International Climate Change Law

 Introduction

I. Climate Change as an Intractable Policy

Climate Change is characterized as the defining issue of our age according to United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki –
Moon, and is said to be one of the most difficult problems ever faced.

Climate Change is caused by a wide range of production and consumption process. Its causes and effects are global, and
require collective action. For a variety of reasons, however, it has proven extremely difficult to secure international
agreement, as International Law generally has difficulty solving collective action problems because it lacks strong tools
to secure participation and compliance, and thus provides only a measure of assurance to states that, if they act, others
will reciprocate.

There are several features of the climate change that exacerbate it:

1. Climate Change implicates virtually every aspect of a state’s domestic policies – energy, agriculture,
transportation, urban planning and so forth.
2. Climate change requires people to act now to address a long – term and , in some cases, uncertain threat.

II. Three Perspectives on the Climate Change Problem

Climate Change as an Environmental Problem

The goal of international climate change policy is to prevent dangerous anthropogenic climate change by reducing net
GHG emissions. Given the persistence of CO2 in the atmosphere, the goal of preventing dangerous climate change will
eventually require completely eliminating net emissions, as the 2015 Paris Agreement recognizes.

Climate Change as an Economic Problem

From this perspective, the goal of climate policy is to achieve the efficient outcome – that is, the outcome with the
highest net benefits. Accordingly, we should reduce emissions only so long as the benefits of further reductions
outweigh the costs.

Climate Change as an ethical problem

Cost – benefit analysis simply seeks to maximize aggregate economic value and does not address the ethical issues
raised by climate change.

III. Demarcating International Climate Change Law

Climate change has been a major international issue since the late 1980s, and states have developed a significant body
of international law in response.

IV. The Subject Matter of International Climate Change Law

International law focuses on four basic issues: (1) mitigation of climate change – that is, limiting it or preventing it from
happening; (2) adaptation to climate change, in order to limit its harmful effects; (3) financial and other means of
support for mitigation and adaptation; and (4) international oversight to promote implementation, compliance and
effectiveness.

A. Mitigation

- Issues relating to mitigation include whether to address emissions on an economy – wide basis or at a
sectoral level and whether to regulate greenhouse gases comprehensively or gas – by – gas
- Encompasses both measures to limit GHG emissions and measures to preserve or enhance sinks.

B. Adaptation

- It involves anticipating the adverse effects of climate change and taking appropriate action to prevent or
minimize the damage they can cause.
- It can be undertaken by individual states.

C. Finance

- It involves magnitude of issues such as what should be the overall magnitude of international funding and
where should international funding come from

D. Oversight

- It encompasses mechanisms to promote implementation, compliance, and effectiveness. These can include
(1) national reporting on CHG emissions and on mitigation and adaptation measures, (2) expert review of
information provided by states, (3) mechanisms to assess implementation and compliance, (4) reviews of
effectiveness, and (5) formal dispute settlement.

V. Recurring Themes in the UN Climate Change

The UN climate regime has explored different solutions – tweaking, amending, and even changing course. Three
recurring issues have characterized these explorations : the legal form of climate instruments; and differentiate among
countries, in particular, between developed and developing countries.

 Treaty No. 30822. Multilateral: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate

Change
(concluded at New York on 9 May 1992)

The Parties to this Convention:

1. Acknowledqe that change in the Earth's climate and its adverse effects are a common concern of humankind;
2. Concerned that human activities have been substantially increasing the atmospheric concentrations of
greenhouse gases, that these increases enhance the natural greenhouse effect, and that this will result on
average in an additional warming of the Earth's surface and atmosphere and may adversely affect natural
ecosystems and humankind,
3. Note that the largest share of historical and current global emissions of greenhouse gases has originated in
developed countries, that per capita emissions in developing countries are still relatively low and that the share
of global emissions originating in developing countries will grow to meet their social and development needs;
4. Aware of the role and importance in terrestrial and marine ecosystems of sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse
gases;
 5. Note that there are many uncertainties in predictions of climate change, particularly with regard to the timing,
magnitude and regional patterns thereof; and
6. Acknowledge that the global nature of climate change calls for the widest possible cooperation by all countries
and their participation in an effective and appropriate international response, in accordance with their common
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and their social and economic conditions.

OBJECTIVE

The objective of this convention is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization
of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems
to adapt naturally to climate chanqe, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic
development to proceed in a sustainable manner. (Article 2)

PRINCIPLES

The following are the key guidelines in the parties’ actions to achieve the convention’s objective (Article 3):
a. the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof
(Paragraph 1);
b. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a
reason for postponinq such measures, taking into account that policies and measures to deal with climate
change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost (Paragraph 3); and
c. Measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary
or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade (Paragraph 5)

COMMITMENTS

The key point under Article Article 4 is Paragraph 8 which provides that In the implementation of the commitments in
this Article, the Parties shall give full consideration to what actions are necessary under the Convention, including
actions related to funding, insurance and the transfer of technology, to meet the specific needs and concerns of
developing country Parties arising from the adverse effects of climate change and/or the impact of the implementation
of response measures, especially on:

(a) Small island countries;

(b) Countries with low-lying coastal areas;
(c) Countries with arid and semi-arid areas, forested areas and areas liable to forest decay
(d) Countries with areas prone to natural disasters
(e) Countries with areas liable to drought and desertification;
(f) Countries with areas of high urban atmospheric pollution;
(g) Countries with areas with fragile ecosystems, including mountainous ecosystems;
(h) countries whose economies are highly dependent on income generated from the production, processing and export,
and/or on consumption of fossil fuels and associated energy-intensive products) and
(i) Land-locked and transit countries.

Further, the Conference of the Parties may take actions, as appropriate, with respect to this paragraph.

CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES

A Conference of the Parties is hereby established. The conference of the parties, as the supreme body of this
convention, shall keep under regular review the implementation of the Convention and any related legal instruments
that the Conference of the Parties may adopt, and shall make, within its mandate, the decisions necessary to promote
the effective implementation of the Convention. To this end, it shall:
(a) Periodically examine the obligations of the Parties and the institutional arrangements under the Convention, in the
light of the objective of the Convention, the experience gained in its implementation and the evolution of scientific and
technological knowledge;

(b) Promote and facilitate the exchange of information on measures adopted by the Parties to address climate change
and its effects, taking into account the differing circumstances, responsibilities and capabilities of the Parties and their
respective commitments under the Convention;
(c) Facilitate, at the request of two or more Parties, the coordination of measures adopted by them to address climate
change and its effects, taking into account the differing circumstances, responsibilities and capabilities of the Parties and
their respective commitments under the Convention;

(d) Promote and guide, in accordance with the objective and provisions of the convention, the development and
periodic refinement of comparable methodologies, to be agreed on by the Conference of the Parties, inter alia, for
preparing inventories of greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks, and for evaluating the
effectiveness of measures to limit the emissions and enhance the removals of these gases;

(e) Assess, on the basis of all information made available to it in accordance with the provisions of the Convention, the
implementation of the Convention by the Parties, the overall effects of the measures taken pursuant to the Convention,
in particular environmental, economic and social effects as well as their cumulative impacts and the extent to which
progress towards the objective of the Convention is being achieved;

(f) Consider and adopt regular reports on the implementation of the Convention and ensure their publication;

(g) Make recommendations on any matters necessary for the implementation of the Conventions;

(h) Seek to mobilize financial resources in accordance with Article 4, paragraphs 3, 4 and 5, and Article 11;

(i) Establish such subsidiary bodies as are deemed necessary for the implementation of the Convention;

(J) Review reports submitted by its subsidiary bodies and provide guidance to them;

(k) Agree upon and adopt, by consensus, rules of procedure and financial rules for itself and for any subsidiary bodies;

(1) Seek and utilize, where appropriate, the services and cooperation of, and information provided by, competent
international organizations and intergovernmental and non-governmental bodies; and

(m) Exercise such other functions as are required for the achievement of the objective of the Convention as well as all
other functions assigned to it under the Convention.
The Conference of the Parties shall, at its first session, adopt its own rules of procedure as well as those of the subsidiary
bodies established by the Convention, which shall include decision-making procedures for matters not already covered
by decision-making procedures stipulated in the Convention. Such procedures may include specified majorities required
for the adoption of particular decisions. The first session of the Conference of the Parties shall be convened by the
interim secretariat referred to in Article 21 and shall take place not later than one year after the date of entry into force
of the Convention. Thereafter, ordinary sessions of the Conference of the Parties shall be held every year unless
otherwise decided by the Conference of the Parties. Extraordinary sessions of the Conference of the Parties shall be held
at such other times as may be deemed necessary by the Conference, or at the written request of any Party, provided
that, within six months of the request being communicated to the Parties by the secretariat, it is supported by at least
one-third of the Parties. The United Nations, its specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well
as any State member there6f or observers thereto not Party to the Convention, may be represented at sessions of the
Conference of the Parties as observers. Any body or agency, whether national or international, governmental or non-
governmental, which is qualified in matters covered by the Convention, and which has informed the secretariat of its
wish to be represented at a session of the Conference of the Parties as an observer, may be so admitted unless at least
one-third of the Parties present object. The admission and participation of observers shall be subject to the rules of
procedure adopted by the Conference of the Parties. (Article 7)

SUBSIDIARY BODY FOR IMPLEMENTATION

A subsidiary body for implementation is hereby established to assist the Conference of the Parties in the assessment and
review of the effective implementation of the Convention. This body sh411 be open to participation by all Parties and
comprise government representatives who are experts on matters related to climate change. It shall report regularly to
the Conference of the Parties on all aspects of its work. Under the guidance of the Conference of the Parties, this body
shall:
(a) Consider the information communicated in accordance with Article 12, paragraph 1, to assess the overall aggregated
effect of the steps taken by the Parties in the light of the latest scientific assessments concerning climate changes
(b) Consider the information communicated in accordance with Article 12, paragraph 2, in order to assist the Conference
of the Parties in carrying out the reviews required by Article 4, paragraph 2 (d)s and (c) Assist the Conference of the
Parties, as appropriate, in the preparation and implementation of its decisions. (Article 10)

RESOLUTION OF QUESTIONS REGARDING IMPLEMENTATION

The parties shall consider the establishment of a multilateral consultative process, available to Parties on their request,
for the resolution of questions regarding the implementation of the Convention. (Article 13)

SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

In the event of a dispute between any two or more Parties concerning the interpretation or application of the
Convention, the Parties concerned shall seek a settlement of the dispute through negotiation or any other peaceful
means of their own choice.
When ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to the Convention, or at any time thereafter, a Party which is not a
regional economic integration organization may declare in a written instrument submitted to the Depositary that, in
respect of any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention, it recognizes as compulsory ipso
facto and without special agreement, in relation to any Party accepting the same obligation:
(a) Submission of the dispute to the International Court of Justice, and/or
(b) Arbitration in accordance with procedures to be adopted by the Conference of the Parties as soon as practicable, in
an annex on arbitration.
A Party which is a regional economic integration organization may make a declaration with like effect in relation to
arbitration in accordance with the procedures referred to in subparagraph (b) above.
A declaration made above shall remain in force until it expires in accordance with its terms or until three months after
written notice of its revocation has been deposited with the Depositary.
A new declaration, a notice of revocation or the expiry of a declaration shall not in any way affect proceedings pending
before the International Court of Justice or the arbitral tribunal, unless the parties to the dispute otherwise agree.
Subject to the operation of paragraph 2 above, if after twelve months following notification by one Party to another that
a dispute exists between them, the Parties concerned have not been able to settle their dispute through the means
mentioned in paragraph 1 above, the dispute shall be submitted, at the request of any of the parties to the dispute, to
conciliation.
A conciliation commission shall be created upon the request of one of the parties to the dispute. The commission shall
be composed of an equal number of members appointed by each party concerned and a chairman chosen jointly by the
members appointed by each party. The commission shall render a recommendatory award, which the parties shall
consider in good faith.
Additional procedures relating to conciliation shall be adopted by the Conference of the Parties, as soon as practicable,
in an annex on conciliation.
The provisions of this Article shall apply to any related legal instrument which the Conference of the Parties may adopt,
unless the instrument provides otherwise. (Article 14)
 AMENDMENTS

Any Party may propose amendments to the Convention. Amendments to the Convention shall be adopted at an ordinary
session of the Conference of the Parties. The text of any proposed amendment to the Convention shall be
communicated to the Parties by the secretariat at least six months before the meeting at which it is proposed for
adoption. The secretariat shall also communicate proposed amendments to the signatories to the Convention and, for
information, to the Depositary. The Parties shall make every effort to reach agreement on any proposed amendment to
the Convention by consensus. if all efforts at consensus have been exhausted, and no agreement reached, the
amendment shall as a last resort be adopted by a three-fourths majority vote of the Parties present and voting at the
meeting. The adopted amendment shall be communicated by the secretariat to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to
all Parties for their acceptance. Instruments of acceptance in respect of an amendment shall be deposited with the
Depositary. An amendment adopted in accordance with paragraph 3 above shall enter into force for those Parties
having accepted it on the ninetieth day after the date of receipt by the Depositary of an instrument of acceptance by at
least three-fourths of the Parties to the Convention. The amendment shall enter into force for any other Party on the
ninetieth day after the date on which that Party deposits with the Depositary its instrument of acceptance of the said
amendment. For the purposes of this Article, "Parties present and voting” means Parties present and casting an
affirmative or negative vote. (Article 15)

PROTOCOLS

Only the parties to the convention may be parties to a protocol, which they may be adopted at any ordinary session. The
text of any proposed protocol shall be communicated to the Parties by the secretariat at least six months before such a
session. The requirements for the entry into force of any protocol shall be established by that instrument. (Article 17)

RIGHT TO VOTE

Each Party to the Convention shall have one vote, except in the case of a regional economic integration organizations,
which shall exercise their right to vote with a number of votes equal to the number of their member States that are
Parties to the Convention. Such an organization shall not exercise its right to vote if any of its member States exercises
its right, and vice versa. (Article 18)

SIGNATURE

This Convention shall be open for signature by States Members of the United Nations or of any of its specialized
agencies or that are Parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice and by regional economic integration
organizations at Rio de Janeiro, during the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, and thereafter
at United Nations Headquarters in New York from 20 June 1992 to 19 June 1993. (Article 20)

RATIFICATION

The Convention shall be subject to ratification, acceptance, approval or accession by States and by regional economic
integration organizations. (Article 22)

ACCESSION

The Convention shall be open for accession from the day after the date on which the Convention is closed for signature.
(Article 22)

ACCEPTANCE
Any regional economic integration organization which becomes a Party to the Convention without any of its member
States being a Party shall be bound by all the obligations under the Convention. (Article 22)

WITHDRAWAL

A party may withdraw from the Convention by giving written notification to the Depositary at any time after three years
from the date on which the Convention has entered into force for said Party. It shall take effect upon expiry of one year
from the date of receipt by the Depositary of the notification of withdrawal, or on such later date as may be specified in
the notification of withdrawal. Any Party that withdraws from the Convention shall be considered as also having
withdrawn from any protocol to which it is a Party. (Article 25)

ENTRY INTO FORCE

The Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date of deposit of the fiftieth instrument of
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. For each State or regional economic integration organization that
ratifies, accepts or approves the Convention or accedes thereto after the deposit of the fiftieth instrument of
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, the Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date
of deposit by such State or regional economic integration organization of its instrument of ratification, acceptance,
approval or accession. any instrument deposited by a regional economic integration organization shall not be counted as
additional to those deposited by States members of the organization. (Article 23)

 The Paris Agreement

I. Background
Paris Agreement is an agreement within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),
dealing with greenhouse-gas-emissions mitigation, adaptation, and finance, starting in the year 2020. The agreement's
language was negotiated by representatives of 196 state parties at the 21st Conference of the Parties of the
UNFCCC in Le Bourget, near Paris, France, and adopted by consensus on 12 December 2015. As of March 2019, 195
UNFCCC members have signed the agreement, including the Philippines, and 185 have become party to it. The Paris
Agreement's long-term goal is to keep the increase in global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-
industrial levels; and to limit the increase to 1.5 °C, since this would substantially reduce the risks and effects of climate
change.

The Paris Agreement requires all countries—developed and developing to make significant commitments to address
climate change. Countries responsible for 97 percent of global emissions have already pledged their Nationally
Determined Contributions (NDCs) for how they will address climate change. Countries will revisit their current pledges
by 2020 and, ideally, strengthen their emissions reduction targets for 2030. The Paris Agreement includes a stronger
transparency and accountability system for all countries—requiring reporting on greenhouse gas inventories and
projections that are subject to a technical expert review and a multilateral examination. Countries will continue to
provide climate finance to help the most vulnerable adapt to climate change and build low-carbon economies. While the
Paris Agreement does not “solve” climate change, it allows us to start the next wave of global climate actions, creating a
virtuous cycle for more aggressive action in the decades to come.
Below is a graph showing the share of greenhouse gas emissions by country.
 Greenhouse gas emission reduction and mitigation an objective of the agreement.

II. Rationale for adaptation of countries

Since climate change represents an urgent and potentially irreversible threat to human societies and the planet and it
requires the widest possible cooperation by all countries, and their participation in an effective and appropriate
international response, with a view to accelerating the reduction of global greenhouse gas emissions. That deep
reductions in global emissions will be required in order to achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention and
emphasizing the need for urgency in addressing climate change.

Climate change is a common concern of humankind, Parties should, when taking action to address climate change,
respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights, the right to health, the rights of indigenous
peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations and the
right to development, as well as gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity, Also
acknowledging the specific needs and concerns of developing country Parties arising from the impact of the
implementation of response measures.
Emphasizing with serious concern the urgent need to address the significant gap between the aggregate effect of
Parties’ mitigation pledges in terms of global annual emissions of greenhouse gases by 2020 and aggregate emission
pathways consistent with holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above preindustrial
levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above preindustrial levels,
Also emphasizing that enhanced pre‐2020 ambition can lay a solid foundation for enhanced post‐2020 ambition,
Stressing the urgency of accelerating the implementation of the Convention and its Kyoto Protocol in order to enhance
pre-2020 ambition,
Recognizing the urgent need to enhance the provision of finance, technology and capacity-building support by
developed country Parties, in a predictable manner, to enable enhanced pre-2020 action by developing country Parties,
Emphasizing the enduring benefits of ambitious and early action, including major reductions in the cost of future
mitigation and adaptation efforts, Acknowledging the need to promote universal access to sustainable energy in
developing countries, in particular in Africa, through the enhanced deployment of renewable energy, Agreeing to uphold
and promote regional and international cooperation in order to mobilize stronger and more ambitious climate action by
all Parties and non-Party stakeholders, including civil society, the private sector, financial institutions, cities and other
subnational authorities, local communities and indigenous peoples,
 III. Highlights from Paris

The Paris Agreement contains:

 An ambitious collective goal to hold warming well below 2 degrees with efforts to limit warming to 1.5 degrees
(Art. 2, par. 1(a) – “(a) Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-
industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels,
recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change”;

 An aim for greenhouse gas emissions to peak as soon as possible, and to achieve net-zero emissions in the
second half of this century(Article 4, par 1) – “1. In order to achieve the long-term temperature goal set out in
Article 2, Parties aim to reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible, recognizing that
peaking will take longer for developing country Parties, and to undertake rapid reductions thereafter in
accordance with best available science, so as to achieve a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources
and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century, on the basis of equity, and in the
context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty.”;

 A requirement for mitigation measures of individual countries to be expressed in nationally determined

contributions (NDCs) (Art. 3) – “As nationally determined contributions to the global response to climate change,
all Parties are to undertake and communicate ambitious efforts as defined in Articles 4, 7, 9, 10, 11 and 13 with
the view to achieving the purpose of this Agreement as set out in Article 2. The efforts of all Parties will represent
a progression over time, while recognizing the need to support developing country Parties for the effective
implementation of this Agreement.”;

 A process that demands a revision of NDCs at least every 5- years representing progression beyond the last
NDCs (Art. 4, par. 9) – ”9. Each Party shall communicate a nationally determined contribution every five years in
accordance with decision 1/CP21 and any relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties serving as the
meeting of the Parties to this Agreement and be informed by the outcomes of the global stocktake referred to in
Article 14.”;

 A mechanism for countries to achieve NDCs jointly, sharing mitigation targets, and a mechanism for countries to
cooperate in achieving NDCs. Countries can meet their NDC targets by transferring ‘mitigation outcomes’
internationally – either in the context of emission trading, or to allow results-based payments (Art. 5, par. 2) –
“2. Parties are encouraged to take action to implement and support, including through results-based payments,
the existing framework as set out in related guidance and decisions already agreed under the Convention for:
policy approaches and positive incentives for activities relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and
forest degradation, and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest
carbon stocks in developing countries; and alternative policy approaches, such as joint mitigation and adaptation
approaches for the integral and sustainable management of forests, while reaffirming the importance of
incentivizing, as appropriate, non-carbon benefits associated with such approaches.”;

 A mechanism for private and public entities to support sustainable development projects that generate
transferrable emission reductions;

 A framework for enhanced transparency (Art. 13, par.1) and an expert review of NDCs (Art. 13, par. 11 & 12) –
“1. In order to build mutual trust and confidence and to promote effective implementation, an enhanced
transparency framework for action and support, with built-in flexibility which takes into account Parties' different
capacities and builds upon collective experience is hereby established”; “11. Information submitted by each
Party under paragraphs 7 and 9 of this Article shall undergo a technical expert review, in accordance with
decision 1/CP.21. For those developing country Parties that need it in the light of their capacities, the review
process shall include assistance in identifying capacity-building needs. In addition, each Party shall participate in
a facilitative, multilateral consideration of progress with respect to efforts under Article 9, and its respective
implementation and achievement of its nationally determined contribution.” “12. The technical expert review
 under this paragraph shall consist of a consideration of the Party's support provided, as relevant, and its
implementation and achievement of its nationally determined contribution. The review shall also identify areas
of improvement for the Party, and include a review of the consistency of the information with the modalities,
procedures and guidelines referred to in paragraph 13 of this Article, taking into account the flexibility accorded
to the Party under paragraph 2 of this Article. The review shall pay particular attention to the respective national
capabilities and circumstances of developing country Parties.”;

 A Global Stocktake from 2023 and every 5 years thereafter to review progress (Art. 14, par. 2) – “2. The
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement shall undertake its first global
stocktake in 2023 and every five years thereafter unless otherwise decided by the Conference of the Parties
serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement.”;

 Encouragement for Parties to implement existing frameworks for REDD+ including through the provision of
results-based payments (Art. 5, par. 2) – “2. Parties are encouraged to take action to implement and support,
including through results-based payments, the existing framework as set out in related guidance and decisions
already agreed under the Convention for: policy approaches and positive incentives for activities relating to
reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, and the role of conservation, sustainable
management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries; and alternative policy
approaches, such as joint mitigation and adaptation approaches for the integral and sustainable management of
forests, while reaffirming the importance of incentivizing, as appropriate, non-carbon benefits associated with
such approaches.”;

 A global goal of enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate
change, and commitment to providing enhanced support for adaptation (Art. 7,par. 1) – “1. Parties hereby
establish the global goal on adaptation of enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing
vulnerability to climate change, with a view to contributing to sustainable development and ensuring an
adequate adaptation response in the context of the temperature goal referred to in Article 2.”;

 A decision to adopt the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage, noting that the agreement does
not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation (Art. 8);

 A commitment to a collective goal of providing USD 100 billion per year to 2025, and beyond 2025 with USD 100
billion as a floor. Developing countries are encouraged to provide voluntary support. Public funds will play a
‘significant role’ in finance, and developed countries must report twice a year on levels of support provided;

 An enhanced transparency framework for action and support with built-in flexibility which takes into account
Parties’ different capacities with the goal to understand climate change action in the light of the objective of the
UNFCCC and the Paris Agreements (Article 13, par. 1) - 1. In order to build mutual trust and confidence and to
promote effective implementation, an enhanced transparency framework for action and support, with built-in
flexibility which takes into account Parties' different capacities and builds upon collective experience is hereby
established.;

 A non-punitive compliance mechanism that is expert based and facilitative in nature (Art. 14, par.2) - 2. The
mechanism referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall consist of a committee that shall be expert-based and
facilitative in nature and function in a manner that is transparent, non-adversarial and non-punitive. The
committee shall pay particular attention to the respective national capabilities and circumstances of Parties.
Article 2

1. This Agreement, in enhancing the implementation of the Convention, including its objective, aims to strengthen
the global response to the threat of climate change, in the context of sustainable development and efforts to
eradicate poverty, including by:
 (a) Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels
and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels,
recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change;
(b) Increasing the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster climate resilience
and low greenhouse gas emissions development, in a manner that does not threaten food
production; and
(c) Making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-
resilient development.
2. This Agreement will be implemented to reflect equity and the principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.

 NOTES:

The Agreement establishes a global warming goal of well below 2°C on pre-industrial averages. It requires countries to
formulate progressively more ambitious climate targets which are consistent with this goal. To achieve this goal, all
Parties to the Paris Agreement will need to make profound changes to their economies.

The Paris Agreement defines a universal, legal framework to ‘strengthen the global response to the
threat of climate change’ (Art. 2). It establishes the obligation of all Parties to contribute to climate change mitigation
and adaptation. For the first time, all countries will develop plans on how to contribute to climate change mitigation,
and will communicate their ‘nationally determined contributions’ to the Secretariat of the Convention.

The Paris Agreement puts emphasis on processes rather than on defined mitigation goals. Unlike the Kyoto Protocol,
the Paris Agreement does not formulate country specific emissions targets. Instead, the Paris Agreement depends on
voluntary mitigation contributions and a series of processes that seek to ensure collective and individual progress in
meeting the initial and progressively more ambitious mitigation contributions.

The Paris Agreement recognizes the different starting points and responsibilities of countries, and emphasizes that the
Agreement will be implemented in accordance with the ‘principle of
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’ which applies ‘in the light of different national
circumstances’ (Art.2.2). This means that developed countries have to continue to take the lead in mitigating climate
change and support the actions taken by developing countries.
The initially communicated NDCs fall short of the required ambition. Much more is needed. To that extent, the Paris
Agreement is an important but only first step towards an effective policy response, creating a framework which
individual countries will have to translate into concrete action.

Additional Notes:
In accordance with Article 4.1., two types of action are essential to meet the 1.5°C target. First, the world has to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions, not to zero, but to a point where there is a balance between emissions and sequestration.
This means, secondly, that countries have to ramp up options to sequester greenhouse gas emissions. The higher the
rate of sequestration, the more residual greenhouse gas emissions are permissible. Article 4.1 does not limit
sequestration to natural carbon sinks, and leaves the door open to technology-driven carbon sequestration solutions,
such as carbon capture and storage.

Each Party shall prepare, communicate and maintain successive nationally determined contributions (NDCs), with an
NDC communicated at a minimum every five years. Developed countries should adopt economy wide absolute emission
reduction targets immediately, and developing countries should aim for this over time (Art. 4.4). Each subsequent NDC
will have to represent a progression beyond the Party’s last NDC. Importantly however, implementing NDCs is not a part
of the Paris Agreement. Rather, the Paris Agreement and COP Decision provide binding, procedural rules for the
preparation and assessment of NDCs – not their execution.
To increase the likelihood that Parties will progress on their NDCs, Parties are required to account for their NDCs in a
way that ensures environmental integrity. Parties shall provide information necessary for clarity, transparency and
understanding (Art. 4.8). Information submitted will undergo a technical expert review (Art. 13.11). This process
foresees a continuous progression of ambition with each NDC (Art. 4.3). Parties may also at any moment adjust their
NDCs with a view to enhance its level of ambition (Art. 4.11).

Forests and Other lands. The Paris Agreement dedicates Article 5 largely to forests. The main purpose of that article is
to anchor existing forest-related provisions, frameworks and decisions in the new Agreement. Paragraph 1 of the Article
refers to the UNFCCC and the mandate to sustainably manage, conserve and enhance biological carbon reservoirs, a
reference that refers to forests and other ecosystems in developed and developing countries. Paragraph 2 complements
this by referring to the forest relevant decisions adopted in recent years, including the REDD+ framework. Through
crossreferencing the decisions become part of the Agreement. Alternative policy approaches such as joint mitigation and
the role of non-carbon benefits are also acknowledged.

The Agreement does not include any direct reference to agriculture. It notes that adaptation and low greenhouse gas
development should be undertaken ‘in a manner that does not threaten food production’ (Art.2.1.b) and the preamble
notes the ‘fundamental priority of safeguarding food security’, but the text does not provide a framework for addressing
emissions from food production. On the contrary, the prominent reference to food production in Article 2 qualifies the
extent to which the agricultural sector is expected to take the lead in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. It is also
noteworthy that the reference to food production brings together producing countries and poor developing nations that
for different reasons are united in the view that mitigation of greenhouse gases from agriculture should not be a
priority.

Assessment Processes. Article 13 provides an ‘enhanced transparency framework for action and support’ that will
provide a clear understanding of mitigation action and available climate finance. Parties will have to collect and make
available information necessary to track progress made in implementing and achieving its NDC and keep track of their
emissions in national inventory reports. In terms of support, developed Parties shall provide information on financial,
technology transfer and capacity building support provided to developing Parties. Developing Parties shall provide
information on support needed and received.

The way in which progress in achieving NDCs could be verified was deeply contested in Paris with a majority of countries
arguing in favour of an independent review of country actions. A number of larger developing countries were sceptical
or rejected outright third-party overview. The compromise consists in a technical expert group which will review
information provided. The experts will check the consistency of information provided and identify areas of
improvement. The transparency framework hence contains elements of a third party review while being ‘facilitative,
non-intrusive, non-punitive [in] manner, respectful of national sovereignty’ (Art. 13.3). The fact that the new
transparency framework will for the first time review the emissions of all Parties can be considered a significant step
towards improving data and increasing transparency around national and global emissions and mitigation actions.

To ensure that the Agreement generally is on track, the COP will take stock of the implementation of the Agreement
every five years (Art. 14.2). The first stocktaking is scheduled for 2023. Before that, the supporting COP decision also
mandates a facilitative dialogue among Parties in 2018 to take stock of the collective efforts of Parties in relation to
progress towards the long-term emissions goals (Para. 20 of the Decision). The stocktake is as an opportunity to assess
whether collective mitigation action as expressed in NDCs is consistent with meeting the global temperature goals of the
Paris Agreement, which is particularly important given the gap in mitigation commitments in intended NDCs (see Para.
17 of the Decision). Beyond mitigation, the stocktake has a wide remit, and covers all of the procedural and substantive
elements of the Paris Agreement.

Adapting to Climate Change. The Paris Agreement creates a global goal on adaptation that had been absent from
previous UNFCCC agreements, aiming to enhance ‘adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability
to climate change’ (Art. 7.1). The Agreement determines that countries should put more emphasis on adaptation
planning, and based on this planning Parties should strengthen their cooperation, including through the transfer of
funds (Art. 7). The adequacy of action and support will be reviewed as part of the global stocktake.
The global goal on adaptation has been high on the agenda of African countries ever since it was first discussed in
Copenhagen in 2009. Developing countries wanted such a goal to be paired with quantitative commitments, while
developed countries wanted it to be qualitative (and they prevailed).

The text focuses on procedural aspects of adaptation planning, and does not mandate concrete areas of action or
provide quantifiable commitments of support for developing countries. As with the Clean
Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol, there is a commitment (though loosely worded) to use a share of the
proceeds from the transfer of emission reductions to finance adaptation in developing countries, though the level of any
‘levy’ is unspecified, and it is not clear whether this would flow through the UNFCCC Adaptation Fund, as before (Art.
6.6). The decision to work within the Cancun Adaptation Framework is a commitment to continue with the National
Adaptation Plans (NAPs), according to which developing countries set out medium and long term adaptation needs, with
Least Developed Countries receiving specific support for NAP preparation and implementation.

Finance, technology and capacity building. To enable and help developing countries to meet their commitments, the
Agreement mandates that developed countries provide financial resources (Art. 9), notes the importance of technology
transfer (Art. 10), and calls for Parties to cooperate and enhance capacities (Art. 11). The language on finance does
neither provides concrete figures for climate finance nor a timetable for disbursement, though it does note the
‘significant role of public funds’ in climate finance (Art.9.3). Developed countries are asked ‘to take the lead in mobilizing
climate finance’ (Art.9.3), but all Parties are ‘encouraged to provide or continue to provide such support voluntarily’
(Art.9.2).
The lack of a concrete, time-bound commitment on climate finance in the Paris Agreement was a major concession by
developing countries for whom greater levels of climate finance was a key demand. To partly rectify this, the COP
Decision clarifies that the ‘existing mobilization goal’ (i.e. USD 100 billion per year from 2020) will continue through
2025, and that from 2025, ‘Parties to the Paris Agreement shall set a new collective quantified goal from a floor of USD
100 billion per year’ (Para. 54 of the Decision).
At present, the question of what counts and does not count as climate finance is unresolved, beyond an
acknowledgement beyond an acknowledgement that public funds should play a significant role. This is noteworthy,
given the disputes about methodologies used to track current levels of climate finance which erupted during the
discussions, centring on an OECD report placing developed country commitments at USD 62 billion in 2014, a figure
strongly contested by some developing countries. However, the Agreement does require developed countries to submit
biennial reports on levels of assistance provided through public interventions, and requires that these reports be
‘transparent and consistent’ (Art.9.7). The encouragement for other countries to provide climate finance reflects
emerging practice by wealthier developing countries, such as China’s example of USD 3.1 billion climate finance
commitment. Its presence in the text however was resisted by China, among other developing countries.

When it comes to technology transfer, the Agreement establishes a framework to provide guidance on the Technology
Mechanism (Art. 10.4.).This framework ought to strengthen cooperative action on technology transfer and development
and is designed to assess needs, capabilities and barriers. The language does not provide much more detail, but this is
not necessarily a sign of weakness. Parties will reconvene in May 2016 to discuss technology transfer, and there will be
periodic updates to reassess progress and needs. The Agreement also stresses the need for capacity building as a means
for developing countries to take action (Art. 11.1). Building capacity is a collaborative effort of all Parties, not limited to a
transfer of capacities from developed to developing countries. The Agreement does however provide that developed
countries should enhance support for capacity building in developing countries.
Capacity building activities shall be enhanced by appropriate institutional arrangements. The COP will consider and
adopt decisions on institutional arrangements for capacity building (Art.11.5).

The Decision establishes the Paris Committee on Capacity-building, the aim of which will be to address
gaps and needs, both current and emerging, in implementing capacity-building in developing country
Parties.
Loss and damage. The Paris Agreement extends the time-bound Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage
and anchors it into the long-term climate framework. Areas of cooperation on loss and damage include e.g., early
warning systems, emergency preparedness, and slow onset events (Art. 8).
The loss and damage mechanism was one of the most controversial issues right up until the end of the negotiations. The
question of whether and how to compensate vulnerable countries damaged by climate
impacts has been a contentious issue for a number of years, and eventually, language clarifying that the mechanism
does not provide a basis for liability or compensation was introduced into the Decision (Para.
52) at the insistence of developed countries, led by the United States. The Decision also requests the Executive
Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism to establish a clearing house for risk transfer (Para. 49) and to
create a task force to develop recommendations ‘to avert, minimize and address’ the risk of displacement (Para. 50).

Final provisions. The Agreement establishes a facilitative compliance mechanism that is based on expert review and
facilitation. The mechanism will function in a manner that is ‘transparent, non-adversarial and non-punitive’ (Art. 15.2).
The Decision requests the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement to develop the modalities and procedures for
the effective operation of the committee, and its rules remain to be determined.
The Paris Agreement does not allow reservations (Art. 27) but allows withdrawal after three years (Art. 28). To enter into
force, the Paris Agreement requires 55 Parties to convention accounting for at least ‘55 percent of total greenhouse gas
emissions have deposited their instruments of ratification’ (Art. 21). The Agreement will be open for signature between
22 April 2016 to 21 April 2017.

Pre-2020 action
The Decision calls for enhanced action prior to 2020. This can be summarised in the following categories:
Mitigation: Parties are urged to ratify and implement the second commitment period to the Kyoto Protocol up to 2020,
to make and implement a mitigation pledge, and improve measuring and reporting processes. Parties resolve to
strengthen the existing technical examination process on mitigation, which means increased cooperation with non-
country stakeholders, increased consultations and dissemination of results.
Adaptation: Parties have decided to launch a technical examination on adaptation, which will function in a similar
manner to the technical examination on mitigation, focussing on lesson sharing and identifying opportunities for
implementation and cooperative action.
Finance: The COP Decision ‘strongly urges’ developed countries to scale up their levels of financial support with a
concrete plan to reach the USD 100 billion target by 2020. The Decision singles out adaptation finance as an area which
needs a significant increase of finance from current levels.
Other: Annual ‘high level events’ (Para 121.) will be convened from 2016 through 2020. These are designed to create the
space for voluntary initiatives and coalitions to be established, and provide a platform for countries to announce
ambitious actions. High level events will be open to dignitaries of Parties, international organizations, international
cooperative initiatives and non-Party stakeholders. Two ‘high level champions’ will be appointed to help build voluntary
efforts and strengthen coalitions.
Conclusions. The Paris Agreement provides a common framework within which individual countries (or alliances of
countries) are invited to define NDCs taking into account the overall goal of the Convention and the Agreement as well
as their own capacities. The hope is that with increased transparency and an ambitious overall target, countries will step
forward with ambitious national plans. The risk however, is that individual country contributions fall short of the overall
goal and that the Paris Agreement remains a shell without sufficient action and support, unable to address the collective
action problem of climate change.
The collaborative approach of the Paris Agreement and the newly won trust in international action will provide a sound
basis for long term, international cooperation on climate change. As costs for climate change mitigation are driven down
by technological advancements and alternative energy systems start to support development, NDCs should become
more ambitious, and the efforts more aligned with the overall goal than current mitigation plans.

Challenges to Implementation
1. The scale and pace of climate change is rapidly moving the natural systems that underpin human well-being
into uncharted territory, with the potential for severe and irreversible impacts.
Concentration of Carbon dioxide have surpassed the parts from pre-industrial level. This concentration is higher than at
any time in the last 800,000 years resulting of both climate change and a strong El Niño that continued into 2016.

2. Climate change will destroy human and physical capital and exacerbate existing pressures on biodiversity,
driving major and potentially irreversible changes to ecosystems.

Climate change is therefore a risk management problem: how to find and implement the most cost-effective ways to
limit climate risks to a politically agreed level, informed by the best scientific evidence. Early and ambitious action on
adaptation and mitigation can significantly reduce these risks.

3. Even the “well-below 2°C” goal is insufficient to avoid major impacts from climate change.

A certain amount of climate change is already locked in from past and current emissions and the extent to which
countries succeed in further mitigating climate change will affect the scale of climate impacts they face. Some types of
extreme weather events are projected to become more severe and frequent, especially those related to extreme heat,
even if international climate goals are met. Floods, droughts and wildfires are also projected to increase. Rising seas will
exacerbate coastal flooding, inundate low lying land and lead to salinization of water supplies in some areas, while
ocean acidification will continue to drive coral mortality, with severe implications for fisheries, tourism and coastal
erosion.

4. Emissions in one part of the world affect the climate globally, so any effective and sufficient response to
climate change must be multilateral in nature.

Economically efficient action on climate requires countries to set their emission reduction efforts based on the marginal
benefits of avoided climate damages globally – the socalled "social cost of carbon". Approaches to GHG emissions
reduction based on purely national agendas may ignore the impacts caused in one jurisdiction by emissions in another
and short-termism may heavily discount the effect of climate damages on future generations. Such approaches will not
deliver policy action at the scale and pace required to meet the Paris Agreement goals

5. The Paris Agreement is an international legal instrument with the potential to measure up to the scale and
urgency of the climate challenge.

It specifies three main aims. First, that of holding the global average surface temperature increase to well below 2°C
above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the increase to 1.5°C. Second, increasing countries’ ability to
adapt to adverse climate impacts and foster resilience. Third, making finance flows consistent with low-emissions,
climate-resilient development.

6. The international community will need to successfully reconcile the disconnect between the bottom-up
ambition in current NDCs and the Paris Agreement’s top-down, long-term temperature goals.
The aggregate level of pledged emissions reductions specified in current NDCs is not nearly sufficient to meet the Paris
Agreement’s mitigation goals. Ensuring the Agreement’s transparency and review mechanisms are robust and effective
is critical in this respect. If Parties are to increase the ambition of their emissions reductions over time and transcend
short-term national perspectives, they will need to be confident that other Parties are also doing their fair share.

7. Parties’ efforts to finalise the Paris Agreement’s “rulebook” by the end of this year, including the development
of modalities, procedures and guidelines for the Agreement's transparency framework, are therefore
fundamental to the future success of international efforts, not just a minor technical exercise. The joint OECD-
IEA Climate Change Expert Group (CCXG), which engages directly with Parties on technical issues within the
UNFCCC process, is supporting Parties’ efforts to meet the challenge of making the Paris Agreement operational.

8. Ongoing efforts to improve transparency and understanding of international support represent another key
challenge, with a new quantified goal for developed country climate finance in support of climate action in
 developing countries to be determined before 2025. The modalities for accounting for climate finance mobilised
and provided are currently being negotiated within the UNFCCC process.

9. Low-emissions pathways consistent with the Paris Agreement require global emissions to peak as soon as
possible, with a subsequent rapid fall in emissions, and net emissions approaching zero or becoming negative in
the second half of the century. The type, scale and pace of actions is likely to differ among and across both
developed and developing economies, but the stringency of the Paris temperature goal is such that all countries
will need to develop and pursue low-emissions development pathways, in the light of their different national
circumstances and the forthcoming IPCC special report on Global Warming of 1.5 °C.

10. The hard-wiring of our economies to the use of fossil-fuels means that the transition to low-emissions,
climate-resilient development pathways will require broader, transformative change.

Policy action needs to go beyond core climate policies to address policy misalignments and social and
distributional issues as well as implementing the structural reforms needed to allow economies to adjust to the
transformational changes that will be required.

11. Achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement will require emission reductions beyond industry and energy
sectors.

Globally, emissions from agriculture, forestry and other land-use (AFOLU) contribute around a quarter of
total GHG emissions. This means that land-use decisions have an important influence over the carbon budget remaining
for energy and industry sectors. Although the large majority of NDCs include emissions from the agricultural sector only
7 countries have a specific target for this sector.

12. The world faces a huge challenge in meeting global food demand, while mitigating and adapting to climate
change, and conserving biodiversity.
Some forms of land-based mitigation actions such as monoculture plantations and using land to grow first-generation
biofuels can negatively impact biodiversity, the availability and supply of food and water and ecosystem resilience. Other
mitigation actions such as ecosystem-based approaches (e.g. agroforestry and ecosystem restoration) and climate smart
agriculture can have positive benefits for both biodiversity and human well-being, while mitigating climate change and
enhancing resilience.

13. Enhancing resilience will require capacity development and policy reforms.

Current development patterns are often increasing countries’ exposure to climate change impacts: for example, through
the growth of low-lying coastal cities or the degradation of ecosystems and the services they provide. These patterns
can lock-in vulnerabilities to climate change that will be difficult and expensive to reverse in future. To prevent this,
there needs to be sufficient awareness and data to understand climate risks.

14. There is also the need to determine how the goal of building adaptive capacity can be measured, and to
identify the most effective approaches for achieving that goal.

Strengthened monitoring and evaluation of adaptation can help to answer these questions and foster learning, adaptive
management and accountability. The OECD has produced guidance on how this can be achieved using existing systems.
Relatively few countries have developed national monitoring and evaluation systems for adaptation, but many more
have indicated their intention to do so in their NDCs. Assessing the effectiveness of adaptation will require a coordinated
approach to aggregate information horizontally across climate-sensitive sectors as well as vertically across different
levels of government.

15. The transition to low emissions, climate-resilient development pathways needs to be inclusive.
The transition of exposed businesses and households, particularly in vulnerable regions and communities, and early
planning to avoid stranded assets in fossil-fuel-intensive industries and stranded communities alongside them are as
essential to the transition as core climate policies and policy alignment across the economy. Vulnerability to climate
change is closely linked to socio-economic vulnerability: measures to reduce poverty and social exclusion will help
vulnerable groups adapt to climate change.

Opportunities
Twenty-four million new jobs will be created globally by 2030 if the right policies to promote a greener economy are put
in place, a new report by the International Labor Organization (ILO) says.

Action to achieve the objectives of the Paris Agreement, to limit global temperature rise to below 2 degrees Celsius and
as close as possible to 1.5 degrees C, will result in sufficient job creation to more than offset job losses of 6 million
elsewhere, according to the study World Employment and Social Outlook 2018: Greening with Jobs.

“The green economy can enable millions more people to overcome poverty, and deliver improved livelihoods for this
and future generations. New jobs will be created by adopting sustainable practices in the energy sector, including
changes in the energy mix, promoting the use of electric vehicles and improving the energy efficiency of buildings.
At the regional level, there will be net job creation in the Americas, Asia and the Pacific and Europe, representing some 3
million, 14 million and 2 million jobs respectively, resulting from measures taken in the production and use of energy.
In contrast, there could be net job losses in the Middle East (-0.48 per cent) and Africa (-0.04 per cent) if current trends
continue, due to the dependence of these regions on fossil fuel and mining, respectively.
Most sectors of the economy will benefit from net job creation: of the 163 economic sectors analysed, only 14 will suffer
employment losses of more than 10,000 jobs worldwide.

Only two sectors, petroleum extraction and petroleum refining, show losses of 1 million or more jobs but, 2.5 million
jobs will be created in renewables-based electricity, offsetting some 400,000 jobs lost in fossil fuel-based electricity
generation. 6 million jobs can be created by transitioning towards a ‘circular economy’ which includes activities like
recycling, repair, rent and remanufacture - replacing the traditional economic model of “extracting, making, using and
disposing”.

Possible Impact on the Philippines

The main challenge for developing countries, like Philippines, is to address its under-development and widespread
poverty. Climate change makes this challenge even more formidable. Their limited and fragile productive capacities will
be further tested and their objective of ‘trading out of poverty’ undermined. Their need has been for an agreement with
adequate mitigation targets based on respective responsibilities and capacities of countries, adaptation efforts at the
same level as the mitigation targets, sufficient provisions for financing and technology transfer to assist them in
transitioning to greener economies while meeting their developmental and poverty-reduction goals, and effective
safeguards against disguised protectionism on their trade prospects. The Paris Agreement addresses these elements
though not always in the manner and to the extent that developing countries wanted and needed.

Global temperature rise and mitigation targets

Parties agreed under article 2.1 (a) of the Agreement to keep global temperature increase well below 2°C and to pursue
efforts to limit it to 1.5°C. The target of 1.5°C offers hope for developing countries, like the Philippines. It will produce
fewer climate extremes for farmers in the tropics who are adversely affected by floods, and typhoons. But achieving this
target requires gigantic efforts which sadly are missing in the Agreement. Even the target of 2°C will not be delivered if
one were to go by the countries’ current pledges under the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs).
Paragraph 17 of the Paris Decision Text “…. notes with concern that the estimated aggregate greenhouse gas emission
levels in 2025 and 2030 resulting from the INDCs do not fall within least-cost 2 degrees Celsius scenarios but rather lead
to a projected level of 55 giga tonnes in 2030”. Obviously more needs to be done and the leadership in this regard has to
come from developed countries while developing countries also make contributions commensurate with their
capacities.
Global goal on adaptation
Article 7.1 sets the globally agreed goal to significantly strengthen adaptation to climate change through support and
international cooperation. Implementation of National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) will be facilitated and technology is
noted as an important tool for the implementation of adaptation actions. The agreement emphasizes climate-safe
technologies and building capacity in the developing world to improve resilience to climate change and reduce
greenhouse gas emissions through technology development and transfer from the developed world. This is a positive
outcome for developing countries since they had pushed for parity between adaptation and mitigation in the
negotiations. It is also good to see the reference made on gender to ensure that it continues to be important in climate
change policy. However, the concern is that no legal or monetary requirement has been placed on individual countries’
contribution leaving room for defaulting. Moreover, provision of adequate funds will be crucial for the success of
adaptation actions to be undertaken by developing countries, especially least developed countries and small island
developing states.

Climate financing
Under article 9.3 of the Paris Agreement, developed countries are to continue to take the lead in mobilising climate
finances from a variety of sources, including both public and private, and to allocate US$100 billion a year in climate
finance for developing countries by 2020 with a commitment for further finances by 2025, taking into consideration the
needs and priorities of developing countries. While this is certainly a positive element in the Agreement, the lack of
binding requirements on individual countries can be a possible cause for unfulfilled commitments. It is feared that the
term “mobilise” has been intentionally kept broad and may include funds that come with strings attached. Similarly,
there has even been talk of calling the money sent home by migrants working in richer countries a form of climate
finance. Developing countries’ expectation is that these commitments will be fulfilled fully and faithfully. They remain
convinced that developed countries have taken note of the need for assistance to developing countries for the common
good, and will meet their commitments in the coming years.

Trade and response measures

It may sound paradoxical, but trade-climate change nexus may become even more challenging after the Paris
Agreement. Measures and actions being developed and to be developed by countries, particularly developed countries
may have trade consequences for developing countries like Philippines. For example, standards, carbon-labelling
schemes and carbon taxes will affect trade flows.
Unfortunately, the Philippines could not effectively deal with the effects of these so-called ‘response measures’ in Paris.
This lack of convergence will test the existing trade rules under the World Trade Organization (WTO). There are already
disputes in the WTO, e.g. on the use of subsidy schemes to promote the production of clean energy. Such disputes may
only increase with the passage of time if the countries do not deal with the ‘response measures’ under the UNFCCC in
the coming months. The WTO also needs to find other means than dispute settlement to better deal with the nexus of
trade and climate change actions and commitments. This may mean paying greater attention to the relationship of trade
and climate change and examining the relevant trade rules to better address this relationship so that the outcome leads
to a win-win situation.

Some recommendations
The urgent need now is to take several actions to ensure that the Paris Agreement leads to actions and outcomes that
fulfill its objectives and assist developing countries, like Philippines, in achieving their development goals in a sustainable
manner. Some concrete suggestions in this regard include:
Sensitisation and de-mystification: Creating climate awareness and sensitisation of all stakeholders, particularly in
developing countries, should be an urgent priority. The outcomes at Paris and the provisions of the Paris Agreement
should be unpacked and explained in simple and clear language for the policy makers and other public and private
stakeholders for their better understanding and to facilitate the implementation. The engagement of all stakeholders is
also essential to ensure ownership of the Agreement at the local and national levels that will be the best guarantee for
its proper implementation. The civil society organisations should play a leading role in this sensitisation effort.
Full and faithful implementation: All parties to the Convention must meet their commitments as pledged in their INDCs
so as to achieve the desired goal of the Paris Agreement. Developed countries must honour their pledges of providing
financial resources and making green technology transfer to developing countries to ensure efficient implementation of
the Agreement. There should not be any attempt to meet these commitments in ‘innovative’ ways that meet only the
letter of the commitments while ignoring the spirit and intent. That will make the Paris Agreement a ‘paper tiger’ and
not the game-changer that it can be. For this purpose, climate negotiators and policy makers must ensure transparency
on climate financing issues by adopting a Measuring, Reporting, and Verification (MRV) system to help developing
countries keep track of how far developed countries are honouring their pledges. Policy makers and implementers in the
East African Community (EAC) must be proactive and take advantage of the UNFCCC technology transfer scheme
through the creation of relevant institutions.
Prioritisation: Developing countries, particularly in Africa, also need to identify priority sectors based on their
development aspirations and challenges, and with a view to integrating climate change concerns in relevant policies and
strategies. Issues of how to address challenges of adaptation and resilience faced by the energy, manufacturing, and
agriculture sectors should be given priority. Urgent priority sectors should remain: energy, agriculture and forestry,
especially agriculture since it is the backbone of a large number of African economies. The time is now ripe to discuss
agriculture and related issues under the UNFCCC. Hence developing countries should prepare their submissions on
agriculture to the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice for discussion at the workshop scheduled for
June 2016.
Individual responsibility and governmental accountability: Finally, climate action is not the responsibility of governments
only. Our planet is the home for every human being and this home is to remain welcoming and hospitable to the coming
generations. Hence, each individual must make responsible choices in order to supplement governmental efforts in
addressing climate change. Individual lifestyle initiatives may include transitioning from the use of fossil fuels to the use
of renewable energy. On the other hand, individuals should also hold governments and the private sector accountable in
their actions in addressing climate change. This sense of individual responsibility for one’s own actions, as well as for
holding the governments accountable, will be the ultimate key for the full and faithful implementation of the Paris
Agreement.

Resources:
https://assets.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/paris-agreement-climate-change-2017-ib.pdf
https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf
https://www.oecd.org/mcm/documents/C-MIN-2018-12-EN.pdf
https://unfccc.int/news/paris-agreement-can-generate-24-million-clean-economy-jobs-ilo