Pakistans Dependence and Limited Influence PDF

Article
Pakistan’s Dependence Journal of Asian Security

and International Affairs
and US Patronage: 4(1) 1–26
2017 SAGE Publications India
The Politics of ‘Limited Private Limited
SAGE Publications
Influence’ sagepub.in/home.nav
DOI: 10.1177/2347797016689220
http://aia.sagepub.com
Ahmed Waqas Waheed1
Abstract
Despite having poured billions of dollars of aid into Pakistan’s economy and its
military over the years, there is a general acceptability among scholars and policy-
makers that the United States exercises limited leverage in Pakistan. Although
India remains the centrepiece in US–Pakistan policy divergences, US frustra-
tions often stem from the ineffectiveness of its aid-for-leverage policy, especially
given Pakistan’s dependence on US military assistance. The limited US influence
in Pakistan can best be understood within the framework of patron–client relation-
ship and arms dependence. If the theory suggests anything, it is that various factors
including US and Pakistan’s behaviour contribute in channelling the relationship
towards its apparent demise. Most important within these is China’s central role
in helping Pakistan indigenize its military production and diversify its arms supply.
In that sense, then, China has colluded with Pakistan in indirectly limiting US influ-
ence in Pakistan and the trend suggests that this collaboration will further reduce
US leverage over Pakistan.
Keywords
Pakistan–US relations, Pakistan–China relations, political dependence, limited
influence, foreign assistance, US leverage
Introduction
Pakistan has received approximately US $70 billion in US foreign aid since its
inception in 1947. This places it among the top recipients of US foreign aid around
the globe. However, this exorbitant flow of US dollars to Pakistan has largely
1
Centre of International Peace and Stability, National University of Sciences and Technology,
Islamabad, Pakistan.
Corresponding author:
Ahmed Waqas Waheed, National University of Science and Technology, Centre of International
Peace and Stability, NIPCONS, H-12, Islamabad, Pakistan.
E-mails: ahmedwaqas.pcs@cips.nust.edu.pk; waqaswaheed@live.com
2 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 4(1)
been a consequence of increased US strategic and geopolitical interests in

the region and ‘the levels year to year have waxed and waned for decades as US
geopolitical interests in the region have shifted’ (Center for Global Development,
2014). For instance, ‘in 1953 the United States offered economic and military
assistance in return for Pakistan’s agreement to join an alliance designed to check
the spread of communism’ (Wynbrandt, 2009, p. 176). In 1981, US efforts to
check Soviet expansionism in Afghanistan witnessed another round of increased
inflow of US foreign assistance to Pakistan and, most recently, the US
War on Terror saw Pakistan benefitting considerably from US foreign assistance
programmes again. Many argue that Pakistan continues to remain heavily dependent
on US foreign aid (Abbas, 2014; The New York Times, 2015; Wright, 2011;
Zaidi, 2011), leading policymakers, politicians and development professionals in
the West to ‘believe that the economic survival of Pakistan rests on handouts
from the United States’ (Haider, 2012). However, Pakistan’s dependence on the
United States has largely been on US military assistance than economic.
This is clearly evident in the patterns of US assistance to Pakistan and the level
of significance both states accord to economic assistance. Barring the General Ayub
era, US foreign assistance to Pakistan witnessed a huge military aid component:
‘Since 1982, the United States has provided $17 billion in military assistance com-
pared to $13.5 billion in economic assistance … [and] since 2002 the US military
assistance to Pakistan at $13billion dollars is two-times the economic assistance it
provided to Pakistan’ (ibid.). Considering the dominant role that the Pakistan Army
has played in Pakistani politics, whether it be directly through military coups or
behind the scenes Fair, 2009b; Hussain, 2010; Shah, 2011; Siddiqa, 2007), it can be
safely assumed that the Pakistani state, which has been historically obsessed with
its territorial defence and sovereignty against India, has primarily been interested
only in military assistance rather than the economic one.
This assertion is validated by the fact that US military support to the Pakistani
military has helped the Pakistan Army become a premium fighting force
(Cohen, 2004). At the same time, an almost equal amount of US economic assis-
tance over more than six decades has not alleviated Pakistan’s economic and
developmental ailments; rather, ‘Pakistan has been a graveyard of development
projects … due to lack of physical infrastructure, financial resources, human capital,
technological growth, political commitment, macro-economic stability in the
country’ (Anwar & Aman, 2010, p. 2). This situation has continued to remain constant
despite US economic assistances and focus on Pakistan’s developmental issues.
Thus, it can be postulated that if the Pakistani military had viewed Pakistan’s
economic and developmental problems through the same lens that it uses to view
Pakistan’s territorial sovereignty, the situation might have been quite different.
Given Pakistan’s dependence on US military assistance, it is quite understand-
able then why some (Beckley, 2012; Miller, 2012; Paul, 1992) would argue that the
United States possesses considerable leverage to influence Pakistan. Yet, that is not
the case (Ibrahim, 2009). US policymakers have often expressed their frustrations
at their inability to hold some clout over Pakistani decision-making processes
despite using aid as leverage. Writing in 1987, Thomas P. Thornton (1987, p. 23),
who was a senior staff member of the National Security Council during the Carter
Waheed 3
administration, confessed that ‘our ability to alter Pakistani developments, at least

in any positive way, is extremely limited’. In a hearing on US Foreign Assistance
to Pakistan, Senator Chuck Hagel (US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
2007, p. 4) admitted that ‘the US must recognize that our influence in Pakistan is
limited’. Even academics have recognized the limits to US leverage. Cohen and
Chollet (2007, p. 9) argue that ‘‘for all the talk of the United States’ global domi-
nance and despite considerable US support to the Pakistani military, Washington
finds itself with relatively little leverage to influence events in Pakistan’’. Cookman
and French (2011, p. 1) believe that ‘the provision or restriction of aid itself has
historically resulted in only limited success in aligning U.S. and Pakistani strategic
priorities over time’. Weinbaum (Putnam et al., 2011) contends that ‘our policy-
makers have had difficulty deciding how best to get political mileage … the United
States has not received anything like full return on its military and economic
assistance to Pakistan’. This brings us to the question: If Pakistan is so heavily
dependent on US foreign assistance, why does the United States exercise such
limited influence over it?
Many commentators and analysts have sought to explore the limits of US
leverage (Birdsall, Elhai & Kinder, 2011; Cookman & Katulis, 2011; Hathaway,
2008; Krepon, 2011; Schaffer, 2002) and also to examine how to maximize the
use of US leverage over Pakistan (Beckley, 2012; Initiative, 2012; Khalilzad,
2012; Miller, 2012; Schaffer & Schaffer, 2011). However, the propensity to take
United States’ limited influence in Pakistan for granted as the basic argument for
analyses has consequently resulted in scant research on the dynamics of why the
United States exercises such limited influence in Pakistan. Invariably, almost all
research agrees that the raison d’être for limited US leverage over Pakistan has
been its conflicting policies with regard to India (Fair et al., 2010; Schaffer,
2002). But that still does not provide us the specifics of why and how United
States has limited leverage over Pakistan, especially given Pakistan’s considera-
ble dependence on US military assistance. Literature that does seek enquiry into
why the United States exercises limited leverage over Pakistan has also remained
narrow in scope. Scholarly contributions on United States’ limited influence have
remained more circumstantial and period-specific (Elias, 2013; Hathaway, 2008;
Sullivan, Tessman & Li, 2011). By limiting the study of limited US leverage in
Pakistan to the post-Cold War, and specifically the War on Terror, these studies
fail to answer why the United States has exercised limited leverage, even during
the Cold War (Sanjian, 1998) or during periods of strategic estrangement such as
in the 1970s and the 1990s.
For instance, one theme deals with the idea of reverse leverage, according to
which the United States possesses little influence over Pakistan because Pakistan
has more leverage over the United States by virtue of the assistance it renders than
the other way round (Perkovich, 2011), which is why the United States cannot
effectively use its leverage (Elias, 2013; Sullivan et al., 2011). While this argu-
ment does hold some veracity, especially when the US–Pakistan relationship is
studied during times when the interests of the two states have converged in a rela-
tionship of mutual dependence; however, it does not explain why the United States
has possessed limited influence during times when the two states had divergent
interests, especially given Pakistan’s dependence on US foreign assistance.

For instance, the 1990s was a period of Pakistan’s unilateral dependence on the
United States. Following Indian nuclear tests in 1998, President Clinton made several
urgent appeals, even until the last hours before the test, to dissuade Pakistan
from a quid pro quo reaction. These appeals included incentives of resumption of
economic and military aid and other financial assistances ‘that would give Pakistan
the sense that it can forgo tests and still feel secure’ (Enda, 1998). The appeals did
not work and Pakistan went ahead with the conduct of its nuclear tests. The failure
of US influence to dissuade Pakistan from conducting its nuclear tests cannot be
explained using the idea of reverse leverage as a model. It can at best be a factor
in the larger explanation of why the United States has limited leverage over the
Pakistani state.
Others believe that the Sino–Pakistani partnership plays an important role in
undermining American leverage with Pakistan (Curtis, 2009; Mahapatra, 2014).
This understanding too does not explain the entirety of the problem. For example,
while commentators (Doherty, 2012; Kugelman, 2009; Riedel & Singh, 2010)
observed that China and the United States shared similar objectives of checking
and thwarting Muslim militancy, however, Pakistan’s reluctant efforts to combat
terrorism ran counter to both US and China interests. In this instance, Pakistan’s
resistance to American leverage had nothing to do with the Sino–Pakistani part-
nership. For this reason, the apprehension that China plays a larger role in
Pakistan’s effort to minimize US influence over its policymaking can also only be
a factor, albeit a major one.
Considering then that Pakistan’s dependence on the United States has primarily
been military in nature and not an economic one, does the statement by the
former Pakistani Chief of Army Staff General Kayani, ‘US funds meant for
military assistance be diverted towards economic aid’ (Express Tribune, 2011),
herald the end of the Pakistani military’s dependence on US military assis-
tance? Does it also mean that the limited influence that the United States had on
Pakistan, is further diminishing? In other words, is Pakistan ceasing to become
a dependent-client state of the United States? This article situates the discussion
on US influence over Pakistan within the framework of a patron–client relationship
and builds it over three sections. The first section provides the details of
Pakistan’s dependence on the United States and the dynamics of this patron–client
relationship before it moves on to explore the causes of Pakistan’s reducing
dependence, and consequently limited US influence, in the second section.
The last section explores the Sino–Pakistan relationship and its effect on US
influence over Pakistan.
Establishing Pakistan’s Dependence and Clientelism

The history of Pakistan’s dependence on US foreign assistance almost traces
back to the Pakistani state’s independence from British colonial rule, following
the end of World War II (Abbas, 2014; Lavoy, 2005). In the aftermath of Pakistan’s
Waheed 5
independence, two immediate events played a vital role in Pakistan seeking the
United States as a patron. First, ‘India’s occupation of Kashmir, and its forceful
absorption of the princely states’ (Cohen, 2004, p. 101) reinforced Pakistan’s
mistrust of India and exacerbated Pakistan’s existential paranoia. Second, the
distribution of the resources at independence, from the colonial India to Pakistan,
was not only unequal but also quite insufficient to maintain Pakistan’s security.
One of the main reasons for that was that the British had allotted only 11 days for
the distribution of resources that had taken a century to build (Nawaz, 2009).
This proved detrimental to Pakistan and its security.
Further, since the departing British had assumed the role of the arbitrator, this
meant that resource distribution rested heavily on India, thus providing it with
more leverage. At the time of independence, it was decided that the distribution of
military resources would be based on a ratio of 66:34 for India and Pakistan,
respectively. The first problem between the two states occurred when India denied
Pakistan its one-third share in the military resources:
Out of forty-six training establishments, only seven existed in Pakistan. Three out
of seventeen ordnance factories were located in Pakistan. Pakistan’s request to dis-
mantle the proportionate machinery was also rejected by India. Further, much-needed
items like military ammunition, tanks and other munitions were also denied by India.
(Chaudhry, 2012, p. 11)
Since most of the defence stores were located in India, it clearly enjoyed a
monopoly in the transfer of these stores to Pakistan. Thus, when the Pakistan–
India War broke out over Kashmir in 1948, Indian attempts to transfer the
resources became more stringent, whereby the Pakistan military was reduced to
fight a war with depleted resources. This event highlighted Pakistan’s inade-
quacies in the face of a stronger India, after which much of its efforts, which
continue even today, remained focused on building a sizeable strong military
against India. Consequently, Pakistan’s realization of the gross military disparity
between itself and India, coupled with its existential mindset, motivated ‘Pakistan’s
need for outside assistance to offset the perceived threat posed by India’ (Lavoy,
2005, p. 52) and resultantly ‘made the United States Pakistan’s most important
foreign partner from the time of partition to the present’ (ibid.).
While the United States sought to rope Pakistan in a regional anti-communist
defence alliance, Pakistan was primarily motivated to muster US political and
military support, as a means to counter India. In 1954, Pakistan and the United
States signed a Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement, and in 1955, Pakistan
joined two of the United States’ three defence alliances, the Southeast Asia
Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO).
Further, between ‘1955 and 1965, Washington provided Pakistan with more
than $700 million in military grant’ (ibid.). The US assistance to Pakistan
exposed the Pakistani military officials to American training. This led to a
change in the Pakistani military structure, which was previously based on
British training, the ‘addition of an American-equipped armoured division, four
infantry divisions, one armoured brigade group, and support elements for
two corps’ (Cohen, 2004, p. 102). Consequently, the exposure of the Pakistani
military to American technology led to a revision and reorientation of their military
doctrine and problem-solving strategies; one of the manifestations of which we
see in Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine ‘which very much resembles American thinking
of the mid 1950s’ (ibid., p. 103). At this particular juncture in time, Pakistan
became the United States’ ‘most allied ally’.
Hence, from the very outset, the US–Pakistan friendship exhibited the trappings
of a patron–client relationship, one based on Pakistan’s dependence on US military
assistance. Various theorists have expounded and explored the key features of clien-
telistic behaviour. Some contend (Kinsella, 1998; Morrow, 1991; Shoemaker &
Spanier, 1984) that a patron–client relationship must involve a decided asymmetry
in their military capabilities. Second while ‘association can take place at a variety of
levels, but it must be apparent to other observers that the patron and client are closely
tied together’ (Shoemaker & Spanier, 1984, p. 14). These ties revolve around three
patronal goals: ‘ideological convergence, international solidarity and strategic
advantage’ (Carney, 1989, p. 49). On the other hand, the client state benefits from
such a patronal association in three ways. First, through strong patronal association
they ‘enhance their position in relation to other states’ (ibid., p. 48). Second, by
subscribing to such a relationship, the client state expects the patron state to serve as
a guarantor of its security by either formally committing to ‘preserve the client’s
security’ (ibid., p. 47) through declaratory commitments or, through arms transfer
to the client (Kinsella, 1998). This is quite evident during the Cold War (1950–
1965), the War in Afghanistan (1980–1989) and the War on Terror (2001–2014)
where the Pakistan–US ideological convergences and the US goal to secure strategic
advantage, quite comfortably meshed with Pakistan’s expectation of US patronage.
Consequently, while the United States gained strategic grounds against communist
Russia during the Cold War and the Al-Qaeda during the War on Terror, Pakistan
received large inflows of US military assistance, which it needed to counter the
Indian threat it perceived (Center for Global Development, 2014).
However, the Pakistan–US relations have largely been dominated by US goals
in South Asia (Ashraf, 2012; Cohen, 2004; Lavoy, 2005; Malik, 1990) and while
these goals have fluctuated over time, Pakistan’s dependence on US military
assistance has been a consistent historic feature in this relationship. In an arms
transfer-dependent relationship, such as that of Pakistan and the United States,
while the client state ‘derives direct benefits from its relationship with its supplier
in that its perceived need for weaponry is fulfilled’ (Kinsella, 1998, p. 9), what
benefits does the patron state accrue? Theorists believe that the patron state
expects influence and leverage (Kinsella, 1998; Moon, 1983, 1985) over the client
state, and compliance from the client government (Sullivan et al., 2011) in line
with its strategic and ideological goals. Sanjian modelling on US arms transfer
policies (1998, p. 98) demonstrates that the purposes of US arms transfer policies
toward Pakistan ‘were not to create a more stable South Asian security environ-
ment; rather … [its] primary goal was to cultivate and then police a largely
dependent and subservient client’. Hence, Kinsella (1998, p. 9) observes that in
circumstances where effective leverage and influence is observed, “recipients’
arms transfer dependence is often identified as a necessary condition’. This leads
Waheed 7
us to enquire, how does a patron state then cope with a client state’s resistance
towards compliance?
There is a consensus among intellectuals that compliance and non-compliance of
weaker dependent states to the agenda of the patron state are responded by a series of
awards and punishments by the patron state. Thus, Carney (1989, p. 47) argues that
‘depending on the importance of the issue to the patron and the level of client intran-
sigence, the patron can bring diplomatic, economic or military pressure to bear until
either compliance is forthcoming or the relationship cracks’. The crests and troughs
in the Pakistan–US relationship follow a remarkably similar pattern, especially when
it comes to the development of Pakistan’s nuclear programme. During the Carter and
the Clinton administration’s year in office, their emphasis on the de-nuclearization of
Pakistan was preceded by military and economic sanctions on Pakistan. However,
during the Reagan and Bush tenure, Pakistan’s strategic alignment with the United
States, first to counter the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and then in the War on Terror,
saw the United States rewarding Pakistan with huge amounts of military assistance,
while ignoring Pakistan’s nuclear development and related issues, for which it had
been sanctioned earlier. This may be because the United States afforded Pakistan
some measure of tolerance on its non-compliant behaviour due to the strategic
advantages it was accruing through Pakistan. As Carney (ibid., p. 46) argues:
‘The more advantage a patron gains over its competitor through its association
with its client, the more the patron will value the relationship … In this way the
client can gain certain degree of leverage with the patron and some measure of
occasional noncompliant behaviour’.
Considering that US–Pakistan relations have often been suspended, as during
the Carter and the Clinton years, due to Pakistan’s non-compliant behaviour, it can
be safely asserted that Pakistan remained resistant to US influence. Even when
US–Pakistan relations have appeared to be at their zenith, the situation was not of
Pakistan’s compliance, which is understood as a ‘sacrifice, wherein actors abandon
their preferences as they conform to another’s dissimilar foreign policy wishes’
(Richardson in Sullivan et al. 2011, p. 279). Instead, the strategic convergences
between Pakistan and the United States were based on a consensus which ‘does not
denote one party’s capitulation’ (Moon, 1985, p. 305). For instance in the early
years of the Cold War, The New York Times noted that ‘in contrast to India’s aloof-
ness from the struggle between Communism and democracy, Pakistan has been
almost aggressive in its moral commitment to the Western Powers’ (Soherwordi,
2010, p. 24). The War in Afghanistan in the 1980s followed a similar consensual
agreement between both the United States and Pakistan (Dorsey, 1980; Paul, 1992;
Wirsing & Roherty, 1982), and similar was the case in the War on Terror (Boone &
Beaumont, 2013; Burgess, 2003; Musharraf, 2006).
Despite Pakistan’s overwhelming dependence on US military assistance over
the years, US policymakers and theorists in the international relations tradition
have found the United States able to exercise only a limited degree of influence
over Pakistan (Cohen & Chollet, 2007; Cookman & French, 2011; Sullivan
et al., 2011; Thornton, 1987; US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 2007).
The central question that arises from this expose of Pakistan–US relations then
is: Given Pakistan’s dependence on US military assistance why has the United
States failed to exercise considerable influence over Pakistan? It is understand-

able how Pakistan resisted US influence during periods of strategic convergence,
especially in areas related to its nuclear programme, democracy and human
rights, due to its strategic importance in US policy calculus. This understanding
can be derived from Sullivan et al. (2011, p. 281) when they postulate that client
states ‘should be more likely to defy the US if they believe that the US will be
unable or unwilling to punish them for defection’. In simple words, US appre-
hensions over Pakistan’s nuclear programme and its dictatorial regime were sim-
ply ignored because they had become peripheral concerns to its main goal of
countering the Soviet Union in Afghanistan during the 1980s and neutralizing
Al-Qaeda elements in Afghanistan during the 2000s more recently. Consequently,
during this time, the limited influence of the United States was due to Pakistan’s
reverse leverage and there is some measure of plausibility in the idea that in
times of Pakistan–US strategic convergence, Pakistani leaders have been operat-
ing ‘on the assumption that the US is dependent on Pakistan to the extent that it
has little choice but to continue to subsidize its government’ (ibid., p. 282).
However, periods of strategic divergences (the 1970s, the 1990s and the 2000s)
between Pakistan and the United States follow a different rationale because at
these junctures in time, the Pakistan–US relations completely cracked under US
sanctions due to Pakistan’s non-compliance, and Pakistan’s resistance to accede
to US pressure signalled a lack of US influence on Pakistan.
Patronal Behaviour and Limited Influence

In the dyadic relationship that builds around a patron–client dynamic, various
reasons serve to limit the influence of the patron on the client state’s policies.
These reasons are not exclusive to the client state’s behaviour. In fact, the patron’s
behaviour and circumstances contribute vitally in diminishing its’ own influence
on the client state. First among these is the notion that aid-for-leverage offers a
greater degree of influence over the client state’s behaviour (Miller, 2012).
This idea has often motivated US administrations to explicitly link military aid or
arms transfer to a ‘quid-pro-quo expectation of compliance from a government’
(Sullivan et al., 2011, p. 275). However, empirical enquiries that have aimed to
examine whether patronal influences on the client’s behaviour manifest them-
selves in observable changes have found the results to be inconclusive at best
(Kinsella, 1998; Moon, 1985; Sullivan et al., 2011).
Both trends of patronal influence, one in which a client state succumbs to
patronal influence and when it does not, are evident in the patterns of US–Pakistan
relations. For instance, when the Indo-China war broke out in 1962, India’s com-
plete defeat at the hands of China left India completely defenceless on the Kashmir
front and presented Pakistan a novel opportunity to liberate Kashmir. At the same
time, the United States had agreed to an unconditional military support to India,
in an effort to counter Chinese influence. Given US strategic engagement
with India at this juncture, it was important that Pakistan, motivated by its own
strategic interests, not jeopardize US assistance to India. Hence, ‘on October 28,
Waheed 9
Kennedy wrote to Ayub Khan, suggesting that he should assure Nehru that, “He
could count on Pakistan’s taking no action on the frontiers to alarm India” ’
(Soherwordi, 2010, p. 28). Even though the idea of ‘the strengthening of Pakistan’s
most determined foes by Pakistan’s closest ally’ (Burke & Ziring, 1990, p. 241)
was seen as a betrayal, Pakistan acquiesced to US demands and demonstrated the
extent of US influence on its policymaking. Conversely, Pakistan’s development
of its nuclear programme, despite US pressures and sanctions over the decades,
has contributed towards the perception of limited US influence over Pakistan
(Burns, 1998; Khan, 2012; The National Security Archive, 2010).
Considering the inconclusive nature of the relationship between military
assistance to a client state and patronal influence, there is a probability that such
a strategy will at times produce disappointing results. In that instance, basing
military assistance on the understanding of a quid-pro-quo strategy will often
raise the spectre of limited influence wherever the client state exhibits non-
compliant behaviour. Only recently, the debates on US–Pakistan relations were
dominated by the idea that substantial US assistance to Pakistan has not resulted
in a reciprocal measure of US influence (Fair, 2009c; Miller, 2012; US Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, 2007). Consequently, the question, ‘are we get-
ting the most bang for our buck’ (US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
2007, p. 3), will often reveal limited influence, especially when the patron and
client have conflicting interests.
Another reason why the United States is often perceived to have limited influ-
ence over Pakistan is because of what Sullivan et al. term ‘Reverse Leverage’
(Sullivan et al., 2011, p. 281). By their account, Pakistan’s relatively high impor-
tance in US strategic calculus has often created a circumstance in which using
Pakistan’s military dependence as leverage to exact specific outcomes has been
seen as more costly than immediate US strategic concerns and its strategic part-
nership with Pakistan. This was quite evident during the US–Pakistan strategic
alliance during the War in Afghanistan and the War on Terror. During the War in
Afghanistan in the 1980s, US dependability on Pakistan was so great that when in
December 1982, Pakistan’s President, General Zia-ul-Haq, visited Washington and
pushed for a tacit US acceptance of its nuclear programme, even though both
Reagan and Shultz warned against the development of nuclear weapons, the secre-
tary noted to the president that they ‘must also recognise that how we handle the
nuclear issue can have a profound effect on our ability to continue to cooperate with
Pakistan in supporting the Afghan freedom fighters’ (Westad, 2005, p. 353).
Consequently, during the War in Afghanistan, the United States turned a blind eye
towards Pakistan’s nuclear development to safeguard its other strategic interests.
Given the extent of the US interests to check Soviet expansion in Afghanistan,
Ambassador Atherton argued that ‘our leverage in Islamabad over this issue is very
limited’ despite ‘possessing the means to influence Pakistan possibly through
military assistance’ (The National Security Archive, 2010).
A similar pattern of US engagement with Pakistan is quite evident during the
War on Terror as well. In January 2004, evidence began to accumulate of a vast
nuclear proliferation network. Allegedly, Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan, the ‘father of
Pakistan’s nuclear bomb’ (Fair et al., 2010), was said to have sold nuclear secrets
to some countries, such as Libya, Iran and North Korea (Rashid & LaGuardia,
2004). Earlier in January 2004, US Secretary of State Colin Powell briefed the
press that ‘American officials have presented evidence to Pakistan’s leaders of
Pakistani involvement in the spread of nuclear weapons technology’ (Murphy,
2004). This was exactly the kind of scenario that the United States had wanted
to avoid. However, while earlier just the mere assumption that Pakistan was
developing and enhancing its nuclear arsenal had brought legislation after legis-
lation and condemnation at its doorsteps, this time around the United States was
unvocal on the issue. Kupfer (2004, p. 3) observed that ‘despite the high stakes
involved in the scandal, the Bush administration has been very protective of the
Musharraf government’. For example, at a hearing of the House Committee on
International Relations at the end of March 2004, John Bolton, Undersecretary
of State for Arms Control and International Security (US House Committee on
International Relations, 2004), stated:
based on the information we have now, we believe that the proliferation activities that
Mr Khan confessed to recently—his activities in Libya, in Iran and North Korea, and
perhaps elsewhere—were activities that he was carrying on without the approval of the
top levels of the government of Pakistan. That is the position that President Musharraf
has taken, and we have no evidence to the contrary … We have not asked for access to
Mr Khan, nor do we think we should.
A Congressional Research Service Report to Congress (Cronin, Kronstadt &

Squassoni, 2005, p. 30) chronicles in greater detail the response of the US govern-
ment on Pakistan’s proliferation episode:
The Bush Administration has maintained that ‘there was no evidence that the top offi-
cials of the Pakistani government were complicit in or approved of [Khan’s] prolifera-
tion activities.’ The Bush Administration has found insufficient evidence to trigger US.
non-proliferation laws, even though U.S. officials claimed neither to have asked for
access to Khan nor believed that such access was necessary. Some senior U.S. officials
have insisted that the United States is receiving the cooperation it needs from Pakistan,
but in testimony to Congress on April 29, 2004, then-Deputy Secretary of State Richard
Armitage said that the Administration was ‘impatient for even greater efforts from
President Musharraf’.
In a feature article on 26 December 2004, The New York Times reported that the
administration had received little new information from Pakistan to its questions
about where Khan obtained the plans for a nuclear weapon. Events such as these
validate the causal hypothesis of Sullivan et al. (2011) that the United States’ lim-
ited influence on a client state is causally linked to its greater dependence on the
client state for its strategic interest.
Some argue that the United States’ limited influence on Pakistan during times
of strategic engagement is because of the US approach ‘of all carrots and no sticks’
(Miller, 2012, p. 37). Consequently, ‘The solution therefore is not to give Pakistan
more aid or improve public diplomacy, but to use a mix of aid, conditions,
and sanctions to change Pakistani officials’ cost-benefit calculus’ (ibid.).
Waheed 11
Proponents of this particular stance believe that Pakistan should be viewed as a

‘dependent country which has begun to view aid with minimal conditionality as
an entitlement’ (Ibrahim, 2009, p. 27). The issue then is how to calibrate US
assistance to Pakistan to best achieve desired results? This means that the reward
(foreign assistance, trade, investments, etc.) and the punishments (sanctions,
diplomatic pressure, etc.) should be carefully calibrated on a continuum of the
client state’s compliance and non-compliance.
However, decades of sanctions have demonstrated that the use of ‘sticks’ have
proved of little value on influencing Pakistan on issues of importance to the
United States. A recent attempt to influence Pakistan into more effectively fight-
ing the War on Terror was the Kerry-Lugar-Bergman bill. However, the Pakistani
state found the conditions accompanying the Bill to be an affront to its sover-
eignty. Consequently, Christine Fair argued that there is ‘little chance that Pakistan
will acquiesce to the stated demands … Pakistan remains ever confident that
Washington cannot cut off a partner as important as Pakistan, irrespective of the
severity of divergence in national priorities or policies’ (Fair, 2009a). It can then
be said quite assertively that when the United States is strategically engaged with
Pakistan, it is too heavily dependent on Pakistan’s support to afford a ‘less carrots,
more sticks’ approach.
Some contributions of patronal behaviour in limiting its own influence in client
states have been identified above and have been analyzed in the backdrop of
Pakistan–US relations. It is understandable how in times of strategic engagement
Pakistan has continued to manipulate US dependence on its support and limiting
its influence, while at the same time attracting an impressive flow of military
assistance. However, the US–Pakistan estrangement in the 1970s and the 1990s,
if anything, demonstrates that cutting off aid to Pakistan and sanctioning the
country to influence its decision-making have also not been successful.
Considering Pakistan’s dependence on US military assistance, surely a certain
degree of ‘punishment’ should have yielded some results, but instead the relation-
ship completely broke down only to be resurrected once the United States became
interested in Afghanistan both in the 1980s and the 2000s. Moon (1983, 1985)
argues that ‘the powerful state must have “conditioning tools”—rewards or pun-
ishments—that it can use to induce articular sorts of behaviour from the weaker
states’. Analyzing ‘how difficult it is to calibrate a tougher approach with Pakistan’
(Miller, 2012, p. 37), it becomes evident that such ‘conditioning tools’ have been
of little use when it comes to US influence on Pakistan. Thus, while patronal
behaviour has contributed to some extent in limiting US influence on Pakistan,
some explanations on Pakistan’s role and factors involved in limiting US influence
can also be derived from the scholarship on patron–client relationships.
Client Behaviour and Limited Influence

Patronal expectations of the client state are often gauged in terms of client
compliance, but the dyadic relationship is based on reciprocity whereby the
‘patrons too, must comply to some degree with the client preferences and needs’
(Carney, 1989, p. 45). It can be argued then that once the patron fails to address
these client preferences and needs, it would eventually result in limiting the
influence of the patron on the client. For instance, one of the needs of the client
state is that the patron should act as a guarantor of its security (ibid.). However,
if the client state believes that the guarantee has not been extended fully or that
it falls short of its expectations, the extent of reciprocity in the relationship may
diminish considerably and consequently, limit the influence of the patron state
on the client state. There are three dimensions to Pakistan’s flailing expecta-
tions of United States on matters of its national security.
First, given Pakistan’s security paranoia against Indian aggression and hegem-
onic designs, Pakistan had primarily sought US military assistance to upgrade its
military against an Indian threat. At the same time, the United States was interested
in bolstering Pakistani defence on the borders neighbouring the Soviet Union and
China. What followed then was a series of agreements and treaties through which
the United States provided substantial military assistance to Pakistan. However,
these agreements and treaties did not provide the explicit guarantee that the United
States would come to Pakistan’s assistance in case of an Indo-Pakistan war (Pasha,
1995). Interestingly, instead the United States kept assuring India that Pakistan’s
military assistance will not be used against it. For instance:
In 1954, when the United States extended military aid to Pakistan, the Indian
Government was assured by the United States that if Pakistan were to misuse
this aid in an aggressive fashion against another country, the United States would
immediately take appropriate action both within and without the United Nations to
thwart such aggression … Pakistanis further alleged that after it became clear that
the United States was determined to extend massive military and economic aid to
India not only for defensive purposes but also for building her up as the leader of
Asia against the Chinese, they could not be absolutely sure any more that the United
States would come to their rescue in the event of Indian aggression. (Sayeed, 1964,
pp. 747–749)
The military assistance to Pakistan was thus strictly a quid-pro-quo for its role
in the US Cold War strategy. Consequently, the US military assistance to India
during the Sino-Indian war of 1962 and the arms embargo following the Indo-
Pakistan 1965 and 1971 wars, in the early years dispelled the myth of the United
States being Pakistan’s security ‘guarantor’.
Second, Pakistan–US strategic engagements have often borne out of US
strategic necessities. During the Cold War and even after that, estrangement
in Pakistan–US relations has been followed by an equal tilt towards India as
evidenced during the years when President Kennedy, President Carter and
President Clinton were in office, when India loomed large on the horizon compared
to the peripheral importance of Pakistan in US policy calculus. Even during
periods of strategic engagements, the United States has been wary not to offset
its relations with India. This has substantially contributed in the perception that
Pakistan cannot fully depend on the United States for its security. In that sense,
then, any pressure by the United States on Pakistan’s pursuit to consolidate its
security with or without US support has often received a resilient reception as
Waheed 13
is evidenced in the case of Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions (Ahmed, 2010; Cronin

et al., 2005; Hoodbhoy, 2013; Khan, 2012).
Carney (1989) believes that two main reasons contribute in a client state reach-
ing out to a patron state: First, ‘to enhance their position in relations to other
states’ (ibid., p. 48) and second, to ‘have a friend in the harsh environment in the
international arena’ (ibid.). In both instances, Pakistan–US relations have failed
to durably sustain these prerequisites and have remained quite circumstantial.
Both these client state needs were only realized during US–Pakistan strategic
engagement periods and during times of estrangement; US grievances of ‘limited
influence’ were often accompanied by Pakistani complaints of ‘betrayal’. Given
Pakistan’s military dependence on the United States, Pakistan has remained
‘keenly aware that compliance means a loss of autonomy and possibly other
costs’ (ibid., p. 47). It is quite interesting to note then that US pressures on
Pakistan in the context of Pakistan–India relations have often been rebuked,
whereas when the context of the influence did not involve India, Pakistan readily
complied. For instance, Pakistan launched a successful campaign in Afghanistan
during the 1980s at the behest of the United States, and similarly allied with the
United States in the War on Terror, but remained resilient on giving in on its
nuclear program (Khan, 2012). Again, during the War on Terror, Pakistan–US
relations were often at a low because of pro-India US policies. Various intellectu-
als have noticed this trend. For instance, Christine Fair opines:
The December 2001 Bonn conference was, in many ways, a conference of Pakistan’s
defeat. With US military assistance, the Northern Alliance, which had long enjoyed
the support and assistance of India, Iran, Russia, and other countries, wrested Kabul
from the Taliban. The United States had promised Pakistan that this would not
happen. The US decisions to rely on the Northern Alliance in the early years of
Operation Enduring Freedom and to retain a light footprint discomfited Pakistan,
which feared the emergence of a pro-India Afghanistan … these early actions, con-
ditioned Pakistan’s decision to retain its contacts with the Taliban to thwart the
emergence of a hostile Afghanistan aligned with India. (Fair, 2009c, p. 159)
Tellis further observes:
Competition with New Delhi has also pushed Islamabad to prevent India from restoring
its influence in Afghanistan. In this effort to preserve its ‘strategic depth,’ Pakistan has
consciously tolerated the presence of Taliban remnants along its north-western frontier
as a hedging strategy in case Afghan president Hamid Karzai’s government turns out
to be overly friendly to Indian interests … The chief difficulty here remains the clash
between US and Pakistani priorities, specifically Pakistan’s policies toward Kashmir
and its relations with India. (Tellis, 2004, pp. 109–112)
Even while India remains quite central to the discussion on US limited influence
over Pakistan, Pakistan’s dependence on US military assistances has contributed
equally in Pakistan’s frustration over US policies. However, realizing that the United
States has almost always viewed India as its main protagonist in its effort to counter
growing Chinese influence, and Pakistan’s dependence on US military assistance
has placed great burdens on its policy decisions, recent events suggest that the
Pakistani state is moving in a direction to reduce its dependence on US military

assistance and consequently wrestle from the United States whatever influence it
has left over the Pakistani state. There are two identifiable ways to reduce arms
dependence on a patron state, and consequently the influence that the patron state
enjoy over the client state; first, by increasing the state’s self-sufficiency in arms
production and second by diversifying their supplier portfolio (Kinsella, 1998).
There is historic evidence that Pakistan’s bid to increase its self-sufficiency in
arms production begun as early as in the 1950s when the second prime minister,
Khawaja Nazimuddin, in collaboration with the British Royal Ordinance, laid the
foundation of four ordinance factories in Wah to manufacture ammunitions and
rifles. While this was a first step towards self-sufficiency, it was not a significant
one. Soon after, extensive US military support in the late 1950s which continued
into the first half of the 1960s ‘reduced the attention given to domestic production’
(International Business Publications, 2013, p. 196), only to be renewed once again
in 1971 when Pakistan was undergoing its first spell of US sanctions. This renewed
commitment towards production was followed by the establishment of the Heavy
Industries at Taxila in 1971, the F-6 overhaul and rebuild factory at Kamra in
1972, the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex at Kamra in 1973 and Dr A.Q Khan
Research Laboratories for the development of its nuclear programme in 1976
(International Business Publications, 2013; Siddiqa-Agha, 2001a). However, it
was not until the 1990s, when Pakistan suffered the second round of US sanctions,
that Defence production became a matter of vital concern. This ‘determination to
move towards a degree of self-sufficiency’ was manifested in Pakistan’s decision
to create a Ministry of Defense Production in 1991, to oversee efforts aimed to
indigenize arms production.
Siddiqa-Agha (1999, 2001) laments that despite coming far ahead in the area of
defence production, Pakistan still lacks the qualitative and the technological edge
that would allow it complete independence in defence production. However, what
remains noteworthy is that the move towards self-reliance in defence production
was motivated by recurring US sanctions on Pakistan and in effect reduce the influ-
ence that arms suppliers, such as the United States, had on Pakistan policymaking
(Siddiqa-Agha, 2001b). As of now, Pakistan manufactures and sells ‘weapons to
over 40 countries, bringing in $20 million annually’ (Haider, 2014) and ‘have
substituted imported defence equipment worth $1.5bn [per year]’ (Syed, 2014).
This has meant that the indigenous production of defence items, such as the JF-17
Thunder fighter jet, Mushak and Super Mushak training aircrafts, Al Khalid and
Al Zarrar tanks along with armoured personnel carriers and an extensive array of
small arms and medium-sized weapon systems for the armed forces, has accorded
Pakistan a certain degree of self-sufficiency (Kazmi, 2015).
Pakistan’s bid for self-reliance has not been a solitary effort. In fact, China’s
support (Table 1) has played a pivotal role in the process which involved
China’s military support in ‘building up Pakistan’s own capabilities rather than
intervention during conflicts or other formal alliance commitments’ (Small,
2015a). Consequently, ‘[China] has helped Pakistan establish several factories for
manufacturing arms’ (Lavoy, 2005, p. 57), which include the Heavy Industries at
Taxila involved in manufacturing Tanks and Armoured Personnel Carriers,
Waheed 15
Table 1. Pakistan Military Industry Benefiting from Chinese Collaboration
Industry Location Year Manufacturing

Karachi Shipyard Karachi 1950s Builds F-22P Frigates, Agosta 90B Khalid Class
and Engineering Submarine, Fast Attack Craft (Missile), Jalalat
Works (KSEW) Class Missile Boat and involved in shipbuilding,
ship repair and general engineering.
Pakistan Kamra 1973 Initially assembled F-6 and French Mirages.
Aeronautical Produces ‘Mushak’ trainer aircraft, assembly
Complex (PAC) of ground-based radar, the Chinese-
developed JF-17 lightweight fighters, K-8
Karakorum advanced jet trainers.
Heavy Industries Taxila 1979 Comprises of six major production units,
Taxila (HIT) involved in manufacturing, rebuilding,
upgrading and developing Tanks, Tank Guns
& APCs, such as Tank Al-Khalid 1, Tank
Al-Khalid, Tank Al-Zarrar, APC Talha (with
12.7 mm protection), 125 mm Smooth Bore
Tank Gun, Command Vehicle (SAKB).
Air Weapons Kamra 1993 Manufactures a variety of air-delivered
Complex (AWC) weapons, including extended range bombs,
target penetration bombs and infra-red
search and track systems. The AWC product
range includes HAFR-1: Anti Runway
Weapon; IRST: Infra-red search and track
system; 250 kg pre-fragmented bomb; 250
kg MK-82 steel bomb; 500 kg MK-83 steel
bomb; 1000 kg MK-84 steel bomb; air burst
electronic fuses (impact and detonating); low/
high-drag tail units; 25 lbs and 6 kg practice
bombs; GPS: Global positioning system; and
the Mushak Trainer Aircraft.
Source: Pakistan Senate Defence Committee and Pakistan Ministry of Defence Production.
the JF-17 Thunder Aircraft Manufacturing Facility at Kamra and the Karachi
Shipyard and Engineering Works facility to build missile craft ships among many
others (Siddiqa-Agha, 2001a).
Only recently, US reluctance to provide Pakistan with Drone technology
motivated Pakistan to develop its own Drone capability, albeit one that is tech-
nologically handicapped. In this regard, the history of Pakistan–China defence
production collaboration raises concerns that Pakistan may use Chinese technology
to arm its Drones. Given this scenario, Sorcher (2014) argues that ‘nations that
buy U.S. drones rely on Washington for spare parts and software upgrades.
Without any type of forced reliance, the divide between Pakistan and the United
States could deepen’. What this actually means is that increased Pakistani reliance
on self-production and defence collaboration with other states, such as China,
might further reduce US influence on Pakistan.
On the other hand, Pakistan has also been extensively diversifying its arms
portfolio since the 1990s (SIPRI, 2014). However, more recently, the source of a
major portion of its defence imports has been China: ‘The country’s arms imports
increased by 119 per cent between the 2004–2008 and 2009–13, with China pro-
viding 54pc and the USA 27pc of Pakistan’s imports’ (Haider, 2014). Considering
how vital Chinese help has been to Pakistan in matters of joint defence production,
transference of defence technology and arms imports from China, it ostensibly
seems that both states are collaborating in an effort to not only raising Pakistan’s
military profile vis-à-vis India but also indirectly working towards reducing US
influence on Pakistan by reducing Pakistan’s dependence on US weapons. In that
sense, then, China has come forward as a major factor in Pakistan’s bid to further
reduce US influence in the region.
The Chinese Factor in Pakistan’s Diminishing

Dependence
A Chinese diplomat, once confronted by a US delegate about Beijing’s uncompro-
mising support for Pakistan, sarcastically responded: ‘Pakistan is our Israel’
(Aljazeera, 2010). Any discussion on Pakistan’s relations with the United States is
incomplete without discussing the role of China in the region. While, China and
the United States are two major powers that have strived to ‘possess significant
exogenous influence over Pakistan and its decision-maker’ (Smith, 2011, p. 199),
they have approached ‘Pakistan with their own agendas and strategic interests’
(ibid.). As we have noted previously, US strategic interests have varied over time,
rendering the Pakistan–US relationship as an ‘on-again, off-again friendship’
(Lavoy, 2005, p. 52). However, China’s relationship with Pakistan has remained
consistent since the 1960s earning it a praise as a ‘reliable ally’ (Lavoy, 2005,
p. 56), while China heralds Pakistan as an ‘irreplaceable all weather friend’
(Economic Times, 2015). When it comes to the divergent and convergent interests
of these two powerful states with Pakistan, the locus of problem is only one:
India. Contrarily, the United States never explicitly addressed Pakistan’s security
paranoia at the expense of its relations with India. Pakistan–US interests have
only converged when US strategic interests were at stake, and India has not
figured in them. During the Cold War, ‘vastly differing ideological and governing
philosophies’ (Burns, 2007b) marginalized India in US foreign policy objectives
(Burns, 2007a). The focus of US policy in South Asia was to support Pakistan
as an anchor against Soviet expansionism in the region, not to allay its security
paranoia against India.
After the Cold War, three developments cemented US–India ties:
First, the end of the Cold War removed the U.S. Soviet rivalry as the principal focus of
U.S. foreign relations and the rationale for India’s nonalignment policy. Second, India’s
historic economic reforms of the early 1990s, led by Manmohan Singh, then finance
minister … opened India to the global economy for the first time and catalyzed the
extraordinary boom in private-sector trade and investment between the United States
Waheed 17
and India that continues today. Finally, as the twenty-first century began, the global
order started to undergo a tectonic shift, and India’s emergence as a global force was
obvious for all to see. (ibid., p. 134)
Adding to the list was also India’s image as ‘a potential counterweight to China’s
growing wealth and power’ (Inderfurth, 2008, p. 253). In the decades proceeding
the War on Terror, the relations between the United States and India reached an
apex, ‘with the two countries enjoying unprecedented levels of cooperation in the
economic, strategic, and diplomatic spheres’ (Kapur & Ganguly, 2007, p. 642).
This development was threatening for both Pakistan and China. For Pakistan, US
rapprochement towards India increased its security paranoia spurring from the
belief that ‘the balance of power is being tipped toward India ... with the help of the
Western World’ (Craig, 2015). For China, US efforts to re-imagine India as a
regional and global player ran counter to Chinese regional strategic interests. This is
because China remains ‘concerned about U.S. attempts to encircle China and the
profound effect on Chinese security of an eventual integration of India into a U.S.
alliance’ (Pant, 2012, p. 90). It is on this juncture that Pakistan and US interests have
diverged and it is here that Pakistan and Chinese interests have converged.
Pakistan–China strategic relations are more historical than the recent sojourn
between United States and India and have increasingly converged on one major
objective. China has always sought to ‘bottle up India in the subcontinent, forestall-
ing the emergence of a continental-sized rival’ (Feigenbaum, 2011) and, in the case
of Pakistan, ‘unlike the Americans, was also interested in balancing Indian power’
(Cohen, 2004, p. 121). The strategic landscape of Pakistan–China convergence of
interests is best illustrated by Pant (2012, p. 83) who argues:
India has been the main factor that has influenced China’s and Pakistan’s policies
vis-à-vis each other. China, viewing India as a potential challenger in the strategic
landscape of Asia, has tended to use Pakistan to counter Indian power in the region,
while Islamabad has gained access to civilian and military resources to balance Indian
might in the sub-continent. The China–Pakistan partnership serves the interests of both
by presenting India with a potential two-front theatre in the event of war with either
country. Each is using the other to balance India as India’s disputes with Pakistan keep
India preoccupied, distracting New Delhi from the task of reaching its potential as a
major regional and global player.
It is quite clear how Pakistan’s political sovereignty, given its India-centricity,

has substantially benefitted from its alliance with China, but the advantages that
Pakistan has accrued from this relationship have also indirectly assisted it in
limiting US influence in the face of US demands.
China’s assistance to Pakistan on three issues helped Pakistan to sustain the
pressure on its sovereignty, namely, its nuclear programme, military assistance and
strategic cooperation. For Pakistan, its nuclear programme symbolized a ‘talisman,
able to ward off all dangers … [and] became the means for neutralizing India’s far
larger conventional land, air, and sea forces’ (Hoodbhoy & Mian, 2002). However,
without China’s help, the development of Pakistan’s nuclear programme could not
have materialized substantially. Hoodbhoy (2013, p. 70) argues: ‘It is quite likely
that the development of nuclear weapons by Pakistan would have eventually

succeeded, but without Chinese assistance this would have taken longer’. On the
other hand, Paul argues that ‘US intelligence sources have contended that
the Pakistani nuclear bomb project would not have come to fruition without the
active support of China’ (Paul, 2003, p. 24). Contributing vitally to Pakistan’s
nuclear and missile programme, Beijing has not only provided Islamabad with
nuclear bombs, ‘uranium and plants (all three Pakistani nuclear plants—Kahuta,
Khushab and Chasma—have been built with Chinese assistance), but also their
delivery systems: ready-to-launch M-9 (Ghaznavi/Hatf), M-11 (Shaheen) and a
number of Dong Feng 21 (Ghauri) ballistic missiles’ (Malik, 2002, p. 3).
During the late 1970s and throughout the 1990s, the United States had attempted
to coerce Pakistan into compliance by levying sanctions that were intended to dis-
suade Pakistan from pursuing its nuclear weapons programme. Even when US–
Pakistan interests had converged, while the United States had lifted sanctions, it
remained concerned about Pakistan’s nuclear programme (The National Security
Archive, 2010). It can be safely assumed that without China’s help Pakistan would
not have been able to limit US influence on its nuclear programme.
Given Pakistan’s historical dependence on US economic and military assis-
tance, the US sanctions were aimed at coercing an agreement out of Pakistan on
its nuclear programme, aligned with US interests. Here again, China’s strategic
cooperation and military assistance to Pakistan played a pivotal role in blunting
the effect of these sanctions. The Chinese–Pakistani military cooperation
gained impetus after the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965. The United States took a
position of neutrality, blaming Pakistan largely and imposed sanctions on
Pakistan. This ran counter to the US–Pakistan 1959 Agreement of Cooperation.
At this point, China provided significant military support to Pakistan (Afridi &
Bajoria, 2010) and helped forge ‘a new friendship that came into being on
account of American neglect and a powerful shared antagonism with India’
(Kabraji, 2012, p. 4).
However, the major turning point in China’s military assistance to Pakistan
took place in the 1990s, when Pakistan was once again under the grips of US
sanctions. In her testimony before the US–China Economic and Security Review
Commission on 20 May 2009, Lisa Curtis detailed the extent of Pakistan–China
security partnership, at which point, she argued:
The most significant development in China-Pakistan military cooperation occurred in

1992 when China supplied Pakistan with 34 short-range ballistic M-11 missiles. Recent
sales of conventional weapons to Pakistan include JF-17 aircraft, JF-17 production
facilities, F-22P frigates with helicopters, K-8 jet trainers, T-85 tanks, F-7 aircraft, small
arms, and ammunition. Beijing also built a turnkey ballistic-missile manufacturing
facility near the city of Rawalpindi and helped Pakistan develop the 750-km-range,
solid-fuelled Shaheen-1 ballistic missile. While the U.S. has sanctioned Pakistan in the
past—in 1965 and again in 1990—China has consistently supported Pakistan’s military
modernization effort. (Curtis, 2009)
What needs to be borne in mind here is that the period specifically mentioned
above, the 1990s, was a period when the Pakistan was unilaterally dependent on
Waheed 19
the United States for the modernization of its security infrastructure. However, the
US sanctions, that had ensued throughout the 1990s as a result of US reservations
on Pakistan’s nuclear programme, were an attempt to influence Pakistan’s deci-
sion with regard to the balance it wished to maintain in the region vis-à-vis India.
At this juncture, Chinese military assistances played a vital role in staving off the
pressure on Pakistan by assisting it in modernizing its army against India and
consequently limiting US influence over Pakistan.
The Pakistani state believes that ‘they have paid too high a price’ (Pande, 2011,
p. 134) for US military and economic aid: ‘Close ties with the US notwithstand-
ing, Pakistan has always resented any attempts by the American administrations
to impose conditions’ (ibid.). In other words, the Pakistani state has remained
wary of US attempts to influence its decisions. Consequently, in China, the
Pakistani state not only found a ‘dependable ally’ (ibid., p. 133) who has ‘never
pressured Pakistan’ (ibid., p. 134), but also an ally with whom military-strategic
cooperation has helped to diversify Pakistan’s dependence and limit US leverage
and continues to do so.
The Pakistan–China relationship has been tested at some occasions (Small,
2015b) and analysts posit that the Chinese–Pakistani partnership may not be as
‘fair-weathered’ as it may seem (Beckley, 2012). Ups and downs in the Pakistan–
China relationship, such as the Kargil conflict with India in 1999 (Kabraji, 2012)
and the ‘issue of Chinese Uighur separatists receiving sanctuary and training
on Pakistani territory’ (Curtis, 2009), along with the growth of unprecedented
economic relations with India (BBC News, 2010), have questioned the longevity
and strength of Pakistan–China relations. However, recent developments, if any-
thing, suggest that the two states remain strategically aligned in protecting their
interests against India, and that will not change soon. For instance ‘over half of
China’s arms exports—namely, 55%—in the 2008–2012 period were to Pakistan’
(Siddique, 2014, p. 36). Two nuclear power complexes are scheduled to be com-
pleted by 2015 and 2016 (ibid.) for which China granted Pakistan US $6.5 billion
in January 2014 (Ersan, 2015). Pakistan has also signed many multimillion dollar
deals with China, ‘including deals for F-22P frigate, AWACS aircraft, JF-17
Thunder and FC-20 aircraft’ (Fazl-e-Haider, 2013) and most recently, China’s US
$46 billion investment plan that includes the strategic China–Pakistan Economic
Corridor has served to contradict claims that the caveats in China–Pakistan rela-
tions are capable to thwart future developments (Beckley, 2012). Pakistan’s
increased leaning towards China for defence commodities and its sway away from
US assistance demonstrate that its years of unilateral dependence on the United
States are largely over. In the foreseeable future, the limited US influence over
Pakistan may further diminish.
Conclusion
Pakistan–US relations have been under considerable scrutiny since both states found
a basis of common interest in the Cold War. For the United States, this interest lay in
its Cold War objective to counter Soviet expansionism; and for Pakistan, an alliance
with the United States helped strengthen its military against India. Yet, over the years,
both states have come to loggerheads when their interests diverged. The United States
has often been frustrated in generating favourable policy outcomes in Pakistan even
though it has been one of the largest foreign aid donors to Pakistan. On the other
hand, Pakistan has suffered considerably at the hands of US sanctions. This article
grounded the discussion on Pakistan–US relations in a patron–client framework and
explored why and how the United States possesses limited influence over Pakistan
despite Pakistan’s overt dependence on US foreign assistance. The article argued that
while the relations both the state displayed had the trapping of a patron–client rela-
tionship, US behaviour often deviated from what should be expected of a patron
state. Further, the US approach of carrots and sticks has not really worked on Pakistan.
Over the years, then, Pakistan has taken an approach to diversify and indigenize its
military arsenal, which signifies a growing realization among policymakers that
Pakistan’s dependence on US military assistance needs to be reduced.
One of the main contributors in Pakistan’s reduced dependence on US military
assistance is the role that the Pakistan–China relationship plays in the regional
dynamic. While analysts and commentators have argued that China’s support to
Pakistan is essentially a means to strengthen Pakistan against India, China has
also played a significant role in decreasing Pakistan’s dependency on US assis-
tance. In view of the trends that have ensued, Pakistan is projected to continuously
reduce its dependency on US military assistance, which will starkly position a
Pakistan–China nexus against a US–India one.
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Article

Pakistan’s Dependence Journal of Asian Security

Ahmed Waqas Waheed1

been a consequence of increased US strategic and geopolitical interests in

administration, confessed that ‘our ability to alter Pakistani developments, at least

interests, especially given Pakistan’s dependence on US foreign assistance.

Establishing Pakistan’s Dependence and Clientelism

States failed to exercise considerable influence over Pakistan? It is understand-

Patronal Behaviour and Limited Influence

A Congressional Research Service Report to Congress (Cronin, Kronstadt &

Proponents of this particular stance believe that Pakistan should be viewed as a

Client Behaviour and Limited Influence

is evidenced in the case of Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions (Ahmed, 2010; Cronin

Tellis further observes:

Pakistani state is moving in a direction to reduce its dependence on US military

Table 1. Pakistan Military Industry Benefiting from Chinese Collaboration

Industry Location Year Manufacturing

The Chinese Factor in Pakistan’s Diminishing

It is quite clear how Pakistan’s political sovereignty, given its India-centricity,

that the development of nuclear weapons by Pakistan would have eventually

The most significant development in China-Pakistan military cooperation occurred in

Dorsey, J. (1980). US hopes to regain a friend in Pakistan. Special to the Christian

Initiative, F.P. (2012). Leveraging Pakistan to prevail in Afghanistan. FPI Analysis.

Moon, B.E. (1985). Consensus or compliance? Foreign-policy change and external

Shoemaker, C.C., & Spanier, J. W. (1984). Patron–client state relationships: Multilateral

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