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Molotov last night that
he intended fully to carry out all the agreements reached by
Eleven days after Roosevelt’s death, Harry S Truman met with President Roosevelt at the Crimea. He added that he felt our
Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, passing through agreements with the Soviet Union so far had been a one way street
Washington on his way to San Francisco for the first United and that could not continue; it was now or never. He intended to
Nations conference. Between two meetings with Molotov, the go on with the plans for San Francisco∗ and if the Russians did not
new president canvassed cabinet and military leaders for
wish to join us they could go to hell. The President then asked in
advice. These minutes were recorded by Charles Bohlen.
rotation the officials present for their view.
MEETING AT THE WHITE HOUSE, APRIL 23, 1945. 2 PM. MR. STIMSON [Secretary of War, the senior member of
Roosevelt’s cabinet] said that this whole difficulty with the
THE SECRETARY OF STATE [Edward Stettinius] told the Russians over Poland was new to him and he felt it was important
meeting that Mr. Molotov had arrived in good spirits yesterday to find out what the Russians were driving at. He said in the big
and had had a good talk with the President yesterday evening but military matters the Soviet Government had kept their word and
that at the Foreign Ministers meeting later great difficulties had that the military authorities of the United States had come to
developed over the Polish question. The continuance of the count on it. In fact he said that they had often been better than
meeting this morning had produced no improvement and a their promise. He said it was important to find out what motives
complete deadlock had been reached on the subject of the carrying they had in mind in regard to these border countries and that their
out of the Yalta agreement on Poland. The Secretary said that the ideas of independence and democracy in areas that they regarded
truth of the matter was the Lublin or Warsaw Government was as vital to the Soviet Union are different from ours. … In this case
not representative of the Polish people and that it was now clear he said that without fully understanding how seriously the
that the Soviet Government intended to try to enforce upon the Russians took this Polish question we might be heading into very
United States and British Governments this puppet government of dangerous water. He remarked that 25 years ago virtually all of
Poland and obtain its acceptance as the legal government of Poland had been Russian.
Poland. He said that as they all recalled at Yalta an agreement had MR. FORRESTAL [Secretary of the Navy] said that he felt that this
been reached regarding the formation of a new Polish difficulty over Poland could not be treated as an isolated incident,
Government representative of the people by means of the that there had been many evidences of the Soviet desire to
reorganization of the present provisional government in dominate adjacent countries and to disregard the wishes of her
consultation with other Polish democratic leaders. He said it had allies. He said he had felt that for some time the Russians had
been made plain to Mr. Molotov how seriously the United States considered that we would not object if they took over all of
Government regarded this matter and how much public Eastern Europe into their power. He said it was his profound
confidence would be shaken by our failure to carry out the
Crimean decision.
∗
ie, the creation of the United Nations.
conviction that if the Russians were to be rigid in their attitude we the dirty work. He said the difficulties with the Russians …
had better have a show down with them now than later. usually straightened out. He was inclined to agree with Mr.
Stimson that possibility of a break with Russia was very serious.
AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN … remarked that the real issue was
whether we were to be a party to a program of Soviet domination Mr. STIMSON observed that he agreed with General Marshall and
of Poland. He said obviously we were faced with a possibility of a that he felt that the Russians would not yield on the Polish
real break with the Russians but he felt that if properly handled it question. He said we must understand that outside the United
might be avoided. The President said that he had no intention of States with the exception of Great Britain there was no country
delivering an ultimatum to Mr. Molotov but merely to make clear that understood free elections; that the party in power always ran
the position of this Government. the election as he well knew from his experience in Nicaragua.
MR. STIMSON observed that he would like to know how far the AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN then remarked that while it was
Russian reaction to a strong position on Poland would go. He said true that the Soviet Union had kept its big agreements on military
he thought that the Russians perhaps were being more realistic matters that those were decisions which it had already reached by
than we were in regard to their own security. itself but that on other military matters it was impossible to say
they had lived up to their commitments. He said for example over
ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he had left Yalta with the impression
a year ago they had agreed to start on preparations for
that the Soviet Government had no intention of permitting a free
collaboration in the Far Eastern war but that none of these had
government to operate in Poland and that he would have been
been carried out. He asked General Deane to express his opinion.
surprised had the Soviet Government behaved any differently
than it had. In his opinion the Yalta agreement was susceptible to GENERAL DEANE said that he felt that the Soviet Union would
two interpretations. He added that he felt that it was a serious enter the Pacific war as soon as it was able irrespective of what
matter to break with the Russians but that we should tell them happened in other fields. He felt that the Russians must do this
that we stood for a free and independent Poland. because they could not afford too long a period of let down for
their people who were tired, there was only a short season in
THE SECRETARY OF STATE then read the part of the Yalta
which offensive action against Manchuria was possible and that
decision relating to the formation of the new Government and the
they would not dare attempt a Bulgarian gambit in the Far East.
holding of free elections and said he felt that this was susceptible
He said he was convinced after his experiences in Moscow that if
of only one interpretation.
we were afraid of the Russians we would get nowhere and he felt
GENERAL MARSHALL said he was not familiar with the Polish that we should be firm when we were right. …
issue and its political aspects. He said from the military point of
THE PRESIDENT then said that he was satisfied that from a
view the situation in Europe was secure but that they hoped for
military point of view there was no reason why we should fail to
Soviet participation in the war against Japan at a time when it
stand up to our understanding of the Crimean agreements.
would be useful to us. The Russians had it within their, power to
delay their entry into the Far Eastern war until we had done all
TRUMAN‐MOLOTOV MEETING, APRIL 23, 1945. 5:30 PM. parties and there had been no case where one or two of the three
Truman met again with Molotov that evening and pressed him had attempted to impose their will on another. He said this was
on the Polish question. In Truman’s later recollection of the the basis of cooperation and the only one acceptable to the Soviet
meeting, he said, “I explained to him [Molotov] in words of Government.
one syllable … that cooperation is not a one way street.” The President agreed and said that all we were asking was that
According to Truman, Molotov said, “I have never been talked
the Soviet Government carry out the Crimean decision on Poland.
to like that in my life,” to which Truman replied, “Carry out
your agreements and you won't be talked to like that.” Mr. Molotov said that … the Soviet Government was convinced
Walking out of the meeting, Truman recalls saying to an aide, that all difficulties could be overcome. He added that surely the
“I just gave him a straight one‐two to the jaw. Do you think I Polish question involving a neighboring country was of very great
did right?” Bohlen’s minutes of the meeting (below) do not interest to the Soviet Government.
specifically include either exchange.
The President replied with great firmness that an agreement had
After greeting Mr. Molotov, the President said that he had been
been reached on Poland and that it only remained for Marshal
sorry to learn that no progress had been made towards a solution
Stalin to carry it out in accordance with his word.
of the Polish question. Mr. Molotov said that he also regretted
that. The President then stated that the proposals contained in the Mr. Molotov replied that Marshal Stalin … had given his views on
joint message from himself and the Prime Minister were the agreement and he personally could not understand why if the
eminently fair and reasonable and that we go as far as we can to three Governments could reach an agreement on the question of
meet the desires of the Soviet Government … He emphasized that the composition of the Yugoslav Government the same formula
the United States Government could not agree to be a party to the could not be applied in the case of Poland.
formation of a Polish Government which was not representative The President replied sharply that an agreement had been reached
of all Polish democratic elements. … on Poland and that it only required carrying out by the Soviet
Mr. Molotov asked if he could make a few observations. Mr. Government. … The President repeated that as he had said last
Molotov said that he hoped he expressed the views of the Soviet night the United States Government was prepared to carry out
Government in stating that they wished to cooperate with the loyally all the agreements reached at the Crimea and he only
United States and Great Britain as before. The President said he asked that the Soviet Government do the same. The President said
agreed; otherwise, they would not be talking today. Mr. Molotov that he desired the friendship of the Soviet Government, but that
continued that he had been authorized to set forth the point of he felt it could only be on the basis of mutual observation of
view of the Soviet Government. The basis of collaboration had agreements and not on the basis of a one way street. In conclusion
been established and that although inevitable difficulties had he arose and handed to Mr. Molotov the press release which he
arisen, the three Governments had been able to find a common stated he intended to release to the press this evening. Mr.
language and that on this basis they had been settling these Molotov read the release and thanked the President for the
differences. He said the three Governments had dealt as equal information.
Winston Churchill, “Iron Curtain” Speech, 1946 between them—I cannot doubt that we shall achieve our common
purpose in the end. …
No longer Prime Minister, Churchill visited the United States in
early 1946. Concerned over Soviet behavior, he confided his A shadow has fallen upon the scenes so lately lighted by the
fears in President Truman. The two men decided that Churchill Allied victory. Nobody knows what Soviet Russia and its
should issue a major address to alert the world to the threat Communist international organization intends to do in the
of Soviet expansion. Churchill gave this address in Truman’s immediate future, or what are the limits, if any, to their expansive
home state of Missouri with Truman on the dais beside him. and proselytising tendencies. I have a strong admiration and
The United States stands at this time at the pinnacle of world regard for the valiant Russian people and for my wartime
power. It is a solemn moment for the American Democracy. For comrade, Marshal Stalin. There is deep sympathy and goodwill in
with primacy in power is also joined an awe inspiring Britain‐and I doubt not here also—towards the peoples of all the
accountability to the future. … Opportunity is here now, clear and Russias and a resolve to persevere through many differences and
shining for both our countries. To reject it or ignore it or fritter it rebuffs in establishing lasting friendships. We understand the
away will bring upon us all the long reproaches of the after‐time. Russian need to be secure on her western frontiers by the removal
It is necessary that constancy of mind, persistency of purpose, and of all possibility of German aggression. We welcome Russia to her
the grand simplicity of decision shall guide and rule the conduct rightful place among the leading nations of the world. We
of the English‐speaking peoples in peace as they did in war. We welcome her flag upon the seas. Above all, we welcome constant,
must, and I believe we shall, prove ourselves equal to this severe frequent and growing contacts between the Russian people and
requirement. … our own people on both sides of the Atlantic. It is my duty
A world organization has already been erected for the prime however … to place before you certain facts about the present
purpose of preventing war. The United Nations Organization, the position in Europe.
successor of the League of Nations, with the decisive addition of From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron
the United States and all that that means, is already at work. We curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all
must make sure that its work is fruitful, that it is a reality and not the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe.
a sham, that it is a force for action, and not merely a frothing of Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest
words, that it is a true temple of peace in which the shields of and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them
many nations can some day be hung up, and not merely a cockpit lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject in one
in a Tower of Babel. Before we cast away the solid assurances of form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high
national armaments for self‐preservation we must be certain that and, in many cases, increasing measure of control from Moscow.
our temple is built, not upon shifting sands or quagmires, but … The Russian‐dominated Polish Government has been
upon the rock. Anyone can see with his eyes open that our path encouraged to make enormous and wrongful inroads upon
will be difficult and also long, but if we persevere together as we Germany, and mass expulsions of millions of Germans on a scale
did in the two world wars—though not, alas, in the interval grievous and undreamed‐of are now taking place. The
Communist parties, which were very small in all these Eastern
States of Europe, have been raised to pre‐eminence and power far On the other hand I repulse the idea that a new war is
beyond their numbers and are seeking everywhere to obtain inevitable; still more that it is imminent. It is because I am sure
totalitarian control. Police governments are prevailing in nearly that our fortunes are still in our own hands and that we hold the
every case, and so far, except in Czechoslovakia, there is no true power to save the future, that I feel the duty to speak out now that
democracy. Turkey and Persia are both profoundly alarmed and I have the occasion and the opportunity to do so.
disturbed at the claims which are being made upon them and at I do not believe that Soviet Russia desires war. What they
the pressure being exerted by the Moscow Government. … desire is the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their
Whatever conclusions may be drawn from these facts—and power and doctrines. …
facts they are—this is certainly not the Liberated Europe we From what I have seen of our Russian friends and Allies
fought to build up. Nor is it one which contains the essentials of during the war, I am convinced that there is nothing they admire
permanent peace. … so much as strength, and there is nothing for which they have less
In front of the iron curtain which lies across Europe are other respect than for weakness, especially military weakness. For that
causes for anxiety. … In a great number of countries, far from the reason the old doctrine of a balance of power is unsound. We
Russian frontiers and throughout the world, Communist fifth cannot afford, if we can help it, to work on narrow margins,
columns are established and work in complete unity and absolute offering temptations to a trial of strength. If the Western
obedience to the directions they receive from the Communist Democracies stand together in strict adherence to the principles of
centre. Except in the British Commonwealth and in the United the United Nations Charter, their influence for furthering those
States, where Communism is in its infancy, the Communist principles will be immense and no one is likely to molest them. If,
parties or fifth columns constitute a growing challenge and peril however, they become divided or falter in their duty, and if these
to Christian civilization. These are somber facts for anyone to have all‐important years are allowed to slip away, then indeed
to recite on the morrow of a victory gained by so much splendid catastrophe may overwhelm us all.
comradeship in arms and in the cause of freedom and democracy; Last time I saw it all coming and cried aloud to my own
but we should be most unwise not to face them squarely while fellow‐countrymen and to the world, but no one paid any
time remains. attention. Up till the year 1933 or even 1935, Germany might have
The outlook is also anxious in the Far East and especially in been saved from the awful fate which has overtaken her and we
Manchuria. The Agreement which was made at Yalta, to which I might all have been spared the miseries Hitler let loose upon
was a party, was extremely favourable to Soviet Russia, but it was mankind. There never was a war in all history easier to prevent by
made at a time when no one could say that the German war might timely action than the one which has just desolated such great
not extend all through the summer and autumn of 1945 and when areas of the globe. It could have been prevented in my belief
the Japanese war was expected to last for a further 18 months without the firing of a single shot, and Germany might be
from the end of the German war. In this country you are all so powerful, prosperous and honoured today; but no one would
well‐informed about the Far East, and such devoted friends of listen and one by one we were all sucked into the awful whirlpool.
China, that I do not need to expatiate on the situation there. … We surely must not let that happen again.
Truman to Byrnes, 1946 When you went to Moscow you were faced with another
accomplished fact in Iran. Another outrage if ever I saw one.
In 1941, the British and Soviets jointly invaded Iran, which, Iran was our ally in the war. Iran was Russia’s ally in the war.
while officially neutral, was a major provider of oil to Nazi Iran agreed to the free passage of arms, ammunition and other
Germany. During the war, Iran became an important supplies running into millions of tons across her territory from the
transportation route for supplies and support from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea. Without these supplies, furnished
western Allies to the Soviet Union. At the Tehran Conference
by the United States, Russia would have been ignominiously
in 1943, the Allies promised to restore Iranian sovereignty
defeated. Yet now Russia stirs up rebellion and keeps troops on
after the war. British and American troops were withdrawn in
September 1945, but the Soviet troops did not leave. By the soil of her friend and ally, Iran.
March 1946, the Red Army had still not left. Truman wrote the There isn’t a doubt in my mind that Russia intends an
following letter to Secretary of State James Byrnes in January invasion of Turkey and the seizure of the Black Sea Straits to the
1946. Mediterranean. Unless Russia is faced with an iron fist and strong
language another war is in the making. Only one language do
My dear Jim, they understand: “How many divisions have you?”
… For the first time I read the Etheridge letter this morning. It I do not think we should play compromise any longer. We
is full of information on Rumania & Bulgaria and confirms our should refuse to recognize Rumania and Bulgaria until they
previous information on those two police states. I am not going to comply with our requirements; we should let our position on Iran
agree to the recognition of those governments unless they are be known in no uncertain terms and we should continue to insist
radically changed. on the internationalization of the Kiel Canal, the Rhine‐Danube
I think we ought to protest with all the vigor of which we are waterway and the Black Sea Straits and we should maintain
capable the Russian program in Iran. There is no justification for complete control of Japan and the Pacific. We should rehabilitate
it. It is a parallel to the program of Russia in Latvia, Estonia and China and create a strong central government there. We should do
Lithuania. It is also in line with the high handed and arbitrary the same for Korea.
manner in which Russia acted in Poland. Then we should insist on the return of our ships from Russia
At Potsdam we were faced with an accomplished fact and and force a settlement of the Lend‐Lease Debt of Russia.
were, by circumstances, almost forced to agree to Russian I’m tired of babying the Soviets.
occupation of Eastern Poland and the occupation of that part of
Germany east of the Oder River by Poland. It was a high handed
outrage.
At the time we were anxious for Russian entry into the
Japanese War. Of course we found later that we didn’t need
Russia there and the Russians have been a head ache to us ever
since.
George Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” 1947 capitalist. … The antagonism remains. It is postulated. And from
it flow many of the phenomena which we find disturbing in the
George Kennan was a foreign service officer in the U.S. State Kremlin’s conduct of foreign policy: the secretiveness, the lack of
Department and a highly regarded analyst of Russian affairs. In frankness, the duplicity, the wary suspiciousness, and the basic
1946, while serving at the American embassy in Moscow, he unfriendliness.
sent a lengthy telegram to Washington providing his analysis
These phenomena are there to stay, for the foreseeable future.
of Soviet behavior. He argued that the USSR could not be
There can be variations of degree and of emphasis. When there is
trusted or reasoned with, and must instead be treated with
firm resistance and strength. Kennan counseled a middle path something the Russians want from us, one or the other of these
between war and appeasement to which he gave the name features of their policy may be thrust temporarily into the
“containment.” The essence of Kennan’s telegram was later background; and when that happens there will always be
published in Foreign Affairs magazine under the title, “The Americans who will leap forward with gleeful announcements
Sources of Soviet Conduct.” The article was published that “the Russians have changed,” and some who will even try to
anonymously, signed by “X,” and became known as “The X take credit for having brought about such “changes.” But we
Article,” although Kennan’s identity was soon disclosed in the should not be misled by tactical maneuvers. These characteristics
New York Times. Together, the Long Telegram and X Article of Soviet policy, like the postulate from which they flow, are basic
offered the intellectual basis for American Cold War policy.
to the internal nature of Soviet power, and will be with us,
whether in the foreground or the background, until the internal
The political personality of Soviet power as we know it today
nature of Soviet power is changed.
is the product of ideology and circumstances …Tremendous
This means we are going to continue for long time to find the
emphasis has been placed on the original Communist thesis of a
Russians difficult to deal with. It does not mean that they should
basic antagonism between the capitalist and Socialist worlds. It is
be considered as embarked upon a do‐or‐die program to
clear, from many indications, that this emphasis is not founded in
overthrow our society by a given date. The theory of the
reality. … But there is ample evidence that the stress laid in
inevitability of the eventual fall of capitalism has the fortunate
Moscow on the menace confronting Soviet society from the world
connotation that there is no hurry about it. The forces of progress
outside its borders is founded not in the realities of foreign
can take their time in preparing the final coup de grâce. …
antagonism but in the necessity of explaining away the
These considerations make Soviet diplomacy at once easier
maintenance of dictatorial authority at home. …
and more difficult to deal with than the diplomacy of individual
Belief is maintained in the basic badness of capitalism, in the
aggressive leaders like Napoleon and Hitler. On the one hand it is
inevitability of its destruction, in the obligation of the proletariat
more sensitive to contrary force … and thus more rational in the
to assist in that destruction and to take power into its own hands.
logic and rhetoric of power. On the other hand it cannot be easily
[This] has profound implications for Russia’s conduct as a
defeated or discouraged by a single victory on the part of its
member of international society. It means that there can never be
opponents. And the patient persistence by which it is animated
on Moscow’s side a sincere assumption of a community of aims
means that it can be effectively countered not by sporadic acts
between the Soviet Union and powers which are regarded as
which represent the momentary whims of democratic opinion but up to its own best traditions and prove itself worthy of
only by intelligent long‐range policies on the part of Russia’s preservation as a great nation.
adversaries—policies no less steady in their purpose … than those Surely, there was never a fairer test of national quality than
of the Soviet Union itself. this. In the light of these circumstances, the thoughtful observer of
In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any Russian‐American relations will find no cause for complaint in the
United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of long‐ Kremlin’s challenge to American society. He will rather
term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian experience a certain gratitude to a Providence which, by
expansive tendencies. It is important to note, however, that such a providing the American people with this implacable challenge,
policy has nothing to do with outward histrionics: with threats or has made their entire security as a nation dependent on their
blustering or superfluous gestures of outward “toughness.” … It pulling themselves together and accepting the responsibilities of
is a sine qua non of successful dealing with Russia that the foreign moral and political leadership that history plainly intended them
government in question should remain at all times cool and to bear.
collected and that its demands on Russian policy should be put
forward in such a manner as to leave the way open for a
compliance not too detrimental to Russian prestige.
It would be an exaggeration to say that American behavior
unassisted and alone could exercise a power of life and death over
the Communist movement and bring about the early fall of Soviet
power in Russia. But the United States has it in its power to
increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must
operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of
moderation and circumspection than it has had to observe in
recent years, and in this way to promote tendencies which must
eventually find their outlet in either the breakup or the gradual
mellowing of Soviet power. For no mystical, Messianic
movement—and particularly not that of the Kremlin—can face
frustration indefinitely without eventually adjusting itself in one
way or another to the logic of that state of affairs.
Thus the decision will really fall in large measure in this
country itself. The issue of Soviet‐American relations is in essence
a test of the overall worth of the United States as a nation among
nations. To avoid destruction the United States need only measure
NSC‐68 (National Security Council Report), 1950 adequate to confront the Kremlin with greater strength could be
assembled. It is in this context that this Republic and its citizens in
By late 1949, it looked as if the United States might be losing the ascendancy of their strength stand in their deepest peril. The
the Cold War. That summer, the Soviets exploded their first issues that face us are momentous, involving the fulfillment or
atomic bomb, much earlier than Americans had expected. A destruction not only of this Republic but of civilization itself. …
few months later, Mao Zedong’s Communists gained control The Soviet Union is developing the military capacity to
of China. In April 1950, a group of U.S. officials drafted a top support its design for world domination. The Soviet Union
secret document known as NSC‐68. NSC‐68’s view of the
actually possesses armed forces far in excess of those necessary to
Soviet threat differed from that of George Kennan. For
defend its national territory. … This excessive strength, coupled
Kennan, the Soviet threat was principally political in nature.
He described a paranoid and defensive USSR, militarily weaker now with an atomic capability, provides the Soviet Union with
than the United States, but obsessed with defending itself great coercive power for use in time of peace in furtherance of its
against another invasion. NSC‐68 reversed this thinking: it said objectives and serves as a deterrent to the victims of its aggression
Moscow was stronger than Kennan thought and the threat it from taking any action in opposition to its tactics which would
posed was military and immediate. NSC‐68 urged that America risk war.
must rearm and stay armed to wage peace. It called for large Should a major war occur in 1950, the Soviet Union and its
expenditures and substantial sacrifices. Truman approved the satellites are considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be in a
document in principle later that year, following the outbreak sufficiently advanced state of preparation immediately to
of the Korean War.*
undertake and carry out the following campaigns:
a. To overrun Western Europe; to drive toward the oil‐
[T]he Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to hegemony, is
bearing areas of the Near and Middle East; and to consolidate
animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own, and seeks
Communist gains in the Far East;
to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world. Conflict
b. To launch air attacks against the British Isles and air and
has, therefore, become endemic and is waged, on the part of the
sea attacks against the lines of communications of the Western
Soviet Union, by violent or non‐violent methods in accordance
Powers in the Atlantic and the Pacific;
with the dictates of expediency. With the development of
c. To attack selected targets with atomic weapons, now
increasingly terrifying weapons of mass destruction, every
including the likelihood of such attacks against targets in Alaska,
individual faces the ever‐present possibility of annihilation should
Canada, and the United States. … It is estimated that, within the
the conflict enter the phase of total war.
next four years, the USSR will attain the capacity of seriously
On the one hand, the people of the world yearn for relief from
damaging vital centers of the United States. …
the anxiety arising from the risk of atomic war. On the other hand,
It is clear that a substantial and rapid building up of strength
any substantial further extension of the area under the domination
in the free world is necessary to check and to roll back the
of the Kremlin would raise the possibility that no coalition
Kremlinʹs drive for world domination. … A program for rapidly
*
Adapted from Edward Judge and John Langdon, eds., The Cold War: A building up strength and improving political and economic
History Through Documents (New York: Prentice Hall, 1999).
conditions will place heavy demands on our courage and
intelligence; it will be costly; it will be dangerous. But half‐ In summary, we must, by means of a rapid and sustained
measures will be more costly and more dangerous, for they will build‐up of the political, economic, and military strength of the
be inadequate to prevent and may actually invite war. Budgetary free world, and by means of an affirmative program intended to
considerations will need to be subordinated to the stark fact that wrest the initiative from the Soviet Union, confront it with
our very independence as a nation may be at stake. convincing evidence of the determination and ability of the free
A comprehensive and decisive program to win the peace and world to frustrate the Kremlin design of a world dominated by its
frustrate the Kremlin design should be so designed that it can be will. Such evidence is the only means short of war which
sustained for as long as necessary to achieve our national eventually may force the Kremlin to abandon its present course of
objectives. It would probably involve: action … The whole success of the proposed program hangs
ultimately on recognition by this Government, the American
1. The development of an adequate political and economic people, and all free peoples, that the Cold War is in fact a real war
framework for the achievement of our long‐range objectives. in which the survival of the free world is at stake.
2. A substantial increase in expenditures for military purposes …
3. A substantial increase in military assistance programs …
4. Some increase in economic assistance programs …
5. A concerted attack on the problem of the United States balance
of payments, along the lines already approved by the President.
6. Development of programs designed to build and maintain
confidence among other peoples in our strength and resolution,
and to wage overt psychological warfare calculated to encourage
mass defections from Soviet allegiance and to frustrate the
Kremlin design in other ways.
7. Intensification of … operations by covert means in the fields of
economic warfare and political and psychological warfare with a
view to fomenting and supporting unrest and revolt in selected
strategic satellite countries.
8. Development of internal security and civilian defense
programs.
9. Improvement and intensification of intelligence activities.
10. Reduction of federal expenditures for purposes other than
defense and foreign assistance.
11. Increased taxes.