J Bus Ethics
DOI 10.1007/s10551-017-3688-y
ORIGINAL PAPER
Wanting More, Getting Less: Gaming Performance Measurement
as a Form of Deviant Workplace Behavior
Laura Graf1 • Wiebke S. Wendler1 • Jutta Stumpf-Wollersheim2 • Isabell M. Welpe1,3
Received: 29 March 2017 / Accepted: 24 August 2017
 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2017
Abstract Investigating the causes of unethical behaviors
in academia, such as scientific misconduct, has become a
highly important research subject. The current performance
measurement practices (e.g., equating research perfor-
mance with the number of publications in top-tier journals)
are frequently referred to as being responsible for scien-
tists’ unethical behaviors. We conducted qualitative semi-
structured interviews with different stakeholders of the
higher education system (e.g., professors and policy mak-
ers; N = 43) to analyze the influence of performance
measurement on scientists’ behavior. We followed a three-
step coding procedure and found (1) that the participants
described a variety of positive behavioral consequences
(e.g., higher productivity) but mainly negative behavioral
consequences (e.g., questionable publishing practices) of
current performance measurement practices in academia;
(2) that scientists’ behavior can be described as gaming
performance measurement (i.e., achieving performance
goals by reducing performance quality and focusing on
those tasks that are measured); and (3) that gaming per-
formance measurement shares the same characteristics as
deviant workplace behavior (i.e., a voluntary violation of
Laura Graf and Wiebke S. Wendler have contributed equally to this
work and they are listed in alphabetical order.
& Laura Graf
laura.graf@tum.de
1
Chair for Strategy and Organization, TUM School of
Management, Technical University of Munich, Arcisstraße
21, 80333 Munich, Germany
2
Technische Universität Bergakademie Freiberg, Freiberg,
Germany
3
Bavarian State Institute for Higher Education Research and
Planning, Munich, Germany
organizational norms that harms the university). We dis-
cuss that gaming performance measurement has not been
considered as a type of deviant workplace behavior in the
previous literature. Furthermore, we draw from research on
deviant workplace behavior and goal setting to discuss
psychological processes that may underlie gaming perfor-
mance measurement. Our results indicate the importance of
connecting literature on deviant workplace behavior and
goal setting to advance our understanding of gaming per-
formance measurement.
Keywords Academia
Deviant workplace behavior

Counterproductive work behavior
Gaming performance
measurement
Higher education
Qualitative interviews

Performance measurement
Production deviance

Scientific misconduct
Introduction
Scientific misconduct, such as strategically manipulating
experimental settings, not only violates ethical rules but
also puts a university’s reputation for research at risk.
Recent scandals illustrate how scientists’ behavior can
cause severe organizational damage for the employing
university (Christian and Ellis 2014; Gross 2016; Stroebe
et al. 2012). Due to negative media coverage, cases of
scientific misconduct have an impact on the image of the
entire scientific community (Stroebe et al. 2012). Honig
et al. (2017) call attention to the danger of unethical
practices in the production of knowledge by scientists.
Even less-severe behaviors than scientific misconduct, such
as carelessness, ‘cooking’ data in order to find significant
results, or harking (i.e., hypothesizing after the results are
known; Butler et al. 2017) can lead to severe impacts, such
123

as less-reliable scientific findings or a wasted funding
(Steneck 2006). Preventing such damage to universities
requires a better understanding of this phenomenon as well
as its antecedents and consequences.
Several authors suggest that an important antecedent of
scientists’ unethical behaviors may be the current perfor-
mance measurement practices in academia (e.g., Barsky
2008; Clor-Proell et al. 2015; Gross 2016; Ordónez et al.
2009). Performance measurement in academia is based on
managerial principles that originated from the private
sector (e.g., Osterloh 2010; Walker et al. 2011). This so-
called ‘new managerialism’ (Deem and Brehony 2005;
Deem et al. 2007) is related to the principles of goal setting
theory, which proposes that setting goals and measuring the
attainment of these goals leads to an increase in perfor-
mance (Latham and Locke 1990, 2007; Locke and Latham
2002). Moreover, new managerialism implies a heightened
accountability, for example, to third parties such as funding
organizations (Melo et al. 2008). Consequently, there is a
need to measure and monitor the performance of scientists
and higher education institutions in an objective and time-
efficient manner (Deem and Brehony 2005; Melo et al.
2008). For this reason, current performance measurement
practices in academia focus on the outcome of scientists’
work (Aguinis et al. 2012, 2014; Hood 1991; Osterloh
2010; Sousa et al. 2010). With regard to research, for
example, performance is mainly based on the number of
publications, particularly in high-impact journals, and on
the amount of acquired funding. Critical voices suggest that
these performance measurement practices do not lead to
the intended increase in performance but encourage sci-
entists to behave unethically (e.g., Osterloh 2010; Schubert
2009; van Thiel and Leeuw 2002). More specifically,
previous research indicates that performance measurement
practices that focus on the outcome of employees’ work
and directly link success to goal attainment can motivate
employees to game the performance measurement prac-
tices (i.e., fulfilling the performance measures while
behaving dysfunctional; Barsky 2008; Jaworski 1988; Saini
and Krush 2008). What is missing so far is a comprehen-
sive and extensive exploration of scientists’ behavioral
adaptations to current performance measurement practices.
To address this research gap, we conducted qualitative
interviews with stakeholders of the higher education sys-
tem (e.g., professors and policy makers) and identified
positive as well as negative behavioral consequences of
current performance measurement practices in academia.
Our results not only show that scientists engage in gaming
performance measurement but also demonstrate that gam-
ing performance measurement is a type of deviant work-
place behavior, that is, a voluntary behavior that violates
significant organizational norms and in so doing threatens
the well-being of an organization, its members, or both
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L. Graf et al.
(Robinson and Bennett 1995, p. 565). Thus, the study
makes two important theoretical contributions: First, based
on the results of our interviews, we propose that gaming
performance measurement is a type of task-related deviant
workplace behavior that is missing in current frameworks
and typologies of deviant workplace behavior. Second, we
embed our findings in both the literature on goal setting and
the literature on deviant workplace behavior, and we
demonstrate that both streams of literature offer potential
explanations for the psychological processes underlying
gaming performance measurement. We claim that con-
necting these research fields will contribute to a better
understanding of gaming performance measurement.
The study also has important practical implications for
university management. Including gaming performance
measurement in frameworks of deviant workplace behavior
helps universities to understand the unintended conse-
quences of their performance measurement practices on
scientists’ behavior. Our finding that scientists who engage
in gaming performance measurement can severely harm
the university should motivate universities to question their
current performance measurement practices, such as
focusing on one-sided performance goals (i.e., publications
and third-party funding) and neglecting the multidimen-
sionality of scholarly performance.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. We start
by defining gaming performance measurement and suc-
cessively describe which characteristics of performance
measurement can lead to gaming behavior. The method
and the results are structured in a three-step process: First,
we identify scientists’ negative and positive behavioral
reactions to current performance measurement practices in
academia. Second, we show that these behavioral conse-
quences can be characterized as gaming performance
measurement. Third, we illustrate that gaming performance
measurement shows clear parallels to deviant workplace
behavior. In the discussion, we provide explanations for
gaming performance measurement and situate it within
current frameworks of deviant workplace behavior.
Theoretical Background
Scientific Misconduct and Other Bad Behaviors
of Scientists
Following the National Science Foundation,1 scientific
misconduct encompasses three types of behaviors: (1)
falsification (i.e., manipulation of the research material,
process, data, or results), (2) fabrication of data or results,
and (3) plagiarism (i.e., not citing another person’s work
1
Source: https://www.nsf.gov/oig/_pdf/cfr/45-CFR-689.pdf.
Wanting More, Getting Less
but presenting it as one’s own; see also Fanelli 2009).
However, besides scientific misconduct, there is behavior
that might not be directly related to fraud but is inherently
unethical and opposed to organizational norms (Martinson
et al. 2005; Steneck 2006). Examples are questionable
research practices such as processing data as much as
possible in order to achieve significant results (Babbage
1830; Ghysels 2000) or failing to represent data that con-
tradict one’s own previous research (Martinson et al. 2005,
p. 737). These behaviors often include ‘cooking’ numbers
and models or building hypotheses after having conducted
the research (Butler et al. 2017). Such questionable
research methods are referred to as being in the ‘gray
zone’; however, they present a form of wrongdoing (Butler
et al. 2017). In a meta-analysis of surveys conducted on
this matter, Fanelli (2009) found that 1.97% (N = 7,
95%CI .86–4.45) of scientists admitted to scientific mis-
conduct, and 33.7% reported engaging in questionable
research methods. Similarly, Martinson et al. (2005) argue
that the ‘bad behavior’ of scientists should not be limited to
actual scientific misconduct but that other behaviors need
to be taken into account as well. As a result, previous
research has addressed a multitude of different question-
able research methods. While they range from severe cases
(i.e., scientific misconduct) to minor transgressions, they
all have in common that they are unethical. Therefore, in
this study, we do not limit our analysis to research per-
formance and scientific misconduct but take other tasks
into account as well, such as teaching, grant acquisition,
and administrational tasks.
There are several widely discussed explanations for
scientific misconduct and similar unethical behaviors,
both in universities and other organizations. To begin
with, several studies analyze individual differences in
scientific misconduct (e.g., individual improperty; see
Sovacool 2008). Other authors describe scientists’
behavior as ‘playing the game’ or ‘gaming the system’
(e.g., Butler et al. 2017; Osterloh and Frey 2015), arguing
that their unethical behavior can be explained as reactions
to current performance measurement practices in acade-
mia (e.g., Fanelli 2009; Martinson et al. 2005; Steneck
2003).
Gaming Performance Measurement
Gaming performance measurement is not only a problem-
atic behavior of scientists but a phenomenon that has been
discussed in other work contexts as well. For example,
several studies have found that public sector employees
adapt their performance to clearly specified performance
indicators (Butler and Spoelstra 2012; De Bruijn 2002;
Smith 1995; van Thiel and Leeuw 2002). Johnsen (2005)
summarizes frequently reported difficulties associated with
performance measurement indicators in public manage-
ment as a form of tunnel vision, gaming, or measure fix-
ation (p. 11). In the context of budgeting decisions, gaming
performance measurement takes the form of financial
misconduct. Jensen (2003), for example, states that setting
particular performance goals and tying the compensation to
these goals, while at the same time giving employees full
freedom in the realization of these goals leads to gaming in
the planning and realization of goals. Jensen (2003)
therefore assumes that pay-for-performance encourages
cheating and claims that setting strong performance goals
can lead to extreme losses for the company. Similarly,
Goebel and Weißenberger (2016) determined that very
strong financial control leads to employee behavior that
does not align with organizational goals. Instead, employee
behavior is focused on meeting the performance goals even
though this behavior might be harmful to the organization.
A severe example of setting the wrong performance goals
and how this encourages gaming performance measure-
ment is the company Enron (i.e., a large energy company
that failed in 2001). Because their executives’ pay-for-
performance was tied to the revenue the company gener-
ated and not its profit, managers focused on the revenue,
while losing sight of the profit2 (Niven and Healy 2016;
Ordónez et al. 2009). Thus, due to a lack of fit between the
performance measurement criteria and the actually desired
employee behavior, Enron encouraged the gaming of per-
formance measurement.
Taken together, gaming performance measurement
seems to be prevalent in diverse work contexts in which
employee behavior is subject to performance measure-
ment. Jaworski (1988) concludes that gaming ‘‘refers to
situations in which employees behave in ways that look
good in terms of the control system measures but are
dysfunctional for the firm’’ (p. 34; see also Saini and
Krush 2008). Similarly, Butler and Spoelstra (2012)
derive from previous research that gaming individuals or
institutions ‘‘seek to skew the system of which they are a
part’’ (p. 900). These definitions and the examples above
all describe the essence of gaming performance mea-
surement: The focus of employee behavior is not on
showing good performance but on fulfilling the perfor-
mance measurement criteria. Cases of financial miscon-
duct, such as the example of Enron, further suggest that
gaming performance measurement is not only dysfunc-
tional but also very harmful to organizations. In the fol-
lowing, we will review further studies on performance
measurement and goal setting to describe which
2
Ackman (2002) Pay madness at Enron. Forbes. Source: https://
www.forbes.com/2002/03/22/0322enronpay.html.
123

characteristics of the current performance measurement
practices in academia might lead to scientists’ gaming
behavior.
Characteristics of Performance Measurement
Practices That Can Lead to Gaming
Barsky (2008) specifies under which circumstances per-
formance measurement may lead to unintended unethical
consequences. Similarly, Aguinis (2013) derives several
factors from prior studies on performance measurement
that are necessary prerequisites for effective performance
measurement practices. However, the current performance
measurement practices in academia do not fulfill all of
these prerequisites, because the practices do not fit the type
of work that is conducted in science.
First, the performance goals in academia may be very
difficult for scientists to achieve (see Aguinis 2013; Barsky
2008). Freeman et al. (2001) describe the work environ-
ment of scientists as influenced by extremely high demands
in addition to particularly intense competition. If scientists
are faced with very high expectations, they may lack the
ability to successfully complete their tasks. Therefore, to
meet these high performance goals, scientists might adapt
their behavior to the performance measurement criteria and
resort to questionable research methods. In line with this
argument, Clor-Proell et al. (2015) found that employee
fraud is more likely when employees are faced with diffi-
cult compared to easy goals.
Second, if the attainment of performance goals is not
directly linked to behavior but only to the outcome,
employees are not rewarded for behaving in an ethical way
(Aguinis 2013; Barsky 2008). In other words, performance
criteria should be an appropriate representation of
employees’ actual performance. In a knowledge-intensive
context, such as in academia, linking work outcomes to
employee behavior is challenging because knowledge work
is difficult to analyze and measure (Daft et al. 2010). An
example is the work of a scientist who derives well-in-
formed hypotheses and conducts a properly planned study
but nevertheless yields insignificant results. The scientist’s
actual performance may be good, but the outcome (i.e., an
insignificant result that is difficult to publish) may be
insufficient. Consequently, the scientist might resort to
violating the standards of good scientific practice in order
to achieve the goal to produce publications. This example
illustrates how performance measurement practices that are
outcome-related and not behavior-related (Barsky 2008)
reward unethical behavior. Instead of rewarding scientists’
behavior during the research process (i.e., the quality of
performance), current performance measurement practices
encourage scientists to publish as many publications as
possible (i.e., the quantity of performance). Gross (2016)
123
L. Graf et al.
emphasizes that one tactic that is frequently used to
antagonize scientific misconduct is to decrease the
emphasis on the number of publications and reinforce
quality over quantity. When the quality of the research
process is rewarded instead of the quantity of publications
(i.e., high-result focus), this might be an incentive to
behave in an ethically correct way. This assumption finds
support in the finding of Tijdink et al. (2014) that there is a
strong correlation between scientists’ perception of publi-
cation pressure and cases of scientific misconduct.
Third, if performance goals do not represent all impor-
tant job tasks, employees tend to concentrate solely on
attaining the performance goals and neglect those tasks of
their job that are not measured (Smith 1995). A so-called
‘tunnel vision’ occurs (Smith 1995) because being focused
on particular content draws attention away from other
aspects (Polzer and Neale 1995). Scientists, for example,
may direct their attention toward research and publishing
papers at the expense of providing high-quality teaching.
As described above, most previous studies have focused on
bad behaviors in the research setting. Few studies have
addressed misbehaviors with regard to teaching. However,
when it comes to reactions to current performance mea-
surement practices in academia, the disregard of teaching
duties for the benefit of better performance in research
seems like a logical consequence of such tunnel vision.
Method
Design and Procedure
We collected data in the years 2014 and 2015 by con-
ducting semi-structured interviews with stakeholders of the
German higher education system. The main purpose of
these interviews was to analyze the criteria that are cur-
rently used to measure performance in academia. The
interviews were conducted by the first two authors and
research assistants, who received an interview guideline
training. Sixty percent of the interviews were conducted by
telephone, and 40% were conducted face-to-face. On
average, the interviews lasted 31 min (SD = 9.15). In the
beginning of each interview, we asked the interviewees for
consent to record the interviews, which all interviewees
provided. Prior to analyzing the interviews, we made a
verbatim transcript of each interview.
Interview Guideline
The purpose of the interviews was to improve our under-
standing of current performance measurement practices in
academia. We sought to discover advantages and disad-
vantages of the prevalent criteria for measuring scientific
Wanting More, Getting Less
performance in order to derive suggestions for amelioration
and future development. To clarify the participants’ per-
spectives on these questions, we first asked whether they
perceived any advantages or disadvantages of the currently
used performance criteria and whether they see any pos-
sibilities for improvement (questions 1–3, see Table 1).
Second, we asked whether the participants thought that the
currently used performance criteria have an effect on the
behavior of scientists (question 4) and, if yes, whether they
thought that this influence was rather positive or negative
(question 5, see Table 1). Further, we asked the participants
to elaborate on this influence and how the behavior of
scientists changes due to performance measurement
(question 6, see Table 1).
Sample
The target population of the interviews included stake-
holders of the German higher education system (N = 47).
We asked the following stakeholder groups to participate in
the interviews: (1) Professors (n = 10), because as scien-
tists, they are directly affected by performance measure-
ment, but are also involved in the performance
measurement of their Ph.D. students; (2) junior scientists
(n = 12), and among those, six Ph.D. students and six
postdoctoral fellows, because they are affected by perfor-
mance measurement and must meet the performance
measurement indicators in order to earn their Ph.D./a
professorship; (3) policy makers who are related to the
higher education system (n = 5), because they are
involved in distributing money to universities; (4) univer-
sity managers (n = 10), because they are involved in uni-
versity leadership and governance and therefore, also in the
decisions regarding the performance measurement prac-
tices of their universities; and (5) students (n = 10),
because they are an important segment of universities and
because of the unity of teaching and research, are directly
affected by performance measurement practices. Partici-
pants were recruited through conferences and an internet
search (particularly for policy makers). In alignment with
the approach of theoretical saturation (see, e.g., Guest et al.
2006; Sandelowski 1995), we thoroughly conducted inter-
views until saturation was observed within each subgroup
and within the entire sample.
Fifty-five percent (n = 26) of the sample were female,
and the mean age was 36.87 years (SD = 12.36). The
students, professors, junior scientists, and university man-
agers were from 22 different higher education institutions
in Germany, including 19 state-funded universities, two
private universities, and one privately funded university of
corporate education (i.e., a higher education institution
offering dual courses that combine tertiary education and
vocational training). With an average student population of
20,129 (SD = 14,592.74), the universities in our sample
are slightly larger compared to the total sample of 110
German universities with an average number of 15,682.35
students (SD = 14,747.37).3 The vast majority of univer-
sities follow Humboldt’s ideal of unity of research and
teaching and thus have a strong tradition in both research
and teaching. The policy makers were affiliated with three
different large German political parties.
We asked the participants to evaluate their experience
with science on a scale of 0 (no experience) to 6 (extensive
experience) and ensured that all participants, including
policy makers and students, had practical experience with
science. Four of the 47 participants were excluded because
they were unable to answer questions related to the current
performance measurement practices in higher education,
resulting in a final sample size of 43. The participants rated
their experience with a 4.50 (SD = 1.40) and all partici-
pants had at least some experience with science. On
average, the interviewees had 13.96 years of work expe-
rience (SD = 10.98). The participants possessed the fol-
lowing academic degrees: high school diploma (n = 6),
bachelor degree (n = 4), master’s degree or equivalent
(n = 10), Ph.D. (n = 17), and professorship (n = 10).
Coding Procedure and Scheme
We used MAXQDA (version 11) to conduct a qualitative
content analysis (Krippendorff 2013) and obtain coding
frequencies. The KALPHA Macro (Hayes and Krippen-
dorff 2007) for IBM SPSS Statistics was used to calculate
Krippendorff’s Alpha (Krippendorff 2013). To code the
interviewees’ answers as objectively as possible, we used a
stepwise coding process. In Step 1, we identified negative
and positive consequences of the current performance
measurement practices in academia. We explain the ratio-
nale for Step 2 and Step 3 of the coding process in more
detail in the results section because we based our decision
to reanalyze the interview data on the results of the pre-
ceding coding steps. We defined the coding unit as the
description of a specific behavioral consequence resulting
from current performance measurement practices in aca-
demia. It includes one or more sentences from the inter-
viewee’s answers.
3
We downloaded information on the number of students at all higher
education institutions in Germany from the website of the German
Rector’s Conference (http://www.hs-kompass2.de/kompass/xml/
download/hs_liste.txt). Because the university of corporate educa-
tion was not included in this data set, we could not obtain reliable data
on the number of students currently enrolled at this university.
Therefore, the average numbers reported for the number of students
do not include this university.
123
 L. Graf et al.

Table 1 Interview questions

Block 1: Advantages and disadvantages
1. In your opinion, what are the most important advantages and disadvantages of currently used indicators for performance measurement?
(open question)
2. If you (at least partially) perceive disadvantages in the currently used indicators for performance measurement, do you see any
possibilities to address these issues? (yes/no)
3. Which changes would have to be implemented to address these disadvantages? (open question)
Block 2: Behavioral consequences
4. Do you think that currently used criteria for performance measurement affect scientists’ behavior? (yes/no)
5. If you think that currently used indicators for performance measurement influence the behavior of scientists: Do you think this influence is
rather positive or negative? (0 = very negative to 6 = very positive)
6. Please provide a concrete insight into the influence that currently used indicators for performance measurement could have on scientists’
performance. (open question)
For the present study, we analyzed the subset of questions presented in this table. The interview guideline included additional questions regarding
current performance measurement practices in academia and several related issues, such as the need for performance-based funding or the
characteristics of research and teaching quality

Step 1: Behavioral Consequences an explorative, inductive content analysis (Krippendorff

In the development of the coding scheme ‘behavioral
consequences,’ we followed a two-step, inductive proce-
dure. First, the first two authors of this article separately
analyzed all interviews and coded the questions about the
behavioral consequences of the currently used performance
criteria (questions 1–3, see Table 1). Coding differences
were discussed and resolved, resulting in an initial coding
scheme. Second, two additional coders used this initial
coding scheme to repeat the analysis on all interviews. In
addition, we extended the analysis to the questions
regarding advantages and disadvantages of the currently
used performance indicators (questions 4–6, see Table 1)
because we realized that many of the participants reported
behavioral consequences when answering these questions.
After inspection of the coding differences by the first two
authors, the code descriptions and coding guidelines were
revised and discussed with the two subsequent coders.
These two subsequent coders reanalyzed the interviews and
revised their codings according to the new guidelines.
Because intercoder agreement was not sufficient for some
of the codes (amin = .33, amax = 1.00), we modified the
coding scheme. In particular, we aggregated some of the
codes to a more general level. For example, all behavioral
consequences related to questionable methods, such as
‘violation of norms and standards’ and ‘use of simple
experimental designs,’ were aggregated to the code ‘use of
questionable methods.’ These modifications resulted in a
final coding scheme that included ten codes (seven nega-
tive consequences and three positive consequences). The
intercoder agreement on the basis of this coding
scheme was greater than .75 for all codes (amin = .75,
amax = 1.00, M = .82, SD = .05), which is acceptable for
2013).
The final coding scheme for the behavioral conse-
quences of current performance measurement practices is
displayed in Table 2, including the code descriptions, the
intercoder agreement (a), and coding frequencies (k).
Coding frequencies represent the number of codings, that
is, the number of times a behavioral consequence was
mentioned in the interviews, across all 47 participants. The
coding frequency for one of the ten behavioral conse-
quences is not identical to the number of interviewees who
reported the behavioral consequence, because in rare cases,
an interviewee referred to different behaviors that were
later aggregated to a more general level. For example, if an
interviewee reported both ‘disseminating scientific find-
ings’ and ‘conducting more research projects and gener-
ating more publications,’ we counted it as two codings of
the code ‘higher productivity.’ After coding, the negative
consequences were further categorized into similar
behaviors; for example, all negative consequences related
to a decrease in research quality were grouped into ‘de-
crease in research quality.’ For these categories of behav-
ioral consequences, the coding frequencies represent the
sum of coding frequencies of all subordinate codes.
Step 2: Gaming Performance Measurement
After Step 1 of the coding process, we noticed that many of
the negative behavioral consequences seemed to describe
the phenomenon ‘gaming performance measurement,’ that
is, scientists ‘‘behave in ways that look good in terms of the
control system measures but are dysfunctional for the firm’’
(Jaworski 1988, p. 34). The interviewees’ responses that
resembled gaming performance measurement described

123
Wanting More, Getting Less
Table 2 Coding scheme for behavioral consequences of current performance measurement practices in academia
Code
Positive behavioral consequences
1. Increase in quality
2. Higher productivity
3. Motivation
Negative behavioral consequences
1. Decrease in quality
1.1. Decrease in research quality
1.1.1. Questionable publishing
practices
1.1.2. Selective choice of research
topics
1.1.3. Use of questionable methods
1.1.4. Research quality decreases
1.2. Decrease in teaching quality
2. Prioritization
3. Demotivation and pressure
a
a = Krippendorff’s Alpha
b
k = coding frequency (number of codings)
two different aspects of scientists’ behavior: (1) focusing
on attaining specific performance goals while actually
producing lower-quality work and (2) putting more effort
into tasks that are defined as performance goals at the
Description aa kb
56
Increase in research quality .77 17
Increase in teaching quality
Disseminating scientific findings (e.g., at conferences or in the media) .75 22
Conducting more research projects and generating more publications
Higher motivation due to positive pressure .79 17
Participating in professional development courses
Revising one’s teaching
Individuals with wrong motives (i.e., obtain an academic title) are sorted out
181
113
101
Orientation toward top-tier journals .84 46
Generating more publications but of lower quality
Slicing (i.e., publishing the results of a research project in numerous separate
publications)
Publishing fewer books
Publication bias (i.e., researchers do not publish nonsignificant results)
Publishing more single-authored articles
Other issues related to publishing behavior that lead to a decrease in research quality
Only topics that quickly lead to results are chosen .87 34
Only popular and easily publishable topics are chosen
Risks are not taken even if the topic would be a better fit
Violation of norms and standards .84 12
Use of undemanding/modest statistics
Use of experimental designs that are likely to generate significant results
Use of simple experimental designs that can be quickly tested
Other methodological issues that lead to a decrease in research quality
The quality of research decreases (not further specified) .75 9
The quality of teaching decreases: .91 12
Specialization on research topic too high and no time to prepare lessons
Supervising too many Ph.D. students
Effort is focused on a specific aspect, while others are disregarded: .87 55
Prioritization of research
Disregard of teaching
Concentration on grant acquisition instead of research
Pressure leads to a decrease in motivation and effort .80 13
Leads to the wrong individuals conducting research due to the wrong incentives
expense of other tasks that are not defined as performance
goals but that nevertheless are important for the univer-
sity’s success. The second coders used this definition of
gaming performance measurement to reanalyze the
123

interviews. More specifically, they coded all questions that
they had also analyzed during Step 1 of the coding process
(i.e., the identification of positive and negative conse-
quences; see Table 1). They decided independently which
of the interviewees’ descriptions of the consequences of the
current performance measurement practices fulfill one or
both aspects of gaming performance measurement as
defined above. Intercoder agreement after the first coding
was already very high (a = .89). After the two first authors
examined the differences and discussed the code descrip-
tions with the research assistants, the intercoder agreement
increased to a = .94 after a second round of coding.
Step 3: Deviant Workplace Behavior
The codes for deviant workplace behavior were deduc-
tively derived from Robinson and Bennett’s (1995) concept
of organizational deviance, which includes (1) voluntary
behavior and (2) violation of significant organizational
norms that threatens the well-being of the organization.
During this process, we specifically reanalyzed the 74
codings of gaming performance measurement we had
identified in Step 2. Intercoder agreement was very high
(a = .93 for the code ‘voluntary’ and a = .95 for the code
‘violates norms and threatens the organization’).
After the final rounds of coding were conducted, the first
two authors of this article examined the remaining differ-
ences and chose the codings that fit better. This resulted in
a final set of codings that formed the basis for an in-depth
qualitative analysis and descriptive analyses of coding
frequencies.
Results
The results were analyzed in a stepwise procedure (see
method section):
Step 1: Behavioral Consequences
Overall, the participants reported 56 positive behavioral
consequences and 181 negative behavioral consequences of
current performance measurement practices.4 The positive
behavioral consequences can be clustered in three cate-
gories, namely (1) increase in quality (k = 17), (2) higher
productivity (k = 22), and (3) motivation (k = 17). Simi-
larly, the negative behavioral consequences can be clus-
tered in three categories and represent behaviors such as (1)
decrease in quality (k = 113), (2) prioritization (i.e.,
4 in research quality in four groups, described below:
The results are simultaneously reported for all five groups of
interviewees. There were no meaningful differences in the answers
the participants provided.
123
L. Graf et al.
neglecting other important performance aspects; k = 55),
and (3) demotivation and pressure (k = 13).
To obtain a clear understanding of the behavioral con-
sequences of performance measurement practices that are
currently used in academia, we begin by illustrating
examples of positive behavioral consequences and con-
trasting them with negative behavioral consequences.
Table 3 includes a list of sample codings of Step 1 (be-
havioral consequences), which we will use in the para-
graphs below to describe the different positive and negative
behavioral consequences.
Positive Behavioral Consequences
With regard to category (1), increase in quality (k = 17),
most interviewees indeed addressed an increase in research
quality (14 of 17 codings of ‘increase in quality’ were
related to research). For example, they described incen-
tivizing publication in internationally highly ranked jour-
nals as a positive influence because it enhances the
motivation to improve the quality of their research papers
(see Table 3). Regarding category (2), higher productivity
(k = 22), most answers (12 of 22 codings) referred to a
better dissemination of research results, emphasizing that
research results are published and thus distributed as a
consequence of the requirements of performance mea-
surement. The statement of a master’s student who was
involved in research exemplifies category (3), motivation
(k = 17). He mentioned that the positive effect of the time
pressure that was generated by performance measurement
was an incentive to publish results, but he also implied that
this time pressure could have negative behavioral conse-
quences in the form of a decrease in the quality of scientific
knowledge (see Table 3). Similarly, other interviewees
described the international orientation toward top-tier
journals as a positive effect because it sets high standards.
The described positive reactions refer to an improvement in
quality as a positive behavioral reaction to the provided
incentives. However, many interviewees described positive
and negative reactions as mutually occurring.
Even more interviewees described particularly negative
reactions to incentives that resulted from the performance
measurement practices:
Negative Behavioral Consequences
With regard to category (1), decrease in quality (k = 113),
most statements of behavioral consequences referred to a
decrease in research quality (101 of 113 codings). We
grouped the behavioral consequences related to a decrease
A decrease in research quality was often connected to
questionable publishing practices (k = 46). So-called
Wanting More, Getting Less

Table 3 Sample codings of ‘behavioral consequences’ (Step 1)

Code Sample coding

Positive behavioral consequences

1. Increase in quality
2. Higher productivity
3. Motivation
Negative behavioral consequences
1. Decrease in quality
1.1. Decrease in research quality
1.1.1. Questionable
publishing practices
1.1.2. Selective choice of
research topics
1.1.3.Use of questionable
methods
1.1.4. Research quality
decreases
1.2. Decrease in teaching
quality
2. Prioritization
3. Demotivation and pressure
Among other things, it led the German research community to give themselves a motivational kick, which
led to more rigor in research, better methodological knowledge, to more international comparability. This
means it really led to an enhancement of research quality on average. […] This is also not surprising, when
you look at it from the point of view of controlling […]. (professor)
It has something really positive, because it makes sense to not only work by yourself. […] I think, it truly has
something positive, to make people publish and maybe also kind of force them a little bit to publish. […]
(junior scientist)
When my performance as a researcher is measured by how many research papers I published in a particular
period of time, in particular research journals, then I can concentrate on conducting and publishing a
certain amount of studies and I would not wait endlessly to do so. So, it [talking about performance
measurement] is virtually an inducement to be very productive. But it is possible that the knowledge that
can be retrieved from each single publication does not contribute significantly to the advancement of
scientific knowledge, because the researchers do not invest a sufficient amount of time. (student)
Considering research […] due to the criteria that are in use at the moment, there is a clear trend toward short-
term projects that quickly lead to publications. Further, there is a trend toward a publication strategy that is
as compartmentalized as possible. Whereas long-term projects are being rather avoided due to the existing
incentives. (professor)
My impression while reading many papers is that they are published to be published and not in order to
address a relevant, a really relevant problem. As a result, I would reconsider whether rankings and the
quantity of publications really are the only suitable metric. [Explains that research fellows already have to
publish very early and quickly] […] And with this, they are being forced to publish something that is easily
publishable at the moment. (junior scientist)
What happens again and again, particularly with experimental research, and whenever I come across this I
am always asking myself how this is even possible, is that publications are retracted, because the data has
been plagiarized. And I am just left thinking: How is this possible? This happened in a renowned journal.
(university manager)
More and more unqualified people are brought in, especially with publications and acquisition, which is
shuffled off onto students or doctoral candidates, and professors do not conduct research themselves
anymore. Accordingly, the quality goes down. (junior scientist)
A frequently used criterion of pay-for-performance, for example, is the number of doctoral candidates who
are being supervised. And some hazard the consequences that it takes some doctoral candidates an
extremely long time to finish their Ph.D. and that many also break off. (university management)
A very straightforward incentive, for example, is not to advise master theses or only a few… because you
won’t get any extra points for that and nobody appreciates it. So I will refrain from that and rather put my
time into a paper that I can get published. (professor)
Well, then there is of course a high amount of pressure for everybody who is included in the system.
Particularly for the professors and I think it has negative implications when they have too much pressure.
Because we should not forget that we are talking about knowledge generation and you cannot do this under
time pressure. (junior scientist)

slicing (i.e., artificially slicing a research project in order to
generate several publications instead of only one) was
described by several interviewees (see Table 3) as lower-
ing the quality of research. Another prominent example of
a decrease in research quality is the selective choice of
research topics (k = 34), that is, selecting only popular
topics for research projects without considering their rele-
vance for the advancement of knowledge. The third group
of behaviors that lead to a decrease in research quality is
the use of questionable methods (k = 12). The intervie-
wees described a range of different practices that fall under
the category ‘use of questionable methods,’ of which six
referred to the violation of methodological norms and
standards, that is, a particularly severe threat against clean
scientific methods (see Table 3). A few statements that
were related to a decrease in research quality were coded as
‘research quality decreases’ (k = 9) because they did not
fit into one of the three categories above.

123

Some interviewees also reported a decrease in teaching
quality (12 of 113 codings of ‘decrease in quality’). They
provided different reasons for this consequence. A problem
that the interviewees described several times was the
supervision of too many Ph.D. students (see Table 3).
Answers that fell into category (2), prioritization
(k = 55), emphasized that high pressure (e.g., pressure to
publish or to acquire research grants) leads scientists to
focus on some tasks at the expense of others. Many par-
ticipants reported that scientists neglect their teaching
duties to concentrate on research and publishing, whereas
others noted that they put less effort into research because
they focus on writing grant proposals instead. For category
(3), demotivation and pressure (k = 13), most examples
described negative effects on scientists’ performance due
to the pressure from performance measurement, for
example, because research is about knowledge generation
and ‘‘you cannot do this under time pressure’’ (junior sci-
entist; see Table 3).
The results of the first coding step suggest that current
performance measurement practices have both positive and
negative effects on scientists’ behavior. These practices
may increase the motivation to perform, leading to higher
productivity. A few participants also reported an increase
in the quality of research and teaching. Conversely, most
participants reported a negative effect on the quality of
research and teaching, the selective prioritization of tasks,
and decreased motivation.
Step 2: Gaming Performance Measurement
When closely analyzing the negative behavioral conse-
quences we had identified, we were intrigued by the
impression that some scientists seem to engage in gaming
performance measurement. Some participants openly dis-
cussed how scientists strategically adapt their behavior to
the performance measurement criteria:
The moment you create an incentive—and that’s
what it is—it leads smart people to adapt to it. […]
you adopt useless criteria for your own part, just for
the sake of one’s own success, no matter whether it
really makes sense or not (policy maker)
[A] disadvantage [of the current performance mea-
surement practices] is that it leads scientists to opti-
mize everything, like in the automobile industry,
where cars are optimized to fulfill the EU [European
Union] test cycles. (junior scientist)
Apparently, scientists are aware that performance cri-
teria do not reflect their true performance and that opti-
mizing their performance in terms of the criteria may
contradict the goals of universities.
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L. Graf et al.
We went through the interviewees’ responses related to
negative behavioral consequences and derived two differ-
ent aspects of scientists’ behavior that describe the phe-
nomenon of gaming performance measurement: (1)
focusing on attaining specific performance goals while
actually producing lower-quality work and (2) putting
more effort into tasks that are defined as performance goals
at the expense of other tasks that are not defined as per-
formance goals but that nevertheless are important for the
university’s success. To confirm our initial impression, we
reanalyzed the same segments of the interviews that we had
also analyzed during Step 1 of the coding process (i.e., the
identification of positive and negative consequences; see
Table 1). The purpose of Step 2 was to identify all
descriptions of the consequences of the current perfor-
mance measurement practices that classify as gaming
performance measurement. Altogether, ‘gaming perfor-
mance measurement’ was coded 74 times across all 43
interviews. Table 4 includes sample codings of gaming
performance measurement that exemplify the two different
aspects we identified.
Step 3: Deviant Workplace Behavior
During the analysis of the 74 codings of gaming perfor-
mance measurement, it became apparent that employees
who engage in gaming performance measurement may
cause serious damage to universities. The behaviors
describe situations in which scientists adapt their behavior
to incentives that are favored by performance measurement
practices to meet the demands. These observations led to
the idea that the behaviors that are reactions to the incen-
tives provided by performance measurement practices may
in fact be a serious threat to the university and its goals.
Consequently, we hypothesized that gaming perfor-
mance measurement is similar to deviant workplace
behavior. To confirm our assumption that gaming perfor-
mance measurement is a form of deviant workplace
behavior, we conducted a third coding step (Step 3). This
additional step enabled us to decide, for each coding of
gaming performance measurement, whether it also fulfilled
the definition of deviant workplace behavior. For Step 3 of
the coding process, we used the definition of organizational
workplace deviance proposed by Robinson and Bennett
(1995), that is, deviant workplace behavior that is targeted
at the organization. Specifically, we coded whether the
examples of gaming performance measurement complied
with the two defining characteristics of organizational
workplace deviance: (1) voluntary behavior and (2) a
violation of significant organizational norms that threatens
the well-being of the organization (see Table 5 for a list of
sample codings of Step 3).
Wanting More, Getting Less

Table 4 Sample codings of ‘gaming performance measurement’ (Step 2)

Code Sample coding

Focusing on attaining specific performance goals
while actually producing lower-quality work
Putting more effort into tasks that are defined as
performance goals at the expense of other tasks
that are not defined as performance goals but that
nevertheless are important for the university’s
success
1. You find something interesting and you don’t put it in one paper but water it down
somehow; you stretch it to like four (university manager)
2. I think it is disadvantageous that scientists produce plenty of papers and pursue
topics that may make it easy to publish but that are rarely relevant […] There are
also a lot of papers that are really not so great or important. More quality instead of
quantity would be desirable, but that is not what is rewarded nowadays. It is all
about counting how many papers you produce and how much money you acquire.
(junior scientist)
3. What results [from the current performance measurement practices] is that
scientists try to generate data as quickly as possible so that they can get a paper out
of it and publish it […] And this also leads to worse experimental designs and
statistical analyses. (university management)
4. Due to the pressure to publish, scientists publish differently […] the results in
their pure form are high quality, but the process of producing the results has some
severe undocumented flaws (student)
5. A frequently used criterion of pay-for-performance, for example, is the number of
doctoral candidates who are being supervised. And some hazard the consequences
that it takes some doctoral candidates an extremely long time to finish their Ph.D.
and that many also break off. (university management)
6. Researchers publish everything, no matter how the quality is. […] Researchers
simply publish very much and this leads to a decrease in quality, and sometimes it
also makes researchers not adhere to certain ethical standards. (university
management)
7. I think there’s something to be said for making people publish and maybe also
forcing them to do so a little bit. But on the other hand, it also results in people
doing only this anymore and me reading some publications and thinking: ok, 80%
of research is basically irrelevant because it is only done to be done. (junior
scientist)
8. Well, I think it is a disadvantage [of the current performance measurement] that
some projects are conducted just to collect data that can then be published.
Regardless of whether this advances our knowledge in a scientific discipline or
field. And I think this is not expedient anymore. (junior scientist)
9. If I am being evaluated solely on the basis of publications, I will try to cut down
all other tasks, for example, teaching and administrative duties, as much as
possible, which might negatively impact my students. (junior scientist)
10. Teaching is extremely underweighted. […] And I think it does not help to
improve the education at universities if you set such a focus on research (junior
scientist)
11. As a result [of the current performance measurement practices], no scientist will
agree to take the job of academic dean, for example, because it does not benefit
your performance in any way (professor)
12. I think it is a disadvantage [of the current performance measurement practices]
[…] that many researchers subordinate teaching because it does not contribute to a
positive performance evaluation (junior scientist)
13. The criterion of third-party funding is quite difficult for many because it is so
easily measureable and difficult to manipulate. And, of course, as a consequence,
you want to fulfill it by any means and maybe put less time into something else.
(professor)

Eighty-two percent of the 74 codings of gaming per-
formance measurement (k = 61) were coded as ‘a viola-
tion of significant organizational norms that threatens the
well-being of the organization.’ In particular, a threat to the
university was defined as deterioration of a university’s
performance with regard to its main tasks: research and
teaching. Any type of damage to the university was coded
as a threat to the organization, for example, a bad reputa-
tion following a scandal of scientific misconduct by one of
the university’s employees.
Numerous participants explained that disregarding
important tasks and a decrease in the quality of teaching
and research threaten the organizational performance of
universities. An extreme example that was described by a

123
 L. Graf et al.

Table 5 Sample codings of ‘deviant workplace behavior’ (Step 3)

Code Sample coding

Violation of significant organizational norms that
threatens the well-being of the organization
Voluntary behavior
1. Usually, the professors are smarter than those who come up with the [performance]
criteria. They know exactly how to cheat. I will give you an example. The moment we
decided to use the number of graded exams as an indicator of teaching load, a colleague
instantly says: ‘So the failure rate does not apply anymore? Because then I will make all
students fail so I will have twice as many exams to grade. (professor)
2. Well, I think it is a disadvantage [of the current performance measurement] that some
projects are conducted just to collect data that can then be published. Regardless of
whether this advances our knowledge in a scientific discipline or field. And I think this is
not expedient anymore. (junior scientist)
3. I think this all [the current performance measurement] has a disadvantage from the
viewpoint of science in general. Researchers publish everything, no matter how the
quality is. Recently, there are critical newspaper articles about this, too. […] they are very
critical of the trend to not look into the question ‘is this really worthy of publication?’
[…] Researchers simply publish very much and this leads to a decrease in quality, and
sometimes it also makes researchers not adhere to certain ethical standards. So, scientific
reality does not work anymore. (university manager)
4. A very straightforward incentive, for example, is not to advise master theses or only a
few… because you won’t get any extra points for that and nobody appreciates it. So I will
refrain from that and rather put my time into a paper that I can get published. (professor)
5. Considering the objectives of universities, teaching is as important as research. However,
as long as this is not implemented in performance measurement, it is not very rational to
put a lot of effort into teaching. You would have to be highly intrinsically motivated to do
good teaching because […] from the outside, you are rewarded for research. (junior
scientist)
6. When researchers feel pressured to acquire as much grant money as possible, it
influences the choice of topics. When they rather apply for a well-endowed research
project that somehow relates to the their interests and not exactly the topic they see as an
important research gap, this is how the criteria ‘research grants’ influences the topics and
even the results of research. […] It is not without reason that scientists themselves show
concern that there will soon be only mainstream research. (policy maker)
7. I would say that about one half [of scientists] is totally independent from any kind of
evaluations. You couldn’t even tempt them with bonuses, they just do what they think is
important and what is right. […] They are based within their peer community and they do
whatever is valued there. […] And there is one part who instantly reacts to the smallest
incentivizing with ‘how can I better present myself?’ And I personally think this is very
negative. (professor)

professor demonstrated that some scientists would go as far
as purposefully harming the teaching quality at their uni-
versity in order to improve their own performance (Coding
1 in Table 5). With regard to research, a common example
of gaming performance measurement was publishing more
papers of a lower quality. The participants indicated that
this behavior leads to a decrease in knowledge production
and occasionally triggers unethical behavior and scientific
misconduct (Codings 2 and 3 in Table 5).
Scientists who engage in gaming performance mea-
surement contribute to a decrease in the overall perfor-
mance of their university, whether in research or in
teaching. Thus, gaming performance measurement runs
counter to the mission of universities to perform both
research and teaching with a high level of quality. Con-
sequently, this behavior represents a violation of
organizational norms to strategically adapt one’s work
behavior to the performance measurement practices.
Although performance measurement encourages scien-
tists to engage in gaming performance measurement and
puts them under pressure to perform, participants spoke of
gaming performance measurement as a voluntary behavior
(99% of the codings, k = 73). It became clear that scien-
tists can choose to adapt their behavior to the performance
criteria but often decide to behave in a strategic manner
because it is incentivized. For example, several participants
stressed that prioritizing research at the expense of teaching
duties is a rational choice for scientists because they are not
rewarded for putting extra effort into teaching (Codings 4
and 5 in Table 5).
Although the participants made clear that it is the per-
formance measurement practices that induce the gaming of
performance measurement, it remains the scientist’s

123
Wanting More, Getting Less
decision of whether to game the performance criteria or
not. Deciding not to do so, however, is perceived to be very
difficult and requires intrinsic motivation.
The trend toward mainstream research is yet another
example that emphasizes that universities do not directly
influence scientists to change their research topics in a
strategic manner. Rather, scientists decide to study main-
stream topics because they try to fulfill the high expectations
of their university management or department (Coding 6 in
Table 5). The voluntary nature of gaming performance
measurement was also evident when the participants
emphasized that not all scientists adapt their behavior to the
performance measurement practices (Coding 7 in Table 5).
In summary, participants reported a wide range of
behavioral consequences that result from performance
measurement. Clearly, scientists are perceived to engage in
various forms of gaming performance measurement, that
is, they strategically adapt their behavior to performance
criteria and optimize their outcomes accordingly. Further-
more, gaming performance measurement can be classified
as both a voluntary behavior of scientists and a violation of
organizational norms that is harmful to universities.
Discussion
This study identified how scientists adapt their behavior to
current performance measurement practices in academia.
Qualitative interviews with different stakeholders of the
higher education system revealed a high prevalence of
negative behavioral consequences as a reaction to perfor-
mance measurement. Most of all, interviewees reported a
decrease in research quality due to questionable publishing
practices, a selective choice of research topics, and ques-
tionable research methods. Current performance measure-
ment practices also lead to a decrease in teaching quality,
but these behaviors were not reported as often as behaviors
that lead to a decrease in research quality. Another negative
behavioral consequence of performance measurement is
prioritizing research at the expense of teaching and grant
acquisition at the expense of research. In addition to these
negative behavioral consequences, some interviewees
reported positive effects of performance measurement,
including higher productivity and motivation as well as an
increase in research and teaching quality. Altogether,
however, the negative behavioral consequences clearly
outweighed the positive ones.
During the analysis, we realized that many of the
reported behavioral reactions resemble the ‘gaming per-
formance measurement’ phenomenon. Two different
aspects of gaming performance measurement emerged
from the interview data: (1) focusing on attaining specific
performance goals while actually producing lower-quality
work and (2) putting more effort into tasks that are defined
as performance goals at the expense of other tasks that are
not defined as performance goals but that nevertheless are
important for the university’s success.
Reanalyses of the behaviors that the interviewees had
reported showed that gaming performance measurement
exhibits the same characteristics as deviant workplace
behavior (cf. Robinson and Bennett 1995). First, gaming
performance measurement is a voluntary behavior. The
current performance measurement practices in academia
set strong incentives for scientists to strategically adapt
their behavior to improve their performance outcomes at
the expense of work quality and job tasks that are not
measured. Nevertheless, scientists choose whether to
engage in gaming performance measurement. Second,
gaming performance measurement is a violation of orga-
nizational norms that causes harm to universities. Gaming
performance measurement threatens the well-being of
universities because scientists who focus on attaining per-
formance goals while reducing the quality of their work
and who focus on tasks that are measured while neglecting
other tasks contribute to a decrease in their universities’
organizational performance in research and teaching.
Characterizing gaming performance measurement as
deviant workplace behavior has several implications for
both future research on gaming performance measurement
and current frameworks of deviant workplace behavior.
First, connecting the literature on goal setting and gaming
performance measurement with the literature on deviant
workplace behavior will allow for a much more detailed
explanation of gaming performance measurement. Second,
we propose that gaming performance measurement is a
type of behavior that is not included in current frameworks
and typologies of deviant workplace behavior. In the fol-
lowing, we will elaborate on both of these implications.
Theoretical Implications
Psychological Processes Underlying Gaming Performance
Measurement
Research on goal setting and deviant workplace behavior
provides valuable input to understand the underlying psy-
chological processes of gaming performance measurement.
In the following, we will first discuss how our findings
relate to previous research on deviant workplace behavior
and how explanations from this stream of literature can
enrich future research on goal setting and gaming perfor-
mance measurement. Afterwards, we will draw from the
literature on goal setting and unethical behavior to explain
in greater depth the cognitive processes that may underlie
gaming performance measurement: moral disengagement
and rationalization.
123

Interaction of Situational Variables and Individual Dif-
ferences In general, deviant workplace behavior is
assumed to result from an interaction of situational vari-
ables (e.g., competitive environment) and individual dif-
ferences (e.g., integrity; see, e.g., Colbert et al. 2004;
Martinko et al. 2002; Spector and Fox 2002; Vardi and
Wiener 1996). In a similar vein, authors have claimed that
deviant workplace behavior is an adaptation to the working
environment (Dalal 2005; Raelin 1994). Previous research
has identified a multitude of antecedents—both individual
and organizational—that can induce deviant workplace
behavior (see, e.g., Bolin and Heatherly 2001; Lasson and
Bass 1997; Martinko et al. 2002; Peterson 2002; Thoms
et al. 2001). In line with this thinking, our findings suggest
that gaming performance measurement results from an
interaction of situational factors and individual differences.
Stakeholders of the higher education system have explicitly
described gaming performance measurement as a conse-
quence of the current performance measurement practices in
academia. Thus, performance measurement practices may
be one of the situational variables that encourage employees
to engage in gaming performance measurement. To date,
only a few authors have discussed performance measure-
ment as a potential cause of deviant workplace behavior.
Litzky et al. (2006), for example, claim that compensation
and reward structures may motivate good employees to
engage in deviant workplace behavior, such as manipulating
sales data to attain performance goals. However, the authors
limit their discussion to commission and gratuity-based
reward systems and do not consider more-complex forms of
performance measurement systems that are less based on
pay-for-performance. Our findings suggest that performance
measurement per se, without financial rewards, also has the
potential to cause deviant workplace behavior. Accordingly,
future studies on the organizational antecedents of deviant
workplace behavior should include an organization’s per-
formance measurement system.
Although our interviewees clearly linked gaming per-
formance measurement to current performance measure-
ment practices in academia, individual differences are
likely to play an important role as well. Many of our
interviewees noted that some scientists engage in gaming
performance measurement and others do not, although they
are subject to the same performance measurement prac-
tices. This finding underlines that deviant workplace
behavior is considered voluntary employee behavior inso-
far as employees are motivated to engage in deviant
behavior or to refrain from doing so (Griffin and Lopez
2005; Kaplan 1975; Robinson and Bennett 1995; Spector
and Fox 2002). Louw et al. (2016) found that employees
whose behavior is motivated by performance goals engage
in a higher level of deviant workplace behavior than other
employees do. Accordingly, employees who are motivated
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L. Graf et al.
by performance goals may be more likely to react to per-
formance measurement practices with gaming behavior
than other employees. Taken together, research on gaming
performance measurement could benefit from examining in
greater depth the interaction of causes that lie within the
organization (i.e., performance measurement practices) and
individual differences between employees (e.g., perfor-
mance goal orientations).
Organizational Goals Our study adds to the growing
literature on the influence of an organization’s goals and
policies on deviant workplace behavior (e.g., Barsky 2008;
Pierce and Aguinis 2015; Umphress and Bingham 2011;
Vardi and Wiener 1996). For example, Pierce and Aguinis
(2015) argue that organizations may trigger employee
behavior that does not truly advance organizational goals.
In particular, the authors propose the concept of detri-
mental citizenship behavior, which refers to employee
behavior that is intended to advance an organization’s
goals but actually causes harm to the organization or one of
its stakeholder groups (e.g., environmentally harmful
behavior to save costs for the organization). Similarly,
gaming performance measurement is influenced by orga-
nizational goals. In contrast to detrimental citizenship
behavior, employees who engage in gaming performance
measurement primarily intend to enhance their own per-
formance and not the performance of the organization.
More research is needed to examine the question of how
organizational goals and policies, such as performance
measurement practices, affect employee behavior and
under what circumstances employees engage in which type
of deviant workplace behavior (gaming performance
measurement versus detrimental citizenship behavior).
Perception of Disequilibria Martinko et al. (2002) pro-
posed that deviant workplace behavior occurs because
employees perceive some kind of disequilibrium in the
workplace. For example, scientists who recognize a mis-
match between their job performance (i.e., what is needed
to perform well and what they achieve) and the perfor-
mance criteria that are used to evaluate their performance
may perceive this situation as unfair. The perception of this
disequilibrium (i.e., feeling of unfairness due to the mis-
match) can induce deviant workplace behavior such as
gaming performance measurement because scientists adapt
their behavior to the performance measurement criteria.
This argument aligns well with Aguinis (2013) and Barsky
(2008), who stress the negative consequences that can
result from a mismatch between employee performance
and the criteria that are used to measure employee per-
formance. A mismatch can also result because scientists
working in universities are faced with multiple contradic-
tory expectations by their universities. On the one hand,
Wanting More, Getting Less
most universities have published ‘codes of conduct’ or
‘principles of good scientific practice.’ These explicit
norms state a university’s expectations of what constitutes
good research and teaching. On the other hand, perfor-
mance criteria also strongly signal what universities regard
as good performance. Accordingly, scientists perceive a
disequilibrium (i.e., mismatch) between the expectation of
both adhering to the university’s codes of conduct and
fulfilling the performance criteria. The notion of perceived
disequilibria or mismatches may help describe how scien-
tists perceive the current performance measurement prac-
tices in academia and why this perception can lead to
gaming performance measurement. We propose that it is
not solely organizational goals per se that can be ante-
cedents of deviant workplace behavior, as other authors
have already claimed (Barsky 2008; Pierce and Aguinis
2015; Umphress and Bingham 2011; Vardi and Wiener
1996). Rather, the existence of contradictory goals or
expectations can also result in the perception of disequi-
libria and cause deviant workplace behavior, such as
gaming performance measurement.
Although the literature on deviant workplace behavior
offers fruitful directions for future research that will
enhance our understanding of gaming performance mea-
surement, such as the interaction of situational variables
and individual differences, a closer look into the interme-
diate psychological processes is warranted. There is a need
to explain in greater depth the question of why employees
decide to engage in gaming performance measurement. To
that end, we will now draw from the literature on goal
setting, which provides several explanations for gaming
performance measurement.
Moral Disengagement Barsky (2008) introduces moral
disengagement as the mechanism that links the attributes of
goals and the relative practices with unethical behavior.
The author argues that performance goals, such as pub-
lishing a certain number of top-tier publications, might
direct the cognitive resources of the person from critical
ethical thinking to the achievement of the goal. Conse-
quently, a scientist does not recognize questionable pub-
lishing practices as unethical (Barsky 2008). This effect has
been shown in experiments by Niven and Healy (2016),
who found that although only participants who were high
in moral disengagement behaved unethically in a normal
task (i.e., anagram task), all individuals behaved signifi-
cantly more unethically in an ethical dilemma task with
specific goals. Similarly, competition has been found to
have a dysfunctional effect on performance in goal setting
conditions (Campbell and Furrer 1995).
Rationalization Barsky (2008) describes a second mech-
anism related to moral disengagement, namely the
rationalization of unethical behavior. Employees whose
performance is measured through strict performance goals
might easily find a way to morally disengage from uneth-
ical behavior because high performance goals serve as a
way to rationalize such behavior. Mazar et al. (2008) found
in a series of six experiments support for the assumption
that people act sufficiently dishonestly to profit from their
behavior. However, they also act honestly enough to justify
their behavior and continue to maintain their self-concept
of being honest. This explanation might be applicable to
scientists’ adaptation to performance measurement prac-
tices: They adapt their behavior enough (e.g., cooking of
data) to be able to publish their research in a top-tier
journal. Nevertheless, they do not feel dishonest by reason
that they do not engage in more serious scientific
misconduct.
Our short review of previous research on deviant
workplace behavior and goal setting demonstrates that
there are already several possible explanations for gaming
performance measurement. At the same time, it highlights
the need for a closer integration of these two streams of
literature. In addition, more empirical studies on gaming
performance measurement are needed to shed light on the
psychological processes that explain why employees
sometimes react to performance measurement practices
with gaming behavior.
Integrating Gaming Performance Measurement
into Frameworks of Deviant Workplace Behavior
Our finding that gaming performance measurement con-
forms to the definition of deviant workplace behavior also
has implications for current frameworks of deviant work-
place behavior. In the following, we briefly review several
typologies that have been most prevalent in the literature
on workplace deviance (cf., Berry et al. 2007; Griffin and
Lopez 2005; Gruys and Sackett 2003; Klotz and Buckley
2013; Marcus et al. 2002; Robinson and Bennett 1995;
Spector 2006; Vardi and Wiener 1996; Warren 2003), and
we demonstrate that they do not take into account behav-
iors of the category gaming performance measurement. To
this end, we refer to those sub-dimensions of the frame-
works that are most similar to gaming performance mea-
surement in that they are directly linked to performing core
job tasks.5 Table 6 gives an overview of the sub-dimen-
sions of the frameworks, including sample behaviors and
items.
5
From our review of frameworks we specifically exclude deviant
workplace behavior (1) that causes harm to the organization but that is
unrelated to an adaptation of core job tasks (e.g., stealing company
goods) or (2) that causes harm to other members of the organization
(e.g., sexual harassment).
123

Gaming performance measurement seems to most clo-
sely fit the category ‘production deviance’ in the sense that
‘‘production deviance refers to behaviors that directly
interfere with work being performed in the organization’’
(Everton et al. 2007, p. 119). This type of deviant work-
place behavior was first introduced by Hollinger and Clark
(1982) and was incorporated into several other frameworks
of deviant workplace behavior (cf. Bennett and Robinson
2000; Robinson and Bennett 1995; Spector et al. 2006).
Whereas the definition of production deviance and similar
categories (e.g., ‘poor quality work’ in the framework of
Gruys and Sackett 2003) suggests that it also includes
gaming performance measurement, the sample behaviors
and items of the respective subscales demonstrate that the
authors of the frameworks did not consider this type of
employee behavior. For example, Hollinger and Clark
(1982) define production deviance as ‘‘behaviors which
violate the formally proscribed norms delineating the
quality and quantity of work to be accomplished’’ (p. 98).
The sample behaviors the authors use to describe produc-
tion deviance (‘‘tardiness, sloppy or slow workmanship, or
the use of alcohol or drugs while at work,’’ Hollinger and
Clark 1982, p. 98) show that they did not consider
employees who adapt the way they perform their job task
to try to fulfill the performance criteria and thereby lower
the quality of their work performance. Spector et al. (2006)
define production deviance as ‘‘the purposeful failure to
perform job tasks effectively the way they are supposed to
be performed’’ (p. 449). However, the items of the pro-
duction deviance subscale refer to ‘doing work incor-
rectly,’ ‘working slowly when things needed to get done,’
and ‘failing to follow instructions.’ Thus, the subscale does
not consider an employee’s intention underlying the
adaptation of job behavior (i.e., achieving higher work
results in terms of measureable performance). Contrary to
most other frameworks of deviant workplace behavior, the
framework of Vardi and Wiener (1996) uses employees’
intention to distinguish different forms of deviance. In this
framework, gaming performance measurement is most
similar to organizational misbehavior ‘Type S,’ which is
defined as ‘‘misbehaviors that are intended to benefit the
self’’ (Vardi and Wiener 1996, p. 155) and which is tar-
geted at ‘‘the work itself (e.g., distorting data)’’ (Vardi and
Wiener 1996, p. 155). Interestingly, the authors use ‘career
considerations’ as an example for an intention that can
underlie Type S behavior. However, this intention would
also apply to behaviors that are not related to performing
job tasks, such as gossiping about colleagues.
The short review of current conceptualizations of task-
related deviant workplace behavior shows that gaming
performance measurement has not been explicitly consid-
ered in the literature on deviant workplace behavior. Thus,
we propose that gaming performance measurement should
123
L. Graf et al.
be incorporated into current frameworks of deviant work-
place behavior, which could be accomplished by extending
the definition of existing sub-categories such as production
deviance (Robinson and Bennett 1995) or poor quality
work (Gruys and Sackett 2003). In addition, items referring
to gaming performance measurement need to be added to
measures of deviant workplace behavior.
Limitations and Future Research
Our study provides initial evidence that gaming perfor-
mance measurement should be treated as a deviant act that
causes damage to an organization. This result raises
questions that provide fruitful avenues for future research,
which will deepen our understanding of gaming perfor-
mance measurement as a form of deviant workplace
behavior.
First, gaming performance measurement should be
studied in different work contexts and types of organiza-
tions to enhance the generalizability of our findings. The
results of this study may not be generalizable to less-
knowledge-based contexts because strategically adapting
one’s work behavior to performance criteria could be
particularly prevalent in the case of non-routine tasks that
are difficult to analyze and measure (cf. Daft et al. 2010).
Rather, the findings of this study are most likely to be
applicable to scientists in other types of knowledge-inten-
sive organizations, because tasks performed in the uni-
versity setting are similar to tasks in other knowledge-
intensive organizations (Chung and Jackson 2013; Keller
2012). The latter assumption is supported by the fact that
universities represent expert organizations (Pellert 1999)
and, thus, are similar to other knowledge-intensive firms
(Glauber et al. 2015). The assumption that our finding can
be generalized to knowledge-intensive contexts outside
academia should be investigated by future research. In
particular, future research on gaming performance mea-
surement should analyze other knowledge-intensive con-
texts such as research and development teams in private
organizations.
Because our results are based on qualitative interviews,
we cannot draw conclusions about the actual consequences
or causal effects of performance measurement on scien-
tists’ behavior. Similar to most previous studies, we rely on
reports of the perceived effects of performance measure-
ment on scientists’ behavior. Future research could use
objective data for measuring both scientific performance
(e.g., publication performance) and the prevalence of per-
formance measurement practices in order to draw causal
inferences about intended and unintended effects of per-
formance measurement in academia, such as gaming per-
formance measurement behavior of scientists.
Wanting More, Getting Less

Table 6 Sub-dimensions of current frameworks of deviant workplace behavior

Framework Sub-dimension and definition Sample behaviors (items)

Hollinger and Production deviance Long lunch or coffee breaks

Clark (1982) ‘‘behaviors which violate the formally proscribed
norms delineating the quality and quantity of
work to be accomplished (e.g., tardiness,
sloppy or slow workmanship, or the use of
alcohol or drugs while at work)’’ (p. 98)
Slow or sloppy work
Influence of alcohol or drugs
Come late/leave early from work
Sick leave when not sick

Robinson and Production deviance Leaving early

Bennett (1995) ‘‘relatively minor but still organizationally Taking excessive breaks
harmful deviant acts’’ (p. 565) Intentionally working slow
Wasting resources

Bennett and Organizational deviance Taken property from work without permission
Robinson ‘‘deviant behaviors directly harmful to the Spent too much time fantasizing or daydreaming instead of working
(2000)a organization’’ (p. 349) Falsified a receipt to get reimbursed for more money than you spent on
business expenses
Taken an additional or longer break than is acceptable at your
workplace
Come in late to work without permission
Littered your work environment
Neglected to follow your boss’s instructions
Intentionally worked slower than you could have worked
Discussed confidential company information with an unauthorized
person
Used an illegal drug or consumed alcohol on the job
Put little effort into your work
Dragged out work in order to get overtime

Spector et al. Production deviance Purposely did your work incorrectly.

(2006) ‘‘the purposeful failure to perform job tasks Purposely worked slowly when things needed to get done.
effectively the way they are supposed to be Purposely failed to follow instructions.
performed’’ (p. 449)
Gruys and Sackett Poor quality work Intentionally perform your job below acceptable standards.
(2003) (no definition) Intentionally do work badly or incorrectly
Intentionally do slow or sloppy work.

Vardi and Wiener Organizational misbehavior Type S Distorting data (target: the work itself)
(1996) ‘‘misbehaviors that are intended to benefit the Stealing and selling manufacturing secrets (target: the organization’s
self’’ (p. 155) property, resources, symbols or regulations)
Harassing peers (target: other members)
a
In the original framework of Robinson and Bennett (1995), the authors distinguished severe cases of organizational deviance (property
deviance) from behaviors that result in less-serious consequences for an organization (production deviance). Later, the authors dropped the
severity dimension (Bennett and Robinson, 2000). The items reported for the framework of Bennett and Robinson (2000) are from the subscale
‘organizational deviance,’ which includes the behaviors of the former category ‘production deviance’

Despite the limitation that we cannot draw causal con-
clusions, our study adds to previous research on the
intended and unintended effects of performance measure-
ment in academia. Our study complements previous find-
ings in that we interviewed different stakeholders of the
higher education system. Thus, we provide a more com-
prehensive perspective on the perceived consequences of
performance measurement than previous studies. We asked
our interviewees about the advantages and disadvantages
of performance measurement in academia and possible
consequences for scientists’ behavior. In sum, they repor-
ted more negative than positive behavioral consequences of
current performance measurement practices in universities.
Other studies that examined the effects of performance
measurement in academia yielded mixed results. Ringelhan
et al. (2013), for example, found that extrinsic motivation

123

is negatively related to scholarly performance, whereas
Lewis (2014) concludes that there is no relationship
between scientists’ attitudes toward performance mea-
surement and their publication performance. Overman
et al. (2016) found a positive relationship between the
specificity of performance contracts (i.e., the extent to
which there are concrete and detailed agreements on per-
formance targets regarding results and rewards) and the
level of integrity (i.e., conforming to norms) that aca-
demics perceive at their workplace. Both studies, Lewis
(2014) and Overman et al. (2016), focused on the positive
consequences of increasing the use of performance mea-
surement practices in academia. This viewpoint is not only
consistent with our finding that performance measurement
practices have positive as well as negative effects on sci-
entists’ behavior, but it is also in line with the extensive
research on the positive effects of goal setting on perfor-
mance (e.g., Latham and Locke 1990, 1991; Locke and
Latham 2002, 2006). Furthermore, finding both positive
and negative effects of performance measurement practices
stresses the point that performance measurement is a
double-edged sword.
More research is also needed to examine (1) the role of
different organizational norms that are related to gaming
performance measurement and (2) the negative as well as
positive consequences this behavior can have for employ-
ees and their organizations. First, we propose that gaming
performance measurement is a form of deviant workplace
behavior because it is a significant violation of organiza-
tional norms that causes harm to the organization. It vio-
lates the organizational norm to produce high-quality work
results and to fulfill all tasks that belong to an employee’s
job. However, one could also argue that the performance
measurement criteria an organization uses constitute a form
of organizational norm that employees are expected to
adhere to. In that sense, employees who engage in gaming
performance measurement do not violate but adhere to
organizational norms and act the way they are told to, for
example, publish as many papers as possible. As discussed
earlier, however, many universities have published official
‘codes of conduct’ or ‘principles of good scientific prac-
tice.’ Clearly, gaming performance measurement consti-
tutes a violation of these official university norms
regarding the quality of research and teaching.
Second, we conclude from our results that gaming per-
formance measurement classifies as deviant workplace
behavior because employees who produce lower-quality
results and put less effort into tasks that are not measured
contribute to an overall loss in organizational performance.
It must be taken into account, however, that an organiza-
tion’s choice of specific performance criteria is usually
influenced by the question of how the performance of the
organization itself is measured. In the last few decades,
123
L. Graf et al.
universities have increasingly come under pressure to be at
the top of international rankings and to outperform other
universities in competing for public funding (Auranen and
Nieminen 2010; Hicks 2012; Melo et al. 2008; Rabovsky
2014; van Thiel and Leeuw 2002). There is a strong focus
on quantitative measures of research performance in the
evaluation of universities’ performance, foremost being the
number of publications in top-tier journals and the amount
of grant money a university acquires (Aguinis et al. 2014;
Aguinis et al. 2012; Harmon 2006; Ringelhan et al. 2015;
Schmoch et al. 2010). From this perspective, scientists who
adapt their behavior in such a way as to fulfill the perfor-
mance criteria (e.g., by focusing on easily publishable
research topics and neglecting teaching duties) appear to
contribute to their university’s overall performance instead
of harming it. Notwithstanding this argument, we claim
that other factors need to be taken into account in deter-
mining the harm that gaming performance measurement
can cause for an organization. If cases of scientific mis-
conduct, such as falsifying results, are made public, they
can lead to a severe loss of a university’s reputation (e.g.,
the Staple fraud, cf. Stroebe et al. 2012). Thus, it is
important to consider not only short-term consequences
and immediate effects but also risks that may threaten an
organization’s well-being in the long run. Furthermore, all
stakeholders of the organization should be taken into
account in deciding whether gaming performance mea-
surement is harmful to an organization. For example, pri-
oritizing research tasks and putting less effort into teaching
threatens the teaching quality at a university and thus
affects students’ quality of education.
Therefore, this study contributes to the ongoing dis-
cussion of which norms need to be violated by employee
behavior and who is being harmed in order for the activity
to fall under the definition of deviant workplace behavior.
Some authors refer only to damage to the organization as a
defining element of deviant workplace behavior (e.g.,
Robinson and Bennett 1995). Classifying gaming perfor-
mance measurement as a form of deviant workplace
behavior reinforces the proposition of other authors to
broaden the concept of deviant workplace behavior by also
considering damage to any of the organization’s stake-
holders, including society (e.g., Vardi and Wiener 1996).
Practical Implications for Universities’ Performance
Measurement
The present study sheds light on the negative consequences
of new managerialism in academia. New managerialism
implies the general tendency to control scientists’ perfor-
mance through performance measurement in Germany but
also in other countries. However, even if—as the inter-
viewees’ answers in this study show—a tight performance
Wanting More, Getting Less
measurement focusing on publications and third-party
funding also has a positive impact on scientists’ perfor-
mance, the negative consequences should not only be kept
in mind but also be taken into account in universities’
performance measurement practices. In particular, we add
to growing concerns that the current performance mea-
surement practices do not always lead to the intended
increase in scientists’ performance (e.g., Barsky 2008;
Honig et al. 2017; Osterloh 2010). They rather tempt sci-
entists to game the performance measurement practices by
reducing the quality of their work and neglecting tasks that
are not measured (e.g., teaching). Scientists’ gaming per-
formance measurement poses a threat to the university and
their stakeholders. Understanding the underlying psycho-
logical processes of gaming performance measurement can
help university management to scrutinize their perfor-
mance measurement practices. Most of all, there is a need
to take the multidimensionality of scholarly performance
into account (Aguinis et al. 2014, 2012). Performance
measurement practices should not focus solely on the
number of publications in top-tier journals and the amount
of acquired funding. They should also consider, for
example, the quality and creativity of research ideas or
scientists’ activities of transferring their ideas to the sci-
entific community as well as to students and society.
Otherwise, measuring scientists’ performance can induce
deviant workplace behavior and thereby impair universi-
ties’ true mission of generating and transmitting
knowledge.
Acknowledgements The authors would like to express their sincere
gratitude to the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research,
to the participants of the study, and to Margit Osterloh, who provided
very valuable feedback on the interview guideline. Additionally, the
authors thank the student assistants who were involved in the tran-
scription of the interviews and partly in the coding of the interviews,
especially, Miriam Rosentritt, Carl Schade, and Falk Serbser. Further
thanks go to the two anonymous reviewers of the Journal of Business
Ethics and to the editor. Their constructive comments and sugges-
tions, which enabled us to improve the manuscript, were extremely
helpful and supportive.
Funding This study was funded by the German Federal Ministry of
Education and Research (Grant No. FKZ 01PY13012).
Compliance with Ethical Standards
Conflict of interest The authors declare that they have no conflict of
interest.
Ethical Approval All procedures performed in studies involving
human participants were in accordance with the ethical standards of
the institutional and/or national research committee and with the 1964
Declaration of Helsinki and its later amendments or comparable
ethical standards.
Informed Consent Informed consent was obtained from all indi-
vidual participants included in the study.
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