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This book is an investigation into the logic of truth. The investigation is provoked
by the liar paradox, which shows that our naive understanding of truth, which is
characterized by the acceptance of Tarski's schema
(T) r$7 is true if and only if $
is inconsistcnt. The aim of the investigation is to develop a new understanding
of truth that does not fall prey to contradictions.
There are scarcely any philosophical problems of greater urgency than the liar
paradox, for there are scarcely any concepts more central to our philosophical
understanding than the concept of truth. The notions of truth and reference lie at
the very center of all our attempts to understand how our language is linked to
the world around us. These are the notions we need to use if we want to understand
the astonishing fact that my utterance of the sentence 'The Yuan emperors
ruled harshly' is son~ehowintimately connected with events that happened seven
hundred years ago half a world away. The liar antinomy and the closely related
antinomies involving reference show us, quite unmistakably, that our present
way of thinking about truth and reference is inconsistent. Unless we can devise
new ways of thinking about truth and reference which rise above the antinomies,
we shall not have even the beginning of a satisfactory understanding of human
language.
We want to replace our naive conception of truth by a scientific conception
that serves the same purposes without falling prey to inconsistencies. The relation
between our old and new conceptions of truth will be the same as the relation
between our old, prescientific understanding of space and time and the understand-
ing of space and time that we get from modern science.
Where do we begin'? Schema (T) is so deeply embedded in our ordinary
thinking about truth that we might fear that, once we decide to give (T) up, we
should become so badly disoriented that we would not be able to talk about truth
at all. A starting point is provided by some advice of Wittgenstein. In trying to
understand a philosophically troublesome concept, do not focus all your attention
upon how the concept behaves when it is on philosophical holiday. Pay attention
to the everyday, unproblematic, nonphilosophical work the concept does.
When we look at the nonphilosophical work done by the concept of truth,
vii
what strikes us most proniincntly is that we can use the notion of truth in order of truth for a formal language : j within 'Y itself. then to see if these sarrie
to endorse or to deny a statement o r set of statements without being required techniques will not enable us to develop a theory of truth for E n g l ~ s hwithin
actually to repeat the statements; it is enough that we be able to namc thc English itself. We are employing Wittgenstein's method of language games.
statements. Thus. if l say practicing our philosophical moves in a simplified setting before trying them out
on English.
Every el- c,crtlzcdr.cr pronounccmcnt of the Pope is true The big philosophical cause this book aims ~ ~ l t i m a t e to
l y promote is the unity
1 have endorsed all of the r.1- (,crthcdt.rrpronouncement.; of the Pope. I have. in a of science. The dominant opinion has it that the liar antinomy proves that it is
sense. asserted the conjunction of all the Pope's o.r c~rthrrli-rrpronouncements. never possible to develop a successful theory of truth for a language within the
Without employing the notion of truth. I could not do this. for 1 surely cannot language itself: instead. one must develop the theory of' truth for a language Y'
repeat 1111 of the Pope's pronouncements. Using thc notion of truth in the ordinary within a metalanguage that is richer than Y in expressive power. This implies
way. we are able. in effect. to produce the conjunction or thc disjunction of an that, since we have no metalanguage richer than English. we cannot develop a
arbitrary named set of sentences. Enabling us to d o this is essential to the theory of truth for English, or for any natural language. We can develop theories
nonphilosophical usefi~lnessof the ordinar) notion of truth. and if our scientifi- of truth for various fragments of a n a t ~ ~ r language;
al for exariiple we can develop
cally reconstructed notion of truth is to continue to perform the ~ ~ s e f work
u l that a theory of truth for thc fragment of the language that we use when we talk about
our ordinary notion performs. then it. too. must enable us, in effect. to for111 chemistry. But we cannot extend the theory to encompass the language we use
conjunctions and disjunctions of named sets of sentences. Although this require- when we talk about language. We can develop a unified zoology that takes
ment by no means uniquely determines our new theory of truth. it tells us a great account of all the animals, and a unified astronomy that takes account of all the
deal about what the new theory ought to look like. the heavenly bodies. But we cannot. according to the dominant view, develop a
tiere I would like to develop a specilic proposal for a way of thinking about unified linguistics that takes account of a11 natural languages: we cannot even
truth which will. I hope, preserve those logical features which make our present develop a linguistic theory that takes account of the entirety of any particular
notion of truth so singularly useful as a practical means for conveying information. natural language. Unlike natural phenomena. human languages lie mysteriously
yet avoid the contradictions that niake our present notion of truth s o singularly beyond the reach of scientific inquiry.
unsuitable as a vehicle for theoretical understanding. The specific proposal is to By providing an alternative to the dominant view, this work aims to encourage
treat 'true' as a vague term. I d o not suppose that. in ordinary usage, 'true' is the prospects for a unified science that treats nature and language as parts of a
simply a vague term like other vague terms. 'True,' in ordinary usage, displays united whole. I hopc to promote the outlook that human language is a product of
many of the characteristics typical of vague terms. but it displays other characteris- human culture and human culture is part of the natural order, not inherently either
tics all its own, notably the propensity to paradox. The proposal here is that we more mysterious or less intelligible than the planetary orbits.
replace our ordinary usage of 'true' by a scientifically respectable usage that treats This book started out, several revisions ago. as my doctoral dissertation for
'tl-ue' simply as a vague predicate like other vague predicates. This reformed the Logic and Methodology of Science program at the University of California
usage of 'true' will, I shall claim, bc satisfactory both as a basis for a theoretical at Berkeley. Berkeley is not only a fun place to visit, it is an excellent place to
understanding of the connection between language and the world and as a means g o to graduate school. and I owe a great deal to the faculty there and to my fellow
for accon~plishingthe practical. nonphilosophical work now ably performed by students.
our naive usage. My dissertation adviser was Charles Chihara. who spent a great dcal of time
We shall develop rules of inference governing the reformed usage of 'true' and effort helping mc with this project. His insights have proven invaluable;
and show that these rules enable us to employ the reformed usage in just the ways without his help, this book could not have been written.
we ernployed the naive usage to simulate con.junction and disjunction of named Jack Silver has given me a trernendous amount of help. He was very generous
sets of sentences. The paradoxes arise. it will be argued, from the misapplication with his time and ideas. and his extraordinary combination of mathernatical and
of these rules of inference in natural but fallacious ways. philosophical abilities have made his assistance invaluable.
The ultimate aini of this endeavor is to develop a theory of truth for English, Let me express niy thanks to three other members of the faculty, Ernest
but I d o not attenlpt anything so ambitious here. Here I work entirely with formal Adams, George Myro, and Bruce Vermazen. and to two of my fellow students,
languages, doing work that is preliminary to the development of a theory of truth Shaughan 1,avine and Steven Yablo.
for English. The plan is to devisc techniques that enable us to develop a theory Since leaving Berkeley. I have been at the University of Arizona. I used a
version of the book in a seminar in which Marian David. Charles Latting. Steven
Laurence, and Scott Sturgeon went carefully through the text, making valuable
suggestions. Let me also thank Keith Lehrer for his help.
Portions of the paper have been read to the philosophy colloquia at the
University of California at Irvine, at the University of Arizona, and at Rutgers
Our Project
University, to the mathematics colloquium at the University of Colorado at
Boulder, to a conference on paradoxes and type-free theories at the University of
Texas at Austin, and to a symposium at the Pacific Division meetings of the
American Philosophical Association. I have received some extremely valuable
comments. It is the aim of science to find out what is true. This is an enormously difficult
Let me list a few of the other people who have helped me: Nicholas Asher, aim to accomplish, so we have made the task easier by dividing up the workload,
Nuel Belnap, George Boolos, Anil Gupta, Brian McLaughlin, William Keinhardt, parceling out the task among the various specialized disciplines. Thus, it is the
Brian Skyrms, Albert Vissar, and Peter Woodruff. aim of astronomy to find out the truth about the heavens and the aim of zoology
A summer stipend from the Social and Behavioral Sciences Research Institute to find out the truth about animals. Each of thcsc specialized disciplines aims to
here at the University of Arizona gave me a valuable opportunity to work on this. find out a portion of the truth, but it remains to philosophy to try to understand
The book was lucky enough to win the Johnsonian prize in philosophy. for truth as such. Each of the sciences aims to find out the truth about its subject
which I am very grateful. As prizewinner, the book was published through a joint matters. One of the subject matters of philosophy is truth. So one of the aims of
effort on the part of the Journal of Philosophy and Hackett Publishing Company, philosophy is to find out the truth about truth.
both of whom have been very helpful to me. When we attempt to find out the truth about truth, an unusual difficulty
I owe a special debt to Shaughan Lavine, who, in his capacity as one of the confronts us. Most of the time, when we try to understand something complicated,
editors of the Journal, went painstakingly through the mathematical portions of our problem is that we do not know what to say, or perhaps we know a few things
the text, working diligently to remove obscurities and confusions. Whatever to say, but what we know to say is altogether too little to constitute a satisfactory
glimmers of clarity you may find in the text are most likely due to Shaughan. account. When we try to understand truth, we encounter precisely the opposite
Michael Kelly at the Journal ofPhilosophy edited the text, putting a great deal difficulty. When asked to give a theory of truth, we know exactly what to say,
of thoughtful effort into it. and what we know to say is altogether too much to constitute a satisfactory
At Hackett Publishing Company. Frances Hackett, James Hullett, and Dan account.
Kirklin have been extremely helpful. Kirklin's thoughtful and tirelessly diligent What we find ourselves almost irresistably inclined to say is this: the statement
efforts have been especially valuable. that a sentence is true expresses exactly the same thought that the sentence itself
Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Roberta Hayes-Bautista, whose pa- does.' If that is so, we must have
tience this project stretched to (sometimes a little past) the breaking point.
5 is true iff 4
whenever is a quotation name of 4. The two sentences '5 is true' and '4'
express exactly the same thought, so that the biconditional conjoining them must
be not only true but analytic.
However attractive this account may be. it cannot be right. According to it,
I More precisely. the statement that an English sentence is true in English exprehses the same thought
that the English sentence expresses. When an English bpeaker says, without qualification, that
what looks like an English sentence is true, we presume that she means that the sentence is true
in (her dialect of) English, just as, when an English speaker says, without qualification, "The
wcather is unpleasantly hot." wc presume she Illcans "The weather is unpleasantly hot here now."
"True" always means true in some particular language. but we do not usually need to bc told
explic~tlywhat language is intended. Cf. remark 0.1 below.
\4,e would havc to havc 'The starrcd scntcncc is not truc' is true iff the stan-ed theory of truth with a scientific thcory that is consistent with tlie evident empirical
sentence is not true. Yet. as we can see from the exhibit below: and mathematical facts.
* The starred sentence is not true
The therapy proposed is elective therapy. Symptoms of the difficulties that
beset the naive thcory of truth were first noted by Epimenides (the Cretan who
'The starrcd scntcncc is not truc' is identical to the starrcd sentence, so that. said that Cretans always lie) in the fourth century B.c.. and we havc not yet died
silbstituting equals for equals. we derive. absurdly. from them. In fact, the evident inadequacies of the naive theory of truth cause
remarkably little disruption in the way wc usc the word 'true'. In practice, we
The starred sentence is true iff the starred sentence is not true
treat the rule that permits us to assert biconditionals
Consideration of the starrcd sentence shows us that there is something drasti-
cally defective about our ordinary understanding of what it is for a sentence to
5 is true iff 6
be true. W e may think of the biconditionals for 5 a quotation narne of 4 , as a rule that admits exceptions. We restrict the rule
on an rrrlhoc, basis. withholding assent fro111those rare instances of tlie rule which
is truc iff ct,
seem likcly to cause mischief. We somehow manage to restrict the rule ,just
for € a cli~otationnarne of d.together with other principles governing the usage enough s o that. without impairing the usefulness of the notion of truth, we are
of the word 'true' which we are intuitively inclined to regard as obvious and, able to avoid being tricked into accepting outrageous o r outlandish conclusions.
indeed, as part of the meaning of the word 'true'-such principles as "A con.junc- Thus. you are likely to be disappointed if you try to beat a traffic ticket by telling
tion is true iff both cor~junctsare true"-as constituting an inforrnal theory. We the judge, "Your honor, if what I am telling you is true, I was only going 55.''
shall refer to this theory as our rlcri~lc~
tllc,ory cf truth: it is not a theory that we expecting the judge to reason as li)llows:
consciously or explicitly avow. What the starred sentence shows us is that our What the dckndant says cannot be false. since if what she said were false,
naive theory of truth is inconsistent with manifestly observable eriipirical fact; then. being a false conditional, it would have to have a true antecedent, so
specifically. the naive theory is inconsistent with the fact that it would have to be true. S o what she says is true. S o we have a true
"l'he starred sentence is not true' = the starred sentence. conditional with a true antecedent. Hence we must havc a truc consequent,
that is, the defendant must have been driving within the speed limit. 1 find
Charles Chiliara [I9791 has usefully distinguished two problems that arise in the defendant not guilty.'
situations like this one. in which obvious preniisses lead us by seemingly impecca-
ble reasoning to absurd conclusions: the diagnostic problem and the therapeutic T o understand how we manage to restrict the naive rule so deftly, that is, to
problem. I shall return to the diagnostic problem in the final chapter, but for now understand in fine detail our ordinary practice in using the word 'truc', is a
my rcsponsc to the diagnostic problem is short and simple: theories that have philosophically interesting problem in ordinary-language metaphysics, but not a
observably false consecluences are incorrect; this rule applies to informal prescien- problen~1 wish to investigate here.
tific theories no less than to scientific ones. The naive theory of truth has an The fact that it is possible to use the word 'true' coherently without possessing
observably falsc conscqucnce, viz., a coherent theory of truth may co111fort those who have no taste for theory, for
it shows that an adequate thcory of truth is not required for brute survival. On
'The starred sentence is not true' # the starred sentence. the other hand, if we want to obtain a theoretical understanding of the connection
Therefore, the naive theory of truth is incorrect.' between language and the world. it will be necessary to develop a satisfactory
C r ~ ~ though
dc this diagnosis may be--it is on a par with the medical diagnosis. thcory oftruth. The naive thcory of truth is demonstrably not a satisfactory theory,
"You are a very sick man"-it is precise enough to indicate a plan of therapy. since it has observably false consequences. So. if we want to obtain a theoretical
The therapeutic program is to replace our demonstrably incorrect prescientific understanding of the connection between language and the world, we must go
beyond the naive thcory. The fact that i t is possible to get around in the world
' Although this is the most straghiforward diagnosis. it 15 by no means the only di:rgnosis posslblc. without having any theory of truth beyond the naive theory should not lead us to
The alternative is t o locate thc \ourcc of thc difficulty not in the naive thcory but in the classical suppose that we ought to rest content with the naive theory, any more than the
logic by which we derive an absurdity from the naive thcory. A version of thls position will he
discussed in chapter 4. I Thlr evariiple is adapted frorir Lob (1955. p. 1171
fact that it is possible to get around in the world without understanding relativity strengthened liar sentence is not true is precisely what the strengthened liar
theory ought to pcrsuadc us to rest content with Newtonian mechanics. Ordinary sentence says, and we are back in the briar patch. This maneuver of responding
language may be all right, but our ordinary theory of language is not all right. to an account of the paradox by turning the account's own words against it will
Toward developing a theory of truth freed of the evident flaws of the naive recur sufficiently often that it will be useful to have a name for it. We shall refer
theory, a natural first thing to try is to suppose that sentences like the starred to it as the .srrengrhcned liar response.
sentence, though syntactically well-formed. are senlantically defective. Declara- It is the aim of science to find our what is true. Were it the case that hurnan
tive sentences arc typically used to express propositions, and the sentences are beings were perfect in knowledge and wisdonl. we would simply require, as part
said to bc true or false according as the propositions they express are true or false. of scientific methodology:
A sentence like the starred sentence, although constructed out of meaningful
components in an unexceptional way, does not express a proposition. either true A satisfactory theory should never make claims that are ~ n t r u e . ~
or false. This account, though appealing. cannot be right. Consider the sentence But since we are limited as we are, such a rule would not be useful, for we would
$ The sentence marked with a dollar sign does not express a true proposition. not know how to apply it. Let me propose a couple of other rules that we can
apply, though fallibly:
We are to suppose that this sentence, though grammatically well-formed, does
not express a proposition. It does not express a true proposition and it does not (PI) A satisfactory theory should never make claims that manifestly contradict
express a false proposition. But that the sentence marked with a dollar sign does clear observations.
not express a true proposition is precisely what the sentence marked with a dollar (P2) A satisfactory theory should never make claims that are, according to
sign tells us. Thus. our theory is self-defeating, since it concludes that its own the theory itself, untrue.
conclusions do not express meaningful propositions.
These principles do not uniquely determine the theory we are going to be develop-
We see here a dialectical pattern that we shall meet again. An account of the
ing, but they guide its development in important ways.
paradoxical sentences is advanced, but the account is turned against itself as the
These principles arise out of a belief that truth is an aim of scientific inquiry
theory's own words are used to formulate a new and devastating version of the
and that agreement with observed fact is a rnark of truth. It is hard to give an
paradox.4 We see the simplest version of this pattern, if we take the prototypical
argument for this belief, for it is hard to find more basic principles on the basis
paradoxical sentence to be the simple liar senteilce:
of which to argue. That a successful theory should give results that conform to
This sentence is false. observation is, by now, fairly well-established, but that truth is an aim (though
not the only aimb) of scientific inquiry remains controversial. One could perhaps
I t would appear, naively. that, if the simple liar sentence is true it has be false,
argue on historical grounds that aiming for truth is a vital component of scientists'
and if it is false it has to be true. A natural response is to say that the simple liar
psychological motivation, and that, were it not directed toward the goal of truth,
sentence is neither true nor false: it has an intermediate truth value, perhaps, or
science would stagnate. To support such a contention would require a massive
no truth value at all. We might go on, if we wishcd, to say that the status of the
investigation that cannot be undertaken here. Here let me merely remark that, if
simple liar sentence is like that of sentences containing denotationless proper
we did not accept (P2). we would probably not find the notion of truth to be
names or sentences containing category mistakes. Although this response is
particularly interesting, useful, or important, so that our most likely response to
intuitively satisfying as an account of the simple liar sentence, its futility is
the liar paradox would be to abandon the mischievous notion of truth altogether.
demonstrated when we focus our attention on what is called the slret~gthet~ed liar
We have already seen ( P l ) and (P2) in action. ( P l ) was what led us to
sentence:
acknowledge the untenability of the naive theory, since the naive theory has the
This sentence is not true. observably false consequence that 'The starred sentence is not true' # the starred
I S we respond to the strengthened liar sentence just the way we did to the simple
liar, by saying that the sentcnce is neither true nor false, then we will have to ' The way 1 shall bc using the terms. 'untrue' will he synonymous with "not truc," and 'false' will
he synonymous with "has a true negation."
say, a ,fortiori, that the strengthened liar sentence is not true. But that the " It may sometimes happen that the aim of getting the truth conflicts with some of the other aims
of science. E . R . , the aim of getting a theory that is simple envugh to be useful. In such cases, no
' Cf. Burge [1979, p. 911 completely satisfactory theory is available: we do the beat we can.
scntence. A natural tirst response to the misl'ortunc that befalls the nalve theory If we substitute the c l c y i ~ l i t rl i ~ S~PrI ~ ~ P I ~ C . ~ , ,
is to say either that thc starred sentence does not express a proposition or that the
starred scntence expresses a proposition that is neither truc nor false: but this This sentence is not definitely true.
response violates (P2). since it requires us both to assert the sentence marked
we get the following bit of argument:
with a dollar sign and to deny that the sentence marked with a dollar sign is true.
( P I ) and (P2) will guide us in developing a theory of truth which will be Suppose that the definite liar sentence is unsettled. that is, neither definitely
expounded at length in the chapters to come. Let rrle now give a sketch of the true nor definitely untrue. Then it is definitely true that the definite liar
account. sentencc is unsettled. and ( I jbriiori it is definitely true that the definite liar
An initially attractive theory that we have already had to abandon tells us that sentence is not definitely true. But that the definite liar sentence i \ not
the paradoxical sentences arc semantically defective. The rules of our language definitely true is just what the definite liar sentencc cays. S o the definite
link an ordinary scntence like 'Toby's cat plays n l ( l h , j o r ~ g , q ' with somc situation. liar sentencc is definitely true after all.
state. or event. and it is in virtue of this linkage that the sentence is either true
or false. With the paradoxical scntences. the wheels are spinning out of gear, s o This argument is no good. From the hypothesis that a sentence is unsettled. it by
that the sentences are not linked to any situation, state, or event, and thus the no means follows that it has been settled that thc sentence is unsettled. Quite the
sentences are not either true or false. contrary, if a sentence is unsettled, then we are free to adopt linguistic conventions
This account, I want to say. is partly right and partly wrong. What is right that settle it.
about the account is the observation that the paradoxical sentences are semanti- Of course. the observation that one particular tactic for recasting the strength-
cally defective: what is niistaken is thc attempt to express this insight by saying ened liar argument in ternis of the definite liar sentencc has been thwarted docs
that the sentences arc ncither true nor false. For an ordinary sentence. the rules not show us that there is not some other tactic that succeeds in getting a contradic-
of our language establish a link between the sentence and the world. and this link tion from the definite liar. For that, we need a consistency proof. which we shall
detern~ineswhether or not the sentencc is true. For the paradoxical sentences. no get in chapter 8 (theorem 8.15).
such link is established, so the rules of our language do not determine whether The linguistic rules for using the word 'true' leave it undetermined whether
the sentences are true. the paradoxical sentences arc true. In this respect, the word 'true' acts like a
It is one thing to say that it is not determined whether the paradoxical sentences vague term. If Harry has only a little hair, the linguistic rules leave it undetermined
are true, and is sonicthing quite different to say that it is determined that the whether 'Harry is bald' is true. I wish to exploit this similarity as vigorously as
sentences arc not true. Thus. if we say that the truth vali~eo f the strengthened possible. Thus. 1 shall develop a for~nalmodel of the logic of vague terms. then
liar sentence is undetermined. wc are not compelled thereby to say that the use this formal model to give a theory of truth which treats 'truc' as a vague term.
sentence is not true. and so we are not drawn into contradictions. The formal model of the logic of vague terms, which is based upon the work
Sentcnccs, I want to propose, fall into three categories: scntcnccs that the rules of' Rudolf Carnap [ 19371, Bas van Fraassen [ 19661, and Kit Fine ( 1974). will
o f our language. together with the empirical facts, determine to be definitely have it that the meanings of vague terms are given by a system of meaning
true: sentences that the rules of our language. together with the enlpirical facts, postulates. T o say that Harry is definitely bald will be to say that 'Harry is bald'
determine to be definitely not true: and sentences that arc lelt unsettled. is derivable. in a certain system of infinitary logic, from the meaning postulates
The transition from the trichotomy trucltalseineither true nor false to the together with certain precisely expressed statements of fact. 'I'hus. if the system
trichotomy definitely trucidefinitely not trueiundetermined is rather undramatic. of meaning postulates consists of the sentences 'Anyone with fewer than ten
but its effect on the paradoxes is quite dramatic. In terms o S the Sormcr trichotomy. thousand hairs on his head is bald' and 'No one with more than twenty thousand
we car1 reason as follows: hairs on his head is bald', then, if IIarry has five thousand hairs on his head, he
will be definitely bald, whereas if he has forty thousand hairs. he will be definitely
Suppose that the strengthened liar sentence is neither true nor false. Then not bald. and if he has fifteen thousand hairs, the baldness question will be
it is true that the strengthened liar sentence is neither true nor false, and a unsettled.
fortiori it is true that the strengthened liar sentence is not true. Rut that the I want to treat 'true' as a vague predicate. I do not intend to suggest by this
strengthened liar sentence is not true is just what the strengthened liar that. in our ordinary usage, 'true' is simply a vague predicate like ordinary
sentence says. S o the strengthened liar sentence is true after all. vague predicates. Ordinary vague predicates are predicates whose applicability is
underdeternlined by the rules of our language, whereas, intuitively, our linguistic into the determination of the semantic status o f thc utterance. In this respect. the
rules overdetermine the applicability of the word 'true' in conflicting ways. fomlal languages are quite unlike English, where we have sentences like 'The
Ordinary English rules for determining whcn to apply the word 'true' present cat is on the mat', the truth value of an utterance of which will depend not only
us with two kinds of problem cases. For some sentences, like the truthtcllcr on the meaning of the words and the location of the world's cats and mats but
scntcnce ('This scntence is true') and the sentence 'Harry is bald', the rules give also on contextual features that tell us what cat is being referred to, what mat,
no answer, and for other sentences, notably thc liar sentences, the rules give what time, and what spatial orientation counts as "on." For our purpose of trying
bizarre and conflicting answers. I propose that we adopt a reformed usage of to investigate the problems raised by the paradoxes in a simplified situation with
'true' which treats all thc problematic cases as unsettled. For the vast majority as few complications as possible, this feature of our formal languages is a
of sentences, the reformed usage will agree with traditional usage in declaring tremendous advantage, since the problems that arise when we try to understand
the sentences unequivocally either "true" or "not true." All the problem cases how the truth value of an English sentence changes with its contcxt of utterance
will be regarded as unsettled. In cases where traditional usage gives conflicting are particularly thick and thorny.' and since, as we shall see in the next chapter,
answers, the reformed usage will give no answer at all, treating all such cases on even in our simple formal languages the semantic paradoxes hit us with full force.
a par with cases of vagueness. Such a reform. 1 want to argue, will preserve those Because of their independence from context, it is legitimate to speak of the
logical features of our everyday usage of 'true' in virtue of which the notion of scntcnccs of our formal languages as being either true or false. We cannot
truth is so useful to us, without succumbing to paradoxes and contradictions. If, normally do this with English sentences, since the same English sentence will
contrariwise, wc attempted to eliminate vagueness as well as contradiction. often be true on one occasion and false on another. Thus, I spoke above of the
replacing our traditional way of using 'true' by a reformed usage that was perfectly sentence
precise as well as perfectly consistent, the logical structure of our everyday usage
This sentence is false.
of "true" would. I claim, be damaged beyond repair.
To get a picture of how vague terms behave in English, we shall utilize as being paradoxical. But if the sentence is uttered while pointing to an arithmeti-
mathematical structures called pnrtinlly interpreted latzguagrs. It is not intended cal equation on the blackboard, the utterance will not be paradoxical. It would
to be a terribly accurate picturc; certainly no one would think of English as one be more precise, rather than speak of a sentence as true. to say that the sentence
of these languages. Our partially interpreted languages are vastly simpler than as used by a certain speaker at a certain time is true, or that the proposition
natural languages. This is why they are useful. They present important logical expressed by the sentence on a certain occasion is true, or that the statement made
features of natural languages in simple contexts in which it is con~parativelyeasy by a certain utterance of the sentence is true. But this added attention to detail
to see what is going on. It is hoped that partially interpreted languages will be leaves the problems of the paradoxes unresolved, as we can see from the following
useful in understanding the logic of vague terms in much the way that familiar examples:
first-order languages are useful in understanding the logic of precise terms.
As used by me now, this sentence is not true.
To develop an adequate theory of truth for a natural language is a task of
This sentence is not now being uscd to express a true proposition.
staggering difficulty, for natural languages are among the most intricate of the
In writing this sentence now I am not making a true statement.
works of mankind. But it is not an impossible task. It would be an impossible
task, if we restricted ourselves to theories of truth which refined and made precise For what we are doing here, always to make explicit the context dependence of
the naive theory, for then we would obtain. at the end of all our labor, a theory the sentences we discuss would produce no real benefits and it would be a
that implied, absurdly, considerable nuisance. So 1 hope the reader will forgive me if I continue to
suppress superfluous speaker and time parameters. Similarly, I shall continue to
'The starred sentence is not true' # the starred scntcnce
use the word 'sentence' as if sentences were only used to make assertions. In
Work like the present project, which aims to develop logical tools with which to fact, we also use sentences to ask questions or issue orders or make promises,
talk about truth without becoming ensnared in paradox, is needed as a preliminary but we shall have little occasion to talk about these other sorts of speech acts.
to the task of developing a theory of truth for a natural language. Contemporary philosphical discussion of truth has largely centered around the
One feature that our partially interpreted languages share with ordinary inter- following proposal made by Alfred Tarski 11935, pp. 187fl:
preted first-order languages is that, once the interpretation or partial interpretation
has been fixed, the context in which a sentence has been uttered does not enter See Searle [1979, ch. 51
Cot1\~entiotlT: A formally correct definition of the symbol ' T r ' , formulated for obtaining theories of truth for natural languages. If l could solve the second
in the metalanguage, will be called an aclrqlratr tlefit1iriotl of [ruth if it has problem, I could get a theory of truth for my own language. If I could solve the
the following consequences: first problem. 1 could translate other languages into my own language. Then I
could combine the two solutions. Given a scntcnce of a foreign tongue. I could
( a ) all sentences which are obtained from the expression 's F Tr if and
first translate the sentence into my own language. then use the theory of truth for
only if p' by substituting for the syrnbol '.r' a structural-descriptive
my own language to give the truth conditions for the translated sentencc. A
namc of any sentence of the language in question and for the symbol
sentence of the alien language will count as true, if and only if it translates into
'y' the expression which forms the translation of this sentence into
a true sentencc ol' my own language.
the metalanguage.
Regrettably, it is not possible to attack the problems of giving a theory o f
( p ) the sentence 'for any .r. if x c- Tr then .r t. 5' (in other words ' T r C truth for my own language and of learning how to translate other languages
S'). into my own language independently. The problem is in obtaining the truth
conditions for indirect speech reports. For the sentence 'John said that Maureen
Here Tarski is using the word 'metalanguage' to mark the distinction between
ate the last Moon Pie'. to be a true sentence of my idiolect, John must have
the language we are speaking and the language about which we are speaking. W e
made some statement that correctly translates into my idiolect as 'Maureen
use the rnetal(lngicc~gc~
when we give a definition of truth for the o11jjcc.tlarlguclgc~.
ate the last Moon Pie.' Thus. in order to know when I have got the truth
'S' refers to the set of sentences of the object language.
conditions for my own sentence right. 1 have to know when I have got the
There are two fundamental questions raiscd by convention T:
translation right. The problem is even stickier when wc report the mental
(1) What constitutes a correct translation of the object language into the attitudes of creatures who lack spccch. such as infants. beasts. and the mute.
metalanguage? This problem has bccn a sub.ject of vigorous investiga- T o give the truth conditions for these reports, 1 shall need solmething like a
tion, particularly after W . V . 0 . Quine 11960, ch. 21 showcd that there correct translation into my dialect of English of the sentences of the subject's
is no purely behavioral criterion of correctness. language of thought.
One tries to solve a difficult problem by breaking it down into simpler prob-
( 2 ) Because of Epirnenides-type problems, if the object language is identical lerns. Thus. a promising strategy would be to begin by developing a theory of
with the metalanguage, it will not be possible to give a definition of truth in which both the object language and the metalanguage consist of a fragment
truth which is materially adequate in the scnsc of Convention T.' Is there o f one's idiolect from which indirect speech reports and psychological attitude
nonetheless some reasonable sense in which one can give a theory of statements have been eliminated, postponing the problem of giving a theory of
truth for a language within the language itself? truth for the full language until after one has worked on the translation problem.
Only the second question will concern us here. S o scrupulously shall we avoid Thus, one begins by working on a version of problem ( 2 ) that does not get
the first question that we shall only look at situations in which either the entangled in problem ( I ) . It is hoped that the present work will bring this initial
object language is identical with the metalanguage or the ob.ject language is stage a little closer to completion.
a part of the metalanguage. The ultimate aim of this effort is to obtain a An advantage of examining the second problem before attacking the first is
theory of truth for thc vcry language I speak. That is, 1 would like, ultimately, that it is a natural constraint on a successful translation that it should preserve the
to get a theory of truth for the dialect of English spoken by mc. This dialect central semantic features of the object language. Thus, if 'chien' is a term of the
is very nearly the same, presumably. as standard English, but, in any case, object language which refers to dogs, the term of the metalanguage that translates
it is rny idiolect that I speak and understand, so it is my idiolect that I have 'chien' should also refer to dogs. Hilary Putnarn's 119751 "Twin Earth argu-
available to use as my metalanguage, and so. when attacking the second ment."\hows us that we need such a constraint, by showing that the fact that a
question, it will be my idiolect that i shall have available to use as an object
language.
" Putnani considers a hypothet~calplanet in which the visible features of the environment and the
Solving both problems would provide us with a versatile and powerful method psychological 5tates of the inhabitants are just like those found on earth, yet. because of hidden
differences bctwcen the environments. the worda of speakers on Twin Earth do not mcan the same
Exception$ can occur uith certain artihcial language\ uhosc ability to describe their own syntax as those of their counterparts on earth: by 'water' they do not refcr to water but to another kind
i$ \everely restricted: \cc Gupta [ 1987. $111. of stuff which looks and tastes like water.
translation successfully reflects the psychological states"' of speakers of the object structure, but this determination will not procccd by establishing a semantic value
language is not enough to guarantee the correctness of the translation. We also for each of the syntactic components. In Donald Davidson's terms [1973, p.
need to make sure that the terms of the metalanguage refer to the same things as 2211, our semantics is constructed by the holistic method rather than the building-
the terms of the object language which they translate. To apply this constraint, block method."
we need to know what kind of semantic properties to expect the object language One might suppose that we must have a compositional semantics in order to
to manifest; to know this, we shall need at least an outline of a semantic theory explain how it is possible for finite beings over a finite period of time to learn
for the object language, and to get even an outline of a semantic theory, we shall truth conditions for infinitely many sentences. But this is not so. The semantic
need to solve problem (2). theories we shall develop will be learnable because they are recursively-indeed,
Our answer to (2) will, in part, determine how rich a semantic structure there in many cases, finitely-axiomatizable.
is for the translation to preserve. Thus, on a classical view, nearly every term of In the first stage of the overall program for developing semantics for natural
a natural language has a determinate referent; the occasional nonreferring term, languages, both the object language and the metalanguage will be taken to be a
like 'the present king of France' or 'phlogiston', is regarded as an exception. In fragment of standard English from which indirect speech reports and propositional
typical cases, reference is fixed by an appropriate causal connection between attitude statements have been excised. Or, more precisely, the object language
word and object. The theory to be advanced here. by contrast, postulates a wide and the metalanguage will both be a fragment of my idiolect of standard English.
range of terms for which no referents have bcen fixed. For a fragment of the What 1 am doing here is describing, writing in my own idiolect, a program that,
language (thefiilly interpreted part), we postulate a classical, referential seman- if carried to completion, would give me a theory of truth for my own idiolect.
tics, but for the rest of the language, the meanings of the terms are given by a Reading this book and treating its words as words of your own idiolect, you read
system of meaning postulates that are not sufficiently powerful to specify a a description of a program that, if carried to completion, would give you a theory
definite referent for each term. Thus. the principle that successful translation must of truth for your own idiolect. In doing so. you are translating my idiolect into
preserve reference can only be meaningfully applied to the fully interpreted part your own homophonically," thus acknowledging me as a mcmbcr of your own
of the language. Thus, on our account, the requirement that a successful transla- speech comnlunity. At the end of this program, neither of us quite gets a theory
tion should preserve reference is considerably less onerous than it is on a classical of truth for standard English, though we see how to get one. Roughly, we identify
account. a community of English speakers by social and historical considerations, and we
More generally, one would have expected the semantics of a natural language regard a sentence as true in standard English if it is true in the idiolects of a
to be developed compositionally. Semantic values are assigned first to the mem- predominance of English speakers.
bers of a finite vocabulary, then to more complex expressions according to rules For most purposes, dividing up a language into individual idiolects is unneces-
that prescribe the behavior of the logical connectives, until finally truth values sary and a bit precious. I am writing and you are reading a book in English
are assigned to sentences." If we have such a semantics, it is natural to require describing a program that, if taken to completion, would give us a theory of truth
that a correct semantics preserve the semantic values at every stage. for English. We speak the same language; unless one has a special purpose in
On the present account, this requirement has no effect, since the semantics mind, there is no purpose in dwelling upon small differences.
proposed is not compositional. For sentences outside the fully interpreted pan of The special purpose here is to separate the problems that arise from question
the language, the truth of a sentence will consist in its being implied (in an (2) from the problems that arise out of the indeterminacy of translation. Quine
enriched sense of implication which goes beyond ordinary deduction) by other ([I9601 and ll9681) argues that the totality of a subject's dispositions to verbal
sentences. Thus, the truth value of a sentence is determined not by the referents behavior does not suffice to determine the referents of the subject's words.
of the components of the sentence but by the position of the sentence within an
implicational network of sentences. The position of the sentence within the I' The proposal that natural languages lack compositional semantics was advanced by Schiffer [I9871
implicational network will be determined in part by the sentence's syntactic on the basis of considerations disjoint from our concerns here. I was initially shocked by Schiffer's
proposal, and I was even more shocked when I belatedly realized that I myself had been proposing
a noncompositional semantics.
"' We are using 'psychological states' in the narrow sense in which "no psychological state, properly " That is, "Fido" is translated "Fido." The translation will not be entirely homophonic. There will
so-called. presupposes the existence of any individual other than the subject to whom that state is be occasions when, faced with a choice between "The author's views are bizarre to the point of
ascribed" [ 1975. p.2201. madness" and "The author is using some of his words eccentrically." you will charitahly choose
I' The locus c l u s ~ i c ufor
~ compositional semantics is Frege's work. See. for example, [1891]. the latter alternative.
N o amount of behavioral evidence will dcternmine whether the subject's word Quine 11968. pp. 300f] likens tlic I'act that it is possible to pin down the
"gavagai" ought to be translated "rabbit" or "rabbit stage" or "undetached rabbit referent of a tern1 in one's own idiolect by stipulating
part" or "rabbithood locally manifest." Quine concludes (rather too abruptly. in
my view) that there is no fact of the matter whether the subject is referring to By 'rabbit: 1 shall r c k r to rabbits
rabbits o r rabbit stagcs. Once the subject's dispositions to verbal behavior are
to the fact that one can pin down the position and time of an event once one has
accounted for, there are no further grounds. either visible or hidden, for saying
laid down a coordinate system. The indeterminacy of translation corresponds to
that one theory of reference for the languagc is better than another.
the fact that there is, in nature. no preferred coordinate system. Rut within a
The discussion takes on a more urgent tone when it is noted that indeterminacy
particular coordinate frame. the position of an event is uniquely determined, just
begins at home. There is no principled basis. says Quine, for prcferring the
as, as far as the considerations Quine adduces are concerned. within one's own
hypotheais that I mean by 'rabbit' what my neighbors mean by 'rabbit' to the
languagc. the referent of a term or the truth value of a sentence is uniquely
hypothesis that when 1 use the word 'rabbit' I refer to what normal English
deterniined. But, in fact. the truth value of the starred sentence remains undeter-
speakers call "rabbit parts."
mined even within one's own language. Sentences like the starred sentence are
T o discuss the mcrits of Quine's argument would take us far from our concerns
evcnts whose location remains unspecitied even after we have ti xed a coordinate
here. For present purposes. what is important to realize is that the indeter~iiinacy
system. They are. to extend the metaphor. singularities in the coordinate metric.
Quine describes does not arise if one looks only within one's own idiolect."
The study of the paradoxes takes us beyond Quine's ontological special relativity,
Within my own idiolect,
where within a particular coordinate system everything is smoothly Euclidean,
'Rabbit' refers (in my idiolect) to rabbits to an ontological general relativity."
L,et me c m p h a s i ~ ethat an individual's idiolect is not a private language in the
is definitely true. It is true because of the rneaning postulates for the word 'refer': sense of Ludwig W-ittgenstein (19.53. $3268-3701. It is the variant of a public
I d o not need to confirm it by examining my own behavior. As we shall see language which is spoken and understood by a particular speaker. Indeed. it will
below, our naive understanding of the notion of reference is undermined by the make no difference, as far as our fornial development is concerned, whether we
paradoxes just as our naive understanding of truth is, but it is not so deeply are talking about standard English or some speaker's dialect of English.
undermined as to dissuade us from By isolating a particular speaker's language from its social and historical
context. we are getting a one-dimensional picture of the language. W e can specify
'Rabbit' refers to rabbits.
the nieanings of the speaker's words, but not how or why they came to have those
According to the theory wc shall be developing, the sentence meanings. W e d o this purposely, in order that we can focus our undistracted
attention on the internal logical structure of the languagc.
V l h e sentence marked with a heart is not true in my idiolect. REMARK 0.1. The observation that "'Rabbit" refers in my idiolect to rabbits' is
true in my idiolect because of the rrleaning of the word "refers" raises an interesting
does not have a definite truth value, even within my own idiolect. Thus, an problem. suggested by Hartry Field [1986]. The claim would appear to imply
indeterminacy underlies the liar paradox. and, unlike the indeterminacy Quine that '"Rabbit" refers in my idiolect to rabbits' is logically necessary, o r as nearly
describes, i t can he found even within a single language. There is no fact of the logically necessary as it can be, given the presence of the indexical "my." Yet,
matter whether "true" refers in my o ~ w idiolect to the sentence marked with a if our language had evolved a little differently, I would have spoken a language
heart. Thus. reference of a foreign term is doubly inscrutable. The translation of in which "rabbit" referred to groundhogs.
a foreign term into our native tongue is underdetermined. and, once we have This puzzlc can be solved by paying careful attention to the scopes of modal
settled upon a translation manual, it may turn out that the doniestic term that operators. The following sentences are perfectly compatible. and apparently true:
translates the foreign term is one whose referent is underdetermined.
(i) (3language Y)(I speak Y' & n('rabbit' refers in if to rabbits))
I' As Quine says 11968. p. 201 1. "In practlce we end the regress of background languages. in (ii) V ( 3 language Y)(I speak Y' & 'rabbit' refers in 3 to groundhogs)
discussions of reference, by acquiesc~ngIn our mother tongue :rnd taking its words at face value."
Quine's foregn~undlanguagc/bnckgrou~~d languase d~st~nction i< what we are calling the object I' As if anticipating thiq metaphor. Gaifman [I9871 refer\ to the genuinely paradoxical sentences as
langu:age/metala11puage d~stinct~on. "hl;ick hole<."
The counterfactual The rule-of-rcvision semantics proposcd by Anil Gupta [1982]. Hans Herz-
berger 119821, and Nuel Belnap [1982]. which we discuss in chapter 6, combine
If our language had evolved differently. 'rabbit' might have referred in my
some of Kripke's ideas with interesting new insights.
idiolect to groundhogs.
In chapter 7 we introduce the basic model theory of partially interpreted
is ambiguous in just the way that languages. In chapter 8 we develop our theory of truth for the languages, and in
chapter 9 we develop a theory of definite truth, using constructions from modal
If Mondale had been more persuasive, the President of the United States
logic which will have been developed in chapter 2. It will emerge that our naive
in I987 would have been a Democrat.
notion of truth has, in a sense, split into two notions, truth and definite truth.
is anlbiguous. We conclude with some rather speculative remarks about the prospects for
If, in spite of the indeterminacy problems raised by Quine and others, it turns applying our formal methods to natural languages.
out to be possible to single out a correct translation from one language to another, Lying on the border between philosophical and mathematical logic, the book
we should expect to be able to derive (i) from the following three sentences, makes extensive use of mathematical methods. Let me say a word about what
which are true in my idiolect when spoken by me: kind of mathematical training will be presupposed. For most of what we do. a
sufficient background will be a standard beginning graduate or advanced under-
( 3 language Y)[l \peak Y & 'rabb~t'IS a term oi 2 & n(V language y * )
graduate course in logic. We use basic definitions and results from model theory
(V tcrm T)(T 15 correctly translated froni Y* to a\ 'rabbit' -+
(definition of satisfaction; completeness, compactness, and Lowenheim-Skolem
T refers In Y* to rabbits)]
theorems), recursion theory (Godel incompleteness theorems; Church's thesis;
@(Vlanguage Y)(V term T of Y)(T 1s correctly translated from Y to 9 as
representation of recursive and recursively enumerable sets within the language
7)
of arithmetic); and set theory (transfinite induction; simple ordinal and cardinal
(VY)(VT)(TI C a term of the language 'P -+ U(T 1s a term of the language
arithmetic; the well-ordering theorem). Occasionally more advanced or esoteric
knowledge will be required, but these occasions will be easily isolated and can
The semantical paradoxes are sometimes dismissed as mere curiosities, brain- be skipped without loss of continuity. I promise to warn you about them.
teasers that amuse the technical-minded but need not trouble those with deeper Our official mathematical theory will be Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the
philosophical concerns. This complacency has always surprised me. 1 should axiom of choice (ZFC), though we shall not come close to using its full strength.
have thought that. inasmuch as no notion is more central to philosophy than the In chapter 6 we talk in terms of proper classes, because Gupta. Herzberger, and
notion of truth, the fact we are unable to give even the rudiments of a consistent Belnap talk in terms of proper classes.
theory of truth for our own language would have been a cause for some alarm. I shall make a great deal of use of the theory of inductive definitions, but for
I hope that, even if the solutions offered here are found to be without merit, this technical reasons it has almost never been possible to proceed by simply citing
book will at least foster an awareness that the problems have merit. textbook theorems. The textbook theorems never give quite enough information,
The plan of the book is as follows. So far wc have only talked about the so what we have used of the theory we have had to develop from scratch. Although
paradoxes generated by our naive understanding of truth, but there are similar this makes for more work, it has the advantage of making the book accessible to
paradoxes involving denotation, satisfaction, necessity, and knowledge. The those who have had no previous acquaintance with inductive definitions. Although
connection of these other paradoxes with the liar paradox will be discussed in 1 should be pleased if the book should prove useful as an introduction to the
chapter 1 , which sets up the rormal apparatus for the rest of the book. The only theory of inductive definitions, it is by no means intended to serve as a textbook on
one of thesc other paradoxes which will be discussed in any dctail will be the the sub.ject: for that purpose, I defer to the excellent textbooks already available,
paradox about necessity, which will be discussed in chapter 2. Yiannis Moschovakis [I9741 and K. Jon Barwise [1975].
In trying to understand the logical problems that beset the naive theory of truth
and the possible ways to overcome them, two articles are supremely important,
Tarski [I9351 and Saul Kripke [ 19751. The first of these is discussed in chapter
3 and the sccond in chapters 4 and 5. Kripke's paper will be important not only
for its own sake, but also because it provides the mathematical foundation for
the later chapters.
expressions and thcir codcs. M1c "identif)." an cxprcssion with its code. so that,
in order to be able to describe its own syntax, it will be enough for a languagc
to be able to talk about numbers.
Formalized Versions of Before the expression types vanish from view. however. there is a philosophi-
cal point to be made. Language is a concrete phenon~enonin human social history,
the Semantic Antinomies and yet the study of the syntax of language has become a part of abstract
matheniatics. What it is important to realize is that the transition from concrete
to abstract occurs not in the move frorn expression types to Godel numbers but
in the move from expression tokens to expression types. Linguistics, as ordinarily
Kurt Giidel 1193 1 1 showed. for a wide class of formal languages, how to reduce practiced, is the study of expression types. One studies the rules of a language
the theory of syntax to the theory of numbers. He did this by associating a by examining the totality of expressions that are constructible by the rules.
numerical code with each expression, in such a way that basic syntactic opera- investigating their syntactic and semantic structure without restricting oneself to
tions, such as forming the c o ~ ~ j u n c t i oorn dis,junction of two li)rmulas, prefixing those expressions which it has served sonleone's purposes actually to bctokcn.
a quantifier to a formula, or substituting a term for free occurrences of a variable We can, for example, describe a sentence as obtained frorn another sentence by
in a formula, correspond to recursive operations on tlie codes. Since. at the time a sequence of transformations without supposing that each of the intermediate
(jiidel wrote, syntax was ~lnderstoodonly superficially. whcrcas number theory transformations has resulted in a concrete utterance. A devout nominalist might
had been fruitfully studied f'or centuries, Godel's method constituted a signal try to develop a linguistic theory that worked solely with concrete expression
advance in the study of syntax. tokens, classifying them directly into grammatical and semantic categories, but
In order to take full advantage of Giidel's proposal, we shall suppose, for ordinary linguists are not constrained by nominalistic scruples.' Expression types
much of what we do. that we arc working with a countable language Y for the are part of the everyday mathematical tools of the working linguist, and expression
first-order predicate calculus with identity, and that we have fixed, without types are fully abstract objects.
lingering over details, a numerical code r&l for each fi)rmula (r, in such a way Thc syntactic theory of expression types is, in fact, interreducible with number
that tlie nu~iierical operations corresponding to disjunction ((r(t1 V r$l) = theory. Godel showed how to reduce syntax to number theory, and Quine [ 19461
r(+ V d l ) ] ) , negation (lr(r,l = ri(r,l), existential quantification ((3v)r+1 = has shown how to go the other way, using the syntactic operation of concatenation
r(3v)(r,?),substitution (rq5-i \'IT = the code for the result of substituting the term to encode arithmetical operations. Thus, we could, if we wanted, develop a
r for free occurrences of 1. in 4). and so on are recursive.' Occasionally we shall syntactic theory that utilized number-theoretic methods but only talked about
add new symbols to Y : when we d o so. we shall suppose that the coding system expressions, since we could replace talk about numbers by talk about their Quine
has quietly been adjusted. codes. It is really only a matter of notational convenience whether we develop a
W e want to look at languages that are able to describe their own syntax. Prirri~ theory that talks about both numbers and expressions, a theory that talks only
,fiic.ie it would appear that, number theoretic methods being so useful in the study about nunibers, replacing talk about expressions by talk about their Giidel codes,
of syntax, a language that was well-equipped to describe its own syntax would or a theory that talks only about expressions. replacing talk about numbers by
have to contain the following three components: the ability to describe expression talk about their Quine codes. Considerations of notational simplicity are, in this
types and their syntactic properties. the ability to talk about natural numbers and case, quite decisive, and we choose the number-theorctic option.
their matheniatical properties, and the ability to talk about the coding relations. In order for a language to be able to describe its own syntax, it will suffice
In practice, however, once we have set up the coding relations. there is nothing that the language be able to describe the natural-number system. It will be useful
useful to be said about the expressions that cannot be said just as well in terms to specify a formal language to use in describing the natural numbers, so we take
of thcir codes, and it is simpler and more convenient to talk about numbers and the lrirzg~tugr of tirithrnetic to be the language for the predicate calculus with
about the arithmetical properties that correspond to syntactic properties o f the
expressions they encode. rather than to keep going back and forth between Wherea\ a demand thirt u e only talk about actual concrctc cxpl-c\slon token\ would be intolei-ably
restrictive. thc \traightforward development of linguistics proceed uithout impediment if u c allow
' This pleasant notational convention of indicatiny an arithmetical operation by placing a dot under ~)ur\clvc\to talk about /7o.s.sihl' \entente tokens. Chihara [I9X11 shahs that much of cla$$~cal
the symbol for the corresponding logical operatlor1 is due to Fefermati ll9h01. mathemat~cscan be reproduced within this less austere norninall\rn.
identity whose nonlogical constant5 are the individual constant 'O', a unary Iff is an n-ary function sign. ?l(f), also written j'l. is an rl-ary operation on
function sign 'S'. binary function signs '+' and '.', and a binary relation sign "L('3').
'<'. We name the numeral for a number by drawing a line over a name of the If R is an rz-place predicate, !'I(R''',). also written R"'. is an n-ary relation
number; thus on "l('3'): in particular. ' = ' is a binary predicate such that ?'i('=')
- = {<s.x>: s F: YI('3')).
- abbreviates 'O', which is the numeral for 0.
'0'
1 ' abbreviates 'S(O)', which is thc numeral for 1.
'- Truth under an interpretation is detined in the usual way; we write !I' 4.
'2' abbreviates 'S(S(0))'. which is the numeral for 2. It will be useful to have a specified axiomatization of the predicate calculus.
and so on. !I? is the standard model of the language of arithmetic, whose universe Following Quine [ 19401, we take the axioms of logic to consist of all sentences
obtained by prefixing universal quantifiers to instances o f the following schemata
is the set of natural numbers and whose arithmetical symbols have their usual
(where '4' and 'I/)' are to be replaced by formulas, 'T' and 'p' by terms and 'v'
meanings. We identify the set of natural numbers with w , the least infinite ordinal.
It will be useful to be able to classify the arithmetical formulas according to by a variable):
the complexity of their quantificational structure. The boirnded formulas, also Tautologies.
known as the x:{ formulas and the I: formulas. constitute the smallest class of
(Vv)(+ + $1 -+ ((Vv,& (Vv)$)
expressions which contains the atomic formulas and which contains (4 V $), (4
-+
4 -. ( V V ) ~where
, does not occur free in 4
& 4). 1 4 , (3v)(v < T & +), and (Vv)(v < T + $), for each variable v and term (Vv)+ -+ 4 L'lT, where no free occurrence of 1. in 4 occurs within the scope
T, whenever it contains 4 and $. The last two expressions are abbreviated ( 3 v of a quantifier that binds a variable that occurs in T
< 7)4 and (Vv < T)+, using the boirnded quuntijiers ( 3 v < T) and (Vv < 7). A (3v)4 l(VV)lC$
:
Xjl,, forrnula is obtained from a formula by prefixing 0 or more existential 7 = 7
quantifiers, and a I: + , formula is obtained from a 2:; formula by prefixing 0 or 7 = p -+ (4 ++ $), where $Jand $ are atomic formulas that are just alike
more universal quantifiers. except that T and p have been exchanged at some places
A relation on w is said to be 2:; or jj if it is the extension of a C:: or a jj
formula. A relation is A: if it is both xj:and li. The 2; relations are closed 4 is derivable from r (in syn~bols. + 4) iff there is a finite sequence of sentences
under finite unions, finite intersections, bounded quantifications, and unbounded which ends in 4, each member of which is either a member of I', an axiom of
existential quantifications. The relations are closed under finite unions, finite logic, or obtained from earlier members of the sequence by modus ponens (from
intersections, bounded quantifications, and unbounded universal quantifications. $ and ($+ 4) to infer 4 ) . The methods of Giidel 119301 show that 4 is derivable
The :j relations are the complements of the 2: relations. The A:: relations r
from iff 4 is true in every model of I'.
are closed under finite unions, finite intersections, complements, and bounded Robinson's arithmetic R (from Tarski, Andrzej Mostowski, and Raphael Rob-
x:'
quantifications. The relations are the recursively enumerable relations. The A: inson [1953, p. 531) consists of the following axioms:
relations are the recursive relations.
We shall take negation, disjunction, and existential quantification to be the
primitive logical operations. treating conjunction, the conditional, the bicondi- r 1 .-p =-r 1 . p
-
tional, and universal quantification as defined. For official purposes, we take the i n = p for each n-# p-
variables to be 'v,', 'v,', 'vL1.and so on, but in practice we often use other letters n
(V.K)(X< V x = n V n < X )
as variables to avoid proliferation of subscripts. A .sentence of the formal language (Vx)(Vy)(.u < y (1 x = y & (3z)(z + x = y)))
is a formula without free variables. (Vx) 1x < 0 -
An interpretation (or moclel or strucrure) for a first-order language 2 will be (Vx)(x < n + I -+ (X = 0 V x = T V . . . V x = II)
a function !)I defined on {individual constants of 2} U {function signs of Y} U
{predicates of 3)U ('3') so that R is useful because of the following theorem:
THEOREM 1.1 (Tarski, Mostowski, and Robinson). Every true 2: sentence is
!)1('3'), also written /!'[I, is a nonempty set. provable in R. For any n-ary recursively enumerable relation S there is a formula
If c is an individual constant, 91(c), also written c'", is an element of 91('3'). ~ ( I J ,. .. . , v.) such that, for any k , , . . . , k,,, we have
4,.. . . . k,,=. F S iff K t- d)(F,. . .
<) & 4) (again changing bound variables,
and replacing (3v)+by (3v)(N(v)
if necessary).
(we say that qb ~tle~ilil!r.cy?r.e.ser7t.cS in R). For any 11-ary rccursivc relation
S, we can tind a formula JJ(Y,. . . . . 1,") such that. for any k , , . . . . k,,. The relative interpretation of R into % will consist of the translations of the
axioms of R , together with sentences that declare that exactly one object satisfies
<kt. . . . , k,,> E S iff^ +ih(F.. . . , K) and (N(x) & Z(x)) and that S(x,y), A(x,y,z), and M(x,y,z) all define functions on the
<k,, . . . , k,,> 6- S iff' R + i$(K. . . . , K) extension of N(x);for example, the axiom for A(x,y,z) will be
-
(we say that strong!\ i.cp-rsozt.~S in R ) . For any 17-ary recursive function
,f we can tind a formula . . . , I , , , , \ > , , ,) such that, for any k , , . . . k,,.
H(i1,. .
R + cvy)ce(G.. . . , K,!)
!. = fik,, . . . . k,,)i
that is
The induction axiom schema tells us that every nonempty definable set has a least
PROOF:Use theorem 1.2 to find A so that
element. If we add new symbols to the language and allow these new symbols
to appear in the induction axiom schema, we increase the store of definable sets,
and so we get stronger versions of PA. Unless otherwise stipulated, 'PA' will
We get the philosophically interesting application of theorem 1.3 when we
always refer to the original version, in which only symbols from the language of
take r(x) to be a formula whose intended meaning is "x is a true sentence of 3."
arithmetic are allowed into the induction axioms.
The theorem shows that speakers of 2 cannot consistently adhere to the naive
The power of Giidel's arithmetization of syntax is seen in the following theory of truth. Either their language lacks the means for talking about truth at
theorem, which is a cornerstone of modcrn logic. Most of the results in this book
all, or else the naive theory of truth, as expressed in their language, is inconsistent
can be regarded as corollaries to this basic result:
with basic arithmetic.
Of course, in reality there are no speakers of 3 , 2being a first-order language.
THEOREM 1.2 (Giidel's Self-referential Lemma). For any formula
In talking about speakers of 2 , we are employing Wittgenstein's method of trying
4(x,v,, . . . , v,,) of Y , one can find a formula +(L#,, . . . , v,,) so that
to understand our use of language by performing thought experiments involving
R + (VIP,,. . . (Vv,,)(+(v,, . . . , v,,) ++ $(r+l, v , , . . . , v,?)).
Notice that the variables here are unrestricted; they do not have to range only This method of seeing that a function is recursive by first observing that the function is computable
and then appealing to Church's thesis will be our standard procedure.
over numbers. ' From Tarski [1935, pp. 247ffl. Tarski's accomplish~nentis not so trifling as the presentation here
PROOF:Let p be the arithmetical function given by suggests, since when Tarski wrote only special cases of theorem 1.2 had been proved.
speakers and cultures whose languages are much simpler than our own. Witt- which express falsehoodc. If the kind of necessity we have in mind is logical
genstein's method is particularly applicable here, since adding to the expressive necessity or analyticity. then the necessary scntenccs will be those sentences
power of the language could only make matters worse for the naive theory; which are deducible from meaning postulates. Unless the set of meaning postu-
increasing the expressive power of a language by introducing new operators and lates is extravagantly complicated, there will be an arithmetical predicate r(s)
connectives cannot make an inconsistent theory consistent. 2 is the minimum whose extension is the set of Godel numbers of necessary truths, and we can
we need to get the liar antinomy. S o long as our language is one in which we can interpret the modal formula a& as r ( r & l j.
carry out first-order deductions, in which we can d o arithrnetic (either directly o r What logical features would we expect the set of necessary sentences to
viu a coding), and in which we can describe basic syntax Giidel codes, we possess'! We would certainly expect that the basic axioms of arithmetic express
get the paradox. necessary truths, and we would expect the set of necessary truths to be closed
Because we can always replace talk about numbers with talk about their Quine under first-order consequence and the rule of necessitation (fr-om 4 to infer 04).
codes, the requirement that our theory I' be able to relatively interpret Kobinso~l's and to contain the instances of the schema ( u 4 -+ 6).But these expectations are
arithmetic amounts to no more than a requirement that we be able to give a contradictory.
moderately detailed theory of syntax. Thus, theorem 1.3 shows that the naive Semantics, according to Tarski [I 936. p. 40 1 1. concerns itself with the connec-
thcory of truth is inconsistent with the basic laws governing syntax. This takes tion between expressions of a language and the objects and states of affairs which
us beyond the observations we made in chapter 0 , which only showed that the those expressions refer to. By this definition. logical necessity is not a semantical
naive thcory of truth was inconsistent with observable empirical facts. concept, since, at least on the traditional conception, a sentence is logically
Richard Montague 119631 isolated what was essential to Tarski's construction necessary solely in virtue of the definitional and grammatical connections among
to obtain a stronger result: the expressions out of which the sentence is constructed. quite independent of
TIIEOREM1.4 (Montague). Let r be a sct of sentences which the objects to which those expressions refer. Nevertheless. necessity intuitively
implies truth and truth is a sernantical concept.' This indirect connection with
( 1 ) contains the axioms of R; semantics is enough to ensure that necessity is afflicted by the selnantic paradoxes.
(2) is closed under first-order consequence; Like necessity, knowledge intuitively implcs truth. This observation leads us to
(3) contains r ( r 4 7 ) whenever it contains 4 ; and fear that the concept of knowledge also falls prey to the paradoxes. This fear is borne
(4) contains all instances of the schema out. Montague's theorem is not directly relevant to the attempt to interpret ' r ( r 4 1 ) '
as is known', since the set of known truths is not closed under first-order
consequence. The proof of Montague's thoerem is directly relevant, however: let
Then is inconsistent. us imagine that we are engaged in a process of rigorous reasoning, s o that we are
careful only to assert things we are sure we know. Now we are able to assert (i).
Taking A as above, the following sentences are in T:
PROOF:
because we can deduce ( i j from basic laws of arithmetic. W e are able to assert (ii),
(i)
(ii) r(rA7) -
i r ( r h 1 ) + A (This is a theorem of R . )
A (This is an instance of ( 4 ) . )
because (ii) is an instance of the first principle of episten~ology,
is known + (1,
-
(iii) A (From (i) and (ii) by (2).)
(iv) r ( r h 1 ) (From (iii) by ( 3 ) . ) W e derive (iii) from (i) and (ii). Now we reflect that we have obtained (iii) by
(v) r(rh1) i A (This is a theorem of R . ) rigorous deduction from secure premisses; we conclude that we know (iii), that
(vij IA (From (iv) and (v) by (2)..j is, we conclude (iv). But from (iv), together with ba\ic laws of arithmetic, we
are able to derive the negation of (iii).'
Tarski's theorem points out a basic difficulty that confronts us when we attempt
to interpret ' r ( r 4 1 ) ' as 'r4l is true'. What Montaguc has shown is that we
encounter the same basic difficulty when we attempt to interpret ' r ( r 4 1 ) ' as 'r41 That truth is a sernantical concept is a consequence of the traditional doctrine that the truth of a
is necessary'. It is natural to think of necessity as a property of sentences; it is sentence depends in palt upon there being an appropriate correlation between what the sentence
says and what the world is like. Like all philosophical doctrines. this is open to dispute.
a property possessed by those sentences which express necessary truths, and
' The applicability of thcorcm 1.4 to thc thcory of knowlcdgc was first notcd by Montague and
lacked by those sentences which express contingent truths and by those sentences Kaplan [1960].
We would not expect that, whenever we know every instance of a universal THEOREM
1.5."' Let I' be a set of sentences which
generalization, we know the generalization itself, for we may not be able to
gather all our knowledge together into a single thought. Similarly, if we take ( 1 ) contains the axioms of R, together with the assertions that the succes-
logical necessity to be derivability from a set of meaning postulates, we will not sor function is one-one and that zero is not a successor;
suppose that a universal generalization is logically necessary whenever each of (2) is closed under first-order consequence;
its instances is. We know from Godel's tirst incompleteness theorem that it is (3) contains ~ ( r 4 1 whenever
) it contains 4; and
sometimes possible to prove every instance of a general law without being able (4) contains all instances of the following schemata:
to prove the law itself. In other words, if '04' is taken to mean 'r41 is logically
necessary', we shall not expect the Barcan formula
Then is w-inconsistent
to be valid. Even if we take 04 as an attribution of metaphysical necessity, as in
Kripke [1972], the Barcan formula will remain highly doubtful. Even if every PROOF:
Use theorem 1.2 to find a formula F(x.y,:) of the language of arithmetic
individual who happens actually to exist is essentially 4. it remains possible that so that
in some other world there exist individuals who do not exist in the actual world (i) (Vx)(Vy)(Vz)(F(x,y,z)* [(x = 0 & 2 = y) V (3w)(N(w) & ,X = S(W)
and who, in that other world, are not 4. &L z = r(vz)(f(G,j,z) + 7(2))1)1)
On the other hand, if we take '04' to mean 'r41 is true', the Barcan formula
will become very plausible indeed. A universal generalization is true if each of is a theorem of R . Using the facts that the successor function is one-one and that
its instances is true. What else could it mean to say that a generalization (Vx)$(x) zero is not a successor, we derive
is true other than that every object in the universe of discourse satisfies $(x)? (ii) (Vy)(Vz)(F(O,y,z) * z = y)
And,
- assuming that for every object a in the universe of discourse there is a name (iii) (Vx)(N(x) + (Vy)(Vz)(F(S(x),y,z) ++ z = r(~z)(F(k,;,z ) + ~(z))'))
a, what else could it mean to say that every object satisfies $(x) other than that,
for every a , $(a)
is true? As the theorem below shows, if we assume the Barcan A rough English translation of 'F(n.y,z)' is "z is the Godel number of the result
of prefixing n 7's to y."
formula,
Now use theorem 1.2 to find a sentence a so that
as part of our theory of truth, together with the modal principles is a theorem of R. cr says that not every result of prefixing 0-or-more TS to ra7 is T.
a(+ + $) + (04 -+ O+) and r.
We want to see that a is in Once we have done so, we can use (3) to prefix
m 4 + 104 more and more TS to r d , SO that, for each n , I' will contain the sentence that
r
says that the result of prefixing n TS to rcrl is T. Since also contains a , which
and a slightly stronger version of the closure conditions (1),(2), and (3) of theorem says that not every result of prefixing TS to [a1 is T, we shall have our w-
1.4, then our theory of truth will be w-inconsistent.' Unlike Montague's theorem, inconsistency.
this result does not assume either direction of the principle that naively character- ICJ says that every result of prefixing 0-or-more TS to u is T. In particular,
izes truth, i c r implies that the result of prefixing 0 TS to a is T, that is, l a implies
~ ( r c r l ) Formalizing
. this argument, we show that the conditional i a -+ ~ ( r a l )
is in r by showing that the following sentences are in 1':
(v) -+
70- (Vx)(N(x) -+ ( t l z ) ( ~ ( x , r a l , z+
) ~ ( 2 ) ) ) (from (iv))
" A theory 1' is w-inconsistent iff there is a formula $(x) such that i ( V x ) ( N ( x ) -,$(.r)) is a theorem
of i- and yet, for each n , $ ( n ) is also a theorem of r: such a theory cannot have any models in r ?-+ ~ ( z ) ) (from (v))
(vi) l a -+ ( V z ) ( ~ ( ~ , r c,z)
which the arithmetical ~ y m b o l shavc their usual meanings. tiodel [I9311 constructed the first (vii) ~ ( 0 , r c r,rcrl)
l (from (ii))
example of a consistent, w-inconsistent theory by adding to a system of basic axioms for arithmetic
the ncgation of a sentence that asserts its own unprovability. "' From McGee [ 19851
(viiii l u 3 ~ ( 6 ~ 1(from
) (vi) and (vii))
Ncxt, we usc the closure conditions in clauses (3) and ( 4 ) to show that the
(xxviii) (V:)(F(~, ,ul ,z)
is in r. On the other hand.
- ~(3)
since (iv) and (xx) are in T. so is
conditional ~ ( r d+
) v is in T. by showing that the following sentences arc ill
r:
(ix) * i ( V - r ) ( N ( a j ( V Z ) ( F ( . ~ , ~ ~ T-+~ .~Z( )2 ) ) ) (from (iv))
+ So is o-inconsistent..
( 1 + i r +V r +T om (ix) by (3)) We shall see below (rcmark 6.9) that the conclusion of the theorem cannot be
xi) T ' + N V F ( Y ) -+ Z ) (from ( x ) by strengthened to say that r' is simply inconsistent.
(4ja)) The liar paradox and its variants by no mcan cxhaust the antinonlies that
(xii) ~ i ~ 3 v - ~ ) ( + ~ ( (Vz)iF(.r,ru1,:)
-ri + T ( Z ) ) ) ~ ) + TT(-(v.~)(N(.~-) -+ arise out of self-referential applications of semantical concepts. Thus. our naive
understanding of the notion of reference gives rise to a numbcr of paradoxical
-
(VZ)(F(-V,~CT: .z) + ~(:ji j l ) (by (4)b))
(xiii) ~ r ( - i ~ . r ) ( N i .+
r ) (VZ)(F(X,,C~,zi + T(Z) jil) -+ constructions. It will be useful to regimcnt ordinary usage a little bit, breaking
V
x i ) ( ' 1 +
.
V
(xii), and (xiii)),
T
r
V (1 ,+ T j
N +( V Z ) F ( . , ) - (by ( 4 ) ~ ) )
7 (froln (xi),
up the ordinary notion of reference into two notions: denotation. which applies
to singular terms: and satisfaction, which applies to general terms. Thc satisfaction
relation has a complicated structure hccause of the varying nurnbers of variable
(xvi) (V.r)(N(x)
.
-
(XV)(Vx)(N(x) -, ~(~(x).-crl.,(~z)(F(i,rv1,z)
+ T
(Vz)(F(s(s),-rrl ,z) + T(z))) .+
V F ) +T
-+ T ( Z ) ) ~ ) )(from (iii)
(from (xv))
places that different general terms possess: but, for now, let us restrict our
attention to satisfaction as a relation between individuals and one-place general
terms.
(xi) ) + N -+. ~ F ) + T ) ) ) S (from (xiv) and Intuitively. we would expect the satisfaction relation to meet the condition
(xvi))
V )( ' I -+ N ) ( F ( ) + ( j ) (from (xvii)
(xix) ~ ( r v l )-+ (+ (from (iv) and (xviii)) For example, my housecat Quijon satisfies '.r is a good mouser' iff Quijon is a
good mouser. But our intuitions here cannot be correct, since substituting '.u does
r contains
-
Consequently, not satisfy x' for '4(x)' yields
(xx) rr (from (viii) and (xix)) (V\)(y satisfies 'x does not satisfy x' y does not satisfy x)
-
W e intend to usc mathematical induction to show that, for each natural number
which implies, absurdly,
' in r. For the case n = 0, observe
1 1 . the sentence '(V=)(F(n,rrrl,z) -+ ~ ( z ) ) is
that the following sentences are in r: 'x does not satisfy .r' satisfies 'x does not satisfy x'
'x does not satisfy .r' does not satisfy 's does not satisfy .r'"
ixxi) ~ ( r c r l ) (fro111 (XX)by (3))
(xxii) (Vz)(F(6,rcrl,z) -+ z = r(+l) (from (ii)) If we think of denotation as a relation bctwccn closed terms and individuals,
(xxiii) ( V ~ ) ( F ( O , ~ ( + ~ ,+
: ) ~ ( 2 ) ) (from (xxi) and (xxii)) we shall not be prcscntcd with any unpleasant surprises. Thus, the relation
correlating a closed term of the language of arithmetic with thc number it denotes
Now suppose, as inductive hypothesis, that
is a perfectly harmless recursive relation.
(xxiv) ( V z ) ( ~ ( E , r ( +,z)
l +~(2)) When we encounter paradoxes is when we inquire into the denotations of
definite descriptions. There are only countably many English definite descrip-
is in r. Then s o are these sentences: tions, and s o there must be ordinal numbers that are not denoted by any definite
( X X V ) T ( ~ ( ~ ; ) ( F ( ~ , ~ c T ~T. (zz)) ) ~ ) (from (xxiv) by (3))
-+
description. But it looks as if the definite description 'the least ordinal not denoted
( V, r l + z ~) ~ z + ( 2 )) ) (from (ijj)) by any English definite description' ought to name the least such ordinal. This
(xxvii) (Vz)((F(S(k),-fl1.i) + ~ ( 2 ) ) (from (xxv) and (xxvi)) contradiction, due to Julius Kiinig [1905], has a finitary version, due to G. G.
It follows by mathematical induction that, for cach 17, the sentence
" This antinomy comes from Grelling and Nelson [I9081
err^:" There are only finitely many English definite descriptions containing r(iv)$(~.!)l denotes a iff LI satisfies r(V.'.r)($(s)++ x = v)1
fewer than forty syllables, so there must be natural numbers that are not denoted
by any definite description containing fewer than forty syllables. But it would Truth is definable in terms of denotation:
appear, absurdly, that the definite description 'the least natural number not r41 is true iff r(iv)(v = 0 & $)l denotes 0
denoted by any English definite description containing fewer than forty syllables'
succeeds in naming the least such number in only thirty-three syllables. These definability relations enable us to establish that our naive theory of reference
Another paradox of denotation, due to Jules Richard [19051. draws our atten- is inconsistent by deriving the inconsistency of the naive theory of reference from
tion to the phrase the inconsistency of the naive theory of truth.
the number r between 0 and 1 such that, for every rz, the nth digit in the COROLI,ARY 1.6. Let a(y,x) be a formula of 2. There is no theory consis-
binary decimal expansion of r is equal to 1 iff 0 is the nth digit of the binary tent with R that entails all instances of the schema
expansion of the number named by the alphabetically nth English definite
description that denotes a real number.
This phrase should appear somewhere, say at the kth position, on an alphabetical For the philosophically interesting application of this corollary, take cr to be a
list of English definite descriptions that name real numbers. Yet the number formula that is intended to express the satisfacion relation for Y .
named by the phrase has to differ at the kth decimal place from the number named ' be an abbreviation for ' ~ ( 0( ,z & rx = 01))', we see
PROOF:If we take ' ~ ( z ) to
by the kth definite description. " that a theory that implied R together with all instances of
These paradoxes show that our naive conceptions of truth, of satisfaction,
and of denotation are all afflicted with inconsistencies. In view of the intimate
connections between the three conceptions, it is not surprising that all of thcm would imply all instances of the schema
should be inconsistent, if any of them is. In describing these connections, let me
make use of the following standard notation: '(ix)(x is a so-and-so)' will be used
to symbolize the definite description 'the so-and-so'. Thus, intuitively, for any
y , '(ix)(x is a so-and-so) will denote y iffy, and y alone, is a so-and-so."
Naively-that is, without taking the paradoxes into account-it would appear
which means, according to theorem 1.3, that the theory must be inconsi~tent.'~
COROLLARY 1.7. Let iS(x,y)be a formula of 2 . There is no theory consistent
.
with R that entails all instances of the schema
that truth and denotation are both definable in terms of satisfaction, as follows:
r47 is true iff at least one individual satisfies r$ & v = vl
iff every individual satisfies r+ & v = 1.17 For the philosophically interesting application, take 6 to be a formula that is
intended to express the denotation relation for y.
I' See Whitehead and Russell 11910. p. h l ] . ' be an abbreviation for '6((Lx)(rx= 01 & z), 0)'. Any
PROOF:NOWtake ' ~ ( z ) to
" One cannot help being struck by the intimate connection between these senlantic paradoxes and
the antinomies that afflict naive set theory. Thus, the contradiction in naive serrlantics discovered
theory that implied R together with all instances of
by Grelling and Nelson is derived virtually word-for-word from Russell's [I9021 paradox about
the set of all sets that d o not contain themselves. if we substitute 'general term' for 'set' and
'satisties' for 'is an clement of'. The cloae relation between KBnig'a paradox and Burali-Forti's would imply all instances of the schema
paradox about the order type of the ordinals is likewise clear. When we examine Richard's paradox,
u e see that its principal ingredient is the diagonal argument used in Cantor's theorem that, for any
set S , the power set of S has more members than S. But this is the theorem used by Cantor [ 18991
to obtain the paradoxical result that the power set of the universe ha? more members than the which means, according to theorem 1.3, that the theory must be inconsistent..
universe. We can define both denotation and truth in terms of satisfaction, and we can
To obtain a proper understanding of the connection between the semantic paradoxes and the set define truth in terms of denotion, but we cannot, in general, reverse these
theoret~cparadoxes is a deep problem to which, regrettably, the present work has nothing to
contributc. " I am grateful to Shaughan Lavine for pointing out these simple proofs to me. I had thought proving
'' See Russell [ 19051. corollaries 1.6 and 1.7 was a much rnore con~plicatedbusiness.
delinability relations. We cannot. in general. define either denotation or where r(is)$(.r)l is a definite description in X ( e ) that. under '1, denotes b. Let
satisfaction in terms of truth. nor can we define dcnotation in terms of a ( y , . ~ , c be
. ) the formula of 2 ( c , c )got from a ( . ~ , n . , D
by) replacing each occurrence
satisfaction. Intuitively. this is what we would expect. I f we know what
sentences are tnle. we shall know which definite descriptions have denotations.
but we need not be able to specify to which individual a given dcnoting
definite description refers; we shall know which general terms are satisfied,
l'lo -
of ' D ( 7 , p ) ' by ' < ~ , p > F c ' . Then we have
k (vy)(u(.Y.r(~(.r)1,c~)44.v))
for each formula $(x) of ? Y ( e ) .Use the self-referential lemma to find a formula
but we shall not know which specilic individuals satisfy a given general terrn.
If we know which individual. if any, a given definite description denotes. we
shall be able to say, for any indiilidual that happens to be named by somc
delinitc description, what general terms that individual satisfies. Rut what
<(.Y) of Y ( FSO
R F
) that
(Vy)(<(!) - i(i(y.ri(.~)l,?.))
about those individuals which are not named by any detinitc description'? There
is no reason to suppose that we should be able to specify what general terrns
those nameless individuals satisfy. Let me now give a specilic example but also, because t?(j,,x,c,)represents the satisfaction relation on %F),
showing that, as expected, we cannot generally define satisfaction in terms of
denotation:
TIIEOREM 1.8. Let y ( e ) and :p(c.D) be, respectively, the lirst-order lan- Contradiction..
guage whose only nonlogical symbol is the binary predicate ' e ' and the first- We next show that it is not generally possible to define either denotation or
order language whose only nonlogical symbols are the binary predicates ' F ' satisfaction in terms oftruth by presenting the following example, loosely derived
and 'D'; I presume that the language of arithcmetic and the notation for from Richard's antinomy:
ordered pairs have been relatively interpreted into Y ( c ) in one of the
THEOREM 1.9. Let Y ( c ) and 2 ( e , T ) be, respectively, the first-order lan-
standard ways. Let \'I be the model of Y ( e ) in which the universe is VsI
guage whose only nonlogical symbol is the binary prcdicate ' F ' and the
and in which 'c' is interpreted as the restriction to )!)I] of the elenlenthood
first-order language whose only nonlogical symbols are the binary predicate
relation,'" and let t'l" be the rnodel l i ~ rY(t-,D)got from !)I by letting the
' 8 ' and the unary predicate 'T'. Let \!I be the tnodel of ? Y ( c )in which the
extension of 'D' b e the set of all ordered pairs < r ( i x ) $ ( x ) l , b > where
universe is VSIand in which ' e ' is interpreted as the restriction to 1911 of the
r(i.r)$(x)l is a definite description in Y ( e )that, under 91, denotes b. Then
elementhood relation, and let !)[I be the model for Y ( t . , T ) got from ?I by
there is no forrnula a ( y , x , D )of 2 ( c , D ) such that, for each forniula $(x) of
letting the extension of 'T' be the set of sentences of - y ( e ) that are true
Y(t.),
under !)I. Thcn there is no forniula 6 ( . r , y , n of iY(e.71 such that, for each
formula $(xi of Y ( F ) ,
Thus the denotation relation for 2 ( e ) is definable within X ( c , D ) , but the satisfac-
tion relation for 2 ( c ) is not definable within X ( c , D ) .
PROOF: Suppose that there were such a formula. Let Y ( c , c ) be the first-order
language whose only nonlogical syrnbols are the binary prcdicate ' e ' and the Moreover, there is no forniula a(y,.r.T) of Y ( e . 7 1 such that, for each
individual constant 'c'. Now the the extension in 1'1" of ' D ' is a countable subset
of VsI x VsI, and every countable subset of VsI x VsI is actually an element of
V,,. Hence, we can define an interpretation \!I<, of Y(t..c.)as the model got from
!'I by taking the denotation of 'c' to be the set of all ordered pairs < r ( ~ x ) $ ( x ,b>
)l
formula $(,I ) of :P(c),
!'I' + (v?.)(cr~y,r$(\)',n - $(!.)I
Thus thc set of truths of Y ( Eis) definable within 2(t..T),but neither the denotation
nor the satisfaction relation for X ( F ) is definable within Lf(e,T).
I" Where. for any set S. iP(S) is the set consisting of all suhscts of S. we detinc PROOF:Suppose that there were a fortnula 6(.r.y.71 so that
-
v,, O
v,,+,
= ?P(V,,)
V , ) . for A altlnit
V , = ,?Uh
Let Z ( F , ( . )be the first-order language whose only nonlogical symbols are the
K , is the least uncountable ordinal. binary predicate 'c' and the individual constant ' c ' , and let !)I, be the model of
Y(F.c) got from !)I by taking the denotation of ' c a ' to be the set of Giidel numbers Thus, in developing a sen~anticaltheory for the extended language, we can take
of sentences of Y ( E true
) in 91. Let 6(x,?,(.)be the formula of Y ( E , c )got from truth to be our sole primitive sen~anticalnotion. We can autonlatically extend a
6(x,~,71by replacing each occurrence of ' T ( r ) ' by ' 7 E c'. Then we havc theory of truth for the extended language into a theory of satisfaction and denota-
tion for the extended language. Of course, we can cut back down to the original
language at the end, so that we get a thcory of truth, denotation, and satisfaction
for every formula $(x) of %(E). Use the self-referential lemma to find a formula for the original language.
t(.u) of 2 ( ~SO) that Thus, our task will be to obtain a theory of truth for the extended language.
Thinking of our task this way will makc the task a bit simpler. since denotation
and satisfaction are more cumbersome to work with than truth." In what
follows, we shall have almost nothing to say about either denotation or
It follows from the separation axiom of ZFC that, Y ( w ) being an element of VXI, satisfaction. other than to point out that, for whatever we shall have occasion
there is an element of 1911 which satisfies [(x). It follows from the extensionality to say about truth, there are obvious corresponding things to be said about
axiom that at most one element of (911 satisfies ( ( x ) . Hence, the other two notions.
Let me emphasize that I do not suggest that a natural language contains a
$1 k ( 1 x ) [ ( x ) exists name for every object or that it is humanly possible to extend a natural
-
and language by adding a name for every individual. On the contrary, the sentences
of the extended language arc abstract entities that we introduce to help us
!)I k (VY)(.Y6. (1x)t(-r) ( y F %w? & ( v z ) ( 6 ( r ( l x ) t ( x ),z,JJ)
l + 7JJ E z))) describe the concrete phenomenon of human language.
We have no reason to suppose that the extended language will be countable,
Since 'c' denotes a set of Godel numbers, !)I, k c E Y ( w ) , and so so we cannot use natural numbers as codes for the expressions of thc extended
language. We may still be able, however, systematically to find objects in
our universe of discourse to serve as codes for expressions of the extended
Now, since, in !)I,, the formula 6(x,,v,c) represents the denotation relation for language. If we are sufficiently careful, the coding will be well-behaved, so
definite descriptions of Y ( E ) , that we shall be able to produce Godel-style constructions without difficulty.
Given a model !I' for the language 2 , we want to find an efficient Godel coding
of a language Y , ,which is just like 2 except that it contains a constant for each u
Hence, element a of IYII. To -do so, we use finite sequences from I?lI, taking the Godel
code of 0(;, . . . , a,,) to be the ordered pair <TO(",, . . . , v,,)l,<a,, . . . ,
a,,>>, whose first component is the Godel number of a formula of 3.''
Contradiction. To describe the syntax of Y,, within %,, we shall not literally require that
Since denotation is definable in terms of satisfaction, the undefinability in 91' of every finite sequence from /!'I1 be an element of I!)l(. What we shall require is that
the satisfaction relation follows from the undefinablitiy in !)I' of the denotation every finite sequence from 1911 be coded by an element of 1911. The paradigm here
relation..
We have seen that it is not, in general, possible to define satisfaction in terms
" If we htay within the unextended language, we need the notion of satisfaction to describe how the
of either truth or denotation and that it is not, in general, possible to define quantifiers work. For the extended language. we only need the notion of truth, because quantification
denotation in terms of truth. We can make it possible to produce such definitions, in the extended language can be regarded as substitutional. In the extended language, substitutional
however, by extending our language, adding a new constant for each object a cr quantification (where (tlv)H(v) is regarded as saying that every substitution instance of B(v) is true)
in the universe of discourse. Assuming that the function taking LI to can be a and objectual quantification (where (Vr.)0(1,)is taken to say that every object in the universe satisfies
H(1,))coincide. They coincide because in setting up the extended language we used objectual quantifi-
specified in the language, we can stipulate:
cation in the metalanguage in stipulating that there should be a constant for every individual.
'"ome convention is needed to determine what sequence of variables < t , , , . . . . v,> to use. We
a satisfies r$(v)l iff r+(u)l is true.
- want to arrange things so that, if one formula of the extended language is obtained from another
r ( ~ v ) $ ( v ) denotes
l a iff r(Vv)($(v) c* v = a)1 is true. by a pern~utationof the new constants, their Giidel codes will havc the same first component. We
(I satisfies r $ ( v ) l iff r(iv)(v = 6t $ ( v ) ) l denotes a . might. for example. always choose the numerically least possible formula.
is Giidel's coding o f a tinite sequence < ( I , , ( 1 : . . . . . ( I , , > of natural numbers by (V.r)(V!)([Sey(.v)& SPY(!) & Ih(.r) = / / I ( ! ) & ( V natural number i)(q(a,i)
the single natural number 2"'" . 3"'" - . . . p::"' ' (where /I,, is the 11th prime), = y ( y , i ) ) ]-+ ,I- = y) -
which enabled Giidel to use thc language of arithmetic to talk about finite se- ('dayl,. . . (V2r,,)(3!)(Seq(y) bt lh(!) = 1 & r/(y.T) = .r, & . . . & y(.i',il)
quences of natural numbers. "' = x,,).
Thus. we need a c~odingsr~lzernc.a onc-one function that associates an element
of 1?1/ with each finite sequence from ) ? I / . In order to be ablc to use Y:,,to talk Once wc have fixed a relative interpretation of the language of arithmetic into -'f
about tinite sequences from /:)I/. wc require that thc set and we have determined which formulas of 5f are to represent S e y , Ih, and ( I ,
these basic facts can be formalized in -y. 12et the axiom system R consist of
Seq = {codes of finite ~equences}
the formalizations of these basic facts together with the relative interpretation of
and thc functions R . R . will play the same role in the study of Y.,, that R plays in the study of
Y. Thus, the theorems we have proved about -Y using R can be easily nlodified
I l ~ ( a=
) the Iengtli of the scquence coded by .I-. if .r codes a sequence into theorems about Y>!,using R. .
= 0 otherwise
Using R to describe the syntax of Y, we are able to see that the basic laws of
and syntax contradict our naivc understanding of the laws governing truth, denotation,
0 iff i ( 4 3 14) Aristotle's doctrine in Mertrl~lr\.\ic..\ % that thc essential properties of a thing are those properties
which are contained in the dctinition of the thing sounds quite \imilar to the rnodern analytic
philosopher's doctrine that thc logically necessary trulhs are the logical consequences of definitions.
' Reported In C)uine [ 196 1 1. The similarity is mi.;leading. however. since the role of definitions is quite different in Aristotlc's
Actually. Wh~tclieadand Rus\cll uwd thc \)mbol '3'
whcrc we arc uung .-' philozophy and in analytic philosophy.
This program confronts two formidable obstacles. The first is that the tradi- derive an express contradiction, and if we take derivability to be provability in
tional doctrines about analyticity have fallen into ill-repute. Traditional logical some explicitly describable system of rules, it will follow that the set of necessary
empiricists drew a sharp distinction between analytic truths, which were true in truths is a recursively enunierable set. But if the set of necessary truths is
virtuc of linguistic conventions, which were entirely devoid of empirical content, recursively enumerable. theorem 1 . I shows us how to explicitly define it.
and which could be known, incorrigibly and a priori, by anyone who had a There is a formula of our language52 that enurrierates the necessary truths of
command of the language; and synthetic truths, which were learned from experi- 2 . Thus, the standard philosopher's response to paradoxes of self-reference,
ence and which always had a clear, and preferably testable, empirical content. which is to claim that the formulation of the paradox employs notions that are
Much of epistemology rested upon this fundamental distinction between matters only definable in the metalanguage, is not available to us here. We must confront
of language and matters of fact, until it was pointed out by Quine [I9511 and the paradox directly; there is no escaping into the metalanguage.
Putnam [ 19661 that the philosophical burden was more than the distinction could Although we can define within :f? the set of necessary truths of 2 , Montague's
bear. The task of creating a scientific language and the task of creating a scientific theorem shows that wc cannot consistently describe the set of necessary truths of
theory are inextricably intertwined parts of the same enterprise, and there is no 2 in the ways that we are naturally inclined to. The premises of Montague's
way of predicting, in the rough-and-tumble of scientific investigation, which parts theorem give a system of closure conditions. It is intuitively obvious that the set
of our theories will be treated as definitional and which as empirical. of logically necessary truths satisfies these closure conditions. But Montague's
In the present chapter, my response to this difficulty will be simply to ignore theorem shows us that, in spite of being intuitively obvious, the thesis that the
it. I shall suppose that it is possible to distinguish a class of sentences whose closure conditions are satisfied is false. We want to see which of the intuitions
principal role is is to express linguistic, mathematical, or logical truths, but I shall that support the closure conditions can reasonably be maintained and which
have no occasion to assume that the sentences so distinguished are completely should be abandoned.
free of empirical consequences, that they are known u priori by anyone who In supposing that we can treat logical necessity as derivability in some explic-
understands the linguistic conventions in virtue of which they are true, or that itly specifiable system of rules, I am idealizing. While the philosophers' technical
they are immune from revision or rejection, nor to assume that the distinction is notion of logical necessity is a good deal less vague than the everyday concept
free of arbitrariness. My own view, which I shall not defend here, is the same as of necessity, it is nonetheless far from precise. There will inevitably be borderline
Putnam's: H. P. Grice and P. F. Strawson [I9561 are right in arguing that there cases, in which it is unclear whether a given biconditional ought to be regarded
has to be something to our intuitive distinction between the analytic and the as a definition or as a deeply held tenet of empirical theory. There is not, in fact,
synthetic, but Quine is right in arguing that the distinction cannot do the work a single formal system such that our informal notion of logical necessity coincides
that classical epistemologists have wanted it to do. with derivability in that formal system. Instead there is a whole family of formal
Ignoring the first obstacle, we shall concentrate upon the second, which is the systems derivability in each of which is a reasonable candidate for how to make
problem raised by theorem 1.4. Once the use-mention confusions that deceived our informal notion precise.h
Whitehead, Russell, and Lewis have been cleared up, it becomes clear that We are assured by Church's thesis that, once we have settled, somewhat
implication is a relation between sentences and that logical necessity and possibil- arbitrarily, upon a particular, speciticd system of rules of deduction as our way
ity are properties of sentences. To these properties and relations we ought to be of making precise Leibniz's informal notion of reducing a necessary truth to
able to apply the apparatus of quantification theory, just as we can apply the identical propositions, the precisionized set of logically necessary truths will be
apparatus to other properties and relations. We ought to be able to treat 'is recursively enumerable. It follows by Craig's [I9531 theorem that there is a
necessary' as a predicate and to treat ' "Horses are animals" is necessary' as recursive set F such that the logically necessary truths are the first-order conse-
having subject-predicate form. But if we do this we shall find, according to quences of r. A proof of Craig's theorem, which tells us that, for any recursively
Montague's theorem, that the basic laws of modal logic contradict the basic laws
of arithmetic. As before. wc take 'L to be a countable first-order language into which the language of arithmetic
The standard response to the analogous problem raised by theorem 1.3, the has bccn relatively interpreted in some fixed fashion cind for w h ~ c ha system of G(idel numbering
liar antinomy, is to say that the set of true sentences of a given language cannot has been established.
Later on, in chapter5 7 arld 9, we shall dcvclop an account of the logic of vague terms. according
be defined within that language itself; we shall discuss this response in the next
to which, roughly. a sentence contalnlng a vague term will counl as definitely true if it comes out
chapter. We cannot happily make the same response here. If, following Leibniz, true under any reasonable policy for making the vague term precise. Thus we may think of our
we identify the necessary truths as those statements from whose denials one can results here as definitc truths regarding our vague, ~ n f o r n ~ concept
al of logical necessity.
enumerable set A of sentences which is closed under tirst-order conscquence,
there is a recursive set I' such that A is the set of tirst-order consequences of I'.
is as follows: since A is nonempty and recursively enumerable, there is a total are not neccssary.
recursive function,/'s~~ch that A is equal to the range of,/: Let I' consist of all the W e can say more. M. H . l i b 1195.51 shows that the conditional
sentences (3\,,,)(11 such that ;I/I; = J l r r ) . 1' is recursive. since to test whether s is
in I ' you first check whet her.^ has the form 1(31.,,)411and. if so. calculate whether
.fltl) = rg1. will be 3 theorem of T only if its consequent 4 is a tlreoreni of T. Thc proof of
Since the precisionized set of logically necessary truths is recursively enumera- this is a straightforward rrrodification of the argument just given:' Suppose that
ble. it must he the extension of some Z',' forrnula of the language of arithmetic. ~ p \ c , ( r $ l )-+ 4 is a theorem of T. Then -i~rrcj(r$l)isa theorem of 1' U (14).
I t is. in fact, the extension of many different 2:' li)rmulas. but there is one Now ' i B ~ ~ ~ t ~ asserts ' consistency of I' U {1$}
( r ~ 1 )the But,
. according to
p~rticular2:'formula that stands out as especially simple, natural. and mathemati- GBdel's second incompletcncss theorern. 1' U { i d }will be able to prove its own
cally tractable. Assuming that we have a recursive set of axioms l', whether r
consistency only if U { i d }is inconsistent, that is, only if 4 is a theorem of T.
gotten by Craig's theorem or in some rnorc direct manner. let us take 'Bc\t,(.t)' 'The proof of Lob's theorem can be formalized within T. and so all instances
to be the forrnali;ration of the statement that there exists a finite sequence of of the schema
sentences ending in .r, each of which is either an element of I', an axiom of logic,
o r obtained from earlier n~embersof the sequence by t?~odus l~orzrrls.'UCIL,'was
introduced by Giidel [ 193 1 1 to enumerate the set of theorems of a certain highcr- are neccssary .
order version of Peano arithmetic. We can, in fact. give a precise characterization of the modal schemata like
We know that the extension of 'Rr>~t" is the set of logically necessary truths. ( L ) that have the property that all their instances arc necessary. 'To give this
1 would like to propose that we g o a step tarther and take 'BcII'(.v)'as a f o r m a l i ~ a - characterization, which is due to Robert Solovay 119761, we need some detini-
tion of '.\ is logically necessary'. This will enable us to employ Godel's methods tions. W e suppose that we have fixed a language for the modal sentential calculus
to investigate, precisely and in detail, the logical properties of logical neccssity. with the connectives 'V', '1'. and '0'which has an ample supply of sentential
'BPI\,'will depend upon 1'. which will. in turn. depend on how we choose to letters.
make our infomral notion of logical necessity precise. It will emerge, however,
that the formal properties of ' B ~ N ,are
' not delicately sensitive to which set of DEFINITION.
An itlterl7r~t~itiotz
of the modal language is a map ": associating
a sentence o f 3 with each modal fornrula such that
sentences we take I- to be. We do, however, require that Peano arithmetic be
relatively interpretable into 1'.
Once we have settled upon a formula 'Bc~t,'to represent the set of logically
(4 " 3,)* =(4" v +:".
(-14)s = ~ ( 4 " )and
.
necessary sentences. we can sce which of the conditions of theorern 1.4 needs to (04)" = Bcll!(rq5:*l).
be relinquished. Condition (4) tells us that all instances of the schema
I~EFINITION.
A modal formula Q, is T-\,cllid iff, for every interpretation *,
Be\tt( r&l) + 4 4" is a logical consequence of T.
are to be counted as neccssary. Since the logically necessary sentences are
precisely the consequences of T, it follows that Thus, in our technical usage, necessity and validity are quite different things.
Necessity is a property of sentences of Y, but validity is a property of modal
formulas. It is the property a modal formula has if every sentence of 2 you get
is a consequence of I'. But 'Rr1r3(ri0 = 01) -+ 1 0 = 0' is equivalent to by interpreting the formula is necessary.
' i B r 1 t l ( r ~ 0= 01)'. which asserts the consistency of T. and so, according to DEFINIIION.
G is the modal deductive system given by the following
Godel's second incompleteness theoren~( 193 1 1 , ' i ~ e u ~ ( r - =d )07)' will be a axioms and rules:
consequence of I- only if I- is inconsistent. Thus, if we interpret the modal
operators by taking 'n' to represent logical necessity, s o that mq5 means the same This derivation of L(ib'a theoreni from the second incon~pleteneaatheorem is an unpublished but
as Bertl(r$l), we find that some instances of the schenia wcll-known discovery of Kripke. Liib gavc a more d~rectarfurnent using the self-referential lemma.
Axiom schemata: There is a derivative notion of necessity as an attribute of sentences. A sentence
All tautologies. is necessary just in case the proposition it expresses (in normal usage) is necessary.
O(4
OCUQ, -
+ $1 +(O$
4) -. ud,
Rules: Modus ponetzs.
+ O$)
'Bachelors are unmarried' is necessary; 'Buchanan was unmarried' is not. The
partitioning of sentences into necessary, contingent, and impossible is just as apt
for the sentences of an interpreted formal language as for the sentences of a
natural language. Logical necessity, regarded as a property of sentences of a
Necessitation. formal language, can be investigated, precisely and in detail, using the methods
There is an algorithm for deciding whether a modal formula is a theorem of C . of Godel [1931]. When this is done we discover. much to our surprise, that
principle (N) fails.
THEOREM 2.1 (Solovay). Assuming that I' does not entail any false C: We find ourselves trapped between three conflicting theses:
arithmetical sentences, the 1'-valid modal formulas will be precisely the
[ I ] No legitimate notion of necessity can fail to satisfy principle (N).
theorems of G.
[2] Logical necessity is a legitimate notion of necessity.
For a proof see Solovay [ 19761, George Boolos 1 19791, or Carl Smorynski 13) Logical necessity does not satisfy principle (N).
1 l985J..
Let me emphasize that the third principle is not a part of the meaning of the words
Notice the stability of this result. For any of a very wide variety of choices
'logical necessity', except in a very dilute sense in which we regard even the
of our theory T, we shall get the same system of r-valid modal formulas.
most recondite logical consequences of the meanings of our words as parts of
The research culminating in Solovay's results shows us that the modal logic
their meanings. Far from being evident to the ordinary speaker, thesis 131 is a
of logical necessity is not at all what we would have expected it to be. The results
deep and surprising result.
are interesting, anlong other reasons, because of what they teach us about the
What Solovay's theorem shows us is that if we abandon thesis [ I ] , as I
methodology of semantics. Consider this principle:
recommend, our thinking about modalities is not reduced to incoherence. Nor do
(N) All instances of the scherna we find, as Montague fears, that "virtually all of modal logic . . . must be
sacrificed [1963, p. 2941. On the contrary, if we abandon our preconception that
04- 4 thesis [ I ] has to hold and we investigate logical necessity systematically, follow-
are necessary. ing the logic where it leads us, we obtain a particularly rich and elegant modal
logic. If we simply repudiated principle (N), without anything new to take its
Before the work of Godel and Montague, principle (N) might well have been place, we would indeed be left with a system so weak that it would be useless,
regarded as so conceptually secure as to be inviolable. The principle, it might so weak that it could scarcely be recognized as a modal logic. But, in fact, we
have been argued, was part of the meaning of the word 'necessary'. If someone do not give up principle (N) without compensation. When we give up principle
denies the principle, even though he tells us that by '0'he means "it is necessary (N), there emerges a new and powerful modal principle, Liib's (L), which our
that," we would not know what he was talking about. Even though he uses the dogmatic insistence upon principle (N) had obscured from view.
word 'necessary', he could not be talking about necessity; he must be using the What this suggests is that we should take a more holistic view of how the
word in a deviant way. meanings of our terms are determined. Principle (N) is indeed part of the meaning
Now it is not required by the meaning of the word 'necessary' that necessity of the word 'necessary', but other features of the way we use the word also enter
should be a property of propositions; it might be an attribute of properties, of into its meaning, in particular, Leibniz's idea that what are necessary are the
states of affairs, or of something else. On the other hand, it is certainly not truths that can be established by unaided reason. When different principles
required by the meaning of the word 'necessary' that necessity should rzot be a governing the usage of a word come into conflict, as they do most dramatically
property of propositions. The concept which Leibniz referred to as necessity and in Montague's theorem, there are no inflexible rules to determine which principles
which we have been referring to as logical necessity is, without doubt, a legitimate will emerge v i c t o r i o ~ s . ~
notion of necessity. I daresay that no one has ever responded to the quoted passage So far, our formal investigations into the logic of logical necessity have
from the Monadology by saying, "This fellow Leibniz must be using the word proceeded at a purely syntactic level. The definition of r-validity was formulated
'necessary' in a queer way ." Thus, on at least one concept of necessity, necessity
is an attribute of propositions. This point of view has been advanced forcefully by Quine. See, e.g.. [1951].
entirely in terms of dcducibility in a f'ormal sy5tem. without considering what the ( V modal sentence & ) ( 3 interpretation :+)(#I is not a theorem of G +
tcrnms of the formal language might rel'er to o r what sentences of the formal 4:': is not a theorem of I')
language might bc true. 4 was said to be r-valid iff. for every interpretation :+.
4" is provable. If we now take the formal languagc If to be interpreted by giving The result can be strengthened by providing a single interpretation that works for
a first-order model 1' of T , we can define a new notion of !'I-validity: every choice of d :
DEFINITION. Let \)I be a structure fix 'f.A rnodal f'ol-mula d, is !'I-valid iff. (3 interpretationt)(V rnodal sentence $)($ is not a theorem of G -,
Ihr each interpretation *. 6'" is true in !)I. 4t is not a theorem of r)
Since we know that there are sentences of Ythat are true without being provable, For a proof see Sniorynski [ 1985, pp. 153f].' The proof relies heavily upon the
it will not surprise us that there are rnodal f o r m ~ ~ l that
a s are $1-valid without being countability of the modal language.
r-valid. Suppose that A is countable and that every finite subset of A is 1'-consistent.
I)EFINITION. G ' is the modal deductive aystern given by the li)llowing and let { a , , . . . , 6,,) be a finite subset of A . Since ( 6 , . . . . , a,,}is r-consistent,
axioms and rules: 1 ( 6 , & . . . & 6,,) is not r-valid. and so i ( 6 , & . . . & a,,) is not a theorem of
Axiom schemata: C . Hence, ( 6 , & . . . & a,,)? is consistent with r . It follows by the compactness
of the predicate calculus that {a+: 6 r A) is consistent with r, so that A is T-
UIU(ct,
"[n(Ud,
-+
-+
- -
00 for 0 a tautology
4) ( 0 4
d) WI
UdJ, I
consistent.
I
of arithmetic, Bew(r41) is true in \!I iff 4 is true in every world accessible an interesting problem in metaphysics, but to discuss it would take us too far
from !)I. from our concern here, which is the modal model theory of arithmetic.
In developing the nonmodal model theory of arithmetic, one particularly useful
PROOF:We want to see that, for any formula 4 ( v , , . . . v,,) of the language of fact is this: assuming that the axioms of T are true in 91, is isomorphic to an
initial segment" of every model of T. We can modify our possible-world
IJ Quine could see some point to specific judgments that a particular sentence was or was not
semantics to incorporate this feature into our modal model theory by requiring
necessary, but he could see no meaning or purpoae in ~teratingmodal operators; he complained
[ I953a, p. 1741 about the "idle and cxcessive elaboration of laws of itcrated modality" in the modal I that a world !I' be isomorphic to an initial segment of every world accessible from
sentential calculus. This was in 1953, bcfore Lob's theorem. In view of thc extensive and fruitful I ?I; we restrict ourselves to countable models:
investigations of the logical laws of iteratcd modalities Lob's theorem provoked. one would not
make the same complaint today. One does want, however. to make the same complaint about the
" Let 91 and % be models of the language of arithmetic with %+ a submodel of I)[. We say that %+
modal predicate calculus. In our present state of knowledge, we have some undcrstanding of
is an initial segtnent of 91 iff, whencvcr a c !'[I, h E /%+I, and <u.h> t: <". we have u E 1%1. If
particular modal judgments but no understanding of iterated rnodalitiea.
this occurs. then every X: sentence of Psi,that is true in %I will bc true in :'I.
PROPOSITION 2.6. Now take a possible world to be a countable model of recursion theory and of the model theory of arithmetic. Readers whom cithcr
r and say that a possible world % is accessible from !)I iff there is a function training or taste disinclines to pursuc such results arc invited to skip to the next
ffrorn
- 1911 onto an initial segment of /%\I so that, whenever Bew~(r+(:, ..., chapter; thc theorems skipped will not be used elsewhere.
a,,)?) is true in "1. &(fo, . . . ,flN,,)) is true in \?i. Then. for any sentence
THEOREM2.7 (Artemov. Boolos. and McGee)." The \ct o f '9-valid
4 of thc language of arithmetic, B e ~ ' ( r d 7is) true in ?)I iff & is true in every formulas 1s complete , In.
11
thc sct of truths of arithmet~c.
world accessible from \)I.
The proof, a straightforward application of the extended omitting types theoremLh Before starting the proof, there is a notational problem that needs to be cleared
is omitted. The crucial step in the proof is thc observation that up. I originally introduced to represent the Gtidel number of thc result of
prefixing rl 'S's to '0'. Later on I took, for a given model 91 and cr c /?'I), to be
a standard name for a taken from outside the original language. Now, if u happens
is a theorem of PA.. to be one of the standard integers of !)(, this notation will bc ambiguous. Most of
Once again, 9i, assuming it is a model of T,is characterized up to isomorphism the time, we shall bc concerned with situations in which 9; is relatively interpreted
by the fact that every world is accessible from 9;. into !'L. so that all of 91's integers will be standard. In such situations, the
Principles of logical inference which we learned for the modal sentential ambiguity scarcely matters, since the two notational systems are readily interde-
calculus are upheld for the modal predicate calculus. Thus, if we take quantified finable. At present, howcver, we want to look at nonstandard rnodels of arithme-
G to be the deductive calculus whose axioms are the instances of the axiom tic, so we had best avoid the ambiguity. Thus, where ili is the language of
schemata we gave for the predicate calculus in chapter 1, together with the axioms arithmetic, $1 is a model of if,and a , , . . . , ' I , , are mcmbcrs of I?'lI, let
for G given earlier and whose rules are tno(luLsponerzs,necessitation, and universal
generalization (from 6 to infer (Vv)H). we find that all the theorems of quantified
G are r-valid. Among these theorems is the converse Barcan formula, represent the result of substituting the standard name of u , for v , . . . . . and the
standard name of a,,for v,,in the formula 4 ( v , , . . . , v,,)of 2. 'n'
will continue
to denote the rcsult of prefixing n 'S's to '0' and '.? to represent the function
The Barcan formula, taking rz to n.
PROOF: The set of !)?-validformulas is { [ d l : (V*)(* is a finite function defined
- -
[(z is atomic & (V(Z) * z is true)) Let us agree, for the duration of the chapter, to treat the language of arithmetic
V (3v)(3w)(z = (v \/ w) (Viz) (V(V) V Viw)))) as formulated using the predicates 'Z(x)', 'S(x,y)', 'A(x,~l.z))'and 'M(x,y,z)' in
V (3w)(z = TIMI & (V(Z) i V ( w ) ) ) place of 'x = 0', 'S(x) = y', 'x + y = z', and 'x . y = 2'. We do this for ease
V (Z is an existential sentence & (V(z) * (3w)(u3 is a substitution instance of translation back and forth between the language of arithmetic and the modal
of z & Viw)))]] language.
PA cannot be finitely a x i o m a t i ~ e dbut
, ~ ~we can find a theorem of PA which At last we arc ready to construct our formula 5,. It is the conditional:
entails a substantial fragment of PA; for definiteness, let us say that p entails all [ p & (Vx)(Vy)(Vz)(A(x,~.,z) ++ nA(x,y.z)) &
of z\,-PA, the fragment of PA we get by only allowing Z:,, formulas into the (v.x)(Vy)(Vz)(M(x.y,z) c* oM(x,v, z))l -+
'"
211
p F V is a truth predicate for r+l
Supplied with an oracle for the set of arithmetical truths and given input k,
the nlth oraclc Turing rnachine halts after fewcr than .r,, steps of a computa-
and so on. Clearly, for any sentence x of the language of arithmetic,%b x iff Y i tion that only asks the oracle about numbers < x,,.
k x*. that is, k 6. S.8.
Let f be the function that rnatchcs up a member o f 19iJ with the corresponding
member of (%I. Thus, THEOREM . " r be a recursively axiornatized extension
2.9 ( ~ a r d a n ~ a n ) Let
of PA that does not entail any false 2:' sentences. Then the set of r-valid
modal formulas is complete '2'.
PROOF:The set of r-valid modal formulas is
I
For any N , 6, and c , we have, becausc ((V-r)(Vy)(Vz)(A(x,y,:) ++ oA(x,y,z)))* is
( r 4 7 : (V*)(* is a finite function defined on the subformulas of that can
true in !I?,
bc extended to an interpretation -3 (3y)(y is a proof from I- of 4")))
<ci.h,c> A'" iff F A*'"
S o the set of r-valid formulas is 1.
F <N.~.c>
iff <ti, b.c> is provably in A*"' Let R be a ternary recursive function. T o show that the set of r-valid formulas
Thus, A"' is the graph of a recursive total function. Similarly, M"' is the graph of is complctc, we want to see how to find, in a uniformly effective manner, a modal
a recursive total function. It follows by lennenbaum's theorem that the reduction Formula 5, for each k , so that 5, is r-valid iff (Vx)(3y)R(x,y.k). Using the notation
of % to the language of arithmetic is isomorphic to \Ji, that is, that the range of of the last proof, 5, will be the following formula:
f'is all of I$+/.
Expand \li to a model 9?+ of 2,by setting
[ p & (V.x)(Vy)(Vz)(A(x,).,z)
-++ oA(.r,y,z)) Bi
(V,x)(Vy)(Vz)(M(x,y,z) nM(x,y,:))l -+
(V,x)(V is a truth predicate below .r + ( 3 y ) ~ ( x , y , - ) )
'' Vardanyan []9X5].George Boolob very kindly providcd mc with an English translation of Vardan-
" Fro111 Tennenhaum (19591. For more rccent, sharper results sce McAloon [I9821 yan's paper.
CLAIM2.10. 5, is r-valid iff ( V r ) ( 3 y ) R ( x , y , k ) Now, v"" is definable in \'I; it is {c: ?Ik ( 3 y ) ( F ( x . y &
) ( V ( y ) ) " )[ c ] } On
. the
PROOF:( 3 )Suppose that i ( V x ) ( 3 y ) R ( x , y , k )Take
. m so that ( V y ) i R ( r n , ~ l , k ) . other hand, the set of sentences true in !'I is not definable in $1, and so v"" f
Let * be an interpretation which interprets the arithmetical formulas homophonic- {sentences true in ?I). In fact, according to theorem 1.3, there is a sentence A of
ally and which lets V* be an arithmetical formula such that 2 so that
PA + V* is a truth predicate below m
Let 91 be a model of U {true :' sentences}. Then 91/= i t , * , so that 5, is not
1'-valid. Hence,
-
(G) Suppose 5, is not r-valid. Let 91 be a model of T and * an interpretation !)I+ V is not a truth predicate for rhl
such that !)IF - 1 5 , " . Define a model % by:
So,
?r+ k x s m [ u j
and so on. For any arithmetical sentence 6,! ) I / =+* iff 6. */=
In the proof of the last theorem, we defined a function f: w -. w so that:
f ( 0 ) = (ib)(\31' (nZ(x))':[ b ] )
':
Now, any arithmetical sentence true in !'I is true in 9i, since 9i is isomorphic
to an initial segment of 91, and sentences are preserved under taking initial
f ( t z + l ) = (1b)(g)k (oS(x,y))*[f(rz),b]) segments. Hence,
Formalizing this recursive definition within the language of arithmetic, we get a
Z:'formula F(x,y) so that
This proof is interesting because of the way it uses theorem 1.3. We normally
think of theorem 1.3, the liar paradox, as a deeply disappointing result. Perhaps
F"' is the graph of a monomorphismf from 91 into the reduction to the language
our grandchildren will view it as a felicitous result, it having helped guide
of arithmetic of %. There is no difficulty in applying the proof of Tennenbaum's
humanity past the folly of the naive theory of truth; but, from our present
theorem to 9I in place of \3?, showing that j ' i s , in fact, an isomorphism. If we
perspective, it appears to be a profoundly negative result. But the proof of claim
expand 91 to a model !'I+ for LtV by stipulating v"" = {a F 1\'1/:f(u)E v ' ~ }f , will
2.10 shows that, in spite of its negative thrust, the theorem can have positive
be an isomorphism from !)I+ onto %. Now. since
applications within classical mathematics. This way of taming the liar paradox
91 ( ( 3 x ) ( Vis a truth predicate below x-& i ( 3 v ) ~ ( x . y , E ) ) ) *
we have, because of the way % was defined using *,
I to do useful work was discovered by Robert Vaught 1 1 9671. As a simpler applica-
tion of the same technique, we show that the one positive result from proposition
I 2.3 cannot be transferred to the modal predicate calculus.
% /= ( 3 x ) ( V is a truth predicate below x & -1(3y)~(.r,y,k)
PROPOSITION 2.11, Let r be consistent, recursively axionlatized extension
and so, since ?+ and 91 + are isomorphic, I
of PA. Then the modal predicate logic of 1'-consistency will not be count-
ably, or even recursively, compact.
!)I + ( 3 x ) (V is a truth predicate below x & i ( 3 v ) ~ ( x , k)
y,
Hence, for some a
I!'
F (911,
+ /= (V is truth predicate below x & ( ~ v ) i ~ ( x , y ,[ka)] )
-
PROOF:Let h be PA U {'(Vl)(Vy)(Vz)(A(x,?.,;) * oA(s,\~.z))','(V,t)(Vy)(Vz)
(M(x,v,:) ~ M ( X . ~ , Z ) U
) ' }{'V is a truth predicate below n':
all n). We saw in
the proof of theorem 2.7 that. for each finite subset A of A . we could, by
interpreting the arithmetical predicates honiophonically and making an appro-
priate choice of V*, find an interpretation :': such that. for cach 6 E A , 6:':is a
theorem of PA. Thus. every finitc subset of A is r-consistent.
Take any interpretation *. and suppose that I:' is a model of I' U {H:!:: 0 is an
Tarski's Solutions
j2y
-
axiom of PA) U {'((vt-)(Vj3)(V:)(A(,r,y,:) t. nA(.r,!,z)))":','((V.r)(Vy)(V:)
(M(.x.j,,z) o M ( x , y . z ) ) ) * ' }Define
= )!)I)
. a model t; for .Y',by setting
to the Liar Antinomy
z'?'= Z*:"
S': = S*"
"?I ":+:\)I
Of the work that has been done on the liar antinomy, possibly the most profound
and certainly the most influential has been that of Tarski (1 19351 and [1944]).
and so on. Find a 2:' arithmetical formula I..(.r.!) so that
Tarski presents two proposals for policies that would enable us to talk about
semantics without becoming ensnared in antinomies; they are the subject of the
present chapter.
Both of Tarski's proposals require that, in giving a theory of truth for a
Letf be the function whose graph is F'", and let 91 + be the expansion of 'l: to a
model of 2, got by letting v"'' equal {tr E I!)(/: ~ ( L I E) v'!'}.By the method used
in the proof of claim 2.10, one can show that f is an isomorphism: I! + 23 and
that v"' ' is definable in \'I. It follows by theorem 1.3 that. for sorne , I , ' V is a
- language, the language one is speaking about should be poorcr in expressive
power than the language one is speaking. In general, there need be no particular
connection between the language one speaks and the language about which one
speaks. One can speak about any language one chooses, utilizing any language
truth predicate below i' is false in I:' +. Because 23 is isomorphic to I! +, ' V is
one knows how to speak. The object language and the metalanguage can be
a truth predicate below n'
is false in 23. and so, because of the way 'li was
1 identical or they can be entirely disjoint o r they can partially overlap or either
defined, '(V is a truth predicate below n):~'
is false in $1. Thus, !)I is not a model
can be a proper part of the other. However, says Tarski, one docs require a special
of (6": 6 e A}, and indeed r U (6": 6 e A} has no n1odels.m
connection between the object language and the metalanguage if one intends to
Our discussion of the modal logic of logical necessity will inspire us, I hope,
give a theory of truth for the object language. Tarski's preferred policy for
with a healthy methodological holism which will serve us well in the subsequent
avoiding antinomies is to require that, in giving a theory of truth, the metalan-
chapters when we try to understand the logic of truth. In particular, it should
guage rnusl be essentially richer than the object lurzguuge in expressive power.
make us realize that the failure of the intuitively obvious principle
Tarski never says precisely what he means by saying that one language is
rC#J?
is true iff d, essentially richer than another, but he does give examples. One example is that
I
second-order arithmetic, which has variables ranging both over natural numbers
does not automatically preclude the dcveloptnent of a coherent theory of truth,
and over sets of natural numbers, is essentially richer than first-order arithmetic,
any more than the failure of the intuitively obvious principle
which only has variables ranging over natural numbers. W e can see how much
greater the expressive power of second-ordcr arithmetic is by observing that in
second-order number theory one can, in effect, talk about real numbers, since
precludes the development of a coherent theory of logical necessity. The success
one can identify a real number with the set of places in its binary decimal
of Solovay and others in solving Montague's paradox should give us courage for
expansion where Is appear. Thus, in first-order number theory, one can do
the attempt to solve the insolubilitr."
arithmetic. whereas in second-order number theory, one can d o geometry, calcu-
lus, and analysis as well. In general, (n+ !)st-order number theory is essentially
richer than nth-order number theory.
As another example, we may take the metalanguage to be the language of set
2'
theory, understood in the usual way, with variables ranging over all sets and ' F '
Less optimistic lhan wc, mediaeval logicians referred to the various versions of the liar antinorny
designating the elcmenthood relation, and the object language to be a first-order
as thc "irrsolrtbilia": see Kneale and Kneale [ 1962. pp. 227ffl.
language that has been interpreted by specifying. within the language of set
--
theory. a set, which is to be the universe of discourse of the object language, and
-
is a real definition. Then it will be a serious flaw in a theory of ps, if the theory
functions and relations on that set, which are to interpret the function signs and does not tell us that ( V x ) ( xis a p O(.r)). But it is, at worst. a pedagogical defect
predicates of the object language. Within the object language. the only individuals if the theory treats ( V x ) ( xis a p +(x)) as a definition and ( V x ) ( xis a p %(x))
we can talk about will be elements of the specified set, whereas in the metalan-
guage we can talk about the whole universe of sets. By any measure of the size
of sets we can think of, the universe of set theory is immensely larger than any
particular set. For any particular set, there are very much larger sets, and the
universc of set theory is very much larger than any of these. Thus, in speaking
O(Vx)(xis a p - O(x))will be true, but n(V,r)(x is a p -
as a theorem. rather than vice versa. (If modal considerations enter into our
metatheory, we might be able to distinguish the two types of definition modally;
+ ( x ) )might not be.)
To illustrate Tarski's method, let us take our object language to be the first-
order language of arithmetic and our metalanguage to be the second-order lan-
the object language, one restricts one's attention to a very tiny fragment of what guage of arithmetic. Using syntactic operations S , +, and : so that ~ ( r r 1 =)
there is. r ~ ( r ) lrr1 +
, + rpl = rr pl , and rr1 : rpl = r ~ . ~we a
l ,first find formula
Tarski showed, by giving examples, that for a clearly specified interpreted that specifies the denotations of closed terms:
formal language 2 , built up from a finite vocabulary, one can give, within an
essentially richer metalanguage, an r.rplic.it dejnition of the true sentences of Y. Den(x.y) =, ( 3 Q ) [ Q is a finite set of ordered pairs &
That is, one can produce an open sentence r ( x ) of the metalanguage, containing ( V v ) ( V w ) ( < ~ ' , w >F Q + ( v is a closed term &
no semantic terms, such that the definition [ ( v = 'ol & M' : 0)
V (3t)(3u)(<t,u> E Q & v = S ( t ) & w1 = S ( u ) )
V ( 3 q ) ( Z r ) ( 3 t ) ( g u ) ( < q , r >F Q & <t,u> F Q &
v=q+t&w=r+u)
is a materially adequate definition of truth in the sense of convention T, which V ( 3 q ) ( g r ) ( g t ) ( g u ) ( < q , r >E Q & <t,u> F Q &
requires that every biconditional got by substituting a sentence of -2 for C$ in the v = q : t & w = r.u)j))
schema & <x,y> E Q ]
Because we can use natural numbers as codes for finite sets of natural numbers,
be a consequence of the definition. By 'consequence' here, Tarski refers to letting the code for the finite set S be 3.2',
we do not really need the second-
the consequences of some unspecified nonsemantical theory, formulated in the order quantifier to define the denotation relation. Replacing talk about finite sets
metalanguage, whose acceptance is taken for granted. by talk about their codes, we may think of 'Deiz(x,y)' as a formula of the first-
The notion of a materially adequate definition is the same as the mediaeval order language of number theory. We use this first-order formula 'Den(x,y)' in
conception of a nominal, as contrasted with a real, definition. A nominal definition giving our second-order definition of the set of first-order truths:
merely picks out the right extension, whereas a real definition gives the essence Tr(x) ++ ( V R ) [ [ ( V y ) ( R (-
y,
) y is a first-order sentence)
of the thing defined. The inevitable example is that 'featherless biped' g. 'IV~Sa
-
& ( V y ) ( V z ) ( yand z are closed terms + ( R ( y 5 z) ++
nominal and 'rational animal' a real definition of 'human being'. Tarski regards ( 3 v ) ( 3 w )(Den(y,v) & Den(z,w) & v = w ) ) )
it as a minimal requirement on a satisfactory definition of truth that it be materially
adequate in the sense of convention T , and he shows how to meet this minimal
& ( V y ) ( V z ) ( yand z are closed terms + ( R ( y z) <
( 3 v ) ( 3 w )(Den(y,v)& Den(z,w) & v < w ) ) )
requirement. Of course, a definition that meets this minimal standard might
-
& ( V y ) ( V z ) ( R ( yV 2 )
++ ( R ( y )V R ( z ) ) )
nonetheless be, in many ways, an unsatisfactory characterization of the thing & ('d sentence y ) ( R ( l y )e i R ( y ) )
defined. It might be woefully uninformative and a poor guide to future research. & (V variable v ) ( V y ) ( R ( ( ? ~ l ) y ) (3 closed term t)R(y vlt))l
( V X ) ( Xis a p -
But such defects need not force us to repudiate such a definition. Suppose that
+(x))
this sense. But the categoricity condition is surely too strong, since, according
for a sentence of the object language. It is obvious that this implicit definition to Beth's theorem (theorem 2.2.22 of C.C. Chang and H.J. Keisler 11973]),
is materially adequate in the sense of convention T. ! whenever the condition is met the concept defined will already be explicitly
Tarski regards this approach as unsatisfactory for two reasons. The first reason definable. But although no implicit definition that cannot be made explicit meets
is that the axiomatization obtained "would be a highly incomplete system, which the categoricity condition, our implicit definition of truth comes rather close to
would lack the most important and most fruitful general theorems" 11935, p. 2571 meeting it. If we let r ( T r ) consist of the six axioms given above for implicitly
For example, for each sentence 4, the theory will enable us easily to prove
-
defining the truths of arithmetic, then from r ( T r ) and 17(Tr'),together with the
Peano axioms strengthened by ullowirzg the predicates 'Tr' and 'Tr" to uppear in
instances of' the induction axiom schema, one can indeed derive ' ( V x ) ( T r ( x )
We cannot, however, prove the generalization T r l ( x ) ) ' Thus,
. it would appear that the origin of the difficulty is not the inability of
the semantic theory to pick out the referents of semantic terms, but rather the inabil-
(V sentence x)(Tr(x)V T r ( 1 x ) ) ity of number thcory to pick out the referents of arithmetical terms.
since this generalization depends upon infinitely many axioms and no proof can Observe the connection between our implicit first-order definition and our
use more than a finite number of premisses. explicit second-order definition. If we let 'y(Tr)' abbreviate the conjunction of
This objection points out a serious defect in the particular implicit definition the six axioms of the implicit definition, the explicit definition is
of truth that Tarski considered, but there are other ways of implicitly defining
truth which are not subject to this objection. To illustrate this. let us again take
our object language to be the language of arithmetic. We form the metalanguage This technique for turning an implicit definition into an explicit higher-order
by adding the new unary predicate 'Tr' to the object language. Recall that definition is due to Frege [1879],and it is available to us whenever we have a
'Den(x-,y)' is an abbreviated formula of the object language. Our theory of truth finite system of axioms implicitly defining a function or relation on a set. A typical
consists of the following six axioms: example of Frege's technique is got by turning the usual recursive definition of
cxponentiation
-
( V y ) ( T r ( y )+ y is a sentences of the object language).
x0 = 1
( V y ) ( V z ) ( jand i are closed terms -+ x5i'J=
-
(Tr(y y z) (3v)(3w)(Detz(y,v)& Den(z,w) & v = w ) ) ) .
( V y ) ( V z ) ( yand z are closed terms -, into an explicit second-order definition:
<
-
(Tr(y z) v )Den(z,w) & v < w ) ) ) .
( 3 ~ ) ( 3 w ) ( D e n ( y ,&
(Vy)(Vz)(Tr(yV z) * ( T r ( y ) T r ( z ) ) .
x' = z = ", ( V R ) [ [ ( V w ) ( R ( w-+) w is an ordered pair) & R(<O. 1 >)
& (Vu)(Vv)(R(<u,v)> ++ R(<S(u),v.x>)]
(V sentence y ) ( T r ( l y ) i T r ( y ) ) . I
+ R(<y,z>)l
( V variable v)(Vy)(Tr((?v)y)e ( 3 closed term l)Tr(y vlt).
Godel [I9311 took the process a step further, showing how to turn the recursive
Here two of the axioms--one for each predicate in the object language-give the definition into an explicit first-order definition; here we use the notation for finite
truth conditions for the atomic sentences, and the following three axioms indicate sequences which we developed at the end of chapter 1:
how the truth values of compound sentences are determined from the truth values
of simpler sentences. This is a materially adequate definition. It is also a quite
( V y ) ( V z ) ( T r ( yV z) ---
( V ~ ) ( V Z ) ( IE~ :~I)( ~ . ?.v E ):
( T r ( y )V TI-(,-))
Godel was able to do this because any particular value of the exponent function
depends upon only finitely rnany previously obtained values of the exponent
( V sentence ! ) ( ~ r ( ? ~ ) ~ T r ( y ) )
-
(V variable ~ l ) ( V x ) ( T r ( ( ? t , ) y ) ( 3 z ) T r ( yv i ; ) )
It is easy to scc that this characterization of truth is materially adequate in the
function. We cannot apply the same method to turn the second-order dcfinition I sense of convention T.
of truth into a first-order definition, because the truth-value of a quantified If we attempt to turn this implicit definition into an explicit definition as we
sentence will depend upon the truth-values of infinitely rnany substitution in- did before. taking y ( T r ) to be the conjunction o f the six axioms, taking y to be
stances. I the formula got from y ( T r ) by replacing each occurrence of 'Tr(p)' by ' p t. z',
In applying Frege's method to convert an implicit to an cxplicit definition, we I
and writing
do not have to have a higher-order logic; a first-order language in which we can
talk about sets will often do just as well. Thus, if our object language is a first-
order language 2,built from a finite vocabulary, that is interpreted by a model
we find that, since there is no set that contains all the truth sentences of %,-the
\'I, we can give, within the language got from Y by adjoining the new unary true sentences of Y,, form a proper class-there is no sct that satisfies y ( z ) , and
predicate ' T r ' , a finitely axiomatized theory that implicitly defines the true scnten-
so our definition implies, absurdly.
ccs of T!%i,,. The technique for doing so is just the method we used above for the
language of arithmetic. Let y(Tr) be the con.junction of the axioms, and let y ( z )
be the formula got from y(Tr) by replacing each occurrence of a subformula of
thc form 'Tr(p)' by ' p E 2 ' ; hcre 'z' is to be a variable that does not occur in The true sentences of :fie,the original language of set theory without the added
y(Tr). We can now give an explicit definition of the true sentences of Y!,,,as constants, do form a set. Although we have several methods for implicitly defining
follows: this set, none of them gives rise to an explicit definition. We can define the true
sentences of 2 as those true sentences of Yv which happen to be sentences of 2 ,
but the detour, getting to the true sentences of 2 by way of the true sentences of
Thus, we see that, whenever our object language is a first-order language with a 2,, makes this implicit definition inexplicable. Similarly, we can define the true
first-order model, built from a finite vocabulary, Tarski's second method will not 1 sentences of 2 in terms of the satisfaction relation on 2, but since the satisfaction
accomplish anything that could not be done just as well by Tarski's first method. relation on if is a proper class, the same problem arises. We can avoid any
The extra versatility of Tarski's second method only becomes evident whcn disruptive detours through proper classes by implicitly defining the true sentences
we look at languages like the language of set theory, whose variables are not of 2 directly, taking our theory of truth to consist of all biconditionals
restricted to any set. Such languages are not interpreted, in the technical sense,
but they can still be meaningful, and we can describe what the symbols of the
languages mean by saying how to translate the symbols into English or some for C#J a sentence of 2 . But now a new problem arises; since the theory is not finitely
other familiar language. If we extend such a language by adding a new constant axiomatized, we cannot form the conjunction y(Tr). As we would anticipate from
for each of the individuals that the object language talks about, the grammar of theorem 1.3, none of these attempts to produce an explicit first-order definition
the resulting language will be perfectly ordinary, even though the sentences of is successful.
the resulting language will not form a set. We can give an implicit definition of F Gset ~ theory, unlike number theory, moving to a second-order logic docs us
truth for the extended language, just as we did for the language of arithmetic. no good. Where y ( T r ) is the conjunction of the six sentences that implicitly define
For example. if Y is the language of set theory and il', is the language obtained the true sentences of Yv, we write
from Y by adding a new constant ii for each set u , we can take our theory of truth
for 2, to be the following:
(v.v)(Triy)-+ v is a sentence of Y , )
( V y ) ( V ~ ) ( ~ r (=r i31
; =
' If, alternatively, we take our second-order definition to be 'Tr(.r)
conclude '(V.t)lTr(.x)', which is equally absurd.
- .,(3:) ( y ( z ) & .r R :)', we
But this gets us no further than its first-order counterpart. If we understand the Every scientifically legitimate general term is coextensive with some open
second-order variables in the usual way, as ranging over all sets formed from those sentence of the language of physics.
individuals over which the fi rst-order variables range, we find that the second-ordcr
variables range over all sets of sets. But every sets of sets is already within the range One might, I suppose, object to this alleged consequence of linguistic physical-
of the first-order variables, so that the second-order variables get us nothing new. ism on the grounds that not every scientifically legitimate term needs to refer to
Moving to a second-order logic accomplishes nothing: we still get a genuine property. Thus, one could claim that, although every property is
expressed by a term of the language of physics, there exist scientifically legitimate
terms that do not refer to properties and are not expressible in the language of
physics. It is not so clear what the physicalistic basis might be for this distinction
The second-order definition will prove to be successful if, making the technical between those scientifically legitimate general terms which express genuine prop-
distinction between sets and classes, we take the second-order quantifiers to range over erties and thosc which do not. In any event, this would not be a happy objection
classes of individuals. Assuming a sufficiently powerful theory of classes (Giidel- for the physicalist to make, since the watered-down physicalism that results from
Bemays is not enough), we shall indeed find that the second-order definition, it would be neither interesting nor important. Once the physicalist admits that
there arc legitimate scientific terms that are not reducible to the language of
physics, physicalisn~becomes nothing more than a quaint sect advocating an
is materially adequate as a definition of the first-order truths of Y,, showing us obscure restriction on the use of the word 'property'.
that the language of class theory is essentially richer than the language of set The philosophically interesting version of linguistic physicalism accepts the
theory. But this is not a philosophically satisfying resolution, since we encounter thesis that every scientifically legitimate term is coextensive with some term of
the same old difficulties when we attempt to give an explicit definition of truth the language of physics. The primafacie counterexample to this thesis is the term
for the language of class theory. 'true sentence of the language of physics'. This is a scientifically legitimate term,
For a more philosophically interesting example, let us take our object language presumably, yet we know from theorem 1.3 that it is not coextensive with any
to consist of the first-order language of set theory together with the basic vocabu- term of the language of physics.
lary of physics. Under the intended interpretation, the variables range over It is open to the linguistic physicalist to respond by insisting that the expression
physical objects and sets built up from physical objects.' Let me refer to this 'true sentence of the language of physics' is somehow illegitimate. But it is by
language as "the language of physics"; there may be some question about whether no means evident what is illegitimate about the expression 'true sentence of the
this appellation is apt, but it seems clear that the language of physics should language of physics', other than that it is an embarrassment for physicalism. We
include the basic physical vocabulary together with a mathematical vocabulary, are able to use and understand the term, and, what is more, we are able to
and what I say here will not be sensitive to precise detail^.^ uniquely specify what it refers to by giving an implicit definition.' Moreover, it
We can give an implicit definition of truth for the language of physics just as appears that the physicalist must himself employ the notions he wants to castigate
we did for the language of set theory. The reason this example is philosophically as illegitimate. For the physicalist wants to claim that every scientifically legiti-
interesting is that it provides a prima,facie counterexample to a doctrine we may mate term is coextensive with some term of the language of physics. But if 'true'
call linguistic physicalism, the doctrine that every (genuine) property can be is forbidden, 'coextensive' must likewise be forbidden, since truth can be defined
described within the language of physics. So characterized, the doctrine utilizes in terms of coextensiveness, as follows:
the excessively vague notion of a property being describable in a language, but r $ l is true =, rx = x & $1 is coextensive with rw
. = xl
it has a tolerably precise consequence, viz.,
Thus, physicalism itself would appear to be one of those extrascientific metaphysi-
cal doctrines which physicalists want to eschew. A closely related difficulty is
' Thus, wc let U,,, the set of so-called ~ r r ~ l r r n r ~consist objccts. U,, , consists of
~ t s , of all physical
the physical objccts together hith all subsets of ti,, and U, for A a limit IS ,,UhU,.. Our intended this: physical realism is, on one prominent account,' the doctrine that the terms
universe of discourse consists of everything that is in any of the U,,a, for cu an ordinal. Set theory
with urelements is discussed in Barwise [1975. # I . l j and in Field [1980. ch. I]. Morc prcciscly, the implicit definition un~quelyspecifies the referents of 'true sentence of the
' Field [I9801 argues that, by artful coding constructions. cnough mathernatica to do science can be language of physics' mod~rlothe assumption that the referents of the terms of the language of
relatively interpreted into a language in which we only talk about physical objects. If that is so, physics are uniquely determined.
we can take the language of physics to be a language that only talks about physical objects. For ' This characterization of realism is due to Richard Boyd. and it is cited with approval by Putnam
what we say here, thia change will makc no difference. (1975, p . 731 and van Fraassen (1980, p. XI.
of the language of physics refer. But one cannot consistently hold that there is a we had best give up a11 pretense that philosphical inquiry is rational. Philosophical
genuine relation of reference, yet deny that there is a genuine property of truth, terms do not refer. Philosophical beliefs are not true, indeed it is improper even
since, as we saw in chapter 1 , truth is definable in terms of reference. So the to ask whether they are true. Unlike scientific discourse. philosophical discourse
linguistic physicalist is forced to disavow physical realism. is beyond truth and falsity.
To understand the significance of this counterexample to linguistic physicalism There is more at stake here than just the dignity of philosophy. At issue is the
would require a substantial philosophical investigation. Are we witnessing a deep possibility of a unified scientific understanding in which human thought and
difficulty with the physicalist tendency in philosophy or a superficial difficulty action are no less intelligible or more mysterious than the planetary orbits. If we
caused by an infelicitous expression of the tendency? Can we find an alternative adopt the proposed solution, we shall find that within the object language we are
formulation of linguistic physicalisnl which is frce of these logical problems'! To unable even to describe human thought and action. We can describe and explain
investigate these questions would take us too far afield. The purpose in raising I the motions of inanimate objects. and we can describe human institutions and
thc questions is merely to reinforce the view that investigations into thc logic of behavior inasmuch as they are treated as meaningless, but intentional human
truth have more than merely technical interest. activities, such as speaking, believing, willing, and acting, will be indescribable
Returning fro111 digressions, let us turn to a question that is central to our and inexplicable. Within the metalanguage we can obtain fragmentary descrip-
prescnt inquiry: To what extent is Tarski's second method useful in understanding tions of human thought and actions. We can describe intentional human activities
the semantics of natural language'? We cannot use the method to give a semantics that are directed toward inanimate objects, but thought about thought and talk
for an entire natural language, since we do not possess even an inessentially about talk will remain indescribable and inexplicable. Thus, if we accept the
richer metalanguage. We can, however, use the method to get a theory of truth limitations imposed by Tarski's proposal for avoiding antinomies, we forfeit
for a substantial fragment of a natural language. We work backward, starting one of the highest aspirations of the human spirit, the aspiration to self-
with English as our tnetalanguage and carving out our ob.ject language from the understanding.
metalanguage by excising all the semantical terms. Our semantic theory will be Even though Tarski's second method does not give us a theory of truth for
the naive theory, restricted so that it only applies to the object language. If we English, it does exhibit an important feature of the English usage of 'true', a
follow this plan, we shall not get a semantic theory for English. but we shall get feature so useful that we would expect any successful theory of truth for English
an attractive semantic theory for the nonsernantic parts of English. to exhibit it. Let r be a set of sentences of the object language that I know to be
There is no simple test for determining what counts as a semantic term, but not wholly accurate; r might, for example, be a report of the outcomes of games
among the notions that get booted out of the object language are truth, reference. in my softball league which I know to be inaccurate because the total number of
I
necessity, and knowledge. One cannot imagine four notions more central to games won in the league is, according to r, different from the total number of
philosophical inquiry. One could conduct investigations into the natural sciences I losses. How can 1convey to a friend the information that l- is not wholly accurate?
within the object language; one could even undertake investigations into the One method would be to assert the disjunction of the negations of the members
social sciences, other than linguistics and perhaps psychology, without serious of r, but this may be impracticable, either because a list of the members of r is
disruption. But one could not begin to do philosophy within the object language. not ready to hand or because r is intractably long. By utilizing the notion of
Epistemology and metaphysics would be entirely off limits. Fragments of ethics, truth, 1 can succinctly convey the information that is inaccurate simply by
aesthetics, and action theory would survive, but some of the central questions asserting, "Not every member of r is true." Without using the notion of truth or
("Are ethical judgments true or false'?" "Are truth conditions enough to give the some other semantic notion, in order to convey the information that 1' is not
content of an agent's beliefs and desires'?") would be excluded. It is only a slight wholly accurate, 1 need to be able to list the members of T. Using the notion of
truth. I only need to be able to narne the set r.
exaggeration to say that we get the object language from the metalanguage by I
cutting out the language of philosophy. In general, if we are only interested in local, sentence-by-sentence properties
The doctrine that the language of philosophy needs to be singled out for of our systems of belief, we shall have no great need of semantic notions. If
exclusion from the domain of discourse to which semantical predicates can be is a set of sentences of the object language which we can conveniently list, we
applied is a doctrine whose acceptance ought to occasion considerable embarrass- can, in effect, assert that all the members of r are true by asserting the conjunction
ment among philosophers. We ordinarily suppose that the aim of a rational inquiry of r, and we can deny that all the members of r are true by denying the
is to acquire true beliefs about the ob,jects to which the terms of our discourse conjunction. On the other hand, to describe global properties of our systems of
refer. But if that is so, then, if we accept the exclusion of philosophical language belief which go beyond sets of sentences we can readily list, explicit semantic
from the realm of discourse in which terms like 'true' and 'refers' are applicable, notions are required. Thus, if r is a nameable set of sentences of the object
language, we can. in effect, assert the conjunction of 1' by saying, "(Vx)(.r c r about in the world even if our semantic theory is infinitely fragmented, but then
-+ xis true)," and we can assert the disjunction of r by saying, "(3x)(x E I'& again we can get about in the world with no semantic theory at all.
.r is true)." If D is a nameable set of sets of sentences, we can even, in effect, The infinitely fragmented account serves neither the practical purposes that
assert the conjunction of the disjunction of thc members of D by saying "(VA) the ordinary unitary notion of truth already serves nor the theoretical purposes
( A e D + (36)(6 e A & 8 is true))." We can even apply this method where the that we would like it to serve. For practical purposes, we would like to use the
sets of sentences involved are infinite, thus simulating a fragment of the infinitary notion of truth as a means for asserting or denying a totality of sentences that we
language YX,,,.' This is a reason why the notion of truth is so precious to us: it can name but cannot list. But in order to assert a set of sentences A of the language
is one of the means by which finite minds are able to apprehend the infinite.' with the 'Tr,'s by saying that the members of A arc all Tr,,, for appropriate n. we
We now see what is wrong with the doctrine, suggested by Frege [1915], that have to have an upper bound on the subscripts of 'Tr' that occur in A . But such
the notion of truth is superfluous, since to say that a sentence is true tells us an open bound will not usually be available, for cases in which we cannot list
nothing more than the sentence itself tells us. The observation that we may replace the members o f A are typically also cases in which we cannot determine an upper
..
'r41 is true' by 4 and 'r41 is not true' by 7 4 enables us to eliminate the word bound on the subscripts in A.
'true' from contexts in which truth is attributed or denied to a sentence that is For theoretical purposes, we would like to be able to use the notion of truth
named by a quotation name. But, in contexts in which truth is attributed or denied to express significant generali~ationsabout the relations of the expressions of the
to a sentence or set of sentences for which quotation names are not available, the language to the world and to each other. Significant generalizations suggest
notion of truth is indispensable."' themselves, for example,
Using Tarski's second method, we construct the metalanguage out of the
object language by giving an implicit definition. We see that the metalanguage
constucted, though vastly weaker than the higher-order languages Tarski's first
method requires, is a significant advance in expressive power over the original
object language. We may, if we like, continue the process. Let 2,be the original But these generalizations cannot be legitimately formulated anywhere in our
object language, and give axioms implicitly defining 'Tr,,' as a truth predicate for sequence of languages, for they use a variable as the subscript of 'Tr'. I f we were
Y,, Let 2, be the metalanguage thus produced, and give axioms implicitly to allow variable subscripts, treating 'Tr,(x)' as a binary relation, we would be
defining 'Tr,' as a truth predicate for Y , ,treating the previous metalanguage as able to use therorem 1.2 to produce a sentence A so that
the new object language. Continue, letting X,, be the language obtained from the
object language by adding 'Tr,'s for k<n and giving axioms implicitly defining 1
'Tr,,' as a truth predicate for 2,, We may even extend this process into the and, once again, we would be mired in paradox.
I
transfinite, continuing as long as we have names for the ordinals to use as Tarski claims to have shown how to give, for a wide class of formalized
subscripts. languages, semantic theories that are "in harmony with the postulates of the unity
As we shall see in chapter 5 , this procedure increases the expressive power of of science and of physicalism" [1936, p. 4061; in this he has succeeded admirably,
the original object language substantially. It does not, however, bring us closer showing how to utilize the logical resources of higher-order languages to explicate
to the goal of obtaining a theory of truth for English. To understand how the the semantical features of lower-order languages. It is sometimes claimed (though
English language works, we need be an account that encompasses the language not by Tarski himself) that Tarski has shown how to give a general account of
as a whole; an infinitely fragmented account will not do. To be sure, we can get semantics which is in harmony with the postulates of the unity of science and
I physicalism, but this is surely excessive. Tarski himself disavowed any attempt
8 2,,.
r which was first investigated by Carol Karp [1964]. differs frorn ordinary first-order logic in to give a semantics for natural languages, and if we nonetheless try to use his
I
that, while ordinary logic only allows ua to form the conjunction or dis~unc!ion of two formulas methods to investigate the semantics of a natural language, what we get, far from
at a time, in %,,,, we can form thc conjunction or disjunction of an arbitrary set of sentences, finitc
or infinite. Thus thc set of true sentences of the objcct language is the cxtension of the dissunction a unified science, is a disjointed and fragmentary account that can describe the
of the set of all sentences of the form (x = r$' & 6). for 6 a sentencc of the objcct language. parts of language used in chemistry or physics but cannot describe the language
' The importance of the notion of truth as a means for, in cffect. producing infinite conjunctions and used in linguistics or philosophy. If we accept the constraints Tarski's policy
disjunctions was emphasized by Quine [1970]. imposes, we must either relinquish the hope for a unified science or else dismiss
"I This objection to the redundancy theory was advanced by Tarski [1944, %16].
semantics (except as applied to formalized languages) as a pseudoscience.
laws of physics and biophysical bridge laws. we could derive all the truths of the genctic structure that A . trn.sna lives in the eastern Sonoran desert and feeds
biology. We would rcquire an utterly detailed physical description, and we would upon Agave. but we shall be able to deduce that it lives in a desert climate and feeds
not be able to derive "Larvac of Agatlzyrnus urTxrza feed upon Aguve palrrzeri and upon succulents. The molecular lepidoptery of thc future will reduce present-day
Aguve c,hpsantha" (unless we were willing to abide a spccies-by-species list of naturalistic lepidoptery to chemistry.
names), but we would be able to derive detailed descriptions of the lives of Unfortunately, focusing our attention upon how the life cycle of a single insect
butterflies. Although this doctrine plays an important role in reductionist meta- depends upon its genetic structure does nothing to improve Field's position. The
physics, surcly we should not assess the work of a flesh-and-blood biologist by difficulty is in specifying the genetic structure of the particular specimen we are
the success of his theory in the hypothetical situation in which biology is a science examining. Although there are general laws that constrain what genetic structures
of pcrfect information, but by its success in the rcal-life situation in which data are possible, these general laws stop far short of determining the genetic structure
are scarce and hard to come by. In the real-life situation, the lepidopterist can do of a particular individual. Were it not the case that the general laws of nature
no better than systematically to list observcd species. drastically underdetermine the genetic structures of particular butterflies. the
Semantics, it seems to me, is more like lepidoptery than like chemistry, for order Lepidopteru would not display the splendid diversity it in fact displays. To
the connections between words and objects studied by semanticists are accidental. describe the genetic structure of a particular insect. we cannot do better than to
Although undoubtedly there are important general laws governing the reference give a nucleotidc-by-nucleotide description of the DNA molecule. Thus, the basis
relation, it is surely too much to expect that general laws will tell us that of the genetic description of the insect is a nucleotide-by-nucleotide list that plays
'inflammable' means "flammable" rather than "not flammable" or that 'egrc- much the role in molecular lepidoptery that Tarski's word-by-word vocabulary
gious', derived from a Latin word meaning "outstandingly good," means "out- list plays in his semantics. The derivation of the overall biological features of the
standingly bad." It is a defect of Tarski's account qua semantic theory that it fails organism from its DNA structure by means of general biological laws is analogous
to inform us of the general laws governing the reference relation." But, except to the derivation of the overall semantic features of a language from the references
perhaps in an eschatological limiting case, knowing the general laws governing of the simple terms by means of general semantic laws. We may think of molecular
the reference relation would not enable us to determine the precise reference of lepidoptery as describing a space of possible genetic structures of butterflies and
every single term of the language. and we need to determine the precise reference as depicting the overall biological features of the possible butterfly that occupies
of cvery single term if our theory is going to be materially adequate in the sense each position in that space; only a few of the hypothetical possibilities are realized
of convention T. Although a theory along the lines proposed by Field might be, in actual butterflies. To deterimine the position of a particular butterfly within the
in some ways, conceptually more satisfying than Tarski's theory, it would provide genetic space, we must specify in exact detail the molecular structure of the
too little information to satisfy convention T. To get a detailed account, in DNA. For this purpose, we can do no better than to give a list.
semantics just as in lepidoptery, we must give a list. The conclusion Field wants to draw from his objection to Tarski's methodology
It might be responded that I have misapplied the analogy. Tarski claimed to is that Tarski's methods fail to provide a physicalistically acceptable understand-
show how to develop the semantics of a single language, and an analogous ing of semantics. Although we have found little merit in Field's methodological
investigation in lepidoptery would be aimed not at describing all the butterflies complaint, we have good reasons to accept Field's conclusion. A reason that has
in an entire continent, as Howe aims to do, but at understanding a single specimen been stressed here is the restriction of Tarski's method to languages that are
in detail. Here the situation looks more promising. since we can derive the poorer in expressive power than the language we speak. Another reason, closer
macroscopic properties of the insect from the molecular structure of its nucleic to Field's concerns, is that Tarski's methods only give a semantic theory for the
acids, thus reducing biological features of the organism to chemical features. We special case in which the object language is included within the metalanguage.
do not find such a derivation in Howe's book, but that is because lepidoptery has To have a satisfactory understanding of semantics, we would have to see how to
only begun to absorb the impact of the recent revolution in molecular biology. give truth conditions not only for our own language but for a wide diversity of
Within the forseeable future, it should be possible to determine the genetic languages, and to do this we would need to solve a problem Tarski completely
structure of each species of butterfly and to explain the life cycle of the species sets aside, how correctly to translate other languages into our own language.
in terms of this genetic structure. To be sure, we shall not be able to infer from We nlay speculate that future semantic theory will describe a space of possible
human languages and will give the truth conditions for the sentences of the
" It is not so clear, however, that this is any defect in Tarbki's account qua dejinition of truth, and language at each position in that space. If we wish to determine truth conditions
Tarski's expressed aim was to provide a definition. for a language with the degree of precision envisaged by convention T , we must
specify the language in precise Ltail: we nlust distinguish English from the
variant that is just like English except that 'infianlmable' means "not flammable,"
and for this purpose we cannot expect to do much better than to give a term-by-
term list. Even so, we would likc to have some sort of social and historical
explanation of how we came to speak the language we speak. It would not do to Kripke and 3-valued Logic
answer the request for such an explanation by pointing out that the referents of
the terms of our own language are determined by the simple schema
refers in this very language to T
This response would be unsatisfactory in just the way that it would be unsatisfac-
Kripke [I9751 has significantly advanced our understanding of the problems
tory to ask your colleagues to gather for a meeting, then to respond to their
raised by the paradoxes by applying to these problems the methods of the mathe-
question-"Why are we heres?''-by pointing out that the rules for using indexicals matical theory of inductive definitions. Kripke develops an account according to
!
ensure that every utterance of 'We are here now' is true. I
which the paradoxical sentences are neither true nor false, utilizing the strong
The upshot of our discussion of Field is to agree that Tarski has left important 3-valued logic of S.C. Kleene [1952, $541 to describe the logical properties of
questions unanswered and so failed to provide us with a satisfactory foundation !
I
such non-truth-valued sentences. The construction Kripke dcvelops is an ex-
for a general semantic theory, yet to doubt whether, given the aims Tarski
intcnded to accomplish, these omissions should be considered a defect in Tarski's 1 tremely versatile mathematical tool that can be fruitfully used for a variety of
work. I philosophical purposes.
I
As Kripke emphasizes [1975, p. 771, his results do not depcnd crucially upon
I the choice of the Kleene 3-valued logic as the method for handling truth-value
gaps. A variety of logics for languages with truth-value gaps have been proposed,
and analogues to the results Kripke obtains using the 3-valued logic can be
obtained for most of these other logics.' But whercas the mathematical results
will be the same, their philosophical significance may vary. The discussion in
this chaptcr is intended to apply only to the particular version of Kripke's construc-
tion which employs the strong Kleene 3-valued logic.
The idea behind Kripke's construction is that the paradoxical sentences are
defective, in much the way that sentences that contain denotationless proper
I names and sentences that contain category mistakes have been thought to be
I defective. Unlikc semantically well-formed sentences, these defective sentences
are neither true nor false. One uses a 3-valued logic to describe how these
1 defective sentences interact with normal sentences.
i Given a countable first-order language 2 and an acceptable structure !I' for 2,
I
we form the language Y' by adjoining the single new unary predicate 'Tr' to 2 .
We expand '?( to a rlassiccrl model I(!' ,E) of 2 ' by picking a subset E of (t'II,
which is to be the extension of 'Tr'. We get aparrinl model ( ! ' ( , ( E , A ) by
) picking
two disjoint subsets E and A of It'll. The extension E is to consist of those things
to which the predicate 'Tr' definitely applics, while the anti-extcrzsion A is to
consist of thosc things to which thc predicate 'Tr' definitely does not apply. There
' An historically Important example of a method for handling truth-value gaps which is not amenable
to Kripke's techniques is the 3-valued logic of tukasiewitz (19201. We ahall encounter another
example in chapter 8.
may be members of /!'I/ which are in neither E nor A; for such things it remains
e
unsettled whether 'Tr' applies. Whether a sentence is true in the partial model is
determined by the following rules: i answer. "?' indicates that no answer has yet been obtained. without judging the
question whether an answcr will be obtained sometime in the future. The system
is designed so that, once we have assigned a truth value 'T' or 'F' to a sentence,
future investigations will not cause us to revoke that assignment. In other words,
An atomic sentence of YiP.,,
is true (falsc) in (?L,(E,A))iff it is true (false) in
I!' . the system is monotone, so that if(UI.(E,A)) and (!'I,(F.B)) are partial models
An atomic sentence Tr(r) is true in (!'I,(E.,A)) iff r" E E, and it is false iff with E C F and A C B, any sentence that is true (false) in (\!I,(E.A)) will be true
7'1' F A . (false) in (!'I,(F,B)).
A disjunction is true in the partial model iff one or both of its disjuncts are i There is no reason why predicates other than 'Tr' should not be partially
true, and it is false iff both disjuncts are false. defined.
-. It is only for simplicity that we focus our attention on the case in which
A negation is true in the partial model iff the sentence negated is false and
false iff the sentence negated is true.
(3v)$(v)is true in (!'I,(E,A)) iff, for some n E /?I/.$);( is true in (?l,(E,A)),
I! 'Tr' is the only predicate that is not fully defined.
Theorem 1.3 tells us that we cannot find a classical model (91,E) such that
E = {sentences true in the classical model (?I,E)}
and it is false iff, for each a in I?Il,$(a) is false.
Kripke's fundamental observation is that one can find partial models that have
If 'Tr' occurs only positively within 4, that is, if every occurrence of 'Tr' in the analogous property.
4 is within the scope of an even number of negation signs, then 4 will be true
in the partial model (!'I,(E,A)) iff 4 is true in the classical model (!'I,E). In I DEFINITION.
A $xed point is a pair (EVA)such that
particular, a sentence of Y\!,will be true in (!'I,(E,A)) iff it is true in :'I. E = {sentences true in the partial model (:'(,(E,A))}
If A should happen to be the complement of E-that is. if A U E = /?I[-then A = {members of (!'1( that are not sentences} U
the sentences of %': true in the partial model (\'I,(E,A)) will be precisely the {sentences false in the partial model (!'(,(E,A))}
sentences true in the classical model (?I,E).
Conjunctions, conditionals, biconditionals, and universal quantifications are THEOREM
4.1 (Martin, Woodruff, and Kripke). There is a fixed point. In
defined in terms of disjunctions, negations, and existential quantifications in the fact, thcre is a fixed point (E.,A,) which is least in the sense that, if (@,A)
usual way. The behavior of the Boolean connectives is nicely summarized in the is another fixed point, then E, E and A, A.
following truth table: PROOF:Define, for each ordinal a ,
E,, = {sentences true in the partial model (:'I.( E,, pU,, AP))};
A,, = {nonsentences} U
{sentences false in the partial model (:'I,( ,,U," EB, pUuAB))}.
Set E. equal2 to LJoKEcxand set A%equal to goKAcr. Evidently, the Emsand the Aes
are nonstrictly increasing, that is, if /3 5 a , then El, C E, and A,, C A, It follows
that there exists an ordinal K with E, = Ex and A, = A,. Hence,
Ex = E, + ,
= {sentences true in (I'I,(E,,A,)))
= {sentences true in (!'I,(E,,A,)))
As Kripke remarks [1975, p. 65111, '1' should not be thought of as representing Similarly.
a third truth value. intermediate between truth and falsity, but rather as indicating A, = {nonsentences) U {sentences false in (PI,(E,,A=))I
the absence of a truth value. Kleene introduced his logic to describe the operation
of decision procedures in arithmetic. In response to a question of the form, "Is
Talk about OR, the class of all ordinals, is not to be taken literally. 'a E OR' is short for 'a is an
n in S?," 'T' represents an affirmative answer and 'F' represents a negative
ord~nal.'
so that (E,,A,) is a fixed point. A transfinite induction shows that, if ( E , A ) is a
fixed point, then, for each a , E, C E and A, C A..
HISTORICAL REMARK 4.2. The existence of a fixed point was first demonstrated the formalization of the English sentence, 'Evcry true sentence is a true sentence',
by Robert Martin and Peter Woodruff [1975], who worked with a different system is truth-valueless in the object language, true in the metalanguagc.
of 3-valued logic. also due to Kleene. Martin and Woodruff used Zorn's lemma Kripke regarded this disparity between the status of a sentence in the object
to show that the set of dis.joint pairs (E,A) such that E C {sentences true in language and its status in the metalanguage as reflecting stages in our linguistic
(\'l,(E,A))} and A C {nonsentences} U {sentences false in (\'l,(E,A))} has a development. He says,
maximal element, and then they showed that this niaximal element is a fixed Such seniantical notions as "grounded." "paradoxical," etc. belong to the
point. metalanguage.' This situation seems to me to be intuitively acceptable; in
Kripke's proof, which was obtained independently, gives a bit more informa- contrast to the notion of truth, none of these notions is to be found in natural
tion about the stucturc of the fixed points, giving, in particular. the existence of language in its pristine purity, before philosophers reflect upon its semantics
a least fixed point. Kripke's proof is especially important because of the intimate (in particular, upon the semantic paradoxes). If we give up the goal of a
connections with the mathematical theory of inductive definitions which we shall universal language, models of the type presented in this paper are plausible
explore in the next chapter.. as models of natural language at a stage before we reflect on the generation
A grave and obvious difficulty stands in the way of any attenlpt to apply process associated with the concept of truth, the stage which continues in
theorem 4.1 to the study of English. 'The difficulty is the strengthened liar the daily life of nonphilosophical speakers [1975, p. 801-11.
response. The Kripke construction is intended to codify an intuition that the
paradoxical sentences, being semantically defective, are neither true nor false, Kripke presents no evidence to support the contention that the construction
and that the antinomies arise because we treat these defective sentences like given in theorem 4.1 represents a stage in the development of English speakers,
normal truth-valued sentences. The fundamental thesis motivating Kripke's the- and, in the absence of such evidence, the contention does not seem to be very
ory, that the liar sentencc A is neither true nor false, can be expressed by a plausible. If the contention were correct, we would expect nonphilosophical
sentence of 2', namely, speakers of English to be unwilling to assert
Every true sentence is a true sentence.
since, according to the logic they employ, the sentence is not true. But, in fact,
But this fundamental thesis of Kripke's theory is itsclf, according to Kripke's
whatever hesitation English speakers feel about asserting
theory, semantically defective and so untrue.
Kripke's response to this problem is to invoke the object languagclmeta- Every true sentence is a true sentence
language distinction, this time with a curious twist. The twist is that, unlike
Tarski's theory, where, the object language being part of the metalanguage, an comes not because they think the sentence is dubious but because they think it is
object language sentence will have the same truth value whether it is regarded as too obviously true to be worth stating. One would suppose that a child learning
part of the object language or part of the metalanguage, in Kripke's theory the logical rules of English would naturally incline toward the simple rules of
whether a sentence is true may depend on whether it is regarded as part of the classical 2-valued logic rather than to the more complicated rules of _?-valued
object language or part of the metalanguage. Whereas no sentence that has a truth logic and that it is only at a much later stage of her development, after philosophi-
value yuc~sentence of the object language has a different truth value qua sentence cal pranksters have drawn her attention to certain perplexing special cases, that
of the metalanguage, a sentence that has no truth value quu sentence of the the speaker begins to doubt the universal validity of the law of the excluded
object language will be truth-valued when it is construed as a sentence of the middle. Thus, in the absence of definite psychological evidence, it appears likely
metalanguage. Thus, in the object language Y' the sentence, that the order of developnlent is just the opposite of what Kripke describes. It is
the classical 2-valued logic that is employed in the daily life of nonphilosophical
speakers, and speakers employ the 3-valued logic, if they employ it at all, as a
is truth-valueless, whereas, in the metalanguage in which classical 2-valued logic ' A sentcncc is said to be grortnded if it is assigned a truth bulue in the least tixcd point. A sentence
is used to prove theorem 4.1, the sentence is true. Similarly, that does not receive a truth value in any fixed point ia purudo.rica1.
highly sophisticated response to problems that are only visible upon philosophical (Vl)(Vy)(Tr(x V yj cf ((Tr(x1 V Tr(y))j
reflection. (Vx)(Vy)(Tr(~l(x\! .v)) cf ( T r ( l x ) & T O Y ) ) )
The Kripke construction does not appear to bc helpful in understanding ordi-
nary speakers' usage of the word 'true'. Quite frankly, the philosophical explica-
tion of folk semantics does not seem to me to be a particularly interesting or
useful task, in any event. The more important task, it seems to me, is to establish
=-
( V X ) ( T ~ (1Tx~ 1 cf Tr(x))
(V variable v)(Vy)(Tr((?v)y)
(t/ variable v)(Vy)(Tr(l(Jv)y)
--
(3x)Tr(v Vi-;))
(Vx)Tr(l(v vik)))
i ( 3 x ) ( T r ( x ) & Tr(7x))
the logical basis for a consistent semantics of natural language. The problem of
giving voice to the our preanalytic intuitions about truth is comparatively less THEOREM^.^ (Feferman). For E a subset of /?I(,the classical model (YI,E)
important, just as understanding popular misconceptions about space and time is is a model of KF iff the partial model (!)i,(E,{nonsentences) U ( 4 : 1 4 E
comparatively less important than understanding the actual geomctry of space- E))) is a fixed point. Also, for each sentence 4 of Y$,
time.
As a vehicle for developing a consistent semantics for a natural language, the
construction given in theorem 4.1, taken at face value, does not make it past the is a theorem of KF U R,
starting gate. The problem here is the same problem we encountered with Tarski's PROOF:The proof is quite straightforward, although the details are fairly lengthy.
preferred solution. The construction of theorem 4.1 requires that the universe of First, assume that the classical model (!)l,E) is a model of KF, set A = {nonsen-
discourse of 2' be a set. The universe of discourse of English is not a set. tences) U (4: 1 4 F E), and prove, by induction on the complexity of 4, that,
Therefore, the construction cannot begin to give a theory of truth for English. for each sentence 4 of 2:,,
All theorem 4.1, taken at face value, gives us is is a class of artificial languages,
unavoidably essentially poorer than English in expressive power, which are able 4 is true in (?(,@,A)) iff 4F E
to give a rudimentary account of their own semantics. The account these artificial and
languages give of their own semantics is not a very good one, since all difficult
questions, such as what to say about the liar sentence, are referred to the meta- 4 is false in (\!I,(E,A)) iff 4 E A
theory. Next, verify that, if (?I,(E,A)) is a fixed point, then each of the axioms of KF is
Theorem 4.1 does not have to be taken at face value. As noted earlier, the
Kripke construction is a remarkably versatile philosophical tool. The construction
I! +
true in (!'l,E). Finally, use induction on the complexity of to show that, for
each formula $(x,, . . . , x,,) of 2',
can be utilized in a variety of ways in attempting to overcome the restrictions
imposed by Tarski's preferred policy for avoiding antinomies. We shall now
examine two straightforward methods for applying Kripke's construction in at- and
tempting to develop the semantics for a language within the language itself.
Further applications will be found in chapters 5 and 8.
Both of the applications of the Kripke construction which we shall be discuss- are both theorems of K F U R., ,. (This induction is conducted in the metatheory,
ing in this chapter make use of the following result of Solomon Feferman 1 19821: not in KF U R,,.).
DEFINITION. KF, the Kripke-Feferman axiom system, consists of the fol- Our first proposal for using Kripke's construction to overcome the limitations
lowing sentences of 2 : imposed by the usual object languageimetalanguage policy is the proposal that
in the philosophy of scienceH-it is. at least, a promising approach toward a no familiar rules we have to abjure. The only difference between the new
solution. system and the old is that now we do not get to write 'Q.E.D.' as often..
Assuming that it is indeed possible to formulate the theory of truth for the 3- OBJECTION 2. UNAVAILABILITY OF SCIENTIFIC GENERALIZA.I.IONS. According to
valued language within the 3-valued language in a satisfactory way, three further Aristotle (Metuphysic,~A), we can distinguish the knowledge of the scientist from
difficulties are encountered by the proposal that we abandon classical logic in the knowledge of the artisan by the fact that the scientist knows universal laws
favor of the 3-valued logic: whereas the artisan knows only particular cases. If that is so, then we find, much
OB.IECTION 1. DIFFICULTY OF LEARNING THE 3-VALUED LOGIC.The first obstacle i to our dismay, that, if we adopt the 3-valued logic we relinquish the possibility
is simply how difficult it would be, in practice, for us to use the 3-valued logic of scientific knowledge, for in the 3-valued logic universal generalizations are
in place of the familiar logic. Classical logic has served us well since earliest virtually impossible to come by.
childhood, yet we are asked to abjure it in favor of a new logic in which Consider Jocko. Jocko is a tiny fictional creature that lives right on the
many familiar and hitherto unproblematic modes of inference are forbidden. So border between animals and plants. Jocko has many of the features we regard as
restrictive are the new rules that, according to Feferman 11984, p. 2641, "nothing characteristic of animals and many features we regard as characteristic of plants.
like sustained ordinary reasoning can be carried on" in the 3-valued logic. In Jocko's animallike characteristics are those we expect to find in protozoa, so that
view of the prodigious effort that would be required for us to make such a drastic Jocko is also on the border between protozoa and nonprotozoa. It is natural to
change in our ways of thinking, we shall perhaps be forgiven for our laziness if say that Jocko is neither in the extension nor in the anti-extension of 'animal' and
we are reluctant to make the change. I
that Jocko is neither in the extension nor in the anti-extension of 'protozoon'; if
These judgments about how difficult it would be to accustom ourselves to that is so, then
utilizing the new logic are rather speculative. The system of formal rules given
in theorem 4.4 is not terribly dissimilar from familiar systems of natural deduc- (Jocko is a protozoon --, Jocko is an animal)
tion, and it is conceivable that, with sufficient practice, we could train ourselves will be neither true nor false. Hence,
so that the new ways of thinking would seem as simple and natural to us as
classical reasoning seems now. (VX)(Xis a prc)tozoon -+ x is an animal)
Luckily we do not need to resolve these speculations. Taking advantage of
will be neither true nor false.
the fact that we are not asked to relinquish classical modes of inference in all
Jocko's story is fictional, but it is a realistic fiction. We have no good reason
our reasoning but only in our deliberations about truth, we can devise a system
to suppose that, in partitioning the organisms into plants and animals, nature
of inference that is tailor-made for the situation in which we have a classical
made a clean break. It would not surprise us in the least to discover some actual
language to which a nonclassical truth predicate has been adjoined. This
creature in the position of the fictional Jocko, equipoised between protozoa and
specialized system of inference is, we shall find, no harder to learn or employ
plants. But if we do not have any good reasons to suppose that there is no creature
than classical logic. In this system, which is due to Reinhardt [1986], we
in the position in which we have imagined Jocko, then we do not have any reason
employ all the modes of inference of classical first-order logic, without
to suppose that
restriction, taking as our premisses Feferrnan's axioms together with those
sentences of the language 2 which we are willing to accept as axioms. What (VX)(Xis a protozoon -+ x is an animal)
is nonclassical about our new system of reasoning is what we are willing to
accept as a finished deduction. Classically, we would regard a sentence 4 as is true. The generalization
proved if there is a derivation of 4 from the premisses. In the new system, All protozoa are animals.
we regard the sentence 4 as proved only if there is a derivation of ~ r ( r 4 1 )
from the pren~isses.Modifying classical logic in this specialized way completely becomes highly suspect.
allays the misgivings I expressed about the difficulty of adopting a strange 'All protozoa are animals' is not an accidental generalization. It is a basic
and somewhat clumsy nonclassical logic. There is nothing awkward about taxonomic principle that is about as secure as a law of nature could ever be. To
Reinhardt's logic. There are no unpleasant new rules we have to learn and forbid the assertion that all protozoa are animals is to outlaw science.
Things get even worse. Because Jocko is neither in the extension nor the anti-
" See Hempel [I9581 extension of 'animal', the conditional
(Jocko is an animal - Jocko is an animal)
i
admonition if we attcmpt to cover up the deficiencies of our naive theory of truth
-
is exiled to the gap between truth and falsity. Hence, by abandoning classical logic.
Imagine that we have a genetic theory to which we are particularly attached,
(VX)(Xis an animal x is an animal) i perhaps on political grounds, and that this theory tells us that, if a certain particular
is untrue; the 3-valued logic does not permit us even to assert
All animals are animals.
One might respond to this objection in the same way we responded to the first
i !
I
DNA molccule has an even number of nucleotides, then all fruitflies are brown;
that, if that particular molecule does not have an even number of nucleotides,
then all fruitflies are green; and that fruitflies are not all the same color. It would
surely be absurd to respond to this circumstance by saying that our cherished
objection, by insisting that 'true' is to be the only predicate accorded a nonclassical genetic theory is entirely corrcct and that the appearance of contradiction arises
treatment. so that, for sentences not containing the predicate 'true', our customary because we have failed to realize that classical logic does not apply when we are
practices are undisturbed. Since most of our scientific reasoning does not make doing genetics. What we have to say instead is that the genetic theory has been
essential use of the notion of truth, most of our scientific reasoning is happily refuted. This is not to say that the theory must be abandoned altogether-perhaps
undisturbed by our change of logics. some simple modification would repair it-but it is to say that the thcory can no
Although this response contains the damage, it does not eliminate it. The science longer be wholeheartedly accepted as it stands.
of zoology, for instance, does not make essential use of the notion of truth, so it will As preposterous as it would be to be to respond to the embarrassment faced
not be disrupted by our change of logics. On the other hand, the change of logics by the genetic theory by saying that classical logic no longer applies when we
ensures that we cannot have a scientific semantics, since even the most harmless are doing genetics. it would be no less preposterous to respond to the liar paradox
semantic generalizations are forbidden to us. We cannot assert, for example: by saying that classical logic no longer applies when we are doing semantics.
The liar paradox refutes the naive theory of truth. It is our duty to come up with
If a conjunction is true, then both conjuncts are true a better theory of truth. It is a dereliction of duty to attempt to obscure the
Since difficulty by dimming the natural light of reason.
Actually, the situation is somewhat worse if we want to give up classical logic
in semantics than if we want to give up classical logic in genetics. In genetics,
lies in the gap," so does we have a huge body of empirical data that our theories are attempting to explain.
We can imagine this body of data by its sheer bulk pushing classical logic aside;
Putnam at one point [I9681 was pushing the line that something of the sort had
Indeed, since happened with quantum mechanics. Now, the pressure to abandon classical logic
Tr(rh1) -+ Tr(rh1) in semantics does not come from an overwhelming body of linguistic data but
rather from our metaphysical intuitions about truth. In metaphysics, we scarcely
is untrue, so is have any data. All that we have to take us beyond our preanalytic prejudices is
our reason, and now we are asked to modify the rules of reason so that they no
longer contravene our preanalytic prejudices. In the end, the role of reason in
so we cannot even assert metaphysics will be merely to reconfirm whatever we have believed all along.
Every true sentence is a true sentence.. This is a devastating objection, but it is not quite a conclusive objection. I have
argued that, in a one-on-one conflict between classical logic and our metaphysical
OBJECTION 3. DEGKAUATION OF METHODOLOGY. The third difficulty with the
proposal that we repudiate classical logic in favor of the 3-valued logic is the one
! intuitions about truth, classical logic ought to prevail. I f other sciences should
enter into the fray, the outcome will no longer be so certain. As of now, our only
that I regard as the most telling. It is based upon an admonition of Field [I9761 motive for adopting the 3-valued logic is that it appears to vindicate some of our
that our methodological standards in semantics ought not be any lower than our naive intuitions about truth. There are other general reasons for dissatisfaction
methodological standards in the empirical sciences. We shall contravene this with classical logic, but these reasons do not point us specifically in the direction
of Kleene 3-valued logic. It may happen that. sometime in the future, adoption
" Where A is the liar scntence constructed in theorcni 1.3 of the 3-valued logic will be found to be advantageous in some science other than
i
semantics, so that classical logic will be pressured from more than one side. This
within ordinary English discourse. There are English connectives that can reason-
has not happened yet, but if it should happen it will become necessary to reevaluate
ably be paraphrased as truth-functional connectives and English quantihers that
our position..
can reasonably be paraphrased as first-order quantifiers. The technique for doing
So far we have looked at two possible methods for applying Kripke's formalism
this is what we learn in introductory logic classes. Although one can quibble
to obtain a theory of truth. The first, preferred by Kripke himself, uses 3-valued -**:
about the accuracy of the paraphrase in troublesome cases, on the whole the
logic in the object languagc and classical logic in the metalanguage. The second
procedure works quite well. In this way, English, or rather the fragment of
uses only the .?-valued logic. Now let us look at a proposal that uses only classical
I English consisting of sentences used to make assertions, can be regarded as a
logic. The proposal is that we take the Kripke-Feferman axioms, understood in
first-order language. Of course, quite a bit is lost in translation. Although we
a perfectly ordinary, classical way. at face value as a theory of truth.
We should distinguish the principle of bivalence (the semantic thesis that every \ can exhibit part of the logical structure of English by thinking of English as
a first-order language, a great deal of the logical structure remains hidden.
sentence is either true or false) from the law of the excluded middle (the logical
For example, 'Agatha believes that, if two people really love each other, then
schema ( 4 V 14)).If, as seems natural, we identify the falsity of C#J with the
it does not matter what the world thinks, they can find happiness together' is
truth of 1 4 , we may write the principle of bivalence as "(V sentence x)(Tr(x) v
analyzed as having simple subject-predicate form, attributing a certain unary
Tr(l.u))." The proposal, then, is that we maintain full classical logic, including
predicate to Agatha. But this does not show that the first-order analysis is
the law of the excluded middle,'.' but we give up the principle of bivalence.
wrong, only that it is shallow.
This proposal does not fall prey to the methodological difficulties that afflicted
I But although English can plausibly be regarded as a first-order language, it
our other proposals. On the contrary, the methodology of this new interpretation
cannot plausibly be regarded as an interpreted first-order language. Certainly if
of Kripke's construction is exemplary: it is an admirable illustration of what one
we take an interpreted language to be one for which an appropriate function on
would like a theory of truth to look like.
{'3'} U {constants, function signs, and predicates of the language) has been
Kripke characterized the fixed points model theoretically, by giving a set of
specified. English is not an interpreted language, because an interpreted language
models; to do this he required an essentially richer metalanguage. Feferman
has a set as its universe of discourse and English discourse is not restricted to any
characterized the fixed points proof theoretically, by giving a set of axioms, and
particular set. Even in the less formal sense in which a language is interpreted if
no metalanguage was required. One still needs the model-theoretic construction
we know what its terms mean, English is not an interpreted language, for the
to prove that the Kripke-Feferman axioms are consistent, but we commonly use
meaning of an English term is often determined by the context in which the term
theories for which we are unable to give consistency proofs.
is used.
Feferman's axioms are as simple, natural, and graceful as any axioms we I
Moschovakis's original definition, though simpler than the definition given here, is less convenient
for our prcscnt purposes. Moschovakis defines an 11-ary relation Y to be inductive iff there exists
an n+m-ary rclation X and b , , . . . , b,,, E ]\'I1
such that X I S the fixed point of a first-order positive
inductive detinition over !)I and Y = {<x,. . . . , .x,,:>: i . r , , . . . . x,,, h , . . . . , b,,,> E X ) . Theorem
(V formula
E S - 4 of 2 ) ( V sentence IC, of 2,,that is a substitution instance of
IC, is true).
by using the following, frequently useful, characterization of the formulas of 2 :
ID. I of Moschovakis [I9741 shows the two characterization'i of the inductive sets to be cqu~valcnt.
' Hyperelementary relations on !Ji arc called h?pc~rari/hmr/ic.trl.Rogers [1967, ch. Ih] gives a The formulas of 2 constitute the smallest class of expressions which
pleasing summary of Kleene's theory. contains the atomic and negated atomic formulas;
contalns ((I, V $). 1 1 4 . and (3\7)1$whenever ~t contalnj (I, and $; substitution instanccs are true. and false iff all its substitution instances are false.
and What distinguish the 2-, 3-, and 4-valued logics are the possibilities they allow
contalns i ( q 5 V 4 ) and 1 ( 3 ~ , )whencvcr
4 it contatns 14 and 1 4 . for the classilication of atomic sentences.
By augmenting the class of possible nlodels. we diminish the class of valid
This shows that the set of true sentences is inductive. To see that it is coinduc-
inferences; for example, disjunctive syllogism (from (4 V 11)and i d , to infer 4 )
tive, observe that its cornplemcnt is the extension of
is valid in 3-valued logic but not in 4-. If we modify the deductive calculus
(1) is a not a sentence V ( 3 y ) ( T ( y &
) ?. = 7 ~ ) ) discussed in theorem 4.4 by deleting the rule of reductio ud ~lbsurclum,
in (!l' ,{true sentences)) .H You may write with (4.1 4 ) as its premiss set.
EXAMPLE 5.6. E,, the extension of 'Tr' at the least tixed point of the Kripke
construction, is parameter-free inductive. It is the least fixed point of the following we get a system that is sound and complete for 4-valued logic.
first-order positive inductive dctinition, where Derz is the function, definable in This liberalization of Kripke's system has been studied by Woodruff [ 19841,
Y. that takes a closed term of Y:>,to the individual it denotes: who obtains a number of elegant results about the resulting system, notably the
theorem that the lattice of fixed points is complete and self-dual." The extensions
(V-r)(F(a)c* [.r is a sentcnce of Y:, &
of 'Tr' in fixed points of Woodruff's system are precisely the fixed points of the
[x is a true atomic or negated atomic sentence of Y!,,
inductive definition given in example 5.6. They are characterized by the axiom
V ( 3 closed term r ) ( s = r ~ r ( r ) & l E(Den(r))) system got by deleting the axiom " 1 ( 3 x ) ( T r ( x )& Tr(1-r))"from KF..
V ( 3 closed term r)(s = r i ~ r ( r )&l E ( ~ D r n ( r ) ) ) In exploring the connection between the Kripke construction and the theory
V ( 3 y ) ( 3 z ) ( x= (.v V z) &k ( E ( y )V E ( z ) ) ) of inductive definitions, we shall need to make use of the self-referential lemma
V (3?.)(3z)(-~ = l(.v V & E ( 1 y )& E(1:)) 1.2, which tells us that, for any formula +(x,v,, . . . , v,,) of If', we can find a
V (3.v)(x = 1 &~(y)) formula $ ( v , , . . . , v,,) of 3 ' such that the biconditional
V ( 3 variable 1,)(3y)(.x= ( 3 v ) y & ( 3 w ) E ( y 1'1,;))
V ( 3 variable 11)(3y)(x= i ( 3 v ) y & ( V I V ) E (vi;))]])~~
We shall see below (corollary 5.11) that E , is not hyperelementary.. is a first-order consequence of the first-order theory of !'L.It does not follow from
DIGRESSION 5.7. WOODRUFF.~ SYSTEM. If ( E , A ) is a fixed point of the Kripke this that the biconditional (#) will be true in the partial models (!'I,(E,A)).
construction, then E is a fixed point of the inductive definition given above. The Although the first-order theory of ?I is true in every partial model ( \ ! I , ( E , A ) )the
,
converse docs not hold, however. There are some fixed points E of the inductive first-order consequences in 2' of that theory need not be, since it might happen
definition such that, for some sentence I/), and riI/11 are both in E. If we set that both sides of the biconditional (#) should lack truth values. What will be
A = {nonsentences} U {rq5l: r 1 4 1 E E), we shall find that ( ? ( , ( E V A does) ) not true, as we shall now see, is that, for each partial model (\'I,(E,A)) and for each
count as a partial model, since our definition of partial model requires that the (true 1
extcnsion and the anti-extension of 'Tr' be disjoint. a , , . . . , cr,, E 1!)1(, $(lT,. . . , will be 6) in (!'t,(E,A))iff +(r$l,
We can liberalize the Kripke construction by allowing extensions and anti- undecided
extensions to overlap. This involves replacing the 3-valued logic with a 4-valued
logic in which, in addition to truth-value gaps (sentences that are neither true nor
false), there will be truth-value gluts (sentences that are both true and false).
-
, ... ,) is {undecided
} in (!)L,(E,A)).
There are four truth values; as well as being simply true, simply false, or neither
true nor false, a sentence can now be both true and false. If ( E , A ) and ( F . 8 ) are fixed points, we say ( E . A ) 5 ( F . B ) iff E F and A C B . To say that we
The rules for determining truth values of compound sentences of 2$in terms have a complete lattice is to say that every nonempty set of tixcd points has a lcast upper bound
of the truth values of their simple components are unchanged from classical logic: and a greatest lower bound. To say the lattice is self-dual is to say that there is a bijection h from
A dis,junction is true iff at least one if its disjuncts is true, and false iff both its the set of fixed points onto itself such that ( E . A ) 5 ( F . B ) iff h((l.'.B))5 h i ( E , A ) ) .h will be given
disjuncts arc false. A negation is true iff the sentence negated is false, and false by
iff the sentence negated is true. An existential sentence is true iff some of its h ( ( E . A ) )= (l!'[I - A , 1911 - E ) )
I
DEFINITION. TWOformulas &v,. . . . , L,,,) and $(I!,, . . . , L;,) of Y:, are i THEOREM
5.10 ( ~ r i p k e ) . 'For any (parameter-free) inductive set C. there
g u ~ ~ - r q ~ ~ i v (with
a l c i ~respect
t to !'I) iff, for any a , , . . . , tr,, in 1?)1/ and any 1 is a (parameter-free) formula y(x) of Xi,such that, for any u,
(b(c.
disjoint subsets E and A of 1!)i/, . . , <) is true, false, or undecided !
in (!'I,(E,A)) according as $(a;, . . . .
PROPOSITION
<) is true, false, or undecided.
5.8 The construction of theorem 1.2 gives us, for each for-
mula +(.r, v, , . . . . v,,) of .yi,.a formula JJ(v,, . . . , I-,,) so that $ ( v , . . . . ,
v,,)is gap-equivalent to $~(r$I,v,,. . . , v,,).
'
I
<
I
.:
a F C iff rY(i)l F E,.
PROOF:It will clearly suffice to prove this for the special case in which C is the
minimal fixed point of a first-order positivc inductive definition
I
In proving this result, we make use of a handy technique from Feferman [1982]: To simplify notation, we look at the special case n = 1.
We prove the theorem by matching up the stages in the construction of r1,
LEMMA 5.9 ( ~ e f e r i a n ) Let
. TL be the language obtained from 2 . by with the stages in which E , was constructed in the proof of theorem 4.1. Where
adding two new unary predicates 'Tr' and 'Fa'. Given a formula 6 of X:,. I
I 'z' is a variable that does not occur in 6, form a formula q(x,z) of 3 ' from O(x,R)
let H + be the formula of 2' got by replacing each negative occurrence of by replacing each occurrence of 'R(v)' by 'Tr(zx/;)', and use the self-referential
' T ~ ( T )by
' ' ~ F U ( T ) If' . (!)I ,(E,A)) is a partial model of 3 ' , let (91,E,A) be lemma to find a formula y(x) that is gap-equivalent to q(x,ry(x)l). Thus, y(x) is
the classical model of LYLgot from !)I by letting the extension of 'Tr' be E gap-equivalent to the result of substituting ' ~ r ( r y ( i ' ) l for
' 'R(v)' in 6(.r,R). Show
and the extension of 'Fa' be A. Then, for any sentence 6 of Y,',,6 is true I by transfinite induction that, for each a and x,
in (!)i,(E,A)) iff OL is true in (\'l,E,A).
x t. rS; iff r y ( i ) l t. E ~ .
PROOF:By induction on the complexity of 0..
PROOF
OF PROPOSITION 5.8: We follow the notation of the proof of theorem 1.2 COROLLARY
5.11. E, is not coinductive over 91.
in detail. We have
PROOF:If Ex were coinductive, there would be a predicate v(x) such that, for
- - any x, x is in the complement of E, iff rv(i)l is is E x . Use the self-referential
t,b(n,, . . . , a,,) is false in (\'I,(E,A))
iff (3z)(8(r!Y(x,z)1,z) & q%z,u,, . . . ,
-
PROOF: Say C {x: (3a)(ry(;)1 E E.)} and D = {x: (3p)(r6(i)l E E,)). Let x E B iff rv(x)l E D
C' = {x: r(y(i) & ~ ( r y ( x ) 1 , r ~ ( x ) l )e:) lEx) PROOF:Take bounded formulas a(x,y), P(x,y), y(x,y) and 6(x,y) so that
D' = {x: r(6(x) & i ~ ( r y ( x ) l , r 8 ( x ) l ) ) lF Ex). A = {x: (3y)a(x,y))
B = {x: ( 3 y ) ~ ( x , y ) )
COROLLARY 5.15 (SEPARATION PRINCIPLE FOR (: SETS).'For any two
C = {x: (3y)y(x,y)) and
disjoint 7 sets F and G, there exists a recursive set that includes F and is D = {x: (3y)6(x,y))
disjoint from G.
Now use the self-referential lemma to find a C:/ formula v(x) so that
-
PROOF:Apply theorem 8.13 with C = w G and D = w F. The recursively -
enumerable set D' that we obtain will be the complement of C', and so C' will
be a recursive set that includes F and is disjoint from G..
I
For each .v r z,, a(;,?)is false and so. every true bounded sentence being provable
in R ,
-
id) R (QY 5 :,,)%i;~) & (n< y h p ( ; , ~ )& (vz< ? ) ~ ~ ( r ~ ( ; ) i , ~ ) l . Then there is a (parameter-frce) formula v(x) such that. for any x,
,
[ff(x) & ? ~ ( r p ( i ) l ra(i)-)
. & l L ( r y ( r v ( i ) l ) l ra(.i.)')l
,
v1 rv(2)i ) & T L ( rp(i)l,ra( rv(;)l ) & TL( ry( rv(.i)i)I,r6( rv(.~jl1111
But then rv(i)l E {sentences refutable in R} C D . Contradiction. I (E,A) is a fixed point of the Kripke construction. If, following Woodruff,
we allow E and A to overlap, there will be coinducti\~efixed points, but
The proof that x E B iff rv(;)l E D is similar. even if we allow overlap there will be no hyperelementary fixed points.
(+)From the assumption that x e B but rvi;)l 4D , one can derive that R F I
PROOF:First we show that, if truth-value gluts are forbidden, then there are no
TUG).But this gives the impossible result that rv(f)l E {sentences refutable in I
-
-
(U,, {sentences eventually outside <Ua: a < ~ > ) ) 4) Weakl? smble: eventually true for some initial guesses, eventually false
- ,,g<t'g<.xc: -
u (U" C! n (Sent- Up)).
<"-.K LI.:@I:K
for others. Either eventually true or eventually false for each initial
for K a limit, where Sent = {sentences of Y ' ) guess. For example, 7,).
5 ) Eventually true for sorne initial guesses, but not others. Eventually false
Gupta's idea is that, as the process continues, our choices for the extension of for no initial guess. For example. (T,, V A).
'Tr' keep getting better and better. They cannot, however, keep getting better 6) Eventually true for no initial guess. Eventually false for some initial
forever. Cardinality considerations show us that eventually we must reach a stage guesses, but not all. For example, (T,, & A).
such that, from that stage on, no new candidates will ever appear, and every 7) Eventually true for some initial guesses, eventually false for others, and.
candidate that ever appears is bound to reappear endlessly. Once we reach this for others still, neither eventually true nor eventually false. For example,
stage, none of the candidates for the extension of 'Tr' we look at will be any (7,)& (71 V A)).
better than any of the others; they are all "best candidates" for the extension of
'Tr' . Notice that, to describe this classification of the sentences of 2', one requires
Each Gupta sequence induces a classification of the sentences of 3' into three the resources of a metalanguage essentially richer than 3'. Thus. Gupta's work
categories: Some, like ' T r ( r i ~ r ( r 2+ 2 = 51)1)', are eventually true, that is, does not directly advance our purpose here, which is to see how to develop a
they are in U , for all sufficiently large a . Others are eventually false. Still others, theory of truth for a language within the language itself. Gupta's purpose is not
like the liar sentence, 'This sentence is false', keep flip-flopping. For some our purpose; Gupta's purpose is to explicate preanalytic intuitions. We shall see,
sentences, like the truthteller, 'This sentence is true', what category the sentence however, that the work of Cupta and the others casts an indirect light upon the
winds up in depends upon our initial choice of U,. prospects for our project.
We are not really interested in the consequences of any particular initial A Herzberger sequence is like a Gupta sequence except that, for K a limit, it
guess U,, since we have no reason to prefer any choice of Uo over any other. will have
What we are interested in is properties sentences have independent of any
U, = {sentences eventually in <U,,: a < K>)
particular initial guess. Categorizing sentences according to their eventual
behavior with respect to different starting sets, we ger a sevenfold classification.
= u
,,'CK
"
acp.h-
u,j
So that we can have examples, let us take A to be the liar sentence constructed As an example, let us take A,, and A, to be independent liar sentences, and let us
in the proof of theorem 1.3, and let us take T , and T , to be truthtellers, so suppose that A,, is in U , but A , is not. In the Gupta sequence beginning with U,,,
that A,, and A, will continue to have different truth values at every stage. In the
' One w a j to get such sentences is to use the self-referential lemma to tind a fen-mula u(u) of Y L
and
s o that
R c (V.r) (u(.x)
and set T,, =
-
-
( ~ ( 0and
)
((.u =
=
i,
6 & ~-r ( ~ c r ( c ) ' )V) (.u = 7 & ~r('(v(7)'))).
(u(I ) . A similar technique gives us the two liars that we use
below.
Herzberger sequence beginning with li,,. A,, and A , will havc different truth values
only at the finite stages. Thcy will both be outsi(ie U.,. and, for all infinite a. they
PROOF:The examples we just looked at show that the sets of stably true sentences
do not coincide for any two o f the three systems. That the sets of stably false
will be either both inside or both outside U,,. 'Thus. in Herzberger's system. but
sentences do not coincide is shown by considering the negations of these exani-
not in Gupta's. (A,, t.A , ) will be stably true.4
ples. That the sets of paradoxical sentences do not coincide is shown by consider-
Thc Beltzap seyrrr17ce.s include the Gupta sequences, the Herzberger sequences,
ing the following two sentences: (A,, V A,), which is paradoxical in Herzberger's
and more besides. A Belnap sequence is any sequence <Utp:a u OR' of sets of
systen~but not in Gupta's, and ((V natural number n) 7 r 1 ' ( r ( ( ~++ , , A , ) ++ T r ( r ( ~ , ,
sentences such that
A , ) I )&~A,,) +,
) (where the notation 'Tr'" is defined by: ~ ; ' ( r $ l ) = T i ' +(r+')
U,, , , = {scntcnces true in thc model ('?I ,Un)). = ~ r ( r ~ r " ( r + i ) lwhich
), is paradoxical in Gupta's system but not in Belnap's.
Zl,, for K a limit, is a set of sentcnces that includes all the sentences Thus. we know that the inclusions. if they obtain at all, are proper.
stably true
cventually in <Uct:tu < K B ,and excludes all the sentences eventually
in Gupta's system includes the set of
-
outside <UC7:a < K > That the set of sentences
paradoxica
Thus. whereas in Herzberger's system (A,, A , ) is eventually true and in Gupta's
in Belnap's system follows immediately from the fact
-
systcm it is either true at every stage or false at every stage, in Belnap's system
there is thc further possibility that the sentence keeps switching at limit stapes.
Thus, in Herzberger's and Gupta's systems. but not in Relnap's. (A,, t.A , ) that every Gupta sequence is a Belnap sequence. So all we have to show is that
Tr(rh,, t.A,?) will be stably true.5 stably true
The Hcrzberger sequence beginning with the empty set is also a Gupta the set of sentences in Herzberger's system includes the set of
sequence and a Belnap sequence. Thus. a sentence that is. say, eventually
true in every Belnap sequence will be eventually true in at least some
Herzberger sequences and eventually true in at least some Gupta sequences. We prove this in a sequence of three lemmas:
It follows that no sentence that is placed into one of the pure categories by
one of the systems is placed into either of the other pure categories by either LEMMA 6.2. If <U,,: a E OR> is either a Gupta sequence or a Herzberger
of the other two systems. Where the systems differ is that one of the systems sequence, then {a < 0 , : U , = UuI} is cofinal in
can place in a pure category a sentence that one of the other systems places PROOF:Given y < w , , pick a countable ordinal K,, bigger than y that is so big
in a mixed category, or two of the systems can place the same sentence in that any sentence that is either eventually in <U,,: a < w,> or eventually outside
different mixed categories. The relationships among the pure categories are it has already settled down at U,,,. Our aim is to form an increasing sequence
given by the following theorem: <K,: tz < W > of countable ordinals so that, for any sentence i/J. if is neither +
eventually inside nor eventually outside <U,: tu < w , > , then $ will be neither
THEOREM
6.1. The set of sentences in Herzberger's sys- eventually inside nor eventually outside <U,,,: 17 < a > . To do this, we form a
list, ordered by w, of all the sentences that are neither eventually inside <U,,: a
< w, > nor eventually outside it in such a way that every sentence that is neither
tem includes the set of sentences system, which eventually inside nor eventually outside <U,: a < w,> appears on the list
infinitely many times. Given K,, if the nth item on the list is the (2j)th occurrence
stably true of the sentence 4. pick K , , + , > K,, so that $ is in U,,,+,.If the 11th item on the list
includes the set of sentences +
is the (2j I )st occurrence of +,
pick K,,, , > K,, so that 11 is not in U , , +,. Thus
inclusions are proper. " Here w , is the least uncountable ordinal. The lemma says that there arc arbitrarily large countable
ordinals a with U,, = U,,,. The ordinal ar~thmeticwe use here and in the other theorems in the
' This example is discussed by Gupta [1982, p. 2311 and by Belnap (1982. pp. 110fl. chapter can be found in many standard textbooks. After all thcse yeara, the best source on the
subject is still Sierpihkii [19581. Those who find ordinal arithmetic unpleasant may skip to the
Tlris example is presented by Belnap [ 1982. p. I I]. who aays it was discovered b ) ~Gupta
end of remark 6.9 without loss of continuity.
+
at the even stages we ensure that is not eventually outside <UK,,:n < w>, and
+
at the odd stages we ensure that is not eventually inside <UK,,:t1 < ,>. PROOF:'The proof is by induction on K. The zero and successor stages are
obvious, so we may assume that K is a limit. We have
Let K . ~= K,,.K, is countable. and U = Uw,..
{sentences eventually in <g,(hwl(U)):P < K>}
Kw
g.(h,,(U)) =
DEFINITION. g J U ) = the ath term of the Gupta sequence beginning with U h W l ( U-
) {sentences eventually outside <g,(h,,(U)):
0 , and h.(U) = the a t h term of the Herzberger sequence beginning with
P < K>)
u. = (sentences eventually in <h,,,, ,,(U): P < K>)
U h W l ( U-
) {sentences eventually outside <h,, +,(U):
LEMMA 6.3- each y 2 1. for each 8. hi., ?,,, ( u )= h w , + , ( u ) ,and
RiwI y , t ~ ( U =
) gw, + a ( U ) .
P < K>I
[by inductive hypothesis]
PROOF:
We prove the lemma for Herzbergur sequences; the proof for Gupta = hwlt,(U)
sequences is similar. For any u and a.
if h,,(U) = h.ol(U),then, by induction, U h,,(U) -{sentences eventually outside <hWl+,(U):
h i =h U . S o it will be enough to show that h,, ,(U) = h W l ( U )We
. /3 < K > I
may assume y > 1, since the case y = 1 is trivial.
Thus to show that g,(h,,(U)) = h,, +,(U),it will be enough to show that h w l ( U )
We prove this by induction on y . We shall use the result from lemma 6.2 that
there is a countable ordinal a with h,.(U) = h k j I ( U ) .
- {sentences eventually outside < h w l , ( U ) : /3 < K>} is included in h W ,,(U),
l
for which it will certainly be enough to show that hWl(C')is included in h , , + , ( U ) .
First of all. let us suppose that y is a successor, say y = 6 + I . We have
The proof breaks into two cases, depending on whether K is countable.
Y(U) = h<,,l,,, l,(U) CASEI. K is countable. We need to show that, if we assume that $ is not eventually
-
- h~wl~R~+wl(u) in <h,,,,+,(U): P < K > , we can conclude that $ is not eventually in <hlj(U):P
- h U l,,,(U) [by inductive hypothesis]
- < w,>. Take 6 < o , . We need to show that there is a y , S < y < w , , so that
= hcr+,,(U)
4
$ h,(U). We know that we can find a /3 < K such that +4 hUl+,(U).Lemma
6.2 tells us that there is a countable ordinal a > 6 with h,(U) = h,,(U). Thus
= h,,(U)
we may set y equal to a + P.
Now, SUppose that y is a limit, and suppose that $ is in h , ,(U). There is a CASE11. K is uncountable. Then we can find an ordinal 6 2 1 and a countable
6. I ,
6 < 7 . so that $ & , ,n, h,.(U). Take any P with a < P < o,. There ordinal /3 such that K = ( w l . 6 ) + P. We compute
exists a 5, 0 < 6 < o I SO that /3 = a + 5. We have
y
'O'.W,
hWlt,iW =
- h,*l+,i,l.,,t,,i~)
- (,
Thus, $ & wg ,,h,(U) c h,,,(W. PROOFOF THEOREM 6.1 (continued): We are going to show that any sentence
that is stably true in Gupta's system is stably true in Herzberger's. Suppose that
For the opposite inclusion, suppose that $ & h w l ( U )Use
. lemma 6.2 to find a
countable ,b so that $ E ,_Q ,,hJU) and so that h,(U) = h,,,,(U)If w , < c < the sentence $ is not stably true in Herzberger's system. Then there is a starting
w l . y then there exist 6, 1 4 6 < y , and 5 < w , so that u = ( w l . 6 )+ 6 . We have guess U such that $ is not eventually in <h,(U): a s OR>. Thus, $ is not
eventually inside <h,,+,(U): a e OR> = <g,,(hwl(U)):a e OR>, so $ is not
eventually inside the Gupta sequence beginning with h,,(U), and hence $ is not
-
- /ziW, n l + c ( U[by
) inductive hypothesis] stably true in Gupta's system.
= h,(W The proof that any sentence that is paradoxical in Gupta's system is paradoxical
in Herzberger's is similar.
LEMMA
6.4. For each ordinal K, h w , + K ( U=) g.(h,,(U)).
by taking negations ..
The proposition that every stable falsehood of Gupta's system is stably false
in Herzberger's system is derived from the corresponding fact about stable truths
COROLLARY 6.5. For any starting set U. h,",(U) = {scntences eventually n in the well-ordering we have selected). Then u ( 0 ) is in the sequence <U,,: u
in <h,(U): 6 E OR>), and g,,,,(U) = {sentences eventually in <g,(U): 6 e & OR> after the ~ t level,
h but not earlier..
OR>) U (U - {sentences eventually outside <g,(U): 6 c OR>} A I-Ierzberger sequence or a Gupta sequence is a proper class; thus, the central
PROOF:We can use lemma 6.2 to find a countable ordinal a such that h,(U) notions of the semantic theory, the notions of stable truth and so on, arc defined
= h,,>,(U)and w c h that every sentence in ha,,(1J)
is in <,.g
, ( U ) Then. for by means of quantification over propcr classes. Now, because of lemmas 6.2 and
6.3 and corollary 6 . 5 , a Herzberger sequencc or Gupta sequence can b e com-
each \entente 4.
pletely described by saying what it does at countable levels, so that the quantifica-
6 is eventually in <h,JU): P E OR> tion over proper classes is inessential. For Belnap sequences this is not s o clear,
iff (3ordinal y r I)(V 6 3 w,.y)(+ c h,(u)) and Belnap asked [1982, p. 1091 whether the seniantic notions of his theory could
iff (3 ordinal y 2 I )IV 6 2 y)tV countable P)(d F h,", , + ,(u)) be defined within the language of set theory. An affirmative answer is contained
lff ( v countable E h_, + ,(U)) [by lemma 6.31 in the following theorem:
.
iff (V countable /3)(4c h, ,(u))
THEOREM 6.7. Let us call an w,-length initial segment <U,: u < o , >of a
lff 4 & Iz,,,,(U) stably true
The demonstration for Gupta sequences is similar.. Belnap sequence an w,-Belnap sequence. A scntence is
From Corollary 6.5 it follows that paradoxical
eventually inside
( V set of sentences U ) ( 3 countable ordinal a ) ( V sentence $) (if $ is Belnap's sense iff it is
eventually in the Herzberger sequence <U,j: /3 E OR> starting with U, then neither eventually inside nor eventually outside
t,!~ is in U, for all ,6 > a ) . every o,-Belnap sequence.
The same holds for Gupta sequences. We might hope to reverse the order of The corresponding result for Gupta and Herzberger sequences is an immediate
quantification, finding a single countable a. depending only on the underlying consequence of corollary 6.5.
model ?'I, that would work for every U and $; the least such a might serve as a PROOF:W e prove that a sentence is stably true (in Bclnap's sense) iff it is
measure of the complexity of ?I. It turns out that we cannot find such an a . eventually in every w,-Belnap sequence. The other two proofs are similar.
(3) Suppose that the sentence 4 is not eventually in the w,-Belnap sequence
PROPOSI'TION 6.6. W e can construct a sentence r ( 0 ) such that, for any <U,.: a < w , > . Pick a countable limit ordinal /3 so large that any sentence
countable ordinal K > 0 , there is a set U , of sentences with the property
that, although a ( 0 ) is eventually in the Herzberger sequence <UU: a e that is eventually { ~ ~ ~ s < ~u C~v :ae <
-
} w l > is { b ~ ~ ~u.. ~ c }
for all a 2
OR> beginning with U , (which is also a Gupta sequence and a Belnap /3. Every ordinal can be uniquely written in the form ( w , . y ) + 6 , where 6 is
sequence), a ( 0 ) is not in any U, with a 5 K. countable. Define a Belnap sequence <V,: a F OR> by setting V,,, ,,+,equal
Thus, although the level at which ~ ( 0 settles
) down must surely be countable, to Upis. Because 4 is not eventually in <U,: a < w , > , we can find a
we can, by an artful choice of U,,, make thc level at which it settles down be as countable ordinal { such that 4 & Up+,. Therefore, for each y, d, & V,,,,,,,+,.
high a countable level as we like. Thus, 4 is not eventually in <V,: a e OR>, and s o it is not stably true.
PROOF:Use the Godel self-referential lemma to find formulas r(x,y) and a(?.) (e)Now let us suppose that 4 is not stably true. There is a Belnap sequence
<U,: a F OR> such that { a E OR: 4 & U,,} is unbounded. Thus {limit ordinals
- -
such that
A: for some finite n , 4 & U,+,,}is unbounded. Since we cannot write an unbounded
R + (V natural numbers x and y)(r(x,y) Tr(rT(.;.f)l)) class of ordinals as a countable union of bounded sets of ordinals, there must be
R + (v natural number ?)(a(?.) (V natural number x) a finite n such that {limit ordinals A: 4 & U , +,,) is unbounded. Hence, we can find
(r(x,y) -+ Tr(ra(.i)l)) limit ordinals A , and A?, A, < A?, such that 4 & UAI+,, and such that U,, = U,,.
Let us consider a first-order language containing two unary predicates '0' and
Given a countable ordinal K , let us pick a well-ordering of w of ordcr type K + I 'S' and two binary predicates 'L' and ' U ' . Let us specify an interpretation of
with 0 as its greatest element. We take the set U,, to be {rr(m,n)1: m is less than this language by declaring:
'o"?' = {ordinals A?)
Sent Thus. we can find arbitrarily large countable ordinals a such that 4 & V,,..
' ~ ' 2=~
),q '07?A " .s,?+ REMARK6.8. APPI,ICATION OF THEOREM1.5 TO RULE-OF-REVISION SEMAN-
TICS. The set of sentences that are stably true in Herzberger's sense will satisfy
'L'" = the less-than relation on '0"'
'u'" = {<a,$>: a 5 AL and $ F UUJ
all the conditions of theorem 1.5 except for condition (4)c); so will the set of
sentences eventually in the Herzberger sequence <ha((/): a s OR>, for each
We can use the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem7 to find a countable elementary starting set U. For the set of sentences stably true in Gupta's system or in Belnap's
submodel of % which contains within its universe of discourse all of the system, conditions (4)a) and (4)b) will also fail. To see this, use the self-referential
sentences of 2' as well as the ordinals X, and A,. An elementary submodel of a lemma to find sentences A and 6 so that
well-ordering is still a well-ordering, and so the structure <'o", 'L"> is
isomorphic to a countable initial segment of OR via an isomorphism that we shall
call f.The sequence <U,-I,,,: a <.f(A,)> is the beginning of a Belnap sequence.
We want to extend it to a Belnap sequence by stipulating that, after the f(Al)nd Upon successive applications of the rule of revision, A describes a cycle of length
term the sequence will endlessly repeat the cycle i U , - ~ , ~ , : f l A5, )a s,f(h2)>. two: true, false, true, false, true, false, true, false, . . . , while 6 describes a
To make this precise, we define an operation I/ /I taking ordinals to ordinals less cycle of length four: true, true, false, false, true, true, false, false, . . . . Let U
than f(Az), as follows: include A, i h , and ( A -+ a ) , but exclude 6. Then, for K a limit, none of the four
sentences A, i A , (A + 6), and 6 will be either eventually inside or eventually
IIOII 0 = outside <g,,(U): a < K > , and so A, i h , and ( A + 6) will be in g,(U) and 6 will
l ff + Ill = llffll + 1 be outside g,(U). Therefore, g,+,(U) will exclude both (Tr(rlA1) -+ i ~ r ( r h 1 ) )
For y a limit, define limsup(<llal): a < y > ) to be the least 6 such that ( 3 a
and (Tr(r(A -+ 6 ) l ) -+ (Tr(rA1) -+ Tr(r61)). so that neither (Tr(riA1) + -
< r)(VB)(ff 5 p < y + IlPl 5 6). ~Tr(rhl))nor (Tr(r(A + 6)l) + (Tr(rh1) + Tr(r61)) is stably true in Gupta's
If limsup(<(lal(: a < y > ) <f(A2), let IIyJJ= limsup(<llall: a < y>).
system. Consequently, according to theorem 6.1, the sentences will not be stably
If limsup(<)(cu(/:a < y > ) = ,f(Az), let llyll = f(Al).
true in Belnap's system either.
Now we define, for each ordinal a , If we suppose, as seems reasonable, that our ordinary usage of 'true' tacitly
presupposes the principles that a sentence and its negation are not both true and
that the set of truths is closed under modus pnnens, then these examples provide
It is straightforward to verify that <V,: a E OR> is a Belnap sequence, and so evidence that Herzberger's system represents ordinary usage more faithfully than
<Va: a < o , > is an w,-Belnap sequence. Gupta's or Belnap's. To defend Gupta's or Belnap's proposal, one might claim
We want to see that 4 is not eventually inside <V<,: a < w , > . Recall that 4 that, when they are dealing with sentences suspected of paradox, ordinary speak-
U . Notice that, since the finite ordinals are in both 1%) and 61,we must ers no longer regard (4)a) and (4)b) as reliable. It is hard to say what would count
have f(k) = k for each finite ordinal k, and, in particular.f(n) = n. Looking at as decisive evidence here.
how // 1) was defined, we see that, for each countable ordinal [ 2 1, 11Cf(A2)-[) + In defending their systems over Herzberger's, Gupta and Belnap do not look
at particular examples but at broad theoretical con~iderations.~ The aim of their
nl = A h , ) + n, and so ( a < o , : llall = A h , ) + n) is unbounded in o , . If 1JaJ
=
AX,) + n, then endeavor is to develop the idea that our usage of 'true' is governed by the rule
of revision. Now, the rule of revision does not tell us what to do at limits, and
if we want the rule of revision to be our governing principle, we should adopt a
limit rule that adds as little as possible to what the rule of revision tells us. In
Herzberger's system, they would say, we do not see the effects of the rule of
revision alone. We see the effects of the rule of revision together with a policy
of declaring disputed sentences untrue rather than true..
' Theorem 3.1.6 of Chang and Keisler [1073]. ' See especially Belnap [1982, p.1051. In trying to understand the issues here. I benefited greatly
from conversations with Gupta and Belnap.
REMARK6.9. APPLICATION OF RULE-OF-REVISION SEMANTICS TO THEOREM
begins with languages of an ordinary two-valued kind in which semantic
1.5. We can use the methods of rule-of-revision semantics to show that we parddoxes are virtually inevitable. Rather than try to eliminate those para-
cannot strengthen theorem 1.5 to say that any set of sentences which satisfies doxes, 1 want to consider the experiment of positively encouraging them
I
conditions ( 1 ) through (4)c) is simply inconsistent. Indeed. we do not get a sinlple to arise and watching them work their way out. This approach, which I call
inconsistency even if we strengthen condition ( 1 ) to require that l- contain all of ,
naive semunrics, is a deliberately nondirective exercise. The idea is to stand
true arithmetic. Let us take our language 2 to be the language of arithmetic, and I
back and let the paradoxes reveal their inner principles (1982, p. 4791.
let us take our model 9t to be the standard model 92 of 2 . Consider the axiom
system, which I shall call A, consisting of all sentences obtained by prelixing
Herzberper wants to make explicit those semantic principles which we implicitly
'Tr's and universal quantifiers to instances of the following schemata:
utilized while we were still innocent of semantic theory. Herzberger surely does
---
4 * Tr(r41). for $I an atomic formula of Y not mean by this that ordinary speakers of English custo~narilymake use of
transfinite methods in evaluating their sentenccs. Every day we meet persons who
Tr( r($I V $1' ) ( ~ rr41)
( V Tr( r$l 1)
Tr(ri41) iTr(r41) exhibit thorough mastery of the ordinary use of 'true', even though they are
Tr( r(3v)1$1) (3~)Tr(r47) entirely unschooied in Cantor's methods. Herzberger's contention must be some-
thing weaker. along these lines: there are certain procedures that we tacitly employ
Here 'Tr(r41)' is to be understood in such a way that all variables that occur in evaluating the sentences we encounter in ordinary life. We normally apply
free in 4 occur free in Tr(r41). If 4 is $(I,,,\.,, . . . , I,,,), ~ r ( r 4 1 )will be these procedures only in rather homely, finitary contexts, but there is nothing to
Tr(r+(G,;, . . . , iy). prevent our attaching the apparatus of the everyday semantical rules to the
The set of first-order consequences of A U {true arithmetical sentences} satisfies powerful machinery of set theory, obtaining results that go far beyond the finitary.
conditions ( 1 ) through (4)c) of theorem 1.4. Yet A U {true arithmetical sentences} Herzberger docs not claim that his system gives either the rules we in fact use or
is first-order consistent, as we can see by observing that, for any U, the model the rules we ought to use, but that it gives the rules we would use if we utilized
<\3>, h,(U)> satisfies all axioms of A i n which fewer than k 'Tr's have been the methods we use now more efficiently.
prefixed to instances of the given schemata. This tells us that every finite subset It is difficult to assess the correctness of this claim, since we have not been
of A U {true arithmetical sentences} is first-order consistent, and so, by the told the rules we actually use. If Herzberger's thesis were broken into two parts-
compactness theorem, A U {true arithemetical sentences} is first-order con- here are the rules we actually use, and this is what results from letting that system
sistent.. of rules be driven by the machinery of set theory-we could evaluate each part
So far, our discussion of the three systems has been purely formal. Let us now separately. As it is, the thesis that the rules we customarily employ, whatever
ask how the formalism is to be interpreted philosophically, examining briefly they are, are such that they extend to Herzberger's system is an interesting
what each of the three authors has to say. psychological speculation, but not a doctrine we have very good reason to
Belnap thinks that Gupta's theory contains important philosophical insights, believe.
and he thinks that these insights are captured better by Belnap's formalism than Gupta bases his account on the fundamental distinction between two kinds of
by Gupta's own, a judgment with which Cupta himself has come to agree.' But, concepts. Ordinary concepts, such as red, blue, and sum. we learn by learning
in spite of these philosophical insights, Belnap does not cornmit himself to the an application procedure, which enables us to separate those objects to which the
theory. On the contrary, he expresses a preference for a rival theory of truth, the concept applies from those to which it does not. Other concepts, notably the
account of Dorothy Grover, J. L. Camp, Jr., and Belnap 119751, although he concept of truth, we learn by learning a rule of revision, which enables us to
does not elaborate his reasons for the preference. improve upon a proposed candidate for the extension of the concept. Gupta
Herzberger explicitly disavows any intention of developing a consistent theory explicitly disavows the claim that we consciously apply the rule of revision when
of truth; he wants to study our inconsistent naive theory. Citing Chihara 11979], we use the word 'true1-"That would be an absurd piece of sociology," he says
he says that his purpose is diagnostic rather than therapeutic. He says that his 11982, p. 2331-but hc apparently thinks that the rule of revision plays some
proposal unconscious role in the use of 'true'. There is a familiar distinction between
learning how to apply a rule and learning how to state it. Thus. children learn
how to apply the rules of grrmmar, (or they learn how to produce grammatical
See the postscript on p. 234 of the reprint of Gupta [I9821 in Martin [19X4]
sentences, but they do not learn how explicitly to state the rules, nor are they
i
consciously aware of them. Perhaps Gupta's contention is that children learn how instances of schema (T) is unsatisfactory, but at which she also realizes that,
to apply the rule of revision in the way that they learn how to apply the rules of whatever the problem is, the vast majority of her uses of 'true' are not affected
grammar. But such a contention is not very plausible. The rules of grammar by it. She therefore finds some way of restricting schema (T) so as to avoid the
describe recursive operations that can be applied in a finite number of steps. dubious applications while keeping the rest. Now, the nonphilosophical speaker
There is nothing recursive or finite about the rule of revision. Indeed, it is not so surely does not hit upon anything as elaborate as the sevenfold classification
clear that the rule of revision should properly be called a rule at all, since it does Gupta produces. But the nonphilosphical speaker is able to classify the vast
not present a procedure to be followed; it only describes an abstract mathematical majority of sentences she encounters as unproblematically either true or false,
function. and she is able to make intuitive distinctions among the problematic cases, seeing
Let me suggest a much simpler account, according to which children first learn that the truthteller sentences, while they have something of an air of paradox
to apply the word 'true' by learning the rule of application described by schema about them, are not viciously paradoxical in the way the liar sentences are.
(T). The principal merit of this account is that it makes out the child's task in Gupta can claim that his classification merely refines this intuitive classification.
.. --a
learning the word 'true' to be a very simple task, and so accounts for the ease Particularly striking is the fact that we are able to make decisive intuitive judg-
with which children are able to learn the word. We arc not required to suppose ments about the truth and falsity of a wide range of convolutedly self-referential
that the child can carry out transfinite inductions or that she has other extravaeantlv sentences that narrowly skirt the edge of paradox. For such sentences, Gupta's
complicated conceptual apparatus at work. Another merit is that the account L ,
Partially Interpreted Languages because we have seen numerous other wooden objects placed into water and we
have observed that none of them have ever dissolved. This pronouncement has
more than speculative interest, since it enables us to make predictions. If we do
not know whether a particular wooden match is going to be immersed in water,
we can nonetheless use the judgmcnt that wooden ob,jects are insoluble to make
aconditional prediction that, if the match is placed into water, it will not dissolve.
In conformity with ordinary usage, we can narrow the range of indeterminate-
Kripke wanted to treat 'true' as a predicate whose meaning had been only partially
ness of the term 'soluble', so that wooden matches are declared "insoluble"
specified. To describe the logical structure of languages some of whose predicates
whether they are placed into water or not, if, in addition to positi~lgthe bilateral
were only partially defined, he utilized Kleene's 3-valued logic. In this chapter,
reduction sentence, we make the further specification:
we shall look at a different way of analyzing the logical structure of languages
with partially undefined predicates, by employing a notion of partially interpreted Two bodies of the same substance are either both soluble or both insoluble.
languages which arises out of the work of Carnap. Later on, we shall see how to
utilize this notion in developing theories of truth. Whereas the original bilateral reduction sentence can be regarded as purely
Camap [I9361 thought that it was particularly important to be able to recognize stipulative, this additional specification has empirical consequences. Specifically,
the observational consequences of a scientific theory, for he felt that precisely it implies
what distinguished scientific discourse from the chatter of metaphysicians was
that the former has a clear observational content. Disposition terms, such as If two bodies of the same substance are each placed into water. then either
'soluble', 'malleable', and 'conducts electricity', occur frequently in science. both will dissolve or neither will.
What is their observational content'? We can observe whether or not a thing that
A formal apparatus for talking about languages some of whose predicates are
is put into water dissolves, but we cannot observe whether or not a thing that is
only partially defined is the following: A parriul interpretatiorz is a pair (\!I,T),
not put into water has a potency to dissolve. A natural suggestion for a definition
where \!I is an ordinary first-order structure and l- is a first-order theory in a
of 'soluble' is that a thing is soluble just in case it dissolves if it is placed into
language extending the language of 91. The language of \!I is fully interpreted,
water. This will not do, since by this standard a wooden match that is never
but the rest of the language is only partially interpreted. In the example we have
placed into water would count as soluble, since it satisfies the material conditional,
been looking at, the language of '?I will include the predicates 'is placed into
"If x is placed into water, then x dissolves." One response would be to use an
-
water', 'dissolves', and 'is the same substance as', but it will not include 'soluble'.
"If-then" construction that has something more than the force of a material
The theory r will consist of the sentences, '(Vx)(xis placed into water 4 (x is
conditional. saying, "If x were placed into water, x would dissolve." Carnap
soluble x dissolves))' and '(Vx)(Vy)(xis the same substance as y -t ( x is
would regard this as a step backward, since the subjunctive conditional does not
soluble tt is soluble))'. If some object of the same substance as Lump A is
have any clear, observationally described truth conditions.
placed into water and dissolves, then 'Lump A is soluble' will be definitely true.
Carnap proposed to solve this problem by taking the term 'soluble' to be only
-
If some object of the same substance as Lump A is placed into water without
partially defined by the so-called bilateral reduction sentence
dissolving, then 'Lump A is soluble' will be definitely untrue. If nothing of the
(VX)(X-
is placed into water + (x is soluble .T dissolves)). same substance as Lump A is ever placed into water, then it will remain undeter-
mined whether 'Lump A is soluble' is true or not.
This stipulation tells us, of the things that are placed in water and dissolve, that
Although Carnap does not give a formal semantics for partially interpreted
they are soluble, and, of the things that are placed into water without dissolving.
languages, we may do so. A partial interpretation of a language should partition
that they are insoluble. We leave it unspecified which, if any, of the objects that
the sentences of the language into three classes: those which are definitely true,
are never placed into water are soluble.
those which are definitely untrue, and those whose truth values remain undeter-
The bilateral reduction sentence leaves the applicability of the predicate 'solu- mined. There are two natural ways of making this classification which I wish to
ble' indeterminate in a much wider range of cases than our ordinary usage does.
discuss.
DEFINITION. A sentence 6 is dejinire(v true under thc partial interpretation
The basic connection between the two notions of definite truth is given by the
(?l,I') in the model-theoretic sense (in syn~bols(!)l.I') 1 4 ) iff 4 is true in
following theorem:
every expansion of ?)I to a model of I-. 4 is dejinite!y unrrue in the model-
theoretic sense iff (91 ,r)1- 1 4 . 7.1 (Henkin and orey).' If (21 ,T)1
THEOREM +, then (91,T)1 4. If 1!1
is countable, then the converse holds.
Here we are using technical terminology taken from Chang and Keisler [1973,
$I. 3 ] An e.rponsiot7 of a first-order model is obtained by adding new symbols PROOF:The first statement is proven by a straightforward induction on the lengths
to the language and specifying the references of these new symbols, leaving the of proofs in 91-logic. To get the converse, suppose that ]!'I]
is countable and that
meanings of the old symbols unchanged and leaving the universe of discourse ( 3 , r ) 4 . We would like extend r to a maximal first-order consistent set A,
unchanged. An expansion is not to be confused with an extension of a model, of sentences which contains ( 1 4 ) U {atomic and negated atomic sentences true
which is obtained by leaving the language unchanged but adding new individuals in 91) and which contains an instance I/,(;) of every existential sentence (3v)$(v)
to the universe of discourse, specifying which of the new individuals are to be in it contains. If we have such a set, we can define an expansion '8 of 91 by letting
the extensions of the predicates of the language and specifying the valucs to be
taken by the function signs with new individuals as arguments. If 8 is an
r. = the unique a s /PI1 such - that the-sentence (r. = a) c A,.
R'" = {<a,, . . . , a,,>: R(u,, . . . , a,,) F A,,,}; and - -
expansion of !'I, ?)( is a reduction of %, and if % is an extension of ?)I. !)I is a
f u ( a , , . . . , a,,) = the unique b such that (f(y,. . . , a,,) = b ) E A,.
submodel of 8.
( w ) 14 iff. once we have fixed I!' as the interpretation of the fully intepreted It is easy to verify that, for each sentence 0, 0 is true in $3 iff 6, s A,.
part of the language, 4 will come out true under any method for assigning To form A. we first set P equal to the set of 9l-logical consequences of T, and
references to the remaining symbols which makes the sentences in r all come r
we take A,, to be U ( 1 4 ) . Extend A,, to a maximal first-order consistent set of
out true. We may think of the language of 91 as the fragment of our language sentences by adding in new sentences one by one, making sure that each time we
con~posedof symbols whose meanings have been fully specified, and we might add an existential sentence (3v)$(v) we also add an instance $(a).
More specifi-
think of the expansions of :'l as representing the hypothetical future interpretation cally, we enumerate the sentences of the language as O,,, O,, t12, . . . , and we
that we will get when the meanings of all thc terms have been co~npletely
specified. r represents features of that hypothetical future model to which our
present-day usage commits us.
i form A,,, , as follows:
If A,, U {O,,)is first-order inconsistent, set A,,, , equal to A,, U {TO,,}.
To give the other notion of definite truth we need a definition: If A,, U {tl,,}is first-order consistent and H,, does not begin with an existential
,
quantifier, then A,,, = A,, U {tl,,}.
DEFINITION.
Let 3 be a countable language extending the language of the If A,, U{O,,} is first-order consistent and O,, has the form (3v)$(v), form A,, , ,
first-order structure 91, and let 4 be a sentence and T a set of sentences of by taking a so that A,, U {$(;)} is tirst-order consistent and letting A,,,, =
9,,.
An 91-logical derivation of d, from r is a well-ordered sequence of A,, U {d,,, $(;)I. To see that we can find such an a , suppose that. on the
sentences of Y , ,which includes 4 , each member of which is either contrary, for each a , A,, U {$(;)I is inconsistent. - Then where 6 is the
a member of r;
-
conjunction of the finitely many sentences' in A,, T , we have, for each
an atomic or negated atomic sentence of the language of 9I that is a , (6 + i $ ( a ) ) eT. ~ i n c e Tis closed under the !'(-rule, (Vv)(6 -+1 $ ( v ) )
true in \!I;
is in r, so that A,, U {(3v)$(v)) is inconsistent. Contradiction.
an axiom of first-order logic; I Now let A,,, be ,u,A,,..
obtained from earlier members of the sequence by modus ponens; or COUNTEREXAMPLE 7.2. The countability condition in theorem 7.1 is needed,
obtained from earlier members of the sequence by the 91-rule (From since if (?I/
, ,
+
is uncountable we can have (\!(,I.) 1 but (\!I, f ) 4. To see this,
,. , ,
$(a),for each ci in /?I/,to infer (thv)$(v)). let 91 be an uncountable acceptable interpretation of a countable language X',
4 is definitely true under the partial interpretation (91,r) in
DEFINITION.
theproqf-theoretic sense (in symbols, (!)I,T) 1 4 ) iff there is an 91-logical ' This result was originally obtained (for the special case 11' = !I>) as a corollary to thc omitting types
-
derivation of I$ from r. 4 is riefinitely untrue in the proof theoretic sense theorem. Sec Chang and Keisler [ I 973, proposition 2.2.131.
' This is where the proof breaks down for l!'ll uncountable. For u transtinitc, A,, - would be
t
iff (?l,r) 1 4 . infinite.
and let Y 2bc obtained from i l l by adding the unary function sign ' f ' . Let l-
The model theoretic notion of definite truth is perhaps more natural, but the
consist of the formalization in 2' of
proof-theoretic notion is more tractable mathernatically, primarily on account of
(VA-)(fix)is a natural number)
and let $I be
II the following result:
THEOREM 7.3. Assume that :I' is an acceptable structure for a language 2
built up from a finite vocabulary. that 2" is a countable extcnsion of 2,
and that I' is a set of sentences of 9;. I f I' is (parameter-free) inductive
over !'I, then (4: (!)I .T) 14) is (parameter-free) inductive over 91.
Since [ )!Iis uncountable, (!)t,T) 1 4 .
I claim that (YI,T) d. Suppose, for reductio ad absurclum, that there is an PROOF:We expand !I' to a model 91" by adding to the language of 91 a new unary
!'I-logical derivation of 4 from T. Let predicate 'G' whose extension is I'. In t'l", {+: (!'(,I7) 1 4) can be described as
the least fixed point of the following first-order positive inductive definition:
P = {<r$l,r~?> : $ occurs before H in the derivation)
'Tr,' to represent the English phrase 'true scntence of 2'.For this translation to
be materially adequate, Tr,?(r+l) must be a definitely true sentence of Y* when-
ever 4 is a sentence of 2 that is definitely true, ~ r , ( r + l ) must be a definitely
untrue sentence of Y* whenever 4 is a sentence of X that is definitely untrue,
and the truth value of Tr,(r$l) must remain unsettled whenever the truth value
of 4 remains unsettled.
For the special case in which 2 and X*are the same, this gives us an analogue
of convention T:
Now suppose that (!)l,T_) 1 4 . Then (!)I,T,) 1 4 , so that 'Tr(r41)' is in T,,, except (4)c).
= r, and (?)I,T,) 1~ r ( r 4 1 ) .
There is a natural fourth member of our sequence of evaluation schemes,
Putting '14' in place of '4' in the argument just given, we see that, if (91,r,) namely,
f 1 4 , then (\'I,17,) 1 ~ r ( r i 4 1 ) But
. (YI,T,) 1( T r ( r i 4 1 ) -+ ~ T r ( r + l ) ) SO,
, (u,) 4 is true (resp., false) in (\'(,(E,A)) iff, for every maximal 91-logically
t
if (?l,rX) 1 1 4 , then (91,rx) ~ T r ( r 4 7 ) . consistent set U of sentences with E U C Sent - A, c$ is true (resp.,
Finally, suppose that (!)l,T,) $- 1 4 .Then {$: (91,T,) $1 U ( 4 ) is a consistent false) in the classical model (?I,U).
set of sentences, so that, if 23 is an expansion of \!I to a model of T, we can
further expand 23 to a model K of T, by setting ' ~ r " ?equal
' to {$: (?)t,r,) +) t ,
The set of sentences declared true at a fixed point under this evaluation scheme
U ($1. Since i ~ r ( r 4 1 )is false in 6,(?l,r,) f i T r ( r + l ) , and so (Yl,T,) would satisfy all the hypotheses of theorem 1.5. But this is impossible, since
b iTr(r41).~ the set of sentences declared true at a fixed point would also have to be o -
DIGRESSION 8.2. KRIPKE'S SYSTEM WITH SUPERVALUATIONS. When Kripke de- consistent. Consequently, there is no fixed point under this evaluation scheme.
vised the construction used in the proof of theorem 8.1, he was working in a If we try to carry out the construction givm in theorem 4.1 using (u4) in
rather different context. He was looking at alternatives to the 3-valued logic for place of the Kleene valuation scheme, we find that pUwEpis o-inconsistent,
evaluating truth in a partial model (Vl,(E,A)). Among others, he considered the so that Em = A*, = Sent. But (",(Sent,Sent)) does not qualify as a partial
following three options, derived from van Fraassen [1967]: model, since in a partial model the extension and the anti-extension have to
be disjoint.
(u,) 4 is true (resp., false) in (YI,(E,A)) iff, for each set U of sentences with In discussing the many possible methods of evaluating truth in a partial
-
E C U C Sent A, 4 is true (resp., false) in the classical model (YI,U). model which we might use to get a fixed point, Kripke stresses one feature
( a ? ) 4 is true (resp., false) in (YI,(E,A)) iff, for each consistent set U of that the evaluation schemes have to have. He says,
-
sentences with E C U C Sent A, 4 is true (resp., false) in the classical
Just about any scheme for handling truth-value gaps is usable. provided
model (t'I,U).
(u3) 4 is true (resp., false) in (?I,(E,A)) iff, for each muximal first-order that the basic property of the monotonicity of u is preserved; that is,
provided that extending the interpretation of Tr(x) never changes the
truth value of any sentence of Y;,, but at most gives truth values to
' That is, [(v.r)(Tr(.xj -* Sent(x)) & 1(3 f nite sequence J ) ( ( v x E s)(x is an axion, of logic v T ~ ( ~ ) previously undefined cases. Given any such scheme, we can . . .
: (.v + .xj both occur before .r in s)) & r~~ = o1 E . ~ j ] .
V (3\.)(!and construct the minimal fixed point 11975, p. 761 [Notation adjusted to fit
the notation used herc; a is the function taking (i3.A) to ({sentences true
theory, an extremely complicated object that we cannot hope to exhibit explicitly.'
at (!)I,(E,A))}. {nonsentences) U {sentences false at (\'I.(E,A))}).]
We can give a description of the theory I T , , formulated within an essentially
We now see that monotonicity alone is not enough to guarantee that we will richer metalanguage, by depicting a transfinite construction which produces T..
find a fixed point, for the evaluation scheme (a,)is monotone. We need some but we cannot present the theory itself. The essentially richer metalanguage is
further condition to ensure that there is no stage in the inductivc construction still with us.
at which the same sentence is declared both true and falsc. One such condition What we would like to be able to do is explicitly to present the new axioms
is the following: let us say that a partial model (?l,(E,A))is uilequit~ocalwith that we add to 1' to get the conservative extension that defines truth. To do this,
respect to a particular scheme for evaluating truth in partial models iff there we must obtain a theory that plays the role of I', by adding a recur.vive set of
is no sentence that is evaluated as both true and false under (?I,(E,A)). With axioms to r. Only by doing so will we get a theory of truth that we can hope that
respect to the Kleene 3-valued valuation scheme and with respect to ( a , ) , human beings can understand and adopt. Seeing how to do this will be our next
whenever E and A are disjoint sets of sentences, I!'l,(E.A)) will be unequivocal. task.
(?I,(E,A))will be unequivocal with respect to ( a z ) and (a,)iff E is a consistent
set of sentences which does not entail any member of A . For (cr,) it is required
THEOREM 8.3. Let "1 be an acceptable structure for a language 3'.
let :f2
be a countable language which extends Y ' and which does not contain the
that the union of E with the set of negations of members of A be consistent
by !'I-logic. The requirement that we impose on an evaluation scheme, in predicate 'Tr', and let r be a set of sentences of 2; which is parameter-
free inductively definable over 91. Then there is a recursive set A of
addition to monotonicity, in order to guarantee that the inductive construction
sentences of a language YZextending 2' such that (?I ,TU A) is a conserva-
yield a fixed point is this:
tive extension of (!'L,T) and such that l' U A is materially adequate as a
,(a,@))
(!)I is unequivocal. If (!)I ,(E,A)) is unequivocal, so is (!)I ,u(E,A)). theory of truth for (!'I,T U A).
The union of a chain of unequivocal partial models is unequivocal.'
In fact, we shall see that, if 9'is built up from a finite vocabulary, then A will
(a,) fails to meet the last condition. be finite. Here as elsewhere, we assume that we have fixed Godel codings for our
Alternatively, we could follow Woodruff 119841 in permitting truth-value languages so that the basic syntactic operations in the languages are represented by
gluts. That way, monotonicity will indeed guarantee the existence of fixed points. recursive operations on the codes.
But although we get a very rich and elegant system of fixed points when we allow We begin by proving a couple of lemmas that simplify our task:
truth-value gluts into the original system based on the Kleene logic, the only new
fixed point we get by allowing truth-value gluts into the supervaluational systems Let r ( x ) be an formula of a language Y that is partially interpre-
DEFINITION.
( u , ) - ( 5 ) is the degenerate fixed point (Sent,Sent). For (q)(Scnt,Serzt)
, will be ted by (!)l,Y) in such a way that, for any sentence 4 of we have
the only fixed point..
Although Kripke utilized the model-theoretic notion of definite truth, for our
purposes here the proof-theoretic notion is more servieable. Hence, throughout and
this chapter, when I say 'definitely true', I shall mean "definitely true in the
proof-theoretic sense."
Theorem 8.1 shows us that there exists a materially adequate theory of truth ' If we assume that the language of \'I is built up from a finite vocabulary, that I' is inductively
for the language of (!'I,T,), formulated entirely within the language of (91,r,).
definable over \'I, and that there is at least one expansion of I!' to a model of r,
we can give a
precise computation: 1', will be a complete inductive set. We can see that it is inductively detinahle
At first blush, it would appear that we have succeeded in our search for a way to over !)Iby formalizing the observation that I', is the smallest set of sentences that satisities the
give a theory of truth for a language within that very language. A closer examina- condition
tion is less cheerful, since we have not given the theory of truth r,
at all; we have ( V x ) [ rE r, " ( \ I-
E
only described the theory. The set of sentences T, is, according to recursion \ / x ha3 the form ~ r ( ' 4 ' )for solllc sentence d~ In I',
v x is an !'[-logical consequence of I',)]
i s I) of unequivocal
More precisely, the last requirerrient is this: given a collection {(!)I,(E,,A,)): To see that I', is a complete inductive set ( i . e . . that. for any inductive set R there will he a
>
partial models, where for each i and j in I either E, C E, and A, C A, or else E, E; and A , A,> hyperelemental.y function f s u c h that, for any .r. t s B iff,f(.r) s I-,). notice that E , l', and A ,
the structure f!'[,(j;l,E,,j;jA,))
will be an unequivocal partial model.
C {$: T$ E r,) U {nonsentences), and apply theorem 5.18.
Then r(.r) is said to be a muferially adequate truth preriirate for (\'I,Y).
The material adequacy condition stipulates that the specific formula 'Tr(x)'should
be a materially adequate truth predicate for our partially interpreted language. -
Our next lemma \bows that, if we have a materially adequate truth predicate for Let 5 be the sentence
a language, we can easily rearrange things so that 'Tr(x)' becomes a materially
adequate truth predicate.
and let the function p: {formulas of 3;)+ {formulas of 2 , , )be given by
LEMMA 8.4. Suppose that L)! is an acceptable structure and that (41,Y)is a
partial interpretation of a countable language 2 in which the predicate 'Tr' p(4) = the unique formula t,b such that 9"(r@1,rt,b1) is true in !"L
does not occur, and suppose that the formula r ( x ) is a materially adequate An induction on the complexity of sentences tells us that, for each sentence 4 of
truth predicate for (!)l,Y). Then we can find a single sentence 5 of the 2:,,we have
language 2' got from Y by adjoining the new predicate 'Tr' such that
(!'I,Y U (5)) is a conservative extension of (y1.Y) and such that 'Tr(x)' is
a materially adequate truth predicate for (!'l,Y U (6)). It follows that, if (91,Y) 1p(+), then (\!I,T U {[I) 1p ( 4 ) , and so (\!I,Y U
PKOOF: It will not suffice to take 5 simply to be the definition (V.r)(Tr(x)++ ~ ( x ) ) , {(I) 1 4 . Suppose, conversely, that (91.r U ( 5 ) ) 1 4 . Then, if we take an 3-
for this would not get any sentences containing 'Tr' into the extension of 'Tr'. logical derivation of 4 from Y U (5) and replace every occurrence of a formula
We need to translate 2' into 2 by substituting T for '7'r' not only where 'Tr' is of the form Tr(t) within the derivation by ( 3 y ) ( 9 ( t , v )& ~ ( y ) )we
, get an \)I-
used but also where 'Tr' is mentioned. Our plan is to find a function p translating logical derivation of p ( 4 ) from Y . Hence,
formulas of 2;,into formulas of Y , ,so that (4I,Y U {tI)k 4 iff (Y(,Y)k p(4)
p ( 4 ) = 4 for 4 an atomic formula of T,,; To see that (41,Y U ( 5 ) ) is a conservative extension of (YI,Y), observe that.
p(Tr(0) = ~ ( p ( D e n ( t ) ) ) if 23 is an expansion of !)I to a model of Y , % can be further expanded to a model
v
~ ( 4$1 = ~ ( 4 )P($) v of Y U { t ) by taking the extension of 'Tr' to be {x: ( 3 y ) ( Y ( x , y )& r ( y ) ) is true
~ ( 1 4=)~ ~ ( 4 1 in 53).
~ ( ( 3 ~ 1=4( 3) v ) p ( 4 ) For each sentence 4 of 2 ; , we have
Then we can take our sentence 5 to be (4LY u {tl) 4 t
iff (Yl,Y) ~ ( 4 )
iff (41,Y) 1 r ( r p ( 4 ) l )[because 7 is a materially adequate truth predicate
We cannot regard this description of p as a straightforward definition, because for (4I,Y)
of its impredicativity. The description shows us how to determine the translation iff ('!r,Y) 1 (3y)(9(r+l,y)& 70'))
of a compound formula once we know how to translate the simple formulas, but iff (41, Y ) p ( ~ r ( r 4 1 ) )
to know how to translate the simple formulas of the form Tr(t) we have to iff (91,Y U { t ) ) 1 ~ r ( r 4 1 )
already know how to translate the compound formulas. We can straighten out this
circularity by using the self-referential lemma. The proof that (Y1,Y U 1 1 4 iff (41,Y U {[}) 1l ~ r ( r 4 1is) similar..
{t})
The self-referential lemma gives us a formula 9 ( x , y ) so that LEMMA
8.5. In proving theorem 8.3, there will be no loss of generality if
R, , t- (Vx)(Vy){Y(x,y)* [(x is an atomic formula of Y,,,& y = x ) we assume that 3' is built up from a finite collection of predicates and
individual constants.
V ( X has the form Tr(r)& y = r ( 3 y ) ( 9 ( t , y &
)
7(~))') The fact that theorem 8.3 does not require that the language be built up from a
v ( 3 ~ ) ( 3 ? ) ( 3 ~ ) ( 3=v )((sxv t ) & y = (uvv) finite vocabulary will be extremely important, if we intend to apply the theorem
to the study of an appropriately rcgimentcd fragment of English by treating the (VX)(V~)(V(.Y.~)
-+ n IS a natural number)
fragment like a first-order language. A first-order analysis sticks close to the
surface, so that even though English is built up from a finite vocabulary, a first- If the nth new symbol in 2' is an individual constant c , rZ contains
order analysis must treat English as containing infinitely many predicates, for a
first-order analysis must often treat compound English expressions as simple,
unanalyzed primitives. and so on. The construction of A is just like the construction of fl, and A, like
PROOF: Lct US pretend that thc already have a proof of theorem 8.3 for the special 0 , will be recursive.
case in which 2' is finitely generated, and let us see how this enables us to prove Let 21be the language whose nonlogical symbols are 'U', 'V', the arithmetical
the general theorem. Our strategy is to extend 2' by adding a couple of master functions, and the terms uscd to describe finite sequences. For each sentence +
predicates that code up all the information expressed by all the symbols of the +
of X', form an sentence $ of Y: as follows: for cach constant c, rewrite so that
language, then to apply theorem 8.3 to the language containing just the master c occurs only in the context of a formula c = 1%.If c is the nth symbol of Y',
predicates. replace c = v by ~ ( i , v )if; c is the nth new symbol of 2' that is not in 2 ' ,replace
We begin by forming a new languagc q!, from 2' by adjoining a new binary c = 1, by v ( ~ , v )Replace
. predicates and function signs in a similar fashion. For
predicate 'U', a master predicate that is to encode all the information expressed each sentence $I, we have
by all the symbols in Y 1 . Form a list of the nonlogical symbols; we shall require
the listing to be reasonably well-behaved, so that if we know the position of a ('?l,I1 U A) 1 ($I t.4).
symbol on the list, we can, in an effective fashion, determine the symbol's Giidel Notice that the function taking r+l to ri$l is definable in !'I, and so {ryl: r y l F
number. Produce a theory R as follows: R contains the sentence f} is parameter-free inductively definable over 91.
(Vx)(Vy)(U(x,y)+ ,x is a natural number) Let r be {ryl: r y l F r} together with sentences that explicitly express the
insormation that is tacitly contained in the logical form of thesentences of yii'?.
(vv)(~(n,y) -
If the nth symbol of 2' is an individual constant c, R contains
= C)
-
~ )y = x); if the nfh item on the list of symbols of 2"
sentence ( 3 x ) ( V y ) ( ~ ( n ,++
that are not in Y' is an individual constant, will contain ( 3 x ) ( ~ y ) ( ~ ( i , ~y )
= x). And so on, for each of the other symbols.
(VY)(U(;,Y) + y is an m-tuple) &
( v v l ) . . . ( V v , , , ) ( ~ ( i , < v ,., . . ,v,,,>)
If the nth symbol of 3'is an m-place function sign f , R contains
- R(vl, . . . , v,,,)).
r
Now, is parameter-frce inductively definable over !'I, and so r is parameter-
free inductively definable over ?)(. Every set that is (parameter-free) inductively
definable over ?)l will also be (parameter-free) inductively definable over 91-
(though not necessarily vice versa), and so will be parameter-free inductively
definable over ?I-.
Since 2' is built up from a finite vocabulary, we can apply theorem 8.3 to get a
recursive set of sente~cesA such that (!'I , r U A) is a conservative extension of
Notice that I1 is a recursive set of sentences of 3;. (9I , r ) and such that r U A is amaterially adequate theory of truth for (!I' , r U A).
Let ?)I+be the unique expansion of !)I to a model of R. Let 2! be the language We want to take l- U R U A U A to be our theory of truth for (!)( ,r U f1 U A U A).
that we get from z:,
by eliminating all the nonlogical symbols except for U and Let % be an expansion of !)I to a model of T. % can be expanded in a unique
the symbols needed to define the arithmetical functions and to talk about finite way to a model %,,,.of R U A. Let % _ be the reductic~nof v,, to 3'. % is an
sequences. Let !'I- be the reduction of ?I+ to 21.Then 9.1 , is the unique expansion expansion of 9I- tp a model of and so, since (!)1-,1' U A) is a conservative
of to a model of 0. extenson of (!I' , f ) , %- can be expanded to a model 6-of A. Let 6 be the
Now, form a new language Xi, by adding to 2', in addition to the new unique expansion of 6- to a model of R U A. Then 6 is an expansion of % to
predicate U,a master predicate V that encodes all the information contained in r
a model of U (1 U A U A. So (!)I,T U R U A U A) is a conservative extension
thc symbols of 9' that are not symbols of 9 ' . Form a well-behaved enumeration ,r)
of (91 .
of the nonlogical symbols in 3' that are do not occur in X1and form a theory A Suppose that (91,r U R U A U A) t 4. Replacing each sentence JJ that
describing the operation of V, as follows: A contains the sentence appears in the '!(-logical derivation of i$ from r U (2 U A U A by $. we get an
-
-
4
\!I -logical derivation of from 1' U A. It follows that there is an \!L_-logical CASEV . has the form i( V 6).$ Similar argument, using the fact that KF +
derivation of Tr(r&l) from 1- U A. Since every member of r and every atomic
( T ~ ( ~ T (V J I 0)l) ( T r ( r k $ l ) & Tr(r761))).
or negated atomic sentence true in \!I is derivable in $1-logic from r U R U A, CASEVI. 4 has the form l l $ . Similar argument, using the fact that KF t-
c:)r.r u n u A u A) t ~ r ( r & l ) . ( T r ( r i i $ l ) tt Tr(r$l)).
Similar arguments show that if (91.T U R U A U A) 1~ r ( r & ?then
) ($1.1' U
t
R U A U A) 14 and that (?'I,1' U f2 U A U A) 14 iff (!)I,T U R U iZ U CASEVII. 4 has the form (3v)$. Similar argument, using the fact that KF t-
( ~ r ( r ( 3 v ) $ ( v ) l )++ (3v)Tr(r$(f )I)).
A) 1i T r ( r & l ) .
The function that takes $ to I$ can be defined in '?I, and we can take r(x) to
CASEVIII. 4 has the form i ( 3 v ) $ ( v ) . If 4 t. E,,, then for each u in (\!I(, l$(n)
abbreviate the formula
e E,, It follows by inductive hypothesis that, for each tr, (!'I,KF) t Tr(rl$(;)l).
Using the !)l-rule, we see that (?I,KF) 1(VV) Tr (r1$(3)1). Since KF t-
( T r ( r i ( 3 v ) $ ( v ) l ) ++ (Vv) Tr ( r ~ $ ( f ) l ) (?I,KF)
, 1 Tr(4).
It follows by induction that, if F E x , then ('?(,KF) 1 Tr(r41). By theorem
getting
4.3, KF U R, ., + (Tr(r47) -+ 4 ) ; hence, if 4 F E,. then (?(,KF) 1 4..
(U1,T uRu A U A) t 4 i f f (!)l,r u f2 U '4 U A) tr(r41) PROOF OF THEOREM 8.3: In view of lemma 8.5, we assume the vocabulary of
(UlJ u S1 u t
A U A) 1 4 iff (91,r U f I U A u A) 1 17(r41) 2' consists of a finite store of predicates and individual constants. Let 3" and
2" be, respectively, the languages obtained from and from 2' by adjoining
Our conclusion follows by lemma 8.4.. the n e w h n a r y predicate 'Kr'. In view of lemma 8.4, it will suffice to find a
We want to link up our current endeavor with Kripke's original investigations formula T(X)of 3" and a recursive set A of sentences of 2'' such that (91,r U
using the Kleene 3-valued logic. In doing so, the following observation will be A) is a conservative extension of (?I,T) and 7(x) is a materially adequate truth
useful: predicate for (!I' ,T U A).
LEMMA 8.6. Where (E,,A,) is the least fixed point of the original Kripke Let us rewrite the Kripke-Feferman axioms for %I+, using 'Kr' in place of
construction applied to 2); ' as in theorem 4.1, and where KF is the Kripke- 'Tr'; for example, if R is an n-place predicate of Y', one of our axioms will be
Feferman axiom system for Y l ' , we have, for each sentence 4 in E x ,
(71,KF) 1 Tr(r41) and (Y1,KF) 4.
Notice that, if we put 'k' in place of ' t ' , this lemma would be an immediate We continue to use 'KF' to refer to the rewritten axiom system and '(E,,A,)' to
consequence of theorem 4.3. refer to the least fixed point of the Kripke construction over ?)I.
PROOF:We show by induction that, for each a , if 4 .s E,, then (\!I,KF) 1 Theorem 4.1 shows that (?I,r
U KF) is a conservative extension of (!)I,T),
+ t
Tr(r41). Assume that, for each P < a , if F E,, then (?l,KF) Tr(r$l). We since any expansion of \!1 to a model of T can be further expanded to a model of
show by induction on the complexity of 4 that, if 4 .s E,, then (PI,KF) /- Tr(r41).
-
KF by taking the extension of 'Kr' to be Ex. We know from lemma 8.6 that E ,
CASEI. 4 is an atomic or negated atomic sentence of Y , , .If 4 .s E,,, 4 is true in is contained in {sentences of X;*: + (!)I,T U KF) t
$), which is included in
\!I, so, since KF t- ( 4 t
Tr(r+l)), (\!I,KF) ~ r ( r 4 1 ) . {sentences +of 3;':(\!l,r U KF) 1$). Unless T U KF is \!(-logically inconsistent
(in which case our theorem is trivially true), (4 F : (91,r U KF) 1 4 ) and
-
CASE11. 4 has the form Tr(7). If is in Em,then, for some sentence $, 7" = r+1
and, for some p < a , $ F Ep, By inductive hypothesis, (!'I ,KF) 1 Tr(r$l). Since {nonsentences} U {+ E %,:+: ( ? I , I U KF) /- 1 4 ) will be disjoint. By theorem
U1 r+l = T and KF +- (Tr(r) Tr(rTr(r)l)), (!'L,KF) /- Tr(rTr(.r)l). 7.3, both set\ will be parameter-free inductive, and so we can apply theorem
t
CASE111. 4 has the form ~ T r ( r ) If. 7 " is not a sentence, then (91,KF) i T r ( 7 ) 5.18 with
because KF t- (Tr(r) + 7 is a sentence). If 7''' is a sentence, say [+I, then, if 4 A = C = (4 F 2;':(Yi,T U KF) 1 4 )
is in E,, then there exists a /3 < a with i +E ED By inductive hypothesis, (!)I,KF)
t , ,KF) 1 Tr(r41).
) . KF + ( T r ( 1 r ) ++ T r ( r k ~ r ( r ) l ) (H
~ r ( ~ i + lSince and
+
-
CASEIV. 4 has the form (+ V 0). If 4 E Em,then either E E, or 0 F E,. By
inductive hypothesis (4 and 0 both being simpler than +), either (Y1,KF)
Tr(r$l) or (\!I,KF) -/ Tr(r01). Since KF + ( ~ r ( r v
(?l,KF) -/ Tr(r41).
1
$ 01) (Tr(r@) v T r ( r d ) ) ,
' If
B = D = {nonsentences} U ( 4 F X,:': (!)l,r U KF) 11 4 )
the symbol 'Kr' should happen to already occur in the language, introduce some other new
predicate instcad. Let me let this go without saying in similar situations in the future.
to find our parameter-free formula ~ ( xthat
) is a materially adequate truth predicate the extension of !T(.i.v) in !)Iis a function p: {formulas of 3;')
+ {formulas of
for (!)(,rU KF).. $1 such that
REMARK 8.7. DENOTATION AND SATISFACTION. AS we have focused our attention
on truth, other senlantic notions such as denotation and satisfaction have receded p(+) = 4, for 4 an atornic formula of 2,;
into the shadows. We can recover these other notions by simple definitions: p(Tr(t)) = (3y)(Y(t,v) & ~ ( y ) ) ;
I p(+ V $1 = ~ ( $ 1V ~ ( $ 1 ;
~ ( 1 4=) ~ ( 4 )and ;
~ ( ( 3 ~ 1=4 )( ~ V ) P ( + ) .
Alternatively, if we prefer to have 'Den' and 'Strt' as primitive, rather than Let
defined, terms, we can redeploy the construction used in lemma 8.4.
C = (5entences r+l of 2:' : (91,Y) p(+)) and
Thcrc arc material adequacy conditions for a theory of denotation and satisfac-
tion, analogous to our material adequacy condition for truth. For denotation, the
I
D = {sentences rb;l of $': (YI,Y) t li)(+)} U {nonsentences).
requirements are: By theoren 7.3, C and D are inductivc over 3, and since Y is %-logically
consistent, C and D are disjoint.
(91-Y) /- D ~ ( ~ ( L v ) iff , c I )/- (Vv)(+ ct v = (I);and
~ ~(!)l,Y) We want to show that (where(E,,A,) is the least fixed point of the Kripke
-
(Yl,Y) b lDetz(i(iv)+l,a) iff (91,Y) f l ( b ' v ) ( + H = a ) ' , as described in theorem 4.1) E, C_ C and A, D. Assume, as
construction for 9'
For satisfaction, the requirements are inductive hypothesis, that, &)reach/? < o, E,, C and A, D A straightforward
+
induction on the complexity of shows that, for each sentence 4 of Y " . if 4
(Yl,Y) t ~ u t ( u . ~ $ ( x )iffl ) (91,Y) t I,!J(~); and E Ea, then $ E C, and if 9E Am,then 4 F D Hence, by transfinite induction, E.
(9.Y) /- l ~ c r t ( ar$(x)I)
, iff (YI ,Y) /- T$(;) C and A, D, and so we can apply theorem 5.18 to get a formula v(x) of IP"
such that, for any a ,
If k' is materially adequate as a theory of truth for (!'I,Y) and if denotation and
satisfaction are defined as indicated above, these material adequacy conditions LI E A iff rv(U)l E C and
will be satisfied.. a B iff rv(ii)l E D.
In chapter 5, we developed a number of useful and elegant formal features of
the minimal fixed point of the Kripke construction. We now want to show that Let p(x) be the formula (3y)(Y(rv(i)l,y)& r(y)). We have
these formal properties are inherited by a partially interpreted language that
a E A iff rv(a)i E C
contains its own truth predicate.
t
iff (91,Y) p(v(z))
THEOREM 8.8. Let !)I be an acceptable structure for a first-order language iff (91,Y) /- r ( r p ( v ( n ) ) l ~
built up from a finite vocabulary, Let Y' be a countable language iff (\'I,Y) k ( 3 y ) ( ~ ( r v ( a ) l , y&
) ~(y))
extending 2 ' ,and let Y be an !)I-logically consistent set of sentences of 2; t
iff (91,Y) p G ) .
which is inductively definable over ?I. Then 3;contains a materially
Similarly, a 8 B iff (Yl,Y) k l p ( Z ) .
adequate truth predicate for (9( ,Y) just in case, for any two disjoint sets A
and B that are inductive over !I(, there is a formula p(x) in 2,; such that, ((=) Set A = {i@l:(YI ,Y) t $1
for any a , t
B = {r$l: (\'I ,Y) - 1 4 ) U {nonscntences}
Theorem 7.3 tells us that A and B are inductive over Yl. and, because Y is 91-
a E A iff (!)I ,Y) 1 p ( a ) and logically conslatent, they are disjoint. Our formula p(x) such that, for any u, a
a E B iff (!'I,Y) t~ ~ ( 6 )
t. A iff (YI ,Y) t
p(;) and a E B iff (91.Y) f ~ ~ (will2 be
) a materially adequate
P R O ~ F(
: 3)
Suppose that ~ ( xis) a materially adequate truth predicate for (Y[,Y). truth predicate for (\!I,Y)..
Let 2'' be the language got from 2' by adding the new unary predicate 'Tr'. In DEFINITION. A set S C (911is weakly definable within a partial interpretation
thc proof of lemma 8.4, we saw how to construct a formula Y(x,y) of 9' so that ($I,Y) iff there is a formula g(x) such that S = (a: (%,Y) t u(o)}.
COROLLARY 8.9. Let 91 be an acceptable structure for a first-order language The corollary below shows that the situation is quite different when we
Y 1built up from a finite vocabulary, let Y 2 be a countable language introduce new predicates via purtiul implicit definitions. Starting with an accept-
extending 2', and let Y be an H-logically consistent set of sentences of 2; able structure "I for a language 2 ' .we can increase the expressive power of 2' by
which is inductively definable over !)I. Then, if Xfcontains a materially introducing new terms and giving a theory that partially specifies their meanings.
adequate truth predicate for (\!I,Y), a subset of 1911 will be inductive over Perhaps we can increase the expressive power further by introducing new terms
?I iff it is weakly definable within ('?I,Y). It follows that the set of true and a stronger theory, but eventually the process comes to an end. Once we get
sentences of L!',,,,,,, the o(?l)th language in the Tarski-Kripke hierarchy, is to a partial interpretation that includes its own truth predicate. further extensions
weakly definable within (t'1.Y). Also, the set of true sentences of the of the theory will not increase the expressive power of the language.
Kripke-definable fragment of Y,,,, is weakly definable within (?)I,Y).
8.11. Let \'I be an acceptable structure for a first-order lan-
COROLLARY
PROOF: TO see that every inductive set is weakly definable, apply theorem 8.8 guage 3'built up from a finite vocabulary, let %' be a countable extension
with B = 0. TO see that every weakly definable set is inductive, use theorem of Y1,and let Y be an inductively definable set of sentences of %,; such
7.3. For the last two statements, use theorems 5.22 and 5.25.. that 2,;contains a materially adequate truth predicate for (?I , Y ) Let 9'be
DEFINITION. A set S C )!)I) IS ~fronglr,
cIq'inuhle withrn a partla1 Interpretation a countable extension of g 2 ,and let R >
Y be an inductively definable,
(91,Y) iff there 1s a formula U ( X ) such that S = {cr: (91,Y) 1 a(;)} = {a: 91-logically consistent set of sentences of 3:.Then a subset of /:'I/ will be
v
(YI,Y) TU(;)). weakly definable (resp., strongly definable) within (?l,Y) iff it is weakly
definable (resp., strongly definable) within (%,Ll). Moreover, %,: will con-
COROLLARY 8.10. Let !)I be an acceptable structure for a first-order lan-
tain a materially adequate truth predicate for ( % , a ) .
guage 54' built up from a finite vocabulary, let 2' be a countable extension
of T', and let Y be an 91-logically consistent set of sentences of 3;which PROOF: The proof closely resembles the argument for theorem 8.8. Let r(x) be
is inductively definable over YI. Then, if X: contains a materially adequate a materially adequate truth predicate for (9I.Y). We want to show that 3,; contains
truth predicate for (91,Y), a subset of !)I will be hyperelementary over '!I a materially adequate truth predicate for (\'I,R).
iff it is strongly definable within (91,Y). It follows that the extension of any As in the proof of lemma 8.4 and again in the proof of theorem 8.8, let "P(x,y)
formula that occurs within the Tarski-Kripke hierarchy will be strongly be a formula of 2' whose extension in \!I is the graph of a function p that translates
definable within ('!I,Y). Also, the extension of any formula that occurs in sentences of into sentences of X,;so that the translation of Tr(t)is (3y)(B(t,y)
the Kripke-definable fragment of 93,w will be strongly definable within & ~ ( y ) ) Let
.
(:)I ,Y). c = (r41: ( % , a ) 1 (3y)(B(r+l,y) & ~ ( y ) ) }and
PROOF: To see that, if S is hyperelementary then S is strongly definable, apply 1
D = {r@: (91,12) (3y)(?P(r+l J) & ~ r ( y ) ) }U {nonsentences}
theorem 8.8 with A = S a n d B = (%I - S. Conversely, if S is strongly definable, As in the proof of theorem 8.8, we see that C and D are disjoint inductive sets
-
then S and 131 S are both weakly definable, and so both inductive. For the last with C > E , and D A,. >
two statements use corollaries 5.24 and 5.26.. Take any two disjoint sets A and B that are inductive over ?I. By theorem
5 18, we can find a formula v(x) of so that. for any element a of (?I(,
One way to measure the expressive power of an interpreted language is to see
what sets of individuals are definable in that language. The Tarski hierarchy shows
a e A iff rv(a)l E C, and
that, by that measure, we can always increase theexpressive power ofan interpreted
a E B iff rv(a)7 E D
first-order language that is able to describe its own syntax simply by adding a new
predicate to the language and interpreting the new predicate by means of a (total) Let
implicit definition. Once we have done so, we can increase the expressive power of
the language still further by adding another new predicate, giving its meaning by p(x) (3y)(Y(rv(;)l, Y) & d y ) )
another implicit definition. And so on. The process of increasing the expressive
We have, for any a in 1'?(1,
power of the language by implicitly defining new predicates never closes off. How-
ever much we have added on to the original language, we can add more still, and a E A iff (91,R) t p(a). and
we will get a language that is strictly richer in expressive power. u E B iff (\'l.fZ) 1y ( i )
It follows by theorem 8.8 that Y" contains a materially adequate truth predicate My reasoning has proceeded as follows: from
for (!l' , f l ) .
Corollary 8.9 tells us that S is weakly definable in (Y1.Y) iff S is inductive Everything Wendy says is true.
over !)I iffS is weakly definable in (!)1,i1). Corollary 8.9 tells us that S is strongly and
definable in (:'l,Y) iff S is hyperelementary over $1 iff S is strongly definable in
,a)..
(:)r Wendy says, "Mogulcorp will go bankrupt."
In the model (w,O,S), the addition operation can be implicitly defined by I conclude:
a recursion. but it cannot be explicitly defined. In the model (w,O,S,+), the
nlultiplication operation can be implicitly defined by a recursion, but it cannot bc 'Mogulcorp will go bankrupt' is true
explicitly defined. In the model (w.O.S,+;), on the other hand, any operation From this I infer:
that can be implicitly defined by a recursion can be explicitly defined. Thus the
model (w,O,S,+ ); is closed under the process of introducing new operations by Mogulcorp will go bankrupt.
recursion. In an analogous sense, any partial interpretation that contains a materi- Thus, I am applying the following rule of inference:
ally adequate truth predicate will be closed under the operation of defining new
properties by partial implicit definition^.^ (R I ) From rT41 is true? to infer r+1.
Philosophers discussing truth have naturally concerned themselves with the Rule ( R l ) and its dual principles,
theoretical use of the word 'true', the use of the notion of truth as the cornerstone
of semantic theory. Kripke has emphasized that there is also an everyday use of (R2) From r
41 to infer rr+l is truel;
the word 'true' as a practical vehicle for conveying information. To take an (R3)From rr+l is not true1 to infer r i + l ; and
example, imagine that Xochitl, an old friend whose word I regard as one hundred (R4) From 'I& to infer rr+l is not truel.
perccnt reliable, tells me, "Everything Wendy says is true," and that Wendy, a
are central to our usage of the notion of truth as a means for conveying informa-
jazz musician with whom I have had no previous dealings, tells me, "Mogulcorp
tion. The material adequacy condition justifies rules ( R l ) through (R4) by ensur-
will go bankrupt." On the basis of this information, I divest myself of my holdings
ing that these rules will be definite-truth preserving. Indeed the fact that the
in Mogulcorp, happy to have avoided financial ruin. In attesting to Wendy's
material adequacy condition ensures the availability of rules ( R l ) through (R4)
veracity, Xochitl has given me valuable information. Without it, I would have
is the principal basis for the claim that the theory of truth we are developing will
had no reason to believe what Wendy said, and I would have held onto Mogulcorp
satisfy the ordinary usage requirement.
until the hitter end. This valuable information could not have been conveyed
To illustrate the usefulness of ( R l ) through (R4), let us review example 6.10.
without using the notion of truth or some other semantic or pragmatic notion. In
Recall that, in this example, Xochitl says:
the sentence ' "Mogulcorp will go bankrupt" is true', the notion of truth is
superfluous; one might just as well have said, "Mogulcorp will go bankrupt." In Not everything that Yolanda tells you will be true.
the sentence 'Everything Wendy says is true', the notion of truth is not superflu-
Yolanda says:
ous. Xochiil can make this assertion as a judgment about Wendy's character
without knowing what, specifically, Wendy is going to say. In telling me what Wooden matches are insoluble.
she has told me, Xochitl has given me the information that would have been Nothing Zaida tells you will be true.
conveyed by the infinite totality of sentences of the form:
Zaida tells me:
If Wendy says, "Mogulcorp will go bankrupt," then Mogulcorp will
The fish in Lake Anza swim backward to keep the water out of their eyes.
go bankrupt.
In Ohio, the ratio of the circumference to the diameter of a circle is 4.0.
The apartments on Elm Street have rats as big as raccoons.
More precisely. if (!)I,Y) contains a materially adcquate truth predicate. the only way extending
Y can increase the expressive power of the language will bc if our new set of axioms is monstrously And 1 conclude:
complicated. If we allow arbitrarily cornplicate_d axiom systems, wc can introduce an arbitrary set
S C / ? via 4
I the axioms { R ( a ) :a E S) U { l R ( a ) :a S } . The apartments on Elm Street have rats as big as raccoons.
To reach the conclusion I have reached. rules ( K I ) thmugh (R4) are prcci\ely
what are needed. On the basis o f Xochltl's warning together with rlly own 'The apartments on Elm Street have rats as big as raccoons' is true.
observations, I know: BY ( R l ) at last I obtain:
Either 'Wooden matches are insoluble' is not true or 'Nothing Zaida tells The apartments on Elm Street have rats as big as raccoons.
you will be true' is not true.
A great many of our everyday, nontheoretical u\es of the notion of truth can
Now, I already know: be understood as applications of (RI) through (R4). There are, however. some
Wooden matches are insoluble. further principles, not following from ( R l ) through (K4), which enter into our
ordinary reasoning about truth in useful ways and which do not engender para-
It is alnply confirmed by numerous observations. By (R2) 1 conclude: doxes. Let me list some of them:
'Wooden matches arc insoluble' is true. The set of true sentences is closed under first-order consequence.
Thus, I determine that The set of true sentences is consistent by first-order logic.
For every sentence, either it or its negation is true.
'Nothing Zaida tells you will be true' is not true.
For illustration, let us look at example 6.1 1, in which Zaida makes a fourth
Knowing this, I use (R3) to obtain: statement:
Something Zaida tells me is true. The residents of Elm Street are constantly menaced by wildcats.
Knowing this and observing Zaida's behavior, 1 obtain:
In this example, I use (R2), (R3), and (R4) to obtain, just as before:
Either 'The fish in Lake Anza swim backward to keep the water out of their
Either 'The apartments on Elm Street have rats as big as raccoons' is true
eyes' is true or 'In Ohio, the ratio of the circumference to the diameter of
or 'The residents of Elm Street are constantly menaced by wildcats' is true.
a circle is 4.0' is true or 'The apartments on Elm Street have rats as big as
raccoons' is true. Using the principle that the set of truths is closed under first-order consequence,
I derive:
Now, of course,
'Either the apartments on Elm Street have rats as big as raccoons
It is not the case that the fish in Lake Anza swim backward to keep the
or the residents of Elm Street are constantly menaced by wildcats' is true.
water out of their eyes.
( R l ) gives me my conclusion:
and so 1 get, using (R4),
Either the apartments on Elm Street have rats as big as raccoons or the
'The fish in Lake Anza swim backward to keep the water out of their eyes'
residents of Elm Street are constantly menaced by wildcats.
is not true.
Similarly, I use (R4) to get As another illustration, let us turn back to example 6.12. By three applications
of (R4), 1know that (al), (a2), and (a4) are all untrue. Application of the principle
'In Ohio, the ratio of the circumference to the diameter of a circle is 4.0' that the set of truths is first-order consistent tells me that at most one of (a3) and
is not true. (a5) is true, and so I know that at most one of A's statements is true. By (R2) I
from conclude that (b4) is true, and by three more applications of (R2) I determine
that ( b l ) , (b2), and (b3) are all true. By (K2) I conclude that (a3) is true, and by
It is not the case that, in Ohio, the ratio of the circumference to the diameter (K4) I conclude that (a5) is untrue.
of a circle is 4.0. EXAMPLE 8.12. AS a final example, suppose that I know for a certainty that
I now know that at least one of Zaida's statements is true and that the first two Professor Moriarty is in either England or Wales and that I am reliably informed
are untrue; so her third statement must be true: that exactly one of Colonel Moran's three statements is true. Colonel Moran's
statements are:
Moriarty is in England.
Because the set of truths is closed under consequence, we have
Moriarty is in Wales.
Either Jules's statements are both true or Jim's statements are both true. If 'The jewels are not either in the millpond or buried by the lighthouse' is
Jules says: true, then 'The jewels are not in the millpond' is true and 'The jewels are
not buried by the lighthouse' is not true.
Moriarty is bald.
The jewels are not in the millpond. Hence,
Jim says: 'The jewels are not either in the n~illpondor buried by the lighthouse' is
Moriarty is not bald. not true.
The jewels are not buried by the lighthouse. (R3) enables us to conclude:
From this information, I can conclude that the jewels are either in the millpond
The jewels are either in the millpond or buried by the lighthouse..
or buried by the lighthouse, by the following rcasoning:
Starting from The principle of bivalence-"For every sentence, either it or its negation is
Moriarty is in either England or Wales. true" or, more succinctly, "Every sentence is either true or falsem-is not, strictly
speaking, forced upon us by our conception of truth; that is, it is not entailed by
(R2) gives me:
the material adequacy condition. Nevertheless, we are inclined to regard it as
'Moriarty is in either England or Wales' is true requisite for a satisfactory theory of truth, on account of its usefulness in fulfilling
From the principles that the set of truths is consistent and that, for every sentence, the ordinary usage requirement. One expects some reluctance in accepting the
either the sentence or its negation is true, we see that a disjunction will be true principle, on account of the feeling that the paradoxical sentences are neither true
only if at least one of its disjuncts is true. Hence, nor false; indeed, it is sometimes thought that the moral of the paradoxes is that
our initial inclination toward bivalence is misguided. This attitude, I want to
'Moriarty is in England' is true or 'Moriarty is in Wales' is true.
argue, comes from a failure to recognize the full import of the strengthened liar.
Since at most one of Moran's statements is true, I get: If bivalence really were the source of the problem posed by the paradoxes, then
'Either Jules's statements are both true or Jim's statements are both true' once we denied bivalence the problem ought to disappear. But the problem does
1s untrue. not disappear; denying bivalence does not solve the problem or even bring us
closer to a solution. Bivalence is a useful principle, an intuitively obvious princi-
Using (R3), from this I get:
ple, and a principle that causes no apparent harm. I propose that we keep it.
Jules' statements are not both true and Jim's statements are not both true. We can use brute force to modify the construction of theorem 8.1 to incorporate
Thus, we have: the principle that the set of truths is a maximal consistent set of sentences. Starting
with a partial interpretation (!'l,r) with ?L acceptable, we define T,,, for each
If 'Moriarty is bald' is true, then 'The jewels are not in the millpond' is ordinal a , to be
not true.
If 'Moriarty is not bald' is true, then 'The jewels are not buried by the I- U {the formalization of 'The extension of "Tr" is a maximal consistent
lighthouse' is not true. : ,oUur,) 1 $1
set of sentences'} U ( ~ r ( r 4 7 )(?I
Now, the principle of bivalence gives us: and we let r, = gJKTe. The proof that (?I ,K)is a conservative extension of (?I ,I-)
for which r, is a materially adequate theory of truth is essentially unchanged from
Either 'Moriarty is bald' is true or 'Moriarty is not bald' is true. the proof of theorem 8.1.
We shall now see that we can likewise modify theorem 8.3 to incorporate the
Whence we derive principle that the set of truths is a maximal consistent set.
Either 'The jewels are not in the millpond' is not true or 'The jewels are
THEOREM 8.13. Let ?I be an acceptable structure for a language 2 ' ,let 3'
not buried by the lighthouse' is not true.
be a countable language extending Y ' that does not contain the symbol
r
'Tr'. and let be a set of sentences of Y' which is parameter-free inductively
set of definite truths is closed under 91-logical consequence, that the set of definite
definable over 91. Then there is a recursive set A of sentences of a countable
truths is included within the set of truths, and that the set of truths is consistent.
language Y 3extending :A2 such that (?I ,TU A ) is a conservative extension
of (?1.1'), such that I' U A is materially adcquate as a theory of truth for
r
So U A is \'!-logically inconsistent.
To overcome this difficulty, we pay attention to the stages in which the set of
(!)I ,TU A ) , and such that A contains the formalized version of the sentence
dcfinite truths is constructed. Let our inductive definition of the set of definite
'The extension of "Tr" is a lnaxirnal consistent set of. sentences'. If 22is
truths of (?I,T U A ) be
built from a finite vocabulary, A will be finite.
PROOF: WC can use the same argument we used in lemma 8.5 to show that there
is no loss in assuming that 3'is built up from a finite vocabulary of predicates and let F",e the set of definite truths constructed by the olth stage, as defined in
and individual constants. Also, we may assume that there is at least one expansion lemma 5.2. Let the consisrrnt part of the set o f definite truths be U{T',: cu is an
of ?[ to a model of 1'. since otherwise we could just take A to be ('-10 = 0'). ordinal and T i is first-order consistent). Our theory A will tell us that the set of
Let me present the proof by first sketching a simple strategy that does not quite truths is a maximal consistent set that contains the consistent part of the set of
work. then saying how the strategy can be improved. According to our simple dcfinite truths. From the fact that the consistent part of the sct of definite truths
strategy, A consists of three parts. First there is an inductive definition of the set
-
is contained within a maximal consistent set, we cannot conclude that the set of
of definite truths: definite truths is consistent, so we do not offend the second incompleteness
(Vx)(Drf(.r) [.Y is an atomic or negated atomic sentence true in ?I theorem. We can give a modcl-theoretic argument that the consistent part of the
set of definite truths is identical to the set of definite truths, but we cannot
V x is an element of r U A
reproduce this argument within the formal system.
V x is an axiom of first-order logic
Getting down to specifics, for each open sentence q ( x ) , let A ( r T l ) be the
& Dell! --, XI)
V (3?.)(Def(~) following theory. expressed in the language 3'that is got from 9'by adding two
v ( 3 y ) ( 3 v ) ( x= (Vv).Y & (Vz)DLif()."I?))]) new unary predicated predicates 'Kr' and 'Tr':
The second part is the fact about the set of truths that we are aiming to include:
The extension of 'Tr' is a maximal consistent set of sentences.
I KF, with 'Kr' in place of ' T r ' , for the language 9" got by adjoining 'Kr'
to 2'
The third part gives the connection between definite truth and truth: U {'The extension of "Tr" is a maximal consistent set of sentences of 2;')
U {'(V sentence x of g i ) l [ ~ r ( r ~ ( ;gi ) l (V
) finite, inconsistent set R ) ( 3 r
(Vx)(Def(x)-+ Tr(x))
l ) Tr(x)]'}.
E ~ ) ~ r ( r ~ ( r ~ ( i ) l , r ~ ( F ) l )-+ ]
Once we have A , we intend to prove I
I Here 'L(x,y)' is the formula constructed in lemma 5.12 to describe the pre-well-
(?t.r U A ) t4 iff ( ? l , r u A ) t ~ t f l r + l iff) (4r.r u A) 1 ~ r ( r 4 1 ) ordering of E,x.
and so The last clause of A ( r q l ) tells us, for any sentence $, if there exists an ordinal
c!ll.r u A) /- -I$ iff (?i,ru A ) t ~ r ( k 4 7iff) ( " , r u A) t ~ T r ( r 4 7 ) cu such that $ is inside (8: rl(rdl) E Em}and such that any finite, inconsistent set
contains some elements that are outside (8:rl(rvl)e E,,}, then $ is in the extension
There are two difficulties with this strategy. The first is that the definition of
of 'Tr'. Thus, it tells us that the consistent part of {$: rl(r$l) e Ex)-that is, the
A is circular. But we can easily use the self-referential lemma to straighten out
set of all sentences $ such that, for some ordinal a , ~ ( r $ l is ) in E. and { B : 11(r81)
the circularity.
E Em}is consistent-is contained within the extension of 'Tr'. If {$: ?(r$1) E Ex)
The second difficulty is more serious. Definite truth in (91 ,r U A) is the same
should happen to be consistent, then the effect of the clause will be to require
as derivability from r U A in 3-logic. As we shall see in the next chapter, many
that {+: ?(r@) E E_} be included in the extension of 'Tr'. But even if {$: T ( ~ J I ' )
of the familiar formal properties of derivability in first-order logic are also
E E x } is inconsistent, we can still consistently stipulate that the extension of 'Tr'
properties of derivability in 91-logic. In particular, there is an 91-logic analogue
is to be a maximal consistent set that includes the consistent part of {$: ~ ( r @ )
of Godel's second incompleteness theorem, and so an %-logically consistent
& E,).
theory cannot prove its own 8-logical consistency. But U A , as we have
described it, does prove its own 41-logical consistency, since it proves that the
For each 7 , ()!I,r U A(Trll)) will be a conservative extension of (v).
To
see this, let % be an expansion of \!X to a model of T. 'Zi can be further expanded
to a model 6 of r U A(r71) by setting 'Kr" equal to E, and taklng 'Tr" to bc
a maximal consistent set of sentences which includes the consistent- part of {$: is true in 6. To show this, it will certainly be enough to show that
,(r$I) E E x } . (V sentence x ) [ ~ r ( r [ ( i ) l )-+ Tr(x)l
Let
is true in6.Suppose that Kr(r<(rX1)l)is true in 6.Then
A {<r,l,r41>: (?r.r u ~ ( r , ? ) ) 1 4 1
=
B = { < r q l ,r47>: (" ,r u ~ ( r , l ) ) t x E {$: Kr(rt(r$l)l) is true in 6)
C = E, and = {$: r<(r$l)l e ' ~ r " }
D = A, = {$: r<(r$l)l & E%}
= {$: (\!t,r u a(ry1)) t- $1
Because we know that, for each 7 . r U A(rvl) is consistent by "1-logic, we Ls
know that A and B are disjoint, so we can apply theorem 5.18 to get a formula = T~'
V(X.?) such that
) true in 6.
So ~ r ( r x 1 is
<r7)1,rb1> E A iff rv(rT1,r41)1 F C and We now know that 6 is an expansion of :'I to a model of r U A(r{l). Since
<rT1,r+1 > E B iff rv(rrll. 11 E L) Tr(r41) is not true in 6 ,it follows that ( % , r U ~ ( r f l ) ) Tr(r41) and hence that
Use the self-referential lemma to find a formula t(x) so that t(.x) is gap-
equivalent (as defined in chapter 5) to v(r[l,x). Thus, for any $, We now know that, for any 4 ,
(%,I- U A(r[l)) -/ $ iff r[(rJ,1)1 E E x , and ('1.r u A(r{l)) 1 4 iff (91,r u h(r(7)) 1 Tr(r41)
(?)l,r u A(rg1)) l$iff r((r$7)1 t. A , We also know that, because A(rt1) requires the extension of 'Tr' to be a maximal
We already know that (!)I,T U A(rt1)) is a conservative extension of (Y1,T). consistent set of sentences,
We want to convince ourselves that 1' U A(r[l) is a materially adequate theory
of truth for (!'I,r U A(rt1)).
(?IJ U h(rt1)) t (V sentence x)(Tr(lx) * l T r ( x ) )
Suppose that (t'1.T U A(rt1)) 1 4 . Then l[(r$l)l E Ex. Now {$: r((r$l)l Hence,
E E,.} = {$: (\!l,r U A(rt1)) t
$1, which is consistent, and so if R is a finite,
(%,ru a(rt1)) t 1 4 iff (9l.r u ~ ( r < l , )1 T r ( h $ l )
inconsistent set, R E {JJ: rt(r$l)l E E,}. Hence, there is a 0 in R such that
4
r&rOl)l E,. and so r~(1t(r41)1,r[(r01)1)1s E,. Since whenever rX1 is in
t
iff ('21,r U A(rt1)) l T r ( r 4 1 ) ~
E,, (!'I,KF) t Kr(rXl), we havc The construction given in theorem 8.13 fulfills the material adequacy condi-
(?I ,KF) 1 ~ r ( r t ( r 4 1 ) l&) (V finite, inconsistent R)(3 r F R) tion. It is difficult to say with assurance that it also fulfills the ordinary usage
K r ( r ~ ( r t ( I 4 1 ) 1r[(P)l)l).
, requirement, because the requirement is so vague, but certainly it goes a very
long way toward fulfilling it.
Hence, In meeting our first two requirements on a satisfactory theory of truth, the
(?l,T U A(r[I)) t~r(r41). theory we have developed so f i r does very well indeed. However, it meets those
requirements no better than the Kripke construction with supervaluation scheme
For the converse, let us suppose that (!)1 ,I' U A(r[l)) 4. Let S be a maximal (v,).What is new and interesting about the theory being developed here is that
. '?i be an expansion
consistent set containing {$: (?)l,rU A(r[l)) t $ ) U { ~ 4 }Let a theory of truth which satisfies the first two requirements is being explicitly
of !)I to a model of T,and further expand % to a model 6 of 3 ' by letting 'Kr'" presented without going outside the object language. Previous attempts to satisfy
= E, and 'Tr" = S. We want to see that Ci is a model of T U A(rt1). The only the first two requirements have not given us theories of truth; they have only
nontrivial part of showing this is to show that given us descriptions of theories of truth. The account given here raises, for the
first time, the prospect of also fulfilling the integrity of the language requirement.
(V sentence x)[[Kr(r[(i)l) & (V finite, inconsistent R )
The integrity of the language requirement demands that we give the semantics
(3 r F ~ ) ~ r ( r L ( I t ( ,,r[(i)l)l)]
?)l -+ Tr(.r)]
of our language within the language itself. Although our work so far arouses the
hope of fulfilling thiv requirement, it does not yet fulfill it. The problem is that STRONG ADEQ~JACY CONDITION. The theory Y is strongly adequate both
we now have two fundamental semantical notions, truth and definite truth, and as a theory of truth and as a theory of definite truth for I!( , Y ) just in case
so far we have only given a theory of truth. the following conditions are met:
To give a theory of definite truth is remarkably easy. We simply give the
inductive definition of the set of definite truths. Assuming that we have a way of There is a formula v(x)that weakly defines Y in (\!(,Y).
describing the set Y and the atomic truths of 91, we get the following natural There is a formula a r ( x ) that strongly defines the set of atomic and
description of the definite truths of (9l , Y ) : negated atomic truths of \'I within (\!I,Y).
-
of the self-referential lemma, that is R, ..-provably equivalent to definite truth for (M,T U A(rt1)). To do this, what we need to show is that, if
t
(?I,r U A(r57)) ~ < f ( r + l then
) , (Y1,T U A(r51)) +.
The other clauses of the
(Vx)[Def(x) { x is a sentence & strong adequacy condition are evident by inspection.
[Y(x) Suppose that (Y1,T U A(rt1)) 4. Let 23 be an expansion of !)I to a model
v
adx) of r, and define a further expansion (I of % as follows:
V x is an axiom of KF (with 'Kr' in place of 'Tr') 'Kr'G = E,
v x = r(~(rq1)l I
,r
'Def' = { r $ l : (91 U h(r51)) $1 t
V x = T(v sentence x)(Def(x)++ Def(rTr(i)l))l 'Tr" is a maximal consistent set that includes {r$1: (?)I,TU ~ ( r t l /--) )$1
V x = r(V sentence x ) ( D e f ( l x )++ ~ e f ( r ~ ~ r ( 2 ) l ) ) l U (741
V x = the formalization of 'The extension of "Tr" is a
maximal consistent set of sentences' We want to see that is a model of T U A(r(1). Since 'Def(r+l)' is not true in
V x = r ( V x ) [ [ ~ r ( r r l ( i&
) l )(V finite, inconsistent set R) 6. this will tell us that (Y1,r U A(re1-i)) Def(r+l), and so (Y1,T U h ( r t 1 ) )
(3 r .z ~)Kr(r~(rq(i)l,rq(F)l)l)] -+ Tr(x)]l ~ef(r41).
V x is an axiom of logic That Cr is a model of T U KF U (o(r(7) U {'The extension of "Tr" is a
v
(3y)(DeS(y)& &f(y 7,x ) ) maximal consistent set of sentences') is obvious. To see that
V ( 3 ~ ) ( 3 v ) (=x (Yv)y & (Vz)Def(yvlt))l)l (tlx)[[Kr(rt(;)l)& (V finite, inconsistent set R ) ( 3 r E R)
Let A(rq1) be the following theory:
Kr(rL(r[(k)l,r((F)l)l)l + TrWl
is true in 6,it will certainly be enough to show that
KF (with 'Kr' in place of 'Tr')
d771).
(V sentence x)(Def(x)++ ~ e f ( r T r ( i ) l ) ) is true in 6.
Take any X . If 'Kr(r[(rXl)1)'is true in 6,
then rt(rxl)lis in 'Kr"
(V sentence x ) ( D e f ( l x )++ D e f ( r i T r ( k ) l ) ) = E,. Hence,
The extension of 'Tr' is a maximal consistent set of sentences.
( V x ) [ [ ~ r ( r q ( i&
) l )(V finite, inconsistent set R ) ( 3 r E R )
Kr(rL(rq ($1 ,rq(F)l)l)] + Tr(x)]
-
iff (?X,r u ~ ( r t l ) 114
) as a strongly adequate theory of truth and definite truth. This means that we must
iff (?l,T U A([,$])) 1 i~r(r$l) accept the biconditional that forms the inductive definition of 'Def , as well as the
sentences '(Vx)(Def(x) ~ef(rTr(2)l))'and '(Vx)(Def(lx) ~ ~ . f ( r l ~ r ( i ) 1 ) ) ' ,
iff 'Def(ri~r(r+1)1)'is true in 6..
ILLUSTRATION 8.16. EXAMPLE 6.13 REVISITED.Let us review example 6.13, in and we must adopt the definite-truth preserving rule of inference
which we have an acceptable structure 91 with 'OR'" = the set of ordinals less
than K and '<'"' = the less-than relation on the ordinals < K , and in which we
From ~ e f ( r + l )one may infer +, and vice versa.
constructed a formula u(x) such that, for each ordinal a , cr(z) says that, for each The intuitive proof of '(Vx)(OR(x)-+ ~ ( x ) )proceeds
' by transfinite induction. In
ordinal P < a , is true. Although this is scarcely an example from everyday order to formalize proofs by transfinite induction within the language of (aI,Y),
life, our everyday usage of 'true' gives us intuitions about the example that are we need to accept the universal closures of instances of the following transfinite
unmistakable: each of the cr(G)s is true. We want to see how well these intuitions induction axiom schema:
are captured by the account we are developing here.
Indeed, it is easy to see that, if Y is a materially adequate theory of truth for (Vx)[(OR(x) & (Vy)(y < x -+ 8(y))) -+ 8(x)I -+ (Vx)(OR(x)+ B ( x ) ) .
(91,Y), each of the o(E)s will be definitely true in (91,Y). Assume, as inductive Certainly we shall accept this schema if we acknowledge that the things that
hypothesis, that for each fi < a , (81,Y)
-
t~ ( p ) .
-
Now, take any element a of )?I).
satisfy 'OR' are well ordered by '<'. Assuming we accept the schema, we can
If u is not an ordinal < a , then i u < a , and so
carry out transfinite inductions within the language of (?I,Y) in the ordinary way.
(ar ,Y) 1Z < (Y -+Tr( r ~ ( Z ) l ) Assuming that we have a theory of truth and definite truth which we recognize
as strongly adequate, that we accept the transfinite induction axiom schema, that
If a is an ordinal < a , then, by inductive hypothesis, we accept the universal closures of instances of the schema
with 4 an atomic or negated atomic formula of the language of $1, and that we
we get
are aware of rudimentary facts of syntax, we can reason as follows:
Def(ru((Y)l)
Take a such that O R ( a ) ,and assume, as inductive hypothesis, that for each
P < a , D e f ( r w ( ~ ) ~Now,
) . take any individual a . If it is not the case that ! By transfinite induction, we conclude
a < a , then, because we have
Hence,
and
(Vx)(OR(x)-+ D ~ V O+
Ru(6~) 7)1)
But also,
we get
Def(ri a <GI) whence
and so
~ e f ( r (<
a a -+ ~r(rw(a)l)l)
Consequently,
If, on the other hand, a < a, then, by inductive hypothesis,
Def(ru(;)l)
Because a universal generalization satisifes 'Def whenever each of its
we get
(Vx)(Def(x) -
Because of the principle
Def(rTr ( i ) ? )
instances does,
DEFINITION. Given a partial interpretation (!'1,17),with Y1 acceptable, the ( S A I ) (')l,r) t (b'x)[Def(x)++ {x is a sentence &
canonicalframe for (?I ,T)is the pair <W,R>, where W (the set of "worlds") [Y(x)
r
is the set of all expansions of ?I to models of and R C W x W (the v~T(x)
V x is an axiom of logic
"accessibility relation" on W ) is given by:
V ( j v ) ( D e f ( y )& Defly -,x ) )
%?RKiff, for every 4 , if Def(r41) is true in 8,4 is true in 6 v ( 3 y ) ( 3 v ) ( x= (Vv)y &
DEFINITION.
The theory r is modally adequate as a theory of definite truth (Vz)Def(y b'!ii))l)l
for (?I,T) iff and
1
( M AI) (!'I ,T) (Vx)(Def(x)+ Sent(x))
( S A 2 ) for each 4 , (?I,T) 1 4 iff (91,r)1 Def(r41)
( M A 2 ) for each 4 , (Y1,F) 14 iff (91,r) 1 Def(r41) and Here we require that y ( x ) strongly define T rather than merely weakly define T ,
( M A 3 ) for any 4 , for any world % in the canonical frame for (9[,1'), because we want to avoid worrying about worlds in which there are nonstandard
members of r, that is, worlds % in the canonical frame for (?I,T) in which there axiom of logic, then (9I,T) 1 4 , and so, according to ( M A 2 ) , (?I,T) 1~ e f ( r + 7 ~
are objects a such that y(a) is true in % even though a F. 4 Hence, ~ e f ( r 4 . 1is) true in %.
The strong adequacy condition we presented in chapter 8 was motivated solely Suppose that, for some sentence $, ~ e f ( r $ Iand ) ~ e f ( r (+ $ +)I) are both
by its intuitive appeal, but now we see in terms of modal logic that the condition true in 9. So, if 6 is any world accessible from $, $ and ($ + 4) are both true
we gave was precisely the correct one: in 6 ,and hence 4 is true in 6.Thus, 4 is true in every world accessible from
THEOREM 9.1. Given !'I countable and acceptable and a partial interpreta- % and so, according to ( M A 3 ) , Dtlflr41) is true in %.
tion (!)l,r) in which the formulas y(x) and n r ( x ) strongly define. respec- Finally, if 4 has the form (Vv)$(v) and, for each ' I , ~ ~ f ( r $ ( i ) isl )true in %,
tively, T and the set of true atomic and negated atomic sentences of Y1. then for each object a and each world 6 accessible from %, $(a)
is true in 6,
r
Then is modally adequate as a theory of definite truth for (\)I,T)iff it is and so (Vv)$(v) is true in every world accessible from %. Thus, according to
strongly adequate. ( M A 3 ) , Def(r(Vv)$(v)l)is true in %.
This proves ( S A I ) , = .(SA2),- is the same as (MA2)..
We break up the proof into two lemmas:
LEMMA
9.2. Even without the countability assumption, if r is modally LEMMA 9.3. Assuming [?I( is countable, if 1' is strongly adequate as a
adequate we shall have
( S AI -
( ? l , r ) 1 (Vx)[Def(x) {x is a sentence &
Iy(x)
PROOF:
theory of definite truth for (?I,T), then it is modally adequate.
PROOF:In showing that r""'is modally adequate, (MAI), (MA2), and the left- Let R, be R,, n (W, x W,,).
to-right direction of (MA3) are immediate. Just as in the proof of lemma 9.3, to It is easy to see that the sequence of W,s is nonstrictly decreasing, that is, if
prove the right-to-left direction of (MA3) it is enough to show that, for any world a. 5 y , then W, > W,, Let
B in the canonical frame for (!)I,rD"), if (Yl,TD" U Dt:f 4 , then Def(r41) is
true in 8.Proving this by induction on the lengths of proofs in 91-logic is routine.
T""' is defined as the smallest set that meets seven closure conditions. The
argument that, if fl > r is modally adequate for (!)1,R), then ( % , a ) 1 To" is a We need to show that <W, ,R,> has the desired properties.
straightforward verification that (4: (Y1,fI) 1 4 ) satisfies all seven conditions; this Notice that the left-to-right direction of condition (F3) is automatic, and that the
argument does not depend upon the countability of 1411.. left-to-right direction of (F2) follows from (F3). Thus, to show that <W, ,R,> is
In strengthening our theory from r to r"",we diminish the class of possible an adequate frame, we need to verify ( F l ) and the right-to-left directions of (F2)
worlds. Unless is already an adequate theory of definite truth for (!)I,r), there and (F3). ( F l ) follows from the first condition defining W,. It follows from the
will be some expansions of ?It that T regards as possible worlds but that T"" does second of the defining conditions for W, that, if W, = W,, , , then W, satisfies the
not regard as genuinely possible. Let me now give a more model-theoretic version right-to-left direction of (F2). It follows from the third of the defining conditions
of proposition 9.4 which works directly with the Kripke frames, rather than get for W, that, if W, = W,,,, then W, satisfies the right-to-left direction of (F3).
at Kripke frames indirectly by way of theories, and which does not depend upon Now suppose that <W,R> is an adequate frame contained within the canonical
the countability of 1911. frame for (!)i,r). We want to show by induction that, for each a, W C We. Thus,
suppose that, for each P < a , W C W,, and take 8 E W. Because <W,R>
Let <W,,,R,,> be the canonical frame for (!'I,@).
DEFINITION. An !)llframe
satisfies ( F l ) , ~ e is ap set of sentences. 1f Def(r41) is valid in < ,?,,W,, ,Q,R,>,
is a pair <W,R>, where W C W,, and R = R,, f l (W x W). A sentence is
) valid in <W,R>, and so, by (F2), 4 is valid in <W,R> and so true
~ e f ( r + l is
valid in <W,R> iff it is true in every world in W. An ?(-frame <W,R> is
in 8.If 4 is true in every world in fin,Wo that is accessible from 8,then 4 is
an czdequate frame iff it meets the following three conditions:
true in every world in W that is accessible from %, and so, by (F3), Def(r+l) is
( F l ) For every world % E W, Def" Sent. true in B.It follows that 3 is in W,.
It is easy to verify that every member of 1'"" is valid in every adequate frame if %? is an expansion of 91 to a model of T, (%, {?'1-logical consequences of T U
that is included in the canonical frame for (!)l,r). It follows that every such frame {a}}) will be an expansion of ?I to a model of U {a} rin which ~ e f ( r 4 1is
) false.
in included in the canonical frame for (?!1,TD"). As a matter of fact, these two constructions produce the same result; one
We now know that the <W, ,R,> is included in the canonical frame for
(91 ,rD"). But if I?)ll is countable, then, according to proposition 9.4, the canonical
- can show by using corollary 9.7 below that
equivalent.'
rU" r
and U { a ) are ?I-logically
frame for (?(,roe') is an adequate frame and so included in <W, ,R,>. Thus If we think of u as a first-order positive inductive definition over \!X, we see
<W, .R,> = the canonical frame for (!)I,T""').m that the possible worlds in the canonical frame for (YI,T U {cr)) will be models
Up to now, in this chapter, we have been looking at the problem of how to r
(%,U), where % is an expansion of 91 to a model of and U is a fixed point of
recognize when we already have an open sentence in our language that adequately a. Thus, the possible extensions of 'Def will be the fixed points of cr. Among
represents the set of definite truths. We now want to look at how we might
represent the set of definite truths by introducing a new predicate. Let us suppose
I
i
these fixed points is the degenerate fixed point Def = Sent So there are possible
worlds in which every sentence is definitely true.
that (?!I,r), with ?!I countable and acceptable, is a partial interpretation of a This is surprising. To intuitions guided by the ordinary English usage of
countable language 2 that does not contain the predicate 'Def; we suppose +
'definitely', it seems nonsensical to suggest that, although '2 2 = 5' could not
further that 2 contains formulas y(x) and a ~ ( xthat,
) under (YI,T), strongly define I possibly be true, it might nonetheless be definitely true. in ordinary usage.
r and the set of atomic and negated atomic truths of ?!I. We form an enlarged 1 'definitely true' implies 'true'.
language 2" from 2 by adding the unary predicate 'Def; the models of TUwill According to everyday intuitions, the schema,
take the form ( % , U ) , where 8 is a model of 2 and U C is the extension of I
'D'. We want to see how to produce within 2" a conservative extension of (91 ,T) If r41 is definitely true, then 4
which is modally adequate as a theory of definite truth. A highly nonconstructive is so obvious that we are inclined to regard it as part of the meaning of 'definitely
way to do this will be to replace r by TD". This procedure does not actually give true', so that we are inclined to accept the schema
us the new axioms that we need to add to to get our conservative extension.' It
merely describes the new set of axioms within an essentially richer metalanguage.
If we want to write down explicitly the new axioms that we need to add to r ,
I It is definitely true that, if r$Jl is definitely true, then $J
But, in fact, if Harry has a full head of hair, a world in which every sentence is
we can do the following: use the self-referential lemma to find a sentence cr that
-
definitely true will be a world in which
is R,, .-provably equivalent to
I
I If 'Harry is bald' is definitely true, then Harry is bald
(V,x)[Defi.x) {X is a sentence &
[Y(x) is false.
v x = ru1 One might suspect that all this result shows us is that, even though U {cr) r
v is an adequate theory of definite truth, in terms of our formal criteria of adequacy,
V x is an axiom of logic U {u) is an unwise choice for a theory of definite truth, and that a more
v (3y)(De.y) & @fly -?x)) sophisticated theory of definite truth would eliminate the possible worlds in which
V ( 3 ~ ) ( 3 v ) ( x= i'fv) & (Vz)Def((y vi;))l}l every sentence is definitely true. The next theorem shows that, on the contrary,
Then (91,T U {u)) will be a conservative extension of (?!I,r), and F U {u) will such worlds are unavoidable. As long as our theory of definite truth is ?I-logically
be strongly adequate as a theory of definite truth for ('!I,r U {cr}). To see that consistent, that is, as long as our theory admits any possible worlds at all, the
(YlJ U {u)) is a conservative extension of (!)l,T), notice that, if 2!3 is an expansion theory will inevitably admit possible worlds in which every sentence is definitely
of !)I to a model of T, (B,Senr) is an expansion of 8 to a model of r U {u). To true. The reason is familiar from Godel's second incompleteness theorem: any
YI-logically consistent theory that can give a decent account of %-logical provabil-
verify the right-to-left direction of (SA2), notice that, if (!'I,r U {u}) 4 , then,
ity will be unable to prove its own ?!I-logical consistency.
I The simplest way to see that (\'i.TD") is a conservative extension of (!1,1') is to note that the theory
(91,r U {v}) constructed in the next paragraph is a conservative extension of (9i.T) and that, That (!)l,rU {v}) rt'" is an immediate consequence of proposition 9.4. T o see that (\'1,To") t
according to proposition 9.4, (\'I,T U (cr}) Tn". t
v, first show that (\'l,TD") (&f0v1) -* v), then apply corollary 0.7 below.
THEOREM 9.6. Let I!' be an acceptable structure, and let (9I.f) be a partial If we substitute 'Def for '7' in theorem 1.5, we find that a strongly adequate
interptetation in which the formula y(x) weakly defines I' and the formula theory of definite truth will give us (11, (2), (3), (4)a), and (4)c), but not (4)b).
ar(x) strongly defines the set of atomic and negated atomic sentences true If we substitute 'definitely true' for 'true' in rules (R1) through (R4), only the
in !'I. If 1' is an !)(-logically consistent, strongly adequate theory of definite analogues of (RI) and (R2),
truth for (!'[,T), then ' i ~ e f l r 0 =11)'will not be definitely true in <4I,T>.
From rr41 is definitely true1 to infer r41
Notice that this theorem does not require that 1411 be countable. The proof actually
uses only clause (SAI) of the strong adequacy condition, not (SA2). and
PROOF:Substituting 'Defcx)' for ' ~ ( x ) in
' theorem 1.5, we see that (SAI) guaran- From r$i to infer rrqbl is definitely true1
tees that ( 4 : (41,r) 4) satisfies all the conditions except for (4)b). If ' i ~ r f ( r 0
will be both valid (definite-truth preserving) and usable. The analogue of (R3),
= 11)' were an ?(-logical consequence of T,(4: (\)I,T) f 4 ) would satisfy (4)b)
as well, and so it would be w-inconsistent. But an w-inconsistent set is !)I-logically From rr$l is not definitely true1 to infer Ti41
inconsistent..
According to our ordinary way of using the phrase 'definitely true', it seems is vacuously valid; it never fails us because we never get to use it. The analogue
preposterous to propose that 'Not every sentence is definitely true' should not be of (R41,
definitely true. But our usage here is not entirely ordinary. We are proposing a From r ~ 4 to
1 infer rrqb1 is not definitely true?
coordinated change in the language we use to talk about semantics, so that as we
exchange our ordinary notion of truth for a scientifically reconstructed notion of always fails.
truth, we simultaneously replace our ordinary notion of definite truth with a We can derive an analogue of Lob's theorem from theorem 9.6 in just the way
scientifically reconstructed notion. Lob's Theorem is derived from Godel's second incompleteness theorem:
If one thinks of definite truth in the way we have been thinking of it here- COROLLARY
9.7. Let 91 be an acceptable structure, and let (91,r) be a
to be definitely true is to follow, in an appropriate sense of 'follow', from a partial interpretation in which the formula y(x) weakly defines and the r
system of meaning postulates-theorem 9.6 is not so surprising. As Carnap formula a ~ ( x strongly
) defines the set of atomic and negated atomic sen-
taught us, laying down meaning postulates is a risky business. If nature is tences true in '!I. If T is a strongly adequate theory of definite truth for
uncooperative, the meaning postulates ('!I,T), then, for any sentence 8 , (\)X,T) b ( ~ e f ( r e 1 )+ 8) iff (%,T) 18.
If a body is placed into water, then it is soluble iff it dissolves. Once again, the result really requires only that (91,T) satisfy (SAI).)
and PROOF:The right-to-left direction is immediate. For the left-to-right direction,
substitute ' ~ e j l r - 1 8 1 x)' for 'T(x)' in theorem 1.5. We see that {qb: (91,r) t
Two bodies of the same substance are either both soluble or both insoluble. ( i d + 4)) satisfies conditions ( l ) , (2), (3), (4)a), and (4)c) If (3.T) k ( ~ e f ( r 0 1 )
+ 8), then (4: (91,r)k ( 1 8 -,4 ) ) also satisfies (4)b). Hence, (4: (%,TI/-- ( 7 6
will enable us the judge the same body both soluble and insoluble. Because laying
+ 4) is w-inconsistent and so 91-logically inconsistent. Hence, ( % , r ) 1 8..
down meaning postulates is a risky business, there is nothing we can do now to
Reflecting upon our ordinary usage of the phrase 'definitely true', we find
foreclose the possibility that, sometime in the future, we should adopt a system
ourselves in a familiar position, trapped between three conflicting theses:
of meaning postulates that is 91-logically inconsistent.
Theorem 9.6 brings to our attention the striking differences between the 111 No legitimate notion of definite truth can fail to acknowledge that all
structural properties of the set of truths and the set of definite truths. If we instances of the schema
substitute 'Tr' for '7' in theorem 1.5, the set of sentences that are definitely true
under a materially adequate theory of truth will satisfy conditions ( I ) , ( 2 ) , and
If r41 is definitely true, then 4
(3). Theorem 8.13 shows us that, with sufficient effort, we can arrange things so are definitely true.
conditions (4)a) and (4)b) are also satisfied. Material adequacy guarantees that [2] The notion of definite truth described in the strong adequacy condition
rules (RI) through (R4), which we discussed in chapter 8, will be definite-truth is a legitimate notion of definite truth.
preserving. 131 Except in cases of inconsistency, the notion of definite truth described
in the strong adequacy condition will not acknowledge that all instances
of the schema
If r41 is definitely true, then 4
are definitely true. Toward a Semantics
With regard to [2], English speakers use the phrase 'definitely true' in a variety
of ways, some of which have scarcely any connection with our concerns here;
of Natural Language
for example, one says that a statement is definitely true as a way of attesting that
one has good evidence for it. Another way of using the phrase 'definitely true'
is to distinguish clear from dubious applications of vague terms; this usage is Looking over the semantics we have developed for partially interpreted first-order
intimately connected with our concerns here. Our partially interpreted first-order languages with an eye to seeing what, if anything, will be useful in developing
languages are intended to provide a model of how clear applications of vague semantics for natural languages, what strikes us as most interesting and unex-
terms are distinguished from dubious applications; that is, on one way of using pected is that our intuitive notion of truth has broken down into two notions, truth
the phrase 'definitely true', they are intended to provide a model of definite truth. and definite truth. In retrospect, this does not seem so surprising, for we put the
They might not provide a very good model-it is highly idealized and greatly intuitive notion of truth to two very different kinds of use, one practical and the
oversimplified-but, even so, the notion that was referred to as "definite truth" other theoretical, and we had no very good reason to suppose that the same notion
in the strong adequacy condition is, quite unmistakably, a notion of definite truth. would serve both purposes.
In view of corollary 9.7, this implies, contrary to thesis [ I ] , that there are The notion of truth is practically useful because it enables us to, in effect,
recognizable and intelligible notions of definite truth for which the principle assert or deny the conjunction or disjunction of a nameable set of sentences
without being required to list the set, sentence by sentence. If we tried to
If r41 is definitely true then 4 achieve the same effect without using any semantic notion, utilizing instead some
is invalid. pragmatic notion such as warranted assertibility or warranted acceptability, we
My response to this trilemma is the same as my response to the corresponding would not succeed. When Xothitl tells me
problem in chapter 2. Although principle [ I ] is powerfully supported by deep
Not everything Yolanda says is true.
intuitions, we must repudiate it, allowing that there are some legitimate uses of
'definitely true' that render the principle she has, in effect, asserted the disjunction of the denials of all Yolanda's state-
ments. To have told me
If r+l is definitely true then q5
You will not be warranted in asserting each thing Yolanda says.
invalid. In developing a scientific worldview, one looks for the best overall fit
between theory and experience. There are inevitably conflicts, in which unex- would have been much too weak, whereas
pected experimental or theoretical results, such as corollary 9.7, come into conflict
You will be warranted in denying some of the things Yolanda says.
with deeply entrenched intuitive beliefs. In the interest of global theoretical
harmony, even the most firmly held pretheoretical intuitions, such as the intuitions would have been too strong.
that support thesis [ I I , must sometimes be cast aside. Semantics, according to Tarski (1936, p. 4011, is concerned with the
connection between expressions of a language and the objects and states of
affairs to which the expressions refer. So understood, there is nothing inherently
semantical about the use of the notion of truth as a means of expressing
infinite conjunctions and disjunctions. Were it not for the paradoxes, we could
take the notion of truth simply to be implictly defined by schema (T), without
saying anything about the connections between expressions and objects or
states of affairs. Even when we take the paradoxes into account, we see that
the principles we need to ensure the usability of the notion of truth to simulate
infinite Boolean operators-rules (R I ) through (R4), the principle of bivalence, (Vx)(x satisfies 'brave' * x is brave)
and so on-do not inherently depend on any connection between expressions
and the things the expressions are about. I and
In contrast to our practical use of the notion of truth, its theoretical use in
enabling us to understand human verbal behavior depends essentially upon its 1 (Vx)(x satisfies 'not brave' ++ x is not brave)
semantical character. It will not do, as an account of language acquisition, simply Yet it is not plausible to suppose that, when we learn to use the word 'brave',
to say that we are taught rules that permit us to utter a sentence on occasions at we are taught an exhaustive classification. We are taught how to classify some
which the utterance is appropiate; for such an account fails to explain how we individuals as brave, others as not brave, but inevitably there are borderline
manage to learn how to use a sentence quite different from any sentence we have cases. There are persons whose bravery is lukewarm and persons who are in
heard before under circumstances quite dissimilar from the circumstances in some ways brave and in other ways cowardly. These are cases that are left
which we were trained. An alternative account has us learning a language by unresolved by the criteria we are taught when we learn to use the word
learning the truth conditions for its sentences. For very simple sentences like 'brave'. Nor is this merely a defect in the linguistic training of a particular
'Theaetetus sits', the account is already contained in the Sophist 12631. We learn individual. There are cases that the totality of conventions and practices
that the referent of the name 'Theaetetus' is the boy Theaetetus and the referent that constitute the English-speaking community's usage of 'brave' fails to
of the verb 'sits' is the action of sitting. We get a sentence by "weaving together" adjudicate.
names and verbs. 'Theaetetus sits' is true iff the agent denoted by the name The satisfaction relation provides an exhaustive classification into 'brave'
performs the action referred to by the verb. This gives us our truth conditions for I and 'not brave'. Our linguistic conventions do not determine an exhaustive
the very simplest sentences. Truth conditions for compound sentences are got l classification into 'brave' and 'not brave'. Therefore, the satisfaction relation
from the truth conditions for simple sentences by means of a Tarski-style composi- is not determined by our linguistic conventions.
tional semantics. This is not so surprising as it first appears. We learn to use the word
It is not so clear how this story is to continue beyond the realm of the predicate 'satisfies' after we learn most of the rest of the language by learning the
calculus. For modal statements, for instance, we can give truth conditions in disquotational satisfaction condition,
terms of possible worlds, but such truth conditions are no help in understanding
how we acquire the ability to use modal language; for we do not teach our children (Vy)(y satisfies r+(x)7
to verify a sentence by inspecting other possible worlds. There is, in fact, a [Here 1 am setting the paradoxes aside, pretending there were no self-reference.]
continual tension between the desire to give simple, graceful truth conditions and This implicit definition does not say anything about linguistic conventions, and
the desire to develop a semantics that has explanatory value in understanding the it gives us no reason to suppose that our linguistic conventions uniquely determine
acquisition and use of language. what pairs of things satisfy 'satisfy'. Our linguistic conventions leave the applica-
We see this tension even with respect to the simplest sentences. It is natural bility of 'satisfies' underdetermined, just as they leave the applicability of 'brave'
to give the truth condition for 'Theaetetus is brave' in terms of the satisfaction underdetermined.
relation: It is initially plausible to suppose that general terms get their meanings in
virtue of linguistic conventions that determine their satisfaction conditions. But
'Theaetetus is brave' is true iff the individual named by 'Theaetetus'
we now see that our linguistic conventions do not fix the satisfaction relation,
satisfies the general term 'brave'.
and that, if we want an account of linguistic usage that has causal explanatory
On the other hand, it is not plausible to suppose that we learn to use and understand power, we need to employ subtler notions than satisfaction, notions that are more
a sentence like 'Theaetetus is brave' by learning which individuals satisfy 'brave'. firmly grounded in linguistic practices.
The satisfaction relation provides an exhaustive classification. Every individual In the same way, it is initially plausible to suppose that sentences get their
satisfies either 'brave' or 'not brave'; meanings in virtue of linguistic conventions that determine their truth conditions.
But if Jones is a borderline case for 'brave',' our linguistic conventions, together
(Vx)(x satisfies 'brave' V x satisfies 'not brave')
' We change our example from 'Theaetetus' to 'Jones' because the historical Theaetetus was
follows logically from distinguished by his courage.
with the empirical facts, will not assign a truth value, either true or false, to
is learned would require adeep investigation into the psychology of language acqui-
'Jones is brave'. Yet 'Jones is brave' is either true or false.
sition; what we have here is a logician's highly simplified model.'
('Jones is bravc' is true V 'Jones is brave' is false) The insight that we use the notion of truth in two fundamentally different ways
is due to Hartry Field [1986], who distinguishes "disquotational truth" from
follows logically from "correspondence truth." The former conception uses the notion of truth, which it
takes to be implicitly defined by schema (T), solely to effect infinite conjunctions
('Jones is brave' is true t* Jones is brave)
and disjunctions, whereas the latter conception attempts to give a causal explana-
and tion of the connection between sentences and the objects and states of affairs to
which they refer, in order to justify the use of semantic notions in explanations
('Jones is brave' is false ++ Jones is not brave). of human behavior. Field draws the distinction by pointing to the counterfactual
Truth is bivalent, but our linguistic conventions produce only a trivalent If we had used the word 'white' to mean green. 'Snow is white' would
partition. There are sentences that our linguistic conventions, together with the have been true.
empirical facts, determine to be true; sentences that our linguistic conventions,
together with the empirical facts, determine to be false; and sentences that are which is, he says, true according to the disquotational conception, which regards
left unsettled. the counterfactual as logically equivalent to
The notion of definite truth we have been developing is an attempt to give
a model, albeit a highly idealized and excessively formalized model, of how If we had used the word 'white' to mean green, snow would have been
our linguistic conventions, together with the empirical facts, give a sentence white.
a determinate truth value. The notion of truth we have been developing here and false according to the correspondence conception. This way of presenting
is not the naive notion that is implicitly defined by the disquotational truth the distinction is, I think, unfortunate. As we noted in remark 0.1, what we really
condition, seem to have in this example is one meaning of 'true' and two readings of the
rq57 is true ++ c$ scope of a modal operator; we have
but it is still a bivalent notion. We employ a bivalent notion of truth because If we had used 'white' to mean green, 'Snow is white' would have been a
bivalence has proved to be practically useful when we utilize the notion of truth true sentence of English as we actually speak it.
to simulate infinitary conjunctions and disjunctions.
versus
We use partial interpetations in giving our formal models of definite truth to
reflect the fact that there is more to the acquisition of general terms than learning If we had used 'white' to mean green, 'Snow is white' would have been a
what Gupta calls rules of application. The two components of a partial interpreta- true sentence of English as we would have been speaking it.
tion are intended to represent, in a crude and oversimplified way, the fact that
there are two components to our acquisition of general terms: learning how to One particularly sticky point is that the fully interpreted part of our language is required to contain
apply the term in particular cases, and learning the position of the term within a an isomorphic copy of the natural number system. Our reason for requiring this is simply that we
theoretical network of concepts. To learn the meaning of 'acid', for instance, it need a copy of the natural numbers in order to be able to talk about sentence types, and unless we
is not enough to learn how to classify liquids as "acid" or "nonacid" using litmus can talk about sentence types we cannot get our project started. To make our notion of definite
paper; one must also learn the position of the notion of acidity within our truth plausible as a model of what speakers learn when they acquire the meanings of the terms of
their language, we would need to provide an account of how numerical terms make their way into
constellation of chemical concepts. the fully interpreted part of the language. The picture I have in mind, derived from the early work
Partial interpretations give us a highly idealized model of how we acquire general of putnam and the recent work of Chihara, is that the universe of !'I, which is our system of
terms. In practice, we do not expect the part of the language learned by acquiring urelements as described in digression 7.4, should consist of physical objects and constructible
a rule of application to be neatly separated from the part of the language learned by physical objects. "Existential" quantifiers ranging over the urelements should be read "it is possible
acquiring a theory; instead, the two components of language learning are thoroughly to construct." "It is possible to construct" can be either taken as primitive or explicated in terms
of modal operators. I do not intend to attempt to develop this picture here. Here the problem is
intertwined. To get a theory of definite truth that accurately reflects how language simply being swept under the rug.
Even though it is not successfully marked by the counterfactual, Field's distinction
any way we choose to restrict the intended interpretation of Y ' to a set-sized
between the two fundamentally different ways we use the notion of truth is an
subuniverse, we shall find that r U A is a strongly adequate theory of truth and
important one.
definite truth for the resulting partial interpretation. Every single time we try out
Following Gupta, let us imagine that we have singled out a fragment of English
that can reasonably be regarded as having a first-order structure. The fragment
r U A on a set-sized scale model, we get precisely the results we wanted. This
gives us good reason to believe that a full-scale application of r U A will give
will consist entirely of sentences used to make assertions, and it will be free of
satisfactory results.
indexicals, modalities, propositional attitude constructions, and so on. We also
1 propose that we take our semantic theory for Y 2to be T U A. I propose
assume that no semantical terms occur in the fragment. We intend to add the
further that we adopt the rules of inference ( R l ) through (R4). together with two
adjective 'true' to the fragment. As noted in remark 8.6, we can simultaneously
1 intuitively clear rules for definite truth:
add 'denotes' and 'satisfies' without extra effort. Some of the other semantical
and quasi-semantical notions-knowledge, for instance-would require quite a From r+l to infer rr$l is definitely truel, and
lot of extra effort. From rr+1 is definitely true? to infer r+7
There are two main obstacles that stand in the way of applying the methods
and one clearly counterintuitive rule, taken from corollary 9.7,
of chapter 8 to obtain a semantics for our fragment of English. The first is that
we have no criterion for distinguishing the fully interpreted part of the language From rlf r+l is definitely true, then 41,to infer r$l.
from the rest of the language, nor for recognizing which of our basic beliefs are
to count as meaning postulates. This is one of many difficult problems that we 1 Now, it makes no sense to ask whether the resulting theory of truth and definite
truth is strongly adequate, for we can only formulate the strong adequacy condi-
are choosing to ignore. To obtain a satisfactory system of meaning postulates 1
would require a deep and detailed investigation into the psychology of language tion from the vantage point of an essentially richer metalanguage. What the proof
acquisition. Such an investigation, while undoubtedly valuable, would likely of theorem 8.15 gives us is good evidence-though not a formal proofi-that the
have little effect on the answers to the central problems we have been working resulting theory gives results consistent with the empirical facts.
on here. With the aim of simplifying our task as much as possible by setting aside The procedure proposed gives us a semantic theory for a sizable fragment of
all problems that are not immediately relevant to the questions at hand, I propose English. Extending the theory beyond the fragment will require further work,
to pretend that we have a way of picking out a set of meaning postulates in the some of it straightforward, some of it quite difficult. If we have a theory that
gives us the truth conditions for assertions, we can easily extend the theory to
same way that we pretend that we have a way of distinguishing semantical from
nonsemantical terms and we pretend that we have a way of distinguishing context-
free from context-dependent sentences.
I one that gives the conditions of satisfaction for the propositional contents of other
speech acts. The fulfillment conditions for the directive, 'Please bring me a beer
from the kitchen', coincide with the truth conditions for the assertion, 'You will
The second obstacle, by contrast, is at the very center of our concerns here.
We pretend that we have divided our fragment of English-call it Z2-into a 1 bring me a beer from the kitchen7.1By contrast, giving the truth conditions for
sentences containing indexicals is likely to be an enormously difficult task. Yet
fully interpreted part 3'and a partially interpreted part and we pretend that we
we may find that including indexicals will actually simplify some aspects of our
have a system of meaning postulates T.The problem is that 2 ' cannot be regarded
semantic theory. The places where the methods developed here appear to be
as a partially interpreted language because its universe of discourse is not a set.
particularly clumsy and complicated are places where we have to produce convo-
Although Z2is not a partially interpreted language, we can treat it as if it were
luted self-referential constructions. Having indexicals in our language might
a partially interpreted language by applying to it the same formal methods we
substantially simplify these constructions, since we can sinlply say 'this sentence'
would apply if the quantifiers were restricted to a set. Let me be more specific.
rather than appeal to the self-referential lemma.
If we have an acceptable structure for X', theorem 8.15 shows us how to
The program of developing a semantics for English by directly applying
produce a theory A so that r U A is strongly adequate as a theory of truth and
theorem 8.15 to a fragment of English that sufficiently resembles the language
definite truth for (%,T U A). Looking over the proof of theorem 8.15, we see
of the predicate calculus, then extending the theory to encompass larger and
that the theory A we construct does not really depend upon the structure 91. What
we really have is a theory A such that, for any model !)I for %' that interprets the
arithmetical symbols and the symbols for finite sequences standardly, r U A will In view of theorem 9.6, no formal proof will be forthcoming.
be a strongly adequate theory of truth and definite truth for (!'I,r U A). Thus,
' See Searle [1969]. One of the great merits of Searle's theory is that it enables us to advance almost
effolilessly from a semantics for assertive5 to a general semantics for speech acts.
larger fragments. is not intended to bc taken seriously. Thc methodology is all unsettled whether or not Harry is bald, the linguistic convcntions that govern the
backward. Rather than let the properties of the language under study guide the use of the term 'true' likewise leave it unsettled whether or not 'Harry is bald'
development of the logical theory, we are using our powerful logical machinery is true. The biconditional
brutally to force the language into a preconccivcd logical mold. While I earnestly
hope that the methods developed in chapter 8 will eventually be useful in the 'Harry is bald' is true iff Harry is bald.
study of natural language, I anticipate a much less heavy-handed application. is intuitively obvious, and, since it involves no self-reference, the intuitions that
What is impressive about theorem 8.15 is not that it actually will be used or support the biconditional are not seriously undermined by the paradoxes. But if
ought to be used to give a semantics for English. What is impressive is the fact we firmly accept the biconditional but we regard the righthand side as unsettled,
that we can cvcn coherently imagine using it to give a semantics for English, for we must regard the lefthand side as unsettled. Thus, 'true' inherits the vagueness
this shows us that it is possible to develop a semantics for a language within the of all the vague nonsemantical predicates of our language.
language itself. It is sometimes supposed that vagueness is an altogether bad thing, to be
A semantics for natural language will be a long time coming. In the meantime, eliminated wherever possible, but a little reflection will reveal that the vagueness
it is worthwhile to set down some interim results that appear likely to emerge of scientific discourse is often quite useful. Imagine, if you will, a little creature
from our eventual semantic theory: Jocko right on the border between protozoa and plants. We normally identify
protozoa by a cluster of properties we typically find all together. But Jocko is an
exception. Jocko satisfies too few of our normal criteria for protozoa for us to
(Vx)(Tr(x)+ Sent(x)) say with conviction that Jocko is a protozoon, yet Jocko satisfies too many of our
( V A ) ( Xis an axlom of l o g ~ c+ T r ( x ) ) normal criteria to say with conviction that Jocko is not a protozoon. We could,
(Vx)(Vg)(Tr(x? g) -+ ( T r ( x )+ Tr(y))) if we chose, settle the matter by stipulation, picking an arbitrary sublist of the
1 ( 3 x ) ( T r ( x )& T r ( 1 x ) ) usual list of criteria and stipulating that an organism is to count as a protozoon
(Vx)(Sent(x)-+ (Tr(x) V T r ( l x ) ) ) if and only if it satisfies all the items on the sublist. Although such a stipulation
(Vx)(Dej(x)-+ Sent(x)) would help stamp out vagueness, it would be bad scientific practice. For it might
( V x ) ( x is an axiom of logic --+ DLif(x)) turn out that there is some micromolecular property, unsuspected by us now and
( V x ) ( V ~ ) ( D e f?
( x Y ) -+ (Def(x)-+D e f ( y ) ) ) certainly not a part of our present-day criteria for using the word 'protozoon',
-
(Vy)(V variable v)[(Vz)Dej(yvls) -+ Def((vv)y)] that underlies our present distinction between animals and plants and explains
(Vx)(Def(.r)++ L)ef( r T r ( i ) l ) ) why some organisms exhibit the characteristic qualities of animals and others the
(Vx)(Def(lx) Def(riTr(k)l)) characteristic qualities of plants. Thus, our arbitrary stipulation would have
produced a sharp, unnatural boundary where, unknown to us, nature provides a
sharp, natural boundary. Because there would be some things that nature classifies
( R l ) From rTr(r+1)1 to infer r41. as animals but we classify as plants, our scientific theory would develop into an
( R 2 ) From to infer rTr(rq51)1. ugly, cumbersome thing, cluttered with exceptions. Because of our squeamish-
( R 3 ) From r i ~ r ( r $ 1 ) 1to infer r i 4 1 . ness about vagueness, we would have produced a degenerate science that studies
(R4) From T i 4 1 to infer r l T r ( r 4 l ) l . artificial categories rather than natural kinds.
From r ~ e f ( r 4 1 ) to
l infer r+l. The notion of truth inherits the vagueness of vague nonsemantical terms; if it
From r41 to infer r ~ e fr+1 ( )I. is undetermined whether Jocko is a protozoon, it is likewise undetermined whether
From r(Def(r+l) --, 4)l to infer r$l 'Jocko is a protozoon' is true. Thus, whatever reasons we have for wanting to
keep the edges of the concept protozoon a bit fuzzy are also reasons for wanting
We have proposed to solve the liar antinomy by treating the adjective 'true' to keep the edges of the concept of truth a bit fuzzy. There is a further reason,
as a vague predicate. That 'true' is a vague predicate should come as no surprise. special to the way we use the notion of truth, for not wanting the border between
Intuitively, when we assert or deny that 'Harry is bald' is true, we are saying the truth and untruth to be conlpletely sharp. Essential to our everyday usage of the
same thing as when we assert or deny that Hany is bald. If that is so, then, if the notion of truth is the application of rules ( R I ) through (R4). According to the
linguistic conventions that govern the use of the vague term 'bald' leave it theory we have been developing, this usage is justified by the fact that ( R l )
through (R4) are definite-truth preserving. If the notion of truth had sharp bound- (5) The starrcd sentence is true -+ the starred sentence is not true.
aries, (RI) through (R4) would not be definite-truth preserving. To see this, let
us suppose, on the contrary, that the prcdicate 'Tr' has a sharp boundary, so that, Hence,
for each sentence 4 , either Tr(r41) is definitely true or i T r ( r 4 1 ) is definitely (6) The starred sentence is not true
true, and, moreover, that ( R l ) through (R4) are definite-truth preserving. If
- -
Tr(r47) is definitely true, then, by ( R l ) , 4 will be definitely true. If i T r ( r 4 1 ) (Alternatively, we could have gone directly from (4) to (6) by the rule of reductio
is definitely true, then, by (R3), 14 will be definitely true. In either case, ud absurdurn; this amounts to the same thing.) By (R2) we get
(Tr(r41) 4) will be definitely true. But, taking 4 to be the liar sentence A, we
(7) 'The starred sentence is not true' is true.
see that i ( T r ( r h 1 ) A) is definitely true, so that the set of definite truths is
contradictory. Substituting again, we obtain
If our notion of truth, either our naive notion or our scientifically reconstructed
notion, were precise, rules ( R l ) through (R4) would not be valid. Thus the (8) The starred sentence is true
vagueness of the notion of truth is essential to its unique logical usefulness. Contradiction.
If asked whether Jocko is a protozoon, I shall have to reply "I do not know," The fallacious step in this argument occurs at line (4). ( R I ) is a legitimate rule
without intending to intimate thereby that there is any fact of the matter there to because the inference
be known. Likewise, if I am asked whether 'Jocko is a protozoon' is true or
whether the liar sentence is true or whether the truthteller is true, I shall be forced 4 is true.
to reply "I do not know," without intending to intimate that there is any fact of Therefore 4 .
the matter there to be known.
is definite-truth preserving. (RI) cannot be legitimately used within conditional
Often one needs a detailed diagnosis of an illness before one can design an
proofs because such a use amounts to applying the much stronger rule
effective plan of therapy. Sometimes, however, one is only able to diagnose a
disease by seeing how the disease responds to treatment. We began our investiga- ($ + (r41 is true)).
tion with the crudest possible diagnosis of the liar antinomy; the antinomy arises, Therefore (+ 4 4 ) .
we said, because our naive theory of truth is inconsistent. Now, retrospectively,
we are in a position to offer a more detailed diagnosis. The liar antinomy arises There is no reason to suppose that this stronger rule is definite-truth preserving,
from an improper application of rules (RI) through (R4). and, indeed, the liar antinomy shows that the rule is not definite-truth preserving.
Let us look at the reasoning by which thinking about the starred sentence from (RI) is a legitimate rule of proof that cannot be legitimately applied within
chapter 0 leads us to a contradiction. We start with the observation: conditional proofs. In this respect, ( R l ) is like the rule of necessitation in modal
logic. Necessitation is a legitimate rule because it preserves modal validity.
( 1 ) The starred sentence = 'The starred sentence is not true'. Necessitation cannot, however, be applied within conditional proofs, for such an
application would enable us to derive the obviously invalid schema
Assume, for conditional proof,
(2) The starred sentence is true.
as follows: Assume, for conditional proof,
Substituting, we get