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THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et. al v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ASIAN
RECRUITMENT COUNCIL PHILIPPINE CHAPTER (ARCO-PHIL.), INC.,
representing its members
G.R. No. 131719. May 25, 2004, CALLEJO, SR., J.
FACTS
Respondent ARCO-PHIL., Inc., the association representing its member recruitment
agencies, assails certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as
the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as unconstitutional and
enjoins petitioners from enforcing the same. It claims that its member recruitment
agencies will suffer grave and irreparable damage or injury with the
implementation of the law. Petitioners contend that ARCO-PHIL., being a mere
association, has no locus standi being not the real party-in-interest in the action.
They likewise posited that there is presumption of constitutionality of the law being
assailed based on the doctrine of separation of powers.
The Regional Trial Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining herein
petitioners from enforcing the assailed order and writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioners claimed the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion and filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which the latter denied. Hence,
petitioners filed another petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
1. Whether ARCO-PHIL., Inc. has locus standi to file petition in representation of its
members.
2. Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of its discretion in granting the
respondent’s plea for injunctive relief, and the appellate court erred in affirming
the order and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court.
RULING
1. Yes. It has been held that standing jus tertii would be recognized if it can be
shown that the party suing has some substantial relation to the third party, or
that the right of the third party would be diluted unless the party in court is
allowed to espouse the third party’s constitutional claims. The modern view is
that an association has standing to complain of injuries to its members, despite
lack of direct interest. This view fuses the legal identity of an association with
that of its members.
In this case, the respondent filed the petition for declaratory relief under Rule 64
of the Rules of Court for and in behalf of its members who approved separate
resolutions expressly authorizing ARCO-PHIL. to file the said suit for and in their
behalf. The respondent and its members are in every practical sense identical.
ARCO-PHIL. asserts that the assailed provisions violate the constitutional rights
of its members and the officers and employees thereof. It is but the medium
through which its individual members seek to make more effective the
expression of their voices and the redress of their grievances.
2. Yes. One who alleges the unconstitutionality of a statue must prove so beyond
reasonable doubt. This presumption of constitutionality is based on the doctrine
of separation of powers, which enjoin upon each department a becoming respect
for the acts of the other departments. The possible unconstitutionality of a
statute, on its face, does not of itself justify an injunction against good faith
attempts to enforce it, unless there is a showing of bad faith, harassment, or any
other unusual circumstance that would call for equitable relief. Further, the fear
or chilling effect of the assailed penal provisions of the law on the members of the
respondent does not by itself justify prohibiting the State from enforcing them
against those whom the State believes in good faith to be punishable under the
laws.
In issuing the writ of preliminary injunction, the trial court, and the Court of
Appeals for sustaining it, considered paramount the interests of ARCO-PHIL. and
its members and capriciously overturned the presumption of the
constitutionality of the assailed provisions on the barefaced claim of the
respondent that the assailed provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042 are unconstitutional.
Both committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction as to the assailed order and writ of preliminary injunction.