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Introduction
The concept of non-decision making was coined by American political scientists, Bachrach
and Baratz (1970), in their attempt to go beyond the view of decision-making power
advanced by Dahl (1961). Bachrach and Baratz argued that by focusing exclusively on
judgements about power in political arenas the assumption was made that all matters of
interest, preference or concern surfaced or were pursued in such decision-making arenas.
They found in their study of Baltimore City that some issues were never voiced or pursued
in recognized political arenas or with appropriate decision makers. Bachrach and Baratz
thus concluded that power also exists covertly, that is, outside political arenas, and argued
that non-decision making power was ‘the less apparent but nonetheless extremely import-
ant face of power’ (1970: 9). Bachrach and Baratz claimed that the flaw in the work by Dahl
was that he failed to acknowledge, even remotely, non-decision making, even though his
work contained some evidence of non-decision making. Studies by Huckman (1992), Bush
et al. (1993), Ball (1994) and Wallace and Hall (1994) also contain examples of non-
decision making in the school sector but they, like Dahl, fail to consider the concept. Deem
et al. (1995) is the exception here, as non-decision making is mentioned although the refer-
ence to Bachrach and Baratz’s definition of non-decision making is inaccurate. Furthermore,
Deem et al. (1995) do not empirically operationalize the concept as they argue that it is dif-
ficult to do so.
Whereas Dahl (1961) was preoccupied with asking who decision makers were and which
were the key locations of decisions, Bachrach and Baratz (1970) were more concerned with
investigating who non-decision makers were and how the political process functioned to
eliminate some issues from arenas of decisions, as will be explored below.
The aim of this paper is twofold: (1) to explore the nature of the concept of non-decision
making and examine how this concept is empirically operationalized and (2) to present
empirical evidence of non-decision making in the school sector. Particular attention will be
paid to the impact which ‘the market’ has had on the school sector in relation to non-
decision making. This paper should be seen as an introduction for further thought, dis-
cussion and development rather than an exhaustive or conclusive account. It is thus intended
as an overview of the main ideas.
decision makers and the second type is called ‘death by discussion’. It is evident in meet-
ings when extensive discussion is used to veer from an issue (until the issue is forgotten)
and a decision is not reached.
To add further to Bachrach and Baratz (1970), I suggest that non-decision making occurs
for four further reasons in addition to the mobilization of bias. First, non-decision making
occurs when individuals fail to forward their concerns in political arenas because it means
sacrificing a valued thing, for example, time or happiness. In this case, interest satisfaction
does not warrant or outweigh the sacrifice of a valued thing. This is what is known as
opportunity cost and relates closely to the concept of the mobilization of bias. A further
form of non-decision making occurs when issues are excluded from arenas of decision
because of the inability of actors to enact their concern due to ignorance of institutional
procedures or absence of essential skills or training—the index of incompetence (see
Morriss, 1987).1 In these two cases, non-decision making arises out of the inaction of cer-
tain individuals in the decision-making process rather than through bias of institutional sys-
tems. The third form of non-decision making is ‘personalities’. Non-decision making
occurs here because a negative conflictual relationship exists between the pursuant and the
decision maker or there is dislike between persons, such as a clash of personalities. Such
relationships result in failure to pursue an issue with relevant decision makers or in appro-
priate decision-making arenas. The final reason for non-decision making is ‘accommo-
dation’, where pursuants fail to pursue issues of interest or concern and instead accept or
adjust to the existing situation.
All of these reasons for non-decision making can exist in a single case—the single effect
of non-decision making—as will be seen below. Similarly, the mobilization of bias and
opportunity cost may jointly be responsible for a non-decision—the dual effect of non-
decision making. Furthermore, the mobilization of bias, the index of incompetence and per-
sonality can combine in a single incident to result in non-decision making—the triple effect
of non-decision making. In the latter two situations, a multiple effect of non-decision
making exists.
Finally, attempts are made to provide examples of each type of non-decision making. If
the paper appears to lack sufficient evidence of each type of non-decision making, this is
due to the limited space allotted.
Although Deem et al. (1995) point out that it is difficult to empirically operationalize the
concept of non-decision making because of the non-transparent nature of the concept, it is
not impossible. Bachrach and Baratz (1970) too had to face the problems of attempting to
operationalize this concept for empirical use and had to answer to their critics, namely
Merelman (1968) and Wolfinger (1968), regarding this problem. It is the approach taken by
Bachrach and Baratz which has helped in my own study. It is necessary for me to adopt
Bachrach and Baratz’s approach in order to take into account the differences between my
study and theirs in terms of setting, geographical location and time-frame. Bachrach and
Baratz’s study was conducted in local government settings of Baltimore City, USA in the
1960s, whereas my study focused on investigation into the English, contemporary, state-
school sector.
Obviously, candid questioning of respondents would have accomplished little as the con-
cept of non-decision making, as used here, can easily be misunderstood and misinterpreted.
To explicitly inquire into non-decisions I sought to discover where and to whom respon-
dents appealed to settle and forward disputes, concerns and interests. This course of ques-
tioning revealed arenas of decision and identified decision makers. If issues were dealt with
in arenas of decision then decisional power was exercised and overt conflict was mani-
fested—overt because it was pursued in sites of decision. If interests did not get to the
decision-making arena despite attempts to pursue issues there, non-decisional power could
have prevented such issues from surfacing in the political arena. Although a respondent’s
answer may indicate apparent non-decisional power it was important that this should not
simply be assumed by the researcher, myself. When such answers were identified I
attempted to obtain confirmation of the reasons for non-decision making. These were sought
through inquiry into actions to pursue interests or preference and into whether conflict was
the result of such action. In case of non-decision making conflict would be covert, that is, it
would not generally be observed in the political arena but present within the system,
revealed by the pursuant and observed by the researcher. Non-decision making which is
observed in public arenas could be removed through divisive means. Such means may not
be apparent to pursuants, as will be demonstrated below.
form, will here concentrate solely on the mobilization of bias. Evidence of dual- and triple-
effects of non-decision making will refer to two or three joint elements respectively where
the mobilization of bias is implicitly observed when other elements are responsible for non-
decision making.
Finally before examining the examples below, in some instances non-decision making
occurred because of micro-political operations (Ball, 1987; Hoyle, 1982) and other insti-
tutional or government biases which are interlinked with one or more of the five elements
responsible for non-decision making. Micro-politics refers to what Hoyle (1982: 87) calls
‘an organisational underworld’, ‘those strategies by which individuals and groups in organ-
isational contexts seek to use their resources of power and influence to further their
interests’ (p. 88). Incidences like these will be specified accordingly throughout the
discussion.
DMC: . . . have you got any matters of concern, anything that concerns you about the job
that you do?
Mrs L: Lack of consideration from people in the training room . . . teaching staff are
encouraged to take on training courses . . . and money is made available for them to
improve their knowledge, refresh their knowledge. We have to fight to get anything . . .
DMC: . . . Have you been able to raise that concern with the teachers, the head or anyone
that you feel . . .
Mrs L [interrupts]: . . . We have, we’ve raised it with various teachers. The head’s aware
of it, the Head of Department is aware of it, . . . but it’s like everything else, it doesn’t get
done. They talk about it and that’s it . . . There is just no progression. You have to fight
everything. I’ve had enough?
DMC: . . . have you been able to sit on any meetings at all and have this concern
[raised]?
Mrs L: . . . our elected representative, who’s the librarian, she sits . . . on the school devel-
opment group and they’re all aware of this fact,2 so where possible the money that is
allotted for training they do try and send us out on courses if we express a desire to do
so, but . . . a day release course there’s just not enough funding. . . . when I said I would
like to do a higher certificate they said, ‘oh yes you can do it but you have to pay for it
yourself’. (Mrs Lee, laboratory technician, Baxter)
Here we see the mobilization of bias operating both to delay the fulfilment of the techni-
cian’s pursuit of training and to reinforce that delay; an example of Bachrach and Baratz’s
(1970) third and fourth forms of the mobilization of bias. There are frequently more requests
than available resources to do in-service training so some requests are inevitably denied.
Denied requests are invariably those of non-teaching staff. The technician’s request is
denied because the system performs in ways that devalue the status of non-teaching staff
compared with teaching staff. For this reason training needs of teaching staff are systemati-
cally given priority consideration over non-teaching staff (in view of scarce resources),
although in principle training is offered to all staff, as the technician also states. The delay
is reinforced because teachers are trained ‘to improve their knowledge, refresh their knowl-
edge’ (Mrs Lee), which in turn leads to career development and progression and a need for
additional training. Conversely, non-teaching staff are not encouraged to develop their pro-
fessional skills through training unless they are prepared ‘to foot’ the financial and time-
availability costs themselves. In any event, traditionally non-teaching staff have received
less training than teaching staff. Furthermore, the delay is reinforced by a lack of funding in
the school generally and budget cuts in school education nationally as government policy
has impacted on school practice. The prevailing mobilization of bias means that, despite the
technician’s repeated request for and pursuit of training with the head of department, Head
and teachers in relevant meetings (who listen but fail to act), training is persistently denied.
Apart from being ‘real’ obstacles, the aforementioned factors are also deployed and used as
arguments to explain or as a legitimate denial in the decision-making process. In this case,
non-decision making exists because of the devalued status of the requester rather than
because of the importance of the request itself. This also suggests that factors such as status
position, social class, ethnicity and gender are significant in determining a pursuant’s suc-
cess in the decision-making process.
As pointed out above, the mobilization of bias also functions when relevant information
is deliberately concealed from pursuants—the sixth form of the mobilization of bias. This
is explored in the following instance, identified at Baxter.
After discussing the need to increase school security (due to the recent spate of attacks
on teachers and others in the school) and the types of security to appropriate, such as
CCTV cameras, security fencing, security guards and radio talkies, there was a brain-
storming section to suggest the need for, cost of purchasing and how and when ‘radio
talkies’ could be used . . . Mrs Mason (deputy head) stated that radios should only be used
in an emergency, to enter and leave the premises once the security alarm has been pro-
grammed rather than for constant use to contact staff. Mr Butler (senior teacher) inter-
rupted and informed the group that in an emergency the glass casing around the doors or
windows can be broken. Mr Pugh then added that if children are aware that they can
leave the building by breaking the glass, rather than utilizing the security system in the
proper manner, they will do so. The group agreed that this would indeed be the case if
children were informed. Mr Brown (head) then concluded this point, after some debate,
and said, ‘I don’t know that we really need to mention that to staff’. (Fieldnotes,
Extended Senior Management Team (ESMT) meeting, Baxter)
Here we see how the mobilization of bias is used, first, to hide the ESMT’s knowledge of
various means of exit from the school in an emergency. This form of the mobilization of bias
is a powerful strategy employed by decision makers because it averts any challenge to the
decision maker’s decision. Lack of knowledge concerning alternative means of leaving the
building pre-empts challenge to the ESMT’s decision as staff would be restricted to the only
option prescribed to them by the ESMT. However, in this instance, should the apparent base
of decision later be exposed the effects could perhaps be more damaging to relationships than
an actual straightforward denial or prohibition. Relationships may be damaged at Baxter
when staff realize that minor damage to windows and doors, thus requiring replacement, was
prioritized over considerations for safety. The irony in this case is that the ESMT meeting
was intended to contemplate school security, yet, set over and against budget control and
possibly economic constraints, safety was accorded a lesser priority than concerns about
damage to school property. This clearly demonstrates how ‘market’ principles and their
impact penetrate the day-to-day deliberations and evaluations of schools’ decision making.
Before moving on to the next example it must be said that, although the mobilization of
bias is evidently at work here, the ESMT’s concerns for the staff may be seen as having
positive rather than pernicious intent. This can be said if the ESMT genuinely believes that
the repercussions of revealing the real reasons for withholding alternative options for exit-
ing the school in an emergency could lead to a destructive outcome either for pupils, staff
or the school at large. However, whether the motive for concealment of relevant information
from others is benevolent or not, it can still be said that good relationships might be threat-
ened if the actual bases of decisions are later revealed.
The last example demonstrates the mobilization of bias operating in the seventh form,
that is, ‘death by discussion’. The illustration shows how lengthy discussion was used,
intentionally or unintentionally, to steer an issue about staff training out of a meeting.
The group discussed the issue of staff attendance for training. ‘Who should go for train-
ing’ was the question debated. The head felt that sufficient training was given to the year
tutors specified. However the year tutors concerned refuted this . . . The debate continued
for some time until the group digressed to talk about mundane issues . . . The time allot-
ted for discussion of this issue had expired so the head stated, ‘now to item number four
. . .’ and the group followed suit. . . . The meeting concluded a hour and a half later but a
decision was not reached concerning which staff should receive permission to go for
training. (Head of year meeting, Fabian Comprehensive)
Accommodation is selected over pursuit for change because teachers, according to Mrs
Townsend, apportion blame to themselves for the mismanagement of time. However, their
self-imposed guilt for supposed mismanagement, seems unjustified given the present
market-driven climate in education and the impact of government policies on school prac-
tice. Actors in this study, and others too (see Bowe et al., 1992; Deem and Brehony, 1993;
Gewirtz et al., 1995), state that the workload and multiple roles they perform far exceed
time-allocation. For this reason, I would argue that traditional management and organiz-
ational models,3 which advocate the practice of time-management and prioritization of
responsibilities, are currently inappropriate for use in the school sector. Stated differently,
increased curriculum work, administration, meeting-attendance and multiple work roles,
can only be accomplished within a given time. Even when school and out-of-school work
time is budgeted adequately and the importance of duties sufficiently prioritized, some
duties, primarily teaching as Mrs Townsend points out, are sacrificed for other duties,
namely administration.
Coupled with the element of accommodation, non-decision making also occurs in this
example through the operationalization of the mobilization of bias. In this case, the mobi-
lization of bias operates implicitly for Mrs Townsend and explicitly for Mrs Amesu, who
seemingly acknowledge the non-decision-making powers of the system—the fifth reason
for non-decision making identified by Bachrach and Baratz (1970). In this case the system
refers to the government which acts to prohibit pursuants pressing for change. This is dem-
onstrated as Mrs Townsend realizes that the head (Mrs Williams) is also experiencing simi-
lar pressures, such as ‘budget constraints’ (Mrs Townsend). Given that it is government
policies that are impacting on school practice Mrs Townsend’s pursuit of change with the
head would seem to be of little avail, despite Mrs Williams’s sympathy towards her staff’s
concerns. As pursuants acknowledge the non-decision making powers of the government,
they believe, according to Mrs Amesu, that pursuit of change with the government would
prove a fruitless exercise and change would not be forthcoming.
Before moving to the next example the point must be made that government policies
impact on school practice and the working life of actors concerned—‘multiple innovation’
(Wallace, 1992), ‘intensification’ (Apple, 1986) or ‘innovation overload’ (Fullan, 1991). As
this is the case, then we can presume that reasons for non-decision making would possibly
decline or a would-be non-decision would be resolved into a decision given a less pressured
climate of change.
DMC: Okay. You’ve raised a number of issues . . . have you been able to raise these
issues in arenas of decision making or policy making . . .
Mrs W: The voice, if you like, locally for head teachers is . . . what we call Standing
Conference of Secondary Headteachers so once a month all the headteachers in
Wongingford meet and yes, we’ve expressed our concerns through . . . that group so
they’ve gone either directly to the Secretary of State or they’ve gone to the Chairman of
Education Committee or else they’ve gone to the Director of Education or all . . . of them
or the appropriate body as the case may be . . . I have written to two different Secretaries
of State and expressed my displeasure about things that have been going on and all I’ve
had is an acknowledgement to say, ‘yes, . . . we’ve received your letter’ but that’s the end
of the story. . . . I will be a public agitator locally to get things done but I’m not . . . in the
greater public arena. So I’m not a union person and I’m not involved in . . . politics above
the local level . . .
DMC: Wh[y] do you think that you . . . cannot actually express your concerns in this
arena . . .
Mrs W: I mean when all this started in 88 I had this little kind of vision . . . to stand up some-
where and say, come on everybody. Why should we just do what this government is asking
us to do? Why don’t we all say, no, we’re not doing it and if we all say, no, we’re not doing
it, then it won’t happen. . . . well, perhaps there is an argument to say I could have done
[that] but that would have obviously taken me away from school . . . But the interesting
thing is that the unions at that time didn’t take on that role or that responsibility. No union
at any point objected to what the government was doing, except for the NAHT ever so often
. . . the NUT said, no, we’re not going to be supervising Key Stage 3 test and so on and
they’re now creating about publishing Key Stage 2 results and so on. . . . but I think that
came at a point when the government in power had been in power for long enough to break
the unions and so there was a feeling generally I think in the unions that if they were to
create any kind of objection, it would be seen as left-wing loonies who do not want any
improvement in the educational system. . . . I think the rank and file member didn’t want to
take any more action because it had all been futile in the past . . . So I think that they real-
ized that they were on a hiding to nothing (a) with their own members and (b) with the gov-
ernment so nobody voiced displeasure to the government and I think the other thing too was
that . . . the government virtually just kind of trammelled through everybody and I think it
was because they’d been in power for a great number of years and they just felt that they
had the ability just to say, we will do this, this, this and this . . . And I think that it was almost
like a . . . remorseless machine that was just mowing everything down in it’s path and the
government was just moving forward and they had this ideological vision of where we were
going to get to, wanted to get there like today. Instead of having . . . I mean in schools we
have to have our plans, our short term, our medium term, our long term plans. They didn’t
have that. It had to be done like tomorrow and they weren’t listening to anybody and it was
almost this futility. They’re going to tell us what to do anyway so we might as well get on
and do it. . . . it was quite a clever thing in a way in that if you didn’t do it, you’d be left
behind and therefore you wouldn’t be attracting children to your school and you’d become
a sink school . . . and you had to be up there in the forefront and in the vanguard of change
and innovation and all the rest of it or else you’d be left behind and it was one of the biggest
cons I think that we’ve ever lived through . . . [laughs]. (Mrs Williams, head, Galfymore)
Before examining the manifestation of the triple effect of non-decision making two sig-
nificant points must be made about this example. First, it differs from previous examples
because here pursuants (headteachers, union members) act as collective bodies, through
their representative organizations (Standing Conference of Headteachers, different teachers’
unions—National Union of Teachers (NUT) and National Association of Head Teachers
(NAHT)), rather than as individuals. The other distinction notable in this case, is the sub-
stantial and significant pursuit of collective agents for change beyond the confines of school
decision making. Here, issues are raised with local or national actors (Director of Education,
Chair of the Education Committee, Secretary of State for Education) or in local or national
arenas. In this instance, the triple effect of non-decision making comprises various forms of
the mobilization of bias, opportunity cost and accommodation. The mobilization of bias will
be considered first.
All forms of the mobilization of bias identified by Bachrach and Baratz (1970) are seen
here in varying degrees. The mobilization of bias is first demonstrated in the third form—
the devaluing of the importance of a request. This is witnessed by the apparent casual
response of Secretaries of State to the local headteachers’ and Mrs Williams’s letters of
grievance concerning the changes in the school sector—‘all I’ve had is an acknowledgement
to say, “yes . . . we’ve received your letter” but that’s the end of the story’. It is this non-
chalant attitude by the government to the headteachers’ concerns which acts as a barrier in
the decision-making process and leads to non-decision making. The second manifestation
of the mobilization of bias is seen in its fourth and fifth forms. In the fourth form, the mobi-
lization of bias operates through the introduction of several pieces of government legislation
(no less than nine major policy reforms since 1979; see Kavanagh, 1990) to restrict unions’
collective bargaining powers and ensure non-union action for change in official (for
example, Whitehall) and non-official decision-making locations. The mobilization of bias
further functions in the fourth form, as the prescribed ‘ideological vision’ of the former
Conservative administration (1979–97) and its various attempts to translate this vision into
practice, acts almost as a fixed, reinforcing barrier which prohibits or limits pursuit of their
interests by union members. Although, as noted by Mrs Williams, the success of the unions
in influencing the decision-making process was not entirely successful, it was nevertheless
not altogether in vain. For example, some curriculum reforms can at least possibly be
accredited to union activities, as in the NUT refusal to supervise the original Key Stage 3
tests. The limited achievement of union goals, because of the mobilization of bias in third
and fourth forms, is also expressed by Mrs Mason.
DMC: Have you been able to . . . pursue some of the concerns that you have just raised,
concerns of Local Management, the concern of the National Curriculum that has been
introduced and basically imposed on the education system and educationalists?
Mrs M: Through the NUT, oh yes, most definitely, I’ve been able to pursue them, not
with much success, but certainly have been able to pursue them.
DMC: OK, could you just give me an example? . . .
Mrs M: . . . the demonstrations, against cuts in education, those kind of things, which
don’t seem to have had an awful lot of overall success, but we’ve often met and discussed
and argued at conference, [so I have my] reservations of the union. I suppose the turn
around on the National Curriculum was at least in part to be accredited to the unions per-
haps . . . and to teachers, but the turn around itself was a pain by then because we were
all trying to adjust ourselves to one thing and then we had to change again. So I suppose
it may have had some influence. (Mrs Mason, deputy head, Baxter)
Unsuccessful former pursuits by the unions and Mrs Williams now serve as reminders of
frustration and failure and result in their reluctance to further pursue policy changes. Put dif-
ferently, the mobilization of bias (perceived in the fifth form) operates because pursuants
(the head and unions) now fail to act in relevant decision-making locations as they recog-
nize the non-decision making powers of the decision maker—the government. According to
Mrs Williams, the unions have also ceased to intervene in relevant decision-making arenas
and have instead become more compliant. Deference is conceded because, as Mrs Williams
puts it, the unions fear government misunderstanding, therefore harassment,4 of their
actions—‘any kind of objection . . . would be seen as left-wing loonies who do not want
improvement in the educational system’. Reasons for failure to pursue, by the unions, on
this occasion demonstrate the mobilization of bias operating in the first form, that is, com-
pliance through force, invoked by the system. Non-pursuit is also sought to avoid negative
sanctions imposed by the decision maker—the mobilization of bias in the second form.
Sanctions are exacted through threats of not ‘attracting children to your school’ and
‘becom[ing] a sink school’ if schools resisted involvement in the marketization of
education.
Alongside the mobilization of bias, the elements of opportunity cost and accommodation
comprise the triple effect in this example. The triple effect of non-decision making here
presents Mrs Williams with a moral dilemma—one which cannot easily be resolved.
Although Mrs Williams opposes the Conservative government reform of the education
system and wants amendments to it, she accepts that pursuit for policy change in the politi-
cal arena would mean sacrificing quality time which could otherwise be spent involved in
school and pupil related activities:
Why don’t we all say, no, we’re not doing it and if we all say, no, we’re not doing it, then
it won’t happen. . . . well, perhaps there is an argument to say I could have done [that] but
that would have obviously taken me away from school . . .
Similarly, the head has come to a reluctant acceptance of the present situation because she
realizes that the government’s dogmatic obstinacy (the mobilization of bias at work as men-
tioned above) supersedes reasoning and compromise—‘They’re [government] going to tell
us what to do anyway so we might as well get on and do it.’ In other words, the element of
opportunity cost is apparent here because Mrs Williams is unprepared to forego school-
based pursuits—the area in which her interest is greater—for political pursuit. Likewise,
accommodation is evident because of the ensuing mobilization of bias and the element of
opportunity cost stated above. This example also suggests that, as recent policy changes in
school-sector education are intrinsically linked to and are the cause of the mobilization of
bias, opportunity cost and accommodation, these elements would possibly have been infre-
quently observed pre-1980s.
Conclusion
Let me conclude where I began. Empirical evidence in the school sector confirms that non-
decision making is apparent, as indicated in the various examples of the single or multiple
effects of non-decision making. This paper also indicates the importance of the impact of
government policy on school-sector decision making. In terms of non-decision making,
these policies are either the reason for non-decision making in some cases, or they have
exacerbated the non-decision making process. Given this acknowledgement, it is clear that
the impact of external forces, such as government policy, cannot be overlooked in the over-
all analysis.
Finally, although this paper attempts to bridge a gap in the study of school-sector decision
making and power, it is highly unlikely that studies on non-decision making will supersede
those on decision making, given the non-translucent nature of the former. However, to focus
solely on examinations of decision making in terms of power, without even minutely refer-
ring to non-decision, is to focus on a partial component of the decision-making process with
regard to power.
Notes
Special thanks to Stephen Ball for support and guidance throughout the study from which this paper
emanates and to the ESRC for funding it. I am grateful to participants at the 1997 British
Educational Research Association where an earlier version was presented, Anne Gold, David
Halpin, Tim Simkins and two anonymous referees who provided useful comments and advice.
1. ‘Opportunity cost’ and the ‘index of incompetence’ are concepts I have adopted from Morriss
(1987). He does not relate these terms to non-decision making because he uses these concepts in
their own right. I refer to Morriss (1987) to forward further reasons for non-decision making.
2. Mrs Lee’s story is confirmed by another laboratory technician and the librarian in general
conversation on separate occasions.
3. Formal models, such as Scientific Management or Taylorism, are far too prescriptive. They fail
to take account of the realities of modern work conditions where excessive workload demands
sacrificing important work responsibilities, such as teaching preparation, in order that other duties
can be done.
4. Recent comments verify such fears. David Blunkett (the Secretary of State for Education in
England and Wales), for example, has argued teachers should carry out the government’s policies
instead of considering themselves victims of the changes.
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Correspondence to:
DR DOREEN M c CALLA - CHEN , Department of Social Sciences, Nottingham Trent University, York
House, Burton Street, Nottingham NG1 4BU.