leaders with whom he felt the closest relations. Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton deferred to Erdogan's leadership in the Middle East, stating in 2011, at the early stage of the Syrian crisis, that the United States would follow Turkey's lead. Erdogan basked in this praise, calling the 2011 AKP election triumph a victory not just for Turkey, but for its Ottoman heritage. Indeed, as far back as October 2009, his foreign minister had explicitly invoked Turkey's former imperial grandeur: "As in the sixteenth century, when the Ottoman Balkans were rising, we will once again make the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East, together with Turkey, the center of world politics in the future. That is the goal of Turkish foreign policy and we will achieve it." But for this and other reasons, Erdogan's critics doubt his commitment to democracy. They note that in his early career he openly advocated for the political empowerment of Islamic law and likened democracy to a train that one can choose to leave at any time. They note, too, that his government has not only expanded the sphere for ordinary expressions of Islam-for example, the wearing of headscarves—but has at the same time contracted the universe of other liberties. Indeed, his critics, especially journalists and even sitting members of Parliament, often find themselves sued or in jail. They whisper of a growing culture of fear that grips Erdogan's foes. In addition to the threats to freedom of expression, concerns about the nature of Erdogan's governance and his future plans have generally focused on three important domestic arenas. First, his slow, artful, implacable, and legally high-handed prosecutorial attacks on the old military leadership, long-time guardian of the Ataturk-envisioned secular order. These have been characterized by very long pre-trial detentions and the use of possibly forged evidence, practices that have generated criticism from the EU, which was generally sympathetic to the desire to rein in the military. Second, Erdogan's steady promotion of Islam throughout Turkey's bureaucracies and particularly in schools to raise what he called a "new religious generation" and promote a more religious Turkey. Third, his attempt to solve Turkey's longstanding problem with its large Kurdish minority's demands for respect and cultural freedom not by structural reforms but by appeals to "common Islamic values." Yet in the last year Kurdish terrorism inside Turkey has reached a level of violence not seen for over a decade. The state has lost control of much 44 WORLD AFFAIRS