In RE Harvey v.

Defensor-Santiago, GR 82544, June 28, 1988

FACTS: American nationals Andrew Harvey and John Sherman, 52 and 72 years, respectively,
and Adriaan Van Elshout, 58, a Dutch citizen, are all residing at Pagsanjan, Laguna.
Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago issued Mission Orders to the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation (CID) to apprehended petitioners at their residences.
The “Operation Report” read that Andrew Harvey was found together with two young
boys. Richard Sherman was found with two naked boys inside his room. While Van Den Elshout
in the “after Mission Report” read that two children of ages 14 and 16 has been under his care
and subjects confirmed being live-in for some time now.
Seized during the petitioner’s apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of
suspected child prostitutes shown in scandalous poses as well as boys and girls engaged in sex.
Posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes were also found.
Petitioners were among the twenty-two (22) suspected alien pedophiles who were
apprehended after three months of close surveillance by CID agents in Pagsanjan, Laguna. Only
the three petitioners have chosen to face deportation.
Warrants of Arrest were issued by respondent against petitioners for violation of
Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code. The Board of Special Inquiry III commenced trial against petitioners.
Petitioners filed a Petition for Bail which the CID denied.
Andrew Harvey filed a Manifestation/Motion stating that he had “finally agreed to a
self-deportation” and praying that he be “provisionally released for at least 15 days and placed
under the custody of Atty. Asinas before he voluntarily departs the country.” However, it
appears that on the same date that the aforesaid Manifestation/Motion was filed, Harvey and
his co-petitioners had already filed the present petition.
Petitioners availed of this Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. A Return of the Writ was
filed by the Solicitor General and the Court heard the case on oral argument on 20 April 1988. A
Traverse to the Writ was presented by petitioners to which a Reply was filed by the Solicitor
General.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Immigration Commissioner violated petitioners’
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures
RULING: NO. The arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close
surveillance for three (3) months during which period their activities were monitored. The
existence of probable cause justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo negatives,
photographs and posters without warrant. Those articles were seized as an incident to a lawful
arrest and are therefore admissible in evidence. The fact that petitioners were not “caught in
the act” does not make their arrest illegal.
 The Court rejects petitioners’ contentions and upholds respondent’s official acts ably
defended by the Solicitor General. The Petition is dismissed and the Writ of Habeas Corpus is
hereby denied.
There can be no question that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures
guaranteed by the Constitution is available to all persons, including aliens, whether accused of
crime or not. One of the constitutional requirements of a valid search warrant or warrant of
arrest is that it must be based upon probable cause.
The deportation charges instituted by respondent Commissioner are in accordance with
Section 37(a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, in relation to Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code. The requirement of probable cause, to be determined by a Judge, does
not extend to deportation proceedings.”
What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to
be arrested and deported, that a fair hearing be conducted with the assistance of counsel, if
desired, and that the charge be substantiated by competent evidence.
The denial by respondent Commissioner of petitioners’ release on bail, also challenged
by them, was in order because in deportation proceedings, the right to bail is not a matter of
right but a matter of discretion on the part of the Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation. As deportation proceedings do not partake of the nature of a criminal action, the
constitutional guarantee to bail may not be invoked by aliens in said proceedings.
Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory upon
such grounds as it may deem proper for its self-preservation or public interest. The power to
deport aliens is an act of State, an act done by or under the authority of the sovereign power. It
is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is
found to be injurious to the public good and the domestic tranquillity of the people. Particularly
so in this case where the State has expressly committed itself to defend the tight of children to
assistance and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and
other conditions prejudicial to their development (Article XV, Section 3[2]). Respondent
Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation, in instituting deportation proceedings against
petitioners, acted in the interests of the State.
 People vs. Andre Marti [GR 81561, 18 January 1991]
FACTS: On 14 August 1987, Andre Marti and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the
booth of the Manila Packing and Export Forwarders in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita,
Manila, carrying with them 4 gift-wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no
relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them.

Marti informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich,
Switzerland. Marti filled up the contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein his name,
passport number, the date of shipment and the name and address of the consignee, namely,
"WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland."

Anita Reyes did not inspect the packages as Marti refused, who assured the former that
the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In
view of Marti's representation, the 4 packages were then placed inside a brown corrugated
box, with styro-foam placed at the bottom and on top of the packages, and sealed with masking
tape. Before delivery of Marti's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job
Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating procedure,
opened the boxes for final inspection, where a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. Job pulled out
a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves, and took several grams
of the contents thereof. Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the
NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane
wrapper.

At the Narcotics Section of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the box containing
Marti's packages was opened, yielding dried marijuana leaves, or cake-like (bricks) dried
marijuana leaves. The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the
contents thereof, after signing a "Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said effects.

Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate Marti but to no avail, inasmuch as the latter's
stated address was the Manila Central Post Office. Thereafter, Information was filed against
Marti for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. After trial, the
Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX) rendered the decision,
convicting Marti of violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and
Section 2 (e)(i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act. Marti appealed.

ISSUE: Whether an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of the accused's

constitutional rights, be invoked against the State
HELD: NO. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. The contraband herein, having come into
possession of the Government without the latter transgressing the accused's rights against
unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be
admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged.

The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by
Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe
and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open,
where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search. Where the contraband
articles are identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting officer, there is not the
search that is prohibited by the constitution. The constitutional proscription against unlawful
searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and
its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the
State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. If
the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured
if it is to pass the test of constitutionality.

However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private
establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the
intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be
invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed
by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government.
 People vs. Asis [GR 142531, 15 October 2002]

FACTS: Danilo Asis y Fonperada and Gilbert Formento y Saricon were charged in an Information
dated 18 February 1998; the information stating "That on or about February 10, 1998, in the
City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent
to gain and by means of force and violence upon person, to wit: by then and there stabbing one
YU HING GUAN @ ROY CHING with a bladed instrument on the different parts of the body
thereafter take, rob and carry away the following, to wit: Cash money in the amount of
P20,000.00; one (1) wristwatch' one (1) gold necklace; and undetermined items; or all in the
total amount of P20,000.00 more or less, belonging to said YU HING GUAN @ ROY CHING
against his will, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the aforesaid amount more or
less of P20,000.00, Philippine Currency, and as a result thereof, he sustained mortal stab
wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death." When arraigned on 9 July
1998, both accused pleaded not guilty.

Found to be deaf-mutes, they were assisted, not only by a counsel de oficio, but also by
an interpreter from the Calvary Baptist Church. The prosecution presented 9 witnesses.
Although none of them had actually seen the crime committed, strong and substantial
circumstantial evidence presented by them attempted to link both accused to the crime. After
due trial, both accused were found guilty and sentenced to death.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch 54; Criminal Case 98-163090), on 8
March 2000, held that the "crime charged and proved is robbery with homicide under Article
294, No. 1 of the Revised Penal Code," ruled that "although no witnesses to the actual killing
and robbery were presented, the circumstantial evidence including the recovery of
bloodstained clothing from both accused definitely proved that the two (2) x x x committed the
crime," and appreciated the aggravating circumstances of abuse of confidence, superior
strength and treachery and thus sentenced both accused to the supreme penalty of death.

Hence, the automatic review before the Supreme Court. Both the accused do not
question the legality of their arrest, as they made no objection thereto before the arraignment,
but object to the introduction of the bloodstained pair of shorts allegedly recovered from the
bag of Formento; arguing that the search was illegally done, making the obtainment of the pair
of shorts illegal and taints them as inadmissible. The prosecution, on the other hand, contends
that it was Formento's wife who voluntarily surrendered the bag that contained the
bloodstained trousers of the victim, and thus claims that her act constituted a valid consent to
the search without a warrant.

ISSUE: Whether Formento, a deaf-mute, has given consent to the recovery of the bloodstained
pair of short, in his possession during the warrantless search.

HELD: NO. Primarily, the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures, being
a personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or
who is expressly authorized to so on his or her behalf.

In the present case, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses show that at the time
the bloodstained pair of shorts was recovered, Formento, together with his wife and mother,
was present. Being the very subject of the search, necessarily, he himself should have given
consent. Since he was physically present, the waiver could not have come from any other
person. Lopez vs. Commissioner of Customs does not apply as the accused therein was not
present when the search was made. Further, to constitute a valid waiver, it must be shown that
first, the right exists; second, the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the
existence of such a right; and third, the person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.

Herein, Formento could not have consented to a warrantless search when, in the first
place, he did not understand what was happening at that moment. There was no interpreter to
assist him -- a deaf-mute -- during the arrest, search and seizure. The point in the case Pasion
vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, i.e. "as the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any
affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either
contesting an officer’s authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they
hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto,
but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law," becomes even more
pronounced in the present case, in which Formento is a deaf-mute, and there was no
interpreter to explain to him what was happening. His seeming acquiescence to the search
without a warrant may be attributed to plain and simple confusion and ignorance. The
bloodstained pair of shorts was a piece of evidence seized on the occasion of an unlawful
search and seizure.

Thus, it is tainted and should thus be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of the
poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for
any purpose in any proceeding. Lastly, as to evidence vis-a-is the case in its totality,
circumstantial evidence that merely arouses suspicions or gives room for conjecture is not
sufficient to convict. It must do more than just raise the possibility, or even the probability, of
guilt. It must engender moral certainty. Otherwise, the constitutional presumption of innocence
prevails, and the accused deserves acquittal.