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Foundations of Democracy
Author(s): Hans Kelsen

Source: Ethics, Vol. 66, No. 1, Part 2: Foundations of Democracy (Oct., 1955), pp. 1-101
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2378551
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ETH I C S AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF
SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
Volume LXVI OCTOBER 1955 Number i, Part II
FOUNDATIONS OF DEMOCRACY'
HANS KELSEN
I. DEMOCRACY AND PHILOSOPHY
DEMOCRACY AS ''GOVERNMENT BY THE new political doctrine was advocated,

PEOPLE": A POLITICAL PROCEDURE passionately opposed to democracy and
proclaiming a new way of political salva-
E political idea of the nineteenth
tion: dictatorship. There should be no
century, born in the American and
doubt about the great attraction which
I French revolutions of the eight-
eenth century, was democracy. To be the new idol exerted over the bourgeois
sure, there were also in Western civiliza- intelligentsia, not only in Italy and Ger-
tion remarkable forces working for the many, but everywhere in the Western
maintenance of the autocracy principle. world. And although fascism and na-
But its representatives were stigmatized tional socialism have been destroyed as
as reactionaries. The future belonged to a political realities in the Second World
government by the people. This was the War, their ideologies have not disap-
peared and still directly, or indirectly,
hope of everybody who believed in prog-
ress, who stood up for higher standards counteract the democratic creed.
A more dangerous adversary than fas-
of social life. It was, above all, the young,
cism and national socialism is Soviet
rising bourgeoisie which fought for this
communism, which is fighting the demo-
idea.
cratic idea under the disguise of a demo-
In the twentieth century, however, the
cratic terminology. It seems that the
intellectual and political situation has
changed. The immediate effect of the symbol of democracy has assumed such a
generally recognized value that the sub-
First World War-it is true-seemed to
stance of democracy cannot be aban-
be a victory of the democratic principle.
doned without maintaining the symbol.
The newly erected states adopted demo-
cratic constitutions. The German Reich, Well-known is the cynical statement: If
the most powerful bastion of monarchy, fascism should come to the United States
it would be called democracy.2 Hence the
became a republic. But the ink on the
peace document of Versailles was not yet
symbol must change its meaning so radi-
dry when in Italy the Fascist govern- cally that it can be used to designate the
ment came into power and in Germany very contrary: In Soviet political theory
the National Socialist party began its the dictatorship of the Communist party,
victorious drive. Together with them a pretending to be the dictatorship of the
1
2 ETHICS
proletariat, is presented as democracy. the people. Again and again, political

It is of the greatest importance to dis- writers tried to demonstrate that autoc-
close the conceptual device through racy, be it hereditary monarchy or
which this distortion of the symbol could leader-dictatorship, is a better gover-
be achieved. ment for the people than a government
The original meaning of the term "de- by the people, i.e., democracy. That
mocracy," coined in the political theory there is something true in this argument
of ancient Greece, was: government by and that "government for the people"
the people (demos = people, kcratein = is not identical with "government by the
govern). The essence of the political phe- people" cannot be denied. Since not only
nomenon designated by the term was the democracy but also its very contrary,
participation of the governed in the gov- autocracy, may be a government for the
ernment, the principle of freedom in the people, this quality cannot be an element
sense of political self-determination; and of the definition of democracy. This is
this was the meaning with which the also the reason why the doctrine that
term has been taken over by the political democracy presupposes the belief that
theory of Western civilization. It stands there exists an objectively ascertainable
to reason that in antiquity as well as in common good and that the people are
our time a government by the people is able to know it and therefore to make it
desired because such a government is the content of their will is erroneous. If
supposed to be a government for the it were correct, democracy would not be
people. A government "for the people" possible. For it is easy to show that there
means a government acting in the inter- is no such thing as an objectively ascer-
est of the people. But the question as to tainable common good, that the question
what is the interest of the people may be as to what is the common good can be
answered in different ways, and what the answered only by subjective value judg-
people themselves believe to be their in- ments which may differ essentially from
terest is not necessarily the only possible each other; and that even if it existed,
answer. It may even be doubted whether the average man, and hence the people,
there is such a thing as an opinion of the would hardly be able to know it. It can-
people about their own interest and a will not be denied that the people as a mass
of the people directed at its realization. of individuals of different economic and
Hence a government may consider itself cultural standards have no uniform will,
to be a government for the people-and that only the individual human being has
as a matter of fact every government a real will, that the so-called "will of the
does so-although it may not be a gov- people" is a figure of speech and not a
ernment by the people at all. Already in reality. But the form of government
ancient Greece adversaries of democ- which is defined as "government by the
racy, like Plato and Aristotle, pointed people" does not presuppose a will of the
out that a government by the people as people directed at the realization of that
a government by men inexperienced in which, according to the opinion of the
governmental practice and without the people, is the common good. The term
necessary knowledge of the facts and designates a government in which the
problems of political life may be not at people directly or indirectly participate,
all in the interest of the people and thus that is to say, a government exercised by
may prove to be a government against majority decisions of a popular assembly
FOUNDATIONS OF DEAMOCRACY 3
or of a body or bodies of individuals or Whether this participation is direct or

even by a single individual elected by the indirect, that is to say, whether there is a
people. The individuals elected by the direct or a representative democracy, it
people are called its representatives. is in both cases a procedure, a specific
This representation of the people means method of creating and applying the so-
the relationship, constituted by election, cial order constituting the community,
between the electorate and the elected. which is the criterion of that political
By "people" all the adult individuals are system which is properly called democ-
to be understood who are subject to the racy. It is not a specific content of the
government exercised directly by the as- social order insofar as the procedure in
sembly of these individuals or indirectly question is not itself a content of, that is
by the elected representatives. Demo- to say, regulated by, this order. The
cratic elections are those which are based method of creating the order is always
on universal, equal, free, and secret suf- regulated by the order itself if the order
frage. According to the extent to which is a legal order. For it is charasteristic of
these requirements, especially the uni- the law that it regulates its own creation
versality of suffrage, are fulfilled, the and application.3 To be sure, the modern
democratic principle may be realized in concept of democracy prevailing in West-
different degrees. It has considerably in- ern civilization is not quite identical with
creased during the twentieth century by the original, the antique, concept, insofar
the fact that the right of voting, re- as the latter has been modified by politi-
stricted during the nineteenth century to
cal liberalism, the tendency of which is
taxpaying people and to the male sex, has to restrict the power of government in
been extended to nontaxpaying wage the interest of the freedom of the individ-
earners and to women. Democracy be- ual. Under this influence guaranties for
came a mass democracy. Whether the certain intellectual freedoms, especially
government of an unrestricted democ- freedom of conscience, have been in-
racy realizes to a greater extent than thecluded in the concept of democracy, so
government of a restricted democracy that a social order which does not contain
the problematic opinion or the no less such a guaranty would not be considered
problematic will of people or the mys- democratic, even if the procedure for its
terious common good according to the creation and application guarantees the
opinion and the will of the people is an- participation of the governed in the gov-
other question. However that question ernment. However, the liberal or modern
may be answered, no answer whatsoever democracy is only a special type of de-
justifies rejecting the concept of democ- mocracy. It is of importance to be aware
racy as government by the people and that the principle of democracy and that
replacing it by another concept, espe- of liberalism are not identical, that there
cially by the concept of a government for exists even a certain antagonism be-
the people. tween them. For according to the prin-
Hence, participation in the govern- ciple of democracy the power of the
ment, and that means in the creation andpeople is unrestricted, or as the French
application of the general and individual Declaration of the Rights of Men and
norms of the social order constituting the Citizens formulates it: "The principle of
community, must be considered as the all sovereignty resides essentially in the
essential characteristic of democracy. nation." This is the idea of the sover-
4 ETHICS
eignty of the people. Liberalism, how- democracy necessarily, always and ev-
ever, means restriction of governmental erywhere, serves also this ideal of intel-
power, whatever form the government lectual freedom. If in a concrete case the
may assume. It means also restriction of social order is not created in a way cor-
democratic power. Hence democracy is responding to the definition, or does not
essentially a government by the people. contain the guaranties of freedom, it is
The procedural element remains in the not democracy which does not serve the
foreground, the liberal element-as a ideals. The ideals are not served because
particular content of the social order- democracy has been abandoned. This
being of secondary importance. Even the critique confuses the idea of democracy
liberal democracy is in the first place a with a political reality which wrongly
specific procedure. interprets itself as democracy, although
It has been said that democracy as a it does not correspond to the idea.
political method, that is to say, as a cer- It further confuses the question as to
tain type of institutional arrangement whether democracy can necessarily serve
for arriving at political, legislative, and a certain ideal with the question as to
administrative decisions, is "incapable of whether democracy can be itself an abso-
being an end in itself irrespective of what lute ideal. It seems that the author infers
decisions it will produce under given his- from the negative answer he gives to the
torical conditions";4 and that as a mere first question a negative answer to the
method it cannot "necessarily, always second one. But although the answer to
and everywhere, serve certain interests the first question has certainly to be in
or ideals for which we do mean to fightthe affirmative, the answer to the second
and die unconditionally"; that "the question may be in the negative. The
democratic method does not necessarily ideal of freedom-as any social ideal-is
guarantee a greater amount of individual from the point of view of political science
freedom than another political method only a relative ideal. But it may be from
would permit in similar circumstances" ;5 the point of view of emotional evaluation
and, in particular, that democracy can- the highest, the supreme, ideal of an indi-
not "always safeguard freedom of con- vidual, a value which the individual pre-
science better than autocracy."' This fers to any other value conflicting with
inference from the procedural character the former. I may fight and die uncondi-
of democracy is not quite correct. If we tionally for the freedom democracy is
define democracy as a political method able to realize, although I may admit
by which the social order is created and that from the point of view of rational
applied by those subject to the order, so science my ideal is only a relative one.
that political freedom, in the sense of Schumpeter quite correctly says: "To
self-determ-ination, is secured, then de- realize the relative validity of one's con-
mocracy necessarily, always and every- victions and yet stand for them unflinch-
where, serves this ideal of political free- ingly is what distinguishes a civilized
dom. And if we include in our definition man from a barbarian."7
the idea that the social order, created in As a method or procedure, democracy
the way just indicated, in order to be is a "form" of government. For the pro-
democratic, must guarantee certain in- cedure by which a social order is created
tellectual freedoms, such as freedom of and applied is considered to be formal,
conscience, freedom of press, etc., then in contradistinction to the content of the
FOUNDATIONS OF DEMOCRACY 5
order as a material or substantial ele-people, it is the will of the people and

ment. If, however, democracy is pri- hence the people who govern, even if the
marily a form, a form of a state or a form
government is not elected by the people
of government, it must be kept in mind on the basis of a universal, equal, free,
that the antagonism of form and sub- and secret suffrage or is not elected at all
stance or form and content is only a rela- or elected on the basis of an electoral sys-
tive one, that one and the same thing tem which does not allow everybody to
may appear from one point of view as express freely his political will. The ob-
form and from another as substance or jection that in such a case the interest
content. There is, in particular, no objec- which the government tries to realize
tive principle that constitutes a differ- may not be what the people themselves
ence between the value of the one and consider to be their interest is rejected by
that of the other. In some respects the the argument that the people may be in
form, in others the content or substance, error about their "true" interest, and if
may be of greater importance. The argu- the government realizes the true interest
ment of "formalism," frequently used in of the people, it represents also the true
order to disparage a certain train of will of the people and thus is to be con-
thought and especially a political scheme, sidered as a "true" democracy-in con-
is mostly a device for the purpose of hid- tradistinction to a merely formal or sham
ing an antagonistic interest which is the democracy. In such a "true" democracy
true reason of the opposition. There is the people may be "represented" by an
therefore no better means to obstruct the elite, an avant garde, or even by a charis-
movement for democracy, to pave the matic leader. All that is necessary to do is
way for autocracy, to dissuade the people to shift in the definition of democracy the
from their desire for participation in gov- accent from "government by the people"
ernment, than to depreciate the defini- to "government for the people."
tion of democracy as a procedure by the
argument that it is "formalistic," to THE SOVIET DOCTRINE OF DEMOCRACY
make the people believe that their desire This shift is a characteristic feature of
is fulfilled if the government acts in their the Soviet doctrine according to which
interest, that they have achieved the the dictatorship of the Communist party
longed for democracy if they have a gov- is democracy.8 The tendency to put in
ernment for the people. The political doc- the foreground of the political ideology
trine which furnishes the appropriate the interest of the masses appears al-
ideology for such a tendency emphasizes ready in the Commuitnist Manifesto,
the point that the essence of democracy where the establishment of the dictator-
is a government in the interest of the ship of the proletariat, the immediate
mass of the people, that the participation goal of the socialist movement, is pre-
of the people in the government is of sec- sented as the victory of democracy. "The
ondary importance. If a government is first step in the revolution by the work-
for the people, that is to say, if it acts in
ing class" is "to win the battle of democ-
the interest of the people, it realizes the racy." The "proletarian movement" is
will of the people, and hence it is also a characterized as "the self-conscious, in-
government by the people. For what ev- dependent movement of the immense
erybody "wills" is his interest; and if a majority, in the interest of the immense
government realizes the interest of the majority." Following this line of thought,
6 ETHICS
Lenin declares that the dictatorship of state only by representatives elected by

the proletariat, i.e., the "organization of the people, to a political regime in the in-
the vanguard of the oppressed," is "an terest of the people is not only theoreti-
immense expansion of democracy, for it cally inadmissible because of a misuse of
becomes democracy for the poor, democ- terminology, but it is also politically
racy for the people, and not [as the bour- most problematical. For it substitutes as
geois democracy] democracy for the the criterion of the form of government
rich."9 The essential characteristic of defined as democracy a highly subjective
this democracy is that it "leads to the value judgment-the interest of the
extension of the actual enjoyment of people-for the objectively ascertainable
democracy to those who are oppressed by fact of representation by elected organs.
capitalism, to the toiling classes, to a Every government may-and, as pointed
degree hitherto unprecedented in world out, actually every government does-
history."10 'What is decisive is not the assert that it is acting in the interest of
formalistic criterion of representative in- the people. Since there is no objective
stitutions but the material realization of criterion for what is called the interest of
the interests of the masses. Hence Lenin the people, the phrase "government for
declared that "socialist democracy is not the people" is an empty formula apt to
contradictory to individual management be used for an ideological justification of
and dictatorship in any way, that the any government whatsoever."4 It is
will of a class may sometimes be carried highly significant that as long as the
out by a dictator, who at times may do ideologists of the National Socialist party
more alone and who is frequently more did not dare turn openly against democ-
necessary."" "Lenin taught us," wrote racy, they used exactly the same device
Pravda, "that the dictatorship of the as the ideologists of the Communist
proletariat in a class society represents party. They disparaged the democratic
the interest of the majority and is there- political system of Germany as plutoc-
fore a form of proletarian democracy. "12racy, as a merely "formal" democracy
But the democracy of the dictatorship which in reality guaranteed a minority of
of the proletariat is not the last step in the rich to govern over the majority of
the development of socialist democracy. the poor, and asserted that the Nazi
"Democracy means equality," but bour- party as an elite of the German people
geois democracy means only "formal" intended to realize the true will of this
equality, whereas the socialist democracy people: the greatness and glory of the
is "going beyond formal equality to real German race.
equality, i.e., to applying the rule: from
A NEW DOCTRINE OF REPRESENTATION
each according to his ability, to each ac-
cording to his needs.""3 This is the The perversion of the concept of de-
Marxian formula for justice in the Com- mocracy which has just been character-
munist stateless society of the future. In ized is not restricted to the Soviet or the
this democracy the people have no share National Socialist political doctrine. A
quite similar pattern of thought has re-
in the government, for there is no govern-
ment at all. cently been presented as the theory of
This perversion of the concept of de- representation advocated by a "new sci-
mocracy from a government by the ence of politics."'5 The author distin-
people, and that can mean in a modern guishes between a merely "elemental"
and an "existential" type of representa- refers, as we shall see, to exactly the

tion, just as the Soviet theorists distin- same external existence of society as the
guish between a merely "formal" and a latter.
"real" democracy. By elemental type of In order to proceed from the elemental
representation is understood that repre- to the existential type of representation,
sentation in which "the members of the the author of the new science of politics
legislative assembly hold their member- maintains: "The elemental type of repre-
ship by virtue of popular election." The sentative institutions"-that is, repre-
author further characterizes it by refer- sentation by organs elected on the basis
ring to "the American election of a chief of universal and free suffrage-"does not
executive by the people," to "the Eng- exhaust the problem of representation."21
lish system of a committee of the parlia- This is certainly true. There exists not
mentary majority as the ministry," to only a democratic but also a nondemo-
"the Swiss system of having the execu- cratic type of representation. The state-
tive elected by the two houses in common ment that an individual "represents" a
session," and even to a monarchical gov- community means that the individual is
ernment "as long as the monarch can act acting as an organ of the community, and
only with the countersignature of a re- he is acting as an organ of the community
sponsible minister"; by emphasizing that when he fulfils certain functions deter-
the representative must be elected "by mined by the social order constituting
all persons of age who are resident in a the community. If the order, as in the
territorial district," that the elections case of the state, is a legal order, the
shall be "reasonably frequent," and that functions determined by this order are
political parties may be "the organizers the creation and application of the order.
and mediators of the election proce- It stands to reason that the legal order
dure."'6 The "elemental" type of repre- must be a valid order; and it is valid if it
sentation is more or less identical with is by and large effective, that is to say,
that called in Soviet political theory the obeyed by those subject to the order.
merely "formal" democracy of the bour- Only if an individual acts as an organ of
geois states. This elemental type of rep- the state can his actions be imputed to
resentation, or-as it is also called-rep- the state; and this means that his action
resentation in a merely "constitutional can be interpreted as an action of the
sense,"''7 is according to the new science state and the acting individual be con-
of politics theoretically a concept of little sidered as a representative of the state.
"cognitive value."'8 It is "elemental" be- The legal order determines not only the
cause it refers only to the "external ex- function but also the individual who has
istence of society,"19 "to simple data of to fulfil the function, the organ. There
the external world."20 But society as an are different ways of determining the
aggregate of interhuman relations can organ. If the organ is to be an assembly
exist only in the external world, and con-of individuals subject to the legal order
sequently representation as a social phe-or individuals elected by these individ-
nomenon can only refer to data of the uals, a democracy or, what amounts to
external world. As a matter of fact, the the same, a democratic type of represen-
"existential" representation, which the tation is established. But the community,
new science of politics tries to substitute especially the state, is represented not
for the merely elemental representation, only if it is organized as a democracy.
8 ETHICS
An autocratic state, too, is represented representation, though the term "repre-

by organs, although they are not deter- sentation" is used also in a narrower
mined in a democratic way. Since any sense, namely, for a specific type of repre-
organized community has organs, there sentation. To use a term in a wider and
is representation whenever there is an in a narrower sense is not the best of ter-
organized community, especially a state. minological practices, but there is noth-
However, in so-called representative ing "elemental" in it. Besides, the author
democracies the organs are considered by of the new science of politics himself
traditional political theory to represent characterizes the democratic type of rep-
the state by representing the people of resentation as "representation in a con-
the state. The statement that the legisla- stitutional sense," although any other
tive organ, the parliament, and the su- type of representation, including the "ex-
preme executive organ, the president in a istential" type, can only be representa-
democratic state, represent the people- tion in a constitutional sense, since any
as pointed out-means nothing else but type of representation must be estab-
that the individuals subject to the legal lished by a constitution.
order constituting the state exercise a Much more important than the double
decisive influence on the creation of the meaning of representation, out of which
legislative and executive organs in ques- hardly any misunderstanding can arise,
tion, insofar as the constitution author- is the fact that the term "representation"
izes them to elect these organs. It is true can claim to mean not only representa-
that representation of the state and rep- tion of the state but at the same time
resentation of the people of the state are representation of the people of the state
two different concepts, which traditional only and exclusively if it refers to repre-
political theory does not always distin- sentation by organs elected in a demo-
guish clearly enough. But there can be cratic way. For if the statement that a
no doubt about the meaning of the state-state organ represents the people is not to
ments concerned when traditional politi- imply a gross fiction, it can mean nothing
cal theory refers to representative in- else but that the individuals subject to
stitutions. As is so frequently the case, the legal order constituting the state are
one and the same term is used in a wider entitled to exercise decisive influence on
as well as in a narrower sense. Just as the creation of the organs. The new sci-
"constitutional" monarchy designates a ence of politics seems not to be interested
monarchy which has a specific, namely, a in avoiding this fiction.
more or less democratic, constitution, al- As a matter of fact, the democratic
though an absolute monarchy, too, has a type of representation is declared merely
*constitution and thus is, in this sense, elemental, not because it does not ex-
also a constitutional monarchy, the term haust the problem of representation but
"representative institutions" signifies a for another reason. It is elemental be-
democratic type of representation, though cause it is, according to the new science,
there exists also a nondemocratic type of meaningless. The way in which the dem-
representation. Just as there is no state ocratic process of voting is described is
without a constitution, although the quite significant: "In the theoretization
term "constitution" is used also in a nar- of representative institutions on this
rower sense, namely, for a special type of [elemental] level, the concepts which en-
constitution, there is no state without ter into the construction of the descrip-
tive type refer ... to men and women, to tation by elected organs is of little value
their age, to their voting which consists because election of the organs by the
in placing check marks on pieces of paper people does not in itself guarantee the
by the side of names printed on them, to existence, or a satisfactory existence, of
operations of counting and calculation the state. This critique of the so-called
that will result in the designation of other
elemental concept of representation con-
human beings as representatives, to the fuses two different questions: the ques-
behavior of representatives that will re- tion of what is democratic representa-
sult in formal acts recognizable as such tion, and the question of whether demo-
through external data, etc."22 The tend- cratic representation assures the exist-
ency of this description is evident. The ence, or satisfactory existence, of the
democratic process is presented as some- state. It is the confusion of the essence of
thing that has no bearing on the essence a political phenomenon with its value;
of the phenomenon in question. It has and this confusion is a serious methodo-
only a formal character; it is of secondary logical error. With respect to the "sub-
importance. "The procedure of represen- stance" of representation, we are in-
tation is meaningful only when certain formed that "certain mediatory institu-
requirements concerning its substance tions, the parties, have something to do
are fulfilled"; "the establishment of the with securing or corrupting this sub-
procedure does not automatically pro- stance," and that "the substance in ques-
vide the desired substance."23 By "the tion is vaguely associated with the will of
establishment of the procedure" only the the people, but what precisely is meant
election procedure can be meant. And if by the symbol 'people' does not become
it is not the democratic procedure that clear."25 This is rather strange, since the
by itself provides "the desired sub- clear meaning of the symbol "people"
stance," then, perhaps, a nondemocratic within the elemental type of representa-
procedure may provide it. Thus, every- tion is: the greatest possible number of
thing depends on the meaning of "the the members of the community able to
substance." What does it mean? Since participate in the procedure of demo-
the "elemental" concept of representa- cratic representation. This is evidently
tion is to be replaced by the "existential" not to be the meaning that the new sci-
concept, it probably means something ence of politics wishes to attribute to the
like existence. When the author of the symbol "people" as an element of the ex-
new science of politics rejects the ele- istential type of representation. But the
mental concept on account of its little symbol "people" is not abandoned. Ex-
cognitive value, he says that "the existential representation, too, it seems,
istence" of the democratic countries, the claims to be, in some way or another,
representative institutions of which are representation of the people. As far as the
described in this elementary way by re- "mediatory institutions, the parties . . .
ferring to the fact that their organs are securing or corrupting this substance"
elected by the people, "must be taken for are concerned, the author of the new sci-
granted without too many questions ence refers to the fact that there exists a
about what makes them exist or what variety of opinion concerning the effect
existence means."24 This statement can of political parties on the working of a
only convey the idea that the definition representative system, which he sum-
of democratic representation as represen- marizes as follows:
10 ETHICS
A representative system is truly representa- reference in current political debate, but it is

tive when there are no parties, when there is obviously not sufficiently clarified to be of rele-
one party, when there are two or more parties, vance in science. It belongs to the elemental
when the two parties can be considered factions class like the elemental type concept of repre-
of one party . . . a representative system will sentative institutions.27
not work if there are two or more parties who
disagree on points of principle.26 But a one-party state may, as we shall
see, offer an ideal case of "existential"
There, again, he confuses the question as
representation.
to the essence of democratic representa-
tion with the question as to the condi-
tions under which a democratic system The most characteristic type of one-
works satisfactorily. It cannot be, and party state is the Soviet Union. The au-
has never been, denied by those who ad- thor of the new science of politics says -of
vocate the above-mentioned opinions this state: "While there may be radical
that political parties are possible in a disagreement on the question whether
democracy and that a constitution which the Soviet government represents the
does not allow the free formation of po- people, there can be no doubt whatsoever
litical parties by admitting either no that the Soviet government represents
party at all or only one party is not dem- the Soviet society as a political society in
ocratic. The principle that only one party form for action in history."" He does not
is to be allowed in order to guarantee the state in an unambiguous way that the
workability of the government is a com- Soviet government does not represent
mon element of the antidemocratic ideol- the people; he does not say that it repre-
ogies of fascism, national socialism, and sents the Soviet state and not the Soviet
communism. Fascist Italy and National people. The only thing he decidedly as-
Socialist Germany were, and Communist serts is that the Soviet government repre-
Russia still is, a typical "one-party sents the Soviet "society." But by Soviet
state." This term can have no other society the Soviet people may be under-
meaning. For, if the constitution, as in a stood, the representation of which is in
democracy, guarantees free formation of question. For, in order to show that the
political parties, the coming into exist- Soviet government represents the Soviet
ence of more than one party is inevitable. society, he refers to the fact that "the
A democracy cannot be a one-party legislative and administrative acts of the
state. Until now, we were of the opinion Soviet government are domestically ef-
that there is a vital difference between a fective in the sense that the governmen-
political system that allows only one tal commands find obedience with the
party and a political system under which people," and he points to the fact that
the formation of parties is free, and that "the Soviet government can effectively
in a one-party state, where there are no operate an enormous military machine
free elections because the citizens can fed by the human and material resources
vote only for the candidates of one party, of the Soviet society." The Soviet gov-
the government cannot be considered as ernment represents the Soviet society be-
representing the people. But the new sci- cause it effectively controls the Soviet
ence of politics informs us that: people. In this connection, he says: "Un-
der the title of political societies in form
A type concept like the "one-party state"
must be considered as theoretically of dubious for action, the clearly distinguishable
value; it may have some practical use for brief power units in history come into view."
These "power units" are usually called selves. When his acts are effectively imputed in
states. Why does the new science avoid this manner, a person is the representative of a
society.30
this term? Why does it not expressly dis-
tinguish representation of the state from The author emphasizes that in this con-
representation of the people? We read: text "the meaning of representation" is
Political societies, in order to be in form for "based on effective imputation," which
action, must have an internal structure that can only mean that the imputation of the
will enable some of its members-the rulers ... acts of the ruler to the state takes place
to find habitual obedience for their acts of com- only if his rule is effective.
mand; and these acts must serve the existential
It is evident that the principle accord-
necessities of a society, such as the defense of
the realm and administration of justice.29 ing to which the legal order constituting
the state is valid only if it is to a certain
It is a generally recognized principle extent effective has no direct relation to
that a body of individuals in order to be the question of representation, that is to
considered as the government of a state say, to the determination, by the legal
must be independent from other state order, of organs of the community con-
governments and able to obtain for the stituted by this order, the individuals
legal order under which they are acting competent to represent the state. Only a
as government the permanent obedience valid legal order can determine the repre-
of the subjects. This principle applies to sentatives, and only a relatively effective
any government, whether democratic or legal order is valid. The principle of ef-
autocratic. The principle is only a par- fectiveness refers to the legal order con-
ticular application of the more general stituting the state, not to the organs of
principle that the legal order constituting the state. It is not the organs which are
the state is valid only if it is, by and effective; it is the norms which they in
large, effective, that is to say, obeyed by conformity with a valid legal order create
the individuals whose behavior it regu- and apply which are effective. That the
lates. It seems that the new science of government is effective means that the
politics seriously presents this principle, norms which are issued by this organ and
taken for granted by the old political and which form a part of the legal order con-
legal science, under the new term of "ex- stituting the state are effective. The acts
istential" representation. For it declares performed by an organ of the state, espe-
"defense" and "administration of jus- cially by the government, are acts of the
tice" as "the existential necessities of a state, that is to say, imputable to the
society" and states: state, and hence the individual perform-
[The] process in which human beings forming these acts represents the state, not
themselves into a society for action shall be because the organ is effective, but be-
called the articulation of a society. As the re-
cause the individual and his acts are de-
sult of political articulation we find human
beings, the rulers, who can act for the society,
termined by a valid, and that means by a
men whose acts are not imputed to their own relatively effective, legal order. Since only
persons but to the society as a whole-with a valid, that is, a relatively effective, le-
the consequence that, for instance, the pro- gal order constitutes the community
nunciation of a general rule regulating an area
called "state," only on the basis of such
of human life will not be understood as an exer-
cise in moral philosophy but will be experienced
a legal order are organs of a state, and
by the members of the society as the declara- that means representation, possible,
tion of a rule with obligatory force for them- whether it is democratic or nondemo-
12 ETHICS
cratic representation, representation of tion. By obliterating this difference, by

the state which is or is not at the same avoiding the term "representation of the
time representation of the people. Effec- state," by using the ambiguous formula
tiveness-as a quality of the constituent "representation of society," the new sci-
order-is a condition of any type of rep- ence of politics creates the impression
resentation, because it is a condition of that only that concept of representation
the existence of the state. Whether or not which includes the element of effective-
a body of individuals, as the government ness is the correct one, and that this type
of a state, represents the state and at the of representation always implies, in some
same time the people of the state does way, representation of the people. "Ob-
not depend on the effectiveness of the viously," says the author, "the represent-
commands, that is, the norms, which it ative ruler of an articulated society can-
issues, for a body of individuals is the not represent it as a whole without stand-
government of a state only if it acts in ing in some sort of relationship to the
conformity with an effective legal order other members of the society.""3 By "the
constituting the state, whether demo- other members of the society" only the
cratic or autocratic, and if the norms is- people can be understood:
sued by this body, forming an essential Under pressure of the democratic symbolism,
part of the legal order, are by and large the resistance to distinguishing between the
obeyed. Whether a government, which two relations terminologically has become so
strong that it has also affected political theory.
always represents the state, represents
... The government represents the people, and
also the people of the state, that is to say,
the symbol "people" has absorbed the two
whether it is a democratic government, meanings which, in medieval language, for
depends only and exclusively on the an- instance, could be distinguished without emo-
swer to the question whether or not it is tional resistance as the "realm" and the "sub-
jects.""2
established in a democratic way, that is
to say, elected on the basis of universal The "two relations" which under the
and free suffrage. Hence it is impossible pressure of democratic symbolism are not
to differentiate the democratic type of distinguished are: the relationship of the
representation from any other type of ruler to the society as a whole, and the
representation by the criterion of effec- relationship of the ruler to "the other
tiveness. members of the society." The statement
This is just what the new science of that the government in a democracy rep-
politics endeavors to do when it depre- resents the people as subject to the gov-
cates the democratic type of representa- ernment means that the government by
tion as "elemental" because it does not- representing the people as the society not
as does the existential type-imply the including the members of the govern-
element of effectiveness. Only by obliter- ment, the "other members of the so-
ating the difference between representa- ciety," represents the society as a whole
tion of the state and representation of the because the members of the government
people can the new science of politics belong to the people as subject to the
maintain that there exists a difference of government. They at the same time gov-
cognitive value between the democratic ern and are subject to the government.
representation as merely an "elemental" As members of the government they are
representation and the representation of not-as is the ruler in an autocracy-ex-
the state as an "existential" representa- empt from the government. It is just for
this reason that only in a democracy the society cannot represent it as a whole-
government represents the society as a and that probably means, cannot repre-
whole, because it represents the society sent the state-without standing in some
including the members of the govern- sort of relationship to the other members
ment. But it is very likely that the new of the society, that is to say, to the
science of politics understands by "so- people. That he stands in a relationship
ciety as a whole" the state. For this term to the people can only mean that he rep-
supposedly has the same meaning as the resents the people, for representation of
medieval term "realm," in contradistinc- the people is one of the two relations ter-
tion to the term "subjects." This terminologically not distinguished under
minology corresponds to the modern dis- the pressure of democratic symbolism.
tinction between "state" and "people." The ruler must stand "in some sort" of
The statement that a democratic govern- relationship to the other members of the
ment represents the people does, indeed, society, that is, to the people, but not
mean that the government by represent- necessarily in that sort of relationship
ing the people represents the state. which is constituted by elections on the
Again we ask: Why does the new science basis of universal, equal, free, and secret
of politics refrain from using the modern suffrage. For this sort of relationship is
term "state," which is much less am- only "elemental," not "existential."
biguous than the medieval term "realm," The Soviet government, as the new
which literally means "kingdom"? Why science of politics asserts, represents the
does it speak of "society as a whole," Soviet society "as a political society" in
when it really means state? Evidently the most effective way, because "the leg-
because representation of "the society as islative and administrative acts of the
a whole" implies necessarily representa- Soviet government are domestically ef-
tion of the "other members of the so- fective in the sense that the governmen-
ciety," because the existential represent- tal commands find obedience with the
ative of the state has to be considered as people," and "the Soviet government can
representing also the people. "The repre- effectively operate an enormous military
sentative ruler of an articulated society" machine fed by the human and material
can only be a ruler who effectively repre- resources of the Soviet society";33 and
sents the society; and if he effectively that can only mean that the Soviet gov-
represents the society, he represents it ernment represents the Soviet society
"as a whole," especially if "society as a "as a whole," especially if "society as a
whole" means the "state." It can only be whole" means the state. Hence the Soviet
the "society as a whole" which a ruler in government is the ideal type of an ex-
the existential sense, an existential ruler, istential ruler, a "representative ruler of
represents; and by the "representative of an articulated society" represented as a
an articulated society" referred to in the whole by the ruler. If a representative
above-quoted statement, obviously an ruler of an articulated society cannot
"existential" ruler is meant. But every represent it as a whole without standing
government-whether democratic or au- in some relation to the other members of
tocratic-is a ruler in the existential the society, that is to say, without repre-
sense, an "existential" ruler. And now senting in some way the people, then the
the new science of politics declares that Soviet government, which is certainly no
the representative ruler of an articulated democratic government, represents the
14 ETHICS
Soviet people. This, of course, is not ex- tocracy and thus obstructs objective un-
pressly maintained by the new science of derstanding of the essence of democracy.
politics. But it is clearly implied in its To achieve this understanding it does
doctrine of representation with its tend- not suffice to describe the typical struc-
ency to belittle the importance of the tures of the two antagonistic systems of
democratic type of representation as organization. For if we recognize that
merely elemental, to put in the fore- the entire history of human society is a
ground the existential type of representa- never-ending struggle between the will to
tion in which the element of effectiveness power of a vigorous personality who tries
is emphasized. to subject the multitude and to suppress
As a result of this doctrine of represen- their resistance against domination by
tation the new science of politics conveys the will of another, that is, their desire
the warning: "If a government is nothing for self-determination, and if we admit
but representative in the constitutional that in the history of human thought the
sense, a representative ruler in the ex- controversy about the value of autocracy
istential sense will sooner or later make and democracy is just as undecided as the
an end of it; and quite possibly the new conflict of the two political regimes in
existential ruler will not be too represent- reality, that there too the fight never
ative in the constitutional sense."34 The ends but is lost for the one and won for
representative ruler in the "existential the other over and over again, we may
sense," we remember, cannot represent assume that there is much more at stake
the society as a whole "without standing than a problem of social technique, the
in some sort of relationship to the other choice between two different types of
members of the society," that is to say, organization, and look for the roots of the
to the people. He too represents, some- antagonism in opposite views of the
how, the people, although he may not be world: we may try to find out the connec-
too "representative" in the democratic tion which exists between politics and
sense, but a ruler who represents the philosophy.
people in a fascistic sense- "Fuehrer" or In the following sections I intend to
a "Duce" who effectively organizes the show that there exists, indeed, not only
mass of the people for action and may an external parallelism but an inner rela-
claim to realize democracy. tionship between the antagonism of au-
Our analysis of the theory of represen-tocracy and democracy, on the one hand,
tation advocated by the new science of and philosophical absolutism and rela-
tivism, on the other, that autocracy as
politics shows that it is of the utmost im-
portance to maintain as strictly as pos- political absolutism is coordinated with
sible just that concept of representation philosophical absolutism and democracy
which this science disparages as merely as political relativism with philosophical
"elemental," or what amounts to the relativism.35
same, the concept of democracy as the
PHILOSOPHICAL ABSOLUTISM
concept of a government representing
AND RELATIVISM
the people in a merely "constitutional"
sense, and to reject its replacement by a Since the time Aristotle presented his
concept of "existential" representation, Politics as the second part of a treatise of
which only obscures the fundamental which the first one was his Ethics, it is a
antagonism between democracy and au- truism that political theory and that part
of philosophy which is called "ethics" the way in which this ego experiences it-
have been in close connection. But there self in its relation to the other who claims
exists also a certain affinity, less generally to be an ego himself and to the thing
recognized, between theory of politics which makes no such claim. Only if we
and other parts of philosophy, such as recognize that the formation of the politi-
epistemology, that is, the theory of cog- cal and philosophical systems is deter-
nition, and the theory of values. The mined, in the last analysis, by peculiari-
main problem of political theory is the ties of the human mind may we explain
relationship between the subject and the why the antagonism between these sys-
object of domination; the main problem tems is so insurmountable, why mutual
of epistemology is the relationship be- understanding is so difficult, if not im-
tween the subject and the object of cog- possible, why there are such exasperated
nition. The process of domination is not passions involved in the conflict, even if
so different from that of cognition by it takes place only in the intellectual
which the subject tries to be master of sphere as a difference of opinion, and yet
his object by bringing some order into is not a clash in the struggle for power.
the chaos of sensual perceptions; and it is A typology of political and philosophical
not too far from the process of evaluation doctrines must finally result in a char-
by which the subject declares an object acterology, or at least the former must
as good or evil and thus sits in judgment try to combine its results with that of the
upon the object. It is just within episte- latter. Because it is the same human
mology and theory of values that the being who tries to interpret his relations
antagonism between philosophical abso- to his fellow-men and the order of these
lutism and philosophical relativism has relations as well as his relation to the
its seat, which-as I shall try to show-is world at large, we may assume that a
analogous to the antagonism between definite political creed is co-ordinated
autocracy and democracy as they repre- with a definite view of the world. But just
sent political absolutism, on the one because it is within the soul of the em-
hand, and political relativism, on the pirical human being and not within a
other, respectively. sphere of pure reason that politics and
In order to avoid misunderstandings philosophy originate, we must not expect
with respect to the meaning of this anal- that a definite political view will always
ogy some preliminary remarks are neces- and everywhere be combined with the
sary. Since, as pointed out, the center of philosophical system which logically cor-
politics and the theories of cognition and responds to it. In the history of political
value is the relationship of subject and and philosophical theories their connec-
object, the character of the politicizing tion can be demonstrated by an analysis
and philosophizing subject, his original of the works of the most representative
disposition must be of decisive influence thinkers. But it would be a great mistake
on the formation of the views about his to ignore the very effective forces of the
relation to the object of domination as human mind which may abolish this con-
well as of cognition and evaluation. The nection and prevent political attitudes to
common root of political creed and philo- associate with the corresponding philo-
sophical conviction remains always the sophical views, and vice versa. The hu-
mentality of the politician and philoso- man mind is not completely dominated
pher, the nature of his ego that is to say,by reason, and hence not always logical.
16 ETHICS
The emotional forces may divert man's Philosophical absolutism is the meta-
thinking from its original direction. It is physical view that there is an absolute
necessary to take into consideration the reality, i.e., a reality that exists inde-
external circumstances by which-though pendently of human cognition. Hence its
philosophical speculation may not be re- existence is beyond space and time, to
stricted the freedom of political opinion which human cognition is restricted.
is abolished. It is further to be noticed Philosophical relativism, on the other
that political judgments, and especially hand, advocates the empirical doctrine
the decision in favor of democracy or that reality exists only within human
autocracy, are frequently based neither cognition, and that, as the object of cog-
on a thorough investigation of facts nor nition, reality is relative to the knowing
on a conscientious self-examination but subject. The absolute, the thing in itself,
are the outcome of a momentary situa- is beyond human experience; it is inac-
tion or a transient mood. Also, one must cessible to human knowledge and there-
not underestimate the fact that every po- fore unknowable.
litical regime is inevitably calling for an To the assumption of absolute exist-
opposition, and thus those who, for some ence corresponds the possibility of abso-
reason or another, are dissatisfied in a lute truth and absolute values, denied by
democracy will probably be for autoc- philosophical relativism, which recog-
racy, and those who, for some reason or nizes only relative truth and relative val-
another, are disappointed in an autoc- ues. Only if the judgments about reality
racy will turn to democracy. Sometimes refer ultimately to an absolute existence
it is the same malcontents-and perhaps may they aim at absolute truth, that is
for good reason malcontent-who are al- to say, claim to be true not only in rela-
ways against the actually established and tion to the human beings as the judging
for the not yet or no longer established subjects, i.e., from the point of view of
regime. Many who under a democratic human reason, but also from the point of
government attribute all possible evils to view of a superhuman, a divine, the abso-
democracy would be convinced demo- lute reason. If there is an absolute real-
crats under a Fascist government and ity, it must coincide with absolute value.
would probably be in favor of fascism if The absolute necessarily implies perfec-
a democratic government were long tion. Absolute existence is identical with
enough in power to provoke considerable absolute authority as the source of abso-
opposition. But these are only the small lute values. The personification of the
fry, who do not count very much for the absolute, its presentation as the omnip-
solution of our problem. As far as the otent and absolutely just creator of the
prominent people, especially the great universe, whose will is the law of nature
thinkers, are concerned, the connection as well as of man, is the inevitable conse-
between their political and philosophical quence of philosophical absolutism. Its
views is sometimes not demonstrable be- metaphysics shows an irresistible tend-
cause the philosopher has not developed ency toward monotheistic religion. It is
a political theory and the politician or essentially connected with the view that
political theorist has not yet reached the value is immanent in reality as a creation
stage of consciously posing the philo- or emanation of the absolute good. This
sophical problem. Only with these reser- metaphysics has the tendency to identify
vations can the relationship between truth, that is, conformity with reality,
politics and philosophy be maintained. with justice, meaning conformity with a
value. Hence a judgment about what is nition. There are normative laws deter-
just or unjust can be as absolute as a mining this process. In complying with
judgment about what is true or false. these norms, rational cognition of reality
Value judgments can claim to be valid -in contradistinction to the expression
for everybody, always and everywhere, of subjective emotions, the basis of value
and not only in relation to the judging judgments-is objective. But these norms
subject, if they refer to values inherent originate in the human mind, the subject
in an absolute reality or, what amounts of cognition being the autonomous law-
to the same, are established by an abso- giver. Hence, freedom of the knowing
lute authority. Philosophical relativism, subject-not the metaphysical freedom
on the other hand, as antimetaphysical of will but freedom of cognition in the
empiricism (or positivism), insists upon a sense of self-determination-is a funda-
clear separation of reality and value and mental prerequisite of the relativistic
distinguishes between propositions about theory of knowledge. Philosophical abso-
reality and genuine value judgments, lutism, on the other hand, if consistent,
which, in the last analysis, are not based must conceive of the subject of knowl-
on a rational cognition of reality but on edge as completely determined by heter-
the emotional factors of human con- onomous laws immanent in objective
sciousness, on man's wishes and fears. reality and as subject to the absolute, es-
Since they do not refer to values im- pecially if the absolute is imagined as a
manent in an absolute reality, they can- personal being and superhuman author-
not establish absolute, but only relative, ity.
values. A relativistic philosophy is de- The specific character of the relativis-
cidedly empiristic and rationalistic and tic theory of knowledge involves tWo
consequently has an outspoken inclina- perils. The one is a paradoxical solipsism;
tion to skepticism. that is, the assumption that the ego as
The hypothesis of philosophical abso- the subject of knowledge is the only ex-
lutism that there is an absolute existence istent reality, the impossibility of recog-
independent of human knowledge leads nizing the simultaneous existence of
to the assumption that the function of other egos, the egotistic negation of the
knowledge is merely to reflect, like a mir-tu. Such assumption would involve a
ror, the objects existing in themselves; relativistic epistemology in a self-contra-
whereas relativistic epistemology, in its diction. For if the ego is the only existent
most consistent presentation by Kant, reality, it must be an absolute reality.
interprets the process of cognition as the Uncompromised solipsism, too, is philo-
creation of its object. This view implies sophical absolutism. The other danger is
that the human subject of knowledge is a no less paradoxical pluralism. Since the
-epistemologically-the creator of his world exists only in the knowledge of the
world, a world which is constituted in subject according to this view, the ego is,
and by his knowledge. This, of course, so to speak, the center of his own world.
does not mean that the process of cogni- If, however, the existence of many egos
tion has an arbitrary character. The con- must be admitted, the consequence seems
stitution of the object of cognition by the to be inevitable that there are as many
process of cognition does not mean that worlds as there are knowing subjects.
the subject creates the object as God cre- Philosophical relativism deliberately
ates the world. There is a correlation be- avoids solipsism as well as pluralism.
tween the subject and the object of cog- Taking into consideration-as true rela-
18 ETHICS
tivism-the mutual relations among the ity, the protest against a foreign will to
various subjects of knowledge, this the- which the own will should submit, the
ory compensates its inability to secure resistance against order, against the
the objective existence of the one and uneasiness of heteronomy; it is nature it-
same world for all subjects by the as- self which in the quest of freedom rebels
sumption that the individuals, as sub- against society. Man feels the burden of
jects of knowledge, are equal. This as- a foreign will imposed upon him as social
sumption implies also that the various order, which is all the more unbearable
processes of rational cognition in the the more the consciousness of his own
minds of the subjects are-in contradis- value rejects the pretension of anybody
tinction to their emotional reactions- else to represent a higher value. The more
equal; and thus the further assumption elementary his feeling toward the one
becomes possible that the objects of who claims to be his superior is, the more
knowledge, as the results of these indi- he is likely to ask: he is a man like me;
vidual processes, are in conformity with we are equal; where is his right to domi-
one another, an assumption confirmed by nate me? Thus the negative idea of equal-
the external behavior of the individuals. ity is supporting the likewise negative
To be sure, there is an undeniable con- idea of freedom.
flict between absolute freedom and equal- From the assumption that men are
ity. But the subject of cognition is not equal the principle might be deduced
absolutely, he is only relatively, free, that no one has a right to dominate an-
free under the laws of rational cognition;other. However, experience teaches that
and this freedom is not incompatible if we want to remain equal in social
with the equality of all the subjects of reality, we must allow ourselves to be
cognition. The restriction of freedom by dominated. But although freedom and
a law under which all subjects are equal equality seem not to be realizable at the
is essential to philosophical relativism. same time, political ideology insists upon
From the point of view of philosophical combining them in the idea of democ-
absolutism, on the other hand, it is not racy. Cicero, one of the masters of politi-
the equality of the subjects which is es- cal ideology, has expressed this combina-
sential but, on the contrary, their funda- tion in the famous statement: "Itaque
mental inequality in relation to the abso-nulla alia in civitate, nisi in qua populi
lute and supreme being. potestas summa est, ullum domicilium
libertas habet: qua quidem certe nihil
THE IDEA OF NATURAL AND OF
potest esse dulcius et quae, si aequa non
SOCIAL FREEDOM
est, ne libertas quidem est" (freedom has
If freedom and equality are its seat only in a state where supreme
essential
elements of philosophical relativism, power is with
its the people, and there can
analogy with political democracy be- be nothing more pleasant than that free-
comes obvious. For freedom and equality dom, which is no freedom at all if it is not
are the fundamental ideas of democracy equal).
and the two primitive instincts of man as In order to become a social category
a social being; the desire for freedom andthe symbol of freedom must undergo a
the feeling of equality are at its basis. It fundamental change of meaning. It must
is, first of all, the reaction against com- cease to mean the negation of any social
pulsion implied in any kind of social real-order, a state of nature characterized by
the absence of any kind of government, subjective value constituted by the norm
and must assume the meaning of a spe- is opposed to the objective reality consti-
cific method of establishing social order, tuted by the law of causality as a catego-
of a specific type of government. If so- ry of rational cognition. If nature is cre-
ciety in general and the state in particu- ated by God and is thus the manifesta-
lar are to be possible, a normative order tion of his absolutely good will, there can
regulating the mutual behavior of men be no difference between the laws of na-
must be valid, and consequently domina- ture and social norms, since the laws of
tion of man over man through such an nature are the expression of God's will,
order must be accepted. If, however, his commands directed at nature, that is
domination is inevitable, if we cannot to say, they are norms. There is, accord-
help being dominated, we want to be ing to this metaphysical view, which is at
dominated by ourselves. Natural free- the basis of the natural law doctrine, no
dom is transformed into social or political difference between nature and society be-
freedom. To be socially or politically free cause nature is itself a universal, cosmic
means, it is true, to be subject to a nor- society, governed by God. In open con-
mative order; it means freedom under tradiction to this fundamental presup-
social law. But it means: to be subject position, the metaphysical speculation of
only to one's own, not to a foreign, will; philosophical absolutism advocates the
to a normative order, a law in the estab- doctrine that man's will, although sub-
lishment of which the subject partici- ject to the will of God, is free. In its theo-
pates. It is just through this metamor- logical version this view is presented in
phosis that the idea of freedom can be- the no less contradictory dogma that
come the decisive criterion in the an- man, although totally different from
tagonism of democracy and autocracy God, is created in God's image; and that
and thereby the leitmotiv for the sys- his will, just as the will of God, is a cause
tematization of the forms of social or- but not an effect of other causes, a first
ganization. cause, a prima causa. This is the meta-
physical freedom of man which consists
THE, METAPHYSICAL IDEA OF FREEDOM in his exemption from the law of causal-
The transition from natural to social ity as implied in the will of God.
freedom, fundamental to the idea of Freedom of man in this sense is consid-
democracy, implies the dualism of nature ered by a metaphysical anthropology as
and society which is in close connection an essential appurtenance of man as a
with the distinction between reality and member of society, that is, as subject to
value, characteristic of a relativistic phi- obligations and responsibilities. The
losophy. Society as a system different main argument of this view is that if man
from nature is possible only as a norma- is not free in this sense, if his will is deter-
tive order of human behavior, in contra- mined by the law of causality, he cannot
distinction to the causal order of natural be made responsible for his actions.
phenomena. A norm, that is, the expres- Hence the existence of a normative order
sion of the idea that something ought to -be it morals or law-presupposes the
be, constitutes a value. Man's ideas metaphysical freedom of man. This view
about what ought to be or what ought to -so-called indeterminism-is decidedly
be done have, as pointed out, their origin rejected by a rationalistic, antimeta-
in his wishes and fears. In this sense the physical philosophy, not because of the
20 ETHICS
contradiction involved in the idea of a them. To attach punishment or reward

human will subject to, but exempt from, to human behavior does not only not ex-
the all-powerful will of God-this is a clude the causal determination of this
concern of the metaphysical speculation behavior but necessarily presupposes the
at the basis of indeterminism-but be- possibility of such determination. For
cause of the inadmissible self-contradic- punishment is attached to certain be-
tion which consists in the assumption havior because it is supposed that man
that a phenomenon of natural reality, will refrain from such behavior out of
such as the human will, is exempt from fear of the punishment; and reward is
the law of causality constituting the nat- attached to certain behavior because it is
ural reality. It can be shown that the il- supposed that man will behave in this
lusive idea of a free will is due to the fact way out of the wish to merit the reward.
that philosophical absolutism does not If man's behavior, and that means, in the
separate reality from value, nature from last analysis, his will, were not deter-
society, causality from normativity. If minable by definite causes, a normative
we are aware that the order of nature and order regulating his behavior by attach-
the order of society are two different or- ing punishment or reward to it and thus
ders, we must admit that if the one is establishing his responsibility would be
constituted by the principle of causality, meaningless. In order to designate the
the other must be constituted by another connection between a human act as con-
principle. Since human behavior may be dition and punishment or reward as con-
considered at one time as a natural, at sequence established by a social norm, in
another time as a social, phenomenon, contradistinction to the connection of
human behavior may be subject to two cause and effect established in a law of
different schemes of interpretation, which nature, the term "imputation" has been
do not exclude each other but are ap- suggested.36 Just as causality is the fun-
plicable side by side, so that human be- damental principle of the cognition of
havior, as natural phenomenon, may be nature, imputation is the fundamental
determined by the laws of causality and, principle of the cognition of society as a
nevertheless, as social phenomenon may normative order. The decisive difference
be "free." Then, to be free cannot mean between the two principles is that the
to be exempt from the law of causality, chain of causes and effects has an in-
i.e., a restriction of this principle, but definite number of links so that there can
must have another meaning, in accord- be no first cause, every cause being neces-
ance with the principle constituting so- sarily the effect of another cause, where-
cial order. And, indeed, if we proceed in as the chain of imputation has only two
this way we see that man is responsible links, crime and punishment, merit and
for his actions not because he is free in reward, so that if punishment is attrib-
the metaphysical sense of being exempt uted to crime, reward to merit, imputa-
from the principle of causality but that tion comes to its end. That man as a
he is free-in a rational sense because member of society, subject to a norma-
he is responsible. For to be responsible tive order, is "free" does not mean that
for his actions means that he is punished his will is the starting point of causality;
or rewarded for these actions, and he is it means that he is the endpoint of im-
punished or rewarded if moral or legal putation. The illusive idea of the human
norms attach punishment or reward to will as a prima causa is the result of the
metaphysical confusion of reality with mysterious self-deception-the expres-

value, nature with society, causality with sion of a definite position of the individ-
imputation, that is, the misinterpreta- ual within society. The freedom of an-
tion of the endpoint of imputation as a archy becomes the freedom of democ-
first cause. Just as the idea of natural racy.
freedom as the absence of government The change is greater than it might ap-
has to be transformed into the concept of pear at first sight. Rousseau, one of the
political freedom as participation in gov- most efficient ideologists of democracy,
ernment, the idea of metaphysical free- formulates the problem of the best con-
dom as a starting point of causality has stitution, and this is, from his point of
to be transformed into the idea of ration- view, the problem of democracy:
al freedom as the endpoint of imputation. To find a form of association which may de-
fend and protect with the whole force of the
ROUSSEAU IS DOCTRINE OF DEMOCRACY community the person and the property of
The definition of freedom as political every associate, and by means of which each,
coalescing with all, may nevertheless obey
self-determination of the citizen, that is
only himself, and remain free as before. Such
to say, as participation in the govern- is the fundamental problem of which the social
ment, is usually opposed as the idea of contract furnishes the solution.37
freedom prevailing among the ancient
By defining freedom as a status where
Greeks to the individualistic idea cher-
the individual obeys only himself, that is
ished by the German people in early
to say, is subject only to his own will,
times of a freedom from government, of a
Rousseau starts from the idea of natural
status of more or less pronounced an-
freedom, the freedom of anarchy, incom-
archy. This is hardly correct, since the
patible with society. It stands to reason
German tribes did not live in a state of
that he cannot maintain his definition.
anarchy. Besides, the difference in ques-
He only rejects parliamentary democ-
tion is not at all a historic, ethnographic
racy, because he does not recognize the
one. The step from the so-called Ger-
possibility of representation:
manic to the classical Greek conception
of freedom is only the first stage of the Sovereignty ... cannot be represented; it
lies essentially in the general will, and will does
inevitable process of transformation, or
not admit of representation, it is either the same
denaturation, which the original instinct or other. There is no intermediate possibility.
of freedom has undergone on the road The deputies of the people, therefore, are not
leading humanity from the state of na- and cannot be its representatives; they are
ture into the state of society. This change merely its stewards, and can carry through no
definitive acts. Every law the people has not
of meaning is most characteristic of the
ratified in person is null and void-is, in fact,
mechanism of our social thinking. The not a law. The people of England regards itself
extraordinary importance which the idea as free; but it is grossly mistaken, it is free only
of freedom has in political ideology can during the election of members of parliament.
be explained only by the fact that this As soon as they are elected, slavery overtakes
it, and it is nothing.38
idea originates in an ultimate source of
the human soul, in the primitive instinct Rousseau consequently advocates the
which pushes the individual against so- principle of direct democracy. However,
ciety. And yet the intellectual reflection even if the will of the state is created di-
of the antisocial tendency, the idea of rectly by the decision of a popular as-
freedom, becomes-through an almost sembly, the individual is free only at the
22 ETHICS
moment is zero, he
and that means isif the valuecas
of
then only if
freedom is infinite, he
there can be no ques- is
ity, not tion ofifsubjection tohe bel
a normative order.
minority. Consequently, restriction, if Consequently, the social order, which ac-
not exclusion, of the possibility of being cording to the social-contract theory can
overruled seems to correspond to the be established only by a unanimous deci-
democratic principle of freedom: quali- sion of the individuals to be subject to it,
fied majority, if possible, unanimity, is can be changed and thus developed by
required as a guaranty of freedom. How-majority decisions. This is what Rous-
ever, even such a radical apostle of free- seau teaches. After having defined free-
dom as Rousseau requires unanimity dom in his first formulation of the prob-
only for the original contract constitut- lem of social contract as being subject
ing the state. This limitation of the exclusively to one's own will, to have to
unanimity principle to the constituent obey nobody but himself, he reformu-
contract is justified not merely by reason lates the problem as follows: "Each of us
of expediency. If the principle of freedom puts his person and all his power in com-
requires unanimity for the conclusion of mon under the supreme direction of the
the constituent contract because freedom general will, and, in our corporate capac-
means to be bound only by one's own ity, we receive each member as an indi-
will, then it is consistent to require visible part of the whole." Here he intro-
unanimous consent of the individuals duces the concept of "general will" as
subject to the normative order estab- distinct from that of the "will of all," a
lished by the contract also as condition most mysterious concept, which he never
for the continuous validity of this order, clearly defines. Then he takes into con-
so that everybody is free to withdraw sideration the possibility of a conflict
from the community constituted by the between the general will and the will of a
order as soon as he refuses to recognize single individual and declares: "In order
its binding force. This consequence shows then that the social contract may not be
clearly the incompatibility of Rousseau's an empty formula, it tacitly includes the
definition of freedom, the idea of natural undertaking, which alone can give force
freedom, with social order. Such an or- to the rest, that whoever refuses to obey
der, by its very nature, is possible only if the general will shall be compelled to do
its validity is to a certain degree inde- so by whole body. This means nothing
pendent of the will of those subject to it. less than that he will be forced to be
If a norm prescribing that an individual free.""9 Now no longer does "freedom"
ought to behave in a certain way makes mean to be subject only to one's own
its validity dependent on the consent of will. Freedom is compatible with being
this individual, if he is obliged to behave
subject to the general will. It consists in
in a certain way only if he is willing to
"sharing in the sovereign power," the
behave in this way, the norm loses its
sovereign being formed wholly of the in-
very meaning. A social order in general
dividuals who compose it,40 that is to
and a legal order, the law of the state, in
particular presuppose the possibility of a say, of the members of the community.
difference between the content of the On this basis Rousseau distinguishes be-
order and the will of the individuals sub- tween citizen and subject and substitutes
ject to it. If the tension between these for the "natural liberty" the "civil lib-
two poles, between the ought and the is, erty." He says:
What man loses by the social contract is his then there are opponents when the social
natural liberty and an unlimited right to every-
contract is made, their opposition does
thing he tries to get and succeeds in getting;
not invalidate the contract, but merely
what he gains is civil liberty.... We must
clearly distinguish natural liberty, which is prevents them from being included in it.
founded only by the strength of the individual, They are foreigners among citizens."
from civil liberty, which is limited by the That seems to mean that those who vote
general will. 4
against the law adopted by a majority
How radical this change of meaning is are not bound by it. But this, of course,
can be seen in the statement that the Rousseau cannot accept. He continues:
individual whose will is not in conformity "When the state is instituted, residence
with the general will may be forced to constitutes consent: to dwell within the
conform and thus beforced to be free. To territory is to submit to the sovereign."43
illustrate this freedom to which a man It is the notorious fiction of Roman law:
may be forced, Rousseau refers to the qui tacet consentire videtur. But in the
fact that in Genoa the word liberty may next statement he proclaims the major-
be read over the front of the prison and ity-vote principle without reference to
on the chains of the galley slaves, and he this fiction: "Apart from this primitive
adds: "this application of the device is contract, the vote of the majority always
good and just." binds the rest. This follows from the con-
The transformation of the natural into tract itself." That means that the ma-
a quite different political freedom-the jority-vote principle is projected into the
"civil liberty" of Rousseau-is obvious social contract as the basic norm of the
all the more as Rousseau admits that the state order. But then the question arises
general will may be produced by a ma- how to justify this principle by the idea
jority vote. of natural freedom? "But it is asked,"
says Rousseau, "how a man can be both
There is but one law which, from its nature,
free and forced to conform to wills that
needs unanimous consent. This is the social
contract, for civil association is the most are not his own. How are the opponents
voluntary of all acts. Every man being born at once free and subject to laws they have
free and his own master, no one under any not agreed to?" In order to show how a
pretext whatsoever can make any man subject
man may be considered as free, that is to
without his consent. To decide that the son of
a slave is born a slave is to decide that he is not say, to be subject only to his own will,
born a man.42 even if he is bound by a law against the
adoption of which he voted, Rousseau
It is a paradoxical fact that Rousseau
undertakes a reinterpretation of the
just at the moment when his transforma-
meaning of the voting procedure. By
tion of the concept of freedom reaches its
voting for or against the adoption of a
culmination point tries to maintain-in
law, the citizen does not express his own
open contradiction to his previous state-
will but his opinion about the general
ments-the original idea of natural free-
will.
dom, the principle that "no one under
any pretext whatsoever can make any I retort that the question is wrongly put. The
man subject without his consent." Then citizen gives his consent to all laws, including
immediately the question arises: What those which are passed in spite of his opposition,
and even those which punish him when he
about those who vote against the major-
dares- to break any of them. The conscious will
ity? Are they bound by a law adopted in of all the members of the state is the general
this way? Rousseau's answer is this: "If will. By virtue of it they are citizens and free.
24 ETHICS
When in the popular assembly a law is proposed, why is it not true at another time, when
what the people are asked is not exactly whether the opinion of those-who were in the mi-
they approve or reject the proposal, but whether
nority gets the majority in another vot-
they are in conformity with the general will.
Each man in giving his vote states his opinion
ing procedure? It is obvious that Rous-
on that point, and the general will is found by seau has entangled himself in all these
counting votes. When therefore the opinion contradictions only in order to save the
that is contrary to my own prevails, this proves illusion of natural, i.e., absolute freedom.
neither more nor less than that I am mistaken,
It is probably to this attempt that his
and that what I thought to be the general will
was not so. If my particular opinion had carried work in spite of these contradictions
the day, I should have achieved the opposite owes its extraordinary success.
of which was my will; and it is in that case that
I should not have been free. This presupposes, THE MAJORITY VOTE PRINCIPLE
indeed, that all the qualities of the general will
If the principle of majority for the de-
reside in the majority. When they cease to do
so, whatever side a man may take, liberty is no velopment of the social order is accepted,
longer possible.44 the idea of natural freedom can no longer
be completely realized; only an approxi-
But just before, we have learned that
mation to this idea is possible. That de-
"the conscious will of all the members of
mocracy is still considered as self-deter-
the state is the general will," and that
mination, that its freedom still means
also only because the will of the members
that everybody is subject only to his own
of the minority is implied in this general
will, although the will of the majority is
will are they supposed to have given
binding, is a further step in the meta-
their consent to a law passed in spite of
morphosis of the idea of freedom.
their opposition; and, hence, they are
Even the individual who votes with
free because subject only to their own
the majority is not subject only to his
will. Since it cannot be denied that a
own will. He becomes immediately aware
man voting for or against the adoption of
of this fact when he changes the will ex-
a law expresses not only his opinion but
pressed in his vote. The fact that such
also his particular will, Rousseau's con-
change of his individual will is legally
struction of the voting procedure pre-
irrelevant shows clearly that he is sub-
supposes that a man has two wills, his
ject to a foreign will or, formulated with-
particular will as a subject and his will as
out the use of a metaphor, to the objec-
a citizen, which is implied in the general
tive validity of the social order.46 He is
will, and that these two wills may be in
again free in the sense of being subject
conflict, so that a man may will some-
exclusively to his own will only if the
thing and at the same time will the con-
change of his will is confirmed by a ma-
trary. Rousseau says expressly: "In fact
jority. This concordance of the will of the
each individual, as a man, may have a
individual with the social order that may
particular will contrary or dissimilar to
be changed by the will of the majority is
the general will which he has as a citi- all the more difficult, this guaranty of
zen."45 But even if one accepts Rous- individual freedom all the more reduced,
seau's interpretation of voting as expres- the more qualified the majority is that is
sion of opinion and not of will, the ques- required for a change of the established
tion remains: Why is the opinion of the order, of the so-called will of the state.
majority true and that of the minority If unanimity is required, this guaranty
false? And if it may be true at one time, is practically abolished. A strange am-
bivalence of the political mechanism be- will of a qualified majority (for instance,
comes here manifest. The same principle by a two-thirds or a three-fourths major-
which in the first establishment of the so-ity vote), then one single individual, or a
cial order protects individual freedom minority of individuals, could prevent a
now destroys it if it is no longer possible to change of the order. And then the order
withdraw from this order. Original crea- could be in discordance with a number of
tion of social order does not occur in the subjects which would be greater than the
reality of our social experience. The indi- number of those with whose will it is in
vidual is always born into an already es- concordance.
tablished social order and normally also The principle of majority, the greatest
into a pre-existent state in the creation of possible approximation to the idea of
which he did not participate. Only the freedom in political reality, presupposes
change, the development, of this order is as an essential condition the principle of
practically in question. In this respect equality. For the view that the degree of
the principle of a simple, not a qualified, freedom in society is proportionate to the
majority constitutes the relatively great- number of free individuals implies that
est approximation to the idea of freedom. all individuals are of equal political value
According to this principle, among the and that everybody has the same claim
subjects of the social order the number of to freedom, that is, the same claim that
those who approve the order will always the collective will be in concordance with
be larger than the number of those who- his individual will. Only if it is irrelevant
entirely or in part-disapprove but re- whether the one or the other is free in this
main bound by the order. At the moment sense (because the one is politically equal
when the number of those who disap- to the other) is the postulate justified
prove the order, or one of its norms, that as many as possible shall be free,
be-
comes greater than the number of those that the mere number of free individuals
who approve, a change is possible by is decisive. This synthesis of freedom and
which a situation is re-established in equality is at the basis of the democratic
which the order is in concordance with a idea concerning the relationship between
number of subjects which is greater than the social order (as the collective will)
the number of subjects with whom it is in and the individual will, between the sub-
discordance. The idea underlying the ject and the object of domination, just as
principle of majority is that the social the synthesis of freedom and equality is
order shall be in concordance with as at the basis of the relativistic idea con-
many subjects as possible and in dis- cerning the relationship between the sub-
cordance with as few as possible. ject and the object of cognition.
Political freedom means agreement be-
DEMOCRATIC TYPE OF PERSONALITY
tween the individual will and the collec-
tive wvil expressed in the social order. From a psychological point of view
Consequently it is the principle of simple synthesis of freedom and equality, the
majority which secures the highest de- essential characteristic of democracy,
gree of political freedom that is possible means that the individual, the ego, wants
within society. If an order could not be freedom not only for himself but also for
changed by the will of a simple majority the others, for the tu. And this is possible
of the subjects but only by the will of all only if the ego experiences itself not as
(that means, unanimously), or by the something unique, incomparable and
26 ETHICS
unreproducible, but, at least in principle, concentrated in one single individual, the

as equal with the tu. Only if the individ- ruler. Its idea is well formulated in the
ual considers the undeniable differences famous words attributed to Louis XIV,
which exist between himself and the I' tat c'est moi, in direct opposition to
others as not essential, only if the ego- democracy,
or the motto of which is, I'WtOt
self-consciousness is reduced to some ex- c'est nous. The ruler's and not the
tent by the feeling to be equal with people's will is the law. For the people
others, can the ego honor the claim of arethesubject to the ruler without partici-
tu to be also an ego. This is just the intel-pating in his power, which for this reason
lectual situation of a relativistic philoso- is unrestricted and has an inherent tend-
phy. The personality whose desire for ency toward totalitarianism. In this
freedom is modified by his feeling of sense political absolutism means for the
equality recognizes himself in the other. ruled the complete renunciation of self-
He represents the altruistic type, for he determination. It is incompatible with
does not experience the other as his the idea of equality because justifiable
enemy but is inclined to see in his fellow- only by the assumption of an essential
man his friend. He is the sympathizing, difference between the ruled and the
peace-loving kind of man whose tendency ruler.
toward aggression is diverted from its The parallelism which exists between
original direction against others to him- philosophical and political absolutism is
self and thus is manifested in the tend- evident. The relationship between the
ency toward self-criticism and an in- object of knowledge, the absolute, and
creased disposition of a feeling of guilt the subject of knowledge, the individual
and a strong consciousness of responsibil- human being, is quite similar to that be-
ity. It is not as paradoxical as it may tween an absolute government and its
seem on first sight that it is just to the subjects. The unlimited power of such
type of relatively lowered self-conscious- government is beyond any influence on
ness that a form of government corre- the part of its subjects, who are bound to
sponds, a form which is characterized as obey the laws without participating in
self-determination, meaning minimiza- their creation; similarly, the absolute is
tion of government. For the attitude of beyond our experience, and the object of
the individual toward the problem of knowledge, in the theory of philosophical
government is essentially determined by absolutism, is independent of the subject
the intensity of the will to power within of knowledge, totally determined in his
the individual. And the individual, even cognition by heteronomous laws. Philo-
as subject to government, is inclined, if sophical absolutism may very well be
living under a form of government which characterized as epistemological totali-
he approves, to identify himself with the tarianism. According to this view, the
government. constitution of the universe is certainly
The stronger the will to power, the less not a democracy. The creature does not
the appreciation of freedom. The total participate in the creation.
negation of the value of freedom, the There exists not only an external par-
maximization of domination-this is the allelism between political and philosophi-
idea of autocracy, the principle of political absolutism; the former has in fact the
cal absolutism. It is characterized by the unmistakable tendency to use the latter
fact that the whole power of the state is as an ideological instrument. To justify
his unlimited power and the uncondi- domination of the majority. For domina-
tional submission of all the others, the tion by the majority of the people dis-
ruler must present himself, directly or tinguishes
in- itself from any other domina-
directly, as authorized by the only true tion by the fact that it not only presup-
absolute, the supreme superhuman being, poses by definition an opposition, name-
as his descendant or deputy or as in- ly, the minority, but also politically rec-
spired by him in a mystical way. Where ognizes its existence and protects its
the political ideology of an autocratic rights. Nothing shows more clearly the
and totalitarian government does not misuse of terminology in Soviet political
permit recourse to the absolute of a his- theory than the fact that it defines the
toric religion, as in National Socialism or democracy which the dictatorship of the
Bolshevism, it shows an unconcealed dis- proletariat pretends to be, the democ-
position to assume a religious character racy for the majority of the poor and not
itself by absolutizing its basic value: the for the minority of the rich, as an organi-
idea of the nation, the idea of socialism. zation of violence for the suppression of
Psychologically, political absolutism this minority. "The dictatorship of the
corresponds to a type of exaggerated ego- proletariat" -the true democracy-says
consciousness. The incapacity or disin- Lenin,47 "imposes a series of restrictions
clination of the individual to recognize on the freedom of the oppressors, the ex-
and to respect his fellow-man as another ploiters, the capitalists," who under the
ego, as an entity of the same kind as his dictatorship of the proletariat are no
own originally experienced ego, prevents longer oppressors, exploiters, and capi-
this sort of man from accepting equality talists, who could be only former op-
as a social ideal, just as his ardent urge of pressors, exploiters, and capitalists and
aggression and intensive will to power are, if they still exist, simply the minority
preclude freedom and peace as political of the people. Among all the facts which
values. It is a characteristic fact that the deprive the Soviet state of the right to
individual raises his self-consciousness bycall itself a democracy, it is above all the
identifying himself with his superego, the fact that it considers as its main task the
ideal ego, and that the dictator endowed suppression by violence of the minority.
with unlimited power represents to him- It is of the greatest importance to note
self the ideal ego. Hence it is not at all a that the transformation of the idea of
contradiction but, from a psychological natural freedom, as the idea of absence of
point of view, quite consistent to say government, into the idea of political
that it is just this type of man who favors
freedom, as the idea of participation in
strict discipline, even blind obedience, government, does not imply a complete
and, indeed, finds happiness in obeying abandonment of the former. What re-
no less than in commanding. Identifi- mains is the principle of a certain restric-
cation with authority-that is the secret tion of the power of the government, the
of obedience. fundamental principle of political liberal-
ism. Modern democracy cannot be sepa-
THE PRINCIPLE OF TOLERANCE
rated from political liberalism. Its prin-
Since the principle of freedom and ciple is that the government must not
equality tends toward a minimization of interfere with certain spheres of interests
domination, democracy cannot be an ab- of the individual, which are to be pro-
solute domination, not even an absolute tected by law as fundamental human
28 ETHICS
rights or freedoms. It is by the respect of son, which is the very essence of rational-
these rights that minorities are safe- ism.
guarded against arbitrary rule by ma- This attitude, especially the respect
jorities. Because the permanent tension for science, corresponds perfectly to that
between majority and minority, govern- kind of person which we have described
ment and opposition, results in the dia- as specifically democratic. In the great
lectical process so characteristic of the dilemma between volition and cognition,
democratic formation of the will of the between the wish to dominate the world
state, that one rightly may say: democ- and that to understand it, the pendulum
racy is discussion. Consequently the will swings more in the direction of cognition
of the state, that is to say, the content of than volition, more toward understand-
the legal order, may be the result of a ing than dominating, just because with
compromise.48 Because this type of gov- this type of character the will to power,
ernment guarantees internal peace, it is the intensity of the ego-experience, is
preferred by the peace-loving, nonaggres- relatively reduced and self-criticism rela-
sive type of character. Hence freedom of tively strengthened; hence, belief in criti-
religion, freedom of opinion and press, cal, and thus objective, science is se-
belong to the essence of democracy; and cured.
above all belongs freedom of science, In an autocracy, on the other hand, no
based on the belief in the possibility of opposition is tolerated. There exists no
objective cognition. The appreciation of discussion, no compromise; there is only
rational science and the tendency to keep dictate. Hence there is no freedom of re-
it free from any intrusion by metaphysi- ligion or opinion. If volition prevails over
cal or religious speculations are signifi- cognition, justice prevails over truth.
cant features of modern democracy such But the question as to what is just is to
as it has been formed under the influence be decided exclusively by the authority
of political liberalism. The idea of free- of the state to which not only the will but
dom which is at the basis of political also the opinion of the citizens are sub-
liberalism not only implies the postu- ject, so that nonconformity with this au-
late that the external behavior of the thority is not only an error but at the
individual in relation to other individuals same time a punishable crime. It stands
shall be subject-as far as this is possible to reason that under such a political
-to his own will, and if to the will of the regime there can be no freedom of sci-
state, this can be only a will in the estab- ence, which is tolerated only as a pliant
lishment of which his own will partici- instrument of the government. Nothing
pates, but also the postulate that the in- is more significant of a turn to an intel-
ternal behavior of the individual, his lectual attitude more or less in favor of
thinking, shall be subject only to his own autocracy than the abandonment of the
reason and not to a transcendental au- belief in the possibility of an objective
thority existing or supposed to exist be- science, that is, a science which is inde-
yond his reason, an authority in which pendent from political interests and
his reason has no share because it is not hence worthy of freedom. The existence
accessible to his reason. The liberalism of democracy is endangered if the ideal
inherent in modern democracy means not of objective cognition is placed behind
only political but also intellectual auton- other ideals. Such an intellectual move-
omy of the individual, autonomy of rea- ment goes usually hand in hand with the
tendency to attribute to the irrational a not able to perform all the necessary ad-
higher value than to the rational. In the ministrative and judicial acts and has to
conflict between religion and science the appoint subordinate organs. In order to
former prevails over the latter. have his intentions realized by these or-
gans, he may bind them by laws deter-
THE RATIONALISTIC CHARACTER
mining their activities. But be retains for
OF DEMOCRACY
himself the absolute right to grant in
The rationalistic character of democ- every case any exemption from the laws
racy manifests itself especially in the that he thinks appropriate. Hence there
tendency to establish the legal order of can be no legal security in an autocracy.
the state as a system of general norms Nevertheless each manifestation of state
created by a procedure well organized for power claims to be the realization of jus-
this purpose. There is a clear intention of tice. And this justice refuses to express
determining, by a pre-established law, itself in general principles; it defies, by
the individual acts of the courts and ad- its very nature, any definition. It reveals
ministrative organs in order to make itself only in individual decisions per-
them-as far as possible-calculable. fectly adapted to the particularities of
There exists an outspoken need for ra- the concrete case. The secret of justice is
tionalizing the process in which the in the exclusive possession of the ruler; it
power of the state is displayed. This is is his personal virtue, his divine capacity,
the reason why legislation is considered implanted in him by divine grace; it is
to be the basis of the other functions of the legitimation of his dictatorial power.
the state. The ideal of legality plays a Consequently an autocratic regime, in
decisive role: it is assumed that the indi- contradistinction to a democratic one,
vidual acts of state may be justified by refuses to make public its aims by pro-
their conformity with the general norms mulgating a program. And if it is pressed
of the law. Legal security rather than ab- to do so, the program is either a series of
solute justice is in the foreground of legal empty phrases or promises, the fulfilment
consciousness. Autocracy, on the other of most contradictory wishes. Against
hand, disdains such rationalization of criticism one argues that the program
power. It avoids, as far as possible, any does not and cannot contain the essential
determination of the acts of state, espe- achievements to be performed by the
cially of the acts of an autocratic ruler, regime. Pulsating life can neither be
by pre-established general norms, which grasped nor regulated by general rules.
could imply a restriction of discretion. Everything depends on the concrete ac-
As supreme legislator the autocrat is con- tion, on the mystery of the creative
sidered not to be bound by the laws is- ratros.
sued by himself: princes legibus solutus Since in a democracy legal security,
est. In Plato's ideal state, which is the legality, and calculability of the func-
archetype of an autocracy, there are no tions of state are required, institutions
general rules of law at all. The "royal for the purpose of controlling these func-
judges" have an unlimited power of dis- tions in order to guarantee their lawful-
cretion in deciding concrete cases. This, ness are established. As a consequence
of course, is possible only because Plato's the principle of publicity prevails. The
state is a very small community. In a tendency to unveil the facts is specifically
state of an average size the autocrat is democratic; and this tendency leads a
30 ETHICS
superficial and malevolent interpretation arch who pretends to hold his office by
of this form of government to the un- the grace of God or the charisma of a
founded judgment that corruption is leader who claims to be inspired by su-
more frequent in democracy than in au- pernatural forces can hardly be attrib-
tocracy, whereas-in truth-corruption uted to the people, to Mr. and Mrs.
only remains invisible in the latter, since America. A democracy which tries to jus-
there the contrary principle prevails. In tify itself in this way would come sus-
an autocratic regime, there are no meas- piciously near to the fable of the ass in
ures of control, which are supposed only the skin of a lion.
to diminish the effectiveness of the gov-
THE PROBLEM OF LEADERSHIP
ernment, and no publicity; there is only
the intensive endeavor to veil everything The antagonism between democracy
that could be harmful to the authority and autocracy appears also in the differ-
of the government and undermine the ent ways in which rulership is inter-
discipline of the officials and the obedi- preted. In the ideology of autocracy the
ence of the citizens. ruler represents an absolute value. Being
As pointed out, the rationalistic and of divine origin or endowed with super-
critical attitudes of democracy manifest natural forces, he is not considered an
themselves also in a certain aversion to organ which is or can be created by the
the religious, metaphysical ideologies community. He is imagined as an au-
which autocracy utilizes in order to thority that stands outside the commu-
maintain its power. The struggle in nity, which is constituted and held to-
which democracy overcomes autocracy is gether by him. Therefore origin and crea-
to a great part conducted in the name of tion of the ruler are not problems that
critical reason against ideologies which could be solved by rational cognition.
appeal to the irrational forces of the hu- The political reality, namely, the in-
man soul. However, since no government evitable usurpation of rulership, is as-
seems to be able to act without the help siduously veiled by the myth of the
of certain justifying ideologies, demo- leader. In a democracy, on the other
cratic governments too make use of hand, the question of how to appoint the
them. But, as a rule, democratic ideolo- magistrates stands in the bright light of
gies are more rationalistic, nearer to real- rational consideration. Rulership repre-
ity, and hence less effective than those sents not an absolute but only a relative
used by autocratic governments. Since value. All the organs of the community
the hold on the subjects by autocratic are elected only for a short period. Even
governments is more intense, they need a the chief executive is a "leader" only for
more dense veil to cover their true na- a certain time and only in certain re-
ture. To be sure, occasionally in a de- spects, since not only his term of office
mocracy the same religious, metaphysi- but also his competence is limited. He is,
cal ideologies are used to which auto- even in his capacity as the head of the
cratic governments owe or are supposed state, a citizen like all the others and is
to owe their success, as, for instance, the subject to criticism. From the fact that
idea that the popular government real- the ruler in an autocracy is transcendent
izes the will of God. But the slogan vox to, and in a democracy immanent in, the
populi vox dei has never been taken too community follows that in the first case
seriously. The halo of an inspired mon- the man who exercises this function is
considered to stand above the social or- to survive. And, indeed, it seems as if in
der and consequently not responsible to history autocracies fill much greater
the community constituted by it or-as spaces of time than democracies, which
it is ideologically formulated-respon- appear-so to speak-only in the
sible only to God and himself, whereas in entr'actes of the drama of mankind. De-
the second case he stands under the so- mocracy seems to have less power of re-
cial order and hence responsible to it. sistance than autocracy, which without
Since in democracy rulership has no su- any consideration destroys every op-
pernatural quality, and the ruler is cre- ponent, whereas democracy, with its
ated by a rational, publicly controllable principle of legality, freedom of opinion,
procedure, rulership cannot be the per- protection of minorities, tolerance, di-
manent monopoly of a single person. rectly favors its enemy. It is a paradoxi-
Publicity, criticism, and responsibility cal privilege of this form of government,
make it impossible that a ruler becomes a doubtful advantage which it has over
irremovable. Democracy is characterized autocracy that it may, by its own spe-
by a more or less quick change of ruler- cific methods of forming the will of the
ship. It has, in this respect, a dynamic state, abolish itself. But the fact that in
nature. A steady rise from the commu- an autocracy there is no constitutional
nity of the ruled to the position of ruler way of smoothing down the conflicts of
takes place. Autocracy, on the other interests, which after all exist here too,
hand, shows an outspoken static charac- constitutes a serious danger. From the
ter: the relationship between ruler and point of view of psycho-political tech-
ruled has the tendency of being frozen. nique, the mechanism of democratic in-
On the whole, democracy has no stitutions aims at raising the political
ground which is favorable to the prin- emotions of the masses and especially of
ciple of authority in general and to the the opposition parties above the thresh-
Fuehrer-ideal in particular. Insofar as the old of social consciousness in order to let
father is the archetype of authority, be- them "abreagieren" (abreact). The so-
cause the original experience of all au- cial equilibrium in the autocracy, on the
thority, democracy is, according to its other hand, is based on the repression of
idea, a fatherless society. It is intended the political emotions in a sphere which
to be a community of equals. Its prin- could be compared with that of the un-
ciple is co-ordination; its most primitive conscious. We shall leave undecided
form is a mother-right organization, which technique is more appropriate to
where men living together are brothers, safeguard the government against revo-
the sons of the same mother. The trinity lutionary overthrow.
of the French Revolution, liberty, equal- Among the attempts, mentioned be-
ity, and fraternity, is its true symbol. fore, to obscure the antagonism between
Autocracy, on the other hand, is by its democracy and autocracy, the tendency
very nature a paternal community. The to present the problem of democracy as a
child-father relationship is its corre- problem of leadership is of an importance
sponding category. Super- and subordi- which should not be underestimated. It
nation, not co-ordination, i.e., hierarchical has been evoked by the undeniable suc-
articulation, is its structure. It is just for cess which fascism and nationalism had
this reason that one might attribute to it during a certain time. It aims at a new
rather than to democracy a better chance doctrine of democracy which, in opposi-
32 ETHICS
tion to the old one, emphasizes the neces- the greatest possible amount of individ-
sity of efficient leadership. Its result is ual freedom. Consequently, the wish for
the concept of an authoritarian democ- effective government, or what is sup-
racy, which, of course, is a contradiction posed to be an effective government, does
in terms. But it enabled the followers of not justify the substitution in place of
this doctrine to recognize fascism as de- the definition of democracy as govern-
mocracy.49 "Fascism," declared Musso- ment by the people a definition from
lini, "is opposed to democracy, which which the people as an active power are
equates the nation to the majority, low- eliminated and maintained only as a pas-
ering it to the level of that majority; sive factor insofar as their approval of
nevertheless it is the purest form of de- the leader expressed in some way or an-
mocracy if the nation is conceived, as it other is required. Such definitions have
should be, qualitatively and not quanti- only the effect-if not the intention-of
tatively, as the most powerful ideal (most covering the retreat from the democratic
powerful because most moral, most co- position by a democratic terminology.
herent, most true) which acts within the
DEMOCRACY AND PEACE
nation as the conscience and the will of a
few, even of one, which ideal tends to The pattern of internal policy just de-
become active within the conscience and scribed corresponds to a definite stand-
the will of all, that is to say, of all those ard of external policy. The democratic
who rightly constitute a nation. ..."5 type is decidedly inclined to cherish a
It cannot, of course, be denied that pacifistic ideal, whereas the autocratic
within a democratic state there is such a type shows unmistakable symptoms of
thing as leadership, that the democratic imperialism. Of course democracies too
form of government does not prevent, al- have waged wars of conquest. But the
though it does not favor, the coming into readiness for such actions is here much
existence of powerful leaders who may weaker, the inner political inhibitions to
obtain the enthusiastic support of the overcome much stronger, than in an au-
masses. Nor can it be denied that the rise tocracy. Consequently, there exists a
of such a personality may result in the clear tendency to justify foreign policy
abolishment of this form of government by a rationalistic, pacifistic ideology. It
and its replacement by an open autoc- is necessary to present the war which one
racy or a dictatorship which pretends to wages or intends to wage as a war of de-
be democracy. It is also true that consti- fense imposed upon the peace-loving gov-
tutional measures such as the institution ernment by the enemy-a measure which
of recall, that is, the procedure by which an autocracy with its heroic ideology
a-public official may be removed from of- does not need. Or the aim of the war is
fice by a vote of the people, or those in- declared to be the final pacification of the
tended to prevent ostracism, as in an- world, or a part of it, through an inter-
tique democracy, have proved to be not national organization, which shows all
very effective. But these facts do not jus- the characteristics of a democracy-a
tify the identification of the problem of community of states with equal rights
democracy with that of leadership. The under a kind of government composed of
problem of democracy is not the prob- elected representatives and a world court
lem of the most effective government; competent to settle international con-
others may be more effective. It is the flicts-as the first step toward the devel-
problem of a government guaranteeing opment of a world state. This is an idea
which from the point of view

sovereignty of of an auto-
the others, that the state
cratic-imperialistic conviction not only which is the starting point of this inter-
does not represent any value at all but is pretation must be considered as the only
decidedly rejected as a leveling mania, sovereign state. Consequently the legal
which ultimately must lead to the de- existence of other communities as states
struction of civilization, the progress of and the validity of the normative order
which depends on the struggle for life and regulating the conduct of the sovereign
the survival of the fittest. state in its relations with these states
must be based on the recognition, and
DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY
thus the will, of the sovereign state,
OF THE STATE
which is the starting point of this inter-
The different ideas of the relationship pretation. Since the legal existence of
which exists or should exist between one's such states and the application of inter-
own state and other states are closely national law to their relationships with
connected with the theories of the nature the sovereign state depend on this rec-
of the state which are congenial, respec- ognition, these states cannot be consid-
tively, to the democratic and to the auto- ered as sovereign in the absolute sense of
cratic types of personality. The latter, the term. From this point of view the in-
with his hypertrophic self-consciousness ternational legal order appears not as a
based on his identification with a power- normative order superior to the state or,
ful autocrat, is predestined to advocate what amounts to the same thing, to the
the doctrine that the state is an entity national legal order, but-if as a legal
different from the mass of individual hu- order at all-as part of the legal order of
man beings, a superindividual, somehow the sovereign state which recognizes the
a collective reality, a mystic organism, validity of the international legal order
and, as such, a supreme authority, the for itself. Thus the entire world of the
realization of absolute value. It is the law is conceived of as implied in the will
concept of sovereignty which accom- of the absolute state-ego, the sovereign
plishes the absolutization, the diviniza- state.
tion, of the state, represented in its to- Diametrically opposed to this view of
tality by the divine ruler. Philosophical the state and its relations with other
absolutism, as pointed out, may result states is the theory according to which
from a view which, in its attempt to con- the state is not a mysterious substance
ceive the world, starts from the ego but different from its members, i.e., the hu-
ignores the tu, refuses to recognize its man beings forming the state, and hence
claim to be an ego too, and thus leads to a transcendental reality beyond rational,
an absolutization of the unique, sov- empirical cognition but a specific norma-
ereign ego within whose conception and tive order regulating the mutual behav-
will the whole universe together with all ior of men. This doctrine refuses to look
the others who in vain claim to be egos is for the existence of the state in a sphere
comprised. In just the same way political beyond or above; it finds this existence in
absolutism starts in its interpretation of the validity and efficacy of a normative
international relations from the inter- order and consequently in the minds of
preter's own sovereign state. It is a sig- the human beings who are the subjects of
nificant consequence of the doctrine of the obligations and rights stipulated by
the absolute sovereignty of the state that this order. This political theory is not di-
the sovereignty of one state excludes the rected at an absolutization but, on the
34 ETHICS
contrary, at a relativization of the state. autocracy can be reduced to a difference

It denounces the concept of sovereignty in the inner habitus of men, then the
as the ideology of a definite power policy antagonism between a scientific attitude
and hence denies that this concept is ap- oriented toward the value of cognition
plicable in a scientific description of po- and a political attitude oriented toward
litical or legal reality. By demonstrating another, the social, value may also be
that absolute sovereignty is not and can- brought in connection with the antago-
not be an essential quality of the state ex- nism between political relativism and po-
isting side by side with other states, it litical absolutism. Then it is quite under-
removes one of the most stubborn preju- standable why a genuine science of poli-
dices which prevent political and legal tics prospers better within a democracy
science from recognizing the possibility where its freedom, its independence from
of an international legal order constitut- the government, is guaranteed than
ing an international community of which within an autocracy where only political
the state is a member, just as corpora- ideologies can be developed, and why the
tions are members of the state. This the- one who prefers democracy to autocracy
ory shows that the state as a legal com- has a stronger disposition for a scientific
munity is an intermediate stage in a se- cognition of society in general, and state
ries of legal phenomena which leads from and law in particular, than the one whom
the universal international community of his character pushes toward autocracy
states, over particular international or- and thereby to an ideological attitude.
ganizations, to the individual state and
DEMOCRACY IN THE HISTORY OF
from the individual state to the associa-
POLITICAL IDEAS
tions incorporated in the state, ending
finally with the individual human being If the result of the foregoing analysis
as the legal subject. concerning the relationship between de-
It follows from all that has been said mocracy and relativism, on one hand,
before that this anti-ideological, ration- and autocracy and absolutism, on the
alistic, and relativistic political theory other, is not yet considered as sufficiently
corresponds to that intellectual type convincing, I refer to the historical fact
which has been described as democratic. that almost all outstanding representa-
It is a scientific theory of political and tives of a relativistic philosophy were po-
legal reality to which the autocratic type litically in favor of democracy, whereas
prefers a metaphysical-theological inter- followers of philosophical absolutism, the
pretation of social phenomena in general great metaphysicians, were in favor of
and of the state in particular. Only the political absolutism and against democ-
democratic type will allow an objective racy.
analysis of the different forms of govern- The Sophists, in antiquity, were rela-
ment, the democratic form included. No- tivists. Their most prominent philoso-
body who believes in political absolutism pher Protagoras taught that man is the
will examine democracy on an equal measure of all things; and their represent-
footing with autocracy without a value ative poet Euripides glorified democ-
judgment implied in his examination. To racy. But Plato, the greatest metaphysi-
evaluate and hence to approve or to dis- cian of all times, advocated, against
approve political reality is more impor- Protagoras, the principle, God is the
tant to him than value-free cognition. If measure of all things; and God as the
the antagonism between democracy and absolute good is at the center of his doc-
trine of ideas. At the same time he rejects good for nothing; and we Athenians decide
public questions for ourselves or at least en-
democracy as a contemptible form of
deavour to arrive at a sound understanding of
government. His criticism aims in the
them in the belief that it is not debate that is a
first place at the constitution of his na- hindrance to action but rather not to be in-
tive town, the focus of his political inter- structed by debate before the time comes for
ests. In order to judge its objective value action.... In a word, then, I say that our city
as a whole is the school of Hellas.51
it should be confronted with the picture
of the Athenean democracy conveyed to
In his dialogue Republic, Plato defines
us in the History of the Peloponnesian democracy not as government by the
War written by Thucydides, one of the people-or as government by "the
greatest and most reliable of historians, many," as Thucydides did-but as a
not more than a generation prior to government by the poor. "When the
Plato. These are the words which Thu- poor win, the result is a democracy. They
cydides puts in the mouth of Pericles: kill some of the opposite party, banish
It is true that our government is called a others, and grant the rest an equal share
democracy, because its administration is in the in civil rights and government, officials
hands, not of the few, but of the many; yet
being usually appointed by lot."52 Free-
while as regards the law all men are on an
equality for the settlement of their private dis- dom, indeed, is the fundamental prin-
putes, as regards the value set on them it is as ciple of democracy, but this freedom is
each man is in any way distinguished that he is nothing but anarchy:
preferred to public honours, not because he
belongs to a particular class, but because of First of all, they are all free. Liberty and
personal merits; nor, again, on the ground of free speech are rife everywhere; anyone is
poverty is a man barred from a public career by allowed to do what he likes.... That being so,
obscurity of rank if he but has it in him to do every man will arrange his own manner of life
the state service. And not only in our public to suit his pleasure. The result will be a greater
life are we liberal, but also as regards our free-variety of individuals than under any other
dom from suspicion of one another in the pur- constitution. So it may be the finest of all
suits of every-day life, for we do not feel resent- with its variegated pattern of all sorts of char-
ment at our neighbour if he does as he likes, nor acters. Many people may think it the best,
yet do we put on sour looks which, though harm- just as women and children might admire a
less, are painful to behold. But while we thus mixture of colours of every shade in the pattern
avoid giving offence in our private intercourse, of a dress.... [In a democracy] you are not
in our public life we are restrained from lawless- obliged to be in authority, however competent
ness chiefly through fear, for we render obedi- you may be, or to submit to authority, if you
ence to those in authority and to the laws, do not like it; you need not fight when your
and especially to those laws which are or- fellow citizens are at war, nor remain at peace
dained for the succour of the oppressed and when they do, unless you want peace; and
those which, though unwritten, bring upon though you may have no legal right to hold
the transgressor a disgrace which all men rec- office or sit on juries, you will do so all the same
ognize.... Wealth we employ rather as an if the fancy takes. A wonderful pleasant life,
opportunity for action than as a subject surely just for the moment.... In a democ-
for boasting; and with us it is not a shame for racyayou must have seen how men condemned
man to acknowledge poverty, but the greater to death or exile stay on and go about in public,
shame is for him not to do his best to avoid it. and no one takes any more notice than he would
And you will find united in the same persons of a spirit that walked invisible. There is so
an interest at once in private and in public much tolerance and superiority to petty con-
affairs, and in others of us who give attention siderations; such a contempt for all those fine
chiefly to business, you will find no lack of in- principles we laid down in founding our com-
sight into political matters. For we alone regard monwealth ... a democracy tramples all such
the man who takes no part in public affairs, notions under foot; with a magnificent indiffer-
not as one who minds his own business, but as ence to the sort of life a man has led before he
36 ETHICS
enters politics, it will promote to honour any- within society. Of course, not any phi-
one who merely calls himself the people's friend.
losophy whatsoever but only the true
... These, then, and such as these, are the fea-
philosophy, the philosophy of Plato,
tures of a democracy, an agreeable form of
anarchy, with plenty of variety and equality which alone leads to the vision of the idea
of a peculiar kind for equals and unequals of the good; and only those who are ca-
alike.5" pable of this vision are entitled to gov-
Of the democratic type of man Plato ern.56 The mass of the people "can never
says: "His life is subject to no order or be philosophical"; only very-few are able
restraint and he has no wish to change an "to consort with philosophy."57 Conse-
existence which he calls pleasant, free, quently the mass of the people are abso-
and happy. That well describes the life of lutely unable to govern themselves. Only
one whose motto is liberty and equal- a few are "naturally fitted to combine
ity."54 philosophical study with political leader-
Nobody can assert that this is an ob- ship, while the rest of the world should
jective description of the idea of democ- accept their guidance and let philosophy
racy or its actual realization in Athens. alone."58 These are the principles that
It is a caricature drawn by a passionate determine the constitution of Plato's
enemy. Plato's hatred of democratic free- ideal state, the population of which is
dom manifests itself in the following divided into two classes: the one com-
statement, meant as a serious argument prising the mass of the working people,
against democracy: "The full measure of the farmers, artisans, and traders, whose
popular liberty is reached when the function is to satisfy the economic needs
slaves of both sexes are quite as free as of the community; and the other, the so-
the owners who paid for them, and I had called guardians or warriors, are a group
almost forgotten to mention the spirit of of men and women whose function is to
freedom and equality in the mutual rela- defend the state against external enemies
tions of men and women." In his gro- and to maintain order within the state-
tesque exaggeration, he goes so far as to they form the army and police of the
say: "No one who had not seen it would state. From this class a small number of
believe how much more freedom the do- individuals are selected by way of special
mestic animals enjoy in a democracy training; they are called the philoso-
than elsewhere. The very dogs behave as phers. The training enables them to have
if the proverb 'like mistress, like maid' a vision of the idea of the good and thus
applied to them; and the horses and don- "take it as a pattern for the right order-
keys catch the habit of walking down the ing of the state" ;59 most of their time will
street with all the dignity of freemen, be spent in study, and only in turn will
running into anyone they meet who does they act as rulers. Plato does not exclude
not get out of their way. The whole place the possibility that only one of them will
is simply bursting with the spirit of exercise this function. He frequently
liberty. 55 speaks of "the philosopher"-in the sin-
Liberty has no political value. This gular-as the ruler. He says that control
becomes manifest in the constitution of of the state shall be given to "the phi-
the ideal state outlined in the Republic. losopher,"60 and that the philosopher "in
The main purpose of this sketch is to jus- constant companionship with the divine
tify the postulate that philosophy shall order of the world will reproduce that
dominate within the individual as well as order in his soul and, so far as man may,
become godlike."" He emphasizes that a ered and appreciated in Hellas as democ-

state is happiest under "a true king,"62 racy. Even the polity, i.e., a government
i.e., the philosopher-king. Neither the by the many exercised for the common
mass of the people nor the members of good, holds only the third place in his six-
the class of warriors have a share in the form scheme of constitutions, which dis-
government, the power of which is not tinguishes three good forms of the state:
restricted by any laws. It is a perfect monarchy, aristocracy, and polity; and
autocracy. three bad forms: tyranny, oligarchy, and
In Aristotle's Metaphysics the absolute democracy.67
appears as the first mover who himself is Aristotle's teleological interpretation
unmoved.68 There must be "something of nature-a consequence of his meta-
which moves without being moved, being physics-is in direct opposition to the
eternal, substance, and actuality."64 This mechanistic view of the atomists, who
unmoved mover is at the same time pure strictly rejected causes that were simul-
and absolute reason. It is the highest taneously ends and thus became the
good, the godhead. In the absolute being, founders of modern science. It was not by
in the being as such, an absolute mon- chance that Democritus, who together
archy is recognized. This conception is with Leucippus developed the antimeta-
definitively expressed in the words, "the physical theory of atoms, declared:
world refuses to be governed badly," to "Poverty in democracy is as preferable
which the Homer quotation is added, to pretended prosperity in monarchy as
"the rule of many is no good; one ruler freedom is to slavery."
let there be."65 In the Middle Ages, the metaphysics
In conformity with his metaphysics of the Christian religion goes hand in
Aristotle declares in his Politics that hand with the conviction that monarchy,
monarchy-that is, a state where "one the image of the divine rule of the uni-
person governs for the common good"- verse, is the best form of government.
is the best form of government; but de- The theology of Thomas Aquinas is the
mocracy is stigmatized as a corruption, classical example of this coincidence of
as the degeneration of a form of govern- philosophical and political absolutism. In
ment which he calls "polity" and which his work De Regimine Principum Thomas
he characterizes as a state where "the says:
citizens at large govern for the common The aim of any ruler should be to secure
good," whereas in a democracy the gov- the well-being of the realm whose government
ernment applies its power in its own in- he undertakes.... But the welfare and pros-
perity of a community lies in the preservation
terest.66 This is a strange terminology,
of its unity.... Now it is clear that that which
for the term "polity," as Aristotle ex- is itself a unity can more easily produce unity
pressly admits, is "a common name for than that which is a plurality: just as that
all governments"; and in other connec- which is itself hot is best adapted to heating
tions he uses "democracy," the generally things. So government by one person is more
likely to be successful than government by
accepted term for government by the
many.... That is best which more nearly
many or the citizens at large, just in this approaches a natural process, since nature
sense. This deviation from the traditional always works in the best way. But in nature,
government is always by one. Among members
terminology can be explained only by
of the body there is one which moves all the
Aristotle's intention to deprecate that rest, namely; the heart: in the soul there is
form of government which was consid- one faculty which is pre-eminent, namely,
38 ETHICS
reason. The bees have one king, and in the whole political statements. So in his political
universe there is one God, Creator and Lord of theory he did not dare express his true
all. And this is quite according to reason: for
opinion. Hegel, on the other hand, the
all plurality derives from unity. So, since the
product of art is but an imitation of work of philosopher of the absolute and objective
nature, and since a work of art is the better spirit, was also a protagonist of absolute
for being a faithful representation of its natural monarchy.
pattern, it follows of necessity that the best
form of government in human society is that
DEMOCRACY AS POLITICAL RELATIVISM
which is exercised by one person.68
It was a disciple of Hegel who, in the
The same ideas are presented in his Sum- fight against the democratic movement
ma Theologica.69 Nicholas of Cusa, on the in Germany during the nineteenth cen-
other hand, who in his philosophy de- tury, formulated the catchword: Author-
clared the absolute as unknowable, in his ity, not majority! And, indeed, if one be-
political theory advocated the freedom lieves in the existence of the absolute,
and the equality of men. In modern and consequently in absolute values, in
times, Spinoza combined his antimeta- the absolute good-to use Plato's ter-
physical pantheism with an outspoken minology-is it not meaningless to let a
preference for democratic principles in majority vote decide what is politically
the moral and political fields; but the good? To legislate, and that means to de-
metaphysician Leibniz defended mon- termine the contents of a social order,
archy. The English founders of antimeta- not according to what objectively is the
physical empiricism were decided op- best for the individuals subject to this
ponents of political absolutism. Locke order, but according to what these indi-
affirmed that absolute monarchy was in- viduals, or their majority, rightly or
consistent with civil society and could wrongly believe to be their best-this
not be a form of government at all. To be consequence of the democratic principles
sure, Hume, who much more than Kant of freedom and equality is justifiable only
deserves to be called the destroyer of if there is no absolute answer to the ques-
metaphysics, did not go as far as Locke; tion as to what is the best, if there is no
but he wrote in his brilliant essay Of the such a thing as an absolute good. To let a
Original Contract that the consent of the
majority of ignorant men decide instead
people is the best foundation of govern- of reserving the decision to the only one
ment, and in his essay Idea of a Perfect who, in virtue of his divine origin or in-
Commonwealth he sketched the constitu- spiration, has the exclusive knowledge of
tion of a democratic republic. Kant, fol- the absolute good-this is not the most
lowing Hume, showed in his philosophy absurd method if it is believed that such
of nature the futility of any metaphysical knowledge is impossible and that, conse-
speculation, but in his ethics he reintro- quently, no single individual has the
duced the absolute, which he so system- right to enforce his will upon the others.
atically excluded from his theoretical That value judgments have only rela-
philosophy. Likewise, his political atti- tive validity-one of the basic principles
tude was not very consistent. He sympa- of philosophical relativism-implies that
thized with the French Revolution and opposite value judgments are neither
admired Rousseau; but he lived under logically nor morally excluded. One of
the absolute monarchy of the Prussian the fundamental principles of democracy
police state and had to be cautious in his is that everybody has to respect the po-
litical opinion of everybody else, since all the most sublime pieces of world litera-
are equal and free. Tolerance, minority ture and, without intending it, grows
rights, freedom of speech, and freedom of into a tragic symbol of the antagonism
thought, so characteristic of democracy, between absolutism and relativism.
have no place within a political system It was at the time of Passover when
based on the belief in absolute values. Jesus, accused of pretending to be the
This belief irresistibly leads-and has al- son of God and king of the Jews, was
ways led-to a situation in which the one brought before Pilate, the Roman pro-
who assumes to possess the secret of the curator. And Pilate ironically asked
absolute good claims to have the right to Jesus, who in the eyes of the Roman was
impose his opinion as well as his will upon but a poor fool, "Then, you are the king
the others, who, if they do not agree, are of the Jews?" But Jesus took this ques-
in error. And to be in error is, according tion very seriously and, burning with the
to this view, to be wrong, and hence pun- ardor of his divine mission, answered:
ishable. If, however, it is recognized that "You say so. I am a king. To this end I
only relative values are accessible to hu- was born and for this cause came I into
man knowledge and human will, then it the world, that I should bear witness to
is justifiable to enforce a social order the truth. Everyone who is on the side of
against reluctant individuals only if this the truth listens to my voice." Then
order is in harmony with the greatest Pilate asked: "What is truth?" And be-
possible number of equal individuals, cause he, the skeptical relativist, did not
that is to say, with the will of the major- know what the truth was, the absolute
ity. It may be that the opinion of the truth in which this man believed, he-
minority, and not the opinion of the ma- quite consistently-proceeded in a demo-
jority, is correct. Solely because of this cratic way by putting the decision of the
possibility, which only philosophical rela- case to a popular vote. He went out
tivism can admit-that what is right to- again to the Jews, relates the Gospel, and
day may be wrong tomorrow-the mi- said to them: "I find in him no fault at
nority must have a chance to express all. But you have a custom that I should
freely their opinion and must have full release to you one at the Passover. Do
opportunity of becoming the majority. you wish that I set free to you this king
Only if it is not possible to decide in an of the Jews?" Then cried they all again,
absolute way what is right and what is saying: "Not this man, but Barabbas."
wrong is it advisable to discuss the issue The Gospel adds: "Now Barabbas was a
and, after discussion, to submit to a com- robber."
promise.70 For those who believe in the son of
This is the true meaning of the politi- God and king of the Jews as witness of
cal system which we call democracy and the absolute truth, this plebiscite is cer-
which we may oppose to political abso- tainly a strong argument against democ-
lutism only because it is political rela- racy. And this argument we political sci-
tivism.71 entists must accept. But only under one
condition: that we are as sure of our po-
JESUS AND DEMOCRACY
litical truth, to be enforced, if necessary,
In chapter 18 of the Gospel of St. with blood and tears-that we are as
John, the trial of Jesus is described. The sure of our truth as was, of his truth, the
simple story in its naive wording is one of son of God.
II. DEMOCRACY AND RELIGION
DEMOCRACY AS A PROBLEM OF JUSTICE course, is-if a justification at all-only a

conditional justification of democracy,
E foregoing examination of the
the only justification a relativistic phi-
| philosophical foundation of democ-
losophy based on science and not on
1 racy is not and cannot be directed
metaphysics or religion can afford. It
at an absolute justification of this type of
leaves the decision about the social value
political organization; it does not and
to be realized to the individual acting in
cannot intend to prove that democracy
political reality. It does not and cannot
is the best form of government. It is a
take the burden of this grave responsibil-
scientific, and that means an objective,
ity off his shoulders.
analysis of a social phenomenon and not
This is, in the last analysis, the reason
its evaluation in the sense that it presup-
why a relativistic philosophy of value
poses a definite social value as uncondi-
meets with such passionate resistance.
tionally valid and demonstrates democ-
For many people are not able, and not
racy as the realization of this value.
willing, to accept the responsibility for
Such a justification is not possible from
the decision about the social value to be
the point of view of a political science
realized, especially in a situation in
which cannot recognize a definite social
which their decision may have fatal con-
value to the exclusion of another but can
sequences for their personal welfare.
only ascertain that in social reality dif-
Therefore they try to shift it from their
ferent and contradictory social values are
own conscience to an outside authority
recognized and examine the appropriate
competent to tell them what is right and
means for their realization. For the rela-
wrong, to answer their question, what is
tionship between means and end is a rela-
justice?-seeking for an unconditional
tionship between cause and effect, objec-
justification in terms of which they long
tively ascertainable by science, whereas
to appease their conscience. Such an au-
the recognition of an end as an ultimate
thority they find in religion. This fact
value, which is itself not the means for a
explains the steadily increasing intellect-
further end, lies beyond scientific cogni-
ual movement directed against rational-
tion. Hence a scientific theory of democ-
istic positivism and relativism toward
racy can only maintain that this form of
religious metaphysics and natural law so
government tries to realize freedom to-
characteristic of our time of high political
gether with equality of the individual
tensions. Christian theology, leading this
and that if these values are to be realized,
movement, offers a vindication of de-
democracy is the appropriate means;
which implies that if social values other
mocracy which promises to be more ef-
than freedom and equality of the indi- fective than the problematical, because
vidual members of the community are to conditional, justification implied in a
be realized, as for instance, the power of merely scientific theory of legal and po-
the nation, democracy may not be the litical positivism. From the point of view
appropriate form of government. This, ofof Christian theology the problem of de-
40
mocracy is presented and supposedly RELATIVISTIC POSITIVISM RESPONSIBLE
solved as a problem of divine, and that FOR TOTALITARIANISM
means of absolute, justice or, what Brunner writes, "The whole world is
amounts to the same, of Christian natu- crying out for justice" ;4 and this desire
ral law. Most significant products of re- for justice "is a constant factor in all
cent democratic theology are the writings human history."5 The vague sense of just
of two outstanding Protestant theologi- and unjust, which everyone has, must be
ans: the Swiss Emil Brunner's Gerechtig- transformed into clear thought, into the
keit: Eine Lekre von den Grundgesetzen derprinciple of justice; and this principle is
Gesellschaftsordnung,l and the American implied in the "conception of the Chris-
Reinhold Niebuhr's The Children of Light tian law of nature. It is the conception of
and the Children of Darkness: A Vindica- justice as eternal, supernatural and abso-
tion of Democracy and a Critique of Its lutely valid" ;6 "it was the Western con-
Traditional Defense.2 A characteristic ception of justice for two thousand
representative of modern Catholic politi- years." But it has disintegrated. It was
cal philosophy is the French thinker "the positivism of the nineteenth cen-
Jacques Maritain, who in his book Chris- tury, with its denial of the metaphysical
tianisme et democratic3 tries to prove an and superhuman, which dissolved the
essential connection between democracy idea of justice by proclaiming the rela-
and religion from the Catholic point of tivity of all views of justice. Thereby the
view. I intend to present in the followingidea of justice was stripped of all divine
a critical analysis of the main ideas of dignity and law abandoned to the vagar-
these writers, not only in order to demon-ies of human will. The view that justice
strate that Christian theology, too, can is of its nature relative became the dogma
justify democracy only as a relative of the jurists."7 As a consequence of this
value, but also-and in the first place- disintegration of the idea of justice,
to examine the claim of theology that it Brunner declares:
furnishes a foundation for democracy
It was only to be expected that one day a
which it attempts to verify by showing
political power devoid of all religious scruples
that there is an essential connection be- should discard the last vestiges of the tradi-
tween democracy and Christian religion. tional idea of justice and proclaim the will
of the ruling power as the sole canon of appeal
Brunner as well as Niebuhr start their
in matters of law. The totalitarian State is
crusade against relativistic positivism or simply and solely legal positivism in political
skeptical secularism, as Niebuhr puts it, practice, the abrogation in actual fact of the
with the accusation that this intellectual classical and Christian idea of a divine "law of
nature." If there is no divine standard of justice,
attitude is responsible for totalitarian-
there is no criterion for the legal system set
ism, especially National Socialism. This up by a State. If there is no justice tran-
is an argument which plays a very im- scending the State, then the State can declare
portant part in the antirelativistic move- anything it likes to be law; there is no limit set
to its arbitrariness save its actual power to give
ment and is used not only by theologians
force to its will. If it does so in the form of a
in favor of religion, but also by thinkers, logically coherent system, it thereby fulfils the
not connected with a particular historic one condition to which the legality of law is
religion, in favor of metaphysical specu- bound in the formalistic view of law. The totali-
tarian State is the inevitable result of the slow
lation in general. Hence it deserves care- disintegration of the idea of justice in the West-
ful consideration. ern world.8
42 ETHICS
The totalitarian state, this "monster of able as to maintain that the notion of the
straight line is a relative one because no human
injustice,"9 is not "the invention of a
being has yet been able to draw a straight line.
handful of criminals in the grand style,"It is just because we can conceive an absolutely
but "the ineluctable consequence" of a straight line that we can say that no man has
"positivism void of faith and inimical to ever drawn a straight line. It is just because
metaphysics and religion," "the inevi- we have knowledge of the law of absolute jus-
tice that we can say that all human laws are
table result of man's loss of faith in a
mere approximations to the truly just.12
divine law, in an eternal justice. Yet the
alternative stands clearly revealed. Either Hence there are, according to this theol-
there is a valid criterion, a justice which ogy, two justices: an absolute divine and
stands above us all, a challenge presented a relative human justice.
to us, not by us, a standard rule of justice The argument set forth against rela-
binding on every State and every system tivistic positivism, that this philosophy
of law, or there is no justice, but only makes the totalitarian state possible,
power organized in one fashion or an- that "if the positivistic theory of law is
other and setting itself up as law."'0 This right, there is no possibility of waging
means: If there is no absolute justice war against the totalitarian State as a
there is no justice at all. Justice is by its monster of injustice,""3 is a political ar-
very nature an absolute value, and only a gument, and as such, even if it were true,
value posited by God can be absolute. could prove nothing against relativism as
The consequence of this view-op- an epistemological principle. The propo-
posed to relativistic positivism-would sition that only relative values are acces-
be that there can be only one, the abso- sible to human cognition cannot be dis-
lute divine, and not also another, merely proved by the proposition that there are
relative, justice. If justice is, by its very evils in this world, especially social evils,
nature as a divine value, absolute, a rela- that is to say, facts which some people
tive justice is a contradiction in terms. condemn as evil, whereas others-as in
Only if theology accepts this consequence the case of the totalitarian state praise
can it reject relativistic positivism in gen- them as good, even as realization of a
eral and a relativistic theory of democ- higher justice. A statement may be true
racy in particular. However, Brunner although the belief in its truth may have
recognizes, in addition to the absolute effects which from some point of view or
divine justice, a relative justice, the hu- another may be considered as evil, just as
man justice of positive law. He says, "It a statement may be false although the
is true that all social systems which we erroneous belief in its truth may have
human beings create are only relatively consequences which from some point of
just."" Positive law is only relatively view or another may be considered as
just because its attempt to be just can good. Hence Plato's famous doctrine of
never reach its goal. For it is absolute the useful lies. Besides, Brunner's asser-
justice tion that relativism is responsible for the
which the best of human laws strive to express, totalitarian state is in open contradiction
though they never reach their goal in the at- to the undeniable fact that the classical
tempt. Hence it is the element of perpetual justification of the totalitarian state, as
ferment in all human systems. Yet it is foolish
pointed out earlier, is furnished just by
and wrong to maintain that justice is a relative
thing because no human system can fully ex- that philosophy which more than any
press this law of justice. That is as unreason- other has rejected relativism and em-
phatically asserted the transcendental idea of a value, whereas a straight line is

existence of absolute values-Plato's a notion of geometry, i.e., a science di-
doctrine of the ideas on the basis of rected at reality. This notion is thinkable
which he outlined the constitution of his and can be defined in a rational, unam-
ideal state, which in every respect is a biguous way, although a straight line
totalitarian autocracy. Totalitarian ide- which completely corresponds to the
ologists, therefore, have always referred definition cannot actually be drawn.
to Plato's philosophical absolutism and The idea of absolute justice, however, as
recognized in the Platonic state the the essence of God, is beyond human
model for their political schemes. Brun- cognition; it is not thinkable and ration-
ner is not very consistent in this respect. ally definable, and hence it is also not
For in another connection he makes the defined by Brunner, who only asserts to
church responsible for the totalitarian know of it. But he cannot prove that
state. He says: what he-according to his assertion-
The Church, which to-day protests, and
knows of absolute justice forms the con-
rightly so, against the oppression it suffers at tent of God's will. What he presents as
the hands of the totalitarian State, would do his knowledge of absolute justice is very
well to remember who first set the State the contradictory and far from the "clear
bad example of religious intolerance by using
thought" into which everybody's vague
the secular arm to safeguard by force what
can only spring from a free act of the will. The sense of just and unjust has to be trans-
Church should always bethink itself with shame formed, according to Brunner's own sug-
that it was the first teacher of the totalitarian gestion. He misinterprets relativistic
State at nearly every point.14 positivism by attributing to this phi-
The Church gave an example to the totali- losophy the consideration that positive
tarian State by using the State to intervene in law is only relatively just because it does
the inner life-inquisition, moral police, mo- not completely correspond to absolute
nopoly of propaganda, persecution of dissidents justice. Such consideration would, in-
and compulsory uniformity must largely be
deed, presuppose the existence of an ab-
laid to its charge."5
solute justice. Relativistic positivism
This is true. But the church could be considers positive law as only relatively
"the teacher of the totalitarian state in just because it assumes that an absolute
nearly every point," not because she rep- justice is unknowable, that one may, re-
resented "a positivism void of faith and ligiously, believe in the absolute, and
inimical to metaphysics and religion," that means in God, but that one cannot
but because she taught just the con- comprehend it; that it is by its very na-
trary: the belief in absolute justice. ture beyond human cognition and conse-
Brunner's assertion that we may not quently no possible object of science,
infer from the imperfect, and in this which can have nothing to do with the
sense only relative, justice of the positive absolute in general and absolute justice
law, that there exists only a relative and in particular.
not an absolute justice, is based on a
EMIL BRUNNER' S THEOLOGY OF JUSTICE
false analogy. One cannot compare the
idea of absolute justice with the notion of It stands to reason that if there is an
a straight line and the merely relatively absolute justice at all, there can be only
just positive law with an actually drawn one such absolute justice. If there are
straight line. For absolute justice is the two justices, neither of them can be ab-
44 ETHICS
solute. Nevertheless B runner distin- if the disintegration of justice, as he as-

guishes not only an absolute and a rela- serts, is the result of man's "loss of faith
tive justice but also two kinds of abso- in a divine law," of a positivism "void of
lute justice. The "earthly" or "worldly" faith" and inimical to metaphysics and
justice, "the just rendering to each man religion? If a "worldly" justice, as the
of his due," the justice of the suum "justice of the institutions of this world,"
cuique, the principle to requite good with is to be distinguished from a "heavenly"
good, evil with evil, the justice of retribu- justice, as the "justice of faith," we must
tion, the "justice of the institutions of assume that by the former is meant the
this world," the "justice of social sys- justice of a social order, established by
tems," the justice of "polity," on the one man on earth, in contradistinction to a
hand, and, on the other, the "heavenly divine order, which is established by
justice," the "righteousness of God," the God in heaven. Justice is "worldly" in-
"biblical justice," the "justice of the sofar as it refers to worldly things, to
faith," which returns good for evil and things of this world, especially to social
forgives the transgressor seventy times orders established by man. Justice is
seven, the principle of divine love. Then "heavenly" insofar as it refers to heav-
he declares that he will deal in his book enly things, things which are not of this
only with the earthly, not with the heav- world. Hence knowledge restricted to
enly justice. The "justice of the institu- worldly or earthly justice can be only a
tions of this world"-"that is the justice knowledge of relative justice. This is
which is the theme of the present work. precisely the view of relativistic positiv-
Our object is to inquire into its origin and ism, which refuses to deal with a heav-
nature, to discover the principle by enly justice and restricts cognition to
which just dealing is distinguished from earthly things, in particular to human
unjust, just criticism from unjust, just social orders to which this philosophy-
wages from unjust, a just from an injust just as Brunner's social theology at-
polity."' If the problem of democracy is tributes only relative justice.
a problem of justice, then it is this But on closer examination one notices
earthly and not the heavenly justice ac- that the "worldly" or "earthly" justice
cording to which the question is to be that Brunner opposes to the "heavenly"
decided whether democracy is a just or justice, the "justice of faith, the right-
unjust social system. But how is it pos- eousness of God," is, according to his
sible to deal with the earthly justice opinion, also a supernatural, divine jus-
without dealing with the heavenly justice. He says, "The idea of justice and
tice, how is it possible to distinguish be- the concept of a divine law of justice are
tween a just and an unjust social order one and the same thing."1 The justice of
without basing this distinction on the the institutions of this world is a divine
heavenly justice, and that can mean only justice, for this world is created by God;
the divine justice, if, as Brunner empha- the order of this world, the order of na-
sizes, only the sacred norm of divine, ture, is the expression of God's will:
eternal justice is the yardstick with
For the believer in the God of Scriptural
which we can measure the value of insti- revelation, the orders of nature are creations
tutions, the plummet by which we can of the divine will. They are as and because God
align what we build?"7 How can Brunner "called" them into being. "And God said let
refuse to deal with the "justice of faith," there be-and there was." "For he spake, and
it was done; he commanded, and it stood fast." supernatural and eternal."22 How can an
God is not an immanent world logos, but the
"earthly" justice be beyond everything
legislator of the world. The law of the world
which is "earthly," and that means hu-
is the manifestation of a creative will. And the
law of justice is also the law of a divine will. man, natural, and within time? It is, for
Underlying the suum cuique there is the order a nontheologian, completely ununder-
of creation, the will of the Creator which de- standable how the principle of retri-
termines what is each man's due. The law, the
bution, the norm according to which the
order of creation, is that primal order to which
evildoer is to be punished, can be con-
every man appeals, even though unwittingly,
who thinks the thought of justice. What is sidered as absolute justice, if the con-
dimly apprehended by the plain man's sense of trary principle, the principle of love,
justice-everyman's sense of justice-is re- according to which the evildoer must not
vealed in divine revelation as the order estab-
be punished but forgiven, is recognized
lished by the Creator."9
as absolute justice, and how both prin-
The justice which renders to everybody ciples, which exclude each other, can be
his due, the justice of retribution-and the will of one and the same absolute au-
that is the "earthly justice"-is "the thority.23 Since, however, the problem of
divine law of justice." It "refers to a democracy lies only within the sphere of
primal allocation, to the act of creation, one of the two absolute justices, the
whereby each man receives what is due earthly justice, its highly problematical
to him." This "order of creation" in relationship to the other, the heavenly
which the will of the creator is mani- justice, may be left out of the question.
fested is, according to Brunner, the We are interested only in the relationship
"Christian law of nature."20 It is the of that absolute, divine justice which
"connection between nature and the will Brunner calls the "earthly" justice, on
of God, firmly rooted in the faith in crea- the one hand, and the relative justice of
tion, which enabled Christian theologi- social orders established by man in gen-
ans and jurists to appropriate the con- eral and positive law in particular, on the
ception of the lex natural and the jus other. For democracy is a social order
naturae, of the 'law of nature.' "21 established by man for man and as a
Hence, according to Brunner, there are legal order is positive law.
not one but two absolute divine justices:
THE CHRISTIAN NATURAL LAW DOCTRINE
the divine justice of the law which re-
turns good for evil and the divine justice The assertion that there exists an ab-
of retribution, the justice of the suum solute justice necessarily implies the as-
cuique, which returns good for good and sumption that it is possible to know this
evil for evil. It is difficult to understand justice. For if the absolute justice were
why the one is called "heavenly" and the unknowable, it would not be admissible
other "earthly" justice, since both origi- to assert its existence. If, as Brunner evi-
nate in God and thus in heaven, in a dently assumes, the absolute, divine jus-
transcendental sphere, and both express tice of the primal order of creation, the
a divine, supernatural will. Brunner him- Christian law of nature, can be known-
self says of the justice which he desig- and Brunner's work is an attempt to pre-
nates as "earthly," that is, the justice of sent it the question arises why this
the order of divine creation, which he earthly justice is not realized on this
opposes to the "heavenly" justice: "This earth, why man although he knows or at
primal order is of its nature superhuman,least is able to know the absolute justice
46 ETHICS
realizes only a relative one. If the reason which presupposes permanence and hence
of the merely relative justice of human applies only to a status where no change
institutions is not the fact that absolute takes place, be adapted to a status of
justice is unknown or unknowable, the endless change? Relative justice is not
only possible answer to the question is and cannot be an adaptation of absolute
that the absolute justice cannot be real- justice to social reality; it is the substitu-
ized on earth because it cannot be applied tion of relative justice for the inappli-
to social reality, which by its very nature cable absolute justice. Quite correctly
escapes regulation by an order of abso- Brunner says:
lute justice. Although this answer is open
Absolute justice would not be just, but un-
to the objection that an order which is just, as a system of state law within given
not applicable to social reality cannot be reality. It would not serve the end which jus-
the justice for which man living in this tice has to serve-namely, submission to God's
reality is crying, it is nevertheless the law of life, but would have exactly the con-
trary effect. In the system of positive law,
answer of Brunner's social theology. He
relative justice is superior to absolute justice
says: because absolute justice would, from the out-
set, be no more than a fiction, a lie, and an
Every law of nature, every theory of justice
outrage on life.27
which takes its stand on an absolute, divine
law of justice, is of its nature static. The very
immutability of the divine law is decisive in That means that from the standpoint of
this connection. Justice, in this acceptance of man and his endeavor to regulate his so-
the term, is that which is firmly established, cial relations, a principle which claims to
at all times unalterable. This immutability, be justice, but which he must consider as
however, stands in a certain opposition to the
"a fiction, a lie, and an outrage on life,"
eternal flux of history. Anyone whose thought is
directed by concrete, ever-changing human is no justice at all. If all "social systems
reality, feels any kind of law of nature, hencewhich we human beings create are only
any form of immutable justice, as an outrage relatively just," such a relatively just
on life. What was yesterday just may be crass system is not, as Brunner maintains,
injustice to-day.... Hence justice must change
"only possible if we are guided by an idea
with changing life.24
of absolute justice, if we align what we
Brunner admits that this insight "lends build by the plummet of divine jus-
a certain justification to the assertion tice" ;28 because we cannot be guided by a
that all justice is relative."25 But it is fiction, a lie, and an outrage on life; nor
much more than a "certain," it is a com- can a divine justice which is a fiction, a
plete justification of relativism. For lie, and an outrage on life be the plum-
met by which we align what we build.
Brunner goes even so far as to assert that
"there must be a difference, if not an What the social theology of Brunner has
antithesis, between positive law and theto say about the relationship of absolute
law of nature. Hence the notion of justice justice to social reality amounts exactly
necessarily undergoes a modification in to the assertion of relativistic positivism:
its application to the positive law of the that such an absolute justice does not
State. We might for the present define exist; what exists as a normative order,
this modification as a mitigation due to and that means what is valid, is positive
its adjustment to actual reality. Relative law, and that means a relative justice
justice comes into being."26 But how canonly.
a static order, that is to say, an order In discussing the question of the rela-
tionship between the divine natural law the right of private property; the right of
and the positive law of the state, Brun- man to obtain livelihood from the earth
ner, in conformity with the natural law by the work of his hands; the right of the
doctrine of the Reformers and their fol- child to an adequate development.80
lowers in the seventeenth and eighteenth These rights he pretends to deduce from
centuries, says that from the fact that a the "order of creation," which is the or-
positive law is in conflict with the natural der of nature as created by God and man-
law and hence unjust does not follow that ifesting his absolutely just will. This
the positive law is not to be obeyed: "No means that Brunner, in spite of his op-
State law can tolerate a competition of position to the rationalistic natural law
this kind presented by a second legal doctrine, and as did the followers of this
system. The laws of the State actually doctrine, tries to deduce the principle of a
obtaining must possess a monopoly of just social order from nature.
binding legal force; the law of nature It is rather astonishing that a Chris-
must claim no binding legal force for it- tian theology does not find God's abso-
self if the legal security of the State is to lute justice in the Scriptures, which, if
remain unshaken."29 What, then, is the they are revelations at all, are the revela-
function of a natural law which is not tions of His justice; and even more as-
valid? It has, according to Brunner, "the tonishing are the arguments set forth by
function of a criterion." But if the abso- Brunner to justify his setting aside the
lute justice of the Christian law of na- Scriptures."1 These arguments are here of
ture refers to a status where no change no interest. From a nontheological point
takes place, it cannot serve as the cri- of view, it is quite understandable that
terion of justice of a dynamic order which the Scriptures are not made the basis of a
applies to a continuously changing social modern theory of justice. For what the
reality. This social theology tries in vain Old Testament reports about the justice
to diff erentiate itself from relativistic of God, especially the primitive principle
positivism, which it so passionately re- "eye for eye, tooth for tooth," is repul-
jects. sive to Christian morality of our time and
Although Brunner emphasizes the in open conflict with the command of
static character of the absolute divine Christ to love even the evildoer, which is
justice of the Christian natural law, fromhardly applicable in social reality. As far
which he infers its antagonism to the as political justice is concerned, God's
positive, and because of the antagonismwill revealed through Moses as well as
only relatively just, law, the principles through Christ points undoubtedly to-
which he presents as those of the Chris- ward a theocracy, whether it is to be
tian law of nature are not at all essen- conceived of as the historical kingdom of
tially static and certainly not necessarily David or the future Kingdom of God on
antagonistic to positive law. They are, on earth. Nowadays even theologians are
the contrary, perfectly realizable in posi- reluctant to declare theocracy as the best
tive law and, to a great extent, actually form of government.
realized. These principles are freedom of If Scriptural revelation is no answer to
religious practice; man's right to his life, the question of divine justice, then, in-
but restricted by the right of the com- deed, the revelation of God's will in na-
munity to inflict capital punishment andture remains as the only possible source.
to impose the duty of military service; But how to find God's will in nature, or-
48 ETHICS
formulated more correctly-what can we The secular world, the life which justice has
to rule, is not merely the world created by
deduce from the fundamental assump-
God, but a world which has fallen away from
tion of Christian theology that nature, as the order of creation. Human nature as we all
it actually exists and is known by us, is know is not simply the human nature created
created and ruled by God, that "God is by God, but a nature whose core and centre has
the legislator of the world,""2 as Brunner fallen away from God. Hence the concept of
nature in Christian teaching is twofold, in that
himself puts it? If there is any conclusion
it denotes both the original order and that which
at all that could be drawn from the fun- has fallen away and violated that original
damental presupposition of Christian order.34
theology with respect to the question of
But the concept of a nature or world not
political justice, it could be only a nega-
created by God is in contradiction to the
tive one. Provided that God's govern-
fundamental presupposition of a world or
ment of the world is to be considered as
nature created by God. It cannot be de-
the ideal type of government-and this is
duced from this presupposition, from the
an argument that is frequently used-
revelation of God's will in nature, but
democracy is not a just form of govern-
only from Scriptural revelation. Hence it
ment.33 Men do not participate in the
is impossible to base a theological doc-
divine government. But in view of the
trine of justice on anything else but on
fact that there actually exist not only
Biblical revelation, on the teachings of
autocratic but also democratic govern-
Moses and Jesus. Any attempt at deduc-
ments, and that these democratic gov-
ing principles of divine justice from the
ernments, just as the autocratic ones, can
"order of creation," and that means
exist only through the will of God, the
from nature, involves the logical fallacy,
antidemocratic conclusion is not con-
which consists in concluding from that
vincing. As a matter of fact, no conclu-
which is, that which ought or ought not to
sion concerning justice or injustice of so-be. The objective principles of justice,
cial institutions is possible. For the un-
allegedly deduced from nature, are in
avoidable consequence of the fundamen-
truth highly subjective value judgments
tal presupposition is that everything that
projected into nature, and if nature is in-
exists, exists through the will of God,
terpreted as an expression of the will of
that an existence without or against the
God, they are imputed by the interpreter
will of God is unthinkable. Consequently
to the intention of the divine creator. This
the fundamental presupposition of a the-
applies to all natural law doctrines and
ological interpretation of nature is elimi-
especially to Brunner's theology of a
nated as a basis of a doctrine of justice
Christian law of nature. Since Brunner,
distinguishing between good and evil so-
as a Protestant theologian, approves of
cial phenomena. This distinction can be the economic and political systems estab-
based by Christian theology only on
lished in the Western world, he finds
Scriptural revelation, on the story in their principles in the divine order of
Genesis of the fall of man, the myth of creation; since he disapproves of the eco-
the evil coming into the divine world. It nomic and political systems of Commu-
is the doctrine of the two natures, a pre- nism, he does not hesitate to assure that
lapsarian and a postlapsarian nature. It God does not will it. Here we are inter-
is an indispensable prerequisite of any ested only in the application of this the-
moral theology, and consequently also of ology of justice to the problem of democ-
Brunner's theology: racy.
FREEDOM AND EQUALITY ACCORDING sideration in establishing a social order?

TO PROTESTANT THEOLOGY To this question Brunner asserts with
Since the idea of democracy is the idea great emphasis that only religion has an
of freedom, combined with the idea of answer:
equality, we must first of all learn what It is a fallacy to believe that the proposition,
Christian theology has to teach with re- "The essential in men is equal," is based on
spect to these two ideas. From our analy- perception. Pure perception tells us nothing
about the essential or inessential. It tells us only
sis of the intellectual foundations of the
and always that men are equal and unequal.
antagonistic forms of government it fol- But no experience can tell us whether that
lows that freedom is the primary, equal- which is equal in all is essential-essential,
ity only a secondary, factor in the struc- that is, in the sense that it alone is taken into
ture of democracy. It is significant, there- account in the distribution of something, so
that equal treatment is just treatment. It is,
fore, that according to Brunner's social
on the contrary, a conviction of faith.39
theology, "in the Christian understand-
ing of man, the cardinal fact is not free- Hence, to answer the question recourse
dom, but man's relation to God, the sov- to the divine order of creation is neces-
ereignty of God.""5 Man's relation to sary. But, first, Brunner does not "dis-
God is his subjection to God's sovereign cuss in which case it is justifiable to dis-
will, constituting man's obligation of regard inequality and in which not." He
unconditional obedience. Although Brun- only asserts: "The fact that it.can ever be
ner has to show that there is something disregarded, and that it can be disre-
like freedom of man compatible with his garded with the full consciousness of just
subjection to God, and although he tries dealing, derives solely from the fact that
to distinguish this freedom of the faith man is regarded as part of that primal
from another freedom of Christian justice order which has power over him as over
-with which we shall deal later-he lays every other, and which has foreordained
more stress on the principle of equality his 'due.' "40 This is a statement without
than on that of freedom. He quite cor- foundation. The order of creation shows
rectly distinguishes between the merely only that differences exist. But there is
formal equality"6 of men, which consists not the slightest possibility of inferring
in the fact that all are equally subject to from the mere existence of these differ-
the law, the equality before the law, from ences a distinction between essential and
the equality of treatment, the principle unessential ones. Brunner repeatedly as-
that men "ought to be treated alike."37 serts: "Empirical observation teaches us
But he is aware of the fact that men are that human beings are just as much
actually not equal. "Human beings are equal as unequal, but fails to tell us
never equal. Equality of treatment is only whether or how far that which is unequal
possible because and in so far as actual is essential."41 But since it is only by
inequality is set aside and disregarded as "empirical observation" that we know
immaterial."38 Hence the decisive ques- the order of creation, we cannot expect to
tion concerning the justice of treatment learn from this kind of revelation more
is: which inequalities are so immaterial than from empirical observation. Scrip-
that they ought to be ignored in con- tural revelation, it is true, is not trans-
ferring rights and imposing duties on mitted to us through empirical observa-
men, and which inequalities are so essen- tion of nature created by God. But this
tial that they ought to be taken into con- revelation, too, does not contain an an-
50 ETHICS
swer to our question. The equality of men him to communion with Himself.... Hence in-
which results from the teaching of the dividuality is never inessential, but is just as
integral a part of man's being as that which is
Scriptures, that man has been created
common to all men. God does not love man-
in the image of God, is the same formal kind in general; He loves the individual in his
equality as the equality before the law. own nature, created by Himself ... God does
And the same formal equality results not create schemes; He creates individuals.
from the order of creation constituting By calling a man "Thou" He bestows upon
him his own unmistakable countenance, his
the law of nature to which all creatures
individuality. The inequality which results
without regard to their differences are from individuality is just as much created and
equally subject. In a chapter devoted to willed by God as that which is common to all
the problem "The Ground of Equality," mankind.46
Brunner says we may find the answer to

the question of the just relationship be- Thus men as spiritual personalities or
tween equality and inequality in the individuals are no less different than men
primal order of creation, because this or- as physical beings. Hence Brunner's the-
der "renders to each man his 'due.' "42 ology comes to the result: "Not only
But at the end of this chapter we read: equality is God's will, but inequality
"Does suum cuique mean-to each man also, the specific nature of every individ-
the same? We have already seen that this ual human being, and the specific nature
is not the case, that not only the equality of every individual species."47 This is, of
of human beings must be respected, but course, no answer to the question as to
their inequality also."48 And in the which inequalities are essential and
following chapter dealing with "The which are not. Instead of answering this
Ground of Inequality," we read: "For question, Brunner turns to the general
the secret of the Christian conception of problem of the relationship between the
justice is not equality, but the blend of individual and the community. He as-
equality and inequality. The blend, how- serts: "Community can only exist where
ever, has exactly the same origin as the there is difference; without difference,
Christian idea of equality."44 But the there is unity, but not community. Com-
question is: how is equality and inequal- munity presupposes reciprocal giving
ity blended in the Christian conception and taking, community is reciprocal ex-
of justice? Brunner thinks he may come change and completion."48 In a commu-
nearer to the answer by substituting the nity the individuals are mutually de-
"spiritual" for the "physical" aspect of pendent. "In Christianity. . . this mu-
the problem. "What counts is not the tual dependence is the goal of creation,
physical but the spiritual man, and not the proof of and preparation for the su-
even the spiritual man, but the spiritual preme destiny of fellowship. It is a tenet
principle in man."45 In contrast to Stoic of the Christian creed that no man is suf-
philosophy ficient unto himself."49 This wisdom is no
particular achievement of Christian the-
the Christian view is not based on an imperson-
al spiritual principle, on a nous or logos pervad- ology and no solution of the problem of
ing all things, a world reason in which all human equality. But Brunner thinks that it re-
beings substantially participate, but on the sults in a "new conception of justice":
personal will of God. The Christian principle
"The suum cuique can never be inter-
of the dignity of the person is unconditionally
personal; the personal God creates the personal preted as 'the same to all.' Human beings
and individual human being and predestinates are equal, for all have the same destiny
and the same dignity; they are equal in of God and hence has to conceive of man
that everyone is responsible to God; as subject to God's will and not as essen-
therefore all have the same right to be tially free. But since it is supposed that
recognized as persons."50 The equality of man cannot be considered morally re-
dignity or of all men as persons is the sponsible if he is not free, that is, if he is
same formal equality as the equality be- determined in his actions by an external
fore the law of the state or the law of na- cause or authority, social theology must
ture. It implies no answer to the decisive try to reconcile man's subjection to
question. Of the equality of men as per- God's omnipotent will with man's free-
sons, Brunner says: "But this equality of dom. The self-contradiction implied in
dignity is combined with a difference in this endeavor becomes evident in Brun-
kind and function, and that is not im- ner's statement: "It is only in freedom
material, inessential, but an element of that man can do God's will as a loving
the same destiny. Hence to each man is creature who obeys of his own free
due not only equality but inequality; it will."54 The freedom of man, subject to
is in actual fact 'to each his due,' to each God's will, the iibertas christiana, is his
shall be rendered what is indefeasibly obedience. This of course is no freedom
his, what is not another's."51 This is a at all, or what amounts to the same, is a
typical example of an answer that is no mystic freedom, the freedom of faith.
answer at all. For the question as to what Since, as Brunner asserts, it "does not
is the just relationship between equality come within the scope of the theory of
and inequality remains open. And noth- justice,"55 we may leave it undiscussed.
ing is added by the statement: "Hence, Political freedom, as a principle of jus-
in the Christian idea of justice, equality tice, "has its origin in the structure of
and the equal right of all are primary, created order."56 But just as it is impos-
while the difference of what is due to each sible to deduce from the sovereignty of
in the fellowship is, though not inessen- God, from His omnipotent, all-determin-
tial, secondary" ;52 or by the final conclu- ing will, the libertas Christiana, the Chris-
sion: "The Christian religion is the only tian freedom of man, is it impossible to
one . . . which emphasizes equally the deduce political freedom from the order
equality and inequality of human beings of creation, which constitutes a strict
and recognizes the independence of the law, the law which natural science calls
individual as well as his subordination to the law of causality. Of this order of crea-
a social whole as anchored in the will of tion, Brunner says: "Every creature
God. Hence Christianity alone can pro- must be what God created it to be, and in
tect men from the demands both of one- so far as freedom is given to it, i.e. in ev-
sided individualism and one-sided col- erything that is not the fulfillment of the
lectivism."53 It is superfluous to note law of creation in itself, every creature
that to reach such empty generalities no must respect the order of creation estab-
recourse to the divine order of creation lished by the Creator. It must respect
is necessary, even if it were possible to every other creature as a thing created,
deduce them from this source, which, of willed by God."57 Brunner, it is true, pre-
course, is not the case. sents a series of freedoms or human
The idea of freedom, as pointed out, is rights, mentioned above.58 But he does
not in the foreground of social theology, not-and cannot-deduce them from,
which is concerned with the sovereignty but projects them into, the order of crea-
52 ETHICS
tion, just as the followers of the natural necessary is not created. The question of the
law doctrine of the seventeenth and justice of the law is primarily independent of
the distribution of power in the State. On the
eighteenth centuries did. The freedoms
contrary, it is a fatal prejudice of modern times
allegedly deduced from the divine order that the republican or democratic constitution
of creation are all negative freedoms, of itself guarantees the justice of law. The
constituting restrictions of the govern- classical example in disproof of that belief is
ment, such as the right to freedom of re- the Athenian democracy in the post-Periclean
age. The decisive factor is not who wields the
ligious practice, man's right to his life,
power in the State, but whether the actually
the right of property, the freedom in theexisting sovereign power is guided by the knowl-
use of sexual faculties. There are two edge and intention of justice.6'
rights which seem to imply a positive
function of the government: the right of This means that democracy is as good or
man to obtain his livelihood from the as bad as autocracy, that political free-
earth by the work of his hands or, more dom, that is, the participation of the
generally formulated, the right to work, governed in the government, is not rec-
and the right of a child to an adequate ognized as a value by this doctrine. It
development. But, with respect to the is only the negative freedom of liberalism
former, Brunner expressly declares that in its connection with private property in
it does not mean "a constitutional guar- which this theology is interested. That
this
antee by the State of the right to work."59 freedom is impossible without pri-
With respect to the right to adequate de- vate property, established by creation, is
velopment, emphasis is laid on the pro- repeatedly maintained.62
hibition of any "interference with a It must be admitted that this attitude
child's healthy growth, physical and of indifference toward the problem of po-
mental."60 litical freedom, the very problem of de-
The most significant fact is that, mocracy, is quite consistent from the
among the freedoms which according to point of view of Christian religion. Its
this social theology are directly estab- vital interests may be protected as well
lished by God's will expressed in the or- as violated under any form of govern-
der of creation, there is no mention of the ment; and autocratic governments may
positive freedom, the right of man to par- be even more in favor of a Christian
ticipate in the government of the state, ideology than democratic ones. It is also
the freedom of democracy. This social understandable that a Christian theology
theology does not justify democracy-as is more interested in freedom from, that
it, for instance, justifies private prop- is, in restriction of, rather than participa-
erty-as being comprised in the will of tion in, government, freedom of religion
God. Democracy is a problem "of the being its main concern. Less understand-
distribution of political power." Its jus- able is its apology for economic freedom,
tice depends on the justice of its laws: its rather astonishing attempt to base the
right of private property on the divine,
The justice of the laws obtaining in a State
is in the first instance independent of who pro- eternal order of creation. This, however,
mulgates those laws and is responsible for their is a problem which we shall discuss later.
execution. Even an absolute monarch can pro- It stands to reason that Brunner, as a
mulgate just laws and rule in the sense of jus-
loyal Swiss citizen, declares: "To fore-
tice. And vice versa, even in a republic or a de-
mocracy, unjust law can be created by the will stall any misunderstanding, it must be
of the majority, while the just law that was said at once that democracy, given the
necessary conditions, is doubtless the less than that a real democracy guaran-
most just of all polities, because it gives teeing participation in government to the
every citizen a share in the responsibility greatest possible number of citizens is
for the exercise of political power."63 But unjust. Consequently Brunner rejects
he immediately adds: the doctrine of representation, meaning
That statement, however, of itself implies the principle that the organs elected by
that democracy is not in all circumstances the the people are, if not legally, politically
best political order, the one which provides the bound to execute the will of the people
best guarantee of justice. It does so only in
or, more exactly formulated, the prin-
definite circumstances which we Swiss par-
ticularly, having lived under democratic insti-
ciple that the government is bound to
tutions longer than any nation on earth, are execute the decisions of a parliament
only too inclined to take for granted. There are elected by the people. He says:
circumstances in which democracy can be the
The so-called representatives of the people
worst of all political orders-namely, when the
should not decide what their electors want,
people are not ripe for it, or when social condi-
but what is right. And that is precisely what
tions are so disorganized that only a strong
the truly democratic citizen expects of them.
central will, a "strong hand," is capable of
The same is true of the government. It has not
curbing the anarchy latent or manifest in the
to do what the people want but what is right.
body social.64
In actual fact it ought not even to do what the
This is an argument which has always legislative body wants; it has to do justice, to
been used by a dictator when overthrow- do the right thing. In a genuine democracy with
a responsible government, the government does
ing a democratic regime. If the social phi-
not first consider the will of the people, but the
losophy presented by Brunner affords
weal of the people, justice. Where the govern-
any justification of democracy at all, it is ment considers from the outset, not what is
only a highly relative one and hence can just, but the will of the people, the justice of
in this respect claim no advantage over the State is in a sorry plight. The government is
not of its very nature really "government." The
relativistic positivism. But it is doubtful
people elect a government which is to govern
whether this theology is even a relative
according to justice, not an executive to do the
justification of democracy if a true de- people's will.66
mocracy, a government elected on the
basis of a universal and equal franchise, This is exactly the Soviet definition of
is in question. "Is it not a requirement of "genuine" democracy. Since the term
justice," asks Brunner, "that this right "democracy" cannot be deprived of its
meaning as a government by the people,
[of universal and equal franchise of all
Brunner's critique of the idea of "rep-
citizens] should exist?" His answer is:
resentation" amounts to the thesis that
"Certainly not primarily. It is no re-
quirement of justice that everyone government by the people does not re-
should have an equal say in the State, for quire that the government execute the
that would mean equal treatment of will of the people and thus has to be
unequals in a connection in which in- elected on the basis of universal and
equality is of great actual importance. equal franchise of all citizens; rather, it
requires only that the government con-
Men are neither equally capable of recog-
nizing the just, nor equally able and will- sider the weal of the people, that is to
ing to put it into action."65 This answer is say, acts in the interest of the people.
quite in harmony with the lack of appre- Then, and only then, is the government
ciation this social theology shows for po- by its very nature really the government
litical freedom. It means no more and no of a genuine democracy. Whether this
54 ETHICS
doctrine is politically good or bad is not effective opponents of tyrannical govern-

our concern. We are not pronouncing po- ment are today, as they have been in the
litical value judgments, and we do not at past, men who can say, 'We must obey
all doubt that Brunner's view is based on God rather than man.' Their resolution
his sincere belief in what he considers to is possible because they have a vantage
be just. The only point in which we are point from which they can discount the
interested here is the fact that this doc- pretensions of demonic Caesars and from
trine-presented as the result of theolog- which they can defy malignant power as
ical considerations-is neither a theoreti- embodied in a given government."'" If
cal basis nor a political vindication of this statement means that Christian the-
democracy. It may, rather, serve anti- ology does and always did effectively re-
democratic tendencies. sist tyrannical governments, its truth is
not beyond doubt. For the source from
THE VIEW OF REINHOLD NIEBUHR
which Christian theology takes the argu-
RELIGION IS THE NECESSARY ment that "we must obey God rather
BASIS OF DEMOCRACY than man" furnishes also the argument:
Like the Swiss theologian Brunner, the all governments are given their powers
American theologian Reinhold Niebuhr from God; this argument has been for-
makes a positivistic, that is to say, an mulated by St. Paul for the very purpose
areligious philosophy responsible for to- of being used in favor of a demonic
talitarianism. He speaks of "secularism Caesar, and since then has been again
which attempts to achieve cultural and again used to support tyrannical
unity" within a society split into oppo- rulers such as Ivan the Terrible of Rus-
site groups of material and intellectual sia, Louis XIV of France, or Frederick II
interests "through the disavowal of tra- of Prussia. Also Mussolini and even Hit-
ditional historical religions,"67 and which, ler found Christian theologians who jus-
in its more sophisticated form, "repre- tified their governments. Christian theol-
sents a form of scepticism which is con- ogy cannot claim to be recognized as an
scious of the relativity of all human per- advocate of a definite political regime,
spectives. In this form it stands on the because it can and actually did justify
abyss of moral nihilism and threatens the contrary regimes, just as it can and ac-
whole of life with a sense of meaningless- tually did defend as well as attack the
ness. Thus it creates a spiritual vacuum distribution of property, as Niebuhr's
into which demonic religions easily excellent chapter on "The Community
rush."68 By "demonic religions" he and Property" shows.72 "The final re-
means, in the first place, National Social- source against idolatrous national com-
ism and other forms of extravagant na- munities . . . must be found in the recog-
tionalism.69 It is the same idea which he nition of universal law by individuals,
expresses in the statement: "A consistent who have a source of moral insight be-
pessimism in regard to man's rational ca- yond the partial and particular national
pacity for justice invariably leads to ab- communities."7" Religion is, according to
solutistic political theories; for they Niebuhr, the source of this insight.
prompt the conviction that only pre- "Religious ideas and traditions may
ponderant power can coerce the various not be directly involved in the or-
vitalities of a community into a working ganization of a community. But they
harmony."70 Furthermore: "The most are the ultimate sources of the moral
standards from which political prin- racy. On the other hand, he sees the rea-
ciples are derived. In any case both son for the insufficiency of the traditional
the foundation and the pinnacle of any justification of democracy "by the liberal
cultural structure are religious; for any culture" in the "excessively optimistic es-
scheme of values is finally determined by timates of human nature and of human
the ultimate answer which is given to the history with which the democratic credo
ultimate question about the meaning of has been historically associated."78 Pes-
life."74 Modern democracy requires a re- simism in regard to man's rational capac-
ligious basis.75 Consequently, Christian ity for justice is not quite compatible
theology can vindicate the democratic with excessively optimistic estimates of
political system more effectively than human nature. Liberalism is not neces-
skeptic secularism, hampered by its dis- sarily combined with an optimistic over-
avowal of religion and its pessimism in estimation of human nature and cer-
regard to man's capacity for justice. tainly not with "a too great reliance upon
Niebuhr's critique of traditional demo- the human capacity for transcendence
cratic philosophy is not very consistent. over self-interest."79 There are many rep-
On the one hand he blames this philoso- resentatives of liberalism, especially lib-
phy for its pessimism in regard to man's eral economists, who take into full ac-
rational capacity for justice. "A free so- count man's egoistic tendencies, and
ciety," he says, "requires some confi- none of the leading liberal philosophers,
dence in the ability of men to reach ten- in his confidence in human nature, went
tative and tolerable adjustments be- so far as to consider a coercive order as
tween their competing interests and to superfluous. It was just because he had
arrive at some common notions of justice no confidence in human nature that one
which transcend all partial interests."76 of the outstanding representatives of po-
To expect only "tentative and tolerable" litical liberalism, Wilhelm von Hum-
adjustments between the competing in- boldt, in spite of his radical individual-
terests is the characteristic result of that ism, recognized the state as a "necessary
pessimistic view according to which hu- evil."80 Niebuhr, who reproaches the lib-
man reason is not able to reach perfect, eral democratic theory with its "general
that is, absolutely just, solutions for hu- confidence of an identity between self-
man conflicts. Niebuhr does not say that interest and the commonweal,"'81 must
the "common notions of justice," to admit that if there were not a possibility
which he here refers, are to be understood of a harmony between self-interest and
as notions of an absolute justice, al- the commonweal, "any form of social har-
though his recourse to religion seems to mony among men would be impossible;
point in this direction. He does not, in and certainly a democratic version of
contradistinction to Brunner, expressly such harmony would be quite unthink-
require that our political value judg- able."82 He emphasizes that "the same
ments be guided by the idea of an abso-man who displays this capacity" of
lute justice, because he is quite aware oftranscending his self-interest "also re-
the limitations of human nature, whoseveals varying degrees of the power of
achievements are, as he says, "infectedself-interest and of the subservience of
with sinful corruption."77 Consequentlythe mind to these interests."88 No liberal
he arrives, as we shall see, at a com- philosopher has ignored this fact. Nie-
buhr's critique is directed against an im-
pletely relativistic justification of democ-
56 ETHICS
aginary opponent, constructed for this RELIGIOUS RELATIVISM

purpose. He believes "that a Christian
At first sight it might seem that Nie-
view of human nature is more adequate
buhr, as a consequence of his religious-
for the development of a democratic so-
theological convictions, rejects relativ-
ciety"84 than the liberal view. But there
ism. He assumes that the "use of restric-
is not only the pessimistic Christian view
tive power" by the rulers and the com-
of man as "infected with sinful corrup-
munity would be "purely arbitrary if it
tion" but also a Christian belief in man
were not informed by some general prin-
as the image of God, which is certainly
ciples of justice, which define the right
more optimistic than any liberal view of
order of life in a community." These
human nature could be.
"general principles of justice" are, as he
"The consistent optimism of our lib-
expressly declares, the "natural law." He
eral culture," says Niebuhr, "has pre-
refers to the fact "that there are no living
vented modern democratic societies both
communities which do not have some no-
from gauging the perils of freedom accu-
tions of justice, beyond their historic
rately and from appreciating democracy
laws, by which they seek to gauge the
fully as the only alternative to injustice
justice of their legislative enactments."
and oppression."85 Hence his task is to
He ascertains, evidently with regret,
show that democracy is the only alterna-
"that in the present stage of liberal dem-
tive to injustice, and that means the
ocratic thought, moral theory has be-
realization of absolute justice. For if de-
come too relativistic to make appeal to
mocracy is demonstrated as relatively
natural law as plausible as in other cen-
just only, it cannot be the "only" alter-
turies," and again emphasizes that "ev-
native to injustice. This is the decisive
ery human society does have something
difference between an absolute and a
like a natural-law concept; for it assumes
merely relative justice: that only the
that there are more immutable and
former, but not the latter, excludes the
purer principles of justice than those ac-
possibility of another justice. The judg-
tually embodied in its obviously relative
ment that a norm or social institution is
laws."87 "The final question to confront
relatively just means that it is just only
the proponent of a democratic and free
under definite conditions; consequently
society," he asserts, "is whether the free-
the judgment implies that under other
dom of a society should extend to the
conditions the norm or institution may
point of allowing these principles to be
not be just, and another, even an oppo-
called into question." He asks: "Should
site norm or institution, may be just.
they not stand above criticism or amend-
Only the judgment that something is ab-
ment? If they are themselves subjected
solutely, that is to say, under all condi-
to the democratic process and if they are
tions, just excludes such a possibility.
made dependent upon the moods and
However, the political philosophy of Nie-
buhr, based on "religious and theological vagaries of various communities and
convictions,"86 is far from fulfilling this epochs, have we not sacrificed the final
task. It is even not in a position to recog- criterion of justice and order, by which
nize this task. For it is in open contradic- we might set bounds to what is inordi-
tion to the very nature of its religious- nate in both individual and collective
theological basis, since it is an unmistak- impulses?"88 The answer to these ques-
able form of political relativism. tions can be only in the affirmative. For
if the principles of justice or natural law systems of natural law, then the question
are subjected to criticism and the demo- arises which of the different systems of
cratic process, very different and even natural law should be the criterion for
contradictory ideas about what is just the positive law; and to this question a
become possible, and then the "final" relativistic natural law doctrine has no
criterion of justice is indeed sacrificed. answer. Thus natural law has no advan-
Hence the principles of justice must be tage over positive law. For then the dif-
declared to be not accessible to critical ference between a system of norms which
reason, to be derivable only from re- is presented as natural law and a system
ligious belief. This is what Niebuhr seemsof norms which has the character of posi-
to maintain. He says: "Every society tive law is exactly the same as the differ-
needs working principles of justice, as ence between two systems of positive
criteria for its positive law and system oflaw, and that means that there is no ab-
restraints. The profoundest of these ac- solute reason to prefer the one to the
tually transcend reason and lie rooted in other, because the decisive question as to
religious conceptions of the meaning of the supreme value to be realized by the
existence."89 This means that Niebuhr law remains unanswered. A relative nat-
believes in the existence of a natural law ural law is a contradiction in terms.
as the criterion of justice for positive law It is just such a relative natural law to
and that this natural law has its source inwhich Niebuhr refers as the necessary
religion. Since he identifies religion with criterion for positive law. For, although
Christianity, religion means the belief in he insists on the belief in a natural law
an absolutely just God. Hence a natural based on the Christian religion as the cri-
law based on Christian religion neces- terion for positive law, he, in the last
sarily claims to represent absolute jus-analysis, does not accept the consequence
tice. Only as an absolute justice can it be that the principles of natural law must
that criterion for positive law which Nie- not be subjected to criticism and hence
buhr has in mind. In order to be such a not to the democratic process, that is to
criterion, natural law must differ from say, he cannot deny the possibility of dif-
positive law, and the difference consistsferent ideas about the content of natural
in nothing else but in the fact that natu-law without a possibility of deciding
ral law is or pretends to be absolutely which is the right one, excluding the
just, whereas positive law is only rela- others. For he admits "that there is no
tively just; and every positive law is rela- historical reality, whether it be church or
tively just, that is to say, just under a government, whether it be the reason of
definite condition, under the condition wise men or specialists, which is not in-
that some social value is presupposed volved in the flux and relativity of hu-
which the law claims to realize, but with-man existence; which is not subject to
out being able to claim that this value iserror and sin, and which is not tempted
absolutely supreme and hence the only to exaggerate its errors and sins when
one to be realized if in conflict with an- they are made immune to criticism."90
other. If natural law, too, is only rela- Hence "every historical statement" of
tively just, if a system of natural law the "principles of justice" is "subject to
cannot be presented with the claim of amendment. If it becomes fixed it will
being the only possible natural law, if destroy some of the potentialities of a
there are various and even contradictory higher justice, which the mind of one
58 ETHICS
generation is unable to anticipate in the buhr's philosophy of justice and the rela-
life of subsequent eras.""9 However, the tivistic moral theory which he rejects for
principles of justice or natural law exist the reason that it does not appeal to nat-
only in "historical statements." We know ural law as a plausible criterion for posi-
nothing about these principles but that tive law. For this relativistic moral the-
which is expressed in "historical state- ory asserts exactly the same thing as
ments"; and if these statements refer Niebuhr emphasizes: that the ideas men
only to a relative justice, we can have no have of justice represent only relative,
knowledge of an absolute justice or natu- not abolute, values. He says:
ral law in the true sense of the term and Natural-law theories which derive absolutely
are not entitled to maintain the existence valid principles of morals and politics from
of such justice or natural law. There is reason invariably introduce contingent prac-
then no reason to assume that the justice tical applications into the definition of the
principle9
which the mind of one generation is able
to reach is "higher" than that of another The principles of political morality, being in-
generation. Besides, the principles of jus- herently more relative than those of pure
morality, cannot be stated without the intro-
tice, formulated in historical statements,
duction of relative and contingent factors.93
change not only from one generation to
another but also from one society to an- If a natural-law theory insists that absolute
other within the same generation and equality is a possibility of society, it becomes an
ideology of some rebellious group which does
from one group to another within the
not recognize that functional inequalities are
same society. necessary in all societies, however excessive
Niebuhr carefully avoids referring to they may be in the society which is under
an absolute justice. He does not speak of attack. If on the other hand functional inequali-
the justice of natural law in its relation to ties are exactly defined, the definitions are
bound to contain dubious justifications of some
positive law in terms of superlatives. He
functional privileges, possessed by the domi-
says only that the principles of natural nant classes of the culture which hazards the
law are "more immutable and purer" definition.94
than those embodied in the "obviously
Even if natural-law concepts do not con-
relative" positive law. But if natural law tain the ideological taint of a particular class or
is only "more" immutable than positive nation, they are bound to express the limited
law and hence mutable and not abso- imagination of a particular epoch, which failed
lutely immutable, then it is relative too. to take new historical possibilities into consid-
eration. This alone would justify the ultimate
And if both are mutable, then the ques-
freedom of a democratic society, in which not
tion arises why the one is more and the
even the moral presuppositions upon which the
other less mutable or pure; and to this society rests are withdrawn from constant
question there is no answer in a relativis-scrutiny and re-examination. Only through
tic philosophy of justice such as that pre-such freedom can the premature arrest of new
vitalities in history be prevented.95
sented by Niebuhr. If the only principles
of justice or natural law known by man A society which exempts ultimate prin-
and hence applicable in social reality are ciples from criticisms will find difficulty in deal-
those expressed in historical statements, ing with the historical forces which have ap-
propriated these truths as their special pos-
and if these statements are subject to
session.96
amendment because subject to error and
sin, and hence cannot claim to represent These are statements to which the most
an absolute but only a relative justice, radical relativist may wholeheartedly
then there is no difference between Nie- subscribe.
But Niebuhr makes the hopeless at- without.... But its internal peril lies in
tempt to soften somehow the impression the conflict of various schools and classes
of his antiabsolutistic philosophy of jus- of idealists, who profess different ideals
tice by relativising its relativism. He but exhibit a common conviction that
thinks there are different degrees, "a de- their own ideals are perfect."98 That an
scending scale of relativity." "The moral ideal is perfect means that it represents
principle may be more valid than the an absolute value. Referring to democ-
political principles which are derived racy he says: "Every absolute devotion
from it. The political principles may have to relative political ends (and all political
greater validity than the specific applica- ends are relative) is a threat to communal
tions by which they are made relevant to peace."99 This means that democracy
a particular situation."97 Relativity is presupposes relativism. But he cherishes
not a quality, like heat, which can have the illusion-and as a theologian he has
different degrees. The relativity of a probably no other choice-that political
value consists in its conditional charac- relativism can be based on religion. How-
ter, and there is no possibility of being ever, religion is by its very nature belief
more or less conditioned. A moral or po- in an absolute value, in an ideal which is
litical value is conditioned or uncondi- perfect, because it is belief in God, who is
tioned. There are no intermediate stages the personification of perfectness, the ab-
between the one and the other. And the solute par excellence. A religious belief
same applies to the concept of validity. which admits that the object of the be-
That a norm referring to a certain human lief constitutes not an absolute but only
behavior is valid means that man ought a relative value, that it represents not an
to behave in this way and that he ought absolute but only a relative truth, and
not to behave in the opposite way. There that, consequently, another religion, the
are no intermediate stages between the belief in another God, another value, an-
two situations. A general norm may be other truth, is not excluded and must
more or less effective, that is to say, in therefore be tolerated is a contradiction
more or less cases obeyed or not obeyed. in terms. It is on this contradiction that
But its validity is not identical with its Niebuhr's relativistic theology is based.
effectiveness. Even if it is not obeyed, He quite correctly sees the decisive
and hence not effective in a concrete problem in the need of maintaining social
harmony, that is, freedom and peace, in
case, it is valid, and only if it is valid can
it be disobeyed. The doctrine of a relative spite of religious and other cultural di-
relativism is as untenable as the doctrine versities. He says that the solution of this
of a relative absolutism, that is, the doc- problem "requires a very high form of
trine of a relative natural law. religious commitment. It demands that
each religion, or each version of a single
TOLERANCE ON A RELIGIOUS BASIS
faith, seek to proclaim its highest insights
Niebuhr quite correctly points out while yet preserving an humble and con-
that one of the essential conditions of trite recognition of the fact that all ac-
democracy is tolerance, and he does not tual expressions of religious faith are sub-
ignore the fact that tolerance presup- ject to historical contingency and relativ-
poses relativism. He says: "Democratic ity. Such a recognition creates a spirit of
life requires a spirit of tolerant coopera- tolerance and makes any religious or cul-
tion between individuals and groups.... tural movement hesitant to claim official
Democracy may be challenged from validity for its form of religion or to de-
60 ETHICS
mand an life official

can only be an absolute truth. But to m
He does not go so far as to say that re- admit that the statement about a re-
ligious faith refers only to a relative valueligious truth has only a relative character
or relative truth. He restricts relativity means that the truth to which the state-
to the expression of the faith. He points ment refers is only a relative-not an
to "the difference between divine ma- ultimate, i.e., absolute-and, hence, not
jesty and human creatureliness; between a religious truth, in the specific sense of
the unconditioned character of the divine this term. Niebuhr says: Religious faith
and the conditioned character of all hu- ought to teach men "that their religion is
man enterprise. "101 The "unconditioned" most certainly true if it recognizes the
character of the divine is the absolute- element of error and sin, of finiteness and
ness of God, which is the very object of contingency which creeps into the state-
religious faith. It is only the "expression" ment of even the sublimest truth."'104 To
of religious faith which, as a human en- assert that a statement is certainly true
terprise, is declared by Niebuhr as condi- if it must be admitted that this state-
tioned, and that means as relative. But ment is possibly erroneous is a rather
the very meaning of the expression of the paradoxical contradiction. If the content
faith in God is that the truth or value ex-of man's faith is founded upon state-
pressed is absolute. The absolute or rela- ments or expressions of ultimate truth
tive character of a symbol-as the ex- made by other men, and if human ex-
pression of an idea-depends on the pression of faith is always only relatively
meaning of the symbol. It is not the true, no faith can claim to be in posses-
psychological act of expressing an idea, it of an absolute truth; and then no
sion
is the meaning of this act which has an faith exists that can claim a really re-
absolute or relative character. The ex- ligious character. For what a religious
pression of an idea is absolute if by this faith distinguishes from secular opinions
expression an absolute truth or value is is just its claim to refer to the absolute.
meant, and it is relative if only a relative If, however, a Christian believes that his
truth or value is intended or expressed. religious faith is based on revelation, that
Hence if the object to which the expres- is to say, on statements or expressions
sion refers is supposed to be absolute- made by God or by His son, then he can-
and the object to which the expression ofnot admit that "the element of error and
religious faith refers, God, is the abso- sin, of finiteness and contingency" may
lute-the expression cannot be charac- creep into these statements or expres-
terized as relative. Niebuhr says: "Re- sions. Niebuhr's distinction between a
ligious faith ought . . . to encourage men religious faith in the absolute and a
to moderate their natural pride and to merely relative, because human, expres-
achieve some decent consciousness of the sion of this faith is meaningful only un-
relativity of their own statement of even der the presupposition that God, i.e.,
the most ultimate truth."'102 An "ulti- absolute truth and absolute value, in His
mate truth" is evidently the "ultimate transcendence, is so far beyond man that
answer which is given to the ultimate neither his rational cognition nor his irra-
question about the meaning of life," and tional faith is able to reach Him, and
which finally determines "any scheme of that consequently whatever may be
expressed as his faith is subject to error
values."'03 The ultimate answer to an
ultimate question about the meaning and
of hence can claim only a relative
truth. The inevitable consequence of this truth or propaganda for the opposite
assumption, that God as the absolute is value must not be suppressed. If men
not accessible to man, is that man cannot who share a definite religious belief, in
make any statement about His qualities their capacity as members of the govern-
or functions, His will or intentions. The ment of a state, adopt a policy of toler-
theology of such a transcendent God can ance toward other religions, their deci-
have no social impact at all. The will of a sion is not determined by their religious,
God absolutely unknown and unknow- irrational belief in the absolute but by a
able to men cannot apply to human so- highly rational wish to maintain peace
ciety. together with freedom within the com-
Niebuhr's fundamental error is that he munity. In the conflict between their re-
thinks he can base relativism on "religious and their political views, the latter
ligious humility." "The real point of con- prevails. That they tolerate a religion
tact between democracy and profound which is in opposition to their own, that
religion is in the spirit of humility which their policy presupposes relativism,
democracy requires and which must be whereas their religion absolutism, is in-
one of the fruits of religion."'05 "Accord- consistent. Niebuhr quotes Chesterton's
ing to Christian faith," he says, "the statement that "tolerance is the virtue of
pride, which seeks to hide the condi- people who do not believe anything."107
tioned and finite character of all human This statement is certainly an exaggera-
endeavour, is the very quintessence of tion. Tolerance is rather the virtue of
sin."'06 But the Christian religion is, ac- people whose religious conviction is not
cording to its own meaning, not a human strong enough to overcome their political
but a divine endeavor; it is revealed by proclivity, to prevent them from the in-
God and implanted by Him in man's consistency of recognizing the possibility
heart. Even the most exaggerated pride a and legitimacy of other religious convic-
man takes in this religion does not and tions. It is just on such an inconsistency
cannot constitute a sin, because this that a religious ideology of democracy is
pride does not at all seek to hide the con- based. But it must be admitted that it is
ditioned and finite character of a human not necessarily the most consistent ideol-
endeavor. It is the natural pride of a man ogy which is the most effective one.
who is certain of an absolute, a divine Since Niebuhr is in favor of demo-
truth. And this pride is compatible with, cratic tolerance which presupposes a
because the compensation for, the most relativistic view, he has recourse to the
sincere humility which manifests itself in contradictory construction of religious
the unconditional submission to this ab- relativism, because as a Christian the-
solute truth. Religious humility is an ologian he cannot accept the relativism
emotion much too ambivalent to form of a rationalistic, antimetaphysical,
the basis of a decision between democ- areligious, skeptical philosophy. He refers
racy and autocracy. to such a philosophy, in the already quot-
Tolerance presupposes the relativity ed statement, as "secularism which at-
of the truth maintained or the value pos- tempts to achieve cultural unity through
tulated; and the relativity of a truth or the disavowal of traditional historical re-
value implies that the opposite truth or ligions,"'108 and he asserts that "in its
value is not entirely excluded. This is the more sophisticated form secularism rep-
reason why the expression of an opposite resents a form of scepticism which is con-
62 ETHICS
scious of the relativity of all human per- religion. If there was a spiritual vacuum
spectives."'109 But Niebuhr's religious into which the Nazi religion rushed, it
relativism, which insists upon the rela- was left by Christianity. It amounts to
tivity of all human enterprise, seems to an inadmissible shift of responsibility to
be not very different from this sophisti- ask why positivistic philosophy, and not
cated skepticism. According to Niebuhr, to ask why Christianity, has failed to
the difference consists in the fact that prevent National Socialism from filling a
this skeptical secularism "stands on the spiritual vacuum. And if relativism is the
abyss of moral nihilism and threatens the answer to this question, it is rather the
whole of life with a sense of meaningless- relativism of a religion, a religious rela-
ness. Thus it creates a spiritual vacuum tivism, such as advocated by Niebuhr,
into which demonic religions easily that should be made responsible for the
rush." By demonic religions-as pointed victory of another religion, which in its
out-he means, in the first place, Na- demonism maintains the illusion of abso-
tional Socialism. But a thinker who is so lutism. But the Nazi religion is only the
deeply involved in a relativistic view of ideological superstructure of a real move-
social reality as to consider even re- ment which has its causes in economic
ligious faith as compatible with relativ- and political facts and not in the insuf-
ism should not share the traditional mis- ficiency of a philosophical or religious
interpretation of positivistic philosophy system. And this movement has been
by dogmatic metaphysics. Skepticism brought to an end, not by an improved
does not mean that cognition is impos- philosophy or religion, but by hard facts.
sible. That all truth is relative does not
JACQUES MARITAIN'S PHILOSOPHY
mean that there is no truth, just as the
OF DEMOCRACY
opinion that all moral values are only
relative values does not mean that there A most remarkable attempt at con-
are no moral values at all; and life is not necting democracy with Christian re-
meaningless to him who admits that ligion was made by the Catholic philoso-
others may attribute to life another pher Jacques Maritain in his book
meaning than he can find in it. The fact Christianisme et democratic. He asserts
that a rationalistic philosophy refuses to that the democratic ideal has its origin in
fill the transcendental sphere beyond hu- evangelical inspiration,'10 that is to say,
man experience with the products of an in the teaching of the Gospel, that the
imagination nourished by man's wishes democratic principles have been formed
and fears is not at all responsible for the in the profane conscience by the action of
rise of demonic religions. To prevent the the evangelical ferment.1"' He goes even
coming into existence of such religions is so far as to maintain that democracy has
not the task of a positivistic philosophy, not yet been realized. Bourgeois democ-
which holds itself aloof from any kind of racy, that is, atheistic democracy, is not
religion. It is the very task of the re- the true democracy because it denies the
ligion which claims to be the true re- Gospel, because the principle of democ-
ligion. The spiritual vacuum which a racy and the principle of Christianity
"demonic religion" can fill is just within have been separated. In order to become
the transcendental sphere to which posi- a "real" democracy, democracy must be-
tivistic philosophy has no claim, but come entirely human, and it can become
which is the specific realm of Christian entirely human only by becoming Chris-
tian. Thus, only by becoming Christian can be a good Christian without being a
can the very essence of democracy be democrat, and even adhering to the auto-
realized.112 cratic ideal. Maritain cannot deny that
This is a device somewhat similar to the Catholic church, in the name of
that used by the Soviet doctrine of de- Christian religion, has supported auto-
mocracy, which also declares that in or- cratic regimes and opposed democratic
der to become a "real" democracy, the movements as long as they were not suc-
merely formal bourgeois democracy cessful. He frankly admits:
must turn into a democracy entirely hu-
We have seen the directing forces of the
man. The difference consists only in the Christian social strata fight during a century
fact that according to the Soviet doctrine against the democratic aspirations in the name
democracy becomes entirely human, not of religion.114
by becoming Christian, but by becoming It was not for the believers entirely faith-
socialist. ful to the Catholic dogma, it was for rationalists
Although Maritain emphasizes that to proclaim in France the rights of man and
citizen."15
the essence of democracy is Christianity,
he must, on the other hand, admit that Neither Locke nor Jean Jacques Rousseau
Christianity as a religious belief is indif- nor the Encyclopedists can be considered as
thinkers faithfully maintaining the integrity
ferent with respect to political life. He
of the Christian treasure.'16
says:
It is clear that Christianity and the Chris- Maritain explains this fact as follows: it
tian faith cannot be made subservient to any is not Christianity as a religious creed
political system whatever, and hence not to and a way to eternal life to which he re-
democracy as a form of government or to fers when asserting an essential relation-
democracy as a philosophy of human life and
ship between democracy and Christian-
politics. This results from the fundamental
distinction introduced by Christ between the ity; it is Christianity as ferment of the
things that belong to Caesar and the things social and political life of the people and
that belong to God.... No doctrine or opinion as bearer of the temporal hope of man.
of simply human origin, as true as it might be, It is not Christianity as treasury of di-
only things revealed by God are imposed on the
vine truth, maintained and propagated
faith of the Christian soul. One may be a Chris-
tian and seek salvation in fighting for any po- by the church, it is Christianity as a his-
litical regime whatever, under the condition toric energy at work in the world. It is
that it does not violate the natural law and not at the heights of theology but in the
the law of God. One can be a Christian and seek depths of profane conscience and profane
salvation by defending a political philosophy
existence that Christianity works,'17 that
other than the democratic philosophy, just as
one could be a Christian at the time of the is to say, that Christianity becomes an
Roman empire while accepting the social regime essential element of democracy, that it
of slavery or, in the seventeenth century, while constitutes a "real" democracy. But
adhering to the political regime of the absolute Christianity is by its very nature a re-
monarchy."13
ligious creed; it can be a ferment of po-
It is difficult to understand how the litical life, a historic energy at work in
very essence of democracy can be Chris- the world only insofar as the Christian
tianity if Christianity as a religion is in- religious creed, its faith in a divine truth
different to political systems in accord- and its hope of eternal life, ferment the
ance with Christ's distinction between political life, as this creed becomes a his-
political and religious matters, if a man toric energy working in the world. But if
64 ETHICS
Christianity as religious creed is politi- than any other religious system. The
cally indifferent, it cannot ferment politi- antique democracy was connected with a
cal life and cannot become a historic en- religion totally different from Christian-
ergy at work in the world; consequently ity, and there is no reason to assume that
there cannot be an essential connection a people who have another than a Chris-
between Christianity and any political tian religion should not be able to estab-
system. Maritain speaks of a "secularized lish a true democracy. There are, as a
Christianity,""18 but this is a contradic- matter of fact, at the present time demo-
tion in terms. cratic states within the non-Christian
It is perhaps possible to maintain- part of humanity, such as Mohammedan,
though it is difficult to prove-that a Jewish, Hindu democracies. What Mari-
democratic government is more efficient tain actually tries to show is not exactly
when Christianity is the predominant re- an essential relationship between democ-
ligion of the people than if there is an- racy and Christian religion, but a rela-
other religion or no religion at all prevail- tionship between democracy and certain
ing, just as one may maintain that a moral-political principles which he sup-
democratic government is more efficient poses to have the character of natural
when it guarantees a capitalist rather law and which he-without sufficient
than a socialist economic system, or vice reason-identifies, or considers to be in
versa. Maritain, who wrote his book dur- harmony, with the evangelical law ("loi
ing the Second World War, says: the evangelique")'20 as the specific Christian
Western democracies can win the peace morality. There is, however, only one
after having won the war only "if the principle of morality which is specifically
Christian inspiration and the democratic Christian because it is enunciated by
inspiration recognize each other and are Christ and embraced by no other moral
reconciled."'19 This may be true; but system: to give up retribution, not to
even if true, it does not demonstrate an requite good with good and evil with
essential connection between democracy evil, but to requite evil with good, to love
and Christianity. The question of the es- not only our neighbor but also our en-
sence of democracy should not be con- emy, which means not punishing the
fused with the question of the efficiency evildoer but forgiving him. This is the
of democratic government. In the third new principle of Christian justice, the
part of this essay I shall show that it is principle of love. But this principle is in-
not possible to demonstrate a connection applicable in political reality; it is in-
between the essence of democracy and a compatible with any state as an order
definite economic system, even if it were providing for coercive acts to be directed
possible to prove that democracy works against the lawbreaker. The other prin-
better if associated with this than with ciples of Christian morality are not spe-
another economic system. The same is cifically Christian or evangelic; they are
true with respect to the relationship be- proclaimed also-and have been pro-
tween democracy and religion: one can- claimed prior to the Gospel-by other
not maintain that there exists a connec- moral systems and are applicable within
tion between the essence of democracy any society and not only in a democrati-
and a definite religious system because cally organized community.
this system guarantees to democratic For a confirmation of his thesis of the
government a higher degree of efficiency evangelical character of democracy Mari-
tain refers to the statement of the French ment whatsoever, that He was far from
philosopher Henri Bergson: "Democracy justifying any government. If we accept
is by its very nature evangelical, its mov- the traditional interpretation of His say-
ing force is love.""12 If love, the love of ing, "render to God what belongs to God,
Christ, were really the moving force of and to Caesar what belongs to Caesar,"
democracy, then and only then could it He did not directly deny the right of an
be maintained that democracy is essen- absolute monarch to be exercised in this
tially connected with Christianity. But it aeon, that is to say, prior to the coming
is evident that this is not and cannot be of the Kingdom of God. His concern was
the case. Bergson's statement is but a this Kingdom of God, which H-e consid-
hyperbolic expression of the fact to ered as imminent and of which He be-
which I have referred in the first part of lieved that it would bring to an end all
this essay, that the democratic form of earthly governments. Consequently the
government corresponds rather to the question as to the just form of earthly
peace-loving than to the aggressive type government did not exist for Him at all.
of character. But the love of peace within St. Paul, on the other hand, was very
a political society is something quite dif- much concerned with the relationship of
ferent from the evangelical love, and the the followers of Christ to the earthly gov-
fact that democracy is congenial to the ernment. And his teaching is in direct
peace-loving type of man does not mean opposition to that which Maritain pre-
that the principle of democracy can be sents as the result of evangelic inspira-
deduced from love of peace and certainly tion. St. Paul did not teach that the au-
not that it can be realized only on the thority of the government can be exer-
basis of the love of God taught by Christ. cised only with the consent of the gov-
erned, which implies that an autocratic
DEMOCRACY AND THE GOSPEL
government has no authority to be re-
How does Maritain demonstrate that spected by a Christian, that such a gov-
the democratic ideal has its origin in the ernment is unjust or unlawful. Instead he
teaching of the Gospel, that it has been admonished the followers of Christ to
formed in the profane conscience by the consider the authority of any established
action of the evangelical ferment, that it government, including governments ex-
is a temporal manifestation of the evan- ercised without the consent of the gov-
gelical inspiration? He says that through erned, as ordained by God; and thus he
the mysterious force of evangelical in- justified any form of an established gov-
spiration the profane conscience has com-ernment.
prehended that the authority of the gov- In complete conformity with the
ernment "can be exercised only with the teaching of St. Paul, the Christian church
consent of the governed,"'22 that the gov- -Catholic as well as Protestant-has
ernment acts only as "delegate or rep- supported the authority of every estab-
resentative" of the people.'28 This is in- lished government, autocratic or demo-
deed the most important principle of cratic. To be sure, the Catholic as well as
democracy. But it is hardly possible to the Protestant churches were, for obvious
derive it from the Gospel. The teaching reasons, more in favor of an autocratic
of Christ did not refer to any form of gov-than a democratic government. They
ernment. From what He said we can only furnished absolute monarchy with its
infer that He was in favor of no govern- most effective ideology: the doctrine that
66 ETHICS
the monarch has his authority by the ernment and those who are subject to
grace of God, that he is in temporal mat- that government, because the governed
ters the delegate or representative of participate in the government, because
God, not of the people. But when a dem- democracy as political self-determination
ocratic government was firmly estab- means identity of the ruled with the
lished, the Catholic as well as the Protes- rulers. Hence there is an essential dif-
tant churches were willing to support ference between the democratic and the
such a government too. It is true that evangelic equality.
they gave their approval only on the con- Maritain considers dignity'26 of the hu-
dition that the government did not pre- man personality as a democratic prin-
vent or restrict the practice of the Chris- ciple and assumes that it is also an ele-
tian religion. This, however, did not ment of the teaching of the Gospel. That
mean that the church required religious is true. But it is not specifically evangeli-
tolerance. The Catholic church had noth- cal, since it is advocated also by philoso-
ing againstethe suppression by the gov-phies and religions which are independ-
ernment of the Protestant, and the Prot- ent of the Gospel. There is no sufficient
estant church nothing against the sup- reason to attribute this ideal to evangeli-
pression of the Catholic religion. The cal inspiration. It is even doubtful
Crusades against the Moslems, the be- whether the dignity of the human per-
lievers in the faith established by Mo- sonality is not seriously impaired by the
hammed, who were significantly called Christian obligation of unconditional
the infidels, were initiated- by the Chris- obedience-to the will of God, by the abso-
tian church, and could much more easily luteness of the divine government to
be based on evangelical inspiration than which man is subject. As a matter of fact,
on the democratic principles of political it is precisely an antireligious rationalis-
self-determination and tolerance of any tic philosophy which emphasizes the
religious or political creed. value of the individual in opposition to a
Maritain ascribes the democratic prin- superindividual authority, be it state or
ciple of equality to evangelical inspira- God. There can be no doubt that the dig-
tion by referring to the teaching of the nity of the human personality is re-
Gospel that all men are the children of spected within a social order which guar-
God and created in His image.'24 But the antees to this personality political au-
idea that men are equal before God ap- tonomy to a much higher degree than
plies much better to autocracy than to within a religious order which is based on
democracy. For it is based on the abso- the principle of heteronomy, that is to
lute inequality which exists in the rela- say, on the principle that a religious man
tion between the ruler and the ruled. is subject to a divine law in the establish-
Men are equal before God, although God ment of which he has no share at all. In
has created them as different personali- order to neutralize that principle and to
ties, because all their differences are ir- save the dignity of the human personal-
relevant in view of the fundamental dif- ity, Christian theology has introduced
ference which exists in the relation be- the doctrine of the freedom of will. But
tween men and God.125 Democratic equal-this doctrine cannot be supported by the
ity, on the other hand, implies the equal- teaching of the Gospel and is hardly com-
ity that is supposed to exist in the rela- patible with the assumption of an om-
tion between those who exercise the gov- nipotent, all-determining will of God, the
consequence of which is the belief in did not reject it, and St. Paul decidedly
predestination. recognized it:
Maritain says: "It is in its radical op-
Slaves, be obedient to those who are your
position to the philosophy of slavery earthly masters, with fear and trembling, in
(philosophic esclavvagiste) that we can see
singleness of heart, as to Christ; not in the way
most clearly the essential characteristics of eye service as men-pleasers, but as servants
of Christ, doing the will of God from the heart,
of the democratic philosophy of man and
rendering service with a good will as to the
society."'27 This is not quite correct,
Lord and not to men, knowing that whatever
since slavery was a legal institution of the good any one does, he will receive the same
antique democracy, and the American again from the Lord, whether he is a slave or
democracy abolished slavery long after free.'28
the Declaration of Independence. It is,

Let all who are under the yoke of slavery
however, true that a state which does not
regard their masters as worthy of all honor,
recognize slavery, if it is a government by so that the name of God and the teaching may
the people, is in a higher degree demo- not be defamed. Those who have believing
cratic than a government by the people masters must not be disrespectful on the ground
under which slavery is permitted. Just as that they are brethren; rather they must serve
all the better since those who benefit by their
the exclusion of women from political
service are believers and beloved.129
rights is not democratic, and, neverthe-
less, we will not deny that Switzerland is To serve as a slave means to fulfil the will
a democracy although women there have of God; evangelical brotherhood is per-
no right to vote. However that may be, fectly compatible with slavery. This, and
the condemnation of slavery is certainly not opposition to slavery, is evangelical
not due to evangelical inspiration. Christ inspiration.
III. DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMICS
CAPITALISM AND SOCIALISM IN RE- essentially, that is to say, by their very

LATIONSHIP TO DEMOCRACY nature, connected with a definite politi-
cal system. Each of them can be estab-
Tg IHE problem of democracy and eco-
nomics is, in the main, the question lished under a democratic as well as an
as to whether there exists an essen- autocratic regime. Since a political sys-
tial relationship between the political tem, as the form of government, is in the
system we call democracy and one of first place a procedure or method for the
the two economic systems which com- creation and application of a social order,
pete with each other in modern civiliza- whereas economic systems form the con-
tion: capitalism and socialism. Since tent of the social order, there is no neces-
these terms are used with different sary relationship between a definite po-
meanings, it is advisable to say clearly litical and a definite economic system.
what is meant by them in the follow- The democratic or autocratic method by
ing analysis. By capitalism we under- which a social order is created and ap-
stand an economic system characterized plied does not preclude any economic
by private property in the means of pro- content of this order. Neither capitalism
duction, free enterprise, and competi- nor socialism implies a definite political
tion; hence an economic system presup- procedure, and hence both are in prin-
posing economic freedom, that is to say, ciple-compatible with democracy as
no direct governmental interference in well as with autocracy. Another question
economic life. By socialism we under- is whether a definite economic system
stand an economic system characterized can be operated more efficiently under
by nationalization and public control of the one rather than under the other po-
the means and processes of production litical regime. It might be that democ-
and distribution; hence an economic sys- racy is more favorable to capitalism than
tem which implies economic constraint, to socialism, and autocracy more favor-
positive regulation of economic life. able to socialism than to capitalism. This
Regarding this problem, two contra- question can be answered only on the
dictory doctrines are advocated in our basis of historical experience, and our
time. According to the one, democracy is actual experience is, in my opinion, not
possible only together with capitalism. It sufficient to give a scientifically founded
is the specific form of government con- answer. All the attempts made until now
genial to this economic system, and in- to cope with the issue are consciously or
compatible with socialism, which by its unconsciously biased by political prefer-
very nature requires an autocratic re- ence.
gime. According to the other doctrine,
THE MARXIAN DOCTRINE THAT DEMOC-
democracy, that is to say, true democ-
RACY IS POSSIBLE ONLY UNDER A SO-
racy, is possible only within the economic
CIALIST ECONOMIC SYSTEM
system of socialism, whereas under capi-
talism only a "formal" or sham democ- The thesis that democracy is possible
racy can exist. only within an economic system of social-
The following analysis tends to show ism is an essential element of Marxian
that neither capitalism nor socialism is ideology and plays an important part in
68
anticapitalistic propaganda. It implies economically ruling group, that is to say,

the perversion of the concept of democ- to establish a socialist system of econ-
racy characterized by the tendency to omy, the proletariat must first become
shift in the usual definition of democracy the politically ruling group, and this can
as a government by the people and for be achieved only by political means:
the people the accent from the first to theeither peacefully, by obtaining a major-
second qualification. It presupposes the ity in the representative body, or by
dogmatic belief that socialism offers the force. In the historically most important
only possibility of realizing the "true" case, namely in Russia, a true socialist
interest and hence the "real" will of the system has been established by a political
people. But under such presupposition revolution, quite in conformity with the
the assertion that democracy is possible Marxian doctrine. The doctrine empha-
only under socialism is an empty tautol- sizes that the only way to realize social-
ogy. ism is by the revolutionary establish-
The Marxian thesis that democracy, ment of the dictatorship of the proletar-
as the best form of government, is pos- iat, which is certainly political action.
sible only under socialism, as the best But it is not only in order to become the
economic system, is an application of the economically ruling group that the prole-
economic interpretation of society, ac- tariat or the political party representing
cording to which political phenomena, it must have recourse to a specifically po-
such as state and law, are only an ideo- litical means; it is also in order to main-
logical superstructure set up above the tain its position as the economically rul-
economic reality constituted by the rela- ing group that it must apply highly po-
tionships of production-the principle of litical measures: a coercive machinery of
the primacy of economics over politics. public and secret police as well as a mili-
Since in a capitalist society a minority, tary organization. There can be not the
the bourgeoisie, is in possession of the slightest doubt about the primacy of poli-
means of production and as such is the tics over economics in the process by
economically ruling group, this minority which socialism is to be established and
also becomes, consequently, the politi- maintained. Hence the economic inter-
cally ruling group; this is incompatible pretation of society from which Marxian
with the idea of democracy as a govern- socialism derives its claim to a monopoly
ment of the majority for the majority. of democracy cannot form the basis of
Only if the majority becomes the eco- this claim. Besides, its final goal is not to
nomically ruling group, which, according build up, but to get rid of, democracy.
to the fundamental presupposition of thisWhen socialism reaches its stage of per-
ideology, is possible only through nation- fection called communism, the state, and
alization of the means of production, can with it the form of the state, democracy,
the majority also become the politically withers away. "In the arguments, usu-
ruling group, and only then is democracy ally advanced about the state," says
established. However, in the decisive sit- Lenin, "the mistake is constantly made,
uation, in the transition from a capitalist against which Engels uttered his warn-
to a socialist regime, the economic inter- ing, namely, it is constantly forgotten
pretation of society with its principle of that the abolition of the state means also
the primacy of economics over politics the abolition of democracy; that the
openly collapses. In order to become the withering away of the state means the
70 ETHICS
withering away of democracy."' Marxian tained that where a capitalist system ex-
socialism is, politically, anarchism, not ists under a government established by
democracy. At the end of its utopian free elections on the basis of universal,
dream, it goes back to its origin, the radi-
equal, and secret suffrage, that is to say,
cal liberalism of the nineteenth century, under a system of "formal" democracy,
with its ideal of an apolitical, stateless the capitalist system exists without or
society.2 If we did accept the Marxian even against the will of the people, and
doctrine-which we do not-we could that for this reason the government can-
say that if there is an economic system not be considered a "true" democracy.
with which democracy in the last analy- The arguments set forth by Marxists to
sis is incompatible, it is socialism. defend this view are evidently wrong. It
is simply not true that the owners of the
CAPITALISM AND POLITICAL IEOLOGY
means of production, the capitalists, be-
The doctrine that a socialist govern- cause they control the economic process,
ment-at least during the period of tran- also control the political ideology. That
sition from socialism to perfect commu- all the means of propaganda, especially
nism-is by its very nature a "truly" the press, are much more at their dis-
democratic government because it is a posal than at the disposal of the adver-
government in the economic interest of saries of capitalism cannot be denied.
the people and that since the true will of But neither can it be denied that, as long
the people is directed at the realization of as the political system maintains its char-
its economic interest, only a socialist gov- acter as a "formal" democracy, no mo-
ernment represents the people is also nopoly of pro-capitalist propaganda can
from a psychological point of view highly be established; and the greater economic
problematical. It presupposes that the power behind a propaganda machinery is
satisfaction of economic needs is man's not a guaranty of its greater effect. It is a
predominant concern. But experience well-known fact that during the 1936
shows that when a minimum of economic presidential campaign the anti-Roosevelt
needs is satisfied, other than economic press had a much wider circulation than
interests may prevail. It is an undeniable the pro-Roosevelt press, and neverthe-
fact that policies for the realization of less Roosevelt won.3 To maintain that
religious or nationalistic ideals have ob- whoever controls the satisfaction of
tained the enthusiastic, even fanatic, man's economic needs controls also man's
support of the great masses regardless of mind and especially his political opinions
the most severe restrictions of their eco- is an absurd exaggeration. There exists,
nomic welfare imposed upon them by of course, a certain relationship between
these policies. Whether the socialist sys- economic reality and political ideology.
tem is a better guaranty for the eco- But the fact that socialist parties could
nomic welfare of the masses than the most successfully develop within capi-
capitalist system is still an open ques- talist democracies proves that it is just
tion. The experience of the Soviet Union the "formal" democracy which prevents
does not yet furnish a convincing proof. economic power from completely con-
But even if it could be proved that so- trolling political movements.
cialism is much more in the interest of This fact shows, indeed, an important
the overwhelming majority of the people difference between democracy and autoc-
than capitalism, it could not be main- racy regarding their relation to capital-
ism and socialism. If one of the two eco- emptied of their significance, even in
nomic systems is actually prevailing some of the most advanced democratic
under an autocratic regime, the coming countries, by the overriding force of eco-
into existence of the other may be sup- nomic power," that the democratic proc-
pressed. Such suppression is excluded ess no longer automatically confers "the
under a democratic regime, where a reality of power." "When organized eco-
peaceful and, in particular, a gradual nomic power became triumphant, the
change cannot be prevented. This does foundation of nineteenth century liberal
not mean, of course, that a democratic democracy crumbled. Political rights
government has not the right to suppress have come to seem irrelevant insofar as
by force an attempt to replace by force they no longer confer control over those
the prevailing economic system by an- factors which determine the decisive is-
other one. But if such an attempt suc- sues of national life."4 The crucial situa-
ceeds, if a minority by revolution over- tion can be handled satisfactorily by
throws the democratic government in building up a "new democracy." The
order to establish a socialist instead of a new democracy must "achieve a reinter-
capitalist, or a capitalist instead of a so- pretation, in predominantly economic
cialist, economic system, such political terms, of the democratic ideas of 'equal-
action implies necessarily the establish- ity' and 'liberty' "; it must "make politi-
ment of an autocratic political regime, cal rights effective over economic power"
just as a democratic regime is about to and must develop among its members a
turn into an autocratic one if it sup- sense "of common responsibility to make
presses the peaceful attempts to establish democracy work."'
another than the prevailing economic This argumentation is based on the
system. idea of a possible antagonism between
economic power and political rights. It is
A "REDEFINITION ) OF DEMOCRACY just this antagonism which, according to
Not only orthodox Marxists but also this view, constitutes the crisis of con-
socialists who believe in a peaceful evolu- temporary democracy. It is, however,
tion of capitalism to socialism rather very doubtful whether there exists in the
than in a revolutionary substitution of political reality of the Western democ-
one economic system by the other advo- racies such an antagonism, or-more ex-
cate the view that democracy, in the tra- actly formulated-whether the antago-
ditional sense of the term, is not com- nism, which certainly exists, is correctly
patible with capitalism. They do not described in this way.
deny that during the nineteenth centuryPower is the capacity of influencing
capitalist states had a democratic char- others. A person has power over others if
acter. But they assert that the economic he can induce them to behave in con-
evolution of the past fifty years has formityren- with his will. Hence, power is in
dered it more and more difficult and itself neither political nor economic; the
finally impossible to maintain democracymeans by which the intended behavior is
under a capitalist system, that this evolu-achieved is political or economic. The
tion has resulted in a "crisis of democ- specific means by which that power is ex-
racy." This crisis, they maintain, con- ercised which is called economic is the
sists in the fact that "democratic forms process of economic production and dis-
and political rights have been graduallytribution of the products. So-called eco-
72 ETHICS
nomic power is in the hands of those who private property and contract are not
control this process. They control this firmly established by the law-making
process when they have at their disposal process and if their property is not effec-
the means of production. Within a politi- tively protected by the law-applying
cal organization constituted by a legal process. This is particularly manifest in
order, that is to say, within a state, the modern states where strong socialist
disposition of the means of production movements in favor of nationalization of
must assume a legal form, the form of the means of production exist. Only
property. The means of production may through the law-making and law-apply-
be the property of private persons- ing process can the economic power of the
which is the essential element of the capi- private owners of the means of produc-
talist system and results in a situation tion be maintained against the forces di-
characterized by the fact that the means rected at the abolition of this economic
of production are concentrated in the system.
hands of a relatively small group, a mi- Political rights are the rights which
nority of the population. In this case the give their possessor influence on the gov-
distribution of the economic products as- ernment, and that means control of the
sumes the legal form of contract. Or the law-making and law-applying process.
means of production may be owned by Since economic power is guaranteed by
the government, that is to say, they maythis process, there can be no antagonism
be nationalized-which is the essential between economic power and political
element of the socialist economic system. rights. The exercise of economic power
In this case the distribution of the prod- depends in the last analysis on those who
ucts assumes the legal form of direct or have political rights and hence the power
indirect assignment by the government to maintain or to abolish the economic
to the subjects. In both cases the eco- system constituting a specific economic
nomic life is regulated by the law-making power.
and the law-applying process. In the case The socialist argument against this
of socialism, it is positively organized by view as a merely "formalistic" interpre-
provisions reserving the disposition of tation of social reality, is as follows: that
the means of production to the govern- within a capitalist economic system the
ment and directing the process of eco- government may be and in the capi-
nomic production and distribution in an talist states of the twentieth century ac-
authoritative way by establishing a tually is- under the decisive influence of
planned economy. In the case of capital- the private owners of the means of pro-
ism, economic life is not outside the duction, that the government only ap-
realm of law; it is regulated by legal pro- parently directs the law-making and law-
visions leaving acquisition of property, in applying process, which in reality is un-
general, and of property in the means of der the control of the economic power ex-
production and the products, in particu- ercised by a small minority in their own
lar, to contract, which is the essence of a interests. If, as in a modern democracy,
free economy. But this freedom of econ- those who possess the economic power
omy is a legal freedom, a freedom guar- are not identical with those who possess
anteed by the law. The private owners of the political rights, these rights are
the means of production cannot exercise meaningless. They are meaningless be-
their economic power if the principles of cause the government, under the influ-
ence of the capitalists, son toexercises its politi-

assert that the political rights
cal power, not in conformity with the have become meaningless because the
will, and hence not in the interest, of thesocialist system is not established.
possessors of the political rights, but in As to the influence of the owners of the
conformity with the will and the inter- means of production on the government,
ests of the private owners of the means of this influence can be exercised only
production. The political rights can be- through the channel of the electorate. If
come meaningful only if the economic the socialist party does not obtain a per-
power, that is, the ownership of the manent majority of the electorate, it is
means of production, is conferred on the impossible to prove that this failure is
government, so that it can be exercised due to the fact that there exists private
in conformity with the will of the major- property in the means of production. If,
ity of the possessors of the political rightsin a society complying with the just-
in their interest, and that means in the mentioned requirements of democracy,
interest of the whole people. the fact that the means of production are
This argumentation stands and falls in the hands of a minority of private
with the assertions that the minority of owners cannot prevent the coming into
the private owners of the means of pro- existence of a strong socialist party, it is
duction exercises decisive influence on more than unlikely that the same fact
the government elected by the majoritycan prevent the socialist party from get-
of the people, and that the majority of ting the majority necessary to control the
the people are against the capitalist sys- government and to establish a socialistic
tem maintained by the government and economic system. It may be that it is not
for a socialist system. But these asser- his own independent judgment about
tions can hardly be proved. what is politically in his interest which
The only way to ascertain the will of determines a person to exercise his politi-
the people is the democratic process, thatcal rights for a definite political party; it
is to say, elections on the basis of univer- may be that it is political propaganda
sal, equal, free, and secret suffrage. With- which has this effect; and it may be justi-
out excessive exaggeration of the effect of fied to consider a vote cast under the in-
certain abuses which may occur every- fluence of political propaganda not to be
where, it cannot be denied that in the the expression of the true or real will of
Western democracies the elections of the the voter. But there is no reason to as-
parliament and the chief executives com- sume that among the socialist voters the
ply with these requirements. If a govern- proportion between those who vote fol-
ment elected in this way maintains a lowing only their own judgment and
capitalist economic system, there is no those who vote under the influence of po-
sufficient reason to assert that this sys-litical propaganda is different from that
tem is against the will of the people or- among the antisocialist voters, that the
more exactly formulated-against the former express more than the latter the
intentions of the majority of the elector- true or real will of the people. That the
ate more or less organized in political antisocialist propaganda, because of the
parties. And as long as only a minority or stronger economic means at its disposal,
only a transitory, not permanent, major- does not necessarily have greater effect
ity of the electorate is for a socialist eco- than the socialist propaganda has al-
nomic system, there is no sufficient rea- ready been mentioned.' It may very well
74 ETHICS
be that a poor man does not vote for a Marxian revolutionary doctrine-by a
socialist party because he believes in reinterpretation of the democratic prin-
God and hence has more confidence in ciples of freedom and equality in eco-
the minister of his church who advises nomic terms, that is to say, by a new
him not to do so than in the political definition in which the accent is shifted
agitator of an antireligious party, or be- from the government by the people to
cause he has for some reason or another the government for the people.
-strong nationalistic emotions and hence There is indeed a crisis, but it is not a
prefers a political party which is rather crisis of democracy; it is a crisis of the
for armament than for social reform. But prevailing economic system of capital-
to assume that the existence of religion or ism. And a reform or revolution may be
nationalism is to be explained only by necessary or inevitable. This reform or
the influence of capitalism would be ab- revolution does not imply a change in the
surd, since both exist within the socialist essence of democracy but the abolish-
state of the Soviet Union, the one in spite ment of the prevailing economic system.
of a strong antireligious propaganda, the The establishment of a socialist system of
other used by the socialist government economy, the nationalization of the
itself as an effective instrument for the means and the process of production,
realization of its policy. may have the effect of improving the
Hence it is simply not true that within average economic standard of the mass
a democratic state economic power can of the people. But it will not "revive"
ever override political power, that the democracy. It will be quite enough if it
democratic process can ever fail to estab- will not destroy democracy; and it will
lish the reality of power, that political certainly not have the effect that "politi-
rights become irrelevant because they do cal rights will once more become impor-
not "confer control over those factors tant."7 It is, on the contrary, quite pos-
which determine the decisive issue of na- sible that, if there exists an economic
tional life." The political situation which system which guarantees to everybody
is described in this misleading way as the the satisfaction of his most important
crisis of modern democracy consists, in economic needs, the interest in politics
truth, in the fact that within a democ- will considerably decrease, especially if a
racy, by virtue of the political principles socialist economic system is combined
which constitute its very essence, a polit- with a foreign policy which succeeds in
ical party has come into being and ac- the establishment of an international or-
cumulated considerable strength which ganization guaranteeing effective collec-
wants to substitute socialism for existent tive security. If man is freed from the
capitalism but does not dispose of a ma- fear of the two greatest evils, hunger and
jority of the voters necessary to exercisewar, the activity of the government may
a permanent control of the government lose a great part of its importance for the
through the democratic process. Hence individual, whose interest in participat-
the ideologists of socialism declare this ing in it may become less intense than it
process as irrelevant, as merely "formal." actually is when the decisions of the gov-
They speak of a "crisis" of democracy ernment in the fields of economic and
and demand the establishment of a foreign affairs affect his very life. The
"'new") or '"real" democracy, either by ideologists of non-Marxian socialism de-
force or-if they are not followers of the mand a redefinition of democracy as a
system of government based on political particular demonstration. It is not even

rights valid against economic power.8 denied by socialists, who only refuse to
This means: democracy must be com- recognize capitalist democracy as "true"
bined with socialism. I personally am not democracy. Hence we are concerned with
against this political program. And I be- the question as to whether democracy is
lieve that democracy is compatible with possible only within a capitalist economy
socialism. But I decidedly deny that in because incompatible with socialism.
order to realize this program a redefini- The question is usually discussed in
tion of the concept of democracy is neces- connection with the problem of planned
sary. To replace the capitalist by a so- economy which is the core of socialism.
cialist democracy is possible without The adversaries of this economic system
changing the meaning of democracy as maintain that the highly complex system
defined in this essay and actually es- of economic activities cannot be directed
tablished already in the existing capital- in a democratic way, that is to say, by
ist democracies. A redefinition of democ- majority decisions of a many-headed
racy as the Soviet theory shows is a body of individuals elected for a short
dangerous enterprise, because it may- term by political parties of opposite in-
and when it, as in the Soviet theory, is terests, but only by a staff of experts un-
achieved, actually does furnish an ideo- der the leadership of a dictator endowed
logical instrument for a political move- with practically unlimited powers.9
ment that is directed against democracy. Planned economy requires suppression of
freedom's essential to democracy. By
THE ALLEGED INCOMPATIBILITY OF
democratic freedoni, as pointed out, two
DEMOCRACY WITH SOCIALISM
different principles are meant: the posi-
(PLANNED ECONOMY)
tive or political freedom of self-deter-
From the foregoing analysis follows mination, the participation of the gov-
that the Marxian doctrine, that democ- erned in the government, that is to say,
racy can be realized only within a social- in the creation and application of the
ist economic system, is evidently wrong. coercive order; and the negative or intel-
But it does not follow that democracy lectual freedom, the freedom from gov-
cannot be realized within such a system, ernment or coercion, guaranteed by con-
that socialism and democracy are incom- stitutional human rights. Regarding the
patible with each other because-accord- suppression of political freedom as a con-
ing to a widespread capitalist doctrine- sequence of planned economy, and this
socialism necessarily means the suppres- means the incompatibility of socialism
sion of all freedom, in a positive as well with democratic procedure, we must take
as in a negative sense, political freedom into consideration the fact that even in
in the sense of participation of the gov- capitalist states, the democratic charac-
erned in the government as well as eco- ter of which is generally recognized, the
nomic and intellectual freedom in the democratic principle is realized within
sense of freedom from government; and the legislative, administrative, and judi-
that consequently democracy is possible cial branches of government in different
only within a capitalist economic system. degrees. It is almost always realized in
That democracy, as defined in this es- the law-creating, i.e., the legislative,
say, is possible within a capitalist society function of the state in a much higher
is an evident fact which does not need degree than in the law-applying, i.e., ad-
76 ETHICS
ministrative and especially the judicial, democratic principle in the organization

function. It would be a mistake to as- of the administration and judiciary. The
sume that the democratization of the requirement of an efficient administra-
law-applying function must necessarily tion may have the same tendency. if an
be in harmony with the democratization inefficient administration may endanger
of the law-creating function. If the terri- the very existence of a democratic state,
torial extension of the state makes a divi- and if a lower degree of democratization
sion into districts and the establishment guarantees a more efficient administra-
of local administrative organs necessary, tion, the less democratic type of adminis-
these organs represent the highest degree trative organization may be chosen in
of democracy if they are collegiate bodies order to maintain the democracy of the
the members of which are elected by the whole. This is certainly the reason why
inhabitants of the district concerned. in all modern democracies the method by
But the political structure of these local which the chief executive is appointed is
administrative bodies may differ from by far less democratic than the method
the political structure of the central leg- by which the parliament is elected. The
islative body. A political party which as a President of the United States, elected
minority is in opposition to the majority indirectly by the people and not respon-
represented in the central body may have sible to the parliament, is a less demo-
the majority in the local body and hence cratic organ than the House of Represent-
not be willing to apply conscientiously atives. The appointment of judges by
the laws adopted by the central parlia- the chief executive is certainly less demo-
ment, that is to say-to use a figure of cratic than their election by the people;
speech-to execute the will of the whole and the rule that only trained lawyers
people. The democracy of the part may may be appointed and, above all, the
impair the democracy of the whole. A principles that a judge has to be inde-
much more effective guaranty of the pendent of those who have him ap-
execution of the so-called will of the pointed or elected and that he is irre-
people, expressed in the laws adopted by movable are anything but democratic.
the central parliament, than the perfectly Nevertheless, we do not hesitate to con-
democratic organization of the local ad- sider a state as a democracy, the consti-
ministration in collegiate bodies is a less tution of which provides for independent,
democratic governor appointed by the irremovable judges to be appointed by
elected chief executive and responsible to the chief executive, because we believe
the executive for the legality of his ad- that this type of judicial administration
ministration. The democratic organiza- is better for a democratic state than the
tion of the supreme, the law-creating, other type. It is a fact that in capitalist
function is of much greater importance states which are models of democracy,
for the democratic character of the whole the chief executive has rather far-extend-
body politic than the democratic organi-ing discretionary powers in the field of
zation of the law-applying, i.e., the ad- military and foreign administration and
ministrative and judicial, function. that, as far as purely technical problems
It is not only the requirement of the are involved, for instance in the field of
legality of the law-applying function health administration, experts partici-
which in the interest of the democracy of pate in the activity of the government to
the whole may lead to a restriction of the a considerable extent. The more techni-
cal an administration is, that is to say, government which is our concern; it is

the more the means for the realization of the question whether socialism is in prin-
its ends are determined by scientific ex- ciple compatible with democracy; and
perience, the less political it is, the less its this, at least for the time being, cannot be
subjection to the democratic process is denied.
essential to the democratic character of
THE "RULE OF LAW"
the whole body politic. This is the reason
why the steadily increasing bureaucrati- The incompatibility of socialism with
zation of the government, a characteris- democracy, on the one hand, and the
tic feature of the modern state, is no necessary connection between democracy
serious danger to its democratic charac- and capitalism, on the other hand, is
ter as long as it is restricted to technical sometimes substantiated by the argu-
administration. ment that the so-called "rule of law"
If a socialist economic system is in cannot be maintained within a socialist,
principle adopted and maintained by the but only within a capitalist, economic
majority of a parliament elected on the system, and the rule of law is essential to
basis of universal, equal, free, and secret democracy because it guarantees free-
suffrage, the administration of this sys- dom."1
tem may have to a great extent a merely By the rule of law the principle is un-
technical character; and hence a more or derstood that the administrative and
less undemocratic organization of this judicial functions of the state should
administration may as little impair the be determined so far as possible by pre-
democratic character of the socialist established general norms of law, so that
state as the discretionary powers of the as little as possible discretionary power is
chief executive, and the influence of left to the administrative and judicial
bureaucracy and experts has annulled organs; freedom is thus guaranteed be-
the claim of the capitalist states of the cause arbitrary government is avoided.
Western civilization to be democracies. Since a system of planned economy, it is
It may be that the administration of a argued, does not allow determination of
planned economy, in order to work satis- the administration by pre-established
factorily, requires discretionary power general norms, arbitrary government is
and hence restriction of the legislative inevitable, and hence freedom is lost.
power to a much greater extent than is This argument, however, is not quite cor-
compatible with a democratic character rect. The principle called the "rule of
of the supreme organ of the state. But law" does not restrict the legislative
the answer to this question can be given power, that is, the power of enacting gen-
only on the basis of a social experience eral legal norms, and hence does not limit
which is not yet at our disposal. The as- the degree to which human behavior may
sertion that socialism inevitably leads to be regulated by such norms. Conse-
dictatorship is certainly not founded on quently, the rule of law principle does not
such an experience. The Russian experi- guarantee the freedom of the individual
ment, restricted to one great power and a but only the possibility of the individual
few small satellites and to one genera- to foresee, to a certain extent, the activ-
tion, proves nothing. Besides, it is not the ity of the law-applying, that is, the ad-
question to what extent socialism can be ministrative and judicial, organs, and
successfully realized under a democratic hence to adapt his behavior to these ac-
78 ETHICS
tivities. The rule of law principle may law-applying organ by general norms is
prevail although the whole life of the in- limited by the very nature of the rela-
dividual is regulated by general legal tionship which exists between the law-
norms prescribing in detail his behavior creating and the law-applying function.
in relation to others, and thus restricting It is the relationship between a general
to a great extent his freedom of action. and an individual norm. The adminis-
The rule of law principle does not guar- trative as well as the judicial act, issued
antee the freedom of the individuals sub- by the competent organ in a concrete
ject to the government because it does case where the general norm is applied to
not refer to the relation between the gov- a definite individual, constitutes an indi-
ernment and the governed but to a rela- vidual norm. The administrative author-
tion within the government, the relation ity as well as the judge orders the indi-
between the law-creating and the law- vidual to do or to refrain from doing
applying function; its purpose is the con- something, and the meaning of this order
formity of the latter to the former. The is a norm prescribing a concrete behavior
effect of the rule of law is the rationaliza- of a definite subject. The tendency of the
tion of the activity of the government, principle called the "rule of law" is to
that is, the processes of creation and ap- determine by a general norm as far as
plication of the law. Its aim is not free- possible the content of the individual
dom but security, security in the field of norms to be issued by the administrative
law, Rechtssicherheit, as it is called in and judicial organs. But the content of
German jurisprudence. If the problem of the individual norm can never be deter-
democracy and economics is approached mined completely by a general norm. If
from the point of view of rationalization this were possible, the issuing of individ-
and security, it must be admitted that it ual norms would be superfluous. There is
is just the rationalization of the economic always a certain degree of discretionary
process and economic security at which power left to the organ bound to apply
socialism, with its planned economy, is the general norm. The general norm is
driving, in opposition to capitalism only a framework within which the indi-
which, with its anarchy of production, vidual
is norm is to be created; and the in-
far from guaranteeing economic security. dividual norm always contains some-
This effect of a capitalist economy can- thing new, not yet contained in the gen-
not be prevented by the rule of law pre- eral norm. Hence a certain degree of arbi-
vailing within a capitalist democracy be- trariness is inevitably involved in the ap-
cause the economic life is not directly plication of the law which is necessarily
regulated by the law; and rationalization also a creation of law. For the individual
of the economic process together with norm issued by the administrative or ju-
economic security will be be achieved dicial organ is as legal as the general
within a socialist democracy even if the norm issued by the legislative organ. On
rule of law principle does not apply to the the other hand, the discretionary power
legal regulation of the economic life. or "arbitrariness" of the legislative organ
As far as the arbitrariness of govern- is practically unlimited. The parliament
ment is concerned, which the "rule of is sovereign; and the sovereignty of the
law" is supposed to prevent, two factors parliament is the sovereignty of the
must not be ignored which seriously im- people within a representative democ-
pair this effect. First of all, the possibility racy.
of determining the freedom of action of a There is still another aspect of the
problem of the arbitrariness of govern- eral norms, can be foreseen by the sub-
ment which should be noted: to the ex- jects concerned is not so great as those
tent to which the administration has a who rely on the rule of law suppose. Ab-
technical character, that is to say, to the solute legal security is an illusion, and it
extent to which the means by which the is just to maintain this illusion in the
ends of the administration are deter- opinion of the law-seeking public that
mined by scientific experience and hence traditional jurisprudence denies the pos-
experts participate directly or indirectly sibility of different interpretations, which
in the administration, to this extent the are from a legal point of view equally
fact that the content of the individual correct, and insists on the dogma that
norms is not determined by pre-estab- there is always only one correct interpre-
lished general legal norms does not nec- tation ascertainable by legal science.
essarily mean that the administration The possibility of different interpreta-
has an arbitrary character. If a govern- tions of a general legal norm is particu-
ment, authorized by the law adopted by larly great in the case of customary law,
a democratically elected parliament-as where there is no written formulation of
for instance in Switzerland-operates a the general legal norms. It is quite sig-
railway, it would be foolish to prescribe nificant that in the doctrine of common
by general legal norms how a locomotive law, which is essentially customary law,
has to be built or tracks are to be laid the importance of the general norms is so
out; it stands to reason that the decisions little recognized that a leading American
concerned are left to the experts of the jurist, John Chapman Gray12 of Harvard
administration. Nobody would consider Law School, could advocate the thesis
the government for this reason as arbi- that all law is judge-made law, which im-
trary. As pointed out, the economic ad- plies the complete rejection of the rule of
ministration within a system of planned law principle within a democratic state.
economy may have to a great extent a The fact that the general norm to be
technical character. The fact that the applied by the administrative and judi-
technical decisions are left to the discre- cial organs may be interpreted in differ-
tion of experts is no sufficient reason to ent ways by these organs is one of the
consider it as "arbitrary." reasons for the hierarchical structure of
The second factor which may impair the administrative and judicial process,
the rule of law principle is even more within which the subjects have the possi-
serious. The application of the law al- bility of appealing from a lower to a
ways implies an interpretation of the law. higher administrative or judicial author-
No application without such interpreta- ity if they consider the decision of the
tion is possible. Since the general norms lower authority to be not in conformity
to be applied by the administrative and with the general norm to be applied. But
judicial organs are necessarily expressed since this appeal must come to an end,
in human language and since human lan- the decision of the supreme authority
guage is always more or less ambiguous, must be endowed with the force of law,
almost always different and sometimes whether it does or does not conform with
contradictory interpretations of a general the general norm to be applied by the
norm are possible. Hence the degree to authority. There is practically no possi-
which the decision of the administrative bility of limiting the discretionary power
and judicial organs, even if determined of a supreme administrative or judicial
as far as possible by pre-established gen- organ, the decisions of which have the
80 ETHICS
force of law. This institution, generally legislator. But even then there remains
accepted by all legal systems, including an important difference between a demo-
those of the most radical democracies, cratic and an autocratic regime. The
may seriously impair the rule of law prin- change of the general rules of law issued
ciple where-as in a democracy-the su- by the legislative organ and, above all,
preme administrative and judicial organ the establishment of exemptions from
is not identical with the supreme legisla- these rules in concrete cases are incom-
tive organ, i.e., where the principle of parably more difficult in a democracy,
separation of power prevails. where they are to be achieved in a com-
The rule of law principle, as far as it is plicated parliamentary process, than in
realizable, is certainly an appurtenance an autocracy, where they are within the
of democracy; but, as pointed out, in a discretion of one individual, the autocrat,
capitalist democracy it is not applied in whose will is the law.13 There is, however,
the field of economics since this field is no reason to assume that in this respect
exempt from direct legal regulation. On there must be an essential difference be-
the other hand, the fact that the principle tween a capitalist and a socialist state,
in question cannot, or at least not very ef- that the relationship between the law-
fectively, be applied to the economic ad- creating and the law-applying function in
ministration within a system of planned a state with planned economy must have
economy does not mean that it is neces- an autocratic character in the sense that
sarily excluded from other fields of the the supreme executive organ must have
application of the law of a socialist state, unlimited power to grant exceptions from
which may have in this respect a per- the general rules determining the admin-
fectly democratic character. istration.
The ideal type of autocracy, to be sure,
DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC FREEDOM
certainly does not favor the rule of law
principle because there is no interest in a The result of the foregoing analysis is
rationalization of governmental activi- that as far as positive or political free-
ties. Nevertheless, in political reality the dom is concerned, the freedom which
principle may be adopted to a certain ex- consists in the participation of the gov-
tent also by an autocratic government for erned in the government-democracy-
the simple reason that the autocrat is not is compatible with a socialist as well as a
able to issue personally all the necessary capitalist system of economy. But what
administrative and judicial decisions and about the negative freedom, which does
consequently must appoint deputies and not consist in the participation of those
subordinate auxiliary organs. If he wants subject to the coercive order of the state
to have his will or intentions realized as in its creation and application but in the
far as possible by the administrative and freedom from coercion, guaranteed by a
judicial apparatus which he is forced to specific restriction of this order by the
build up or to take over from his prede- constitutional establishment of certain
cessor, he must try to determine the deci- human rights? That capitalism, as eco-
sions of the administrative and judicial nomic liberalism, requires such freedom
organs, which act in his name, by general is self-evident and a historical fact. That
norms which he is able to formulate or socialism, as a system of planned econ-
to have formulated by experts under his omy in direct opposition to economic lib-
control in his capacity as the supreme eralism, is incompatible with economic
freedom, because by its very nature an whether the collectivization of the eco-
extension of the coercive order of the nomic sector of life necessarily leads to
state to economic relations, is likewise the collectivization of all the other sec-
self-evident. But economic freedom is not tors. And this question has been an-
the decisive issue as far as the question is swered by some outstanding economists
concerned whether the freedom essential in the affirmative. They assert that col-
to democracy is compatible with social- lectivization cannot be limited to eco-
ism. First of all, it should be kept in nomic matters, that if economic freedom
mind that even the classical liberalism of is suppressed, intellectual freedom can
the nineteenth century did not mean no longer be maintained, that collectiv-
complete economic freedom; it never re- ism which controls the economic life of
quired that the coercive order of the man must inevitably control also his in-
state should not interfere at all in eco- tellectual life. This is the most important
nomic matters. Private property and free argument set forth in the defense of capi-
contract, the very basis of liberal capitalism against socialism. But, as para-
talism, are, after all, legal institutions; doxical as it may seem, this argument is,
and to protect private property and to if not identical with, very similar to the
enforce the fulfilment of contracts is one Marxian doctrine, which states that the
of the main functions of capitalist civil economic reality determines its ideologi-
law; punishment attached to theft, cal, that is, its intellectual, especially its
fraud, embezzlement, as specifically eco- legal and political, superstructure. To
nomic crimes, is an essential function of explain political totalitarianism as the
capitalist criminal law. The development consequence of a specific economic sys-
of the modern state is characterized by a tem is to apply an economic interpreta-
steadily increasing tendency toward a tion of society.
legal regimentation of economic matters; The argument rests on the assumption
labor and antitrust legislation are indis- that socialism is collectivism, in contra-
pensable elements of domestic policy and distinction to the individualism of liberal
certainly constitute a remarkable restric- capitalism, and on the identification of
tion of economic freedom. It is generally collectivism with totalitarianism.'4 This
recognized that this development did not identification, however, is inadmissible,
deprive the Great Powers of Western for collectivism exists in social reality in
civilization of their democratic character. different degrees, and totalitarianism is
If we are not to admit that democracy only the highest possible degree of collec-
has disappeared in the modem world, we tivism. Any normative order regulating
cannot include in the definition of de- the mutual behavior of individuals con-
mocracy the principle of economic free- stitutes a collectivum, that is, a collective
dom. It is not the economic, it is the in- body, and hence represents some kind of
tellectual freedom-the freedom of re- collectivism. But the normative orders
ligion, of science, of the press-that is differ with respect to their material
essential to democracy. Hence the car- sphere of validity, that is, the extent to
dinal question is whether within a politi- which they regulate human relations,
cal system which abolishes economic and with respect to the degree of cen-
freedom through planned economy, in- tralization. Even the most primitive so-
tellectual freedom can be maintained. cial order which is completely decentral-
This has been formulated as the question ized and limited to the regulation of the
82 ETHICS
most vital human relations by prohibit- if the bank has a more secure or more
ing only murder and incest represents a profitable use for its money, it will not
certain degree of collectivization. The grant the credit. Of course, insofar as in
modern state, a centralized coercive or- a capitalist society there also is free com-
der with a rather extensive material petition in the bank business, the people
sphere of validity, exhibits a much higher may try to get the credit from another
degree of collectivization, without having bank. But this does not mean that they
necessarily a totalitarian character. To will succeed. They may not be able to
be sure, socialism is collectivism, because find a bank willing to lend the necessary
it means the collectivization of the eco- money and hence are, with respect to the
nomic life of man. But it is just the ques- realization of their religious needs by
tion whether this collectivization neces- economic means in a capitalist society, as
sarily leads to the collectivization of hu- little free as in a socialist society, even if
man life in its totality. The train of the capitalist society has a democratic
thought on which an affirmative answer constitution guaranteeing freedom of
to this question is based runs about as religion. In a capitalist society, says
follows."5 It is not possible to separate theHayek, "the obstacles in our path are not
economic from other spheres of human due to someone's disapproving of our
life, for to realize other than economic ends, but to the fact that the same means
ends, economic means are necessary, and are also wanted elsewhere.'6 But are we
the ultimate ends are never economic; free to realize our noneconomic ends if
economic ends are always means for fur- the economic means for these ends are
ther ends. If, for instance, a group of in- "wanted elsewhere"? From the point of
dividuals who share the same religion view of the men who need a building for
want to perform the common worship their religious service, it makes no differ-
prescribed by their belief, they need an ence whether the banks or a central au-
appropriate building, that is to say, eco- thority refuses to provide them with the
nomic means in order to achieve their necessary economic means. It has been
intellectual end. If-as in a socialist so- maintained that within a socialist eco-
ciety-these economic means are under nomic system of planned economy there
the control of a central authority, the can be no freedom in choosing our work.
realization of the end depends upon the This is true. But it cannot be denied that
decision of this authority which conse- within a capitalist economic system this
quently controls also the noneconomic freedom too is a privilege of relatively
end. Hence the members are not free as few, even if the democratic constitution
far as the realization of these ends is con- prohibits any legislative, administrative,
cerned. This is true. But is the situation or judicial restriction of this freedom.
in a capitalist society essentially differ- If there is freedom in the satisfaction
ent? Is there freedom with respect to the of noneconomic needs in a capitalist so-
satisfaction of noneconomic needs where ciety, it is the freedom of the rich, not the
there is no planned economy? If, in our freedom of the poor.17 This is the socialist
example, the individuals concerned have argument. There is certainly a lot of
not the money to buy or to erect the truth in it; as well as in the other argu-
building which they need for their re- ment that, if in a socialist economic sys-
ligious service, they may try to obtain tem the satisfaction of the most funda-
credit for this purpose from a bank, But mental economic needs of nourishment,
clothing, and housing are guaranteed, ends by economic means which is at is-
men will be freed from the coercion re- sue. The negative freedom which is essen-
sulting from the necessity to care for the tial to modern democracy exists in the
satisfaction of these needs, from the per- constitutional prohibition of any legisla-
manent pressure which actually limits tive, administrative, or judicial act re-
the range of choice the average man has stricting the exercise of religion, science,
in a capitalist society. This is not eco- or art, the expression of opinion in the
nomic freedom in the sense of liberalism, press or in any other form, the associa-
it is not freedom from government, that tion for legal purposes, and the like. The
is to say, from the coercive order of the human freedoms or rights, which a con-
state. It is freedom from the compulsion stitution must guarantee in order to be
resulting from the system of liberal econ- considered as democratic, are reflections
omy. That this freedom, the freedom of a certain limitation of the power of
from compulsion resulting from the ne- government. But, as it has been shown,
cessity to care for the satisfaction of eco- the constitutional guaranty of these in-
nomic needs, is to be achieved by the tellectual freedoms does not secure any
suppression of freedom in the satisfaction freedom in the satisfaction of the intel-
of these economic needs is not as para- lectual needs concerned by the economic
doxical as it seems. For the freedom from means required. It may be correct to em-
compulsion is by its very nature a rela- phasize that, for this reason, the human
tive freedom. The freedom of one may be freedoms guaranteed by a democratic
the bondage of the other, freedom in one constitution are only "formal" or "legal"
respect may be guaranteed by the sup- freedoms. But a capitalist democracy
pression of freedom in another, and vice guarantees only such formal or legal free-
versa. doms. On the other hand, there is no rea-
As far as the freedom to realize our son, based on sufficient historical experi-
noneconomic ends by economic means is ence, to assume that the constitutional
concerned, the question cannot be guaranty of such formal and legal free-
whether or not such freedom is possible doms is not possible within a socialist so-
under socialism or under capitalism, ciety, be- to assert that if the government
cause there can be no doubt that it is controls directly the economic means and
possible to a certain extent-and only to hence indirectly the noneconomic cul-
a certain extent-under both regimes. tural ends to be realized by these means,
The question can only be whether there its power cannot be restricted by the con-
is an essential difference as to the degree stitutional prohibition of legislative, ad-
in which this freedom is possible within ministrative, and judicial acts character-
the two systems. And this question can istic of capitalist democracy. It is usual
be answered only on the basis of histori-to argue that if the government controls
cal experience which is not yet at our the production and distribution of print-
disposal. ing machines and paper, it will not per-
But even if the answer were decidedly mit the publication of periodicals or
in favor of one or the other economic sys- books directed against the policy of the
tem, it has no bearing on the question as government. This is possible, and in the
to whether democracy is compatible withSoviet Union it is indeed the case. But it
socialism or only with capitalism. For it is not necessary. The nationalization of
is not the freedom to realize noneconomicthe means of production does not by its
84 ETHICS
very nature exclude legal institutions with the essence of democracy but also in
guaranteeing the freedom of press, and conflict with the fact that even where the
these guaranties may be no less effective governmental body is elected, the most
than analogous guaranties within a capi- democratic electoral system is the one
talist democracy. which eliminates, or at least reduces to a
minimum, the competitive struggle for
DEMOCRACY AS GOVERNMENT ESTAB- the people's vote: the system of propor-
LISHED BY COMPETITION tional representation. It is characterized
One of the most characteristic ele- by the fact that in the procedure of the
ments of a capitalistic system of econ- election the majority-minority relation
omy is the principle of free competition, has no importance. In order to be repre-
which is excluded by a socialist economic sented, a political group does not need to
system. In order to show, not that de- comprise the majority of the voters; for
mocracy is incompatible with socialism, every group is represented, even if it is
but that capitalism is by its very nature not a majority group, according to its
more akin to democracy than is social- numerical strength. In order to be repre-
ism, the democratic procedure has been sented, a political group must have only
defined as "that institutional arrange- a minimum number of members. The
ment for arriving at political decisions smaller
in this minimum number, the more
which individuals acquire the power members the representative body has.
to decide by means of a competitive In the mathematical borderline case
struggle for the people's vote."118 This where the minimum is one, the number
means that the definition of democracy of delegates is equal to the number of
as government by the people is replaced voters-the representative body coin-
by the definition as government estab- cides with the electorate. This is the case
lished by competition. of direct democracy. Such democracy is
The competitive struggle for the certainly to a much higher degree a gov-
people's vote is the consequence of free ernment by the people than an indirect
elections; it is not its purpose. In a direct or representative democracy. The system
democracy there are no elections at all. of proportional representation shows a
The primary criterion of democracy is clear tendency in this direction.
that the power of government is with the It is frequently maintained that pro-
people. If the people cannot or will not portional representation does not guar-
exercise this power directly, they may antee an efficient government, that for
delegate it by free election to representa- this purpose majority representation is
tives and thus, instead of governing preferable. This may be true, although
themselves, create a government. Hence the disadvantage of proportional repre-
free election and its consequence, the sentation is very much exaggerated by
competitive struggle for the people's the supporters of majority representa-
vote, is a secondary criterion. Only by tion. However that may be, the insuf-
reversing the relationship between the ficiency in question has nothing to do
two criteria and making the creation of with a the democratic character of propor-
government by free election the primary tional representation. Government in a
criterion can democracy be defined as direct democracy is certainly less ef-
government established by competition. ficient than government in an indirect
Such reversion is not only inconsistent democracy, but, nevertheless, the former
is more democratic than the latter. Our differences and respect for opinions he does
question is not the efficiency but the es- not share than any other type of human
being. Moreover, so long as bourgeois standards
sence of democracy. And from this point
are dominant in society, this attitude will tend
of view there can be no doubt that a gov- to spread to other classes as well.'9
ernmental body in which all political
groups are represented is more likely to If it is admitted that within a capitalist
express the will of the people than a body society tolerance is preserved as long as
in which only the majority group or the the private concerns of the bourgeois,
majority group and one minority group and this means the fundamental prin-
are represented. And one of the greatest ciples of capitalism, private property and
advantages of the system of proportional free enterprise, are not "seriously threat-
representation is that no competition of ened," it can hardly be maintained that
candidates of different political parties is there exists an essential difference be-
necessary. According to the system of tween the attitude of a capitalist and
majority representation, every delegate that of a socialist society in this respect.
is elected with the votes of one group, the If a man's main concerns are secured, if
majority, against the votes of another there is no danger that others will pre-
group, the minority. According to the vent him from realizing what he con-
system of proportional representation, siders as major values, he has no reason
every delegate is elected only with the to prevent them in their attempt to real-
votes of his own group without being ize what he considers as minor values.
elected against the votes of another Hence there is no reason to assume that a
group. The system of proportional repre- socialist government will not display tol-
sentation is the greatest possible approxi- erance as long as the fundamental prin-
mation to the ideal of self-determination ciples of the prevailing economic system
within a representative democracy and, are not seriously endangered. Recent ex-
hence, the most democratic type of elec- perience shows clearly that in a capitalist
toral system, precisely because it does democracy tolerance is the first principle
not require a competitive struggle for the to be abandoned when the prevailing
people's vote. economic system is endangered by anti-
capitalistic forces from within or from
CAPITALISM AND TOLERANCE
without. The same would probably hap-
pen in aof
Another argument set forth in favor socialist democracy. It is a fact
the view that capitalism is an economic that democracy does not work when the
system more appropriate than socialism antagonism between the majority and
for democracy is the assertion that the the minority is so strong that no com-
principle of tolerance, essential to mod- promise is possible and the rule of the
ern democracy, is better guaranteed by political game, the submission of the
the former than by the latter. minority to the will of the majority, is
It is easier for a class whose interests are questioned, when the government, right-
best served by being left alone to practice ly or wrongly, is afraid of being over-
democratic self-restraint than it is for a class thrown by force. This applies to a capi-
that naturally tries to live on the state. The talist as well as to a socialist democracy
bourgeois who is primarily absorbed in his
and has nothing to do with the peculiar-
private concerns is in general-as long as these
concerns are not seriously threatened-much ity of their economic systems. It is, how-
more likely to display tolerance of political ever, a peculiarity of the political system
86 ETHICS
of democracy, in contradistinction to posed, it seems to some a very great dif-

that of autocracy, that in such a situa- ficulty how any one should ever come to
tion the former may lose one of its essen- have a property in anything."22 Hence
tial elements and thus break down, the problem of property is from the very
whereas the latter will remain intact be- beginning the problem of the justice of
cause in suppressing by force any intel- individual or private property; and the
lectual movement directed against the justice of this kind of property cannot be
government, it has nothing to lose. based on Scriptural revelation. Locke en-
deavors "to show how men might come
INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY AND FREEDOM
to have a property in several parts of that
IN THE NATURAL LAW DOCTRINE
which God gave to mankind in common,
OF JOHN LOCKE
and that without any express compact of
If individual freedom is the fundamen- all the commoners."23 Locke's self-im-
tal principle of democracy and individual posed task is to deduce the justice of indi-
property the basis of capitalism, an es- vidual property from another source
sential connection of democracy with than Scriptural revelation. He tries to
capitalism could be maintained if it were fulfil this task by referring to reason with
possible to demonstrate that there exists which God has endowed man to make
an inseparable union of property with use of the common earth "to the best ad-
freedom. Such an attempt was first made vantage of life and convenience." Hence,
in the natural law doctrine as developed "there must of necessity be a means to
by John Locke, who to a great extent has appropriate" the fruits and beasts of the
shaped the ideology of modern democ- earth "some way or other before they can
racy; and later in the philosophy of He- be of any use or at all beneficial to any
gel, which still plays an important part particular man." They "must be his, and
in the political thinking of our time. so his, i.e., a part of him, that another
The supreme value presupposed as can no longer have any right to it, before
self-evident in Locke's moral-political it can do any good for the support of his
reasoning is the idea of freedom. He dis- life."24 It stands to reason that this argu-
tinguishes between "natural liberty" ment can prove the necessity of individ-
which he defines as "to be free from any ual property only in articles of food
superior power on earth," and "freedom which man immediately needs for his
of man under government," which is the subsistence, for it is only with respect to
"liberty to follow my own will in all these articles that exclusive disposition
things, where that rule [which is estab- on the part of the individual is required.
lished by the legislative power and is But since Locke wants to justify individ-
common to everyone] prescribes not, and ual property in general, he does not con-
not to be subject to the inconstant, un- tinue to argue in this direction leading to
certain, unknown, arbitrary will of an- an impasse. He emphasizes the specific
other man."20 In other words, that man is means by which man appropriates the
free means that man is "master of him- articles of food and by which he may ap-
self. "21 propriate also other things. And this
The problem of property results from means is man's labor:
the fact that God, according to the Scrip- Though the earth and all inferior creatures
tures, "has given the earth . . . to man- be common to all men, yet every man has a
kind in common. But this being sup- property in his own person; this nobody has
any right to but himself. The labour of his political system, the supreme value of
body and the work of his hands we may say are
-which is freedom, only by freedom, prop-
properly his. Whatsoever, then, he removes out
of the state that nature hath provided and left erty must be brought in relationship to
it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined freedom. Hence the argument: freedom
to it something that is his own, and thereby means property of man in himself, and
makes it his property. It being by him removed since labor is a function of his personal-
from the common state nature placed it in, it
ity, it also means property in his labor.
hath by this labour something annexed to it
that excludes the common right of other men. If man's property in his labor is free-
For this labour being the unquestionable prop- dom, any extension of this property' to
erty of the labourer, no man but he can have a other things is the extension of freedom.
right to what that is once joined to, at least If a man appropriates a thing by mixing
where there is enough and as good left in com-
his labor with it, such appropriation is
mon for others.25
justified as an exercise of his freedom.
It is hardly possible to overestimate the The justification of property through the
influence which this argumentation exer- ideal of freedom as man's self-determina-
cised on the social theory of the eight- tion becomes quite evident in Locke's
eenth and nineteenth centuries. Hence a statement: "From all which it is evident
careful analysis seems not to be super- that, though the things of nature are
fluous. given in common, yet man, by being mas-
The basic proposition from which the ter of himself and proprietor of his own
justice of individual property is inferred person and the actions or labour of it,
is the statement that man has property had still in himself the great foundation
in his own person, which means that no- of property."26 Freedom is the founda-
body has any right to his person but tion of property. But, finally, the idea of
himself. Man's "property" in his person freedom is put in the background and
is his personal freedom, the fact that that of property prevails. "Man being
man, in a state of nature, is free from any born . . . with a title to perfect freedom,
superior power on earth and, in a state of and an uncontrolled enjoyment of all the
government, not subject to the arbitrary rights and privileges of the law of nature
will of another man. It is evident that equally with any other man or number of
this freedom, the right of the individualmen in the world, hath by nature a power
to dispose exclusively of himself, that is not only to preserve his property-that
to say, of his person, is something differ- is, his life, liberty, and estate-against
ent from the right of property, that is, the injuries and attempts of other men,
the right to exclude others from the dis- but to judge of and punish the breaches of
position of a thing. And insofar as the that law...."127 The concept of property
right of man to dispose exclusively of his includes that of liberty. Hence it is not
person includes the right to use the labor astonishing that Locke considers the
of his body and the work of his hands ac-"preservation of property" the chief end
cording to his own will, freedom of man of "civil society."28 The "power of mak-
implies the freedom of his labor and ing laws" as well as "the power to punish
work. But this does not mean that his any injury done unto any of its members
labor is his property. It is the concept ofby any one that is not of it, which is the
freedom, not the concept of property, power of war and peace," are conferred
which applies in this respect. But since upon the commonwealth "for the preser-
property can be justified within a moral- vation of the property of all the members
88 ETHICS
of that society as far as is possible."29 If The individual has no absolute right, to

the end of government is the preserva- life, that is to say, no absolute right to
tion of property, the right to property exclude others from disposing of his life,
cannot be abolished by the government: but an absolute right to property, that is,
The supreme power cannot take from any the right to exclude others from disposing
man any part of his property without his own of things which he owns. Since man's
consent. For the preservation of property being power to dispose exclusively of his life is
the end of government, and that for which men his freedom, the right of property is
enter into society, it necessarily supposes and
placed above the right to freedom. Thus
requires that the people should have property,
without which they must be supposed to lose the attempt to justify property by free-
that by entering into society, which was the dom leads to the abolishment of its very
end for which they entered into it, too gross an basis: the idea of freedom as the supreme
absurdity for any man to own. Men, therefore, value.
in society having property, they have such a
right to the goods which by the law of the com- COLLECTIVE PROPERTY IN THE NATURAL
munity are theirs, that nobody hath a right
LAW DOCTRINE
to take them or any part of them from them,
without their own consent; without this they The essential connection which, ac-
have no property at all. For I have truly no
cording to Locke, exists between the
property in that which another can by right
man's right to freedom and his right to
take from me when he pleases, against my con-
sent. Hence it is a mistake to think that the individual property is based on the law
supreme or legislative power of any common- of nature from which both rights are de-
wealth can do what it will, and dispose of the duced. Locke achieves his results by ap-
estates of the subjects arbitrarily, or take any plying the specific method of the natural
part of them at pleasure. . . . And to let us see
law doctrine, which during the last dec-
that even absolute power, where it is necessary,
is not arbitrary by being absolute, but is still ades has again come to the front in politi-
limited by that reason, and confined to those cal and legal thinking and is considered
ends which required it in some cases to be abso- by some recognized authorities as a
lute, we need look no farther than the common
strong bastion in the defense of democ-
practice of martial discipline. For the preserva-
racy against communist autocracy. But
tion of the army, and in it the whole common-
wealth, requires an absolute obedience to the we can hardly rely upon it. For on the
command of every superior officer, and it is basis of the natural law doctrine and
justly death to disobey or dispute the most with its specific methods, it has also been
dangerous or unreasonable of them; but yet we
proved that private property is against
see that neither the sergeant, that could com-
nature and the source of all social evils.
mand a soldier to march up to the mouth of a
cannon, or stand in a breach, where he is almost To eradicate these evils nothing else is
sure to perish, can command that soldier to necessary but to abolish private property
give him one penny of his money; nor the gen-and to establish communism, the only
eral, that can condemn him to death for desert-economic system dictated by nature.
ing his post, or not obeying the most desperate
This is the main thesis of a work which
orders, cannot yet, with all his absolute power
of life and death, dispose of one farthing of under the title Code of Nature, or the
that soldier's estate, or seize one jot of his goods,True Spirit of Its Laws was published
whom yet he can command anything, and hang anonymously in Paris in 1755.31 Its au-
for the least disobedience. Because such a blind thor was a certain Morelly of whom we
obedience is necessary to that end for which the
know very little. It is significant that the
commander has his power, viz., the preserva-
tion of the rest; but the disposing of his goods work was originally attributed to the
has nothing to do with it."0 famous encyclopedist Diderot. It be-
came the "great book of socialism of the Consequently individual property is

eighteenth century,"32 and Baboeuf, the against nature. The positive legislators,
leader of a communist movement within in establishing individual property, are
the French Revolution, frequently re- guilty of a "monstrous division of the
ferred to the Code of Nature, which an- products of nature. They divide what ac-
ticipated many ideas later developed by cording to nature ought to remain a
Fourier and other Communists.33 The whole or ought to be restored as a whole
if by accident it has been divided. Thus
Code of Nature, as its title indicates, is a
they destroy all sociability" ;38 in so doing
legitimate child of the natural law doc-
they "work against the reason of na-
trine. It proceeds from the assumption
ture."39 By establishing individual prop-
that nature has definite intentions, that
erty the legislators recognize the individ-
these intentions are intelligible and are
ual interest of man and thus create a so-
directed at the happiness of mankind,
cial situation where avarice, the worst of
and that justice can be established only
all vices and the source of all the others,
by conforming our social institutions to must prevail. "Could this universal pes-
the intentions of nature. Morelly main- tilence, this slow fever, this consumption
tains as an "incontestable principle" of the entire society, the individual inter-
that "nature is one, constant, unchange- est, exist where it could find no nourish-
able"; that the laws of nature are im- ment or ferment? Hence it is evident
plied in "the pacific inclinations by that: Where there exists no property,
which nature animates its creatures"; there cannot exist any of its disastrous
and that "anything that deviates from consequences."40 If we want to realize
these friendly affections is unnatural."34 the "wise intentions of nature" and cre-
Hence Morelly-as many writers on nat- ate "a situation where man is as happy
ural law-believes that human nature is as he can be in this life,"'41 we must "dash
basically good. He assumes a "natural to the ground that monster, the spirit of
probity of creatures endowed with rea- property"42 and establish a social order
son")35 and proclaims as the "first law of under which nothing in society belongs
as private property to the individuals,
nature" the law of "sociability." The
except the things they want for immedi-
positive legislators "have only to recog-
ate use to satisfy their needs, their pleas-
nize and to put into force this law of na-
ure, or for their daily work; where each
ture."36 The law of sociability is inter-
citizen is a public servant, employed and
preted to mean
supported by society and obliged to con-
that nature has distributed the human facul- tribute to the public welfare according to
ties among the individuals in different propor-
his forces, talents, and age.43 This is the
tions, but that nature has left the ownership
in the means of production [la propriatg du
essence of communism and communism
champ producteur de ses dons] indivisible to all, natural law.
is
and to everybody the use of its liberality. The Since the main political problem is
world is a table sufficiently provided for all that of property, Morelly considers the
guests, to whom all the dishes belong; and they
form of government as a question of sec-
belong to all guests because all are hungry;
only to some' of them when the others are
ondary importance, provided that pri-
satisfied. Hence nobody is the owner [maitre] vate property is abolished and the prin-
exclusively, nor has anybody the right to pre- ciple of collective property, that is, com-
tend to be so.37 munism, established. For, if the law of
90 ETHTICS
nature is applied, the welfare of the INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY AND FREEDOM

people is guaranteed." Then the govern- IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF HEGEL
ment is necessarily a government for the
The tendency to bring property in an
people, whether it is a democracy, an
essential connection with freedom cul-
aristocracy, or a monarchy:
minates in Hegel's philosophy of law, the
If a people unanimously decides to obey only center of which is the idea of freedom.
the laws of nature as defined by us [that is to
"Law," Hegel says, "is by definition free-
say, the principle of communism], and conse-
quently is living under the direction of the
dom as idea."49 Freedom of will is an es-
fathers of the families, the state is a democracy. sential element of the human personal-
If the people, in order to achieve religious ob- ity. But "the person must translate his
servance of the sacred laws of nature, confers freedom into an external sphere in order
the government on some wise men, the state is
to exist as idea."50 "If the free will is not
an aristocracy.... If, in order to achieve still
more exactness, justice and regularity of the
to remain abstract, it must in the first
movement of the body politic, only one person place give itself an embodiment, and the
governs, the state is a monarchy, but can never material primarily available to sensation
degenerate as long as private property is not for such an embodiment is things, i.e., ob-
introduced.45
jects outside us. This primary mode of
A monarchy, or to use the modern term, freedom is the one which we are to be-
a dictatorship, may even be the best way come acquainted with as property....
to realize the law of nature, that is to The freedom which we have here is what
say, communism, and consequently the is called a person, i.e., the subject who is
welfare of the people. That is just what free, free indeed in his own eyes, and who
Lenin said.46 The monarch or dictator gives himself an embodiment in things."'"
has to be considered as the representa- The "translation of freedom in an ex-
tive of the people. "A nation," says ternal sphere" or the "embodiment of the
Morelly, "which places one of its citizens will in objects outside the will" is the
at the head, especially if it submits to the decisive point in this identification of
laws of simple nature, is it not entitled to property with freedom. It is evident that
Hegel's formulas are nothing but meta-
say to this person: we charge you to
phorical descriptions of the fact that
make us obey the agreements we have
man, whether free or not, exercises his
concluded with you.... Reason has
will by taking possession of things. In
prescribed these laws [of nature] to us
reality freedom cannot be translated to,
and we prescribe to you to recall them
the will cannot be embodied in, things.
always to our mind; we confer upon you
To take these metaphors for reality
the power, the authority of these laws amounts to a type of thinking which is
and of this reason over each of us, and characteristic of primitive mentality: the
thereby we make you the organ and substantialization or hypostatization of
herald of them."47 Hence a communist the abstract and immaterial, such as
dictatorship, as a government for the qualities, relationships, values, and the
people, could be considered as govern- like. In order to assume that there exists
ment by the people. It is quite under- an essential connection between prop-
standable that a Russian translation of erty and freedom, which is Hegel's aim,
Morelly's Code de la nature has recently the metaphorical statement that prop-
been published in the Soviet Union.48 erty is the embodiment of freedom must
be taken literally. But taken literally- stance of his soul, in a thing and thus
and not as mere metaphor-it is a mean- make the thing part of his personality,
ingless phrase. Between freedom and which Hegel identifies with freedom. "I
property there is no relation at all. The as free will am an object to myself in
only relation that exists is the relation what I possess and thereby also for the
between a man, who may or may not be first time am an actual will. This is the
free, and a thing; and the relation con- aspect which constitutes the category of
sists in nothing but in the exclusion of property, the true and right factor in pos-
others from the man's disposition of his session."54 Hegel expressly rejects the
thing. Without any sufficient founda- view that property is a means for the sat-
tion, Hegel asserts: "The person has the isfaction of man's needs. "The true posi-
right of putting his will into everything tion is that, from the standpoint of free-
and thereby making it his."52 Just as dom, property is the first embodiment of
Locke explains appropriation as an act freedom and so is in itself a substantive
by which the individual mixes his labor end."55 "The rationale of property is to
with a thing and thus joins to it some- be found not in the satisfaction of needs
thing of his personality, Hegel interprets but in supression of the pure subjectivity
the process by which a thing becomes the of personality. In his property a person
property of a person as putting the per- exists for the first time as reason."56 Thus
son's free will into the thing, as the em- property is justified as the realization of
bodiment of man's freedom into an ex- freedom and reason. Hegel goes as far as
ternal sphere. "All things may become to assert: "A person by distinguishing
man's property because man is free will himself from himself relates himself to
and consequently is absolute, while what another person, and it is only as owners
stands over against him [i.e., the thing] that these two persons really exist for
lacks this quality." By appropriating a each other."57
thing "I endow the thing with some pur- Hegel does not allow any doubt about
pose not directly its own. When the liv- the kind of property he has in mind when
ing thing becomes my property, I give tohe identifies it with freedom and reason.
it a soul, other than the one it had before, "Since my will, as the will of a person,
I give to it my soul."53 This is exactly theand so as a single will becomes objective
way in which property is conceived of byto me in property, property acquires the
primitive people who believe that man character of private property."58 Since
by taking possession of a thing transfers property is the embodiment of individual
some of the substance of his personality, freedom, the freedom of an individual
and that means some of his "soul," to the transferred to a thing, it can be only in-
thing and thus makes the thing a part of dividual, that is, private, property. "In
himself. Primitive man can imagine the property my will is the will of a person;
relationship of property, that is, the rela- but a person is a unit and so property be-
tionship of a man and a thing, only by comes the personality of this unitary
imagining the substance of the thing as will." In order to emphasize the individ-
part of the substance of the man. The ual character of property, Hegel asserts
consequence of substantializing a quality that property is personality and thus ob-
is the possibility of transferring it by literates the distinction between person
contagion. Only by contagion can man and thing. "Since property is the means
embody his freedom, that is, the sub- whereby I give my will an embodiment,
92 ETHICS
property must also have the character of he rejects the principle of equality, the
being 'this' or 'mine' [i.e., the property of postulate that everyone's property shall
a definite individual]. This is the impor- be equal, abandons his metaphor of
tant doctrine of the necessity of private property as embodiment of freedom with
property."'' its identification of property with per-
The ultimate goal at which this phi- sonality. For if men are, as persons,
losophy of property is driving becomes equal, and personality is freedom, men
evident in the following statement: are equally free; and if property is the
The general principle that underlies Plato's embodiment of this freedom, then prop-
ideal state [communism among the members of erty, which is personality, must be equal
the ruling group] violates the right of person- too. Hence, Hegel distinguishes carefully
ality by forbidding the holding of private prop-
-and quite correctly-between the per-
erty. The idea of a pious and even a compulsory
brotherhood of men holding their goods in com-
son as the source from which possession,
mon and rejecting the principle of private that is, property, springs and the prop-
property may readily present itself to the dis- erty itself. When equality of property is
position which mistakes the true nature of the in question, the property loses the free-
freedom of mind and right and fails to appre-
dom or soul otherwise embodied in it,
hend it in its determinate moments.60
ceases to be personality, and remains
It is for an unmistakable political pur- just what it is: simply property.
pose, namely, against communism, that
property is interpreted by means of an INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY AND FREEDOM IN
absurd hypostatization as the embodi- THE THEOLOGY OF EMIL BRUNNER
ment of freedom. Consequently the prin-
The view that property is an essential
ciple of equality must be rejected. "In
condition, even "the true basis of free-
relation to external things, the rational
dom,"63 is advocated today by Catholic
aspect is that I possess property. ...
as well as Protestant theologians. Refer-
What and how much I possess, therefore,
ring to the authority of the Reformers,
is a matter of indifference so far as right
especially Calvin, who recognized private
is concerned."' Of course men are equal,
property as in conformity with the will of
but only qua persons, that is, with respect
God, Emil Brunner tries to justify this
only to the source from which possession
institution as established by the divine
springs. The inference from this is that
order of creation which confers upon man
everyone must have property. "Hence, if
not only freedom but also property, since
you wish to talk of equality, it is this
freedom is not possible without prop-
equality which you must have in view.
erty.64
But this equality is something apart
from the fixing of particular amounts, It was not only the power to dispose freely
of his body and limbs, however, which was
from the question how much I own.
given to man by creation, but also "property."
From this point of view, it is false to
The man who has nothing at his disposal can-
maintain that justice requires everyone'snot act freely. He is dependent on the permis-
property to be equal, since it requiression of others for every step he takes, and if
only that everyone shall own property.they so wish, they can make it impossible for
him to carry on any concrete activity. Without
The truth is that particularity is just the
property there is no free personal life. Without
sphere where there is room for inequalityproperty there is no power to act. The man who
and where equality would be wrong."62 treads on strange ground, touches strange prop-
It is quite significant that Hegel, when erty at every movement he makes, is not a free
man. And the word "property" must be taken man has a free will and hence his actions,
literally as ownership, or, as we say today,
motivated by his will not determined by
private property. Without private property
a cause, are free too, this freedom of ac-
there is no freedom.65
tion exists whether the principle of pri-
Collective property, the essence of com- vate or that of collective property pre-
munism, on the other hand, means serf- vails. Consequently, the freedom which
dom and hence is incompatible with true Brunner tries to base on private property
democracy: can only mean the situation of a man
Collective ownership can never replace the whose choice of actions is not limited by
value of private property in terms of freedom. the established economic system. The
Where I have no right of disposal, I have no free
principle of private property necessarily
scope. For somebody who is not myself has the
implies the principle of free enterprise,
right of disposal over collective property, be it
the corporate body, the union I belong to, or the the possibility of acquiring property by
State. The fraction of right in State property free contract. The inevitable consequence
which I possess as a citizen of the State cannot of this principle is the distribution of
outweigh the dependence to which I am bound
property characteristic of the capitalistic
by the general will of the State. It is just as
easy to be a slave of the State as a slave of a
society with its division into a propertied
single master. Where the State is sole owner, and and propertyless class. In order to sup-
I am not an owner at all, even though the port his thesis of private property as the
State be a democracy in every other respect, I basis of freedom, Brunner refers to the
am a slave of the State, a slave of the general
proletariat. "The lack of personal prop-
will which gives my own will no free scope.66
erty is largely responsible for the reduc-
If , as in a socialist state, private property tion of the proletariat to an impersonal
is abolished, "the individual has lost the mass,"69 a mass of men who-according
true basis of his freedom; he is delivered, to Brunner's theory of freedom-are not
bound hand and foot, to the sole em- free. But the proletariat is not the conse-
ployer, the State. For all its ideology of quence of collective property, and it is
freedom and equality derived from equal- just for the purpose of abolishing the
itarian individualism, there is no individ- proletariat and making such a social
ual left. The volonte generate has ab- status impossible that socialism is for the
sorbed him into the 'collective.' Freedom establishment of collective property.
has become an illusion which may be sus- Brunner says:
tained for a time by a pseudo-democratic
All that collective property means is that in a
State machinery, but sooner or later it is certain domain-the domain of the collective
unmasked as an illusion, and then it is property-certain incontestable rights are
too late."67 "The freedom of action," granted to each individual. But it gives him no
which is destroyed if private property is actual right to dispose of that property. Yet
without something over which he has the right
abolished and the principle of collective
of free disposal, man cannot be free. We shall
property established, follows, as Brunner at once realize this if we take as an example the
expressly states, "in the order of crea- most immediate kind of necessary private
tion" "from free will."68 property-clothing and household goods. The
If the freedom of action Brunner has man who can never put on his own clothes,
sleep in his own bed and eat at his own table is
in mind follows from the metaphysical
not a free man.70
freedom of will, its exemption from the
law of causality, then it is necessarily in- The "right of free disposal" of the ar-
dependent of any economic system. If ticles which are necessary for the satis-
94 ETHICS
faction of man's most important needs pointed out-only relative freedom of

may be guaranteed by an economic sys- action within both systems, and the
tem based on the principle of collective question as to which one guarantees this
property. In discussing the question of freedom to a greater extent than the
private and collective property, Brunner
other cannot yet be answered on the
evidently tries to define the position of basis of sufficient experience.
Christian theology in relation to the The result of the foregoing analysis is
great problem of our time, the antago-
that the attempts at showing an essential
nism between capitalism and socialism.
connection between freedom and prop-
But this problem is not the conflict be-
erty, as all other attempts to establish a
tween an economic system within which
closer relationship of democracy with
only private, and another within which
capitalism rather than with socialism or
only collective, property is recognized.
even the exclusive compatibility of de-
Just as capitalism does not completely
exclude collective property, socialism mocracy with capitalism, have failed.
does not completely exclude private Hence our thesis stands that democracy
property. The problem is the establish- as a political system is not necessarily
ment of collective property in the means attached to a definite economic system.
of production which socialism demands UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
and capitalism rejects. There is-as BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA
NOTES
I. DEMOCRACY AND PHILOSOPHY
1. This paper was first presented as public lec- resting on popular enthusiasm completely different
tures under the Charles R. Walgreen Foundation from absolute power wielded by a divine king or by a
for the Study of American Institutions at the Uni- usurping tyrant" (p. 6). If "popular enthusiasm"
versity of Chicago in April, 1954. cannot manifest itself through an electoral system
2. Cf. Ithiel de Sola Pool, Symbols of Democracy based on universal, equal, free, and secret suffrage,
("Hoover Institute Studies"; Stanford: Stanford its existence is more than problematical. It is not
University Press, 1952), p. 2. an objectively ascertainable fact, but an unproved
3. Cf. my General Theory of Law and State (Cam- assumption which may be, and actually has been,
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1945), pp. 113 ff. used for the ideological justification of every-even
4. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism the most tyrannical-government. The "divine-
and Democracy (New York and London: Harper & right kings" have always maintained that their
Bros., 1942), p. 242. government is based on the love of their people; and
5. Ibid., p. 271. there is no essential difference between the "love"
6. Ibid., p. 243, note. and the "enthusiasm" of the people. If popular
7. Ibid., p. 243. enthusiasm is the criterion of democracy, then the
8. Cf. N. S. Timasheff, "The Soviet Concept of dictatorship of the National Socialist party is just
Democracy," Review of Politics, XII (1950), as much a democracy as the dictatorship of the
506 ff. Communist party. If democracy can be a dictator-
9. Lenin, "State and Revolution," in Selected ship, then the concept of democracy has lost its
Works, ed. J. Fineburg (New York: International specific meaning, and there is no difference between
Publishers, 1935-38), VII, 80. Italics supplied. democracy and autocracy. The antagonism which
10. Lenin, "Bourgeois Democracy and Proletari- Talmon describes as tension between liberal and
an Dictatorship," ibid., p. 231. totalitarian democracy is in truth the antagonism
11. Lenin, "Speech to the 9th Congress of between liberalism and socialism and not between
CPSU" (March 31, 1920), ibid., VIII, 222. two types of democracy. There are, indeed, two
12. Pravda, August, 1945. Italics supplied. types of democracy, a democracy with restricted,
13. Lenin, "State and Revolution," op. cit., p. 91. and a democracy with unrestricted, power of gov-
14. If one accepts the Marxian doctrine that the ernment; the latter is the older, the original, type,
so-called dictatorship of the proletariat is true which, however, did not rise as late as in the eight-
democracy, one may arrive at the concept of a eenth century but had already come into existence
"totalitarian democracy." J. L. Talmon, The Rise of in antiquity. The common element of both, the
Totalitarian Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, criterion according to which the restricted, as well
1952), tries to show "that concurrently with the as the unrestricted, government is a democracy, is
liberal type of democracy there emerged from the the fact that the government is exercised either di-
same premises in the eighteenth century a trend rectly by a popular assembly or by representatives
towards what we propose to call the totalitarian elected on the basis of universal, equal, free, and
type of democracy." "The tension between them has secret suffrage. It is by ignoring this essential fact
constituted an important chapter in modern history, that Talmon-like the Soviet theory-can present a
and has now become the most vital issue of our time" dictatorship as a democracy.
(p. 1). Liberal democracy is, according to Talmon, 15. Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics
characterized by the idea of freedom defined as (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952),
"spontaneity and the absence of coercion," whereas pp. 27ff.
totalitarian democracy is based on the belief that 16. Ibid., p. 32.
"freedom is to be realized only in the pursuit and 17. Ibid., p. 49.
attainment of an absolute collective purpose." The 18. Ibid., p. 32.
final aims of liberal democracy "are conceived in 19. Ibid., p. 31.
rather negative terms, and the use of force for their 20. Ibid., p. 33.
realization is considered as an evil." Totalitarian 21. Ibid., p. 35.
democracy "aims at the maximum of social justice 22. Ibid., p. 33.
and security," its "purpose" is thought "to consti- 23. Ibid., p. 35.
tute the fullest satisfaction of his [man's] true inter- 24. Ibid., p. 32.
est, and to be the guarantee of his freedom" (p. 2). 25. Ibid., p. 35.
"Modern totalitarian democracy is a dictatorship 26. Loc. cit.
95
96 ETHICS
27. Ibid., p. 36. extent and content of his authorization depends

28. Loc. cit. on his own discretion" (p. 237). He further main-
29. Ibid., pp. 36, 37. tained that the principle of majority-vote decision
30. Ibid., p. 37. was not specifically democratic but liberal (p. 82).
31. Ibid., p. 38. The "will of the people" may be expressed in "ir-
32. Loc. cit. resistible acclamations and an uncontested public
33. Ibid., p. 36. opinion" which "have nothing to do with the proce-
34. Ibid., p. 49. dure of secret voting and statistical ascertainment of
35. Cf. my Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie majority. In such a case it is even not certain that a
(2d ed.; TUbingen: J. C. B. Mohr [P. Siebeck], subsequent secret voting will confirm the spontane-
1929) and Staatsform und Weltanschauung (Ttibin- ous eruption and expression of the will of the people.
gen: J. C. B. Mohr [P. Siebeck], 1933). For the public opinion, as a rule, is produced only
36. Cf. my "Causality and Imputation," by an active politically interested minority of the
Ethics, LXI (1950), 1-11. people, whereas the overwhelming majority of the
37. Rousseau, The Social Contract, Bk. I, chap. enfranchised citizens are not necessarily politically
vi. interested. Hence it is not at all democratic, and
38. Ibid., Bk. III, chap. xv. would be a strange political principle, that those
39. Ibid., Bk. I, chap. vii. who have no political will should have the power to
40. Loc. cit. decide against the others who have such a will"
41. Ibid., chap. viii. (p. 279). Consequently, Schmitt declares, "dic-
42. Ibid., Bk. IV, chap. ii. tatorship is possible only on a democratic basis"
43. Loc. cit. (p. 237).
44. Loc. cit. 50. Benito Mussolini, "La Dottrina de Fascis-
45. Ibid., Bk. I, chap. vii. mo," Enciclopedia Italiana, XIV (1932), 847-51.
46. John H. Hallowell, The Moral Foundation of 51. Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian
Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, War ii. 35 ff.
1954), p. 120, says: "What is demanded by the 52. Plato Republic viii. 557.
democratic form of government is not submission 53. Ibid. 557 ff.
to the will of the majority because that will is 54. Ibid. 561.
numerically superior but rather submission to the 55. Ibid. 564.
reasoned judgment of the majority." According to 56. Cf. my "The Platonic Justice," Ethics,
this author, the principle of majority rule does not XLVII (1938), 367 ff.
demand "that we abandon all qualitative judg- 57. Republic vi. 494, 495.
ments in favor of a quantitative method." If this 58. Ibid. v. 474.
is true the question arises as to who is competent 59. Ibid. vii. 540.
to decide whether the judgment of the majority is or 60. Ibid. vi. 501.
is not "reasoned." The decision could be made only 61. Ibid. 500.
by the individual obligated to submit to the decision 62. Ibid. ix. 576.
of the majority. Then submission to the decision of 63. Aristotle Metaphysics iv. 8. 1012.
the majority depends in the last analysis on the 64. Ibid. xii. 6. 1072.
discretion of the individual, which means anarchy, 65. Ibid. 10.. 1076.
not democracy. 66. Aristotle Politics iii. 8. 1279.
47. Lenin, State and Revolution, op. cit., pp. 67. Aristotle's political theory is not consistent.
81, 246. He recognizes also a moderate democracy, where the
48. The relativistic philosophy of values makes middle class is stronger than both the other classes,
compromise possible, but compromise is not the i.e., the rich and the poor, and where the right of
essence or the "animating principle" of democracy. property is protected against confiscation, as the
(Cf. Hallowell, op. cit., pp. 27 f.) The essence best government for most states (Politics iv. 11.
or the animating principle of democracy is freedom 1295; v. 8. 1309; vi. 5. 1320). Cf. my "The Philoso-
combined with equality. phy of Aristotle and the Hellenic-Macedonian
49. A typical representative of this doctrine is Policy," Ethics, XLVIII (1937), 1 ff., where I tried
the one expounded by Carl Schmitt, who enjoyed to explain this discrepancy.
temporary success as ideologist for National Social- 68. Thomas Aquinas De Regimine Principum i. 2.
ism. In his Verfassungslehre (Munich and Leipzig: 69. Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologica i. 103. 3.
Duncker & Humblot, 1928), he tried to obliterate the In this work there is a quite interesting statement
difference between democracy and dictatorship. He about tolerance: "Human government derives from
admitted that the rule of the Soviets in Russia and divine government and should imitate it. Now God,
of the Fascists in Italy were dictatorships (pp. 81 f.). in His omnipotence and sovereign goodness, some-
And dictatorship, he said, is characterized by the times permits evil to be done in the world, though
fact "that the competence of the dictator is not He could prevent it; lest, by so doing, a greater good
precisely determined by general norms but that thebe destroyed or even greater evils might follow. So
also in human government those who are in power not futile at all but may be highly successful. Hence
rightly permit certain evils lest some good be they have not the slightest reason to accept autoc-
brought to nothing or perhaps even greater evils racy as inevitable. The only consequence of a
take their place.... So, therefore, though infidels relativistic theory of values is: not to force democ-
may sin by their rites, they are to be tolerated either
racy upon those who prefer another form of govern-
because of some good they may draw from them or ment, to remain aware in the struggle for one's
because of some evil which is thus avoided. Thus, own political ideal that the opponents, too, may be
from the fact that the Jews observe their rites, in fighting for an ideal, and that this fight should be
which the true faith, which we hold, was foreshad- conducted in the spirit of tolerance.
owed of old, there derives this benefit that we ob- A relativistic value theory does not deny the
tain testimony to our faith from our enemies, and a existence of a moral order and, therefore, is not-
symbolic representation of our beliefs: so they are as it is sometimes maintained-incompatible with
tolerated in their rites. But the rites of other moral or legal responsibility. It denies that there
infidels, which have nothing of truth or usefulness exists only one such order that alone may claim
in them, are to be in no-wise tolerated; unless per- to be recognized as valid and, hence, as universally
haps to avoid some evil, such as the avoidance of applicable. It asserts that there are several moral
scandal or the discord which might arise from their orders quite different from one another, and that
suppression; or the obstacle which would thus be put consequently a choice must be made among them.
in the way of the salvation of those who might, on Thus relativism imposes upon the individual the
account of such tolerance, end by being converted to difficult task of deciding for himself what is right
the faith. For this reason the Church has sometimes and what is wrong. This, of course, implies a very
tolerated the rites even of heretics and pagans, when serious responsibility, the most serious moral re-
the infidels were great in number" (ibid. ii/ii. 10. sponsibility a man can assume. Positivistic rela-
11). tivism means: moral autonomy.
Voegelin (op. cit., pp. 6 ff.) suggests not to rely The assumption that there exist absolute values
on "destructive" positivism and its value-free de- and that these values can be deduced from reality
scription of social reality but rather on the methods by means of rational cognition presupposes the view
of "metaphysical speculation," such as applied by that value is immanent in reality. Hallowell formu-
Plato and Aristotle, and "theological symboliza- lates this assumption as a principle of what he
tion," such as presented by Thomas Aquinas. This calls "classical realism," "that being and goodness
suggestion should not be accepted without taking belong together. Through knowledge of what we
into consideration the results of the political phi- are, we obtain knowledge of what we ought to do.
losophies of these authorities. To know what man is, is to know what he should
70, It is a gross misinterpretation of the rela- be and do" (p. 25). This principle is based on
tivistic value theory of positivism to assume-as a logical fallacy. It is the typical fallacy of the
does, e.g., John H. Hallowell-that it implies the natural law doctrine. There is no rational possi-
view that there are no values at all, that "there is bility of inferring from that what is that what
no moral law or moral order" (op. cit., p. 76), that ought to be or to be done. As goodness is not think-
democracy is a mere "fiction" and that conse- able without badness, not only being and goodness
quently the struggle against autocracy (or tyranny) but also being and badness belong together. Since
"is both meaningless and futile," and that "we had being in itself does not contain a criterion to dis-
best now surrender to the inevitable" (p. 21). tinguish the good from the bad-the good is not
Positivistic relativism means only that value judg- more or less "being" than the bad-it is not possible
ments in general-without which human actions to obtain knowledge of what we ought to do through
are not possible-and in particular the judgment knowledge of what we are; we "are" good as well as
that democracy is a good or the best form of gov- bad. From the fact that men are and always have
ernment, cannot be proved by means of rational, been waging war, thus demonstrating that war
scientific cognition to be absolute, that is to say, cannot be incompatible with human nature, it does
excluding the possibility of a contrary value judg- not follow either that war ought to be or that war
ment. Democracy, if actually established, is also ought not to be. Hence it is not possible to deduce
from the point of view of a relativistic value theory from our knowledge of what is in general and what
the realization of a value and in this sense, though we are in particular "universally applicable prin-
the value is only a relative one, a reality and not a ciples in terms of which we can guide our individual
mere fiction. If somebody prefers democracy to and social life toward the perfection of that which is
autocracy because freedom is to him the highest distinctively human" (pp. 25-26), meaning moral
value, nothing can be more meaningful to him than principles constituting absolute social values. As a
to struggle for democracy and against autocracy, matter of fact, the most contradictory principles
and that means to create for him and those who have been presented as being obtained through
share his political ideal the social conditions which knowledge of "what we are" or, what amounts to
they consider to be the best. If those who prefer the same thing, as deduced from human nature.
democracy are numerous enough, their struggle is The principle "that being and goodness belong
98 ETHICS
together" and that through knowledge of what is more accurately, it seems to me demonstrable that
we obtain knowledge of what ought to be done can no system of metaphysics univocally determines a
be maintained only on a religious basis, that is, system of ethics or politics" (p. 284). However, he
on the basis of the belief that the existing world is admits: "The evidence seems to me to be overwhelm-
created by God and thus is the realization of His ing that there is a definite historical connection
absolutely good will; that man is formed in the image between the social movement of a period and its
of God and hence human reason is somehow connect- metaphysical teachings; further, I am prepared to
ed with divine reason. It is just this belief to which defend as a historically true proposition that sys-
Hallowell, quite consistently, appeals. "We must tems of idealistic metaphysics, because of the semi-
recover," he emphasizes, "the belief in man as a official roles they have played in their respective
unique being whose reason is a reflection of the cultures, have been more generally employed to
image of God" and must recover "the theological bolster antidemocratic social movements than
foundations upon which the belief in natural law systems of empirical or materialistic metaphysics"
rests" (p. 83). If, abandoning the realm of science, (pp. 283-84). He also states: "If empiricism be a
we recover this belief and the theological foundations generic term for the philosophic attitude which sub-
of natural law, a moral-and that means under these mits all claims of fact and value to test by experi-
conditions a religious-foundation of democracy ence, then empiricism as a philosophy is more con-
becomes more than problematical. It was precisely genial to a democratic than to an antidemocratic
on the basis of a theological natural law doctrine community, for it brings into open light of criticism
that Robert Filmer rejected democracy as contrary the interests in which moral values and social insti-
to human nature and thus not in conformity with tutions are rooted" (p. 280). Hook distinguishes
the will of God. As to the relationship between two kinds of metaphysics as theory of being and
democracy and religion, I refer to the second part becoming, an "idealistic" and an "empirical or
of this study. materialistic" metaphysics, and he assumes, it
71. J. L. Stocks, Reason and Intuition (London seems, that the idealistic metaphysics goes hand in
and New York: Oxford University Press, 1939), hand with belief in supernatural religious truths
p. 143, says: "There is a close natural connection (cf. p. 280). I am using the term metaphysics only
between the prevalence of democratic ideals in in the latter sense. I, too, do not maintain that there
politics and the practice of methodical empiricism exists a "necessary logical" connection between
in science and other fields of thought . . . it is democracy and empirical relativism, on the one
striking to observe that those countries in which hand, and autocracy and metaphysical absolutism,
the empirical tendency in thought has been most on the other. The relationship which I assume to
persistent are also those countries in which democ- exist between the two political and the correspond-
racy has struck deepest root. It is surely no accident
ing philosophical systems may very well be char-
that among the Great Powers of Europe, France and
acterized as "congeniality." But Hook does not take
England are at once the most democratic and the
into consideration the relationship between philo-
most empirical in their outlook on the world, while
sophical absolutism, essentially connected with
Germany which is the least democratic, is the most
"idealistic" metaphysics, and political absolutism,
friendly to ambitious metaphysical systems." Sidney
Hook in an article "The Philosophical Presuppo- i.e., autocracy, on the one hand, and philosophical
sitions of Democracy," Ethics, LII (1942), 275-96, relativism, essentially connected with empiricism,
maintains "that there is no necessary logical con- and democracy, on the other. It is just this rela-
nection between a theory of being or becoming tionship which seems to me to be of the greatest
and any particular theory of ethics or politics. Stated
importance.
II. DEMOCRACY AND RELIGION
1. Emil Brunner, Gerechtigkeit: Eine Lehre von (Paris: P. Hartmann, 1943).

den Grundgesetzen der Gesellschaftsordnung (Zurich: 4. Brunner, op. cit., p. 13.
Zwingli Verlag, 1943). English translation: Justice 5. Ibid., p. 14.
and the Social Order, trans. Mary Hottinger (Lon- 6. Ibid., p. 15.
don and Redhill: Lutterworth Press; New York: 7. Loc. cit.
Harper & Bros., 1945). Quotations used by permis- 8. Ibid., pp. 15 f.
sion of Harper & Bros. 9. Ibid., p. 17.
2. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Children of Light 10. Ibid., p. 16.
and the Children of Darkness: A Vindication of 11. Ibid., p. 17.
Democracy and a Critique of Its Traditional Defense 12. Ibid., pp. 27 f.
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950). Copy- 13. Ibid., p. 17.
righted by Charles Scribner's Sons. Reprinted by 14. Ibid., p. 57.
permission of the publisher. 15. Ibid., p. 235.
3. Jacques Maritain, Christianissme et d6mocratie 16. Ibid., p. 20.
17. Ibid., pp. 16 f. stitute neither necessary nor sufficient conditions."

18. Ibid., p. 47. 34. Brunner, op. cit., p. 92.
19. Ibid., pp. 48 f. 35. Ibid., p. 55.
20. Ibid., pp. 80 ff. 36. Ibid., p. 29.
21. Ibid., p. 84. 37. Ibid., p. 37.
22. Ibid., p. 35. By "eternal" the German term 38. Ibid., p. 30.
"Uberzeitlich," meaning "beyond time," is not 39. Ibid., p. 36.
quite correctly translated. 40. Ibid., pp. 35 f.
23. Cf. my "Die Idee der Gerechtigkeit nach den 41. Ibid., p. 40.
Lehren der christlichen Theologie," Studia Philoso- 42. Ibid., p. 35.
phica: Jahrbuch der Schweizerischen Philosophischen 43. Ibid., p. 39.
Gesellschaft, XIII (1953), 157 ff. 44. Ibid., p. 41.
24. Brunner, op. cit., p. 90. 45. Loc. cit.
25. Loc. cit. 46. Ibid., p. 42.
26. Ibid., p. 93. 47. Ibid., p. 43.
27. Ibid., pp. 93 f. 48. Loc. cit.
28. Ibid., p. 17. 49. Ibid., p. 44.
29. Ibid., p. 87. 50. Ibid., pp. 44 f.
30. Ibid., pp. 57 ff. 51. Ibid., p. 45.
31. Cf. my "Die Idee der Gerechtigkeit nach den 52. Loc. cit.
Lehren der christlichen Theologie," op. cit., pp. 53. Ibid., p. 46.
180ff. 54. Ibid., p. 55.
32. Brunner, op. cit., p. 48. 55. Loc. cit.
33. Sidney Hook, "The Philosophical Presup- 56. Ibid., p. 56.
positions of Democracy," Ethics, LII (1942), p. 281, 57. Ibid., p. 49.
says with respect to the relationship between democ- 58. Cf. supra, p. 47.
racy and religion: "Does democracy as a way of life 59. Brunner, op. cit., p. 60.
rest upon belief in supranatural religious truths in 60. Loc. cit.
the sense that, if the latter are denied, the former 61. Ibid., p. 177.
must necessarily be denied? It is becoming increas- 62. Ibid., pp. 77, 126, 133.
ingly fashionable to maintain this. Were historical 63. Ibid., p. 177.
considerations relevant here, I think it could be con- 64. Loc. cit.
clusively established that the great institutional 65. Ibid., pp. 190 f.
religions, with the possible exception of some forms 66. Ibid., p. 191.
of Protestantism, have tended in fact to suppose 67. Niebuhr, op. cit., p. 126.
theocratic forms of government. Nor is it surprising 68. Ibid., p. 133.
if the Kingdom of Heaven be taken as a model of 69. Ibid., p. 134.
inspiration for the Kindgom of Earth. Whoever 70. Ibid., pp. x f.
heard of a democratically organized Paradise? Walt 71. Ibid., p. 82.
Whitman in heaven would meetwith the same fate 72. Ibid., pp. 86 ff.
as Lucifer, but for different reasons. Not only is the 73. Ibid., p. 82.
notion of a democratically organized heaven blas- 74. Ibid., p. 125.
phemous, but the proposal to reform along demo- 75. Ibid., p. xi.
cratic lines a hierarchically organized church would 76. Ibid., p. x.
lead to excommunication. If we examine the actual 77. Ibid., p. 189.
behavior which has been sanctified by the maxim: 78. Ibid., p. x.
'Render unto Caesar what is Caesar's and to God 79. Ibid., p. 39.
what is God's,' we shall discover that historically 80. Wilhelm von Humboldt, "Ideen zu einem
institutional religion has always been able to adapt Versuch die Granzen der Wirksamkeit des Staats zu
itself to any form of government or society whichbestimmen," Gesammelte Werke, Bd. VII (Berlin:
will tolerate its existence.... Does belief in Georg Reimer, 1852).
democracy logically rest upon any theological 81. Niebuhr, op. cit., p. 28.
propo-
sitions in the sense that the denial of the second 82. Ibid., p. 39.
entails the denial of the first? And for this discus- 83. Ibid., pp. 39 f.
sion I shall take as illustrative of theological propo- 84. Ibid., p. xiii.
sitions the two cardinal propositions of natural 85. Ibid., p. xii.
theology, viz., 'God exists' and 'Man has an im- 86. Loc. cit.
mortal soul.' To assert that whoever has no grounds 87. Ibid., pp. 67 f.
for affirming the existence of God and immortality 88. Ibid., p. 68.
has no grounds for affirming the validity of democ- 89. Ibid., p. 71.
racy is to claim that the former are at least necessary 90. Ibid., pp. 70 f.
conditions of the latter. I shall argue that they con- 91. Ibid., p. 71.
100 ETHICS
92. Ibid., p. 72. 113. Ibid., pp. 42 ff.

93. Ibid., p. 73. 114. Ibid., p. 33.
94. Ibid., p. 74. 115. Ibid., p. 44.
95. Loc. cit. 116. Ibid., p. 47.
96. Ibid., p. 75. 117. Ibid., pp. 43 f.
97. Ibid., pp. 74 f. 118. Ibid., p. 49.
98. Ibid., pp. 151 f. 119. Ibid., p. 35.
99. Ibid., p. 151. 120. He says that "political life shall conform to
100. Ibid., pp. 134 f. natural law and, according to the conditions of its
101. Ibid., p. 135. temporal object, to the evangelical law itself" (ibid.,
102. Loc. cit. p. 60).
103. Ibid., p. 125. 121. Henri Bergson, Les deux sources de la morale
104. Ibid., p. 135. et de la religion (Paris: F. Alcan, 1932), p. 304;
Maritain, op. cit., p. 78.
105. Ibid., p. 151.
122. Maritain, op. cit., p. 57.
106. Ibid., p. 135.
123. Ibid., p. 58.
107. Ibid., p. 130.
124. Ibid., p. 51.
108. Ibid., p. 126.
-125. Cf. supra, p. 18.
109. Ibid., p. 133.
126. Maritain, op. cit., p. 54.
110. Jacques Maritain, op. cit., p. 33. 127. Ibid., p. 76.
111. Ibid., p. 65. 128. Eph. 6: 5-8.
112. Ibid., pp. 31 ff., 36. 129. Tim. 6:1-2.
III. DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMICS
1. Lenin, "State and Revolution," in Selected order which, politically, has an autocratic char-
Works, ed. J. Fineburg (New York: International acter. Law may be created in very different ways;
Publishers, 1935-38), VII, 75. the democratic way is one of them, not the only
2. Cf. my Sozialismus und Staat (2d ed.: Leipzig: possible one; and law is created not only in general
C. L. Hirschfeld, 1923), pp. 50 ff. norms, i.e., by legislation, but also in the individual
3. Cf. Alf Ross, Why Democracy? (Cambridge: norms enacted by judicial and administrative or-
Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 172. gans and hence also by the autocrat, who is the
4. Edward Hallett Carr, Conditions of Peace supreme legislative, judicial, and administrative
(New York: Macmillan Co., 1942), p. 28. organ of the state. To identify law with democratic
5. Ibid., p. 30. law is the typical fallacy of a natural law doctrine,
6. Cf. supra, p. 70. the method of which does not exclude an opposite
7. Carr, op. cit., p. 34. conception-the identification of law with auto-
8. Loc. cit. cratic law. It even cannot be denied that the possi-
9.
Cf. Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom bility of adapting the law to the particular circum-
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944), stances of a concrete case has some advantage, the
pp. 88 if. so-called flexibility of the legal system. This flexi-
10. Ibid., p. 70. bility is achieved by conferring upon the law-apply-
11. Cf. ibid., pp. 72 ff. He says: "Nothing dis- ing organ the power to set aside the pre-established
tinguishes more clearly conditions in a free country general norm to be applied, according to its meaning,
from those in a country under arbitrary govern- in a concrete case where its application is con-
ment than the observance in the former of the gen- sidered by this organ as not appropriate, and to
eral principle known as the 'Rule of Law.'" That create-by way of an exception to the general norm
this-principle cannot be observed within a system of -new law for that case. Flexibility is especially
planned economy is one of the main arguments of appreciated in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence.
his thesis that socialism means serfdom. This view, which is only the consequence of a
12. John Chapman Gray, The Nature and positivistic theory of law, was expounded in my
Sources of the Law (2d ed.; New York: Macmillan Allgemeine Staatslehre (1925), pp. 335 f. Leo Strauss,
Co., 1927), pp. 121 ff. Natural Right and History (1953), p. 4, says that
13. Cf. supra, p. 29. The term "rule of law" he cannot imagine why I have omitted the "in-
seems to imply the idea that where the principle structive passage" expressing this view "from the
designated by this term does not prevail, no "law" English translation," i.e., my General Theory of
exists. However, the unlimited power of the auto- Law and State (1949). The answer is that my General
crat to grant exemptions from the general norms, Theory of Law and State is not a translation of my
the arbitrariness of the autocratic-or, as it is some-Allgemeine Staatslehre, and that consequently there
times called, despotic-government is not sufficient can be no question of an "omission." If Strauss
reason for denying the legal character of a social thought that I considered it, for some reason or
another, no longer advisable to maintain in my 27. Ibid., chap. vii, sec. 87.
General Theory the opinion I advocated in my 28. Ibid., sec. 85.
Allgemeine Staatslehre, he can see now that he was 29. Ibid., sec. 88.
wrong. Besides, the general principle, of which the 30. Ibid., chap. xi, secs. 138-39.
statements referred to by Strauss as so "instructive" 31. Code de la nature ou le veritable esprit de ses
are only a particular application, is clearly expressed loix. Republished in Collection des 6conomistes et
in the way in which I present, in my General Theory des r~formateurs sociacx de la France, ed. E.
of Law and State, democracy and autocracy as two Dolleans (Paris: P. Guethner, 1910).
equally legitimate forms of state, and the state, 32. A. Lichtenberger, Le Socialisrne au XVIIIe
whether democratic or autocratic, as a legal order. siecle (Paris: F. Alcan, 1895), p. 114.
14. Thus, for instance, Hayek, op. cit., p. 56, 33. Cf. Dolleans, op. cit., pp. 5 ff., and Kingsley
writes under the heading "Planning and De- Martin, French Liberal Thought in the Eighteenth
mocracy": "The various kinds of collectivism, com- Century (London: E. Benn, 1929), p. 243.
munism, fascism, etc., differ among themselves in 34. Code de la nature, op. cit., p. 23.
the nature of the goal toward which they want to 35. Ibid., p. 17.
direct the efforts of society. But they all differ from 36. Ibid., p. 36.
liberalism and individualism in wanting to organize 37. Ibid., p. 13.
the whole of society and all its resources for this 38. Ibid., p. 37.
unitary end and in refusing to recognize autonomous 39. Ibid., p. 39.
spheres in which the ends of the individuals are su- 40. Ibid., p. 16.
preme. In short, they are totalitarian in the true 41. Ibid., p. 84.
sense of this new word which we have adopted to 42. Loc. cit.
describe the unexpected but nevertheless inseparable 43. Ibid., pp. 85 if.
manifestations of what in theory we call collectiv- 44. Ibid., pp. 51 f.
ism." 45. Ibid., p. 51.
15. Ibid., pp. 88 ff. 46. Cf. supra, p. 6.
16. Ibid., pp. 93 f. 47. Code de la nature, op. cit., p. 54.
17. Hayek, ibid., p. 89, says in defense of capital- 48. Moscow, 1947.
ist society: "Money is one of the greatest instru- 49. Hegel, "Grundlinien der Philosophie des
ments of freedom ever invented by man. It is money Rechts," Sdmtliche Werke, Herausgegeben von
which in existing society opens an astonishing Georg Larson (Leipzig: Verlag von Felix Meiner,
range of choice to the poor man-a range greater 1911), Bd. VI, Par. 29. English translation by
than that which not many generations ago was open T. M. Knox, Hegel's Philosophy of Right (Oxford:
to the wealthy." That is true-provided the poor Oxford University Press, 1942). When the German
man has the money, which seems to be rather a term "Recht" as in the title of Hegel's work means a
contradiction in terms. social order and not particularly a subjective ca-
18. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism pacity of man, it should be translated into English
and Democracy (New York and London: Harper & as "law" and not as "right."
Bros., 1942), p. 269. Cf. also F. A. Hermens, Demo- 50. Ibid., sec. 41.
kratie und Kapitalismus (Munich and Leipzig: 51. Ibid., addition to sec. 53.
Duncker & Humblot, 1931). Hermens tries to show 52. Ibid., sec. 44.
that "any form of government other than democ- 53. Ibid., addition to sec. 44.
racy, is incompatible with fully developed capital- 54. Ibid., sec. 45.
ism (p. iii), but he expressly rejects the definition 55. Loc. cit.
of democracy as government by the people. "De- 56. Ibid., addition to sec. 41.
mocracy is not government by the people (Volksherr- 57. Ibid., sec. 40.
schaft) in the old sense of the term, but that form 58. Ibid., sec. 46.
of government by which the integration [of the mass 59. Ibid., addition to sec. 46.
of the people into a whole for the purpose of action] 60. Ibid., sec. 46.
is the work of political leadership" (p. 21). "The 61. Ibid., sec. 49.
concept of leadership developed by democratic prac-
62. Ibid., addition to sec. 49.
tice contains the element of free competition"
63. Emil Brunner, Justice and the Social Order,
(p. 10).
trans. Mary Hottinger (London and Redhill: Lutter-
19. Ibid., pp. 297 f.
worth Press, 1945), p. 77.
20. John Locke, Second Essay on Civil Govern-
64. Ibid., pp. 58, 236.
ment, chap. iv, sec. 22.
65. Ibid., p. 58.
21. Ibid., chap. v, sec. 44.
66. Loc. cit.
22. Ibid., sec. 25.
23. Loc. cit. 67. Ibid., p. 77.
24. Ibid., sec. 26. 68. Ibid., p. 58.
25. Ibid., sec. 27. 69. Ibid., p. 59.
26. Ibid., sec. 44. 70. Loc. cit.

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Foundations of Democracy

Author(s): Hans Kelsen

Volume LXVI OCTOBER 1955 Number i, Part II

I. DEMOCRACY AND PHILOSOPHY

DEMOCRACY AS ''GOVERNMENT BY THE new political doctrine was advocated,

as reactionaries. The future belonged to a political realities in the Second World

proletariat, is presented as democracy. the people. Again and again, political

or of a body or bodies of individuals or Whether this participation is direct or

order as a material or substantial ele-people, it is the will of the people and

Lenin declares that the dictatorship of state only by representatives elected by

and an "existential" type of representa- refers, as we shall see, to exactly the

An autocratic state, too, is represented representation, though the term "repre-

A representative system is truly representa- reference in current political debate, but it is

cratic representation, representation of tion. By obliterating this difference, by

contradiction involved in the idea of a them. To attach punishment or reward

metaphysical confusion of reality with mysterious self-deception-the expres-

unreproducible, but, at least in principle, concentrated in one single individual, the

which from the point of view

contrary, at a relativization of the state. autocracy can be reduced to a difference

become godlike."" He emphasizes that a ered and appreciated in Hellas as democ-

DEMOCRACY AS A PROBLEM OF JUSTICE course, is-if a justification at all-only a

mocracy is presented and supposedly RELATIVISTIC POSITIVISM RESPONSIBLE

solved as a problem of divine, and that FOR TOTALITARIANISM

phatically asserted the transcendental idea of a value, whereas a straight line is

solute. Nevertheless B runner distin- if the disintegration of justice, as he as-

FREEDOM AND EQUALITY ACCORDING sideration in establishing a social order?

Brunner says we may find the answer to

is in question. "Is it not a requirement of "genuine" democracy. Since the term

doctrine is politically good or bad is not effective opponents of tyrannical govern-

aginary opponent, constructed for this RELIGIOUS RELATIVISM

mand an life official

the Declaration of Independence. It is,

CAPITALISM AND SOCIALISM IN RE- essentially, that is to say, by their very

anticapitalistic propaganda. It implies economically ruling group, that is to say,

ence of the capitalists, son toexercises its politi-

system of government based on political particular demonstration. It is not even

ministrative and especially the judicial, democratic principle in the organization

cal an administration is, that is to say, government which is our concern; it is

of democracy, in contradistinction to posed, it seems to some a very great dif-

of that society as far as is possible."29 If The individual has no absolute right, to

came the "great book of socialism of the Consequently individual property is

nature is applied, the welfare of the INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY AND FREEDOM

faction of man's most important needs pointed out-only relative freedom of

I. DEMOCRACY AND PHILOSOPHY

27. Ibid., p. 36. extent and content of his authorization depends

II. DEMOCRACY AND RELIGION

1. Emil Brunner, Gerechtigkeit: Eine Lehre von (Paris: P. Hartmann, 1943).

17. Ibid., pp. 16 f. stitute neither necessary nor sufficient conditions."

92. Ibid., p. 72. 113. Ibid., pp. 42 ff.

III. DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMICS

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