Soviet Cinema, 1929-41: The Development of Industry and Infrastructure

Author(s): Jamie Miller

Source: Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 58, No. 1 (Jan., 2006), pp. 103-124
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
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 EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES Routledge
Vol. 58, No. 1, January 2006, 103-124 Taylor&FrancisGr

Soviet Cinema, 1929-41: The Developm

of Industry and Infrastructure

JAMIE MILLER*

Abstract
This article explores the development of the Soviet film industry in the 1920s and 1930s and argues that
the rise of Soviet cinema as an industry was hampered by a lack of technical equipment and the know
how to produce this, and that the USSR struggled to achieve independence in the production of
equipment for film production and demonstration throughout the 1930s. The article examines the
technical and economic aspects of film production in the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s. It
explores the extent of 'cinefication', especially in terms of the lack of technology for sound film. It
scrutinises the distribution and demonstration systems for films, making comparisons to the US
industry. It argues that fewer films were produced in the USSR, thus offering a limited choice to Soviet
audiences; at the same time new films were distributed with an insufficient number of copies, so that the
rise of Soviet film as an industry was hampered. The article demonstrates the absence of an
infrastructure and an industry to produce the technical equipment for film production and
demonstration (film stock, cameras, sound equipment were all important) making the industry
dependent on the West.

CINEMA PRESENTED THE BOLSHEVIKS with a potentially powerful weapon, as it was not
only an exciting new technology, it was also accessible and appealing to the masses as
an art form that they could engage in. From the communist perspective, cinema could
serve many crucial functions. First of all, it could play its role in the struggle to
eliminate illiteracy. Yet, this was not merely a practical application. The liquidation of
illiteracy would be done within the terms of reference and ideas of communist
ideology. Therefore, cinema would politically educate the masses so that they would
develop a conscious understanding of the revolution, the new socialist reality and their
part in that reality. At its most ambitious, such an education would contribute to the
creation of a 'New Soviet Man', a highly moral, socialist paragon of virtue, dedicated
to the final goal of communism. However, the most fundamental task of cinema was
never publicly spelled out. Through the political education of the masses, cinema had
to help legitimise communist ideology, power and, most importantly, the reality that
they had given rise to. The legitimating task was central, as the communists had to
reconcile their rhetoric of human emancipation with the grim Soviet reality of

*1 would like to thank the Arts and Humanities Research Council for the financial support that
allowed me to carry out this research.

ISSN 0966-8136 print; ISSN 1465-3427 online/06/010103-22 ? 2006 University of Glasgow

DOI: 10. 1080/09668130500401715

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104 JAMIE MILLER

breakneck industrialisation and the hardship an

such a transformation. Party leaders also knew
essential for the realisation of their goals to
culturally transform the country; they had to
their effective participation in socialist cons
working towards a communist paradise. The
cinema industry development is essential because
had to be an infrastructure to produce, distrib
Over the past two decades, scholars of Sovi
attention to the Stalinist period. The basic shap
to Soviet cinema, which emerged in the 1930
totalitarian form of analysis, suggests that unde
brought under the firm grip of an all-embraci
system, which crushed the creative spirit of
become complicit in the creation of pro-re
approach emerged in the 1970s and 1980s. Revis
brought to cinema were not only imposed from
within the film industry itself. It was also arg
1930s as crushing creative freedom, it was in f
Soviet cinema into a mass form of politicised en
elitist cinema of the 1920s.2 Meanwhile, ac
formally, saw the Party as the careful guiding h
it moved in the correct political direction. Since
of the 1930s has ironically adopted the traditio
concentrating on the supposedly overwhelmi
Soviet films of the 1930s with those of Nazi Ge
purges in the cinema industry.3
However, while in general the debates and pole
become increasingly more sophisticated, acad
neglected the economic and technical aspects of

lA series of important studies of cinema under Stalin c

(eds) (1993) Stalinism and Soviet Cinema (London, Rou
McDonald (1969), 'Soviet Cinema, 1930-1940, A Histo
Prentice Hall). This work, originally carried out in the
more systematic totalitarian accounts. The most influe
Soviet Society from the Revolution to the Death of Sta
2See Denise Youngblood (1985) Soviet Cinema in the S
Research Press). In this book, Youngblood argued that
in cinema, but later amended this theory, arguing tha
Instead a revolution 'from the middle' was said to have ta
for instance, Denise Youngblood (1993) Movies for the
Press). The argument that the 1930s saw an attempt t
entertainment can be found in Richard Taylor (199
Shumyatsky and Soviet Cinema in the 1930s', in Taylo
Factory (London, Routledge), pp. 193-216.
3See Alentina Rubailo (1976) Partiinoe rukovodstvo ra
Moskovskii Universitet). For examples of more rece
Mamatova (ed.) (1995) Kino: politika i lyudi 30-e gody

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 SOVIET CINEMA, 1929-41 105

1930s. For example, when addressing issues such as the productio

expansion of cinema exhibition outlets, the development of sound
base for film stock, cameras and projectors, it is usually claimed
USSR was fairly successful in reaching the masses and achie
sufficiency in every sphere. Where economic and technical
addressed, the conclusion has emphasised Soviet successes in th
economic and technical independence without foreign assistance.4
of the film industry is not only crucial in our general histor
whether or not the Soviet cinema infrastructure was sufficient fo
part of an effective political propaganda system of persuasion an
also helps us to understand how realistic the broader aim of surp
West really was in relation to cinema.
This article adopts a perspective, that acknowledges the value of
the totalitarian account, especially those that emphasise central sta
control over policy direction, as well as endorsing revisionist accou
Soviet bureaucracy was often extremely inefficient at implementin
thus examine the aims that emanated 'from above' and the reality
the ground. I begin by examining the goals of the cinema administ
that the attempt to reach the masses through new exhibition ou
success, largely due to the failure to create an adequate infrastructu
of sound equipment. I also contend that existing viewing facilities
standard and the films being shown for much of the decade were o
Soviet products. The analysis suggests that there was a fundamen
copies and the nature of the distribution and exhibition network,
towards ideological planning. Subsequently, the article shall exam
establish a technical base for the production of film stock, came
indicate that shortcomings of both quantity and quality meant th
and knowledge still played a central role in Soviet filmmaking dur
point out that the general weakness of development in the industr
area of exports. The article concludes with an assessment of the ad
arguing that limited achievements were the result of extremely
factors and a degree of administrative ambiguity. All of these fac
central argument, which suggests that the failure to adequately
achieve an independent, developed infrastructure represented a s
Bolsheviks' intended political use of cinema in the 1930s.
Concerns about the development of the film industry were
Conference on Cinema in March 1928. The conference decid
industry had to be significantly expanded to reach the masses an
balance between commerce and ideology to ensure that Soviet cin

4Economic and technical matters are addressed in Kenez, Cinema and Sov
An important recent examination of industry development during the fir
found in Vance Kepley Jr (1996) 'The First Perestroika: Soviet Cinema und
Plan', Cinema Journal, 35, 4, Summer. Kepley offers an extremely detailed an
the institutional changes of Soviet cinema in the late 1920s and early 1930s. F
industry development in the 1930s, see N. Semenov & L. Chernyabskii (
Sovetskoi Kinematografii (Moscow, Goskinoizdat).

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106 JAMIE MILLER

profitable. This required the development of

where films would convey the political message
this new agenda was, to some extent, recognitio
of Soviet cinema in the 1920s failed to attr
wanted the action, adventure and comedy t
through popular Soviet films and imported Am
other central points of the resolution was that
freeing itself from dependence on the foreign
almost all forms of cinema equipment and hard
imported from countries such as the USA, Ger
reflected the Party rhetoric of recent years, wh
foreign help. In 1928 Stalin also made his famo
the capitalist countries in an economic sense. C
matching and surpassing the economic achi
cinema also had to play another role; the Bolsh
their economy was also capable of engaging in
and they wanted to be associated with such fut
The political leadership's concern with econom
aspirations of the cinema administration under
in a draft plan written by Shumyatskii in 1931
of Soyuzkino for 1932'. Shumyatskii began w
Soviet cinema to date. That is the lack of film
'illnesses' of Soviet cinema production, name
films, as well as the lack of scripts and cadres. S
of an industrial base for the production of film
the poor financial position of Soviet cinema in
lack of investment in capital construction. Furt
completed films were not being exploited prop
by the backwardness of the rural and school ci
In response to these problems, Shumyatskii p
of development and reconstruction for Soviet c
creation of 500 full-length films, including mo
the output of 200 films in 1931. He looked to a
compared with 700 million in 1930 and 1 bill
turnover compared to R400 million in 1931
rather optimistic figures, Shumyatskii deduced
taxes and duties of between R200 and 220 milli
and R20 million in 1930. He wanted to see a c
220 million instead of the zero profit of 1930 a
well as a dramatic increase in financial gro

5B. S. Ol'khovyi (ed.) (1988) 'Party Cinema Conf

Construction in the USSR and the Tasks of Soviet C
Richard & Christie, Ian (eds) The Film Factory: Russia
(Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press), pp. 383-
6Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Literatury i Iskusst
'BoFshaya programma Soyuzkino na 1932'.

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 SOVIET CINEMA, 1929-41 107

industrial projects including the building of a gigantic film stock f

studios in Central Asia, Belorussia and Eastern Siberia, 100 new c
new areas and kolkhoz centres, 8,500 sound cinema installation
mobile installations. Shumyatskii's plan was extremely ambitio
intended to be a programme for 1932, in terms of the figures suggest
prove to be a programme for the entire decade.7

Sound
In 1929 - 30 the central issue of the time for Soviet cinema was the tr
Such a transition, of course, had huge political and artistic significa
illiteracy was still a significant problem and while cinema certainly
eliminating this dilemma, sound cinema still provided the ideal mea
masses in a more effective way. Sound also represented a technical a
The director, cameraman, scriptwriter and journalist Nikolai Anoshc
that the rhetoric of the political leadership on 'catching and overha
could, ironically, not be realised without the technical help of
journalists, such as Ippolit Sokolov, believed that the Soviet sound de
Pavel Tager and Aleksandr Shorin were important and not inferior t
rivals.8 But in March 1930 Anoshchenko argued that, despite Ta
impressive efforts, sound cinema in the USSR was still at an 'ele
development'. In effect, the materials that Tager and Shorin were w
develop their ideas were not sophisticated enough and therefore the qu
experimental films was fairly low. Anoshchenko realistically conten
cinema wanted to make a speedy and effective transition to sound cine
of quality, propaganda and the overseas trade of Soviet films,
administration simply had to rely on American help and t
Anoshchenko concluded that help from America should take tw
Soyuzkino should pay for equipment and expert advice on sound
brought over to the Soviet Union. Second, personnel from various sec
cinema industry should be sent to American factories and studios in
themselves with the specifics of the production and application of s
Regardless of the official government line on independent So
development, the government and the cinema administration su
practical need for technical assistance. On 25 June 1930, Soyuzk
agreement with a New York company called Audio-Cinema to
technical help in the planning, design and installation of equipment
and theatres, applying the most up-to-date methods of the cinema i
American specialist Joey Koffman arrived in the Soviet Union in th
bringing with him all the latest equipment to satisfy Soyuzkin
including microphones and modulators. His payment of $10,00

7RGALI, f. 2497, op. 1, ed. khr. 22, 1. 182-183.

8I. Sokolov (1930), 'Tekhnicheskaya baza Sovetskogo tonkino', Kino i zhizr?, 1
9N. Anoshchenko (1930), 'Tekhnicheskaya pomoshch' zagranitsy nashemu kino', K
10RGALI, f. 2497, op. 1, ed. khr. 3, 1. 229, 'Protokoly zasedanii fraktsii pravlen

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108 JAMIE MILLER

advising Soyuzkino's specialists on how to op

Soyuzkino's reaction to Koffman's visit was fra
VSNKh (Supreme Council of National Eco
availability of the American equipment, it was
of Leningrad and Moscow (where Tager and
'immediately copy these samples significantly im
recording and sound producing apparatuses'.1
Anoshchenko's other suggestion that a delegat
realised almost immediately. Many filmma
Sokolov, travelled to the West in the late 1920s
industries operated and produced in Europe a
included Sergei Eisenstein, Grigorii Aleksand
left the USSR in 1929 for America, with the ce
experience' of sound in cinema.12 To a large ext
based on their personal fascination with so
However, after they returned in 1932, Alek
extremely detailed report on America's sound s
practice.13 This report was intended to have ha
developing sound-equipped studios.
Regardless of the efforts of the Soviet techni
had received from Europe and America, the
much slower process than Soviet politicians, adm
envisaged. To a large extent, this was a consequ
October and 23 November 1930, when M
Shumyatskii became the head of Soyuzkino, Ko
control of the administrative body. Shvedchiko
device that Joey Koffman had brought to the
sound projectors from America with a plan to
some foreign sound films and recover th
Simultaneously, Soyuzkino ambitiously ordered
projectors, as well as 120 sound recording appar
went ahead, mainly due to rising prices and a l
before around 30 of Shorin's sound recordin
year. 14 Consequently, the studios were under-
For instance, in 1932, the more prosperous
version of Tager's model, one version of Sh
recorder. Poorly equipped studios meant tha
developed extremely slowly with five being pr

nRGALI, f. 2497, op. 1, ed. khr. 20,1. 269-273, 'Materi

12Grigorii Aleksandrov (1976) Epokha i kino (Moscow
13RGALI, f. 2498, op. 1, ?d. khr. 32, 1. 26-29, 'Byulle
Kinofabriki RosfiTm Soyuzkino'.
14K. Gladkov (1931) 'Etapy razvitiya zvukovogo kino v
Verlinskii (1936) 'Recent Progress in the Soviet Motion
1936 Film Daily Year Book of Motion Pictures (New Y
15Anon. (1940) 'Sovetskoe kino v tsifrakh', Iskusstvo

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 SOVIET CINEMA, 1929-41 109

Cinefication

The development of sound in Soviet cinema was closely ass

development of 'Kinofikatsiya' (cinefication) in the country at large
referred to the expansion of the cinema network and the availa
facilities in both the urban and rural environments. Even if the pro
films had been more substantial, the chances of the majority of the
able to see them were fairly slim. By June 1931, the Soviet enterpr
only managed to produce one sound projector, which was set up
month.16 The situation remained difficult throughout the 1930s. By th
Five-Year Plan in 1933, there were 27,578 cinema installations, b
sound projectors. In 1938 there were still only 28,574 cinema install
seems that many of the silent projectors had been decommissioned as
sound projectors included in this figure had now reached 11,242. It
end of 1938 that the quantity of sound projectors within the overal
the 54% mark.17 Overall, despite the dramatic increase between the m
beginning of the new decade, the growth of cinema outlets was
the 1930s, largely due to the slow transition to sound. It made no se
more silent projectors, yet the technological base was not developed
the mass production of sound projectors. We can gain a strong idea
the cinema network was serving the population from the proposals
Year Plan declared in 1939. In order to adequately provide
throughout the USSR, Molotov announced that the network of
stationary and mobile projectors would have to be increased by six t

Urban cinefication

The cinefication programme undoubtedly favoured the urban and Eu

the Soviet Union. Throughout the 1930s, the major towns and c
consistently had over one third of the viewing facilities of the entire
the quality of cinefication in the urban environment was far super
countryside. In the towns and cities citizens were more likely to see
theatres as opposed to the more makeshift installations that predomi
areas. It is also notable that while the growth of sound cinema was g
urban zones saw a much quicker growth than the villages. For
wealthier capital Moscow, there were 48 cinemas by the end of 1
seven theatres had been wired for sound but by the end of 1934 this f
32, or two thirds of the total. In contrast, only 24 installations in the
Union had sound at the same time. It was only towards the end of t
countryside began to catch up. This meant that the large cities,
Leningrad and Kiev, had a much better quality of cinema provision

16B. Shumyatskii (1931) 'Signal Trevogi', Proletarskoe kino, 5-6, pp. 5-7.
17See 'Cinema Installations and Their Distribution in the Russian Empire and the U
translated in Taylor & Christie (eds) The Film Factory, p. 423. M. Ryzhkov (1940),
in Semenov & Chernyabskii (eds) Dvadtsat' let Sovetskoi kinematografii, p. 170.

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 110 JAMIE MILLER

counterparts.'8 The fact that the urban working

natural supporters of Bolshevik ideology may hav

Rural cinefication

The cinefication of the countryside had been give

Conference on Cinema in 1928. The Bolsheviks
decreasing popularity among the peasantry an
cinema was considered to be a matter of urgent pr
that propaganda feature films, showing only the p
help legitimise the regime in the eyes of a pea
starvation and brutality during the government's
the development of the cinema network in the cou
In that year there were 3,477 mobile and 863 per
country, and a range of poorly organised bodies co
in reality the countryside was always at the
Consequently, peasants would only see films a
among theatres and workers clubs in the towns, w
bad condition by the time they reached the ru
introduced a project to bring the countryside's net
the aforementioned difficulties. Narkompros aim
year period that would give the majority of the p
Yet, despite the intentions of the government, th
the 1930s. By the end of 1935, there were on
permanent cinema installations, which was now
areas throughout the Soviet Union. Of those insta
were not operating and there were too few projec
correct this situation. Even those installations in
silent projectors, which were often aged and subj
leading to persistent film stoppages. Due to the fre
projectionists sometimes had to piece film togethe
causing either confusion or amusement among the
the countryside still took second place to the urba
films were still being shown in small rooms in ko
five or six square metres, which were crammed t
have seats. Such places were often dirty, dark, co
Moreover, the projectionist, who was expected to
on-site, as well as prepare the premises and adver
turn up.20 This grim situation did not improve un

18Moskovskii Partiinyi Arkhiv (MPA) f. 3, op. 44, ed. kh

soveta o kinoobsluzhivanii naseleniya', in M. Akifeva & A
stroitel'stva, Kniga 1 (Moscow, Moskovskii rabochii), p. 3
19Anon. (1930) 'Kinoprokat na sluzhbu kul'turnoi revolyu
20B. Kotiev (1935) 'Zvukofikatsiya sela', Kino, 6 Novem
kinofikatsii derevni', Kino, 16 February. E. Sheval (1934)
December.

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 SOVIET CINEMA, 1929-41 111

At the beginning of 1939, there was a total of around 19,500 cin

throughout the rural areas of the Soviet Union, revealing a very
Moreover, only 7,500 of these installations were equipped wit
indicated, the issue of sound was of central importance in persua
throughout the USSR that the Soviet political system was working
During the 1930s, the campaigns against mass illiteracy w
Nonetheless, this took time and showing peasants sound film
effective means of conveying the communist message. The failur
quantity of sound projectors for the country represented a major
attempt to reach the masses during the 1930s.
As noted above, cinefication favoured the European par
especially its towns and cities. Many rural regions in the RS
facilities at all until the end of the decade. This included the nor
Koryak regions where primitive transport meant that it was very
heavy projectors to these areas. Republics, such as Tadzhikist
Kirgiziya, very rarely had the opportunity to see films and milli
never seen a film.22 It was only in 1939-40 that some of these ar
16mm projectors and some film copies, usually one copy of each
people in many regions and republics of the USSR spoke a multit
in these parts of the Soviet Union Russian speakers were still in
population as a whole. It became clear to the cinema administratio
or even sound films with solely Russian subtitles or only in Russ
regions and republics, would have little impact in persuading
Bolshevik cause was one that they should support. Again it was onl
the 1930s that some films were made with inter-titles in many of
indigenous languages.

Films and cinemas

In the latter half of the 1920s, journalists constantly complained

was relying far too much on commercialism. This largely referre
mass entertainment foreign films, which continued after 19
demands made by the Party. However, in 1930 a combination
Soviet cultural and economic independence, as well as the U
deficit, led to a drastic cut in imports of foreign films. In fact t
cinema industry came to achieving complete independence in any a
in the area of film production. During the early part of the deca
Soviet-produced films could be seen, especially in urban areas
curtailment of foreign products. Nonetheless, regardless of the d
figures in the cinema industry still thought of box office re
important. Consequently, foreign films that had been import
1920s were shown in many of the main cinema theatres in Mosco

21Iu. Kalistratov (1939) 'Ulushchit' kinoobsluzhivanie sela', Kino, 23 Novem

22Anon. (1939) 'Kino na severe', Kino, 17 February. I. Dyakonov (1939), 'Ogro
February.

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112 JAMIE MILLER

urban centres until as late as 1935. These films we

including comedies featuring Harold Lloyd and
German thrillers, such as the film Angst, which
repeatedly in subsequent years. In the summer of
why Moscow's theatres were dominated with date
time and time again with the exception of the oc
By 1934, in urban areas, the presence of foreign
Soviet movies began to dominate cinemas. None
foreign films was now reduced to a few on a yea
Such events as the first international film festiv
foreign products alive. Shumyatskii ordered the
shown at the festival for the benefit of the wide
entertainment films, including The Invisible Man
finds a way of becoming invisible then loses his
rise to fame of a Mexican dancer; and the Wa
(1933), Peculiar Penguins (1934) and The Band
Mouse. Shumyatskii's administration also bought s
films that had been shown at the festival, includi
told of the life of an unemployed girl, and Rene
satirical comedy. All of these were dubbed into
released during 1935-36.
Yet many of the Soviet films shown in the early
1920s, such as The Bears Wedding (Medvezh'ia
rather than the politicised classics. It was clear by
that urban film exhibition still had an essentia
Soviet films were deliberately advertised to l
audiences and maximise profits. For instance, a
advertised in Vecherniaia Moskva during March 1
title, The Glory of the World, and an illustration
import. The film was in fact produced at Belg
Despite the huge reduction in foreign imports, fo
presence in urban cinemas. Rossnabfil'm, the f
ordinary people would still pay to see endless rep
rather than repeats of the Soviet films favoured b
Lower down the distribution ladder the situation
1920s workers' clubs had established themselv
watching films compared to the commercial cinem
often too expensive for the average citizen. D
popular, yet the films exhibited in these establish
For instance, in the autumn of 1933, the workers
east of Moscow, were shown films, such as Aleks
Wild West (Naezdniki iz uail'd-vesta, 1925), a
Georgii Tasin's Jimmy Higgins (Dzhimmi Khiggin
worker coming to revolutionary consciousnes

23N. Lyadov (1933) 'Sledya za reklamoi', Vechernyaya Mo

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 SOVIET CINEMA, 1929-41 113

Pushkin's The Captain's Daughter (Kapitanskaya dochka, 1928), and Ch

City Lights (1931).24
In the countryside a similar situation prevailed. The problem in bo
and rural areas was not an excess of foreign films, but rather t
generally. In 1936 one commentator claimed that 80% of the i
showing dated films, which in many cases, were not in a condition
exhibition. The typical sort of film shown would again be Soviet prod
1920s, such as Grigorii Roshal's Salamander (1928), a film about t
Kammerer, which was unpopular on its original release, or Am
Khaz Push (1928), a film about a revolt of Persian peasants and cr
Older foreign films were also shown in the countryside, such as Duk
Fox (1921), an American adventure movie. The obvious concern for P
not only that the more prestigious urban theatres and, to a lesser ext
clubs and kolkhoz buildings, were still showing many dated foreign f
domestic product, but that most new Soviet films were hardly b
throughout the USSR. Soviet citizens, especially in the smaller towns
could only be offered the same films from the 1920s over and over
to all that the new cinema for the millions was not actually reachin
The crux of the problem was the lack of prints available for new So
mid-1930s, it usually took two to three years before the areas with
had seen the majority of new Soviet films due to the low productiv
established copy factories and this was compounded by the slowness
There simply were not enough copies to distribute. At the beginning
an average of 39 copies of each film for the entire USSR. Over the ne
figure slowly increased and prints for sound projectors also began t
end of the decade, this had risen to between 250 and 300 sound and
film, which was still less than sufficient. It is useful to draw a compa
in this case. In 1940 the USA had fewer than 20,000 cinemas compar
29,000 viewing facilities in the USSR. The average number of
American films at this time was 250, similar to the Soviet figur
fundamental difference was that America produced 673 movies in 1
the USSR's 40 films. So, in addition to the fact that US theatres wer
with film prints, they also had a higher level of choice.26

24Eberhard Nembach (2001) Stalins Filmpolitik: Der Umbau der Sowjetischen F

1938 (St. Augustin, Gardez! Verlag), pp. 67-68.
25N. Ivanov (1936) 'Kinoobsluzhivanie derevni v zagone', Kino, 22 June. Anon.
plokho', Kino, 22 December.
26B. Kotiev (1935) 'Problema kopii', Kino, 5 May. Kotiev also notes that the overal
available in the USSR in 1934 was 24,355. This figure actually decreased over th
17,000 in 1938 and only returned to just over 25,000 the following year. This was
sizeable number of Soviet and foreign silent films that were gradually falling out
failure of the copy factories to compensate by producing sufficient quantities of
print runs, see Anon. (1939) 'V komitete po delam kinematografii', Kino, 3 No
(1939) 'Neskol'ko voprosov Soyuzkinoprokatu', Kino, 11 October. For the Ame
Chester Bahn (1941) 'Industry Statistics', in Alicoate, Jack (ed.) The 1941 Fil
Motion Pictures (New York, The Film Daily), pp. 35-47.

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114 JAMIE MILLER

The Soviet industry which, in theory at lea

should see its major films, failed to produce and
the necessary communication of the communis
to this rule, such as Sergei Eisenstein's Aleksan
Peasants (Krest'iane, 1935), which were eventua
including part two of Ermler's The Great C
released in approximately 500-600 copies. But, e
figures were still less than sufficient, especiall
output of film production and the rapid dec
distribution of most films, including ideologica
as Lenin in 1918 (1939), was meagre. In 1939 on
better-served regions of the Soviet Union,
presented with only five copies of the film. M
would increase sharply over the next two years,
still consisted of silent projectors. Despite this,
produced and this applied to other films suc
Drivers (Traktoristy, 1939).27
A great deal of the blame for what was being
USSR in the early to mid 1930s was placed on t
agencies. Rossnabfil'm and its Union represen
administration's control until 1938. This meant
profit making with the films that were av
ideologically orientated distribution. In 1930
that the distribution agencies were not living
mass spectator. Instead of helping to transfo
the service of the proletariat', the distributors w
commercial imperative, focusing more on the w
and peasant masses.28
Although distribution did not fall under Sh
successors gave their full support to the idea o
level the imbalances that favoured urban centr
competition between theatres. In 1938 distr
Dukel'skii, formally giving the new Cinema Com
being shown on Soviet screens. However, by th
the division of the cinema committee now resp
evenly distribute films. Instead of planning, th
cinemas up into first, second and third screens
administrators of Soyuzkinoprokat were not
prints to the less profitable regions and villages
Theatre managers in Moscow regarded the n
chaotic. They complained that Soyuzkinopro
details of film content and duration, which me

27Anon. (1939) '570 kopii', Kino, 1 December. Svetlani

28Anon. (1930) 'Kinoprokat na sluzhbu kul'turnoi revol
29S. Osipov (1938) 'Stolichnyi kinoteatr', Vechernyaya

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 SOVIET CINEMA, 1929 -41 115

tickets in advance was impossible. Managers also complained that S

frequently promised individual theatres specific films. In response to t
would arrange advertisements and sell a large quantity of advance tick
that they would not receive the film after all.30 These complaints sugge
opposite of planning was taking place in the area of film distribution.
Some argued that the theatres themselves should also be under
centralised control structure. When the autonomous Cinefication Adm
established in 1933, the theatres that had formerly fallen under Sovkin
control were placed in its hands while equivalent administrations were
the republics. Yet, although private ownership had by now been offic
urban theatres were controlled by a variety of organisations that still
each other for the biggest profits. Moscow provides an interesting ex
outlets, that did not constitute part of the Cinefication Administratio
were under the control of Moscow City Council, the autonomous Mezh
controlled several top theatres in the capital, and other organisa
Vostokfil'm, which also owned a theatre in Moscow. These different o
competition with one another to maximise profits. Gradually, ownershi
down. In 1936 Mezhrabpom was liquidated, as was Vostokino. In 1938 t
Administration was also liquidated, handing over the control of many
centralised Cinema Committee. In Moscow the majority of theatres we
the control of the city council's cinema trust (Mosgorkino). In effect, t
had been significantly reduced. Nonetheless, even in Moscow there wa
between the quality of theatres located in the centre of the city and thos
the main metropolis. Managers of the top theatres knew that they wou
to receive the best films and the newest prints. Consequently, they coul
as four rubles per ticket whereas the lesser theatres usually charged less
per ticket. In contrast, tickets for the most basic rural cinema installatio
50 kopecks. Ultimately, the desire to eliminate competition and
ideologically sound, planned, equal system of film access was com
distribution and theatre system that was stratified and which inevitabl
the practical necessity of making money for the state.

The development of the industry's technical base

The problems of establishing an industry and infrastructure were parti

the sphere of equipment production. The production of Soviet f
considered to be a matter of urgent priority as the USSR had become
importing it from Western Europe and America on a large scale and at
the cinema industry. In 1929 construction began on the USSR's first fil
in Shostka in northern Russia and this was soon followed by the build
factory at Pereslavl'-Zalesskii near Moscow. In the Shostka case a d
with Lumiere to help with the construction and equipping of the film
while a company called SIPM was hired to provide similar suppor
Zalesskii. Both factories began operating at the end of 1931. However,

30P. Tikhonravov (1939) 'O strannostyakh prokata', Kino, 29 June.

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116 JAMIE MILLER

to move towards fully independent film st

difficult process. The official figures suggest t
film stock were imported, but in 1933 this fi
Between 1932 and 1941, the output of Soviet f
eight-fold. Nonetheless, this quantitative incre
1930s, accompanied by qualitative improve
presented with low quality Soviet film stock.
'new' film stock that might be scratched, cover
unevenly perforated, or even partly or co
chemical emulsion necessary to shoot the imag
abundance of film stock, a great deal of it wa
In practice this meant that there were short
this was undoubtedly a factor in the low le
import of foreign film stock had been curtaile
1930s and beyond, the cinema administrat
chemical emulsion for the Soviet stock from
Indeed, during April 1935, Shumyatskii inf
produced at approximately two times below
more than was being imported from abroad. T
were still very significant. Foreign companies w
were still fairly widely used in the Soviet U
Agfa was even allowed to advertise its film st
filmmakers much preferred to use well know
on many occasions they did so. For instance
film stock or a combination of foreign and So
director of Mezhrabpomfil'm over the lack
positive print for his film Girl Without A Dow
was given a Kodak print. Important Soviet film
including Kozintsev and Trauberg's The Retur
1937). Imported film stock was also used f
Kadochnikov and Fedor Fillipov's fairytale
1941), produced using 50% foreign film stock
If the import of foreign film stock had been
film camera production was less successful. In
were under construction in Odessa, Samara,
used to develop cameras, projectors, lighting e
production of cameras and projectors develo
1930s, much of the key equipment used in

31A. Kalyuzhnyi (1932) 'Sovetskaya kinoplenka i ee ne

32RGALI, f. 2496. op. 2. ed. khr.l, 1. 1-10, 'Otchety
eksportu i importu kinofiPmov i kinofoto-materi
sil'naya, khoroshaya, no ne Chapaev". Zapisi besed
kinoprosmotrov 1935-1937 gg.', Kinovedcheskie Za
opozdanie s otvetom vini B. Z. Shumyatskogo', Kinov
Filmpolitik, p. 123. RGALI, f. 2453. op. 2, ed. khr. 23
33RGALI, f. 2497. op. 1, ed. khr. 20, 1. 269-273.

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 SOVIET CINEMA, 1929-41 117

including cameras and lighting equipment. By the end of 1932, ther

cameras in Soyuzkino's studios all of which were imported mo
journalist Bluvshtein argued that Soyuzkino was not taking the i
Soviet cameras seriously enough. It simply continued to import
models, an approach that could not be sustained. In his view, if t
Soviet cameras were not rapidly launched, the industry would f
production of cameras only really began in 1933, but again the
necessitating a continued reliance on foreign models. Soviet ca
particularly liked the cameras made by Andre Debrie's French comp
German 'Kinamo' model. By the late 1930s, most cameramen, s
Kaplan, still preferred to use Debrie cameras that had been imported
and early 1930s for studio work, as well as newer models that were
Although the aging Debrie camera gave Kaplan problems during the
Baltic Deputy (Deputat Baltiki, 1937), the quality of result was still s
the emerging Soviet models. As with film stock, the import of came
the 1930s, but still continued and by the end of the decade Ivan Bol
that Soviet studio equipment was still dominated by imported camer
products. As well as cameras for feature films, specialist camera
including the 20 models approved for purchase by Stalin in June 19
Party parades.35
The production of Soviet projectors had begun in Leningrad
manufacture of TOMP and GOZ projectors started in 1924. These mo
purpose, but with the advent of sound, the industry struggled to p
right quantity and quality of sound projectors. As in every oth
technicians combined their own ideas with foreign designs. For exam
American Super-Simplex sound projector was purchased for th
Green Theatre in Gorkii Park, Moscow. Before being installed at
delivered to the Scientific Research Cinema Photographic Instit
under Professors Goldovskii and Tager studied and examined the dev
Soviet projectors were of a higher quality than Soviet film cameras, t
nearly enough of them to be installed in exhibition outlets thro
Union and older foreign models, especially the Pathe silent proj
common in the countryside. In the urban centres, the more mod
foreign sound projectors were preferred for the best theatres, incl
cinema, which contained several Super-Simplex projectors.
Since becoming head of the cinema industry in November 1930, Bo
initial approach to developing Soviet cinema's technical base had bee
the emphasis on imported materials and machines, emphasising the
the production of domestic cinema equipment. But Shumyatskii
realistic attitude by the mid-1930s, realising that Soviet technic
cinema had not reached acceptable standards. He was not afraid t

34V. Bluvshtein (1932) 'V poiskakh za utrachennym vremenem', Proletarskoe k

35Ivan Bol'shakov (1939) 'O prieme del novym rukovodstvom komiteta i o
polugodiya', Kino, 18 August. Troshin (ed.), 'Kartina sil'naya', pp. 145-148.
36Anon. (1935) 'Kino v zelenom teatre', Vechernyaya Moskva, 20 February.

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 118 JAMIE MILLER

leadership what he thought about the quali

instrumental in persuading Stalin and the Cent
foreign products, as well as expertise, was abso
an American film at the Kremlin, Shumyatskii
and American film stock in comparison to th
Shumyatskii: 'But you say that we have probabl
of film stock'. Shumyatskii replied:

No, Josef Vissarionovich, I am not saying that to eit

always underline our backwardness and the necess
and of sending people abroad on practical work.

Stalin modestly responded:

We need to say directly that we still have not cau

country we are all boasting that we have overtaken
and working badly in our blissful conceit.

Shumyatskii went on to point out that the pro

lay in the poor quality of raw materials, as w
personnel in places, such as Shostka and
administration of these factories. He conclud
to import equipment. Stalin accepted Shumy
speak to Molotov, regarding the necessary fina
Shumyatskii's realistic approach to economic
on Stalin and the Central Committee, which ha
In May 1935, Shumyatskii was permitted to lea
technical equipment and production processe
understanding of film stock production wa
delegation visited the Fridmen laboratory in
film developing and film copying machines
efficiency and quality. After the delegation had
technicians were invited to the USSR to help wit
development in the various areas of production
were posted at Mosfil'm and Lenfil'm to carr
cinema administration ordered a sizeable qu
imported into the Soviet Union. In 1936 Shum
$500,000 purchasing American equipment t
studios.38
Thus, under Shumyatskii, the aspiration to achieve complete autarky for the Soviet
cinema industry was gradually brushed aside as importation continued in almost every
single area associated with cinema. All the key technical items were still imported,

37Aleksandr Troshin (ed.) (2002) '"A dryani podobno 'garmon" bol'she ne stavite?" Zapisi besed
B. Z. Shumyatskogo s I. V. Stalinym posle kinoprosmotrov 1935-1937 gg.', Kinovedcheskie zapiski,
61, p. 293.
38Vladmir Verlinskii (1937) 'Ten Years of Soviet Films in The United States', in Alicoate, Jack (ed.)
The 1937 Film Daily Year Book of Motion Pictures (New York, The Film Daily), pp. 1170-1171.

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 SOVIET CINEMA, 1929-41 119

including film stock, cameras and projectors, but Shumyatskii and h

imported other items. Amongst them were film printing and develo
cranes, special automobiles for carrying out moving shots, as we
items, such as cables. This meant that imports varied from, for exam
rubles released by the government in 1940 for Ivan Bol'shakov's a
make some purchases in France, Germany and Switzerland to the
Bol'shakov's representatives in New York in the same year, with plan
times that amount.39

Exports
The relative weakness of the industry's development was also manifest in levels of
exports. Due to the fact that in the 1930s the USSR had to construct its own cinema
industrial base, its levels of exports were relatively low. The export of raw film stock
only really began in the mid-1930s. In 1935 the Soviet government earned a modest
R10,000 from raw film stock export. This income peaked at R65,000 in 1938, before
dropping over the next few years. The export of cameras, projectors, sound recording
devices, lighting and so on was also relatively minimal. This began with the export of
one item in 1934, yielding R25,000, before reaching its height in 1939 with the export
of 29 items at a profit of R216,000. However, in 1940 the number of items exported
dropped to ten and the previous year's profit was halved. As the USSR was relatively
new to these areas of production, demand for its raw film stock and equipment was
almost non-existent in the West. Most of the income from exports in the late 1930s
came from neighbouring countries, such as China and Mongolia, which were at a
fairly early stage of cinema industry development.40
By far the most profitable area of export for the Soviet film industry was of the films
themselves. In the mid to late 1920s, Soviet films achieved both critical and financial
success in countries, such as Germany and the USA. Yet, despite financial success, the
USSR was receiving relatively little in terms of a currency equivalent due to relatively
weak connections and understandings of Western markets, as well as a lack of
specialised personnel to trade with foreign partners and establish more beneficial price
policies.4' Moreover, by 1933 the close relationship with Germany was ended by the
rise of the Nazi regime. Despite this setback, the USSR began to develop a more
professional approach to film export with the establishment in 1930 of a specialised
department called Intorgkino, which became Soyuzintorgkino in 1933. The closure of
its Berlin offices led to the establishment of a new permanent Paris office and stronger
trade links were set up with America through the Amkino Corporation in New York.
Overall however, Soviet trade links with foreign cinema industries remained
extremely basic, partly due to the general decline of world trade in the 1930s and also
to the increasingly inward nature of the Soviet economic system. The export of Soviet

39See endnote number 34, in Andrei Artizov & Oleg Naumov (1999) Vlast' i khudozhestvennaya
intelligentsiya (Moscow, Demokratiya), pp. 777-778. Paul Babitskii & John Rimberg (1955), The
Soviet Film Industry (New York, Praeger), p. 260.
40Anon. (1960) Vneshyaya torgovlya SSSR za 1918-1940: statisticheskii obzor (Moscow, Vheshtor
gizdat), pp. 126, 160.
41Efraim Lemberg (1930) Kinopromyshlennost SSSR (Moscow, Teakinopechat'), p. 89.

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120 JAMIE MILLER

films to America in the mid to late 1930

underdeveloped trade links were at this time. I
agreement with Amkino, giving that corporation
of Soviet film. However, these rights not o
America, Central America, Mexico, Cuba and Ca
was reliant on one trading partner for the leng
Moreover, while the price of each individual
feature films were to be sold for ten cents a m
figure for the time. Given such an undeveloped
the actual overall income from film exports, wh
levels of the late 1920s. In 1929 the Soviet U
exports. Throughout the 1930s, exports often fa
falling to R216,000 in 1940.42

An assessment of administrative achie

Shumyatskii has been most commonly depict

acted as a mouthpiece for the Soviet governme
most of his policies reflected the Soviet gove
growth and development, although this emphas
But Shumyatskii was not merely a compliant b
the communist system, yet he was an energeti
this, he and the Cinefication Administration m
failing to achieve the most fundamental go
administration. The Bolsheviks wanted to r
medium of cinema to persuade them of the rig
convince them that their everyday hardships w
a future communist paradise. However, the cin
success. The transition to sound was slow an
unevenly distributed and, on average, Soviet
nearly enough copies to cover the entire dist
therefore, to see the 1930s as the period wh
cinema administration attempted to esta
propaganda would be conveyed to the mass
propaganda was effectively conveyed th
sophisticated cinematic propaganda machine
1928, the masses were presented with an unsop
same dated films time and time again.
By 1941 the aspiration of the late 1920s to bu
Soviet cinema industry free from depende

42Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Ekonomiki (R

mezhdu aktsionernym obshchestvom "Amkino Korpor
prave prodazhi produktsii sovetskoi kinematografii na te
Kanady', in G. Sevostyanov & E. Tyurina (eds) (2001)
1933-1941: Sbornik Dokumentov (Moscow, Nauka), pp.
126, 160.

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 SOVIET CINEMA, 1929 -41 121

significant strides forward. Before the onset of war with Germany

much closer to making the full transition to sound with all of its 1
make sound films. In addition, the industry was now manufactu
recording devices and cinema theatre sound systems were on
successive cinema administrations had overseen the construction of
production of film stock, cameras, projectors, lighting equipment,
for creating mass prints of completed films. In the space of a deca
created its own cinematic technical foundations from scratch, whic
achievement in itself.
Yet, despite the rhetoric of 'catching up with and overhauling
industry in 1929 was still at a very early stage of development. It la
and infrastructure of the West, which had industrialised over a muc
time. Stalin's political vision of an autarkic USSR closed off from th
industrialising at breakneck speed and overtaking the West w
superiority, so he thought, of the Soviet socialist idea. Soviet ci
exempt from this political vision of isolation and growth under a s
command structure. Nevertheless, the reality for Soviet cinema's e
ment was rather different from the political ideal. The desire to se
cinema infrastructure develop meant that the USSR, as in ma
industry, would realistically need to learn from the experience
foreign specialists who were working in much more favourable con
Soviet counterparts. Yet, while the trips of Soviet representatives a
coverage in the cinema press, the extent of the foreign influence w
publicly acknowledged and subsequent official histories on Sovie
either ignore or play down this influence. The main reason for thi
with economic development more generally, Stalin and the Party le
masses to think that any progress or success could be attributed to
organising political, social and economic life. This in turn would he
dictatorial, arbitrary style of government. Thus, the goal of
independent Soviet film industry was not achieved. While many se
economy did achieve this independence in the mid-1930s, specialist
as technical advice for cinema was imported throughout the de
quantities.
One of Shumyatskii's most important achievements was to mainta
the Western film industry at a time when the USSR was becom
isolated. His insistence on continuing to import equipment and kno
West was partly based on practical necessity. Nevertheless, it helped
Soviet film industry functioning and in touch with external te
ments. This explains why, in the mid to late 1930s, he constantly p
Molotov of the need to grant him substantial extra budgetary
imported equipment. Shumyatskii believed that the cinema's contr
Soviet economy that would eventually surpass the West and hel
legitimacy to the regime, could only be realised through practical m
the other branches of industry, Soviet cinema could only grow rap
dialogue and trade of up-to-date equipment were to be maintained
vastly experienced American industry.

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 122 JAMIE MILLER

Reasons for limited achievements: administ

In the first place, Soviet cinema was relatively

available. In reality the cinema industry strugg
capital and sometimes had to rely on state loa
huge investments required to build a cinema in
the dilemma partly caused by a persistentl
overall difficulties. Cinema was still looked upo
state. Indeed, as discussed earlier, Shumyatski
taking a massive chunk of revenue from t
industry would experience the optimist
Unsurprisingly, Shumyatskii's figures were
number of film spectators, the industry was
turnover mark in 1932. In fact, by the mid-19
between R400 and 450 million compared to th
several billion rubles. The approximate figu
amount; the state took over half of this in the
cinema trusts and enterprises. This meant t
very tight budgets to work with. In 1937 S
million. Of this around R60 million was allocat
many films cost well over R2 million each, it
his successors of producing hundreds of featu
Shumyatskii in particular encouraged t
infrastructure as far as it was realistic in s
tenure, the Scientific Research Cinema Photog
body for research into technical matters r
industrial base, from the design and constr
study of film stock emulsion. Shumyatsk
inventiveness among Soviet technicians. Dur
inventions were created, ranging from reusabl
However, the inventors and technicians lacked
experience necessary to fully realise their ide
the fact that these technicians, as well as film
circumstances.
Regardless of how innovative or ambitiou
might have been, Soviet industry as a whole w
or quality of the necessary parts and there w
such as microphones or lenses. Throughout th
recording machines, were made in the laborato
inevitably led to a failure to produce even a r
early 1930s, other parts were to be manufa
which operated in the sphere of heavy industr
was not considered to be a priority. In 1929

43Troshin, 'A dryani podobno 'garmon" bol'she ne st

p. 122.

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 SOVIET CINEMA, 1929-41 123
Production), which was responsible for the production of stationary
into financial trouble and was forced to make a deal with the State S
Enterprise in order to maintain the production of projectors. Unfort
proved to be a failure as the sewing machine enterprise did not carry
Even when mechanical factories specifically aimed at cinema were est
failed to fulfil the demands that were made on them.
Furthermore, shortages of electricity were still a fundamental
developing cinema industry during the 1930s. Although the black
gradually became a thing of the past, this did not mean that problem
supply had been resolved. For instance, in August 1934, one commen
the need for more powerful lamps in the studios. At the same time he
powerful devices required around 35-45 volts, which was still not pos
studios at that time.44 The provision of electricity was also intimate
development of effective cinefication. Many parts of the Soviet count
electricity, which meant that those areas that did have cinema provi
make do with silent hand-cranked projectors with dynamo fed lam
the more sophisticated electrically-driven models. As with many oth
problem was only slowly resolved towards the end of the 1930
electricity supply rapidly increased.
Another key contextual problem that undoubtedly had an imp
development of the Soviet cinema industry was the lack of personne
poorly trained cadres that were available. In 1929 Soviet cinema lacke
quantity of technical personnel who could be relied upon to generate
required to create the infrastructural base of the industry. This incl
themselves who often lacked the qualifications to train the wo
sometimes experts in another field, such as chemical applications, but
teaching mechanical courses on projectors and cameras. Apart from V
Institute), which had a small department for engineers, the educationa
broader mass of mechanics and engineers only reached adequate capac
the 1930s. Consequently, by the time that the first film stock, camera, p
and film copying factories were built between the early and late 1930s
were not adequately trained to carry out their tasks in the most effic
manner. This led to constant complaints about the quality of items, r
materials, such as gelatine, to the final product, such as film stock. The
numbers of well-trained specialists had an impact on most of th
including the production and application of sound projectors.
But the efficiency of those workers who had received the necessary
compromised by the nature of the Soviet economic system. Under St
cinema industry was subjected to the same system of central planning
to every other sphere of the economy. However, despite the industry
and inefficiency, the administrations of Shumyatskii, Dukel'skii and
fully committed to the attempt to impose planning on every aspect o
thematic content of films to their distribution and from the productio
the building of cinemas. Yet, Shumyatskii displayed ambiguity b

44V. Mikhailyk (1934) 'O kachestve osvetitel'noi apparatury', Kino, 16 August.

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 124 JAMIE MILLER

advocating Hollywood production ideas. Duri

been impressed by American methods of film
the division of labour into specialist tasks. On
series of organisational changes along these lin
introduced as Shumyatskii was unable to recon
new American inspired approach was viewed
role in his downfall and eventual execution in
All the administrative leaders supported Soviet
such as socialist competition, which began in t
late 1930s, Shumyatskii gave his full backing t
movement to cinema. Both socialist competit
productivity, the exceeding of planned norms, t
The treatment of the Soviet film sector as just
iron or coal production, was arguably a wholly
of production. The language associated with the
base included 'shock workers' conjuring an ima
of riveters and drillers that was more applicab
approach led to an emphasis on quantitativ
development: the successful production of a giv
commonly thought of in terms of how many
with less emphasis on its quality.

Conclusion
In the final analysis, contextual factors made Shumyatskii's chances of success
extremely low, but his limited achievements were also partly due to his irreconcilable
ideas. Throughout his tenure, he called for huge increases in film output, knowing that
he had neither the personnel nor the resources to realise such unrealistic goals. He
wanted the Soviet government to benefit from cinema's substantial tax revenues yet
he fought hard to gain financial resources back for the development of the industry.
He wanted to introduce the best of capitalist production techniques, but still
supported the inefficient and ineffective implementation of planning to every aspect of
Soviet cinema. In the end, Shumyatskii was largely unsuccessful. However, Dukel'skii
and Bol'shakov, who were both more conservative, encountered the same problems.
Nonetheless, regardless of the increasingly dogmatic nature of the leadership, the
cinema trade links established by Shumyatskii were prolonged after his death. By the
early 1940s, however, the Soviet film industry, which had made remarkable leaps
forward during the 1930s, had still failed to reach the masses in the way it had planned
in 1928 and it had not achieved its goal of economic autarky.

The University of Exeter

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