RULE 39: EXECUTION, SATISFACTION, AND EFFECTS OF
20 It dismissed the petition, and
JUDGMENT (SECTIONS 15 - 30)
Hector L. Ong Vs. Marilyn Tating And Robert Tating, Et Al
149 Scra 265 (1987)
FACTS:
An action of desahucio was instituted in the City Court of
Quezon City by petitioner Ong against his lessee, Evangeline
Roces.
The decision became final and executory, no appeal having
been taken therefrom; and in due course, the records of the case
were remanded to the City Court.
On Ong's application, the City Court directed execution of the
judgment. Accordingly, the sheriff cleared the premises of its
occupants, which included Anacleto Tating (Evangeline's
stepfather and lawyer), Marilyn Tating (Anacleto's wife), and
Robert Tating.
The sheriff also levied on certain chattels found in the place: a
"Citizen" stereo set; a "Sanyo" television set; a "Frigidaire"
refrigerator; and a "Hitachi" electric desk fan. Marilyn and Robert
Tating sought to retrieve these appliances from the sheriff,
alleging that the articles belonged to them and not to the lessee,
Evangeline Roces. 5 To this end, Robert filed with the sheriff a
"Third Party Claim" dated September 13, 1979 as regards the
"Citizen" stereo set; and Marilyn, a similar claim with respect to
the other chattels. 6 When these proved unavailing, they filed
with the City Court Identical applications dated September 17,
1979, entitled "Urgent Motion for Suspension of Sheriff Sale and
for Release of Properties Wrongfully Levied Upon on
Execution," in which they set out their respective titles to the
goods and prayed that the execution sale thereof scheduled on
September 19, 1979 be abated and that, after hearing, said
goods be released to them as the true and lawful owners
thereof.
To neutralize the Tatings' moves, and so that the execution sale
might proceed as scheduled, Ong posted two (2) surety bonds 8
to indemnify the sheriff for any liability for damages. 9 But by
Order dated September 19, 1979 the City Court restrained the
sale and set the Tatings' motions for hearing.
What Ong did was to present an "Omnibus Opposition, etc. "
contending that the Tatings' motions should have been filed with
the Court of First Instance since it was the latter's decision which
was being executed; and that, in any event, the Tatings' remedy
was "to file an action for damages against the indemnity bonds
after the auction sale. "
Ong later filed a "Motion to Inhibit" dated January 9, 1980, which
the City Court denied.
He filed with the Court of First Instance on February 7, 1980 a
petition for certiorari and prohibition, with application for
preliminary injunction. 14 Acting thereon, the Court (Branch IX)
promulgated an Order dated April 2, 1980 directing the
maintenance of the status quo and commanding that the City
Court refrain "from hearing and deciding the third party claims
and the urgent motion for suspension of Sheriff's Sale, etc. until
the resolution of the injunction
The Tatings appealed to the Court of Appeals by "a petition for
review. Court of Appeals expressed puzzlement why the matter
of the execution and related incidents were passed upon by the
lower court, when the only issue was the correctness of the City
Judge's refusal to inhibit, himself.
sent the case back to the City Court for further proceedings."
Ong is now before this Court, praying for the reversal of the
decision of the Court of Appeals, and the perpetual inhibition of
the City Judge "from further hearing and deciding the (Tatings')
third-party claims."
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Tating’s remedy is appeal and not
petition for review to the Court of Appeals.
2. Whether or not the City Court lost jurisdiction to hear
and determine the Tatings' third-party claims upon the
filing by him (Ong) of the bonds prescribed by Section
17, Rule 39, the purpose of which is precisely to hold
the sheriff free from liability for damages for proceeding
with the execution sale despite said third- party claims.
RULING:
1. Yes. Hence, Tating availed the wrong mode of appeal. The
mode by which the Tatings thus brought up to the Court of
Appeals the adverse judgment of the CFI — i.e., by petition
for review — was erroneous. This aspect of the case
apparently escaped the Appellate Court's attention; it did not
treat of it at all. This is however of no moment. The need of
finally resolve this case makes this defect inconsequential.
In any event, the defect has been waived, no issue
concerning it having been raised in the proceedings before
the Court of Appeals.
2. NO. That bond had absolutely no effect on the Court's
jurisdiction. It was merely "equivalent to the personal
interference of the indemnitor and his bondsmen in the
course of the proceeding by directing or requesting the
sheriff to hold and sell the goods as if they were the property
of the defendants in attachment. In doing this they (the
indemnitor and his bondsmen) assume the direction and
control of the sheriff's future action so far as it constitutes a
trespass; and they become to that extent the principals and
he their agent in the transaction. This makes them
responsible for the continuance of the wrongful possession
and for the sale and conversion of the goods; in other words,
for all the real damages which plaintiff sustains (Love Joy vs.
Murray, 70 U.S. 129).
Certain it is that the Trial Court has plenary jurisdiction over the
proceedings for the enforcement of its judgments. It has
undeniable competence to act on motions for execution
(whether execution be a matter of right or discretionary upon the
Court), issue and quash writs, determine if property is exempt
from execution, or fix the value of property claimed by third
persons so that a bond equal to such value may be posted by a
judgment creditor to indemnify the sheriff against liability for
damages, resolve questions involving redemption, examine the
judgment debtor and his debtors, and otherwise perform such
other acts as may be necessary or incidental to the carrying out
of its decisions. It may and should exercise control and
supervision over the sheriff and other court officers and
employees taking part in the execution proceedings, and correct
them in the event that they should err in the discharge of their
functions.
Now, it is axiomatic that money judgments are enforceable only
against property unquestionably belonging to the judgment
debtor. One man's goods shall not be sold for another man's
debts, as the saying goes. 29 Therefore, the sheriff acts properly
only when he subjects to execution property undeniably
Page 1 of 24
belonging to the judgment debtor. But to the extent that he levies
on assets of a third person, in which the judgment debtor has no
interest, to that extent he acts as a trespasser, and to that extent
he is amenable to control and correction by the Court.
When the sheriff thus seizes property of a third person in which
the judgment debtor holds no right or interest, and so incurs in
error, the supervisory power of the Court which has authorized
execution may be invoked by the third person. Upon due
application by the third person, and after summary hearing, the
Court may command that the property be released from the
mistaken levy and restored to the rightful owner or possessor.
What the Court can do in these instances however is limited to
a determination of whether the sheriff has acted rightly or
wrongly in the performance of his duties in the execution of the
judgment, more specifically, if he has indeed taken hold of
property not belonging to the judgment debtor. The Court does
not and cannot pass upon the question of title to the property,
with any character of finality. It can treat of that matter only in so
far as may be necessary to decide if the Sheriff has acted
correctly or not. 31 The Court can require the sheriff to restore
the property to the claimant's possession if warranted by the
evidence. If the claimant's proofs do not however persuade the
Court of his title or right of possession thereof, the claim will of
course be denied.
This remedy is not that of intervention, which is dealt with in Rule
12 of the Rules of Court, and may be availed of only before or
during trial, not thereafter, and certainly not when judgment is
executory. It is rather simply an invocation of the Court's power
of supervision and control over the actuations of its officers and
employees to the end that it be assured that these conform to
the law. 32
Independently of the recourse just indicated, and even before or
without availment thereof, the person who claims that his
property has been wrongfully seized by resort to the remedy
known as terceria set out in Section 17, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, viz:
SEC. 17. Proceedings where property claimed by third person.
— If property levied on be claimed by any other person than
the judgment debtor or his agent, and such person make an
affidavit of his title thereto or right to the possession thereof,
stating the grounds of such right or title, and serve the same
upon the officer making the levy, and a copy thereof upon the
judgment creditor, the officer shag not be bound to keep the
property, unless such judgment creditor or his agent, on
demand of the officer, indemnify the officer against such claim
by a bond in a sum not greater than the value of the property
levied on. In case of disagreement as to such value, the same
shall be determined by the court issuing the writ of execution.
The officer is not liable for damages, for the taking or keeping
of the property, to any third-party claimant unless a claim is
made by the latter and unless an action for damages is brought
by him against the officer within one hundred twenty (120) days
from the date of the filing of the bond. But nothing herein
contained shall prevent such claimant or any third person from
vindicating his claim to the property by any proper action.
xxx xxx xxx
The remedies just mentioned are without prejudice to "any
proper action" that a third-party claimant may deem suitable, to
vindicate "his claim to the property." Such a "proper action," in
the context of Section 17 of Rule 39, has been held to refer to
an action distinct and separate from that in which the judgment
is being enforced.
Such a "proper action" is, quite obviously, entirely distinct from
the explicitly described in Section 17 of Rule 39, i.e., "an action
for damages ** brought (by a third-party claimant) against the
officer within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the
filing of the bond ** for the taking or keeping of the property"
subject of the terceria. Quite obviously, too, this "proper action"
would have for its object the recovery of the possession of the
property seized by the sheriff, as well as damages resulting from
the allegedly wrongful seizure and detention thereof despite the
third-party claim; and it may be brought against the sheriff, of
course, and such other parties as may be alleged to have
wrongful with the sheriff in the supposedly wrongful execution
proceedings, such as the judgment creditor himself. And such a
"proper action," as above pointed out, is and should be an
entirety separate and distinct action from that in which execution
has issued, if instituted by a stranger to the latter suit.
** (C)onstruing Section 17 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of
Court, the rights of third-party claimant over certain properties
levied upon by the sheriff to satisfy the judgment should not be
decided in the action where the third- party claims have been
presented, but in the separate action instituted by the claimants.
This is evident from the very nature of the proceedings. In Herald
Publishing, supra. We intimated that the levy by the sheriff of a
property by virtue of a writ of attachment may be considered as
made under authority of the court only when the property levied
upon unquestionably belongs to the defendant. If he attaches
properties other than those of the defendant, he acts beyond the
acts of his authority. Otherwise stated, the court issuing a writ of
execution is supposed to enforce its authority only over
properties of the judgment debtor, and should a third party
appear to claim the property levied upon by the sheriff, the
procedure laid down by the Rules is that such claim should be
the subject of a separate and independent action.
As we explained in the Quebral case (Quebral v. Garduno, 67
Phil., 316), since the thirdparty claimant is not one of the parties
to the action, she could not strictly speaking, appeal from the
order denying her claim, but should file a separate reivindicatory
action against the execution creditor or the purchaser of her
property after the sale at public auction, or a complaint for
damages against the bond filed by the judgment creditor in favor
of the sheriff.
We reiterated this in Potenciano v. Dineros, et al. (97 Phil. 196;
Agricultural Credit Administration v. Lasam 28 SCRA 1098)
when We ruled that "such reivindicatory action is reserved to the
third-party claimant by Section 15 of Rule 39 despite disapproval
of his claim by the court itself (Planas v. Madriga 94 Phil. 754,
Lara v. Bayona, G.R. No. L-7920, decided May 10, 1955)." This
rule is dictated by reasons -of convenience, as "intervention is
more likely to inject confusion into the issues between the
parties in the case *** with which the third-party claimant has
nothing to do and thereby retard instead of facilitate the prompt
dispatch of the controversy which is the underlying objective of
the rules of pleading and practice" ( Herald Publishing, supra, p.
101). Besides, intervention may not be permitted after trial has
been concluded and a final judgment rendered in the case.
In such separate action, the court may issue a writ of preliminary
injunction against the sheriff enjoining him from proceeding with
the execution sale.
Page 2 of 24
Upon the other hand, if the claim of impropriety on the part of
the sheriff in the execution proceedings is made by a party to
the action, not a stranger thereto, any relief therefrom may be
applied for with, and obtained from, only the executing court; and
this is true even if a new party has been impleaded in the Suit.
NOVERNIA P. NAGUIT vs. CA, OSLER U.
PADUA and NORBERTO B. MAGSAJO
G.R. No. 137675 December 5, 2000
QUICK SUMMARY:
RTC ruled that petitioner’s husband is liable for violation of BP
22. In view of this, petitioner’s property was levied upon and was
sold to respondents. Petitioner filed for the annulment of sale
against the respondents before the RTC on the ground that the
property levied upon and sold to private respondent is her
exclusive property. RTC denied petitioner's prayer. The CA
upheld the trial court's decision. SC ruled that the court issuing
the writ of execution may enforce its authority only over
properties of the judgment debtor. If the sheriff levies upon the
assets of a third person in which the judgment debtor has no
interest, then he is acting beyond the limits of his authority.
FACTS:
In a decision rendered on 15 October 1991, the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 133, found Rolando Naguit liable
for violation of BP 22, and ordered him to indemnify private
respondent Osler U. Padua. A writ of execution was issued by
said court and pursuant thereto, respondent Sheriff Norberto B.
Magsajo levied upon a condominium unit. Consequently, the
property was sold at a public auction in favor of private
respondent, as the highest bidder. The certificate of sale was
issued in the name of private respondent
Petitioner filed a complaint with the RTC of Makati against
private respondent Padua and respondent Sheriff Magsajo for
the annulment of sale and for damages, with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in order to enjoin the
final conveyance of title over the condominium unit to private
respondent. Petitioner claimed that the debt contracted by her
husband did not redound to the benefit of the family, nor was it
made with her consent, and therefore, should not be charged to
the conjugal partnership of gains or to her exclusive property;
that the condominium unit levied upon and sold to private
respondent is her exclusive property, not the judgment obligor's;
and that consequently, the levy and sale of the condominium
unit are void.
RTC of Makati denied petitioner's prayer for the issuance of
preliminary injunction, explaining that if plaintiff believes that
there were irregularities in the auction sale of the property
subject of this case which is claimed to be owned by the
petitioner, the problems should have been threshed out before
the RTC Makati, Branch 133, which court authorized the levy on
execution of judgment of property of plaintiff in this case.
Besides, the petitioner should have elevated the matter to the
higher tribunal, and seek proper injunctive relief, and not to refer
to this Court which does not exercise an appellate authority over
the court that issued the aforesaid writ of execution.
The trial court issued an order denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration and dismissing the case on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction. The CA upheld the trial court's decision to dismiss
the case. In its decision, the appellate court explained that since
petitioner is the spouse of the judgment debtor she cannot be
considered a stranger to the case. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is deemed a stranger to the action wherein
the writ of execution was issued and is therefore justified in
bringing an independent action
RULING:
Yes. In the case at bar, petitioner filed an independent action for
the annulment of the certificate of sale issued in favor of private
respondent, contending that the property levied upon and sold
to private respondent by virtue of the writ of execution issued in
Criminal Case No. 90-2645 was her exclusive property, not that
of the judgment obligor. Pursuant to our ruling in Sy v. Discaya,
petitioner is deemed a stranger to the action wherein the writ of
execution was issued and is therefore justified in bringing an
independent action to vindicate her right of ownership over the
subject property.
Contrary to the stand taken by the trial court, the filing of such
an independent action cannot be considered an encroachment
upon the jurisdiction of a co-equal and coordinate court. The
court issuing the writ of execution may enforce its authority only
over properties of the judgment debtor; thus, the sheriff acts
properly only when he subjects to execution property undeniably
belonging to the judgment debtor. If the sheriff levies upon the
assets of a third person in which the judgment debtor has no
interest, then he is acting beyond the limits of his authority and
is amenable to control and correction by a court of competent
jurisdiction in a separate and independent action. This is in
consonance with the well-established principle that no man shall
be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger.
Execution of a judgment can only be issued against a party to
the action, and not against one who has not yet had his day in
court.
MATILDE S. PALICTE vs. HON. RAMOLETE and MARCELO
SOTTO, Administrator
G.R. No. L-55076 September 21, 1987
QUICK SUMMARY:
Certain properties administered by respondent administrator
were levied upon. Within the period for redemption, petitioner
redeemed from the purchaser 4 lots. Subsequently, petitioner
filed a motion with respondent Judge for the transfer to her name
of the titles to the 4 parcels of land. This was opposed by
respondent administrator on the ground that petitioner is not one
of those authorized to redeem. The lower court held that
petitioner does not qualify as a successor-in-interest who may
redeem the real properties sold. However, SC ruled that the
petitioner, as a legitimate heir, legitimate heir, qualifies as a
successor-in- interest.
FACTS:
A sale at public auction was held pursuant to a writ of execution
issued by the respondent judge in the case of Pilar Teves, et al.
vs Marcelo Sotto, Administrator, for the satisfaction of judgment
in the amount of P725,270.00.
Page 3 of 24
Certain properties belonging to the late Don Filemon Sotto and
administered by respondent Marcelo Sotto were levied upon.
Some of the properties were awarded to Pilar Teves. The
residential house situated on a government lot at Lahug, Cebu
City, was awarded to lone bidder Asuncion Villarante.
Within the period for redemption, petitioner Matilde S. Palicte,
as one of the heirs of the late Don Filemon Sotto, redeemed from
purchaser Pilar Teves, 4 lots.
A deed of redemption was issued for these lots. Subsequently,
petitioner Palicte filed a motion with respondent Judge Ramolete
for the transfer to her name of the titles to the 4 parcels of land
covered by the deed of redemption.
This motion was opposed by the plaintiffs in Civil Case entitled
"Pilar Teves, et al. vs Marcelo Sotto, administrator" on the
ground that movant, Palicte, is not one of those authorized to
redeem under the provisions of the Rules of Court.
The lower court held that although Palicte is one of the declared
heirs, she does not qualify as a successor-in-interest who may
redeem the real properties sold. It ruled that the deed of
redemption is null and void. The motion of Palicte was denied.
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Palicte may validly exercise the right
of redemption under Sec. 29, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
RULING:
Yes.
Sec. 29 of Rule 39 provides:
SEC. 29. Who may redeem real property so sold. — Real
property sold as provided in the last preceding section, or any
part thereof sold separately, may be redeemed in the manner
hereinafter provided, by the following persons:
(a) The judgment debtor, or his successor in interest in the whole
or any part of the property;
(b) A creditor having a lien by attachment, judgment or mortgage
on the property sold, or on some part thereof, subsequent to the
judgment under which the property was sold. Such redeeming
creditor is termed a redemptioner.
Under Subsection (a), property sold subject to redemption may
be redeemed by the judgment debtor or his successor-in-
interest in the whole or any part of the property. Does Matilde
Palicte fall within the term "successor-in-interest"? In the case at
bar, petitioner Palicte is the daughter of the late Don Filemon
Sotto whose estate was levied upon on execution to satisfy the
money judgment against it. She is one of the declared heirs in
Special Proceeding No. 2706-R. As a legitimate heir, she
qualifies as a successor-in- interest.
The lower court, therefore, erred in considering the person of the
administrator as the judgment debtor and as the only
"successor-in-interest." The estate of the deceased is the
judgment debtor and the heirs who will eventually acquire that
estate should not be prohibited from doing their share in its
preservation.
Although petitioner Palicte validly redeemed the properties, her
motion to transfer the titles of the four (4) parcels of land covered
by the Deed of Redemption from registration in the name of
Filemon Sotto to her name cannot prosper at this time.
Otherwise, to allow such transfer of title would amount to a
distribution of the estate.
ALFARO FORTUNADO, et al. v. CA and NATIONAL STEEL
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 78556. April 25, 1991
QUICK SUMMARY:
Respondent purchased a lot which was previously levied upon
by the sheriff. The said lot was not yet registered in respondent’s
name. The lots were sold at a public auction to the petitioner.
Hence, respondent filed with the trial court an urgent motion to
redeem the lots and later on issued a check to the sheriff to
cover the redemption price. The petitioner rejected the check
because it was not legal tender and was not intended for
payment but merely for deposit. SC ruled that a check may be
used for the exercise of the right of redemption, the same being
a right and not an obligation. However, although respondents
properly exercised their right or redemption, they remain liable
of course, for the payment of the redemption price.
FACTS:
RTC of Quezon City 2 rendered judgment in Civil Case entitled
"Alfaro Fortunado v. Angel Bautista," ordering the defendant to
pay damages to the plaintiff. Pursuant to the said judgment,
respondent Basilisa Campano, City Sheriff, levied upon two
parcels of land registered in the name of Bautista. The latter lot
had already been purchased by respondent National Steel
Corporation, but had not yet been registered in its name.
After due notice, these lots were sold at public auction to the
petitioners as the only bidder. They were issued a certificate of
sale which was registered on April 25, 1984.
Subsequently, NSC filed with the trial court an urgent motion to
redeem both lots. This was opposed by the petitioners on the
ground that the movant did not have the personality to intervene.
As the motion remained unresolved and the period of
redemption would expire on April 18, 1985, NSC issued to the
sheriff PNB Check which was sufficient to cover the full
redemption price for both lots.The sheriff acknowledged receipt
of the check as redemption money for the two parcels and
issued a certificate of redemption in favor of NSC and Bautista.
Bautista wrote the sheriff that he would no longer effect the
redemption because there was nothing to redeem, the auction
sale being null and void.
The sheriff wired the petitioners’ counsel, notifying him of the
deposit of the PNB check. The said counsel told the sheriff that
he was rejecting the check because it was not legal tender and
was not intended for payment but merely for deposit.
Petitioner requested the sheriff to issue a final deed of sale over
the two lots and deliver the same to them on the ground that no
valid redemption had been effected within the 12-month period
from the registration of the sale. When the request was not
granted, the petitioners filed with the respondent court a petition
for mandamus. The respondent court denied mandamus but
granted injunction to restrain the registration of the certificate of
redemption in favor of NSC and Bautista.
Aggrieved, the petitioners moved for partial reconsideration.
While their motion was pending, NSC filed a Manifestation
informing the respondent court that the certificate of redemption
Page 4 of 24
had already been registered and TCT No. T-27154 had been
issued in its favor.
The respondent court denied the petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this appeal by certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not redemption had been validly effected by
the private respondents.
Ruling:
Yes. Although the private respondents in the case at bar did not
file a redemption case against petitioners, it should be noted that
private respondents NSC filed an Urgent Motion for Redemption
dated February 11, 1985, and Bautista filed an Urgent Motion
(To Deposit Redemption Money with Quezon City Clerk of
Court) dated March 27, 1985. The motions were well within the
redemption period.
In the United States, it has also been held and recognized that
a payment by check or draft or bank bills or currency which is
not legal tender is effective if the officer accepts such payment.
If in good faith the redemptioner pays, and the officer receives
before the expiration of the time of redemption, an ordinary
banker’s check, the payment is regarded as sufficient.
We find nothing wrong with Bautista’s letter of March 21, 1985,
where he made his redemption of the lot covered by TCT No. T-
7625 subject to the reservation that "the same shall not be taken
to mean my acknowledgment of the validity of the aforesaid writ
of execution and sale . . . nor . . . as waiver on my part of any of
the legal rights and remedies available to me under the
circumstances." Had he not done so, estoppel might have
operated against him. As we held in Cometa v. IAC, 15
"redemption is an implied admission of the regularity of the sale
and would stop the petitioner from later impugning its validity on
that ground." In questioning the writ of execution and sale and
at the same time redeeming his property, Bautista was
exercising alternative reliefs.
In Javellana, it was contended that the position of Luis Mirasol
as a litigant in the prior appeal was inconsistent with his position
as litigant in the redemption case and that he was estopped from
now claiming as redemptioner the property which he had earlier
claimed as owner. The Court held:
We are unable to see any force in the suggestions; as the
positions occupied by this litigant are based upon alternative
rather than upon opposed pretension. No one can question the
right of a litigant to claim property as owner and to seek in the
same proceeding alternative relief founded upon some
secondary right. The right of redemption, for instance, is always
considered compatible with ownership, and one who fails to
obtain relief in the sense of absolute owner may successfully
assert the other right. That which a litigant may do in any one
case can of course be done in two different proceedings.
We are not, by this decision, sanctioning the use of a check for
the payment of obligations over the objection of the creditor.
What we are saying is that a check may be used for the exercise
of the right of redemption, the same being a right and not an
obligation. The tender of a check is sufficient to compel
redemption but is not in itself a payment that relieves the
redemptioner from his liability to pay the redemption price. In
other words, while we hold that the private respondents properly
exercised their right or redemption, they remain liable of course,
for the payment of the redemption price.
VICENTA P. TOLENTINO and JOSE TOLENTINO vs.
CA, BPI, CONSUELO B. DE LA CRUZ, et al.
G.R. Nos. L-50405-06 August 5, 1981
QUICK SUMMARY:
A parcel of land was sold by the respondent de la Cruz to the
petitioner. The petitioner mortgaged the said land to BPI.
Subsequently, the respondent de la Cruz filed an action with the
CFI against the petitioner for the repurchase of the land which
was granted. Thereafter, the lower court issued a writ of
possession in favor of the respondent de la Cruz. Petitoner filed
a Motion to Quash the writ of possession but it was denied.
Aggrieved, the petitioner filed before the respondent CA a
petition for certiorari which was also denied. Later, petitioner
simultaneously consigned a crossed check with the City Sheriff
and filed a redemption case against BPI. CA ruled that the
consignation made by the petitioner was not valid. SC ruled
otherwise stating that under the last sentence of Section 31,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, it is expressly provided that the
tender of the redemption money may be made to the Sheriff who
made the sale. And the redemption is not rendered invalid by
the fact that the said officer accepted a check for the amount
necessary to make the redemption instead of requiring payment
in money.
FACTS:
Ceferino de la Cruz died leaving as his only heirs his widow,
Consuelo de la Cruz, and their children (hereinafter referred to
as the De la Cruzes). At the time of his demise, Ceferino left a
parcel of land (homestead land). In a deed of sale executed by
the De la Cruzes, the homestead land was sold to the spouses
Jose Tolentino and Vicenta Tolentino (hereinafter referred to as
the Tolentinos). The Tolentinos took immediate possession of
the homestead land and caused the issuance of T.C.T. No. T-
11135 in their names.
The Tolentinos constituted a first mortgage over the homestead
land, together with two other parcels of land covered in favor of
BPI. Another mortgage was constituted over the said properties
in 1964 in favor of PBC. The Tolentinos failed to pay their
mortgage indebtedness to the BPI upon maturity in the judicial
foreclosure sale that followed, conducted by the City Sheriff of
Davao, BPI was the sole and highest bidder.
Meanwhile, the De la Cruzes filed an action with the CFI of
Davao against the Tolentinos for the repurchase of the
homestead land, on the ground that they had tried to repurchase
said land extrajudicially for several times already but that the
Tolentinos would not heed their request, thus constraining the
De la Cruzes to file a court action for the repurchase thereof.
The Tolentinos filed a Motion to Dismiss the repurchase case on
the ground that the complaint states no cause of action, but said
motion was denied by the lower court.
Upon a manifestation filed by the De la Cruzes, the lower court
issued an Order declaring the Tolentinos as "having no
standing" in the proceedings therein, to which the latter filed a
motion for its reconsideration. This motion, as well as their
second Motion for Reconsideration, was denied by the lower
court.
Page 5 of 24
Subsequently, the lower court rendered a decision allowing the
De la Cruzes to repurchase the homestead land. Upon payment
by the De la Cruzes of the amount representing the repurchase
price to the BPI, the latter executed a deed of conveyance over
the homestead land. On motion, the lower court issued a writ of
possession in favor of the De la Cruzes.
The Tolentinos filed a Motion to Quash the writ of possession
alleging as principal grounds therefor the absence of service on
their counsel of a copy of the writ of possession, as well as the
decision of the lower court declaring the De la Cruzes entitled to
repurchase the homestead land. The lower court denied the
Motion to Quash. A motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied by the lower court.
Aggrieved, the Tolentinos filed before the respondent CA a
petition for certiorari. This petition was denied by the respondent
court. In the meantime, petitioner Vicente Tolentino went to BPI
Davao Branch, offering to redeem the homestead property for
P16,000 covered by a check. Upon being informed that she can
no longer redeem the same for the reason that it was already
conveyed to the De la Cruzes, Vicente left the office of the
manager. Vicente later on consigned with the Office of the City
Sheriff of Davao a crossed PNB check drawn against the PNB
Kidapawan Branch, allegedly for the redemption of the 3 lots,
including the homestead land. The following day, however, upon
advice of their counsel, Vicente issued a stop-payment order
against the said crossed check purportedly to protect her rights
and to prevent BPI cashing said check without returning all the
properties which BPI had foreclosed and purchased.
Simultaneously with the consignation of the crossed check with
the City Sheriff of Davao, the Tolentinos filed a complaint
(redemption case) against BPI, with the Davao CFI for the
redemption of their properties, which were foreclosed by and
sold to BPI. BPI seasonably filed an answer with counterclaim
for exemplary damages in the sum of P5,000 and attorney's fees
in the sum of P4,000 plus costs. The trial court rendered its
decision dismissing the complaint of the Tolentinos. From that
decision, both the Tolentinos and BPI appealed to the
respondent Court of Appeals,
In a consolidated decision, the respondent Court of Appeals
held, among others, that consignation by crossed check does
not satisfy the requirements set forth in Article 1249 of the New
Civil Code governing the payment of debts in money.
The Tolentinos filed a Motion for Reconsideration in CA. This
Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the respondent court
for lack of merit. Hence, the instant petition for review.
Issue:
Whether or not the tender of payment and consignation made
by the Tolentinos before the City Sheriff of Davao were valid
Ruling:
Yes. When the action to redeem was filed, a simultaneous
deposit of the redemption money was tendered to the Sheriff
and under the last sentence of Section 31, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court, it is expressly provided that the tender of the
redemption money may be made to the Sheriff who made the
sale. And the redemption is not rendered invalid by the fact
that the said officer accepted a check for the amount
necessary to make the redemption instead of requiring
payment in money. It goes without saying that if he had seen fit
to do so, the officer could have required payment to be made
in lawful money, and he undoubtedly, in accepting a check,
placed himself in a position where he could be liable to the
purchaser at the public auction if any damage had been
suffered by the latter as a result of the medium in which
payment was made. But this cannot affect the validity of the
payment. The check as a medium of payment in commercial
transactions is too firmly established by usage to permit of any
doubt upon this point at the present day. No importance may
thus be attached to the circumstance that a stop-payment
order was issued against said check the day following the
deposit, for the same will not militate against the right of the
Tolentinos to redeem, in the same manner that a withdrawal of
the redemption money being deposited cannot be deemed to
have forfeited the right to redeem, such redemption being
optional and not compulsory.
MA. FE BACOS vs. DOMINGO ARCEGA
G.R. No. 152343 January 18, 2008
QUICK SUMMARY:
An illegal dismissal case was ruled in favour of respondent.
Upon failure of his employer to pay, sewing machines were
levied upon by the sheriff. Petitioner, filed with the NLRC a
notice of third party claim, alleging that the levied machines were
previously sold to her. LA and NLRC dismissed petitioner’s claim
on the ground that the Deed of Absolute Sale presented by
petitioner is spurious. Petitioner then filed with the CA a petition
for certiorari. The CA rendered its Decision dismissing the
petition, holding that herein petitioner had not succeeded in
substantiating her claim. Petitioner argued that the Rules merely
require the third-party claimant to submit an affidavit of title to
the property, the Rule does not require that her title of ownership
be produced. SC affirmed CA’s ruling and stated that the
circumstances supporting the third-party claimant’s ownership
or possession of the levied properties must be specified.
FACTS:
Domingo Arcega, respondent, filed with the Labor Arbiter a
complaint for illegal dismissal against Viabel International
Garments, Inc. (Viabel) and/or Marlon Viado. The Labor Arbiter
rendered a Decision in favor of respondent.
Due to the failure of Viabel and/or Marlon Viado to appeal to the
NLRC, the Labor Arbiter’s Decision became final and
executory. Upon respondent’s motion, a writ of execution was
issued. The sheriff of the NLRC levied 28 sewing machines
belonging to Viabel and/or Marlon Viado and scheduled their
sale at a public auction.
Maria Fe Bacos, petitioner, filed with the NLRC a notice of third
party claim, alleging that the levied machines were previously
sold to her by Marlon Viado. The respondent filed an opposition
to petitioner’s third- party claim contending that it is frivolous and
spurious.
The Labor Arbiter Barcelona dismissed the third-party claim on
the ground that the Deed of Absolute Sale appears to be
spurious. On appeal by petitioner, the NLRC dismissed the
same. In another Resolution, the NLRC denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
Page 6 of 24
Petitioner then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari. The CA
rendered its Decision dismissing the petition, holding that herein
petitioner had not succeeded in substantiating her claim that the
levied properties were sold to her.
Forthwith, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was
denied by the appellate court. Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner contends inter alia that the CA erred in dismissing the
petition, claiming that Section 16, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, merely requires the third-party claimant to
submit an affidavit of his title to the property. The Rule does not
require that her title of ownership be produced.
Issue: Whether the circumstances supporting the third-party
claimant’s ownership or possession of the levied properties
must be specified.
Ruling:
Yes.
The petition lacks merit.
Section 16, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, provides:
SEC. 16. Proceedings where property claimed by third
person. If the property levied on is claimed by any person
other than the judgment obligor or his agent, and such
person makes an affidavit of his title thereto or right to the
possession thereof, stating the grounds of such right or
title, and serves the same upon the officer making the levy
and a copy thereof upon the judgment obligee, the officer
shall not be bound to keep the property, unless such
judgment obligee, on demand of the officer, files a bond
approved by the court to indemnify the third-party claimant
in a sum not less than the value of the property levied
on. In case of disagreement as to such value, the same
shall be determined by the court issuing the writ of
execution. No claim for damages for the taking or keeping
of the property may be enforced against the bond unless
the action therefor is filed within one hundred twenty (120)
days from the date of the filing of the bond.
Corollarily, Sections 2 and 3, Rule VI of the NLRC Manual of
Instructions for Sheriffs provide:
Section 2. Proceedings. If property levied upon be
claimed by any person other than the losing party or his
agent, such person shall make an affidavit of his title
thereto or right to the possession thereof, stating the
grounds of such right or title and shall file the same with
the sheriff and copies thereof served upon the Labor
Arbiter or proper officer issuing the writ and upon the
prevailing party. Upon receipt of the third-party claim, all
proceedings with respect to the execution of the
property subject of the third-party claim shall
automatically be suspended and the Labor Arbiter or
proper officer issuing the writ shall conduct a hearing
with due notice to all parties concerned and resolve the
validity of the claim within ten (10) working days from
receipt thereof and his decision is appealable to the
Commission within ten (10) working days from notice,
and the Commission shall likewise resolve the appeal
within the same period.
Section 3. Resolution of the Third-Party Claim, Effect. In
the event the third party claim is declared to be valid, the
sheriff shall immediately release the property to the third
party claimant, his agent or representative and the levy
on execution shall immediately be lifted or discharged.
However, should the third party claim be found to be
without factual or legal basis, the sheriff must proceed
with the execution of the property levied upon as if no
third party claim has been filed.
It is thus clear that a third-party claim must be supported by an
affidavit stating the claimant’s title to, or right to possession of
the property, and the grounds therefor. In other words, a mere
affidavit will not suffice. The circumstances supporting the third-
party claimant’s ownership or possession of the levied
properties must be specified.
Here, both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found that the Deed
of Absolute Sale involving the sewing machines between
petitioner and Marlon Viado is spurious. Likewise, the Court of
Appeals found that no copy of the said document is on file with
the Clerk of Court. The appellate court aptly held that the
absence of such document is itself a badge of fraud and
simulation that could make any court suspicious and wary of
imputing any legitimacy and validity to the same, and actually
militates against its use as basis for petitioners claim.
Spouses Roberto Buado And Venus Buado Vs. The
Honorable Court Of Appeals, Romulo Nicol
G.R. No. 145222 April 24, 2009
FACTS:
Sps. Buado filed a complaint for damages against Erlinda Nicol
before RTC Br. 19 of Bacoor, Cavite. Said action originated
from Erlinda Nicol’s civil liability arising from the criminal offense
of slander filed against her by petitioners. RTC ordered Nicol
topay damages. Nicol appeals said decision but CA affirmed
RTC’s decision.
Subsequently, a writ of execution was issued by trial court. Since
Erlinda’s properties were not enough to satisfy the judgment, the
deputy sheriff levied on a real property. This was annotated on
the TCT of said property. A certificate of sale was then issued
in favor of petitioners.
A year later, Ramon Nicol (Erlinda’s husband) filed a complaint
for annulment of certificate of sale and damages with preliminary
injunction against Sps. Buado and deputy sheriff with RTC Br.
21 of Imus Cavite. According to him, they connived and directly
levied upon and execute his real property without exhausting the
personal properties of Erlinda Nicol. Sps. Buado filed a motion
to dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and that they had
acted on the basis of a valid writ of execution.
RTC Br. 21 dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. It said
that Br. 19 has proper jurisdiction over the case. On appeal, CA
reverse said ruling and held that Br. 21 has jurisdiction to act on
the case. The MR was likewise denied. Sps. Buado filed a
petition for certiorari with the SC attributing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of CA.
ISSUE:
Whether the husband of the judgment debtor may file an
independent action to protect the conjugal property subject to
execution.
Page 7 of 24
[NOTE: Nowhere in the petition was it shown that the jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals was questioned. The issue devolves on
whether the husband of the judgment debtor may file an
independent action to protect the conjugal property subject to
execution. The alleged error therefore is an error of judgment
which is a proper subject of an appeal.]
RULING:
Yes, the filing of a separate action by respondent is proper and
jurisdiction is thus vested on Branch 21.
Apart from the remedy of terceria available to a third-party
claimant or to a stranger to the foreclosure suit against the
sheriff or officer effecting the writ by serving on him an affidavit
of his title and a copy thereof upon the judgment creditor, a third-
party claimant may also resort to an independent separate
action, the object of which is the recovery of ownership or
possession of the property seized by the sheriff, as well as
damages arising from wrongful seizure and detention of the
property. If a separate action is the recourse, the third-party
claimant must institute in a forum of competent jurisdiction an
action, distinct and separate from the action in which the
judgment is being enforced, even before or without need of filing
a claim in the court that issued the writ.
A third-party claim must be filed by a person other than the
judgment debtor or his agent. In other words, only a stranger to
the case may file a third-party claim. This leads us to the
question: Is the husband, who was not a party to the suit but
whose conjugal property is being executed on account of the
other spouse being the judgment obligor, considered a
“stranger?” In determining whether the husband is a stranger to
the suit, the character of the property must be taken into
account. It must further be settled whether the obligation of the
judgment debtor redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership or not.
There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature.
Article 122 of the Family Code16 explicitly provides that payment
of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before
or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal
partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of
the family.
Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities
incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is
chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the
absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-
spouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the system of
conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership of gains
has no duty to make advance payments for the liability of the
debtor-spouse.
Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be concluded
that the civil obligation arising from the crime of slander
committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.
To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be held liable for the
personal obligation contracted by one spouse, unless some
advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal
partnership.
Hence, the filing of a separate action by respondent is proper
and jurisdiction is thus vested on Branch 21. Petitioners failed
to show that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion.
Villasi vs. Garcia, 713 SCRA 629
G.R. No. 190106 January 15, 2014
FACTS: Petitioner Villasi engaged the services of respondent
Fil-Garcia Construction, Inc. (FGCI) to construct a seven-storey
condominium building.
For failure of Villasi to fully pay the contract price despite several
demands, FGCI initiated a suit for collection of sum of money
before the RTC.
RTC rendered a Decision in FGCI’s favor. Elevated on appeal,
the CA reversed the disquisition of the RTC.
Unrelenting, FGCI filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before
the SC. SC, however, denied the appeal for being filed out of
time. The said resolution became final and executory on 27
November 2001, as evidenced by the Entry of Judgment made.
Villasi filed a Motion for Execution of CA Decision, which was
favorably acted upon by the RTC. A Writ of Execution was
issued commanding the Sheriff to execute and make effective
the Decision of the CA.
To satisfy the judgment, the sheriff levied on a building built in
the lots located at No. 140 Kalayaan Avenue, Quezon City and.
While the building was declared for taxation purposes in the
name of FGCI, the lots in which it was erected were registered
in the names of the Spouses Garcia.
To forestall the sale on execution, the Spouses Garcia filed an
Affidavit of Third Party Claim and a Motion to Set Aside Notice
of Sale on Execution, claiming that they are the lawful owners of
the property which was erroneously levied upon by the sheriff.
The Spouses Garcia argued that the building covered by the
levy was mistakenly assessed by the City Assessor in the name
of FGCI. The motion was opposed by Villasi who insisted that
its ownership belongs to FGCI and not to the Spouses Garcia
as shown by the tax declaration.
After weighing the arguments of the opposing parties, the RTC
issued an Order directing the Sheriff to hold in abeyance the
conduct of the sale on execution. The motion for reconsideration
of Villasi was denied by the trial court.
Arguing that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in ordering
the suspension of the sale on execution, Villasi timely filed a
Petition for Certiorari before the CA. The appellate court
dismissed the petition and refused to reconsider its decision.
Villasi is now before this Court via this instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari assailing the adverse CA Decision.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in upholding the decision of the
trial court to suspend and hold in abeyance the sale on
execution of the buildings levied upon on the basis of
respondents’ affidavit of third-party claim
RULING: NO. Money judgments are enforceable only against
the property incontrovertibly belonging to the judgment debtor,
and if the property belonging to any third person is mistakenly
levied upon to answer for another man’s indebtedness, such
person has all the right to challenge the levy through any of the
Page 8 of 24
remedies provided for under the Rules of Court. Section 16,
Rule 39 specifically provides that a third person may avail
himself of the remedies of either terceria, to determine whether
the sheriff has rightly or wrongly taken hold of the property not
belonging to the judgment debtor or obligor, or an independent
“separate action” to vindicate his claim of ownership and/or
possession over the foreclosed property. However, the person
other than the judgment debtor who claims ownership or right
over levied properties is not precluded from taking other legal
remedies to prosecute his claim.
The right of a third-party claimant to file a terceria is founded on
his title or right of possession. Corollary thereto, before the court
can exercise its supervisory power to direct the release of the
property mistakenly levied and the restoration thereof to its
rightful owner, the claimant must first unmistakably establish his
ownership or right of possession thereon.
As the party asserting their title, the Spouses Garcia failed to
prove that they have a bona fide title to the building in question.
Aside from their postulation that as title holders of the land, the
law presumes them to be owners of the improvements built
thereon, the Spouses Garcia were unable to adduce credible
evidence to prove their ownership of the property. In contrast,
Villasi was able to satisfactorily establish the ownership of FGCI
thru the pieces of evidence she appended to her opposition.
Worthy to note is the fact that the building in litigation was
declared for taxation purposes in the name of FGCI and not in
the Spouses Garcias’. While it is true that tax receipts and tax
declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership,
they constitute credible proof of claim of title over the property.
It likewise failed to escape our attention that FGCI is in actual
possession of the building and as the payment of taxes coupled
with actual possession of the land covered by tax declaration
strongly supports a claim of ownership.
POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION (PSALM) vs. MAUNLAD
HOMES, INC
[G.R. No. 215933. February 8, 2017. PERALTA, J.]
FACTS:
Respondent Maunlad Homes, Inc. filed with the MTCC an
unlawful detainer case with damages against National Power
Corporation (NPC)
The MTCC issued its Decision ordering NPC to vacate the
subject premises and surrender physical possession thereof to
respondentto pay reasonable compensation. On appeal, RTC
affirmed in toto the decision of the MTCC
Respondent filed a Motion for Execution which RTC granted.
Respondent then filed an urgent motion for issuance of a Break
Open Order since the sheriff who tried to implement the writ of
execution, by serving the notice of levy on the NPC Warehouse
was prevented by the security guards assigned therein.
The NPC argued that the warehouse is being used both by it
and petitioner PSALM, an entity created and existing by virtue
of Republic Act No. 9136, the Electric Power Industry Reform
Act of 2001 (EPIRA Law). Under the law, the ownership and all
generation assets, IPP contracts and other NPC disposable
assets are transferred to PSALM and that as of the moment, the
ownership of the said items stored cannot be established with
certainty.
The RTC issued a Break Open Order.
PSALM filed an Affidavit of third-party claim with the sheriff
pursuant to Section 16, Rule 39 alleging that it is the owner of
the levied properties pursuant to the EPIRA Law
PSALM also filed a Manifestation with Urgent Ex Parte Motion
for Issuance of Status Quo Order with the RTC arguing that it is
the owner of the subject properties and therefore cannot be
bound by the judgment therein.
The RTC issued an Order denying both motion for issuance of
Status Quo Order and the third-party claim filed by PSALM.
PSALM filed before the CA a petition for certiorari. It alleged that
it has no adequate remedy available. CA issued its assailed
Decision dismissing the petition for certiorari for being an
incorrect remedy.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in dismissing petitioner's petition for
certiorari assailing the denial of the latter's third party claim for
being a wrong remedy
RULING:
NO. CA did not err in dismissing petitioner's petition for certiorari
assailing the denial of the latter's third party claim for being a
wrong remedy
Under the Sec. 16, Rule 39, the third-party claimant may
execute an affidavit of his title or right to the possession of the
property levied, and serve the same to the officer making the
levy and a copy thereof to the judgment creditor. This remedy is
known as terceria. The officer shall not be bound to keep the
property, unless the judgment creditor files a bond approved by
the court to indemnify the third-party claimant in a sum not less
than the value of the property levied on.
Section 16 also provides that a third-party claimant may file a
proper action to vindicate his claim to the levied property. The
proper action mentioned in Section 16 would have for its object
the recovery of ownership or possession of the property seized
by the sheriff. If instituted by a stranger to the suit in which
execution has issued, such proper action should be a totally
separate and distinct action from the former suit
In this present case, aside from serving said affidavit of third-
party claim to the Sheriff, PSALM also filed this instant motion
for issuance of status quo order to prevent the sale of the levied
properties at public auction. In effect, instead of the Sheriff
requiring the plaintiff obligee to file an indemnity bond, the Court
is constrained to resolve the merit of the third-party claim filed
by PSALM.
After giving an opportunity to vindicate their claim and after a
judicious examination of the arguments posed by all of the
parties, RTC finds that PSALM has not been able to
satisfactorily establish their claim of ownership over the subject
properties
Notably, PSALM cannot appeal from the denial of its third-party
claim since it is not one of the parties in the action where the writ
Page 9 of 24
of execution. Also, the denial of the third-party claim is not
appealable. Hence, PSALM filed certiorari before the CA.
However, Petition for certiorari file by PSALM alleging that there
is no available remedy is contradicted by the procedure laid
down under Section 16 of Rule 39, i.e., the third-party claimant
may file an independent action to vindicate its claim of
ownership to the levied property.
And in such separate action, the court may issue a writ of
preliminary injunction against the sheriff enjoining him from
proceeding with the execution sale, which is a speedy and
adequate remedy to immediately relieve petitioner from the
adverse effects of the lower court's judgment. Thus, the CA did
not err in saying that Section 16 of Rule 39 provides a more
expeditious and encompassing recourse from the denial of its
third party claim.
RULE 39: EXECUTION, SATISFACTION, AND EFFECTS OF
JUDGMENT (SECTIONS 31 - 48)
Dilag vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
152 SCRA 459, No. L-72727 July 30, 1987
Quick Summary:
A notice of levy was annotated on a lot owned by Sps. Dilag by
Arellano who won against spouses payment for damages
arising from quasi-delict. The property was sold in public auction
as ordered by the court and was bought Arellano. Spouses failed
to redeem the property. Arellano sold it Florete. Dancin who was
lessee thereof informed the Dilag Children. The children filed for
annulment of the judgment of the RTC on its notice of levy
because the Dilag spouses where not owners of the lot. That the
claim should have been brought to administrator of the estate.
Arellano filed an MD on the ground that court has no jurisdiction
to annul the order by another court but was denied. Arellano filed
an MR but was denied. CA denied his petition for certiorari.
FACTS:
Marciano Arellano, as parent of the late Herminio Arellano who
had died in a vehicular accident involving a truck owned by
spouses Pablo and Socorro Dilag, was awarded by the trial court
in an action for quasi-delict sum of money, damages and
attorney’s fees. The judgment became final and executory. Dilag
spouses filed before the Court a petition for relief from judgment.
A compromise agreement between the parties was presented
but the same was disapproved by the Court for failure of the
Dilag spouses to sign it.
Notice of Levy on Execution was annotated on TCT covering a
parcel of land in Dumangas, registered in the name of spouses
Pablo and Socorro Dilag. An examination of the TCT shows that
inscribed therein is an Adverse Claim dated filed by Suzette,
Benito, Sussie and Susan all surnamed Dilag to protect their
rights and interests as vendees evidenced by a Deed of
Absolute Sale. The adverse claim further stated that the owner's
duplicate certificate was then in the possession of the
Development Bank of the Philippines to which the property had
earlier been mortgaged. Said TCT further shows an inscription
a Contract of lease executed by the spouses Pablo and Socorro
Dilag in favor of David and Erlinda Diancin.
After compliance with the legal requirements of notice and
publication and pursuant to the Writ of Execution, the Lot was
sold at public auction to Marciano Arellano as the highest bidder.
Dilag spouses failed to exercise their right of redemption.
A writ of possession was issued Sheriff's Return of Service
attested to the fact that delivery of possession of the subject lot
was made to Marciano Arellano. Marciano Arellano sold the Lot
to Marcelino Florete Jr. and Leon. David Diancin, the actual
lessee of the property in question, executed a deed giving up his
claim or interest as a lessee over the leased property in favor of
Marciano Arellano and/or his successors-in-interest
Diancin informed the Dilag children that he had nothing to do
anymore with the fishpond or lot in question because he had
assigned whatever right he had thereon. Sussie Dilag in behalf
of her sisters and brother, executed a Notarial Recission of the
Lease Contract entered into by Diancin and the Dilag spouses.
Dilag children filed Civil Case for the annulment of decision in
Civil Case No. 8714, that the levy on execution on TCT was
illegal since it was made on property no longer owned by
judgment debtors (the Dilag spouses); that they (Dilag children)
are not parties in Civil Case No. 8714 and that the claim of the
judgment creditor should be brought against the administrator of
the estates of the spouses Pablo and Socorro Dilag.
The court issued a restraining order directing defendants
(private respondent herein) and his agents to desist from
entering and wresting possession of the lot and from disturbing
the possession of the Dilag children.
Motion to Dismiss was filed by defendants (private respondents
herein) on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction to annul
a judgment of another branch of the same. Motion was denied
and order was issued by the court granting the prayer of the
Dilag children for preliminary prohibitory injunction.
Marciano Arellano filed a Motion for Reconsideration and
exception to the bond and offered a counterbond double that of
the Dilag children. The lower court denied it on the ground that
the answer with the defenses and counterclaim raised the issue
of ownership, which is within the exclusive and original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and that the offer
of a counterbond by Marciano Arellano cannot dissolve the
injunction not being coupled with a clear legal right of
possession over the land in question. Denied by the lower court
of his motion for reconsideration, defendant Marciano Arellano
filed his petition for certiorari, prohibition and/or injunction with
preliminary mandatory injunction and damages to invalidate the
Orders issued by the trial court. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision and the consequent writ of
execution in Civil Case No. 8714 of the court below are operative
against petitioners who admittedly were not parties to said civil
case.
RULING:
NO. When the Dilag children (petitioners herein) filed Civil Case
no. 15085 on July 5, 1983, they were not in possession of the
property in question. There was therefore no factual and legal
basis for the restraining order dated July 8, 1983 of the lower
court ordering Arellano and/or his agents to desist from entering
Page 10 of 24
Lot No. 288. Thus Rule 39 Sec. 135 relied upon by petitioners
will not apply in the case at bar.
Likewise it cannot be denied that in securing the cancellation of
TCT No. 30137 covering Lot No. 288 in the names of Pablo and
Socorro Dilag, petitioners had to rely on another deed of
absolute sale supposedly executed by their parents in their favor
in 1981, instead of relying on the first deed of sale executed in
1974, an indication that petitioners do not really consider the
1974 deed of sale valid and legal is not disputed that at the time
of the levy on execution in Civil Case No. 8714 the Dilag
spouses were still the registered owners of Lot 288 as shown in
TCT No. 30137 and they were also the declared owners of Lot
1927 as shown in Tax Declaration No. 411900-3039.
On the other hand, it is alleged by private respondent herein and
not refuted by petitioners herein that the title in the name of
herein petitioners was issued on August 14, 1981, several days
ahead of the deed of sale, dated August 26, 1981 on which the
new title in the name of the petitioners was based, and inscribed
on August 27, 1981. Clearly the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor
of petitioners herein executed in 1974 after the filing of Civil
Case No. 8714 was a simulated and fictitious transaction to
defraud Arellano who obtained a money judgment against the
parents of petitioners.
Sostenes Campillo Vs. Hon. Court Of Appeals And Zenaida
Diaz Vda. De Santos, In Her Capacity As Administratrix Of
The Intestate Estate Of The Late Simplicio S. Santos
G.R. No. L-56483 May 29, 1984
DON’T PANIC, IT’S ORGANIC:
Campillo bought at an execution sale 3 parcels of land, two of
which are being claimed by Santos. Santos alleged that he is an
innocent purchaser for value and hence he has a better right
over the land. Supreme Court ruled that Campillo has better right
because a sale becomes binding only once it is registered in the
registry of deeds.
FACTS:
Campillo obtained a judgment for a sum of money against
Tomas de Vera before CFI of Manila. Pursuant to the writ of
execution for said judgment, the City Sheriff levied on 3 parcels
of land owned by de Vera. 2 parcels of said land were already
sold by de Vera in favor of Simplicio Santos (died in the course
of the case, he is now represented by his administratix, Zenaida
Diaz Vda. De Santos).
After notice and publication by the sheriff, the lands were sold at
a public auction in favor of Campillo and a TCT was issued in
his favor. Simplicio then filed an action to annul the levy, notice
of sale at public auction, and final deed of sale of the lots which
he bought from de Vera. He alleged that he is an innocent
purchaser for value and the previous sale could not be preferred
over the levy and sale at public action because it was not
registered.
The trial court upheld the validity of the levy and sale because
at the time of the levy, the properties were still under the name
of the judgment debtor. On appeal, CA modified the decision
and declared the levy and sale null and void. CA declared
Simplicio as the owner of the 2 parcels of land. CA rationalized
that said lots cannot be levied upon to satisfy the judgment
because at the time of the execution sale, de Vera is no longer
the owner of the lands.
Campillo filed a petition for review on certiorari before the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether an innocent purchaser for value who failed to register
the sale has a better right over the property against a purchaser
at an execution sale who obtained a certificate of title.
RULING:
Campillo (purchaser at an execution sale) has a better right over
the property than Santos (innocent purchaser). The SC reversed
the ruling of the CA. It is settled in this jurisdiction that a sale of
real estate, whether made as a result of a private transaction or
of a foreclosure or execution sale, becomes legally effective
against third persons only from the date of its
registration. Consequently, and considering that the properties
subject matter hereof were actually attached and levied upon at
a time when said properties stood in the official records of the
Registry of Deeds as still owned by and registered in the name
of the judgment debtor, Tomas de Vera, the attachment, levy
and subsequent sale of said properties are proper and legal. The
net result is that the execution sale made in favor of the herein
petitioner transferred to him all the rights, interest and
participation of the judgment debtor in the aforestated properties
as actually appearing in the certificate of title, unaffected by any
transfer or encumbrance not so recorded therein.
While it may be true that purchasers at execution sales should
bear in mind that the rule of caveat emptor applies to such sales,
that the sheriff does not warrant the title to real property sold by
him as sheriff, and that it is not incumbent on him to place the
purchaser in possession of such property, still the rule applies
that a person dealing with registered land is not required to go
behind the register to determine the condition of the property
and he is merely charged with notice of the burdens on the
property which are noted on the face of the register or the
certificate of title. Hence, the petitioner herein, as the purchaser
in the execution sale of the registered land in suit, acquires such
right and interest as appears in the certificate of title unaffected
by prior lien or encumbrances not noted therein. This must be
so in order to preserve the efficacy and conclusiveness of the
certificate of title which is sanctified under our Torrens system
of land registration.
Ciriaco Pacheco, Estrella Razo-Rey And Benvenuto Abitria
Vs. Honorable Court Of Appeals, Daniel Hernandez And
Anastacio Raneses
G.R. No. L-48689 August 31, 1987
DON’T PANIC, IT’S ORGANIC:
Hernandez won a civil case against Emiliano Pacheco.
Hernandez then filed a complaint against Pacheco alleging that
the latter refuses to vacate the property he acquired through
execution sale. Pacheco contended that he has better right over
the property because he acquired it through acquisitive
prescription. SC said that Pacheco has better right than
Hernandez because Emiliano Pacheco (the execution debtor) is
no longer the owner of the land when the execution sale took
place. An execution creditor acquires no higher or better right
than what the execution debtor has in the property levied upon.
FACTS:
Emiliano Pacheco owns an unregistered parcel of land. He later
on sold some of it to Rafael Pacheco. Rafel mortgaged the
purchased land to PNB. When it was foreclosed, it was sold t a
Page 11 of 24
public auction but Rafael was able to repurchase it. After
repurchasing, Rafel sold the land to Ciriarco Pacheco
(petitioner). Petitioner then sold a portion of the land to Estrella
Razeo-Rey, his co-petitioner.
In a civil case entitled Daniel Hernandez vs. Emiliano Pacheco,
a decision was rendered in favor of Daniel Hernanez. To enforce
it, certain properties, including the land in question, were levied
and sold at a public auction. Hernandez was the purchaser of
said auction.
Hernandez filed a case against petitioners alleging that they
were refusing to vacate the part of the property which he had
acquired in a judgment sale. This was dismissed by the CFI
declaring that the petitioners were the lawful owners of the
property which they had acquired through prescription.
Hernandez filed an appeal with the CA and the CA reversed the
ruling of the trial court. CA held that petitioners claim of
acquisitive prescription was untenable because their possession
of the property in dispute was interrupted when the Philippine
National Bank acquired it at the foreclosure sale in 1959 and
held it for one year before it was repurchased by Rafael Pacheco
in 1960. The ten-year period for prescription had not been
completed.
Petitioners filed a petition for review before the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether Ciriaco Pacheco has a better right over the land than
Daniel Hernandez who obtained said land through execution
sale.
RULING:
Ciriaco Pacheco has better right over the parcel of land. The
ruling of the trial court was reinstated.
The rule in execution sales is that an execution creditor acquires
no higher or better right than what the execution debtor has in
the property levied upon. The purchaser of property on sale
under the execution and levy takes as assignee only, as the
Judicial seller possesses no title other than that which would
pass by an assignment by the owner. An execution purchaser
generally acquires such estate or interest as was vested in the
execution debtor at the time of the seizure on execution, and
only such interest, taking merely a quit-claim of the execution
debtor's title, without warranty on the part of either the execution
officer or of the parties, whether the property is realty or
personality. This rule prevails even if a larger interest in the
property was intended to be sold. Accordingly, if the judgment
debtor had no interest in the property, the execution purchaser
acquires no interest therein."
Applying the above principles, we hold that the judgment sale in
favor of private respondent Hernandez did not and could not
cover the lands claimed by the petitioners as these lots no longer
belonged to the judgment debtor when they were levied upon
and sold. That sale covered only the lands under the ownership
of the judgment debtor and did not affect the ownership of the
property titled in the name of the herein petitioners. None of
them was a party to the civil case brought by the private
respondent against Emiliano Pacheco.
[Note: Other issue in this case is whether petitioner acquired the
property by acquisitive prescription. SC ruled in the affirmative.
Respondent argued that the period of possession of the property
by the petitioners were interrupted when PNB acquired the land
through foreclosure sale. Hence, the 10-year period was not
completed. SC said that although both the trial court and
respondent court accepted the petitioner's claim of such a sale,
the subject thereof was, however, not positively Identified. The
land purchased by Rafael from Emiliano Pacheco was covered
by Tax Declaration No. 12490 with an area of 4,698 square
meters, and in his name. On the other hand, the land foreclosed
by the bank, which Ciriaco's father later repurchased and then
sold to him, was covered by Tax Declaration No. 3431 with an
area of 1,170 square meters, and in the name of Rafael
Pacheco. It was not shown by Ciriaco that Tax Declaration No.
3431 revised in part or in whole Tax Declaration No. 12490.
Nevertheless, whether or not the subject of the sale was the land
in dispute, it was clearly established that Rafael Pacheco started
occupying the same since 1939 and that his possession was
public, open, peaceful, continuous, uninterrupted, adverse and
in the concept of owner until and even beyond 1949. After ten
years of such possession, acquisitive prescriptive title was
vested in Rafael Pacheco, pursuant to Article 1134 of the Civil
Code. Consequently, when he mortgaged the land to the PNB,
he did so not as a mere possessor but as an owner by virtue of
prescription under Article 1134 of the Civil Code. Article 1121
could no longer apply to him because the ten-year prescriptive
period had already been completed at the time.]
National Power Corporation Vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong,
Dominador B. Adriano, Deputy Sheriff, Allied Control &
Electric Corporation, And Philippine National Bank
G.R. No. 87140 September 7, 1989
DON’T PANIC, IT’S ORGANIC:
When ACEC won a case for recovery of money against BBGMI,
Judge Gonong ordered the garnishment of BBGMI’s credit with
NPC. NPC alleged that the court has no jurisdiction to issue
order of garnishment because it was not a party to said civil case
and NPC was not in possession of any property belonging to
BBGMI. SC ruled in favor of BBGMI. It held the proper provision
applicable in this case is Sec 42 and 45 of Rule 39 and not
Section 15. Execution may issue against such person or entity
only upon an incontrovertible showing that the person or entity
in fact holds property belonging to the judgment debtor or is
indeed a debtor of said judgment debtor
FACTS:
Allied Control and Electric Corporation (ACEC) filed a complaint
to recover sum of money against Batong Buhay Gold Mines, Inc.
(BBGMI), in which judgment was ordered against BBGMI to pay
ACEC its indebtedness.
Attempt for execution failed. Hence, ACEC filed an Ex-Parte
Motion for Examination of Debtor of Judgment Debtor, alleging
that NPC was a debtor of BBGMI.
Judge Gonong, then summoned Mr. Viroya, Manager of NPC
General Accounts Division. From his statement, it was found out
that NAPOCOR and BBGMI entered into an agreement. It was
agreed upon that BBGMI will finance the construction of the line
connecting their mining site to the lines of NPC. In exchange,
NPC is going to reimburse BBGMI the amount spent for said
construction by crediting 25% of BBGMI’s monthly electric
power bills until the actual cost shall have been fully paid.
However, BBGMI ceased its operation leaving a balance of
P18,947,623.06 which is still due to defendant.
Page 12 of 24
Judge Gonong then directed the NPC to pay ACEC, out of its
remaining credit NPC held in favor of BBGMI and further
directed Sheriff Adriano to garnish and attach said credit. He
anchored said decision on Section 15, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, authorizing the sheriff charged with execution of a money
judgment to levy on "debts" and "credits" 3 in addition to "real
property, stocks, shares, .. and other personal property, or any
interest in either real or personal property," pointing out, too, that
the NPC official, Vinoya, had later admitted that "this amount of
P18,947,623.06 is due to defendant Batong Buhay Gold Mines
Inc.
NPC filed a Manifestation alleging that the court has no
jurisdiction to issue the assailed order, since they were never a
party in the said civil case and that NPC was not in possession
of any property belonging to BBGMI nor does BBGMI have any
receivable from NPC.
No action was taken by Judge Gonong in response to such
Manifestation (Motion to Set Aside the Order).
Hence this present action of certiorari praying
ISSUE:
Whether, Judge Gonong acted with grave abuse of discretion
when it ordered the garnishment of NPC’s account with PNB.
RULING:
YES. It is true that Rule 39 empowers a Court to order the
examination of a judgment debtor. It was thus clearly within
respondent Judge's prerogative to require the appearance, by
subpoena, of officials of the NPC to appear and be questioned
regarding the latter's claimed indebtedness to the judgment
debtor, BBGMI. But just as clearly, it was not within His Honor's
power to order the payment by the alleged debtor of the
judgment debtor to pay the claimed debt without indubitable
admission or conclusive proof that the debt existed and was
demandable. The applicable provision is not, as was respondent
Judge's erroneous notion, Section 15 of Rule 39, which merely
states the procedure that the sheriff should follow in the
enforcement of a money judgment against the judgment debtor
himself, i.e., to levy on property of the judgment debtor,
including "debts" or "credits," and sell the same, etc., but which
obviously does not at all treat of the propriety and requisites for
collecting such "debts" or "credits" from third persons. The
relevant provisions are those embodied in Sections 42 and 45
of the same Rule 39.
A reading of these two provisions leaves no doubt about the
proposition that after summary examination of a person or entity
alleged to be a debtor of the judgment debtor or holding property
belonging to the latter, in accordance with Section 39, Rule
39, supra execution may issue against such person or entity
only upon an incontrovertible showing that the person or entity
in fact holds property belonging to the judgment debtor or is
indeed a debtor of said judgment debtor, i.e., that such holding
of property, or the indebtedness, is not denied. In the event of
such a denial, it is not, to repeat, within the judge's power to
order delivery of property allegedly belonging to the judgment
debtor or the payment of the alleged debt. A contrary rule would
allow a court to adjudge substantive liability in a summary
proceeding, incidental merely to the process of executing a
judgment, rather than in a trial on the merits, to be held only after
the party sought to be made liable has been properly summoned
and accorded full opportunity to file the pleadings permitted by
the Rules in ventilation of his side. This would amount to a denial
of due process of law.
The record demonstrates that the supposed indebtedness of
NPC to BBGMI was denied not only by the representative of
NPC who gave testimony at the summary hearing scheduled by
His Honor, but also by its lawyers who, in a formal pleading,
detailed the facts and circumstances in substantiation of the
thesis of non-liability. Of course, the respondent Judge's Order
makes a general reference to later admissions supposedly
made by Vinoya, the NPC representative. Such unspecified
admissions are, of course, not only contradictory of the earlier
denial of Vinoya, but are themselves contradicted by the
subsequent assertions of the NPC through its lawyers. This
state of things, when the least that can be said is that it is
doubtful if there has been a categorical admission of liability on
the part of the NPC, cannot operate to invest the respondent
Court with jurisdiction to order NPC to pay its alleged
indebtedness to BBGMI. The only disposition that said Court
could legitimately have made in the premises, was that indicated
in Section 46 of Rule 39, above quoted, i.e., authorize ACEC, as
judgment creditor, to bring a separate action against NPC, as
alleged debtor of BBGMI, the judgment debtor, for
establishment by satisfactory proof of the postulated
indebtedness of NPC to BBGMI, and consequent payment to it
ACEC of so much of that indebtedness as corresponds to the
amount of its judgment.
Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. Vs. Court Of Appeals And
C.F. Sharp & Company Inc.
G.R. No. 112573 February 9, 1995
DON’T PANIC, IT’S ORGANIC:
Northwest obtained a favorable judgment for collection of money
against Sharp in a Japanese Court. When Northwest failed to
execute said judgment in Japan and hence, it filed a complaint
for enforcement of foreign judgment before RTC of Manila.
Sharp opposed contending that the judgment of the Japanese
Court is null and void because it failed to acquire jurisdiction over
them. Supreme Court ruled in favor of Northwest. It stated that
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the
country from which it comes, until the contrary is shown. It is also
proper to presume the regularity of the proceedings and the
giving of due notice therein. Under Section 50, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court, a judgment in an action in personam of a tribunal
of a foreign country having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors-in-interest by a subsequent title.
FACTS:
Northwest Oriental Airlines (Northwest) and C.F. Sharp &
Company (Sharp) entered into an agreement authorizing Sharp
to sell Northwest’s air transportation tickets. When Sharp failed
to remit the proceeds of the sale, Northwest sued Sharp in
Tokyo, Japan for collection thereof. Civil court in Japan failed to
serve summons because Mr. Dinozo, the person authorized to
receive court processes, refused to accept the summons
claiming that he was no longer an employee of Sharp. The
Japan court decided to have the summons served at the head
office of Sharp in Manila through diplomatic channels. Japan
court ruled in favor of Northwest and ordered Sharp to pay the
former.
Northwest was not able to execute the judgment in Japan hence,
a suit for enforcement of judgment was filedf by Northwest
against Sharp in RTC Manila. On its answer, Sharp averred that
Page 13 of 24
the judgment of Japanese court is null and void because no
proper notice was served to them. Defendant filed a demurrer to
evidence which the court granted. Trial court said that the
judgment of Japan court is null and void because it failed to
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
Northwest appealed to the CA but Ca sustained RTC’s decision.
CA held that the service of summons effected in Manila or
beyond the territorial boundaries of Japan was null and did not
confer jurisdiction upon the Tokyo District Court over the person
of SHARP; hence, its decision was void.
Northwest filed a petition for review on certiorari with the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the dismissal of the complaint to enforce judgment of
the Japanese Court is proper.
RULING:
No. The dismissal of the complaint to enforce the judgment of
the Japanese Court is not proper.
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the
country from which it comes, until the contrary is shown. It is also
proper to presume the regularity of the proceedings and the
giving of due notice therein.
Under Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judgment in
an action in personam of a tribunal of a foreign country having
jurisdiction to pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a
right as between the parties and their successors-in-interest by
a subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be assailed by
evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Also, under
Section 3 of Rule 131, a court, whether of the Philippines or
elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was acting in the
lawful exercise of jurisdiction and has regularly performed its
official duty.
Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the
burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity. 7Being the
party challenging the judgment rendered by the Japanese court,
SHARP had the duty to demonstrate the invalidity of such
judgment. In an attempt to discharge that burden, it contends
that the extraterritorial service of summons effected at its home
office in the Philippines was not only ineffectual but also void,
and the Japanese Court did not, therefore acquire jurisdiction
over it.
It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as those
relating to the service of process upon a defendant are governed
by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum. In this case, it is
the procedural law of Japan where the judgment was rendered
that determines the validity of the extraterritorial service of
process on SHARP. As to what this law is is a question of fact,
not of law. It may not be taken judicial notice of and must be
pleaded and proved like any other fact. Sections 24 and 25, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court provide that it may be evidenced by
an official publication or by a duly attested or authenticated copy
thereof. It was then incumbent upon SHARP to present
evidence as to what that Japanese procedural law is and to
show that under it, the assailed extraterritorial service is invalid.
It did not. Accordingly, the presumption of validity and regularity
of the service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered
by the Japanese court must stand.
Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad Vs. Court Of
Appeals And Philippine National Construction Corporation
G.R. No. 110263 July 20, 2001
DON’T PANIC, IT’S ORGANIC:
Asiavest filed a complaint before RTC of Pasig to enforce a
judgment issued by the High (hehe, high) Court of Malaysia.
RTC of Pasig ruled in favor of private respondent and CA
sustained this decision. Supreme Court held that CA erred in
sustaining RTC’s decision. The rules of comity, utility and
convenience of nations have established a usage among
civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of
competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered
efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different
countries.
FACTS:
Asiavest Merchancant Bankers initiated a suit for collection
against private respondent, then known as Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines, before the High
Court of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur entitled “Asiavest Merchant
Bankers (M) Berhad v. Asiavest CDCP Sdn. Bhd. and
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines.”
Petitioner sought to recover the indemnity of the performance
bond it had put up in favor of private respondent to guarantee
the completion of the Felda Project and the nonpayment of the
loan it extended to Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. for the completion
of Paloh Hanai and Kuantan By Pass Project.
The High Court of Malaya (Commercial Division) rendered
judgment in favor of the petitioner. Following unsuccessful
attempts to secure payment from private respondent, petitioner
initiated the complaint before RTC of Pasig to enforce the
judgment of the High Court of Malaya.
Private respondent sought the dismissal of the case contending
that the alleged judgment of the High Court of Malaya should be
denied since on in face, it is tainted with want of jurisdiction, want
of notice to private respondent, collusion and/or fraud, and there
is a clear mistake of law or fact. Dismissal was denied by the
trial court considering that the grounds relied upon are not the
proper grounds in a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
Subsequently, private respondent filed its Answer with
Compulsory Counter claim and therein raised the grounds it
brought up in its motion to dismiss. In its Reply, the petitioner
contended that the High Court of Malaya acquired jurisdiction
over the person of private respondent by its voluntary
submission the court’s jurisdiction through its appointed
counsel. Furthermore, private respondent’s counsel waived any
and all objections to the High Court’s jurisdiction in a pleading
filed before the court.
RTC of Pasig rendered its decision dismissing petitioner’s
complaint. Petitioner interposed an appeal with the Court of
Appeals, but the appellate court dismissed the same and
affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Page 14 of 24
Whether the CA erred in denying recognition and enforcement
to the Malaysian Court judgment.
RULING:
Yes. Generally, in the absence of a special compact, no
sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a
judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country; however,
the rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have
established a usage among civilized states by which final
judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are
reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain
conditions that may vary in different countries.
In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign
tribunal may be recognized insofar as the immediate parties and
the underlying cause of action are concerned so long as it is
convincingly shown that there has been an opportunity for a full
and fair hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction; that the
trial upon regular proceedings has been conducted, following
due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant and under
a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial
administration of justice; and that there is nothing to indicate
either a prejudice in court and in the system of laws under which
it is sitting or fraud in procuring the judgment.
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the
country from which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the
basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the
giving of due notice in the foreign forum Under Section 50(b),
Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which was the governing
law at the time the instant case was decided by the trial court
and respondent appellate court, a judgment, against a person,
of a tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to pronounce
the same is presumptive evidence of a right as between the
parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
The judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want
of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact. In addition, under Section 3(n), Rule
131 of the Revised Rules of Court, a court, whether in the
Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was
acting in the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction. Hence, once the
authenticity of the foreign judgment is proved, the party
attacking a foreign judgment, is tasked with the burden of
overcoming its presumptive validity.
In the instant case, petitioner sufficiently established the
existence of the money judgment of the High Court of Malaya by
the evidence it offered. Petitioner’s sole witness, testified to the
effect that he is in active practice of the law profession in
Malaysia; that he was connected with Skrine and Company as
Legal Assistant up to 1981; that private respondent, then known
as Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines, was sued by his client, Asiavest Merchant Bankers
(M) Berhad, in Kuala Lumpur; that the writ of summons were
served on March 17, 1983 at the registered office of private
respondent and on March 21, 1983 on Cora S. Deala, a financial
planning officer of private respondent for Southeast Asia
operations; that upon the filing of the case, Messrs. Allen and
Gledhill, Advocates and Solicitors, with address at 24th Floor,
UMBC Building, Jalan Sulaiman, Kuala Lumpur, entered their
conditional appearance for private respondent questioning the
regularity of the service of the writ of summons but subsequently
withdrew the same when it realized that the writ was properly
served; that because private respondent failed to file a
statement of defense within two (2) weeks, petitioner filed an
application for summary judgment and submitted affidavits and
documentary evidence in support of its claim; that the matter
was then heard before the High Court of Kuala Lumpur in a
series of dates where private respondent was represented by
counsel; and that the end result of all these proceedings is the
judgment sought to be enforced.
In addition to the said testimonial evidence, petitioner also
offered the documentary evidence to support their claim.
Having thus proven, through the foregoing evidence, the
existence and authenticity of the foreign judgment, said foreign
judgment enjoys presumptive validity and the burden then fell
upon the party who disputes its validity, herein private
respondent, to prove otherwise. However, private respondent
failed to sufficiently discharge the burden that fell upon it – to
prove by clear and convincing evidence the grounds which it
relied upon to prevent enforcement of the Malaysian High Court
judgment.
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO Vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO
G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001
FACTS:
Rederick Recio (Filipino) was married to Editha Samson
(Australian). Shortly after their marriage, a decree of divorce was
issued by an Australian Family Court. Later on, Rederick
became an Australian citizen. He got married to Grace Garcia,
a Filipina. Rederick was declared as single and Filipino in their
marriage license. 3 years after their marriage, they lived
separately. Grace then filed a declaration of nullity of marriage
on the ground of bigamy. She alleged that Rederick had a prior
subsisting marriage at the time they were married. Rederick
contended that his first marriage had been validly dissolved by
a divorce decree. While the suit for declaration of nullity was
pending, Rederick secured a divorce decree from a family court
in Sydney. He now prayed in his answer that the complaint be
dismissed on the ground that it states no cause of action. The
trial court dissolved the marriage. The Australian divorce had
ended the marriage; thus, there was no more marital union to
nullify or annul.
A petition for review was filed before the Supreme Court seeking
to nullify the order of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether the divorce between Rederick and Editha Samson was
proven
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that the mere presentation of the
divorce decree of respondent’s marriage to Samson is
insufficient. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized
by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a
fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing
it. Furthermore, the divorce decree between respondent and
Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an
Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient;
compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be
demonstrated. The Supreme court also rejected the claim of
respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable
presumption or presumptive evidence as to his civil status based
on Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, for the simple
Page 15 of 24
reason that no proof has been presented on the legal effects of
the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.
Wolfgang O. Roehr Vs. Maria Carmen D. Rodriguez, Hon.
Judge Josefina Guevara-Salonga, Presiding Judge Of
Makati Rtc, Branch 149
G.R. No. 142820, June 20, 2003
FACTS:
Wolfgang Roehr, a German citizen, married Carmen Rodriguez,
a Filipino citizen. They had two children. Several years later,
Carmen filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
before RTC of Makati. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss but
this was denied.
Meanwhile, petitioner obtained a divorce decree in Germany
which was promulgated on 1997. Same court which decreed the
divorce also gave him parental custody over their two children.
In view of said decree, petitioner filed a second MD on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The second
MD was granted. Respondent filed a motion for partial
reconsideration with a prayer that the case should proceed for
the purpose of determining the custody of the children and
distribution of their properties. The trial court issued an order
partially setting aside the earlier decision. The issue on custody
and property relations must be tackled. Petitioner filed an MR
but was denied.
Petitioner then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the
SC. He contends that Judge Salonga acted with grave abuse of
discretion when she assumed jurisdiction over the issue on child
custody and their property relations. Said issue has already
been ruled upon by the German Court.
ISSUE:
Whether it is proper for Judge Salonga to assume jurisdiction
over the issue on property relations and child custody.
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the judge may proceed to
determine the issue regarding the custody of the two children.
As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in
other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal
effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the
children, must still be determined by our courts.Before our courts
can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as
the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it must
be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been
given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule
39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. - The effect of a judgment
of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce
the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is
conclusive upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment
may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact.
It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge
the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to
properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of
Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam,
as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely
constitutes prima facieevidence of the justness of the claim of a
party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.
In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent
was given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the
German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment
as res judicata with regard to the rights of petitioner to have
parental custody of their two children. The proceedings in the
German court were summary. As to what was the extent of
private respondent’s participation in the proceedings in the
German court, the records remain unclear. The divorce decree
itself states that neither has she commented on the
proceedings nor has she given her opinion to the Social
Services Office. Unlike petitioner who was represented by two
lawyers, private respondent had no counsel to assist her in said
proceedings. More importantly, the divorce judgment was
issued to petitioner by virtue of the German Civil Code provision
to the effect that when a couple lived separately for three years,
the marriage is deemed irrefutably dissolved. The decree did not
touch on the issue as to who the offending spouse was. Absent
any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of
the children, the trial court was correct in setting the issue for
hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support
and education mindful of the best interests of the children. This
is in consonance with the provision in the Child and Youth
Welfare Code that the child’s welfare is always the paramount
consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody.
On the matter of property relations, petitioner asserts that public
respondent exceeded the bounds of her jurisdiction when she
claimed cognizance of the issue concerning property relations
between petitioner and private respondent. Private respondent
herself has admitted in Par. 14 of her petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage dated August 26, 1996 filed with the RTC of
Makati, subject of this case, that: "[p]etitioner and respondent
have not acquired any conjugal or community property nor have
they incurred any debts during their marriage." Herein petitioner
did not contest this averment. Basic is the rule that a court shall
grant relief warranted by the allegations and the proof.Given the
factual admission by the parties in their pleadings that there is
no property to be accounted for, respondent judge has no basis
to assert jurisdiction in this case to resolve a matter no longer
deemed in controversy.
Gerbert R. Corpuz Vs. Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas And The
Solicitor General
G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010
FACTS:
Gerbert Corpuz acquired Canadian citizenship. Later on, he
married Daisylyn Sto. Tomas. Due to work, petitioner left for
Canada. When he returned, he was surprised to find out that
Page 16 of 24
respondent was having an affair with another man. Petitioner
went back to Canada and obtained a divorce decree. Two years
after, petitioner planned to remarry. He went to civil registry and
registered the Canadian divorce decree. Despite registration,
marriage between him and respondent remained subsisting
according to an official of NSO. Said official also said that the
decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent court.
Accordingly, petitioner filed a petition for judicial recognition of
foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved
(petition) with the RTC which was denied. RTC ruled that
petitioner was not the proper party to institute the action for
judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a
naturalized Canadian citizen.
Petitioner directly appealed said decision to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner can institute an action for judicial recognition
of the foreign divorce decree.
RULING:
Yes, petitioner can institute an action for judicial recognition of
foreign divorce decree.
RTC anchored its decision on the legislative intent of paragraph
2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. RTC was correct in limiting
the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino
spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien
spouse can claim no right under this provision. However, that
fact does not strip the petitioner of legal interest to petition the
RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The
foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity
with the alien’s national law have been duly proven according to
our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right
in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This
Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect
of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country,
having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as
follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the
judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of the thing;
and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the
judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the
foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite
interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition
of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared,
no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid
according to his or her national law.27
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce
judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera
explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect
within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of
another country."28 This means that the foreign judgment and its
authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on
evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to
show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or
herself.29 The recognition may be made in an action instituted
specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party
invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or
defense.
In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the
national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain
a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority,
Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This
Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2)
copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the
documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the
Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of
the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving
its authenticity,30 but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law
on divorce.31 Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply
dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence,
unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the
RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with
the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action,
given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina
wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the petition. A
remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to
oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner’s
presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law
or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to
ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made,
as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect
of res judicata between the parties, as provided in Section 48,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Tadeja vs. People, 496 SCRA 157
G.R. No. 145336 February 20, 2013
FACTS: During the celebration of the annual fiesta of Barangay,
Ruben Bernardo was hacked to death by the brothers Reynante,
Ricky, Ricardo, Ferdinand, and Plaridel – all surnamed Tadeja.
An Information for homicide for the death of Ruben was filed
against Reynante, Ricky, Ricardo, Ferdinand, and Plaridel.
The RTC issued a Decision finding Reynante, Ferdinand,
Plaridel, Ricardo and Ricky guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Page 17 of 24
homicide. Except for Plaridel, who absconded, all the other
accused (petitioners herein) appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings and Decision of the
RTC. Petitioners then filed with this Court a Petition for Review
under Rule 45. The SC affirmed the Decision and Resolution of
the CA.
Petitioners filed a Motion with Leave of Court to Vacate
Judgment and later on, a Supplemental Motion to Motion with
Leave of Court to Vacate Judgment Due to Supervening Event
alleging that the police finally arrested Plaridel. Also attached
was a statement, executed by Plaridel admitting therein that he
had killed Ruben.
SC treated the motion of petitioners as a second motion for
reconsideration and denied it on the ground that it was a
prohibited pleading. SC denied the motion of petitioners with
finality for lack of merit. The Decision was then recorded in the
Book of Entries of Judgments on July 26, 2007.
In a letter addressed to then Chief Justice, Ferdinand prayed for
the reopening of the case on the basis of the confession of
Plaridel. Petitioners filed a letter manifesting the hope that their
last motion would be favorably acted upon by this Court and
reiterating their request for the reopening of the case to receive
newly discovered evidence despite the fact that this Court’s
Decision affirming their conviction already became final and
executory on 26 July 2007.
ISSUE: Whether the case may be reopened to receive the newly
discovered evidence of petitioners
RULING: NO. Fundamental considerations of public policy and
sound practice necessitate that, at the risk of occasional errors,
the judgment or orders of courts should attain finality at some
definite time fixed by law. Otherwise, there would be no end to
litigation. This is the reason why we have consistently denied
petitioners’ motions for reconsideration of this Court’s Decision
and subsequent pleas for the reopening of the case.
A new trial may only be granted by the court on motion of the
accused, or motu proprio with the consent of the accused "at
any time before a judgment of conviction becomes final." In this
case, petitioners’ judgment of conviction already became final
and executory on 26 July 2007. Thus, pleas for the remand of
this case to the trial court for the conduct of a new trial may no
longer be entertained.
Petitioners premise their motion for a new trial on the ground of
newly discovered evidence, i.e. Plaridel’s extrajudicial
confession.
Newly discovered evidence refers to that which (a) is discovered
after trial; (b) could not have been discovered and produced at
the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) is
material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching;
and (d) is of such weight that it would probably change the
judgment if admitted.58
The most important requisite is that the evidence could not have
been discovered and produced at the trial even with reasonable
diligence; hence, the term "newly discovered." The confession
of Plaridel does not meet this requisite. He participated in the
trial before the RTC and even gave testimony as to his defense.
It was only after he and petitioners had been convicted by the
trial court that he absconded. Thus, the contention that his
confession could not have been obtained during trial does not
hold water.
Oropeza Marketing Corporation vs. Allied Banking
Corporation, 393 SCRA 278
G.R. No. 129788 December 3, 2002
FACTS: Allied Banking Corporation extended a loan to
petitioners Oropeza Marketing Corporation (OMC) and the
spouses Oropeza.
To secure this obligation, petitioners executed a Promissory
Note, a Surety Agreement, and a Real Estate Mortgage over
their properties in favor of the respondent bank.
Due to financial constraints, petitioners allegedly defaulted and
reneged on their obligation. Thus, Allied Bank filed a collection
suit (Civil Case #1) with an application for a writ of preliminary
attachment.
While its application for a writ of attachment was pending, Allied
Bank discovered that the Oropeza spouses had executed an
Absolute Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage in favor of
Solid Gold Corporation, covering most of petitioner spouses real
properties, including those mortgaged to respondent.
Allied Bank then filed a complaint for the annulment of said Deed
of Sale (Civil Case #2). Allied Bank likewise instituted a separate
criminal complaint for fraudulent insolvency under Article 314 of
the Revised Penal Code against petitioner spouses before the
RTC (Criminal Case).
In the meantime, the court in Civil Case #1 issued an order
granting Allied Banks application for attachment and fixed the
amount of the attachment bond. Allied Bank, however, failed to
submit an attachment bond and instead moved that the service
of the summons upon petitioner be held in abeyance.
Consequently, the case was archived by the lower court.
The lower court ordered the revival of the Civil Case #1 but held
in abeyance respondents’ motion to reduce the amount of the
bond.
Respondent moved for the suspension of the proceedings in the
Civil Case #1 citing the pendency of the Criminal Case. The
lower court granted the motion and again ordered Civil Case #1
archived. Allied Bank then moved for reconsideration resulting
in the reopening of the Civil Case #1, with respect to OMC alone.
The RTC rendered judgment in the Civil Case #2 declaring the
Deed of Sale valid and that defendant's accounts have been
satisfied. Respondent Allied Bank appealed to the Court of
Appeals (CA Case #1)
The lower court hearing Civil Case #1 dismissed respondent’s
complaint on the ground of litis pendentia.
Dissatisfied with this turn of events, respondent elevated the
case to the appellate court (CA Case #2) which reversed and
set aside the decision of the trial court in Civil Case #1. Hence,
this petition for review.
Meanwhile, the CA, in CA Case #2, sustained the finding of the
trial court in Civil Case #2 that the Deed of Sale was valid.
Petitioners now contend that the affirmance of the lower court’s
ruling in the Civil Case #2 by the appellate court in CA Case #2
would constitute res judicata in Civil Case #1.
Page 18 of 24
ISSUE: Whether the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA
Case #2 constitute res judicata insofar as Civil Case #1 is
concerned
RULING: NOT ENTIRELY. The principle of res judicata has two
aspects, namely: (a) “bar by prior judgment” as enunciated in
Rule 39, Section 49 (b) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure;
and (b) “conclusiveness of judgment” which is contained in Rule
39, Section 47 (c).
There is “bar by prior judgment” when, as between the first case
where the judgment was rendered and the second case that is
sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter,
and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first
case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action.
But where there is identity of parties in the first and second
cases, but no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is
conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly
controverted and determined and not as to matters merely
involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata known as
“conclusiveness of judgment.” Stated differently, any right, fact,
or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in
the determination of an action before a competent court in which
judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the
judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the
parties and their privies whether or not the claim, demand,
purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.
There being substantial identity of parties but no identity of
causes of action, the applicable aspect of res judicata in the
instant case is conclusiveness of judgment. There is
conclusiveness of judgment only as to the matters actually
determined by the trial court in Civil Case #2 as affirmed by the
CA in CA Case #2. These include the findings that: (1) the
promissory note relied upon by respondent bank is spurious;
and (2) that the loan obligation of the Oropeza spouses has
been settled and paid.
People vs. Manuel Escobar
G.R. No. 214300, July 26, 2017
FACTS: Escobar was suspected of conspiring in the kidnap for
ransom of Mary Grace Cheng-Rosagas (Mary Grace), daughter
of Filipino-Chinese businessman Robert G. Cheng (Robert), and
two (2) other victims.
Escobar filed a petition for bail (First Bail Petition), which was
denied by the RTC and by the CA. A subsequent development
in the accused's case compelled him to file a second petition for
bail (Second Bail Petition). The RTC denied this on the ground
of res judicata. However, the CA overturned the RTC order and
granted the Second Bail Petition.
According to the CA, Escobar's Second Bail Petition was not
barred by res judicata, which applies only if the former judgment
is a final order or judgment and not an interlocutory order. An
order denying a petition for bail is interlocutory in nature.
The prosecution, through the OSG, filed a Petition for Review
via Rule 45 before this Court. In its Petition, prosecution avers
that the doctrine of res judicata must be respected.
ISSUE: Whether Manuel Escobar's second petition for bail is
barred by res judicata
RULING: NO. Escobar's Second Bail Petition is not barred by
res judicata as this doctrine is not recognized in criminal
proceedings.
Expressly applicable in civil cases, res judicata settles with
finality the dispute between the parties or their successors-in-
interest. Res judicata, as found in Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, is a principle in civil law and "has no bearing on
criminal proceedings.” Rule 124, Section 18 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure states:
Section 18. Application of certain rules in civil procedure to
criminal cases. - The provisions of Rules 42, 44 to 46 and 48 to
56 relating to procedure in the Court of Appeals and in the
Supreme Court in original and appealed civil cases shall be
applied to criminal cases insofar as they are applicable and not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.
Indeed, while certain provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure
may be applied in criminal cases, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure is excluded from the enumeration under Rule 124 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
An interlocutory order denying an application for bail, in this case
being criminal in nature, does not give rise to res judicata. Even
if we are to expand the argument of the prosecution in this case
to contemplate "res judicata in prison grey" or double jeopardy,
the same will still not apply. Double jeopardy requires that the
accused has been convicted or acquitted or that the case
against him or her has been dismissed or terminated without his
express consent. Here, while there was an initial ruling on
Escobar's First Bail Petition, Escobar has not been convicted,
acquitted, or has had his case dismissed or terminated.
Even assuming that this case allows for res judicata as applied
in civil cases, Escobar's Second Bail Petition cannot be barred
as there is no final judgment on the merits.
In deciding on a matter before it, a court issues either a final
judgment or an interlocutory order. A final judgment "leaves
nothing else to be done" because the period to appeal has
expired or the highest tribunal has already ruled on the case. In
contrast, an order is considered interlocutory if, between the
beginning and the termination of a case, the court decides on a
point or matter that is not yet a final judgment on the entire
controversy.
A decision denying a petition for bail settles only a collateral
matter—whether accused is entitled to provisional liberty—and
is not a final judgment on accused's guilt or innocence.
Being an interlocutory order, the Court of Appeals Decision
denying Escobar's First Bail Petition did not have the effect of
res judicata.
St. Aviation Services Co., Pte., Ltd. vs. Grand International
Airways, Inc., 505 SCRA 30
G.R. No. 140288 October 23, 2006
FACTS:
St. Aviation Services Co., Pte., Ltd., petitioner, is a foreign
corporation based in Singapore executed an Agreement for the
Maintenance and Modification of Airbus with Grand International
Airways, Inc., respondent, a domestic corporation engaged in
airline operations.
Page 19 of 24
Petitioner undertook the contracted works and thereafter
promptly delivered the aircrafts to respondent. Petitioner billed
respondent. But despite petitioners repeated demands,
respondent failed to pay, in violation of the terms agreed upon.
Thus, petitioner filed with the High Court of the Republic of
Singapore an action for the sum of money.
The Singapore Court issued a Writ of Summons to be served
extraterritorially or outside Singapore upon respondent. It
sought the assistance of the sheriff of Pasay City to effect
service of the summons upon respondent. However, despite
receipt of summons, respondent failed to answer the claim.
On motion of petitioner, the Singapore High Court rendered a
judgment by default against respondent.
Petitioner filed with the RTC of Pasay City, a Petition for
Enforcement of Judgment.
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition on two
grounds: (1) the Singapore High Court did not acquire
jurisdiction over its person; and (2) the foreign judgment sought
to be enforced is void for having been rendered in violation of its
right to due process.
The RTC denied respondents motion to dismiss, holding that
neither one of the two grounds are among the grounds for a
motion to dismiss under Rule 16.
Respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari assailing
the RTC Order denying its motion to dismiss.
The CA issued its Decision granting the petition and setting
aside the Orders of the RTC without prejudice to the right of
private respondent to initiate another proceeding before the
proper court to enforce its claim.
Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the judgment by default of the Singapore High
Court is enforceable in the Philippines
RULING: YES. In the absence of a special contract, no
sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a
judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country; however,
under the rules of comity, utility and convenience, nations have
established a usage among civilized states by which final
judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are
reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain
conditions that may vary in different countries. Certainly, the
Philippine legal system has long ago accepted into its
jurisprudence and procedural rules the viability of an action for
enforcement of foreign judgment, as well as the requisites for
such valid enforcement, as derived from internationally
accepted doctrines.
A foreign judgment or order against a person is merely
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties. It may
be repelled, among others, by want of jurisdiction of the issuing
authority or by want of notice to the party against whom it is
enforced. The party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden
of overcoming the presumption of its validity.
Matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the
service of process upon a defendant are governed by the lex fori
or the internal law of the forum, which in this case is the law of
Singapore.
Here, a copy of the Writ of Summons was served on the
Defendant at ground floor, APMC Building, 136 Amorsolo corner
Gamboa Street, 1229 Makati City, or elsewhere in the
Philippines.”
In the Philippines, jurisdiction over a party is acquired by service
of summons by the sheriff, his deputy or other proper court
officer either personally by handing a copy thereof to the
defendant or by substituted service.
Considering that the Writ of Summons was served upon
respondent in accordance with our Rules, jurisdiction was
acquired by the Singapore High Court over its person. Clearly,
the judgment of default rendered by that court against
respondent is valid.
Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc. vs. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue
G.R. No. 167330 September 18, 2009
FACTS:
Respondent CIR sent petitioner a formal demand letter and the
corresponding assessment notices demanding the payment of
deficiency taxes. The deficiency [documentary stamp tax (DST)]
assessment was imposed on petitioner’s health care agreement
with the members of its health care program pursuant to the Tax
Code.
Petitioner protested the assessment. As respondent did not act
on the protest, petitioner filed a petition for review in the Court
of Tax Appeals (CTA) seeking the cancellation of the deficiency
VAT and DST assessments.
The CTA rendered a decision partially granting its petition.
Respondent appealed the CTA decision to the [Court of Appeals
(CA)] insofar as it cancelled the DST assessment. He claimed
that petitioner’s health care agreement was a contract of
insurance subject to DST.
The CA rendered its decision. It held that petitioner’s health care
agreement was in the nature of a non-life insurance contract
subject to DST.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the CA denied it.
Hence, petitioner filed this case.
The Court denied the petition and affirmed the CA’s decision.
We held that petitioner’s health care agreement during the
pertinent period was in the nature of non-life insurance which is
a contract of indemnity. SC also ruled that petitioner’s contention
that it is a health maintenance organization (HMO) and not an
insurance company is irrelevant because contracts between
companies like petitioner and the beneficiaries under their plans
are treated as insurance contracts. Moreover, DST is not a tax
on the business transacted but an excise on the privilege,
opportunity or facility offered at exchanges for the transaction of
the business.
Unable to accept our verdict, petitioner filed the present motion
for reconsideration and supplemental motion for
reconsideration.
In support of one of its argument, petitioner cites the August 29,
2001 minute resolution of this Court dismissing the appeal in
Philippine National Bank (G.R. No. 148680). Petitioner argues
that the dismissal of G.R. No. 148680 by minute resolution was
a judgment on the merits; hence, the Court should apply the CA
Page 20 of 24
ruling there that a health care agreement is not an insurance
contract.

ISSUE: Whether this Court is bound by the ruling of the CA in

CIR v. Philippine National Bank that a health care agreement of
Philamcare Health Systems is not an insurance contract for
purposes of the DST

RULING: YES. It is true that, although contained in a minute

resolution, our dismissal of the petition was a disposition of the
merits of the case. When we dismissed the petition, we
effectively affirmed the CA ruling being questioned. As a result,
our ruling in that case has already become final. When a minute
resolution denies or dismisses a petition for failure to comply
with formal and substantive requirements, the challenged
decision, together with its findings of fact and legal conclusions,
are deemed sustained. But what is its effect on other cases?

With respect to the same subject matter and the same issues
concerning the same parties, it constitutes res judicata.
However, if other parties or another subject matter (even with
the same parties and issues) is involved, the minute resolution
is not binding precedent. Thus, in CIR v. Baier-Nickel, the Court
noted that a previous case, CIR v. Baier-Nickel involving the
same parties and the same issues, was previously disposed of
by the Court thru a minute resolution sustaining the ruling of the
CA. Nonetheless, the Court ruled that the previous case "ha(d)
no bearing" on the latter case because the two cases involved
different subject matters as they were concerned with the
taxable income of different taxable years.

Besides, there are substantial, not simply formal, distinctions

between a minute resolution and a decision. The constitutional
requirement under the first paragraph of Section 14, Article VIII
of the Constitution that the facts and the law on which the
judgment is based must be expressed clearly and distinctly
applies only to decisions, not to minute resolutions. A minute
resolution is signed only by the clerk of court by authority of the
justices, unlike a decision. It does not require the certification of
the Chief Justice. Moreover, unlike decisions, minute resolutions
are not published in the Philippine Reports. Finally, the proviso
of Section 4(3) of Article VIII speaks of a decision.73 Indeed, as
a rule, this Court lays down doctrines or principles of law which
constitute binding precedent in a decision duly signed by the
members of the Court and certified by the Chief Justice.

Accordingly, since petitioner was not a party in G.R. No. 148680

and since petitioner’s liability for DST on its health care
agreement was not the subject matter of G.R. No. 148680,
petitioner cannot successfully invoke the minute resolution in
that case (which is not even binding precedent) in its favor.

Page 21 of 24
Mijares vs. Ranada, 455 SCRA 397
G.R. No. 139325 April 12, 2005
FACTS: The petitioners in this case are victims of human rights
violations during the martial law era. A complaint was filed with
the US District Court of Hawaii against the Estate of former
Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
The US District Court rendered a Final Judgment awarding the
plaintiffs a total of almost Two Billion dollars. The Final
Judgment was eventually affirmed by the US Court of Appeals.
Petitioners filed a Complaint with the Makati RTC for the
enforcement of the Final Judgment alleging that since the
decision of the US District Court had become final and
executory, it may now be recognized and enforced in the
Philippines, pursuant to Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
The Marcos Estate filed a motion to dismiss, raising, among
others, the non-payment of the correct filing fees. It alleged that
petitioners had only paid P410.00 as filing fee, notwithstanding
the fact that they sought to enforce a monetary amount of
damages.
The respondent judge dismissed the complaint without prejudice
opining that the subject matter of the complaint was capable of
pecuniary estimation, as it involved a judgment rendered by a
foreign court ordering the payment of definite sums of money.
The RTC estimated the proper amount of filing fees was
approximately P472 Million, which had not been paid.
Petitioner’s filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which Judge
Ranada denied. From this denial, petitioners filed a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the twin orders of respondent
judge.
Petitioners submit that their action is incapable of pecuniary
estimation as the subject matter of the suit is the enforcement of
a foreign judgment, and not an action for the collection of a sum
of money or recovery of damages.
The Commission on Human Rights was permitted to intervene.
The CHR argues that the RTC erred in interpreting the action for
the execution of a foreign judgment as a new case, in violation
of the principle that once a case has been decided between the
same parties in one country on the same issue with finality, it
can no longer be relitigated again in another country.
ISSUE: Whether the action filed with the lower court is a money
claim against an estate not based on judgment
RULING: NO. Petitioners complaint may have been lodged
against an estate, but it is clearly based on a judgment, the Final
Judgment of the US District Court.
It is necessary for an action to be filed in order to enforce a
foreign judgment, even if such judgment has conclusive effect
as in the case of in rem actions, if only for the purpose of allowing
the losing party an opportunity to challenge the foreign
judgment, and in order for the court to properly determine its
efficacy.
The rules are silent as to what initiatory procedure must be
undertaken in order to enforce a foreign judgment in the
Philippines. But there is no question that the filing of a civil
complaint is an appropriate measure for such purpose.
The actionable issues are generally restricted to a review of
jurisdiction of the foreign court, the service of personal notice,
collusion, fraud, or mistake of fact or law. The limitations on
review is in consonance with a strong and pervasive policy in all
legal systems to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues.
In a complaint for the enforcement of a foreign judgment
awarding damages from the same tortfeasor, for the violation of
the same right through the same manner of action, the cause of
action derives not from the tortious act but from the foreign
judgment itself.
The matter at hand is capable of pecuniary estimation, down to
the last cent. While the subject matter of the action is
undoubtedly the enforcement of a foreign judgment, the effect
of a providential award would be the adjudication of a sum of
money. There is no denying that the enforcement of the foreign
judgment will necessarily result in the award of a definite sum of
money.
At the same time, it is also an action based on judgment against
an estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit of Section 7(a) of
Rule 141. It is covered by Section 7(b)(3), involving as it does,
other actions not involving property. Notably, the amount paid
as docket fees by the petitioners on the premise that it was an
action incapable of pecuniary estimation corresponds to the
same amount required for other actions not involving property.
The petitioners thus paid the correct amount of filing fees.
In this particular circumstance, given that the complaint is
lodged against an estate and is based on the US District Courts
Final Judgment, this foreign judgment may, for purposes of
classification under the governing procedural rule, be deemed
as subsumed under Section 7(b)(3) of Rule 141, i.e., within the
class of all other actions not involving property. Thus, only the
blanket filing fee of minimal amount is required.
BPI Securities Corporation vs. Guevara
752 SCRA 342, G.R. No. 167052 March 11, 2015
FACTS:
Guevara was hired by Ayala Corp. and later became the Head
of the Legal Dept. of Ayala Corp. and then the President of
PHILSEC and thereafter served as VP of Ayala Corp. until his
retirement.
One of Guevara’s obligation as President of PHILSEC was to
resolve the outstanding loans of Ventura Ducat which amounted
to US$31 Million.
Ducat proposed to settle his debts by an exchange of assets –
particularly a real estate he owns in Houston, Texas, in
partnership with Daic, the President of 1488, Inc., a US based
corporation. The negotiations culminated in an Agreement with
ATHONA.
However, after acquiring the properties, ATHONA had difficulty
in selling the same. Despite repeated demands by 1488, Inc.,
there was failure to pay the balance of the purchase price for the
property. Also, PHILSEC and AIFL refused to release Ducat’s
stock portfolio, claiming that they were defrauded into believing
that the property had a fair market value higher than it actually
had.
1488, Inc. instituted a suit against PHILSEC, AIFL, and
ATHONA. PHILSEC, AIFL, and ATHONA filed counterclaims
Page 22 of 24
against 1488, Inc., Daic, Craig, Ducat, and respondent, for the
recovery of damages.
Respondent then moved in open court to sanction petitioner
(formerly PHILSEC), AIFL, and ATHONA based on Rule 11 of
the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The U.S. District
Court also ruled favorably on respondent’s pending motion for
sanction. The jury returned a verdict for 1488, Inc..
Petitioner, AIFL, and ATHONA appealed the jury verdict, as well
as the aforementioned order of the U.S. District Court for them
to pay respondent US$49,450.00. The U.S. Court of Appeals
rendered its Decision affirming the verdict.
The order of the U.S. District Court attained finality as it was no
longer appealed by petitioner, AIFL, and ATHONA.
Guevara now filed a Complaint for the enforcement of the Order
of the U.S. District Court. Respondent prayed that petitioner be
ordered to pay the sum of $49, 450.
Petitioner opposed the enforcement of the Order on the grounds
that it was rendered upon a clear mistake of law or fact and/or
in violation of its right to due process.
The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondent ordering
BPI Securities Corporation to pay respondent. Petitioner
appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the
decision. Hence, petitioner seeks recourse from this Court via
the instant Petition for Review, insisting that the CA erred in
affirming the RTC judgment which enforced the Order of the
U.S. District Court.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in affirming the decision of rtc
enforcing the order of the US District Court
RULING: NO. An action for the enforcement of a foreign
judgment or final order in this jurisdiction is governed by Rule
39, Section 48 of the Rules of Court, which provides: SEC. 48.
Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a
judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows: (a)
In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the
judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing;
and (b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the
judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors-in-interest by a
subsequent title. In either case, the judgment or final order may
be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice
to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
The Order of the U.S. District Court is presumptive evidence of
the right of respondent to demand from petitioner the payment
of US$49,450.00 even in this jurisdiction.
In complete disregard of the limited review by Philippine courts
of foreign judgments or final orders, petitioner opposes the
enforcement of the Order of the U.S. District Court on the very
same allegations, arguments, and evidence presented before
and considered by the U.S. District Court when it rendered its
verdict imposing the Rule 11 sanction against petitioner.
Petitioner attempts to convince the Court that it is necessary to
look into the merits of the Order because the U.S. District Court
committed clear mistake of law and fact in issuing the same. The
Court, however, is not convinced. A Philippine court will not
substitute its own interpretation of any provision of the law or
rules of procedure of another country, nor review and pronounce
its own judgment on the sufficiency of evidence presented
before a competent court of another jurisdiction. Any purported
mistake petitioner attributes to the U.S. District Court in the
latter’s issuance of the Order dated March 13, 1990 would
merely constitute an error of judgment in the exercise of its
legitimate jurisdiction, which could have been corrected by a
timely appeal before the U.S. Court of Appeals.
Policarpio vs. Active Bank
566 SCRA 27, G.R. No. 157125 September 19, 2008
FACTS:
Spouses Septem and Grelita Ricaza mortgaged a parcel of land
to respondent Active Bank. For failure to settle their obligation,
respondent foreclosed the mortgage. The spouses Ricaza also
failed to redeem the property during the redemption period.
Hence, respondent consolidated its ownership over the
property.
Respondent subsequently filed a Petition for Issuance of Writ of
Possession with the RTC. Petitioner Iluminada Policarpio
opposed it and submitted a Deed of Sale of the property
executed by Septem in her favor.
The trial court ordered the issuance of a Writ of Possession. It
observed that the Deed of Sale appears to be void since only
Septem signed it and it was not shown that he was authorized
by Grelita to sell the conjugal property.
The court sheriff together with respondents’ employees entered
the property and removed petitioner’s personal belongings.
However, respondent was able to occupy only a portion of the
property due to the timely intervention of the Muntinlupa Police
and the village security personnel.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA and sought the
nullification of the trial courts orders arguing that she was a third
party in possession of the property contemplated under Section
33, Rule 39 and thus, the trial court could not issue the Writ of
Possession in favor of respondent.
The CA denied the petition. It ruled that the validity of the sale in
petitioners favor was questionable since only Septem signed the
deed. It also noted that unlike the mortgage, the Deed of Sale
was not registered.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration which the appellate court
denied. Hence, this recourse.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner is a third party in possession of the
property contemplated under Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court such as to preclude the trial court from issuing a Writ of
Possession in favor of respondent
RULING: NO. Respondent has no legal obligation to honor
petitioner’s possession of the property. Rather conversely, it is
petitioner who has the legal obligation to honor respondent’s
prior ownership and existing right to possess the property.
Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which relates to the
right of possession of a purchaser of property in an extrajudicial
foreclosure sale provides:
SEC. 33. Under the expiration of the right of redemption, the
purchaser or redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire
all the rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment obligor to
the property as of the time of the levy. The possession of the
Page 23 of 24
property shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner by
the same officer unless a third party is actually holding the
property adversely to the judgment obligor.
Ordinarily, a purchaser of property in an extrajudicial foreclosure
sale is entitled to possession of the property. Thus, whenever
the purchaser prays for a writ of possession, the trial court has
to issue it as a matter of course. However, the obligation of the
trial court to issue a writ of possession ceases to be ministerial
once it appears that there is a third party in possession of the
property claiming a right adverse to that of the debtor/mortgagor.
Where such third party exists, the trial court should conduct a
hearing to determine the nature of his adverse possession.
The trial and appellate courts found the validity of the sale in
petitioners favor questionable since only Septem signed the
Deed of Sale and it was not shown that he was authorized by
Grelita to sell the conjugal property. In our view, however, even
if both Ricaza spouses had signed, the result would still be the
same, given the circumstances in this case. In any event, we
note that the deed was not even registered, a truly fatal defect
in this case.
Petitioner’s reliance on the certified true copy of the TCT which
was given to her by Septem, is misplaced. It is settled that a
person dealing with registered property is charged with notice
only of such burdens and claims which are annotated on the title.
Yet, petitioner simply believed Septem’s assurance that the title
was clean and accepted a copy consisting only of the first page
sans the dorsal page where respondent’s mortgage was
annotated. What is more, we find it hard to believe that petitioner
did not compel the spouses Ricaza to register the sale in her
favor and to have the proper title issued in her name. As a
lawyer, petitioner should have been more circumspect in
protecting her interests.
LZK Holdings and Development Corporation vs. Planters
Development Bank
714 SCRA 294, G.R. No. 187973 January 20, 2014
FACTS: LZK Holdings obtained a loan from Planters Bank and
secured the same with a Real Estate Mortgage over its lot. Due
to LZK Holdings' failure to pay its loan, Planters Bank
extrajudicially foreclosed the real estate mortgage thereon and
the lot was sold at a public auction. Planters Bank emerged as
the highest bidder during the auction sale and a certificate of
sale was registered.
LZK Holdings filed before the RTC Makati a complaint for
annulment of extra judicial foreclosure, mortgage contract,
promissory note and damages. LZK Holdings also prayed for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) or writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin the consolidation of title over the
lot by Planters Bank.
Planters Bank filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of a writ
of possession with the RTC-San Fernando.
The RTC-Makati issued a TRO enjoining Planters Bank from
consolidating its title over the property. The RTC-Makati also
ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction for the
same purpose, but the writ was issued only after LZK Holdings'
posting of a bond.
In the meantime, Planters Bank succeeded in consolidating its
ownership over the property. However, the proceedings for its
ex-parte motion for the issuance of a writ of possession was
suspended by the RTC-San Fernando
In view of the TRO and injunction issued by the RTC-Makati.
Planters Bank moved for reconsideration but its motion was
denied by the RTC-San Fernando.
Upon motion of LZK Holdings, the RTC-Makati declared as null
and void the consolidated title of Planters Bank. Such ruling was
affirmed by the CA. When the matter reached the SC, it
sustained the CA's judgment.
Planters Bank also appealed the Order of RTC-San Fernando
which held in abeyance the resolution of its ex-parte motion for
the issuance of a writ of possession. This time, Planters Bank
was victorious. The CA granted the appeal and annulled the
assailed order of the RTC-San Fernando.
Aggrieved, LZK Holdings sought recourse with the SC in a
petition for review but SC affirmed the CA's ruling and decreed
that Planters Bank may apply for and is entitled to a writ of
possession as the purchaser of the property in the foreclosure
sale.
LZK Holdings filed a petition for review assailing the decision of
the CA affirming the order of the RTC of San Fernando which
issued the writ of possession in favor of Planters Bank
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in affirming the order of the RTC
issuing of a writ of possession in favor of Planters Bank
RULING: NO. Under the principle of conclusiveness of
judgment, the right of Planter’s Bank to a writ of possession as
adjudged is binding and conclusive on the parties. The doctrine
of res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment postulates that
“when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by
a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for such
trial has been given, the judgment of the court, as long as it
remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and
those in privity with them.”
LZK Holdings can no longer question Planter Bank’s right to a
writ of possession over the subject property because the
doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of
such particular issue.
The purchaser in foreclosure sale may take possession of the
property even before the expiration of the redemption period by
filing an ex parte motion for such purpose and upon posting of
the necessary bond.
No hearing is required prior to the issuance of a writ of
possession. The proceeding in a petition for a writ of possession
is ex parte and summary in nature. It is a judicial proceeding
brought for the benefit of one party only and without notice by
the court to any person adverse of interest. It is a proceeding
wherein relief is granted without giving the person against whom
the relief is sought an opportunity to be heard. By its very nature,
an ex parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession is a non-
litigious proceeding. It is a judicial proceeding for the
enforcement of one’s right of possession as purchaser in a
foreclosure sale. It is not an ordinary suit filed in court, by which
one party sues another for the enforcement of a wrong or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
Page 24 of 24