Rule 45 – Appellate Practice

F.A.T. Kee Computer Systems v. Online Networks
International, Inc.
 ONLINE v. FAT KEE: complaint for sum of money
after FAT KEE failed to pay purchase price for the
computers sold to it by ONLINE
 RTC: Dismissed complaint (in favor of FAT KEE)
o MR (by ONLINE) denied
 CA (via NoA): reversed RTC (in favor of ONLINE)
o MR (by FAT KEE) denied
 Pet. For Review on Certiorari (R45)
R45 petition fatally detective for FAT KEE’s failure to
attach TSN of the RTC proceedings? NO
Given that the TSN of the proceedings before the RTC forms
part of the records of the instant case, the failure of FAT KEE
to attach the relevant portions of the TSN was already cured
by the subsequent elevation of the case records to this Court.
Procedural rules should be liberally construed in order to
promote their objective and assist the parties in obtaining
just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every
action or proceeding.

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what

the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a
question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or
falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law,
the same must not involve an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants
or any of them.

Tay Chun Suy v. CA  Sta. Clara Lumber (SCLC) obtained a loan from DBP, wc
was secured by a mortgage on SCLC’s vessel. Failed to
pay loan, thus mortgage was foreclosed.
 Auction sale  sold vessel to DBP; however, DBP did
not register w the PHL Coast Guard the mortgage,
neither the foreclosure nor the auction sale.
 SC Housing Industries (SCHI) and DBP entered into a
Lease/Purchase Agreement, wc provided that DBP
should lease some of SCLC’s properties, including the
vessel, to SCLI and transfer actual ownership upon full
payment
 SCLC caused the levy and attachment of the same vessel
in order to satisfy a judgment rendered in RTC Davao in
civil case, Tay Chun Suy v. SCLC || SCLI was the holder
of the coastwise license of the vessel
 Execution sale  DBP was the owner, not SCLC;
Sheriff still proceeded w the sale
SCHI, lessee of the vessel, is an entity separate from SCLC, and
was not a party to the case filed by petitioner against the
latter.16 Yet, SCHI was furnished, on a Saturday, copy of the
notice of auction sale of MV Sta. Clara I. Sta. Clara Lumber
Co., Inc., which was the proper party, does not appear to have
been notified. Upon being informed of the auction sale,
counsel for SCHI immediately went to the auction site and
requested that the sale be reset that day on the ground that
SCLC was no longer the owner of the vessel. To support this
claim, the Manager of SCHI hurriedly left for her office to
secure a copy of the certificate of sale in favor of DBP as this
was demanded by the sheriff.
Petitioner estopped from denying knowledge of prior
claim of DBP to the vessel? YES.
Asserts he never admitted that he knew of DBP’s prior
acquisition at the time of execution sale on 16 Jul 1986. Never
challenged this particular ruling in his appeal to the CA. Hence,
cannot be allowed to ventilate it now in this proceeding. Points
of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately

1

Producers Bank v. Excelsa Industries
 Vessel again levied upon and attached by virtue of a
writ of attachment by RTC Cebu in civil case Philippine
Trigon v. SCHI
 Upon being informed of execution sale, DBP filed a
complaint for annulment of the execution sale, recovery
of possession, damages and AF w prayer for restraining
order and preliminary injunction
o MTD (by Tan Chun Suy): denied, but granted
DBP’s prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction
o MR on denial: denied
 CA: petition for certiorari and mandamus with
prohibition
 SC: Pet. For Review on Certiorari (R45)
 TC issued decision wc declared DBP was the lawful
owner and public auction sale was void
o CA: dismissed appeal
o MR on dismissal: denied
 Excelsa obtained a loan from Producers Bank in the form
of a bill discounted and secured credit accommodation of
P200K secured by a REM over real estate properties
registered in the Excelsa’s name. Also secured loans that
might be extended in the future by Producers to Excelsa.
 Excelsa thereafter applied for a credit export advance
with Producers Bank supported by a LoC issued by a
Korean Bank through BPI  approved
 Korean buyer, however, refused to pay the export
documents prompting petitioner to demand from
respondent the payment of the peso equivalent of said
export documents together with its due and unpaid loans.
 Producers Bank: EJF of the REM; emerged as highest
bidder (failed to redeem, thus consolidated in favor of
Producers Bank)
 Excelsa @ RTC: Annulment of EJF with prayer for
preliminary injunction and damages
o Producers Bank: petition for the issuance of a
writ of possession
o RTC: VALID EJF and ordered the issuance of
writ of possession
 Excelsa: both assailing RTC Decision
1. Ordinary appeal to CA
2. SCA for certiorari to CA
 CA 1: reversed and set aside RTC decision decaling the
EJF as invalid and annulling the issuance of the writ of
possession
 CA 2: reversed RTC
Rule 45 – Appellate Practice
brought to the attention of the trial court need not be, and
ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing Court as
they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
Factual findings of the trial court, as well as those of the
Court of Appeals, are entitled to great weight and respect.
Pet. For certiorari should have been immediately
dismissed bc there was a remedy (MR and appeal)
available to Excelsa? YES.
Respondent herein committed a procedural blunder when it
filed a separate petition for certiorari before the CA, because
when the two cases were consolidated and a joint decision was
rendered, the cases lost their identities; and a petition for
certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail a decision granting
the issuance of a writ of possession.
The remedy of a party from the trial court’s order granting the
issuance of a writ of possession is to file a petition to set aside
the sale and cancel the writ of possession, and the aggrieved
party may then appeal from the order denying or granting said
petition.
A special civil action for certiorari could be availed of only if a
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction; and if there is no appeal or any
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. It has been repeatedly held in a number of cases that
the remedy of a party from the trial court’s order granting the
issuance of a writ of possession is to file a petition to set aside
the sale and cancel the writ of possession, and the aggrieved
party may then appeal from the order denying or granting said
petition. When a writ of possession had already been issued as
2

Union Bank v. People
Steelcase, Inc v. International Selections, Inc.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
assailing the March 31, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA) which affirmed the May 29, 2000 Order2 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 60, Makati City (RTC), dismissing the
complaint for sum of money in Civil Case No. 99-122 entitled
“Steelcase, Inc. v. Design International Selections, Inc.”
Resolution
The March 31, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals and its
March 23, 2006 Resolution are hereby REVERSED and SET
 Tomas charged for perjury for making a false narration in
CAFS.
 Union Bank’s 2 complaints for sum of money with prayer
for writ of replevin vs. Spouses Tamondong and a John
Doe
o Complaint 1 @ RTC Pasay
o Complaint 2 @ MeTC Pasay
 Tomas executed and signed CAFS for both complaints.
 MTQ (g: lack of jurisdiction and facts charged do not
constitute an offense)
o MeTC Makati (where the CAFS was
subscribed): DENIED
 Union Bank and Tomas @RTC Makati: Petition for
certiorari to annul and set aside MeTC Makati orders on
the ground of grave abuse of discretion
 Dealership agreement bw Steelcase and DISI
 Steelcase v. DISI: complaint for sum of money alleging
that DISI had an unpaid account of $600,000
o DISI’s compulsory counterclaim sought
issuance of TRO, dismissal, and payment of
damages
 Steelcase
o Motion to Admit Amended Complaint
o Motion to Admit SECOND Amended
Complaint
Rule 45 – Appellate Practice
in this case, the proper remedy is an appeal and not a petition
for certiorari. To be sure, the trial court’s order granting the
writ of possession is final. The soundness of the order granting
the writ of possession is a matter of judgment, with respect to
which the remedy of the party aggrieved is ordinary appeal. As
respondent availed of the wrong remedy, the appellate court
erred in not dismissing outright the petition for certiorari.
Certificate against forum shopping can be made either by a
statement under oath in the complaint or initiatory pleading
asserting a claim or relief; it may also be in a sworn certification
annexed to the complaint or initiatory pleading.
The Certificate against Forum Shopping can be made either by
a statement under oath in the complaint or initiatory pleading
asserting a claim or relief; it may also be in a sworn certification
annexed to the complaint or initiatory pleading. In both
instances, the affiant is required to execute a statement under
oath before a duly commissioned notary public or any
competent person authorized to administer oath that:
(a) he or she has not theretofore commenced any action or filed
any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or
quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his or her knowledge,
no such other action or claim is pending therein;
(b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete
statement of the present status thereof; and
(c) if he or she should thereafter learn that the same or similar
action or claim has been filed or is pending, he or she shall
report that fact within five days therefrom to the court wherein
his or her aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been
filed.
In relation to the crime of perjury, the material matter in a
Certificate against Forum Shopping is the truth of the required
declarations which is designed to guard against litigants
pursuing simultaneous remedies in different fora.
Steelcase doing business in the PHL? NO (QoF)
[T]he appointment of a distributor in the Philippines is not
sufficient to constitute doing business unless it is under the full
control of the foreign corporation. On the other hand, if the
distributor is an independent entity which buys and distributes
products, other than those of the foreign corporation, for its
own name and its own account, the latter cannot be considered
to be doing business in the Philippines. Here, DISI was an
independent contractor which sold Steelcase products in its
own name and for its own account. As a result, Steelcase
3

ASIDE. The dismissal order of the Regional Trial Court dated
November 15, 1999 is set aside. Steelcase’s Second Amended
Complaint is ordered ADMITTED. The case is REMANDED
to the RTC for appropriate action.
Estores v. Supangan
Petition for Review filed under Rule 45.
Resolution
The Petition for Review is DENIED. The May 12, 2006
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 83123 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that the rate of interest
shall be twelve percent (12%) per annum, computed from
September 27, 2000 until fully satisfied. The award of attorney’s
fees is further reduced to P50,000.00.
 RTC: dismissed complaint (no license, but doing
business; no right to seek redress), granted TRO, denied
amendment of complaint
o MR denied
 Appeal to CA: affirmed RTC
o MR: denied by CA
 Conditional deed of sale bw Estores and Sps Supangan,
but after 7 years Estores still failed to transfer ownership
 Sps Supangan demanded return of P3.5M w/in 15 days
from receipt  Estores promised to return money within
120 days  Sps Supangan agreed, but imposed an interest
of 12% annually  Estores still failed to return money
 Sps Supangan @ RTC: complaint for sum of money
o RTC: entitled to interest, but only at 6% per
annum + AF
 CA on appeal
o Issue: whether it is proper to impose interest
for an obli that does not involve a loan or
forbearance of money in the absence of
stipulation of the parties
o Affirmed RTC that interest should start on
date of formal demand
Rule 45 – Appellate Practice
cannot be considered to be doing business in
the Philippines by its act of appointing a distributor as it falls
under one of the exceptions under R.A. No. 7042.
Proper imposition of interest and AF? YES (QoL)
Interest may be imposed even in the absence of
stipulation in the contract. Contract involved in the case
is not a loan, but a conditional deed of sale – can be
considered as a forbearance of money which requires 12%.
Article 2210 of the Civil Code expressly provides that
“[i]nterest may, in the discretion of the court, be allowed upon
damages awarded for breach of contract.” In this case, there
is no question that petitioner is legally obligated to return
the P3.5 million because of her failure to fulfill the obligation
under the Conditional Deed of Sale, despite
demand. Petitioner enjoyed the use of the money from the
time it was given to her until now. Thus, she is already in
default of her obligation from the date of demand.
Forbearance is defined as a “contractual obligation of lender
or creditor to refrain during a given period of time, from
requiring the borrower or debtor to repay a loan or debt then
due and payable.” This definition describes a loan where a
debtor is given a period within which to pay a loan or debt. In
such case, “forbearance of money, goods or credits” will have
no distinct definition from a loan. We believe however, that
the phrase “forbearance of money, goods or credits” is meant
to have a separate meaning from a loan, otherwise there would
have been no need to add that phrase as a loan is already
sufficiently defined in the Civil Code.
Forbearance of money, goods or credits should therefore
refer to arrangements other than loan agreements, where a
person acquiesces to the temporary use of his money, goods or
credits pending happening of certain events or fulfillment of
certain conditions.
In this case, the respondent-spouses parted with their money
even before the conditions were fulfilled. They have therefore
allowed or granted forbearance to the seller (petitioner) to use
their money pending fulfillment of the conditions. They were
deprived of the use of their money for the period pending
fulfillment of the conditions and when those conditions were
breached, they are entitled not only to the return of the
4

Dalton v. FGR Realty and Development Corp.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. The petition challenges the 9 November 2005
Decision and 10 April 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 76536. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
26 February 2002 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Judicial Region 7, Branch 13, Cebu City, in Civil Case No. CEB
4218.
Resolution
The Court DENIES the petition. The Court AFFIRMS the 9
November 2005 Decision and 10 April 2006 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76536.
 Dayrit owned a parcel of land located in Cebu City.
Dalton and Sasam, et al. leased portions of the property.
 Dayrit sold the property to FGR. Both stopped accepting
rental payments bc they wanted to terminate the lease
agreements with Dalton and Sasam, et al.
 Dalton and Sasam, et al consigned the rental payments
with the RTC, but failed to notify Dayrit and FGR about
the consignation.
 Dayrit and FGR withdrew the rental payments, but
reserved the right to question the validity of the
consignation.
 Compromise agreement entered into and was agreed
upon to abandon all claims against each other.
 Dalton did not enter into compromise agreement
 RTC: dismissed complaint and ordered Dalton to vacate
the property.
 Appeal to CA: affirmed RTC
Rule 45 – Appellate Practice
principal amount paid, but also to compensation for the use of
their money. And the compensation for the use of their
money, absent any stipulation, should be the same rate of legal
interest applicable to a loan since the use or deprivation of
funds is similar to a loan.
CA erred in ruling that Dalton failed to pay rent? NO.
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court states that petitions
for review on certiorari “shall raise only questions of law which
must be distinctly set forth.” Whether Dalton failed to pay
rent is a question of fact. It is not reviewable.
The factual findings of the lower courts are binding on the
Court. The exceptions to this rule are
(1) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
(2) when the findings are grounded on speculation;
(3) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken;
(4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on a
misapprehension of facts;
(5) when the factual findings are conflicting;
(6) when the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the
case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of the
parties;
(7) when the Court of Appeals overlooked undisputed facts
which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion;
(8) when the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed
by the respondent; and
5

PNB v. Perez
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 187640 is
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 96534 dated October 23, 2008 is AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that the July 5, 2006 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Isabela in Civil Case No. 20-1155
is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE, the titles issued to Spouses
Angelito Perez and Jocelyn Perez by virtue of the aforesaid
August 17, 2006 Order and all derivative titles emanating
thereon are cancelled and declared null and void and directing
the Register of Deeds of Isabela to issue new certificates of title
in the name of the Philippine National Bank (PNB) to replace
the fourteen (14) titles previously issued to Spouses Angelito
and Jocelyn Perez pursuant to the August 17, 2006 Order and
for Spouses Angelito and Jocelyn Perez to pay to PNB the
amount of PhP 2,676,140.70 representing the amount
garnished from PNB’s account with Equitable PCI Bank
(EPCIB) by virtue of the August 15, 2006 Writ of Execution
issued pursuant to the July 5, 2006 Decision.
 Sps Perez obtained a revolving credit line from PNB
Cauayan secured by CMs over palay stocks inventory and
REMs over real properties.
 Default on financial obligations  PNB: EJF
proceedings
 Sps Perez filed an Amended Complaint for Release or
Discharge of Mortgaged Properties, Breach of Contract,
Declaration of Correct Amount of Obligation,
Injunction, Damages, Annulment of Sheriff’s Notice of
Extra-Judicial Sale, with a Prayer for the Issuance of a
Preliminary Mandatory Injunctive Writ and a
Temporary Restraining Order (denied bc absent)
 Pre-trial conference: Absent [Motion for Postponement
DENIED]
o MR denied
o Second MR denied
 NoA denied for being filed out of time
o MR denied
 Appeal to CA: denied
o MR: granted (g: higher interest of substantial
justice)
 Case remanded to RTC, but PNB failed to receive copy
and was unable to attend; Sps Perez allowed to adduce
evidence and considered the hearing as a pre-trial
conference
o PNB MR: denied w/o stating reason
o RTC: decided in favor of Sps Perez
o PNB MR, but counsel failed to send copy to
TC: denied
 RTC: issued Writ of Execution
o PNB Pet. For Relief from Judgment/Order of
Execution w prayer for issuance of writ of
preliminary injunction: denied prayer for
preliminary injunction + annulled certificates
of title issued to PNB
 PNB Pet. For Certiorari (with Prayer for the Issuance of
an Ex-Parte Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of
Preliminary Injunction) + filed a Supplement to the
Petition for Certiorari (with Urgent Prayer for the
Issuance of an Ex-Parte Temporary Restraining
Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction)13 and an Urgent
Rule 45 – Appellate Practice
(9) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are premised on
the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence
on record.
Dalton did not show that any of these circumstances is present.
Petition for certiorari is proper remedy? YES
Here, the trial court failed to issue a proper notice of pre-trial
to PNB. Thus, it committed grave abuse of discretion when it
issued the Order dated March 8, 2006 allowing Spouses Perez
to present their evidence ex-parte.
Considering that the trial court’s action in issuing such order
constituted grave abuse of its discretion, PNB availed of the
proper remedy when it filed a petition for certiorari with the
CA.
Nevertheless, even with the existence of the remedy of appeal,
this Court has, in certain cases, allowed a writ of certiorari
where the order complained of is a patent nullity. In the instant
case, the lack of notice of pre-trial rendered all subsequent
proceedings null and void. Hence, the CA was correct in not
dismissing the petition for certiorari.
Evidently, the argument that the petition for certiorari is
precluded by the motion for reconsideration and the petition
for relief from judgment filed before the trial court is
untenable.
Argument that subject properties were sold to certain
innocent purchasers for value will stand? NO. Such
allegation is a QoF, not a QoL.
The issues that can be raised in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 are limited only to questions of law.
The test of whether the question is one of law or of fact is
whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised
without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it
is a question of law; otherwise, it is a question of fact.
It is settled that matters not raised in the trial court or lower
courts cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. “They must
be raised seasonably in the proceedings before the lower courts.
Questions raised on appeal must be within the issues framed
by the parties; consequently, issues not raised before the trial
court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Spouses
6
 Rule 45 – Appellate Practice

Motion for the Issuance of an Ex-Parte Temporary Perez never raised this issue before the CA. Hence, they cannot
Restraining Order with Supplement to Petition @ CA: raise it before this Court now.
granted and issued TRO
 Despite issuance of TRO, Sps Perez were able to garnish
P2.6M from PNB’s account on the same date TRO was
issued
 PNB @ CA: Supplemental Petition for Certiorari (with
Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of an Ex-Parte Writ of
Preliminary Injunction) seeking additional reliefs for the
return or reinstatement of the garnished amount and/or
the appointment of a receiver over the said funds to
administer and preserve the same pending the final
disposition of the case  GRANTED (the sending of a
notice of pre-trial is mandatory and that the Order dated
March 8, 2006 issued by the trial court cannot be
considered as such. Therefore, the CA held that all orders
issued subsequent to the said order are, likewise, null and
void.); however, failed to address PNB’s prayer for
issuance of writ of mandatory injunction and
return/reinstatement
o PNB: Motion for Clarificatory Order 
denied
o Sps Perez: MR  denied
 PNB and Sps Perez filed their separate petitions with SC
assailing both the decision and resolution of CA.
 Spouses Perez argue that the filing of a petition for
certiorari by PNB before the CA was improper for two
reasons: (a) a petition for certiorari is not a substitute for
a lost appeal; and (b) there were other pending petitions
for relief from judgment and a motion for reconsideration
with the lower court.

7

RGM Industries v. United Pacific Capital Corp.
At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and set aside the Decision
dated July 23, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 87727 which affirmed with modification the Decision
dated April 11, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
147 of Makati City, in Civil Case No. 99-1888, ordering RGM
Industries, Inc. (petitioner) to pay its obligation to United
Pacific Capital Corporation (respondent). The RTC’s judgment
was modified as to the interest rates and penalty charges
imposed. Likewise assailed is the CA’s Resolution dated
December 14, 2010 denying the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, the Petition
is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated July 23,
2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 87727 is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that: (1) the penalty
charge is reduced to 1% per month or 12% per annum; and (2)
the attorney’s fees is reduced to 1% of the total unpaid
obligation.
Sarona v. NLRC
 UCPC granted a P30M short-term credit facility in favor
of RGM.
 RGM failed to satisfy PNs as they fell due.
 RGM issued a consolidated PN in favor UCPC in the
principal amount of P27M++ for a term of 14 days.
Stipulated interest was 32%. In case of default, penalty
charge of 8% per month  failed to satisfy  asked for
restructuring of the loan
 UCPC @ RTC: complaint for collection of sum of money
o RGM claimed that the agreed interest rate was
fixed at 15.5% per annum and not the varying
interest rates imposed by the respondent
which reached as high as 40% per annum
(assertion of unilateral imposition of increased
interest rates)
 RTC: in favor of UCPC
 CA: affirmed RTC but modified the interest rates and
penalty charges imposed.
o RGM MR bc the modified interest rates and
penalty charges are still exorbitant and failed
to appreciate partial payments already made:
DENIED
 On June 20, 2003, the petitioner, who was hired by
Sceptre as a security guard sometime in April 1976, was
asked by Karen Therese Tan (Karen), Sceptre’s
Operation Manager, to submit a resignation letter as the
same was supposedly required for applying for a position
at Royale. The petitioner was also asked to fill up Royale’s
employment application form, which was handed to him
by Royale’s General Manager, respondent Cesar Antonio
Tan II (Cesar).
 After several weeks of being in floating status, Royale’s
Security Officer, Martin Gono (Martin), assigned the
petitioner at Highlight Metal Craft, Inc. (Highlight Metal)
from July 29, 2003 to August 8, 2003. Thereafter, the
petitioner was transferred and assigned to Wide Wide
World Express, Inc. (WWWE, Inc.).
 On September 17, 2003, the petitioner was informed that
his assignment at WWWE, Inc. had been withdrawn
because Royale had allegedly been replaced by another
security agency. The petitioner, however, shortly
discovered thereafter that Royale was never replaced as
WWWE, Inc.’s security agency. When he placed a call at
WWWE, Inc., he learned that his fellow security guard
was not relieved from his post.
Rule 45 – Appellate Practice
The issue on partial payments and their application to the
outstanding balance involves a calibration of the evidence
presented, hence, factual in nature and not reviewable in the
petition at bar. Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
may be brought only on questions of law, not on questions of
fact.
Nevertheless, we are convinced that the courts a quo, in
concluding the outstanding balance of the petitioner, have both
carefully considered and appreciated the evidence of partial
payments adduced. As found by the CA, the payments made
by the petitioner before the complaint was filed were duly
deducted from the outstanding balance; while the payments
made during the pendency of the case were applied to the due
and outstanding penalty charges.
However, pursuant to Bank of the Philippine Islands, Inc. v.
Yu, we deem it proper to further reduce the penalty charge
decreed by the CA from 2% per month to 1% per month or
12% per annum in view of the following factors: (1) respondent
has already received P7,504,522.27 in penalty charges, and (2)
the loan extended to respondent was a short-term credit
facility.
Sarona barred from exercising his right to elevate CA
decision to SC? NO. Receipt of the proceeds of the NLRC
award is qualified and without prejudice to the CA’s resolution
of his pet. for certiorari.
The prevailing party’s receipt of the full amount of the
judgment award pursuant to a writ of execution issued by the
labor arbiter does not close or terminate the case if such receipt
is qualified as without prejudice to the outcome of the petition
for certiorari pending with the CA.
The finality of the NLRC’s decision does not preclude the filing
of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
That the NLRC issues an entry of judgment after the lapse of
ten (10) days from the parties’ receipt of its decision will only
give rise to the prevailing party’s right to move for the
execution thereof but will not prevent the CA from taking
cognizance of a petition for certiorari on jurisdictional and due
process considerations. In turn, the decision rendered by the
CA on a petition for certiorari may be appealed to this Court
by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. Under Section 5, Article VIII of the
Constitution, this Court has the power to “review, revise,
reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or
8

 On September 21, 2003, the petitioner was once again
assigned at Highlight Metal, albeit for a short period from
September 22, 2003 to September 30, 2003.
Subsequently, when the petitioner reported at Royale’s
office on October 1, 2003, Martin informed him that he
would no longer be given any assignment per the
instructions of Aida Sabalones-Tan (Aida), general
manager of Sceptre. This prompted him to file a
complaint for illegal dismissal on October 4, 2003.
Rule 45 – Appellate Practice
the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of
lower courts in x x x all cases in which only an error or question
of law is involved.” Consistent with this constitutional
mandate, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides the remedy of
an appeal by certiorari from decisions, final orders or
resolutions of the CA in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature
of the action or proceedings involved, which would be but a
continuation of the appellate process over the original case.
Since an appeal to this Court is not an original and independent
action but a continuation of the proceedings before the CA,
the filing of a petition for review under Rule 45 cannot be
barred by the finality of the NLRC’s decision in the same way
that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA cannot.
Furthermore, if the NLRC’s decision or resolution was
reversed and set aside for being issued with grave abuse of
discretion by way of a petition for certiorari to the CA or to
this Court by way of an appeal from the decision of the CA, it
is considered void ab initio and, thus, had never become final
and executory.

May SC resolve the issue of whether one corporation is a
mere alter ego of another entity or whether the corporate
fiction was invoked for fraudulent or malevolent ends?
YES.
As a general rule, this Court is not a trier of facts and a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
must exclusively raise questions of law. Moreover, if factual
findings of the NLRC and the LA have been affirmed by the
CA, this Court accords them the respect and finality they
deserve. It is well-settled and oft-repeated that findings of fact
of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have
acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to
specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect, but
finality when affirmed by the CA. Nevertheless, this Court will
not hesitate to deviate from what are clearly procedural
guidelines and disturb and strike down the findings of the CA
and those of the labor tribunals if there is a showing that they
are unsupported by the evidence on record or there was a
patent misappreciation of facts. Indeed, that the impugned
decision of the CA is consistent with the findings of the labor
tribunals does not per se conclusively demonstrate the
correctness thereof. By way of exception to the general rule,
this Court will scrutinize the facts if only to rectify the prejudice
and injustice resulting from an incorrect assessment of the
evidence presented.
9

Sta. Maria v. CA
This is an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the
decision1 of 18 December 1996 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 48473, which affirmed with modification the
30 June 1994 Decision2 of Branch 19 of the Regional Trial
Court of Bulacan in Civil Case No. 77-M-92 granting the
private respondents a right of way through the property of the
petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED
and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED in toto.
 Sps Fajardo v. Sps Sta Maria for the establishment of an
easement of right of way.
 Sps Fajardo allege that their lot is surrounded by
properties belonging to other persons, including those of
Sps Sta Maria’s; bc no adequate outlet to the prov’l road,
easement either of Sps Maria’s properties wc are directly
abutting the provincial road is most convenient
 Sps Sta Maria MTD: denied
 Sps Sta Maria NoA to the SC denying their MTD under
R45: denied for lack of merit
 Sps Sta Maria pet. for review on certiorari of LC’s order:
denied for failure to comply w SC Circulars
o MR denied w finality
 RTC: granted easement
 Sps Sta Maria Appeal w CA: affirmed RTC, but modified
the property valuation by increasing it
 Sps Sta Maria Pet. for Review on Certiorari
Rule 45 – Appellate Practice
May a resolution of an issue that has supposedly become
final and executory as the petitioner only raised it in his
reply to the respondents’ appeal be revisited by the
appellate court? YES, if such is necessary for a just disposition
of the case.
The NLRC refused to disturb LA Gutierrez’s denial of the
petitioner’s plea to pierce Royale’s corporate veil as the
petitioner did not appeal any portion of LA Gutierrez’s May
11, 2005 Decision.
Under Section 4(c), Rule VI of the NLRC Rules, the NLRC
shall limit itself to reviewing and deciding only the issues that
were elevated on appeal. The NLRC, while not totally bound
by technical rules of procedure, is not licensed to disregard and
violate the implementing rules it implemented. Nonetheless,
technicalities should not be allowed to stand in the way of
equitably and completely resolving the rights and obligations of
the parties. Technical rules are not binding in labor cases and
are not to be applied strictly if the result would be detrimental
to the working man. This Court may choose not to encumber
itself with technicalities and limitations consequent to
procedural rules if such will only serve as a hindrance to its duty
to decide cases judiciously and in a manner that would put an
end with finality to all existing conflicts between the parties.
Questions of fact? YES
Assigned errors 1, 2, and 4 involve questions of fact.
1 - whether or not a compulsory easement of right of way can
be established in the light of the doctrine laid down by the SC
in Costabella Corporation vs. CA which held that [for] the
failure of private respondents to show that the isolation of their
property was not due to their personal or their
predecessors­in­interest’s own acts, they are not entitled to a
compulsory easement of right of way.
2 - whether or not a compulsory right of way can be granted to
private respondents who have two other existing passage ways
other than that of petitioners and an alternative vacant lot
fronting the provincial road also adjacent to private
respondents’ property, which can be used in going to and from
private respondents’ property.
4 – CA seriously erred in holding that private respondents have
no adequate outlet to a public highway which inference drawn
from facts was manifestly mistaken
Settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases
brought before it from the Court of Appeals via Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court is limited to reviewing errors of law. Findings
10

Republic v. Ortigas  Respondent is the owner of a parcel of land in Pasig
City. Upon the request of the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH), respondent caused the
segregation of its property into five lots and reserved one
portion for road widening for the C-5 flyover
project. The C-5-Ortigas Avenue flyover was completed
in 1999, utilizing only 396 square meters of the 1,445-
square-meter allotment for the project.
 Consequently, respondent further subdivided the lot into
the portion actually used for road widening, and the
unutilized portion, and filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig a petition for authority to sell to the
government the portion of the lot actually used for the
road widening.
 The RTC issued an order authorizing the sale but
petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General, filed an opposition,
alleging that respondent Ortigas’ property can only be
conveyed by way of donation to the government, citing
Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, also known
as the Property Registration Decree.
 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied by the RTC.
 Petitioner’s appeal was also dismissed by the Court of
Appeals.
Rule 45 – Appellate Practice
of fact of the latter are conclusive, except in the following
instances: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when
there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of
fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court
of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings
are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the
appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial
court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts
set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when
the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
All told, the findings of fact of both courts satisfied the
following requirements for an estate to be entitled to a
compulsory servitude of right of way under the Civil Code
CA erred in denying Republic’s appeal based on
technicalities? NO
The sole issue raised by petitioner Republic of the Philippines
to the Court of Appeals is whether respondent Ortigas’
property should be conveyed to it only by donation, in
accordance with Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
This question involves the interpretation and application of the
provision. It does not require the Court of Appeals to examine
the truth or falsity of the facts presented. Neither does it invite
a review of the evidence. The issue raised before the Court of
Appeals was, therefore, a question purely of law. The proper
mode of appeal is through a petition for review under Rule 45.
Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the
appeal on this ground.
Section 2 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides that appeals
taken from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals
raising only pure questions of law are not reviewable by the
Court of Appeals. In which case, the appeal shall not be
transferred to the appropriate court. Instead, it shall be
dismissed outright. Appeals from the decisions of the Regional
Trial Court, raising purely questions of law must, in all cases,
be taken to the Supreme Court on a petition for review on
certiorari in accordance with Rule 45. An appeal by notice of
appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals is
11

Altres v. Empleo
Assailed via petition for review on certiorari are the Decision
dated February 2, 2007 and Order dated October 22, 2007 of
Branch 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iligan City,
which denied petitioners’ petition for mandamus praying for a
writ commanding the city accountant of Iligan, Camilo G.
Empleo (Empleo), or his successor in office, to issue a
certification of availability of funds in connection with their
appointments, issued by then Iligan City Mayor Franklin M.
Iligan Mayor Quijano advised CSC of its variou career
positions in the city government, of which the latter proceeded
its publication. Petitioners and other applicants submitted their
applications for the different positions where they felt
qualified.
Toward the end of his term, Mayor Quijano issued
appointments to petitioners.
Rule 45 – Appellate Practice
proper if the appellant raises questions of fact or both
questions of fact and questions of law.
There is a question of law when the appellant raises an issue as
to what law shall be applied on a given set of facts. Questions
of law do “not involve an examination of the probative value
of the evidence presented.” Its resolution rests solely on the
application of a law given the circumstances. There is a
question of fact when the court is required to examine the truth
or falsity of the facts presented. A question of fact “invites a
review of the evidence.”
The trial court’s order denying petitioner Republic of the Philippines’
motion for reconsideration of the decision granting respondent Ortigas the
authority to sell its property to the government was not an interlocutory
order because it completely disposed of a particular matter. An appeal from
it would not cause delay in the administration of justice. Petitioner Republic
of the Philippines’ appeal to the Court of Appeals, however, was properly
dismissed because the former used the wrong mode of appeal.
Orders denying motions for reconsideration are not always
interlocutory orders. A motion for reconsideration may be
considered a final decision, subject to an appeal, if “it puts an
end to a particular matter,” leaving the court with nothing else
to do but to execute the decision. “An appeal from an order
denying a motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal
of a complaint is effectively an appeal of the order of dismissal
itself.” It is an appeal from a final decision or order. The trial
court’s order denying petitioner Republic of the Philippines’
motion for reconsideration of the decision granting respondent
Ortigas the authority to sell its property to the government was
not an interlocutory order because it completely disposed of a
particular matter. An appeal from it would not cause delay in
the administration of justice. Petitioner Republic of the
Philippines’ appeal to the Court of Appeals, however, was
properly dismissed because the former used the wrong mode
of appeal.
Defect in the verification and CAFS? NO.
Court held that in the present case, the signing of the
verification by only 11 out of the 59 petitioners already
sufficiently assures the Court that the allegations in the pleading
are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or
a matter of speculation; that the pleading is filed in good faith;
and that the signatories are unquestionably real parties-in-
interest who undoubtedly have sufficient knowledge and belief
to swear to the truth of the allegations in the petition.
12
 Rule 45 – Appellate Practice

Quijano (Mayor Quijano), which were pending approval by the
Civil Service Commission (CSC).
WHEREFORE, the Court declares that it is Section 474(b)(4),
not Section 344, of the Local Government Code of 1991,
which applies to the requirement of certification of availability
of funds under Section 1(e)(ii), Rule V of Civil Service
Commission Memorandum Circular Number 40, Series of
1998.
In the meantime, the Sangguniang Panglungsod issued
requesting a suspension of action on the processing of
appointments to all vacant positions until the enactment of a
new budget and another resolution holding transmission of all
appointments.
Respondent city accountant Empleo did not issue a
certification as to availability of funds for the payment of
salaries and wages of petitioners, as required in the LGU
appointment.
Under justifiable circumstances, we have already allowed the
relaxation of the requirements of verification and certification
so that the ends of justice may be better served. Verification is
simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in
the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the
imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is
filed in good faith; while the purpose of the aforesaid
certification is to prohibit and penalize the evils of forum
shopping.

The CSC Field Office for Lanao del Norte and Iligan City On the requirement of a certification of non-forum shopping,
disapproved the appointments issued to petitioners invariably the well-settled rule is that all the petitioners must sign the
due to lack of certification of availability of funds. certification of non-forum shopping. The reason for this is that
the persons who have signed the certification cannot be
Mayor Quijano appealed to CSC but later dismissed due to presumed to have the personal knowledge of the other
lacks a requirement prescribed by the civil service law, rules and non-signing petitioners with respect to the filing or non-filing
regulations, it would disapprove it without delving into the of any action or claim the same as or similar to the current
reasons why the requirement was not complied with. petition. The rule, however, admits of an exception and that is
when the petitioners show reasonable cause for failure to
RTC: personally sign the certification. The petitioners must be able
 RTC denied petitioners’ petition for mandamus. to convince the court that the outright dismissal of the petition
 Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and is would defeat the administration of justice.
subsequently denied as well.
Verification v. CAFS [see De Leon]
SC:
 The Court, without giving due course to the
petition, required respondents to comment thereon
within ten (10) days from notice, and at the same
time required petitioners to comply, within the same
period, with the relevant provisions of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.
 Petitioners filed a Compliance Report as required.
 Respondents duly filed their Comment, alleging
technical flaws in petitioners’ petition, to which
Comment petitioners filed their Reply in
compliance with the Court’s Resolution
 Respondents assail as defective the verification and
certification against forum shopping attached to the
petition as it bears the signature of only 11 out of
the 59 petitioners, and no competent evidence of
identity was presented by the signing petitioners.
They thus move for the dismissal of the petition
 Petitioners, on the other hand, argue that they have
a justifiable cause for their inability to obtain the
signatures of the other petitioners as they could no

13

Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc.
Mendoza v. CA
longer be contacted or are no longer interested in
pursuing the case.
 Francisco v. Cebu Country Club @ RTC Cebu: action for
declaration of nullity and non-existence of deed/title,
cancellation of certificates of title, and recovery of
property
o RTC: in favor of Cebu Country Club
 Both parties appealed to CA
o CA: affirmed RTC
o Francisco MR: denied
 Francisco appeal to SC: denied pet. for review, but set
aside CA and RTC decision
o Francisco MR: denied
 Gov’t via OSG @ RTC: motion for issuance of writ of
execution (opposed by Cebu Country Club)
 Later on, the proceedings on the OSG’s motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution at the instance of Cebu
Country Club in deference to the on-going hearings being
conducted by the Committee on Natural Resources of the
House of Representatives on a proposed bill to confirm
the TCTs and reconstituted titles covering the Banilad
Friar Lands Estate in Cebu City.
 The Congress ultimately enacted a law to validate the
TCTs and reconstituted titles covering the Banilad Friar
Lands Estate in Cebu City.
o RTC: denied OSG’s motion
o Francisco MR questioning denial of OSG’s
motion for issuance of writ of execution:
denied
o Upon being directed by the RTC to comment
on the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration,
the OSG manifested in writing that the
Government was no longer seeking the
execution of the decision in G.R. No. 130876,
subject to its reservation to contest any other
titles within the Banilad Friar Lands Estate
should clear evidence show such titles as
having been obtained through fraud.1
 Francisco pet. for review on certiorari
 Sps Mendoza signed a PN of US$35k in favor of Sps
Asuncion.
 Sps Mendoza made $500 monthly payments for a period
of 10 months. Last payment made in Nov 1982.
 RTC: dismissed; no acceleration clause
Rule 45 – Appellate Practice
Immediate dismissal? YES
A. Petitioners’ breach of the hierarchy of courts by coming
directly to the Court to appeal the assailed issuances of the RTC
via petition for review on certiorari.
The need to elevate the matter first to the CA is also
underscored by the reality that determining whether the
petitioners were real parties in interest entitled to bring this
appeal against the denial by the RTC of the OSG’s motion for
the issuance of a writ of execution was a mixed question of fact
and law. As such, the CA was in the better position to review
and to determine. In that regard, the petitioners violate Section
1, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which demands
that an appeal by petition for review on certiorari be limited to
questions of law.
B. The second violation concerns the omission of a sworn
certification against forum shopping from the petition for
review on certiorari. Section 4, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure requires that the petition for review should
contain, among others, the sworn certification on the
undertakings provided in the last paragraph of Section 2, Rule
42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Only petitioner Tomas V. Alonso has executed and signed the
sworn certification against forum shopping attached to the
petition. Although neither of his co-petitioners—Mercedes V.
Alonso and Asuncion V. Alonso—has joined the certification,
Tomas did not present any written express authorization in his
favor authorizing him to sign the certification in their behalf.
The signing of the certification by only one of the petitioners
could not be presumed to reflect the personal knowledge by
his co-petitioners of the filing or non-filing of any similar action
or claim. Hence, the failure of Mercedes and Asuncion to sign
and execute the certification along with Tomas warranted the
dismissal of their petition.
Has the assailed decision become final and executory?
YES
No valid service upon the public respondent of the motion for
extension of time to file a petition for review and consequently,
the CA Decision has become final.
14

 CA: in favor of Sps Asuncion ordering Sps Mendoza to
pay amount representing unpaid obligation of the latter
together w legal interest until full amount is fully paid +
10% AF [w benefit of acceleration clause]
Rule 45 – Appellate Practice
Settled is the rule that no question will be entertained on appeal
unless it has been raised in the court below. Points of law,
theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought to the
attention of the lower court need not be, and ordinarily will not
be, considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal. Basic considerations of due process
impel this rule.
Not disputed or denied by petitioner is the fact that there was
no valid service upon Respondent Court of Appeals of the
motion for extension of time to file the present petition.
Although the motion for extension carried a registry receipt
purportedly sent to Respondent Court of Appeals, the affidavit
of service attached thereto did not state whether the service
was effected by personal delivery, ordinary or registered mail.
That an entry of judgment was effected by the Court of
Appeals, on the other hand, indicates that there was no valid
service upon the public respondent of the motion for extension
of time to file a petition for review and that, consequently, the
CA Decision has become final. This is consistent with the
presumption of regularity in the performance of duties by
public officers and offices. For this reason alone, the dismissal
of this petition is already in order.
15