DAMODARAM SANJIVAYYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY

VISAKHAPATNAM, A.P., INDIA

PROJECT TITLE: CASE ANALYSIS – CASES BY N.V. RAMANA J.

SUBJECT: INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

NAME OF THE FACULTY: MR.R BHARATH KUMAR

NAME OF THE STUDENT: P SAMHITH PADMANAYAKA

ROLL NO. : 2016084

SEMESTER: 6

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would sincerely like to put forward my heartfelt appreciation to our respected IOS Faculty Mr.
R BHARATH KUMAR for giving me a golden opportunity to take up this project on the cases
dealt by Justice N.V. Ramana. I have tried my best to collect information about the project in
various possible ways to depict clear picture about the given project topic.

DECLARATION CERTIFICATE:

I hear by declare the every single page in the project is done by researcher himself,there is no
mischief or anything as such, played in the progress and completion of the project .The project is
done in the guidance of the concerned faculty .

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 Abstract

ABSTRACT

TOPIC: N.V. RAMANA

N.V. Ramana, B.Sc., B.L., was born in an agricultural family on August 27, 1957 in Ponnavaram
Village, Krishna District. He enrolled as an Advocate on February 10, 1983. He has practiced in
the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Central and Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunals and
the Supreme Court of India in Civil, Criminal, Constitutional, Labour, Service and Election
matters. He has specialized in Constitutional, Criminal, Service and Inter-State River laws. He
has also functioned as Panel Counsel for various Government Organizations. He has functioned
as Additional Standing Counsel for Central Government and Standing Counsel for Railways in
the Central Administrative Tribunal at Hyderabad. He has also functioned as Additional
Advocate General of Andhra Pradesh. He was appointed as a permanent Judge of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court on June 27, 2000. He functioned as Acting Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh
High Court from March 10, 2013 to May 20, 2013. He had participated in several National and
International Conferences held in India and abroad and submitted papers on various topics of
legal importance. Elevated as the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court w.e.f. 02.09.2013. Elevated
as a Judge, Supreme Court of India w.e.f. 17.02.2014

Cases

 Criminal liability
1. Suresh Chandra Jana and Ors . vs . The State of West Bengal and Ors CRIMINAL
APPEAL NO. 32 OF 2008
2. J . V . Baharuni and Ors . vs . State of Gujarat and Ors . Criminal Appeal No. 2221 of
2014
3. Ashish Jain and Ors . vs . Makrand Singh and Ors . CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1980 OF
2008
4. State of Rajasthan vs . Madan Criminal Appeal No. 1333 of 2011
5. Sham Singh vs . The State of Haryana Criminal Appeal No. 544 of 2018
6. Kumar vs . State Criminal Appeal No. 409 of 2017

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7. Khurshid Ahmed vs . State of Jammu and Kashmir CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 872 OF
2015
8. Bhaskarrao and Ors . vs . State of Maharashtra CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 408 OF 2014
9. Burujukadi Laxmappa and Ors . vs . State of U . P . MANU/SC/1027/2015
10. Suresh and Ors . vs . State and Ors . MANU/SC/0842/2016
11. Ashok vs . State of Maharashtra CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2224 OF 2011
12. Menoka Malik and Ors . vs . The State of West Bengal and Ors
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1198 OF 2006
13. Yashwant and Ors . vs . The State of Maharashtra CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). 385-
386 OF 2008
14. Dev Kanya Tiwari vs . The State of Uttar Pradesh Criminal Appeal No. 720 of 2016
15. Vutukuru Lakshmaiah vs . State of Andhra Pradesh CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2047 OF
2008
 Benefit of Doubt
16. P . Rajagopal and Ors . vs . The State of Tamilnadu ( 29 . 03 . 2019 - SC )
17. Sachin Kumar Singhraha vs . State of Madhya Pradesh ( 12 . 03 . 2019 - SC )
18. Balaji vs . The State of Maharashtra ( 14 . 03 . 2019 - SC )
19. Narne Gopikrishna and Ors . vs . State of A . P . ( 03 . 08 . 2012 - APHC )
20. Ganpat Singh vs . The State of Madhya Pradesh ( 19 . 09 . 2017 - SC
21. State of Rajasthan vs . Madan ( 25 . 10 . 2018 - SC )

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY 6

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 6

BODY OF THE PROJECT

 Area of interest 7
 Case laws 7

OUTCOMES OF THE PROJECT 46

BIBLIOGRAPHY 46

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OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY: The objective of the study is to analyze the interpretation of
judgments dealt by the Supreme Court Judge N.V.Ramana.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY:

This project is purely Doctrinal and based on primary and secondary sources such as websites,
articles ,and internet sources. The referencing style followed in this project is OSCOLA ( The
Oxford University Standard for Citation of legal Authorities) format of citation .this research
process deals with theoretical and analyzing information that is collected .The research is purely
descriptive in its boundries of the topic.

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BODY OF THE PROJECT

 Area of interest

The Area of interest chosen by the researcher based on the judgments of the Supreme Court
Judge N.V. Ramana ARE CRIMINAL LAW AND BENEFIT OF DOUBT.

CASE LAWS

1. Suresh Chandra Jana and Ors.

vs.
The State of West Bengal and Ors.
 Hon'ble Judges/Coram: N.V. Ramana and Prafulla C. Pant, JJ.
 Appellants: Suresh Chandra Jana and Ors.
 Respondent: The State of West Bengal and Ors.
 Acts/Rules/Orders: Indian Evidence Act - Section 32, Indian Evidence Act - Section 157;
Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013; Indian Penal Code 1860, (IPC) - Section 302, Indian
Penal Code 1860, (IPC) - Section 307, Indian Penal Code 1860, (IPC) - Section 326, Indian
Penal Code 1860, (IPC) - Section 376; Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) - Section 164,
Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) - Section 215, Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) -
Section 313, Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) - Section 464; Indian Medical Council
(Professional conduct, etiquette and ethics) Regulations, 2002
 Facts: The Accused was alleged to have raped the deceased. The prosecution of the rape case
was pending at the time of the incident, when the Accused had thrown acid at the deceased
which caused severe burn injuries to the body of the deceased. The Trial Court after a full
fledged trial had convicted the Accused/Respondent under Section 302 of Code. Being
dissatisfied, the Accused approached the High Court on appeal in Death Reference. The High
Court while allowing appeal and dismissing the death reference, acquitted the Accused on
hyper technical grounds of delay and laches in the investigation and prosecution. Aggrieved
by the acquittal, complainant as well as the State had filed these appeals.
 Issues: the Accused approached the High Court on appeal in Death Ref. No. 4 of 2005 and
CRA No. 599 of 2005. The High Court while allowing appeal and dismissing the death
reference, acquitted the Accused on hyper technical grounds of delay and laches in the

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 investigation and prosecution. Aggrieved by the acquittal, complainant as well as the State
has filed these appeals.
 Reasoning: The High Court had failed to appreciate the fact that Sub Inspector had
specifically stated that he did make an attempt to record the dying declaration of the victim,
but the Medical Officer. The victim had specifically mentioned in her report about the motive
on the part of the Accused-Respondent, who had allegedly raped her. The prosecution story-
given in the First Information Report also gets corroboration from the statement of nephew of
the victim.The High Court had erred in holding Accused-Respondent not guilty. The charge
of offence punishable under Section 302 of Code was fully established on the record as
against Accused-Respondent as found by the Trial Court. So far as other Accused was
concerned, undoubtedly he had no motive to commit the crime, nor was it found that he was
having acid with him, as such, it could not be said that he had any common intention with
Accused-Respondent to cause burn injuries with acid on the victim. It is possible that he
might have accompanied Accused to pressurize the victim to withdraw the rape case against
him as he was witness in said case, As such, taking such fact into consideration by the High
Court to hold him not guilty beyond reasonable doubt, could not be said to be erroneous.
Acquittal of Accused-Respondent was set aside.
 Conclusion: Accordingly, the appeal is partly allowed, and acquittal of Accused-Respondent
Purnendu Kumar Patra by the High Court is set aside. The conviction of said Accused Under
Section 302 Indian Penal Code, recorded by the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track, 1st
Court, Contai, is affirmed. He is sentenced to imprisonment for life with fine of Rs. 10,000/-,
in default of payment of which he shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two
years.

2. J . V . Baharuni and Ors .

vs .
State of Gujarat and Ors . Criminal Appeal No. 2221 of 2014
 Hon'ble Judges/Coram: Ranjana Prakash Desai and N.V. Ramana, JJ.
 Appellants: J.V. Baharuni and Ors.
 Respondent: State of Gujarat and Ors.

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 Acts/Rules/Orders:
 Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Negotiable Instruments (Amendment and Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act, 2002; Evidence Act; Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) Indian Penal
Code (IPC) - Section 498A; Constitution of India - Article 21
 Facts: Appellant No. 2 is the owner of Appellant No. 1 Company. The Respondent No. 2,
who is in the business of manufacture, process and marketing of petroleum products, has a
'Company Owned Company Operated' retail outlet at Village Gadu, Maliya Hatina Taluq,
District Junagadh, Gujarat. Appellants entered into a contract with the Respondent No. 2
Corporation for performing various contractual jobs. As per the terms of the contract, the
Appellants were required to undertake the contracted jobs and to deposit the money out of
sale proceeds on a daily basis in the State Bank of India, Veraval Branch. The business
dealings between the parties were going on since 1996 and in terms of the contract
Appellants furnished to the Respondent No. 2, two Cheques bearing Nos. 884572 and
884574, dated 24th June, 2000 for Rs. 10 lakhs and Rs. 25 lakhs, respectively. When the
cheques were presented for realization, they bounced with the endorsement "not arranged
for". Hence, Respondent No. 2 initiated criminal proceedings Under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short 'the N.I. Act') against the Appellants and filed
Criminal Complaint.
 Issues: (a) Before the Trial Court it was argued on behalf of Respondent No. 2--Corporation
that the cheques in question were issued by the Appellants to discharge their part liability for
clearing the dues whereas the case of the Appellants was that there were no dues payable to
the Respondent Corporation and the Cheques were taken by the complainant. (b) Before the
Trial Court it was argued on behalf of Respondent No. 2--Corporation that the cheques in
question were issued by the Appellants to discharge their part liability for clearing the dues
whereas the case of the Appellants was that there were no dues payable to the Respondent
Corporation and the Cheques were taken by the complainant--Corporation as 'guarantee' and
misused the same.
 Reasoning: The court stated that without strong, cogent, unimpeachable evidence on record
that cases were tried 'summarily' but not as regular trial, the Court below gravely erred in
remanding them to the Trial Court for a de novo trial. It is worthwhile to mention that in one
of the present cases, the Trial Court took about six years to acquit the accused and then High

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 Court took about six and half years to remit the matter to the Trial Court on a technical
ground of mode of trial i.e. being summary trial. Special Leave Petition against the order of
High Court has been filed on 28th April, 2012. Thus, about 14 years have elapsed, without
definitive determinative conclusion of the case on merits. Thus, the whole purport of
expeditious trial under N.I. Act has been preposterously frustrated. Thus, the court decide
that while dealing with the matters under the N.I. Act should keep in mind that the difference
between summary and summons trial for the purpose of N.I. Act is very subtle but has grave
repercussions in case of mistaken identification of trial which is de novo trial in the light of
Section 326(3) of the Code.
 Conclusion: In the light of the discussion made above, we are of the considered opinion that
the High Court failed to appreciate the evidence on record in its true perspective.. Hence, in
our considered opinion, the matters are required to be remanded back to the High Court for
consideration on merits. We make it clear, that we have not expressed any opinion on the
merits of the cases. The High Court should, by conducting an independent inquiry and by
reasoned order, dispose of the cases on their own merits as expeditiously as possible,
preferably within a period of three months due to the fact that these cases are languishing for
almost 14 years. For the foregoing reasons, we allow the appeals, set aside the impugned
judgments passed by the High Court and remand the matters to the High Court for
consideration on merits.

3. Ashish Jain and Ors .

vs .
Makrand Singh and Ors . CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1980 OF 2008
 Hon'ble Judges/Coram: N.V. Ramana and Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, JJ.
 Appellants: Ashish Jain and Ors.
 Respondent: Makrand Singh and Ors.
 Acts/Rules/Orders: Arms Act - Section 25(1), Arms Act - Section 27; Evidence Act -
Section 27; Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 34, Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 302,
Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 394, Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 449; Code of
Criminal Procedure (CrPC) - Section 161, Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) - Section 162,

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 Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) - Section 163, Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) -
Section 164; Constitution of India - Article 20(3);
 Facts: Deceased Premchand Jain was in occupation of money lending, and pawning gold and
silver ornaments. Incident took place on intervening night where Accused persons, on pretext
of doing electrical repairs in house of deceased, entered house and committed said murder
and robbery. After committing offence, they locked house from outside and fled. Appellant
in Criminal Appeal was complainant Ashwash Jain (PW26), who was nephew of deceased
Premchand. After completing due procedure and upon investigation, Accused persons were
arrested next morning. Robbed gold and silver ornaments, cash, blood-stained clothes, and
certain electrical tools, i.e. a suja and a chisel, which were said to be weapons of offence,
were recovered from possession of three Accused persons at their instance. Key used to lock
house from outside after commission of crime was also recovered from a field at instance of
Accused No. 1. Robbed ornaments were said to be ornaments which were pledged by
different people as a part of business run by deceased. Naib Tehsildar, Executive Magistrate,
conducted identification of robbed ornaments by pledgers, who identified ornaments which
belong to them. Trial Court, upon framing charges and appreciating evidence, found Accused
persons guilty of said offences, and sentenced them to capital punishment. Reference for
death sentence and an appeal by Accused persons were filed before High Court. Both were
heard by a Division Bench; however, learned judges could not reach a consensus and had a
difference of opinion. One learned Judge was in favour of acquittal of Accused persons and
another learned Judge concurred with judgment of Trial Court. Hence, matter was heard by
learned Third Judge, and as his findings were in consonance with acquittal, upon a majority
of 2:1, High Court acquitted Accused persons from all charges levelled against them.
 Issues: The instant appeals arise from the judgments of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh,
Jabalpur, Gwalior Bench, in reference to the acquittal of the Accused Respondents Makrand
Singh, Raj Bahadur Singh and Shyam Sunder for the offences punishable Under Sections 302
read with 34, 394 read with 34 and 449 of the Indian Penal Code (in short "the IPC"), and
Sections 11 read with 13 of the Madhya Pradesh Dakaiti and Vyapharan Prabhavit Kshetra
Adhiniyam (in short "the MPDVPKA") and additionally Respondent Makrand Singh for
offences Under Section 25(1)(b)(a) read with Section 27 of the Arms Act and Sections 11

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 and 13 of the MPDVPKA for causing the death of three people, and for committing robbery
of Rs. 30,000/- in cash and about Rs. 8,00,000/- worth of gold and silver.
 Reasoning: A bare reading of these Rules makes it amply clear that a police officer is
permitted to take the photographs and measurements of the Accused. Fingerprints can be
taken under the directions of the police officer. As held by this Court in Sonvir (supra),
although Section 4 mentions that the police officer is competent to take measurements of the
Accused, but to dispel doubts as to its bona fides and to Rule out the fabrication of evidence,
it is eminently desirable that they were taken before or under the order of a Magistrate.
However, the aforesaid observations cannot be held to mean that this Court observed that
Under Section 4, police officers are not entitled to take fingerprints until the order is taken
from a Magistrate. If certain suspicious circumstances do arise from a particular case relating
to lifting of fingerprints, in order to dispel or ward off such suspicious circumstances, it
would be in the interest of justice to get orders from the Magistrate. Thus there cannot be any
hard and fast Rule that in every case, there should be a magisterial order for lifting the
fingerprints of the Accused. Thus, it cannot be held that the fingerprint evidence was illegally
obtained merely due to the absence of a magisterial order authorizing the same.At the same
time, we find that in the current facts and circumstances, the absence of a magisterial order
casts doubts on the credibility of the fingerprint evidence, especially with respect to the
packing and sealing of the tumblers on which the fingerprints were allegedly found, given
that the attesting witnesses were not independent witnesses, being the family members of the
deceased. Thus, we cannot Rule out the possibility of tampering and post-facto addition of
fingerprints, and concur with the High Court in discarding the fingerprint evidence.
 Conclusion: In light of the aforementioned discussion and reappraisal of evidence by this
Court, we do not find any glaring infirmity in the acquittal granted by the High Court. On the
other hand, we find it well-reasoned, and therefore accept the view of the High Court. The
Appellants have failed to establish that the High Court has erred in its conclusion. Unless any
blatant illegality or substantial error in the order of acquittal is proved by the Appellants, and
as long as the conclusion of acquittal is a possible view based on the circumstances and
material on record, this Court is not bound to interfere with the same. As a reasonable
suspicion or doubt persists in our minds regarding the guilt of the Accused based on the case
of the prosecution, the scales of criminal justice tilt in favour of acquittal of the Accused. In

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 such a scenario, the acquittal of the Accused persons is confirmed. At this juncture, we would
like to extend our appreciation to the learned Counsel and especially for the able assistance
of Mr. V.N. Sinha, Senior Counsel appointed as the Amicus Curiae. Therefore, Criminal
Appeal Nos. 1980-1981 of 2008 are dismissed, and the judgment and order of acquittal of the
High Court is maintained.
4. Sham Singh
vs .
The State of Haryana Criminal Appeal No. 544 of 2018
 Hon'ble Judges/Coram: N.V. Ramana and Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, JJ
 Appellants: Sham Singh
 Respondent: The State of Haryana
 Acts/Rules/Orders: Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 342, Indian Penal Code (IPC) -
Section 376(2), Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 506; Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) -
Section 313
 Facts: The Additional Sessions Court framed charges against both the Accused, for the
offences punishable under Sections 376(2)(g), 342 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, and
against the mother of the Accused, under Sections 342 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code. The
Additional Sessions Judge acquitted the Accused. Thereafter, the victim preferred an appeal
before the High Court, which came to be allowed, and set aside the judgment of acquittal
passed by the Trial Court. The High Court remitted the matter back to the Trial Court for
fresh consideration. The Trial Court on re-consideration of the materials on record, convicted
the Accused. On appeal, the High Court while confirming the judgment of conviction against
the Accused, had acquitted the Accused mother.
 Issues: The Additional Sessions Judge (Ad-hoc), Fast Track Court No. II, Faridabad, after
appreciating the materials on record, acquitted the Accused by its judgment and order dated
29.03.2003. Thereafter, the victim preferred an appeal before the High Court, which came to
be allowed, and set aside the judgment of acquittal passed by the Trial Court. The High Court
remitted the matter back to the Trial Court for fresh consideration. The Trial Court on re-
consideration of the materials on record, convicted the Accused by its judgment dated
4.6.2011. Against this conviction, the Accused preferred appeal before the High Court, and
the High Court while confirming the judgment of conviction against the Accused Jai Singh

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 and Sham Singh, has acquitted the Accused mother - Memwati from the charges levelled
against her. As mentioned supra, the Accused Jai Singh has served out the sentence imposed
upon him and hence this appeal is only by the Accused - Sham Singh, who is still serving the
remainder of his sentence.
 Reasoning: The three important witnesses, namely the milkman Mahavir, the doctor who
administered injection immediately after the alleged incident and Pappu in front of whose
house the victim was allegedly lying unconscious were not examined by the prosecution.
Non-examination of these crucial witnesses further weakens the case of the prosecution. The
fact that at the residential house of the Appellant, wherein all the inmates of the house
including the mother, children, sister and wife of the Accused were living, such a brutal
offence of rape could not have been executed without attracting the attention of anyone at
that point of time, would make the prosecution version seriously improbable. We are of the
view that the doubtful and suspicious nature of the evidence sought to be relied upon to
substantiate the circumstances in this case themselves suffer from serious infirmities and lack
of legal credibility to merit acceptance in the hands of the court of law. Having regard to the
material on record, we find that there is every possibility of false implication of the Accused
in this matter to take revenge against the family of the Accused because of the longstanding
disputes inter se between the two families. We cannot resist ourselves to place on record that
the prosecution has tried to rope in the Appellant merely on assumptions, surmises and
conjectures. The story of the prosecution is built on the materials placed on record, which
seems to be neither the truth, nor wholly the truth. The findings of the court below, though
concurrent, do not desire the merit of acceptance or approval in our hands with regard to the
glaring infirmities and illegalities vitiating them, and the patent errors apparent on the face of
record resulting in serious and grave miscarriage of justice to the Appellant.
 Conclusion: We find that the Trial Court and the High Court have convicted the Accused
merely on conjectures and surmises. The Courts have come to the conclusion based on
assumptions and not on legally acceptable evidence, but such assumptions were not well
founded, inasmuch as such assumptions are not corroborated by any reliable evidence.
Medical evidence does not support the case of the prosecution relating to offence of rape.
For the reasons aforementioned, the offence of rape does not stand proved. Accordingly, the
Appellant deserves to be acquitted, by allowing this appeal. The appeal is thus allowed, the

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 Appellant - Sham Singh is acquitted of the charges levelled against him. He shall be released
forthwith, if not required in any other case.

5. State of Rajasthan
vs .
Madan Criminal Appeal No. 1333 of 2011
 Appellants: State of Rajasthan
 Respondent: Madan
 Hon'ble Judges/Coram: N.V. Ramana and Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, JJ.
 Acts/Rules/Orders: Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 34, Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section
302, Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 460; Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) - Section
313
 Facts: A charge sheet was filed charging Accused persons for offence punishable under
Sections 302, 460 and 34 of IPC. Thereafter, Accused persons were put on trial as they did
not plead guilty to charges leveled against them. Trial Court vide order convicted Accused
for offences under Sections 302 and 460 of IPC. Accordingly, he was sentenced to undergo
imprisonment for life under Section 302 of IPC, with fine of Rs. 1000 and in default of
payment of fine, Accused was directed to undergo 2 months rigorous imprisonment. He was
also directed to undergo 10 years rigorous imprisonment for conviction under Section 460 of
IPC with a fine of Rs. 500 and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo one-month
rigorous imprisonment. On other hand, co-accused was acquitted by trial Court after being
given benefit of doubt for charges levelled against him under Sections 302 and 460 of IPC.
Aggrieved by the above order of conviction, Accused-Respondent preferred an appeal before
High Court. High Court allowed appeal and set aside order of conviction and sentence
awarded by learned Sessions Judge. Benefit of doubt was extended in favor of Accused and
he was acquitted from all charges. Aggrieved by impugned order passed by High Court, State
of Rajasthan had preferred present appeal.
 Issues: This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order dated
16.04.2010 passed by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur in D.B. Criminal

15
 Appeal No. 678 of 2004, whereby the High Court acquitted the Accused of the charges
Under Sections 302 and 460 of the Indian Penal Code, giving him the benefit of doubt.
 Reasoning: In the present case, the evidence relied by the prosecution is full of
contradictions. We cannot ignore the fact that although P.W. 4 (Kaptan), clearly admitted
that, their house is situated in a populated neighborhood, it is quite surprising that, when the
incident occurred on the terrace no one interfered or came to the place of occurrence until
morning. The prosecution has failed to provide any independent witness to bring home, the
guilt of the Accused. Further, the High Court also raised doubt while placing reliance upon
the scientific evidence as there existed contradictions in the seizure list of the clothes of
deceased and the forensic evidence on record, which was left unexplained by the Public
Prosecutor. Additionally, the prosecution has pressed that recovery was made subsequent to
the confession of the Accused. In this context, it is pertinent to note that, the alleged recovery
was made in the presence of P.W. 7 (Sukhbir Singh) who is the paternal cousin of the
deceased, who in his statement has stated that the lathi recovered had blood stains in it.
Surprisingly, this fact of lathi marked in blood stains is not only absent in the recovery memo
but also in the forensic report. These shortcomings imply a sketchy investigation hence,
bringing the reliability of the above evidences into question considering the facts and
circumstances of the present matter.Moreover, the High Court has correctly observed that,
the trial court totally overlooked the defense adduced by the Accused-Respondent, especially
when he has denied the allegations levelled against him, vitiating the fundamentals of justice.
In light of the above observations, it is correctly concluded that, there exists reasonable doubt
for believing the case laid down by the prosecution and the guilt of the Accused has not been
proved beyond doubt.
 Conclusion: It is the duty of the court to separate the grains from the chaff and to extract the
truth from the mass of evidence. In our opinion, the case of the prosecution is based on mere
conjectures and surmises. Moreover, the material contradictions inevitably raises a doubt as
to whether it was the Accused-Respondent, who had caused the death of the deceased-
Santosh. After examining the rationale behind the conclusion of the High Court in acquitting
the Accused-Respondent, we do not find any compelling reasons to deviate from the same. In
our opinion, there exists no perversity in the judgment of the High Court. Further, in the
absence of compelling reasons, this Court is not keen to entertain this appeal challenging the

16
 order of acquittal.. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. Pending applications, if any, shall
also stand disposed of.

6. Kumar
vs .
State Criminal Appeal No. 409 of 2017
 Appellants: KUMAR
 Respondent: STATE REPRESENTED BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE
 Bench: N.V. Ramana and S. Abdul Nazeer, JJ.
 Acts/Rules/Orders: Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 302, Indian Penal Code (IPC) -
Section 323, Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 324
 Facts: There was a scuffle between the Accused-Appellant and the Deceased while watching
a street play during a village festival. Afterwards the Appellant with an intention to draw out
the deceased started a quarrel with first prosecution witness. The Deceased intervened and
the Appellant hit him with a wooden log on his head. The Deceased succumbed to death due
to injuries. The matter was adjudicated wherein the Trial Court convicted the Appellant.
Aggrieved by an appeal was preferred. The High Court dismissed the appeal; hence the
present appeal was filed.
 Issues: i. That the contention of the defense concerning the statement of the PW-2 about
recording by the police, just after the incident is a flimsy contradiction, which does not have
the force to dislodge the entire case. ii. That PW-2's cross examination after re-calling the
witness, cannot be taken into consideration. iii. That failure to provide reasons for the injuries
sustained by the Accused, would not be sufficient to dislodge the prosecution's case. iv. That
the nature of weapon and the injury would not mandate reduction in the sentence from the
charge of murder to grievous injury.
 Reasoning:(1) The twentieth Prosecution Witness categorically stated that he was present
before the Ambulance had reached the place. Even though he was extensively cross-
examined, he had not budged from his position that there was no recording of any statement
before the Ambulance reached. On the contrary the second Prosecution Witness categorically
remarks that a statement was recorded by the twentieth Prosecution Witness before the

17
 ambulance arrived. Although the High Court had discredited the evidence of the second
Prosecution Witness as the part which provides the aforesaid details was on recalling after
few days, therefore, in light of possibility of being won over, the credibility of the statement
made by the second Prosecution Witness needs to be viewed with this background fact.
However, the present Court fail to understand internal logic of such assumption, when the
prosecution had not declared the witness as hostile and more so, when his narrative was
corroborated by other witnesses. Therefore, the second Prosecution Witness's evidence was
taken into fold.(ii) In the case on hand, admittedly, the Accused-Appellant was also injured
in the same occurrence and he too was admitted in the hospital. But, prosecution did not
produce his medical record, nor the Doctor was examined on the nature of injuries sustained
by the Accused. The Trial Court, instead of seeking proper explanation from the prosecution
for the injuries sustained by the Accused, appeared to have simply believed what prosecution
witnesses deposed in one sentence that the Accused had sustained simple injuries only. (iii)
The motive of the Accused to commit the crime was ascribed to the previous quarrel
occasioned between the Accused and the deceased during a drama at a village festival.
Generally, in case prosecution desires to place motive of the Accused as a circumstance, like
any other incriminating circumstance, it should also be fully established. The present Court
was alive to the fact that if the genesis of the motive of the occurrence is not proved, the
ocular testimony of the witnesses as to the occurrence could not be discarded only on the
ground of absence of motive, if otherwise the evidence was worthy of reliance. But in the
case on hand, the evidence of direct witnesses was not satisfactory and on the other hand, it
was demonstrated that the deceased hit the Accused on his head with the wooden log besides
the testimony from the eye witnesses that there was scuffle. In such a factual situation,
certainly motive might act as a double-edged sword.
 Conclusion: In the result, the appeal is allowed and the conviction and sentence awarded by
the Courts below is set aside. The Accused--Appellant stands acquitted from all the charges
levelled against him. The Appellant is stated to be in jail. He may be set at liberty forthwith,
if not required in any other case.

18
 7. Khurshid Ahmed
vs.
State of Jammu and Kashmir MANU/SC/0567/2018
 Appellants: Khurshid Ahmed
 Respondent: State of Jammu and Kashmir
 Hon'ble Judges/Coram: N.V. Ramana and S. Abdul Nazeer, JJ.
 Acts/Rules/Orders: Ranbir Penal Code - Section 302, Ranbir Penal Code - Section 307,
Ranbir Penal Code - Section 323, Ranbir Penal Code - Section 341; Code of Criminal
Procedure (CrPC) - Section 161.
 Facts: he deceased and his father were returning their home. The Appellant was coming from
opposite direction started hurling and abuses them. When the deceased and his father ignored
his abuses he attacked the deceased on his head from behind with an iron rod. An FIR report
was registered against the Appellant. The deceased was then taken to Hospital wherein he
succumbed to injuries. The Trial Court acquitted the Accused Appellant. On appeal, the High
Court reversed the order of acquittal and convicted the Appellant. Hence, present appeal was
filed.
 Issues: (1) Appellant has advanced his arguments strongly pointing out that in the entire case
there were several lapses on the part of prosecution which were ignored by the High Court,
while reversing the well considered judgment of the trial Court. (2) It was further contended
that despite there being no proof of strong motive for the Appellant to commit the offence,
nor there being any independent eyewitness to the incident, the fact that only one injury has
been suffered by the deceased. (3) The learned senior Counsel tried to impress upon this
Court that the evidence of PW9 i.e. father of the deceased, is not trustworthy and he is an
interested witness.
 Reasons: If the evidence of an eyewitness, though a close relative of the victim, inspires
confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration with minute material
particulars. The Courts must be cautious while considering the evidence of interested
witnesses. In his evidence, the description of the incident by the ninth prosecution witness
(father of deceased) clearly portrays the way in which the Accused attacked the deceased
causing fatal head injury as propounded by the prosecution. The testimony of the father of
deceased must be appreciated in the background of the entire case. (ii) The present Court was

19
 of the opinion that the testimony of ninth prosecution witness inspires confidence, and the
chain of events and the circumstantial evidence thereof completely supports his statements
which in turn strengthens the prosecution case with no manner of doubt. The present Court
had no hesitation to believe that ninth prosecution witness was a 'natural' witness to the
incident, reliable and wholly trustworthy. (iii) In the present case, there was manifest
irregularity in the appreciation of evidence by the Trial Court. The High Court based on
sound principles of criminal jurisprudence, interfered with the judgment of acquittal passed
by the Trial Court and convicted the Accused as the prosecution was successful in proving
the guilt of the Accused beyond reasonable doubt.
 Conclusion: In view of the foregoing discussion and a conspectus of all the material would
pave way to conclude that the prosecution has proved the case beyond reasonable doubt and
the appeal preferred by the Accused is bereft of any substance and accordingly dismissed.

8. Bhaskarrao and Ors .

vs
. State of Maharashtra CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 408 OF 2014
 Appellants: Bhaskarro and Ors.
 Respondent: State of Maharashtra
 Hon'ble Judges/Coram: N.V. Ramana and S. Abdul Nazeer, JJ.
 Acts/Rules/Orders:
 Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act - Section 2, Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act - Section - 3; Indian Penal Code
(IPC) - Section 147, Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 148, Indian Penal Code (IPC) -
Section 149, Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 302, Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 452,
Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 506
 Facts: These appeals arise out of the common judgment and order, dated 21st December,
2013, passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Bench at Nagpur, in Criminal
Appeal No. 290 of 1998 whereby the High Court reversed the order of acquittal passed by
the Additional Sessions Judge, Amravati in Sessions Trial No. 40 of 1995 and convicted all
the accused/Appellants herein except Accused No. 6 (since dead) for the offence punishable

20
 Under Sections 147, 148, 452 read with Section 149, Section 302 read with Section 149 and
Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The prosecution story in short is that, on 19th
June, 1995 at about 7 pm, in the village Jalka Shahapur an altercation had taken place
between two villagers namely Shamrao (deceased) and Balya (Accused No. 4) on the road
near a grocery shop over repayment of Rs. 50/-. It was alleged that Shamrao (deceased) had
slapped Balya (Accused No. 4) during the scuffle. After sometime, all the sixteen Accused
persons armed with weapons, while entering the house of Shamrao hurling abuses, dragged
him out of the house, assaulted on his hands and legs. They are alleged to have continuously
assaulted Shamrao while simultaneously dragging him to a field where they finally cut his
right palm and left the place. During the course of assault by the accused, Chanda (PW 1)
[wife of Shamrao followed them pleading not to hurt her husband and out of fear she took
shelter in some cattle shed. Later on she went to the house of one Harshawardhan Bhalekar
and informed him about the incident. Then Harshawardhan Bhalekar along with PW 1
proceeded to Amravati and informed about the occurrence to the family members of
Shamrao. After that they went to the office of Superintendent of Police, Amravati where they
were advised to lodge a complaint at Nandgaon Peth police station. Accordingly, a complaint
(Ext. 55) was lodged on 20th June, 1995 being crime case No. 72 of 1995.
 Issues: (1) It is the case of the Appellants-accused that the entire prosecution story has been
concocted to falsely implicate the innocent Appellants (2) there were several lapses in the
prosecution theory (3) There were also no bloodstains on any weapon alleged to have been
recovered by the investigating authorities at the instance of accused. All the prosecution
witnesses are inter-related and there was no independent witness to support the prosecution
case.
 Reasoning: A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she springs from
sources which are likely to be tainted and that usually means unless the witness has cause,
such as enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily, a close
relative would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person. It
is true, when feelings run high and there is personal cause for enmity, that here is a tendency
to drag in an innocent person against whom a witness has a grudge along with the guilty, but
foundation must be laid for such a criticism and the mere fact of relationship far from being a
foundation is often a sure guarantee of truth. However, we are not attempting any sweeping

21
 generalisation. Each case must be judged on its own facts. Our observations are only made to
combat what is so often put forward in cases before us as a general Rule of prudence. There
is no such general rule. Each case must be limited to and be governed by its own facts.
 Conclusion: Taking note of the foregoing shortcomings and discrepancies in the prosecution
case coupled with the improvements and contradictions in the statements of prosecution
witnesses, it cannot be said that the Accused persons had really firmed into an unlawful
assembly and carried out an assault on the deceased that too with a view to kill him, so as to
attract the provisions of criminal law. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it is
abundantly clear that the guilt of the Accused persons was not proved beyond reasonable
doubt. We are of the considered view that the trial Court had dealt with the case in a fool-
proof manner by drawing out 11 important circumstances and delivered a well reasoned
judgment thereby acquitting the accused, with which the High Court ought not to have
interfered. In our view, there are no compelling reasons and substantial grounds for the High
Court to interfere with the order of acquittal passed by the trial Court. Added to the above,
we are informed that the Accused have already undergone about three years' of imprisonment
before they were enlarged on bail. Keeping in view the substratum of the prosecution case
and the material available on record, we are of the considered opinion that the prosecution
has miserably failed to prove the guilt of Accused beyond reasonable doubt. In the
aforementioned circumstances, we allow these appeals, set aside the impugned order passed
by the High Court and restore the judgment and order passed by the trial Court in respect of
the Appellants before us. Resultantly, their bail bonds stand discharged. Pending
applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of.

9. Burujukadi Laxmappa and Ors .

vs .
State of U . P . MANU/SC/1027/2015
 Appellants: Burujukadi Laxmappa and Ors.
 Respondent: State of U.P.
 Hon'ble Judges/Coram: S.J. Mukhopadhaya and N.V. Ramana, JJ.

22
 Acts/Rules/Orders: Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 34, Indian Penal Code - Section 148,
Indian Penal Code - Section 149, Indian Penal Code - Section 302, Indian Penal Code -
Section 307, Indian Penal Code - Section 324
 Facts: On 27.5.2001 at about 10.30 A.M., while D-1, D-2, P. Ws. 1, 3, 5, 11, 12 and 13 were
loading manure in the tractor in the outskirts of Udmuligidda Village, A-1, A-2 and other
accused assaulted them. On seeing them, D-1 tried to run away. D-1 rushed into the house of
P.W. 2(declared hostile) and tried to hide himself there. The accused chased him and both A-
1 and A-2 forcibly opened the door and dragged D-1 out of the house and assaulted him
indiscriminately with sticks hitting on his hip and buttocks. A-9 assaulted him with an axe
blow on the back of his neck. Meanwhile, Lalappa (A-3) and Venkatappa (A-4) assaulted D-
2 by hitting him with sticks on his face and left temporal region and caused him bleeding
injuries. G. Narasimhulu (A-5) and G. Thippanna (A-6) assaulted D-1 by hitting with sticks
on his back side. A-4, A-15, A-16 and A-17 threw stones on the heads of D-1 and D-2. The
remaining accused A-7 and A-8 assaulted P.W. 1 by throwing stones on the left side of his
head. A-10 and A-11 assaulted Ashamma (P.W.5) by throwing stones. A-12 and A-13
assaulted Narsimhulu with stones and kicked him with legs. A-18 assaulted Bheemappa
(P.W. 13) by throwing stones on his head and other parts of body. Due to the injuries
sustained, D-1 died on the spot. While shifting D-2 and the other injured persons to
Narayanpet Hospital, D-2 died on the way, due to the injuries sustained. On the next day at
about 14.00 hours, P.W.I lodged an FIR Ex. P-1 before Damarigidda Police Station. On the
basis of Ex. P-1, P.W. 16 the then Head Constable registered the case as Crime No. 9/2001
and issued FIR covered under Ex. A-27. P.W. 17, the then Inspector of Police took up
investigation.
 Issues: the Appellants have challenged the impugned judgment mainly on the ground that
there is discrepancy between the statements made by witnesses and the medical evidence
 Reasons: All the eye-witnesses, P.W. 1, P.W. 3, P.W. 4, P.W. 5, P.W. 11, P.W. 12 and P.W.
13 made similar statements and deposed that A-1 and A-2 dragged D-1 in front of the house
of P.W. 2. Then A-1 and A-2 assaulted D-1 hitting him on his back and buttocks. A-9 gave
an axe blow on the back portion of the neck of D-1 and he fell down. Allegation against A-3
is that he and A-4 assaulted the father (D-2) of P.W. 11 on his face. There is no allegation
against any of the accused, A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4 or A-9 with respect to giving blow on the

23
 scalp of the right rib of D.1. P.W.1 and P.W. 2 stated that they have given sticks blow on the
back and buttocks of D-1. The prosecution has miserably failed to explain as to how the
scalp/skull of D-1 was fracturedAll structures of mouth, teeth, tongue and pharynx were
intact but right eye was completely damaged and on the right 6th rib fracture was detected
while the other ribs were intact. If the accused had given blow by stick on the back or
buttocks of D-1 or one of the accused has given axe blow on the back portion of the neck, it
cannot cause multiple fracture of skull with lacerated wound nor meninges will come out..
The prosecution has failed to explain as to who gave the blow on the scalp and skull of D-2
causing complete damage to brain and meninges. The cause of death is due to lacerated
wound on the scalp and skull due to which brain and meninges were completely damaged.
 Conclusion: We find that none of the prosecution witnesses could connect A-1, A-2, A-3, A-
4 and A-9 with any of the injuries caused to D-1 and D-2 to come to a definite conclusion
that the Appellants caused murder of D-1 or D-2. There being doubt with regard to the
veracity of the statements of eye- witnesses, P.W.1, P.W. 3, P.W. 4, P.W. 11, P.W. 12 and
P.W. 13, we are of the view that this is a fit case to give benefit of doubt in favour of the
Appellants. We, accordingly, set aside the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the
Trial Court as affirmed by the High Court by the impugned judgment dated 01.05.2009 in so
far as it relates to Appellants - Burujukadi Laxmappa (A-1), Burjukadi Malkappa (A-2),
Burjukadi Lalappa (A-3), Burjukadi Venkatappa (A-4) and Guttakindi Ramyulu (A-9). They
are acquitted of the offence Under Section 302 read with Section 34 Indian Penal Code and
be set at liberty forthwith if they are not required in any other crime.

10. Suresh and Ors .

vs .
State and Ors . MANU/SC/0842/2016
 Appellants: Suresh and Ors.
 Respondent: State and Ors.
 Hon'ble Judges/Coram: A.K. Sikri and N.V. Ramana, JJ.
 Acts/Rules/Orders: Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 114, Indian Penal Code (IPC) -
Section 120B, Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 147, Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section

24
 148, Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 149, Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 406, Indian
Penal Code (IPC) - Section 420, Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 506; Code of Criminal
Procedure (CrPC) - Section 313; Constitution of India - Article 136
 Facts: A practicing lawyer was murdered. According to the prosecution, this occurrence was
witnessed by brother of deceased/Complainant/Prosecution Witness (P.W.) 1. On the basis of
his statement, First Information Report (FIR) was recorded by the Investigating Officer
(IO)/P.W. 22. It was stated by him that his deceased brother was a subscriber in a private chit
run by Accused No. 1 (A-1) who was liable to pay a certain sum. Because of the non-
payment of remaining amount, the deceased had lodged a complaint against A-1. It was
further stated that pursuant to the said registration of crime at the instance of the deceased,
the Inspector of Police had inquired into the matter and questioned A-1 in the presence of his
son/Accused No. 2 (A-2) and his son-in-law/Accused No. 6 (A-6). All the six persons were
tried for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 114, 506(ii) and 120B read with Section 149
of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The Trial Court returned the findings to the effect that A-2,
A-3, A-4 and A-5 were persons who had committed the murder of the deceased. He, thus,
convicted them under the aforesaid provisions and gave life sentence. Insofar as A-1 and A-6
were concerned, they were acquitted by the Trial Court. All four convicted Accused persons,
i.e., A-2 to A-5 filed appeals against their conviction. While examining the prosecution case
qua the other Accused persons and analysing the evidence, the High Court found that A-1
was also guilty of murder along with A-2 to A-5. Thus, even while recording his guilt, the
appeal of the State and Revision Petition of P.W. 1 against him were treated as abated.
Insofar as A-6 was concerned, his acquittal was maintained by the High Court. As far as A-2
and A-3 were concerned, it appeared that they accepted the verdict of the High Court as there
was no challenge to their conviction by them. Insofar as acquittal of A-6 was concerned,
there was no further challenge either by the State or P.W. 1 and, therefore, this attained
finality. However, A-4 and A-5 challenged their conviction recorded by the Trial Court and
upheld by the High Court. Hence, the present appeal
 Issues: (1) there were number of material contradictions in the testimonies of P.W. 1 on the
one hand and P.W. 22/23 on the other hand and, therefore, the Courts below could not have
believed the version of these witnesses (2) Test Identification Parade (TIP) which was
conducted inasmuch as though A-4 was arrested on 07.10.2005 and A-5 surrendered on

25
 13.10.2005, their TIP was conducted 1 1/2 months thereafter, i.e., on 28.11.2005 and, in the
meantime, photographs of these two persons, i.e. A-4 and A-5, were not only published in the
newspapers but even flashed on television media. Therefore, their identity was revealed to
the world at large and the very purpose of conducting the TIP had been frustrated.
 Reasoning: Two Courts below recorded findings of facts holding that culpability of A-4 and
A-5 stands established. Normally, when on appreciation of evidence which is surfaced on
record finding of facts are recorded, this Court is not to interfere with the same unless it is
found to be perverse or where it is palpably wrong and the evidence on record did not
warrant such a conclusion. (ii) The testimonies of P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 on the one hand and
that of IO on the other hand contradicted each other on the aspect to the effect that P.W. 1
came to know about the names of the A-4 and A-5 later on and he had informed the IO about
the same at the time of inquest. But, it did not happen. Admittedly for next 6-7 days when
P.W. 22 was in-IO of the investigation, he neither questioned A-4 and A-5 nor arrested them.
In fact, for this period they were not in picture at all. Therefore, one may intend to believe the
testimony of IO, viz., the names were not disclosed to him by P.W. 1 or P.W. 2 and to this
extent, these two witnesses have not told the truth. (iii) No explanation worth the name was
coming forward. An attempt was made on behalf of the Respondents to argue that P.W. 3
who was also an eye witness had named A-4 and A-5 and thereupon, A-4 was arrested and
A-5 surrendered. (iv) The testimony of P.W. 3 was also shrouded by suspicion. He was stated
to be an auto-driver who, according to him, when was crossing the road, saw the occurrence.
It could not be pointed out as to at whose instance it became known that P.W. 3 was also an
eyewitnessTherefore, this possibility cannot be ruled out that at the instance of the family
members of the deceased, he agreed to give the statement. All these circumstances created a
reasonable doubt insofar as the presence and participation of A-4 and A-5 was concerned.
 Conclusion: All these circumstances create a reasonable doubt insofar as the presence and
participation of A-4 and A-5 is concerned. We, thus, are inclined to allow these appeals
giving benefit of doubt to A-4 and A-5. Accordingly, the appeals are allowed and the
conviction recorded in respect of A-4 and A-5 (Appellants herein) is, thus, set aside. These
two Appellants shall, thus, be released forthwith unless they are required in any other case.

26
 11. Ashok
vs .
State of Maharashtra CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2224 OF 2011
 Appellants: Ashok
 Respondent: State of Maharashtra
 Hon'ble Judges/Coram: Pinaki Chandra Ghose and N.V. Ramana, JJ.
 Acts/Rules/Orders: Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 106; Indian Penal Code 1860, (IPC) -
Section 201, Indian Penal Code 1860, (IPC) - Section 302, Indian Penal Code 1860, (IPC) -
Section 313, Indian Penal Code 1860, (IPC) - Section 498A
 Facts: The facts of the case are that Ashok, the Appellant herein was the husband of
Shubhangi, (deceased herein) and they had two daughters, Janhavi (5 1/2 years old) and
Namrata (3 1/2 years old), both deceased. The Accused-Appellant and Shubhangi were
married on 4th May, 2001 according to customs. The two were related to each other prior to
marriage as first cousins from the side of the Shubhangi's mother. At the time of their
engagement, the Accused-Appellant was pursuing D. Ed. Education and for completing the
said course, Rs. 50,000/- was given along with a 5 gm gold ring and one 15 gm gold chain. In
addition, Rs. 1 lakh was spent on the marriage arrangement. Thereafter, in 2004 Ashok
finished D. Ed. and got a job of 'shikshan sevak' at Arer Navargaon. Till now Shubhangi was
staying at her matrimonial home but after the Accused-Appellant got a job, they both started
staying at a rented house in Arer Navargaon. Admittedly, they had cordial relations for 6
years of marriage but they got strained after 6 years. It is alleged that once they shifted to
Arer Navargaon the parents of the Accused-Appellant used to visit them on festivals. On
their visits, it is alleged, the father of the Accused-Appellant and the Accused-Appellant used
to talk secretly and the Accused-Appellant would not sleep with Shubhangi. It is further
alleged that the father of the Accused-Appellant used to taunt that his son could have got a
better earning lady as his wife and also that Shubhangi had a squint in her one eye.
 Issues: (i) There is an unexplained delay of almost one month in filing the FIR. The dead
bodies of Namrata and Shubhangi were found on 29th and 30th August, 2008 respectively
while the FIR was filed on 27th September, 2008. (ii) The prosecution has not put forth any
story or any version of its own as to how was the murder of three persons committed by the

27
 accused. (iii) There is no question asked even in Section 313 statement of the accused as to
whether he killed the deceased persons.
 Reasoning: Keeping the above points in mind, we are of the opinion that in the present case
the prosecution has failed to discharge its initial burden itself. Therefore, the question of
burden of proof shifting to the accused to explain the happening of incidents does not arise.
First and foremost, the delay of one month in filing FIR at the very face of it makes the entire
case of the prosecution as concocted and an afterthought. There is no explanation as to why
did the parents of Shubhangi not make any complaint or FIR immediately after the recovery
of her dead body. It is surprising that nowhere in the case of the prosecution this delay has
been explained. Further, we find no merit in the Trial Court's reasoning in finding the facts
that accused asked his colleague to prepare dinner, filing missing report on the next morning
and leaving the family at HP Gas Agency as incriminating pieces of evidence. The accused
could have asked his friend and colleague to prepare dinner in normal course as he would
have got late in returning from Wadsa. Further, it was but natural for the accused to search
and try to find out his family even before he would go to the police. We do not find it was
unnatural to have registered a missing report the very next morning. Also, leaving wife and
two daughters at HP Gas Agency is not so unusual and would depend from person to person.
With respect to previous incidents, all that is proved is demand of dowry by the in-laws and
the Accused-Appellant. The allegation that husband would not sleep with the deceased wife
when his parents would visit, is the only allegation against the Accused-Appellant.
 Conclusion: From the above discussion, we conclude that the prosecution has not brought
any clinching evidence in support of last seen together theory so as to shift the burden of
proof on the Accused-Appellant. In light of this, the prosecution has evidently failed to prove
the guilt of the Accused-Appellant beyond doubt. Therefore, the appeal is allowed and the
judgment and order passed by the High Court as also by the Trial Court are set aside. The
Appellant is directed to be released forthwith if not required in connection with any other
case. The Appellant is directed to be released forthwith if not required in connection with any
other case in terms of the signed reportable judgment.

28
 12. Menoka Malik and Ors .
vs .
The State of West Bengal and Ors CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1198 OF 2006
 Appellant: MENOKA MALIK & ORS.
 Respondent: STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS.
 Hon'ble Judges/Coram: N.V. Ramana and Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, JJ.
 Acts/Rules/Orders:
 Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 147, Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 148, Indian Penal
Code (IPC) - Section 149, Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 302, Indian Penal Code (IPC) -
Section 307, Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 325, Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 326,
Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 342, Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 379, Indian Penal
Code (IPC) - Section 436, Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 448; Code of Criminal
Procedure (CrPC) - Section 401, Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) - Section 401(3);
Constitution of India - Article 136, Constitution of India - Article 142
 Facts: The first information came to be lodged by Appellant No. for the offences punishable
under Sections 147, 148, 149, 342, 448, 325, 326, 436, 379, 307 and 302 of the Indian Penal
Code. Charges were framed for the mentioned offences. Accused persons were tried and
witnesses were examined by the prosecution. The Trial Court after full fledged trial acquitted
accused persons. The High Court, on appeal confirmed judgment of acquittal passed by Trial
Court.
 Issues: (1) the preliminary question that arose during the course of arguments regarding the
scope of interference by this Court with a judgment of the High Court in exercise of its
revisional power, affirming a conviction. (2) The trial Court, while coming to its conclusion,
has observed that several eye witnesses had revealed the material facts before the trial Court
for the first time, inasmuch as such statements of the witnesses before the Court are material
improvements; such statements were not made by the witnesses during the course of
investigation before the police officials and omissions are proved as per law.
 Reasoning: (i) The non-consideration of vital issues by the High Court, without which a
question before the Court could not have been satisfactorily determined, had led to injustice
of a serious and substantial character, warranting interference of this Court and remand of the
matter to the High Court for rehearing. The High Court had failed to consider whether the

29
 trial Court brushed aside material evidence related to the issue of murder, attempt to murder
and grievous hurt, and entirely overlooked material evidence on vital issues such as house
burning, grievous hurt and unlawful assembly. (ii) It was clear that where the material
evidence has been overlooked either by the trial Court or by the appellate Court or the order
was passed by considering irrelevant evidence, the revisional jurisdiction could be exercised
by the High Court. In the matter on hand, material evidence has been overlooked by the Trial
Court and the High Court was incorrect in observing that the witnesses had deposed for the
first time before the court. The contradictions and improvements were minor in nature, e.g.
mainly with regard to weapons used. Curiously, the Courts had observed that the injuries
must have been suffered in a stampede. There was no reason as to why only one group of
people would sustain injuries in the alleged stampede, if any. Thus, the theory of stampede
also prima facie may not be available to the Defendant having regard to the evidence on
record. Moreover, the material evidence regarding the charges other than murder had also
been ignored. (iii) Thus, the High Court had failed to consider whether the Trial Court
discarded material evidence in the form of eye-witness testimony on the issues of murder,
attempt to murder and grievous hurt and completely overlooked evidence on other charges
such as unlawful assembly and house-burning. Consequently, the High Court had not given
due consideration to the evidence on record to arrive at a reasoned conclusion and had thus
failed to exercise its revisional jurisdiction in accordance with established principles. It
would be appropriate for the High Court to undertake proper consideration of the material of
the matter once again with due application of the judicial mind to find out as to whether the
trial Court's order has caused gross miscarriage of justice, manifest illegality or perversity.
 Conclusion: Thus, the High Court has failed to consider whether the Trial Court discarded
material evidence in the form of eye-witness testimony on the issues of murder, attempt to
murder and grievous hurt and completely overlooked evidence on other charges such as
unlawful assembly and house-burning. Consequently, we find that the High Court has not
given due consideration to the evidence on record to arrive at a reasoned conclusion and has
thus failed to exercise its revisional jurisdiction in accordance with established
principlesWith these observations, the appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment and order
of the High Court is set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court to decide the
revision petition on merits, in accordance with law.

30
 13. Yashwant and Ors .
vs .
The State of Maharashtra CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). 385386 OF 2008
 Appellants: Yashwant and Ors.
 Respondent: The State of Maharashtra
 Acts/Rules/Orders: Evidence Act - Section 114B; Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 34,
Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 76, Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 299, Indian Penal
Code (IPC) - Section 302, Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 304, Indian Penal Code (IPC) -
Section 323, Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 330, Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 342,
Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 354, Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 355, Indian Penal
Code (IPC) - Section 420
 Facts: The accused persons were tried for offence of murder under Section 302, 330,354,355
and 342 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860. After full fledged trial, the Trial
Court acquitted Accused No. 1 to 10 for offence of murder under Section 302, however
convicted them for offence punishable under Sections 330,354,355 and 342 read with Section
34 of Code. On appeal, the High Court, acquitted Accused No. 1 to 9 of offences punishable
under Sections 354, 355, 342 read with 34 of Code, however, upheld conviction under
Section 330 of Code. Moreover, Accused No.10 was acquitted of all offences.
 Issues: a. That the concurrent opinion of the court below, w.r.t. non applicability of Section
302 of Indian Penal Code, need not be disturbed. (b). The defence of superior orders were
applicable for the other Accused subordinate officers. (c). That in any case the charge Under
Section 330 of Indian Penal Code could have been attracted in this case. (d). In alternative,
he pleads that only Section 323 of Indian Penal Code may be maintainable which would
suffice a punishment of the period already undergone. (e). In any case they plead that
acquittal of Accused A-10 should not be interfered with.
 Reasoning: (i) The various circumstances which disassociate the cause of death to the actions
of the Appellant officers are available. It was on record that the injuries noted in the post-
mortem report clearly indicate that the nature of these injuries were not grievous. The head
injury noted did not show any internal fracture to the skull bone. Therefore, when, on facts, it
is concurrently inferred by the courts below that the cause of death was due to asphyxiation,
no reasons for accepting a different factual inference herein, as the same was not perverse.

31
 (ii) The causal link between the injuries caused to the deceased by the erring officers and the
death was not connected, therefore, Section 299 of Indian Penal Code was not attracted.
Accordingly, there was no question of attracting Section 302 or 304 of Indian Penal Code.
(iii) With regard to acquittal of Accused No.10, it was not uncommon that in some cases
witnesses in the jealousness to see all the Accused get conviction, may stretch the facts or
twist them. In those instances, it is necessary for the Courts to be cautious enough to not rush
to convict rather uphold justice. It was clear from the statements of all the Accused as well as
the evidence of prosecution witnesses that there exists a reasonable doubt as to the presence
of Accused No,10, during the patrolling party and thereafter. Therefore, not inclined to
disturb the findings of the High Court on this aspect as well. (iv) With regard to punishment
under Section 330 of Indian Penal Code, there was no material on record to interfere with the
conviction of the Accused under the aforesaid Section, except for the quantum of
punishment.
 Conclusion: In light of the afore-said discussion, we partly allow the Criminal Appeal Nos.
182-187 of 2009 in the afore-stated terms. Further Criminal Appeal Nos. 385-386 of 2008,
Criminal Appeal Nos. 387-388 of 2008, Criminal Appeal No. 299 of 2008 stand dismissed.
The Appellants-Accused are directed to surrender before the authorities for serving out the
rest of the sentence forthwith.

14. Dev Kanya Tiwari

vs .
The State of Uttar Pradesh Criminal Appeal No. 720 of 2016
 Appellants: Dev Kanya Tiwari
 Respondent: The State of Uttar Pradesh
 Hon'ble Judges/Coram: N.V. Ramana and S. Abdul Nazeer, JJ.
 Acts/Rules/Orders: Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 34, Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section
302; Constitution of India - Article 136
 Facts: The Complainant alleged that his brother (deceased herein) went to his in-laws house
to see the well being of his children, and to his belief his brother was killed by his wife and
in-laws. The wife of the deceased has also given a complaint to the police. The body of the

32
 deceased was sent for postmortem wherein the doctor opined that the cause of death was
asphyxia due to strangulation of throat. The charge sheet was filed against the Accused-
Appellant. The Trial Court convicted the Appellant. On appeal the High Court affirmed the
order of the Trial Court. Aggrieved by, present appeal was filed.
 Issues: (1) the order of conviction and sentence awarded by the Courts below suffers from
severe infirmities (2) the panchanama report was prepared in the presence of PW5 and there
was no mention in the panchanama of any ligature mark or injuries on the body.
 Reasoning: (i) A complaint was also lodged by the other Accused wife of deceased (died
during the pendency of trial) prior to the complaint lodged by Complainant. As per that
complaint, on the previous day, after having food the deceased went out for stroll and came
back with unsteady walking, wobbling and falling. When he was taken to the doctor, the
deceased informed the doctor (Hiralal) about consuming tablets of sulfas as he did not want
to live anymore and requested the doctor (Hiralal) not to make any attempt to save his life.
While they were shifting him to another hospital, he had expired on the way. (ii) In the above
backdrop of the case, primarily when there existed a complaint lodged by the wife of
deceased pointing out that the deceased committed suicide by consuming poison, generally it
was expected that the doctor (Fifth Prosecution Witness) will preserve viscera for chemical
analysis. On this point, prosecution had failed in its duty as no steps were taken to preserve
viscera. Merely a statement by doctor (Fifth Prosecution Witness) that viscera was not
preserved as there was no presence of poison would not be suffice in the peculiar
circumstances of this case, particularly when the independent panch witnesses together as
well as the Investigating Officer recorded their view that it was a case of poisoning. (iii)
Medical evidence in the form of postmortem report though supports the case of prosecution;
non-preservation of viscera by the doctor (Fifth Prosecution Witness) remains fatal to the
prosecution case. The present Court noted that nowhere in his evidence, fifth prosecution
witness mentioned about noticing ligature mark on the neck of the deceased, nor he agitated
the cause of death during panchanama. The fact remains that on certain aspects, the Trial
Court also disbelieved the version of fifth prosecution witness. The present Court was of the
opinion, the prosecution miserably failed to establish the chain of events, which points out at
the guilt of the accused, and the Courts below gravely erred in not considering the case in
accordance with the settled principles of law.

33
 Conclusion: In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal succeeds. The Appellant be
released from custody forthwith, if not required in any other case. The appeal stands allowed
accordingly. Pending applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of.

15. Vutukuru Lakshmaiah

vs .
State of Andhra Pradesh CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2047 OF 2008
 Appellants: Vutukuru Lakshmaiah
 Respondent: State of Andhra Pradesh
 Hon'ble Judges/Coram: Dipak Misra and N.V. Ramana, JJ.
 Acts/Rules/Orders: Evidence Act - Section 11; Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 34, Indian
Penal Code (IPC) - Section 114, Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 147, Indian Penal Code
(IPC) - Section 148, Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 149, Indian Penal Code (IPC) -
Section 302, Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 304, Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 307,
Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 324, Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 535, Indian Penal
Code (IPC) - Section 537; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 215, Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 464
 Facts: the prosecution case is that the deceased, Patrangi Ramanaiah, was a supporter of the
Telugu Desam Party, while accused Vutukuru Lakshmaiah, A-1, was the Councilor for Ward
No. 16 of Nellore Municipality and belonged to the Congress Party. One Patrangi Velongini
Raja of Telugu Desam Party was allegedly murdered by accused, A-1, and his brother and in
the said prosecution the deceased and PW-1 were witnesses. On 14.05.1996 about 9.30 p.m.,
Pamula Ramanaiah, PW-1, and the deceased were travelling on their scooter towards
Akuthota Harijanawada, and when they reached a sweet meat shop, Meriga Yedukondalu, A-
4, and Utukuru Seenaiah, A-6 (since deceased) attacked them as a result of which, PW1, who
was driving the scooter lost control of the scooter and both of them fell down. As the
prosecution story proceeds, Vutukuru Lakshmaiah, A-1, Rayapu Srinivasulu, A-2, Rayapu
Sivaiah, A-3, Meriga Ramaiah, A-5, and Meriga Penchlaiah, A-7, stabbed the deceased
multiple times with knives, while A-4 and A-6 beat him with iron rods. A-2 then tried to stab

34
 PW-1 but missed. Thereafter A-3 stabbed PW-1 with a knife on his left arm, but he managed
to escape and hid in the PWD office situated nearby.
 Issues: (1) the evidence adduced by the prosecution witnesses should have been discarded
inasmuch as their testimony is replete with contradictions and as the occurrence (2) It is also
urged by him that the Appellants could not have been convicted in aid of Section 149 Indian
Penal Code as the charge framed against them was simplicitor Section 302 Indian Penal
Code;
 Reasoning: Sections 34, 114 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code provide for criminal liability
viewed from different angles as regards actual participants, accessories and men actuated by
a common object or a common intention; and the charge is a rolled-up one involving the
direct liability and the constructive liability without specifying who are directly liable and
who are sought to be made constructively liable. In such a situation, the absence of a charge
under one or other of the various heads of criminal liability for the offence cannot be said to
be fatal by itself, and before a conviction for the substantive offence, without a charge can be
set aside, prejudice will have to be made out. In most of the cases of this kind, evidence is
normally given from the outset as to who was primarily responsible for the act which brought
about the offence and such evidence is of course relevant.
 Conclusion: It is because one of the relevant factors to gather the intention is the nature of
injury inflicted on the deceased. In the instant case, considering the nature of injuries and the
previous animosity, we are of the considered opinion that it is not a fit case where the offence
Under Section 302 Indian Penal Code should be converted to Section 304 Part I Indian Penal
Code. Consequently, we do not perceive any merit in these appeals and accordingly, the
same stand dismissed.

16. P. Rajagopal and Ors.

vs.
The State of Tamilnadu MANU/0469/2019
 Appellants: P. Rajagopal and Ors.
 Respondent: The State of Tamilnadu
 Hon'ble Judges/Coram: N.V. Ramana, Mohan M. Shantanagoudar and Indira Banerjee, JJ.

35
 Acts/Rules/Orders: Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 109, Indian Penal Code (IPC) -
Section 323, Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 352, Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 364,
Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 365, Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 366, Indian Penal
Code (IPC) - Section 506
 Facts: Accused No. 1, the proprietor of a chain of hotels (Saravana Bhavan) allegedly had the
illegal intention of taking PW1 Jeevajothi, (aged about 21 years at the time of commission of
the offence) as his third wife, even though his second wife was still alive and Jeevajothi was
married. The family of PW1 had been acquainted with Accused No. 1 since 1994, and he had
even given a managerial job to the father of PW1 in one of his hotels. PW2 is the mother of
PW1. Their family hailed from Thethakudi village near Vedaranyam, and had come to
Chennai and settled there after selling all their properties at Thethakudi and clearing all
debts. They had come to Chennai with about Rs. 4.5 Lakhs, which they deposited with
Accused No. 1, who gave them an interest of Rs. 6,000-7,000/- per month on the same. PW1
(Jeevajothi), a Hindu, fell in love and married Prince Santhakumar, who was a Christian,
much to the disapprobation of the family of PW1. Even after the marriage of PW1 with
Santhakumar, Accused No. 1 displayed a munificent attitude towards PW1 and her parents,
liberally presenting expensive birthday gifts to PW1, paying her hospital bills, etc. He also
helped them monetarily and logistically in setting up their travel agency in Chennai. He even
used to interfere in the personal affairs of PW1 and used to tell her false stories about her
husband Santhakumar, and advised her to abstain from sexual relations with Santhakumar.
However, PW1 did not pay any heed to Accused No. 1 and continued to live happily with her
husband. Moreover, she did not have any love or affection towards Accused No. 1. On
28.09.2001, Accused No. 1 came to the house of PW1 and Santhakumar along with PW1's
parents and started shouting at PW1 for not listening to him. Accused No. 1 gave an
ultimatum of two days to Santhakumar to sever all his relationships with PW1. However, the
relationship between PW1 and her husband remained unaffected. Even so, being agitated by
the attitude of Accused No. 1, PW1 and her husband decided to move to a place unknown to
Accused No. 1.
 Issues: (1) learned senior Counsel for the Appellants submitted that the drivers of the two
vehicles involved in the incident of abduction (i.e. M.O. Nos. 1 and 2) were acquitted by the
Trial Court, as was Accused No. 14 Chandrasekaran, in whose house PW1 and her husband

36
 Santhakumar were kept confined after abduction, and hence the High Court was not justified
in affirming the conviction of the other accused (2) He further argued that there was an
enormous delay in the lodging of the F.I.R. by PW1, inasmuch as the alleged incident had
taken place on 01.10.2001 and the complaint came to be lodged only on 12.10.2001, and that
the F.I.R. was only registered on 09.11.2001, which delay was not explained by the
prosecution either. (3) he stated that the explanation regarding the delay in filing the FIR that
PW1's house was being watched by Accused Nos. 2 to 9 may not be accepted in view of the
fact that she or her husband could have called the police using a phone, which was
admittedly in their possession.
 Reasoning : In order to prove its case, the prosecution mainly relied upon the evidence of
PW1 and PW2. By the time the evidence could be recorded for the matter on hand,
Santhakumar, the husband of PW1, was murdered. Therefore, the prosecution did not have
the opportunity to adduce his evidence and consequently we do not have the benefit of the
same. However, ample material has been brought on record to prove that the first Accused
used to unduly favour PW1 and her family, and showed unwanted personal attention to PW1.
Accused No. 1 tried to taint Santhakumar's image in the eyes of PW1, and also used to
threaten Santhakumar with dire consequences if he did not keep away from PW1. The
evidence of PW5, who is the brother of the second wife of Accused No. 1, reveals that
Accused No. 1 had taken one Kruthiga (sister of PW5) as his second wife using the same
measures and tactics that he was using against PW1. The courts have mainly relied on the
evidence of PW1 and PW2 to conclude that Accused Nos. 2 to 9 had abducted Santhakumar
and PW1 upon the instructions of Accused No. 1. Though the Trial Court and the High Court
have taken pains to assess the material on record meticulously, in order to satisfy our
conscience, we have re-evaluated the evidence of these two important witnesses in entirety.
To prove the crime, as mentioned supra, the most important testimony would be that of PW1,
as she was also abducted along with Santhakumar and was confined in the house of Accused
No. 14 by the accused. At the risk of repetition, we would like to reiterate a few important
circumstances as deposed by PW1. PW1 has deposed in detail about how Accused No. 1
hoped to marry her and unduly favoured her and her family. For instance, she deposed that
when she was admitted in a hospital due to some illness, Accused No. 1 forcibly made her

37
 shift to another hospital under the pretext of better treatment, and even gave her a mobile
phone to contact him in case she needed anything.
 Conclusion:T he Trial Court and the High Court may have acquitted the drivers and Accused
No. 14 by giving them the benefit of doubt, but this cannot be made the sole basis to doubt
the case of the prosecution in all other respects. We find that the entire evidence has been
considered in its proper perspective to rightly conclude that the Appellants had in fact
abducted PW1 and Santhakumar. In light of the aforementioned discussion and perusal of the
material on record, we do not deem it a fit case for setting aside the judgments of the Courts
below. The conviction and sentence as granted is hereby confirmed, and the appeals are thus
dismissed.

17. Sachin Kumar Singhraha

vs.
State of Madhya Pradesh Criminal Appeal Nos. 473-474 of 2019
 Appellants: Sachin Kumar Singhraha
 Respondent: State of Madhya Pradesh
 Hon'ble Judges/Coram: N.V. Ramana, Mohan M. Shantanagoudar and Indira Banerjee, JJ.
 Acts/Rules/Orders: Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 - Section 5,
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 - Section 6; Evidence Act - Section
27; Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 201, Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 302, Indian
Penal Code (IPC) - Section 363, Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 376A; Code of Criminal
Procedure (CrPC) - Section 161, Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) - Section 313
 Facts: The case of the prosecution in brief is that on 23.02.2015, PW4 (the elder brother of
the victim's father) came over from his village to drop the victim child to school in a vehicle
bearing Registration No. MP 19 T 2374, owned and driven by the Accused/Appellant. PW4,
on the assurance of the Accused/Appellant that he would go along with the victim child to
her school, as he had to pay his own daughter's fees, alighted from the vehicle near the Sabzi
Mandi. The child went along with the Accused/Appellant towards her school in the vehicle,
but did not return home that day. Despite a frantic search by her parents, relatives and the
villagers, the victim child could not be traced. The father of the deceased suspected that the

38
 Accused/Appellant had left his daughter somewhere else, however, the first information
report (Ext. P1) came to be lodged against an unknown offender and the Accused/Appellant
was apprehended after two days. After the trial, as mentioned supra, the Accused/Appellant
was convicted by the Trial Court and the order of conviction was confirmed by the High
Court.
 Issues: There cannot be any dispute as to the well settled proposition that the circumstances
from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn must or "should be" and not merely "may
be" fully established. The facts so established should be consistent only with the guilt of the
accused, that is to say, they should not be explicable through any other hypothesis except that
the Accused was guilty. Moreover, the circumstances should be conclusive in nature. There
must be a chain of evidence so complete so as to not leave any reasonable ground for a
conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused, and must show that in all human
probability, the offence was committed by the accused.
 Reasoning: PW2 and PW3 have deposed about the recovery of the dead body as well as the
school bag of the child based on the disclosure statement made by the Accused/Appellant.
Needless to say, only so much of the statement as has led to the recovery of the dead body
and the school bag is admissible in evidence Under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act.
Both these witnesses have deposed that after the disclosure statement of the .The police took
out the dead body of the deceased from the well, and after such recovery, recorded the
recovery memo Ext. P7 and took the signatures of the witnesses. Thereafter, the
Accused/Appellant led the police and the witnesses to the school at Dubehi, on the rooftop of
which he had hidden the victim's school bag. The recovery memo of the school bag (Ext. P8)
was prepared at the spot and the signatures of the witnesses were taken. Though certain
suggestions were made to PW2, the same were denied. The evidence of PW2, in our
considered opinion, has remained unshaken. The evidence of PW3 is almost similar to the
evidence of PW2. In his cross-examination, PW3 has deposed that the police had prepared
the police papers at several places, such as village Paraswara, and at the police station. It is
also admitted by PW3 that the inquest panchnama was prepared at the police station.
However, these admissions of PW3 will not take away the effect of Ext. P7 and Ext. P8,
which are the recovery memos duly signed by the witnesses. It is clear from the evidence of
PW2 and PW3 that immediately after the dead body was taken out from the well and after

39
 the recovery of the school bag from the rooftop of the school at Dubehi, the recovery memos
Ext. P7 and Ext. P8 were prepared on the spot and the signatures of the witnesses were taken.
The evidence relating to the recovery is relevant to show that certain incriminating material
has been recovered at the instance of the Accused/Appellant, and that the Accused/Appellant
knew about the place of throwing the dead body and the school bag after the crime. We find
that the evidence of PW2 and PW3 is compatible with the prosecution version. Hence, we
cannot reject the evidence merely based on the fault of the Investigating Officer in not
preparing the inquest panchnama on the spot, particularly keeping in mind Ext. P7 and Ext.
P8 which were prepared on the spot.
 Conclusion: The judgment and order of the High Court affirming the conviction of the
Accused/Appellant for the offences punishable Under Sections 376(A), 302 and 201(II) of
the Indian Penal Code and Under Section 5(i)(m) read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act
stands confirmed. However, the sentence is modified. The Accused/Appellant is hereby
directed to undergo a sentence of 25 years' imprisonment (without remission). The sentence
already undergone shall be set off. The appeals are disposed of accordingly.

18. Balaji
vs.
The State of Maharashtra MANU/SC/0422/2019
 Appellants: Balaji
 Respondent: The State of Maharashtra
 Hon'ble Judges/Coram: N.V. Ramana, Mohan M. Shantanagoudar and S. Abdul Nazeer, JJ.
 Acts/Rules/Orders: Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 302, Indian Penal Code (IPC) -
Section 307
 Facts: The brief facts leading to this appeal are that, at about 1:30 p.m. on 28.08.2006, the
police officer, Sikander Pakhali (PW12) received information that a woman had been
stabbed. Upon reaching the house of Shamalbai Lohare, PW2 (landlady of the house of the
deceased), he noticed that the deceased Lata was lying in a pool of blood and she was shifted
to the hospital at about 1:45 to 2:00 p.m. PW12 was informed by Dr. Dhele (PW11) that the
deceased was in a fit condition to give the statement and PW12 recorded the same. The

40
 deceased in her statement stated that the Appellant/Accused (brother of the deceased) was
annoyed with her as she was having an illicit relationship with Mahendra Dhaware (PW4)
after the death of her husband and thus, stabbed her in her abdomen, chest, face, right arm,
etc. At the same time, i.e. at about 1:45 to 2:00 p.m., the Appellant/Accused voluntarily
arrived at the police station in bloodstained clothes carrying bloodstained knife and disclosed
his name as Balaji and the crime committed by him to Changdeo, PW6, the officer of the
police station. Lata succumbed to injuries at about 2:45 p.m.
 Conclusion: Having regard to the aforementioned discussion and other material on record,
we find that the origin and genesis of the prosecution is shrouded in mystery; the prosecution
has tried to improve its case from stage to stage. In our considered opinion, the prosecution
has not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt against the Accused. Hence, benefit of doubt
will go in favour of the Accused. The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and
accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The Accused/Appellant is directed to be released
forthwith, if not required in any other case.

19. Narne Gopikrishna and Ors.

vs.

State of A.P. : MANU/AP/0748/2012

 Appellants: Narne Gopikrishna and Ors.

 Respondent: State of A.P.
 Hon'ble Judges/Coram: Hon'ble Sri Justice N.V. Ramana and Sri Justice B.N. Rao Nalla
 Acts/Rules/Orders: Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 156(1), Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 161(3), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(CrPC) - Section 2(h); Identification Of Prisoners Act, 1920 - Section 2(a), Identification Of
Prisoners Act, 1920 - Section 4, Identification Of Prisoners Act, 1920 - Section 5,
Identification Of Prisoners Act, 1920 - Section 8; Indian Penal Code (45 Of 1860) (IPC) -
Section 302, Indian Penal Code (45 Of 1860) (IPC) - Section 34, Indian Penal Code (45 Of
1860) (IPC) - Section 379

41
 Facts: This criminal appeal is directed against the judgement dated 08.08.2008, passed by the
VIII Additional District and Sessions Judge (FTC), Visakhapatnam, in S.C. No. 5 of 2008,
convicting the appellants-accused for the offences under Section 302 read with Section 34
IPC and sentencing them to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs.500/- each,
in default to undergo simple imprisonment for two months each, and further convicting them
for the offence under Section 379 IPC and sentencing them to suffer imprisonment for a
period of six months each. Briefly stated, the case of the prosecution is that P.W.3 is the
mother of the deceased, namely Pondara Raju. The deceased, P.W.5 and L.Ws. 8 to 11 used
to live in opposite rooms in the house of P.W.7 at Chattivanipalem and became friends.
About fifteen days prior to the incident on 05.06.2006, the deceased along with P.W.5 came
from Thippanaputtuga, Ichapuram Mandal to Gajuwaka and joined in A.B.B.S. Talent
Training Centre of P.W.4 at Autonagar, for industrial training. As the accused did not have
any earnings for their livelihood, they decided to kill the deceased and take away his
motorcycle and his personal belongings.
 Conclusion: The prosecution having failed to establish the circumstances, much less each
circumstance connecting the accused to the death of the deceased beyond all reasonable
doubt, the conviction and sentence of the appellants for the charges under Section 302 read
with Section 34 IPC and Section 379 IPC, recorded by the learned Sessions Judge, cannot be
sustained and is liable to be set aside. In the result, the criminal appeal is allowed. The
conviction and sentence imposed against the appellants/accused, by the VIII Additional
District and Sessions Judge (FTC), Visakhapatnam, for the charges under Section 302 read
with Section 34 IPC and Section 379 IPC, is hereby set aside. The appellants shall be set at
liberty forthwith, if they are not required in any other case, and the fine amount, if any paid
by them, shall be refunded.

20. Ganpat Singh

vs.
The State of Madhya Pradesh MANU/SC/1187/2017
 Appellants: Ganpat Singh
 Respondent: The State of Madhya Pradesh

42
 Hon'ble Judges/Coram: N.V. Ramana and Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, JJ.
 Acts/Rules/Orders: Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 302; Code of Criminal Procedure
(CrPC) - Section 161
 Facts: The Additional Sessions Judge by a judgment found the Appellant guilty of an offence
under Section 302 of the Code and sentenced him to imprisonment for life. The High Court
affirmed the conviction of the Appellant under Section 302 of the Code. Hence, present
appeal.
 Issues: The High Court noticed a clear contradiction with her statement Under Section 161 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure. The recovery of the ornaments from the house of the
Appellant has hence been disbelieved. The High Court also noted in the course of the
judgment that Rakesh, PW4 had exaggerated what he claimed to know, in the course of his
deposition. PW4 stated that the Appellant had admitted to him that he had killed Shantabai
but no such statement was made Under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
 Reasoning: An important circumstance which weighed with the High Court was that the
body of the deceased was recovered at the behest of the Appellant. There was a manifest
error on the part of the High Court in arriving at this conclusion since the record would
indicate that the body of the deceased was recovered several months before the arrest of the
Appellant. The mere circumstance that the Appellant was last seen with the deceased was an
unsafe hypothesis to found a conviction on a charge of murder in this case. The lapse of time
between the point when the Appellant was last seen with the deceased and the time of death
was not minimal. The time of death was estimated to be between two to four weeks prior to
the recovery of the body. One must also place in balance the testimony of prosecution
witness that when he enquired regarding whereabouts of his mother, the Appellant informed
him that she had stayed back at the house of her sister. This, coupled with the fact that the
Appellant had absconded after the date of the incident was a pointer to a strong suspicion that
the Appellant was responsible for the death of deceased. However, a strong suspicion in itself
was not sufficient to lead to the conclusion that the guilt of the Appellant stands established
beyond reasonable doubt. There were material contradictions in the case of the prosecution.
The prosecution failed to establish a complete chain of circumstances and to exclude every
hypothesis other than the guilt of the Appellant.

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 Conclusion: However, a strong suspicion in itself is not sufficient to lead to the conclusion
that the guilt of the Appellant stands established beyond reasonable doubt. There are material
contradictions in the case of the prosecution. The prosecution failed to establish a complete
chain of circumstances and to exclude every hypothesis other than the guilt of the Appellant.
We accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the conviction of the Appellant Under Section
302 of the Indian Penal Code. The Appellant is on bail. His bail bonds are discharged.

21. State of Rajasthan

vs .
Madan MANU/SC/1274/2018
 Appellants: State of Rajasthan
 Respondent: Madan
 Hon'ble Judges/Coram: N.V. Ramana and Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, JJ.
 Acts/Rules/Orders: Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 34, Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section
302, Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 460; Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) - Section 31
 Facts: A charge sheet was filed charging Accused persons for offence punishable under
Sections 302, 460 and 34 of IPC. Thereafter, Accused persons were put on trial as they did
not plead guilty to charges leveled against them. Trial Court vide order convicted Accused
for offences under Sections 302 and 460 of IPC. Accordingly, he was sentenced to undergo
imprisonment for life under Section 302 of IPC, with fine of Rs. 1000 and in default of
payment of fine, Accused was directed to undergo 2 months rigorous imprisonment. He was
also directed to undergo 10 years rigorous imprisonment for conviction under Section 460 of
IPC with a fine of Rs. 500 and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo one-month
rigorous imprisonment. On other hand, co-accused was acquitted by trial Court after being
given benefit of doubt for charges levelled against him under Sections 302 and 460 of IPC.
Aggrieved by the above order of conviction, Accused-Respondent preferred an appeal before
High Court. High Court allowed appeal and set aside order of conviction and sentence
awarded by learned Sessions Judge. Benefit of doubt was extended in favor of Accused and
he was acquitted from all charges. Aggrieved by impugned order passed by High Court, State
of Rajasthan had preferred present appeal.

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 Issues: The counsel for the Appellant-State has submitted that, the High Court has gravely
erred while passing the order of acquittal despite the existing ocular evidence as well as
forensic evidence wherein the guilt of the Accused was clearly established.
 Reasoning:1. In an appeal against acquittal, appellate Court would only interfere where there
exists perversity of fact and law. Further, presumption of innocence was further reinforced
against acquitted-accused by having a judgment in his favor. 2. There existed major
contradictions in statements of prosecution witnesses while establishing circumstances
surrounding murder of deceased-Santosh. 3. Firstly, case of prosecution strongly relied upon
on testimony rendered by two child-witnesses, P.W. 4 and P.W. 5. It was an established Rule
of practical wisdom, that evidence rendered by child-witness must be evaluated carefully and
it must find adequate corroboration before it was relied on. Although, both P.W. 4 and P.W.
5 claimed to be eye witnesses to entire incident, they had given different versions as to
position of victim, while P.W. 4 clearly stated that, Accused gave blows to deceased while
she was sitting, P.W. 5 (Seema) on contrary had stated that, victim was standing and after
receiving blow she fell down. Moreover, both witnesses had failed to state specific timing at
which incident occurred. 4. In present case, evidence relied by prosecution was full of
contradictions. Prosecution had failed to provide any independent witness to bring home,
guilt of Accused. 5. Further, High Court also raised doubt while placing reliance upon
scientific evidence as there existed contradictions in seizure list of clothes of deceased and
forensic evidence on record, which was left unexplained by Public Prosecutor. Additionally,
prosecution had pressed that, recovery was made subsequent to confession of Accused.
Alleged recovery was made in presence of P.W. 7 who was paternal cousin of deceased, who
in his statement had stated that, lathi recovered had blood stains in it. Surprisingly, this fact
of lathi marked in blood stains was not only absent in recovery memo but also in forensic
report. There existed reasonable doubt for believing case laid down by prosecution and guilt
of Accused had not been proved beyond doubt.
 Conclusion: In our opinion, there exists no perversity in the judgment of the High Court.
Further, in the absence of compelling reasons, this Court is not keen to entertain this appeal
challenging the order of acquittal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. Pending applications,
if any, shall also stand disposed of.

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OUTCOME OF THE PROJECT:

The researcher had understood the concept of rule of interpretation in this procedure of case
analysis and the outcome of the project under this analysis is an clear view or rather a clear
understanding about the applicability of rules of interpretation and it had made out that the
beneficial sense of rule is widely used aspect and it is the type of burden that has fallen and it is
due to which the system of law is in proper order. The researcher has analyzed many case laws
on the civil procedural matters of various civil subject matters and has understood the process of
applicability of rules of interpretation and its purpose. The case analysis was made on the
judgments given by Judge N.V.Ramana and the way he has interpreted the provisions of law in
different cases and contexts was concerned here so that the rules of interpretation could be
clearly under made understood.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

All the cases here mentioned are taken from the secondary sources, Manupatra.

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