ESTRADA V.

SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R No. 148560 November 19, 2001

FACTS:

Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted under an Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of
Plunder, wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that
it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. His
contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said law that it suffers from the vice of
vagueness. It dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and it
abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code
saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused. The focal point of the case is the
alleged “vagueness” of the law in the terms it uses. Particularly, this terms are: combination, series
and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of the
mentioned law.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague.
2) Whether or not the Plunder Law requires less evidence for providing the predicate
crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process.
3) Whether or not Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether
it is within the power of Congress to so classify it.

HELD:
In the question whether or not the Plunder Law is unconstitutional. The court held that it
is not, As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who
are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained.
The amended information itself closely tracks the language of law, indicating with reasonable
certainty the various elements of the offense which the petitioner is alleged to have committed.
The court discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse petitioner
in his defense. Petitioner however bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory
definition of the terms “combination” and “series” in the key phrase “a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts. These omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law
unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence violative of his fundamental
right to due process. Statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms
are used herein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them.

A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that
men of common intelligence most necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In
such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution first if it violates due process for failure
to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid and
secondly when, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. In the second issue under Sec. 4 of Rule
of Evidence it states that: For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be
necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme
or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish
beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused
always has in his favor the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless
the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the
accused is entitled to an acquittal. The court answered that Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is to
be considered as malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Precisely because the
constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for
plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was
committed “willfully, unlawfully and criminally.” It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of
petitioner. The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code
to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of
plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent.
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have
been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the
heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise
known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the
petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
 CARLOS F. GARCIA VS SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 165835

FACTS:

To recover unlawfully acquired funds and properties that the Garcias’ had allegedly
amassed and acquired, the Republic, through the OMB filed with the SB 2 petitions for the
forfeiture of those properties. The Garcias’ filed motion to dismiss on the ground of SB’s lack of
jurisdiction for lack of proper and valid service of summons: (1) Forfeiture I – the corresponding
summons on the case were all issued and all served on Gen. Garcia at his place of
detention; (2) Forfeiture II – the sheriff stated giving the copies of the summons to the
OIC/Custodian of the PNP Detention Center who in turn handed them to Gen. Garcia. The
general signed his receipt of the summons, but as to those pertaining to the other respondents,
Gen. Garcia acknowledged receiving the same, but with the following qualifying note: “I’m
receiving the copies of Clarita, Ian Carl, Juan Paolo & Timothy – but these copies will
not guarantee it being served to the above-named (sic).”

ISSUE:
WON the SB has acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner and her 3 sons.

HELD:
SB did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner and her children. It
is basic that a court must acquire jurisdiction over a party for the latter to be bound by its decision
or orders. Valid service of summons, by whatever mode authorized by and proper under the
Rules, is the means by which a court acquires jurisdiction over a person.
In the instant case, it is undisputed that summons for Forfeitures I and II were served personally
on Maj. Gen. Carlos Flores Garcia, who is detained at the PNP DetentionCenter, who
acknowledged receipt thereof by affixing his signature. It is also undisputed that substituted
service of summons for both Forfeitures I and II were made on petitioner and her children through
Maj. Gen. Garcia at the PNP Detention Center. However, such substituted services of summons
were invalid for being irregular and defective.

Requirements as laid down in Manotoc vs CA:

1) Impossibility of prompt personal service, i.e., the party relying on substituted service or the
sheriff must show that defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt
service within a reasonable time. Reasonable time being “so much time as is necessary under
the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the
contract or duty requires that should be done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss,
if any[,] to the other party.” Moreover, we indicated therein that the sheriff must show several
attempts for personal service of at least three (3) times on at least two (2) different dates.
2) Specific details in the return, i.e., the sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts
and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service.
3) Substituted service effected on a person of suitable age and discretion residing at defendant’s
house or residence; or on a competent person in charge of defendant’s office or regular place of
business.
From the foregoing requisites, it is apparent that no valid substituted service of summons was
made on petitioner and her children, as the service made through Maj. Gen. Garcia did not comply
with the first two (2) requirements mentioned above for a valid substituted service of
summons. Moreover, the third requirement was also not strictly complied with as the substituted
service was made not at petitioner’s house or residence but in the PNP Detention Center where
Maj. Gen. Garcia is detained, even if the latter is of suitable age and discretion. Hence, no valid
substituted service of summons was made.