Special Proceeding – April 16, 2019
III. ESCHEAT (RULE 91)
MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA V. COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE, GR L-45460. FEB.
25, 1938, 65 PHIL. 318
Doctrine: Escheat is a proceeding whereby the real and personal property of a deceased person
become the property of the State upon his death without leaving any will or legal heirs. It is not
an ordinary action but a special proceeding which should be commenced by petition and not
by complaint
FACTS:
 The Municipality of San Pedro, Laguna filed in the CFI a petition claiming the Hacienda de
San Pedro Tunasan by the right of Escheat.
 Colegio de San Jose, claiming to be the exclusive owner of the said hacienda, assailed the
petition upon the grounds that the petition does not allege sufficient facts to entitle the
applicants to the remedy prayed for.
 Carlos Young, claiming to be a lessee of the hacienda under a contract legally entered with
Colegio de San Jose, also intervened in the case.
 Municipal Council of San Pedro, Laguna objected to the appearance and intervention of
Colegio de San Jose and Carlos Young but such objection was overruled.
 Furthermore the lower court dismissed the petition filed for by Municipal Council of San
Pedro.
ISSUE: W/N the petition for escheats should be dismissed?
RULING: YES.
Escheat is a proceeding whereby the real and personal property of a deceased person become
the property of the State upon his death without leaving any will or legal heirs. It is not an
ordinary action but a special proceeding. The proceeding should be commenced by a petition
and not by a complaint.
According to Sec. 750 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now Sec 1 of Rule 91), the essential facts
which should be alleged in the petition, which are jurisdictional because they confer
jurisdiction upon the CFI are:
1. That a person died intestate or without leaving any will,
2. That he has left real or personal property and he was the owner thereof,
3. That he has not left any heir or person by law entitled to the property, and
4. That the one who applies for the escheat is the municipality where deceased has his last
residence or in case he should have no residence in the country, the municipality where the
property is situated.
Sec. 751 (now Sec 3 of Rule 91) provides that after the publications and trial, if the court finds
that the deceased is in fact the owner of real and personal property situated in the country
and has not left any heir or other person entitled there to, it may order, after payment of debts
and other legal expenses, the escheat and in such case, it shall adjudicate the personal
property to the municipality where the deceased had his last residence and the real property
to the municipality/ies where they are situated.
In a special proceeding for Escheat under section 750 to 752 (now sec 1 to 3 of Rule 91), the
petitioner is not the sole and exclusive interested party. Any person alleging to have a direct
right or Interest in the property sought to be escheated is likewise an interested and necessary
party and may appear and oppose the petition for escheat.
When a petition for escheat does not state facts which entitle the petitioner to the remedy
prayed for and even admitting them hypothetically, it is clear that there is no ground for the
court to proceed to the Inquisition provided by law, an interested party should not be
disallowed from filing a motion to dismiss the petition which is untenable from all standpoint.
And when the motion to dismiss is entertained upon this ground the petition may be dismissed
unconditionally.
In this case, Colegio de San Jose and Carlos Young had a right to intervene as an alleged
exclusive owner and a lessee of the property respectively.
The Municipal base its right to escheat on the fact that the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan,
temporal property of the Father of the Society of Jesus, were confiscated by the order of the
King of Spain. From the moment it was confiscated, it became the property of the
commonwealth of the Philippines. Given this fact, it is evident that the Municipality cannot
claim that the same be escheated to them, because it is no longer the case of real property
owned by a deceased person who has not left any person which may legally claim it (2nd
requirement lacking).
RCBC V. HI-TRI DEVELOPMENT CORP., GR 192413. JUNE 13, 2012, 672 SCRA 514
Doctrine: Escheat proceedings also refer to the judicial process in which the state, by virtue of
its sovereignty, steps in and claims abandoned, left vacant or unclaimed property without an
interested person having a legal claim thereto.
Facts:
 Luz Bakunawa and her husband Manuel, now deceased (Spouses Bakunawa) are
registered owners of six (6) parcels of land in Quezon City. These lots were sequestered
by the Presidential Commission on Good Government [(PCGG)].
 A certain Teresita Millan (Millan), through her representative, Jerry Montemayor,
offered to buy said lots with the promise that she will take care of clearing whatever
preliminary obstacles there may be to effect a completion of the sale.
 The Spouses Bakunawa gave to Millan the Owners Copies of said TCTs and in turn, Millan
made a downpayment for the intended purchase.
 However, for one reason or another, Millan was not able to clear said obstacles.
 As a result, the Spouses Bakunawa rescinded the sale and offered to return to Millan her
downpayment.

 Millan refused to accept back the down payment.
 Consequently, the Spouses Bakunawa, through their company, the Hi-Tri Development
Corporation (Hi-Tri) took out on a Managers Check from RCBC-Ermita payable to Millan’s
company Rosmil Realty and Development Corporation (Rosmil) c/o Teresita Millan and
used this as one of their basis for a complaint against Millan and Montemayor which they
filed with the Regional Trial Court.
 During the pendency of the above mentioned case and without the knowledge of [Hi-Tri
and Spouses Bakunawa], RCBC reported the ₱1,019,514.29-credit existing in favor of
Rosmil to the Bureau of Treasury as among its unclaimed balances.
 Allegedly, a copy of the Sworn Statement executed by Florentino N. Mendoza, Manager
and Head of RCBCs Asset Management, Disbursement & Sundry Department (AMDSD)
was posted within the premises of RCBC-Ermita.
 Republic, through the [Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)], filed with the RTC the action
below for Escheat.
 Spouses Bakunawa settled amicably their dispute with Rosmil and Millan.But during
negotiations and evidently prior to said settlement, [Manuel Bakunawa, through Hi-Tri]
inquired from RCBC-Ermita the availability of the ₱1,019,514.29 under RCBC Managers
Check.
 [Hi-Tri and Spouses Bakunawa] were however dismayed when they were informed that
the amount was already subject of the escheat proceedings before the RTC.
Issue: Whether or not the escheat (the reversion of property to the state on the owner’s dying
without legal heirs) of the account in RCBC is proper.
Held: No.
Escheat proceedings refer to the judicial process in which the state, by virtue of its sovereignty,
steps in and claims abandoned, left vacant, or unclaimed property, without there being an
interested person having a legal claim thereto. In the case of dormant accounts, the state
inquires into the status, custody, and ownership of the unclaimed balance to determine
whether the inactivity was brought about by the fact of death or absence of or abandonment
by the depositor. If after the proceedings the property remains without a lawful owner
interested to claim it, the property shall be reverted to the state “to forestall an open invitation
to self-service by the first comers.” However, if interested parties have come forward and lain
claim to the property, the courts shall determine whether the credit or deposit should pass to
the claimants or be forfeited in favor of the state. We emphasize that escheat is not a
proceeding to penalize depositors for failing to deposit to or withdraw from their accounts. It
is a proceeding whereby the state compels the surrender to it of unclaimed deposit balances
when there is substantial ground for a belief that they have been abandoned, forgotten, or
without an owner.
In this case, there was no delivery and presentment of the check to the bank for payment did
not occur. An order to debit the account of respondents was never made. In fact, petitioner
confirms that the Manager’s Check was never negotiated nor presented for payment to its
Ermita Branch, and that the allocated fund is still held by the bank. As a result, the assigned
fund is deemed to remain part of the account of Hi-Tri, which procured the Manager’s Check.
Special Proceeding – April 16, 2019
The doctrine that the deposit represented by a manager’s check automatically passes to the
payee is inapplicable, because the instrument —although accepted in advance—remains
undelivered. Hence, respondents should have been informed that the deposit had been left
inactive for more than 10 years, and that it may be subjected to escheat proceedings if left
unclaimed.
Since it was settled that respondents retained ownership of the funds because Rosmil did not
accept the Manager’s Check nor was it further negotiated to other persons and that the
respondents retained custody of the instrument instead of cancelling it. It is obvious from their
foregoing actions that they have not abandoned their claim over the fund, we rule that the
allocated deposit, subject of the Manager’s Check, should be excluded from the escheat
proceedings. We reiterate our pronouncement that the objective of escheat proceedings is
state forfeiture of unclaimed balances, which is absent in this case.
A. WHEN TO FILE THE PETITION
Rule 91 Sec. 1. When and by whom petition filed. - When a person dies intestate, seized of real
or personal property in the Philippines, leaving no heir or person by law entitled to the same,
the Solicitor General or his representative in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, may file
a petition in the Court of First Instance of the province where the deceased last resided or in
which he had estate, if he resided out of the Philippines, setting forth the facts, and praying
that the estate of the deceased be declared escheated.
B. REQUISITES FOR FILING PETITION
CITY OF MANILA V. ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, GR L-10033. AUG. 30, 1917
Doctrine: Under the provisions of section 750 of Act No. 190 property may be declared
escheated when a person dies intestate, seized of real or personal property, leaving no heir or
person by law entitled to the same.
Facts:
 Action was commenced in the Court of First Instance to have declared escheated to the
city of Manila certain property situated in and around said city.
 The theory of the plaintiff is that one Ana Sarmiento was the owner of said property and
died in the year 1668 without leaving "heir or person entitled to the same."
 However, upon examination of evidence, it was adduced:
o that Ana made another will containing provisions for the establishment of a
"Capellanía de Misas;
o that the first chaplain of said capellanía should be her nephew Pedro del Castillo;
o that said will contained a provision for the administration of said property in relation
with the said "Capellanía de Misas" succeeding that of her nephew Pedro del Castillo;
o that such subsequent administration should continue perpetually;
o that said Ana Sarmiento died;
o that for more than two hundred years the intervener, the Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila, through his various agencies, has administered said property;

o that the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila has rightfully and legally succeeded to
the possession and administration of said property in accordance with the terms and
provisions of the will of Ana Sarmiento.
 Action was denied.
Issue: Whether the property may be escheated to City of Manila?
Ruling: No.
Under the provisions of section 750 of Act No. 190 property may be declared escheated when
a person dies intestate, seized of real or personal property, leaving no heir or person by law
entitled to the same. In the present case the deceased disposed of her property by a will and
left heirs entitled to inherit the same. The will clearly, definitely and unequivocally designated
what disposition should be made of the property in question. The property in question is still
being administered in accordance with the terms of the will for the benefit of the real
beneficiary as was intended by the original owner.
C. Remedy of respondent against petition; period for filing a claim
Rule 91 Sec. 4. When and by whom claim to estate filed. - If a devisee, legatee, heir, widow,
widower or other person entitled to such estate appears and files a claim thereto with the
court within five (5) years from the date of such judgment, such person shall have possession
of and title to the same, or if sold, the municipality or city shall be accountable to him for the
proceeds, after deducting reasonable charges for the care of the estate; but a claim not made
within said time shall be forever barred.
BALAIS-MABANAG V. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY, GR 153142. MAR. 29, 2010, 617
SCRA 1
Doctrine: Under Section 7, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185, the Solicitor General or his representative
shall institute escheat proceedings against its violators.
Facts:
 The Coronel brothers executed a document entitled “Receipt of Down payment” in favor
of Ramona Alcaraz upon the receiving P50,000.00 as a down payment for the sale of their
inherited house and lot in Quezon City.
 In the agreement with Ramona, they will execute a deed of absolute sale immediately upon
the transfer of the TCT to the name of the brothers Coronel because the same was named
to their father.
 On Feb.18, 1985, they sold the same property to petitioner herein for a higher contract
price than that of Ramona.
 For this reason, Coronel rescinded the first agreement with Ramona by depositing to her
the down payment of P50, 000.00.
 Consequently, respondents filed a case for specific performance and caused the
annotation of lis pendens over the property.
 On June 5, 1985, TCT 351382 was issued in the name of petitioner herein.
Special Proceeding – April 16, 2019
 RTC ruled in favor of respondents herein ordering the cancellation of the TCT in the name
of petitioner.
 Petitioner thwart the execution by assailing the directive of the RTC for the Branch Clerk
of Court to execute the deed of absolute sale and by blocking the registration of the deed
of absolute sale in the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, on the ground that Ramona was
disqualified from owning land in the Philippines.
Issue: Whether petitioner lacked the capacity to institute suit
Ruling: Yes
The petitioner was not the proper party to challenge Ramona’s qualifications to acquire land.
Under Section 7, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185, the Solicitor General or his representative shall
institute escheat proceedings against its violators. Although the law does not categorically
state that only the Government, through the Solicitor General, may attack the title of an alien
transferee of land, it is nonetheless correct to hold that only the Government, through the
Solicitor General, has the personality to file a case challenging the capacity of a person to
acquire or to own land based on non-citizenship. This limitation is based on the fact that the
violation is committed against the State, not against any individual; and that in the event that
the transferee is adjudged to be not a Filipino citizen, the affected property reverts to the
State, not to the previous owner or any other individual. Herein, even assuming that Ramona
was legally disqualified from owning the subject property, the decision that voids or annuls
their right of ownership over the subject land will not inure to the benefit of the petitioner.
Instead, the subject property will be escheated in favor of the State in accordance with Batas
Pambansa Blg. 185.
IV. GUARDIANSHIP (RULES 92-97)
FRANCISCO V. CA, GR L-57438. JAN. 3, 1984, 212 PHIL. 346
Doctrine: A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which one person,
called a “guardian” acts for another called the “ward” whom the law regards as incapable of
managing his own affairs.
Facts:
Petitioner is the duly appointed guardian of the incompetent Estefania San Pedro in Special
Proceedings of the cfi of Bulacan. Respondent Pelagio Francisco, claiming to be a first cousin
of Estefania San Pedro, together with two others, petitioned the court for the removal of
petitioner and for the appointment in his stead grounded on the failure of the guardian to
submit an inventory of the estate of his ward and to render an accounting. Respondent Judge
also ordered the retirement of petitioner on the ground of old age.
Petitioner also contended that to grant execution pending appeal would render petitioner's
appeal moot and academic that "advanced age" was not one of the, grounds raised by private
respondent in the court below; that the court a quo abuse its discretion in appointing
respondent as guardian despite the fact that private respondent is five (5) years older than
petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not the removal of petitioner as guardian of the ward on the ground of old
age is a good ground for the execution of the decision pending appeal?
Held: Yes
A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which one person, called a
“guardian” acts for another called the “ward” whom the law regards as incapable of managing
his own affairs. A guardianship is designed to further the ward’s well-being, not that of the
guardian. It is intended to preserve the ward’s property, as well as to render any assistance
that the ward may personally require.
Thus, in determining the selection of a guardian, the court may consider the financial situation,
the physical condition, the sound judgment, prudence and trustworthiness, the morals,
character and conduct, and the present and past history of a prospective appointee, as well as
the probability of his being able to exercise the powers and duties of guardian for the full
period during which guardianship will be necessary.
A guardian, once appointed may be removed in case he becomes insane or otherwise
incapable of discharging his trust or unsuitable therefore, or has wasted or mismanaged the
estate, or failed for thirty (30) days after it is due to render an account or make a return.
There is need for petitioner Feliciano Francisco to be retired from the guardianship over the
person and property of incompetent Estefania San Pedro. The conclusion reached by the trial
court about the "rather advanced age" of petitioner at 72 years old (petitioner is now 76 years
old) finding him unfit to continue the trust cannot be disturbed. As correctly pointed out by
the appellate court, this finds direct support in the delay of the accounting and inventory made
by petitioner. To sustain petitioner as guardian would, therefore, be detrimental to the ward.
While age alone is not a control criterion in determining a person's fitness or qualification to
be appointed or be retained as guardian, it may be a factor for consideration.
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS V. EL MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA DE AHORRAS DE
MANILA, GR L-9959. DEC. 13, 1916, 35 PHIL. 72
Facts:
On June 3, 1863, an Earthquake took place in the Philippine Islands, which was then under the
Spanish Crown, that devastated lot of civilians. A central relief board was appointed, by
authority of the King of Spain, to distribute the money voluntarily contributed by donors. After
a thorough investigation and consideration, the relief board allotted $365703.50 to the various
sufferers name in its resolution.
These were later distributed in accordance with the above mentioned allotments, the sum of
$30,299.65, leaving a balance of $365.403.85 for distribution. Upon the petition of the
governing body of the Monte de Piedad, dated February 1, 1833, the Philippine Government,
by order dated the first month, directed its treasured to turn over Monte de Piedad the sum
of $80,000 of relief fund in its installment of 20,000 each. These amounts received on the
following dates: February 15, March 12, April 14, and June 2, 1883, and are still in the
possession of Monte de Piedad.
Special Proceeding – April 16, 2019
The Attorney General in representation of the Philippine Islands, a file of claim for the $80000
together with interest, for the benefit of those persons or their heirs appearing in the list of
names published in the Official Gazette instituted on May, 3, 1912 by the Government of the
Philippine Islands, represented by the Insular Treasurer, and after due trial in the lower court,
judgment was entered in honor of the plaintiff currency, together with legal interest from
February 28, 1912, and cost of cause. The Monte de Piedad then contended that the present
Philippine Government cannot file suit on the ground that the obligation of the former was
wiped out when their was a change of sovereignty.
Issue: Whether or not the government of the Philippine Islands has capacity to file a suit against
the Monte de Piedad for the recovery of the said amount.
Ruling: Yes
Under the Principle of Parens Patriae, the Philippine Government being the guardian of the
“rights of the people” can represent the legitimate claimants of the beneficiary and therefore
has the capacity to file a suit against the appellant. The Philippine Government is not merely a
nominal party that’s why it can bring and prosecute this action by exercising its sovereign
powers. The supreme court then held the right of the government to file the case.
A. GENERAL POWERS AND DUTIES OF GUARDIANS
RULE 96
Section 1. To what guardianship shall extend. — A guardian appointed shall have the care and
custody of the person of his ward, and the management of his estate, or the manangement of
the estate only, as the case may be. The guardian of the estate of a non-resident shall have the
management of all the estate of the ward within the Philippines, and no court other than that
in which such guardian was appointed shall have jurisdiction over the guardianship.
Section 2. Guardian to pay debts of ward. — Every guardian must pay the ward's just debts out
of his personal estate and the income of his real estate, if sufficient; if not, then out of his real
estate upon obtaining an order for the sale or encumbrance thereof.
Section 3. Guardian to settle accounts, collect debts, and appear in actions for ward. — A
guardian must settle all accounts of his ward, and demand, sue for, and receive all debts due
him, or may, with the approval of the court, compound for the same and give discharges to
the debtor, on receiving a fair and just dividend of the estate and effects; and he shall appear
for and represent his ward in all actions and special proceedings, unless another person be
appointed for that purpose.
Section 4. Estate to be managed frugally, and proceeds applied to maintenance of ward. — A
guardian must manage the estate of his ward frugally and without the waste, and apply the
income and profits thereof, so far as may be necessary, to the comfortable and suitable
maintenance of the ward and his family, if there be any; and if such income and profits be
insufficient for that purpose, the guardian may sell or encumber the real estate, upon being

authorized by order so to do, and apply to such of the proceeds as may be necessary to such
maintenance.
Section 5. Guardian may be authorized to join in partition proceedings after hearing. — The
court may authorized the guardian to join in an assent to a partition of real or personal estate
held by the ward jointly or in common with others, but such authority shall only be granted
after hearing, upon such notice to relatives of the ward as the court may direct, and a careful
investigation as to the necessity and propriety of the proposed action.
Section 6. Proceedings when the person suspected of embezzling or concealing property of
ward. — Upon complaint of the guardian or ward, or of any person having actual or prospective
interest in the estate of the ward as creditor, heir, or otherwise, that anyone is suspected of
having embezzled, concealed, or conveyed away any money, goods, or interest, or a written
instrument, belonging to the ward or his estate, the court may cite the suspected person to
appear for examination touching such money, goods, interest, or instrument, and make such
orders as will secure the estate against such embezzlement, concealment or conveyance.
Section 7. Inventories and accounts of guardians, and appraisement of estates. — A guardian
must render to the court an inventory of the estate of his ward within three (3) months after
his appointment, and annually after such appointment an inventory and account, the rendition
of any of which may be compelled upon the application of an interested person. Such
inventories and accounts shall be sworn to by the guardian. All the estate of the ward described
in the first inventory shall be appraised. In the appraisement the court may request the
assistance of one or more of the inheritance tax appraisers. And whenever any property of the
ward not included in an inventory already rendered is discovered, or suceeded to, or acquired
by the ward, like proceedings shall be had for securing an inventory and appraisement thereof
within three (3) months after such discovery, succession, or acquisition.
Section 8. When guardian's accounts presented for settlement. Expenses and compensation
allowed. — Upon the expiration of a year from the time of his appointment, and as often
thereafter as may be required, a guardian must present his account to the court for settlement
and allowance. In the settlement of the account, the guardian, other than a parent, shall be
allowed the amount of his reasonable expenses incurred in the execution of his trust and also
such compensation for his services as the court deems just, not exceeding fifteen per centum
of the net income of the ward.
B. CONDITIONS OF THE BOND OF THE GUARDIAN
Rule 94 Section 1 - Before a guardian appointed enters upon the execution of his trust,
or letters of guardianship issue, he shall give a bond, in such sum as the court directs,
conditioned as follows:
a. To make and return to the court, within three (3) months, a true and complete
inventory of all the estate, real and personal, of his ward which shall come to his
possession or knowledge of any other person for him;
Special Proceeding – April 16, 2019
b. To faithfully execute the duties of his trust, to manage and dispose of the estate
according to these rules for the best interests of the ward, and to provide for the
proper care, custody, and education of the ward;
c. To render a true and just account of all the estate of the ward in his hands, and of
all proceeds or interest derived therefrom, and of the management and disposition
of the same, at the time designated by these rules and such other times as the
courts directs, and at the expiration of his trust to settle his accounts with the court
and deliver and pay over all the estate, effects, and moneys remaining in his hands,
or due from him on such settlement, to the person lawfully entitled thereto;
d. To perform all orders of the court by him to be performed.
C. RULE ON GUARDIANSHIP OVER MINOR (AM 03-02-05-SC)
CABALES V. CA, GR 162421. AUG. 31, 2007, 531 SCRA 691
FACTS:
Sometime in 1964, Rurfino Cabales died leaving behind a parcel of land in Southern Leyte to
his wife, Saturnina and six children, namely, Bonifacio, Francisco, Alberto, Albino, Lenora, and
Rito. On 1971, the brothers and co-owners Bonifacio, Alberto and Albino sold the property to
Dr. Corrompido with a right to repurchase within eight (8) years. On 1972, prior to the
redemption of the property, Alberto died leaving behind his wife and son, Nelson, herein
petitioner.
Sometime later and within the redemption period, the said brothers and their mother, in lieu
of Alberto, tendered their payment to Dr. Corrompido. Subsequently, Saturnina, and her four
children, Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco and Leonora sold the said land to Spouses Feliano. It was
provided in the deed of sale that the shares of Nelson and Rito, being minor at the time of the
sale, will be held in trust by the vendee and will paid upon them reaching the age of 21.
In 1986, Rito received the sum of 1,143 pesos from the Spouses Feliano representing his share
from the proceeds of the sale of the property. It was only in 1988, that Nelson learned of the
sale from his uncle, Rito. He signified his intention to redeem the property in 1993 but it was
only in 1995 that he filed a complaint for redemption against the Spouses Feliano. The
respondent Spouses averred that the petitioners are estopped from denying the sale since: (1)
Rito already received his share; and (2) Nelson, failed to tender the total amount of the
redemption price.
The Regional Trial Court ruled in favour of Spouses Feliano on the ground that Nelson was no
longer entitled to the property since, his right was subrogated by Saturnina upon the death of
his father, Alberto. It also alleged that Rito had no more right to redeem since Saturnina, being
his legal guardian at the time of the sale was properly vested with the right to alienate the
same.
The Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court stating that the sale made by
Saturnina in behalf of Rito and Nelson were unenforceable.

ISSUE: Whether or not the sale made by a legal guardian (Saturnina) in behalf of the minors
were binding upon them.
HELD:
With regard to the share of Rito, the contract of sale was valid. Under Section 1, Rule 96 “A
guardian shall have the care and custody of the person of his ward, and the management of
his estate, or the management of the estate only. x x x” Indeed, the legal guardian only has the
plenary power of administration of the minor’s property. It does not include the power of
alienation which needs judicial authority. Thus, when Saturnina, as legal guardian of petitioner
Rito, sold the latter’s pro indiviso share in subject land, she did not have the legal authority to
do so. Accordingly, the contract as to the share of Rito was unenforceable. However, when he
received the proceeds of the sale, he effectively ratified it. This act of ratification rendered the
sale valid and binding as to him.
With respect to petitioner Nelson, the contract of sale was void. He was a minor at the time of
the sale. Saturnina or any and all the other co-owners were not his legal guardians; rather it
was his mother who if duly authorized by the courts, could validly sell his share in the property.
Consequently, petitioner Nelson retained ownership over their undivided share in the said
property. However, Nelson can no longer redeem the property since the thirty day redemption
period has expired and thus he remains as co-owner of the property with the Spouses Feliano.
HERNANDEZ V. SAN JUAN-SANTOS, GR 166470, AUG. 7, 2009, 595 SCRA 464
Doctrine: Persons who, though of sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other
similar causes are incapable of taking care of themselves and their property without outside
aid, are considered as incompetents who may properly be placed under guardianship.
Facts:
Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez (or Lulu) was born on February 14, 1947 to the spouses
Felix Hernandez and Maria San Juan Hernandez. Unfortunately, the latter died due to
complications during childbirth. After Maria's death, Felix left Lulu in the care of her maternal
uncle, Sotero C. San Juan.
On December 16, 1951, Felix married Natividad Cruz. The union produced three children,
petitioners Cecilio C. Hernandez, Ma. Victoria C. Hernandez-Sagun and Teresa C. Hernandez-
Villa Abrille.
Meanwhile, as the only child of Maria and the sole testate heir of Sotero, Lulu inherited
valuable real properties from the San Juan family (conservatively estimated at P50 million in
1997).
Sometime in 1957, Lulu went to live with her father and his new family. She was then 10 years
old and studying at La Consolacion College. However, due to her violent personality, Lulu
stopped schooling when she reached Grade 5.
In 1968, upon reaching the age of majority, Lulu was given full control of her estate.
Nevertheless, because Lulu did not even finish her elementary education, Felix continued to
Special Proceeding – April 16, 2019
exercise actual administration of Lulus properties. Upon Felix's death in 1993, petitioners took
over the task of administering Lulu's properties.
Medical specialists testified to explain the results of Lulus examinations which revealed the
alarming state of her health. Not only was Lulu severely afflicted with diabetes mellitus and
suffering from its complications, she also had an existing artheroselorotic cardiovascular
disease (which was aggravated by her obesity). Furthermore, they unanimously opined that in
view of Lulus intelligence level (which was below average) and fragile mental state, she would
not be able to care for herself and self-administer her medications.
Issue: Whether Lulu is an incompetent who requires the appointment of a judicial guardian
over her person and property.
Ruling: Yes
Under Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court, persons who, though of sound mind but by
reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes are incapable of taking care of
themselves and their property without outside aid, are considered as incompetents who may
properly be placed under guardianship. The RTC and the CA both found that Lulu was incapable
of taking care of herself and her properties without outside aid due to her ailments and weak
mind. Thus, since determining whether or not Lulu is in fact an incompetent would require a
reexamination of the evidence presented in the courts a quo, it undoubtedly involves
questions of fact.
Inasmuch as respondent’s appointment as the judicial guardian of Lulu was proper, the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in her favor was also in order. A writ of habeas corpus
extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention or by which the rightful custody of
person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. Respondent, as the judicial guardian of Lulu,
was duty-bound to care for and protect her ward. For her to perform her obligation,
respondent must have custody of Lulu. Thus, she was entitled to a writ of habeas corpus after
she was unduly deprived of the custody of her ward.
PEOPLE V. FLORES, GR 188315. AUG. 25, 2010, 629 SCRA 478
Doctrine: Jurisprudence dictates that the guardian must be a person who has legal relationship
with his ward.
FACTS:
AAA lived with her adoptive mother, BBB, since she was just a few months old. BBB is married
to appellant, who was working abroad for six years. Appellant came home in 1997 and lived
with AAA and BBB. BBB was working as a restaurant supervisor from 4pm to 2am for six days
a week. In February 1999 at around 9:30 pm, AAA then 11 yrs old, was sleeping inside the
house when she felt and saw appellant touch her thighs. The following day, at around the same
time and while BBB was at work, appellant again touched AAA from her legs up to her breast.
Two weeks after the incident, AAA was already asleep when she suddenly woke up and saw
appellant holding a knife, then appellant was able to penetrate her. Two days after, appellant
again raped her. AAA recounted that appellant raped her at least 3 times a week at the same

time until October 15, 2002, when she was 14 yrs. old. RTC rendered judgment finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 181 counts of rape.CA affirmed the finding that
AAA was raped by appellant, but did so only on 2 counts and consider the qualifying
circumstances of minority and relationship.
ISSUE: Whether or not appellant should be consider as a guardian of the victim even without
court authority
HELD: No
Jurisprudence dictates that the guardian must be a person who has a legal relationship with
his ward. The theory that a guardian must be legally appointed was first enunciated in the early
case of People vs. Dela Cruz which held that the guardian referred to in the law is either a legal
or judicial guardian as understood in the rules on Civil Procedure. The law requires a legal or
judicial guardian since it is the consanguineous relation or the solemnity of judicial
appointment which impresses upon the guardian the lofty purpose of his office and normally
deters him from violating its objectives. The appellant cannot be considered as the guardian
falling within the ambit of the amendatory provision introduced by RA 7659. Since both logic
and fact conjointly demonstrate that he is actually only a custodian, that is, a mere caretaker
of the children over whom he exercises a limited degree of authority for a temporary period,
we cannot impose death penalty contemplated for a real guardian under RA 7659, since he
does not fit into that category. Be that as it may, this qualifying circumstance of being a
guardian was not even mentioned in the Information.
What was clearly stated was that appellant was the “adopting father” of AAA, which the
prosecution nonetheless failed to establish. For failure of the prosecution to prove the
qualifying circumstance of relationship, appellant could only be convicted for two counts of
simple rape, and not qualified rape.
UY V. CA, GR 109557. NOV. 29, 2000, 346 SCRA 246
Doctrine: A spouse who desires to sell real property as such administrator of the conjugal
property must observe the procedure for the sale of the ward’s estate required of judicial
guardians under Rule 95, 1964 Revised Rules of Court, not the summary judicial proceedings
under the Family Code
Facts:
Teodoro Jardeleza, petitioner, filed a petition in the matter of the guardianship of Dr. Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr., upon learning that one piece of real property belonging to the latter spouses
was about to be sold. The petitioner averred therein that the present physical and mental
incapacity of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza Sr. prevent him from competently administering his
properties, in order to prevent the loss and dissipation of the Jardeleza’s real and personal
assets, there was a need for a court-appointed guardian to administer said properties.
Gilda Jardeleza, respondent, filed a petition regarding the declaration of incapacity of Dr.
Ernesto Jardeleza Sr., assumption of sole powers of administration of conjugal properties and
authorization to sell the property. She alleged that her husband’s medical treatment and
Special Proceeding – April 16, 2019
hospitalization expenses were piling up and that she need to sell one piece of real property
and its improvements. She prayed for authorization from the court to sell said property.
RTC of Iloilo City rendered its decision, finding that it was convinced that Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza
Sr. was truly incapacitated to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties.
However, Teodoro filed his opposition to the proceedings being unaware and not knowing that
a decision has already been rendered on the case. He also questioned the propriety of the sale
of the lot and its improvements thereon supposedly to pay the accumulated financial
obligations and hospitalization.
Issue: Whether or not Gilda Jardeleza may assume sole powers of administration of the
conjugal property under Article 124 of Family Code?
Ruling: No
The rule on summary proceedings does not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse
is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In this case, trial court found that subject
spouse was incompetent who was in a comatose condition and with a diagnosis of brain stem
infract. Hence, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceeding under the Revised
Rules of Court. The law provides that wife who assumes sole powers of administration has the
same powers and duties as a guardian. Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real
property as administrator of the conjugal property, must observe the procedure for the sale of
the ward’s estate required of judicial guardians, and not the summary judicial proceedings
under Family Code. SC further held that such incapacity of the trial court to provide for an
opportunity to be heard is null and void on the ground of lack of due process.
V. TRUSTEES (RULE 98)
A. RTC TO APPOINT A TRUSTEE
Section 1. Where trustee appointed. — A trustee necessary to carry into effect the provisions
of a will on written instrument shall be appointed by the Court of First Instance in which the
will was allowed, if it be a will allowed in the Philippines, otherwise by the Court of First
Instance of the province in which the property, or some portion thereof, affected by the trust
is situated.
B. TRUSTEE DISTINGUISHED FROM EXECUTOR/ADMINISTRATOR
Trustee
- Holds an office of trust
- Duties may cover a wider range, and are usually governed by the intention of the
trustor or the parties (if established by contract)
Executor/ Administrator
- Holds an office of trust
- Duties are fixed and/or limited by law [Araneta v. Perez (1962)]
C. CONDITIONS DEEMED WRITTEN IN THE BOND
 Special Proceeding – April 16, 2019

Section 6. Conditions included in bond. — The following conditions shall be deemed to be part
of the bond whether written therein or not;

(a) That the trustee will make and return to the court, at such time as it may order, a true
inventory of all the real and personal estate belonging to him as trustee, which at the time of
the making of such inventory shall have come to his possession or knowledge;

(b) That he will manage and dispose of all such estate, and faithfully discharge his trust in
relation thereto, according to law and the will of the testator or the provisions of the
instrument or order under which he is appointed;

(c) That he will render upon oath at least once a year until his trust is fulfilled, unless he is
excused therefrom in any year by the court, a true account of the property in his hands and
the management and disposition thereof, and will render such other accounts as the court may
order;

(d) That at the expiration of his trust he will settle his account in court and pay over and deliver
all the estate remaining in his hands, or due from him on such settlement, to the person or
persons entitled to thereto.

But when the trustee is appointed as a successor to a prior trustee, the court may dispense
with the making and return of an inventory, if one has already been filed, and in such case the
condition of the bond shall be deemed to be altered accordingly.

D. GROUNDS FOR THE REMOVAL AND RESIGNATION OF A TRUSTEE

Grounds for removal of a trustee: [Rule 98, Sec. 8]
1) If essential to the interests of the party petitioning the removal
a. Requires petition of a beneficially interested person, notice to trustee and hearing.
2) If trustee becomes insane or otherwise incapable/unsuitable of discharging the trust;
a. Requires notice to all interested parties.
3) If trustee assumes to be possessing in his own right and thus renounces the trust.

General Rule: A trustee cannot acquire the trust estate by prescription because for the purpose
of prescription, the possession of the property by the trustee is not an adverse possession, but
only a possession in behalf of the owner of the same. [Palma v. Cristobal]

Exception: If there is an open, clear and unequivocal repudiation of the trust, and the
beneficiary knows of the repudiation. [Salinas v. Tuazon]

A trustee may resign if it is proper for the court to allow him, whether the trustee was
appointed by the court or by a will.

E. EXTENT OF AUTHORITY OF TRUSTEE

TERRITORIALITY OF TRUSTEE’S AUTHORITY – The powers of a trustee appointed by a
Philippine court cannot extend beyond the confines of the Philippine territory.