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Extract title: Information Interdependence
Title author: Rogerson, K.S.
Publication year, Volume, Issue: 2000, 3 (3)
Page extent: 415-436
Source title: Information, Communication and Society
ISBN: 1369-118X
Information, Communication & Society 3:3 2000 415–436
INFORMATION INTERDEPENDENCE
Keohane and Nye’ s complex interdependence
in the information age
Kenneth S. Rogerson
Duke University, Durham, USA
Abstract
A well-known and respected attempt to theorize interdependence in the eld
of international relations is complex interdependence. In Power and Interdependence,
Downloaded by [The British Library] at 06:18 01 August 2017
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr de ne interdependence as reciprocal

effects among actors resulting from ‘international transactions – ows of money,
goods, people and messages across international boundaries’. Though much
research has been done on the effects of interdependence on the rst three, the
ows of messages have been studied less often. Keohane and Nye addressed the
issue in a 1998 article in Foreign Affairs, discussing changes in the global environ-
ment resulting from the information age which have had an impact on their ideas.
This article proposes to go deeper into complex interdependence. The world is
becoming increasingly ‘information interdependent’ and this essay is an attempt
to apply the assumptions and concepts presented in complex interdependence to
the information age. In the nal analysis, complex interdependence complements
research from the field of communications, that information flows should be
understood as underlying mechanisms and processes that facilitate contextual
understanding of issues. It maintains the integrity of the assumptions of complex
interdependence, while adding an understanding of the nature of information
and information ows.
Keywords
complex interdependence, information ows,

Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, Jr, international actors,
channels
On 28 December 1995, CompuServe, a global internet service provider, blocked

access to more than 200 sexually explicit computer discussion groups worldwide.
This action was a response to an announcement by the German government that
it would investigate the company on charges of violating the country’s strict
pornography laws (Markoff 1995: A1). While CompuServe examined the legal
ramifications of the investigation, it denied access to more than four million
customers, 3.75 million of whom lived outside German borders. Who controlled
the flow of information? CompuServe or the German government? Why is it
Information, Communication & Society
ISSN 1369-118X print/ISSN 1468-4462 online © 2000 Taylor & Francis Ltd
http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals
Supplied by the British Library 01 Aug 2017, 14:19 (BST)

KENNETH S. ROGERSON
important to know who controls it and what implications might that knowledge
have? Each entity certainly had, at minimum, an in uence on the ow of infor-
mation in an increasingly interdependent world.
Interdependence is a term used more and more to describe global inter-
actions. It means, in a very general sense, that events and situations in one area
depend on, or are influenced by, those in another and, most importantly,
this relationship can be reciprocal. In addition, there is the understanding that
groups increasingly need each other, for various reasons, in order to function and
exist. Interdependence is a characteristic of information and communication
flows and processes. But, these concepts have not been fully analysed in the
context of interdependence, especially since the meaning of interdependence, as
well as the environment in which information and communications interactions

take place, are part of a world that has evolved dramatically over the past half
century.
A well-known and respected attempt to theorize interdependence in the
eld of international relations came in the mid-1970s. Robert O. Keohane and
Joseph S. Nye, Jr (1977) explained the nature of relationships taking place in
the world going beyond the assumptions of realism.1 They called this analysis
‘complex interdependence’. Keohane and Nye define interdependence as
reciprocal effects among actors resulting from ‘international transactions – ows
of money, goods, people and messages across international boundaries’ (Keohane
and Nye 1989: 8–9). Though much research has been done on the effects of
interdependence on the ows of money, goods and people, the ows of messages
have been studied less often. In the second edition of their book, Keohane and Nye
(1989) acknowledged that the world had changed and they give evidence to the
fact, emphasizing the differences in economic interdependence. They recognize
the importance of message flows only in a very general way in a section on
‘Perceptions and Learning’ (1989: 264) and in the reprint of a 1985 article from
Foreign Policy entitled ‘Two Cheers for Multilateralism’ (1989: 268, see especially
p. 272).
In 1998, in response to an increasingly information-reliant world, the authors
specifically addressed information issues in an article entitled, ‘Power and
Interdependence in the Information Age’. They discussed how both the global
context in which complex interdependence was originally conceived and the
nature of information flows have evolved to a great extent since their book’s
first printing. The essay points to several generalizations about the nature of
information which have altered the contexts in which international relations take
place: including the relationship of information to power, the dominance of
Western cultures in the creation of information technology and content, and the
416

IN FORMATION INTERDEPENDENCE
possibility of a ‘democratic advantage’ in the information age. These observations

ring true in an information age and certainly invite further empirical research.
Yet, research can be facilitated with a more in-depth examination of the
underlying assumptions and concepts of complex interdependence, which
continues to be an extremely valuable tool for understanding international
interactions in the information age between a number of different entities –
including, but hardly limited to, states. What follows is an attempt to understand
the foundations of complex interdependence in the context of the information
age. First, why is interdependence a useful tool for understanding global
interactions in the information age and second, how well does Keohane and Nye’s
idea of complex interdependence account for information and communications
flows? This essay is a theoretical discussion, analysing the usefulness of the concepts
behind complex interdependence in a different context than originally intended.2
It begins by looking at the interdependent nature of the world and how
‘interdependence’, both theoretically and empirically, can be used to describe the
environment in which international relations take place and then focuses on how
information ows might be applied to the complex interdependence.
WHAT IS INTERDEPENDENCE?
An early de nition of interdependence noted that it is ‘a state of affairs where what
one actor does impinges directly upon other nations’ (Rosecrance 1977: 426),
emphasizing the notion of reciprocating governmental in uences. But Keohane
and Nye believe that interdependence is more than just ‘connectedness between
groups’ (Rosecrance 1975: 21) and certainly more than simply political
connections. Interdependence also refers to the degree of interaction as well as
the outcomes of interaction. Mizukami (1990) points out that discussions
of economic interdependence began as a look at the quantity and type of ‘trans-
actions ‘ but later moved to the effects and results of those transactions. In other
words, there is an element of influence on, as well as susceptibility to, the
consequences of another’s actions.
In academic writing and research, the most common use of the term inter-
dependence has been in an economic sense, referring to the interdependent nature
of open markets and the idea of comparative advantage. In theory, open markets
provide opportunities for foreign trade and investment and encourage the
recipient country to do the same elsewhere. Comparative advantage means that
different groups will specialize in the production of the item(s) and/or services
they can provide most ef ciently, which forces interaction in order to obtain those
items/services they do not have. The greater reliance there is on these other
417

KENNETH S. ROGERSON
goods and services which cannot easily be produced, the more interdependent a
group is considered. As an example, economic theory is replete with discussions
of trade balances and imbalances which contribute to an interdependent world.
Bilateral trade relations between the USA and Japan are often studied because
‘the economic performance of the United States and Japan and harmonious
economic relations [what the authors refer to as interdependence] between them
are of global signi cance’ (Noguchi and Yamamura 1996: 4).
In both an economic and political sense, interdependence has advantages and
disadvantages. One of the principal advantages is that groups find they have
something to gain (often monetarily) through an interdependent relationship.
In addition, some believe that interdependence leads to co-operation in other
areas. For example, Deutsch3 believed that increasing interdependence meant

the formation of a community (Deutsch 1953; 1966). Russett (1970) maintained
that increased ties and transactions promote trade, migration, tourism, and
cultural and educational exchanges which encourage voluntary political and
economic co-operation (see also Cooper 1968).
The most visible disadvantage is that the reciprocal relationship includes the
notion of dependence, which means that each group relinquishes some ability to
completely control its own activities. In other words, sovereignty can decrease.
For example, it could become more dif cult to make foreign policy decisions
by completely relying on one’s own national interests. Other interests and
groups outside national boundaries may have an increasing in uence on the foreign
policy-making process (see Keohane 1975). ‘The increase in importance of inter-
national transactions and the growth of multinational institutions have weakened
government’s control over some of its most important policy instruments, while
the increase in economic interdependence has increased the risks of retaliation and
adverse feedback’ (Vernon 1987: 27).
Interdependence theory in the study of politics has also contributed to a
broader discussion on transnational relations. Thanks in part to the contributions
of Keohane and Nye, interdependence has come to stand on its own as a concept
rich in meaning, beginning with the simple observation that it is consistently
used as a basis for discussion in many areas of international politics. ‘It is rare
indeed for one term or idea, to attract such widespread popular and academic
appeal as that secured by “interdependent” in recent years’ (Jones and Willets
1984: 1).
In addition, other useful concepts are related to interdependence, such as
regime theory, integration and globalization, but there are reasons why inter-
dependence is, so far, a clearer and more appropriate choice for understanding
the international relations in the ‘information age’, a time in which the ows and
418

exchanges of information are becoming increasingly noticeable, important and

relevant. In fact, William Welch of the World Paper believes information is the
economic indicator for the twenty- rst century (Lewinsky 1997).
WHY USE INTERDEPENDENCE?
There are numerous concepts that have been used in conjunction with
explanations of the information age. What do we gain from focusing on inter-
dependence as opposed to these? These alternative ideas have elements of both
interdependence and information ows, and provide some understanding of how
the term ‘interdependence’ is used.
First, world systems theory views the world in principally economic terms,
which emphasize relationships between core groups of states and those in
the periphery. These relationships are uneven and must be so in order for the
relationships to function. Dependency theories explain that these relationships
unfairly favour the core group of countries since this group is wealthy and takes
advantage of the peripheral group in order to maintain core status. In a second
line of thinking (one that has been applied specifically to information and
communication ows) Galtung has taken this a step further by saying not only
are these primarily economic relationships, but are structural as well. That is, the
inequities are a part of the systemic structure. Imperialistic societies are ones
in which the collective relates to some of its parts in terms of ‘harmony of interest,
and other parts in relations of disharmony of interest, or conflict of interest’
(Galtung 1971: 81; see also Haynes 1984). Galtung believed that these inequalities
were very much a part of information-oriented relationships in the world
(Galtung 1985; Galtung and Vincent 1992).
In a second category of explanations, Keohane and Nye (1989: 19) define
regimes as ‘governing arrangements that affect relationships of interdependence’.
Later, regimes were more speci cally de ned as norms, standards and decision-
making rules which emerge in a given issue area (see Krasner 1983: 1). Based on
these formal de nitions, there really can be no such a thing as an information
regime, though other scholars would argue the existence of informal regimes
that may be applicable (see Puchala and Hopkins 1983). ‘Information’ is too broad
a concept to discuss the overriding norms and standards by which people interact
in all information issues. For example, though not all encompassing, GATT has
been considered the institutionalization of a trade (an equally broad concept)
regime. But, as of yet, there is no similar institutionalization in information. In
fact, many organizations – international, regional, national and local; govern-
mental and nongovernmental – claim a stake in these issues.
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KENNETH S. ROGERSON
However, those who have written about regimes have grappled with many of
these issues. Krasner (1983:2) posits explicit and implicit regimes; that is, regimes
that are openly understood through formal, often institutionalized, processes
as opposed to regimes that may be underlying broader contexts (a theme that
will be addressed hereafter). In addition, there may be regimes in subcategories
of information, such as telecommunications trade or satellite usage. For example,
there may be a regime in discussions surrounding the allocation of satellite
space, but these rules do not apply in negotiations on internet access or biased
media coverage. Events and situations that take place because of interdependent
relations may be subject to regimes, but interdependence is not a synonym
for regimes.
Interdependence is also a characteristic of integration, the idea that increasing

interactions lead toward uni cation of goals, institutions and possibly even states.
It is seen in the international standardization of technical capabilities, such as
the VCR. But interdependence is a necessary but hardly a suf cient condition
for efforts and increased economic and political uni cation. ‘. . . [I]ntegration of
societies entails a degree of common governance which goes far beyond that
which is implied by interdependence’ (Jones and Willets 1984: 20). Much of the
discussion of economic interdependence is found in the literature on integration,
specically European integration. Information integration is happening slowly. For
example, the European Union (EU) has pursued ‘Television Without Frontiers’
which encourages transborder broadcasts throughout the Union. But integration
does not address the dominance of one television market (American) over another
(European).
Finally, globalization has become a general term signifying an overwhelming,
unifying force which tends to decrease the importance of political and cultural
boundaries. This concept comes the closest to interdependence, but its broad
nature has only begun to be concretized. One explanation for its popularity is the
‘increasing significance of the external context for issues that were formerly
deemed to be “national” in character or amenable to local resolution’ (Jones 1995:
11). As one example, the effects of information ows on globalization have been
touted in statements about ‘The Global Village’, a place in which more commu-
nication provides increased numbers of global interactions as well as increasingly
homogenized world citizens. This idea that the international arena will increase
in importance at all levels from the global to the individual takes into account the
linkages between different actors, but it does not explain the nature of these
relationships. Interdependence, once again, can be a necessary condition for
globalization, but not a suf cient one. Yet, it does provide the important concepts
for understanding the nature of global interactions.
420

Drawing on some key points within each of these alternative explanations, we

nd that interdependence can be a theoretically unifying concept (see table 1). It
provides us with (1) an explanation of uneven relationships in various issue areas
(World Systems Theory and Structural Imperialism); (2) an environment for
making decisions in these issue areas (Regimes); ‘relationships of interdependence
often occur within’ regimes (Keohane and Nye 1989: 19); (3) an explanation of
the goals of the actors (Integration); and (4) a context in which these relationships
take place (Globalization). The concept of interdependence combines these ideas
and explains how they interrelate. Complex interdependence provides a strong
grounding for them.
Table 1 Complex interdependence and alternative explanations
Complex interdependence Alternative explanations
1) a multiple number of actors, 1) an explanation of uneven

placing an emphasis on non-state relationships in various issue areas
actors (World Systems Theory and Structural
Imperialism)
2) multiple channels through which 2) a context in which these
these actors interact in the system relationships take place (Globalization)
3) a changing hierarchy of issues 3) an explanation of the goals of the
actors (Integration)
4) a decrease in the use of military 4) a broadening of the environment
force in interactions for making decisions (Regimes)
In brief, complex interdependence states that power does not lie only in the
traditional areas of study in international relations – the state and military strength
– but in other conceptual frameworks and issue areas. The de ning characteristics
of complex interdependence are: (1) a multiple number of actors, placing an
emphasis on non-state actors (a discussion of the relationships in the system [the
uneven characteristic] will be elaborated on below); (2) multiple channels through
which these actors interact in the system (a context in which the relationships take
place); (3) a changing hierarchy of issues (an explanation of the goals of the actors);
and (4) a decrease in the use of military force in interactions (a broadening of the
environment in which decisions are made) (Keohane and Nye 1989: 24–5).
In addition, complex interdependence provides other fertile concepts:
sensitivity, ‘the degree of responsiveness within a policy framework – how quickly
do changes in one country bring costly changes in another’ and vulnerability ,
‘the relative availability and costliness of the alternatives that various actors
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KENNETH S. ROGERSON
face’ (Keohane and Nye 1989:12–13). If an entity is less sensitive to changes, it

will be able to retain a dominant status through maintaining the status quo. If
it is more sensitive, it will feel forced to adjust and adapt its decision making
more often and more quickly. If an entity is less vulnerable, it will have the ability
to keep control through the changes it makes to confront issues. If it is more
vulnerable, it will become increasingly less able to nd solutions to its problems
in a timely, ef cient manner.
The key idea extrapolated here is: a less sensitive and less vulnerable actor will
have more influence and control (for example, showing leadership or being
dominant) in an issue area. In addition, it behaves less as an interdependent actor
in an interdependent world. It is more detached, possibly even showing signs of
imperialism. In other words, it is able to have a greater impact on international

policy instead of reacting to it.
Table 2 gives an overview of these concepts as heuristic constructs. Relying on
the assumptions of complex interdependence, placement in the various boxes
will differ with issue area and situation. In addition, it is possible to move between
the boxes as circumstances change. An entity would have to be perfectly
insensitive and invulnerable in order to not be interdependent at all. In addition,
it must be somewhat sensitive and can be slightly (if temporarily) vulnerable, to
retain dominance or leadership in any issue area, such as economic relations,
military affairs or information ows and exchanges.
It is important to remember that interdependence does not mean equality:
‘The capacity of some individuals or groups to shape directly how . . . conceptual
systems are formed and used by others is fundamentally important. . . .’ (Comor
1998: 222). There must be someone in control in order for the interdependent
relationships to exist. Keohane and Nye note, ‘Rules require authority, whether
Table 2 How to recognize relative sensitivity and vulnerability
Sensitive Insensitive
Vulnerable Open to constant political Cut off from others by choice,

and societal changes; possibly but sometimes forced to react
imposed from the outside to globalization processes6
Invulnerable Feels pressure to change, Perfectly hegemonic/

but no immediate change imperialistic; not affected by
necessary choices others make; has
Has choices/alternatives numerous alternatives that are
Has time to react quickly implemented
422

in the form of public government or private or community governance’ (1998:

82).
Interdependence, therefore, is more than mutual dependence which connotes
perfect (or near perfect) symmetry between actors in the relationship. It is
also more than dependence, which envisions a satisfactory outcome for one
actor requiring acceptable developments elsewhere (Jones and Willets 1984:
8). It is also different from imperialistic tendencies, which may be seen as
interdependence gone awry: one actor is dictating the terms of the relationship.
If relative dependence is seen as a spectrum (see gure 1), true interdependence,
then, finds itself someplace between mutual dependence and imperialism or
hegemony.
Dependence « Mutual Dependence « Interdependence « Imperialism
Figure 1 Spectrum of relative dependence
Thus, Keohane and Nye provide the basis for examining interdependence as
an ideal type, a true theoretical example of how international relations function.
In other words, pure dependence, pure mutual dependence, or pure imperialism
or hegemony are, less and less, complete explanations of the reality of relation-
ships in the international system. Interdependence could be filling that void.
Other concepts from complex interdependence support this assertion.
Sometimes, interdependent relationships are assumed to benefit every
participant – interdependence is something good and positive. This is known
as symmetrical interdependence. This positive relationship does not reflect
reality. Jones notes that ‘most signi cant instances of manifest interdependence
are asymmetrical and imbalanced’ (Jones and Willetts 1984: 14). Indeed, ‘it is
possible for [a] . . . relationship to involve a relatively trivial sensitivity depen-
dence in one direction, but a critical dependence, of high vulnerability, in the
other’ (Jones 1995: 8).
Another important concept, then, is asymmetry. For Keohane and Nye (1989:
16–18) and others, the international system would not function in complete
symmetry, that is, each group giving and receiving ‘equally’:
Asymmetries in interdependence are important both economically and politically.

Economically, they make one country or group of countries sensitive to economic policies
and economic cycles in other countries that are not so dependent themselves. Politically,
asymmetries create power relations between countries and vulnerabilities open to political
exploitation. They give countries that are less dependent leverage over countries that are more
dependent.
(Levine 1996: 39)
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KENNETH S. ROGERSON
An important response to this would be, ‘Where asymmetry or imbalance is

held to prevail it may then become a question of how much is permissible in a
relationship before it should properly be deemed one of dominance or one-way
dependence, rather than proper interdependence’ (Jones and Willetts 1984: 20,
original emphasis).
More importantly, asymmetry is not merely a conceptual heuristic. ‘Such
asymmetry and imbalances are, moreover, prevalent within the contemporary
international system’ (Jones 1995: 8). Examples of it evident in the world today
might include something as simple as telecommunications trade imbalances
between nations to the more complicated complaint that when Microsoft sells a
computer operating system, the user feels ‘forced’ to return to the same company
for an upgrade, complementary software or hardware or to the learn and utilize

the English language.
The next step, then, is the question of relevance. Why would being in
a situation of asymmetric interdependence be important to a particular actor?
What is gained from having an ‘upper hand’ in international interactions? ‘The
asymmetry and imbalance characterising . . . pattern[s] of ‘interdependence’ may
have very serious implications for the relationship. Asymmetry and imbalance
could be particularly pertinent to the potential for relative power and inuence
between the participants’ (Jones 1995: 8). In other words, it provides an
advantage in encouraging and persuading others to act according to a country’s
desires. This is a generally accepted de nition of power. Philosophers and scholars
have struggled to de ne power, often resorting to what can be seen and measured
– such as military strength as with the number of tanks or troops, or economic
strength as with the size of a GNP. But, by de nition, groups in an interdependent
world may become relevant in many different issues areas, though these areas
may be prioritized according to situation and environment. Power, then, must also
be de nable as more than just tanks and dollars.
The answer lies in the encouraging and persuading elements of the de nition
of power: ‘Proof of power lies not in resources but in the ability to change the
behavior of states. Thus, the critical questions for the United States [for example]
is not whether it will start the next century as the superpower with the largest
supply of resources, but to what extent it will be able to control the political
environment and get other countries to do what it wants’ (Nye 1990a: 155). Nye
describes the use of what he terms ‘soft power’, or intangible forms of power,
such as the control of and access to information and communications, organizing
and institutional skills (especially the use of international institutions) and the
ability to manipulate interdependent relationships. It is because of the potential
of this soft power that issues other than military strength are becoming more
424

relevant in this interdependent world; issues like control of information and

communications content and their accompanying technologies.
INTERDEPENDENCE AND INFORMATION
As stated earlier, interdependence has most often been understood as economic

and military interdependence. Placing it in the context of information and
communications issues is beneficial for both the issues and the concept.
Information interdependence is an extension of the original de nition: events
and situations in one area depend on or are in uenced by those in another, and,
most importantly, the reverse is also true. When information of any type ows
beyond political or geographic borders, there is an impact. The same is true
of the technologies associated with information flows. Vernon believes that

all types of interdependence are ‘intimately linked to improvements in . . .
communication’ (1987: 28). Interdependent actions based in information and
communications ows and technology are re ective of the concepts of sensitivity
and vulnerability that Keohane and Nye discussed. Information flows affect
sensitivity, or how responsive an actor can be within a policy framework, as well
as vulnerability, the availability and costliness of policy alternatives.
One reason for this connection between information and interdependence is
the interdependent nature of information itself. Communications scholar Joseph
Klapper (1990: 12) summarized this interconnecting nature of information.
He proposed that: (1) mass communication does not usually serve as a necessary
and suf cient cause of something, but rather functions with other factors and
in uences; (2) these other factors and in uences use mass communication in the
process of change; (3) on the occasions that mass communication is used in the
service of change, one of two conditions are likely to occur: (a) the other factors
and in uences are likely to be inoperative and the media effect will be direct or
(b) the other factors and inuences, which normally reinforce the status quo, will
be found to favour change; (4) there are always situations in which mass commu-
nication will produce direct effects or serve psycho-physical functions. That is,
there are some things which mass communication can do that other factors cannot
do, such as the continued presence of printed material in an individual’s home;
and (5) the effects of mass communication on change are affected by the nature
of the media and communications themselves (i.e. aspects of textual organization,
the source and medium, public opinion).
The important idea running through these generalizations is that commu-
nications systems rarely serve as a single force in politics, economics and society.
The connective nature of communications processes has an essential characteristic
which is applicable to this analysis: the flow of information and the existence
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KENNETH S. ROGERSON
of information and communications technologies are vital for international

interactive processes to occur. Therefore, whoever exerts the greatest control
over those processes, may nd themselves in a greater position of power:
Yet, there is a ‘paradox’ in the expansion of information and communications processes. The
integrating versions of information ows also have a fragmenting effect. One the one hand,
current technological innovations are creating a global infrastructure much more sophisticated
in scope and technical quality than previously imagined . . . On the other hand, however,
technological innovation has also functioned to fracture or fragment the mass audience. The
advent of diverse, individualized telecommunications and media systems . . . threaten to render
the concept of mass national or international systems obsolete.
(McPhail 1989: 49–50)
Both the fragmentive and integrative forces may be at work at the same time and
quite possibly from the same sources. Rosenau (1997) has called this a ‘fragmegra-
tive’ approach to understanding global governance, a ‘label referring to the
simultaneous fragmentation and integration of a panoply of global developments’
(Comor 1998: 217). Interdependence itself can also manifest fragmegrative
characteristics as increasing international relationships bring nations and peoples
together. But, the same interactions can also increase con ict. The management
of this characteristic may be the key to maintaining leadership in an information
interdependent world.
The connective nature of information and communication may be adapting to
a more interdependent world as the importance of these issues increases both
nationally and internationally. Klapper noticed this when he said, it is:
Very clear that the mass media [as a form of information ows] do have important consequences
for individuals, for institutions and for society and culture. That we cannot trace very precise
causal connection or make reliable predictions about the future does not nullify this conclusion
. . . All that remains is to discover not whether the media have power and how it works, but who
has access to the use of this power.
(Klapper 1989: 33, original emphasis)
It is less important to focus solely on the underlying causal nature of information

ows and more important to focus on the characteristics which apply to speci c,
currently relevant, situations. This focus on actors and situations in which infor-
mation could have an impact is the contribution of complex interdependence.
Complex interdependence stipulates a multiple number of actors, placing an
emphasis on non-state actors. The information age has emphasized the multiplicity
of actors at a number of levels – global, regional domestic, local and individual
(see Rosenau 1992) – as well as in various societal groupings – international
426

and regional organizations, ethnic groups, states, the media, and age and gender
groups. More than at any other time in history, groups are utilizing information
channels to be heard. Revolutionary groups, like the indigenous people’s rebellion
in the Mexican state of Chiapas, as well as the Irish Republican Army and Hamas
have ‘taken their struggles to the Internet . . . as a cheap and effective way to
promote their cause and disseminate information, usually without the interfer-
ence of state censorship’ (Vincent 1996: 9). With the appropriate technology,
individuals may spread their ideas via personal web pages and local cable television
stations. Radio and television talk shows have proliferated. According to Heath
(1998), during the early 1980s, only fty-three US radio stations had news/talk
formats, compared with more than 1,000 in the late 1990s, while the total
number of stations remained constant at 10,000. The number of television talk

shows ballooned from a few in 1986, to fteen in the 1989–90 season, to nineteen
during the 1996–97 season, in addition to the proliferation of talk shows on cable.
When asked what is fuelling the popularity of talk media, Michael Harrison,
editor of Talkers Magazine, which covers the talk-media industry, said: ‘It all serves
the simple need for connections with other people . . . People don’t know their
neighbors anymore, and they wouldn’t have time to talk over the backyard fence
even if they did. But there’s still a human need for community, so it’s a virtual,
electronic, global media community’ (Heath 1998: 48). The growth of talk radio
is not only an American phenomenon: ‘Talk radio is an international growth
industry. A . . . listener who spins her dial along the medium-wave frequencies
might get a crash course in European languages, as stations from Germany and
Spain, in particular, seep into [Irish] airspace’ (‘Is Talk Radio Something You Have
to Grow Into?’ 1998: 8).
The number of actors ties in strongly to a second characteristic of complex
interdependence: the multiple channels through which these actors interact in the
system. The sheer number methods for communication have grown almost
exponentially over the past decade. From cable and satellite communications to
electronic information ows of a number of varieties, increased information ow
has created a world in which traditional geo-political borders no longer describe
the communities and societies that exist. For example, organizations such as
CNN International have created a number of venues for voices not before
heard via the electronic airways, encouraging local, indigenous coverage of issues.
CNN International’s ‘coverage reaches homes in more than 210 countries
and territories worldwide, including the United States. In fact, today CNNI has
100 million subscribers – even more subscribers than CNN has in the United
States’ (CNN International 2000). In addition, the advent of the internet has
provided an explosion in the avenues available for communication.4 E-mail and
427

KENNETH S. ROGERSON
the posting of web pages are the two most visible examples of methods for inter-
actions between groups. In the future, complex interdependence could provide
a solid theoretical grounding for the study of international interactions over the
internet.
Third, there is a changing hierarchy of issues. In some situations, economic
questions might prevail, while in others military or environmental needs might
be more pressing. As stated above, information ows play a role in probably most,
if not all, of these issues. Complex interdependence could help in analysing this
relationship. One way to do it would be to identify various issues that arise in
international interactions and juxtapose them with some general characteristics
of information and then examine potential outcomes.
These are the two general characteristics which seem to continually surface
when discussing information: (1) access to the ‘hardware’, the physical capabilities
of information and communication systems such as fibre optic cable and the
launching and control of satellites, by individuals, groups and institutions and
the training and education that is necessary to achieve access; and (2) content, the
‘software’ or the information itself and the interpretation and structures of that
information, such as computer programmes, television shows and news. An
analysis of these concepts can aid in understanding the power of information and
its accompanying technologies and how they can be most effectively used to situate
a group on the world stage into the twenty- rst century.
In addition to these general methods of recognizing information issues, there
are different issue areas that arise in the international interactions of different
types of groups. Though not completely exhaustive, many interactions can t in
the following categories: security, economy, ideology, culture, environmental,
health and human rights. These, when analysed with the various concepts used
to de ne information, are only heuristic separations. In addition, information
ows may inform one or more of these categories at the same time.
First, as information has focused on the security area, it has been discussed in
two categories: national security and personal security. Decisions of national
security have been instrumental in the creation of information technologies and
the gathering of data and, as far as they apply to protecting the state and its peoples,
tight control is maintained on both. Personal security has centred on discussions
of privacy. The proliferation of access to international communications networks
has made personal data much more difcult to keep hidden or secret.
Second, economically , decision makers have focused on information as a
commodity. The underlying processes have been the spread of capitalism and
consumerism. For example, when the promotion of a state’s economic interests
abroad seem to dovetail with the interests of domestic businesses: ‘One of the
428

most unique features distinguishing information from other commodities is that

it is not depleted through use’ (Winseck 1997: 200). Does this mean decision
makers can treat information the same way they treat steel, computer chips or
money?
Much of the literature in the communications eld has focused on the role of
information and communications processes in the spread of ideology, another area
of interest. This applies to both the ‘modernization’ debates in which these
processes are used in the establishment and spread of democracy and democratic
institutions, as well as the revolutionary actions of communism and its subsequent
use of these processes as a mouthpiece for the government.
Information has been viewed culturally both as a liberating and controlling
process. The liberation comes through education, especially on the local level
in the form of family planning or agricultural projects. The controlling exists in
the colonial and neo-colonial tendencies of those with the ability to produce
information hardware and software to seem imperialist in their quest to nd new
markets for their goods as well as teach others a ‘better’ way to live.
Finally, in interaction on the environment, health and human rights, the issues
of the truthfulness, validity and applicability of information ows can have a great
effect on the way political and economic decisions are made. The advent of a crisis
– such as the outbreak of the E-bola virus or the spread of AIDS – as well as the
presence on charismatic leaders – such as Saddam Hussein – or international
pressure – such as East Timor – can lead to lopsided or biased information ows
and quick reactions by the international community without lasting effects.
Complex interdependence provides some conceptual tools for addressing
complexities surrounding the information flows through diplomatic commu-
nications, the media or other avenues.
Finally, according to complex interdependence, international relationships are
characterized by a decrease in the use of military force. As seen above, military
and security issues play an important role, but, if the assertions of complex
interdependence are to hold true, the use of force should be less than what might
be expected from a realist analysis of the situation. Though military organizations
around the world are in the habit of discussing information as a military tool
(Libicki 1995; Henry and Peartree 1998), the flow of information is more
associated with diplomatic actions than military ones. Though there can be no
assertion that the increasing flows of information have eliminated or even
decreased con ict, the idea that information ows have provided an outlet for
alternative views as a substitute for force could be pursued.
429

KENNETH S. ROGERSON
THE USA AND INFORMATION

INTERDEPENDENCE
It is important to note – without any intimation of inevitability or any sense of

longevity – that the USA is an important case study of complex interdependence
in the information age: ‘The spread of information and American popular culture
has generally increased global awareness of and openness to American ideas and
values. To some extent this re ects deliberate policies, but more often, soft power
is an inadvertent byproduct’ (Keohane and Nye 1998: 85). In other words, the
increasing number of actors and channels in the information arena has been more
bene cial than harmful for the dissemination of US ideas and culture. This has
placed the USA at least in a position of leadership and, some would argue, in a
position of dominance on the spectrum of interdependence (see gure 1).

Yet, the USA is not perfectly hegemonic or imperialistic in this area. It is not
so completely integrated into an interdependent world that it must react to every
action by another actor. It can be sensitive, even if slightly, to events and situations
going on in other parts of the world. Witness, for example, the uctuation of US
stock markets in reaction to markets throughout the world as seen in the Asian
nancial crisis which began in the fall of 1997. It is not as vulnerable as other
countries since, in many cases, it seems to have a choice among policy options and
can choose according to the situation, sometimes with near impunity.
There are many situations that emphasize the importance of information
interdependence to the USA today. In both information content and its accom-
panying technologies, the USA is interdependent. In many ways, it is forced to
be interdependent because of the nature of information to disregard traditional,
political boundaries. In order to function, it relies on information ows from
around the world, be they nancial, military or the news. Yet, the asymmetrical
nature of this interdependence is also clear, because the USA is dominant in the
production of both information content and the technology. One could add
an additional descriptive term: interdependence in this case is ‘highly skewed’ in
favour of the USA because of the noticeably large differences – in both the
production of information technology and the distribution of information of US
origin – between the USA and other compatriots or competitors.
For example, the USA has the ‘highest volume of data communication, the
most network access and service providers, the most Internet hosts, and the
highest total number of Internet connections’ in the world (Electronic Commerce
1997: 71). In addition, for now, the world seems to be more interested in what
the USA (or US business) does than what any other country (or company) does.
The USA has had great control over international information and communi-
cations; both the physical capabilities (hardware) and the content and its structures
430

(software). At the 1998 World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, CNN

correspondent Jim Bittermann (1998) noted that in the area of technology
speci cally, as well as in many other domains, ‘it is surprising and sobering to
come to an international gathering . . . to nd that all ears are inclined to hear
what the US is doing. . . . No matter what resentment there may be, for now,
few have alternatives to the American way. . . . The next century will at least
dawn as an American one’. The communications revolution ‘is of particular and
immediate signicance to the United States, for the technologies of the new age
of communication have increasingly become a principal engine of US economic
leadership and growth. These new technologies have fueled much of our current
prosperity and may be the key to our continuing strength’ (Fascell 1985: 3).
This asymmetric information interdependence has placed the USA in a unique

position. It is dominant both in the production of information and communi-
cations content and its accompanying technologies. This condition can be
understood as a type of hegemony: information hegemony.5 Since this condition
of hegemony is imperfect, the USA cannot always dictate its desires in every
situation, because of the nature of information itself as well as the nature of the
interdependent world in which the USA participates. Yet, it has been able to
dictate its desires quite often over its history of participation in information and
communications issues.
CONCLUSION
There are various, competing ways of understanding global interactions.

As conditions evolve, some explanations are unable to withstand the test of time;
i.e. whether their underlying assumptions and concepts are adaptable to new
contexts and situations. Complex interdependence seems to have been able, so
far, to pass the test; to make sense of a world that is based in military and economic
relationships and is moving into an information age as well. The great contribution
of complex interdependence was the simple recognition that international
interactions are, indeed, complex. For example, the understanding that the
hierarchy of issues can change with time, crisis, leadership and context is a simple,
but invaluable, insight into the study of international relations.
More importantly, it is exactly these types of observations that provide
a grounding for integrating the theories of information and communications
with those of international relations. Concepts such as sensitivity, vulnerability
and asymmetrical interdependence accurately portray the effects of informa-
tion flows on global interactions. As discussed earlier (see Klapper 1990) the
strength of complex interdependence lies in its ability to allow information and
431

KENNETH S. ROGERSON
communication processes to be a part of many types of international interactions

as well as providing a basis for understanding them on a case-by-case basis (as
hierarchies change). In addition the effects of information ows may be analysed
more generally as trends and patterns are recognized through the study of a
number of situations.
For example, in their more recent article, Keohane and Nye (1998) state: ‘The
information revolution alters patterns of complex interdependence by exponen-
tially increasing the number of channels of communication in world politics
– between individuals in networks, not just individuals within bureaucracies. But
it exists in the context of an existing political structure, and its effects on the
ows of different types of information vary vastly’ (1998: 84). This observation
dovetails well with the research from the eld of communications: information
ows should be understood as underlying mechanisms and processes that facilitate
contextual understanding of issues. It maintains the integrity of the multiple-
actor and multiple-channel assumptions, while adding an understanding of the
nature of information and information ows.
Finally, one important caveat must be mentioned. Keohane and Nye (1998)
rightly point out that ‘globalization is far from universal’ and that a ‘large portion
of the world’s population will not participate’ in many aspects of the information
revolution. Yet, the impact of information interdependence will still be felt. Many
who do not participate in the information revolution are still subject to the effects
of decisions made by those who do.
Complex interdependence has informed much of the authors’ work. It began
as a collaborative effort in 1968 with a special issue of the journal International
Organization, devoted to the relevance of international organizations in world
politics, which was later reprinted as Transnational Relations and World Politics
(1972). The authors continued to develop their ideas because they felt that though
they ‘had pointed out signi cant problems with realist theory, . . . [they] had not
provided an alternative theory’ (Keohane and Nye 1989: v). The result was Power
and Interdependence and it elicited much attention (Keohane and Nye 1977). The
responses to complex interdependence, both positive and negative, led to a second
printing with some additional material (Keohane and Nye 1989). At the same
time each separately worked on different ideas related to complex interdepen-
dence (see, for example, Keohane 1984; Nye 1990a, b). Finally, in recognition
of the value their ideas could have for the information age, they collaborated again
(Keohane and Nye 1998), providing a valuable overview of interdependence and
its relationship to information content and technologies.
The richness of complex interdependence is apparent in the fact that it is still
being discussed, both by the authors and others. The true value of the ideas and
432

concepts associated with it will become clear as it is used as the basis for more
research, especially in the growing area of information and communications.
Kenneth S. Rogerson
DeWitt Wallace Center for Communications and Journalism
Duke University
Box 90241
Durham, NC 27708
USA
rogerson@pps.duke.edu
NOTES
1 These assumptions are generally understood to include the primacy of the state as an actor, as
well as the dominance of military and security issues in the study of international relations.
2 It is important to note that, even by the second edition of their book, Keohane and Nye
stated: ‘we did not pursue complex interdependence as a theory, but as a thought
experiment’ (Keohane and Nye 1989: 254). Despite the modesty, it has taken on the status
of theory in many international relations discussions.
3 Keohane and Nye even mention Deutsch in the following: ‘Our respect for the liberal
tradition of political analysis re ects our debt to studies of regional integration carried out
during the 1950s and 1960s. Karl Deutsch focused on the development of pluralistic security
communities, ‘groups of states which developed reliable expectations of peaceful relations
and thereby overcame the security dilemma that realists see as characterizing international
politics’ (1989: 247). This reference was to Deutsch’s Political Community and the North
Atlantic Area, written in 1957. There is no reference to his Nationalism and Social Communication
written in 1953 which also emphasized community building.
4 Even conservative estimates say this number is, at minimum, growing rapidly. There are
numerous web sources providing estimates at the numbers of internet users and their
demographics (all accessed September and October 1999);
www.anamorph.com/docs/stats/stats.html;
www.isc.org/ds/;
www.headcount.com;
new-website.openmarket.com/intirdex/99-05.htm;
www.computereconomics.com/new4/pr/pr990610.html; Headcount.com;
www.wcom.com/about_the_company/speakers_bureau/statistics.html;
www.infoplease.com;
www.euromktg.com/globstats;
www.nua.ie/surveys/how_many_online/index.html; and
MIDS (Matrix Information and Directory Service) www.mids.org
5 The term ‘hegemony ‘ is accompanied by some intellectual baggage. There are theories of
hegemonic stability, referring principally to the propensity for states to be in war; economic
hegemony as in Immanuel Wallerstein’s work on world systems theory; as well as combinations
of both in Paul Kennedy’s works on great powers. But this view of the ‘hegemonic ‘ status of
the USA in information and culture is not my idea alone. It comes from the perceptions that
the rest of the world, both Western and non-Western, has of the USA. For example, in 1993,
French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur talked about the ‘Commercial and cultural
433

KENNETH S. ROGERSON
domination’ and ‘hegemonic tendencies’ of the USA (Federic Bobin. ‘L’accord sur le commerce
international, La declaration de politique generale du premier ministre, La France n’a jamais
ete aussi grande que lorsqu’elle s’ouvre sur le monde’ Le Monde, 17 December 1993, p. 3).
Robert Keohane said in a panel discussion called ‘IPE Distinguished Senior Scholar Panel in
Honor of Immanuel Wallerstein’, (ISA Annual Meeting in Minneapolis, Minnesota, March
1998), that the USA is as hegemonic now as ever, both in a Gramscian sense and in the sense
of Nye’s ‘soft power’. Hegemony means providing something ‘extra’ that you can use to
‘perpetuate the issue above and beyond’ what may be considered legitimate.
6 This could happen in an instance where there is an intransigent dictator who is on the verge of
collapse, but refuses to admit defeat, i.e. Adolf Hitler, Kim Il Sung of North Korea, or
Saddam Hussein.
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Online library: digital copies

Course of study: EMFSS - Foreign Policy Analysis - IR2137

Page extent: 415-436

Source title: Information, Communication and Society

Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr de ne interdependence as reciprocal

complex interdependence, information ows,

On 28 December 1995, CompuServe, a global internet service provider, blocked

Supplied by the British Library 01 Aug 2017, 14:19 (BST)

well as the environment in which information and communications interactions

Supplied by the British Library 01 Aug 2017, 14:19 (BST)

possibility of a ‘democratic advantage’ in the information age. These observations

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areas. For example, Deutsch3 believed that increasing interdependence meant

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exchanges of information are becoming increasingly noticeable, important and

WHY USE INTERDEPENDENCE?

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Interdependence is also a characteristic of integration, the idea that increasing

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Drawing on some key points within each of these alternative explanations, we

Complex interdependence Alternative explanations

1) a multiple number of actors, 1) an explanation of uneven

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face’ (Keohane and Nye 1989:12–13). If an entity is less sensitive to changes, it

imperialism. In other words, it is able to have a greater impact on international

Table 2 How to recognize relative sensitivity and vulnerability

Vulnerable Open to constant political Cut off from others by choice,

Invulnerable Feels pressure to change, Perfectly hegemonic/

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in the form of public government or private or community governance’ (1998:

Dependence « Mutual Dependence « Interdependence « Imperialism

Figure 1 Spectrum of relative dependence

Asymmetries in interdependence are important both economically and politically.

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An important response to this would be, ‘Where asymmetry or imbalance is

for an upgrade, complementary software or hardware or to the learn and utilize

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relevant in this interdependent world; issues like control of information and

INTERDEPENDENCE AND INFORMATION

As stated earlier, interdependence has most often been understood as economic

of the technologies associated with information flows. Vernon believes that

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of information and communications technologies are vital for international

It is less important to focus solely on the underlying causal nature of information

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number of stations remained constant at 10,000. The number of television talk

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most unique features distinguishing information from other commodities is that

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THE USA AND INFORMATION

It is important to note – without any intimation of inevitability or any sense of

position of dominance on the spectrum of interdependence (see  gure 1).

Supplied by the British Library 01 Aug 2017, 14:19 (BST)

(software). At the 1998 World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, CNN

This asymmetric information interdependence has placed the USA in a unique

There are various, competing ways of understanding global interactions.

Supplied by the British Library 01 Aug 2017, 14:19 (BST)

communication processes to be a part of many types of international interactions

Supplied by the British Library 01 Aug 2017, 14:19 (BST)

Supplied by the British Library 01 Aug 2017, 14:19 (BST)

Bittermann, J. (1998) Commentary for National Public Radio, copy obtained

Supplied by the British Library 01 Aug 2017, 14:19 (BST)

Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr de ne interdependence as reciprocal

complex interdependence, information ows,

position of dominance on the spectrum of interdependence (see gure 1).