4F Criminal Law Review Fourth Wave Arts 114 159

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests
Outline by Fiscal Victoria C. Garcia
REVISED PENAL CODE: BOOK TWO
TITLE TWO (ARTICLES 124-133): Crimes Against the Fundamental Law of the State
FELICIANO GALVANTE v HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO

G.R. No. 162808 | April 22, 2008
TICKLER: Illegal possession of firearms. “Illegal Search.”
DOCTRINE: The complaint for warrantless search charges no criminal offense. The conduct
of a warrantless search is not a criminal act for it is not penalized under the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) or any other special law. What the RPC punishes are only two forms of searches: Article
129 and Article 130.
FACTS: Private respondents SPO4 Benjamin Conde, PO1 Ramil Avenido, PO1 Eddie
Degran, PO1 Valentino Rufano, and PO1 Federico Balolot, confiscated from petitioner Galvante
one pistol, a short magazine, and some ammunition. Consequently, an Information for Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions was filed against Petitioner.
Pending the resolution of the above-mentioned criminal case (Criminal Case

5047), Petitioner filed an administrative case for grave misconduct, before the DILG-
Internal Affairs Service, and a criminal case against Respondents for Arbitrary
Detention, Illegal Search and Grave Threats, before the Ombudsman.
Petitioner alleges that he went to the house of a retired policeman, Percival Plaza,
to inquire about the retirement procedure for policemen. Upon his arrival, Private Respondents
blocked his way and pointed their long firearms, ready to fire at him. Petitioner and his
companions raised their hands to show their waistline and to prove that they had no firearm.
While their arms were raised, one of the Private Respondents (SPO4 Conde, Jr.) went near
Petitioner’s owner jeep and conducted a search. He saw Petitioner’s super .38 pistol under
the floor mat of the jeep and asked him of the MR (the full-text did not say what an MR is…) of
the firearm but due to fear that their long arms were still pointed to them, Petitioner gave the
asked document. Private Respondents left them alone, bringing with them the firearm.
Petitioner left Percival Plaza’s house and went to Trento Police Station where he saw a
person in civilian attire with a revolver tucked on his waist. He then asked the police officers,
including those who searched his jeep, to apprehend the civilian. Nobody apprehended the
armed civilian person so he went to the office of Police Chief Rocacorba who immediately called
the armed civilian to his office and when already inside his office, the disarming was done. After
the disarming of the civilian, Petitioner was put to jail with the said person by Police
Chief Rocacorba and was released only after posting a bail bond.
Subsequently, the RTC dismissed Criminal Case 5047 (the Illegal Possession of
Firearms case), after recommendation by the Prosecutor, on the ground that “the action of the
policemen who conducted the warrantless search in spite of the absence of any circumstances
justifying the same intruded into the privacy of the accused and the security of his property.”
CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

4F (A.Y. 2017-2018) Acuesta, Baccay, Bajande, Bustillos, Cabuyadao, Cantos, Chua Cheng,
San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
San Beda College of Law Manila Marohombsar, Ocampo, Oro, Padua, Pallon, Panotes, Parojinog, Penaflor,
Roque, Quintos, Sale, Salor, Sanchez, Santos, Sioson, Soliva, Uy
Unaware of what transpired in Criminal Case No. 5047, Ombudsman Investigation &
Prosecution Officer Dennis L. Garcia issued a Resolution stating that the allegations of Petitioner
failed to establish the factual basis of his affidavit-complaint, it appearing from the records that
the incident stemmed from a valid warrantless arrest.
Thus, this present Petition.
CRIME CHARGED: ARBITRARY DETENTION, ILLEGAL SEARCH AND GRAVE

THREATS
OMBUDSMAN: DISMISSED for LACK OF MERIT
“It appearing from the records that the incident stemmed from a valid warrantless
arrest.”
CA: N/A
ISSUE: Was the criminal complaint for illegal search, which petitioner filed with the Ombudsman
against private respondents, proper?
RULING: NO, it was improper. The criminal complaint which petitioner filed with the
Ombudsman charges private respondents with warrantless search, arbitrary detention, and
grave threats.
The complaint for warrantless search charges no criminal offense. The conduct of
a warrantless search is not a criminal act for it is not penalized under the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) or any other special law. What the RPC punishes are only two forms of searches:
Art. 129. Search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of those
legally obtained. - In addition to the liability attaching to the offender for the
commission of any other offense, the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine not
exceeding P1,000.00 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer or
employee who shall procure a search warrant without just cause, or, having
legally procured the same, shall exceed his authority or use unnecessary severity
in executing the same.
Art. 130. Searching domicile without witnesses. - The penalty of arresto mayor in
its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon a public officer or
employee who, in cases where a search is proper, shall search the domicile,
papers or other belongings of any person, in the absence of the latter, any
member of his family, or in their default, without the presence of two witnesses
residing in the same locality.

Petitioner did not allege any of the elements of the foregoing felonies in his Affidavit-
Complaint; rather, he accused private respondents of conducting a search on his vehicle without
being armed with a valid warrant. This situation, while lamentable, is not covered by Articles 129
and 130 of the RPC. The remedy of petitioner against the warrantless search conducted on his
vehicle is found under the Civil Code.
The criminal complaint for arbitrary detention was likewise properly dismissed by public
respondents. To sustain a criminal charge for arbitrary detention, it must be shown that:
1. The offender is a public officer or employee;
2. The offender detained the complainant, and
3. The detention is without legal grounds.
The second element was not alleged by Petitioner in his Affidavit-Complaint. As pointed
out by private respondent Conde in his Comment and Memorandum, Petitioner himself
identified in his Affidavit-Complaint that it was Police Chief Rocacorba who caused his
detention. Nowhere in said affidavit did petitioner allege that private respondents effected his
detention, or were in any other way involved in it. There was, therefore, no factual or legal basis
to sustain the criminal charge for arbitrary detention against private respondents.
DECISION: Petition DENIED. Public respondents did not act with grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the criminal complaint against private respondents.
GEROCHE VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 179080 | November 26, 2014
TICKLER: Violation of Domicile by Barangay Captain and his squad
DOCTRINES:
1. An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question
including one not raised by the parties.
2. When accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he or she waives the
constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case
open to the review of the appellate court, which is then called upon to render
such judgment as law and justice dictate.
FACTS: On May 14,1989 at around 10:00pm at Sitio New Lantawan, Brgy. Greenhills,
Province of Cotabato, Philippines, herein petitioners (barangay captain and other
citizen armed forces geographical unit entered the house of one Roberto Mallo by
forcibly breaking down the front door and searched the effects without consent from the
owner and mauled one of the occupants of the house.
The prosecution’s version was that Baleriano at around 10:00pm that night was
inside the house which he already bought from Mallo. They were already sleeping when
they were awakened by such petitioners who without any warrant entered the house

and mauled and struck him while a garand rifle, the petitioners took away his airgun.
His nephew who was living with him corroborated his testimony.
The defense denied the crime charged and declared that they were in their
respective houses the entire evening, however the night before the incident, they
conducted a roving foot patrol due to rampant cattle rustling.
CRIME CHARGED: VIOLATION OF DOMICILE
RTC: LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES (The prosecution failed to present

evidence that the petitioners were indeed public officers which is an essential element
in the crime of Violation of Domicile.)
CA: VIOLATION OF DOMICILE (Their judicial admissions in open court that they were
CAFGU and barangay captain are sufficient proof that they are public officers.)
ISSUES:
1. Are petitioners guilty of violation of domicile?
2. Was there double jeopardy?
RULING:
1. YES, they are guilty of violation of domicile.
The Court adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the CA. In their
testimony before the open court as well as in the pleadings they filed, neither
Geroche denied that he was a barangay captain nor Garde and Marfil refuted
that they were CAFGU members. In holding such positions, they are considered
as public officers/employees.
2. NO, there was no double jeopardy.
An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question
including one not raised by the parties. When accused appeals from the
sentence of the trial court, he or she waives the constitutional safeguard against
double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the review of the appellate
court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice
dictate. Thus, when petitioners appealed the trial court’s judgment of conviction
for Less Serious Physical Injuries, they are deemed to have abandoned their
right to invoke the prohibition on double jeopardy since it becomes the duty of
the appellate court to correct errors as may be found in the assailed judgment.
Petitioners could not have been placed twice in jeopardy when the CA set aside
the ruling of the RTC by finding them guilty of Violation of Domicile as charged
in the Information instead of Less Serious Physical Injuries.
DECISION: CA Ruling AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION as to the penalty. THERE IS
NO DOUBLE JEOPARDY.

TITLE THREE (ARTICLES 134-159): Crimes Against Public Order
VICENTE P. LADLAD vs. SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR EMMANUEL Y.

VELASCO
G.R. Nos. 172070-72 | June 1, 2007
TICKLER: Beltran two inquests – Rebellion, and Inciting to Sedition. Ladlad and Maza
– preliminary investigation for Rebellion.
DOCTRINES:
1. Inquest proceedings are proper only when the accused has been lawfully
arrested without warrant.
2. By its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving crowd
action done in furtherance of a political end.
3. Mere membership in the CPP does not constitute rebellion.
FACTS:
Beltran Petition:
On February 24, 2006, PGMA signed Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 declaring a
“State of National Emergency.” Following that, police officers arrested Crispin Beltran
on while he was en route to Marilao, Bulacan, and detained him in Camp Crame.
Beltran was arrested without a warrant and the arresting officers did not inform Beltran
of the crime for which he was arrested.
He was subjected to a first inquest involving the crime of inciting to sedition. This
was based on a speech Beltran allegedly gave during a rally in Quezon City on 24
February 2006. Inquest prosecutor found probable cause.
BASIS OF FIRST INQUEST: Joint affidavit of Beltran’s arresting officers who claimed
to have been present at the rally.
He was also subjected to a second inquest involving the crime of rebellion conducted
by DOJ state prosecutors.
BASIS OF SECOND INQUEST: Two letters from CIDG executive officer and deputy
director. The letters contained results of CIDG’s investigation implicating Beltran, et al
as “leaders and promoters” of an alleged foiled plot to overthrow the Arroyo
government. DOJ state prosecutors found probable cause.
Beltran opposes the second inquest finding probable cause that he committed rebellion
and that such inquest was void.

Ladlad and Maza petitions:
Ladlad, Maza, et al were called for a preliminary investigation for the crime of
rebellion.
BASIS OF THE P.I.: Results of the CIDG investigation, culled from the Beltran inquest.
During the PI, CIDG presented a masked man, later identified as Jaime Fuentes, who
claimed to be an eyewitness against petitioners. Velasco, who was the prosecutor,
gave copies of the affidavit of Fuentes to media members present during the
proceedings.
Ladlad moved for the inhibition of Velasco citing lack of impartiality and independence,
considering the political milieu under which petitioners were investigated, the
statements that the President and the Secretary of Justice made to the media regarding
petitioners’ case, and the manner in which the prosecution panel conducted the
preliminary investigation.
Furthermore, they contend that the P.I. was tainted with irregularities as not pursuant
to Rule 112 Sec 3 of the Rules of Court.
CRIME CHARGED: NONE. (Consolidated petitions for prohibition and certiorari with
the Supreme Court.)
RTC: N/A
CA: N/A
ISSUES:
1. Was the inquest for rebellion against Beltran valid?
2. Was there probable cause to indict Beltran for rebellion? NO.
3. Were the preliminary investigations conducted against Ladlad and Maza tainted with
irregularity? YES.
RULING:
1. NO, the inquest for rebellion against Beltran was invalid.
The Inquest Proceeding against Beltran for Rebellion is void. Inquest

proceedings are proper only when the accused has been lawfully arrested
without warrant.
The joint affidavit of Beltran’s arresting officers, states that the officers arrested
Beltran, without a warrant, for Inciting to Sedition, and not for Rebellion. Thus,
the inquest prosecutor could only have conducted – as he did conduct – an

inquest for Inciting to Sedition and no other. Consequently, when another group
of prosecutors subjected Beltran to a second inquest proceeding for Rebellion,
they overstepped their authority rendering the second inquest void. None of
Beltran’s arresting officers saw Beltran commit, in their presence, the crime of
Rebellion. Nor did they have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances
that Beltran had just committed Rebellion, sufficient to form probable cause to
believe that he had committed Rebellion. What these arresting officers alleged
in their affidavit is that they saw and heard Beltran make an allegedly seditious
speech on 24 February 2006.
2. NO, there was no probable cause to indict Beltran for rebellion.
Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is committed by rising
publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing
from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic
of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other armed
forces or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of
any of their powers or prerogatives.
Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving

crowd action done in furtherance of a political end. The evidence before the
panel of prosecutors who conducted the inquest of Beltran for Rebellion
consisted of the affidavits and other documents attached to the CIDG letters. We
have gone over these documents and find merit in Beltran’s contention that the
same are insufficient to show probable cause to indict him for Rebellion.
Assuming that Beltran is a member of the CPP, which Beltran does not
acknowledge, mere membership in the CPP does not constitute rebellion.
3. YES, the preliminary investigations conducted against Ladlad and Maza were
tainted with irregularities.
The prosecutors failed to comply with Section 3(a) of Rule 112 which provides
that the complaint must be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and
his witnesses, subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government
official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before
a notary public. Here, the prosecutors treated the unsubscribed letters of
Tanigue and Mendoza of the CIDG, PNP as complaints and accepted the
affidavits attached to the letters even though some of them were notarized by a
notary public without any showing that a prosecutor or qualified government
official was unavailable as required by Section 3(a) of Rule 112.
Section 3(b) of Rule 112 also mandates that the prosecutor, after receiving the
complaint, must determine if there are grounds to continue with the investigation.
If there is none, he shall dismiss the case, otherwise he shall “issue a subpoena
to the respondents.” Here, after receiving the CIDG letters, respondent

prosecutors peremptorily issued subpoenas to petitioners requiring them to

appear at the DOJ office on 13 March 2006 “to secure copies of the complaints
and its attachments.”
During the investigation, prosecutors allowed the CIDG to present a masked

Fuentes who subscribed to an affidavit before respondent prosecutor Velasco.
Velasco proceeded to distribute copies of Fuentes’ affidavit not to petitioners or
their counsels but to members of the media who covered the proceedings.
Indeed, by peremptorily issuing the subpoenas to petitioners, tolerating the
complainant’s antics during the investigation, and distributing copies of a
witness’ affidavit to members of the media knowing that petitioners have not had
the opportunity to examine the charges against them, respondent prosecutors
not only trivialized the investigation but also lent credence to petitioners’ claim
that the entire proceeding was a sham. Hence, the court concluded that there
was indeed partiality on the part of the prosecutors who conducted the PI.
DECISION: Petition GRANTED.
LT. (SG) EUGENE GONZALES, ET AL. v GEN. NARCISO ABAYA

G.R. No. 164007 | August 10, 2006
TICKLER: Oakwood mutiny in 2003. Jurisdiction: RTC versus Court Martial.
DOCTRINES:
1. Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055, quoted above, is clear and unambiguous:

- General Rule: Members of the AFP and other persons subject to military
law who commit crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code
(like coup detat), other special penal laws, or local ordinances shall be tried
by the proper civil court.
- Exception: Where the civil court, before arraignment, has determined the
offense to be service-connected, then the offending soldier shall be tried
by a court martial.
- Exception to the Exception: Where the President of the Philippines, in the
interest of justice, directs before arraignment that any such crimes or
offenses be tried by the proper civil court.
2. The service-connected crimes or offenses as limited to those defined

in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of the Articles of
War, are triable by court martial.
3. The RTC, in making such declaration [of absorbing the offenses under the
Articles of War in the crime of coup d’etat], practically amended the law which
expressly vests in the court martial the jurisdiction over service-

connected crimes or offenses. What the law has conferred the court should
not take away. It is only the Constitution or the law that bestows jurisdiction on
the court, tribunal, body or officer over the subject matter or nature of an action
which can do so.
FACTS: On July 26, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo received intelligence

reports that some AFP members, with high-powered weapons, had abandoned their
designated places of assignment. The following day, more than 300 heavily armed
junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP entered the premises of the Oakwood
Premier Luxury Apartments on Ayala Avenue, Makati City.
In that place, the troops, led by Navy Lt. (SG) Antonio Trillanes IV, announced
their grievances against the Arroyo administration, declared their withdrawal of support
from their Commander-in-Chief, and demanded her resignation as President.
At noontime, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 declaring a state of

rebellion, followed by General Order No. 4 directing the AFP and PNP to take all
necessary measures to suppress the rebellion in Makati.
However, after hours of negotiations with the government panel, the troops laid
down their arms and defused the explosives planted in the vicinity. They also returned
to their barracks.
A total of 321 soldiers, including herein petitioners, surrendered to the

authorities. After investigation, the NBI recommended the filing of a case of coup d’etat
under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Meanwhile, respondent
former AFP chief of staff, General Narciso Abaya, ordered the arrest and detention of
the soldiers involved, pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War.
The DOJ filed an Information for coup d’etat with RTC Makati City. At the same
time, respondent Chief of Staff issued a Letter Order No. 625 creating a Pre-Trial
Investigation Panel (PTIP).
Only 243 of the 321 accused filed an Omnibus Motion praying that the RTC
would assume jurisdiction over their case. Petitioners herein filed with the Judge
Advocate Generals Office (JAGO) a motion praying for the suspension of its
proceedings until after RTC shall have resolved the motion to assume jurisdiction.
CHRONOLOGICAL SET OF EVENTS:
PTIP: Initial Report recommending that the military personnel involved in Oakwood
incident be charged before a general court martial for violations of the Articles of War
DOJ: Found probable cause against 31 of the 321 accused, prosecution filed an
Amended Information

RTC: Admitted the Amended Information.
PTIP: Final Pre-Trial Investigation Report, recommending that, following the doctrine of
absorption, those charged with coup d’etat before the RTC should NOT BE CHARGED
BEFORE THE MILITARY TRIBUNAL.
RTC: Issued an Order stating that all charges before the court martial against the
accused are declared NOT SERVICE-CONNECTED, but rather absorbed and in
furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d’etat.
JAGO Officer-in-Charge: Recommended that 29 of the officers in the Oakwood

incident, including petitioners, be prosecuted before a general court martial for violation
of Article 96, Articles of War. This was approved by the AFP top brass.
CRIME CHARGED: NONE. (This is a petition for prohibition against respondents from
assuming jurisdiction over their case.)
RTC: N/A
CA: N/A
ISSUE: Are the petitioners entitled to the writ of prohibition?
RULING: NO, they are not.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055, quoted above, is clear and unambiguous. First, it lays down
the general rule that members of the AFP and other persons subject to military law,
including members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit
crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code (like coup detat), other
special penal laws, or local ordinances shall be tried by the proper civil court.
Next, it provides the exception to the general rule, i.e., where the civil court, before
arraignment, has determined the offense to be service-connected, then the
offending soldier shall be tried by a court martial.
Lastly, the law states an exception to the exception, i.e., where the President of
the Philippines, in the interest of justice, directs before arraignment that any such
crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil court.
The second paragraph of the same provision further identifies the service-connected
crimes or offenses as limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to
92, and Articles 95 to 97 of the Articles of War. Violations of these specified Articles
are triable by court martial. This delineates the jurisdiction between the civil courts
and the court martial over crimes or offenses committed by military personnel.

Such delineation of jurisdiction by R.A. No. 7055 is necessary to preserve the

peculiar nature of military justice system over military personnel charged with
service-connected offenses. The military justice system is disciplinary in nature,
aimed at achieving the highest form of discipline in order to ensure the highest degree
of military efficiency. Military law is established not merely to enforce discipline in times
of war, but also to preserve the tranquility and security of the State in time of peace; for
there is nothing more dangerous to the public peace and safety than a licentious and
undisciplined military body.
Here, petitioners are charged for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer
and a gentleman) of the Articles of War before the court martial. The Supreme Court
held that the offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is service-
connected. This is expressly provided in Section 1 (second paragraph) of R.A. No.
7055. It bears stressing that the charge against the petitioners concerns the
alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution and the
duly-constituted authorities. Such violation allegedly caused dishonor and
disrespect to the military profession. In short, the charge has a bearing on
their professional conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally indicative of the
service-connected nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the same
dismissal from the service imposable only by the military court. Such penalty
is purely disciplinary in character, evidently intended to cleanse the military
profession of misfits and to preserve the stringent standard of military discipline.
Obviously, there is no merit in petitioners’ argument that they can no longer be charged
before the court martial for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War because the
same has been declared by the RTC in its Order of February 11, 2004 as not service-
connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup
detat, hence, triable by said court (RTC). The RTC, in making such declaration,
practically amended the law which expressly vests in the court martial the
jurisdiction over service-connected crimes or offenses. What the law has
conferred the court should not take away. It is only the Constitution or the law that
bestows jurisdiction on the court, tribunal, body or officer over the subject matter or
nature of an action which can do so. And it is only through a constitutional amendment
or legislative enactment that such act can be done. The first and fundamental duty of
the courts is merely to apply the law as they find it, not as they like it to be. Evidently,
such declaration by the RTC constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack
or excess of jurisdiction and is, therefore, void.
DECISION: Petition DENIED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v EX-MAYOR CARLOS ESTONILO, SR., ET AL.

G.R. No. 201565 | October 13, 2014
TICKLER: District Supervisor of public schools, complex crime of direct assault with
murder
DOCTRINES:
1. There are two modes of committing atentados contra la autoridad o sus agentes
under Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code. Accused-appellants committed
the second form of assault, the elements of which are that (1) there must be
an attack, use of force, or serious intimidation or resistance upon a person in
authority or his agent; (2) the assault was made when the said person was
performing his duties or on the occasion of such performance; and (3) the
accused knew that the victim is a person in authority or his agent, that is, that
the accused must have the intention to offend, injure or assault the offended
party as a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority.
2. When the assault results in the killing of that agent or of a person in authority for
that matter, there arises the complex crime of direct assault with murder or
homicide.
FACTS: Accused-appellants were charged of the crime of murder with direct assault
for having killed Floro Casas while in the performance of his duty being the District
Supervisor of public schools in the Municipality of Placer, Masbate.
Trial ensued and the prosecution presented several witnesses. Testimonies of

the prosecution witnesses revealed that Floro was killed while in the discharge of his
official duties while in the Celera Elementary School by six men. Records show that
Floro sustained gunshot wounds caused by more than one firearm based on the sizes
of the slugs recovered and that some of them were fired at close range.
The defense tried to discredit the witnesses by confronting them with facts of
pending criminal cases filed against them. Meanwhile, they relied on the defenses of
denial and alibi.
The RTC gave credence to the eyewitness account of Antipolo and the
corroborating testimony of Serapion, who were both present at the school grounds
during the shooting incident. The RTC pronounced that the evidence on record showed
unity of purpose in the furtherance of a common criminal design, that was the killing of
Floro. Accused-appellants Nonoy and Negro were the gunmen, while accused-
appellants Edel and Nonong served as backup gunmen. Accused-appellant Bulldog,
and accused Gali, Titing and one alias Ace served as lookouts.
The RTC found accused-appellants Mayor Carlos, Sr. and Rey to have ordered
their co-accused to kill Floro based on the testimony of Servando, who was present
when the group planned to kill Floro. Thus, the RTC concluded that Ex-Mayor Carlos,
Sr. is a principal by inducement. And accused-appellant Rey conspired with his father.
In sum, the prosecution was able to establish conspiracy and evident premeditation
among all the accused-appellants.

The accused-appellants’ defense of alibi and denial did not withstand the
positive identification of the prosecution witnesses. The RTC was convinced that the
motive for the murder was due to Floro’s support for mayoral candidate Vicente Cotero.
Since the victim was a district supervisor of public schools, the RTC convicted the
accused-appellants of the complex crime of murder with direct assault.
CRIME CHARGED: COMPLEX CRIME OF MURDER WITH DIRECT ASSAULT
RTC: GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Murder with Direct
Assault under Article 248 and Article 148 in relation to Article 48 all of the Revised Penal
Code
CA: AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the penalty imposed upon accused-
appellants shall simply be reclusion perpetua
ISSUE: Are the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder with direct assault?
HELD: YES, the accused-appellants are proven to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the complex crime of murder with direct assault.
On the offense committed by accused-appellants, the RTC correctly concluded

that they should be held accountable for the complex crime of direct assault with
murder. There are two modes of committing atentados contra la autoridad o sus
agentes under Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code. Accused-appellants committed
the second form of assault, the elements of which are that (1) there must be an attack,
use of force, or serious intimidation or resistance upon a person in authority or his
agent; (2) the assault was made when the said person was performing his duties or on
the occasion of such performance; and (3) the accused knew that the victim is a person
in authority or his agent, that is, that the accused must have the intention to offend,
injure or assault the offended party as a person in authority or an agent of a person in
authority.
In this case, Floro was the duly appointed District Supervisor of Public Schools,
Placer, Masbate, thus, was a person in authority. But contrary to the statement of the
RTC that there was direct assault just because Floro was a person in authority, this
Court clarifies that the finding of direct assault is based on the fact that the attack or
assault on Floro was, in reality, made by reason of the performance of his duty as the
District Supervisor.
When the assault results in the killing of that agent or of a person in authority for
that matter, there arises the complex crime of direct assault with murder or homicide.
The offense is a complex crime, the penalty for which is that for the graver offense,
to be imposed in the maximum period. Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, provides for the penalty of reclusion perpetua to

death for the felony of murder; thus, the imposable penalty should have been death.
Plus the fact that there exists an aggravating circumstance, pursuant to Article 63,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, the proper penalty is death. But the imposition
of death penalty has been prohibited by Republic Act No. 9346, entitled “An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines”; thus, the RTC, as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, properly imposed upon accused-appellants the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
DECISION: CA Ruling AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to civil indemnity and moral

damages. Accused-appellants are GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of
MURDER WITH DIRECT ASSAULT.
EDMUND SYDECO v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 202692 | November 12, 2014
TICKLER: “Plain view lang boss, plain view lang.”
DOCTRINE: The two key elements of resistance and serious disobedience punished
under Art. 151 of the RPC are: (1) That a person in authority or his agent is engaged in
the performance of official duty or gives a lawful order to the offender; and (2) That the
offender resists or seriously disobeys such person or his agent.
FACTS:
Version of the Prosecution:
On or about June 11, 2006, P/Insp. Manuel Aguilar, SPO4 Bodino, PO3 Benedict
Cruz III and another officer were manning a checkpoint established along Roxas
Boulevard when, from about 20 meters away, they spotted a swerving red Ford Ranger
pickup wherein petitioner was behind the wheel. The team members flagged the vehicle
down and asked the petitioner to alight from the vehicle so he could take a rest at the
police station situated nearby, before he resumes driving. Petitioner, who the policemen
claimed was smelling of liquor, denied being drunk and insisted he could manage to
drive. Then in a raised voice, petitioner started talking rudely to the policemen and in
fact yelled at P/Insp. Aguilar blurting: "P…g ina mo, bakit mo ako hinuhuli." At that
remark, P/Insp. Aguilar proceeded to arrest petitioner who put up resistance. Despite
petitioner’s efforts to parry the hold on him, the police eventually succeeded in subduing
him who was then brought to the Ospital ng Maynila where he was examined and found
to be positive of alcoholic breath and was then turned over to the Malate Police Station
for disposition.

Version of the Defense:

Petitioner, on the other hand, claimed to be a victim in the incident in question.
He together with Joenilo Pano and Josie Villanueva, were on the way home from on
board his pick-up when signaled to stop by police officers at the area immediately
referred to above. Their flashlights trained on the inside of the vehicle and its occupants,
the policemen then asked the petitioner to open the vehicle’s door and alight for a body
and vehicle search, a directive he refused to heed owing to a previous extortion
experience. Instead, he opened the vehicle window, uttering, "plain view lang boss,
plain view lang." Obviously irked by this remark, one of the policemen, P/Insp. Aguilar,
as it turned out, then told the petitioner that he was drunk, pointing to three cases of
empty beer bottles in the trunk of the vehicle. Petitioner’s explanation about being sober
and that the empty bottles adverted to came from his restaurant was ignored as P/Insp.
Aguilar suddenly boxed him (petitioner) on the mouth and poked a gun at his head, at
the same time blurting, "P…g ina mo gusto mo tapusin na kita dito marami ka pang
sinasabi." The officers then pulled the petitioner out of the driver’s seat and pushed him
into the police mobile car.
Separate Informations, one for Violation of Section 56(f) of Republic Act No. (RA)
4136 and another, for Violation of Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) were
filed against petitioner Sydeco.
CRIME CHARGED: Violation of Section 56(f) of Republic Act No. (RA) 4136 and
Violation of Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
MeTC: GUILTY AS CHARGED
RTC: AFFIRMED MeTC.
CA: AFFIRMED RTC
ISSUE: Is the accused guilty of violation of Article 151 of the RPC?
RULING: NO, the accused is not guilty of violation of Art 151 of RPC.
Going over the records, it is fairly clear that what triggered the confrontational
stand-off between the police team, on one hand, and petitioner on the other, was the
latter’s refusal to get off of the vehicle for a body and vehicle search juxtaposed by his
insistence on a plain view search only. Petitioner’s twin gestures cannot plausibly be
considered as resisting a lawful order. He may have sounded boorish or spoken crudely
at that time, but none of this would make him a criminal. It remains to stress that the
petitioner has not, when flagged down, committed a crime or performed an overt act
warranting a reasonable inference of criminal activity. He did not try to avoid the road
block established. He came to a full stop when so required to stop. The two key
elements of resistance and serious disobedience punished under Art. 151 of the RPC
are: (1) That a person in authority or his agent is engaged in the performance of official

duty or gives a lawful order to the offender; and (2) That the offender resists or seriously
disobeys such person or his agent.
There can be no quibble that P/Insp. Aguilar and his apprehending team are
persons in authority or agents of a person in authority manning a legal checkpoint. But
surely petitioner’s act of exercising one’s right against unreasonable searches to be
conducted in the middle of the night cannot, in context, be equated to disobedience let
alone resisting a lawful order in contemplation of Art. 151 of the RPC. As has often
been said, albeit expressed differently and under dissimilar circumstances, the vitality
of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees, but in the courage of the people to
assert and use them whenever they are ignored or worse infringed. Moreover, there is,
to stress, nothing in RA 4136 that authorized the checkpoint-manning policemen to
order petitioner and his companions to get out of the vehicle for a vehicle and body
search. And it bears to emphasize that there was no reasonable suspicion of the
occurrence of a crime that would allow what jurisprudence refers to as a "stop and frisk"
action.
DECISION: Appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner is hereby

acquitted of the crimes charged.


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CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests

Outline by Fiscal Victoria C. Garcia

REVISED PENAL CODE: BOOK TWO

FELICIANO GALVANTE v HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO

TICKLER: Illegal possession of firearms. “Illegal Search.”

Pending the resolution of the above-mentioned criminal case (Criminal Case

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

Thus, this present Petition.

CRIME CHARGED: ARBITRARY DETENTION, ILLEGAL SEARCH AND GRAVE

OMBUDSMAN: DISMISSED for LACK OF MERIT

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

GEROCHE VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

TICKLER: Violation of Domicile by Barangay Captain and his squad

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

CRIME CHARGED: VIOLATION OF DOMICILE

RTC: LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES (The prosecution failed to present

1. YES, they are guilty of violation of domicile.

2. NO, there was no double jeopardy.

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

TITLE THREE (ARTICLES 134-159): Crimes Against Public Order

VICENTE P. LADLAD vs. SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR EMMANUEL Y.

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

Ladlad and Maza petitions:

1. NO, the inquest for rebellion against Beltran was invalid.

The Inquest Proceeding against Beltran for Rebellion is void. Inquest

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

2. NO, there was no probable cause to indict Beltran for rebellion.

Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

prosecutors peremptorily issued subpoenas to petitioners requiring them to

During the investigation, prosecutors allowed the CIDG to present a masked

DECISION: Petition GRANTED.

LT. (SG) EUGENE GONZALES, ET AL. v GEN. NARCISO ABAYA

TICKLER: Oakwood mutiny in 2003. Jurisdiction: RTC versus Court Martial.

1. Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055, quoted above, is clear and unambiguous:

2. The service-connected crimes or offenses as limited to those defined

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

FACTS: On July 26, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo received intelligence

At noontime, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 declaring a state of

A total of 321 soldiers, including herein petitioners, surrendered to the

CHRONOLOGICAL SET OF EVENTS:

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

RTC: Admitted the Amended Information.

JAGO Officer-in-Charge: Recommended that 29 of the officers in the Oakwood

ISSUE: Are the petitioners entitled to the writ of prohibition?

RULING: NO, they are not.

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

Such delineation of jurisdiction by R.A. No. 7055 is necessary to preserve the

DECISION: Petition DENIED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v EX-MAYOR CARLOS ESTONILO, SR., ET AL.

Trial ensued and the prosecution presented several witnesses. Testimonies of

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

CRIME CHARGED: COMPLEX CRIME OF MURDER WITH DIRECT ASSAULT

On the offense committed by accused-appellants, the RTC correctly concluded

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

DECISION: CA Ruling AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to civil indemnity and moral

EDMUND SYDECO v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

TICKLER: “Plain view lang boss, plain view lang.”

Version of the Prosecution:

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

Version of the Defense:

MeTC: GUILTY AS CHARGED

RTC: AFFIRMED MeTC.

CA: AFFIRMED RTC