters, in Caloocan, Province of Rizal, plus the
amount of P25,000.00 in full and final satisfaction of all the
claims and causes of action of all of the employees against the
estate of Fortunato F. Halili (2) the union, its officers and
members-claimants withdraw the case and sign the
Memorandum of Agreement with Release and Quitclaim.
2. A prospective buyer, the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery,
Inc. expressed its misgivings on the authority of the Union to
sell the property in view of sec. 66 of PD 1529 which requires
no less than an order from a court of competent jurisdiction as
authority to sell property in trust. So, Atty. Pineda
(representing the Union) filed a motion with the Supreme
Court requesting for authority to sell the property. This Court,
however, merely noted the motion in a resolution dated
December 8, 1982.
3. Nevertheless, Atty. Pineda, without authority, filed another
urgent motion with the Ministry of Labor, praying that the
Union be authorized to sell to Manila Memorial Park
Cemetery, Inc. and to make arrangements with it, as it had
decided to withdraw its objection regarding the Union's
authority to sell.
4. The Labor Arbiter Raymundo R. Valenzuela granted the
motion. So, the sale was finally consummated on June 7, 1983,
resulting in the execution of an escrow agreement on June 8,
1983 wherein the purchase price was deposited under escrow
with the Manila Bank-Cubao Branch. The Bank then released
the amounts due the claimants in accordance with the escrow
agreement" (pp. 35
5. Upon finding out about the sale, Atty. Jose C. Espinas, alleged
original counsel for the Union, filed the urgent motion with
prayer for a temporary mandatory restraining order,
questioning the legality of the LA’s orders which (1)
authorized the sale of the awarded property and the distribution
of the proceeds from such purchase (2) award of attorney’s
fees on the sale. Atty. Pedro Lopez, an original associate of
Atty. Espinas, filed his motion for leave to intervene, that the
lawyers involved should only divide 20% fees as per the
workers' contract and the rest refunded by Atty. Pineda and the
alleged "union officers" for redistribution to the members.
1. The SC resolution
6. The SC (1) set aside as null and void the orders of Labor
Arbiter Valenzuela; (2) allowed the intervention of Atty. Pedro
Lopez; (3) directed the Manila Bank (Cubao Branch), Atty.
Benjamin Pineda, and the Halili Drivers and Conductors
Union to comply with the temporary mandatory restraining
order; and (4) remanded these cases to the NLRC for further
proceedings.
7. IN THIS CASE, there is an urgent motion to cite Atty.
Benjamin C. Pineda, Ricardo Capuno and Manila Bank
(Cubao Branch) in contempt for the alleged continued failure
of aforenamed parties to comply with the orders in #6.
ISSUE: WON the retainer contract between Atty. Pineda and the
Union violated the Labor Code - YES
WON Atty Pineda is guilty of contempt - YES
RULING:
Atty Pineda is found guilty of indirect contempt, sentenced to
imprisonment until the SC orders are complied with. He is also
directed to show cause why he should not be disbarred under Rule 138.
. the Union knew of the contract.
RATIO:
1. In its resolution nullifying the LA’s orders, this Court took
cognizance of the following:
a. Union President Amado Lopez informed J.C. Espinas and
Associates that the general membership of the said Union
had authorized a 20% contingent fee for the law firm
based on whatever amount.
b. Atty. Jose C. Espinas, the original counsel, established the
award of 897 workers' claim in the main cases before the
defunct CIR and the Supreme Court.
c. When Atty. Pineda appeared for the Union in these cases,
still an associate of the law firm, his appearance carried
the firm name "B.C. Pineda and Associates," giving the
impression that he was the principal lawyer in these cases.
In fact, he always held office in the firm's place, except
for a one-year stint, Atty. Pineda continued handling the
case with the arrangement that he would report the
developments to the Espinas firm. When he rejoined the
law firm in 1968, he continued working on these cases and
using the Puyat Building Office as his address in the
pleadings.
d. A deeper scrutiny of the pleadings notably indicates a
fraudulent or deceitful pattern in the actuations of Atty.
Pineda. In his motion for execution of judgment filed on
September 18, 1965 in this case, he signed for and in
behalf of "J.C. Espinas & Associates" but in his
manifestation dated December 10, 1968, he signed as
"B.C. Pineda," lone counsel for petitioner (p. 327, rec.);
and yet, he carried the address of Espinas & Associates.
e. When Atty. Pineda rejoined the Espinas firm in 1968, he
did not reveal to his partners (he was made the most senior
partner) that he had a retainer's contract entered into on
January 1, 1967 which allegedly took effect in 1966. He
stayed with the law firm until 1974 and still did not
divulge the 1967 retainer's contract. Only the officers of
f. As to the alleged retainer's contract between Atty. Pineda
and the Union, it was executed only between Atty. Pineda
and the officers of the Union chosen by about 125
members only. It was not a contract with the general
membership. Only 14% of the total membership of 897
was represented. This violates Article 242 (d) of the Labor
Code which provides: "The members shall determine by
secret ballot, after due deliberation, any question of major
policy affecting the entire membership of the
organization, unless the nature of the organization or force
majeure renders such secret ballot impractical, in which
case the board of directors of the organization may make
the decision in behalf of the general membership." Its
other infirmities: When Atty. Pineda filed his motion for
 approval of his attorney's lien with the LA, he did not charges. He could also be prosecuted before the Tanodbayan under
attach the retainer's contract. Also it was not notarized. the provisions of the Anti-Graft Law. Independently of his liabilities
3. Also, said orders of Labor Arbiter Valenzuela as violative of the due as a government officer, he could be the subject of disbarment
process clause. In administrative proceedings, or cases coming before proceedings under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.
administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers, due process § Atty. Benjamin Pineda could also be held liable under Section 4(b)
requires not only notice and hearing, but also the consideration by the of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) which makes
administrative tribunal of the evidence presented; the existence of it unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any public
evidence to support the decision; its substantiality; a decision based official to commit any of the offenses defined in Section 3 (which
thereon or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties; enumerates the corrupt practices which public officers may be
such decision by the administrative tribunal resting on its own prosecuted for). Atty. Pineda knowingly induced or caused Labor
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy; and Arbiter Valenzuela to issue the questioned orders without or beyond
such decision acquainting the parties with the various issues involved the latter's authority and to which orders the former was not entitled,
and the reasons therefor. considering that he was not the sole and proper representative.
a. In this case, without notice to the other lawyers and
parties, Atty. Pineda commenced the proceedings before
the NLRC wherein he asked for authority to sell the
property. When LA Valenzuela approved the motion,
only Atty. Pineda and the lawyers of the purchaser were
informed of such order. When he filed motion asking for
authority to distribute the proceeds of the sale including
his attorney’s fees, he did so without notice and the LA
without informing the other lawyers approved the motion.
4. Atty. Pineda's act of filing a motion with this praying for authority to
sell was by itself an admission on his part that he did not possess the
authority to sell the property and that this Court was the proper body
which had the power to grant such authority. He could not and did not
even wait for such valid authority but instead previously obtained the
same from the labor arbiter whom he knew was not empowered to so
authorize. Under Article 224 (a) of the Labor Code, only final
decisions or awards of the NLRC, the Labor Arbiter, or compulsory
or voluntary arbitrators may be implemented or may be the subject of
implementing orders by aforenamed body or officers.

Other notes:
§ Labor Arbiter Raymundo Valenzuela should be made to answer for
having acted without or beyond his authority in proper administrative

Pacific Banking Corporation v. Hon. Clave
March 7, 1984 | Aquino, J. | Union Funds
PETITIONER: Pacific Banking Corporation
RESPONDENTS: JACOBO C. CLAVE, Presidential Executive
Assistant, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR., Deputy Presidential Executive
Assistant, PACIFIC BANKING CORPORATION EMPLOYEES
ORGANIZATION and JUANITO M. SAAVEDRA
SUMMARY: Atty. Saavedra is the union’s lawyer in its Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) negotiations with the employer bank.
Upon the finalization of the CBA, which granted monetary benefits of
more than PhP 14M to the employees, the union requested the bank to
withhold around P345,000 out of the total benefits as 10% attorney’s
fees of Saavedra. SC ruled that the attorney’s fees should be taken
from the union fund, not from the newly-granted monetary benefits.
DOCTRINE: The case is covered squarely by the mandatory and
explicit prescription of article 222 which is another guarantee
intended to protect the employee against unwarranted practices
that would diminish his compensation without his knowledge and
consent. (See National Power Corporation Supervisors’ Union v.
National Power Corporation). Other provisions of the Labor Code
animated by the same intention are the following: Article 242,
paragraphs (n) and (o); 288, PD 442; 291, PD 570-A; 240, PD 626;
241, PD 850. There is no doubt that lawyer Saavedra is entitled to
the payment of his fees but Article 222 ordains that union funds
should be used for that purpose. The amount of P345,000 does not
constitute union funds. It is money of the employees. The union, not
the employees, is obligated to Saavedra.
FACTS
1. January 1979 → negotiations between the Pacific Banking Corporation
and the Pacific Banking Corporation Employees Organization (PABECO)
for a collective bargaining agreement for 1979 to 1981. Union was
represented by its President, Paula S. Paug, allegedly assisted as
consultant by Jose P. Umali, Jr., the president of the National Union of
Bank Employees (NUBE) with which it was formerly affiliated.
PABECO’s counsel is Atty. Saavedra. Because of a deadlock, the
Minister of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the controversy.
2. July 10, 1979 → the Deputy Minister rendered a decision directing the
parties to execute a CBA in accordance with the terms and conditions set
forth in his decision.
3. July 15 and 27, 1979 → Atty. Saavedra’s earliest recorded participation
in the case, when he filed a motion for reconsideration and a supplemental
motion. No action was taken on said motions.
4. The parties appealed to the Office of the President of the Philippines
(OP). The CBA negotiations were resumed. The union president took part
in the second phase of the negotiations. Saavedra filed a memorandum.
He claimed he exerted much effort to expedite the decision.
5. March 18, 1980 → The OP issued a resolution directing the parties to
execute a CBA containing the terms and conditions of employment
embodied in the resolution.
6. May 20, 1980, the bank’s vice-president in a reply to the letter of the union
president stated that he had serious doubts about paying the attorney’s fees
7. March 24, 1980 → Saavedra filed his notice of attorney ‘s lien.
8. CBA was ultimately finalized on June 3, 1980. Monetary benefits of
more than fourteen million pesos were involved in the three-year
CBA, according to the bank’s counsel.
9. The union officials requested the bank to withhold around P345,000 out
of the total benefits as ten percent attorney’s fees of Saavedra. At first,
the bank interposed no objection to the request in the interest of
harmonious labor-management relations. In theory, the actual ten percent
attorney’s fees may amount to more than one million pesos.
10. For nearly a year, OP in four resolutions wrestled with the propriety of
Saavedra’s 10% attorney’s fees. In a resolution dated May 29, 1980,
Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave refused to intervene in
the matter. He ruled that the payment of attorney’s fees was a question
that should be settled by the union and its lawyer themselves. Then, he
"clarified" that ruling in a second resolution wherein he directed that
the attorney’s fees may be deducted from the total benefits and paid
to Saavedra in accordance with Art 111 of the Labor Code and its
IRR (See Rules# 1-2)
11. Finally, in a fourth resolution Deputy Presidential Executive Assistant
Joaquin T. Venus, Jr. ordered the bank to pay the union treasurer the said
attorney’s fees less the amounts corresponding to the protesting
employees. He held that Article 222 of the Labor Code (See Rule #3), as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1691, effective May 1, 1980 (before
 the formalization of the CBA award) had no retroactive effect to the
case.
12. Bank assailed in this Court the said resolutions by means of certiorari.
NUBE and 13employees of the bank, members of the PABECO
intervened in this case and prayed that the said resolutions be declared
void and that said sum of P345,000 be paid directly to the employees or
union members
ISSUE: W/N it is legal to deduct from the monetary benefits awarded in a
CBA the attorney’s fees of the lawyer who assisted the union president in
negotiating the agreement → NO
RULES
1. Art. 111. Attorney’s fees. — (a) In cases of unlawful withholding of
wages the culpable party may be assessed attorney’s fees equivalent
to ten percent of the amount of wages recovered.xxx (b) It shall be
unlawful for any person to demand or accept, in any judicial or
administrative proceedings for the recovery of wages, attorney’s fees
which exceed ten percent of the amount of wages recovered.cralaw
virtua1aw
2. Rule VIII, Book III of the IRR: Sec. 11. Attorney’s fees. —
Attorney’s fees in any judicial or administrative proceedings for the
recovery of wages shall not exceed 10% of the amount awarded. The
fees may be deducted from the total amount due the winning party."
3. "ART. 222. Appearances and Fees. — . . . (b) No attorney’s fees,
negotiation fees or similar charges of any kind arising from any
collective bargaining negotiations or conclusion of the collective
agreement shall be imposed on any individual member of the
contracting union: Provided, however, that attorney’s fees may be
charged against union funds in an amount to be agreed upon by
the parties. Any contract, agreement or arrangement of any sort to
the contrary shall be null and void."
4. "ART. 242. Rights and conditions of membership in a labor
organization. — The following are the rights and conditions of
membership in a labor organization:xxx (n) No special assessment
or other extraordinary fees may be levied upon the members of a
labor organization unless authorized by a written resolution of a
majority of all the members at a general membership meeting
duly called for the purpose. The secretary of the organization shall
record the minutes of the meeting including the list of all members
present, the votes cast, the purpose of the special assessment or fees
and the recipient of such assessment or fees. The record shall be
attested to by the president;.xxx (o) Other than for mandatory
activities under the Code, no special assessment, attorney’s fees,
negotiation fees or any other extraordinary fees may be checked
off from any amount due an employee without an individual
written authorization duly signed by the employee. The
authorization should specifically state the amount, purpose and
beneficiary of the deduction
HELD:
1. Article 111 refers to a proceeding for the recovery of wages and not to
CBA negotiations. The two are different or distinct proceedings.
2. The case is covered squarely by the mandatory and explicit prescription
of Art 22 which is another guarantee intended to protect the employee
against unwarranted practices that would diminish his compensation
without his knowledge and consent. (See National Power Corporation
Supervisors’ Union v. National Power Corporation).
3. Other provisions of the Labor Code animated by the same intention are
the following: Article 242, paragraphs (n) and (o) (See Rule #4); 288,
PD 442; 291, PD 570-A; 240, PD 626; 241, PD 850.
4. There is no doubt that lawyer Saavedra is entitled to the payment of his
fees but Article 222 ordains that union funds should be used for that
purpose. The amount of P345,000 does not constitute union funds. It is
money of the employees. The union, not the employees, is obligated to
Saavedra.
 EDUARDO J. MARIÑO, JR. + 3 v. GIL Y. GAMILLA + 7
2009 | Chico-Nazario, J. | Excluded EE’s > Union funds
SUMMARY: Petitioner group alleging to be the legitimate officers of
the Union and CBAgent of UST faculty is given a 42M peso economic
benefit package for the salaries of all CBU personnel. The officers
then demand a 10% check off as attorney’s fees, which the general
membership contests because the entire package is supposedly only
granted by virtue of law (RA 6728) directly to school personnel hence
not diminishable. Court agrees and explains that atty’s/negotiation
fees are generally only deductible from union funds but not from the
funds of individual union members.
DOCTRINE: general rule is that attys fees, etc. may only be collected
from union funds, from individual members. As an exception, special
assessments or fees may be checked off from an EE for as long as there
is proper authorization by EE.
A check-off is a process or device whereby the ER, on agreement
with the Union, or on prior authorization from the EEs, deducts union
dues or agency fees from the latter's wages and remits them directly to
the Union. The system of check-off is primarily for the benefit of the
Union and only indirectly, for individual EEs.
FACTS:
1. Mariño group bargaining with UST in union’s behalf led to
a MOA which granted additional economic benefits.
a. Aggregate amount of 42M inclusive of earnings but
exclusive of check-offs, shall be used for salary
increases.
b. chargeable against the share of the faculty members
in the incremental proceeds of tuition fees. Provided,
that the faculty shall still be entitled to their
proportionate share in the incremental proceeds of the
tuition fee which by law are required to be allotted for
the payment of salaries of personnel.
c. Allegedly this was individually ratified by majority of
the membership (signed doc)
d. Mariño group then wrote to UST Treasurer requesting
release of P4.2M, 10% of the P42M economic
benefits package granted by the MOA, in
consideration of its efforts in obtaining the package.
UST remitted it.
5. 15 DEC 1994, RESPs filed with Med-Ar Complaint for the
expulsion of Mariño Group as officers; alleged they violated the
conditions of membership by: 1) investing the balance of P42M
w/o prior approval; 2) ratifying CBA; and 3) approving attys fees
P4.2M in the form of check-off. 2 more complaints along this line
were filed.
6. Meanwhile DOLE DO No. 9 took effect, vesting jurisdiction in
Regional Director. Thus the cases were consolidated and indorsed,
and Dir. ruled for RESPs.
a. check-off of P4.2 M collected by the Mariño Group,
as negotiation fees, was invalid
b. Under RA 6728, 70% of tuition fee increases should
be allotted to personnel. Given that the records were
silent as to how much was from the statutory
allotment, the entire amount was considered within;
thus, could not be burdened by negotiation fees.
c. Upon appeal, BLR agreed that the P42 M package
was sourced from the faculty members share in the
tuition fee increases under RA 6728, 70% of which
go to the payment of salaries of personnel. (CIT v.
Ople) This is mandatory; cannot be diminished. Only
the amount beyond that mandated by law shall be
subject to negotiation fees.
d. P4.2 M collected by the Mariño Group was in the
nature of attys/negotiation fees, under the prohibition
in Article 222(b), VOID.
7. On certiorari, CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Was the 4.2M a valid check off on union funds? NO.
RATIO:
1. The law in the aforequoted Section 7 of MOA (3.b. of
FACTS) can only refer to RA 6728[1] which grants
various forms of financial aid to private educational
institutions such as tuition fee supplements.[2]
2. A private educational institution under RA 6728 still has
the discretion on the disposition of 70% of tuition fee
increase, e.g. kind of allowances to give. The only
precondition is that 70% goes to the payment of salaries.
3. MOA states the P42M granted by UST to members of its
CBU chargeable against the 70% allotment from the
proceeds of the tuition fee increases. As observed, absent
a showing sources other than the statutory 70% allotment,
conclusively presumed that the entirety of it came from
the law.
4. Article 222(b) LC prohibits payment of attorney's fees
only when it is effected through forced contributions from
the EEs from their own funds as distinguished from union
funds (general rule). As an exception, special assessments
or other extraordinary fees may be levied upon or checked
off from any amount due an EE for as long as there is
proper authorization by the EE.
5. A check-off is a process or device whereby the ER, on
agreement with the Union, or on prior authorization from
the EEs, deducts union dues or agency fees from the
latter's wages and remits them directly to the Union. Its
desirability in a labor org is quite evident, assured thereby
of continuous funding. The system of check-off is
primarily for the benefit of the Union and only indirectly,
for individual EEs.
6. In the instant case, the P42 M did not constitute union
funds from whence the P4.2 M could have been validly
deducted. It was intended for all mems of the CBU.
7. Requisites for a valid check-off of special assessments,
laid down by Article 241(n) and (o), not complied with:
1. · authorization by written resolution of the majority of all
union members at general membership meeting duly called
for the purpose;
2. · secretary's record of the minutes of the meeting
3. · individual written authorization for check-off duly signed
by the EE concerned
8. The ratification of the MOA by DOLE carried with it the
automatic authorization of the check-off of union dues in
favor of the union. Such a situation militates against the
legitimacy of the authorization for the P4.2 M check-off
by a majority of membership.
4. àAlthough the law does not prescribe a particular form for the
written authorization for the levy or check-off of special
assessments, the authorization must, at the very least, embody
the genuine consent of the union member.
9. P4.2 M illegal check off which rightfully belongs to the
intended beneficiaries: members of CBU.
10. Without prejudice to the right of petitioners to seek
reimbursement from the other USTFU officers and
directors, who were part of the Mariño Group, and who
were equally responsible for the illegal check-offs.
 MIRANDA v. ASIAN TERMINALS
June 23, 2009 | Puno, C. J. | Union Member Relations > Shop Steward
SUMMARY: Teodorico was appointed as Shop Steward (a union
position) of the APCWU. He was recalled from his position and was
reinstated to his former position as Checker. He filed a complaint with
Dole against the union president questioning the recall. The Med
Arbiter ruled in his favor ordering his reinstatement and backwages.
This decision was not executed and worse he was demoted from his
position so he filed series of complaints with DOLE and NLRC. Most
of the complaints dismissed but one filed against the company
president and the union president was decided in his favor by the
Labor Arbiter who ordered his reinstatement with backwages. The SC
resolved the question of WN he should be reinstated as Shop Steward
– The Court held that the Med-Arbiter’s decision prevails as his recall
was invalid HOWEVER, it cannot be enforced as the case has been
rendered moot and academic due to Teodorico’s valid retrenchment
DOCTRINE:
Union Shop Steward is a position within the union, and not within the
company. A shop steward is appointed by the union in a shop,
department, or plant and serves as representative of the union, charged
with negotiating and adjustment of grievances of employees with the
supervisor of the employer. He is the representative of the union
members in a building or other workplace.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Teodorico S. Miranda, Jr. was employed by
respondent ATI in 1991 as Checker I and became a member
of the Associated Port Checkers and Workers Union
(APCWU or the union).
2. April 10, 1992 - Teodorico who was then the Vice President
of the union, was appointed to the position of Shop Steward
(assigned to the night shift) which is a union position under
the payroll of the company.
3. CBA between the union and ATI provided for the
appointment of a Shop Steward from among the union
members, upon the recommendation of the union president.
a. The Shop Steward is a field representative of both the
company and the union and acts as an independent
arbiter of all complaints brought to his attention.
4. December 28, 1993- Roger P. Silva, the President of APCWU,
wrote a letter to Teodorico regarding the recall of his
designation as the union Shop Steward for the following
reasons:
a. loss of trust and confidence in him, pursuant to the
Agreement Amending the MPSI (Marina Port
Services, Inc.) - APCWU CBA.
b. refusal to heed the reminders concerning his chronic
absenteeism leaving the union members with no
responsible union officer when summoned for
investigation concerning alleged infractions of
company rules.
5. June 1994- Teodorico and other members of the union sent an
undated letter to ATI protesting the manner in which the
APCWU leadership handled the affairs of the union.
6. The grievance committee issued a report recommending to
ATI the recall of the petitioner as Shop Steward and for his
reversion to his former position of Checker I, in accordance
with the CBA.
7. The petitioner questioned his recall as union Shop Steward,
and the union president, Roger P. Silva, issued a letter which
reasoned that the petitioners recall as Shop Steward was
pursuant to the CBA which required that the term of office of
the Shop Steward shall be based on trust and confidence and
favorable recommendation of the duly elected president of the
Union.
8. DOLE NCR
 a. The petitioner first filed a complaint against Roger
Silva as the President of APCWU with DOLE NCR,
praying for his reinstatement as Shop Steward.
b. MedArbiter ordered reinstatement since union
president did not have the authority to recall the
petitioner as Shop Steward for lack of approval of the
Board of Directors of the union.
c. The Order of the Med-Arbiter was affirmed by the
Secretary of Labor
i. Silva relied heavily on the provisions of the CBA
1. “Section 2. …Only bonafide [sic] members of the union shall
be designated as shop steward whose designation and term of
office shall be based on trust and confidence and upon the
favorable recommendation of the duly elected president of the
union
ii. It is not the union president who makes the
appointment. The union president merely
recommends. The union constitution and by-laws
confers upon the Board of Directors the power to
approve appointments made by the President.
iii. Consequently, recall of appointments likewise
requires the imprimatur of the Board.
iv. Even assuming arguendo, that the union president has
the power to recall appointments, still the action may
not be upheld for being violative of complainants
right to due process.
1. no evidence was presented to substantiate that there was loss
of trust and confidence primarily arising from alleged
absenteeism. In fact, Mirandas subordinates executed
affidavits to the effect that he never failed to assist
2. The removal was effected without affording complainants the
opportunity to present their side since there was no showing
that an investigation was conducted prior to the removal of the
complainants.
9. Teodorico filed a series of complaints
a. 2nd complaint with DOLE NCR involving money
claims: Med-Arbiter dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
b. 1st complaint with NLRC for unfair labor practice
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
10. July 10, 1995- Teodorico was reassigned from the position of
Checker I to Checker I Mobile,which is lower in rank than
Checker I. and subsequently, he was further re-assigned to
Vessel Operation Checker, which is designated only to casual
Checkers.
11. Teodorico filed another series of complaints
a. 2nd complaint in the NLRC against the respondent
for unfair labor practice, illegal demotion and
reduction and diminution of pay- DISMISSED
asthere was a case pending which involved the same
parties and the same cause of action.
b. 3rd complaint with NLRC for Unfair Labor Practice
and Illegal Demotion against the company president,
operations manager and the union president -
dismissed on the ground that the claim is barred by
prior judgment
12. Appeal (of dismissal of P’s 3rd complaint) – NLRC remanded
back to LA
13. LA Amansec’s decision after remand – ordered reinstatement
with backwages
a. Demotion from union Shop Steward to Checker 1 was
for cause but was effected without observance of
procedural due process.
i. the managements approval of his recall and
termination as Shop Steward cannot be adjudged
as one constitutive of constructive dismissal.
ii. the company had the primordial duty to provide the
complainant an opportunity to explain why the
company should not affirm, approve and adopt the
unions recall prior to removing him as Shop
Steward.
 iii. Complainant had the right to refuse complainants
transfer to an inferior position since there appears
no justifiable basis therefor.
b. He ordered the respondent to pay the petitioner
indemnity in consonance with the Wenphil Doctrine,
which was then the prevailing doctrine with respect to
separation for a valid cause but through an invalid
procedure
c. ATI’s appeal of Labor Arbiter Amansec to the NLRC
arguing that the controversy between the petitioner
and the other officers and members of the union is an
intra-union dispute that must be resolved within the
union itself. – decision remanded to LA for
clarification
d. Teodorico filed for execution of the reinstatement
aspect of the decision of Labor Arbiter Amansec,
praying to be reinstated to the position of union Shop
Steward.
14. Motion for reinstatement by Teodorico to the position of
union Shop Steward – granted by LA Reyes
15. ATI filed for Prohibition, TRO and/or Writ of Permanent
Injunction claiming that the petitioner should merely be
reinstated to his previous position of Checker I.
16. Teodorico was retrenched by ATI from his position then as a
Vessel Operation Checker.
17. Teodorico filed a separate case questioning the validity of his
retrenchment - terminated upon the execution of a Quit Claim
and Release
18. NLRC- there is no need to execute the reinstatement aspect of
the decision of Labor Arbiter Amansec since it has been
rendered moot and academic by the petitioners
re-employment as Checker I
19. CA reversed NLRC - It ruled that the reinstatement aspect of
the labor arbiters decision is immediately executory and not
even the filing of an appeal or the posting of a bond could
forestall the same. However, the confusion remained as to
which position the petitioner should be reinstated.
20. ATI filed a MR; CA vacated its earlier decision rendered and
ruled that the petitions at bar had been rendered moot and
academic. MR denied
ISSUE:
(1) whether the petitioner should be reinstated to the position of Shop
Steward – Yes, but this cannot enforced as there was a valid
retrenchment and union position cannot be occupied by one who is not
employed the company
(2) whether the case has been rendered moot and academic. – YES
RATIO:
Union Shop Steward: A position within the union (RELEVANT
TO OUR TOPIC)
1. It is a position within the union, and not within the company.
2. A shop steward is appointed by the union in a shop, department,
or plant and serves as representative of the union, charged with
negotiating and adjustment of grievances of employees with the
supervisor of the employer. He is the representative of the union
members in a building or other workplace.
3. Black's Law Dictionary: a union official elected to represent
members in a plant or particular department. His duties include
collection of dues, recruitment of new members and initial
negotiations for the settlement of grievances.
4. Section 2 of Rule XIX of the Implementing Rules of Book V of
the Labor Code, as amended by D0 40-03
a. shop steward is responsible for receiving complaints
and grievances of the employees and for bringing
these complaints to the immediate supervisor of the
employee concerned. If the grievance is not settled
through the efforts of the shop steward, it is referred
to the grievance committee.
5. Santa Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union v. Coca-Cola
Bottlers Phils., Inc.:
a. Landrum Griffin Act of 1959 was used as the bases
to conclude that the Shop Steward is an officer of the
union which confirms that the Shop Steward
occupies a position of trust within the union. It may
be an elective official within the union or key
administrative personnel, and it is considered to be
within the same class as union officers, agents and
representatives.
b. “He is to help other members when they have
concerns with the employer or other workrelated
issues. He is the first person that workers turn to for
assistance or information. If someone has a problem
at work, the steward will help them sort it out or, if
necessary, help them file a complaint. In the
performance of his duties, he has to take cognizance
of and resolve, in the first instance, the grievances of
the members of the Union. He is empowered to
decide for himself whether the grievance or
complaint of a member of the petitioner Union is
valid, and if valid, to resolve the same with the
supervisor failing which, the matter would be
elevated to the Grievance Committee.”
c. “ the jurisdiction of shop stewards and the
supervisors includes the determination of the issues
arising from the interpretation or even
implementation of a provision of the CBA, or from
any order or memorandum, circular or assignments
issued by the appropriate authority in the
establishment. In fine, they are part and parcel of the
continuous process of grievance resolution designed
to preserve and maintain peace among the
employees and their employer. They occupy
positions of trust and laden with awesome
responsibilities.
Intra-union dispute
1. Since the Shop Steward is a union position, the controversy
surrounding his recall from his position as Shop Steward
becomes a dispute within the union.
a. An "Internal Union Dispute" or intra-union conflict
refers to a conflict within or inside a labor union.
b. Article 226 of the Labor Code of the Philippines vests
on the Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor
Relations Division jurisdiction to act on all inter-union
or intra-union conflicts.
2. In this case, P’s grievances were directed against the union and
not the company
a. He actually first filed a complaint against the union, but
since the money claims (backwages) could not be
executed against the un since he was paid by the
company, he then included the respondent company in
his later complaints
Ruling of the Med-Arbiter Prevails: Invalid Recall
1. The Med-Arbiter, as affirmed by the Secretary of Labor, ruled
that there was neither cause nor due process in the recall of the
petitioner from the position of union Shop Steward.
2. He found that the claim of loss of trust and confidence due to
the petitioners alleged absenteeism was not substantiated and
that the recall was not approved by the Board of Directors of
the union, as required by the APCWU Constitution and
By-Laws.
3. It is inappropriate to review the factual findings of the
Med-Arbiter and the Secretary of Labor regarding the invalidity
of the petitioners recall due to a violation of the APCWU
Constitution and By-Laws which requires that the recall must
be approved by the union Board of Directors. These facts are
binding on the SC
The Labor Arbiters decision is void for want of jurisdiction
1. Labor Arbiter incorrectly assumed jurisdiction over the case
due to his confused understanding of the relationship between
and among the petitioner, respondent company and the union
and his decision on the merits of the case is void for lack of
jurisdiction.

Petitioner cannot be reinstated to Shop Steward due to his valid

retrenchment
1. The events which have taken place during the pendency of the
case have rendered the present petition moot and academic.
2. Notwithstanding the determination of the Med-Arbiter,the
petitioner could not be reinstated to the position of Shop
Steward because his eventual separation from respondent ATI
made reinstatement unfeasible since employment with
respondent ATI and membership in the union are required in
order to occupy the position of Shop Steward.
3. Because of the petitioners retrenchment, which was finally
settled through the Quit Claim and Release, any order for the
reinstatement of the petitioner to the position of union Shop
Steward can no longer be executed by the union
 GABRIEL, LUALHATI, SIA, EUGENIO, MAKISIG and
SALAS v. HON. SARMIENTO, ET AL.
| March 16, 2000 | Quisumbing, J.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners comprise the Executive Board of the SolidBank Union,
the duly recognized collective bargaining agent for the rank and
file employees of Solid Bank Corporation.
2. Respondents are members of said union.
3. The Executive Board decided to retain the service of Atty. Lacsina
as union counsel in connection with the negotiations for a new
CBA.
a. The board called a general membership meeting for the
purpose
b. Majority of all union members approved and signed a
resolution confirming the decision of the executive board
to engage the services of Atty. Lacsina as union counsel
4. The resolution provided that 10% of the total economic benefits
that may be secured through the negotiations will be given to Atty.
Lacsina as attorneys fees.
a. It also contained an authorization for SolidBank
Corporation to check-off said attorney’s fees from the
first lump sum payment of benefits to the employees
under the new CBA and to turn over said amount to Atty.
Lacsina
5. When the CBA was signed, the bank made payroll deductions for
attorneys fees from the CBA benefits paid to the union members
in accordance with the resolution
6. Private respondents then instituted a complaint against the
petitioners and the union counsel before the DOLE for illegal
deduction of attorneys fee as well as quantification of the benefits
in the 1992 CBA.
a. Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint
citing litis pendentia, forum shopping and failure to state
a cause of action.
b. Med-Arbiter ordered the petitioners to return immediately
to the respondents the illegally deducted amount of
attorney’s fees from the package of benefits.
c. On appeal, Secretary of Labor ordered the refund to be
limited to those union members who have not signed their
conformity to the check-off of attorneys fees.
ISSUE: WON refund should be made by everyone?
PETITIONERS: The General Membership Resolution authorizing
the bank to check-off attorney’s fees from the first lump sum payment
of the benefits to the employees under the new CBA satisfies the legal
requirements for such assessment
RESPONDNETS: The check-off provision is illegal because it was
never submitted for approval at a general membership meeting called
for the purpose and that it failed to meet the formalities mandated by
the Labor Code.
HELD:
1. The Court first looked at the pertinent legal provisions on check-
offs which are Article 222(b) and Article 241(o) of the Labor Code
a. Article 222(b) states that “No attorney’s fees […] arising
from any collective bargaining negotiations or
conclusions of the collective agreement shall be imposed
on any individual member of the contracting union:
Provided, however, that attorney’s fees may be charged
against union funds in an amount to be agreed upon by the
parties.
b. Article 241 (o) states that no special assessment,
attorney’s fees may be checked off from any amount due
to an employee without an individual written
authorization duly signed by the employee. The
authorization should specifically state the amount,
purpose and beneficiary of the deduction.
2. The Court then enumerated the three requisites for the validity of
the special assessment for attorney’s fees:
 a. Authorization by a written resolution of the majority of all general fund or account. No deduction may be made from the
the members at the general membership meeting called salaries of the concerned employees other than those mandated by
for the purpose law.
b. Secretary’s record of the minutes of the meeting
c. Individual written authorization for check off duly signed
by the employees concerned
3. Clearly, attorney’s fees may not be deducted or checked off from
any amount due to an employee without his written consent.
4. The Court found that the General Membership Resolution of the
SolidBank Union did not satisfy the requirements laid down by
law and jurisprudence for the validity of the ten percent (10%)
special assessment for unions incidental expenses, attorney’s fees
and representation expenses.
a. There were no individual written check off authorizations
by the employees concerned and so the assessment cannot
be legally deducted by their employer
5. Palacol v. Ferrer-Calleja: the express consent of employees is
required, and this consent must be obtained in accordance with the
steps outlined by law, which must be followed to the letter. No
shortcuts are allowed.
6. Stellar Industrial Services, Inc. v. NLRC: Written individual
authorization duly signed by the employee concerned is a
condition sine qua non for such deduction.
7. BPI Employees Union-Association Labor Union v. NLRC:
Article 222(b) prohibits the payment of attorney’s fees only when
it is effected through forced contribution from workers from their
own funds as distinguished from the union funds. […] The
obligation to pay the attorney’s fees belongs to the union and
cannot be shunted to the workers as their direct responsibility.
Neither the lawyer nor the union itself may require the individual
worker to assume the obligation to pay attorney’s fees from their
own pockets
8. Hence, public respondent did not act with grave abuse of
discretion when he ruled that the workers through their union
should be made to shoulder the expenses incurred for the services
of a lawyer. The reimbursement should be charged to the unions
 PENINSULA EMPLOYEES UNION v. ESQUIVEL, ET AL.
| December 1, 2016 | Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
1. PEU’s Board of Directors passed Local Board Resolution No. 12,
series of 2007 authorizing (a) the affiliation of PEU with
NUWHRAIN, and the direct membership of its individual
members thereto; (b) the compliance with all the requirements
therefor; and (c) the Local President to sign the affiliation
agreement with NUWHRAIN upon acceptance of such affiliation.
a. The said act was submitted to the general membership on
the same day and was duly ratified by 223 EPU members
2. PEU-NUWHRAIN sought to increase the union dues/agency fees
from one percent to two percent of the rank and file employees’
monthly salaries, brought about by PEU’s affiliation with
NUWHRAIN, which supposedly requires its affiliates to remit to
it two percent of their monthly salaries
3. Meanwhile, the OSEC in a decision resoled the collective
bargaining deadlock between PEU-NUWHRAIN and The
Peninsula Manila Hotel, ordering the parties to execute a CBA
incorporating the arbitral award.
4. PEU-NUWHRAIN requested OSEC for Administrative
Intervention for Dispute Avoidance pursuant to DOLE Circ. No.
1 in relation to the issues, among others, of its entitlement to
collect increased agency fees from the non-PEU members.
5. The non-PEU members objected to the assessment of increased
agency fees arguing that: (a) the new CBA is unenforceable since
no written CBA has been formally signed and executed by PEU-
NUWHRAIN and the Hotel, (b) the 2% agency fee is exorbitant
and unreasonable; and (c) PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to comply
with the mandatory requirements for such increase.
6. OSEC upheld PEU-NUWHRAIN’s right to collect agency fees
from the non-PEU members in accordance with the CBA but only
at a rate of one percent, and denied its bid to increase the fees t
two percent for failure to show that the general membership
approved the same.
a. Upon MR, OSEC partially granted the motion for
reconsideration, declaring PEU-NUWHRAIN entitled to
collect two percent agency fees from non-PEU members
but only from the time the GMR showing approval for the
increase of the union dues was procured
7. Respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the CA
a. CA set aside OSEC’s Order and reinstated its earlier
decision.
b. It rueld that PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to prove
compliance with the requisites for a valid check=off since
the October 28, 2008 minutes do not show that the
increase in union dues was duly approved by its general
membership.
ISSUE: WON PEU-NUWHRAIN has right to collect the increased
agency fees - NO
HELD:
1. The recognized collective bargaining union which successfully
negotiated the CBA with the employer is given the right to collect
a reasonable fee called ”agency fee” from non-union members
who are employees of the appropriate bargaining unit, in an
amount equivalent to the dues and other fees paid by union
members, in case they accept the benefits under the CBA
2. While the collection of agency fee is recognized by Article 259 of
the Labor Code, the legal basis of the union’s right to agency fees
is neither contractual nor statutory but quasi contractual – deriving
from the established principle that non-union employees may not
unjustly enrich themselves by benefiting from unemployment
conditions negotiated by the bargaining union
3. In the present case, PEU-NUWHRAIN’s right to collect agency
fees is not disputed. However, the rate of agency fees it seeks to
collect from the non-PEU members is contested, considering its
failure to comply with the requirements for a valid increase of
union dues, rendering the collection of increased agency fees
unjustified
4. Case law mandates the submission of three documentary NUWHRAIN’s 8th General Membership Meeting, there was
requirements in order to justify a valid levy of increased union nothing to confirm, affirm, or ratify through the GMR.
dues 7. Contrary to the ruling of the OSEC, the GMR by itself cannot
a. An authorization by a written resolution of the majority of justify the collection of two percent of agency fees from the non-
all the members at the general membership meeting duly PEU members.
called for the purpose a. Assembly was not called for the purpose of approving the
b. The secretary’s record of the minutes of the meeting, proposed increase in union dues and the corresponding
which shall include the list of all members present, the check-off
votes cast, the purpose of the special assessment of fees 8. No individual check-off can proceed therefrom, and the
and the recipient of such assessment or fees submission of the November check off became inconsequential
c. Individual written authorizations for check-off duly 9. Jurisprudence states that the express consent of the employee to
signed by the employees concerned. any deduction in his compensation is required to be obtained in
5. In the present case, PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to show compliance accordance with the steps outlined by the law which must be
with the requirements. It attempted to remedy the “inadvertent followed to the letter
omission” of the matter of the approval of the deduction of two a. PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to comply
percent union dues from the monthly basic salary of each union 10. Petition Denied
member through the GMR(General Membership Resolution)
a. It is evident that while the matter of implementing the two
percent union dues was taken up during the General
Membership Meeting, there was no sufficient showing
that the same had been duly deliberated and approved.
b. Minutes of the Assembly itself belie PEU-NUWHRAIN’s
claim that the increase in union dues and the
corresponding check-off were duly approved since it
merely states that the 2% union dues will have to be
implemented, meaning, it would still require the
submission of such matter to the assembly for deliberation
and approval
c. Such conclusion is bolstered by the silence fo the GMR
on the matter of two percent union dues, in contrast to the
payment o 10% attorneys fees from the CBA backwages
which was clearly spelled out as having been “discussed
and approved”
6. Having failed to establish due deliberation and approval of the
increase in union dues from one percent to two percent, as well as
the deduction of the two percent union dues during PEU-
 VENGCO, MOISES, REYES, WAGAS, ET AL v. HON.
TRAJANO and TIMBUNGCO
| May 5, 1989 | Medialdea, J.
FACTS:
1. Sometime in 1981, the Management of the Anglo-American
Tobacco Corporation and the Kapisanan ng Mangagawa sa
Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation entered into a compromise
agreement whereby the company will pay to the union members
the sum of P150,000 for their claims arising from the unpaid
ECOLA and other benefits which were the subject of their
complaint before the ministry of labor
2. Respondent Timbungco was the union president who received the
money in installments.
a. Thereafter, he distributed it among union members
3. Petitioner Vengco, et al, are union members who noted that
Timbungco was not authorized by the union workers to get the
money; and that ten percent of the P150,000 had been deducted to
pay attorney’s fees without their written authorization in violation
of Article 242(o) of the Labor Code
a. They demanded from Timbugnco an accounting of how
the P150,000 was distributed to the members
4. Timbungco did not give in to their demand. Hence, petitioners
filed a complaint with the Ministry of Labor praying for (a)
expulsion of Timbungco as union president, (b) an order requiring
Timbungco to render accounting of how the P150,000 was
distributed, and (3) an order requiring private respondent to
publish the bulletin board of the list of the members and the
corresponding amount they each received from the P150,000.
a. Timbungco alleged that he was authorized by a resolution
signed by majority of the union members to receive and
distribute the P150,000 among the workers, and that the
10% deduction was in accordance with the IRR of the
Labor Code.
b. Med-Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit.
c. Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations reversed and
Timbungco was ordered to make an accounting.
d. Upon MR, the resolution was set aside but an audit
examination of the book of account of FOITAF was
ordered
ISSUE: WON Timbungco must be ordered to render of the P150,000
received by him and be removed as president - YES
HELD:
1. The Court first looked at Article 241 (o) and then said that it is
very clear that attorney’s fees may not be deducted or checked off
from any amount due to an employee without his written consent
except for mandatory activities under th e Code.
2. A mandatory activity has been defined as a judicial process of
settling dispute laid down by the law
3. In the instant case, the amicable settlement entered into by the
management and the union cannot be shattered a s mandatory
activity under the Code.
4. Moreover, Book III, Rule VIII, Section II of the Implementing
Rules cited by Timbungco which dispenses with the required
written authorization from the employees concerned does not
apply in this case.
a. This provision envisions a situation where there is a
judicial or administrative proceedings for recovery of
wages.
b. Upon termination of the proceedings, the law allows a
deduction for attorney's fees of 10% from the total amount
due to a winning party.
c. In the herein case, the fringe benefits received by the
union members consist of back payments of their unpaid
emergency cost of living allowances which are totally
distinct from their wages. Allowances are benefits over
and above the basic salaries of the employees (University
of Pangasinan Faculty Union vs. University of
 Pangasinan, G.R. No. L-63122, February 20, 1984, 127
SCRA 691). We have held that such allowances are
excluded from the concept of salaries or wages (Cebu
Institute of Technology (CIT) vs. Ople, G.R. No. L-
58870, December 18, 1987, 156 SCRA 629). In addition,
the payment of the fringe benefits were effected through
an amicable settlement and not in an administrative
proceeding.
5. The submission by Timbungco of an accounting report on the
distribution of P 150,000.00 is of no moment in the face of our
findings that the deduction of 10% for attorney's fees is illegal and
void for failure to comply with the requirements of the law.
6. Considering the aforestated violations of Timbungco, there can be
no question that he should bear the consequences of his acts. We
find that the penalty of expulsion from the union presidency
imposed upon Timbungco is justified.
GALVADORES, ET AL v. HON. TRAJANO, MANGGAGAWA
NG KOMUNIKASYON SA PILIPINAS (FIWU), PLDT, and
ESPINAS
Mandatory Activity | September 15, 1986 | Melencio-Herrera, J.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners are employees of PLDT and members of Free
Telephone Workers Union, now the Manggagawa ng
Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas.
2. Respondnet Atty. Espinas has been the legal counsel of respondent
Union since 1964. For his services, he was hired on a case to case
contingent fee basis.
a. He received in September 1983 a letter from the Union
President asking him to appear as counsel in the ongoing
dispute as PLDT.
b. In consideration thereof, the union will pay him 10% of
any improvement of the PLDT’s last offer to the deadlock
in CBA negotiations
3. PLDT’s “last offer” was P230 for the first year of the CBA, and
P100 on the second year, and P90 on the third year
4. The Minister of Labor and Employment assumed jurisdiction over
all unresolved issues in the bargaining deadlock between the
PLDT and union and proceeded to resolve the same by
compulsory arbitration
5. The MOLE awarded across-the-board wage increases of
P330/month for the first year, P155 for the second year and third
year. This is on top of Christmas bonus and other fringe benefits.
These are “improvements” obtained form PLDT’s last offer.
6. The Executive Board of the union passed a resolution requesting
PLDT to deduct P115 per employees for the legal services
extended to the union by Espinas.
7. Petitioners numbering 5,258 filed a letter-complaint before the
MOLE through Galvadores assailing the imposition of P155 per
employee as attorney’s fees.
a. Petitioners claim that the attorney’s fees of Espinas were
not only unreasonable but also violative of Article 242(o)
of the Labor Code that deductions cannot be given legal
affect by a mere board resolution but needs the ratification
by the general membership of the union
8. Respondents Union and Counsel argued that the attorney’s fees
being exacted pertained to Espinas’ services during compulsory
arbitration proceeds and cannot be considered as negotiation fees
or attorney’s fees within the context of Article 242(o)
9. MOLE referred the dispute to the Bureau of Labor Relations for
being intra-union nature.
10. Union filed a Manifestation that about 6,067 members of the
Union ratified the resolution of the council in a plebiscite called
for that purpose.
a. Petitioner questioned the plebiscite on the ground that it
was misleading and deceptive as it assumed there was no
dispute regarding the deduction of attorney’s fees from
the monetary benefits awarded to PLDT employees.
b. Respondnet Director Trajano dismissed petitioner’s
complaint for lack of merit saying that the outcome of
plebiscite negates any question on the right of the union
and counsel to collect the amount of P115 from each of
the employees
Petitioners: Individual written authorization must first be obtained
before any assessment can be made against the monetary benefits
awarded to them pursuant to Article 242(o). And that the attorney’s
fees must be sourced from Union funds
Respondents: compulsory arbitration is a “mandatory activity” and
an exception to article 242(o) of the Labor Code and that the Union
members approved the questioned deduction in the plebiscite.
ISSUE: WON compulsory arbitration is a “mandatory activity” that
will serve as exemption to Article 242(o)
HELD:
1. The Court first looked at Article 222(b) and Article 242(o) of the
Labor Code/
2. The Court then cited the Omnibus Rules implementing the Labor
Code which provide that deductions form wages of the employees
may only be made by the employer in cases authorized by law,
including deductions for insurance premiums advanced by the
employer on behalf of the employees as well as union dues where
the right to check-off is authorized in writing by the individual
employees himself
3. The provisions are clear. No check offs from any amounts due
employees may be effected without individual written
authorizations duly signed by the employee specifically stating the
amount, purpose and beneficiary of the deduction.
a. The required individual authorizations in this case are
wanting. In fact, petitioner employees are vigorously
objecting
b. The question in the plebiscite assumed that there was no
dispute relative to attorney’s fees
4. Contrary to respondents’ stand, the benefits awarded to
PLDT employees still part of the collective bargaining
negotiations although placed already under compulsory
arbitration
a. Notwithstanding its “compulsory” nature, this is not a
“mandatory activity” under the Code which dispenses
with individual written authorizations for checkoffs
b. It is a judicial process of settling disputes laid down by
law. Besides, Article 222(b) does not except a CBA, later
placed under a compulsory arbitration, form the ambit of
its prohibition.
c. The cardinal principle should be borne in mind that
employees are protected by law from unwarranted
practices that diminish their compensation without their
knowledge and consent.
CONTINENTAL CEMENT CORPORATION LABOR UNION
v. CONTINENTAL CEMENT CORPORATION and DEPUTY
MINISTER OF LABOR
Union Information/Obligation | August 30, 1990 | Gancayco, J.
FACTS:
1. The NLRC issued an arbitration award in two cases resolving
demands of the petitioner respecting the working terms and
conditions that should be observed in the establishment of private
respondent Continental Cement Corporation
2. However, due to disagreement on the interpretation of the
provisions of the award concerning vacation, sick leaves and
standardization of wages, compliance was delayed
3. In order to compel private respondent to immediately implement
the award, petitioner staged a strike.
a. Tis was lifted after private respondent agreed to pay the
disputed employees’ leaves.
4. Private respondent sought clarification from the labor arbiter as to
WON a group of 91 workers who were unable to complete 300
days of work within a 12month period was entitled to
proportionate payment of vacation and sick leave benefits
a. LA ruled that the award required private respondent to
make proportionate payments in favor of the workers.
This was appealed
b. Petitioner filed a notice of strike for its refusal to make the
proportionate payments and carried it out. The strike was
settled after private respondent agreed to pay out of
“humanitarian reasons” but reserved the right to seek
clarification of its obligations under the NLRC award
5. The obligation of private respondent to pay the employees their
vacation and sick leaves developed into a new issue between the
parties.
a. There was a disagreement as to the method of payment
and the time of the payment.
b. Petitioner staged a strike picketing the entrance of the
premises of private respondent.
6. The minister of labor issued an order thru the Director of the BLR,
directing the striking workers to resume work under the terms and
conditions prevailing prior to work stoppage.
7. Nevertheless, only 11 out of the total work force of 120 reported
for work and were admitted by the company.
a. Petitioner filed MR to the return-to-work order or its
suspension pending compliance by private respondent
8. The MOLE certified the dispute between the parties to the NLRC
for compulsory arbitration
a. Under the Labor Code, this certification had the effect of
automatically enjoining any strike by the union
b. Nonetheless, some 110 striking workers did not return to
work. Hence, private respondent filed with DOLE reports
on the dismissal of those who failed to comply with the
return-to-work order
9. The president of petitioner and other officers requested admission
to work but were informed that their employed had been
terminated by the company
10. After due hearing, NLRC rendered a judgment dismissing the
union officers from the company and form their positions as
officers in the union, and suspending the union members who
participated in the strike
a. MOLE affirmed upon appeal. MR denied
ISSUE: WON the strike staged by petitioner until its lifting was illegal
and WON the penalties by the NLRC to the union officers are
warranted - YES
HELD:
1. The Court first looked into PD 823 which states that all forms of
strike are strictly prohibited in vital industries, and then the LOI
No. 368 which listed cement as a vital industry in relation to PD
823.
2. Private respondent was engaged in the manufacture of cement
which is a vital industry in which a strike or lockout is prohibited
under the decree.
 a. Even assuming that private respondent was not engaged
in a vital industry, the strike that was staged by petitioner
was nonetheless illegal. It was not in connection with any
unresolved economic issues in collective bargaining
which is the only ground for which a lawful strike can be
held.
3. The issue between he petitioner and the private respondent ast the
time of the strike concerned merely the implementation of an
arbitration award of the NLRC.
a. Petitioner had the remedy of applying for a writ of
execution to enforce the award
Furthermore, under Section 1 of PD 823, there is a
requirement of notice

4. As to the invocation of petitioner of its right to strike as a measure

of self-defense, the Court held that non-compliance with the said
award did not threaten the existence of petitioners or that of its
members.
a. The dispute did not concern the right of the union to
organize nor the employees’ right to work.
b. It merely involved the non-payment of the vacation and
sick leaves of the employees for the past years.
5. The strike in question did not only violate the no-strike policy of
the state in regard to vital industries, but it also defied the orders
of the Director of Labor Relations and the MOLE for them to
return to work.
6. As to the separation form work of the officers, the Court held that
the officers had the duty to guide their members to respect the law.
Instead, they urged them to violate it and defy the authorities.
Their responsibility is greater than that of the members. Their
dismissal is a just penalty for the unlawful acts.
7. The officers of petitioner misinformed the members and led them
into staging an illegal strike. If NLRC is to attain the objective of
the LC to ensure stable but dynamic and just industrial peace, the
removal of undesirable labor leaders must be effected.
 MALAYAN EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION – FFW and
MANGALINGO v. MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY
Union Leave | February 2, 2010 | Brion, J.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner union is the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-
file employees of the company.
2. A provision in the CB with the company allows union official to
avail of union leave with pay for a total of 90 days per year for the
purpose of attending various meetings and activities
3. The company issued a rule requiring not only the prior notice that
the CBA express requires, but prior approval by the department
head before the union and its members can avail of union leaves.
a. The rule was placed into effect without any objection
from the union until a union officer filed for leave
application two years later.
b. The department head disapproved because the department
was undermanned.
4. Despite the disapproval, Mangalino proceeded to take the union
leave, believing in good faith that he had complied with the
existing company practice and procedure set forth in the CBA.
a. Company suspended him for a week for the first offense,
and a month for the second.
5. The union raised the suspension as a grievance issue and went
through the grievance processes.
a. After internal remedies failed, the union went to the
NCMB for preventive mediation. When this vailed,
parties submitted the dispute for voluntary arbitration
b. The Arbitrators held that the suspension for the first
offense was invalid while the second was valid.
6. Company appealed the decision to the CA which upheld the
validity of the suspension on the basis of company’s prerogative
to prescribe reasonable rules to regulate the use of union leaves.
CA denied MR.
COMPANY: the regulation of the use of union leaves is within the
company’s management prerogative and the company was simply
exercising its management prerogative when it requires its employees
to first obtain the approval of either the department head or the human
resource manager before making use of any union leave. Hence,
petitioner committed acts of insubordination when he insisted going
to leave despite the disapproval
UNION: the use of management prerogative was improver because
the CBA grant of the union leave benefit did not require prior
company’s approval as condition. Any change requires union
conformity.
ISSUE: WON the suspension was invalid - NO
HELD:
1. While it is true that the union and its members have been granted
union leave privileges under the CBA, the grant cannot be
considered separately form the other provisions of the CBA
particularly on the provision on management prerogatives where
the CBA reserved for the company the full and complete authority
in managing and running its business
2. The Court saw nothing in the wordings of the union leave
provision that removes form the company the right to prescribe
reasonable rules and regulation to govern the manner of availing
union leaves, particularly the prerogative to require prior approval
3. Precisely, prior notice is expressly required und eth CBA so that
the company can appropriately respondent to the request of the
leave.
a. The rule requiring prior approval only made express what
is implied in the terms of the CBA
4. The union accepted the regulation without objection since its
promulgation and the rule on its face is not unreasonable,
oppressive nor violative of CBA terms.
a. Ample evidence exists indicating the union acquiescence
to the rule.
 b. Union and its members have willing applied for approval
as the rule requires
c. No letter form union complaining about the unilateral
change in policy
d. Even Mangalino himself in the past had filed application
for union leave with his manager and complied with the
disapproval without protest
5. Thus, when Mangalino asserted his right to take a leave without
prior approval, the requirement for prior approval was already in
place and established and could no longer be removed except with
company’s consent or by express agreement in future CBA
6. The prior approval policy fully supported the validity of the
suspension of the company imposed on Mangalino
a. As an employee, Mangalino had the clear obligation to
comply with the management disapproval of his request
leave while at the same time registering his objection to
the company regulation nd action
b. That he still went on leave in open disregard of his
superior’s orders rendered him open to the charge
insubordination, separate from his being AWOL
BELYCA CORPORATION v. DIR. CALLEJA, MILADO,
and ALU-TUCP
Determination of Appropriate Bargaining Unit – Proper
Constituency | November 29, 1988 | Paras, J.
FACTS:
1. Private Respondent Associated Labor Union (ALU-TUCP), a
legitimate organization duly registered with the Ministry of Labor
and Employment. On the other hand, Belyco Corporation is a
corporation engaged in the business of poultry raising, piggery and
planting of agricultural crops with around 205 rank and file
employees.
2. ALU-TUCP filed with the Regional Office of the Ministry of
Labor and Employment a petition for direct certification as the
sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank and file
employees of Belyca Corporation.
3. ALU-TUCP in its petition and position paper alleged:
a. There is no existing CBA between petitioner corporation
and any other existing labor unions
b. There had neither been a certification election conducted
in the proposed bargaining unit within the last 12 months
prior to the filing of the petition nor a contending union
requesting for certification as the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative in the proposed bargaining unit
c. More than a majority of respondent employer’s rank and
file employees/workers in the proposed bargaining unit or
one hundred 138 have signed membership with ALU-
TUCP and have expressed their written consent and
authorization to the filing of the petition
d. That in response to petitioner union’s two letters to the
General Manager of petitioner, requesting for direct
recognition as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of
the rank-and-file workers, the petitioner employer has
locked out 119 of its rank-and-file employees in the said
bargaining unit and had dismissed earlier the local union
president, and other officers of the union for which an
unfair labor practice case was filed by respondent.
4. Petitioner on the other hand alleged that:
a. Due to the nature of its business, very few of its
employees are permanent, the overwhelming majority of
which are seasonal and causal and regular employees
b. That out of the total 138 rank-and-file employees who
authorized, signed and supported the filing of the petition,
14 were no longer working, 4 resigned, 6 withdrew their
membership, 5 were retrenched, 12 were dismissed due to
malicious insubordination and destruction of property,
100 simply abandoned their work or stopped working,
c. That the 128 incumbent employees or workers of the
livestock sections were merely transferred from the
agricultural section as replacement for those who have
been dismissed, retrenched or resigned
d. The statutory requirement for holding a certification
election has not been complied with by the union.
5. Labor Arbiter, thorugh an order, granted the certification election
sought by respondent
a. Belyca Corporation appealed the order to the BLR.
Denied. MR denied. Hence, a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction seeking to annul
or to set aside the resolution of the BLR was filed by
petitioner.
ISSUE: WON the proposed bargaining unit is an appropriate
bargaining unit - YES
RESPONDENT: Seeks direct certification as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of all the rank-and-file workers of the livestock and
agro-division of petitioner BELYCA corporation, engaged in piggery,
poultry raising and the planting of agricultural crops such as corn,
coffee and various vegetables
PETITIONER: the bargaining unit must include all the workers in its
integrated business concerns ranging from piggery, poultry, to
supermarts and cinemas so as not to split an otherwise single
bargaining unit into fragmented bargaining units.
HELD:
1. The Labor Code does not specifically define what constitutes an
appropriate collective bargaining unit
a. Article 256: the labor organization designated or selected
by the majority of the employees in an appropriate
collective bargaining unit shall be exclusive
representative of the employees in such unit for purpose
of collective bargaining.
2. Rothernberg: a proper bargaining unit maybe said to be a group
of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than
all of the entire body of employees, which the collective interests
of all the employees consistent with equity to the employer,
indicate to be best suited to serve reciprocal rights and duties of
the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.
3. Democratic Labor Association v. Cebu Stevedoring: the factors
considered are: (1) will of employees (Glove Doctrine); (2)
affinity and unity of employee’s interest, such as substantial
similarity of work and duties or similarity of compensation and
working conditions; (3) prior collective bargaining history, and (4)
employment status, such as temporary, seasonal and probationary
employees.
a. The Court stressed the importance of the fourth factor and
sustained the trial court’s conclusion that two separate
bargaining units should be formed in dealing with
respondent company, one consisting of regular and
permanent employees, and another consisting of casual
laborers or stevedores. Temporary employees should be
treated separately form permanent employees.
b. More importantly, the Court laid down the test of proper
grouping which is community and mutuality of interest.
4. Alhambra Cigar v. Alhambra EA: the employment status was not
at issue but the nature of work of the employees concerned was.
a. The Court stressed the importance of the second factor or
the “substantial-mutual-interest test” and found no
reason to disturb the finding of the lower court that the
employees in the administrative, sales and dispensary
departments perform work which has nothing to do with
production and maintenance, unlike those in the raw leaf,
cigar, cigarette and packing and engineering departments
and therefore community of interest which justifies the
format or existence as a separate appropriate collective
bargaining unit.
5. PLALSU v. CIR: Court reiterated ruling both aforementioned
rulings and held that among the factors to be considered are:
employment status of the employees to be affected, that is the
positions and categories of work to which they belong, and the
unity of employees’ interest such as substantial similarity of work
and duties.
6. In any event, whether importance is focused on the employment
status or the mutuality of interest of the employees, concerned,
“the basic test of an asserted bargaining unit’s acceptability is
WON it is fundamentally the combination which will best
assure to all employees the exercise of their collective
bargaining rights.
7. In the case ta bar, the employees of the livestock and agro division
of Belyca Corporation perform work entirely different from those
performed by employees in the supermats and cinema.
a. The noted difference are: working conditions, hours of
work, rates of pay, including the categories of their
positions and employment status.
b. Due to the nature of the business in which its livestock-
agro division is engaged in, very few of its employees in
the divisions are permanent - the overwhelming majority
of which are seasonal and casual and not regular
employees.
 c. Definitely they have little common with the employees of
the supermarts and cinemas.
d. To lump all the employees of petitioner in its
integrated business concerns cannot result in an
efficacious bargaining unit comprised of constituents
enjoying a community or mutuality of interest.
e. Undeniably, the rank and file employees of the livestock-
agro division fully constitute a bargaining unit that
satisfies both requirements of classification according to
employment status and of the substantial similarity of
work and duties which will ultimately assure its
members the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.
ISSUE: WON the statutory requirement of 20% of the employees in
the proposed bargaining unit, asking for a certification election had
been strictly complied with - YES
HELD:
1. It is undisputed that petitioner BELYCA Corporation (Livestock
and Agro Division):
a. employs around 205 rank-and-file employees and
workers.
b. Has no existing duly certified collective bargaining
agreement with any legitimate labor organization.
c. There has not been any certification election conducted in
the proposed bargaining unit within the last twelve (12)
months prior to the filing of the petition for direct
certification and/or certification election, and
d. there is no contending union requesting for certification
as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative in the
proposed bargaining unit.
2. The records show that 124 employees which are more than a
majority of the rank-and-file signed membership with respondent
ALU-TUCP and had expressed their written consent and
authorization to the filing of the petition.
a. Thus, the Labor Arbiter ordered the certification election
on a finding that 30% of the statutory requirement under
Art. 258 of the Labor Code has been met.
3. But, petitioner corporation contends that since the petition, 4
employees resigned; 6 subsequently withdrew their membership;
5 were retrenched; 12 were dismissed for illegally and unlawfully
barricading the entrance to petitioner's farm; and 100 simply
abandoned their work.
a. Petitioner's claim was however belied by the
Memorandum of its personnel officer to the 119
employees showing that the employees were on strike,
which was confirmed by the finding of the Bureau of
Labor Relations to the effect that they went on strike on
July 24, 1986
b. Earlier the local union president, Warrencio Maputi; the
Vice-president, Gilbert Redoblado and three other active
members of the union Carmen Saguing, Roberto Romolo
and Iluminada Bonio were dismissed and a complaint for
unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal etc. was filed by the
Union before the NLRC
4. Under Art. 257 of the Labor Code once the statutory requirement
is met, the Director of Labor Relations has no choice but to call a
certification election
a. It becomes mandatory for the Bureau to conduct a
certification election for the purpose of determining the
representative of the employees in the appropriate
bargaining unit and certify the winner as the exclusive
bargaining representative of all employees in the unit
more so when there is no existing collective bargaining
agreement.
b. There has not been a certification election in the company
for the past three years as in the instant case.
5. It is significant to note that 124 employees out of the 205
employees of the Belyca Corporation have expressed their written
consent to the certification election or more than a majority of the
rank and file employees and workers; much more than the required
 30% and over and above the present requirement of 20% by of the Labor Code because the latter was requested to bargain
Executive Order No. 111 issued on December 24, 1980 and collectively. But thereafter the role of the employer in the
applicable only to unorganized establishments under Art. 257, of certification process ceases. The employer becomes merely a
the Labor Code, to which the BELYCA Corporation bystander
6. More than that, any doubt cast on the authenticity of signatures to 12. There is no showing that the instant case falls under the above-
the petition for holding a certification election cannot be a bar to mentioned exception. However, it will be noted that petitioner
its being granted. Even doubts as to the required 30% being met corporation from the outset has actively participated and
warrant holding of the certification election. consistently taken the position of adversary in the petition for
7. In fact, once the required percentage requirement has been direct certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining
reached, the employees' withdrawal from union membership representative and/or certification election filed by respondent
taking place after the filing of the petition for certification Associated Labor Unions (ALU)-TUCP to the extent of filing this
election will not affect said petition. petition for certiorari in this Court.
8. On the contrary, the presumption arises that the withdrawal was 13. Considering that a petition for certification election is not a
not free but was procured through duress, coercion or for a litigation but a mere investigation of a non-adversary character to
valuable consideration Hence, the subsequent disaffiliation of the determining the bargaining unit to represent the employees, and
six (6) employees from the union will not be counted against or its only purpose is to give the employees true representation in
deducted from the previous number who had signed up for their collective bargaining with an employer, there appears to be
certification elections no reason for the employer's objection to the formation of subject
9. Similarly, until a decision, final in character, has been issued union, much less for the filing of the petition for a certification
declaring the strike illegal and the mass dismissal or retrenchment election.
valid, the strikers cannot be denied participation in the
certification election notwithstanding, the vigorous condemnation
of the strike and the fact that the picketing were attended by
violence.
10. Under the foregoing circumstances, it does not necessarily follow
that the strikers in question are no longer entitled to participate in
the certification election on the theory that they have
automatically lost their jobs. For obvious reasons, the duty of the
employer to bargain collectively is nullified if the purpose of the
dismissal of the union members is to defeat the union in the
consent requirement for certification election. As stressed by this
Court, the holding of a certification election is a statutory policy
that should not be circumvented.
11. Finally, as a general rule, a certification election is the sole
concern of the workers. The only exception is where the employer
has to file a petition for certification election pursuant to Art. 259
 UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON.
CALLEJA and THE ALL UP WORKERS UNION
Determination of Appropriate Bargaining Unit – Proper
Constituency | July 14, 19992 | Narvasa, C.J.
FACTS:
1. This case stemmed a petition for the holding of certification of
election by Organization of Non-Academic Personnel of UP
(ONAPUP) with the Bureau of Labor Relations.
a. It claims to have a membership of 3,236 members
comprising more than 33% of the 9,617 persons
constituting the non-academic personnel of UP –Diliman,
Los Baños, Manila and Visayas
2. Another registered labor union, the “All UP Workers’ Union”
filed a comment, alleging that its membership covers both
academic and non-academic personnel and that it aims to unite all
rank-and-file employees in one union.
a. It declared its assent to the holding of the election
provided the appropriate organizational unit was first
defined.
b. It observed that the Research, Extension and Professional
Staff (REPS), who are academic non-teaching personnel,
should not be deemed part of the organization unit.
3. The UP, through the its General Counsel, made of record its view
that there should be two unions: one for academic, the other for
non-academic/administrative personnel considering the
dichotomy of interests, conditions and rules governing these
employee groups.
4. Director Calleja declared that the appropriate organizational unit
should embrace all the regular rank-and-file employees, teaching
and non-teaching, of UP, including all its branches. She also held
that there was no sufficient evidence to justify the group of the
non-academic or administrative personnel into an organization
unit apart and distinct from that of the academic or teaching
personnel.
a. Director Calleja cited Section 9 of E.O. 180 which says
that “the appropriate organization unit shall be the
employer unit consisting of rank-and-file employees,
unless circumstances otherwise require.”
b. Hence, Calleja commanded that a certification election be
conducted among rank-and-file employees, teaching, and
non-teaching, in all four autonomous campuses of UP
c. At the pre-election conference, the University sought
further clarification of the coverage of the term “rank-and-
file” personnel, asserting that not every employee could
be properly embraced within both teaching and non-
teaching categories since there are those whose positions
are in truth managerial and policy-determining and hence,
excluded by law
5. At a subsequent hearing, UP filed a Manifestation seeking the
exclusion from the organizational unit of (1) high-level employees
with policy-making, managerial or confidential functions, (2)
those employees holding supervisory positions among non-
academic personnel, and (3) those in teaching staff with the rank
of Assistant Professor or higher (because they participate in the
University Council, a policy-making body)
a. This was not opposed by ONAPUP
b. However, this was opposed by the ALL UP Workers
Union in a position paper.
6. Director Calleja promulgated an order on the issue of WON
assistant professors, associate professors and professors should be
included in the definition of “high-level employees”
a. Citing Rule 1, Section 1 of the Implementing Guidelines
of E.O. 180, the Director said that said teachers are not
“high level employees” are rank-and-file employees
since according to the University Code, the policy-
making powers of the Council are limited to academic
matters, namely, prescribing courses of study and rules of
discipline, fixing student admission and graduation
requirements, recommending to the BOR the conferment
of degrees and disciplinary power over students.
 b. The policy-determining functions contemplated in the
definition of a high-level employee pertain to managerial,
executive or organization policies such as hiring, firing
and disciplining employees, salaries, teaching/working
hours, etc., which are usual issues in collective bargaining
negotiations, the ones contemplated by the definition of a
high-level employee.
c. MR Denied. Hence, University appealed to the SC.
ISSUE: WON professors, associate professors and assistant
professors are “high-level employees” “whose functions are normally
considered policy determining, managerial or highly-confidential in
nature”
HELD:
1. The Court agreed with Director Calleja and held that in light of
E.O. 180 and its implementing rules, as well as the University’s
charter and regulations, the professors, associate professors and
assistant professors cannot be considered as exercising such
managerial or highly-confidential functions as would justify their
being categorized as high-level employees of the institution.
2. The Academic Personnel Committees, through which the
professors supposedly exercise managerial functions, were
constituted “in order to foster greater involvement of the
faculty and other academic personnel in appointments,
promotions and other personnel matters that directly affect
them.”
a. Academic Personnel Committees at the Departmental and
College levels were organized “consistent with, and
demonstrative of the very idea of consulting the faculty
and other academic personnel on matters directly
affecting them” and to allow “flexibility in the
determination of guidelines peculiar to a particular
department or college”
3. Personnel actions affecting the faculty and other academic
personnel should be considered under uniform guidelines and
consistent with he resolution of the Board of Regents creating the
University Academic Personnel Board
a. The Departmental Academic Personnel Committee is
given the function of assisting in the review of the
recommendations initiated by the Department Chairman
with regard to recruitment, selection, performance,
evaluation, tenure and staff development, in accordance
with the general guidelines formulated by the University
Academic Personnel Board and the implementing details
laid down by the College Academic Personnel
Committee.
b. The Court then listed down the functions of the College
Academic Personnel Committee and the University
Academic Personnel Board.
4. From the foregoing, it is evident that it is the University Academic
Personnel Committee, composed of deans, the Assistant for
Academic Affairs, and the chief of personnel, which formulates
the policies rules and standards respecting selection,
compensation and promotion of members of the academic staff.
a. The departmental and college academic personnel
committee functions are purely recommendary in
nature, subject to review and evaluation by the
University Academic Personnel Board.
b. Franklin Baker Company v. Trajano: the power to
recommend, in order to qualify an employee as a
supervisor or managerial employee must not only be
effective but the exercise of such authority should not
be merely of a routinary or clerical nature but should
require the use of independent judgment.
c. Where such recommendary powers, as in the case at bar,
are subject to evaluation, review and final action by the
department heads and other higher executives of the
company, the same, although present, are not effective
and not an exercise of independent judgment as required
by law.
5. Furthermore, the personnel actions that may be recommended by
the departmental and college academic personnel committees
must conform with the general guidelines drawn up by the
university personnel academic committee
a. The members of the departmental and college academic
personnel committees are not unlike the chiefs of
divisions and sections of the NAWASA whom this court
considered as rank-and-file employees in NWSA v.
NWSA Consolidated Union because given ready policies
to execute and standard practices to observe for their
execution. . . they have little freedom of action, as their
main function is merely to carry out the company’s orders,
plans and policies.
6. The power or prerogative pertaining to a high-level employee “to
effectively recommend such managerial actions, to formulate or
execute management policies or decisions and/or to hire, transfer,
suspend, lay-off, recall dismiss, assign or discipline employees” is
exercised to a certain degree by the university academic
personnel board/committees and ultimately by the BOR in
accordance with Section 6 of the University Charter.
7. Furthermore, not all professors are members of the departmental
and college academic personnel committees. This militates
against the argument of UP that the professors have managerial
employment status.
8. The policy-determining functions of the University Council are
subject to review, evaluation and final approval by the Board of
Regents. The Council’s power of discipline is likewise
circumscribed by the limits imposed by the Board of Regents.
9. Assuming that UP professors discharge policy-determining
functions through the UC, still such exercise would not qualify
them as high-level employees within the context of E.O. 180.
a. E.O. 180 is a law concerning public sector unionism. It
must be construed within that context. In that context, UP
represents the government as an employer.
b. Policy-determining refers to policy-determination in
university matters that affect those same matters that may
be the subject of negotiation between the public sector
management and labor.
c. The reason why policy determining has been laid down as
a test in segregating rank-and-file form management is to
ensure that those who lay down policies in areas that are
still negotiable in public sector collective bargaining do
not themselves become part of those employees who seek
to change these policies for their collection welfare.
d. The policy determining functions of the UC refer to
academic matters. Hence, no conflict of interest results
in the professors being members of the UC and being
classified as rank-and-file employees.
ISSUE: WON they and other employees performing academic
functions, should comprise a collective bargaining unit distinct and
different form that consisting of the non-academic employees of the
university.
HELD:
1. A “bargaining unit” has been defined as a group of employees of
a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire
body of employees, which the collective interest of all the
employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be
the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the
parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law
2. Our labor laws particularly Section 12 of RA 875 or the Industrial
Peace Act, do not provide the criteria for determining proper
Colective bargaining Unit.
3. Although said Section 12 of RA 875 was subsequently
incorporated into the Labor Code, but no guidelines were included
in said code for determination of an appropriate bargaining unit in
a given case.
4. Even E.O. 180 did not help. All it says is that “the appropriate
organizational unit shall be the employer unit consisting of rank-
and-file employees, unless the circumstances otherwise require.”
Case law however, provides guidance.
5. Democratic Labor Association v. Cebu Stevedoring: the issue of
how to determine the proper collective bargaining unit and what
unit would be appropriate to be the collective bargaining agency
is novel in this jurisdiction. However, American precedents on the
matter abound considering that our present Magna Carta has been
pattenred after the American Law.
a. The Court then cited Rothenburg who mentions four
basis: (1) will of the employees, (2) affinity and unit of
employees’ interest such as substantial similarity of work
and duties, or similarity of compensation and working
conditions; (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4)
employment status, such as temporary, seasonal
probationary employees
b. The Court further explained that “the test of the grouping
is community or mutuality of interests. This is so because
the basic test of an asserted bargaining unit’s acceptability
is WON it is fundamentally the combination which will
best assure to all employee the exercise of their collective
bargaining rights.”
6. Since then, the community or “mutuality of interests test” has
provided the standard in determining the proper constituency of a
collective bargaining unit.
a. Alhamba Cigar v. Alhambra EA – The Court, noting that
the employees in the administrative sales and dispensary
departments of a cigar and cigarette manufacturing firm
perform work which have nothing to do with production
and maintenance, unlike those in the raw lead, cigar,
cigarette, packing and engineering and garage
departments, authorized the formation of the former set of
employees into a separate collective bargaining units.
7. In the case at bar, the University employees may quite easily be
categorized into two general classes: (1) group composed of
employees whose functions are non-academic (janitors,
messengers, typists, clerks, receptionists, carpenters, electricians,
grounds-keepers, etc.) and (2) the group made up of those
performing academic functions (professors, associate professors,
assistant professors, instructors)
8. Not much reflection is needed to perceive that the community or
mutuality of interests which justifies the formation of a single
collective bargaining unit is wanting between the academic and
non-academic personnel of the university.
a. Teachers would find very little in common with the
university clerks and other non-academic employees as
regards responsibilities and functions, working
conditions, compensation rates, skills, etc.
b. On the contrary, the dichotomy of interests, the
dissimilarity in the nature of the work and duties as well
as in the compensation and working conditions of the
academic and non-academic personnel dictate the
separation of these two categories of employees for
purpose of collective bargaining
9. The formation of two separate bargaining units – (1) consisting of
the rank-and-file non-academic personnel, and the (2) the rank-
and-file academic employees, is the setup that will best assure to
all the employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.
10. These special circumstances bring the case at bar within the
exception contemplated in Section 9 of E.O. 180.
 MECHANICIAL DEPARTMENT LABOR UNION SA
PHILIPPIEN NATIONAL RAILWAYS v. CIR and
SAMAHAAN NG MGA MANGAGAWA SA CALOOCAN
SHOPS
| August 30, 1968 | J.B.L., J.
FACTS:
1. Respondent Samahan ng mga Manggagawa” filed a petition
calling attention to the fact that there were three unions in the
Caloocan Shops of the Philippine National Railways – (1) the
“Samahan”, (2) the “Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa Manila
Railroad Company, and (3) the Mechanical department Labor
Union.
a. That no certification election had been held in the last 12
months in the Caloocan Shops
b. That both “Samahan” and the Mechanical Department
Labor union had submitted different labor demands upon
the management for which reason a certification election
was needed to determine the proper collective bargaining
agency for the Caloocan Shop Workers
2. The management and petitioner Mechanical Department Labor
Union opposed the petition on the ground that the latter had been
previously certified in two cases as sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of the employees and laborers of the PNR’s mechanical
department, and had negotiated two bargaining agreements with
the management.
a. It further averred that before the expiration of the CBA, a
renewal had been negotiated and the contract remained
signed.
b. That the Caloocan shops was not established nor
separated from the Mechanical Department Unit
c. That “Samahan” is composed mainly of supervisors who
had filed a pending case to be declared non-supervisors
3. Judge Arsenio Martinez found the following:
a. “Samahan” is composed of workers exclusively at the
Caloocan shops of the PNR charged with the maintenance
of rolling stocks for repairs, major repairs of locomotive,
engines, etc. are done in the Caloocan shops while minor
ones in the Manila sheds.
b. Workers in the Caloocan shops do not leave their station
unlike Manila Shop workers who go out along the routes
and lines for repairs
c. Workers in both the Caloocan shops and Manila sheds are
exposed to hazards occasioned by the nature of their work
d. That with respect to wages and salaries of employees, the
company apply to all workers the categories under the Job
Classification and Evaluation Plan of Employees.
e. Administration over employees, members of petitioner
union as well as oppositor is under the Administrative
Divisions of the company
f. From the very nature of their work, members of petitioner
union and other workers of the Mechanical Department
have been under the coverage of the current CBA which
was a result of a certification in 1960 and 1963.
g. In deciding WON a new unit should be established for the
Caloocan Shops separate and distinct from the
Mechanical department labor union, the CIR observed:
h. The Caloocan shops have 360 workers. It is part and
parcel of the whole Mechanical department of the PNR
which is composed of four divisions or units: (1) manila
area and lines, (2) locomotive crew, (3) motor car crew,
and (4) shops rolling stocks maintenance
i. The locomotive crew and motor car crew, though part of
the Mechanical. Department, are separate units and are
represented by the Union de Maquinistas and Union de
Empleados de Trenes. The workers under the other two
main units of the departments are represented by
petitioner Mechanical Department Labor Union.
i. The workers of the Shops Rolling Stocks
Maintenance Divisions or the Caloocan Shops
now seek to be separated from the rest of the
workers of the department
 j. There is certainly a community of interest among the
workers of the Caloocan shops. They are grouped in one
place. They work under one or same working conditions,
working time or schedule and are exposed to the same
occupational risk.
k. The difference between the Caloocan Shops and the
Mania Shed lies in the fact that workers at the Caloocan
Shops perform major repairs of locomotives, rolling
stocks, engines, etc. while those in the Manila Shed work
on minor repairs
4. The Judge then reviewed the collective bargaining history of the
PNR
a. The history of the collective bargaining in the Philippine
National Railways shows that originally, there was only
one bargaining unit in the company, represented by the
Kapisanan Ng Manggagawa sa MRR. This Court ordered
the establishment of two additional units, the engine crew
and the train crew to be represented by the Union de
Maquinistas, Fogoneros, Ayudante Y Motormen and
Union de Empleados de Trenes, respectively.
b. Then in 1961, three new separate units were established,
namely, the yard crew unit, station employees unit and
engineering department employees unit, respectively,
after the employees concerned voted in a plebiscite
conducted by the court for the separation from existing
bargaining units in the company.
c. Then again, a new unit, composed of the Mechanical
Department employees, was established to be represented
by the Mechanical Department Labor Union.
d. In the case of the yard crew, station employees and the
Engineering Department employees, the Supreme Court
sustained the order of this Court in giving the employees
concerned the right to vote and decide whether or not they
desire to be separate units
5. In view of its findings and the history of union representation in
the railway company, indicating that bargaining units had been
formed through separation of new units from existing ones
whenever plebiscites had shown the workers’ desire to have their
own representatives, and relying on the “globe doctrine” applied
in the Democratic Labor Union v. Cebu Stevedoring, Judge
Martinez held that the employees in the Caloocan Shops should
be given a chance to vote on WON their group should be separated
from that represented by the Mechanical Department Labor Union
and ordered a plebiscite for that purpose.
ISSUE: WON the Globe Doctrine was erroneously applied
PETITIONER: Not warranted because the workers of the Caloocan
shops do not require different skills form the rest of the workers in the
Mechanical Department of Railway Company
HELD:
1. The question is primarily one of facts. The CIR has found that
there is a basic difference in.
2. Those in the Caloocan shops not only have a community of
interest and working conditions but perform major repairs of
railway rolling stock, using heavy equipment and machineries
found in said shops. On the other hand, the other workers only
perform minor repairs
3. It is easy to understand that the workers in the Caloocan shops
require special skill in the use of heavy equipment and
machinery sufficient to set them apart from the rest of the
workers.
4. The records also show that the collective bargaining
agreements negotiated by the petitioner and the management
have been in existence for more than 2 years; Hence, such
agreements do not constitute a bar to the determination by
proper elections, of a new bargaining representative
5. As to the argument that some of the members of “Samahan”
are actually supervisors, the question is still pending final
decisions. It would not constitute a legal obstacle to the
holding of the plebiscite.
 KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAAGAWA
Right to Self-Organize | October 31, 1960 | Paredes, J.
FACTS:
1. Kapisanan ng mga Mangagawa sa Manila Railroad Company
(Kapisanan) filed a petition praying that it be certified as the
exclusive bargaining agent in the Manila Railroad Company.
a. CIR found three units appropriate for purposes of
collective bargaining: (1) the unit of locomotive drivers,
firemen, assistant firemen, and motormen, or the engine
crew unit, (2) the unit of conductors, assistant conductors,
unit agents, assistant route agents, and train posters, or the
crew unit, and (3) the unit of all the rest of the company
personnel, except the supervisors, temporary employees,
the members of the Auditing department, the members of
the security guard and professional and technical
employees or the unit of the rest of the employees
b. For these three units, the following unions were certified
as the exclusive bargaining agents: (1) Union de
Maquinistas, (2) Union de Empleados de Trenes, (3) the
Kapisanan Ng Mga Mangagawa sa Manila Railroad
Company
2. After the decision became final, the following unions filed a case
praying that they be defined as a separate bargaining unit:
a. the Manila Railroad Yard Crew Union
b. The Station Employees’ Union
c. Railroad Engineering Department Union
3. The Kapisanan and the Management opposed the separation on
the following grounds:
a. Kapisanan had already been duly certified as the
collective bargaining agent in the unit of all the rest of the
employees and it had entered into a CBA with the
management. This bars certification of a unit at least
during the first 12 months after the finality of the case.
b. The Court had denied similar petitions for separation of
unit wherein the petition for the separation of
Mechanndical Deparmtent Labor Union was dismissed by
CIR
c. That the three unions are barred from petitionoing for
separate units becase they are bound by the decision in
favor of Kapisanan for having been represented therein by
the Kapisanan
4. The CIR ordered the holding of a plebiscite and declared tha the
CBA could not be a bar to another certification election because
one of its signatories, the Kapisanan President, was a supervisor.
a. MR by Kapisanan. Denied. Hence the appeal
ISSUE: WON there should be moral and exemplary damages
HELD:
1. The Court cited the case of Democratic Labor Association v. Cebu
Stevedoring where it held that because of the modern complexity
of the relation between the employer and the union structure, it
becomes difficult to determine from the evidence alone which of
the several claimant groups forms a proper bargaining unit. It then
becomes necessary to give consideration to the express will or
derive of the employees – a practice designated as the “Globe
Doctrine” which sanctions the holding of a series of elections, not
for the purpose of allowing the group receiving an overall majority
of votes to represent all employees, but for the specific purpose of
permitting the employees in each of the several categories to select
the group which each chooses as a bargaining unit
a. The factors that may be considered are: (1) history of the
collective bargaining, (2) history, extent and type of
organization of employees in other plants of the same
employer or other employees in the same industry, (3) the
skill, wages, work and working conditions of the
employees, (4) the desires of the employees, (6) the
eligibility of the employees for membership in the union
or unions involved, (7) the relationship between the unit
or units proposed and the employer’s organization,
management operation, and the test in determining the
 appropriate bargaining unit is that a unit must effect a
grouping of employees who have substantial, mutual
interests in wages, hoours, working conditions and other
subjects of collective bargaining.
2. Therefore, “the desire of the employees” is one of the factors in
determining the appropriate bargaining unit
a. Respondent Court was simply interested in the
verification of the evidence already placed on record and
submitted wherein the workers have signed
manifestations and resolutions of their desire to be
separated from Kapisanan
b. No one would deny the respondent court’s right of full
investigation in arriving at a correct and conclusive
finding of fact in order to deny or grant the petitions for
certification of election.
c. One way of determining the will or desire of the
employees is what the respondent court had suggested
which is through a plebiscite carried out by secret ballot.
(Note: not to be conducted by the DOLE but CIR itself)
 SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION v. HON. LAGUESMA,
NORTH LUZON MAGNOLIA SALES LABOR UNION-
INDEPENDENT
Right to Self-Organize | September 21, 1994 | Puno, J.
FACTS:
1. Respondent North Luzon Magnolia Sales Labor Union filed with
the Department of Labor a petition for certification election
among all the regular sales personnel of Magnolia Diary products
in the North Luzon Sales Area
a. Petitioner corporation opposed the petition and
questioned the appropriateness of the bargaining unit
sought to be represented by respondent union, claiming
that its bargaining history in its sales offices, plants and
warehouses is to have a separate bargaining unit for each
sales office.
b. Atty. Batalla, counsel of petitioner, withdrew petitioner’s
opposition to a certification election and agreed to
consider all the sales offices in northern Luzon as one
bargaining unit.
2. Respondent won the election and was certified by the Med-Arbiter
Galang to be sole and exclusive bargaining agent for all the regular
sales personnel in all the sales offices of Magnolia Dairy Products
in the North Luzon Sales Area
a. Petitioner appealed to the Secretary of Labor claiming that
Atty. Batalla did not have the authority to agree on the
holding of certification elections, absent certain
conditions
b. Denied. Certiorari
ISSUE: WON respondent union represents an appropriate bargaining
unit – YES
PETITIONER: Director Laguesma disregarded its collective
bargaining history which is to have a separate bargaining unit fo reach
sales office. It insists that its prior collective bargaining history is the
most persuasive criterion in determining the appropriateness of the
collective bargaining unit.
HELD:
1. A bargaining unit is a “group of employees of a given employer,
comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees,
consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be the best
suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under
the collective bargaining provisions of the law”
2. The fundamental doctrine in determining the appropriate
collective bargaining unit are: (1) the will of the employees (Globe
Doctrine); (2) affinity and units of the employees’ interest, such
as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of
compensation and working conditions; (3) prior collective
bargaining history, and (4) similarity of employment status
3. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, this Court has ruled that
existence of a prior collective bargaining history is neither
decisive nor conclusive in the determination of what
constitutes an appropriate bargaining unit
4. The test of grouping is mutuality or commonalty of interests. The
employees sought to be represented by the collective bargaining
agent must have substantial mutual interests in terms of
employment and working conditions as evidenced by the type of
work they perform.
5. In this case, Respondent union sought to represent the sales
personnel in various Magnolia sales offices in Northern Luzon.
a. There is similarity of employment status for only the
regular sales personnel in the north Luzon area are
covered
b. Same duties and responsibilities and substantially similar
compensation and working conditions
c. The commonality of interest among the sales personnel
cannot be gainsaid. In fact, in the certification of election,
thee employees concerned accepted respondent union as
their exclusive bargaining agent. Clearly, they have
expressed their desire to be on one
6. Petitioner cannot insist that each of the sales office of magnolia
should constitute only one bargaining unit. What greatly militates
against this position is the meager number of sales personnel in
each of the Magnolia sales office in North Luzon.
a. Even the bargaining unit sought to be represented by
respondent union in the entire North Luzon sales area
consists only of approximately 55 employees. It would
not be in the best interest of these employees if they would
further be fractionalized. The adage “there is strength in
number” Is the very rationale underlying the formation of
a labor union.
 FULACHE, JABONERO, CASTILLO, LAGUNZAD,
BIGNO, CABAS, PONCE and ALMENDRAS v. ABS-CBN
CORPORATION
Right to Self-Organize | January 21, 2010 | Brion, J.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners who were drivers/cameramen/PA/editor of ABS-CBN
filed two separate complaints for regularization, unfair labor
practice and several money claims against Respondent
2. Petitioners allege that ABS-CBN and the ABS-CBN employees
union executed a CBA from December 1999 to 2002.
a. They only became aware of the CBA when they obtained
copies of the agreement and learned that they had been
excluded from its coverage
b. They claim to have rendered more than a year of service
in the company and should have been recognized as
regular employee entitled to security of tenure and other
privileges enjoyed by regular employees.
c. They asked that they be paid overtime, night shift
differential, holiday, ret day and service incentive leave.
3. ABS-CBN explained the nature of the petitioners’ employment
within the framework of its operations and claims that the
production of programs per se is not necessary or desirable in its
business because it could generate profits by selling airtime to
block-timers or through advertising.
a. To cope with fluctuating business conditions, it contracts
on a case-to-case basis the service of persons who possess
the necessary talents, skills, trainings, to meet the
requirements of its programs and productions.
b. These persons are called talents and are considered
independent contractors who offer their services to
broadcasting companies. They are paid a pre-arranged
talent fee instead of salaries.
c. Petitioners services were contracted on various dates by
its Cebu station as independent contractors and were not
entitled to regularization in these capacities.
4. LA held that petitioners were regular employees of ABS-CBN,
not independent contracts, who are entitled to the benefits and
privileges of regular employees.
a. Appealed to the NLRC.
5. During pendency of appeal, ABS-CBN dismissed Fulache,
Jabonero, Lagunzad and Atinen for their refusal to sign up
contracts of employments with service contractor Able Services.
a. Hence, a complaint for illegal dismissal was filed.
b. ABS-CBN alleged that even before the LA rendered a
decision, it had already undertaken a comprehensive
review of its existing organizational structure to address
its operational requirements.
c. It decided to course through legitimate service contractors
all driving, messengerial, janitorial, utility, make and
security service to prove its operations and make them
more economically viable.
d. Fulache, Jabonero, Castillo, lagunzad and Atinen were
not singled out for dismissal as they were dismissed
because they belonged to a job category which had
already been contracted out.
e. LA found the ABS-CBN’s contracting out of certain work
or services as valid and that petitioners were dismissed
due to redundancy. Hence, they were merely awarded
separation pay. ABS-CBN appealed to the NLRC
6. NLRC ruled on the regularization and illegal dismissal case that
there was an employer-employee relationship between petitioner
and ABS-CBN since the petitioners were engaged in activities
necessary for ABS-CBN’s trade or business.
a. NLRC reversed the ruling on the illegal dismissal case
and found petitioner to have been illegally dismissed.
b. Both parties appealed. NLRC stood by the ruling that the
petitioners were regular employees and that in the illegal
dismissal case, petitioners were dismissed due to
redundancy.
7. When the case was brought to the CA, the CA ruled that the
petitioners failed to prove their claim to CBA benefits since they
 never raised the issues in the compulsory arbitration proceedings
and did not appeal the LA decisions which was silent on their
entitlement to CBA benefits.
a. As to the illegal dismissal issue, CA upheld the NLRC
that petitioners were not illegally dismissed as their
separation was due to redundancy.
ISSUE: WON petitioners, as regular employees, are members of the
bargaining unit entitled to CBA benefits - YES
HELD:
1. As regular employees, the petitioners fall within the coverage of
the bargaining unit and are therefore, entitled to CBA benefits as
a matter of law and contract.
2. NLRC and CA affirmed the LA which unequivocally settled the
petitioners employment status – that they are ABS-CBN’s regular
employees entitled to the benefits and privileges of regular
employees.
3. These benefits and privileges arise from entitlements under the
law, and from their employment contract as regular ABS-CBN
employees, part of which is the CBA if the fall within the coverage
of this agreement.
a. Thus, the issue to be resolved is WON petitioners fall
within CBA coverage
4. The parties 1992-2002 CBA provides in its Article I, Section I that
the appropriate bargaining shall be regular rank-and-file
employees of AB-CBN except (1) supervisor and confidential
employees, (2) employees how are on casual or probationary
status, (3) personnel who are on contract status
a. Under these terms, the petitioners are members of the
appropriate bargaining unit because they are regular rank-
and-file employees and do not belong to any of the
excluded categories. Thus, they fall within CBA coverage
under CBA’s express terms and are entitled to its benefits.
5. CBA coverage is not only a question of fact, but of law and
contract. The factual issue is WON petitioners are regular rank and
file employees of ABSC-CBN.
ISSUE: WON Fulache, Jabonero, Castillo and Lagnzad were illegally
dismissed – YES
HELD:
1. The termination occurred under highly questionable
circumstances and with plain and unadulterated bad faith
a. The regularization case was filed leading to the LA
decisions declaring petitioners to be regular employees.
ABS-CBN appealed arguing that petitioners were
independent contractors
b. In the course of the appeal, ABS-CBN took matters into
its own hands and terminated the petitioners’ services,
clearly disregarding its own appeal then pending in the
NLRC.
c. To justify the termination of service, the company cited
redundancy as its authorized cause but offered no
supporting evidence. It merely claimed that it was
contracting out of the petitioners’ activities in the exercise
of its management prerogative.
2. ABS-CBN’s intent was to transfer the petitioners and their
activities to a service contractor without paying any attention to
the requirements of our labor laws.
a. ABS-CBN dismissed the petitioners when they refused to
sign up with the service contractor.
3. ABS-CBN forgot that it had an existing CBA with a union which
agreement must be respected in any move affecting the security of
tenure of affected employees. Otherwise it ran the risk of
committing ULP which is both a criminal and administrative
offense. It forgot that the exercise of management prerogative can
be valid only if its undertaken in good faith and with no intent to
defeat or circumvent the rights of its employees under the laws or
under valid agreements.
4. It also forgot that there was a standing labor arbiter’s decisions
that, while not yet final because of appeal, cannot simply be
disregarded. By implementing the dismissal action at the time the
labor arbiters ruling was under review, the company unilaterally
negated the effects of the LA’s ruling while at the same time
appealing the same ruling to the NLRC. This is an abuse of the
appeals process.
5. The Court then compared the bad faith made by ABSC-CBN to
the act of forum-shopping since the actions of ABS-CBN had the
intention to defeat and render useless the decisions of the LA in
the regularization case.
6. Hence, the Court held that these employees were illegally
dismissed and entitled to reinstatement of rights, privileges, full
backwages and entitled to moral damages.
 GENERAL RUBBER AND FOOTWEAR CORP. v. BUREAU
OF LABOR RELATIONS and NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
TRAD EUNION OF MONTHLY PAID EMPLOYEES
October 29, 1987 | Paras, J. | Effect of Prior Agreement
SUMMARY: The monthly-paid employees of General Rubber and
Footwear Corp. formed their own collective bargaining unit, the
National Association of Trade Union of Monthly Paid Employees-
NATU, which filed a petition for direct certification. The corporation
opposed the petition on the ground that the monthly-paid employees
were managerial employees and that they had been excluded from the
bargaining unit under a 1963 agreement. The Court ruled that: a) the
monthly-paid employees were merely supervisory employees; and b)
the agreement to exclude them from the bargaining unit violated their
right to self-organization.
DOCTRINE:
A prior agreement can never bind subsequent federations and unions
because it is a curtailment of the right to self-organization guaranteed
by the labor laws.
FACTS:
1. In 1985, the Samahang Manggagawa sa General Rubber
Corporation-ANGLO was formed by the daily-paid rank-and-file
employees of petitioner General Rubber and Footwear Corp. as
their union following the expiration of the CBA between the
corporation and General Rubber Workers Union.
2. On July 17, 1985, the monthly-paid employees of petitioner
formed their own collective bargaining unit, respondent National
Association of Trade Union of Monthly Paid Employees-NATU,
which filed a petition for direct certification with the BLR.
3. The petition for direct certification was opposed by petitioner.
However, the Med-Arbiter issued an Order for the holding of a
certification election, which the BLR affirmed.
4. Petitioner offered the following arguments to support its position:
a. 30% of petitioner’s monthly-paid employees are
managers or employees exercising managerial functions,
and thus they are ineligible to form a labor union pursuant
to Art. 246 of the Labor Code.
b. In 1963, petitioner and its employees’ previous
bargaining representatives, including the General Rubber
Workers Union, agreed to exclude the monthly-paid
employees from joining the rank-and-file employees’
bargaining unit or from forming their own unit.
ISSUE: WON the BLR erred in allowing the creation of a bargaining
unit for the monthly-paid employees of General Rubber and Footwear
Corp. - NO
HELD:
1. In the first place, it appears that the monthly-paid employees of
petitioner perform supervisory functions, being responsible for
recommending managerial actions in disciplinary cases. Petitioner
has not shown that the responsibilities of the monthly-paid
employees require the exercise of discretion and independent
judgment or that they possess the power and authority to exercise
management policies.
2. More importantly, the record shows that from the inception of the
bargaining unit in 1963, petitioner has sought to suppress
respondent’s right to self-organization. It has not been shown that
the respondent union was privy to the 1963 agreement. And even
if it were, the same can never be binding as it curtails the right to
self-organization.
 SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA CHARTER CHEMICAL SOLIDARITY
OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND
REFORMS (SMCC-SUPER), ZACARRIAS JERRY VICTORIO-Union
President,
vs.
CHARTER CHEMICAL and COATING CORPORATION
PETITIONER: SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA CHARTER CHEMICAL
SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT
AND REFORMS (SMCC-SUPER), ZACARRIAS JERRY VICTORIO-Union
President
RESPONDENTS: CHARTER CHEMICAL and COATING CORPORATION
SUMMARY: Charter Chemical objected to SMCC-Super’s petition for
certification election among the rank-and-file on the ground that some of
its members were supervisory employees. The Court held that the mixing
of employees did not divest the union of its status as a legitimate labor
organization, as it is not among the grounds to cancel union registration,
unless the mingling was brought about by misrepresentation, false
statement or fraud.
DOCTRINE: The inclusion of the supervisory employees in a rank-and-file
union does not divest it of its status as a legitimate labor organization—
the doctrine in Toyota Motor Philippines v. Toyota Motor Philippines
Corporation Labor Union (1997), no longer holds sway under the altered
state of the law and rules applicable.
March 16, 2011 | DEL CASTILLO, J. | Effect of Including Employees Outside
the Bargaining Unit/Mixture of RAF & Supervisory Employees
FACTS:
1. February 19, 1999: Samahang Manggagawa sa Charter Chemical
Solidarity of Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and
Reforms filed a petition for certification election among the
regular rank-and-file employees of Charter Chemical and Coating
Corporation with the Mediation Arbitration Unit of the DOLE,
National Capital Region.
2. April 14, 1999: Charter Chemical filed an Answer with Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that the union is not a legitimate labor
organization because of failure to comply with the documentation
requirements set by law and the inclusion of supervisory
employees within petitioner union.
3. April 30, 1999: Med-Arbiter Falconitin dismissed the petition for
certification election. The union is not a legitimate labor
organization because the Charter Certificate, "Sama-samang
Pahayag ng Pagsapi at Authorization," and "Listahan ng mga
Dumalo sa Pangkalahatang Pulong at mga Sumang-ayon at
Nagratipika sa Saligang Batas" were not executed under oath and
certified by the union secretary and attested to by the union
president. The list submitted also included 12 batchman, mill
operator and leadman who performed supervisory functions.
4. July 16, 1999: DOLE affirmed MA. Although the charter certificate
need not be verified and that there was no independent evidence
presented to establish respondent company’s claim that some
members of petitioner union were holding supervisory positions.
The appeal was filed out of time because the union already filed a
prior petition for certification election.
a. On MR, the DOLE reversed its earlier ruling DOLE finding
that a review of the records indicates that no certification
election was previously conducted in respondent
company. Hence, there was no obstacle to the grant of
petitioner union’s petition for certification election.
5. March 15, 2005: CA nullified the ruling of the DOLE giving credence
to the findings of the Med-Arbiter that the union failed to comply
with the documentation requirements under the Labor Code. The
union consisted of both rank-and-file and supervisory employees.
CA also held that issues as to the legitimacy of petitioner union
may be attacked collaterally in a petition for certification election
and the infirmity in the membership of petitioner union cannot be
remedied through the exclusion-inclusion proceedings in a pre-
election conference.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certification
election— YES, the right to file a petition for certification election is
accorded to a labor organization provided that it complies with the
requirements of law for proper registration. The inclusion of supervisory
employees in a labor organization seeking to represent the bargaining unit
of rank-and-file employees does not divest it of its status as a legitimate
labor organization.
RULING:
PETITION GRANTED
RATIO:
1. The charter certificate need not be certified under oath by the local
union’s secretary or treasurer and attested to by its president.
a. Congress enacted RA 9481 in 2007. But since operative
facts in this case occurred in 1999, the Court decided the
issues under the pertinent legal provisions then in force
which was RA 6715 amending Book V of the Labor Code,
and the rules and regulations implementing R.A. No.
6715, as amended by D.O. No. 9
b. Section 1, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules of Book V, as
amended by D.O. No. 9, series of 1997, provides: Section
1. Chartering and creation of a local chapter — A duly
registered federation or national union may directly
create a local/chapter by submitting to the Regional
Office or to the Bureau two (2) copies of the following: (a)
A charter certificate issued by the federation or national
union indicating the creation or establishment of the
local/chapter; (b) The names of the local/chapter’s
officers, their addresses, and the principal office of the
local/chapter; and (c) The local/chapter’s constitution and
by-laws provided that where the local/chapter’s
constitution and by-laws [are] the same as [those] of the
federation or national union, this fact shall be indicated
accordingly. All the foregoing supporting requirements
shall be certified under oath by the Secretary or the
Treasurer of the local/chapter and attested to by its
President.
c. The Sama-samang Pahayag ng Pagsapi at Authorization
and Listahan ng mga Dumalo sa Pangkalahatang Pulong
at mga Sumang-ayon at Nagratipika sa Saligang Batas
are not among the documents that need to be submitted
to the Regional Office or Bureau of Labor Relations in
order to register a labor organization. As to the charter
certificate, Section 1 Rule VI indicates that it should be
executed under oath. Petitioner union concedes and the
records confirm that its charter certificate was not
executed under oath. However, in San Miguel
Corporation (Mandaue Packaging Products Plants) v.
Mandaue Packing Products Plants-San Miguel, the Court
ruled it was not necessary for the charter certificate to be
certified and attested by the local/chapter officers.
d. Thus, the union’s charter certificate need not be executed
under oath. Consequently, it validly acquired the status of
a legitimate labor organization upon submission of (1) its
charter certificate, (2) the names of its officers, their
addresses, and its principal office, and (3) its constitution
and by-laws— the last two requirements having been
executed under oath by the proper union officials as
borne out by the records
2. The mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory employees in
petitioner union does not nullify its legal personality as a legitimate
labor organization.
3. Here, the union failed to present any rebuttal evidence in the
proceedings below after respondent company submitted in
evidence the job descriptions of the aforesaid employees. Hence,
the Court upheld the findings of the MA and CA that the union
consisted of both rank-and-file and supervisory employees.
4. Nonetheless, the inclusion of the aforesaid supervisory employees
in the union does not divest it of its status as a legitimate labor
organization. R.A. No. 6715 omitted specifying the exact effect any
violation of the prohibition [on the co-mingling of supervisory and
rank-and-file employees] would bring about on the legitimacy of a
labor organization.
5. The applicable law and rules in the instant case are the same as
those in Kawashima because the present petition for certification
 election was filed in 1999 when D.O. No. 9, series of 1997, was still
in effect. As a result, petitioner union was not divested of its status
as a legitimate labor organization even if some of its members
were supervisory employees, and it had the right to file the subject
petition for certification election.
6. The legal personality of petitioner union cannot be collaterally
attacked by respondent company in the certification election
proceedings.
7. In Kawashima, the Court previously held that, “Except when it is
requested to bargain collectively, an employer is a mere bystander
to any petition for certification election; such proceeding is non-
adversarial and merely investigative, for the purpose thereof is to
determine which organization will represent the employees in
their collective bargaining with the employer. The choice of their
representative is the exclusive concern of the employees; the
employer cannot have any partisan interest therein; it cannot
interfere with, much less oppose, the process by filing a motion to
dismiss or an appeal from it; not even a mere allegation that some
employees participating in a petition for certification election are
actually managerial employees will lend an employer legal
personality to block the certification election. The employer's only
right in the proceeding is to be notified or informed thereof.”

STA. LUCIA EAST COMMERCIAL CORPORATION v. HON. SECRETARY

OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and STA. LUCIA EAST COMMERCIAL
CORPORATION WORKERS ASSOCIATION
14 Aug 2009 | Carpio, J. | GR 162355

PETITIONER: SMC Employees Union

RESPONDENTS: San Miguel Packaging Products Employees Union-
PDMP
 SUMMARY: When CLUP-SLECCWA (formerly CLUP-SLECC and its
Affiliates Workers Union) filed a petition for direct certification,
SLECC opposed this saying that it already voluntary recognized
another union, SMSLEC, as the appropriate bargaining unit of its
regular RNF employees. Thus, SLECC filed a pettion for certiorary
with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction and TRO. The CA denied
this saying that the SOLE was correct when she held that voluntary
recognition and the execution of a CBA between SLECC and SMSLEC
was not a bar to SLECCWA’s petition for direct certification. The SC
affirmed the appellate court’s decision.
DOCTRINE:
(1) A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer,
comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees,
consistent with equity to the employer, indicated to be the best suited
to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the
collective bargaining provisions of the law.
(2) The fundamental factors in determining the appropriate collective
bargaining unit are: (1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2)
affinity and unity of the employees interest, such as substantial
similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and
working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior
collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status.
(3) The existence of a prior collective bargaining history is neither
decisive nor conclusive in the determination of what constitutes an
appropriate bargaining unit.
THE FACTS
· TERMS: SLECC: Petitioner, CLUP-SLECCWA: Private
respondent, SMSLEC: another bargaining unit. Please refer to this
when things get messy, because they will.
1. 27 February 2001: Confederated Labor Union of the Philippines (CLUP)
instituted a petition for certification election among the RNF
employees of petitioner and its affiliates.
2. 21 August 2001: Med-Arbiter Bactin ordered the dismissal of the
petition due to the inappropriateness of the bargaining unit. Petitioner
appealed the order, which it later withdrew. The dismissal of the
petition was granted by the SOLE in 2002.
3. On 10 October 2001, the earlier CLUP (termed CLUP-SLECC and its
Affiliates Workers Union) reorganized itself and re-registered as CLUP-
SLECCWA (CLUP-Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation Workers
Association -- herein private respondent), which limited its
membership to the RNF employees of Sta. Lucia East Commercial
Corporation. It was issued a Certificate of Creation of a Local Chapter.
4. Also on 10 October, CLUP-SLECCWA filed the instant petition, alleging
that SLECC employs about 115 employees and that more than 20% of
employees belonging to the RNF category are its members. SLECCWA
claimed that no certification election has been held among them within
the last 12 months prior to the filing of the petition, and while there was
another union registered with DOLE covering the same employees
(named SMSLEC), it has not been recognized as the exclusive
bargaining agent of SLECC’s employees.
5. SLECC filed a motion to dismiss the petition. It said that it had
voluntarily recognized SMSLEC as the exclusive bargaining agent of its
regular RNF employees, and that there were already collective
bargaining negotiations between them.
6. SLECCWA filed its opposition to the motion to dismiss, and assailed
the validity of the voluntary recognition by SLECC of SMSLEC.
According to SLECCWA, the subsequent negotiations and execution of
a CBA were tainted with malice, collusion, and conspiracy, and should
not have been approved.
7. The Med-Arbiter dismissed SLECCWA’s petition. He said that SMSLEC
is entitled to enjoy the rights, privileges, and obligations of an exclusive
bargaining representative from the time of the recording of the
voluntary recognition. Also, the duly registered CBA bars the filing of
the petition for direct certification.
8. The SOLE held that the subsequent negotiations and registration of a
CBA could not bar the petition, so the decision of the Med-Arbiter was
reversed and set aside. The CA affirmed the ruling of the SOLE.
ISSUE + RATIO: W/N the CA erred in finding that there was already a
legitimate labor organization when SLECC voluntary recognized SMSLEC
as its bargaining unit. - NO
1. Article 212(g), Labor Code: A labor organization is any union or
association of employees which exists in whole or in part for the
purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers
concerning terms and conditions of employment.
2. Bargaining unit: Group of employees of a given employer, comprised
of all or less than all the entire body of employees, consistent with
equity to the employer, indicated to be the best suited to serve the
reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective
bargaining provisions of the law. (SMC v. Laguesma)
3. Fundamental factors in determining the appropriate collective
bargaining unit are: (1) will of the employees, (2) affinity and unity of
the employees interest, (3) prior collective bargaining history, and (4)
similarity of employment status.
4. In the case at bar, CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union
subsequently re-registered as CLUP-SLECCWA. SLECC cannot ignore
the fact that CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union was a
legitimate labor organization at the time of SLECC’s voluntary
recognition of SMSLEC. SLECC and SMSLEC cannot, by themselves,
decide whether CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union
represented an appropriate bargaining unit. The CA found that petitioner union has for its membership both rank-and-file
(1) The employer may voluntary recognize the representation status of a and supervisory employees. However, petitioner union sought to represent
union in unorganized establishments. SLEC was not an unorganized the bargaining unit consisting of rank-and-file employees. Under Article
establishment when it voluntarily recognized SMSLEC as its exclusive 245[27] of the Labor Code, supervisory employees are not eligible for
bargaining representative on 20 July 2001. CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates membership in a labor organization of rank-and-file employees. Thus, the
Workers Union filed a petition for certification election which remained appellate court ruled that petitioner union cannot be considered a legitimate
pending. Thus, SLECC’s voluntary recognition of SMSLEC, its subsequent labor organization pursuant to Toyota Motor Philippines v. Toyota Motor
Philippines Corporation Labor Union[28] (hereinafter Toyota).
negotiations, and the resulting registration of a CBA executed between
them two are void and cannot bar CLUP-SLECCWA’s present petition for
certification election. Preliminarily, we note that petitioner union questions the factual findings of
the Med-Arbiter, as upheld by the appellate court, that 12 of its members,
RULING: CA decision affirmed. consisting of batchman, mill operator and leadman, are supervisory
employees. However, petitioner union failed to present any rebuttal evidence
in the proceedings below after respondent company submitted in evidence
the job descriptions[29] of the aforesaid employees. The job descriptions
indicate that the aforesaid employees exercise recommendatory managerial
actions which are not merely routinary but require the use of independent
judgment, hence, falling within the definition of supervisory employees under
Article 212(m)[30] of the Labor Code. For this reason, we are constrained to
agree with the Med-Arbiter, as upheld by the appellate court, that petitioner
union consisted of both rank-and-file and supervisory employees.
Nonetheless, the inclusion of the aforesaid supervisory employees in
petitioner union does not divest it of its status as a legitimate labor
organization. The appellate courts reliance on Toyota is misplaced in view of
this Courts subsequent ruling in Republic v. Kawashima Textile Mfg.,
Philippines, Inc.[31] (hereinafter Kawashima). In Kawashima, we explained
at length how and why the Toyota doctrine no longer holds sway under the
altered state of the law and rules applicable to this case, viz:
R.A. No. 6715 omitted specifying the exact effect any violation of the
prohibition [on the co-mingling of supervisory and rank-and-file employees]
would bring about on the legitimacy of a labor organization.
It was the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 6715 (1989
Amended Omnibus Rules) which supplied the deficiency by introducing the
following amendment to Rule II (Registration of Unions):
Sec. 1. Who may join unions. - x x x Supervisory
employees and security guards shall not be eligible for
membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file
employees but may join, assist or form separate labor
organizations of their own; Provided, that those supervisory
employees who are included in an existing rank-and-file
bargaining unit, upon the effectivity of Republic Act No.
6715, shall remain in that unit x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
and Rule V (Representation Cases and Internal-Union
Conflicts) of the Omnibus Rules, viz:
Sec. 1. Where to file. - A petition for certification election
may be filed with the Regional Office which has
jurisdiction over the principal office of the employer. The
petition shall be in writing and under oath.
Sec. 2. Who may file. - Any legitimate labor organization
or the employer, when requested to bargain collectively,
may file the petition.
The petition, when filed by a legitimate labor organization,
shall contain, among others
xxxx
(c) description of the bargaining unit which shall be the
employer unit unless circumstances otherwise require;
and provided further, that the appropriate bargaining
unit of the rank-and-file employees shall not include
supervisory employees and/or security guards.
(Emphasis supplied)
By that provision, any questioned mingling will prevent an otherwise
legitimate and duly registered labor organization from exercising its right to
file a petition for certification election.
Thus, when the issue of the effect of mingling was brought to the fore in
Toyota, the Court, citing Article 245 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A.
No. 6715, held:
Clearly, based on this provision, a labor organization
composed of both rank-and-file and supervisory employees
is no labor organization at all. It cannot, for any guise or
purpose, be a legitimate labor organization. Not being one,
an organization which carries a mixture of rank-and-file and
supervisory employees cannot possess any of the rights of a
legitimate labor organization, including the right to file a
petition for certification election for the purpose of collective
bargaining. It becomes necessary, therefore, anterior to the
granting of an order allowing a certification election, to
inquire into the composition of any labor organization
whenever the status of the labor organization is challenged
on the basis of Article 245 of the Labor Code.
xxxx
In the case at bar, as respondent union's membership list
contains the names of at least twenty-seven (27) supervisory
employees in Level Five positions, the union could not, prior
to purging itself of its supervisory employee members, attain
the status of a legitimate labor organization. Not being one,
it cannot possess the requisite personality to file a petition for
certification election. (Emphasis supplied)
In Dunlop, in which the labor organization that filed a petition for
certification election was one for supervisory employees, but in which the
membership included rank-and-file employees, the Court reiterated that such
labor organization had no legal right to file a certification election to represent
a bargaining unit composed of supervisors for as long as it counted rank-and-
file employees among its members.
It should be emphasized that the petitions for certification election involved
in Toyota and Dunlop were filed on November 26, 1992 and September 15,
1995, respectively; hence, the 1989 Rules was applied in both cases.
But then, on June 21, 1997, the 1989 Amended Omnibus Rules was
further amended by Department Order No. 9, series of 1997 (1997
Amended Omnibus Rules). Specifically, the requirement under Sec. 2(c)
of the 1989 Amended Omnibus Rules that the petition for certification
election indicate that the bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees has
not been mingled with supervisory employees was removed. Instead,
what the 1997 Amended Omnibus Rules requires is a plain description
of the bargaining unit, thus:
Rule XI
Certification Elections
xxxx
Sec. 4. Forms and contents of petition. - The petition shall
be in writing and under oath and shall contain, among
others, the following: x x x (c) The description of the
bargaining unit.
In Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Trajano, the Court had occasion to uphold the
validity of the 1997 Amended Omnibus Rules, although the specific
provision involved therein was only Sec. 1, Rule VI, to wit:
Section. 1. Chartering and creation of a local/chapter.- A duly registered
federation or national union may directly create a local/chapter by submitting
to the Regional Office or to the Bureau two (2) copies of the following: a) a
charter certificate issued by the federation or national union indicating the
creation or establishment of the local/chapter; (b) the names of the
local/chapter's officers, their addresses, and the principal office of the
local/chapter; and (c) the local/ chapter's constitution and by-laws; provided
that where the local/chapter's constitution and by-laws is the same as that of
the federation or national union, this fact shall be indicated accordingly.
All the foregoing supporting requirements shall be certified under oath by the
Secretary or the Treasurer of the local/chapter and attested to by its President.
which does not require that, for its creation and registration, a local or chapter
submit a list of its members.
Then came Tagaytay Highlands Int'l. Golf Club, Inc. v. Tagaytay
Highlands Employees Union-PGTWO in which the core issue was whether
mingling affects the legitimacy of a labor organization and its right to file a
petition for certification election. This time, given the altered legal milieu,
the Court abandoned the view in Toyota and Dunlop and reverted to its
pronouncement in Lopez that while there is a prohibition against the mingling
of supervisory and rank-and-file employees in one labor organization, the
Labor Code does not provide for the effects thereof. Thus, the Court held that
after a labor organization has been registered, it may exercise all the rights
and privileges of a legitimate labor organization. Any mingling between
supervisory and rank-and-file employees in its membership cannot affect its
legitimacy for that is not among the grounds for cancellation of its
registration, unless such mingling was brought about by misrepresentation,
false statement or fraud under Article 239 of the Labor Code.
In San Miguel Corp. (Mandaue Packaging Products Plants) v. Mandaue
Packing Products Plants-San Miguel Packaging Products-San Miguel
Corp. Monthlies Rank-and-File Union-FFW, the Court explained that since
the 1997 Amended Omnibus Rules does not require a local or chapter to
provide a list of its members, it would be improper for the DOLE to deny
recognition to said local or chapter on account of any question pertaining to
its individual members.
More to the point is Air Philippines Corporation v. Bureau of Labor
Relations, which involved a petition for cancellation of union registration
filed by the employer in 1999 against a rank-and-file labor organization on
the ground of mixed membership: the Court therein reiterated its ruling in
Tagaytay Highlands that the inclusion in a union of disqualified employees
is not among the grounds for cancellation, unless such inclusion is due to
misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the circumstances
enumerated in Sections (a) and (c) of Article 239 of the Labor Code.
All said, while the latest issuance is R.A. No. 9481, the 1997 Amended
Omnibus Rules, as interpreted by the Court in Tagaytay Highlands, San
Miguel and Air Philippines, had already set the tone for it. Toyota and Dunlop
no longer hold sway in the present altered state of the law and the rules.[32]
[Underline supplied]

The applicable law and rules in the instant case are the same as those in
Kawashima because the present petition for certification election was filed in
1999 when D.O. No. 9, series of 1997, was still in effect. Hence, Kawashima
applies with equal force here. As a result, petitioner union was not divested
of its status as a legitimate labor organization even if some of its members
were supervisory employees; it had the right to file the subject petition for
certification election.

PHILIPPINE DIAMOND HOTEL AND RESORT, INC. v.

MANILA DIAMOND HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION
Right to Self-Organize | January 24, 2000 | Quisumbing, J.

FACTS:
1. Respondent union filed a petition for certification election before
the DOLE-NCR seeking certification as the exclusive bargaining
representative of its members.
a. DOLE-NCR denied for failure to comply with legal
requirements, specifically Section 2, Rule V, Book V of
the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code,
and was seen to fragment the employees of petitioner
2. Francis Mendoza, one of the Hotels cashiers, was discovered to
have failed to remit to the Hotel the amount of P71,692 at the end
of his duty.
a. Mendoza explained that after accomplishing his daily
cash remittance report, the union president Jose Kimpo
(Kimpo) signed the same and dropped his remittances.
 b. Kimpo, when confronted, said that he was not aware of
any such procedure.
c. Hence, Mendoza was suspended for one week because it
is the responsibility of the cashier to personally drop-off
his remittances in the presence of a witness.
3. The Union, through Kimpo, notified petitioner of its intention to
negotiate a Collective Bargaining Agreement for its members.
a. The Hotel advised the union that since it was not certified
by the DOLE as the exclusive bargaining agent, it could
not be recognized as such.
b. Union clarified that it sought to bargain for its members
only and declared the Hotel’s refusal to bargain would
prompt the union to engage in concerted activities to
protect and assert its rights under the Labor Code.
4. The union announced that its executive officers and directors
decided to go on strike in view of the management’s refusal to
bargain collectively, and thus called for the taking of strike vote.
5. Petitioner issued a Final Reminder and Warning to respondent
against continuing misinformation campaign and activities which
confused the Hotel employees and disturbed their work
performance.
6. The union went on to file a Notice of Strike with the NCMB due
to unfair labor practice in that the Hotel refused to bargain with it
and the rank-and-file employees were being harassed and
prevented from joining it.
a. Conciliation conferences were conducted for 3
consecutive weeks during which the union insisted on the
adoption of a CBA for its members.
7. In the meantime, union president Kimpo filed before the
Arbitration Branch a complaint for ULP against petitioner.
8. More conferences took place between petitioner and union before
the NCMB where union demanded the holding of a consent
election to which the Hotel interposed no objection, provided the
union followed the procedure under the law. Both parties agreed
to meet the following month.
9. However, the union suddenly went on strike. The following day,
the National Union fo Workers in the Hotel, Restaurant and Allied
Industries joined the strike and openly extended its support to the
nation.
a. Hotel Supervisors Agustina and Rowen failed to report
for work and were along with another Supervisor De
Leon, participating in and supporting the strike.
10. Petitioner filed a petition for injunction before the NLRC.
a. Mary Grace explained that she was merely traying to
pacify the group. Petitioner found this explanation
arrogant and unsatisfactory as her active participation was
confirmed by an eyewitness and terminated her service.
Hence, Mary Grace, along with Agustin, filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal. Rowena later joined them.
11. NLRC issued a TRO directing the strikers to immediately cease
and desist form obstructing the free ingress and egress from the
Hotel Premises.
a. The strikers refused to dismantle the tent they put up at
the employees entrance to the Hotel, prompting the
security guards to dismantle the same during which the
strikers as well as the guards were hit by rocks coming
from a nearby construction, resulting to physical injuries.
12. DOLE Sec. Trajanos attempted to conciliate but failed. He issued
an order certifying the dispute to the NLRC for compulsory
arbitration and directed the officers and members to return to work
within 24 hours and the hotel to accept them back under the same
terms and conditions before the strike.
a. On MR, Acting Secretary Espaol modified the order and
directed the Hotel to just reinstate the strikers to its
payroll, and ordering that all cases between the parties be
consolidated with the case earlier certified to the NLRC
for compulsory arbitration.
13. By resolution, the NLRC declared that the strike was illegal and
that the union officers and members who were reinstated to the
Hotels payroll were deemed to have lost their employment status.
It also dismissed the complaints for illegal dismissal filed by Mary
 Grace, Agustin and Rowena,and the other complaints filed by the
union.
14. CA affirmed the dismissal of the complaints of Mary Grace,
Agustin and Rowena but ordered the reinstatement with back
wages of union members. According to the CA< petitioner failed
to establish by convincing and substantial evidence that the union
members who participated in the illegal strike committed illegal
acts.
ISSUE: WON the strike was illegal - YES
HELD:
1. Art. 255 of the Labor Code provides: the labor organization
designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an
appropriate collective bargaining unit shall be the exclusive
representative of the employees in such union for the purpose of
collective bargaining.
2. Hence, only the labor organization designated or selected by the
majority of the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining
unit is the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit
for the purpose of collective bargaining.
3. The union is admittedly not the exclusive representative of the
majority of the employees of petitioner, hence, it could not
demand from petitioner the right to bargain collectively in their
behalf.
4. Respondents insist that it could validly bargain in behalf of its
members relying on Article 242 of the Labor Code.
a. Respondent’s reliance on said article, a general provision
on the right sof legitimate labor organizations, is misplace
for not every legitimate labor organization possesses the
rights mentioned therein.
b. Article 242(a) must be read in relation to Article 255.
5. Respondents contend that it was bargaining in behalf only of its
members.
a. The NLRC was correct that the same would only fragment
the employees, more particularly the rank-and-file
employees. The other workers who are not members are
at a serious disadvantage, because if the same shall be
allowed, employees who are non-union members will be
economically impaired and will not be able to negotiate
their terms and conditions of work. This defeats the very
essence and reason of collective bargaining which is an
effective safeguard against the evil schemes of employers
in terms and conditions of work.
b. Petitioner’s refusal to bargain with respondent cannot be
considered a ULP to justify the staging of strike.
ISSUE: WON petitioner prevented or intimated some workers form
joining the union force, during or after the strike - NO
HELD:
1. This was carefully discredited by the CA. The CA noted that a
strike took place despite a scheduled conciliatory meeting.
Furthermore, the principal ground for the strike was not justified
because the union was not a certified bargaining unit which can
negotiate a CBA with the hotel.
2. The SC added that respondent violated Article 264 which
proscribes the staging of a strike on the gorund of ULP during the
pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike.
3. Furthermore, the union obstructed the free ingress and egress from
the employers premises, violating 264(e) of the Labor Code.
Photographs also showed that the strikers held noise barrages and
threatened the guests with bodily harm, and used firecrackers
which caused the guests to panic.
4. The right of private sector employees to strike is not absolute. As
provided for by Section 3 of Article XIII of the Constitution, the
right strike must be in accordance with the law. Employment of
violence, intimidation, restraint or coercion render a strike illegal.
ISSUE: WON there was no substantial proof that the strikers-
members of the union who participated in the illegal strike committed
illegal acts. - YES
HELD:
1. A union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and
any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the
commission of illegal acts during strike my be declared to have
lost his employment status in accordance with Article 264(a).
2. On the other hand, an ordinary striking worker cannot be
dismissed for mere participation in an illegal strike, there must be
proof that he committed illegal acts during a strike.
3. The photographs show that some of the workers-strikers who
joined the strike committed illegal acts blocking the free ingress
to and egress from the Hotel, holding noise barrage, threatening
guests and the likes. The names of the strikers were in a list
attached to petitioners Position Paper filed with the NLRC.
However the list failed to determine who specifically committed
the illegal acts. Hence, the Court held that this hsold be remanded
to the LA for the purpose only of detemring the respsective
liability of the strikers listed by petitioner.
ISSUE: WON those ordered reinstated are entitled to backwages –
NO
HELD:
1. The general rule is that backwages shall not be awarded in a n
economic strike on the principle that a fair days wage accrues only
for a fair days labor.
2. J.P. Heilbronn Co. v. National Labor Union: When in case of
strikes, and according to the CIR even if the strike is legal, strikers
may not collect their wages during the days they did not go to
work, for the same reasons if not more, laborers who voluntarily
absent themselves from work to attend the hearing of a case in
which they seek to prove and establish their demands against the
company, the legality and propriety of which demands is not yet
known, should lose their pay during the period of such absence
from work.
3. This Court must thus hearken to its policy that when employees
voluntarily go on strike, even if in protest against unfair labor
practices, no backwages during the strike is awarded.
4. Court made a disction between two types of employees in the case
of PTUC v. CIR.
a. Those who are discriminatorily dismissed for union
activities were entitled to backwage form the date of the
act of discrimination
b. Those who voluntarily go on strike were not entitled to
backpay
5. Jurisprudence provides exception. But such are not present in this
case.
KAISAHAN NG MANGGAGAANG PILIPINO v. HON.
TRAJANO and VIRON GARMENTS MGC., CO., INC.
Bars to Certificaiton of Election – One Year Bar Rule | September 9,
1991| Narvasa, J.
FACTS:
1. By virtue of a Resolution of the Bureau of Labor Relations, the
National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU) was declared the
exclusive bargaining representative of all rank-and-file employees
of Viron Garments Manufacturing Co., Inc. (VIRON).
2. More than four years later, another union, the Kaisahan ng
Manggagawang Pilipino KAMPIL Katipunan filed with the BLR
a petition for certification election among the employees of Viron.
a. Petitioner counted with the support of more than 30% of
the workers at Viron
3. NAFLU opposed the petition. However, Med-Arbiter ordered that
a certification election be held at VIRON
 a. NAFLU appealed contenting that at the time the petition
for certification election as filed, it was already in the
process of collective bargaining with VIRON and that
there was a deadlock in the negotiations which prompted
the filing of a notice of strike. It used as basis Section 3,
Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules saying that no
certification election may be held if, before the filing of a
petition for certification election, a bargaining deadlock
to which an incumbent or certified bargaining agent is a
party had been submitted to conciliation/arbitration or had
become the subject of a valid notice of strike.
4. Director of Labor Relations rendered a Resolution setting aside
the Med-Arbiter’s Order and dismissed KAMPIL’s petition for
certification of election.
a. KAMPIL moved for reconsideration. Denied. Hence, the
present case for certiorari.
ISSUE: WON KAMPIL’s petition for certification election is barred
because of the deadlock - NO
HELD:
1. Prior to the filing of the petition for election in this case, there was
no such “bargaining deadlock” which had been submitted to
conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject of a valid
notice of strike or lockout.
a. There are in the record assertions by NAFLU that its
attempts to bring VIRON to the negotiation table had been
unsuccessful because of the Latter’s unfulfilled promises
to bargain collectively. But there is no proof that it had
taken any action to legally coerce VIRON to comply with
its statutory duty to bargain collectively.
b. It could have charged VIRON with ULP but it did not. It
could have gone on a legitimate strike in protest against
VIRON’s refusal to bargain collectively but it did not.
2. The incontrovertible fac tis that from the time NAFLU was
proclaimed the exclusive bargaining representation of all VIRON
employees up to when KAMPIL filed its petition for certification
election, or a period of more than 4 years, no CBA was ever
executed and no deadlock ever arose from the negotiations
between NAFLU and VIRON resulting in conciliation
proceedings or the filing of a valid strike notice.
3. Respondents advert to a strike declared by NAFLU for refusal of
VIRON to bargain and for violation of terms and conditions fo
employment, and to another strike in connection with a claim of
violation of the parties agreement settling the first strike – a
dispute which has since been certified for compulsory arbitration
by the SOLE. However, these took place after the initiation of the
certification election case by KAMPIL.
DIVINE WORD UNIVERSITY OF TACLOBAN v. SOLE
and DIVINE WORD UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES
UNION-ALU
Bars to Certification Election - Deadlock | Septemer 11 1992 |
Romero, J.
FACTS:
1. Med-Arbiter Elorcha certified respondent Divine Word
University Employees Union as the SEBA of petitioner Divine
Word University.
2. The union submitted its collective bargaining proposals.
a. Petitioner replied and requested a preliminary conference.
b. However, two days prior to the conference, the union’s
resigned VP wrote a letter addressed to petitioner
unilaterally withdrawing the CBA proposals. Hence, the
conference was cancelled.
3. After three years, the union affiliated with the Associated Labor
Union and requested a conference with the petitioner for the
purpose of continuing the collective bargaining negotiations.
a. Since petitioner was not replying, respondent union sent
another letter and warned petitioner against committing
acts of interference through its various meetings with both
the academic and non-academic employees regarding
their union affiliation and activities. Petitioner remained
silent.
4. The union filed with the NCMB a notice of strike on the grounds
of bargaining deadlock and unfair labor practice acts, specifically,
refusal to bargain, discrimination and coercion on employees.
5. Conferences were held after the filing of the notice of the strike
and concluded to an agreement between petitioner and respondent
union.
a. Before agreement was concluded, petitioner had filed a
petition for certification election with DOLE.
6. The Union submitted its collective bargaining proposals but the
same were ignored by the University.
7. Secretary Drilon issued an order assuming jurisdiction over the
labor dispute and directed all striking workers to report back to
work within 24 hours and the management to accept them back
under the same terms and conditions prior to the work stoppage.
8. Med-Arbiter Milado, acting on the University’s petition for
certification election, issued an order directing the conduct of a
certification election to be participated in by the union and “no
union” after finding that the petition was supported in fact and in
law.
9.
ISSUE: WON a certification election should have been ordered by the
Secretary of Labor - YES
HELD:
1. The Court cited Art. 258 of the Labor Code and Rule V, Book V
of its IRR. These provisions state that in the absence of a collective
bargaining agreement, an employer who is requested to bargain
collectively may file a petition for certification election any time
except upon a clear showing that one of these two instances exists:
(a) the petition is filed within one year form the date of issuance
of a final certification election result or (b) when a bargaining
deadlock had been submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had
become the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout.
2. There is no question as to the timeliness of the petitioner.
However, the problem appears to lie in the fact that the Secretary
of Labor had found that a bargaining deadlock exists.
3. A deadlock is defined as the “counteraction of things producing
entire stoppage: a state of inaction or of neutralization caused by
the opposition of persons or of factions (as in government or a
voting body): standstill.”
a. There is deadlock when there is a complete blocking or
stoppage resulting from the action of equal and opposed
forces
b. Synonymous to the word “impasse” which presupposes
reasonable effort at good faith bargaining which ,despite
noble intentions, does not conclude in agreement between
the parties.
4. The Court found that there was no reasonable effort at good faith
bargaining specially on the part of the university. Its indifferent
attitude towards collective bargaining resulted in the filure of the
parties to arrive at an agreement. While collective bargaining
should be initiated by the union, there is a corresponding
responsibility on the part of the employer to respond in some
manner to such acts, as mandated by Article 250(a) of the Labor
Code.
5. The Court noted, however, that the union was not entirely
blameless in the matter of delay in the bargaining process because
it remained passive for three years after the withdrawal of its
former Vice President which was supposedly unauthorized and
therefore ineffective.
a. It was only after its affiliation with the ALU that the same
union requested an initial conference for the purpose of
collective bargaining.
6. The Court is not inclined to rule that there has been a deadlock or
an impasse in the collective bargaining process.
a. There has not been a "reasonable effort at good faith
bargaining" on the part of the University.
b. While DWUEU-ALU was opening all possible avenues
for the conclusion of an agreement, the record is replete
with evidence on the University’s reluctance and thinly
disguised refusal to bargain with the duly certified
bargaining agent, such that the inescapable conclusion is
that the University evidently had no intention of
bargaining with it.
c. While the Court recognizes that technically, the
University has the right to file the petition for certification
election as there was no bargaining deadlock to speak of,
to grant its prayer that the herein assailed Orders be
annulled would put an unjustified premium on bad faith
bargaining.
7. Bad faith on the part of the University is further exemplified by
the fact that an hour before the start of the May 10, 1988
conference, it surreptitiously filed the petition for certification
election.
a. Yet during said conference, it committed itself to "sit
down" with the Union.
b. The University tried to preempt the conference which
would have legally foreclosed its right to file the petition
for certification election. In so doing, the University failed
to act in accordance with Art. 252 of the Labor Code
which defines the meaning of the duty to bargain
collectively as "the performance of a mutual obligation to
meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good
faith."
c. Moreover, by filing the petition for certification election
while agreeing to confer with the DWUEU-ALU, the
University violated the mandate of Art. 19 of the Civil
Code that" (e)very person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith."
8. Moreover, the University’s unscrupulous attitude towards the
DWUEU-ALU is also betrayed by its belated questioning of the
status of the said union.
a. The communications between them afforded the
University ample opportunity to raise the issue of
representation if indeed it was doubtful of the DWUEU-
ALU’s status as a majority union, but it failed to do so.
b. On the other hand, in the agreement of May 10, 1988, the
University even agreed "to sit down and determine the
number of employees that will represent their bargaining
unit." This clearly indicates that the University recognized
the DWUEU-ALU as the bargaining representative of the
employees and is, therefore, estopped from questioning
the majority status of the said union.
9. Hence, petitioner’s contention that the DWUEU-ALU’s proposals
may not be unilaterally imposed on it on the ground that a
collective bargaining agreement is a contract wherein the consent
of both parties is indispensable is devoid of merit. A similar
argument had already been disregarded in the case of Kiok Loy v.
NLRC, 26 where we upheld the order of the NLRC declaring the
union’s draft CBA proposal as the collective agreement which
should govern the relationship between the parties. Kiok Loy v.
NLRC is applicable in the instant case considering that the facts
therein have also been indubitably established in this case. These
factors are: (a) the union is the duly certified bargaining agent; (b)
it made a definite request to bargain and submitted its collective
bargaining proposals, and (c) the University made no counter
proposal whatsoever. As we said in Kiok Loy," [a] company’s
refusal to make counter proposal if considered in relation to the
entire bargaining process, may indicate bad faith and this is
especially true where the Union’s request for a counter proposal
is left unanswered." Moreover, the Court added in the same case
that "it is not obligatory upon either side of a labor controversy to
precipitately accept or agree to the proposals of the other. But an
 erring party should not be tolerated and allowed with impunity to
resort to schemes feigning negotiations by going through empty
gestures."
PROTECTION TECHNOLOGY v. SEC. OF LABOR
Mar 1 1995 | J. Feliciano | Opposition
PETITIONER: Protection Technology
RESPONDENTS: Sec of Labor, DOLE, Med-Arbiter Brigida Fadrigon
and Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Protection- Alliance of Nationalist
and Genuine Labor Organization (SMP-ANGLO)
SUMMARY: The Union, a local/chapter of a federation, filed a petition
for certification election. The Company opposed the same. It argued
that the Union was not capable of filing the petition because it had
failed to submit its books of account with the BLR when it applied for
registration. SC held that the non-submission of books of account is a
ground which the employer can invoke legitimately to oppose a
petition for certification election filed by the local/chapter concerned.
However, in the case at hand, the conduct of certification election in
the presence of and under the supervision DOLE which resulted in the
overwhelming victory of the Union has rendered the petition moot
and academic. Nevertheless, the Union must first submit its books of
account before it can demand that it be recognized by the Company
and exercise its rights as the SEBA.
DOCTRINE: Non-submission of books of account certified by and
attested to by the appropriate officer is a ground which the employer
can invoke legitimately to oppose a petition for certification election
filed by the local/chapter concerned.
FACTS:
1. Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Protection- Alliance of Nationalist
and Genuine Labor Organizations (the Union) a newly organized
union affiliated with a federation filed a petition for certification
election.
2. In its comment on the petition, Protection Technology (the
Company) stated that the Union was not a legitimate labor
organization capable of filing the petition because it had failed to
submit its books of account with the BLR.
3. Med-Arbiter dismissed the Union’s petition.
4. On appeal, DOLE Usec. set aside the order of the Med-Arbiter. He
held that the requirement to submit books of account applies only
to labor organizations already existing for at least a year. The
Union had been operating for only four months when it filed the
petition. DOLE USec. ordered the holding of a certification
election. He also took note of the Union's submission of one sheet
of paper captioned a "Statement of Income and Expenses for the
month ended September 28, 1993." This "Statement" contained
only one entry: "Cash on hand — P590.00;" the sheet was certified
correct by the Union secretary, attested by the Union president
and duly subscribed.
5. The Company filed this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether books of account form part of the mandatory
documentation requirements for registration of a newly organized union
affiliated with a federation or a local or chapter of such a federation as a
legitimate labor organization
HELD: YES
RATIO:
1. A local/chapter becomes a legitimate labor organization only upon
submission of the following to the BLR: (a) A chapter certificate
and (b) the CBL, a statement on the set of officers and the books
of accounts all of which are certified under oath by the secretary or
treasurer as the case may be of such local/chapter and attested to
by its president (Progressive Dev’t. Corp. v Sec of Labor).
 2. Non-submission of books of account certified by and attested to 6. However, the conduct of the certification election in the presence
by the appropriate officer is a ground which the employer can and under the supervision of DOLE representation officers has rendered
invoke legitimately to oppose a petition for certification election this petition moot and academic. Of the 58 votes validly cast, the Union
filed by the local/chapter concerned. obtained 53. The certification election reflected the free and democratic will
3. What had been actually submitted to the BLR by the Union was a of the workers. SC will not set aside that will in the absence of compelling
mere financial statement-- a generous description for a single reasons to do so.
sheet of paper with one entry. 7. Nevertheless, the Union must submit its books of account before
4. Books of account are different in their essential nature from it may demand recognition by the Company as the exclusive bargaining
financial statements. agent of the members of the bargaining unit and before the Union may
exercise any of the rights pertaining to such an agent.
Books of Account Financial Statements
FALLO: Petition is dismissed for being moot and academic but the Union
consist of journals, ledgers and other accounting books is enjoined
merely summarize individual from exercising
transactions the rights and privileges of a legitimate labor
as have
containing a record of individual transactions wherein organization
been set out in the books of accountand duly authorized collective bargaining representative until
monies are received and disbursed by an establishment or it shall have submitted the required books of account.
entity Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Pacific Plastic v. Hon. Laguesma & Malayang
Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Pacific Plastic
entries are made on such books on a day-to-day basis usually prepared at the end of an accounting
AIR PHILS. CORP. v. BLR
period, commonly corresponding to the fiscal
June 22, 2006 | Tinga, J. | Effect of Petition for Cancellation of Trade
year of the establishment or entity concerned
Union Registration
kept and handled by bookkeepers (employees) of the company or may be audited statements, i.e., prepared by external
agency independent auditors (certified public accountants).
PETITIONER: Air Philippines Corporation (APC)
5. It is immaterial that the Union, having been organized for less than RESPONDENTS: Bureau of Labor Relations and Air Philippines
a year before its application for registration with the BLR, would have had Flight Attendants Association (APFLAA)
no real opportunity to levy and collect dues and fees from its members
which need to be recorded in the books of account. Such accounting books SUMMARY: Air Philippines Corporation (APC) filed a Petition for De-
can and must be submitted to the BLR, even if they contain no detailed or Certification and Cancellation of Union Registration against Air
extensive entries as yet. The point to be stressed is that the applicant local Philippines Flight Attendants Association (APFLAA). APC’s petition
or chapter must demonstrate to the BLR that it is entitled to registered was based on its claim that among APFLAA’s members were flight
status because it has in place a system for accounting for members' attendants with the position of Lead Cabin Attendant, which APC
contributions to its fund even before it actually receives dues or fees from claimed was supervisory in character. The Court held that such a claim
its members. The controlling intention is to minimize the risk of fraud and was not sufficient to constitute misrepresentation as a ground for
diversion in the course of the subsequent formation and growth of the cancellation of union registration under Art. 239 of the Labor Code.
Union fund.
 DOCTRINE:
For the purpose of de-certifying a union, it is not enough to establish
that the rank-and-file union includes ineligible employees in its
membership. Pursuant to Article 239 (a) and (c) of the Labor Code, it
must be shown that there was misrepresentation, false statement or
fraud in connection with the adoption or ratification of the
constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto, the minutes of
ratification, or in connection with the election of officers, minutes of
the election of officers, the list of voters, or failure to submit these
documents together with the list of the newly elected-appointed
officers and their postal addresses to the BLR.
FACTS:
1. Respondent Air Philippines Flight Attendants Association (APFLAA) filed
on March 17, 1999 a petition for certification election as the collective
bargaining representative of the flight attendants of petitioner Air
Philippines Corporation (APC).
2. The Med-Arbiter ordered the holding of a certification election, where
the majority of the votes were won by APFLAA.
3. On November 25, 1999, APC filed a Petition for De-Certification and
Cancellation of Union Registration against APFLAA with the DOLE. APC
alleged that among the members of APFLAA were flight attendants with
the position of Lead Cabin Attendant, which APC claimed was supervisory
in character.
4. DOLE-NCR Regional Dir. Alex Maraan dismissed APC’s petition. The
DOLE-NCR held that Art. 245 of the Labor Code does not provide a ground
for cancellation of union registration, which is governed by Art. 239 of the
Labor Code.
5. APC filed a Motion for Reconsideration/Appeal which the BLR denied.
ISSUE/HELD:
WON the union registration of respondent Air Philippines Flight Attendants
Association (APFLAA) may be cancelled – NO
RULING:
Petition is denied.
RATIO:
1. In the case of Tagaytay Highlands International Golf Club v. Tagaytay
Highlands Employees Union-PGTWO, the Court declared that the inclusion
in a union of disqualified employees is not among the grounds for
cancellation, unless such inclusion is due to misrepresentation, false
statement, or fraud under the circumstances enumerated in Secs. (a) and
(c) of Art. 239 of the Labor Code.
2. However, APC did not impute on APFLAA such misrepresentation as
provided by the said provision of the Labor Code.
3. In fact, it appears that APC devoted the bulk of its arguments to establish
that supervisory employees formed part of the membership of APFLAA,
which is not sufficient to cause the cancellation of union registration. And
this argument even rests on the assumption that Lead Cabin Attendants are
supervisory employees, a claim denied by APFLAA and not confirmed by
the DOLE-NCR or the BLR.
COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN v ASSOCIATION OF EMPLOYEES
AND FACULTY OF LETRAN
September 18, 2000 | Kapunan, J. | contract bar rule
PETITIONER: COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN
RESPONDENTS: ASSOCIATION OF EMPLOYEES AND FACULTY
OF LETRAN and ELEONOR AMBAS
SUMMARY: Union through new president Ambas wanted to
continue negotiating CBA. Letran claimed it was already prepared for
signing. Union rejected the unsigned CBA. Petitioner accused the
 union officers of bargaining in bad faith before the NLRC. SC Letran is
guilty of Unfair labor practices for refusing to bargain and dismissing
Labor Union president Ambas. The petition for certification election
was filed outside the sixty-day freedom period. Hence, the filing
thereof was barred by the existence of a valid and existing collective
bargaining agreement. Consequently, there is no legitimate
representation issue and, as such, the filing of the petition for
certification election did not constitute a bar to the ongoing
negotiation.
DOCTRINE: For the employer to validly suspend bargaining
processes, there must be a valid petition for certification election
raising a legitimate representation issue. No petition for certification
election for any representation issue may be filed after the lapse of
the sixty-day freedom period. Mere Filing of petition for certification
of election does not justify suspension of negotiations of ER.
FACTS:
1. DECEMBER 1992: Union president Salvador Abtria of Association of
Employees and Faculty of Letran, initiated the renegotiation of its CBA
with petitioner Colegio de San Juan de Letran for the last two (2) years
of the CBA's five (5) year lifetime from 1989-1994.
2. On the same year, the union elected a new set of officers where Eleanor
Ambas became the newly elected President
3. Ambas wanted to continue the renegotiation of the CBA but petitioner,
through Fr. Edwin Lao, claimed that the CBA was already prepared for
signing by the parties. The parties submitted the disputed CBA to a
referendum by the union members, who eventually rejected the said
CBA
4. Petitioner accused the union officers of bargaining in bad faith before the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
5. LA: Decided in favor of petitioner.
6. NLRC: reversed
7. January 1996: the union notified the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board (NCMB) of its intention to strike on the grounds of
petitioner's: non-compliance with the NLRC (1) order to delete the
name of Atty. Federico Leynes as the union's legal counsel; and (2)
refusal to bargain.
8. January 18, 1996: the parties agreed to disregard the unsigned CBA and
to start negotiation on a new five-year CBA starting 1994-1999.
9. February 7, 1996: the union submitted its proposals to petitioner, which
notified the union six days later that the same had been submitted to
its Board of Trustees.
10. Ambas was informed through a letter dated February 15, 1996 from her
superior that her work schedule was being changed from Monday to
Friday to Tuesday to Saturday. She protested and requested
management to submit the issue to a grievance machinery under the
old CBA
11. Due to petitioner's inaction, the union filed a notice of strike on March
13, 1996. The parties met on March 27, 1996 before the NCMB to
discuss the ground rules for the negotiation. On March 29, 1996, the
union received petitioner's letter dismissing Ambas for alleged
insubordination. Hence, the union amended its notice of strike to
include Ambas' dismissal.
12. They again discussed ground rules for negotiations. However petitioner
stopped negotiations after it received information that a new group of
employees had filed a petition for certification election.
13. June 18, 1996, the union finally struck.
14. Secretary of Labor and Employment assumed jurisdiction and ordered
all striking employees to return to work and for petitioner to accept
them back under the same terms and conditions before the actual
strike.
15. All were admitted back except Amabas.
16. Secretary of labor declared guilty of unfair labor practice and directed
reinstatement of Ambas with backwages.
17. CA: affirmed secretary of labor.
ISSUE: WoN petitioner is guilty of unfair labor practice by refusing to
bargain with the union when it unilaterally suspended the ongoing
negotiations for a new Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) upon mere
information that a petition for certification has been filed by another
legitimate labor organization? – NO
WoN the termination of the union president amounts to an interference of
the employees' right to self-organization? - YES
RULING:
petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
RATIO:
1. Article 252[1] of the Labor Code defines the meaning of the phrase duty to
bargain collectively.
2. above definition requires on both parties of the performance of the mutual
obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the8.
purpose of negotiating an agreement. Undoubtedly, respondent Association of
Employees and Faculty of Letran (AEFL) lived up to this requisite when it
presented its proposals for the CBA to petitioner on February 7, 1996. On the
other hand, petitioner devised ways and means in order to prevent the
negotiation. 9.
3. Petitioner's utter lack of interest in bargaining with the union is obvious in its
failure to make a timely reply to the proposals presented by the latter. More
than a month after the proposals were submitted by the union, petitioner still10.
had not made any counter-proposals. This inaction on the part of petitioner
prompted the union to file its second notice of strike on March 13, 1996.
Petitioner could only offer a feeble explanation that the Board of Trustees had
not yet convened to discuss the matter as its excuse for failing to file its reply.
This is a clear violation of Article 250.[2] 11.
4. Company’s refusal to make counter-proposal to the union's proposed CBA is an
indication of its bad faith. Where the employer did not even bother to submit an
answer to the bargaining proposals of the union, there is a clear evasion of the
duty to bargain collectively.
5. The series of events that transpired after the filing of the first notice of strike in
January 1996 show petitioner's resort to delaying tactics to ensure that
negotiation would not push through. Thus, on February 15, 1996, or barely a few
days after the union proposals for the new CBA were submitted, the union
president was informed by her superior that her work schedule was being
changed from Mondays to Fridays to Tuesdays to Saturdays. 12.
6. A request from the union president that the issue be submitted to a grievance
machinery was subsequently denied. Thereafter, the petitioner and the union
met on March 27, 1996 to discuss the ground rules for negotiation. However,
just two days later, or on March 29, 1996, petitioner dismissed the union
president for alleged insubordination. In its final attempt to thwart the
bargaining process, petitioner suspended the negotiation on the ground that it
allegedly received information that a new group of employees called the
Association of Concerned Employees of Colegio (ACEC) had filed a petition for13.
certification election.
7. Petitioner claims that the suspension of negotiation was proper since by the
filing of the petition for certification election the issue on majority
representation of the employees has arose. According to petitioner, the
authority of the union to negotiate on behalf of the employees was challenged
when a rival union filed a petition for certification election.
In order to allow the employer to validly suspend the bargaining process there
must be a valid petition for certification election raising a legitimate
representation issue. Hence, the mere filing of a petition for certification
election does not ipso facto justify the suspension of negotiation by the
employer.
The petition must first comply with the provisions of the Labor Code and its
Implementing Rules. Foremost is that a petition for certification election must
be filed during the sixty-day freedom period.
The "Contract Bar Rule" under Section 3, Rule XI, Book V, of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code, provides that: " If a collective bargaining
agreement has been duly registered in accordance with Article 231 of the Code,
a petition for certification election or a motion for intervention can only be
entertained within sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of such agreement."
The rule is based on Article 232, in relation to Articles 253, 253-A and 256 of the
Labor Code. No petition for certification election for any representation issue
may be filed after the lapse of the sixty-day freedom period. The old CBA is
extended until a new one is signed. The rule is that despite the lapse of the
formal effectivity of the CBA the law still considers the same as continuing in
force and effect until a new CBA shall have been validly executed. Hence, the
contract bar rule still applies. The purpose is to ensure stability in the
relationship of the workers and the company by preventing frequent
modifications of any CBA earlier entered into by them in good faith and for the
stipulated original period.
In the case at bar, the lifetime of the previous CBA was from 1989-1994. The
petition for certification election by ACEC, allegedly a legitimate labor
organization, was filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
only on May 26, 1996. Clearly, the petition was filed outside the sixty-day
freedom period. Hence, the filing thereof was barred by the existence of a valid
and existing collective bargaining agreement. Consequently, there is no
legitimate representation issue and, as such, the filing of the petition for
certification election did not constitute a bar to the ongoing negotiation.
Concerning the issue on the validity of the termination of the union president,
we hold that the dismissal was effected in violation of the employees' right to
self-organization.
14. The employer's right to terminate the services of an employee for just or
authorized cause must be exercised in good faith. More importantly, it must not
amount to interfering with, restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of
their right to self-organization because it would amount to, as in this case,
unlawful labor practice under Article 248 of the Labor Code.
15. Ms. Ambas was dismissed in order to strip the union of a leader who would fight
for the right of her co-workers at the bargaining table. Ms. Ambas, at the time
of her dismissal, had been working for the petitioner for ten (10) years already.
In fact, she was a recipient of a loyalty award. Moreover, for the past ten (10)
years her working schedule was from Monday to Friday. However, things began
to change when she was elected as union president and when she started
negotiating for a new CBA. Thus, it was when she was the union president and
during the period of tense and difficult negotiations when her work schedule
was altered from Mondays to Fridays to Tuesdays to Saturdays. When she did
not budge, although her schedule was changed, she was outrightly dismissed
for alleged insubordination.
[1] Art. 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively. - The duty to bargain collectively means
the performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in
good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect to wages, hours of work
and all other terms and conditions of employment including proposals for adjusting any
grievances or questions arising under such agreement and executing a contract incorporating
such agreements if requested by either party but such duty does not compel any party to agree
to a proposal or to make any concession.
[2] Art. 250. Procedure in collective bargaining. - The following procedures
shall be observed in collective bargaining:
(a) When a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it shall serve a written
notice upon the other party with a statement of its proposals. The other
party shall make a reply thereto not later than ten (10) calendar days from
receipt of such notice.
PICOP Resources, Inc. v. Ricardo Dequilla, plus 3 others & NAMAPRI-SPFI
PICOP RESOURCES, INC. V. RICARDO DEQUILLA, PLUS 3 OTHERS
AND NAMAPRI-SPFI
December 7, 2011 | Mendoza, J. | Contract Bar Rule – When not a bar
FACTS:
1. Ricardo Dequilla, Cesar Atienza and Aniceto Orbeta were regular
rank-and-file employees of Picop Resources, Inc. (PICOP) and
members of the NAMAPRI-SPFL, a duly registered labor
organization and existing bargaining agent of the PICOP rank-and-
file employees. PICOP and NAMAPRI-SPFL had a collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) which would expire on May 22, 2000.
2. On May 16, 2000, Atty. Proculo P. Fuentes, Jr. (Atty. Fuentes), then
National President of the Southern Philippines Federation of
Labor (SPFL), advised the PICOP management to terminate about
800 employees due to acts of disloyalty, specifically, for allegedly
campaigning, supporting and signing a petition for the
certification of a rival union, the Federation of Free Workers Union
(FFW) before the 60-day freedom period and during the effectivity
of the CBA. Such acts of disloyalty were construed to be a valid
cause for termination under the terms and conditions of the CBA.
Based on the CBA, the freedom period would start on March 22,
2000.
3. PICOP served a notice of termination due to acts of disloyalty to 31
of the 46 employees which included the respondents.
4. The LA, NLRC, and CA all ruled in favor of respondents
5. PICOP basically contends that private respondents were justly
terminated from employment for campaigning, supporting and
signing a petition for the certification of FFW, a rival union, before
the 60-day freedom period and during the effectivity of the CBA.
Their acts constitute an act of disloyalty against the union which is
valid cause for termination pursuant to the Union Security Clause
 in the CBA. PICOP also alleges that the applicable provision is not
Art. 256 (now Art. 268) but Art. 253 (now Art. 265) which states
that "it shall be the duty of both parties to keep the status quo
and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions
of the existing agreement during the 60-day period and/or until
a new agreement is reached by the parties." (It’s not specifically
mentioned in the facts, but it can be inferred from the ruling that
the) Petitioner was arguing that an existing CBA serves as a bar for
a filing of a certification election.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. W/N the respondents committed acts of disloyalty by signing the
authorization for petition for certification election of a rival union
before the freedom period (considering that the petition for
certification election itself was filed during the freedom period)? NO.
2. W/N Art. 253 (now 264) on maintaining the status quo should apply
despite the fact that a petition for certification election has already
been filed within the freedom period? NO. Art. 256 (now 268 applies).
MAIN ISSUE
RULES:
Art. 238 [232]. Prohibition on certification election. The Bureau shall not
entertain any petition for certification election or any other action which
may disturb the administration of duly registered existing collective
bargaining agreements affecting the parties except under Articles 253, 253-
A and 256 of this Code (renumbered as Arts. 264, 265, and 268 respectively.
Art. 264 [253]. Duty to bargain collectively when there exists a collective
bargaining agreement. When there is a collective bargaining agreement,
the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that neither party shall
terminate nor modify such agreement during its lifetime. However, either
party can serve a written notice to terminate or modify the agreement at
least sixty (60) days prior to its expiration date. It shall be the duty of both
parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the
terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day period
and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties.
Article 268 [256]. Representation issue in organized establishments. - In
organized establishments, when a verified petition questioning the
majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent is filed before the
Department of Labor and Employment within the sixty-day period before
the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement, the Med-Arbiter shall
automatically order an election by secret ballot when the verified petition
is supported by the written consent of at least twenty-five percent (25%) of
all the employees in the bargaining unit to ascertain the will of the
employees in the appropriate bargaining unit. To have a valid election, at
least a majority of all eligible voters in the unit must have cast their votes.
The labor union receiving the majority of the valid votes cast shall be
certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of all the workers in the unit.
When an election which provides for three or more choices results in no
choice receiving a majority of the valid votes cast, a run-off election shall be
conducted between the labor unions receiving the two highest number of
votes: Provided, That the total number of votes for all contending unions is
at least fifty per cent (50%) of the number of votes cast.
At the expiration of the freedom period, the employer shall continue to
recognize the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent where no
petition for certification election is filed.
RATIO:
On Acts of Disloyalty
1. Their mere act of signing an authorization for a petition for
certification election before the freedom period does not
necessarily demonstrate union disloyalty. The act of signing an
authorization for a petition for certification election is not
disloyalty to the union per se considering that the petition for
certification election itself was filed during the freedom period
which started on March 22, 2000.
2. The records are bereft of proof of any contemporaneous acts of
resignation or withdrawal of union membership or non-payment
of union dues. Neither is there proof that private respondents
joined FFW. The fact is, private respondents remained in good
standing with their union, NAMAPRI-SPFL.
 Lingkod Manggagawa ng Rubberworld v. Rubberworld Phils.
On maintaining the status quo
1. Applying Art. 256 (now 268), it can be said that while it is
incumbent for the employer to continue to recognize the majority
status of the incumbent bargaining agent even after the expiration
of the freedom period, they could only do so when no petition for
certification election was filed. The reason is, with a pending
petition for certification, any such agreement entered into by
management with a labor organization is fraught with the risk that
such a labor union may not be chosen thereafter as the collective
bargaining representative. The provision for status quo is
conditioned on the fact that no certification election was filed
during the freedom period. Any other view would render nugatory
the clear statutory policy to favor certification election as the
means of ascertaining the true expression of the will of the workers
as to which labor organization would represent them.
2. Moreover, the last sentence of Article 253 which provides for
automatic renewal pertains only to the economic provisions of the
CBA, and does not include representational aspect of the CBA. An
existing CBA cannot constitute a bar to a filing of a petition for
certification election. When there is a representational issue, the
status quo provision in so far as the need to await the creation of a
new agreement will not apply. Otherwise, it will create an absurd
situation where the union members will be forced to maintain
membership by virtue of the union security clause existing under
the CBA and, thereafter, support another union when filing a
petition for certification election. If we apply it, there will always
be an issue of disloyalty whenever the employees exercise their
right to self-organization. The holding of a certification election is
a statutory policy that should not be circumvented, or
compromised.
3. Therefore, following Article 256 (now 268), at the expiration of the
freedom period, PRI's obligation to recognize NAMAPRI-SPFL as
the incumbent bargaining agent does not hold true when petitions
for certification election were filed, as in this case.
FACTS:
LINGKOD MANGGAGAWA SA RUBBERWORLD v RUBBERWOLRD
INC.
January 29, 2007 | Garcia, J. | Suspension of CE: Prejudicial Question
PETITIONER: Lingkod Manggagawa sa Rubberworld, Adidas-Anglo
represented by Sonia Esperanza
RESPONDENTS: Rubberworld Inc., Antonio Yang, Laya
Mananghaya Salgado & Co.
SUMMARY: Rubberworld filed a notice of temporary partial
shutdown due to severe financial crisis. Bisig (had a CBA with
Rubberworld) went on strike, speeding up the shutdown. Petitioner
union filed a complaint against Rubberworld. Alleging it filed a
petition for certification election during the freedom period granted
by the DOLE Regional Director. While the complaint was pending,
Rubberworld filed a petition with the SEC which granted all actions
for claims against Rubberworld be suspended. LA still rendered
decision finding Rubberworld liable for ULP and ordering the
payment of P27M. SC held that the LA decision is void for violating
the suspension order, which mandates the suspension of all actions
for claims against a corporation under a management committee by
the SEC.
DOCTRINE: Upon appointment of a management committee, the
rehabilitation receiver, board or body, all actions for claims against
corporations under managements or receiverships pending before
any court, tribunal, board, or body shall be suspended. Allowing
labor cases to proceed defeats the purpose of the automatic stay
and encumbers management committee’s time and resources.
1. Petitioner is a legitimate labor union whose members were employees of
Rubberworld, a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of footwear,1.
bags and garments.
2. 1994, Rubberworld files with DOLE a Notice of Temporary Partial Shutdown due
to severe financial crisis.
3. After being notified of such, Bisig Pagkakaisa-NAFLU (union with which the
company had a CBA) staged a strike; resulting to Rubberworld's premature2.
shutdown.
4. Petitioner filed a complaint against Rubberworld for unfair labor practice (ULP),
illegal shutdown, and non-payment of salaries and separation pay. It alleged
that it had filed a petition for certification election during the freedom period
which had been granted by the DOLE Regional Director.
5. While petitioner’s complaint was pending with the LA, Rubberworld filed with
the SEC a Petition for Declaration of a State of Suspension of Payments with1.
Proposed Rehabilitation Plan
6. The SEC granted Rubberworld’s petition, ordering that – with the creation of
the Management Committee, all actions for claims against Rubberworld
Philippines, Inc. pending before any court, tribunal, office, board, body,
Commission or sheriff are hereby deemed SUSPENDED.
7. Notwithstanding the SEC's suspension order, LA decided on petitioner’s
complaint – ruling in favor of petitioner union. For purposes of any appeal, LA
granted the appeal bond be tentatively set at P500,000.00.
8. Rubberworld posted a temporary appeal bond but went on to appeal to the
NLRC.
9. However, the NLRC recomputed the monetary awards granted to the
petitioners – later came out to be 27M. NLRC directed Rubberworld to upgrade2.
their bond accordingly to 27M.
10. Rubberworld filed a petition for Certiorari.
11. In Rubberworld’s failure to upgrade its appeal bond, the NLRC dismissed
Rubberworld’s appeal.
12. SEC later declared Rubberworld as dissolved and lifted its suspension order.
13. Rubberworld filed a motion to admit its amended petition for certiorari and its
supplement, alleging that pursuant to the SEC Order – the proceedings before
the LA should have been suspended. Since the LA disregarded the SECs
suspension order, the subsequent proceedings were null and void.
14. CA granted Rubberworld’s petition – finding that the LA committed grave abuse
of discretion and declared the proceedings before it null and void.
ISSUES:
Whether the CA had committed GAD/LEJ thereof when it gave due course to
the petition filed by Rubberworld (Phils.), Inc. and annulled and set aside the
decisions rendered by the LA a quo and the NLRC, when the said decisions had
become final and executory warranting the outright dismissal of the aforesaid
petition? – NO, CA did not commit GAD/LEJ.
Whether the CA had committed GAD and reversible error when it applied
Section 5(d) and Section 6 (c) of P.D. No. 902-A, as amended, to the case at bar?
– NO.
RULING: Instant petition is denied.
RATIO:
While posting an appeal bond is indeed a requirement for the perfection of an
appeal from the decision of the LA to the NLRC, Rubberworld’s failure to
upgrade its appeal bond cannot bar the review by the CA of the lower court
proceedings. Given the facts, the decision of the Labor Arbiter could never
attain final and executory status. The LA completely disregarded and violated
Section 6(c) of PD 902-A which mandates the suspension of all actions for claims
against a corporation placed under a management committee by the SEC. Thus,
the proceedings before the LA and the order and writ subsequently issued by
the NLRC are all null and void for having been undertaken or issued in violation
of the SEC Suspension Order. As such, the LA’s decision, including the dismissal
by the NLRC of Rubberworld’s appeal, could not have achieved a final and
executory status.
The applicability of the provisions of Section 5 (d) and Section 6 (c) of P.D. No.
902-A, reorganizing the SEC, vesting it with additional powers, and placing it
under the Office of the President, as correctly ruled by the CA, had already been
resolved by this Court in its earlier decisions.
a. In the first Rubberworld case, the Court upheld the
applicability of PD 902-A to labor cases pursuant to Section
5(d) and Section 6(c), stating – the law is clear: upon the
creation of a management committee or the appointment of
a rehabilitation receiver, all claims for actions shall be
suspended accordingly. No exception in favor of labor claims
is mentioned in the law. Since the law makes no distinction or
exemptions, neither should this Court. Ubi lex non distinguit
nec nos distinguere debemos. Allowing labor cases to proceed
 clearly defeats the purpose of the automatic stay and severely
encumbers the management committee's time and
resources. The justification for the automatic stay of all
pending actions for claims is to enable the management
committee or the rehabilitation receiver to effectively
exercise its/his powers free from any judicial or extra-judicial
interference that might unduly hinder or prevent the rescue of
the debtor company.
b. In Chua v. National Labor Relations Commission, labor claims
cannot proceed independently of a bankruptcy liquidation
proceeding, since these claims would spawn needless
controversy, delays, and confusion. Allowing labor claims to
continue despite a SEC suspension order would lead to such
results. Article 217 of the Labor Code should be construed in
harmony with PD 902-A, according to the basic rule in
statutory construction that implied repeals are not favored.
Each and every statute must be construed in a way that would
avoid conflict with existing laws. True, the NLRC has the
power to hear and decide labor disputes, but such authority is
deemed suspended when PD 902-A is put into effect by the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
AIR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION v. BLR and AIR
PHILIPPINES FLIGHT ATTENDANTS ASSOCIATION
Effect of Petition for Cancellation of Trade Union Registration Not a
Prejudicial Question | June 22, 2006 | Tinga, J.
FACTS:
1. The case started with Respondent Air Philippines Flight
Attendants Association was issued a Certificate of Registration by
DOLE
2. The union then filed a petition for certification election as the
collective bargaining representative of the flight attendants of Air
Phlippines Corporation.
a. Med-arbiter ordered the holding of such
b. The union got the majority of the votes cast in said
certification election
3. Petitioner APC filed a Petition for De-Certification and
Cancellation of Union Registration against respondent union with
the DOLE, alleging that the union could not be registered as a
labor organization as it is composed of a mixture of supervisory
and rank-and-file flight attendants.
a. Particularly, APC alleged that flight attendants holding
the position of Lead Cabin Attendant were among those
who comprised the union.
4. DOLE Director dismissed the petition holding that Article 245 of
the Labor Code, which states that supervisory employees are not
eligible for membership in labor organizations of rank-and-file
employees, does not provide a ground for cancellation of union
registration. It is instead governed by Article 239
a. On appeal, BLR affirmed DOLE. On appeal to CA, CA
dismissed outright on the ground that APC failed to avail
remedy of MR which is a condition sine qua non.
ISSUE: WON the registration of respondent union must be cancelled
on the ground of it not being composed purely of rank and file
employees - NO
HELD:
1. Tagaytay Highlands International Golf Club v. Tagaytay
Highlands Employees Union-PGTWO: the inclusion in a union
of disqualified employees is not among the grounds for
cancellation unless such inclusion is due to misrepresentation,
false statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated in
Sections (a) and (c) of Article 239 of the Labor Code.
2. Clearly, for the purpose of de-certifying a union, it is not enough
to establish that the rank-and-file union includes ineligibile
employees in its membership.
3. Pursuant to Article 239 (a) and (c) of the Labor ode, it must be
shown that there was misrepresentation, false statement or fraud
in connection with the adoption or ratification of the constitution
 and by-laws or amendments thereto, the minutes of ratification, or
in connection with the election of officers, minutes of the election
of officers, the list of voters, or failure to submit these documents
together with the list of the newly elected-appointed officers and
their postal addresses to the BLR
4. In its Petition for De-certification and Cancellation of Union
Registration, APC did not impute on the union such
misrepresentation of the character necessitated under Article 239
(a) and (c) of the Labor Code
a. Petitioner APC merely argued that respondent union was
not qualified to become a legitimate labor organization by
reason of its mixed composition of rank-and-file and
supervisory employees, and that the union made
misrepresentation by making it appear that its
composition was composed purely of rank-and-file
employees
b. Such misrepresentation is not conformable to Article 239
(a) and (c) of the Labor Code.
KIOK LOY v. NLRC and PAMBANSANG KILUSAN NG
PAGGAWA (KILUSAN)
Collective Bargaining: General Concept | Jan. 22, 1986| Cuevas, J.
FACTS:
1. Respondent Pambansang Kilusang Paggawa won in a certification
election and was subsequently certified by the BLR as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of
Sweden Ice Cream Plant.
2. The Union furnished the Company with two copies of its proposed
CBA and requested for the company’s counter proposals.
a. Company did not respond. Hence, Union wrote again
reiterating its request for collective bargaining
negotiations and for the counter proposals. Ignored.
3. The union filed a “Notice of Strike” with the BLR on ground of
unresolved economic issues in collective bargaining
a. Conciliation proceedings ensued but all attempts towards
an amicable settlement failed, prompting BLR to certify
the case to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration
b. Company failed to submit its position paper several times
and kept on asking for postponement until one time when
labor arbiter finally denied said request and held that the
company has waived its right to present further evidence
and that the case is deemed submitted for resolution.
4. NLRC rendered a decision holding that the company is guilty of
unjustified refusal to bargain, in violation of now Section 249, and
declared that the draft proposal for a CBA submitted by the union
as the collective agreement governing the relationship between the
parties.
PETITIONER: Its right to procedural due process has been violation
when it was precluded from presenting further evidence in support of
its stand and when its request for further postponement was denied.
Petitioner also contends that the finding of unfair labor practice for
refusal to bargain is not supported by law and the evidence considering
that the position paper was submitted only 2 months before the
decision and that the CBA is unreasonable and lacks legal basis.
ISSUE: WON NLRC committed GAD - NO
HELD:
1. Collective bargaining is defined as negotiations toward a
collective agreement and is one of the democratic frameworks
under the New Labor Code designed to stabilize the relation
between labor and management and to create a climate of sound
and stable industrial peace.
2. It is a mutual responsibility of the employer and the Union and is
characterized as a legal obligation. So much so that Article 249,
par. (g) of the LC makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer
to refuse “to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in
good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with
respect to wages, hours of work, and all other terms and conditions
of employment including proposals for adjusting any grievance or
question arising under such an agreement and executing a contract
incorporating such agreement, if requested by either party.”
3. While it is a mutual obligation of the parties to bargain, the
employer is not under nay legal duty to initiate contract
negotiation.
a. Mechanics of collective bargaining is set in motion only
when the following preconditions are present: (1)
possession of the status of majority representations of the
employees’ representative in accordance with any of the
means of selection or designation provided by the LC; (2)
proof of majority representation; and (3) a demand to
bargain under Art. 251, par. (a0 of the New Labor Code.
4. From the over-all conduct of petitioner company in relation to the
task of negotiation, there can be no doubt that the Union has a
valid cause to complain against its attitude, the totality of which is
indicative of the latter’s disregard of, and failure to live up to, what
is enjoined by the Labor Code – to bargain in good faith.
5. Petitioner Company is guilty of unfair labor practice. It has been
established that
a. Respondent union was a duly certified bargaining agent
b. Union made a definite request to bargain, accompanied
with a copy of the proposed CBA to the company, not
only once but twice which were left unanswered and
unacted upon
c. The company made no counter proposal whatsoever
6. This indicates that there is a lack of sincere desire to negotiate. A
company’s refusal to make counter proposal if considered in
relation to the entire bargaining process, may indicate bad faith
and this is especially true where the Union’s request for a counter
proposal is left unanswered.
7. Even during the period of compulsory arbitration before the
NLRC, petitioner ‘s approach and attitude of stalling the
negotiation by a series of postponements, non-appearance, and
undue delay in submitting its financial statements, lead to no other
conclusion except that it is unwilling to negotiate and reach an
agreement with union.
8. Petitioner has not at any instance, evinced good faith or
willingness to discuss freely and fully the claims and demands set
forth by the Union much less justify its opposition thereto.
ISSUE: WON due process was violated – NO
HELD:
1. Considering the various postponements granted in its behalf, the
claimed denial of due process is totally bereft of any legal and
factual support.
2. Petitioner had not even honored respondent Union with any reply
to the latter’s successive letters, all geared towards bringing the
company to the bargaining table.
3. It did not even bother to furnish the union with a counter proposal
despite persistent requests made therefor
4. Certainly, the moves and overall behavior of petitioner-company
were in total derogation of the policy enshrined in the Labor Code
aimed towards expending settlement of economic disputes.
ISSUE: WON the CBA is a nullity for lack of company’s consent -
NO
PETITIONER: If the CBA is implemented, the company will face
the prospect of closing down because it has to pay a staggering amount
of economic benefits to the union that will equal if not exceed its
capital.
HELD:
1. Such a stand should have been presented to the Labor Arbiter
which is the proper forum for the purpose.
 a. The complaint charged petitioner with non-compliance
with a wage order mandating a P12 increase in wages. As
a result, complainants’’ basic pay, 13th month pay, SIL
pay, legal holiday pay, night shift differential and
overtime pay were all underpaid.
2. Petitioner countered that the failure to comply with the pertinent
wage order was brought about by the tremendous losses suffered
by the company which were aggravated when the workers staged
a strike on account of the non-adjustment of their basic pay.
3. To forestall continuous suspension/closure of business operations,
the strikers sent a notice that thy were willing to condone the
implementation of the increase.
a. Such condonation was distinctly stated in Sec. 3, Article
VIII, of the CBA which was voluntarily entered into by
the parties
b. Complainants admitted the existence of the provision in
the CBA but denied the validity thereof inasmuch as it
was not reached after due consultation with the members.
c. LA sustained the claim that the subject provision of the
CBA was void but based its conclusion on a different
ground which is that it was contrary to law as only the
Tripartite Wage Productive Board of DOLE can approve
exemption of an establishment from coverage of a wage
order.
4. Petitioner was adjudged liable to each of the complainants for
MANILA FASHIONS, INC. v. NLRC, ZAMORA and underpayment of salary, 13th month pay, vacation leave pay, and
NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG MANILA legal holiday pay in the total amount of P900,012.
FASHIONS, INC. a. NLRC denied both appeals of petitioner and respondent
Collective Bargaining – Bargainable Issues | November 13, 1996 | ton the ground of lack of merit and prescription,
Bellosillo, J. respectively.

FACTS: ISSUE: WON the condonation of the implementation of wage order

1. Respondnet Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Manila Fashions, contained in the CBA valid - NO
Inc., through its president Zamora, filed a complaint before the LA
on behalf of its 150 members who were regular employees of PETITIONER: Valid. Invoked cases decided by Court applying the
Petitioner Manila Fashions, Inc. rule that if the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents
a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not be
disowned simply because of change of mind.

HELD:
1. We sustain the decision of the LA as affirmed by the NLRC that
the condonation appearing in Sec. 3, Art. VIII of the CBA did not
exempt petitioner form compliance with Wage Order.
2. A CBA refers to the negotiation contract between a legitimate
labor organization and the employer concerning wages, hours of
work and all other terms and conditions of employment in a
bargaining unit, including mandatory provisions for grievances
and arbitration machineries.
a. As in all other contracts, parties in a CBA may establish
stipulations, clauses, terms and condition as they may
deem convenient provided they are not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy
3. Section 3, Article VIII of the CBA is a void provision because by
agreeing to condone the implementation of the Wage Order, the
parties contravened its mandate of wage increase of P12. Also,
only the Tripartite Wage Productivity Board of the DOLE could
approve exemption of an establishment from coverage of a wage
order.
4. If petitioner is financially distressed, it should have applied for a
wage exemption to meet its labor cost without endangering its
viability or its very existence.
5. The Office of the Solicitor General emphasizes the point that
parties to a CBA may not, by themselves, set a wage lower than
the minimum wage. To do so would render nugatory the purpose
of a wage exemption, not to mention the possibility that
employees may be duped or be unwittingly put in a position to
accept a lower wage.
6. The cases cited by petitioner is inapplicable because the present
case involves a stipulation in the CBA in contravention of law,
unlike the cited cases which are concerned with compromise
settlements as a means to end labor disputes.

UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES - DRUG, FOOD AND
ALLIED INDUSTRIES UNION - KILUSANG MAYO UNO
(UFE-DFA-KMU) v. NESTLÉ PHILIPPINES
INCORPORATED
22 August 2006 | J. Chico-Nazario | Bargainable issues
SUMMARY: As the CBA between Nestle and the union was about to
expire, the Presidents of the Alabang and Cabuyao Divisions of the
Union informed Nestle of their intent to open negotiation for the
succeeding years. The union and Nestle reached a deadlock regarding
economic issues; hence, UFE filed a Notice of Strike. SOLE Sto.
Tomas issued that the strike be enjoined; nevertheless, it pushed
through. On appeal to the CA, the dismissal of the ULP charges
against Nestle was affirmed. Further, it ruled that the retirement plan
was a unilateral grant and not a mandatory subject for bargaining. The
SC held that the retirement plan is still a valid issue for the re-
negotiations, and that Nestle is not guilty of ULP. The retirement plan
is a bargainable issue precisely because it was existing at the time they
desired to re-negotiate, and thus held a consensual character.
DOCTRINE: (Quoting Nestle PH vs. NLRC)
The NLRC correctly observed that the inclusion of the retirement plan
in the collective bargaining agreement as part of the package of
economic benefits extended by the company to its employees to
provide them a measure of financial security after they shall have
ceased to be employed in the company, reward their loyalty, boost
their morale and efficiency and promote industrial peace, gives a
consensual character to the plan so that it may not be terminated or
modified at will by either party.
The fact that the retirement plan is non-contributory, i.e., that the
employees contribute nothing to the operation of the plan, does not
make it a non-issue in the CBA negotiations. As a matter of fact,
almost all of the benefits that the petitioner has granted to its
employees under the CBA salary increases, rice allowances, midyear
bonuses, 13th and 14th month pay, seniority pay, medical and
hospitalization plans, health and dental services, vacation, sick & other
leaves with pay are non-contributory benefits. Since the retirement
plan has been an integral part of the CBA since 1972, the Unions
demand to increase the benefits due the employees under said plan, is
a valid CBA issue. [E]mployees do have a vested and demandable
right over existing benefits voluntarily granted to them by their
employer. The latter may not unilaterally withdraw, eliminate or
diminish such benefits.
FACTS:
1. Since the CBA between Respondnet Nestlé and Petitioner UFE-
DFA-KMU was to expire, the Presidents of the Alabang &
Cabuyao Divisions of the union, through a Letter of Intent,
 informed Nestlé of their intent to open Collective Bargaining
Negotiation for 2001-2004.
2. Nestlé acknowledged receipt and informed the union that it was
preparing its own counter-proposal and proposed ground rules to
govern the conduct of CB Negotiations. It later underscored the
position that "unilateral grants, one-time company grants,
company-initiated policies and programs, which include, but are
not limited to the Retirement Plan, Incidental Straight Duty Pay
and Calling Pay Premium, are by their very nature not proper
subjects of CBA negotiations and therefore shall be excluded
therefrom."
3. The Cabuyao Division later became the sole bargaining unit
involved in negotiations with the closure of the Alabang Plant.
4. Nestlé, claiming to have reached impasse in dialogue, requested
NCMB to conduct preventive mediation proceedings; despite 15
meetings, however, the parties failed to reach any agreement on
the proposed CBA.
5. Conciliation proceedings proved ineffective.
6. UFE-DFA-KMU filed a Notice of Strike complaining of
bargaining deadlock (on economic issues). It later filed another
Notice of Strike predicated on Nestlé's alleged ULP (bargaining
in bad faith --> setting pre-conditions in the ground rules by
refusing to include issue of Retirement Plan in the CBA
negotiations) A strike vote conducted was met with overwhelming
approval.
7. Nestlé filed with DOLE a Petition for Assumption of Jurisdiction,
pursuant to LC 263 (g), effectively enjoying any impending strike.
8. Secretary Sto. Tomas ordered any strike or lockout to be enjoined
and the parties to cease and desist from committing any act that
might lead to the further deterioration of the current labor relations
situation. The parties were further directed to meet and convene
for the discussion of the union proposals and company counter-
proposals before the NCMB. MR filed by UFE denied.
9. Despite SOLE Order, the union went on strike.
10. SOLE issued an order directing (1) the members of UFE-DFA-
KMU to return-to-work within twenty-four (24) hours from
receipt of such Order; (2) Nestlé to accept back all returning
workers under the same terms and conditions existing preceding
to the strike; (3) both parties to cease and desist from committing
acts inimical to the on-going conciliation proceedings leading to
the further deterioration of the situation; and (4) the submission of
their respective position papers within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof. But notwithstanding the Return-to-Work Order, UFE
continued with their strike, prompting SoLE to seek the assistance
of the PNP for the enforcement of said order.
11. Members still continued with their strike and refused to go back
to work as instructed --> SOLE sought assistance of PNP for
enforcement of the order
12. CA: ordered the retirement plan was a unilateral grant and not a
mandatory subject for bargaining and affirmed the dismissal of
ULP charges against Nestlé.
ISSUE: WON the Retirement Plan was a proper subject to be included
in CBA negotiations - YES.
1. SC upheld UFE's contention, saying that there is nothing in either
of the documents that prove that it agreed to treat the Retirement
Plan as a unilateral grant of the company which is outside the
scope of the CBA.
2. In a similar case involving the same parties, the Court had
occasion to rule that a retirement plan is consensual in nature.
"The fact that the retirement plan is non-contributory does not
make it a non-issue in the CBA negotiations.
3. Since the retirement plan has been an integral part of the CBA
since 1972, the Union's demand to increase the benefits due
the EEs under said plan is a valid CBA issue."
4. Here, as this benefit was already subject of the existing CBA, the
members of UFE were only exercising their prerogative to bargain
or renegotiate for the improvement of the terms of the Retirement
Plan just like they would for all the other economic & non-
economic benefits previously enjoyed by them.
5. Precisely, the purpose of collective bargaining is the acquisition
or attainment of the best possible covenants or terms relating to
economic & non-economic benefits granted by ERs due to EEs.
LC has imposed a mutual obligation on both parties to bargain
collectively (LC 252 & 253)
ISSUE: WON assumption of powers of SOLE should have been
limited merely to grounds alleged in the Second Notice of Strike - NO.
1. SOLE's assumption of jurisdiction power necessarily includes
matters incidental to the labor dispute, that is, issues that are
necessarily involved in the dispute itself, not just to those ascribed
in the Notice of Strike, or otherwise submitted to him for
resolution.
2. Accordingly, even if not exactly on the ground upon which the
Notice of Strike is based, the fact that the issue is incidental to the
resolution of the subject labor dispute or that a specific issue had
been submitted to SOLE for her resolution, validly empowers the
latter to take cognizance of and resolve the same.
3. In any event, the query as to W/N the Retirement Plan is to be
included in the CBA Negotiations between the parties ineluctably
dictates upon SOLE to go into the substantive matter of CBA
negotiations.
2. Though Nestlé underscored its position that "unilateral grants,
one-time company grants, company-initiated policies and
programs, which include, but are not limited to the Retirement
Plan, Incidental Straight Duty Pay and Calling Pay Premium, are
by their very nature not proper subjects of CBA negotiations and
therefore shall be excluded therefrom," such attitude is not
tantamount to refusal to bargain viewed in light of the fact
that 8 out 9 BUs have allegedly agreed to treat the Retirement
Plan as a unilateral grant. Nestlé, therefore, cannot be faulted
for considering the same benefit as unilaterally granted.
3. Construing arguendo that the content of the aforequoted letter of
29 May 2001 laid down a precondition to its agreement to bargain
with UFE-DFA-KMU, Nestlé’s inclusion in its Position Paper of
its proposals affecting other matters covered by the CBA
contradicts the claim of refusal to bargain or bargaining in bad
faith. Accordingly, since UFE-DFA-KMU failed to proffer
substantial evidence that would overcome the legal presumption
of good faith on the part of Nestlé, the award of moral and
exemplary damages is unavailing.

ISSUE: WON Nestlé is guilty of ULP (setting a pre-condition to

bargaining) - NO

1. By imputing bad faith unto the actuations of Nestlé, it was UFE,

therefore, who had the burden of proof to present substantial
evidence to support the allegation of ULP. The allegations &
arguments raised readily show that they failed to discharge this
onus probandi as there is still a need for presentation of evidence
other than its bare contention of ULP. It is not enough that the
union believed that ER committed acts of ULP when the
circumstances clearly negate even a prima facie showing to
warrant such a belief.
 SAMAHANG MANGAGAWA SA TOP FORM v NLRC
September 7, 1998 | Romero, J. |Collective Bargaining – Permissive
Subject of CB
SUMMARY: During the Collective Bargaining negotiation.
Petitioner union proposed to include a provision which states that any
future wage increase given by the government should be implemented
across-the-board or non-conditional. The Management requested that
the original provision be retained on their promise that they would
grant wage increases across-the-board. The union decided to defer this
provision. Wage Orders Nos. 1&2 were issues granting P17 and P12
respectively. The company did not grant the increase across-the-board.
The union demanded that the company fulfil promise but the company
refused saying that it did not grant an across-the board increase to
prevent wage distortion and so the union filed a complaint against the
company unfair labor practices. LA & NLRC (and even commended)
Top Form’s implementation of the wage orders and dismissed the
complaint filed by the union. SC affirmed the LA & NLRC because
the “promise” was not included in the CBA so the company cannot be
compelled to fulfil it.
DOCTRINE:
ON PERMISSIVE SUBJECT OF CB:
A party may refuse to enter into a collective bargaining contract unless
it includes a desired provision as to a matter which is a mandatory
subject of collective bargaining; but a refusal to contract unless the
agreement covers a matter which is not a mandatory subject is in
substance a refusal to bargain about matters which are mandatory
subjects of collective bargaining; and it is no answer to the charge of
refusal to bargain in good faith that the insistence on the disputed
clause was not the sole cause of the failure to agree or that agreement
was not reached with respect to other disputed clauses.
ON MINUTES OF NEGOTIATIONS:
The Minutes reflects the proceedings and discussions undertaken in
the process of bargaining for worker benefits in the same way that the
minutes of court proceedings show what transpired therein. At the
negotiations, it is but natural for both management and labor to adopt
positions or make demands and offer proposals and counter-proposals.
However, nothing is considered final until the parties have reached an
agreement.
FACTS:
1. Samahang Manggagawa sa Top Form Manufacturing United
Workers of the Philippines (SMTFM) was the collective
bargaining representative of all regular rank and file employees of
Top Form Manufacturing Philippines, Inc.
2. The minutes of the meeting of the collective bargaining
negotiation showed that, Article VII of the CBA pertaining to
wages was discussed. The minutes stated that the Union proposed
that any future wage increase given by the government should be
implemented by the company across-the-board or non-
conditional.
3. Management requested the union to retain the original provision
since their sincerity was already proven when the P25.00 wage
increase was granted across-the-board. The union ultimately
decided to defer this provision
4. On October 15, 1990, Wage Order No. 01 was issued granting an
increase of P17.00, this was followed by Wage Order No. 02
providing for a P12.00 daily increase in salary.
5. The union requested the implementation of said wage orders.
However, they demanded that the increase be on an across-the-
board basis. Top Form refused to accede to that demand. Instead,
it implemented a scheme of increases purportedly to avoid wage
distortion.
6. Thus, private respondent granted the P17.00 increase under Wage
Order No. 01 to workers/employees receiving salary of P125.00
per day and below. The P12.00 increase mandated by Wage Order
No. 02 was granted to those receiving the salary of P140.00 per
day and below. For employees receiving salary higher than
P125.00 or P140.00 per day, private respondent granted an
 escalated increase ranging from P6.99 to P14.30 and from P6.00
to P10.00, respectively.
7. The union wrote Top Form a letter demanding that it should fulfill
its pledge of sincerity to the union by granting an across-the-board
wage increase to all employees under the wage orders. The
company refused so the union filed a complaint with the NLRC
alleging that Top Form’s act of reneging on its
undertaking/promise clearly constitutes an act of unfair labor
practice through bargaining in bad faith.
8. Top Form contended that in implementing Wage Orders Nos. 01
and 02, it had avoided the existence of a wage distortion that
would arise from such implementation. It asserted that there was
no agreement to the effect that future wage increases mandated by
the government should be implemented on an across-the-board
basis. Otherwise, that agreement would have been incorporated
and expressly stipulated in the CBA
9. Labor Arbiter Jose G. de Vera dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit. NLRC also dismissed appeal for lack of merit.
ISSUE: WON private respondent committed an unfair labor practice
in its refusal to grant across-the-board wage increases in implementing
Wage Orders Nos. 01 and 02 - NO
HELD:
1. Petitioner union anchors its arguments on the alleged
commitment of private respondent to grant an automatic across-
the-board wage increase in the event that a statutory or legislated
wage increase is promulgated. It cites as basis, the portion of the
Minutes of the collective bargaining negotiation on February 27,
1990 regarding wages, arguing additionally that said Minutes
forms part of the entire agreement between the parties.
a. If there was indeed a promise on the part of Top Form,
petitioner union should have demanded that such
promise be incorporated in the CBA. After all,
petitioner union has the means under the law to
compel Top Form to incorporate this specific
economic proposal in the CBA.
b. It could have invoked Article 252 of the Labor Code
defining duty to bargain, thus, the duty includes
executing a contract incorporating such agreements if
requested by either party. However, Article 252 also
states that the duty to bargain does not compel any
party to agree to a proposal or make any concession.
Thus, petitioner union may not validly claim that the
proposal embodied in the Minutes of the negotiation
forms part of the CBA that it finally entered into with
private respondent.
2. The CBA is the law between the contracting parties, the
collective bargaining representative and the employer-company.
Compliance with a CBA is mandated by the expressed policy to
give protection to labor. In the same vein, CBA provisions should
be construed liberally rather than narrowly and technically, and
the courts must place a practical and realistic construction upon
it, giving due consideration to the context in which it is negotiated
and purpose which it is intended to serve.
a. It goes without saying, however, that only provisions
embodied in the CBA should be so interpreted and
complied with. Where a proposal raised by a
contracting party does not find print in the CBA it is
not a part thereof and the proponent has no claim
whatsoever to its implementation.
b. The Minutes reflects the proceedings and discussions
undertaken in the process of bargaining for worker
benefits in the same way that the minutes of court
proceedings show what transpired therein. At the
negotiations, it is but natural for both management
and labor to adopt positions or make demands and
offer proposals and counter-proposals. However,
nothing is considered final until the parties have
reached an agreement.
 c. If indeed private respondent promised to continue
with the practice of granting across-the-board salary
increases ordered by the government, such promise
could only be demandable in law if incorporated in
the CBA.
d. Petitioner union had the right and the opportunity to
insist on the foreseeable fulfillment of the private
respondents promise by demanding its incorporation
in the CBA. Because the proposal was never
embodied in the CBA, the promise has remained just
that, a promise, the implementation of which cannot
be validly demanded under the law.
3. In the case at bench, however, petitioner union does not deny that
discussion on its proposal that all government-mandated salary
increases should be on an across-the-board basis was deferred,
purportedly because it relied upon the undertaking of the
negotiating panel of private respondent. The mere fact, however,
that the proposal in question was not included in the CBA
indicates that no contractual commitment thereon was ever made
by private respondent as no agreement had been arrived at by the
parties.
4. The purpose of collective bargaining is the reaching of an
agreement resulting in a contract binding on the parties; but the
failure to reach an agreement after negotiations continued for a
reasonable period does not establish a lack of good faith. The
statutes invite and contemplate a collective bargaining contract,
but they do not compel one. The duty to bargain does not include
the obligation to reach an agreement.
5. The question as to what are mandatory and what are merely
permissive subjects of collective bargaining is of significance on
the right of a party to insist on his position to the point of
stalemate.
a. A party may refuse to enter into a collective
bargaining contract unless it includes a desired
provision as to a matter which is a mandatory subject
of collective bargaining;
b. but a refusal to contract unless the agreement covers
a matter which is not a mandatory subject is in
substance a refusal to bargain about matters which are
mandatory subjects of collective bargaining; and it is
no answer to the charge of refusal to bargain in good
faith that the insistence on the disputed clause was not
the sole cause of the failure to agree or that agreement
was not reached with respect to other disputed
clauses.
c. On account of the importance of the economic issue
proposed by petitioner union, it could have refused to
bargain and to enter into a CBA with private
respondent. On the other hand, Top Form’s firm
stand against the proposal did not mean that it was
bargaining in bad faith. It had the right to insist on
(its) position to the point of stalemate.
d. On the part of petitioner union, the importance of its
proposal dawned on it only after the wage orders were
issued after the CBA had been entered into. Indeed,
from the facts of this case, the charge of bad faith
bargaining on the part of private respondent was
nothing but a belated reaction to the implementation
of the wage orders that private respondent made in
accordance with law.
e. In other words, petitioner union harbored the notion
that its members and the other employees could have
had a better deal in terms of wage increases had it
relentlessly pursued the incorporation in the CBA of
its proposal. The inevitable conclusion is that private
respondent did not commit the unfair labor practices
of bargaining in bad faith and discriminating against
its employees for implementing the wage orders
pursuant to law.
6. The Court likewise finds unmeritorious petitioner unions
contention that by its failure to grant across-the-board wage
increases, private respondent violated the provisions of Section
 5, Article VII of the existing CBA as well as Article 100 of the 01 and 02. This debunks the claim that there was wage
Labor Code. distortion as could be shown by the itemized wages
a. No benefits or privileges previously enjoyed by implementation quoted above.
petitioner union and the other employees were
withdrawn as a result of the manner by which private
respondent implemented the wage orders. Granted
that private respondent had granted an across-the-
board increase pursuant to Republic Act No. 6727,
that single instance may not be considered an
established company practice. Petitioner unions
argument in this regard is actually tied up with its
claim that the implementation of Wage Orders Nos.
01 and 02 by private respondent resulted in wage
distortion.

ISSUE: WON there was a significant wage distortion of the wage

structure in private respondent as a result of the manner by which said
wage orders were implemented –NO

HELD:
1. This is a question of fact that is within the jurisdiction of the
quasi-judicial tribunals below. No reason to disturb the
findings of the LA & NLRC
2. LA which was affirnmed by the NLRC: “That there were
employees who were granted the full extent of the increase
authorized and some others who received less and still others
who did not receive any increase at all, would not ripen into
what the complainants termed as discrimination. That the
implementation of the subject wage orders resulted into an
uneven implementation of wage increases is justified under
the law to prevent any wage distortion. What the respondents
did under the circumstances in order to deter an eventual wage
distortion without any arbitral proceedings is certainly
commendable.”
3. NLRC: On the issue of wage distortion, we are satisfied that
there was a meaningful implementation of Wage Orders Nos.
CALTEX REFINERY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (CREA)
vs. HON. JOSE S. BRILLANTES, in his capacity as Acting
Secretary of DOLE, and CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), Inc.
April 7, 2014 | Panganiban, J. | Bargaining Procedure > Labor Code
Procedure
SUMMARY: The CBA of Caltex and CREA was set to expire, so
they met for negotiations. Upon petition by Caltex, however, the
SOLE assumed jurisdiction over the dispute. CREA filed a Notice of
Strike contrary to the SOLE order which enjoined all strikes or
lockouts. The SOLE ruled on wage increase, union security clause,
retirement benefits or application of the new retirement plan, signing
bonus and grievance and arbitration machineries. CREA assailed the
Orders of the SOLE to execute a new CBA. The SC affirmed the
SOLE’s decision in all aspects except for a grievance machinery
issue, which was remanded for resolution.
DOCTRINE: Unless shown to be clearly whimsical, capricious or
arbitrary, the orders or resolutions of the secretary of labor and
employment resolving conflicts on what should be the contents of a
CBA will be respected by this Court. Oftentimes, such orders and
resolutions are are grounded largely on what is possible, fair and
reasonable under the peculiar circumstances of each case.
No particular setup for a grievance machinery is mandated by law.
Article 260 of the Labor Code, as incorporated by RA 6715, provides
for only a single grievance machinery in the company to settle
problems arising from interpretation or implementation of their
collective bargaining agreement and those arising from the
interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies.
FACTS:
1. CREA and Caltex negotiated the terms and conditions of
employment for a new CBA as their previous one was to expire
soon. The National Conciliation and Meditation Board (NCMB)
and the Office of the Secretary of Labor and Employment
(SOLE) participated in the negotiation.
2. To settle the unresolved issues, eight meetings between the
parties were conducted but CREA after still declared a deadlock
and then filed a notice of strike. Six NCMB conciliation
meetings and then marathon meetings at the plant level did not
resolve the issues.
3. During a strike vote on August 16, 1995, CREA members opted
for a walkout. SOLE, on Caltex’s motion, assumed jurisdiction
over the entire labor dispute following Article 263 (g) of the
Labor Code, and in an Order enjoined any strike, lockout, or act
which might exacerbate the situation.
4. CREA defied the SOLE order and began a strike and set up a
picket in the premises of Caltex on August 25, 1995, defying
company return-to-work notices. DOLE Undersecretary
Bienvenido Laguesma interceded and conducted several
conciliation meetings between the contending parties. He was
able to convince the members of the union to return to work and
to enter into a memorandum of agreement with private
respondent. On September 9, 1995, the picket lines were finally
lifted.
5. Because of the strike, Caltex terminated the employment of some
CREA officers which caused more tensions. Once conciliation
failed, the parties stopped further negotiation and, on September
13, 1995, decided to refer the problem to the Secretary of Labor
and Employment: [i]
6. SOLE issued three assailed orders now being assailed by CREA
through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The disposition of
the first assailed Order was that Caltex and CREA were to
execute a new CBA with unmodified previous CBA provisions
and company policy benefits maintained. The motions for
reconsideration filed by both parties were denied in the second
assailed Order, which then ordered the commencement of
proceedings concerning the legality of strike and termination of
union officers. CREA’s second motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied by the third assailed Order.

ISSUES: Whether SOLE erred in resolving five issues in the CBA,
specifically on
(1) wage increase
(2) union security clause - YES
(3) retirement benefits or application of the new retirement plan
(4) signing bonus, and
(5) grievance and arbitration machineries?
YES, with regard to the disagreement on the union security clause
which should have been definitively resolved by the SOLE. Petition
is partly GRANTED. Assailed Orders are AFFIRMED with the
modification that the issue on the union security clause be
REMANDED to the DOLE for definite resolution within one month
from the finality of this Decision.
RULE: Article 260, Labor Code.
Grievance Machinery and Voluntary Arbitration. The parties to a
Collective Bargaining Agreement shall include therein provisions that
will ensure the mutual observance of its terms and conditions. They
shall establish a machinery for the adjustment and resolution of
grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of their
Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the
interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies.
All grievances submitted to the grievance machinery which are not
settled within seven (7) calendar days from the date of its submission
shall automatically be referred to voluntary arbitration prescribed in
the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
For this purpose, parties to a Collective Bargaining Agreement shall
name and designate in advance a Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of
voluntary arbitrators, include in the agreement a procedure for the
selection of such Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators, preferably from the listing of qualified Voluntary
Arbitrators duly accredited by the Board. In case the parties fail to
select a Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, the
Board shall designate the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators, as may be necessary, pursuant to the selection procedure
agreed upon in the Collective Bargaining Agreement, which shall act
with same force and effect as if the Arbitrator or panel of Arbitrators
has been selected by the parties as described above.
Preliminary Matter: Certiorari in Labor Cases
(1) Factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies (such as the
Department of Labor and Employment), when supported by
substantial evidence, are binding on this Court considering the
expertise of these agencies.
(2) Substantial evidence is such amount of relevant evidence a
reasonable mind sees adequate to justify a conclusion.
(3) A special civil action for certiorari under rule 65 is an
extraordinary remedy available only when the acts of an inferior
court are challenged as void on the ground of jurisdiction, including
grave abuse of discretion.
(4) Petitioners claim of grave abuse of discretion is anchored on
the simple fact that public respondent adopted largely the proposals
of private respondent. Bargaining is simply a process of finding a
reasonable solution to a conflict and harmonizing opposite positions
into a fair and reasonable compromise. When parties agree to submit
unresolved issues to the secretary of labor for his resolution, they
should not expect their positions to be adopted in toto. Unless grave
abuse of discretion is cogently shown, this Court will refrain from
using its extraordinary power of certiorari to strike down decisions
and orders of quasi-judicial officers specially tasked by law to settle
administrative questions and disputes.
1. Wage Increase
The main assailed Order resolved the increases as follows: wage
Increases: August 1. 1995 (14%); 1996 (14%); 1997 (13%) and meal
subsidy - P15.00
CREA insists that the increase should be ruled on the basis of four
factors: (a) the economic needs of the [u]nions members; (b) the
[c]ompanys financial capacity; (c) the bargaining history between the
[u]nion and the [c]ompany; and (d) the traditional parity in wages
between Caltex and Shell Refinery Employees. [ii]
(1) The matter of inflation rate was clearly addressed in public
respondents Order dated November 21, 1995. Average inflation for
the first ten (10) months was only 7.496% and not the 11% claimed
by CREA, and Central Bank projections indicate that it will take a
13.5% inflation for November and December to record an average
inflation of 8.5% for the year.
(2) Caltex’s financial capacity has been insufficiently explained
in its Comment dated April 16, 1996 in which it stated that the
Banaba Housing Facilities upgrade (from its establishment in 1954)
should not be seen as a yardstick of its financial standing but as a
necessary expense for operations. The proof of financial standing is
its financial statements audited by independent and credible external
auditors.
(3) The traditional parity in wages used by petitioner is flimsy.
Caltex’s discussion is reasonable: Higher productivity equals higher
pay. Shell, produces 155,000 barrels per day on a 120 manpower
complement of operatives and rank and file; while the Company only
produces 65,000 barrels per day with its 221 manpower complement.
Union members have the right to demand wage increases through
their collective force; but it is equally cogent that they should also be
able to justify an appreciable increase in wages.
2. Union Security Clause
The relevant provisions found in Article III of the CBA, are sought
to be amended by CREA (amendments in brackets):
Section 1. Employees of the COMPANY who at the signing of this
Agreement are members of the UNION and those who subsequently
become members thereof shall maintain their membership [in good
standing] with the UNION for the duration of this Agreement as a
condition of [continuous] employment.
Section 2. Members of the UNION who cease to be members of the
UNION in good standing by reason of resignation or expulsion shall
not be retained in the employment of the COMPANY. [Section 2.
PURSUANT TO THE FOREGOING, ANY UNION MEMBER
WHO CEASES TO BE SUCH MEMBER ON GROUNDS
PROVIDED IN ITS CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS SHALL ,
UPON PRIOR WRITTEN NOTICE BY THE UNION TO THE
COMPANY, BUT SUBJECT TO THE OBSERVANCE OF DUE
PROCESS AND THE EXPRESS RATIFICATION OF THE
MAJORITY OF THE UNION MEMBERSHIP, BE DISMISSED
FROM EMPLOYMENT BY THE COMPANY; PROVIDED,
HOWEVER, THAT THE UNION SHALL HOLD THE COMPANY
FREE AND BLAMELESS FROM ANY LIABILITY IN THE
EVENT THAT THE EMPLOYEE IN ANY MANNER
QUESTIONS HIS DISMISSAL.]
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT: it may expel a member only on any
of three grounds: non-payment of dues, subversion, or conviction for
a crime involving moral turpitude. If the employees act does not
constitute any of these three grounds, the member would continue to
be employed by private respondent.
CALTEX’S ARGUMENT: nothing prevents petitioner from
expelling its members; however, termination of employment should
be based only on these three grounds agreed upon in the existing
CBA. Further, private respondent explains that citation of Article
249 (a) of the Labor Code is out of context. It adds that the cited
section provides only for the right of a union to prescribe its own
rules with respect to the acquisition and retention of membership,
and that upholding the arguments of petitioner would make the
private respondent a policeman of the union.
HELD: The labor secretary should take cognizance of an issue which
is not merely incidental to but essentially involved in the labor
dispute itself, or which is otherwise submitted to him for resolution.
The secretary of labor has given no valid reason for avoiding the said
issue; he merely points out that this issue is a procedural matter.
Such vacillation clearly sidesteps the nature of the union security
clause as one intended to strengthen the contracting union and to
protect it from the fickleness or perfidy of its own members. Without
such safeguard, group solidarity becomes uncertain; the union
becomes gradually weakened and increasingly vulnerable to
company machinations. In this security clause lies the strength of the
union during the enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement.
It is this clause that provides labor with substantial power in
collective bargaining.
3. New Retirement Plan
CREA’S ARGUMENT: CREA contests the denial of the application
of the new retirement plan to employees who opted to be covered by
the old plan at the introduction of the new one. It claimed that 40 of
its members were not able to exercise the option to shift to the New
Retirement Plan. Petitioner argues that the exclusion of forty
employees from the New Plan constitutes grave abuse of discretion
as a discriminatory practice. [iii]Private respondent counters that
these 40 or so employees have opted to remain covered by the old
plan despite opportunities given them in 1985 to shift to the New
Plan. [iv]
HELD: SOLE did not commit grave abuse of discretion in respecting
the free and voluntary decision of the employees in regard to the
Provident Plan and the irrevocable one-time option provided for in
the New Retirement Plan. Although the union has every right to
represent its members in the negotiation regarding the terms and
conditions of their employment, it cannot negate their wishes on
matters which are purely personal and individual to them.
4. Grievance Machinery and Arbitration
SOLE ORDER: “shorten the periods to process/resolve grievances
based on existing practice from (45) days to (30) days at the first step
and (10) days to seven (7) days at the second step which is the level
of the VP for manufacturing. Establishment of a joint Council as an
additional step in the grievance procedure is unnecessary, and
grievances not settled within (7) days at the level of the VP for
Manufacturing, shall automatically be referred by both parties to
voluntary arbitration in accordance with R.A. 6715. The number of
Arbitrators shall be agreed on by both parties, the list of accredited
being taken care of by the National Conciliation and Meditation
Board (not the BLR).
CREA’S ARGUMENT: that the proposed Grievance Settlement
Council is intended to supplement the effort of the Vice President for
Manufacturing in reviewing the grievance elevated to him, so that
instead of acting alone he will be obliged to convoke a conference of
the Council to afford the grievant a thorough hearing. Caltex says the
disposition is fair and reasonable as a reiteration of the unions
position during the conciliation meetings conducted by
Undersecretary Laguesma. [v]
HELD: Refer to doctrine. We believe that the procedure described by
public respondent sufficiently complies with the minimum
requirement of the law. Public respondent even provided for two
steps in hearing grievances prior to their referral to arbitration. The
parties will decide on the number of arbitrators who may hear a
dispute only when the need for it arises. Even the law itself does not
specify the number of arbitrators. Their alternatives whether to have
one or three arbitrators have their respective advantages and
disadvantages. In this matter, cost is not the only consideration; full
deliberation on the issues is another, and it is best accomplished in a
hearing conducted by three arbitrators. In effect, the parties are
afforded the latitude to decide for themselves the composition of the
grievance machinery as they find appropriate to a particular situation.
5. Signing Bonus
ORDER: The public respondents contested resolution on the signing
bonus in the Order dated November 21, 1995 reads: Fifth,
specifically on the issue of whether the signing bonus is covered
under the maintenance of existing benefits clause, the award for a
signing bonus should partake of the nature of an incentive and
premium for peaceful negotiations and amicable resolution. Thus, we
are constrained to rule that the award of signing bonus is not covered
by the maintenance of existing benefits clause.
CREA’S ARGUMENT: The award of a signing bonus is also as an
extra award to the workers following the settlement of a CBA
dispute by whatever means.
HELD: Court agreed with Caltex that the condition sine qua non for
its grant--a non strike--was not complied with. Caltex correctly
contended that a signing bonus is not awarded when CBA
negotiations result in a strike, as (1) the grant of a signing bonus is a
matter of discretion and cannot be demanded as a matter of right; (2)
it is an incentive for a peaceful negotiation.
Also, Caltex in its counter-proposal wanted the new collective
bargaining agreement to constitute the only agreement between the
parties as seen in Section 4, referring to benefits not expressly
provided for as purely discretionary; and in the clause on waiver,
where the parties waive their right to bargain on matters not covered
in the CBA.
 CALTEX REFINER EMPLOYYES ASSOCIAITION v.
HON. BRILLANTES and CALTEX
Collective Bargaining – Bargainable Procedure | September 16,
1997| Panganiban, J.
FACTS:
1. An existing CBA agreement between Petitioner Caltex Refiner
Employees Association and Respondent Caltex was about to
expire.
a. Hence, the parties negotiated the terms and conditions for
employment to be contained in a new CBA with the
participation of the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board and the Office of Labor Secretary.
b. The parties were unable to settle certain unresolved
issues; hence a deadlock was declared by petitioner.
2. A notice of strike was filed by petitioner union and this was
followed by several conciliation meetings conducted by the
NCMB but the same proved unavailing.
a. During a strike vote, the members of petitioner union
opted for a walkout.
b. Caltex filed with DOLE a petition for assumption of
jurisdiction in accordance with Article 263(g) of the LC/
3. DOLE assumed jurisdiction over the entire labor dispute and
ordered the enjoinment of the strike and lockout.
a. Petitioner defied the order and began a strike and set up a
picket in the premises of Caltex.
b. Several notices were sent directing the employees to
return to work but these were defied and ignored.
4. DOLE USec. Laguesma interceded and conducted several
conciliation meetings between the parties and was successful in
convincing the members of the union to return to work and entered
into a MOA. Picket lines were finally lifted and the parties
submitted their position papers pertaining to the unresolved issues.
5. Because of the strike, Caltex terminated the employment of some
officers of the union.
a. This resulted to additional contentious issues which
eventually resulted to the end of further negotiation
b. Parties agreed to refer the problem to the Secretary of
Labor which ordered the execution of a new collective
bargaining agreement.
ISSUE: WON Secretary of Labor committed grave abuse of
discretion in resolving the labor dispute – NO
Relevant part of the order
In this regard, we affirm our resolution to shorten the periods to
process/resolve grievances based on existing practice from (45)
days to (30) days at the first step and (10) days to seven (7) days at
the second step which is the level of the VP for manufacturing. We
further reviewed the steps through which a grievance may be
processed and in line with the principle to expedite the early resolution
of grievances, we find that the establishment of a joint Council as
an additional step in the grievance procedure, may only serve to
protract the proceeding and, therefore, no longer necessary.
Instead, the unresolved grievance, if, not settled within (7) days at
the level of the VP for Manufacturing, shall automatically be
referred by both parties to voluntary arbitration in accordance
with R.A. 6715. As to the number of Arbitrators for which the Union
proposes to employ only one instead of a panel of three Arbitrators,
we find it best to leave the matter to the agreement of both parties.
Finally, we hereby advise the parties that the list of accredited
voluntary arbitrators is now being maintained and disseminated by the
National Conciliation and Meditation Board and no longer by the
Bureau of Labor Relations.
PETITIONER: Labor secretary derailed the grievance and
arbitration scheme proposed by the Union. The proposed Grievance
Settlement Council is intended to supplement the effort of the VP for
Manufacturing in reviewing the grievance elevated to him, so that
instead of acting alone, he will be obliged to convoke a conference of
the Council to afford the grievant a through hearing.
SEC. OF LABOR: the disposition on the grievance machinery is fair
and reasonable under the circumstance and in fact was merely a
reiteration of the union’s position during the conciliation meetings.

HELD:
1. No particular setup for a grievance machinery is mandated by law.
Rather, Article 260 (now 273) of the Labor Code provides for only
a single grievance machinery in the company to settle problems
arising from interpretation or implementation of their collective
bargaining agreement and those arising from the interpretation or
enforcement of company personnel policies.
2. The procedure described by Sec. Brillantes sufficiently complies
with the minimum requirement of the law. He even provided for
two steps in hearing grievances prior to their referral to arbitration.
a. The parties will decide on the number of arbitrators who
may hear a dispute only when the need for it arises.
b. Even the law itself does not specify the number of
arbitrators.
c. The parties are given the latitude to decide for themselves
the composition of the grievance machinery as they find
appropriate to a particular situation.
 TABANGAO SHELL REFINERY EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION v. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION
Collective Bargaining – Duty to Bargain | April 7, 2014 | Leonardo-
De Castroo, J.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner union and respondent Shell started negotiations for a
new CBA in anticipation of the expiration of the existing CBA.
2. The union proposed a 20% annual across-te-board basic salary
increase for the next 3 years
a. Shell countered to grant all covered employees a lump
sum amount of P80,000 yearly for the year-year period of
the new CBA. This was based on its affordability for the
corporation and the then current salary levels of the
members of the union relative to the industry.
b. This was rejected by the union and proposed which then
lowered its proposal to 12% annual across-the-board
increase for the next three years. Shell countered with a
lump sum of P88,000.
3. When the union asked for a copy of the comparision of the slaries
of its members and those from allied indsutries, the company
denied the request on the ground that the information was
confidential.
a. Union considered this a bad faith bargaining on the aprt
of the corporation.
4. Company proposed the declaration of a deadlock and
recommended that the help of a third party to be sought.
a. On the same day of the proposal, the union filed a Notice
of Strike alleging bad faith bargaining.
5. Corporation petitioned for the sassumption of jurisdiction by the
Secretary of Laborpursuant to Art. 263 which was granted by the
Secretary of Labor.
a. Secretary then enjoined any form of concerted action and
directed the parties to maintain status quo or return to
work if the strike has already commenced.
b. The Secretary also instructed the parties submit their
respective position paper on the economic issues.
6. The union filed a petition for certiorari with the CA alleging that
the Secretary acted with GAD in missappreciating the facts an d
issue of the case.
a. According to the union, the issue is unfair labor practice
of the company in the form of bad faith bargaining and
not CBA deadlock.
b. CA denied saying that the Secretary of Labor has power
to assume jurisdiction.
7. During the pendency of the CA case, the Secretray of Labor
rendered a decision saying that there was already a deadlock
though the ground fo rhte first notice of strike was ULP, and that
the company was not guilty of bargaining ni bad faith since the
duty to bargain does not compel any party to accept a prospoal or
to make any concession, as recognized by Art. 252 fo the Labor
Code. Hence the appeal.
ISSUE: WON corporation is guilty of bargaining in bad faith. - NO
HELD:
1. The Court started by saying that the findings of SOLE that there
already existed a bargaining deadlock when she assumed
jurisdiction and that ther was no bad faith on the part of the
company were both supported by substantial evidence. Hence,
there is no reason to overturn the findings.
2. The Court said reiterated the nature of the duty to bargain that is,
it does not compel any party to accept a proposal or to make any
concession.
3. While the purpose of collective bargaining is the reaching of an
agreement between the employer and the employee’s union
resulting in a binding contract between the parties, the failure to
reach an agreement after negotiations continued for a reasonable
period does not mean lack of good faith. The laws invite and
 contemplate a collective bargaining contract but do not compel assumption of jurisdiction, the issue of deadlock was neither an
one. incidental issue to the matter of unfair labor practice nor an
4. For after all, a CBA, like any contract is a product of mutual existing issue is incorrect.
consent and not of compulsion. As such, the duty to bargain does
not include the obligation to reach an agreement.
5. In this light, the corporation’s unswerving position on the matter
of annual lump sum payment in lieu of wage increase did not, by
itself, constitute bad faith even if such position caused a stalemate
in the negotiations, as correctly ruled by the Secretary of Labor
and Employment in the decision dated June 8, 2005.

ISSUE: WON there was deadlock - YES

1. As there was no bad faith on the part of the company in its
bargaining with the union, deadlock was possible and did occur.
2. The fact is that the negotiations between the union and the
company were stalled by the opposing offers of yearly wage
increase by the union, on the one hand, and annual lump sum
payment by the company, on the other hand.
3. Each party found the other’s offer unacceptable and neither party
was willing to yield. The company suggested seeking the
assistance of a third party to settle the issue but the union preferred
the remedy of filing a notice of strike. Each party was adamant in
its position. Thus, because of the unresolved issue on wage
increase, there was actually a complete stoppage of the ongoing
negotiations between the parties and the union filed a Notice of
Strike. A mutual declaration would neither add to nor subtract
from the reality of the deadlock then existing between the
parties. Thus, the absence of the parties’ mutual declaration
of deadlock does not mean that there was no deadlock. At
most, it would have been simply a recognition of the prevailing
status quo between the parties.
4. As discussed above, there was already an actual existing deadlock
between the parties. What was lacking was the formal recognition
of the existence of such a deadlock because the union refused a
declaration of deadlock. Thus, the union’s view that, at the time
the Secretary of Labor and Employment exercised her power of
 BARON, BERSABAL, MELENDRES v. EPE
TRANSPORT INC and/or ENRIQUEZ
Collective Bargaining – Duty to Bargain | August 5, 2015 | Perlas-
Bernabe, J
FACTS:
1. Respondent EPE Transport is a domestic corporation engaged in
the operation of taxi units.
2. Petitioners were employed as EPE’s taxi drivers and were paid on
boundary system.
a. They were also members of the EPE Transport, Inc.
Drivers’ Union-Filipinong Samahang Manggagawa
(FSM), the exclusive bargaining agnet of the taxi drivers
in EPE.
3. Bersabal questioned the boundary rates for not being in line with
what the CBA provides.
a. He was told by the Company that he was free to go if he
does not like the company policy
4. Bersabal, together with the other EPE’s taxi drivers, filed a
complait for violation of the CBA, unfair labor practice, refund of
overcharged boundary and money claism against Respondent
Company and its president Respondnet Enriquez.
5. Petitioners Baron and Melendres also questioned the company
about the overcharging of boundary and filed a similar complaint
for unfair labor practice.
a. Three days later, Baron was no longer allowed to use his
taxi unit and prevented form entering EPE’s premises
b. Melendres and Bersabal also suffered the same fate.
6. Hence, Petitioners filed a case for illegal dismissal against
respondnets.
a. Respondnets claim that petitioners were dismissed
because they failed to return to work. According to
respondents, after filing the separate cmoplaints,
petitioners usddently went on absence without leave.
7. LA dismissed petitioners’ illegal dismissal case for lack of
jurisdiction and lack of cause of action.
a. LA gave more credence to respondnet’s claim that
petitioners failed to return to work. Furthermore,
according to them they have no jursidiciton over the ULP
case because CBA provides that the grievance machinery
will be resorted for the resolution of such dispute.
8. NLRC reversed the decision of LA and found petitioenrs to have
been illegally dimissed.
a. Ordered the respondents to present evidence for the
computation of backwages and separation pay
b. Rejected respondnets defense that petitioner went on
AWOL, saying that there was no evidence presented to
show that the petitioenrs failed to report back to work.
c. The filing of petitioners’ previous complaitns to correct
what is wrong in the administration of CBA negated
intentto abandon work.
d. MR denied.
9. CA reversed and concurred witih LA that petitioners complaint in
the illegal dismissal case failed to sufficiently establish the fact of
their dismissal. It failed to name the persons who prevented them
from reporting for work of form using their taxi units. The
statemenet that “they were free to go fi they did not want to follow
company policy” neither autmotically amount to dismissal nor can
it be interepreted as a termination of their employment.
a. Hence, their absene from work was not authorized.
ISSUE: WON Petitioners were illegally dismissed - YES
HELD:
1. The Court held that the CA was wrong in reversing the NLRC.
2. The Court reminded that in numerous cases, it has held that the
onus of proving that an employees was not dismissed or, if
dismissed, his dismissal was not illegal, fully rests on the
employer. Failure to discharge such onus would mean that the
dismissal was not justified and, therefore, illegal.
3. Barros v. NLRC: Court enied employer’s arguemtn that the
seafarer voluntarily terminated his employment, finding that since
 the fact of repatriation was not disputed, it is incumbent upon the a. ON the contrary, such intention is belied by the fact that
employer to prove by the quantum of evidence required by law shortly after peititoners ceased from working, they
that the seafarer was not dismissed, or if dismissed, that the immediately instituted the compalitn for illegal dismissal.
dismissal was not illega. Otherwise, dismissal would be b. An employee who immediately takes steps to protest his
unjustified. layoff cannot be said to have abandeond his work. It
4. Sevillana v. IT: Article 277(b) of the Labor Code, which places would have been illogical for them to have left their job
upon the employer the burden of proving tha tht edismissal of an and thereafter seek redress by filing a complaint
employees was for a valid or authorized cause, does not c. Moreover, petitioners prior to the filing of the illegal
distinguish whtehter the employer aadmits or does not admit the dismissal case, filed cases against respondent o correct
dismissal. what they perceived as errors in the administration of
5. Thus, on this score, case law states that the employer must not rely CBA. This bolsters the supposition that they actually
on the weakness of the employees’ evidence but must stand ont eh desried to continue with ther employement as they were
merits of their own defennce. enforcing their rights under the CBA.
6. Abandoneoment conntes a deliberate and unjustified refusal on d. Lastly, petitioners’ submission to the company’s
the aprt of the employee to resume his employment. Notably, grievance machinery doesnot disprove illegal dismissal.
“abandonement of work does not per sesever the employer- What was referred to the grievance machinery was the
emplyoee relationship. It is merely a form of neglect of duty, unfair labor practice case filed by the petitioners befor thy
which is, in turn, a just casuse for termination of employment. were terminated, which contains issues that are different
The operative act that will ultimately put an end to this and distinct form their cause of action for illegal dismissal
relationship is the dismissal of the employee after complying case.
with the procedure prescribed by law.
7. For a valid finding of abandonment, two (2) elements must
concur: (a) the failure to report for work or absence without valid
or justifiable cause, and (b) clear intention to sever the employer-
employee relationship, with the second element as the more
determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts.
8. Dimagan v. Dacworks United: Absence must be accompanied by
overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply
does not want to work anymore. Mere absence or failure to report
for work is not tantamount to abndonement of work.
9. RBC CCable v. Baluyot: Emplyoer has the burden of proof to
show deliberate and unjstufied refusal of the employee to resume
employment witout any intention to return.
10. In the present case, no proof was adduced by repsodnents to prove
their theory of abandonement.
 SON, ANTIOLA, POLLARCO v. UST, DELA ROSA,
CARILLO, ALAURIN, and CFA
Contract Infirmity | April 18, 2018 | Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
1. Respondent University of Santo Tomas (UST) is an educational
institution operating under the authority of the Commission on
Higher Education (CHED). The rest of the herein respondents are
impleaded as officers and administrators of the school.
2. Petitioners Raymond A. Son (Son), Raymond S. Antiola
(Antiola), and Wilfredo E. Pollarco (Pollarco) are full time
professors of the UST Colleges of Fine Arts and Design and
Philosophy, and are members of the UST Faculty Union, with
which UST at the time had a Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA).
3. Son and Antiola were hired in June, 2005, while Pollarco was
employed earlier, or in June, 2004. Under their respective
appointment papers, petitioners were designated as "faculty
member[s] on PROBATIONARY status," whose "accession to
tenure status is conditioned by [sic] your meeting all the
requirements provided under existing University rules and
regulations and other applicable laws including, among others,
possession of the (prerequisite] graduate degree before the
expiration of the probationary period and by your satisfactory
performance of the duties and responsibilities set forth in the job
description hereto attached."
4. Petitioners did not possess the required Master's degree, but were
nonetheless hired by UST on the condition that they fulfill the
requirement within the prescribed period. Petitioners enrolled in
the Master's program, but were unable to finish the same. In spite
of their failure to obtain the required Master's degree, they
continued to teach even beyond the period given for completion
thereof.
5. On March 3, 2010, then CHED Chairman Emmanuel Angeles
issued a Memorandum11 addressed to the Presidents of public and
private higher education institutions, directing the strict
implementation of the minimum qualification for faculty members
of undergraduate programs, particularly the Master's degree and
licensure requirements, as mandated by Memorandum Order No.
40-08, "to ensure the highest qualification of their faculty."
6. Acting on the March 3, 2010 Memorandum, UST wrote the
petitioners and other affected faculty members, informing them of
the university's decision to cease re-appointment of those who
failed to complete their Master's degrees, but allow a written
appeal from the concerned faculty members who are due for thesis
defense/completion of their Master's degrees.
7. Petitioners did not make a written appeal, operating under the
belief that they have been vested tenure under the CBA for their
continued employment despite failure to obtain the required
Master's degree.
a. Petitioners received termination/thank you letters signed
by respondent Dr. Cynthia Loza, Dean of the College of
Fine Arts and Design. The reason given for non-renewal
of their appointments is their failure to obtain the required
Master's degree.
8. Petitioners filed a labor case against the respondents for unfair
labor practice, illegal dismissal, and recovery of money claims.
Petitioners claimed, among others, that since they have already
acquired tenure by default pursuant to the tenure provision in the
CBA, they could not be dismissed for failure to complete their
respective Master's degrees; that respondents are guilty of bad
faith when they re-hired the other professors even when they did
not possess the required Master's degree,
9. Respondents countered that the CBA provision granting tenure by
default may no longer be enforced on account of the requirement
under Memorandum Order No. 40-08, an administrative
regulation that is equivalent to law and has the effect of abrogating
the tenure provision of the CBA; that petitioners could not have
acquired tenure since they did not possess the minimum
qualification - a Master's degree - prescribed under Memorandum
Order No. 4008; that the CBA provision on tenure by default has
 become illegal as it is contrary to law, and for this reason, it may
not be enforced;
10. Labor Arbiter rendered his Decision finding for petitioners and
declaring respondents guilty of illegal dismissal and unfair labor
practice, as well as malice and bad faith in illegally dismissing the
former.
a. The Labor Arbiter upheld the CBA provision granting
tenure by default to petitioners, and declared that
petitioners were not accorded due process prior to
dismissal. Thus, petitioners were awarded money claims,
damages, and attorney's fees.
b. NLRC affirmed. But upon MR, reversed.
11. The Special Division held that CHED Memorandum Order No.
40-08 took precedence over the parties' CBA; that the CBA should
conform to the said Memorandum, which had the force and effect
of law; and that since the CBA provision on tenure by default did
not conform to the CHED Memorandum, it is null and void.
a. NLRC then granted MR which reinstated the Labor
Arbiter's Decision.
b. It held that the CBA superseded the CHED
Memorandum; that CHED Memorandum Order No. 40-
08 requiring a Master's degree of professors in the
undergraduate programs is merely directory, and did not
provide that the lack of a Master's degree was a ground to
terminate the professor's services; that CHED
Memorandum Order No. 40-08 was issued only in 2008,
while the CBA was concluded in 2006 - thus, it may not
be retroactively applied in the absence of a specific
provision authorizing retroactivity; and consequently,
petitioners acquired tenure.
c. MR denied
12. CA reversed. MR denied. Hence, the instant case
ISSUE: WON petitioenrs were illegally dismissed. - NO
HELD:
1. As early as in 1992, the requirement of a Master's degree in the
undergraduate program professor's field of instruction has been in
place, through DECS Order 92 or the Revised Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools.
a. Article IX, Section 44, paragraph 1 (a) thereof provides
that college faculty members must have a master's degree
in their field of instruction as a minimum qualification for
teaching in a private educational institution and acquiring
regular status therein.
2. DECS Order 92, Series of 1992 was promulgated by the DECS in
the exercise of its rule-making power as provided for under
Section 70 of the Education Act of 1982. As such, it has the force
and effect of law.
3. Thus, when the CBA was executed between the parties in 2006,
they had no right to include therein the provision relative to the
acquisition of tenure by default, because it is contrary to, and thus
violative of the 1992 Revised Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools that was in effect at the time.
a. As such, said CBA provision is null and void, and can
have no effect as between the parties. "
b. Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void
from the beginning:
4. When CHED Memorandum Order No. 40-08 came out, it merely
carried over the requirement of a masteral degree for faculty
members of undergraduate programs contained in the 1992
Revised Manual of Regulations for Private Schools.
a. It cannot therefore be said that the requirement of a
master's degree was retroactively applied in petitioners'
case, because it was already the prevailing rule with the
issuance of the 1992 Revised Manual of Regulations for
Private Schools.
5. Thus, going by the requirements of law, it is plain to see that
petitioners are not qualified to teach in the undergraduate
programs of UST. And while they were given ample time and
 opportunity to satisfy the requirements by obtaining their
respective master's degrees, they failed in the endeavor.
6. From a strict legal viewpoint, the parties are both in violation of
the law: respondents, for maintaining professors without the
mandated masteral degrees, and for petitioners, agreeing to be
employed despite knowledge of their lack of the necessary
qualifications. Petitioners cannot therefore insist to be employed
by UST since they still do not possess the required master's
degrees; the fact that UST continues to hire and maintain
professors without the necessary master's degrees is not a ground
for claiming illegal dismissal, or even reinstatement.
a. As far as the law is concerned, respondents are in
violation of the CHED regulations for continuing the
practice of hiring unqualified teaching personnel; but the
law cannot come to the aid of petitioners on this sole
ground. As between the parties herein, they are in pari
delicto.
b. Article 1411. When the nullity proceeds from the
illegality of the cause or object of the contract, and the act
constitutes a criminal offense, both parties being in pari
delicto, they shall have no action against each other, and
both shall be prosecuted.
c. Article 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden
cause consists does not constitute a criminal offense, the
following rules shall be observed:
7. The minimum requirement of a master's degree in the
undergraduate teacher's field of instruction has been cemented in
DECS Order 92, Series of 1992. Both petitioners and respondents
have been violating it. The fact that government has not cracked
down on violators, or that it chose not to strictly implement the
provision, does not erase the violations committed by erring
educational institutions, including the parties herein; it simply
means that government will not punish these violations for the
meantime. The parties cannot escape its concomitant effects,
nonetheless. And if respondents knew the overwhelming
importance of the said provision and the public interest involved -
as they now fiercely advocate to their favor - they should have
complied with the same as soon as it was promulgated.
It cannot be said either that by agreeing to the tenure by default
provision in the CBA, respondents are deemed to be in estoppel or
have waived the application of the requirement under CHED
Memorandum Order No. 40-08. Such a waiver is precisely contrary
to law. Moreover, a waiver would prejudice the rights of the students
and the public, who have a right to expect that UST is acting within
the bounds of the law, and provides quality education by hiring only
qualified teaching personnel. Under Article 6 of the Civil Code,
"[r]ights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public
order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a
third person with a right recognized by law." On the other hand, there
could be no acquiescence - amounting to estoppel - with respect to
acts which constitute a violation of law. "The doctrine of estoppel
cannot operate to give effect to an act which is otherwise null and
void or ultra vires."35 "[N]o estoppel can be predicated on an illegal
act."36
It cannot be said either that in requiring petitioners to file a written
appeal, respondents are guilty of bad faith and malice for practically
forcing the former to renounce their tenure. There is no tenure to
speak of in the first place.
 1. PAL and PALEA, the collective baragiaing agent of the rank
and file employees of PAL, entered into a CBA. Part of ht
eagreemetn was that the PAL will pay its rank and file
employees the following bonsuses: (1) 13th month pay
(midyear bonus), (2) Christmas Bonus.
2. Prior to the payment of the 13th monthpay, PAL released an
impelmetnign guideline which states that only regular
employees will be given the full amount for the christas
bonus.
3. This was assailed by PALEA on the ground that all
employees of PAL,w hether regular or non regular, should
be paid their 13th month Pay.
a. Pal informed PALEA that rank and file employees
who were regularized after April 30 1988 were not
entitled because they were already given Christmas
bonus in December 1988 per the IRR of PD 851.
4. PALEA file da complaint fo rULP before the NLRC arguing
that the cut-off period for regularization sould be used a the
parameter for granting the 13th month pay considering tha
thte law does not distiguinsht eh status of employemtn but
the law coveras sall amployees.
5. PAL countered that those rank and file emplyoees who wer
nt regularized by April 30, in principel, are not denied their
13th month pay considering that they receive said mandatory
ybonus in the form of Christmas bonus. And that the
Christmas bonus given to all its employees is complaint with
PD 851 and the IRR.
6. LA dismissed for lack of merit. LA ruled that PAL was not
guilty of ULP in withholding the grant of the 13th Month
Pay, as set out in Section 4 of the CBA, to the employees, to
the concerned employees. The giving of the particular bonus
was said to be merely an additional prace made in the past.
7. NLRC reverse the decision of LA.CA affirmed.
PAL: (1) CBA does not apply to non-regular employees such that
any benefits arising from said agremeetns cannot be mad e to apply
to them, including the mid-year bonus, and (2) it has always been the
company practice not to extend the midyear bonus to those
employees who have not attained regular status priot to the month of
Mya when payment of the aprticular bonus accrues.
PALEA: Benefits to all employees in the CBU, including those who
do not belong to the chosen bargaining albor organization applies.
All emplyoees of PAL are entitled to the same benefits as they are
wthint he same CBU and the entitlement of such benefits spills over
to even non-union mebmers.
ISSUE: CA was wrong - NO
HELD:
Petitioner PAL maintains that in extending the grant
of the 13thmonth pay or mid-year bonus to employees
who are not covered by the CBA, the Court of
Appeals, in effect, modified or altered the terms of
said agreement and expanded its coverage to non-
regular employees who are not covered by the
bargaining unit.[29] The issue on modification or
alteration of the CBA, however, was raised by
petitioner PAL rather belatedly and invoked for the
first time on appeal. This being the case, We are
barred from taking cognizance of and resolving the
issue for it would be violative of the proscription
against the presentation of new issues on appeal. To
do otherwise would be offensive to the basic rules of
fair play, justice and due process.[30]
 This case arose from a labor Complaint,[7] filed by
herein PALEA against herein PAL and one Mary
Anne del Rosario, Director of Personnel, PAL, on 1
March 1989, charging them with unfair labor practice
for the non-payment of 13thmonth pay of employees
who had not been regularized as of the 30th of April
1988, as allegedly stipulated in the Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) entered into by herein
parties.
The non-regular rank and file employees of
petitioner PAL as of 30 April 1988, are not actually
seeking more benefits than what the other member-
employees of the same bargaining unit are already
enjoying.They are only requesting that all members of
the bargaining unit be treated equally and afforded the
same privileges and benefits as agreed upon between
respondent PALEA and petitioner PAL in the
CBA.Petitioner PAL is committing a patent act of
inequity that is grossly prejudicial to the non-regular
rank and file employees there being no rational basis
for withholding from the latter the benefit of a
Christmas bonus besides the 13th month pay or mid-
year bonus, while the same is being granted to the other
rank and file employees of petitioner PAL who have
been regularized as of 30 April 1988, although both
types of employees are members of the same
bargaining unit. As it had willfully and intentionally
agreed to under the terms of the CBA, petitioner PAL
must pay its regular and non-regular employees who
are members of the bargaining unit represented by
respondent PALEA their 13th month pay or mid-year
bonus separately from and in addition to their
Christmas bonus.
A collective bargaining agreement refers to a
negotiated contract between a legitimate labor
organization and the employer concerning wages,
hours of work and all other terms and conditions of
employment in a bargaining unit.[40] As in all other
contracts, the parties to a CBA may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may
deem convenient, provided these are not contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy.[41] Thus, where the CBA is clear and
unambiguous, it becomes the law between the parties,
and compliance therewith is mandated by the express
policy of the law.[42]
HONGKONG BANK INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION V.
HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORP LTD.
(2018)
Facts:
After expiration of the CBA between the parties, HSBC proposed
amendments (Plan) to the former CBA, to which the Union
vigorously objected to. HSBC withdrew the proposed
amendments, and so the CBA on that particular matter was left
unchanged. However, HSBC, in the guise of complying with BSP
regulations, enforced compliance of the Plan despite the same not
being entered into in the CBA agreed upon by the parties.
Doctrine: 7 Cardinal Rights of Workers guaranteed by the
Constitution; Labor: a primary social economic force
Preliminarily, it is crucial to stress that no less than the basic law
of the land guarantees the rights of workers to collective
bargaining and negotiations as well as to participate in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits.
Section 3, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and
overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. It
shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted
activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law.
They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of
work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as
may be provided by law.
Pursuant to said guarantee, Article 211 of the Labor Code, as
amended, declares it a policy of the State:
(a) To promote and emphasize the primacy of free collective
bargaining and negotiations, including voluntary arbitration,
mediation and conciliation, as modes of settling labor or industrial
disputes;
…
(d) To promote the enlightenment of workers concerning their
rights and obligations as union members and as employees;
…
(g) To ensure the participation of workers in decision and policy-
making processes affecting their rights, duties and welfare.
Corollary thereto, Article 255 of the same Code provides:
ART. 255. EXCLUSIVE BARGAINING REPRESENTATION
AND WORKERS PARTICIPATION IN POLICY AND
DECISION-MAKING.
…
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, workers
shall have the right, subject to such rules and regulations as the
Secretary of Labor and Employment may promulgate, to
participate in policy and decision-making process of the
establishment where they are employed insofar as said processes
will directly affect their rights, benefits and welfare. For this
purpose, workers and employers may form labor-management
councils: Provided, That the representatives of the workers in such
labor management councils shall be elected by at least the majority
of all employees in said establishment.
We deem it necessary to remind HSBC of the basic and well-
entrenched ntle that although jurisprudence recognizes the validity
of the exercise by an employer of its management prerogative and
will ordinarily not interfere with such, this prerogative is not
absolute and is subject to limitations imposed by law, collective
bargaining agreement, and general principles of fair play and
justice. 20 Indeed, being a product of said constitutionally-
guaranteed right to participate, the CBA is, therefore, .the law
between the parties and they are obliged to comply with its
provisions.