Constitutional Law 1 Digests Part 2

DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY.
ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019
VII. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

1. APPORTIONMENT OF LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS
a. Aldaba vs. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 188078, January 25, 2010)
CARPIO J.:
FACTS:
This case is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional, R.A. 9591 which
creates a legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan. Allegedly, the R.A. violates the minimum
population requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city. Before the May 1, 2009, the
province of Bulacan was represented in Congress through 4 legislative districts. Before the passage
of the Act through House Bill 3162 (later converted to House Bill 3693) and Senate Bill 1986, Malolos
City had a population of 223, 069 in 2007.
House Bill 3693 cites the undated Certification, as requested to be issued to Mayor Domingo
(then Mayor of Malolos), by Region III Director Miranda of NSO that the population of Malolos will be
as projected, 254,030 by the year 2010.
Petitioners contended that R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum
population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representative in Congress.
ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. 9591, “An act creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos,
Bulacan” is unconstitutional as petitioned.
RULING:
It was declared by the Supreme Court that the R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for being violative
of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
1987 Constitution on the grounds that, as required by the 1987 Constitution, a city must have at least
250,000 population. In relation with this, Regional Director Miranda issued a Certification which is
based on the demographic projections, was declared without legal effect because the Regional
Director has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification based on the following statements
supported by Section 6 of E.O. 135 as signed by President Fidel V. Ramos, which provides:
The certification on demographic projection can be issued only if such are declared official by
the Nat’l Statistics Coordination Board. In this case, it was not stated whether the document have
been declared official by the NSCB.
The certification can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying
officer, in which case, the Regional Director of Central Luzon NSO is unauthorized.
The population projection must be as of the middle of the year, which in this case, the
Certification issued by Director Miranda was undated.
It was also computed that the correct figures using the growth rate, even if compounded, the
Malolos population of 223,069 as of August 1, 2007 will grow to only 249,333 as of August 1, 2010.
It was emphasized that the 1935 Constitution, that this Court ruled that the aim of legislative
reappointment is to equalize the population and voting power among districts.
DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY. ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019
b. Aquino III v. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 189793 April 7, 2010)
Perez, J.
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 9176 created an additional legislative district for the province of
Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province.
The said law originated from House Bill No. 4264 and was signed into law by President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009.
To that effect, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order
to create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of
Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second
district Municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district.
Petitioners claim that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716 violates
the constitutional standards that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (
250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Thus, the proposed first district will end up with a
population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
ISSUE: Whether a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the

creation of a new legislative district in a province.
RULING:
NO. The second sentence of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the constitution states that: “ Each
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least
one representative.”
There is a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one
hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For a province is entitled to at
least a representative, there is nothing mentioned about the population. Meanwhile, a city must
first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.
It should be clearly read that Section 5(3) of the constitution requires a 250,000 minimum
population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.
c. Mariano vs COMELEC
(G.R. No 118577, March 7, 1995)
Puno, J.
FACTS:
The petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 7854 which is entitled “An Act Converting the
Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati.” Suing as
taxpayers, the first petition assails Sec. 2, 51 and 52 of RA 7854 as unconstitutional on the three
grounds namely: 1) delineated the land area of the proposed City of Makati in violation of Art. X, Sec.
10 of the Constitution, in relation to Sec. 7 and 450 of LGC wherein area of local government unit
should be made by metes and bounds with technical descriptions (Sec. 2); 2) attempts to alter or
restart the “3 consecutive term” limit for local elective officials since the city shall acquire a new
corporate existence is in violation of Art. X, Sec. 8 and Art. VI, Sec. 7 of the Constitution (Sec. 51);
and 3a) reapportionment cannot be made by a special law; 3b) the addition of a legislative district
was not expressed in the title of the bill; and 3c) Makati’s population, as per 1990 census, stands only
at 450,000 (Sec. 52).
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7854 is unconstitutional.
RULING:
Yes, petition is dismissed for lack of merit in petitions. Sec. 2 did not add, subtract, divide or
multiply the established land area of Makati. It was expressly stated that the city’s land area “shall
comprise the present territory of the municipality.” Furthermore, the legitimate reason why the land
area was not defined by metes and bounds with technical descriptions was because of the territorial
dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio. Out of respect, they did
not want to foreclose the dispute by making a legislative finding of fact which could decide the issue.
Petitioners have far complied with the requirements in challenging the constitutionality of a
law. They merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy.
Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (exception Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise
the issue. Also, they raised the issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no
jurisdiction.
In Tobias v. Abalos ruling, it should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general
subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject.
Makati has met the minimum population requirement. In fact, Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than
250,000 shall be entitled to at least 1 congressional representative.
d. Tobias vs Abalos
(G.R. No. L-114783, December 8, 1994)
BIDIN, J.
FACTS:
Complainants, invoking their right as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, filed a
petition questioning the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act
Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of
Mandaluyong." Before the enactment of the law, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to the same
legislative district.
The petitioners contended that the act is unconstitutional for violation of three provisions of
the constitution. First, it violates the one subject one bill rule. The bill provides for the conversion of
Mandaluyong to HUC as well as the division of congressional district of San Juan and Mandaluyong
into two separate district. Second, it also violate Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution, which
provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law. The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into
separate congressional districts increased the members of the House of Representative beyond that
provided by the Constitution. Third, Section 5 of Article VI also provides that within three years
following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts
based on the standard provided in Section 5. Petitioners stated that the division was not made
pursuant to any census showing that the minimum population requirement was attained.
ISSUE:
(1) Does RA 7675 violate the one subject one bill rule?
(2) Does it violate Section 5(1) of Article VI of the Constitution on the limit of number of rep?
(3) Is the inexistence of mention of census in the law show a lack of constitutional requirement?
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that the contentions are devoid of merit. With regards to the first
contention of one subject one bill rule, the creation of a separate congressional district for
Mandaluyong is not a separate and distinct subject from its conversion into a HUC but is a natural
and logical consequence. In addition, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been
invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation.
The second contention that the law violates the present limit of the number of representatives,
the provision of the section itself show that the 250 limit is not absolute. The Constitution clearly
provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members,
"unless otherwise provided by law”. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation
mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
With regards, to the third contention that there is no mention in the assailed law of any census
to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of 250,000
inhabitants to justify their separation into two legislative districts, unless otherwise proved that the
requirements were not met, the said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular
congressional processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum
requirements for the establishment of separate legislative district
The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

e. Montejo vs. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 118702, March 16, 1995)
PUNO, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Cerilo Roy Montejo, representative of the first district of Leyte, pleads for the
annulment of Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte, on the
ground that it violates the principle of equality of representation.
The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban and Ormoc is composed of 5 districts. The
3rd district is composed of: Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Calubian, Culaba, Kawayan,
Leyte, Maripipi, Naval, San Isidro, Tabango and Villaba.
Biliran, located in the 3rd district of Leyte, was made its subprovince by virtue of Republic Act
No. 2141 Section 1 enacted on 1959. Said section spelled out the municipalities comprising the
subprovince: Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi and Naval and all
the territories comprised therein.
On 1992, the Local Government Code took effect and the subprovince of Biliran became a
regular province. (The conversion of Biliran into a regular province was approved by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite.) As a consequence of the conversion, eight municipalities of the 3rd district
composed the new province of Biliran. A further consequence was to reduce the 3rd district to five
municipalities (underlined above) with a total population of 146,067 as per the 1990 census.
To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants, voters and municipalities
in the province of Leyte, respondent COMELEC held consultation meetings with the incumbent
representatives of the province and other interested parties and on December 29, 1994, it
promulgated the assailed resolution where, among others, it transferred the municipality of Capoocan
of the 2nd district and the municipality of Palompon of the 4th district to the 3rd district of Leyte.
ISSUE: Whether the unprecedented exercise by the COMELEC of the legislative power of
redistricting and reapportionment is valid or not.
RULING:
No. Respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it promulgated Section 1 of its Resolution No. 2736 transferring the municipality of
Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third
District of Leyte.
While concededly the conversion of Biliran into a regular province brought about an imbalance
in the distribution of voters and inhabitants in the 5 districts of Leyte, the issue involves
reapportionment of legislative districts, and petitioner’s remedy lies with Congress. This Court cannot
itself make the reapportionment as petitioner would want.
Also, respondent COMELEC relied on the ordinance appended to the 1987 constitution as
the source of its power of redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the power to make
laws. Said ordinance states that “The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make minor
adjustments to the reapportionment herein made.”
However, Minor adjustments does not involve change in the allocations per district. Examples
include error in the correct name of a particular municipality or when a municipality in between which
is still in the territory of one assigned district is forgotten. And consistent with the limits of its power to
make minor adjustments, section 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the respondent COMELEC any
authority to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another district. The power granted
by section 3 to the respondent is to adjust the number of members (not municipalities.)
f. Sema vs Commission on Elections

(G.R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008)
Carpio, J.
FACTS:
The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the province of
Maguindanao but it is not part of ARMM because Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in a
plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao has two legislative districts. The 1st legislative district
comprises of Cotabato City and 8 other municipalities.
A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMM’s Organic Act and vesting it with power to
create provinces, municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional
Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of the
municipalities of the 1st district of Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato City.
For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the 1st district is now only
made of Cotabato City (because of MMA 201). But it later amended this stating that status quo should
be retained; however, just for the purposes of the elections, the first district should be called Shariff
Kabunsuan with Cotabato City – this is also while awaiting a decisive declaration from Congress as
to Cotabato’s status as a legislative district (or part of any).
Bai Sandra Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of S. Kabunsuan
with Cotabato (1st district). Later, Sema was contending that Cotabato City should be a separate
legislative district and that votes therefrom should be excluded in the voting (probably because her
rival Dilangalen was from there and D was winning – in fact he won). She contended that under the
Constitution, upon creation of a province (S. Kabunsuan), that province automatically gains legislative
representation and since S. Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City – so in effect Cotabato is being
deprived of a representative in the HOR.
COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that regardless of S.
Kabunsuan being created, the legislative district is not affected and so is its representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM can create validly LGUs.
RULING:
No. Congress cannot validly delegate to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create
legislative districts, nothing in Sec. 20, Article X of the Constitution, authorizes autonomous regions,
expressly or impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districts. Accordingly, Sec. 19, Art. VI of
R.A. 9054, granting the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void
for being contrary to Sec. 5, Art. VI, and Sec. 20, Art. X, as well as Sec. 3 of the Ordinance appended
to the Constitution.
The power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays was delegated by
Congress to the ARMM Regional Assembly under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054. However,
pursuant to the Constitution, the power to create a province is with Congress and may not be validly
delegated. Section 19 is, therefore, unconstitutional. MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional
Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void. The creation of Shariff Kabunsuan
is invalid.
Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase, through
a law, the allowable membership in the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress
to reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes
the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through
a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that regional or local legislative bodies enact.
The allowable membership of the House of Representatives can be increased, and new legislative
districts of Congress can be created, only through a national law passed by Congress. It would be
anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a
national legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body,
cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body.
"The Regional Assembly may exercise legislative power… except on the following matters:
(k) National elections…”. Since the ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power to
enact laws relating to national elections, it cannot create a legislative district whose representative is
elected in national elections. Whenever Congress enacts a law creating a legislative district, the first
representative is always elected in the "next national elections" from the effectivity of the law.
Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national office, and
its occupant, a Member of the House of Representatives, is a national official. It would be incongruous
for a regional legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office when its
legislative powers extend only to its regional territory. The office of a district representative is
maintained by national funds and the salary of its occupant is paid out of national funds. It is a self-
evident inherent limitation on the legislative powers of every local or regional legislative body that it
can only create local or regional offices, respectively, and it can never create a national office. To
allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office is to allow its legislative powers to
operate outside the ARMM's territorial jurisdiction. This violates Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution which expressly limits the coverage of the Regional Assembly's legislative powers
"[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction…”
2. QUALIFICATIONS
a. Marcos vs COMELEC
(G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995)
KAPUNAN, J.
FACTS:
Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte
where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She
then pursued her college degree, education, in St. Paul’s College now Divine Word University also in
Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila
during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of
Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a
Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected
as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965,
when Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San
Miguel Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila
during 1978.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District
of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District
of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position, filed a “Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven
months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always
maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven months residency
due to the fact that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1 year residency requirement to be eligible in running as
representative of the First District of Leyte.
RULING:
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor
of a conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte
despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imelda’s domicile of origin by
operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona
fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which
correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin
should be deemed to continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence”
in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late
President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and
not domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to
choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the
country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of
choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte
while living in her brother’s house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly
manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her
birthdays and other important milestones.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence

qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the
COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby
SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers
to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.
b. AQUINO vs. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995)
KAPUNAN, J.
FACTS:
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy,
Aquino stated that he was a resident of the aforementioned district for 10 months. Faced with a
petition for disqualification, he amended the entry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1
year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections dismissed the petition on 6 May and allowed Aquino
to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino won. Acting on a motion for reconsideration of the above
dismissal, the Commission on Election later issued an order suspending the proclamation of Aquino
until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections found Aquino
ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence.
ISSUE: Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile” to warrant
the disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district.
RULING:
No. The place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he,
no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his
domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of
election law. The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and
needs of the community from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community
for electoral gain.
Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a previous (1992) election indicates that he was a resident
and a registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that election.
Aquino’s connection to the Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a
condominium unit in the area. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is
evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. The short length of time he claims
to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other
residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical residence is not
to acquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the
Second District of Makati City. Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections.
c. Coquilla vs COMELEC
(G.R. No. 151914, July 31, 2002)
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS:
Coquilla was born on 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided
there until 1965, when he was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen after joining the US Navy.
In 1998, he came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate, although he continued
making several trips to the United States.
Coquilla eventually applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 which was approved. On
November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.
On November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a voter of Butunga, Oras, Eastern
Samar which was approved in 2001. On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating
that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for 2 years.
Incumbent mayor Alvarez, who was running for re-election sought to cancel Coquilla’s
certificate of candidacy on the ground that his statement as to the two year residency in Oras was a
material misrepresentation as he only resided therein for 6 months after his oath as a citizen.
Before the COMELEC could render a decision, elections commenced and Coquilla was
proclaimed the winner. On July 19, 2001, COMELEC granted Alvarez’ petition and ordered the
cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy.
ISSUE: Whether or not Coquilla had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least one year before
the elections held on May 14, 2001 as what he represented in his COC.
RULING:
No. The petitioner had not been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar, for at least one year prior
to the May 14, 2001 elections. Although Oras was his domicile of origin, petitioner lost the same when
he became a US citizen after enlisting in the US Navy. From then on, until November 10, 2000, when
he reacquired Philippine citizenship through repatriation, petitioner was an alien without any right to
reside in the Philippines. In Caasi v. Comelec, infra., it was held that immigration to the US by virtue
of the acquisition of a “green card” constitutes abandonment of domicile in the Philippines.
The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to

"dwelling" of "habitation," but rather to "domicile" or legal residence, that is "the place where a party
actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at
any given time, eventually intends to return and remain.
A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the child's
parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of a new domicile.
3. PARTY-LIST SYSTEM (REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7941)
a. Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 203766 : April 2, 2013)
CARPIO, J.
FACTS:
52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions totaling 54 with the Supreme
Court (SC) in an effort to reverse various resolutions by the Commission on Elections (Comelec)
disqualifying them from the May 2013 party-list race. The Comelec, in its assailed resolutions issued
in October, November and December of 2012, ruled, among others, that these party-list groups and
organizations failed to represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector, their nominees do not
come from a marginalized and underrepresented sector, and/or some of the organizations or groups
are not truly representative of the sector they intend to represent in Congress.
Petitioners argued that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections, either by denial of their new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by
cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as party-list organizations; andsecond,
whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down inAng Bagong Bayani and
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on
Elections(BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list
elections.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
RULING:
No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani
and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the
Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some principles established in the
two aforestated cases.
Political Law- Party-list system
Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system, stressed that
"the party-list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation." Indisputably, the
framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include not only sectoral parties but
also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the
entirety, of the party-list system. As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties
can participate in the party-list system "For as long as they field candidates who come from the
different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution."
Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act is the law that implements the party-list
system prescribed in the Constitution.
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as "either a political party or a sectoral party
or a coalition of parties." Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A.
No. 7941 further provides that a "political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an
ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government. "On the other
hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a "sectoral party refers to an organized group of
citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. "R.A. No. 7941 provides different
definitions for a political and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each
other.
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly

different from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need
not represent any particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or
regional political party must represent a "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient
that the political party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same
governance principles and policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens.
Political Law- parameters in qualifying party- lists
The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those that
did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all nominees must belong to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Petitioners may have been disqualified
by the COMELEC because as political or regional parties they are not organized along sectoral lines
and do not represent the "marginalized and underrepresented."
Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent may have been
disqualified, although they may have a track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees
of non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified because they do not belong to any sector.
Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because one or more of its nominees failed to qualify,
even if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee.
In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list
elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to

organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-
list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether
major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list
elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system.
The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party
through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or

lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized
and underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-
defined political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the

"marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral
parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the
sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "well-defined political
constituencies," either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of
advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of
their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains
qualified.
This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and desist
from engaging in socio-economic or political experimentations contrary to what the Constitution has
ordained. Judicial power does not include the power to re-write the Constitution. Thus, the present
petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly qualify to
participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters prescribed by
this Court.
b. Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) v. Commission on Elections

(G.R. No. 190529, April 29, 2010)
BRION, J.
FACTS:
Respondent delisted petitioner, a party list organization, from the roster of registered national,
regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system through its
resolution, denying also the latter’s motion for reconsideration, in accordance with Section 6(8) of
Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941), otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, which provides:
Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. – The COMELEC may motu proprio or upon
verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following
grounds:
x x x x
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum
(2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered.[Emphasis supplied.]
Petitioner was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not
participate in the 2007 elections. Petitioner filed its opposition to the resolution citing among others
the misapplication in the ruling of MINERO v. COMELEC, but was denied for lack of merit. Petitioner
elevated the matter to SC showing the excerpts from the records of Senate Bill No. 1913 before it
became the law in question.
ISSUES: WON COMELEC erred in delisting PGBI.
RULINGS:
Yes. Petition is granted. The law is clear that the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified
complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of
any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition if it a) fails to participate in the last
two (2) preceding elections; or b) fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under
the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
The word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing
from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily
implies, as a disjunctive word. Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law provides
for two (2) separate reasons for delisting.
The disqualification for failure to garner 2% party-list votes in two preceding elections should
now be understood, in light of the Banat ruling, to mean failure to qualify for a party-list seat in two
preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. This, we declare, is how Section
6 (8) of RA 7941 should be understood and applied. We do so under our authority to state what the
law is, and as an exception to the application of the principle of stare decisis.
The MINERO ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it cannot
sustain PGBI’s delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties,
organizations or coalitions under the party-list system. First, the law is in the plain, clear and
unmistakable language of the law which provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting. Second,
MINERO is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941, as PGBI’s cited
congressional deliberations clearly show. MINERO therefore simply cannot stand.
c. ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010)
DEL CASTILLO, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBT’s). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad
first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006 as a party-list organization under Republic
Act 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. The application for accreditation was denied
on the ground that the organization had no substantial membership base. In 2009, Ang Ladlad again
filed a petition for registration with the COMELEC upon which it was dismissed on moral grounds.
Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration but the COMELEC upheld its First Resolution, stating that
“the party-list system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of marginalized individuals whose
interests are also the nation’s. Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to justify that having mixed
sexual orientations and transgender identities is beneficial to the nation, its application for
accreditation under the party-list system will remain just that.” That “the Philippines cannot ignore its
more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some moral precepts espoused
by said religions have sipped into society and these are not publicly accepted moral norms.”
COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national political agenda
to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for
the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA
7941. Thus Ladlad filed this petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner should be accredited as a party-list organization under RA 7941.
RULING:
The Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside the resolutions of the COMELEC. It
also directed the COMELEC to grant petitioner’s application for party-list accreditation.
The enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial
element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization
complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. Ang Ladlad has sufficiently
demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Nowhere in the records
has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list
organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “no law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-
establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly, “governmental
reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.”
Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs and they deserve to
participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented
sectors.
The principle of non-discrimination requires the laws of general application relating to

elections be applied to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation.
d. ANAD v. COMELEC
(GR No. 206987, September 10, 2013)
PEREZ, J.
FACTS:
On November 7, 2012, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution cancelling the
Certificate of Registration and/or Accreditation of petitioner Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy
(ANAD) on the following grounds: a) ANAD does not belong to, or come within the ambit of the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors enumerated in Sec. 5 of RA 7941; b) The Certificate of
Nomination submitted by the party only contained 3 nominees instead of 5, which is a failure to comply
with the procedural requirement set forth in Sec. 4, Rule 3 of Resolution No. 9366; and c) ANAD failed
to submit its statement of Contributions and Expenditures for the 2007 National and Local Elections
as required by Sec. 14 of RA 7166
ANAD challenged the above-mentioned resolution. The Court remanded the case to the
COMELEC for re-evaluation. In the assailed Resolution dated May 11, 2013, the COMELEC affirmed
the cancellation of petitioner’s Certificate of Registration and/or Accreditation and disqualified them
from participating in the 2013 Elections for violation of election laws and regulations. Hence, this
petition
ISSUE: WON the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in promulgating the assailed Resolution
without the benefit of a summary evidentiary hearing mandated by the due process clause.
RULING:
NO. ANAD was already given the opportunity to prove its qualifications during the summary
hearing of August 23, 2012, during which ANAD submitted documents and other pieces of evidence
to establish said qualifications. The COMELEC need not have called another summary hearing as
they could readily resort to the documents and other piece of evidence previously submitted by
petitioners in re-appraising ANAD’s qualifications.
The COMELEC, being a specialized agency tasked with the supervision of elections all over
the country, its factual findings, conclusions, rulings and decisions rendered on matters falling within
its competence shall not be interfered with by this Court in the absence of grave abuse of discretion
or any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law. As empowered by law, the COMELEC may cancel, after
due notice and hearing, the registration of any party-list organization if it violates or fails to comply
with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections
Compliance with Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 is essential as the said provision is a safeguard
against arbitrariness. Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 rids a party-list organization of the prerogative to
substitute and replace its nominees, or even to switch the order of the nominees, after submission of
the list to the COMELEC.
The COMELEC will only determine whether the nominees pass all the requirements
prescribed by the law and whether or not the nominees possess all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications. Thereafter, the names of the nominees will be published in newspapers of general
circulation. Although the people vote for the party-list organization itself in a party-list system of
election, not for the individual nominees, they still have the right to know who the nominees of any
particular party-list organization are. The publication of the list of the party-list nominees in
newspapers of general circulation serves that right of the people, enabling the voters to make
intelligent and informed choice.
e. Abang Lingkod Party-list vs COMELEC

(G.R. No. 206952, October 22, 2013)
REYES, J.
FACTS:
Abang Lingkod Party-list is a sectoral organization that represents the interest of peasant
farmers and fisherfolk. On May 31, 2012, the party manifested its intent to participate in the May 2013
elections. The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9513 which required previously registered party-list
groups that have filed their respective Manifestations of Intent to undergo summary evidentiary
hearing for purposes of determining their continuing compliance with the requirements under RA
7941. The party complied with the needed documents and after due proceedings, the COMELEC en
banc cancelled their registration as a party-list group. They pointed out that Abang Lingkod (1) failed
to establish its track record in uplifting the cause of the marginalized and underrepresented; (2) it
merely offered photographs of some alleged activities it conducted after the May 2010 elections; and
(3) failed to show that nominees are themselves marginalized and underrepresented or that they have
been involved in activities aimed at improving the plight of the sectors it claims to represent. Abang
Lingkod then filed a petition alleging COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling its
registration under the party-list system. This was consolidated with 51 other separate petitions whose
registration were cancelled or who were denied registration.
On April 2, 2013, the Court laid down new parameters to be observed by the COMELEC in
screening parties, organizations or associations seeking registration and/or accreditation under the
party-list system. The Court then remanded to COMELEC the cases of previously registered party-
list groups, including that of Abang Lingkod, to determine whether they are qualified pursuant to the
new parameters and, in the affirmative, be allowed to participate in the May 2013 party-list elections.
On May 10, 2013, the COMELEC issued a Resolution affirming the cancellation of Abang
Lingkod’s registration. The party sought for reconsideration, however, withdrew it and filed instead
this petition, claiming that the former gravely abused its discretion when it affirmed the cancellation
of its registration when it should have allowed it to present evidence to prove its qualification as a
party-list group pursuant to the Atong Paglaum ruling. On the other hand, the COMELEC asserts that
the petition should be dismissed for lack of merit.
ISSUE: WON COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in canceling the party’s registration under the
party-list system.
RULING:
YES. The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it insisted on requiring ABANG
LINGKOD to prove its track record notwithstanding that a group's track record is no longer required
pursuant to the Court's pronouncement in Atong Paglaum. Abang Lingkod's registration must be
cancelled due to its misrepresentation is a conclusion derived from a simplistic reading of the
provisions of R.A. No. 7941 and the import of the Court's disposition in Atong Paglaum. Not every
misrepresentation committed by national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations would merit
the denial or cancellation of their registration under the party-list system. The misrepresentation must
relate to their qualification as a party-list group.
Under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, groups intending to register under the party-list system are
not required to submit evidence of their track record; they are merely required to attach to their verified
petitions their "constitution, by-laws, platform of government, list of officers, coalition agreement, and
other relevant information as may be required by the COMELEC."
Sectoral parties or organizations are no longer required to adduce evidence showing their
track record, i.e., proof of activities that they have undertaken to further the cause of the sector they
represent. Indeed, it is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector. Otherwise stated, it is sufficient that the ideals represented by the sectoral
organizations are geared towards the cause of the sector/s, which they represent. If at all, evidence
showing a track record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented sectors is only
required from nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and
underrepresented who do not factually belong to the sector represented by their party or organization.
Also, a declaration of an untruthful statement in a petition for registration under Section 6 (6)
of R.A. No. 7941, in order to be a ground for the refusal and/or cancellation of registration under the
party-list system, must pertain to the qualification of the party, organization or coalition under the
party-list system. In order to justify the cancellation or refusal of registration of a group, there must be
a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact, which would otherwise render the group
disqualified from participating in the party-list elections.
There was no necessity for the COMELEC to conduct further summary evidentiary hearing to
assess the qualification of Abang Lingkod pursuant to Atong Paglaum. It was only remanded to the
them so that they may reassess, based on the evidence already submitted, whether the party qualifies
to participate in the party-list system. The records also disclose that Abang Lingkod was able to file
with the COMELEC a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 10, 2013, negating its
claim that it was denied due process. As it has been held, deprivation of due process cannot be
successfully invoked where a party was given a chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.
f. COCOFED v. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 207026, August 6, 2013)
BRION, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner COCOFED-Philippine Coconut Producers Federation Inc. is an organization and
dectoral party whose membership comes from the peasant sector, particularly the coconut farmers
and producers. On May 29, 2012, it manifested with the COMELEC its intent to participate in the
party-list elections of May 13, 2013 and submitted only 2 nominees - Atty. Emerito Calderon and Atty.
Domingo Espina. Pursuant to Res. No. 9513, the COMELEC conducted a summary hearing to
determine whether COCOFED, among several party-list groups, had continuously complied with the
legal requirements. In its November 7, 2012 resolution, the COMELEC cancelled petitioner’s
registration and accreditation as a partylist organization. On Dec. 4, the party submitted the names
of Charles Avila in substitution of Atty. Espina and Efren Villaseñor as its third nominee.
Pursuant to the Atong Paglaum ruling, the Court remanded all the petitions to the COMELEC
to determine their compliance with the new parameters set by the Court in that case. On May 10,
2013, COMELEC issued its assailed resolution, maintaining its earlier ruling for the party’s failure to
comply with the requirement of Sec. 8 of RA 7941 to submit a list of not less than 5 nominees.
COCOFED moved for reconsideration only to withdraw its motion later and instead, filed a
Manifestation with Urgent Request to Admit Additional Nominees with the COMELEC, namely: Felino
Gutierrez and Rodolfo de Asis. On May 24, 2013, the COMELEC issued a resolution declaring the
cancellation final and executory.
COCOFED argues that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the assailed
resolution on the following grounds: a) COMELEC violated its right to due process; b) Failure to
submit the required number of nominees was based on the good faith belief that its submission was
sufficient for purposes of the elections, that it could still be remedied, and the number of nominees
becomes significant only when a party-list organization is able to attain a sufficient number of votes
which would qualify it for a seat in the House of Representatives; and c)COMELEC violated its right
to equal protection of the laws since at least 2 other party-list groups (ACT-CIS and MTM Phils.)
which failed to submit 5 nominees were included in the official list of party-list groups.
ISSUE: WON Comelec gravely abused its discretion on issuing assailed Resolution
RULING:
No. COCOFED’s failure to submit a list of 5 nominees, despite ample opportunity to do so
before the elections, is a violation imputable to the party under Section 6 (5) of RA 7941. Under
Section 6 (5) of RA No. 7941, violation of or failure to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating
to elections is a ground for the cancellation of registration. However, not every kind of violation
automatically warrants the cancellation of a party-list group's registration. Since a reading of the entire
Section 6 shows that all the grounds for cancellation actually pertain to the party itself, then the laws,
rules and regulations violated to warrant cancellation under Section 6 (5) must be one that is primarily
imputable to the party itself and not one that is chiefly confined to an individual member or its nominee.
The language of Sec. 8 of RA 7941 does not only use the word ‘shall’ in connection with the
requirement of submitting a list of nominees; it uses this mandatory term in conjunction with the
number of names to be submitted that is couched negatively, i.e., “not less than five.”
While COCOFED’s failure to submit a complete list of requirements may not have been among
the grounds cited by the COMELEC in earlier cancelling its registration, this is not sufficient to support
a finding of grave abuse of discretion.
The fact that a party-list group is entitled to no more than three seats in Congress, regardless
of the number of votes it may garner, 24 does not render Section 8 of RA No. 7941 permissive in
nature.
The Court cannot discern any valid reason why a party-list group cannot comply with the
statutory requirement. A party is not allowed to simply refuse to submit a list containing "not less than
five nominees" and consider the deficiency as a waiver on its part.
A party may have been disqualified because one or more of its nominees fail to qualify, even
if party has at least one remaining qualified nominee. The Court in no way authorized a party-list
group's inexcusable failure, if not outright refusal, to comply with the clear letter of the law on the
submission of at least five nominees.
g. AMORES v HRET
(G.R. No. 189600, June 29, 2010)
CARPIO MORALES, J.
FACTS:
Petition for certiorari challenging the assumption of office of one Emmanuel Joel Villanueva
as representative of CIBAC in the HoR. Petitioner argues that Villanueva was 31 at the time of filing
of nomination, beyond the age limit of 30 which was the limit imposed by RA 7941 for "youth sector"
and his change of affiliation from Youth Sector to OFW and families not affected six months prior to
elections.
ISSUE: Whether the requirement for youth sector representatives apply to respondent Villanueva
RULING:
The law is clear that representative of youth sector should be between 25 to 30 and sectoral
representation should be changed 6 months prior to elections. Villanueva is ineligible to hold office
as a member of HoR representing CIBAC because he violated both requirements.
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only
at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure.
Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged.
h. Bantay Republic Act. v. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 177271, May 4, 2007)
GARCIA, J.
FACTS:
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus to nullify and set
aside certain issuances of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) respecting party-list groups which
have manifested their intention to participate in the party-list elections on May 14, 2007.
A number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations and subsequently were
accredited by the Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections. Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941)
and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR) filed with the Comelec an Urgent Petition seeking to
disqualify the nominees of certain party-list organizations. Meanwhile petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No.
177314, addressed 2 letters to the Director of the Comelec’s Law Department requesting a list of that
groups’ nominees. Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was the issuance of Comelec
en banc Resolution 07-0724 under date April 3, 2007 virtually declaring the nominees’ names
confidential and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales’ basic disclosure request. According to
COMELEC, there is nothing in R.A. 7941 that requires the Comelec to disclose the names of
nominees, and that party list elections must not be personality oriented according to Chairman
Abalos.
In the first petition (G.R. No. 177271), BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR assail the Comelec resolutions
accrediting private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the forthcoming party-list
elections without simultaneously determining whether or not their respective nominees possess the
requisite qualifications defined in R.A. No. 7941, or the "Party-List System Act" and belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sector each seeks to.
In the second petition (G.R. No. 177314), petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan
Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution dated April 3, 2007.
While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names
of the nominees of the various party-list groups named in the petitions, BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR have
the additional prayers that the 33 private respondents named therein be "declare[d] as unqualified to
participate in the party-list elections and that the Comelec be enjoined from allowing respondent
groups from participating in the elections.
ISSUE: WON respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the various
party-list groups, has violated the right to information and free access to documents as guaranteed
by the Constitution.
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
refusing to release the names of said candidates based on the right to information. That the right to
information is being sought after in the context of the electoral climate and the controversial Party-
List system under Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act highlights the uniqueness of
these cases.
The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: "[T]he names of the party-list nominees
shall not be shown on the certified list" is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the
requested disclosure. To us, the prohibition imposed on the Comelec under said Section 7 is limited
in scope and duration, meaning, that it extends only to the certified list which the same provision
requires to be posted in the polling places on election day. To stretch the coverage of the prohibition
to the absolute is to read into the law something that is not intended. As it were, there is absolutely
nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through
mediums other than the "Certified List" the names of the party-list nominees. The Comelec obviously
misread the limited non-disclosure aspect of the provision as an absolute bar to public disclosure
before the May 2007 elections. The interpretation thus given by the Comelec virtually tacks an
unconstitutional dimension on the last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7941
It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right to elect their
representatives on the basis of an informed judgment. Hence the need for voters to be informed about
matters that have a bearing on their choice. The ideal cannot be achieved in a system of blind voting,
as veritably advocated in the assailed resolution of the Comelec. The Court, since the 1914 case of
Gardiner v. Romulo, 21 has consistently made it clear that it frowns upon any interpretation of the law
or rules that would hinder in any way the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election. 22 So
it must be here for still other reasons articulated earlier. In all, we agree with the petitioners that
respondent Comelec has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of
the party-list groups named in the herein petitions.
i. BANAT v COMELEC
(G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009)
CARPIO, J.
FACTS:
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made
a partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the
following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining 20%
shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at least
2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is
entitled to 3 seats – this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case of
Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of the votes
cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list
candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that the
2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify
for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list election, is not
supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the
20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory,
then with the 2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the
prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new computation
(which shall be discussed in the “HELD” portion of this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the
3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political parties
are allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties.
ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.
RULING:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for legislative districts,
there shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally, the 1987 Constitution
provides that there shall be not more than 250 members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule,
200 of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would be from party-list representatives. However,
the Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the number of the membership of the lower house as in
fact, it can create additional legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the
May 2007 elections, there were 220 district representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1
ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted for party-list representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats Available

to Party-List Representatives
Hence,
(220 ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling – meaning, the number of party-
list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the members of the lower house.
However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow that only
party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and those which garnered less
than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the
ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast
for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or
one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one
million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation
of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list
seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum
number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number
of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives.”
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is
guaranteed a seat, and not “qualified”. This allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also
get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on
the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast
for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are
allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because
they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining
available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party
List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision
in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first round,
all party-lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their
one seat each. The total number of seats given to these two-percenters are then deducted from the
total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are
a total 55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the
full text of the case for the tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round, particularly,
in determining, first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in determining seats for
the party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the process filling up the 20%
allocation for party-list representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining
number of seats. The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional number of seats
allotted for the party list – but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33%
of the total votes cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above:

(Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-
percenter which means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3 seats.
Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats because the 3 seat
limit rule prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and there
are still unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those
higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are occupied.
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the likes of
UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from the
Constitution or from RA 7941 against major political parties from participating in the party-list elections
as the word “party” was not qualified and that even the framers of the Constitution in their deliberations
deliberately allowed major political parties to participate in the party-list elections provided that they
establish a sectoral wing which represents the marginalized (indirect participation), Justice Puno, in
his separate opinion, concurred by 7 other justices, explained that the will of the people defeats the
will of the framers of the Constitution precisely because it is the people who ultimately ratified the
Constitution – and the will of the people is that only the marginalized sections of the country shall
participate in the party-list elections. Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the party-list
elections, directly or indirectly.
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall dominate the
party-list system.
4. ELECTION, SALARIES, PRIVILEGES
a. LOZADA V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. L-59068. JANUARY 27, 1983)
DE CASTRO, J.
FACTS:
Lozada together with Igot filed a petition for mandamus compelling the COMELEC to hold an
election to fill the vacancies in the Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP). They anchor their contention
on Sec 5 (2), Art 8 of the 1973 Constitution which provides: “In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang
Pambansa eighteen months or more before a regular election, the Commission on Election shall call
a special election to be held within sixty (60) days after the vacancy occurs to elect the Member to
serve the unexpired term.” COMELEC opposes the petition alleging, substantially, that 1) petitioners
lack standing to file the instant petition for they are not the proper parties to institute the action; 2) this
Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this petition; and 3) Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution does not apply to the Interim Batasan Pambansa.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court can compel COMELEC to hold a special election to fill
vacancies in the legislature.
RULING:
No. The SC’s jurisdiction over the COMELEC is only to review by certiorari the latter’s
decision, orders or rulings. This is as clearly provided in Article XII-C, Section 11 of the New
Constitution which reads: “Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy
thereof.” There is in this case no decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC which is sought to be
reviewed by this Court under its certiorari jurisdiction as provided for in the aforequoted provision,
which is the only known provision conferring jurisdiction or authority on the Supreme Court over the
COMELEC.
It is obvious that the holding of special elections in several regional districts where vacancies
exist, would entail huge expenditure of money. Only the Batasang Pambansa (BP) can make the
necessary appropriation for the purpose, and this power of the BP may neither be subject to
mandamus by the courts much less may COMELEC compel the BP to exercise its power of
appropriation. From the role BP has to play in the holding of special elections, which is to appropriate
the funds for the expenses thereof, it would seem that the initiative on the matter must come from the
BP, not the COMELEC, even when the vacancies would occur in the regular not IBP. The power to
appropriate is the sole and exclusive prerogative of the legislative body, the exercise of which may
not be compelled through a petition for mandamus. What is more, the provision of Section 5(2), Article
VIII of the Constitution was intended to apply to vacancies in the regular National Assembly, now BP,
not to the IBP.
b. PHILCONSA v. Mathay
(G.R. No. L-25554. OCTOBER 4, 1966)
REYES, J.B.L., J.
FACTS:
Petitioner has filed a suit against the former Acting Auditor General of the Philippines and the
Auditor of the Congress ofthe Philippines seeking to permanently enjoin them from authorizing or
passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries authorized by RA 4134 to the Speaker and
members of the House of Representatives before December 30, 1969.
The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and members of
the House of Representatives set by RA 4134, approved just the preceding year 1964. Petitioner
contends that such implementation is violative of Article VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution.
The reason given being that the term of the 8 senators elected in 1963, and who took part in the
approval of RA 4134, would have expired only on December 30, 1969; while the term of the members
of the House who participated in the approval of said Act expired on December 30, 1965
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution require that not only the term of all
the members of the House but also that of all the Senators who approved the increase must have
fully expired before the increase becomes effective.
RULING:
No. In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased compensation
for legislators becomes fully effective, the Constitutional provision refers to “all members of the Senate
and the House of Representatives” in the same sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or
separation between them. This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks
of the “expiration of the full term” of the Senators and Representatives that approved the measure,
using the singular form and not the plural, thereby rendering more evident the intent to consider both
houses for the purpose as indivisible components of one single Legislature. The use of the word
“term” in the singular, when combined with the following phrase “all the members of the Senate and
the House,” underscores that in the application of Art. VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10), the fundamental
consideration is that the terms of office of all members of the Legislature that enacted the measure
must have expired before the increase in compensation can become operative.
The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased compensation provided by RA 4134 is not
operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of the Senate and House that
approved it will have expired.
c. LIGOT V. MATHAY
(G.R. No. L-34676. APRIL 30, 1974)
TEEHANKEE, J.
FACTS:
Ligot served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines
for three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from December 30, 1957 to
December 30, 1969. During his second term in office (1961-1965), RA 4134 “fixing the salaries of
constitutional officials and certain other officials of the national government” was enacted into law and
under section 7 thereof took effect on July 1, 1964. The salaries of members of Congress (senators
and congressman) were increased under said Act from P7,200.00 to P32,000.00 per annum, but the
Act expressly provided that said increases “shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution.” Ligot’s term expired on December 30, 1969, so he filed a claim for retirement under
Commonwealth Act 186, section 12 (c) as amended by RA 4968 which provided for retirement gratuity
of any official or employee, appointive or elective, with a total of at least twenty years of service, the
last three years of which are continuous on the basis therein provided “in case of employees based
on the highest rate received and in case of elected officials on the rates of pay as provided by law.”
HOR granted his petition however, Velasco, the then Congress Auditor refused to so issue
certification. The Auditor General then, Mathay, also disallowed the same. The thrust of Ligot’s appeal
is that his claim for retirement gratuity computed on the basis of the increased salary of P32,000.00
per annum for members of Congress (which was not applied to him during his incumbency which
ended December 30, 1969, while the Court held in Philconsa vs. Mathay that such increases would
become operative only for members of Congress elected to serve therein commencing December
30, 1969) should not have been disallowed, because at the time of his retirement, the increased
salary for members of Congress “as provided by law” (under Republic Act 4134) was already
P32,000.00 per annum.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ligot is entitled to such retirement benefit.
RULING:
No. To allow petitioner a retirement gratuity computed on the basis of P32,000.00 per annum
would be a subtle way of increasing his compensation during his term of office and of achieving
indirectly what he could not obtain directly. Ligot’s claim cannot be sustained as far as he and other
members of Congress similarly situated whose term of office ended on December 30, 1969 are
concerned for the simple reason that a retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of compensation within
the purview of the Constitutional provision limiting their compensation and “other emoluments” to their
salary as provided by law. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired
on December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum
(which they were prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during their term of office) would be to
pay them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase the salary beyond that which they were
permitted by the Constitution to receive during their incumbency. As stressed by the Auditor-General
in his decision in the similar case of petitioner’s colleague, ex-Congressman Singson, “(S)uch a
scheme would contravene the Constitution for it would lead to the same prohibited result by enabling
administrative authorities to do indirectly what cannot be done directly.”
d. PEOPLE V. JALOSJOS
(G.R. No. 132875. FEBRUARY 3, 2000)
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
FACTS:
Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now confined at the national
penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six
counts is pending appeal. Jalosjos, filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge his
duties of a Congressman including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings
despite his having convicted in the first instance including of a non-bailable offense.
Jalosjos argument is the mandate of sovereign will which he states that he was re-elected as
Congressman of Firs District of Zamboanga del Norte by his constituents in order that their voices
will be heard and since the accused-appellant is treated as bona fide member of the House of
Representatives, the latter urges co-equal branch of government to respect his mandate.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos, be allowed to discharge his mandate
as member of the House of Representatives.
RULING:
No. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators or members of the House of
Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution and shows that this privilege has always
been granted in a restrictive sense.
It is true, that election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, the
rights and privileges from being elected as public official may be restricted by law. Privilege has to be
granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position, the higher the rank the greater the
requirement of obedience rather that exemption.
The accused-appellant Romeo Jalosjos has not given any reason why he should be exempted
from the operation of Section 11 Article VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot
compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the abuse is a legitimate one. The
confinement of a Congressman with a crime punishable imprisonment by more than six (6) months
is not merely authorized by law, has constitutional foundations. Allowing Jalosjos to attend in
Congressional sessions and meetings for five (5) days in a week which will make him a free man with
all the privileges and would make his status to that of a special class, it also would be a making of the
purpose of the correction system.
e. TRILLANES IV V. PIMENTEL
(G.R. No. 179817. JUNE 27, 2008)
CARPIO-MORALES, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Trillanes IV is on trial for coup d’etat in relation to the “Oakwood Incident.” In the
2007 elections, he won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on June 30,
2007. Petitioner now asks the Court that he be allowed to attend all official functions of the Senate,
alleging mainly that his case is distinct from that of Jalosjos as his case is still pending resolution
whereas that in the Jalosjos case, there was already conviction.
Antonio Trillanes won a seat in the Senate while being under detention for staging an alleged
coup d’etat. Before the commencement of his term, his fellow opposition Senators filed a motion to
allow him to attend Senate sessions and perform his duties as senator. It was argued that there is a
world of difference between his case and that of Jalosjos respecting the type of offense involved, the
stage of filing of the motion, and other circumstances which demonstrate the inapplicability of
Jalosjos.
Trillanes posits that his election provides the legal justification to allow him to serve his
mandate, after the people, in their sovereign capacity, elected him as Senator. He argues that denying
his Omnibus Motion is tantamount to removing him from office, depriving the people of proper
representation, denying the people’s will, repudiating the people’s choice, and overruling the mandate
of the people.
Moreover, he pleads for the same liberal treatment accorded certain detention prisoners who
have also been charged with non-bailable offenses, like former President Joseph Estrada and former
Governor Nur Misuari who were allowed to attend “social functions.”
ISSUE: Whether or not valid classification between petitioner and Jalosjos exists
RULING:
No. The petition is bereft of merit. In attempting to strike a distinction between his case and
that of Jalosjos, petitioner chiefly points out that former Rep. Romeo Jalosjos (Jalosjos) was already
convicted, albeit his conviction was pending appeal, when he filed a motion similar to petitioner's
Omnibus Motion, whereas he (petitioner) is a mere detention prisoner. He asserts that he continues
to enjoy civil and political rights since the presumption of innocence is still in his favor.
Further, petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was charged with crimes involving moral turpitude,
i.e., two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness, whereas he is indicted for
coup d'etat which is regarded as a "political offense." Furthermore, petitioner justifies in his favor the
presence of noble causes in expressing legitimate grievances against the rampant and
institutionalized practice of graft and corruption in the AFP.
In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and for release on
recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained
in a hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court's judgment of conviction, justifies
the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates
the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal
action." Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies
equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos.
f. OSMENA V. PENDATUN
(G.R. No. L-17144. OCTOBER 28, 1960)
BENGZON, J.
FACTS:
In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr. delivered a speech entitled “A Message to
Garcia”. In the said speech, he disparaged then President Carlos Garcia and his administration.
Subsequently, House Resolution No. 59 was passed by the lower house in order to investigate the
charges made by Osmeña during his speech and that if his allegations were found to be baseless
and malicious, he may be subjected to disciplinary actions by the lower house.
Osmeña then questioned the validity of the said resolution before the Supreme Court.
Osmeña avers that the resolution violates his parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in
Congress. Congressman Salipada Pendatun filed an answer where he averred that the Supreme
Court has not jurisdiction over the matter and Congress has the power to discipline its members.
ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeña’s immunity has been violated
RULING:
No. Sec. 15 (now Sec. 11), Art. VI of the Constitution provides that for any speech or debate
in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representatives shall not be questioned in
any other place.
The Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished

in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom
of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or
any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility
before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter
disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.
On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the President constitutes disorderly
conduct for which Osmena may be disciplined, the Court believes that the House of Representatives
is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution has conferred
jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which
the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and
adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if the Court assumed the power to determine whether
Osmena’s conduct constituted disorderly behavior, it would have assumed appellate jurisdiction,
which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the government.
g. JIMENEZ V. CABANGBANG
(G.R. No. 15905. AUGUST 3, 1966)
CONCEPCION, C.J.
FACTS:
Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its
Committee on National Defense. In November 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication of an open
letter addressed to the Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have been allegedly three operational
plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian political
strategists. That such strategists have had collusions with communists and that the Secretary of
Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planning a coup d’état to place him as the president. The “planners”
allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, among others, under their guise and that Jimenez et al may or may
not be aware that they are being used as a tool to meet such an end. The letter was said to have
been published in newspapers of general circulation. Jimenez then filed a case against Cabangbang
to collect a sum of damages against Cabangbang alleging that Cabangbang’s statement is libelous.
Cabangbang petitioned for the case to be dismissed because he said that as a member of the lower
house, he is immune from suit and that he is covered by the privileged communication rule and that
the said letter is not even libelous.
ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication endowed to members
of Congress.
RULING:
No. Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides “The Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be
privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and
returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any
other place.”
The publication of the said letter is not covered by said expression which refers to utterances
made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered,
statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session as well as bills
introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by
Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge
of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform
its functions as such at the time of the performance of the acts in question. Congress was not in
session when the letter was published and at the same time he, himself, caused the publication of
the said letter. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not
performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof.
Hence, contrary to the finding made by the lower court the said communication is not absolutely
privileged.
5. DISQUALIFICATIONS AND OTHER INHIBITIONS
a. ADAZA V. PACANA
(G.R. No. 68159. MARCH 18, 1985)
ESCOLIN, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Homobono Adaza was elected Governor of Misamis Oriental during the 1980
elections. His Vice-Governor, herein respondent Fernando Pacana, Jr., was likewise qualified and
assumed officed during their oath on March 3, 1980. Under the law, their respective terms of office
would expire on March 3, 1986.
Pacana and Adaza filed their certificates of candidacy for the May 14, 1984 Batasan
Pambansa elections on March 27, 1984 and April 27, 1984 respectively. Petitioner won and took his
oath as Mambabatas Pambansa on July 19, 9184 and respondent likewise took over the vacancy as
Governor and took his oath of office on July 25, 1984.
Petitioner contends Pacana’s unlawful occupancy of the Governor’s office, hence this petition
for prohibition with a writ of parliamentary injunction and/or restraining order was filed before the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Homobono Adaza can exercise and discharge his functions as
Mambatas Pambansa and Provincial Governor simultaneously.
RULING:
No. Under Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, a Member of the National Assembly
(now Batasan Pambansa) shall not hold any other office or employment in the government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, during his tenure, except that of prime minister or member of the cabinet. Petitioner
Adaza, being a public officer is subject to the regulations and conditions as the law may impose and
cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his holding of more than one
office.
Upon taking his oath of office as an elected Mambabatas Pambansa, petitioner subsequently
operated to vacate his former post and he can no longer continue to occupy the same, nor attempt
to discharge its functions which makes respondent to reassume the position of Vice-Governor and
later on take oath of office as Governor for the unexpired term in lawful accordance with the Local
Government Code.
b. LIBAN V. GORDON
(G.R. No. 175352, JULY 15, 2009)
CARPIO, J.
FACTS:
Petitioners Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo, and Salvador M. Viari (petitioners) filed
with this Court a Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate.
Petitioners are officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter while
respondent is Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors. During
respondent's incumbency as a member of the Senate of the Philippines, he was elected Chairman of
the PNRC during the 23 February 2006 meeting of the PNRC Board of Governors. Petitioners allege
that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has ceased to be
a member of the Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution.
Petitioners cite Camporedondo v. NLRC, which held that the PNRC is a government-owned
or controlled corporation. Petitioners claim that in accepting and holding the position of Chairman of
the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate,
pursuant to Flores v. Drilon, which held that incumbent national legislators lose their elective posts
upon their appointment to another government office.
ISSUE: Whether Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution applies to the case of respondent
who is Chairman of the PNRC and at the same time a Member of the Senate.
RULING:
No. PNRC is a Private Organization Performing Public Functions. The PNRC is a non-profit,
donor-funded, voluntary, humanitarian organization, whose mission is to bring timely, effective, and
compassionate humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable without consideration of nationality,
race, religion, gender, social status, or political affiliation.
To ensure and maintain its autonomy, neutrality, and independence, the PNRC cannot be
owned or controlled by the government. Indeed, the Philippine government does not own the PNRC.
The PNRC does not have government assets and does not receive any appropriation from the
Philippine Congress. The PNRC is financed primarily by contributions from private individuals and
private entities obtained through solicitation campaigns organized by its Board of Governors. The
PNRC Charter is Violative of the Constitutional Proscription against the Creation of Private
Corporations by Special Law. The Constitution recognizes two classes of corporations. The first refers
to private corporations created under a general law. The second refers to government-owned or
controlled corporations created by special charters.
The Constitution emphatically prohibits the creation of private corporations except by general
law applicable to all citizens. The purpose of this constitutional provision is to ban private corporations
created by special charters, which historically gave certain individuals, families or groups special
privileges denied to other citizens. In short, Congress cannot enact a law creating a private
corporation with a special charter. Such legislation would be unconstitutional. Private corporations
may exist only under a general law. If the corporation is private, it must necessarily exist under a
general law. Stated differently, only corporations created under a general law can qualify as private
corporations. Under existing laws, the general law is the Corporation Code, except that the
Cooperative Code governs the incorporation of cooperatives.
In sum, we hold that the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office
in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution. However, since the PNRC Charter is void insofar as it creates the PNRC
as a private corporation, the PNRC should incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with
the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporate.
c. LIBAN V. GORDON
(G.R. No. 175352. JANUARY 18, 2011)
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
FACTS:
Respondent filed a motion for partial recommendation on a Supreme Court decision which
ruled that being chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) did not disqualify him from
being a Senator, and that the charter creating PNRC is unconstitutional as the PNRC is a private
corporation and the Congress is precluded by the Constitution to create such.The Court then ordered
the PNRC to incorporate itself with the SEC as a private corporation. Respondent takes exception to
the second part of the ruling, which addressed the constitutionality of the statute creating the PNRC
as a private corporation. Respondent avers that the issue of constitutionality was only touched upon
in the issue of locus standi. It is a rule that the constitutionality will not be touched upon if it is not the
lis mota of the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not it was proper for the Court to have ruled on the constitutionality of the PNRC
statute.
RULING:
No. In the case at bar, the constitutionality of the PNRC statute was raised in the issue of
standing. As such, the Court should not have declared certain provisions of such as unconstitutional.
On the substantive issue, the PNRC is sui generis. It is unlike the private corporations that the
Constitution wants to prevent Congress from creating.
First, the PNRC is not organized for profit. It is an organization dedicated to assist victims of
war and administer relief to those who have been devastated by calamities, among others. It is
entirely devoted to public service. It is not covered by the prohibition since the Constitution aims to
eliminate abuse by the Congress, which tend to favor personal gain. Secondly, the PNRC was created
in order to participate in the mitigation of the effects of war, as embodied in the Geneva Convention.
The creation of the PNRC is compliance with international treaty obligations. Lastly, the PNRC is a
National Society, an auxiliary of the government. It is not like government instrumentalities and
GOCC. The PNRC is regulated directly by international humanitarian law, as opposed to local law
regulating the other mentioned entities. As such, it was improper for the Court to have declared certain
portions of the PNRC statute as unconstitutional. However, it is the stand of Justice Carpio that there
is no mandate for the Government to create a National Society to this effect. He also raises the fact
that the PNRC is not sui generis in being a private corporation organized for public needs. Justice
Abad is of the opinion that the PNRC is neither private or governmental, hence it was within the power
of Congress to create.
6. SESSIONS, OFFICERS, QUORUM, RULES OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISCIPLINE OF

MEMBERS
a. AVELINO v. CUENCO
(G.R. No. L-2821, March 4, 1949)
FACTS:
On February 21, 1949, Sen. Tanada filed with the Senate Secretary charges against Senate
President Avelino. Sen. Tanada requested to give a privilege speech during the session. Sen.
Tanada’s motions were continuously denied of the common courtesy and ruling Sen. Sanidad and
Tanada “out of order!”. Senator Avelino along with other Senators, walked-out of the session hall.
Senate President Pro-Tempore Arranz issued Resolution No. 67 and 68 declaring the vacancy of the
position of Senate President and installing Hon. Cuenco as Acting Senate President. These
resolutions were voted and unanimously approved.
Thus, Avelino filed a petition before the Supreme Court. However, the Supreme Court with a
vote of 6 out of the 10 Justices present, decided to deny the petition stating that the Court has no
jurisdiction on the case. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The SC with a majority vote of
seven, granted the motion and took cognizance over the case.
ISSUE: WON the 12 Senators who installed Cuenco as the Acting President of the Senate constituted
a quorum?
RULING:
YES. Supreme Court held that there is a quorum that the 12 senators being the majority of 23
Senators. Resolution Nos. 67 and 68 are valid. Sen. Cuenco has been legally elected as Senate
President. PETITION DISMISSED.
If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it validly constituted?
In other words, was there the majority required by the Constitution for the transaction of the business
of the Senate. Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was, firstly because the minute say
so, secondly, because at the beginning of such session there were at least fourteen senators
including Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the absence from the country
of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twelve three
senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a quorum,
"the House: does not mean "all" the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute "the
House". (Missouri Pac. vs. Kansas, 63 Law ed. [U. S.], p. 239). There is a difference between a
majority of "the House", the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority
(12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate
for the purpose of a quorum. Mr. Justice Pablo believes furthermore than even if the twelve did not
constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if
one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have
been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one
abstained.
b. Arroyo v. De Venecia
(G.R. No. 127255, June 26, 1998)
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS:
The petitioners are challenging the validity of R.A. 8420 (amends certain provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code by imposing “Sin Taxes”) by filing a petition for for certiorari and/or
prohibition. They claim that respondents violated the rules of the House which are "constitutionally
mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution when the Chair of the
Committee (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) allegedly ignored a privileged question raised by Rep.
Arroyo during the committee report for the approval of R.A. 8420.
Petitioners claim that there are actually four different versions of the transcript of this portion of Rep.
Arroyo's interpellation:
(1)the transcript of audio-sound recording of the proceedings in the session hall

(2) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996, as
certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 21, 1996
(3) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996 as
(4) the published version
Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the constitutional provision
that "each House may determine the rules of its proceedings" and that for this reason they are
judicially enforceable. This contention was invoked by parties, although not successfully, precisely to
support claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to conduct its business free from interference by
courts. In this case, petitioners cite the provision for the opposite purpose of invoking judicial review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the House of Representatives acted with grave abuse of discretion
in enacting R.A. No. 8240 affects its validity?
RULING:
No. The petition was dismissed. According to the findings of the court, the alleged violations
are merely internal rules of procedures rather than what petitioners claim to be constitutional
requirements for enacting laws. In this case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only
those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this
Court. It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court
either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded
its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the
judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself.
There is no rule of the House concerned that quorum shall be determined by viva voce or
nominal voting. The Constitution does not require that the yeas and nays of the Members be taken
every time a House has to vote, except only on the following instances – upon the last and the third
readings of the bill, at the request of 1/5 of the Members present and in repassing a bill over the veto
of the President. Second, there is obviousness on the part of the petitioner to delay the business of
the House, thus eliminating the alleged skullduggery on part of the accused. Third, the enrolled bill
doctrine states that enrolled bills are in itself conclusive thus legally binding provided it is in harmony
with the constitution. Lastly, the court upheld principle of separation of powers, which herein, is
applicable for the legislative branch for it has exercised its power without grave abuse of discretion
resulting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
c. Pacete v Commission on Appointments

(G.R. No. L-25895, July 23, 1971)
FERNANDO, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Felizardo S. Pacete alleged that he was appointed by the then President of the
Philippines on August 31, 1964 as Municipal Judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato.
He assumed office on September 11, 1964 and discharged his duties as such. As his
appointment, was made during the recess of Congress, it was submitted to the Commission on
Appointments at its next session in 1965.
On February 7, 1966, the then Secretary of Justice, whom he likewise included in his petition,
through the Judicial Superintendent, advised petitioner to vacate his position as municipal judge, the
ground being that his appointment had been by-passed.
Senator Rodolfo Ganzon, wrote to its Chairman stating that he was filing a motion for the
reconsideration of the confirmation of the appointment of petitioner as municipal judge of Pigcawayan,
Cotabato, in view of derogatory information which he had received.
Respondent Secretary of the Commission on Appointments thus was led to notify the then
Secretary of Justice accordingly, following what he considered to be the prevailing practice of such
body that the mere presentation of such letter "automatically vacated the confirmation of the
appointment in question . . ." Respondent Secretary of Justice through the Judicial Superintendent
then advised petitioner that he should vacate his position as municipal judge, as he had not been
duly confirmed. The Disbursing Officer of the Department of Justice was likewise named respondent
as he had, as a consequence, withheld petitioner's salaries.
ISSUE: WoN petitioner’s appointment must be confirmed.
RULING:
For respondents to argue that the mere filing of a motion for reconsideration did suffice to set
it aside, even in the absence of any further action, is, as stressed by petitioner, to lose sight of what
is provided in the Constitution. That would be moreover tantamount to imparting to a move of a single
member of a collective body a decisive weight. It is bad enough if the minority were to prevail. A one-
man rule, which is the effect of what respondent Secretary of the Commission on Appointments
contends, is infinitely worse. It is indefensible in principle and pernicious in operation. It can find no
shelter in the constitutional prescription.
In view of confirmation
In petitioner's memorandum submitted on August 1, 1966, it was contended that his

confirmation became final and irrevocable upon the adjournment of the fourth regular session of the
Fifth Congress on May 21, 1965.
In view of construction
As was noted, the controlling principle is supplied by Altarejos v. Molo, which interpreted Rule
21 of the Revised Rules of the Commission on Appointments, which reads: "Resolution of the
Commission on any appointment may be reconsidered on motion by a member presented not more
than one (1) day after their approval. If a majority of the members present concur to grant a
reconsideration, the appointment shall be reopened and submitted anew to the Commission. Any
motion to reconsider the vote on any appointment may be laid on the table, this shall be a final
disposition of such a motion."
In Altarejos v. Molo this Court gave full attention to the argument that the motion for
reconsideration of Congressman Aldeguer on May 19, 1965 had the effect of recalling the
confirmation of petitioner's appointment and that, accordingly, it should be considered non-existent.
His opinion continued: "Pursuant to this provision, the vote of a majority of the members present in
favor of the motion for reconsideration is necessary to 'reopen' the appointment — and, hence, to
'recall' its confirmation — and to require a resubmission of the appointment for confirmation."
The other provision is worded thus: "The President shall have the power to make
appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress."
That would be moreover tantamount to imparting to a move of a single member of a collective

body a decisive weight. It is bad enough if the minority were to prevail. A one-man rule, which is the
effect of what respondent Secretary of the Commission on Appointments contends, is infinitely worse.
WHEREFORE, petitioner is entitled to the writ of mandamus and the Secretary of the
Commission on Appointments is commanded to issue the certificate of confirmation prayed for by
petitioner. The right of petitioner to perform his functions as municipal judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato
is in accordance with law, his confirmation having been duly confirmed. No pronouncement as to
costs.
d. Osmeña v. Pendatun
(G.R. No. L-17144, October 28, 1960)
BENGZON, J.
FACTS:
Congressman Sergio Osmeña Jr., herein petitioner, delivered his privilege speech before the
House making serious imputations of bribery against the President of the Philippines. Because of
this, a Resolution was issued authorizing the creation of special House Committee to investigate the
truth of the charges made against the President, to summon petitioner to substantiate his charges,
and in case petitioner fails to do so, to require petitioner to show cause why he should not be punished
by the House.
Petitioner then resorted to the Court seeking for the annulment of said resolution on the
ground that it infringes his constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in
the House. Meanwhile, the Special Committee continued with its proceeding, and after giving
petitioner a chance to defend himself, found the latter guilty of seriously disorderly behavior. A House
resolution was issued and petitioner was suspended from office for 15 months.
Thereafter, respondents filed their answer challenging the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain
the petition, and defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension.
ISSUE: Whether the House Resolution violated petitioner’s constitutionally granted parliamentary
immunity for speeches
RULING:
NO. Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that “for any speech or debate” in
Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representative “shall not be questioned in any
other place.” This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the
United States. In that country, the provision has always been understood to mean that although
exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of
Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that “they shall not be
questioned in any other place” than Congress.
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished

in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose
“is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness
and success” for “it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and
that he should be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom exercise
of that liberty may occasion offense.” It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression
without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum
outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative
body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a
member thereof.
On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes
disorderly conduct for which Osmeña may be discipline, We believe, however, that the House is the
judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution has conferred
jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which
the House knows best but which cannot be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and
adjudication by the Courts.
e. Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan

(G.R. No. 128055, April 18, 2001)
VITUG, J.
FACTS:
In October 1988, Miriam Defensor Santiago, who was the then Commissioner of the
Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID), approved the application for legalization of the
stay of about 32 aliens. Her act was said to be illegal and was tainted with bad faith and it ran counter
against Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The legalization of such is also
a violation of Executive Order No. 324 which prohibits the legalization of disqualified aliens. The aliens
legalized by Santiago were allegedly known by her to be disqualified. Two other criminal cases were
filed against Santiago. Pursuant to this information, Francis Garchitorena, a presiding Justice of the
Sandiganbayan, issued a warrant of arrest against Santiago. Santiago petitioned for provisional
liberty since she was just recovering from a car accident which was approved. In 1995, a motion was
filed with the Sandiganbayan for the suspension of Santiago, who was already a senator by then. The
Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate President (Maceda) to suspend Santiago from office for 90 days.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member of the Senate without
violating the Constitution.
RULING:
Yes. it is true that the Constitution provides that each “… house may determine the rules of
its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds
of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not
exceed sixty days.”
But on the other hand, Section 13 of RA 3019 provides:
Suspension and loss of benefits. – any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a
simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is
pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall
lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless
in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress
to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above
constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or
the Lower House, as the case may be, upon an erring member. This is quite distinct from the
suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive
measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior
as a Member of the Senate.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and
that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension
order.
But Santiago committed the said act when she was still the CID commissioner, can she still be
suspended as a senator?
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be
suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been
charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word “office” would indicate that it applies to any
office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he
stands accused.
Santiago has not yet been convicted of the alleged crime, can she still be suspended?
The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-suspension
proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to
determine (1) the strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense
charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a threat
to the safety and integrity of the records another evidence before the court could have a valid basis
in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of the case. All it secures to the accused is
adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings against him, such as,
that he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to him
do not constitute a specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13
of Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is subject to quashal on any of the grounds set out
in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on Criminal procedure.
7. RECORDS AND BOOKS OF ACCOUNTS; LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL AND CONGRESSIONAL

RECORD
a. Mabanag v. Vito
(G.R. No. L-1123, March 5, 1947)
Tuason, J.
FACTS:
Three senators and eight representatives had been proclaimed by a majority vote of the
Commission on Elections as having been elected senators and representatives in the elections held
on 23 April 1946. The three senators were suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening of the
first session of Congress following the elections, on account of alleged irregularities in their election.
The eight representatives since their election had not been allowed to sit in the lower House, except
to take part in the election of the Speaker, for the same reason, although they had not been formally
suspended. A resolution for their suspension had been introduced in the House of Representatives,
but that resolution had not been acted upon definitely by the House when the petition for prohibition
was filed. As a consequence, these three senators and eight representatives did not take part in the
passage of the congressional resolution, designated "Resolution of both houses proposing an
amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto," nor was
their membership reckoned within the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote which is
required in proposing an amendment to the Constitution. If these members of Congress had been
counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the
necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. The petition for prohibition sought to
prevent the enforcement of said congressional resolution, as it is allegedly contrary to the
Constitution. The members of the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines, the
Auditor General, and the Director of the Bureau of Printing are made defendants. Eight senators, 17
representatives, and the presidents of the Democratic Alliance, the Popular Front and the Philippine
Youth Party.
ISSUE: Whether the Court may inquire upon the irregularities in the approval of the resolution
proposing an amendment to the Constitution.
RULING:
It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities that political questions are
not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with such questions
has been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory provision. This doctrine is
predicated on the principle of the separation of powers, a principle also too well known to require
elucidation or citation of authorities. The difficulty lies in determining what matters fall within the
meaning of political question. The term is not susceptible of exact definition, and precedents and
authorities are not always in full harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this ground, on the
courts to meddle with the actions of the political departments of the government. If a political question
conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or
resolution also binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect. If ratification of an
amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political question.
The two steps complement each other in a scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be
noted that the amendatory process as provided in section I of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution
"consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification." There is no logic in attaching political
character to one and withholding that character from the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is
a highly political function performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and
committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even in dependent of
any intervention by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of the
judiciary be needed to safeguard public interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the validity
of a proposal then into that of ratification.
b. Arroyo v De Venecia
(G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997)
Mendoza, J.
FACTS:
Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit against
respondents charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are "constitutionally
mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a
question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and
the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress
as having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21,
1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.
ISSUE: Whether Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion when R.A. No. 8240 was passed
in violation of the rules of the House.
RULING:
No. The Court, after considering the arguments of the parties, found no ground for holding
that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. The Court was of
the opinion that what was violated were merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than
constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law. In Osmeña v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any
rate, courts have declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.' And it has been said that
'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern.
They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere failure to conform
to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite
number of members have agreed to a particular measure.'" Accordingly, the case was dismissed.
c. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez

(G.R. No. L-17931, February 28, 1963)
Concepcion, J.
FACTS:
Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. (Casco) was engaged in the production of synthetic resin
glues used primarily in the production of plywood. The main components of the said glue are urea
and formaldehyde which were both being imported from abroad. Pursuant to a Central Bank circular,
Casco paid the required margin fee for its imported urea and formaldehyde. Casco however paid in
protest as it maintained that urea and formaldehyde are tax exempt transactions. The Central Bank
agreed and it issued vouchers for refund. The said vouchers were submitted to Pedro Gimenez, the
Auditor General, who denied the tax refund. Gimenez maintained that urea and formaldehyde, as two
separate and distinct components were not tax exempt; that what was tax exempt is urea
formaldehyde (the synthetic resin formed by combining urea and formaldehyde). Gimenez cited the
provision of Sec. 2, par 18 of Republic Act No. 2609 which provides that the margin established by
the Monetary Board shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of
Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the
exclusive use of end-users.
Casco however averred that the term “urea formaldehyde” appearing in this provision should
be construed as “urea and formaldehyde”. It further contends that the bill approved in Congress
contained the copulative conjunction “and” between the terms “urea” and, “formaldehyde”, and that
the members of Congress intended to exempt “urea” and “formaldehyde” separately as essential
elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called “urea formaldehyde”, not the latter a
finished product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during
the consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof.
The enrolled bill however used the term “urea formaldehyde”
ISSUE: Whether or not the term “urea formaldehyde” should be construed as “urea and
formaldehyde”.
RULING:
No. Urea formaldehyde was not a chemical solution. It was the synthetic resin formed as a
condensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions
relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. “Urea formaldehyde” was clearly a finished
product, which was patently distinct and different from “urea” and “formaldehyde”, as separate articles
used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as “urea formaldehyde”.
The opinions or statements of any member of Congress during the deliberation of the said
law/bill do not represent the entirety of the Congress itself. What is printed in the enrolled bill would
be conclusive upon the courts. The enrolled bill — which uses the term “urea formaldehyde” instead
of “urea and formaldehyde” — was conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure
passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of
the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive — on which
the SC cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining
one of the cornerstones of our democratic system — the remedy was by amendment or curative
legislation, not by judicial decree.
d. Astorga v. Villegas
(G.R. No. L-23475, April 30, 1974)
Makalintal, C.J.
FACTS:
In 1964, Antonio Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued circulars to the department heads and
chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of
business establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of Republic Act No. 4065. He likewise
issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force who had been
assigned to then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga (assigned under authority of RA 4065).
Astorga reacted against the steps carried out by Villegas. He then filed a petition for
“Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction” to
compel Villegas et al and the members of the municipal board to comply with the provisions of RA
4065 (filed with the SC). In his defense, Villegas denied recognition of RA 4065 (An Act Defining the
Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila) because the said law was
considered to have never been enacted. When the this said “law” passed the 3rd reading in the lower
house as House Bill No. 9266, it was sent to the Senate which referred it to the Committee on
Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by then Senator Roxas. Some minor
amendments were made before the bill was referred back to the Senate floor for deliberations. During
such deliberations, Sen. Tolentino made significant amendments which were subsequently approved
by the Senate. The bill was then sent back to the lower house and was thereafter approved by the
latter. The bill was sent to the President for approval and it became RA 4065. It was later found out
however that the copy signed by the Senate President, sent to the lower house for approval and sent
to the President for signing was the wrong version. It was in fact the version that had no amendments
thereto. It was not the version as amended by Tolentino and as validly approved by the Senate. Due
to this fact, the Senate president and the President of the Philippines withdrew and invalidated their
signatures that they affixed on the said law.
Astorga maintains that the RA is still valid and binding and that the withdrawal of the
concerned signatures does not invalidate the statute. Astorga further maintains that the attestation of
the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill’s due enactment.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4065 was validly enacted.
RULING:
No. The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The
Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks
of misprinting and other errors, the journal can be looked upon in this case. The SC is merely asked
to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the President was the same text passed
by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, the SC can do
this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy
amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in
the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. Note however that the SC is not asked to
incorporate such amendments into the alleged law but only to declare that the bill was not duly
enacted and therefore did not become law. As done by both the President of the Senate and the Chief
Executive, when they withdrew their signatures therein, the SC also declares that the bill intended to
be as it is supposed to be was never made into law. To perpetuate that error by disregarding such
rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction
and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body.
e. Morales v. Subido
(G.R. No. L-29658, November 29, 1968)
Castro, J.
FACTS:
Enrique Morales has served as captain in the police department of a city for at least three
years but does not possess a bachelor’s degree. Morales was the chief of detective bureau of the
Manila Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He began his career in 1934 as
patrolman and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the resignation of the former Chief,
Morales was designated acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same time, given a provisional
appointment to the same position by the mayor of Manila. Abelardo Subido, Commissioner of Civil
Service, approved the designation of Morales as acting chief but rejected his appointment for “failure
to meet the minimum educational and civil service eligibility requirements for the said position.”
Instead, Subido certified other persons as qualified for the post. Subido invoked Section 10 of the
Police Act of 1966, which Section provides for the minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of
Police Agency that no person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a
bachelor’s degree from a recognized institution of learning and has served either in the Armed Forces
of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or has served as chief of police with
exemplary record, or has served in the police department of any city with rank of captain or its
equivalent therein for at least three years; or any high school graduate who has served as officer in
the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher.
Nowhere in the above provision was it provided that a person “who has served the police
department of a city …” can be qualified for said office. Morales however argued that when the said
act was being deliberated upon, the approved version was actually that no person may be appointed
chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor’s degree and has served either in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city and
has held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school
graduate who has served the police department of a city or who has served as officer of the Armed
Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher.
Morales argued that the above version was the one which was actually approved by Congress
but when the bill emerged from the conference committee the only change made in the provision was
the insertion of the phrase “or has served as chief of police with exemplary record.” Morales went on
to support his case by producing copies of certified photostatic copy of a memorandum which
according to him was signed by an employee in the Senate bill division, and can be found attached
to the page proofs of the then bill being deliberated upon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look upon the history of the bill, thereby inquiring upon the
journals, to look searchingly into the matter.
RULING:
No. The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the Philippines
shows that Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip form by the Bureau
of Printing. The SC cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The respect
due to the other branches of the Government demands that the SC act upon the faith and credit of
what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of their respective departments.
Otherwise the SC would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine
what actually did happen in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with consequent impairment of the integrity
of the legislative process.
The SC is not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the journals must yield
to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters which the Constitution expressly requires
must be entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be
affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal, is a question which the SC can
decide upon but is not currently being confronted in the case at bar hence the SC does not now
decide. All the SC holds is that with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the
journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.
8. ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS
a. TAÑADA V. CUENCO
(G.R. No. L-10520, February 28, 1957)
CONCEPCION, J.
FACTS:
In the 1955 elections, the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) was dominantly occupied by five
(5) senators, from the Nacionalista Party and only one (1) opposing senator from the Citizens Party,
one of the petitioners, Lorenzo Tañada.
The other petitioner, Diosdado Macapagal, ran for office at Senate and subsequently lost and
therefore contested to court contesting that SET was dominated with members of Nacionalista Party
which would make his election with no chance of winning.
It was provided that SET should be composed of: three (3) justices of the Supreme Court,
three (3) senators from the majority party, and three (3) senators from the minority party.
ISSUE: Whether or not the composition of five (5) Nacionalista Party on a SET is constitutional?
RULING:
No, it was clearly provided that there should be three (3) senators each for both the majority
and minority party in SET as provided in the previously Article VI, Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution.
The most vital feature of the Electoral Tribunals in the equal representation of said parties therein,
and the resulting equilibrium to be maintained by the Justices of the Supreme Court as members of
said Tribunals.
The framers of the Constitution intended to prevent the majority party from controlling the
Electoral Tribunals, and that the structure thereof is founded upon the equilibrium between the
majority and the minority parties therein, with the Justices of the Supreme Court, who are members
of said Tribunals, holding the resulting balance of power.
b. BONDOC V. PINEDA
(G.R. No. 97710, September 26, 1991)
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.
FACTS:
In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano M. Pineda of the
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP)
were rival candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of the province of
Pampanga.
On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election. In due time, Bondoc filed a
protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which is composed of nine (9)
members, three of whom are Justices of the Supreme Court and the remaining six are members of
the House of Representatives chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein.
Petitioner, Bondoc then filed a protest in HRET and won over respondent, Pineda.
Thereafter, the Chairman of the Tribunal, Justice Ameurfina M. Herrera, received a letter from
the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives, informing the Tribunal decided
to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura, Jr. to the House of
Electoral Tribunal as Congressman Camasura allegedly helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of
Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said political
party.
ISSUE: Whether or not the House of Representatives can interfere with the protest in the HRET by
removing one of its members.
RULING:
No, the resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from
the House Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of the
Nacionalista Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the
House Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc as
provided in Article VII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution.
Furthermore, the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it
violates Congressman Camasura's right to security of tenure.
Members of the HRET, as "sole judge" of congressional election contests, are entitled to
security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution.
Therefore, membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just cause,
such as, the expiration of the member's congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability,
resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political
party, or removal for other valid cause.
A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of
proof that he has formally affiliated with another political group. As the records of this case fail to show
that Congressman Camasura has become a registered member of another political party, his
expulsion from the LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause, hence, it violated his right to
security of tenure.
This serves as HRET as a non-partisan group and clearly independent of the House of
Representatives.
c. ABBAS V. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

(G.R. No. 83767, October 27, 1988)
GANCAYCO, J.
FACTS:
The petitioners filed before the respondent Tribunal an election contest docketed as SET Case
against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 1987
congressional elections by the Commission on Elections.
The respondent Tribunal was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court
and six (6) Senators. Thereafter, the Abbas and some of the petitioners filed with the respondent
Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing
and resolution of SET Case on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case, as
respondents therein.
The petitioners, in essence, argue that considerations of public policy and the norms of fair
play and due process imperatively require the mass disqualification sought and that the doctrine of
necessity which they perceive to be the foundation of the questioned Resolutions does not rule out a
solution both practicable and constitutionally unobjectionable, such as the amendment of the
respondent Tribunal's Rules of procedure so as to permit the contest being decided by only three
Members of the Tribunal.
The proposed amendment to the Tribunal's Rules (Section 24) — requiring the concurrence
of five (5) members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature — is a proviso that where more
than four (4) members are disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less
than three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no
abstentions
ISSUE: Whether or not, the proposed amendment to the Tribunal Rules may be appreciated,
especially with regards to the disqualification of members?
RULING:
No, the proposed amendments obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the petition for
disqualification, this would, in the context of that situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the
only three Members who would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose disqualification is not sought.
We do not agree with petitioners' thesis that the suggested device is neither unfeasible nor
repugnant to the Constitution. We opine that in fact the most fundamental objection to such proposal
lies in the plain terms and intent of the Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates
the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.
Furthermore, the proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the
Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but which it
cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Senators. To our
mind, this is the overriding consideration — that the Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a
duty which it alone has the power to perform, the performance of which is in the highest public interest
as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law. Electoral Tribunal
cannot legally function as such; absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of
its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a
senatorial election contest.
d. PIMENTEL V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

(G.R. No. 141489, November 29, 2002)
CARPIO, J.
FACTS:
On March 3, 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. Petitioners were among the party-
list representatives who were proclaimed winners during the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioners
assailed the composition of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the
Commission on Appointments (CA).
In accordance with the Party-List System Act, national elections were held which included, for
the first time, the election through popular vote of party-list groups and organizations whose nominees
would become members of the House. Proclaimed winners were 14 party-list representatives from
13 organizations. Due to the votes it garnered, APEC was able to send 2 representatives to the
House, while the 12 other party-list groups had one representative each. Also elected were district
representatives belonging to various political parties.
As of the date of filing of the instant petitions, the House contingents to the HRET and the CA
were composed solely of district representatives belonging to the different political parties.
The Petitioners prayed for the reorganization of the members of the HRET and the CA to be
inclined with the Section 17 and 18 of Article VI of the Constitution and the Party-List System Act,
Republic Act No. 7941.
ISSUE: Whether or not the members of HRET and CA violates the Constitution
RULING:
No, Under Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the Constitution, party-list representatives must
first show to the House that they possess the required numerical strength to be entitled to seats in
the HRET and the CA. Only if the House fails to comply with the directive of the Constitution on
proportional representation of political parties in the HRET and the CA can the party-list
representatives seek recourse to this Court under its power of judicial review. Under the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, prior recourse to the House is necessary before petitioners may bring the instant
case to the court. Consequently, petitioners' direct recourse to this Court is premature.
e. SAMPAYAN V DAZA
(G.R. No. 103903, September 11, 1992)
ROMERO, J.
FACTS:
On February 18, 1992, petitioners, filed the instant petition for prohibition seeking to disqualify
respondent RaulDaza, then incumbent congressman, from continuing to exercise the functions of his
office, on the ground that the latter is a greencard holder and a lawful permanent resident of the
United States since October 16, 1974.Petitioners allege that Mr.Daza has not renounced his status
as permanent resident.Petitioners manifested that on April 2, 1992, they filed a petition before the
COMELEC to disqualify respondent Daza from running in the recent May 11, 1992 elections on the
basis of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and that the instant petition is concerned with the
unlawful assumption of office by respondent Daza from June 30, 1987 until June 30, 1992.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Daza should be disqualified as a member of the House of
Representatives for violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code
RULING:
No. The prohibition case should be dismissed because this case is already moot and
academic for the reason that petitioners seek to unseat respondent from his position forthe duration
of his term of office commencing June 30, 1987 and ending June 30, 1992. Moreover the jurisdiction
of this case rightfully pertains to the House Electoral Tribunal and a writ of prohibition can no longer
be issued against respondent since his term has already expired. Furthermore as a de facto public
officer, respondent cannot be made to reimburse funds disbursed during his term of office becaus e
his acts are as valid as those of a dejure officer. Moreover, as a de facto officer, he is entitled to
emoluments for actual services rendered.
f. AQUINO V COMELEC
(G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995)
KAPUNAN, J.
FACTS:
On March 20, 1995, petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. He provided in his
certificate that he has resided for 10 months in Makati.
Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of the LAKAS--
NUCD--UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Agapito A. Aquino on
the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for Congressman which,
under Section 6, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution which requires: should be for a period not less than
one (1) year immediately preceding the May 8, 1995 elections. On May 8, 1995, the elections were
held and the petitioner, Agapito Aquino, garnered 38,547 votes against another candidate, Agusto
Syjuco, who obtained 35,910 votes. However, his victory was suspended by COMELEC due to the
case. On June 2, 1995, the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution reversing the resolution of the
Second Division dated May 6, 1995 and declared Aquino ineligible and thus disqualified as a
candidate for the Office of Representative of the Second Legislative District of Makati City.
The petitioner claims that COMELEC lost its jurisdiction on May 8, 1995, election day, and
that the original jurisdiction is in the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal (HRET), therefore
COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC’s finding of noncompliance with the residency requirement of one
year against the petitioner is contrary to evidence and to applicable laws and jurisprudence.
RULING:
No. COMELEC assumes jurisdiction in all contests relative to the election returns and
qualification of the candidates and the HRET only becomes applicable when the said candidate
becomes a member of Senate or HOR. Thus, a candidate that was still not proclaimed is still not a
member of HOR in compliance to Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution. Also, under Sec 6 of RA
6646, COMELEC has the power to proclaim a candidate to be suspended and thus has the capacity
to not count the votes. The basis of this is RA 6646, Section 6: Effect of Disqualification Case:
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted
for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by
final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing
of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during
the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong.
Furthermore, it also shows how the trial will not be terminated just because the candidate won
the election giving then COMELEC jurisdiction outside election. The words “evidence of guilt is strong”
in Sec. 6 of RA 6646 does not preclude the power of COMELEC to disqualification cases only but a
further reading of Omnibus Election Code Sec 7 of RA 6646 also involve cases of ineligibility.
g. VINZONS-CHATO V COMELEC
(G.R. No. 172131, April 2, 2007)
CALLEJO, SR., J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Chato and respondent Renato J. Unico were among the candidates for the lone
congressional district of Camarines Norte during the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local
elections.
On May 14, 2004, at 11:30 a.m., the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) proclaimed
respondent Unico as representative-elect of the lone congressional district of Camarines Norte. On
July 2, 2004, the COMELEC (First Division) ordered the suspension of the effects of the proclamation
of respondent Unico. On July 23, 2004, it lifted the said order on the ground that respondent Unico’s
proclamation and taking of oath of office had not only divested the Commission of any jurisdiction to
pass upon his election, returns, and qualifications, but also automatically conferred jurisdiction to
another electoral tribunal.
Subsequently, the COMELEC (First Division) issued the Resolution dated April 13, 2005,
dismissing the petition for lack of merit. It stated preliminarily that the Municipal Board of Canvassers
(MBC) is precluded from entertaining pre-proclamation controversies on matters relating to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody, and appreciation of the election returns or certificates of
canvass involving the positions of President, Vice-President, Senators, and Members of the House
of Representatives and Party-List.
The COMELEC (First Division) also held that the MBC or PBC had no discretion on matters
pertaining to the proclamation of the winning candidates because they were simply performing a
ministerial function. Absent a lawful order from the COMELEC to suspend or annul a proclamation,
the PBC of Camarines Norte, in particular, was mandated to comply with its duties and functions
including the proclamation of respondent Unico as the winning candidate for the lone congressional
district of Camarines Norte. His petition was dismissed for utter lack of merit.
Aggrieved, petitioner Chato filed a motion for reconsideration thereof which was elevated to
the COMELEC en banc for resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of jurisdiction.
RULING:
No. In the assailed Resolution dated March 17, 2006, the COMELEC en banc denied
petitioner Chato’s motion for reconsideration ruling that the Commission already lost jurisdiction over
the case since respondent Unico had already taken his oath as a Member of the Thirteenth (13th)
Congress. It reasoned, thus:
In Pangilinan vs. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 105278, November 18, 1993), the
Supreme Court made a categorical pronouncement that:
The Senate and the House of Representatives now have their respective Electoral Tribunals
which are the “sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members, thereby divesting the Commission on Elections of its jurisdiction under the 1973
Constitution over election cases pertaining to the election of the Members of the Batasang Pambansa
(Congress). It follows that the COMELEC is now bereft of jurisdiction to hear and decide the pre-
proclamation controversies against members of the House of Representatives as well as of the
Senate.
The Honorable Court reiterated the aforequoted ruling in the recent case of Aggabao vs.
COMELEC, et al. (G.R. No. 163756, January 26, 2005), where it held that:
The HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns,
and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate has
been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives,
COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications
ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
Considering that private respondent Renato Unico had already taken his oath and assumed
office as member of the 13th Congress, the Commission had already lost jurisdiction over the case.
h. BELLO V COMELEC
(G.R. No. 191998, December 7, 2010)
BRION, J.
FACTS:
AGPP filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) its Manifestation of Intent to
Participate in the May 10, 2010 elections. Subsequently, It filed its Certificate of Nomination together
with the Certificates of Acceptance of its nominees wherein the first nominee is Mike Arroyo.
Several petitions for disqualification of Arroyo emerged but have been dismissed both by
Comelec Second division and comelec en banc. In the interim, AGPP obtained in the May 10, 2010
elections the required percentage of votes sufficient to secure a single seat. This entitled Arroyo, as
AGPP’s first nominee, to sit in the House of Representatives. He was proclaimed as AGPP’s duly-
elected party-list representative in the House of Representatives. On the same day, Arroyo took his
oath of office, as AGPP’s Representative. And, his name was, thereafter, entered in the Roll of
Members of the House of Representatives.38
Thereafter two (2) separate petitions for quo warranto were filed with the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) questioning Arroyo’s eligibility as AGPP’s representative
in the House of Representatives. The HRET took cognizance of the petitions by issuing a Summons
directing Arroyo to file his Answer to the two petitions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the HRET has jurisdiction over the question of Arroyo’s qualifications as
AGPP’s nominee after his proclamation and assumption to office as a member of the House of
Representatives.
RULING:
The consistent judicial holding is that the HRET has jurisdiction to pass upon the qualifications
of party-list nominees after their proclamation and assumption of office; they are, for all intents and
purposes, "elected members" of the House of Representatives although the entity directly voted upon
was their party. Hence, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications
ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
Since Arroyo, AGPP’s first nominee, has already been proclaimed and taken his oath of office
as a Member of the House of Representatives, Thus, following the lead of Abayon and Perez, we
hold that the Court has no jurisdiction over the present petitions and that the HRET now has the
exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and rule upon Arroyo’s qualifications as a Member of the House
of Representatives.
i. VILANDO V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

(G.R. No. 192147 & 192149. AUGUST 23, 2011)
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS:
The petitioner Renald F. Vilando, as taxpayer, filed petitions for Quo Warranto, challenging
the eligibility of Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong, who won the position of Representative of the First District
of Negros Oriental. They contended that Limkaichong was a Chinese citizen and was ineligible for
office, and that she was born to a father whose naturalization had not attained finality, and a mother
whose citizenship has changed when she married. Limkaichong maintained that she is a natural born
citizen, the naturalization of her father had already attained status of res judicata (a matter that has
been adjudicated by a competent court and may not be pursued further by the same parties). HRET
dismissed the petition on May 17, 2010. The petitioner contended that The petition for Quo
Warranto is not a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father of Limkaichong because her father’s
certificate of naturalization is of no force and effect; Limkaichong cannot derive her citizenship from
her mother because of her marriage to her father; and as HRET has the plenary, absolute and
exclusive jurisdiction over questions of eligibility of Members of the House of Representatives, the
HRET can look into the eligibility of Limkaichong, and as incident thereto, look into the validity of her
father’s certificate for naturalization.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition has merit.
RULING:
No, the expiration of Limkaichong’s term renders the question of her eligibility moot and
academic. However, as citizenship is a continuing requirement for Members of the House of
Representatives, the Court deems it appropriate to resolve the petition. Vilando’s contention which
requires the Court to look into the alleged nullity of the grant of naturalization of Limkaichong’sfather
is not allowed as it would constitute a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father, which can only
be done through a direct action. It is true that HRET has complete and exclusive jurisdiction over
such cases but it does carry the authority to delve into the legality of the grant of naturalization.
Pursuant to par.1, Sec. 1, Article IV of governing law of 1935 Constitution, records disclosed that
Limkaichong was born in Dumagete City to naturalizaed Filipino father, as a result, Limkaichong is a
Filipino citizen. In the petitioner’s contention that her mother is no longer a Filipino when she married
is without merit as her mother is natural born citizen and LImkaichong, upon reaching the age of
majority, elected Philippine citizenship, falling under par. 1, Sec. 1, Art. VI of the 1935 Constitution.
Also, under par. 3, Sec. 1 of Article VI of the present Constitution, those born before January 17, 1973
of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority are Filipino
citizens. LImkaichong was deemed to elected Filipino citizenship informally when she participated in
barangay elections as a young voter, and when she ran and won as Mayor of Negros Oriental.
j. ANGARA V. ELECTORAL COMMISSION

(G.R. No. L-45081, JULY 15, 1936)
LAUREL, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member of the
National Assembly of the Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly
passed a resolution confirming the election of those who have not been subject of an election protest
prior to the adoption of the said resolution.
On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest
against the petitioner before the Electoral Commission of the National Assembly. The following day,
December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted its own resolution providing that it will not
consider any election protest that was not submitted on or before December 9, 1935.
Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner sought the
dismissal of respondent’s protest. The Electoral Commission however denied his motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly.
RULING:
No, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly. The Court denied the petition.
The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative
in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election of
the petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot in any manner
toll the time for filing election protests against members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the
filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the
Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly.
The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative
in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. [W]here a
general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the
one or the performance of the other is also conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional
provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission,
therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its
exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members
of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the
Electoral Commission.
k. PEÑA V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

(G.R. No. 123037, March 21, 1997)
TORRES, JR., J.
FACTS:
Assailed herein is the October 12, 1995 Resolution1 of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) dismissing the Petition Ad Cautelam of the Petitioner Teodoro Q. Peña in HRET
Case No. 95-014. Petitioner questioned the election of the private respondent Alfredo E. Abueg, Jr.
as Member of the House of Representatives representing the Second District of the province of
Palawan.
Petitioner and the private respondent were contenders for the said Congressional Office in
the May 8, 1995 elections. On May 12, 1995, upon canvassing the votes cast, the Provincial Board
of Canvassers of Palawan proclaimed the private respondent as the winner.
On May 22, Pena filed a petition AD CAUTELAM with the HRET, claiming that the elections
in the 2nd district of Palawan were tainted with massive fraud, widespread vote buying, intimidation
and terrorism and other serious irregularities committed before, during and after the voting, and during
the counting of votes and the preparation of election returns and certificates of canvass which affected
the results of the election. Because of these irregularities, Pena stated that he lost the election by
almost 7k votes. He then assailed Abueg’s proclamation. Abueg filed an answer and a motion to
dismiss on June 23, averring that the HRET has not acquired jurisdiction over the petition, the same
being insufficient in form and substance. In essence, the motion to dismiss anchors its challenge on
the fact that the petition failed to allege the precincts where the massive fraud and disenfranchisement
of voters occurred, nor did it point out how many votes would be gained by the protestant as a result
of the same. Pena later submitted a list of specific contested precincts on July 10, or 17 days after
Abueg’s answer. In October, the HRET ruled that while it had jurisdiction over the petition, as the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election returns and qualifications of the members of the House
of Representatives, the said petition, however, fails to state a cause of action, and is therefore,
insufficient in form and substance, meriting its dismissal. Pena filed a petition for certiorari with the
SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the HRET committed great abuse of discretion in dismissing Pena’s petition
ad cuatelam for lack of substance.
RULING:
No, A perusal of the petition reveals that petitioner makes no specific mention of the precincts
where widespread election, fraud and irregularities occurred. This is a fatal omission, as it goes into
the very substance of the protest. The prescription that the petition must be sufficient in form and
substance means that the petition must be more than merely rhetorical. If the allegations contained
therein are unsupported by even the faintest whisper of authority in fact and law, then there is no
other course than to dismiss the petition, otherwise, the assumption of an elected public official may,
and will always be held up by petitions of this sort by the losing candidate. The defect in the instant
case arises from the failure to allege the contested precincts. Only a bare allegation of “massive fraud,
widespread intimidation and terrorism and other serious irregularities,” without specification and
substantiation of where and how these occurrences took place, appears in the petition.
We cannot allow an election protest based on such flimsy averments to prosper, otherwise,
the whole election process will deteriorate into an endless stream of crabs pulling at each other,
racing to disembark from the water.
9. COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
a. Daza v. Singson
(G.R. No. 86344, December 21, 1989)
CRUZ, J.
FACTS:
After the congressional elections, House of Representatives proportionally apportioned its
twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments among the several political parties. Petitioner Raul
A. Daza was among those chosen and was listed as a representative of the Liberal Party.
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political realignment in the

House of Representatives. Twenty four members of the Liberal Party formally resigned from that party
and joined the LDP, reducing their former party to only 17 members.
The petitioner challenged his removal from the Commission on Appointments and the
assumption of his seat by the respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the realignment will validly change the composition of the Commission on
Appointments.
RULING:
Yes. In Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution:
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the
Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of
Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The
Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all
appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The
Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.
The authority of the House of Representatives to change its representation in the Commission
on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of
its membership. It is understood that such changes must be permanent and do not include the
temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or formal
disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another.
The Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member of the Commission
on Appointments and is entitled to assume his seat in that body pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of
the Constitution.
b. Coseteng v. Mitra
(G.R. No. 86649, July 12, 1990)
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.
FACTS:
The congressional elections resulted in the election to the House of Representatives of the
candidates of diverse political parties such as the PDP-Laban, Lakas ng Bansa (LB), Liberal Party
(LP), NP-Unido, Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan (KBL), Panaghiusa, Kababaihan Para sa Inang Bayan
(KAIBA), and some independents. Petitioner Anna Dominique M.L. Coseteng was the only candidate
elected under the banner of KAIBA.
A year later the "Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino" (LDP, for brevity) was organized as a
political party. As 158 out of 202 members of the House of Representatives formally affliated with the
LDP, the House committees, including the House representation in the Commission on
Appointments, had to be reorganized.
The House of Representatives revised the House majority membership in the Commission on
Appointments to conform with the new political alignments.
Coseteng and her party, the KAIBA, filed this Petition for Extraordinary Legal Writs to declare
as null and void the election of respondent Ablan, Verano-Yap, Romero, Cuenco, Mercado, Bandon,
Cabochan, Imperial, Lobregat, Beltran, Locsin, and Singson, as members of the Commission on
Appointments, to enjoin them from acting as such and to enjoin also the other respondents from
recognizing them as members of the Commission on Appointments on the theory that their election
to that Commission violated the constitutional mandate of proportional representation.
ISSUE: Whether the members of the House in the Commission on Appointments were chosen on the
basis of proportional representation from the political parties therein as provided in Section 18, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution.
RULING:
Yes. The revision of the House representation in the Commission on Appointments is based
on proportional representation of the political. parties therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution The composition of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments
was based on proportional representation of the political parties in the House. There are 160
members of the LDP in the House. They represent 79% of the House membership (which may be
rounded out to 80%). Eighty percent (80%) of 12 members in the Commission on Appointments would
equal 9.6 members, which may be rounded out to ten (10) members from the LDP. The remaining
two seats were apportioned to the LP (respondent Lorna Verano-Yap) as the next largest party in the
Coalesced Majority and the KBL (respondent Roque Ablan) as the principal opposition party in the
House. There is no doubt that this apportionment of the House membership in the Commission on
Appointments was done "on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties therein."
c. Guingona v. Gonzales
(G.R. No. 106971, October 20, 1992)
CAMPOS, JR., J.
FACTS:
After elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC senators, 3 LAKAS-
NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To have 12 representatives in the CoA, the parties
agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) / Total No. of
Senators elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members
for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-LABAN.
Guingona, filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to prohibit the respondent
Senate President Neptali Gonzales, as ex-officio Chairman of the Commission on Appointments, from
recognizing the membership of Senators Alberto Romulo as the eighth senator elected by the LDP,
and Wigberto L. Tañada, as the lone member representing the LP-PDP-LABAN, in the Commission
on Appointments, on the ground that the proposed compromise of Senator Tolentino was violative of
the rule of proportional representation, and that it is the right of the minority political parties in the
Senate, consistent with the Constitution, to combine their fractional representation in the Commission
on Appointments to complete one seat therein, and to decide who, among the senators in their ranks,
shall be additionally nominated and elected thereto.
ISSUE: Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a party’s representation in the CoA.
RULING:
No. The political parties represented in the Senate is as follows: LDP- 7.5, LP-PDP-LABAN -
.5, NPC - 2.5, and LAKAS-NUCD - 1.5. Based on Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution question
is the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is entitled. Converting a fractional half
membership into a whole membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 is a violation of
Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that membership in the Commission
be based on the proportional representation of the political parties. In so doing one other party's
fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latter's representation in the
Commission on Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the Senate.
d. Drilon v. De Venecia and Madrigal v. Villar

(G.R. No. 180055, July 31, 2009)
CARPIO MORALES, J.
FACTS:
Drilon et al. went to respondent then Speaker Jose de Venecia to ask for one seat for
theLiberal Party in the CA. Speaker Jose de Venecia merely said that he would study their demand.
During the session of the House of Representatives, Tañada requested from the House leadership
one seat in the CA for the Liberal Party. Respondents filed for dismissal of the petition.
In the meantime, Senator Madrigal sent letters to Villar and Nograles claiming that the
composition of the Senate and House in the CoA violated the constitutional requirement of
proportional representation. She requested for the reorganization of the membership of CoA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is the proper party concerned.
RULING:
No. The first petition has been rendered moot with the designation of a Liberal Party as
member of the House contingent. Senator Madrigal failed to show that she sustained a direct injury
as a result of the act complained of. Her petition does not allege that she (or her political party) was
deprived of a seat in the CoA, or that she or her party possess personal and substantial interest to
confer with her locus standi.
VIII. POWERS OF CONGRESS
1. CONCEPT
a. Gonzales v. Hechanova
(G.R. No. L-21897, October 22 1963)
CONCEPCION, J.
FACTS:
During the term of President Diosdado Macapagal, he entered into two executive agreements
with Vietnam and Burma for the importation of rice without complying with the requisite of securing a
certification from the National Economic Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals or rice.
Hence, the then Executive Secretary, Rufino Hechanova, authorized the importation of 67,000 tons
of rice from abroad to the detriment of our local planters. Ramon Gonzales, then president of the Iloilo
Palay and Corn Planters Association assailed the executive agreements. Gonzales averred that
Hechanova is without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction”, because Republic Act 3452 prohibits
the importation of rice and corn by “the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government
agency.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive agreements entered into by
Macapagal.
RULING:
Yes. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by
Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter,
except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired
the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the
performance of the very act prohibited by said laws. In the event of conflict between a treaty and a
statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar,
Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. No such
justification can be given as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation,
without completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and
balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set up.
As regards the question whether an executive or an international agreement may be

invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it
in the affirmative, by providing that the SC may not be deprived “of its jurisdiction to review, revise,
reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may
provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in “All cases in which the constitutionality or
validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question”. In other words,
our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental
law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.
2. ONE SUBJECT RULE
a. TIO v. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY COMMISSION

(G.R. No. L-75697, June 18, 1987)
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Valentin Tio assails the constitutionality of PD 1987 entitled “An Act Creating the
Videogram Regulatory Broad” with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry.
He attacks the constitutionality of the decree on the ground that ‘Sec. 10 thereof, which imposes a
tax of 30% on the gross receipts payable to the local government is a rider and the same is not
germane to the subject matter thereof.’
ISSUE: WON the tax provision of PD 1987 is a ‘rider’.
RULING:
NO. The foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of, the general object of the decree, which is the regulation of the video industry
through the Videogram Regulatory Board as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent
with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation, it is simply one of the
regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the decree. The title of the decree, which is
the creation of the Videogram Regulatory Board, is comprehensive enough to include the purposes
expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covers all its provisions. It is unnecessary to express all
those objectives in the title or that the latter be an index to the body of the decree.
b. PHILCONSA V. GIMENEZ
(G.R. No. L-23326, December 18, 1965)
REGALA, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Philippine Constitution Association Inc. (PHILCONSA) filed this petition to restrain
the Auditor General of the Philippines and the disbursing officers of both Houses of Congress from
"passing in audit the vouchers, and from countersigning the checks or treasury warrants for the
payment to any former Senator or former Member of the House of Representatives of retirement and
vacation gratuities pursuant to Republic Act No. 3836; and likewise restraining the respondent
disbursing officers of the House and Senate, respectively, and their successors in office from paying
the said retirement and vacation gratuities." One of petitioner’s arguments is that the provision for the
retirement of the members and certain officers of Congress is not expressed in the title of the bill, in
violation of Section 21 (1) of Art. VI of the Constitution. The title gives no inkling or notice whatsoever
to the public regarding the retirement gratuities and commutable vacation and sick leave privileges
to the members of Congress.
Title of RA 3836: "AN ACT AMENDING SUBSECTION (c), SECTION TWELVE OF

COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBERED ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-SIX AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC
ACT NUMBERED THIRTY HUNDRED NINETY-SIX”
ISSUE: WON the title of RA 3836 is germane to the subject matter expressed in the act.
RULING:
NO. The succeeding paragraph of Republic Act No. 3836 refers to members of Congress and
to elective officers thereof who are not members of the Government Service Insurance System. To
provide retirement benefits, therefore, for these officials, would relate to subject matter, not germane
to Commonwealth Act No. 186. In the light of the history and analysis of RA 3836, the Court concludes
that the title of said law is void as it is not germane to the subject matter and is a violation of the
aforementioned paragraph 1, section 21, Article VI of the Constitution.
c. LIDASAN V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. L-28089, October 25, 1967)
SANCHEZ, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Bara Lidasan, resident and tax payer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato and a
qualified voter for the 1967 elections prays that RA 4790, which is entitled “An Act Creating the
Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur” be declared unconstitutional and that
COMELEC resolutions implementing the same for electoral purposes be nullified. RA 4790
transferred twelve barrios in two municipalities in the province of Cotabato to the province of Lanao
del Sur.
ISSUE: WON RA 4790 is constitutional.
RULING:
NO. Similar statutes aimed at changing boundaries of political divisions, which legislative
purpose is not expressed in the title, were likewise declared unconstitutional. Suggestion was made
to salvage said law since the limited title of the Act still covers those barrios actually in the province
of Lanao del Sur, however, the totality of 21 barrios was in the mind of the proponent thereof, and the
Court may not now say that Congress intended to create Dianaton with only nine out of twenty-one
barrios, with a seat of government still left to be conjectured, for this unduly stretches judicial
interpretation of congressional intent beyond credibility point, and to do so indeed, is to pass the line
which circumscribes the judiciary and tread on legislative premises. RA 4790 is inseparable and it is
accordingly null and void in its totality.
d. CHIONGBIAN V. ORBOS
(G.R. No. 96754, June 22, 1995)
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS:
These suits challenge the validity of a Art. XIX, Sec. 13 of the Organic Act for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (R.A. No. 6734), authorizing the President of the Philippines to "merge"
by administrative determination the regions remaining after the establishment of the Autonomous
Region, and the EO 429 issued by the President Corazon Aquino pursuant to such authority,
"Providing for the Reorganization of Administrative Regions in Mindanao."
ISSUE: WON the power granted to the President is not expressed in the title of the RA 6734.
RULING:
YES. The reorganization of the remaining administrative regions is germane to the general
subject of R.A. No. 6734, which is the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
The constitutional requirement that "every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof" has always been given a practical rather than a technical
construction. The title is not required to be an index of the content of the bill. It is sufficient compliance
with the constitutional requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all provisions are
germane to that subject.
e. MARIANO V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. L-118577, March 7, 1995)
PUNO, J.
FACTS:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 7854 - “An Act Converting the Municipality of
Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati.” One of the arguments of the
petitioners is that Sec. 52 of said RA increases the legislative district of Makati, which was not
expressed in the title of the bill.
ISSUE: W/N RA 7854 failed to comply with the one subject rule.
RULING:
NO. The policy of the Court favors the liberal construction of the one title-one subject rules so
as not to impede legislation. The Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly
mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its details. It should be sufficient compliance if the title
expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject. There is
compliance to the one title-one subject rule if the title expresses the general subject and all the
provisions are germane to such general subject.
f. TATAD V. SECRETARY OF ENERGY

(G.R. No. 124360, November 5, 1997
PUNO, J.
FACTS:
Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of RA 8180 - An Act Deregulating the Downstream
Oil Industry and For Other Purposes. The law imposes tariff duty on imported crude oil at the rate of
3% and imported refined petroleum products at the rate of 7%. One of the arguments of the petitioners
is that the inclusion of the tariff provision violates Sec. 26 (1) of the Constitution requiring every law
to have only one subject which shall be expressed in its title. It argues that such provision is foreign
to the subject of the law which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry.
ISSUE: W/N such provision failed to comply with the one subject rule.
RULING:
NO. This Court has adopted a liberal construction of the one title-one subject rule. The title
need not mirror, fully index, or catalogue all contents and minute details of a law. A law having a
single general subject indicated in the title may contain any number of provisions, no matter how
diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general method and
means of carrying the general subject. Providing for tariff differential is germane to the subject of RA
8180 which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry.
g. LACSON V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

(G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999)
MARTINEZ, J.
FACTS:
11 persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, and organized crime
syndicated involved in bank robberies in Manila, were slain along Commonwealth Avenue by the Anti-
Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG). An information came that what transpired is
actually is a summary execution and not a shoot our. Panfilo Lacson, petitioner, was among those
charged as principal in 11 informations for murder before the Sandiganbayan. After reinvestigation,
11 amended informations were filed, where petitioner was charged only as an accessory. The
accused now question the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as it is limited only to cases where one
or more of the principal accused are government officials with SG 27 or higher, or PNP officials with
a rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. During the pendency of the resolution, a law (RA 8249) was
passed defining or expanding the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan deleting the word “principal” from the
“principal accused.” Hence, the Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended Informations. Petitioners
challenge the constitutionality of RA 8249, an act which further defines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.One of the arguments is that the title of the law is misleading, which actually expands
rather than define the old Sandiganbayan law, thereby violating the one title-one subject requirement
for the passage of statutes.
ISSUE: W/N RA 8249 failed to comply with the one subject rule.
RULING:
NO. The challenged law does not violate the one title-one subject provision of the Constitution.
Much emphasis is placed on the wording in the title of the law that it “defines” the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction when what it allegedly does is to “expand” is jurisdiction. The expansion in the jurisdiction
of Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, does not have to be expressly stated in the title
of the law because such is the necessary consequence of the amendments.The requirement that
every bill must only have one subject expressed in the title is satisfied if the title is comprehensive
enough, as in this case, to include subjects related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to
achieve.
h. FARINAS V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

(G.R. No. 147387, December 10, 2003)
CALLEJO, SR., J.
FACTS:
Petitioners question the constitutionality of Sec. 14 of RA 9006 - The Fair Election Act (An
Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful, and Credible Elections through Fair
Election Practices). According to petitioner, the inclusion of Sec. 14 repealing Sec. 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code constitutes a proscribed rider. They point out the dissimilarity in the 2 statutes. RA
9006 deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination
of unfair election practices, while the OEC imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an
office other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto
resigned upon filing of COC. The repeal is thus not embraced in the title nor germane to the subject
matter of RA 9006.
ISSUE: W/N Sec. 14 of RA 9006 is a proscribed rider insofar as it was not included in the title of the
statute.
RULING:
NO. The proscription provided in the Constitution is aimed against the evils of the so-called
omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as well as surreptitious and unconsidered encroaches. The
provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its subject finding expression in its title. To
determine whether there has been compliance, it is sufficient that the title be comprehensive enough
reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and
every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need
not be set forth.The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of RA 9006 are comprehensive
enough to include the repeal of the OEC within its contemplation. This Court has held that an act
having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions no matter
how diverse so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be
considered in furtherance of such subject.
i. CAWALING V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 146319, October 26, 2001)
SANDOVAL, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Benjamin Cawaling assails R.A. No. 8806 entitled “An Act Creating the City of
Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon, And
Appropriating Funds Therefor” since it contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule of the Constitution.
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 8806 actually embraces two principal subjects which are: (1) the
creation of the City of Sorsogon, and (2) the abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon.
While the title of the Act sufficiently informs the public about the creation of Sorsogon City, petitioner
claims that no such information has been provided on the abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and
Sorsogon.
ISSUE: WON RA 8806 is constitutional.
RULING:
YES. Contrary to petitioner's assertion, there is only one subject embraced in the title of the law, that
is, the creation of the City of Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation of the corporate existence of the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon due to their merger is not a subject separate and distinct from
the creation of Sorsogon City. Such abolition/cessation was but the logical, natural and inevitable
consequence of the merger. Otherwise put, it is the necessary means by which the City of Sorsogon
was created. Hence, the title of the law, "An Act Creating the City of Sorsogon by Merging the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in the Province of Sorsogon, and Appropriating Funds
Therefor," cannot be said to exclude the incidental effect of abolishing the two municipalities, nor can
it be considered to have deprived the public of fair information on this consequence.
j. GIRON V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 188179, January 22, 2013)
SERENO, CJ.
FACTS:
Petitioner Henry Giron assails the constitutionality of Section 12 (Substitution of Candidates)
and Section 14 (Repealing Clause) of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9006, otherwise known as the Fair
Election Act. Giron asserts that the insertion of both sections in the Fair Election Act violates the Art.
VI, Sec. 26 (1) of the 1987 Constitution. ” Petitioner avers that these provisions are unrelated to the
main subject of the Fair Election Act: the lifting of the political ad ban. Section 12 refers to the
treatment of the votes cast for substituted candidates after the official ballots have been printed, while
Section 14 pertains to the repeal of Section 67 (Candidates holding elective office) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code. Section 67 of this law concerns
the ipso facto resignation of elective officials immediately after they file their respective certificates of
candidacy for an office other than that which they are currently holding in a permanent capacity.
ISSUE: WON the inclusion of the sections violates the “one subject-one title” rule.
RULING:
NO. Petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention were unable to present a compelling reason that
would surpass the strong presumption of validity and constitutionality in favor of the Fair Election Act.
They have not put forward any gripping justification to reverse our ruling in Fariñas, in which we have
already ruled that the title and the objectives of R.A. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include
subjects other than the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda. Moreover, the
Congress consciously looked for a more generic title in order to express the thrust of the law. Such
can be construed in the Bicameral Conference Committee deliberations (the case has an excerpt of
the discussion). The Congress did not limit the law to the lifting of the political ad ban. After combing
through various laws, they found other election practices that they considered inequitable. Some of
these practices included the appreciation of the votes cast in case of a late substitution of candidates
and the ipso facto resignation of certain elective officials upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy. Thus, to "level the playing field," Congress fashioned a law that would address what they
determined were unfair election practices; hence, the birth of the Fair Election Act. After a careful
analysis of the foregoing, the Court finds that the assailed sections are indeed germane to the subject
expressed in the title of RA 9006: R.A. 9006: An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest,
Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices. The title was worded broadly enough
to include the measures embodied in the assailed sections.
k. IMBONG V. OCHOA
(G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS:
The RH Law made it mandatory for health providers to provide information on the full range
of modern family planning methods, supplies and services, and for schools to provide reproductive
health education. To put teeth to it, the RH Law criminalizes certain acts of refusals to carry out its
mandates.Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective
the current laws on contraception, women's health and population control. The petitioners are one in
praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional. One of the many arguments against it is
that it violates the one subject-one bill rule provision of the Constitution. According to them, being one
for reproductive health with responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional
standards of due process by concealing its true intent — to act as a population control measure.
ISSUE: W/N the law violates the one subject-one bill rule provision.
RULING:
NO, the law does not violate the one subject-one bill rule provision. A textual analysis of the
various provisions of the law shows that both “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” are
interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. The one
subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be "so uncertain that the
average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as
to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another
or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real
subject or scope of the act." Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and
"responsible parenthood" which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving "sustainable human
development" as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress
intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.
3. ORIGIN OF BILLS; THREE READINGS
a. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance

(G.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994)
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS:
The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties
as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing
VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There
are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.
One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives
as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation
of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not
pass 3 readings as required by the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution
RULING:
The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as
required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law
but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative
process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill
would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose
amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff
or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application
must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the
districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and
problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation
of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending
receipt of the House bill.
The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate
days as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same
day. But this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential
certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on
separate days. That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings on
separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of
legislative practice.
b. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance

(G.R. No. 115455, October 30, 1995)
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS:
The present case involves motions seeking reconsideration of the Court’s decision dismissing
the petitions for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the
Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. The motions, of which there are 10 in all, have been filed by the
several petitioners.
The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI) contends that by removing the exemption of the press
from the VAT while maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates against the press. At
any rate, it is averred, “even nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally guaranteed freedom is
unconstitutional”, citing in support of the case of Murdock v. Pennsylvania.
Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Invc., (CREBA), on the other hand,
asserts that R.A. No. 7716 (1) impairs the obligations of contracts, (2) classifies transactions as
covered or exempt without reasonable basis and (3) violates the rule that taxes should be uniform
and equitable and that Congress shall “evolve a progressive system of taxation”.
Further, the Cooperative Union of the Philippines (CUP), argues that legislature was to adopt
a definite policy of granting tax exemption to cooperatives that the present Constitution embodies
provisions on cooperatives. To subject cooperatives to the VAT would, therefore, be to infringe a
constitutional policy.
ISSUE: Whether or not, based on the aforementioned grounds of the petitioners, the Expanded
Value-Added Tax Law should be declared unconstitutional.
RULING:
No. With respect to the first contention, it would suffice to say that since the law granted the
press a privilege, the law could take back the privilege anytime without offense to the Constitution.
The reason is simple: by granting exemptions, the State does not forever waive the exercise of its
sovereign prerogative. Indeed, in withdrawing the exemption, the law merely subjects the press to
the same tax burden to which other businesses have long ago been subject. The PPI asserts that it
does not really matter that the law does not discriminate against the press because “even
nondiscriminatory taxation on constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional.” The Court was
speaking in that case (Murdock v. Pennsylvania) of a license tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax, is
mainly for regulation. Its imposition on the press is unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint
on the exercise of its right. The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the
exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or
exchange of goods or properties or the sale or exchange of services and the lease of properties
purely for revenue purposes. To subject the press to its payment is not to burden the exercise of its
right any more than to make the press pay income tax or subject it to general regulation is not to
violate its freedom under the Constitution.
Anent the first contention of CREBA, it has been held in an early case that even though such
taxation may affect particular contracts, as it may increase the debt of one person and lessen the
security of another, or may impose additional burdens upon one class and release the burdens of
another, still the tax must be paid unless prohibited by the Constitution, nor can it be said that it
impairs the obligation of any existing contract in its true legal sense. It is next pointed out that while
Section 4 of R.A. No. 7716 exempts such transactions as the sale of agricultural products, food items,
petroleum, and medical and veterinary services, it grants no exemption on the sale of real property
which is equally essential. The sale of food items, petroleum, medical and veterinary services, etc.,
which are essential goods and services was already exempt under Section 103, pars. (b) (d) (1) of
the NIRC before the enactment of R.A. No. 7716. Petitioner is in error in claiming that R.A. No. 7716
granted exemption to these transactions while subjecting those of petitioner to the payment of the
VAT. Finally, it is contended that R.A. No. 7716 also violates Art. VI, Section 28(1) which provides
that “The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive
system of taxation”. Nevertheless, equality and uniformity of taxation mean that all taxable articles or
kinds of property of the same class be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to
make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation. To satisfy this requirement it is
enough that the statute or ordinance applies equally to all persons, firms, and corporations placed in
similar situation. Furthermore, the Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes
which, like the VAT, are regressive. What it simply provides is that Congress shall “evolve a
progressive system of taxation.” The constitutional provision has been interpreted to mean simply
that “direct taxes are . . . to be preferred [and] as much as possible, indirect taxes should be
minimized.” The mandate to Congress is not to prescribe, but to evolve, a progressive tax system.
c. Alvarez v. Guingona
(G.R. No. 118303, January 31, 1996)
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.
FACTS:
In April 1993, House Bill 8817 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an
Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago) was passed in the House of
Representatives.
In May 1993, a Senate Bill (SB 1243) of similar title and content with that of HB 8817 was
introduced in the Senate.
In January 1994, HB 8817 was transmitted to the Senate. In February 1994, the Senate
conducted a public hearing on SB 1243. In March 1994, the Senate Committee on Local Government
rolled out its recommendation for approval of HB 8817 as it was totally the same with SB 1243.
Eventually, HB 8817 became a law (RA 7720).
Now Senator Heherson Alvarez et al are assailing the constitutionality of the said law on the
ground that the bill creating the law did not originate from the lower house and that City of Santiago
was not able to comply with the income of at least P20M per annum in order for it to be a city. That
in the computation of the reported average income of P20,974,581.97, the IRA was included which
should not be.
ISSUE: Whether or not considering that the Senate passed SB 1243, its own version of HB 8817, RA
7720 can be said to have originated in the House of Representatives
RULING:
Yes. Bills of local application are required to originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives. Petitioners contend that since a bill of the same import was passed in the Senate,
it cannot be said to have originated in the House of Representatives.
Such is untenable because it cannot be denied that the HB was filed first (18 Apr 1993). The
SB was filed 19 May. The HB was approved on third reading 17 Dec, and was transmitted to the
Senate 28 Jan 1994.
The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House,
does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate in
the House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the
House bill.
The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House
of Representatives, does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application
should originate in the House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon
until it receives the House bill.
In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, the Court said that what the Constitution simply means
is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt,
private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory
that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more
sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large,
are expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby
made to bear on the enactment of such laws. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate
of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the
Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.
d. Arroyo v. De Venecia
(G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997)
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS:
A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of
the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives,
charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-
mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain
amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions
of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the
House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of
quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then
proceeded. After Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader
Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called
out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: “There being none, approved.” At the same
time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, “What is that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and
Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the
Majority Leader’s motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been
declared by the Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and
the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress.
The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the
House
RULING:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily
procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the
effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular
measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects
person other than members of the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in
character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved.
In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who,
instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which
the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep.
Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier
motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the
existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the
quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.
e. Arroyo v. De Venecia
(G.R. No. 127255, June 26, 1998)
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS:
The petitioners are challenging the validity of R.A. 8420 (amends certain provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code by imposing “Sin Taxes”) by filing a petition for for certiorari and/or
prohibition. They claim that respondents violated the rules of the House which are "constitutionally
mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution when the Chair of the
Committee (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) allegedly ignored a privileged question raised by Rep.
Arroyo during the committee report for the approval of R.A. 8420.
Petitioners claim that there are actually four different versions of the transcript of this portion
of Rep. Arroyo's interpellation:
(1)the transcript of audio-sound recording of the proceedings in the session hall

(2) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996, as
(3) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996 as
(4) the published version
Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the constitutional provision
that "each House may determine the rules of its proceedings" and that for this reason they are
judicially enforceable. This contention was invoked by parties, although not successfully, precisely to
support claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to conduct its business free from interference by
courts. In this case, petitioners cite the provision for the opposite purpose of invoking judicial review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the House of Representatives acted with grave abuse of discretion in enacting
R.A. No. 8240 affects its validity?
RULING:
The petition was dismissed. According to the findings of the court, the alleged violations are
merely internal rules of procedures rather than what petitioners claim to be constitutional
requirements for enacting laws. In this case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only
those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this
Court. It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court
either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded
its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the
judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself.
4. APPROVAL OF BILLS; VETO
a. BOLINAO ELECTRONICS v. VALENCIA

(G.R. No. L-20740, June 30, 1964)
BARRERA, J.
FACTS:
This is an original petition for prohibition, mandatory injunction with preliminary injunction
filed by the Bolinao Electronics Corporation, Chronicle Broadcasting Network, Inc., and Monserrat
Broadcasting System, Inc., owners and operators of radio and television stations enumerated therein,
against respondents Secretary of Public Works and Communications and Acting Chief of the Radio
Control Division. Later the Republic of the Philippines, as operator of the Philippine Broadcasting
Service, sought and was allowed to intervene in this case, said interveners having been granted a
construction permit to install and operate a television station in Manila.
Petitioners applications for renewal of their station licenses were denied because it should be
filed two month before the expiration of the license. Pursuant to Section 3 of Act 3846, as amended
by Republic Act 584, on the powers and duties of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
(formerly Commerce And Communications), he may approve or disapprove any application for
renewal of station or operator license, provided, however, That no application for renewal shall bed
is approved without giving the licensee a hearing. Thus the notices of hearing were sent by
respondents to petitioners. Clearly, the intention of the investigation is to find out whether there is
ground to disapprove the applications for renewal. According to petitioner however, the violation has
ceased to exist when the act of late filing was condoned or pardoned by respondents by the issuance
of the circular dated July 24, 1962.The lone reason given for the investigation of petitioners'
applications, i.e., late filing thereof, is therefore no longer tenable. The violation, in legal effect, ceased
to exist and, hence, there is no reason nor need for the present investigation.
They were summoned by Valencia, then Secretary of Communications, for operating even
after their permit has expired. Valencia claimed that because of CBN’s continued operation sans
license and their continuing operation had caused damage to his department.
ISSUE: Whether or not Valencia is entitled to claim for damages.
RULING:
In the case at bar, the issuance of the said circular, the lone reason given for the investigation
of petitioners' applications, i.e., late filing thereof, is therefore no longer tenable. The violation, in legal
effect, ceased to exist and, hence, there is no reason nor need for the present investigation.
There was no express agreement there was abandonment or renunciation by the Chronicle
Broadcasting Network (CBN) of channel 9 in favor of PBS. The only basis of the contention of the
respondents that there was such renunciation is the statement "Channel 10 assigned in lieu of
Channel 9", appearing in the construction permit to transfer television station DZXL-TV from Quezon
City to Baguio City, issued to petitioner. This statement alone, however, does not establish any
agreement between the radio control authority and the station operator, on the switch or change of
operations of CBN from Channel 9 to Channel 10.
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Valencia failed to show that any right of his has
been violated by the refusal of Chronicle Broadcasting Network to cease operation. Further, the
Supreme Court noted that as the records show, the appropriation to operate the Philippine
Broadcasting Service as approved by Congress and incorporated in the 1962-1963 Budget of the
Republic of the Philippines does not allow appropriations for TV stations particularly in Luzon. Hence,
since there was no appropriation allotted then there can be no damage; and if there are expenditures
made by Valencia’s department they are in fact in violation of the law and they cannot claim damages
therefrom. And even if it is shown that the then President vetoed this provision of the Budget Act, this
gives rise to the question of whether the President may legally veto a condition attached to an
appropriation or item in the appropriation bill. The executive's veto power does not carry with it the
power to strike out conditions or restrictions, has been adhered to in subsequent cases.
If the veto is unconstitutional, it follows that the same produced no effect whatsoever, and the
restriction imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore, remains. Any expenditure made by the
intervener PBS, for the purpose of installing or operating a television station in Manila, where there
are already television stations in operation, would be in violation of the express condition for the
release of the appropriation and, consequently, null and void. It is not difficult to see that even if it
were able to prove its right to operate on Channel 9, said intervener would not have been entitled to
reimbursement of its illegal expenditures.
b. Gonzales v. Macaraig
(G.R. No 87636, November 19, 1990
Melencio–Herrera, J.
FACTS:
Gonzales, together w/ 22 other senators, assailed the constitutionality of Cory’s veto of
Section 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill (Sec 55 FY ’89, and subsequently of its counterpart Section
16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill (Sec 16 FY ’90). Gonzalez averred the following: (1) the President’s
line-veto power as regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does not cover provision/s;
therefore, she exceeded her authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90)
which are provision; (2) when the President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot
exercise the item-veto power but should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power does not carry
with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of the
doctrine of separation of powers; and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of
the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the
prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise of that power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the Constitution.
Or differently put, has the President the power to veto `provisions’ of an Appropriations Bill.
RULING:
SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be
more properly enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate provisions inserted
by it must be treated as “item,” which can be vetoed by the President in the exercise of his item-veto
power. The SC went one step further and rules that even assuming arguendo that “provisions” are
beyond the executive power to veto, and Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) were not
“provisions” in the budgetary sense of the term, they are “inappropriate provisions” that should be
treated as “items” for the purpose of the President’s veto power.
Article 6 Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution has 2 parts, a.) President generally can veto the
entire bill as exercise of her power and b.) president shall have the power to veto any
particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue of tariff bill but the veto shall not affect the item
or items to which he does not object.
Court ruled the constitutionality of the presidential veto and the petition was DISMISSED.
c. BENGZON v. DRILON
(G.R. 103524, April 15, 1992)
Gutierrez, J.
FACTS:
In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e. Republic Act No. 1797) that were
“repealed” during the time of former President Ferdinand Marcos. These old laws provided certain
retirement benefits to retired judges, justices, and members of the constitutional commissions.
Congress felt a need to restore these laws in order to standardize retirement benefits among
government officials. However, President Corazon Aquino vetoed the bill (House Bill No. 16297) on
the ground that the law should not give preferential treatment to certain or select government officials.
Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition with the Supreme Court
asking the court to readjust their pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797 was never repealed (by
P.D. No. 644) because the said PD was one of those unpublished PDs which were subject of the
case of Tañada v. Tuvera. Hence, the repealing law never existed due to non publication and in effect,
RA 1797 was never repealed. The Supreme Court then readjusted their pensions.
Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in the General Appropriations Bill (GAB)
for 1992, Congress allotted additional budget for pensions of retired justices. Congress however did
the allotment in the following manner: Congress made an item entitled: “General Fund Adjustment”;
included therein are allotments to unavoidable obligations in different branches of the government;
among such obligations is the allotment for the pensions of retired justices of the judiciary.
However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which provided for the pensions of the
retired justices in the judiciary in the GAB. She explained that that portion of the GAB is already
deemed vetoed when she vetoed H.B. 16297.
This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired judges and justices to question the
constitutionality of the veto made by the President. The President was represented by then Executive
Secretary Franklin Drilon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill is
constitutional.
RULING:
No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them
in accordance to Republic Act 1797 which was never repealed. The president has no power to set
aside and override the decision of the Supreme Court neither does the president have the power to
enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws.
The veto of these specific provisions in the GAA is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary ot its funds
should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. Pursuant to constitutional mandate,
the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations
law.
Any argument which seeks to remove special privileges given by law to former Justices on
the ground that there should be no grant of distinct privileges or “preferential treatment” to retired
Justices ignores these provisions of the Constitution and in effect asks that these Constitutional
provisions on special protections for the Judiciary be repealed.
The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is unconstitutional since the power of the
president to disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto
part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of said item. It appears that in the same item,
the Presidents vetoed some portion of it and retained the others. This cannot be done. The rule is:
the Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all; the Executive must veto an entire line item in
its entirety or not at all. In this case, the president did not veto the entire line item of the general
adjustment fund. She merely vetoed the portion which pertained to the pensions of the justices but
did not veto the other items covering obligations to the other departments of the government.
The petition is granted and the questioned veto is illegal and the provisions of 1992 GAA are
declared valid and subsisting.
d. PHILCONSA v. ENRIQUEZ
(G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994)
QUIASON, J.
FACTS:
This is a consolidation of cases which sought to question the veto authority of the president
involving the General Appropriations Bill of 1994 as well as the constitutionality of the pork barrel.
The Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) questions the countrywide development fund.
PHILCONSA said that Congress can only allocate funds but they cannot specify the items as to which
those funds would be applied for since that is already the function of the executive.
In G.R. No. 113766, after the vetoing by the president of some provisions of the GAB of 1994,
neither house of congress took steps to override the veto. Instead, Senators Wigberto Tañada and
Alberto Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against Executive
Secretary Teofisto Guingona et al. Tañada et al contest the constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four
special provisions added to items in the GAB of 1994 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
and the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and (2) the conditions imposed by the
President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGU’s, the DPWH, and the
National Housing Authority (NHA).
ISSUE: Whether or not the President’s veto is valid.
RULING:
In the PHILCONSA petition, the SC ruled that Congress acted within its power and that the
CDF is constitutional. In the Tañada petitions the SC dismissed the other petitions and granted the
others.
Veto on special provisions
The president did his veto with certain conditions and compliant to the ruling in Gonzales vs
Macaraig. The president particularly vetoed the debt reduction scheme in the GAA of 1994
commenting that the scheme is already taken cared of by other legislation and may be more properly
addressed by revising the debt policy. He, however did not delete the P86,323,438,000.00
appropriation therefor. Tañada et al averred that the president cannot validly veto that provision w/o
vetoing the amount allotted therefor. The veto of the president herein is sustained for the vetoed
provision is considered “inappropriate”; in fact the Sc found that such provision if not vetoed would in
effect repeal the Foreign Borrowing Act making the legislation as a log-rolling legislation.
Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUCs
The appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s), the President vetoed special
provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of
revolving funds was likewise vetoed. The reason for the veto is that there were already funds allotted
for the same in the National expenditure Program. Tañada et al claimed this as unconstitutional. The
SC ruled that the veto is valid for it is in compliant to the “One Fund Policy” – it avoided double funding
and redundancy.
Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance
The President vetoed this provision on the basis that it may result to a breach of contractual
obligations. The funds if allotted may result to abandonment of some existing contracts. The SC ruled
that this Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a
veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how
the said item shall be expended – 70% by administrative and 30% by contract. The 1987 Constitution
allows the addition by Congress of special provisions, conditions to items in an expenditure bill, which
cannot be vetoed separately from the items to which they relate so long as they are “appropriate” in
the budgetary sense. The veto herein is then not valid.
Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of military equipment
As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said condition and prohibition violate the
Constitutional mandate of non-impairment of contractual obligations, and if allowed, “shall effectively
alter the original intent of the AFP Modernization Fund to cover all military equipment deemed
necessary to modernize the AFP”. The SC affirmed the veto. Any provision blocking an administrative
action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval of executive acts must be incorporated
in a separate and substantive bill. Therefore, being “inappropriate” provisions.
Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds
According to the President, the grant of retirement and separation benefits should be covered
by direct appropriations specifically approved for the purpose pursuant to Section 29(1) of Article VI
of the Constitution. Moreover, he stated that the authority to use savings is lodged in the officials
enumerated in Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution. The SC retained the veto per reasons
provided by the president.
Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGU’s
Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGU’s including the payment of separation
benefits. The President declared in his Veto Message that the implementation of this Special
Provision to the item on the CAFGU’s shall be subject to prior Presidential approval pursuant to P.D.
No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758. The SC ruled to retain the veto per reasons provided by the president.
Further, if this provision is allowed the it would only lead to the repeal of said existing laws.
Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, etc
In his veto message: “The said condition is consistent with the Constitutional injunction
prescribed under Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitutional which states that ‘no elective or
appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation unless
specifically authorized by law.’ I am, therefore, confident that the heads of the said offices shall
maintain fidelity to the law and faithfully adhere to the well-established principle on compensation
standardization. Tañada et al claim that the conditions imposed by the President violated the
independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme court, the Ombudsman, the COA and the CHR.
The SC sustained the veto: In the first place, the conditions questioned by petitioners were placed in
the GAB by Congress itself, not by the President. The Veto Message merely highlighted the
Constitutional mandate that additional or indirect compensation can only be given pursuant to law. In
the second place, such statements are mere reminders that the disbursements of appropriations must
be made in accordance with law. Such statements may, at worse, be treated as superfluities.
Pork Barrel Constitutional
The pork barrel makes the unequal equal. The Congressmen, being representatives of their
local districts know more about the problems in their constituents areas than the national government
or the president for that matter. Hence, with that knowledge, the Congressmen are in a better position
to recommend as to where funds should be allocated.
5. APPROPRIATION
a. TESDA v. COA
(G.R. No. 196148, February 10, 2015)
Bersamin, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari 1 with prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order or writ
of preliminary injunction to annul Decision No. 2012-210 2 of the Commission on Audit (COA). The
COA disallowed payments of EME by the TESDA to its officials.
The audit team disallowed the payment of EME amounting to P5,498,706.60 for being in
excess of the amount allowed in the 2004-2007 GAAs. It was further discovered that EME were
disbursed to TESDA officials whose positions were not of equivalent ranks as authorized by the
Department of Budget and Management.
TESDA, through Director-General Augusto Boboy Syjuco, Jr., appealed and argued that the
2004-2007 GAAs and the Government Accounting and Auditing Manual allowed the grant of EME
from both the General Fund and the TESDP Fund provided the legal ceiling was not exceeded for
each fund. TESDA argued further that the General Fund and the TESDP Fund are distinct from each
other, and TESDA officials designated as project officers concurrently with their regular functions
were entitled to separate EME from both funds. The COA denied the appeal for lack of merit
prompting TESDA, through its Director-General to file a petition for review with COA. The same was
denied. The COA ruled that failure of TESDA officials to conform to the 2004-2007 GAAs negated
their claim of good faith. Hence this petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of temporary
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction to annul COA decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COA properly disallow the payment of excessive EME by TESDA.
RULING:
Yes. COA did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it disallowed the disbursement of
EME to TESDA officials for being excessive and unauthorized by law. Provisions in the GAA are clear
in stating that the EME shall not exceed the amount fixed therein. Those entitled to claim EME not
exceeding the amount provided in the GAA are as follows: (1) the officials named in the GAA, (2) the
officers of equivalent rank as may be authorized by the DBM, (3) and the offices under them.
However, TESDA had a different interpretation of the law. It contends that there was no prohibition
under the 2004-2007 GAAs regarding the additional EME chargeable against TESDP Fund. This
argument deserves scant consideration. It is worth noting that TESDA, an instrumentality of the
government established under the TESDA Act of 1994, is accorded with budget for its implementation
which is included in its annual GAA. The TESDP Fund, which is being sourced from the Treasury,
belongs to the government. The Constitution provides that, o money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.No law was pointed out by TESDA authorizing
it to grant additional reimbursement for EME from the TESDP Fund, contrary to the explicit
requirement in the Constitution and the law.
The Director-General blatant violation of the clear provisions of the Constitution, the 2004-
2007 GAAs and the COA circulars is equivalent to gross negligence amounting to bad faith. Hence,
he is required to refund the EME he received from the TESDP Fund for himself. TESDA officials, on
the other hand, who had no participation in the approval of the excessive EME acted in good faith
and they need not refund the excess EME they received.
b. COMELEC v. Quijano-Padilla
(G.R. No. 151991, September 18, 2002)
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
FACTS:
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the "Voter's Registration Act of 1996,"
providing for the modernization and computerization of the voters' registration list and the
appropriation of funds therefor "in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent and updated list
of voters," the COMELEC issued invitations to pre-qualify and bid for the supply and installations of
information technology equipment and ancillary services for its VRIS Project. Private respondent
Photokina Marketing Corporation (PHOTOKINA) pre-qualified and was allowed to participate as one
of the bidders. After the public bidding was conducted, PHOTOKINA's bid in the amount of P6.588
Billion Pesos garnered the highest total weighted score and was declared the winning bidder.
However, under Republic Act No. 8760, the budget appropriated by Congress for the
COMELEC's modernization project was only One (1) Billion Pesos and that the actual available funds
under the Certificate of Availability of Funds (CAF) issued by the Chief Accountant of the COMELEC
was only P1.2 Billion Pesos. Then COMELEC Chairman Harriet O. Demetriou issued a memorandum
to the COMELEC en banc expressing her objections to the contract.
On February 2, 2001, the term of former Chairman Demetriou and those of Commissioners
Julio F. Desamito and Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores expired. Appointed as their successors were
petitioners Alfredo L. Benipayo as Chairman and Resurreccion Z. Borra and Florentino A. Tuason,
Jr. as Commissioners. Chairman Benipayo, through various press releases and public statements,
announced that the VRIS Project has been "scrapped, dropped, junked, or set aside," He further
announced his plan to "re-engineer" the entire modernization program of the COMELEC,
emphasizing his intention to replace the VRIS Project with his own version, the "Triple E Vision."
Unsatisfied with the adverse turn of events, PHOTOKINA filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch
215, Quezon City a petition for mandamus, prohibition and damages against the COMELEC and all
its Commissioners.
On December 19, 2001, respondent Judge Ma. Luisa Quijano-Padilla issued the first assailed
Resolution granting PHOTOKINA's application for a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction. On
February 8, 2002, respondent judge issued the second assailed Resolution denying the COMELEC's
Omnibus Motion and, this time, granting PHOTOKINA's application for a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
in behalf of then COMELEC Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo and Commissioners Resurreccion Z.
Borra and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr.
ISSUE: WON the Commission On Elections is justified in refusing to formalize the contract; prudence
dictated the commission not to enter into a contract not backed up by sufficient appropriation and
available funds.
RULING:
Yes. Petitioners are justified in refusing to formalize the contract with PHOTOKINA. Prudence
dictated them not to enter into a contract not backed up by sufficient appropriation and available
funds. Definitely, to act otherwise would be a futile exercise for the contract would inevitably suffer
the vice of nullity. Verily, the contract, as expressly declared by law, is inexistent and void ab initio.
This is to say that the proposed contract is without force and effect from the very beginning or from
its incipiency, as if it had never been entered into, and hence, cannot be validated either by lapse of
time or ratification.|||
While this is not the proceeding to determine where the culpability lies, however, the
constitutional mandate cited above constrains us to remind all public officers that public office is a
public trust and all public officers must at all times be accountable to the people. The authority of
public officers to enter into government contracts is circumscribed with a heavy burden of
responsibility. In the exercise of their contracting prerogative, they should be the first judges of the
legality, propriety and wisdom of the contract they entered into. They must exercise a high degree of
caution so that the Government may not be the victim of ill-advised or improvident action. In fine, we
rule that PHOTOKINA, though the winning bidder, cannot compel the COMELEC to formalize the
contract. Since PHOTOKINA's bid is beyond the amount appropriated by Congress for the VRIS
Project, the proposed contract is not binding upon the COMELEC and is considered void; and that in
issuing the questioned preliminary writs of mandatory and prohibitory injunction and in not dismissing
Special Civil Action No. Q-01-45405, respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion.
The Supreme Court set aside the assailed orders of the trial court. The Court ruled that
mandamus does not lie to enforce the performance of contractual obligations. In the case at bar, the
alleged contract relied upon by PHOTOKINA as source of its rights which it seeks to be protected, is
being disputed, not only on the ground that it was not perfected but also because it was illegal and
against public policy. The Court also ruled that petitioners were justified in refusing to formalize the
contract with PHOTOKINA. Prudence dictated them not to enter into a contract not backed up by
sufficient appropriation and available funds. Definitely, to act otherwise would be a futile exercise for
the contract would inevitably suffer the vice of nullity. There is no way that the COMELEC could enter
into a contract with PHOTOKINA whose accepted bid was way beyond the amount appropriated by
law for the project. That being the case, the Bid Awards Committee should have rejected the bid for
being excessive or should have withdrawn the Notice of Award on the ground that in the eyes of the
law, the same is null and void.
c. Araullo v. Aquino
(G.R. No. 209187, July 1, 2014)
BERSAMIN, J.
FACTS:
Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad then came up with a program called the
Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) which was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of
government projects. DAP enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority
projects instead of waiting for next year’s appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if
a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds
allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as
“savings” by the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP
program did work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of
such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court). Other sources of the DAP
include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds
are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé claiming that he,
and other Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the
impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was
taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators. This apparently opened a
can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds within the Executive. It turns
out that some non-Executive projects were also funded. This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo,
Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens to file
various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions
was: DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that “no money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” Secretary
Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and augmentation
provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs.
38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and authority to
use savings, respectively).
ISSUE: Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
RULING:
No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a
program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing
government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1),
Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise,
an appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds, which were already appropriated
for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP. There is no executive impoundment in the
DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the President’s power to refuse to spend appropriations or to
retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA
unless there will be an unmanageable national government budget deficit (which did not happen).
Nevertheless, there’s no impoundment in the case at bar because what’s involved in the DAP was
the transfer of funds.
But, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President
(and even the heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to
make realignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be made “within their
respective offices”. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the
DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being
transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies. Further, transfers “within their
respective offices” also contemplate realignment of funds to an existing project in the GAA. Under the
DAP, even though some projects were within the Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar
as the GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some
of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were not
provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal
basis.
The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25 (5),supra,must be made upon
a concurrence of the following requisites, namely:
(1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House
of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional
Commissions to transfer funds within their respective offices;
(2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for their respective
offices; and
(3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices.
On the issue of what are “savings”
These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary to what was being declared by the Executive.
Under the definition of “savings” in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there
is an excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally
abandoned. The GAA does not refer to “savings” as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project.
Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis
at all for the transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But
under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and
then being declared as “savings” by the Executive particularly by the DBM.
d. Belgica v. Ochoa
(G.R. No. 208566, November 11, 2013)
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet
members may request for the realignment of funds into their department provided that the request for
realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel. The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included
in the GAA. The so-called presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya
Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project – this has been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential
Social Fund which is derived from the earnings of PAGCOR – this has been around since about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy. Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by
allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for
the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles.
Napoles had been helping lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGO’s
(non-government organizations) which would make it appear that government funds are being used
in legit existing projects but are in fact going to “ghost” projects. An audit was then conducted by the
Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before
the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.
RULING:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it violates
the following principles: a. Separation of Powers, b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power, c. Principle
of Checks and Balances, d. Local Autonomy. The 2013 PDAF Article congers post-enactment
identification authority to individual legislators, which violates the principle of non-delegability since
said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation. This is
lodged in the Congress (Sec. 29 par. 1 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution). The individual legislators
are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate how much from such fund
would go to a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. The constitution
does not allow this.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid. The Supreme Court ruled that PD 910,which created the
Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCOR’s
charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit: (i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all
fees,among others, collected from certain energy-related ventures shall form part of a special fund
(the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy resource development and for
other purposes which the President may direct; (ii)PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides
that a part of PAGCOR’s earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund)
which shall be used in government infrastructure projects.These are sufficient laws which met the
requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The appropriation contemplated therein does
not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the case of PD 910
and PD 1869. The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation
of the budget makes it difficult for them to become disinterested observers when scrutinizing,
investigating or monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law.
The conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-
enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate.
The concept of post-enactment authorization violates Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
which prohibits members of Congress to intervene in any matter before any office of the Government,
because it renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office. The Court,
however, cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or the individual
legislator‘s control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetuate himself in office.
e. Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and Communications

(G.R. No. L-10405, December 29, 1960)
CONCEPCION, J.
FACTS:
In 1953, Republic Act No. 920 was passed. This law appropriated P85,000.00 “for the
construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement Pasig feeder road terminals”.
Petitioner Wenceslao Pascual, then governor of Rizal, assailed the validity of the law. He claimed
that the appropriation was actually going to be used for private use for the terminals sought to be
improved were part of the Antonio Subdivision. The said Subdivision is owned by Senator Jose
Zulueta who was a member of the same Senate that passed and approved the same RA. Pascual
claimed that Zulueta misrepresented in Congress the fact that he owns those terminals and that his
property would be unlawfully enriched at the expense of the taxpayers if the said RA would be upheld.
Pascual then prayed that the Secretary of Public Works and Communications be restrained from
releasing funds for such purpose. Zulueta, on the other hand, perhaps as an afterthought, donated
the said property to the City of Pasig.
Respondents moved to dismiss the petition, however the lower court dismissed such.
ISSUE: WON said item of appropriation should be declared null and void.
RULING:
YES. Decision appealed from is reversed, and the records remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this decision.
The appropriation is void for being an appropriation for a private purpose. The subsequent
donation of the property to the government to make the property public does not cure the
constitutional defect. The fact that the law was passed when the said property was still a private
property cannot be ignored. “In accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be exercised for
public purposes only, money raised by taxation can be expanded only for public purposes and not for
the advantage of private individuals.” Inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder roads were
to be constructed belonged then to Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private
purpose, and, hence, was null and void.
Where the land on which projected feeder roads are to be constructed belongs to a private
person, an appropriation made by Congress for that purpose is null and void, and a donation to the
Government, made over five (5) months after the approval and effectivity of the Act for the purpose
of giving a "semblance of legality" to the appropriation, does not cure the basic defect. Consequently,
a judicial nullification of said donation need not precede the declaration of unconstitutionality of said
appropriation.
f. Guingona v. Carague
(G.R. No. 94571, April 22, 1991)
GANCAYCO, J.
FACTS:
The 1990 budget consists of PHP 98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with PHP 86.8 Billion
for debt service) and PHP 155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as the General
Appropriations Act (PHP 233.5 Billion in total); while the appropriations for DepEd, Culture and Sports
amount to PHP 27.017 Billion.
Petitioners seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of PD 81, Sec. 31 of PD 1177 and
PD 1967 which authorizes the automatic appropriation for debt service and restrain its disbursement.
They argue that (1) upon the expiration of the one-man legislature in the person of Pres. Marcos, the
legislative power was restored to the Congress when the Constitution was ratified by the people; (2)
that there is a need for a new legislation by Congress providing for automatic appropriation, but
Congress, up to the present, has not approved any such law; (3) and said PHP 86.8 Billion automatic
appropriation is an administrative act that rests on no law, and thus, cannot be enforced.
Moreover, petitioners contend that assuming arguendo that such decrees did not expire, it is
still inoperative under Art. XVIII, Sec. 3 which states that those inconsistent with the Constitution shall
remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked. They also point out that it is inconsistent with
Art. VI, Sec. 24 whereby bills have to be approved by the President, then a law must be passed by
Congress to authorize said automatic appropriation. Further, they state that said decrees violates Art.
VI, Sec. 29 (1), asserting that there must be definiteness, certainty and exactness in an appropriation,
otherwise, it is an undue delegation of legislative power to the President who determines in advance
the amount appropriated for the debt service.
ISSUE: WON the decrees are in violation of the Constitution.
RULING:
NO. An examination of the PDs show the clear intent that the amounts needed to cover the
payment of the principal and interest on all foreign loans including those guaranteed by the national
government, should be made available when they shall become due precisely without the necessity
of periodic enactments of separate laws appropriating funds therefor, since both the periods and
necessities are incapable of determination in advance.
The automatic appropriation provides the flexibility for the effective execution of debt
management policies. The argument of petitioners that said decrees are inconsistent with the
Constitution is untenable. The framers of the Constitution did not contemplate that existing laws in
the statute books including existing presidential decrees appropriating public money are reduced to
mere "bills" that must again go through the legislative mill. The only reasonable interpretation of said
provisions of the Constitution which refer to "bills" is that they mean appropriation measures still to
be passed by Congress.
Although the subject presidential decrees do not state specific amounts to be paid,
necessitated by the very nature of the problem being, addressed, the amounts nevertheless are made
certain by the legislative parameters provided in the decrees.
g. Garcia v. Mata
(GR No. L-33713, Jul 30, 1975)
CASTRO, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Eusebio Garcia was a reserve officer on active duty with the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. He held the rank of Captain with a monthly emolument of PHP 478.00. Pursuant to RA
2334, which provided that reserve officers with at least 2 years of active duty shall be reverted to
inactive status within 3 years from the approval of the act, he was reverted to inactive status and
since then has neither received emoluments from AFP nor employed in the government in any
capacity. He filed the necessary petitions to the concerned offices, but received reply only from the
Chief of Staff through the AFP Adjutant General. Thus, he filed a petition in court to reinstate him,
readjust his rank and pay all emoluments and allowances due to him from the time of his reversion.
Garcia argues that his reversion was in violation of RA 1600 (Appropriation Act for Fiscal Year
1956-1957) Par. 11 of the Special Provisions for the Armed Forces of the Philippines which prohibits
the reversion to inactive status of reserve officers on active duty with at least ten years of accumulated
active commissioned service. When RA 1600 took effect, he had already had accumulated service
of 10 years, 5 months and 5 days in the AFP.
The trial court dismissed the petition. Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE: WON Par. 11 of RA 1600 is invalid, unconstitutional and inoperative.
RULING:
YES. While RA 1600 appropriated money for the operation of the Government for the fiscal
year 1956-1957, said paragraph refers to the fundamental governmental policy matters of the calling
to active duty and the reversion to inactive status of reserve officers in the AFP. The incongruity and
irrelevancy continue throughout the entire paragraph. It was a non-appropriation item inserted in an
appropriation measure in violation of the constitutional inhibition against ‘riders’ to the ‘general
appropriation act.’
Being unconstitutional, it confers no right and affords no protection. In legal contemplation, it

is as though it has never been passed. Petitioner cannot compel the respondents to reinstate him,
promote or readjust his rank, much less pay him back the emoluments and allowances.
h. Araullo v. Aquino
(G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015)
BERSAMIN, J.
FACTS:
In this case, the respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the decision
promulgated on July 1, 2014 and the petitioners, a Motion for Partial Reconsideration.
The respondents maintain the the issues in these consolidated cases were mischaracterized
and unnecessarily constitutionalized; that the Court's interpretation of ‘savings’ can be overturned by
legislation considering that ‘savings’ is defined in the General Appropriations Act (GAA), hence
making it a statutory issue; that the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations
constitute savings and may be used for augmentation; and that the Court should apply legally
recognized norms and principles, most especially the presumption of good faith, in resolving their
motion.
The petitioners, on the other hand, contend that the Court failed to declare as unconstitutional
and illegal all moneys under the DAP used for alleged augmentation of appropriation items that did
not have actual deficiencies. They submit that augmentation of items beyond the maximum amounts
recommended by the President for the programs, activities and projects (PAPs) contained in the
budget submitted to Congress should be declared unconstitutional.
ISSUE: WON DAP is in violation of the Constitution.
RULING:
YES, HOWEVER, the Court finds merit in the respondent’s argument regarding the DAP-
funded projects that there is no constitutional requirement for Congress to create allotment classes
within an item.
Indeed, Section 25 (5) of the 1987 Constitution mentions of the term item that may be the
object of augmentation by the President, the Senate President, the Speaker of the House, the Chief
Justice, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions. In Belgica v. Ochoa , we said that an item
that is the distinct and several part of the appropriation bill, in line with the item-veto power of the
President, must contain "specific appropriations of money" and not be only general provisions.
Accordingly, the item referred to by Section 25 (5) of the Constitution is the last and indivisible
purpose of a program in the appropriation law, which is distinct from the expense category or
allotment class. There is no specificity, indeed, either in the Constitution or in the relevant GAAs that
the object of augmentation should be the expense category or allotment class. In the same vein, the
President cannot exercise his veto power over an expense category; he may only veto the item to
which that expense category belongs to.
i. Aglipay v. Ruiz
(G.R. No. 45459, March 13, 1937)
LAUREL, J.
FACTS:
The Director of Posts declared that he will order the issuance of postage stamps
commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress,
organized by the Roman Catholic Church. Petition, the Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent
Church, seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition to prevent the Director of Post from issuing and
selling the said postage stamps.
The said act of the Director of Posts is pursuant to the appropriation act appropriating P60,000
for the cost of plates and printing of postage stamps, and authorizing the Director of Posts to dispose
of the amount as may be deemed advantageous to the Government.
ISSUE: W/N issuing and selling said postage stamps is violative of Sec. 13 Art. VI of the Constitution
(now Sec. 29 Par. 2).
RULING:
NO. The issuance of the postage stamps in question was not inspired by any sectarian feeling
to favor a particular church or religious denominations. The stamps were not issued and sold for the
benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to
that Church. The only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was to advertise the Philippines and
attract more tourists to this country. The officials merely took advantage of an event considered of
international importance to give publicity to the Philippines and its people. In the stamp, what is
emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itslf but Manila as the seat of that congress.
While the issuance and sale of the stamps may be said to be inseparably linked with an event
of a religious character, the resulting propaganda received by the Roman Catholic Church was not
the aim and purpose of the Government. The Government should not be embarrassed in its activities
simply because of incidental results.
j. Garces v. Estenzo
(G.R. No. L-53487, May 25, 1981)
AQUINO, J.
FACTS:
The Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City, issued resolutions regarding the acquisition
of the wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer to be used in the celebration of his annual feast day.
Included in the resolution is the provision that the custody of the image shall be with the chairman of
the fiesta and would remain in his residence for one year until the election of his successor. The
image was obtained from Cebu City using private funds from cash donations and solicitations of the
barangay residents and neighboring places. The image was displayed in the Roman Catholic Church
during the day of the mass. However, the parish priest refused to return the same, claiming that it
belongs to the Catholic church. After series of disagreements, a petition was filed questioning the
constitutionality of the resolutions. Petitioners contend that the resolutions contravene the
constitutional provision that no public money shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or used for the
benefit of any religion.
ISSUE: WON the resolutions violate such constitutional provision.
RULING:
NO. The questioned resolutions do not directly or indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge
religious liberty, nor appropriate public money or property for the benefit of any sect, priest or
clergyman. The image was purchased with private funds, not with tax money. It is entirely a secular
matter. Not every governmental activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and wh has
some religious tint is violative of the constitutional provision banning the use of public money or
property.
k. Manosca v. CA
(G.R. No. 106440, January 29, 1996)
VITUG, J.
FACTS:
Petitioners inherited a piece of land, which is being claimed by the Government pursuant to
its eminent domain / expropriation function. The said piece of land was ascertained by the National
Historical Institute to have been the birthsite of Felix Manalo, the founder of Iglesia ni Cristo. NHI
passed a resolution declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. Respondents filed an
urgent motion for the issuance of an order to permit it to take immediate possession of the property.
Petitioners move to dismiss the petition on the thesis that the intended expropriation was not for a
public purpose and the act would constitute and application of public funds for the use, benefit,
support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity.
ISSUE: WON the expropriation is in violation of Sec. 29 Par. 2 Art. VI.
RULING:
NO. What should be significant is the principal objective of, not the casual consequences that
might follow from, the exercise of the power. The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to
recognize the distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather
than to commemorate his founding and leadership of the INC. The benefit that may be derived by
members of INC are merely incidental and secondary in nature.
6. TAXATION
a. Lladoc v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

(G.R. No. L-19201 June 16, 1965)
PAREDES, J.
FACTS:
In 1957, the M.B. Estate, Inc. in Bacolod City donated P10,000 in case to Rev. Fr. Crispin
Ruiz, the then parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental and the predecessor of Rev. Fr. Casimiro
Lladoc, for the construction of a new Catholic Church. The total amount was actually spent for the
purpose intended.
On March 1958, M.B. Estate filed a donor’s gift tax return. Subsequently, on April 1960, the
CIR issued an assessment for donee’s gift tax in the amount of P1,370 including surcharges, interest
of 1% monthly from May 1958 to June 1960 and the compromise for the late filing of the return against
the Catholic Parish of Victorias, Negros Occidental of which Lladoc was a priest.
Lladoc protested and moved to reconsider but it was denied. He then appealed to the CTA,
in his petition for review, he claimed that at the time of the donation, he was not the parish priest,
thus, he is not liable. Moreover, he asserted that the assessment of the gift tax, even against the
Roman Catholic Church, would not be valid, for such would be a clear violation of the Constitution.
The CTA ruled in favor of the CIR. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be liable for assessed donee’s gift tax donated.
RULING:
Yes, imposition of gift tax is valid. Section 22 (3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the Philippines,
exempts from taxation, cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents, appurtenant thereto, and
all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious purposes. The exemption is only
from the payment of taxes assessed on such properties enumerated, as property taxes, as contra
distinguished from excise taxes.
In the present case, what the Collector assessed was a donee's gift tax; the assessment was
not on the properties themselves. It did not rest upon general ownership; it was an excise upon the
use made of the properties, upon the exercise of the privilege of receiving the properties. Manifestly,
gift tax is not within the exempting provisions of the section just mentioned. A gift tax is not a property
tax, but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos, the imposition of
which on property used exclusively for religious purposes, does not constitute an impairment of
Constitution. The exempt from taxation as employed in the Constitution should not be interpreted to
mean exemption from all kinds of taxes. And there being no clear, positive or express grant of such
privilege by law, in favor of petitioner, the exemption herein must be denied.
However, the Court noted the merit of Lladoc’s claim, and held as liable the Head of Diocese
for being the real party in interest instead of Lladoc who was held to be not personally liable; the
former manifested that it was submitting himself to the jurisdiction and orders of the Court and he
presented Lladoc’s brief, by reference, as his own and for all purposes.
b. Province of Abra v. Hernando

(G.R. No. L-49336, August 31, 1981)
FERNANDO, C.J.
FACTS:
The Province of Abra sought to tax the properties of The Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued,
Inc. Desirous of being exempted from a real estate tax, the latter filed a petition for declaratory relief
on the ground that other than being exempted from payment of real estate taxes, its properties are
also "being actually, directly and exclusively used for religious or charitable purposes as sources of
support for the bishop, the parish priest and his helpers.” After conducting a summary hearing,
respondent Judge Hernando granted the exemption & without hearing the side of petitioner. The
petitioner then filed a motion to dismiss but the same was denied. Hence, this present petition for
certiorari and mandamus alleging denial of procedural due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not the properties of the Church in this case is exempt from taxes.
RULING:
No, the properties of the Church are not exempted for tax. It is true that the Constitution
provides that "charitable institutions, mosques, and non-profit cemeteries” are required that for the
exemption of "lands, buildings, and improvements,” they should not only be "exclusively but also
"actually and "directly used for religious or charitable purposes. There must be proof therefore of the
actual and direct use of the lands, buildings, and improvements for religious or charitable purposes
to be exempt from taxation. It has been the constant and uniform holding that the exemption from
taxation is not favored and is never presumed, so that if granted it must be strictly construed against
the taxpayer. Affirmatively put, the law frowns on exemption from taxation; hence, an exempting
provision should be construed strictissimijuris. However, in this case, there is no showing that the
said properties are actually and directly used for religious or charitable uses.
The respondent judge would not have erred so grievously had he merely compared the
provisions of the present Constitution and with that appearing in the 1935 Charter on the tax
exemption of “lands, buildings, and improvements.” There is a marked difference. Under the 1935
Constitution: “Cemeteries, churches, and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands,
buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall
be exempt from taxation.” The present Constitution added “charitable institutions, mosques, and non-
profit cemeteries” and required that for the exemption of “lands, buildings, and improvements,” they
should not only be “exclusively” but also “actually” and “directly” used for religious or charitable
purposes. The Constitution is worded differently. The change should not be ignored. It clearly
appears, therefore, that in failing to accord a hearing to petitioner Province of Abra and deciding the
case immediately in favor of private respondent, respondent judge failed to abide by the constitutional
command of procedural due process. The petition was granted. Respondent judge, or whoever as
acting on his behalf, was ordered to hear the case on the merit.
c. Abra Valley College v. Aquino

(G.R. No. L-39086, June 15, 1988)
PARAS, J.
FACTS:
Abra Valley College, an educational corporation and institution of higher learning duly
incorporated with the SEC filed a complaint to annul and declare void the “Notice of Seizure” and the
“Notice of Sale” of its lot and building located at Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of real estate taxes
and penalties. Paterno Millare filed through counsel a motion to dismiss the complaint. The provincial
fiscal filed a memorandum for the government wherein they opined that based on the evidence, the
laws applicable, court decisions and jurisprudence, the school building and the school lot used for
educational purposes of the Abra Valley College is exempted from payment of taxes. Nonetheless,
the trial court disagreed because of the use of the second floor by the Director of the said school for
residential purpose. He thus ruled for the government and rendered the assailed decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lot and building in question are used exclusively for educational purposes.
RULING:
NO. It must be stressed that while the court allows a more liberal and non-restrictive
interpretation of the phrase “exclusively used for educational purposes” as provided for in the Article
VI, Section 22, Paragraph 3 of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, reasonable emphasis has always
been made that exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the main purpose. Otherwise stated, the use of the school building or lot for
commercial purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence. Thus, while the use of
the second floor of the main building in the case at bar for residential purposes of the Director and
his family, may find justification under the concept of incidental use, which is complementary to the
main or primary purpose – educational, the lease of the first floor thereof to the Northern Marketing
Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered incidental to the purposes of
education. Under the 1935 Constitution, the trial court correctly arrived at the conclusion that the
school building as well as the lot where it is built should be taxed, not because the second floor of the
same is being used by the director and his family for residential purposes, but because the first floor
thereof is being used for commercial purposes. However, since only a portion is used for purposes
of commerce, it is only fair that half of the assessed tax be return to the school involved.
7. LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATION AND QUESTION HOUR
a. In the matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Camilo L. Sabio v. Gordon
(G.R. No. L-19201, June 16, 1965)
PAREDES, J.
FACTS:
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced Senate Res. No. 455
“directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in
their operations by their respective Board of Directors.” Pursuant to this, on May 8, 2006, Senator
Richard Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo Sabio of the PCGG inviting him to be one of the resource
persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and
Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. Chairman Sabio declined the invitation
because of prior commitment. At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 “No member
or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative
or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.” Apparently, the
purpose is to ensure PCGG’s unhampered performance of its task. Gordon’s Subpoenae Ad
Testificandum was repeatedly ignored by Sabio hence he threatened Sabio to be cited with contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 constitutes a limitation on the power of legislative
inquiry.
RULING:
It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and
expansive construal. The Court’s high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v.
Ermita, where it categorically ruled that “the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the
executive branch.” Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that “the operation of
government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation” and that
“the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate”. Subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.
Article III, Section 7:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions,
as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and
in the operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to enable
them to exercise effectively their constitutional rights. Armed with the right information, citizens can
participate in public discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and their effective
implementation.
b. Philcomsat Holdings v. Senate

(G.R. No. 180308, June 19, 2012)
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
Petitioners Enrique L. Locsin (Locsin) and Manuel D. Andal (Andal) are nominees of the
government to the board of directors of Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT) and Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC). Both Locsin and
Andal are also directors and corporate officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporations (PHC). By virtue
of its interest in both PHILCOMSAT and POTC, the government has also substantial interest in PHC.
The government, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), received cash
dividends from POTC. However, POTC suffered losses because of its huge operating expenses. In
view of the losses and to protect the government’s interest in POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC,
Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Proposed Senate Resolution No. 455 directing the
conduct of an inquiry, in aid of legislation, on the losses incurred by POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC
and the mismanagement committed by their respective board of directors. PSR No. 455 was referred
to Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises (Senate Committee), which
conducted hearings. Locsin and Andal were invited to attend these hearings as resource persons.
The Senate Committee found an overwhelming mismanagement by the PCGG over POTC,
PHILCOMSAT and PHC, and that PCGG was negligent in performing its mandate to preserve the
government’s interest in the said corporations. Committee Report No. 312 recommended the
privatization and transfer of the jurisdiction over the shares of the government in POTC and
PHILCOMSAT to the Privatization Management Office (PMO) under the Department of Finance
(DOF) and the replacement of government nominees as directors of POTC and PHILCOMSAT.
Locsin and Andal filed a petition before the Supreme Court questioning the hasty approval of the
Senate of the Committee Report No. 312.
ISSUE: Whether or not Senate committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in approving Committee Resolution No. 312.
RULING:
The Senate Committees’ power of inquiry relative to PSR No. 455 has been passed upon and
upheld in the consolidated cases of In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Camilo L. Sabio
which cited Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution, as follows: “The Senate or the House of
Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected
by such inquiries shall be respected.” The Court explained that such conferral of the legislative power
of inquiry upon any committee of Congress, in this case, the respondents Senate Committees, must
carry with it all powers necessary and proper for its effective discharge. On this score, the Senate
Committee cannot be said to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess
of jurisdiction when it submitted Committee Resolution No. 312, given its constitutional mandate to
conduct legislative inquiries. Nor can the Senate Committee be faulted for doing so on the very same
day that the assailed resolution was submitted. The wide latitude given to Congress with respect to
these legislative inquiries has long been settled, otherwise, Article VI, Section 21 would be rendered
pointless.
c. Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon

(G.R. No. 89914, November 20, 1991)
PADILLA, J.
FACTS:
By virtue of a privilege speech made by Sen. Enrile urging the Senate to look into the
transactions, an investigation was conducted by the Senate Blue-ribbon Committee. Petitioners and
Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before it and testify on "what they know"
regarding the alleged acquisition of the Lopa Group of the properties of Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez
which is a subject of sequestration by the PCGG and citing probable violations of Republic Act. 3019
Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 5.
Ricardo Lopa declined to and Petitioner Jose F.S. Bengzon,Jr. likewise refused to testify
involving his constitutional right to due process, and averring that the publicity generated by
respondents Committee’s inquiry could adversely affect his rights as well as those of the other
petitioners who are his co-defendants in Civil Case. Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
is poised to subpoena them and required their attendance and testimony in proceedings before the
Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of their
constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damages, prejudice and injury, and that there
is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the
petitioners filed the present petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraining order and/or
injunctive relief.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee’s inquiry has valid legislative purpose and
done in aid of legislation.
RULING:
No, the inquiry cannot be given due course. The speech of Enrile contained no suggestion of
contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5
of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as “The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.” In other words, the
purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by the Blue Ribbon Committee was to find out whether or not
the relatives of Cory, particularly Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the
36 or 39 corporations belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no
intended legislation involved. Hence, the contemplated inquiry by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
is not really “in aid of legislation” because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of
Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the President
or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of RA No. 3019, the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act”, a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature.
Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this
case.
d. Arnault v. Nazareno
(G.R. No. L-3820, July 18, 1950)
OZAETA, J.
FACTS:
The Senate investigated the purchase by the government of two parcels of land, known as
Buenavista and Tambobong estates. A question that the Senate sought to resolve was the obvious
irregularity of the government’s payment to one Ernest Burt, a non-resident American citizen, of the
total sum of Php1.5 million for his alleged interest in the two estates that only amounted to
Php20,000.00, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before. The Senate sought to
determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the
government. Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest Burt in the subject transactions,
was one of the witnesses summoned by the Senate to its hearings. In the course of the investigation,
the petitioner repeatedly refused to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the amount of
Php440, 000.00, which he withdrew from the Php1.5 million proceeds pertaining to Ernest Burt.
Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and was committed to the custody of the
Senate Sergeant-at-Arms for imprisonment until he answers the questions. He thereafter filed a
petition for habeas corpus directly with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of his detention.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Senate has the power to punish petitioner for contempt for refusing to reveal the name
of the person to whom he gave the P440,000.
2. Whether the petitioner can rightfully invoke his right against self-incrimination?
RULING:
1. Yes, the Senate has the power to punish the petitioner. The Constitution (1935) did not contain an
express provision empowering either of the two Houses of Congress to punish non-members for
contempt. But the power of inquiry—with process to enforce it—is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the
jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, the investigating committee has the power to require a
witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject to his constitutional right against self-
incrimination. The Court found that the question for the refusal to answer which the petitioner was
held in contempt by the Senate was pertinent to the matter under inquiry. If the subject of investigation
before the committee is within the range of legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony
of the witness called relates to that subject, obedience, to its process may be enforced by the
committee by imprisonment.
2. No, the petitioner may not exercise his right against self-incrimination in this case. As against
witness's inconsistent and unjustified claim to a constitutional right, is his clear duty as a citizen to
give frank, sincere, and truthful testimony before a competent authority. The ground upon which the
witness' claim is based is too shaky, in firm, and slippery to afford him safety. Due to his inconsistent
and evasive answers, the Courts believed that his answers were false, and that his insistent claim
that if he should reveal the name he would incriminate himself, necessarily implied that he knew the
name. Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a refusal to testify and is
punishable as contempt, assuming that a refusal to testify would be so punishable. Since according
to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the P440,000 to a representative
of Burt in compliance with the latter's verbal instruction, we find no basis upon which to sustain his
claim that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him.
e. Arnault v. Balagtas
(G.R. No. L-6749, July 30, 1955)
LABRADOR, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner-appellee was an attorney in-fact or Ernest H. Burt in the negotiations for the
purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by the Government of the #Philippines. The
price paid for both estates was Php 5,000,000. On February 27, 1950, the Senate of the Philippines
adopted Resolution No. 8 whereby it created a Special Committee to determine “whether the said
purchase was honest, valid and proper, and whether the price involved in the deal was fair and just,
the parties responsible therefor, any other facts the Committee may deem proper in the premises.”
In the investigation conducted by the Committee in pursuance of said Resolution, petitioner-appellee
was asked to whom a part of the purchase price, Php 440,000 was delivered. Petitioner-appellee
refused to answer this question, whereupon the Committee resolved on May 15, 1950 to order his
commitment to the custody of the Sergeant at-arms of the Philippines Senate and imprisoned in the
new Bilibid Prison in Rizal until such time when he shall reveal to the Senate or to the Special
Committee the name F$ the person who received Php 440,000 and to answer questions pertinent
thereto.
While still in confinement in Bilibid, petitioner-appellee executed an affidavit wherein he gives

in detail the history of his life, the events surrounding acquisition of the Buenavista and Tambobong
estates by Gen. Burt, the supposed circumstances under which he met one by the name of Jess D.
Santos. The Committee did not believe this. The Committee adopted Resolution No. 114 which reads
as follows: “RESOLUTION APPROVING THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO
INVESTIGATE THE BUENAVISTA AND TAMBOBONG ESTATES DEAL AND ORDERING THE
DIRECTOR OF PRISON TO CONTINUE HOLDING JEAN L. ARNAULT IN HIS CUSTODY AND IN
CONFINEMENT AND DETENTION AT THE NEW BILIBID PRISON AT MUNTINLUPA, RIZAL,
UNTIL THE SAID ARNAULT SHALL HAVE PURGED HIMSELF OF CONTEMPT OF THE SENATE.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the continued confinement and detention of the petitioner-appellee, as
ordered in Senate Resolution of November 8, 1952 valid.
RULING:
Yes, the principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant
witnesses is sounded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or incidental
to the exercise of legislative power, or necessary to effectuate said power. How could a legislative
body obtain the knowledge and information on which to base intended legislation if it cannot require
and compel the disclosure of such knowledge and information, if it is impotent to punish a defiance
of its power and authority? The process by which a contumacious witness is dealt with by the
legislature in order to enable it to exercise its legislative power or authority must be distinguished from
the judicial process by which offenders are brought to courts of justice for the meting out of the
punishment which the criminal law imposes upon them. The former falls exclusively within the
legislative authority, the latter within the domain of the courts; because the former is a necessary
concomitant of the legislative power or process, while the latter has to do with the enforcement and
application of the criminal law. Also, the contempt is related to the exercise of the legislative power
and is committed in the course of the legislative process, the legislature's authority to deal with the
defiant and contumacious witness should be supreme, and unless there is a manifest and absolute
disregard of discretion and a mere exertion of arbitrary power coming within the reach of constitutional
limitations the exercise of the authority is not subject to judicial interference.
f. Senate v. Ermita
(G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006)
CARPIO MORALES, J.
FACTS:
This case is regarding the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the
China National Machinery and Equipment Group as well as the Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP,
and the Fertilizer scam. The Senate Committees sent invitations to various officials of the Executive
Department and AFP officials for them to appear before Senate on Sept. 29, 2005. Before said date
arrived, Executive Sec. Ermita sent a letter to Senate President Drilon, requesting for a postponement
of the hearing on Sept. 29 in order to “afford said officials ample time and opportunity to study and
prepare for the various issues so that they may better enlighten the Senate Committee on its
investigation.” Senate refused the request. On Sept. 28, 2005, the President issued EO 464, effective
immediately, which, among others, mandated that “all heads of departments of the Executive Branch
of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House
of Congress.” Pursuant to this Order, Executive Sec. Ermita communicated to the Senate that the
executive and AFP officials would not be able to attend the meeting since the President has not yet
given her consent. Despite the lack of consent, Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani, among all the
AFP officials invited, attended the investigation. Both faced court marshal for such attendance.
Hence, these petitions.
ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order 464 is constitutional.
RULING:
The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the provisions
of EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the1987 Constitution.
The Congress’ power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution.
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with
power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative
functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be
implied. In other words, the power of inquiry, with process to enforce it, is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change;
and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information, which is not
infrequently true, recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Section 22 on the other hand
provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and
it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the
members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the application of check and balance
but also,in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21
would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be
summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. A distinction was thus made
between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be
discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and
22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as
pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries
in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the
other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information
in pursuit of Congress oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the
appearance of executive officials under Section21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis
in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the
legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its
demands for information. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department
heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the
mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this
power the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress
except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive
branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a
long-standing custom. The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited
as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI
of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their
part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid
of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head
to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the
President herself or by the Executive Secretary. When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how
department heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is
not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must
give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with
the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless,
when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is 'in aid of legislation' under Section
21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.
g. Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks

(G.R. No. 167173, December 27, 2007)
NACHURA, J.
FACTS:
Before February 1, 2005, Senator Enrile introduced P.S. Resolution No. 166. On February 1,
2005, Senator Enrile delivered a privilege speech denouncing SCB- Philippines for selling
unregistered foreign securities in violation of the Securities Regulation Code (R.A. No. 8799) and
urging the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, to prevent similar fraudulent
activity. The aforementioned Senate Committee, acting through Senator Angara, set the initial
hearing on February 28, 2005. Then, SCB- Philippines submitted to the Senate Committee a letter
dated February 24, 2005, stressing that there were cases pending in court allegedly involving the
same issues, challenging the jurisdiction of Committee to continue with the inquiry. Senator enrile
moved that subpoenas be issued to those who did not attend the hearing.
SCB – Philippines also brought to the attention of the Senate Committee the lack of proper
authorization from affected clients for the bank to make the public disclosures of their accounts and
the lack of copies of accusing documents mentioned in Senator Enriles’s privilege speech, and
reiterated that there were pending court cases regarding the alleged sale in the Philippines by SCB-
Philippines of unregistered foreign securities. The petitioners were later served with subpoena ad
testificandum and duces tecum to compel them to attend and testify at a hearing set on March 15,
2005. As such, this Petition for Prohibition was filed by the petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Committee, by aid of legislation, would encroach upon the
judicial powers vested solely in the courts who took cognizance of the foregoing cases.
RULING:
The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the resolution, as initiated in
the privileged speech of Senate President Enrile, was simply "to denounce the illegal practices
committed by a foreign bank in selling unregistered foreign securities xxx", and at the conclusion of
the said speech "to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as to prevent the
occurrence of a similar fraudulent in the future."
The mere filing of a criminal or administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-judicial body
should not automatically bar the conduct of legislation. The exercise of sovereign legislative authority,
of which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a
criminal or an administrative investigation.
The intent of legislative inquiries is to arrive at a policy determination, which may or may not
be enacted into law. Except only when it exercises the power to punish for contempt, the committees
of the Senate or the House of Representatives cannot penalize violators even there is overwhelmingly
evidence of criminal culpability. Other than proposing or initiating amendatory or remedial legislation,
respondent Committee can only recommend measures to address or remedy whatever irregularities
may be unearthed during the investigation, although it may include in its Report a recommendation
for criminal indictment of persons who may appear liable. At best, the recommendation, along with
the evidence, contained in such Report would only be persuasive, but it is still up to the prosecutorial
agencies and the courts to determine the liabilities of the offender.
h. Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability

(G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008)
FACTS:
On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into
a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and
services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290
(approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007 hearing
Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their
influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then
invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was
interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with
P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed
President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to
answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on: (a)
whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to
prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. He later refused to attend the other
hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that the communications between GMA and
Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited
in contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time that
he would appear and give his testimony.
ISSUE: Whether or not the three questions that petitioner Neri refused to answer were covered by
executive privilege.
RULING:
Yes, Citing the case of United States vs. Nixon (418 U.S. 683), the Court laid out the three
elements needed to be complied with in order for the claim to executive privilege to be valid. These
are: 1.) the protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential
power; 2.) it must be authored, solicited, and received by a close advisor of the President or the
President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the
President; and, 3.) it may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information
sought “likely contains important evidence,” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by
an appropriate investigating authority.
In the present case, Executive Secretary Ermita claimed executive privilege on the argument
that the communications elicited by the three questions “fall under conversation and correspondence
between the President and public officials” necessary in “her executive and policy decision-making
process,” and that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as
economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.” It is clear then that the basis of the claim is
a matter related to the quintessential and non-delegable presidential power of diplomacy or foreign
relations.
As to the second element, the communications were received by a close advisor of the
President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner Neri can be considered a close advisor,
being a member of the President’s Cabinet.
And as to the third element, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would
justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority. Presidential communications are presumptive privilege and that
the presumption can be overcome only by mere showing of public need by the branch seeking access
to such conversations. In the present case, respondent Committees failed to show a compelling or
critical need for the answers to the three questions in the enactment of any law under Sec. 21, Art.
VI. Instead, the questions veer more towards the exercise of the legislative oversight function under
Sec. 22, Art. VI. As ruled in Senate vs. Ermita, “the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated
by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.”
Neri’s refusal to answer based on the claim of executive privilege does not violate the people’s
right to information on matters of public concern simply because Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution
itself provides that this right is “subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.”
8. BOARD OF CANVASSERS IN ELECTION FOR PRESIDENT/VICE-PRESIDENT
a. Lopez v. Senate
(G.R. No. 163556, June 08, 2004)
FACTS:
A petition for prohibition and mandamus was filed by Congressman Lopez seeking the
nullification of Section 13, Rule VIII of the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress creating a
Joint Committee in charge of the preliminary canvassing of votes of the candidates for President and
Vice-President in the May 2004 election.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress committed grave abuse of discretion in the creation of a Joint
Committee for the purpose of the preliminary canvassing of the votes for the 2004 Presidential and
Vice-Presidential elections.
RULING:
The Court en banc upheld the constitutionality of the Joint Committee created by Congress;
“to promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.”
The creation of the Joint Committee does not constitute grave abuse of discretion for
Congress may validly delegate the initial determination of the authenticity and due execution of the
certificates of canvass to a Joint Congressional Committee.
The Court reiterated that “Congress may validly delegate the initial determination of the
authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass to a Joint Congressional Committee,
composed of members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate.”
The petition was therefore dismissed on the ground of the petitioner failed to establish that
Congress gravely abused its discretion in the creation of such Joint Committee.
b. Pimentel v. Joint Committee of Congress

(G.R. No. 163783, June 22, 2004)
FACTS:
A petition for prohibition was filed by Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., seeking for the
declaration of the Court of the nullity and void continued existence of the Joint Committee of
Congress created to determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass and
preliminarily canvass the votes cast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates in the 2004
elections following the adjournment of Congress sine die on June 11, 2004 on the ground of that said
adjournment “terminated and expired on the said day and the said Twelfth Congress serving the term
2001 to 2004 passed out of legal existence. "Henceforth, petitioner goes on, "all pending matters and
proceedings terminate upon the expiration of ... Congress." Petitioner relied in Section 15, Article VI
of the Constitution to further support his claim.
ISSUE: Whether or not the term of the regular session of both Houses of the Twelfth Congress
terminated and expired upon its adjournment.
RULING:
The Court ruled that the term of the Twelfth Congress did not terminate and expire upon the
adjournment sine die of the regular session of both Houses on June 11, 2004. It further reiterated
that Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution “does not pertain to the term of Congress, but to its
regular annual legislative sessions and the mandatory 30-day recess before the opening of its next
regular session”.
The final adjournment of the regular sessions of the Twelfth Congress does not terminate the
task of Congress in tasks of authenticating and canvassing the certificates of canvass since it’s a
non-legislative function.
IX. THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
1. THE PRESIDENT
a. Macalintal v. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003)
Austria-Martinez, J.
FACTS:
A petition was filed by Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal assailing the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 entitled, "An Act Providing for A System of Overseas Absentee
Voting by Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other
Purposes" as unconstitutional. Alongside such questioned provisions sought to be declared as
unconstitutional by the petitioner is Section 18.5 which provides Respondent Commission on
Elections the power to proclaim the winning candidates for national offices and party list
representatives including the President and the Vice-President.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 18.5 or Republic Act No. 9189 is unconstitutional for being violative
of Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution.
RULING:
The Court ruled that Section 18.5 of Republic Act No. 9189 is repugnant to Section 4, Article
VII of the Constitution. Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 provides that the Commission on Elections “is
empowered to order the proclamation of winning candidates”. Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution
dictates that Congress has the power to canvass votes and proclaim the winners for the Presidential
and Vice-Presidential elections.
In allowing Respondent COMELEC to be empowered under Section 18.5 or said R.A.

encroaches the power of Congress vested by the Constitution, to canvass the votes for President and
Vice-President and the power to proclaim the winners for the said positions.
It partially upheld Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 with respect only to the authority given to the
COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for Senators and party-list representatives but not as
to the power to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for President and Vice-
President which is lodged with Congress.
b. Lopez v. Senate
(G.R. No. 163556, June 08, 2004)
FACTS:
A petition for prohibition and mandamus was filed by Congressman Lopez seeking the
nullification of Section 13, Rule VIII of the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress creating a
Joint Committee in charge of the preliminary canvassing of votes of the candidates for President and
Vice-President in the May 2004 election.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress committed grave abuse of discretion in the creation of a Joint
Committee for the purpose of the preliminary canvassing of the votes for the 2004 Presidential and
Vice-Presidential elections.
RULING:
The Court en banc upheld the constitutionality of the Joint Committee created by Congress;
voting 14-0, ruled that Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution expressly empowers Congress “to
promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.”
The Court ruled that it had no power to review the internal proceedings of Congress, unless
there is a clear violation of the Constitution. The creation of the Joint Committee does not constitute
grave abuse of discretion for Congress may validly delegate the initial determination of the
authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass to a Joint Congressional Committee.
The petition was therefore dismissed on the ground of the petitioner failed to establish that
Congress gravely abused its discretion in the creation of such Joint Committee.
c. Brillantes v. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 163193, June 15, 2004)
Callejo Sr., J.
FACTS:
A petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court led by Atty. Sixto
S. Brillantes, seeking to nullify, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, Resolution No. 6712.
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act 8436 which authorizes the
COMELEC to use an automated election system (AES) for the process of voting, counting of votes
and canvassing or consolidating the results of the national and local elections.
This AES system has 3 phases mainly; the biometrics system of registration, the computerized
voting and counting of votes and lastly, the electronic transmission of result; Senate President
Franklin Drilon questioned the constitutionality of the proposed electronic transmission of results for
the positions of the President and the Vice-President.
COMELEC issued a resolution 6712, declaring that it adopts the policy that the precinct
election results of each city and municipality shall be immediately transmitted electronically in
advance to the COMELEC, Manila. For the purpose, respondent COMELEC established a National
Consolidation Center, Electronic Transmission Centers for every city and municipality. In relation to
this, the electronically transmitted results shall be made available via the Internet, text messaging and
electronic billboards. Interested parties may print the result published in the COMELEC website.
ISSUE: Whether or not Res. No. 6712 is violative of Section 4 Article VII of the Constitution.
RULING:
The Court ruled that Res. No. 6712 under the guise of an “unofficial” tabulation of election
results based on a copy of the election returns, the sole and exclusive authority of Congress to
canvass the votes for the election of President and Vice-President.
If the COMELEC is proscribed from conducting an official canvass of the votes cast for the
President and Vice-President, the COMELEC is, with more reason, prohibited from making an
“unofficial” canvass of said votes.
The Court further pointed out that there is no constitutional and statutory basis for COMELEC
to undertake a separate and an unofficial tabulation of results, whether manually or electronically, for
in conducting such unofficial tabulation of the results of the election. In allowing so, Respondent
COMELEC descends to the level of a private organization and spends public funds for the purpose.
d. Pimentel v. Joint Committee of Congress

(G.R. No. 163783, June 22, 2004)
FACTS:
A petition for prohibition was filed by Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., seeking for the
declaration of the Court of the nullity and void continued existence of the Joint Committee of
Congress created to determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass and
preliminarily canvass the votes cast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates in the 2004
elections following the adjournment of Congress sine die on June 11, 2004 on the ground of that said
adjournment “terminated and expired on the said day and the said Twelfth Congress serving the term
2001 to 2004 passed out of legal existence. "Henceforth, petitioner goes on, "all pending matters and
proceedings terminate upon the expiration of ... Congress." Petitioner relied in Section 15, Article VI
of the Constitution to further support his claim.
ISSUE: Whether or not the continued canvassing of Joint Committee created by Congress even after
the final adjournment of the regular sessions of the Twelfth Congress is unconstitutional.
RULING:
The Court ruled that in favor of the constitutionality of act of the Joint Committee created by
Congress. “Senate shall convene in joint session during any voluntary or compulsory recess to
canvass during any voluntary or compulsory recess to canvass the votes for President and Vice-
President not later than thirty days after the day of the elections” as expressly provided in Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution. Regardless of the adjournment sine die of both Houses of Congress,
the Constitution clearly directs the Congress to canvass the votes and proclaim the elected President
and Vice-President. Thus, upon the fulfillment of said constitutionally mandated tasks, only then can
the said Joint Committee sine die adjourn.
The Court, therefore, finds that “there is no legal impediment to the Joint Committee
completing the tasks assigned to it and transmitting its report for the approval of the joint public
session of both Houses of Congress, which may reconvene without need of call by the President to
a special session.”
e. Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 221697, March 8,2016)
Perez, J.
FACTS:
A petition for certiorari was filed by Grace Poe-Llamanzares against Respondent Commision
on Elections for disqualifying her certificate of candidacy for Presidency for the May 2016 elections.
Petitioner was disqualified by Respondent on the ground of false material representation by indicating
on such COC that she at that time, has been residing in the Philippines for 10 years and 11 months
prior to the day of the 2016 elections but on the contrary, stated on her previous COC for the 2013
Senatorial elections that she has been a resident of the Philippines for 6 years and 6 months before
the said election; thus, making her unable to satisfy the requirement of 10-year residency in the
country. There were two other significant issues raised in the case at bar. The question of whether
she is a natural-born citizen and of whether such citizenship was reacquired upon repatriation.
ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in disqualifying the certificate of candidacy of Petitioner.
RULING:
The Court ruled that Respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction for disqualifying the Certificate of Candidacy of Poe-Llamanzares for Presidency.
Section 3 Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides for the qualifications of a President and a Vice-
President and reads: “No person may be elected to the office of the President or Vice-President
unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines, a qualified voter, forty years of age or over, and
has been a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding the election.”
Respondent COMELEC does not have the power to determine the qualifications of a
candidate. It is the Presidential Electoral Tribunal that is granted power by the Constitution to
determine the qualifications of a candidate as stated in Section 4 Article VII of the Constitution. The
Certificate of Candidacy of the Petitioner therefore cannot be cancelled by COMELEC at it is not a
competent body which holds the power to decide whether such candidate lacks or is unable to satisfy
the requirements.
2. TERM OF OFFICE; PRIVILEGES
a. Osmeña v. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 100318, July 30, 1991)
PARAS, J.
FACTS:
The petition at bar for a determination of the validity and constitutionality of Republic Act 7056,
"An Act Providing for the National and Local Elections in 1992, Pave the Way for Synchronized and
Simultaneous Elections Beginning 1995, and Authorizing Appropriations Therefor,"
Such provisions in the said RA that were deemed by the petitioners unconstitutional were:
• Republic Act 7056 violates the mandate of the Constitution for the holding of synchronized
national and local elections on the second Monday of May 1992.
• Republic Act 7056, particularly the 2nd paragraph of Section 3 thereof, providing that all
incumbent provincial, city and municipal officials shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and
shall serve until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified violates Section
2, Article XVIII (Transitory Provision) of the Constitution.
• The same paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act 7056, which in effect, shortens the term or
tenure of office of local officials to be elected on the 2nd Monday of November, 1992 violates
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution.
• Section 8 of Republic Act 7056, providing for the campaign periods for Presidential, Vice-
Presidential and Senatorial elections, violates the provision of Section 9, Article IX under the
title "Commission on Elections" of the Constitution.
• The so-called many difficult if not insurmountable problems mentioned in Republic Act 7056
to synchronized national and local elections set by the Constitution on the second Monday of
May, 1992, are not sufficient, much less, valid justification for postponing the local elections
to the second Monday of November 1992, and in the process violating the Constitution itself.
If, at all, Congress can devise ways and means, within the parameters of the Constitution, to
eliminate or at least minimize these problems and if this, still, is not feasible, resort can be
made to the self-correcting mechanism built in the Constitution for its amendment or revision.
ISSUE: Whether or not, the RA 7056 is unconstitutional.
RULING:
Yes. Article XVIII, Sections 2 and 5 of the 1987 Constitution which provides for the
synchronization of national and local elections. However, RA 7056 provides for the de-
synchronization of election by mandating that there be two separate elections in 1992. It also violated
Sec. 8, Art. X of 1987 Constitution which fixed the term of office of all elective local officials, except
barangay officials, to three (3) years. If the local election will be held on the second Monday of
November 1992 under RA 7056, those to be elected will be serving for only two years and seven
months, that is, from November 30, 1992 to June 30, 1995, not three years. The law was also held
violative of Sec. 9, Article IX of the Constitution by changing the campaign period. RA 7056 provides
for a different campaign period.
b. Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco

(G.R. No. 6157, July 30, 1910)
JOHNSON, J.
FACTS:
An original action commenced in this court to secure a writ of prohibition against the Hon. A.S.
Crossfield, as one of the judges of the Court of first Instance of the city of Manila, to prohibit him from
taking or continuing jurisdiction in a certain case commenced and pending before him, in which
Chuoco Tiaco (alias Choa Tea) (respondent herein) is plaintiff, and W. Cameron forbes, J.E. Harding,
and C.R. Trowbridge (petitioners herein) are defendants.
The plaintiffs are W. Cameron Forbes is the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and
Chief of Police J. E. Harding and Chief of the Secret Service of the city of Manila C. R. Trowbridge.
Defendant A. S. Crossfield is one of the judges of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila.
Defendant Chuoco Tiaco is a foreigner of Chinese nationality and a resident of the Philippine Islands
for the last 35 years having a family in the country and some properties. Chuoco Tiaco filed a case
for DAMAGES (monetary) alleging that defendants forcibly deported the plaintiff to China and forcibly
prevented his return for some months in violation of the right of the said plaintiff herein to be and to
remain in the Philippine Islands as established by law.
Crossfield issued an inhibition against Forbes et al from spelling or deporting or threatening

to expel or deport Chuoco Tiaco. Forbes, Harding, and Trowbridge sued for writs of prohibition
against the judge and the respective plaintiffs, alleging that the expulsion was carried out in the public
interest and at the request of the proper representative of the Chinese government in the Philippines,
and was immediately reported to the Secretary of War. The complaints were demurred to, but the
Supreme Court overruled the demurrers, granted the prohibition, and ordered the actions dismissed.
The judge, having declined to join in the applications for writs of error, was made a respondent, and
the cases are here on the ground that the plaintiffs have been deprived of liberty without due process
of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Governor General, as Chief Executive, can be sued in a civil action.
RULING:
No. No one can be held legally responsible in damages, or otherwise, for doing in a legal
manner what he had authority under the law to do. The Governor-General had authority, under the
law, to deport or expel the defendants, and the circumstance justifying the deportation and the method
of carrying it out are left to him. He can not, therefore, be held liable in damages for the exercise of
such power.
c. In Re: Bermudez
(G.R. No. 76180, October 24, 1986)
FACTS:
Petitioner quoted the first paragraph of Section 5 of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986
Constitution, which provides in full as follows:
"Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the
February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon
of June 30, 1992."
"The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall
be held on the second Monday of May, 1992."
Bermudez claims that the said provision “is not clear” as to whom it refers, he then asks the
Court “to declare and answer the question of the construction and definiteness as to who, among the
present incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice President Salvador Laurel and the elected
President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice President Arturo M. Tolentino being referred to as the
“incumbent president”.
ISSUE: Whether or not said provision is ambiguous.
RULING:
No. The petition is dismissed outright for lack of jurisdiction and for lack of cause of action.
Prescinding from petitioner's lack of personality to sue or to bring this action (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43
SCRA 677). It is elementary that this Court assumes no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory
relief. More importantly, the petition amounts in effect to a suit against the incumbent Presidents of
the Republic. President Corazon C. Aquino, and it is equally elementary that incumbent Presidents
are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure.
The petition furthermore states no cause of action. Petitioner's allegation of ambiguity or vagueness
of the aforequoted provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and common
public knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent President Corazon
C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the
extension of their term to noon of June 30, 1992 for purpose of synchronization of elections. Hence
the second paragraph of the cited section provides for the holding on the second Monday of May,
1992 of the first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under said 1986 Constitution.
d. Soliven v. Makasiar
(G.R. No. 82585, November 14, 1988)
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
FACTS:
The petitioners in this case was charged for libel by the president. Cory Aquino herself filed a
complaint-affidavit against him and others. Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit
because this would defeat her immunity from suit. He grounded his contention on the principle that a
president cannot be sued. However, if a president would sue then the president would allow herself
to be placed under the court’s jurisdiction and conversely she would be consenting to be sued back.
Also, considering the functions of a president, the president may not be able to appear in court to be
a witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal
proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.
RULING:
Yes. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to
assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction,
considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of
the office-holder's time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and
may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf
Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the
presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the
privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and
submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely
the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.
e. Estrada v. Desierto
(G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001)
PUNO, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. Estrada was elected President while
respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice- President. He was accused of receiving P220
million in jueteng money from Governor Singson. He was also charged that he took from Governor
Singson 70 million on excise tax on cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur. There was an outcry for his
resignation.
The impeachment trial began on 7 December 2000, with 21 senator-judges presided over by
Chief Justice Hilario Davide. At a point when 11 senator-judges ruled against opening a second
envelope of evidence showing the president’s P3.3 billion bank account under the name “Jose
Velarde”, the public prosecutors resigned and a mass demonstration at EDSA began.
On 20 January 2001, the president negotiated with representatives of the vice-president. News broke
out that Chief Justice Hilario Davide would administer the oath of presidency to the vice president at
EDSA Shrine. Estrada issued two statements - one stating reservations on the constitutionality of
Arroyo’s presidency, and another stating that he is incapable of dispensing his responsibilities as
president, thus allowing Arroyo to be the acting president.
The Arroyo administration was met with acceptance by the different branches of government,
by majority of the public, and by the international community. The impeachment trial was closed,
despite sentiments such as those of Senator Defensor- Santiago that the impeachment court had
failed to resolve the case, leaving open questions regarding Estrada’s qualifications to run for other
elected posts.
The Office of the Ombudsman proceeded to file a series of cases regarding the corruption of
Estrada. Estrada filed a motion compelling the Ombudsman to refrain from further proceedings until
his term as president was over. He also filed a petition to be confirmed as the lawful and incumbent
president, temporarily unable to fulfill his duties, thus making Arroyo an acting president only.
The Supreme Court ruled a) to inform the parties that they did not declare the Office of the President
vacant on 20 January 2001, b) to prohibit either party from discussing in public the merits of the case
while in its pendency, c) to enjoin the Ombudsman from resolving pending criminal cases against
Estrada for 30 days.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President
(2) Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit. Assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent
of the immunity
RULING:
(1) Yes. The court ruled that that the resignation of the Estrada cannot be doubted. It was confirmed
by his leaving Malacañang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged
the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality;
(2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and
in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to
any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability
disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without
doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he
assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of
our country. Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president
which he has given up, and (5) he called on this supporters to join him in the promotion of a
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation
and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was
petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense.
(2) No. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder,
bribery and graft and corruption . By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder
which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting
president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal
acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that
immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts
of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but
stands in the same footing as any other trespasser.
f. Gloria v. CA
(G.R. No. 119903, August 15, 2000)
PURISIMA, J.
FACTS:
Respondent filed a petition for prohibition to restrain petitioners from reassigning him from
incumbent Schools Division Superintendent of Quezon City to Vocational Schools Superintendent of
the Marikina Institute of Science and Technology (MIST).
The Court of Appeals, in its decision, prohibited the petitioners from implementing the
respondent's reassignment as it is violative of his right to security of tenure. No period was fixed for
private respondent's reassignment, nor was there any indication that the reassignment was only
temporary.
ISSUE: Whether the reassignment of private respondent from School Division Superintendent of
Quezon City to Vocational School Superintendent of MIST is violative of his security of tenure.
RULING:
Yes. the Court upholds the finding of the respondent court that the reassignment of petitioner
to MIST "appears to be indefinite." The same can be inferred from the Memorandum of Secretary
Gloria for President Fidel V. Ramos to the effect that the reassignment of private respondent will "best
fit his qualifications and experience" being "an expert in vocational and technical education." It can
thus be gleaned that subject reassignment is more than temporary as the private respondent has
been described as fit for the (reassigned) job, being an expert in the field. Besides, there is nothing
in the said Memorandum to show that the reassignment of private respondent is temporary or would
only last until a permanent replacement is found as no period is specified or fixed; which fact evinces
an intention on the part of petitioners to reassign private respondent with no definite period or
duration. Such feature of the reassignment in question is definitely violative of the security of tenure
of the private respondent.
g. Senate v. Ermita
(G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006)
CARPIO MORALES, J.
FACTS:
The cases at bar are petitions for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has
abused such power by issuing Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464) last September 28, 2005, praying
for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
EO 464 prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the
judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of
Staff are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of
chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP
are covered by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the
National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be
determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first
securing the president’s approval. EO 464’s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it
infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct
oversight functions in the implementation of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.
RULING:
EO 464 is constitutional in part. Only Section 1 and Section 2a are valid and the rest are
invalid. To determine the validity of the provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21
from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The Congress’ power of inquiry is expressly
recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Although there is no provision in the
Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and
exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such
power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of
inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.
A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the
conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does
not itself possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to
others who do possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely
related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the
Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not
only in the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers
only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation,
under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt
of the House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question
hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in
inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary
to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One
specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit
information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a
question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function.
Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21
and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power
of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress
exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is
by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads.
Only one executive official may be exempted from this power — the President on whom executive
power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment.
It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to
a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement
then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the
question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance
of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however,
be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not
bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry,
unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the
Executive Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the
statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President
to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a
matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that
Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress
requires their appearance is ‘in aid of legislation’ under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for
the same reasons stated in Arnault.
h. Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability and Public Officers and Investigations

(G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008)
FACTS:
At bar is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the show cause
Letter dated November 22, 2007 and contempt Order dated January 30, 2008 concurrently issued by
respondent Senate Committees on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, Trade and
Commerce, and National Defense and Security against petitioner Romulo L. Neri, former Director
General of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA).
On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into
a contract with Zhing Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and
services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $329,481,290
(approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People's Republic of China.
Petitioner testified before respondent Committees for eleven (11) hours. He disclosed that
then Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in
exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo
about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed
further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking
"executive privilege". In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President
Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether
or not she directed him to approve. As a result, the Senate cited him for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by
executive privilege.
RULING:
Yes. Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground that
the communications elicited by the three (3) questions "fall under conversation and correspondence
between the President and public officials" necessary in "her executive and policy decision-making
process" and, that "the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as
economic relations with the People's Republic of China." Simply put, the bases are presidential
communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the
three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the
communications relate to a "quintessential and non-delegable power" of the President, i.e. the power
to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into
executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized
in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are "received" by a close advisor of the
President. Under the "operational proximity" test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being
a member of President Arroyo's cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling
need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
3. PROHIBITIONS/INHIBITIONS
a. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan

(G.R. No. 152154, July 15, 2003)
CORONA, J.
FACTS:
One of the foremost concerns of the Aquino Government in February 1986 was the recovery
of the unexplained or ill-gotten wealth reputedly amassed by former President and Mrs. Ferdinand E.
Marcos, their relatives, friends and business associates. Thus, the very first Executive Order (EO)
issued by then President Corazon Aquino upon her assumption to office after the ouster of the
Marcoses was EO No. 1, issued on February 28, 1986. It created the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) and charged it with the task of assisting the President in the "recovery of
all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including
the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them
during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public
office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship."
In all the alleged ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the PCGG, this Court has seen fit to set aside
technicalities and formalities that merely serve to delay or impede judicious resolution. This Court
prefers to have such cases resolved on the merits at the Sandiganbayan. But substantial justice to
the Filipino people and to all parties concerned, not mere legalisms or perfection of form, should now
be relentlessly and firmly pursued. Almost two decades have passed since the government initiated
its search for and reversion of such ill-gotten wealth. The definitive resolution of such cases on the
merits is thus long overdue. If there is proof of illegal acquisition, accumulation, misappropriation,
fraud or illicit conduct, let it be brought out now. Let the ownership of these funds and other assets
be finally determined and resolved with dispatch, free from all the delaying technicalities and annoying
procedural sidetracks.
ISSUE: Whether or not President Marcos committed prohibited and inhibited acts as a president
during his term of office.
RULING:
Yes. It is settled that judicial admissions may be made: (a) in the pleadings filed by the parties;
(b) in the course of the trial either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations; or (c) in other
stages of judicial proceedings, as in the pre-trial of the case.[82] Thus, facts pleaded in the petition
and answer, as in the case at bar, are deemed admissions of petitioner and respondents,
respectively, who are not permitted to contradict them or subsequently take a position contrary to or
inconsistent with such admissions.[83]
The sum of $304,372.43 should be held as the only known lawful income of respondents since
they did not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL), as required by law, from which their
net worth could be determined. Besides, under the 1935 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as
President could not receive any other emolument from the Government or any of its subdivisions and
instrumentalities.[84] Likewise, under the 1973 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could
not receive during his tenure any other emolument from the Government or any other source.[85] In
fact, his management of businesses, like the administration of foundations to accumulate funds, was
expressly prohibited under the 1973 Constitution:
Article VII, Sec. 4(2) The President and the Vice-President shall not, during their tenure, hold
any other office except when otherwise provided in this Constitution, nor may they practice any
profession, participate directly or indirectly in the management of any business, or be financially
interested directly or indirectly in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by
the Government or any other subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any
government owned or controlled corporation.
Article VII, Sec. 11 No Member of the National Assembly shall appear as counsel before any
court inferior to a court with appellate jurisdiction, x x x. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be
interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof including any government owned
or controlled corporation during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any
office of the government for his pecuniary benefit.
Article IX, Sec. 7 The Prime Minister and Members of the Cabinet shall be subject to the
provision of Section 11, Article VIII hereof and may not appear as counsel before any court or
administrative body, or manage any business, or practice any profession, and shall also be subject
to such other disqualification as may be provided by law.
Their only known lawful income of $304,372.43 can therefore legally and fairly serve as basis
for determining the existence of a prima facie case of forfeiture of the Swiss funds.
Respondents argue that petitioner was not able to establish a prima facie case for the forfeiture of
the Swiss funds since it failed to prove the essential elements under Section 3, paragraphs (c), (d)
and (e) of RA 1379. As the Act is a penal statute, its provisions are mandatory and should thus be
construed strictly against the petitioner and liberally in favor of respondent Marcoses.
We hold that it was not for petitioner to establish the Marcoses other lawful income or income
from legitimately acquired property for the presumption to apply because, as between petitioner and
respondents, the latter were in a better position to know if there were such other sources of lawful
income. And if indeed there was such other lawful income, respondents should have specifically
stated the same in their answer. Insofar as petitioner Republic was concerned, it was enough to
specify the known lawful income of respondents.
Section 9 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations provides that, in determining prima facie
evidence of ill-gotten wealth, the value of the accumulated assets, properties and other material
possessions of those covered by Executive Order Nos. 1 and 2 must be out of proportion to the known
lawful income of such persons. The respondent Marcos couple did not file any Statement of Assets
and Liabilities (SAL) from which their net worth could be determined. Their failure to file their SAL
was in itself a violation of law and to allow them to successfully assail the Republic for not presenting
their SAL would reward them for their violation of the law.
b. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

(G.R. No. 83815, February 22, 1991)
FERNAN, C.J.
FACTS:
In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which allowed
members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government
offices or positions in addition to their primary positions subject to limitations set therein. The Civil
Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that such law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality
of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13,
Article 7 of the Constitution which provides:
“Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any
other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in
any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.”
CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution“, the
only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in
the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under
Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and
Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.
RULING:
No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President,
Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure
multiple offices or employment in the government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution
itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio
capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of
Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on the
general rule laid down for all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions
which cannot override the constitution’s manifest intent and the people’s understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of
the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that
Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary
position to not more than 2 positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284
actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express
mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise
provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
c. Funa vs. Ermita

(G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010)
VILLARAMA, JR., J.
FACTS:
On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Maria Elena
H. Bautista (Bautista) as Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC), vice Agustin R. Bengzon. Bautista was designated as Undersecretary for Maritime Transport
of the department under Special Order No. 2006-171 dated October 23, 2006.
On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Vicente T.

Suazo, Jr., Bautista was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the Administrator, MARINA,
in concurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary.
On October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and
lawyer, filed the instant petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautista’s
appointment/designation, which is proscribed by the prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the
Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants to hold any other office or employment.
On January 5, 2009, during the pendency of this petition, Bautista was appointed
Administrator of the MARINA vice Vicente T. Suazo, Jr. and she assumed her duties and
responsibilities as such on February 2, 2009.
ISSUE: Whether or not the designation of respondent Bautista as OIC of MARINA, concurrent with
the position of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to which she had been appointed,
violated the constitutional proscription against dual or multiple offices for Cabinet Members and their
deputies and assistants.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The designation of respondent Ma. Elena H.
Bautista as Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Administrator, Maritime Industry Authority, in a concurrent
capacity with her position as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and
therefore, NULL and VOID.
Finally, the Court similarly finds respondents’ theory that being just a “designation,” and
temporary at that, respondent Bautista was never really “appointed” as OIC Administrator of MARINA,
untenable. In Binamira v. Garrucho, Jr., we distinguished between the terms appointment and
designation, as follows:
Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an
individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its
confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is
replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes
merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official, as where, in the case before
us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine
Tourism Authority, or where, under the Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme Court are
designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of
Representatives. It is said that appointment is essentially executive while designation is legislative in

nature.
Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise involves the
naming of a particular person to a specified public office. That is the common understanding of the
term. However, where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he
shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing
authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which
does not confer security of tenure on the person named.
Clearly, respondents’ reliance on the foregoing definitions is misplaced considering that the
above-cited case addressed the issue of whether petitioner therein acquired valid title to the disputed
position and so had the right to security of tenure. It must be stressed though that while the
designation was in the nature of an acting and temporary capacity, the words “hold the office” were
employed. Such holding of office pertains to both appointment and designation because the
appointee or designate performs the duties and functions of the office. The 1987 Constitution in
prohibiting dual or multiple offices, as well as incompatible offices, refers to the holding of the office,
and not to the nature of the appointment or designation, words which were not even found in Section
13, Article VII nor in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IXB.
To “hold” an office means to “possess or occupy” the same, or “to be in possession and
administration,” which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and duties of
the office.
d. Funa vs Agra
(G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013)
BERSAMIN, J.
FACTS:
The petitioner alleges that on March 1, 2010, President Gloria M. Macapagal Arroyo appointed
Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice following the resignation of Secretary Agnes VST Devanadera
in order to vie for a congressional seat in Quezon Province; that on March 5, 2010, President Arroyo
designated Agra as the Acting Solicitor General in a concurrent capacity; that on April 7, 2010, the
petitioner, in his capacity as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a lawyer, commenced this suit to
challenge the constitutionality of Agra’s concurrent appointments or designations, claiming it to be
prohibited under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution; that during the pendency of the suit,
President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed Atty. Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz as the Solicitor General; and
that Cadiz assumed as the Solicitor General and commenced his duties as such on August 5, 2010.
Agra renders a different version of the antecedents. He represents that on January 12, 2010, he was
then the Government Corporate Counsel when President Arroyo designated him as the Acting
Solicitor General in place of Solicitor General Devanadera who had been appointed as the Secretary
of Justice; that on March 5, 2010, President Arroyo designated him also as the Acting Secretary of
Justice vice Secretary Devanadera who had meanwhile tendered her resignation in order to run for
Congress representing a district in Quezon Province in the May 2010 elections; that he then
relinquished his position as the Government Corporate Counsel; and that pending the appointment
of his successor, Agra continued to perform his duties as the Acting Solicitor General.
Notwithstanding the conflict in the versions of the parties, the fact that Agra has admitted to holding
the two offices concurrently in acting capacities is settled, which is sufficient for purposes of resolving
the constitutional question that petitioner raises herein.
ISSUE: Whether or not Agra’s holding of concurrent position is unconstitutional.
RULING:
Yes. At the center of the controversy is the correct application of Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution, viz:
Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any
other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in
any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
A relevant and complementing provision is Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution, to wit:
Section 7. x x x Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.
Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting
Solicitor General, therefore, Agra was undoubtedly covered by Section 13, Article VII, supra, whose
text and spirit were too clear to be differently read. Hence, Agra could not validly hold any other office
or employment during his tenure as the Acting Solicitor General, because the Constitution has not
otherwise so provided.
It was of no moment that Agra’s designation was in an acting or temporary capacity. The text
of Section 13, supra, plainly indicates that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was to impose
a stricter prohibition on the President and the Members of his Cabinet in so far as holding other offices
or employments in the Government or in government-owned or government controlled-corporations
was concerned. In this regard, to hold an office means to possess or to occupy the office, or to be in
possession and administration of the office, which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of
the functions and duties of the office. Indeed, in the language of Section 13 itself, supra, the
Constitution makes no reference to the nature of the appointment or designation. The prohibition
against dual or multiple offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply to all
appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary, for it is without question that the
avowed objective of Section 13, supra, is to prevent the concentration of powers in the Executive
Department officials, specifically the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet and
their deputies and assistants. To construe differently is to “open the veritable floodgates of
circumvention of an important constitutional disqualification of officials in the Executive Department
and of limitations on the Presidents power of appointment in the guise of temporary designations of
Cabinet Members, undersecretaries and assistant secretaries as officers-in-charge of government
agencies, instrumentalities, or government-owned or controlled corporations.
It is not amiss to observe, lastly, that assuming that Agra, as the Acting Solicitor General, was
not covered by the stricter prohibition under Section 13, supra, due to such position being merely
vested with a cabinet rank under Section 3, Republic Act No. 9417, he nonetheless remained covered
by the general prohibition under Section 7, supra. Hence, his concurrent designations were still
subject to the conditions under the latter constitutional provision. In this regard, the Court aptly pointed
out in Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma:
The general rule contained in Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution permits an appointive
official to hold more than one office only if “allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position.”
In the case of Quimson v. Ozaeta, this Court ruled that, “[t]here is no legal objection to a government
official occupying two government offices and performing the functions of both as long as there is no
incompatibility.” The crucial test in determining whether incompatibility exists between two offices was
laid out in People v. Green – whether one office is subordinate to the other, in the sense that one
office has the right to interfere with the other.
e. National Amnesty Commission vs. COA

(G. R. No. 156982, September 8, 2004)
CORONA, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government agency created in 1994 by
then President Fidel V. Ramos through Proclamation No. 347. The NAC is tasked to receive, process
and review amnesty applications. It is composed of 7 members: a Chairperson, three regular
members appointed by the President, and the Secretaries of Justice, National Defense and Interior
and Local Government as ex officio members.
After personally attending the initial NAC meetings, the three ex officio members turned over
said responsibility to their representatives who were paid honoraria. However, in 1997, NAC resident
auditor Eulalia disallowed on audit the payment of honoraria to these representatives pursuant to
COA Memorandum No. 97-038.
Meanwhile, in 1999, the NAC passed Administrative Order No. 2 (the new Implementing Rules
and Regulations of Proclamation No. 347), which was approved by then President Joseph Estrada.
Section 1, Rule II thereof provides that ex officio members may designate their representatives to the
Commission. Said Representatives shall be entitled to per diems, allowances, bonuses and other
benefits as may be authorized by law.
Petitioner invoked Administrative Order No. 2 in assailing before the COA the rulings of the
resident auditor and the National Government Audit Office disallowing payment of honoraria to the
ex officio members' representatives, to no avail.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not COA committed grave abuse of discretion in implementing COA Memorandum No.
97-038 without the required notice and publication under Article 2 of the Civil Code
2. Whether or not COA committed grave abuse of discretion disallowing the payment of honoraria
on the ground of lack of authority of representatives to attend the NAC meetings in behalf of the ex
officio members
3. Whether or not the representatives de facto officers and as such are entitled to allowances
RULING:
1. No. COA Memorandum No. 97-038 does not need, for validity and effectivity, the publication
required by Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such
publication.
We clarified this publication requirement in Taada vs. Tuvera:
[A]ll statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the
legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations
must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties.
COA Memorandum No. 97-038 is merely an internal and interpretative regulation or letter of
instruction which does not need publication to be effective and valid. It is not an implementing rule or
regulation of a statute but a directive issued by the COA to its auditors to enforce the self-executing
prohibition imposed by Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution on the President and his official
family, their deputies and assistants, or their representatives from holding multiple offices and
receiving double compensation.
2. No. The COA is correct that there is no legal basis to grant per diem, honoraria or any allowance
whatsoever to the NAC ex officio members' official representatives.
The representatives in fact assumed their responsibilities not by virtue of a new appointment
but by mere designation from the ex officio members who were themselves also designated as such.
There is a considerable difference between an appointment and designation. An appointment

is the selection by the proper authority of an individual who is to exercise the powers and functions
of a given office; a designation merely connotes an imposition of additional duties, usually by law,
upon a person already in the public service by virtue of an earlier appointment.
Designation does not entail payment of additional benefits or grant upon the person so
designated the right to claim the salary attached to the position. Without an appointment, a
designation does not entitle the officer to receive the salary of the position. The legal basis of an
employee's right to claim the salary attached thereto is a duly issued and approved appointment to
the position, and not a mere designation.
In Civil Liberties Union, we held that cabinet secretaries, including their deputies and
assistants, who hold positions in ex officio capacities, are proscribed from receiving additional
compensation because their services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached
to their principal offices. Thus, in the attendance of the NAC meetings, the ex officio members were
not entitled to, and were in fact prohibited from, collecting extra compensation, whether it was called
per diem, honorarium, allowance or some other euphemism. Such additional compensation is
prohibited by the Constitution.
Furthermore, in de la Cruz vs. COA and Bitonio vs. COA, we upheld COA's disallowance of
the payment of honoraria and per diems to the officers concerned who sat as ex officio members or
alternates. The agent, alternate or representative cannot have a better right than his principal, the ex
officio member. The laws, rules, prohibitions or restrictions that cover the ex officio member apply
with equal force to his representative. In short, since the ex officio member is prohibited from receiving
additional compensation for a position held in an ex officio capacity, so is his representative likewise
restricted.
3. No. The representatives cannot be considered de facto officers because they were not appointed
but were merely designated to act as such. Furthermore, they are not entitled to something their own
principals are prohibited from receiving.
f. Bitonio vs COA
(G.R. No. 147392, March 12, 2004)
CALLEJO, SR., J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Bitonio was appointed Director IV of the Bureau of Labor Relations in the DOLE.
DOLE Acting Secretary Brilliantes designated the Bitonio to be the DOLE representative to the Board
of Directors of PEZA. As representative of the Secretary of Labor to the PEZA, Bitonio was receiving
a per diem for every board meeting he attended during the years 1995 to 1997. After a post audit of
the PEZA's disbursement transactions, the COA disallowed the payment of per diems to the petitioner
pursuant to the ruling in Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary where Executive Order No. 284
allowing government officials to hold multiple positions in government was declared unconstitutional.
Thus, Cabinet Secretaries, Undersecretaries, and their Assistant Secretaries, are prohibited to hold
other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions and to receive
compensation therefor, except in cases where the Constitution expressly provides. Bitonio filed an
MR but the COA denied the same. Thus, he appealed to the SC.
The petitioner maintains that he is entitled to the payment of per diems, as R.A. No. 7916
specifically and categorically provides for the payment of a per diem for the attendance of the
members of the Board of Directors at board meetings of PEZA. The petitioner contends that this law
is presumed to be valid; unless and until the law is declared unconstitutional, it remains in effect and
binding for all intents and purposes. Neither can this law be rendered nugatory on the basis of a mere
memorandum circular COA Memorandum No. 97-038 issued by the COA. The petitioner stresses
that R.A. No. 7916 is a statute more superior than an administrative directive and the former cannot
just be repealed or amended by the latter.
He also posits that R.A. No. 7916 was enacted four (4) years after the case of Civil Liberties
Union was promulgated. It is, therefore, assumed that the legislature, before enacting a law, was
aware of the prior holdings of the courts. Since the constitutionality or the validity of R.A. No. 7916
was never challenged, the provision on the payment of per diems remains in force notwithstanding
the Civil Liberties Union case. Nonetheless, the petitioner's position as Director IV is not included in
the enumeration of officials prohibited to receive additional compensation as clarified in the Resolution
of the Court dated August 1, 1991; thus, he is still entitled to receive the per diems.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COA correctly disallowed the per diems received by the petitioner for his
attendance in the PEZA Board of Directors meetings as representative of the Secretary of Labor.
RULING:
Yes. The Secretary of Labor, who sits in an ex officio capacity as member of the Board of
Directors of the Philippine Export Processing Zone (PEZA), is prohibited from receiving any
compensation for this additional office, because his services are already paid for and covered by the
compensation attached to his principal office. It follows that the petitioner, who sits in the PEZA Board
merely as representative of the Secretary of Labor, is likewise prohibited from receiving any
compensation therefor. Otherwise, the representative would have a better right than his principal, and
the fact that the petitioner’s position as Director IV of the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) is not covered by the ruling in the Civil Liberties Union case is of no moment. After all, the
petitioner attended the board meetings by the authority given to him by the Secretary of Labor to sit
as his representative. If it were not for such designation, the petitioner would not have been in the
Board at all.
There is also no merit in the allegation that the legislature was certainly aware of the
parameters set by the Court when it enacted R.A. No. 7916, four (4) years after the finality of the Civil
Liberties Union case. The payment of per diems was clearly an express grant in favor of the members
of the Board of Directors which the petitioner is entitled to receive.
It is a basic tenet that any legislative enactment must not be repugnant to the highest law of
the land which is the Constitution. No law can render nugatory the Constitution because the
Constitution is more superior to a statute. If a law happens to infringe upon or violate the fundamental
law, courts of justice may step in to nullify its effectiveness. It is the task of the Court to see to it that
the law must conform to the Constitution.
The framers of R.A. No. 7916 must have realized the flaw in the law which is the reason why
the law was later amended by R.A. No. 8748. Under the amended law, the members of the Board of
Directors was increased from 8 to 13, specifying therein that it is the undersecretaries of the different
Departments who should sit as board members of the PEZA. The option of designating his
representative to the Board by the different Cabinet Secretaries was deleted. Likewise, the last
paragraph as to the payment of per diems to the members of the Board of Directors was also deleted,
considering that such stipulation was clearly in conflict with the proscription set by the Constitution.
4. SUCCESSION
a. ESTRADA VS. ARROYO

(G.R. No. 146738, MARCH 2, 2001)
PUNO, J.
FACTS:
This involves petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic. A short outline of events that
precipitated the case at bar thus follows:
1. Petitioner won in the May 1998 national elections as president, the respondent as vice
president.
2. On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singson accused the petitioner and his
family of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. Such expose ignited several reactions
of rage.
3. There became a built up of a call for petitioner to resign from office and his officials one by
one resigned withdrawing their support.
4. In November 20 Impeachment Trial of the petitioner was opened, in December 7
Impeachment Trial began.
5. January 19 people lined up in EDSA showing a greater call for the resignation of the
president.
6. January 20 was the day of petitioner's surrender. At 12:00 noon Chief Justice Hilario Davide
administered oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. At 2:30 pm petitioner
left Malacanang and issued a press statement and a letter transmitting the executive power
upon him, the president to the vice president becoming the acting president
7. The Monday after the oath, Arroyo discharged powers of the President.
8. Criminal cases have been filed against the petitioner after he stepped down into presidency.
ISSUE:
1. WON the cases at bar present a justiciable controversy / political question specifically in regard the
legitimacy of the Arroyo administration
2. WON Estrada merely resigned as President
3. WON Estrada is only temporarily unable to act as President
4. WON Estrada enjoys immunity from suit
5. WON the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity
RULING:
FIRST: The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions.
The principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the
1987 Constitution, notably section 1 of Article II, and section 8 of Article VII, and the allocation of
governmental powers under section II of Article VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope
of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner
against prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison, the doctrine has been
laid down that “it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is . . .”
The Court also distinguished between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People Power II.
EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole
government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly
to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President.
EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot
be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting
President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial
review. EDSA I presented political question; EDSA II involves legal questions.
SECOND: Using the totality test, the SC held that petitioner resigned as President.
The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a candidate is
an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that time.
The Angara diary shows that the President wanted only five-day period promised by Reyes,
as well as to open the second envelop to clear his name.
"If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday.

"The President says. “Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa
red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I don’t want any more of this – it’s too painful. I’m tired
of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.)
"I just want to clear my name, then I will go.”
The SC held that this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The intent to
resign is clear when he said “x x x Ayoko na masyado nang masakit.” “ Ayoko na” are words of
resignation.
During the negotiations, the resignation of the petitioner was treated as a given fact. The only
unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after
transition period.
His resignation was also confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the press release containing
his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the
Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace,
the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our
nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and he was going to re-
assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the
people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given
him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge
that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner’s reference is to a future challenge
after occupying the office of’ the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters
to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly,
the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the
presidency. The press release was petitioner’s valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is
now in the past tense.
THIRD: The petitioner is permanently unable to act as President.

Section 11 of Article VII provides that “Congress has the ultimate authority under the
Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his functions.” Both
houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President.
The House of Representative passed on January 24, 2001 House Resolution No. l75 which
states: “RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
TO THE ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS
PRESIDENT OFTHE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS
AND EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT FOR HER ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE
ATTAINMENT OF THE NATION’S GOALS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.” The Senate also passed
Senate Resolution No. 82 which states: “RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO’S NOMINATION OF SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES”
Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no
longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner’s claim of inability. Even if petitioner can
prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the
ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress
and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of
government cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court.
FOURTH: The petitioner does not enjoy immunity from suit.
The Supreme Court rejected petitioner’s argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the
reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of
petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his
loss of the presidency. On February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83
“Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio.” Since the Impeachment Court is now
functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then
convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea, if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his
prosecution. The debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment
proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil
cases may already be filed against him.
The SC also ruled in In re: Saturnino Bermudez that “incumbent Presidents are immune from
suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure” but not beyond.
Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been
aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner cannot demand as a condition sine qua non
to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment
proceedings.
Also, petitioner cannot cite any decision of the SC licensing the President to commit criminal
acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public
officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in
the same footing as any other trespasser.
FIFTH: Petitioner was not denied the right to impartial trial.

Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere
fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove
that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. In the case at
bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a
consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of
circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of
prejudicial publicity which is incapable if change even by evidence presented during the trial.
Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.
X. POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT
1. GENERAL
a. National Electrification Administration v. Commission on Audit

(G. R. No. 143481, February 15, 2002)
Carpio, J.
FACTS:
Joint Senate and House of Representatives Resolution No. 01, Series of 1994, raised the
salaries of government employees. The new salary schedule shall be implemented within four (4)
years beginning in 1994. On December 28, 1996, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive
Order No. 389 (EO 389) directing payment of the fourth and final salary increases authorized under
Joint Resolution No. 01 in two tranches: one on January 1, 1997 and the other on November 1, 1997.
On January 1, 1997 NEA, implemented and paid out fourth and final salary increases one-
time tranche, lumpsum, instead of paying it in two tranches. As a result, COA issued a notice of
disallowance which NEA appealed but was denied by the Commission on Audit en banc. NEA filed a
petition for certiorari before Supreme Court to reverse and set aside COA’s denial.
ISSUE: Whether or not Commission on Audit committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess jurisdiction in disallowing the single or lump sum payout of the fourth and final salary
increases.
RULING:
No. NEAs accelerated implementation of the Salary Standardization Law II is not in
accordance with law. There is no merit in NEAs contention that the DBM, upon its approval of NEAs
proposed budget, had effectively stamped its imprimatur on the accelerated implementation of the
salary increases starting January 1, 1997 because NEAs proposed budget for 1997 included funds
for such accelerated implementation. This is not the approval contemplated by the Presidential
Memorandum dated November 7, 1995, which requires compliance with specific terms and
conditions. The DBMs approval of NEAs proposed budget cannot be deemed sufficient authority to
execute the same in disregard of the relevant orders and circulars providing for its manner of
execution. The budget process is a cycle of sequential and interrelated budget activities regularly
recurring within a specific time frame (a twelve-month period called fiscal year). The presidential
power of control over the executive branch of government extends to all executive employees from
Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. The constitutional vesture of this power in the President is
self-executing and does not require statutory implementation, nor may its exercise be limited, much
less withdrawn, by the legislature.
b. Villena v. The Secretary of the Interior

(G.R. No. L-46570, April 21, 1939)
Laurel, J.
FACTS:
Jose D. Villena was mayor of Makati in the 1930s. After investigation, the Secretary of Interior
recommended the suspension of Villena to the Office of the president that approved the same. The
Secretary suspended Villena. Villena claimed that the Secretary has no jurisdiction over the matter
and that power or jurisdiction was vested in the local government [the governor] pursuant to Sec.
2188 of the Administrative Code. Further, even if the respondent Secretary of the Interior has the
power of supervision over local governments, that power, according to the constitution, must be
exercised in accordance with the provisions of law and the provisions of law governing trials of
charges against elective municipal officials are those contained in Sec. 2188 of the Administrative
Code as amended. In other words, the Secretary of the Interior must exercise his supervision over
local governments, if he has that power under existing law, in accordance with sec 2188 of the
Administrative Code, as amended, as the latter provisions govern the procedure to be followed in
suspending and punishing elective local officials while sec 79 (C) of the Administrative Code is the
genera law which must yield to the special law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Interior can suspend an elected Local Government Official
under investigation.
RULING:
Yes. There is no clear and express grant of power to the secretary to suspend a mayor of a
municipality who is under investigation. On the contrary, the power appears vested in the provincial
governor by sec 2188 of the Administrative Code which provides that “The provincial governor shall
receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty,
oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment
of any crime involving moral turpitude”.
However, that power of the provincial governor of suspension, expressly granted by sec 2188
of the Administrative Code, was not necessarily exclusive which will preclude the Secretary of the
Interior from exercising the same power. For instance, Villena admitted in the oral argument that the
President of the Philippines may himself suspend the petitioner from office by virtue of his greater
power of removal (sec. 2191, as amended, Administrative Code) to be exercised conformably to law.
Indeed, if the President could, in the manner prescribed by law, remove a municipal official; it would
be a legal incongruity if he were to be devoid of the lesser power of suspension. And the incongruity
would be more patent if, possessed of the power both to suspend and to remove a provincial official
(sec. 2078, Administrative Code), the President were to be without the power to suspend a municipal
official. The power to suspend a municipal official is not exclusive. Preventive suspension may be
issued to give way for an impartial investigation.
c. Planas v. Gil
(G.R. No. L-46440, January 18, 1939)
Laurel, J.
FACTS:
In November 1938, Carmen Planas, a municipal board member of Manila, published a
statement criticizing the acts of certain government officials including Pres. Manuel Quezon in a
newspaper. The following morning, she received a letter from Jorge Vargas (Secretary to the
President) by order of the president directing her to report before the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
She was directed to explain and prove her allegations.
She appeared before the CSC but she questioned the jurisdiction of the CSC over the matter.
She said that as an elective official, she was accountable for her political acts to her constituency
alone, unless such acts constitute offenses punishable under our penal laws, and not to executive
officials belonging to a party opposed to that to which petitioner was affiliated. Further, she contended
that her statement in the newspaper was made by her as a private citizen and in the exercise of her
right to discuss freely political questions and cannot properly be the subject of an administrative
investigation; that the issue was only cognizable by courts of justice in case the contents of said
statement infringe any provision of the Penal Code. The CSC, acting through Commissioner Jose Gil,
however took cognizance of the case hence Planas appealed to the Supreme Court. The Solicitor
General replied for the CSC arguing that under the separation of powers marked by the Constitution,
the court has no jurisdiction to review the orders of the Chief Executive which were of purely
administrative in character.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction to review orders issued by the President.
RULING:
The acts of the Chief Executive performed within the limits of his jurisdiction were his official
acts and courts will neither direct nor restrain executive action in such cases. The rule was non-
interference. But from this legal premise, it does not necessarily follow that the SC was precluded
from making an inquiry into the validity or constitutionality of his acts when these were properly
challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. The classical separation of governmental powers
viewed in the light of political philosophy was a relative theory of government. There was more truism
and actuality in interdependence than in independence and separation of powers.
In the present case, the President was not a party to the proceeding. He was neither
compelled nor restrained to act in a particular way. The CSC was the party respondent and the theory
was advanced by the Sol-Gen that because an investigation undertaken by him was directed by
authority of the President of the Philippines, the SC has no jurisdiction over the present proceedings
instituted by Planas. The argument was farfetched. A mere plea that a subordinate officer of the
government was acting under orders from the Chief Executive may be an important averment, but
was neither decisive nor conclusive upon this court. Like the dignity of his high office, the relative
immunity of the Chief Executive from judicial interference was not in the nature of a sovereign
passport for all the subordinate official and employees of the executive Department to the extent that
at the mere invocation of the authority that it purported the jurisdiction of this court to inquire into the
validity or legality of an executive order was necessarily abated or suspended.
Nevertheless, SC ruled that the CSC can take cognizance of the case. Planas was not denied
the right to voice out her opinion but since she made allegations against the administration it is but
right for her to prove those allegations. The CSC has the right to elicit the truth.
d. Lacson v. Roque
(G.R. No. L-6225, January 10, 1953)
Tuazon, J.
FACTS:
The mayor of Manila, Arsenio Lacson, broadcasted some allegedly defamatory and libelous
utterances against a certain judge (Judge Montesa). Montesa then filed a libel case against Lacson.
A special prosecutor was assigned to the case. The special prosecutor recommended the suspension
of Lacson to the President. The President, through acting Executive Secretary Mariano Roque, issued
a suspension order against Lacson.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President can suspend a Mayor from his office.
RULING:
No. There was neither statutory nor constitutional provision granting the President sweeping
authority to remove municipal officials. It is true that the President “shall . . . exercise general
supervision over all local governments,” but supervision does not contemplate control.
The contention that the President has inherent power to remove or suspend municipal officers
was not well taken. Removal and suspension of public officers were always controlled by the
particular law applicable and its proper construction subject to constitutional limitations
The power of the President to remove officials from office as provided for in section 64 (b) of
the Revised Administrative Code must be done “conformably to law;” and only for disloyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines he “may at any time remove a person from any position of trust or authority
under the Government of the Philippines.” Again, this power of removal must be exercised
conformably to law, in this case, the allege libelous act of Lacson cannot be considered as disloyalty.
e. Mondano v. Silvosa
(G.R. No. L-7708, May 30, 1955)
Padilla, J.
FACTS:
Jose Mondano was the mayor of Mainit, Surigao. A complaint was filed against him for rape
and concubinage. The information reached the Assistant Executive Secretary who ordered the
governor to investigate the matter. Consequently, Governor Fernando Silvosa then summoned
Mondano and the latter appeared before him. Thereafter Silvosa suspended Mondano. Mondano filed
a petition for prohibition enjoining the governor from further proceeding.
In his defense, Silvosa invoked the Revised Administrative Code which provided that he, as
part of the executive and by virtue of the order given by the Assistant Executive Secretary, was with
“direct control, direction, and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction . . .” and
to that end “may order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any
bureau or office under his Department and in connection therewith may appoint a committee or
designate an official or person who shall conduct such investigations.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Governor, as agent of the Executive, can exercise the power of control
over a mayor.
RULING:
No. The Constitution provides:
“The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices,
exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care
that the laws be faithfully executed.”
Under this constitutional provision the President has been invested with the power of control
of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, but not of all local governments over which he
has been granted only the power of general supervision as may be provided by law. The Department
head as agent of the President has direct control and supervision over all bureaus and offices under
his jurisdiction as provided for in section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, but he does not
have the same control of local governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices under
his jurisdiction.
Likewise, his authority to order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the
service of any bureau or office under his department is confined to bureaus or offices under his
jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments over which, as already stated, the President
exercises only general supervision as may be provided by law.
If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code are to be construed as
conferring upon the corresponding department head direct control, direction, and supervision over all
local governments and that for that reason he may order the investigation of an official of a local
government for malfeasance in office, such interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of par
1, sec 10, Article 7, of the 1935 Constitution.
In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to

see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former
may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter.
The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal
officials in the provincial governor who is authorized to “receive and investigate complaints made
under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of
maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude.”
And if the charges are serious, “he shall submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial
board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by registered mail, and
he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the
board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question.” Sec
86 of the Revised Administrative Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised by
the Department Head over the administration of municipalities.
In this case, the governor can only investigate Mondano for crimes relating to Mondano’s
office. If the issue is not related to his office but involves a rime of moral turpitude (such as rape or
concubinage as in this case), there must first be a final conviction before a suspension may be issued.
The point is, the governor must suspend a mayor not because he’s acting as an agent of the Executive
but because of the power granted him by the Revised Administrative Code.
f. Almario V. Executive Secretary

(G.R. No. 189028, July 16, 2013)
Leonardo-De Castro, J.
FACTS:
The National Artists Awards Committee. and the NCCA decided to team up and jointly
administer the National Artists Award. There were three deliberations for determining the nominees
and on the final deliberation, a final list of four names was agreed upon namely: Manuel Conde,
Ramon Santos, Lazaro Francisco and Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz.
They submitted this recommendation to the President. According to respondents, the

aforementioned letter was referred by the Office of the President to the Committee on Honors.
Meanwhile, the Office of the President allegedly received nominations from various sectors, cultural
groups and individuals strongly endorsing private respondents.
Acting on this recommendation, a series of Proclamations were issued declaring Lazaro

Francisco, Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz and private respondents, Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and
Moreno, respectively, as National Artists.
Hence, the petition. All of the petitioners claim that former President Macapagal-Arroyo
gravely abused her discretion in disregarding the results of the rigorous screening and selection
process for the Order of National Artists and in substituting her own choice for those of the
Deliberation Panels.
ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the President amounted to grave abuse of discretion with regards
to the violation of the right to equal protection.
RULING:
Yes. It should be recalled that one of the respondents was disqualified to be nominated for
being the Executive Director of the NCCA at that time while respondents Masa and Caparas did not
make it to the preliminary shortlist and respondent Moreno was not included in the second shortlist.
Yet, the four of them were treated differently and considered favorably when they were
exempted from the rigorous screening process of the NCCA and the CCP and conferred the Order
of National Artists.
The special treatment accorded to respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno
fails to pass rational scrutiny. No real and substantial distinction between respondents and petitioner
Abad has been shown that would justify deviating from the laws, guidelines and established
procedures, and placing respondents in an exceptional position.
In view of the foregoing, there was a violation of petitioner Abads right to equal protection, an
interest that is substantial enough to confer him standing in this case.
2. APPOINTMENT
a. Valencia v. Peralta
(GR. No. L-20864, August 23, 1963)
Reyes, J.B.L., J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Elpidio Valencia was designated as Acting Chairman of the board of directors of
then President Carlos P. Garcia on October 4, 1961. Allegedly, after Valencia was extended the ad
interim appointment, he took an oath of office “to the position Chairman, ad interim, Board of
Directors, National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA)” on October 25, 1961. Such
appointment was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments (CA) on April 27, 1962, declaring
him as “Chairman of the Board… for a term expiring July 20, 1967.”
On June 2, 1962, however, respondent Secretary of National Defense Macario Peralta Jr.
was appointed ad interim to the same position by President Diosdado Macapagal. This prompted
Valencia to institute a petition challenging the legality of Peralta’s appointment, claiming that the
position is not vacant since he has not resigned nor been removed for cause, and his tenure is bound
to expire only after a term of six years.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of respondent Peralta is valid.
RULING:
YES. The argument of petitioner Valencia that his oath and confirmation imply a prior ad
interim appointment cannot be considered as it has been held in jurisprudence (People v. Murray)
that the better rule requires some kind of written memorial that could render his title to public office
indubitable. There is on record only one written designation of Valencia, but as mere Acting Chairman,
dated October 4, 1961. Such was not a permanent appointment, and therefore, was revocable at
anytime by the Chief Executive, and actually revoked by his subsequent designation of Peralta.
Therefore, the Court had no alternative but to declare that Valencia had failed to establish title to the
office he claims.
b. Binamira v. Garrucho
(G.R. No. 92008, July 30, 1990)
Cruz, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Ramon Binamira was designated as General Manager of the Philippine Tourism
Authority (PTA) by the Minister of Tourism and Chairman of the PTA. Board, Jose Gonzales. His
resignation was demanded by respondent Peter Garrucho. Two days after, President Corazon
Aquino sent Garrucho a memorandum designating him as General Manager of the PTA for the reason
that the present General Manager – Binamira – was not designated by the President as required by
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 564, but only by the Secretary of Tourism, making such invalid.
Garrucho having taken over the position, Binamira filed this petition of quo warranto to question his
title and to seek reinstatement to the office from which he claims to have been removed without just
cause in violation of his security of tenure.
ISSUE: Whether or not Binamira has claim of security of tenure.
RULING:
NO. Binamira was merely designated by the Minister of Tourism, which the President had
overturned as required by PD No. 564. Where the person is merely designated and not appointed,
the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will
by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an acting or temporary
appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the person named. Thus, Binamira cannot
sustain that he has been illegally removed.
c. Matibag v. Benipayo
(G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002)
Reyes, J.B.L., J.
FACTS:
The COMELEC en banc appointed petitioner Angelina Matibag as "Acting Director IV" of the
EID, which then Chairperson Harriet O. Demetriou renewed in a "temporary" capacity.
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Alfredo Benipayo as COMELEC

Chairman together with other commissioners in an ad interim appointment. In his capacity as
Chairman, Benipayo issued a Memorandum reassigning directors, including the reassignment of
Matibag to the Law Department. The latter requested to reconsider such, citing Civil Service
Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7, reminding heads of government offices that "transfer and
detail of employees are prohibited during the election period beginning January 2 until June 13, 2001."
Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration, citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300, exempting
the COMELEC from the coverage of the said memo circular.
Matibag appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc. At
the same time, she filed an administrative and criminal complaint with the Law Department against
Benipayo. During the pendency of her complaint, she filed a petition to the Court questioning the
appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and
Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ad interim appointments of the COMELEC officers were valid.
RULING:
YES. An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect
immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into
office. The fact is it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its
permanent character. Pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, an ad interim
appointment is permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission
on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress pursuant. Thus, the ad interim
appointments extended by the President to Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are valid and do not
constitute temporary or acting appointments.
d. Sarmiento v. Mison
(G.R. No. L-79974, December 17, 1987)
Padilla, J.
FACTS:
Petitioners Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcialla seek to enjoin respondent Salvador
Mison from performing the functions of the Office of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs
(BOC) and respondent Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of Department of Budget, from effecting
disbursements in payment of Mison’s salaries and emoluments. They assail that the appointment of
Mison is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments (CA). The respondents maintain its constitutionality.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of Mison as BOC Commissioner is unconstitutional.
RULING:
NO. Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are four groups of officers
whom the President shall appoint. The first group includes the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel
or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. Such
is clearly appointed with the Consent of the CA. The second group includes all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; and the third group are those
whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. Appointment for any of the positions
included in both groups of officers can be made by the President without the consent or confirmation
of the CA. And finally, the fourth group are those officers lower in rank whose appointments the
Congress may, by law, vest in the President alone. This implies that, in absence of such a law, lower-
ranked officers appointed by the President are also subject to confirmation by the CA.
In this case, the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is not one of those within
the first group of appointments where the consent of the CA is required. As a matter of fact, based
on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commissions, the 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded
the position of “heads of bureaus” from appointments that need consent or confirmation of the CA.
Therefore, Mison’s appointment is constitutional.
e. Quintos-Deles v. Committee on Constitutional Commissions, Commission on

Appointments
(G.R. No. 83216, September 4, 1989)
Bidin, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Teresita Quintos-Deles and three others were appointed as Sectoral
Representatives by President Corazon Aquino pursuant to Art. VII, Sec. 16 (2) and Art. XVIII, Sec.
17 of the Constitution. Quinton-Deles was the sectoral representative for Women. They were
subsequently scheduled to take their oath of office, but the Commission on Appointments (COA) filed
an opposition against petitioner and those appointed alleging that their appointment must have the
concurrence of the COA. This compelled the House Speaker to suspend their oathtaking.
During a committee meeting of COA, to which respondent was invited, the Committee of the
Constitutional Commissions and Offices of COA ruled against the position of petitioner. Hence,
petitioner filed a petition questioning the objection of COA. She claims that her appointment does not
need the concurrence of COA, pursuant to Section 7, Article XVIII of the Constitution, which does not
require her appointment to be confirmed by the COA to qualify her to take her seat in the lower house.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral representatives to the
House of Representatives before they can assume office.
RULING:
YES. The seats reserved for sectoral representatives in Section 5 (2), Article VII of the
Constitution may be filled by appointment by the President by express provision of Section 7, Article
XVIII of the same. It is indubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives are
among the “other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution,”
referred to in the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments are-subject to confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments.
f. Soriano v. Lista
(G.R. No. 153881, March 24, 2003)
Corona, J.
FACTS:
Eight officers of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) were promoted by the President to Vice
Admiral, Rear Admiral, Commodore, Naval Captain and they assumed office without confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments (COA). Petitioner Elpidio Soriano, as member of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and as a taxpayer, filed a petition against the officers and Emilia Boncodin in her
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management. In his petition, he questions
the constitutionality of their assumption of office, which he claims requires confirmation of the COA.
ISSUE: WON the promotions and appointment of said officers require confirmation of the COA.
RULING:
NO. The PCG is now under the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC)
pursuant to Executive Order (EO) No. 475 issued by President Fidel Ramos. It is no longer part of
the Philippine Navy or Armed Forces of the Philippines. It is clear from Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution that only appointed officers from the rank of colonel or naval captain in the armed forces
require confirmation by the COA. The clause “officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain” in the provision refers to military officers alone. Therefore, the promotions and
appointments of respondent officers of the PCG, or any PCG officer from the rank of captain and
higher for that matter, do not require confirmation by the CA.
g. Bautista v. Salonga
(G.R. No. 86439, April 13, 1989)
Padilla, J.
FACTS:
On August 27, 1987, the President designated petitioner Mary Concepcion Bautista as “Acting
Chairman, Commission on Human Rights (CHR)”, and after a few months, extended her permanent
appointment. Immediately after taking her oath, she immediately discharged the functions and duties
of her office.
On January 8, 1989, Bautista received a letter from the Secretary of the Commission on
Appointments (CA) requesting her to submit information and documents required by its rules in
connection with the confirmation of her appointment. The CA wrote to her again, requesting her
presence at a meeting that would deliberate on her appointment. She wrote back to the Chairman of
the CA stating that the CA has no jurisdiction to review her appointment. The CA, on the other hand,
disapproved her “ad interim appointment” in view of her refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the CA.
Bautista’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the position of Chairman of the CHR is among those positions that require
the confirmation of the CA.
RULING:
NO. Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are four groups of officers
whom the President shall appoint. The appointment of the Chairman and Members of the CHR falls
under the second sentence of the provision because they are officers of the government “whom he
(the President) may be authorized by law to appoint, pursuant to Section 2(c) of Executive Order (EO)
No. 163. This type of appointment does not require the review or participation of the Commission on
Appointments. Therefore, the CA does not have jurisdiction to review her appointment and likewise,
cannot disapprove such.
h. Calderon v. Carale
(G.R. No. 91636, April 23 1992)
Padilla, J.
FACTS:
Sometime in March 1989, RA 6715 (Herrera-Veloso Law), amending the Labor Code (PD
442) was approved. It provides that the Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other
Commissioners shall all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments (COA). Pursuant to said law, President Corazon Aquino appointed the Chairman
and Commissioners of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). After said appointments,
then Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon issued Administrative Order (AO) No. 161, designation the
places of assignment of the newly appointed commissioners.
This petition instituted by Peter Calderon questions the constitutionality and legality of the
permanent appointments extended by the President of the Philippines to the respondent Chairman
and Members of NLRC, without submitting the same to the COA.
ISSUE: Whether or not said appointments are subject to the confirmation of the COA.
RULING:
NO. The second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution refers to all other
officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law and those
whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and
Commissioners fall within the second sentence, more specifically under the 3rd group of appointees
– those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. Undeniably, the Chairman and
Members of NLRC are not among the officers mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16 whose
appointments require confirmation by COA.
To that extent, RA 6715 which requires the confirmation of COA is unconstitutional because
it amends by legislation the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution by adding
thereto appointments requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and it amends by
legislation the second sentence of the same provision, by imposing the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments on appointments which are otherwise entrusted only with the
President.
i. Manalo v. Sistoza
(G.R. No. 107369, August 11, 1999)
Purisima, J.
FACTS:
On December 1990, Republic Act (RA) 6975 creating the Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG) was signed into law by President Corazon Aquino. Under Sections 26 and 31 of
the same, it was provided that the PNP Chief as well as certain police officers including Directors and
Chief Superintendents, after being appointed by the President, must be confirmed by the Commission
on Appointments (COA) before they can take their office.
On March 10, 1992, President Aquino promoted fifteen police officers by appointing them to
positions in the PNP with the rank of Chief Superintendent to Director. Without their names submitted
to the COA for confirmation, said police officers took their oath and assumed their respective
positions. Thereafter, the Department of Budget and Management, under Secretary Salvador
Enriquez, authorized for their salaries and other emoluments.
On October 21, 1992, petitioner Jesulito Manalo brought to the Supreme Court a petition for
prohibition to assail the legality of subject appointments and disbursements made thereof.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of the police officers is valid.
RULING:
YES. There was no need for the confirmation of respondent officers by the Commission on
Appointments because their positions are not included in the group of officers enumerated under
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution that require the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments. Consequently, Sections 26 and 31 of RA 6974 are unconstitutional for empowering
the Commission on Appointments to confirm the appointments of public officials whose appointments
are not required by the Constitution. In view thereof, Secretary Enriquez did not act with grave abuse
of discretion in authorizing and effecting disbursements for the salaries and other emoluments of the
respondent police officers whose appointments are valid.
j. Rufino v. Endriga
(G.R. No. 139554, July 21, 2006)
Carpio, J.
FACTS:
The Endriga group were appointed members of the board of trustees of the Cultural Center
of the Philippines (CCP) by President Fidel V. Ramos in 1995, with the qualification that their
appointments would extend only until December 31, 1998. By December 22, 1998, then President
Joseph Estrada advised petitioners that they were being replaced by seven new trustees to the CCP
board, the Rufino group. This led the Endriga group to file quo warranto proceedings questioning the
authority of the president to appoint new members in the CCP board. They claim that under Section
6(b) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 15, vacancies in the board “shall be filled by election by a vote
of a majority of the trustees held at the next regular meeting.” Since there was only one seat vacant
due to the expiration of Mañosa’s term, President Estrada could not appoint a new board.
The Court of Appeals (CA) granted their petition and declared the Endriga group lawfully
entitled to hold office and ousted respondents from the CCP board. The Rufino group filed for a motion
for reconsideration, asserting that Section 6(b) of PD 15, which authorized the CCP trustees to elect
their fellow trustees, should be declared unconstitutional for it is allegedly repugnant to Section 16 of
Article VII of the Constitution, which allowed the appointment only of “officers lower in rank” than the
appointing power.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 6(b) of PD No. 15 is unconstitutional.
RULING:
YES. Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution allows heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards to appoint only "officers lower in rank" than such "heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards." In this case, the President appointed the Endriga group as
trustees, while the remaining CCP trustees elected the same Endriga group to the same positions. In
effect, there are two appointing powers over the same set of officers in the Executive branch. Each
appointing power insists on exercising its own power, even if the two powers are irreconcilable. Thus,
the Court must put an end to this recurring anomaly.
k. Lacson v. Romero
(G.R. No. L-3081, October 14, 1949)
Montemayor, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Antonio Lacson was appointed by the President as provincial fiscal of Negros
Oriental. The appointment was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments (COA) and thereafter,
he took his oath of office and performed the duties of that office.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Justice, the President nominated Lacson to the
post of provincial fiscal of Tarlac. On the same date, the President nominated for the position of
provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental respondent Honorio Romero. Both nominations were
simultaneously confirmed by COA.
Lacson neither accepted the appointment nor assumed the office of the fiscal of Tarlac.
Romero, on the other hand, took his oath of office, notified the Solicitor General of the fact, and
thereafter proceeded to his station. Upon arrival at Negros Oriental, Romero notified Lacson of his
intention to take over the office, but the latter objected. Lacson then instituted a petition for quo
warranto against Romero.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lacson is entitled to the post of provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental.
RULING:
YES. There is no power in this country which can compel a man to accept an office.
Consequently, since Lacson has declined to accept his appointment as provincial fiscal of Tarlac and
no one can compel him to do so, then he continues as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental and no
vacancy in said office was created unless Lacson had been lawfully removed as such fiscal of Negros
Oriental. A provincial fiscal as a civil service official may not be removed from office even by the
President who appointed him, and even with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, except
for cause.
l. Luego v Civil Service Commission

(G.R. No. L-69137, August 5, 1986)
Cruz, J.
FACTS:
On 18 February 1983, petitioner was appointed as Administrative Officer II at the Office of the
City Mayor in Cebu City by Mayor Florentino Solon. The appointment was described as "permanent"
but the Civil Service Commission approved it as "temporary due to a protest filed by the private
respondent. On March 22, 1984, after protracted hearings the legality of which does not have to be
decided here, the Civil Service Commission found the private respondent better qualified than the
petitioner for the contested position and on June 28, 1984, said respondent was appointed by the
new mayor, Mayor Ronald Duterte.
ISSUE: WON the Civil Service Commission is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on
the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee.
RULING:
NO. The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was therefore
protected by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the
right to do so, and it was not for the respondent Civil Service Commission to reverse him and call it
temporary. The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the
appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing
the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the appointee is
qualified and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest
to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws. Appointment is an essentially
discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best
lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law.
If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified
who should have been preferred.
m. Lapinid v Civil Service Commission

(G.R. No. 96298, May 14, 1991)
Cruz, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Renato M. Lapinid was appointed by the Philippine Ports Authority to the position
of Terminal Supervisor at the Manila International Container Terminal on October 1, 1988. This
appointment was protested on December 15, 1988, by private respondent Juanito Junsay. He
contended that he should be designated terminal supervisor, or to any other comparable position, in
view of his preferential right thereto. In a resolution dated February 14, 1990, the Commission
disposed that Appellants Juanito Junsay and Benjamin Villegas be appointed as Terminal Supervisor
(SG 18). Upon learning of the said resolution, Lapinid, who claimed he had not been informed of the
appeal and had not been heard thereon, filed a motion for reconsideration on March 19, 1990.
ISSUE: WON the Civil Service Commission is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on
the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee.
RULING:
NO. The Court declares once again that the Civil Service Commission has no power of
appointment except over its own personnel. Neither does it have the authority to review the
appointments made by other offices except only to ascertain if the appointee possesses the required
qualifications. The determination of who among aspirants with the minimum statutory qualifications
should be preferred belongs to the appointing authority and not the Civil Service Commission. It
cannot disallow an appointment because it believes another person is better qualified and much less
can it direct the appointment of its own choice. Appointment is a highly discretionary act that even
this Court cannot compel. While the act of appointment may in proper cases be the subject of
mandamus, the selection itself of the appointee — taking into account the totality of his qualifications,
including those abstract qualities that define his personality — is the prerogative of the appointing
authority. This is a matter addressed only to the discretion of the appointing authority.
n. Pobre v Medieta
(G.R. No. 106677, July 23, 1993)
Grino-Aquino, J.
FACTS:
The controversy began on January 2, 1992, when the term of office of Honorable Julio B.
Francia as PRC Commissioner/Chairman expired. At that time, Mariano A. Mendieta was the senior
Associate Commissioner and Hermogenes P. Pobre was the second Associate Commissioner of the
PRC. On January 6, 1992, Executive Secretary Franklin M. Drilon sought the opinion of Acting
Secretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello, III on whether the President's power to appoint the
Commissioner of the Professional Regulation Commission is restricted by Section 2 of P.D. No. 223,
as amended. The Executive Secretary wanted to know whether the President may appoint as
Commissioner/Chairman of the PRC another Associate Commissioner or any person other than the
Senior Associate Commissioner. In a Memorandum dated January 22, 1991, Acting Secretary of
Justice Silvestre H. Bello, III answered that the said provision by the Executive Secretary does not
limit or restrict the appointing power of the President. On February 15, 1992, President Corazon C.
Aquino appointed the petitioner, then an Associate Commissioner, as the PRC
Commissioner/Chairman. He took his oath of office on February 17, 1992.
Even before Commissioner Pobre's appointment, the private respondent, Mariano A.

Mendieta, as the Senior Associate Commissioner, filed a petition for declaratory relief against
Commissioner Pobre, Executive Secretary Drilon, and Acting Secretary of Justice Eduardo
Montenegro, praying that they be enjoined from appointing, or recommending, the appointment of
Associate Commissioner Pobre as Chairman of the PRC because under Section 2 of P.D. No. 223,
he (Mendieta), as the senior Associate Commissioner, was legally entitled to succeed Francia as
Chairman of the PRC, being that “any vacancy in the Commission shall be filled for the unexpired
term only with the most senior of the Associate Commissioners succeeding the Commissioner at the
expiration of his term, resignation or removal”.
On August 5, 1992, Judge Somera rendered a decision in favor of Mendieta and on August
19, 1992, she issued a writ of prohibitory injunction directing the Deputy Sheriff of Manila to stop
Pobre from discharging the functions and duties of the Chairman/Commissioner of the PRC, and from
enjoying the rights and privileges of that office.
ISSUE: WON the President may appoint as Commissioner/Chairman of the PRC another Associate
Commissioner or any person other than the Senior Associate Commissioner.
RULING:
YES. In interpreting this section of P.D. No. 223, consideration should be accorded the
provision of the Constitution vesting the power of appointment in the President of the Philippines.
Section 10, Article VII of the 1973 Constitution empowers the President to appoint "those whom he
may be authorized by law to appoint." The Court finds unacceptable the view that every vacancy in
the Commission (except the position of "junior" Associate Commissioner) shall be filled by
"succession" or by "operation of law" for that would deprive the President of his power to appoint a
new PRC Commissioner and Associate Commissioners — "all to be appointed by the President"
under P.D. No. 223. The absurd result would be that the only occasion for the President to exercise
his appointing power would be when the position of junior (or second) Associate Commissioner
becomes vacant. We may not presume that when the President issued P.D. No. 223, he deliberately
clipped his prerogative to choose and appoint the head of the PRC and limited himself to the selection
and appointment of only the associate commissioner occupying the lowest rung of the ladder in that
agency. Since the appointment of the petitioner as PRC Chairman/Commissioner to succeed Julio B.
Francia, Jr. at the expiration of his term, did not violate any provision of P.D. No. 223 and in fact
conforms with the Chief Executive's interpretation and implementation of the law, the legality of said
appointment should be upheld.
o. Pimentel v Ermita
(G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005)
Carpio, J.
FACTS:
The Senate and the House of Representatives ("Congress") commenced their regular session
on 26 July 2004. The Commission on Appointments, composed of Senators and Representatives,
was constituted on 25 August 2004. Meanwhile, President Arroyo issued appointments 2 to
respondents as acting secretaries of their respective departments. Respondents took their oath of
office and assumed duties as acting secretaries.
On 8 September 2004, petitioners filed the present petition as Senators of the Republic of the
Philippines. Congress adjourned on 22 September 2004. On 23 September 2004, President Arroyo
issued ad interim appointments 3 to respondents as secretaries of the departments to which they
were previously appointed in an acting capacity.
ISSUE: WON President Arroyo's appointment of respondents as acting secretaries without the
consent of the Commission on Appointments while Congress is in session is constitutional.
RULING:
YES. The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may not
interfere with the exercise of this executive power except in those instances when the Constitution
expressly allows it to interfere. 6 Limitations on the executive power to appoint are construed strictly
against the legislature. 7 The scope of the legislature's interference in the executive's power to
appoint is limited to the power to prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot
appoint a person to an office in the guise of prescribing qualifications to that office. Neither may
Congress impose on the President the duty to appoint any particular person to an office.
The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap

measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to
the office. 16 In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the
office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice
as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office.
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint
automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego.An alter ego,whether temporary or
permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing
qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since
a department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must
necessarily have the President's confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a department
secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even while
Congress is in session. That person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical
reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee.
The law expressly allows the President to make such acting appointment. Section 17, Chapter
5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that "[t]he President may temporarily designate an officer already
in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the
executive branch." Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in
the government service, as long as the President deems that person competent.
p. De Rama v Court of Appeals

(G.R. No. 131136, February 28, 2001)
Ynares-Santiago, J.
FACTS:
Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitioner Conrado L. de
Rama wrote a letter dated July 13, 1995 to the Civil Service Commission (or CSC), seeking the recall
of the appointments of fourteen (14) municipal employees. Petitioner de Rama justified his recall
request on the allegation that the appointments of the said employees were "midnight" appointments
of the former mayor, Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja, done in violation of Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987
Constitution. On April 30, 1996, the CSC denied petitioner's request for the recall of the appointments
of the fourteen employees, for lack of merit. The CSC also dismissed petitioner's allegation that these
were "midnight" appointments, pointing out that the Constitutional provision relied upon by petitioner
prohibits only those appointments made by an outgoing President and cannot be made to apply to
local elective officials. After reviewing the facts and issues raised by petitioner, the Court of Appeals
issued a Resolution 6 dated May 16, 1997 which held that there was no abuse of the power of
appointment on the part of the outgoing mayor.
ISSUE: WON there was abuse of the power of appointment on the part of the outgoing mayor.
RULING:
NO. In truth and in fact, there is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making
appointments during the last days of his or her tenure. A thorough perusal of the records reveal that
the CSC's ruling is supported by the evidence and the law. The fourteen (14) employees were duly
appointed following two meetings of the Personnel Selection Board held on May 31 and June 26,
1995. There is no showing that any of the private respondents were not qualified for the positions
they were appointed to. Moreover, their appointments were duly attested to by the Head of the CSC
field office at Lucena City. By virtue thereof, they had already assumed their appointive positions even
before petitioner himself assumed his elected position as town mayor. Consequently, their
appointments took effect immediately and cannot be unilaterally revoked or recalled by petitioner. It
has been held that upon the issuance of an appointment and the appointee's assumption of the
position in the civil service, "he acquires a legal right which cannot be taken away either by revocation
of the appointment or by removal except for cause and with previous notice and hearing." 17
Moreover, it is well-settled that the person assuming a position in the civil service under a completed
appointment acquires a legal, not just an equitable, right to the position. This right is protected not
only by statute, but by the Constitution as well, which right cannot be taken away by either revocation
of the appointment, or by removal, unless there is valid cause to do so, provided that there is previous
notice and hearing. The CSC correctly ruled, however, that the constitutional prohibition on so-called
"midnight appointments," specifically those made within two (2) months immediately prior to the next
presidential elections, applies only to the President or Acting President.
q. In Re: Mateo Valenzuela

(A.M. No. 98-5-01, November 9, 1998)
Narvasa, C.J.
FACTS:
Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta are appointed as Judges of the RTC
of Bago City and Cabanatuan, respectively, by the President. These appointments appear prima
facie, at least, to be expressly prohibited by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution. The said constitutional
provision prohibits the President from making any appointments two months immediately before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
ISSUE: WON the President is required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Sections 4(1) and
9 of Art. VIII, during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the
Constitution.
RULING:
NO. During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution “two months immediately
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term” the President is neither required
to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Secs. 4(1) and 9 of Art. VIII simply
mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided
therein unless prohibited by Sec. 15 of Art. VII. This prohibition on appointments comes into effect
once every 6 years.
The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were unquestionably made during the period of
the ban. They come within the operation of the prohibition relating to appointments. While the filling
of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in this case of
any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments during the period of the ban.
r. De Castro v Judicial and Bar Council

(G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010)
Bersamin, J.
FACTS:
C.J. Puno is set to retire on 17 May 2010 or 7 days after the presidential election. January
2010, the JBC begun to take applications for the position of C.J. Meanwhile, strong objections to
Pres. GMA’s appointing C.J. Puno’s successor arose. The instant petitions were thus filed questioning
her authority to appoint a new C.J. in the light of the ban imposed on presidential appointments two
months immediately before the next presidential elections up to the end of the President’s term under
Sec 15, Art VII of the Constitution. This view however seemingly conflicts with Sec 4(1), Art VIII which
provides that any vacancy in the SC shall be filled within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy,
and Sec 9, Art VIII which provides that the President shall issue appointments to the Judiciary within
90 days from submission by the JBC of the list of nominees.
It is further argued that there is no imperative need to appoint the next Chief Justice
considering that Sec 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 can still address the situation of having the next
President appoint the successor. It provides that in case of a vacancy in the office of the C.J. or of
his inability to perform the duties and powers of his office, they shall devolve upon the Associate
Justice who is first in precedence, until such disability is removed, or another C.J. is appointed and
duly qualified.
It is also argued that there is no need for the incumbent President to appoint during the
prohibition period the successor of C.J. Puno because anyway there will still be about 45 days of the
90 days mandated in Sec 4(1), Art VIII remaining (the period that remains of the 90 days counted
from C.J. Puno’s retirement after the end of GMA’s term).. A precedent frequently cited by the parties
is the In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B.
Vallarta as Judges of the RTC of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City,
respectively, shortly referred to here as the Valenzuela case, by which the Court held that Section
15, Article VII prohibited the exercise by the President of the power to appoint to judicial positions
during the period therein fixed.
ISSUE: WON the ban on making presidential appointments under Sec 15, Art VII extend to
appointments to fill vacancies in the SC and in the rest of the Judiciary.
RULING:
No. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Sec 15, Art VII to the
appointment of Members of the SC, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored
the meticulous ordering of the provisions.
The exchanges during deliberations of the Constitutional Commission further show that the
filling of a vacancy in the SC within the 90-day period was made a true mandate for the President.
This was borne out of the fact that 30 years hitherto, the Court seldom had a complete complement.
Further, the usage in Sec 4(1), Art VIII of the word “shall”—an imperative—should not be disregarded.
Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Sec 15, Art VII, undoubtedly, the
Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Dept. The
framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their
establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for judicial
positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there would no longer
be midnight appointments to the Judiciary and appointments to the Judiciary for the purpose of buying
votes in a coming presidential election, or of satisfying partisan considerations.
The fact that Secs 14 and 16 of Art VI refer only to appointments within the Executive Dept.
renders conclusive that Sec 15 of the same also applies only to the Executive Dept. This is consistent
with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context. If the
framers intended Sec 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments, they would have easily and
surely inserted a similar prohibition.
To hold that Sec 15 extends to appointments to the Judiciary undermines the intent of the
Constitution of ensuring the independence of the Judicial Dept. for it will tie the Judiciary and the SC
to the fortunes or misfortunes of political leaders vying for the Presidency in a presidential election.
s. VILLALUZ v ZALDIVAR
(G.R. NO. L-22754, December 31, 1965)
Bautista Angelo, J.
FACTS:
The petitioner seeks his reinstatement as Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office. He
alleged that he was as chief of said office on 20 May 1958 and two days thereafter his nomination
was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In 1960, Congressman Joaquin Roces alleged
that Villaluz was an ineffective leader and had caused losses to the government. He indorsed the
removal of Villaluz. Consequently, Executive Secretary Calixto Zaldivar suspended Villaluz and
ordered a committee to investigate the matter. After investigation, it was recommended that Villaluz
be removed. The president then issued an Administrative Order removing Villaluz from his post.
Villaluz averred that the president has no jurisdiction to remove him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Villaluz is under the jurisdiction of the President to be removed considering
that he is an appointee of the president.
RULING:
Yes. The president has jurisdiction and not the Civil Service. The President of the Philippines
has jurisdiction to investigate and remove him since he is a presidential appointee who belongs to
the non-competitive or unclassified service under Sec 5 of Republic Act No. 2260; being a
presidential appointee, Villaluz belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service of the
government and as such he can only be investigated and removed from office after due hearing by
the President of the Philippines under the principle that “the power to remove is inherent in the power
to appoint”.
There is some point in the argument that the power of control of the President may extend to
the power to investigate, suspend or remove officers and employees who belong to the executive
department if they are presidential appointees or do not belong to the classified service for such can
be justified under the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint but not
with regard to those officers or employees who belong to the classified service for as to them that
inherent power cannot be exercised. This is in line with the provision of our Constitution which says
that “the Congress may by law vest the appointment of the inferior officers, in the President alone, in
the courts, or in heads of department”.
t. ALAJAR v ALBA
(G.R. Nos. L-10360 & L-10433, January 17, 1957)
Felix, J.
FACTS:
RA 603 created the City of Roxas. Sec 8 thereof provides that the vice mayor shall be
appointed by the president. Pursuant to the law, Alba was appointed as the mayor. Later
on, the president sent communication to Alba telling him that he will be replaced by a new appointee,
Alajar. Alajar was then declared as the acting mayor. Alba refused to leave his post and he appealed
his case before the Judge Evangelista who ruled in favor of him. Alajar then complained. Alba argued
that section 2545 of the RAC w/c provides:
“ Appointment of City Officials. – The President of the Philippines shall appoint, with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments of the Congress of the Philippines, the mayor, the vice-
mayor . . . and he may REMOVE at pleasure any of the said officers . . .”, has been declared
incompatible with the constitutional inhibition that “no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be
removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law”, because the two provisions are mutually
repugnant and absolutely irreconciliable.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alba can be removed by the president upon displeasure.
RULING:
The question is whether an officer appointed for a definite time or during good behavior, had
any vested interest or contract right in his office, of which Congress could not deprive him. The
question is not novel. There seems to be but little difficulty in deciding that there was no such
interest or right.
“Admittedly, the act of Congress in creating a public office, defining its powers, functions and
fixing the “term” or the period during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right and the
“tenure” or the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office, is a valid and constitutional
exercise of legislative power. In the exercise of that power, Congress enacted RA 603 on April 11,
1951, creating the City of Roxas and providing, among others for the position of Vice-Mayor and its
tenure or period during which the incumbent Vice-Mayor holds office at the pleasure of the President,
so, the logical inference is that Congress can legally and constitutionally make the tenure of certain
officials dependent upon the pleasure of the President. Therefore, Alba was appointed by the
pleasure of the resident and can also be removed when that pleasure ceases.
u. APARRI v COURT OF APPEALS

(G.R. No. L-30057, January 31, 1984)
Makasiar, J.
FACTS:
On January 15, 1960, the Board of Directors of the defunct National Resettlement and
Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) approved resolution no. 13 (series of 1960), which appointed
Appari as a general manager of the said company which will take effect on January 16, 1960.
However on March 15, 1962, the same Board of Directors approved resolution no. 24 (series of 1962)
which states that the Chairman of the Board has transmitted to the Board of Directors the desire of
the office of the Philippines to fix the term of Aparri, the general manager up to the closing time of the
office on March 31, 1962 in accordance with paragraph 2, section 8 of R.A. 1160:
Sec. 8. Powers and Duties of the Board of Directors. — The Board of Directors shall have the
following powers and duties:
2) To appoint and fix the term of office of General Manager …, subject to the recommendation
of the Office of Economic Coordination and the approval of the President of the Philippines, …. The
Board, by a majority vote of all members, may, for cause, upon recommendation of the Office of
Economic Coordination and with the approval of the President of the Philippines, suspend and/or
remove the General Manager and/or the Assistant General Manager (p. 46, rec., emphasis supplied).
ISSUE: Whether or not Resolution no. 24 (series of 1962) was a removal or dismissal of the petitioner
without cause.
RULING:
YES. It was affirmed that the term of office of petitioner expired on March 31, 1962. It is
necessary in each case to interpret the word "Term" with the purview of the statutes so as to effectuate
the statutory scheme pertaining to the office under examination. In the case at bar, the term of office
is not fixed by law. However, the power to fix the term is rested in the board of directors subject to the
recommendation of the office of economic coordination and the approval of the president of the
Philippines. Resolution No. 24 speaks of no removal but an expiration of the term of office of the
petitioner. The statute is undeniably clear. "It is the rule in statutory construction that if the words and
phrases of a statute are not obscure or ambiguous. Its meaning and intention of the legislative must
be determined from the language employed and where there is no ambiguity in words, there is no
room for construction.
The petitioner in this case was not removed before the expiration of his term rather, his right
to hold office ceased by the expiration on March 31, 1962, of his term to hold such office.
v. DOMINGO v ZAMORA
(G.R. No. 142283, February 6, 2003)
Carpio, J.
FACTS:
On 5 March 1999, former President Jospeh E. Estrada issued EO 81 entitled Transferring the
Sports Programs and Activities of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports to the Philippine
Sports Commission and Defining the Role of DECS in School-Based Sports.
Pursuant to EO 81, former DECS Secretary Gonzales issued Memorandum No. 01592
reassingning all remaining BPESS staff to other divisions or bureaus of the DECS. Secretary
Gonzales then issued another memorandum reassigning the BPESS Staff named in the
Memorandum to various offices within DECS. The petitioners were dissatisfied with the reassignment.
They argue that EO 81 is void for being an undue legislation by President Estrada. They likewise
challenged the DECS Memoranda for violating their right to security of tenure.
ISSUE: WON EO 81 and DECS Memoranda are valid.
RULING:
YES. EO 81 is a valid exercise of the President’s delegated power to reorganize the Office of
the President. The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring need of every
President to reorganize his office to achieve simplicity, economy, and efficiency. To remain effective
and efficient, the Office of the President must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the
President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. After all, the Office of
the President is command post of the President. This is the rationale behind the President’s
continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President.
Petitioners contention that the DECS is not part of the Office of the President is immaterial.
Under EO 292 which expressly grants the President the power to reorganize the Office of the
President, the DECS is indisputably a Department of the Executive Branch. Even if it is not part of
the Office of the President, said EO clearly authorizes the President to transfer any function or agency
of the DECS.
3. CONTROL
a. Banda v. Ermita
(G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010)
FACTS:
President GMA issued Executive Order No. 378 on 2004 amending Section 6 of Executive
Order No. 285 by, inter alia, removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO (National Printing Office)
over the printing services requirements of government agencies and instrumentalities. Pursuant to
Executive Order No. 378, government agencies and instrumentalities are allowed to source their
printing services from the private sector through competitive bidding, subject to the condition that the
services offered by the private supplier be of superior quality and lower in cost compared to what was
offered by the NPO.
Executive Order No. 378 also limited NPO’s appropriation in the General Appropriations Act
to its income. Perceiving Executive Order No. 378 as a threat to their security of tenure as employees
of the NPO, petitioners now challenge its constitutionality, contending that: (1) it is beyond the
executive powers of President Arroyo to amend or repeal Executive Order No. 285 issued by former
President Aquino when the latter still exercised legislative powers; and (2) Executive Order No. 378
violates petitioners’ security of tenure, because it paves the way for the gradual abolition of the NPO.
ISSUE: Whether EO 378 is constitutional.
RULING:
YES. It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has the power to re
organize the offices and agencies in the executive department in line with the President’s
constitutionally granted power of control over executive offices and by virtue of previous delegation
of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes. Executive Order No.
292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 gives the President continuing authority to reorganize and
redefine the functions of the Office of the President. Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of the
said Code, is explicit: The President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to
achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the President. It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency
that is part of the Office of the Press Secretary (which in various times has been an agency directly
attached to the Office of the Press Secretary or as an agency under the Philippine Information
Agency), is part of the Office of the President. To be very clear, this delegated legislative power to
reorganize pertains only to the Office of the President and the departments, offices and agencies of
the executive branch and does not include the Judiciary, the Legislature or the constitutionally-created
or mandated bodies. Moreover, it must be stressed that the exercise by the President of the power
to reorganize the executive department must be in accordance with the Constitution, relevant laws
and prevailing jurisprudence.
b. Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines v. Romulo

(G.R. No. 160093, July 31, 2007)
PUNO, C.J.
FACTS:
President Joseph E. Estrada issued E.O. No. 102 on May 24, 1999 pursuant to Section 20,
Chapter 7, Title I, Book III of E.O. No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, and
Sections 78 and 80 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8522, also known as the General Appropriations Act
(GAA) of 1998. E.O. No. 102 provided for structural changes and redirected the functions and
operations of the Department of Health. On October 19, 1999, the President issued E.O. No. 165
"Directing the Formulation of an Institutional Strengthening and Streamlining Program for the
Executive Branch" which created the Presidential Committee on Executive Governance (PCEG)
composed of the Executive Secretary as chair and the Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) as co-chair.
Secretary of Health Issued issued Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 94, Series of 2000, which
set the implementing guidelines for the restructuring process on personnel selection and placement,
retirement and/or voluntary resignation. A.O. No. 94 outlined the general guidelines for the selection
and placement of employees adopting the procedures and standards set forth in R.A. No. 66564 or
the "Rules on Governmental Reorganization," Civil Service Rules and Regulations, Sections 76 to 78
of the GAA for the Year 2000, and Section 42 of E.O. No. 292. On August 29, 2000, the Secretary of
Health issued Department Memorandum No. 157, Series of 2000.
Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines, Inc. (MEWAP) is a union of
affected employees in the Malaria Control Service of the Department of Health. MEWAP filed a case
assailing that E.O. 102 violates E.O. 292 and R.A 8522.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President has the power to reorganize structurally and functionally the
functions of the Department of Health.
RULING:
Yes. The President has the authority to carry out a reorganization of the Department of Health
under the Constitution and statutory laws pursuant to Article VII, Sections 1 and 17 of the 1987
Constitution. The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with
the legislature. This proceeds from the legal precept that the power to create includes the power to
destroy. A public office is either created by the Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law. Thus,
except where the office was created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same
legislature that brought it into existence. The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies
or offices in the executive department are concerned, the President’s power of control may justify him
to inactivate the functions of a particular office, or certain laws may grant him the broad authority to
carry out reorganization measures.
c. Domingo v. Zamora
(G.R. No. 142283, February 6, 2003)
Carpio, J.
FACTS:
On March 5, 1999, former President Joseph E. Estrada issued Executive Order No. 81 entitled
"Transferring the Sports Programs and Activities of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
to the Philippine Sports Commission and Defining the Role of DECS in School-Based Sports."
Pursuant to EO 81, former DECS Secretary Andrew B. Gonzales issued Memorandum No. 01592 on
January 10, 2000. Memorandum No. 01592 temporarily reassigned, in the exigency of the service,
all remaining BPESS Staff to other divisions or bureaus of the DECS effective March 15, 2000.
On January 21, 2000, Secretary Gonzales issued Memorandum No. 01594 reassigning the
BPESS staff named in the Memorandum to various offices within the DECS effective March 15, 2000.
Petitioners were among the BPESS personnel affected by Memorandum No. 01594. Dissatisfied with
their reassignment, petitioners filed the instant petition. Petitioners argue that EO 81 is void and
unconstitutional for being an undue legislation by President Estrada. Petitioners maintain that the
President’s issuance of EO 81 violated the principle of separation of powers. Petitioners also
challenge the DECS Memoranda for violating their right to security of tenure.
ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order 81 and the DECS Memoranda are valid.
RULING:
Yes. Although the issue is moot and academic upon the passing of Republic Act 9155 which
abolished the BPESS and transferred DECS’s functions relating to sports competition to the
Philippine Sports Commission, the Supreme Court stressed that E.O. 292 (Administrative Code of
1987), grants the President continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the President “to achieve
simplicity, economy, and efficiency”. The reorganization of the President of the Office of the President
is limited only to transferring functions from the Office of the President to Departments or agencies or
vice versa. Transfer does not result in the employee’s cessation in the office because his office
continues to exist although in another department or agency.
However, the President's power to reorganize the Office of the President under Section 31 (2)
and (3) of EO 292 should be distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of the President
Proper. Under Section 31 (1) of EO 292, the President can reorganize the Office of the President
Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by transferring functions from one unit to
another. In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, the President's power to reorganize
offices outside the Office of the President Proper but still within the Office of the President is limited
to merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President to Departments or
Agencies, and vice versa.
d. Pichay vs. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs
(G.R. No. 196425, July 24, 2012)
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 13
(E.O. 13), abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs(ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established Investigative and
Adjudicatory Division (IAD).On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed
before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint-affidavit for grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero A.
Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), as
well as the incumbent members of the LWUA Board of Trustees, namely, Renato Velasco, Susana
Dumlao Vargas, Bonifacio Mario M. Pena, Sr. and Daniel Landingin, which arose from the purchase
by the LWUA of Four Hundred Forty-Five Thousand Three Hundred Seventy Seven (445,377) shares
of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc. On April 14, 2011, petitioner received an Order3 signed by
Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr. requiring him and his co-respondents to submit their
respective written explanations under oath. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed a Motion to
Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam manifesting that a case involving the same transaction and
charge of grave misconduct entitled, "Rustico B. Tutol, et al. v. Prospero Pichay, et al.", and docketed
as OMB-C-A-10-0426-I, is already pending before the Office of the Ombudsman.
ISSUE: Whether E.O. 13 is unconstitutional for abrogating unto an administrative office a quasi-
judicial function through and E.O. and not through legislative enactment by Congress.
RULING:
No, because the President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize the Executive Department
under E.O. 292. In the case of Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora the Court affirmed that the
President's authority to carry out are organization in any branch or agency of the executive
department is an express grant by the legislature by virtue of Section 31, Book III, E.O. 292(the
Administrative Code of 1987), "the President, subject to the policy of the Executive Office and in order
to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the President. "The law grants the President this power in
recognition of the recurring need of every President to reorganize his office "to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency." The Office of the President is the nerve center of the Executive Branch. To
remain effective and efficient, the Office of the President must be capable of being shaped and
reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. After
all, the Office of the President is the command post of the President. (Emphasis supplied) Clearly,
the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially created within the
ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the President under his continuing "delegated legislative
authority to reorganize" his own office pursuant to E.O. 292.The President's power to reorganize the
Office of the President under Section31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 should be distinguished from his power
to reorganize the Office of the President Proper. Under Section 31 (1) of EO292, the President can
reorganize the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by
transferring functions from one unit to another. In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292,
the President's power to reorganize offices outside the Office of the President Proper but still within
the Office of the President is limited to merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of
the President to Departments or agencies, and vice versa. The distinction between the allowable
organizational actions under Section31(1) on the one hand and Section 31 (2) and (3) on the other is
crucial not only as it affects employees' tenurial security but also insofar as it touches upon the validity
of the reorganization, that is, whether the executive actions undertaken fall within the limitations
prescribed under E.O. 292. When the PAGC was created under E.O. 12, it was composed of a
Chairman and two (2) Commissioners who held the ranks of Presidential Assistant II and I,
respectively, and was placed directly "under the Office of the President.
e. DENR v DENR Region 12 Employees

(G.R. No. 149724, August 19, 2003)
Ynares-Santiago, J.
FACTS:
Regional Executive Director of DENR for Region 12, Israel Gaddi, issued a Memorandum,
(pursuant to DENR Admin Order 99-14) directing immediate transfer of the DENR [Region] 12 offices
from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato Respondents filed with RTC a petition for nullity of
orders with prayer for preliminary injunction. TC issued TRO enjoining petitioner from implementing
assailed Memorandum Petitioner filed MR with motion to dismiss raising the ff grounds:
1. power to transfer the Regional Office of the DENR is executive in nature

2. The decision to transfer the Regional Office is based on EO 429, which reorganized
Region 12
3. The validity of EO 429 has been affirmed by the SC in the case of Chiongbian vs.
Orbos (1995)
4. Since the power to reorganize the Administrative Regions is executive in nature citing
Chiongbian, the SC has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition
Subsequently, TC rendered judgment ordering that the assailed Memorandum be not

enforced for being bereft of legal basis and issued with grave abuse of discretion. Furthermore, TC
ordered that the seat of the DENR Regional Offices be returned to Cotabato City. Petitioner’s MR
was denied. Appeal before the CA was dismissed outright on procedural grounds. Another MR was
denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR.
RULING:
YES. Under the doctrine of qualified political agency, which recognizes the establishment of
a single executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief
Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to
act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President as provided for under Article
VII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution.
Applying the doctrine of qualified political agency, the power of the President to reorganize
the National Government may validly be delegated to his cabinet members exercising control over a
particular executive department. .In the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the
DENR by ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal,
South Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed
to be the acts of the President for the latter had not expressly repudiated the same.
f. CITY OF ILIGAN v DIRECTOR OF LANDS

(G.R. No. L-30852, February 26, 1988)
Gancayco, J.
FACTS:
President issued Proclamation 335, withdrawing certain parcels of public land in Iligan from
sale or settlement and reserving such for the use of NPC (Nat’l Power Corporation). By virtue of said
proclamation, NPC constructed a fertilizer plant named “Maria Cristina” Later, NPC sold the fertilizer
plant to “Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corp” with all the machineries, right of occupancy, and use of land
and then covenanted to collaborate with DANR in facilitating sale and right to lease for at least 25
years, the lands where plant is erected. Proclamation 20 and 198 were issued. Proc. 20 – excluding
from operation of Proc. 335 certain areas occupied by “Ma. Cristina” and Employees Housing and
declaring such lands for open disposition. Proc. 198 – changing the technical description of said areas
(6 lots). Then “Marcelo Steel” and “Ma. Cristina” filed a Msc. Sales Application with the Bureau of
Lands “Marcelo Tire” and “Ma. Cristina” are sister corporations. Purchaser was “Marcelo Tire” but
another sister corp. “Marcelo Steel” operated said plant. In the notice of sale issued in Manila, Director
of Lands advised that Bureau will sell in an auction said lands of “Marcelo Steel.” President then
issued Proc. 469 – excluding from the reservation made in favor to NPC certain lands in Iligan (Lot
1, 1-a, 3, and 4) and DONATING said lands in favor of Iligan City. Mayor of Iligan wrote to Director of
Lands informing him that City is the owner of said lands and foreshores in auction. But no action was
taken on said request for exclusion and so City filed a complaint for injunction in CFI against Director.
Injunction temporarily issued. Pending case, President Marcos issued Proc. 94 – excluding from the
donation in Proc. 469 certain lands (Lot 1-a, 2-a, and 3) and declaring same for open disposition. CFI
dismissed the complaint of City and dissolved injunction. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not President has the authority to grant a portion of public domain to any
government like the City of Iligan.
RULING:
YES
• Section 60 of Public Land Act states that tracts of land can be disposed of by grant, donation
or transfer made to a province, municipality, branch, or subdivision of government for
purposes conducive to public interest.
• Who has authority to donate? Secretary of Agriculture and National Resources through
Director of Lands (Sec 60)
• Can President donate instead of Secretary and Director? YES
• Director has direct executive control of lands (e.g. lease, sale, concession, disposition of land
of public domain)
• Director SUBJECT to control of Secretary of Agriculture.
• Secretary’s control is SUBJECT to control of PRESIDENT
• Under Art VII Sec 17: President shall control ALL executive departments, bureaus, and offices.
• Hence, President has the same authority to dispose of portions of public domain as his
subordinates.
• Such authority to dispose is also granted to the President under Section 69 of the Public Land
Act.
• Since, President has the authority to donate lands of public domain for residential,
commercial, & industrial purposes. Questioned Proclamation 469 is VALID and binding:
• Ownership of lands now vested in City of Iligan.
• Mayor of City upon proclamation immediately had the lots surveyed and entered into
negotiation with National Investment and Development Corp. and those interested in
developing the Coco-Chemical Plant in order to accelerate economic expansion in the City.
• Proclamation 94 is NULL and VOID as said parcels had been segregated and had become
property of Iligan.
Decision of CFI REVERSED.

g. Araneta v Gatmaitan
(G.R. Nos. L-8895 L-9191, April 30, 1957)
Felix, J.
FACTS:
San Miguel Bay, located between the provinces of Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur, a
part of the National waters of the Philippines with an extension of about 250 square miles and an
average depth of approximately 6 fathoms, is considered as the most important fishing area in the
Pacific side of the Bicol region. The operation of trawls in the area was said to have depleted the
marine resources in the area. On April 4, 1954, the President issued Executive Order 22, prohibiting
the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay, and the E.O 66 and 80 as amendments to EO 22, as a response
for the general clamor among the majority of people living in the coastal towns of San Miguel Bay. A
group of Otter trawl operators filed a complaint for injunction to restrain the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources from enforcing the said E.O. and to declare E.O 22 as null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order Nos. 22, 60 and 80 were valid.
RULING:
Yes. Congress provided under the Fisheries Act that a.) it is unlawful to take or catch fry or
fish eggs in the waters of the Phil and; b.) it authorizes Sec. of Agriculture and Nat. Resources to
provide regulations and restrictions as may be deemed necessary. The Fisheries Act is complete in
itself, leaving to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources the promulgation of rules and
regulations to carry into effect the legislative intent. It also appears from the exhibits on record in
these cases that fishing with trawls causes "a wanton destruction of the mother shrimps laying their
eggs and the millions of eggs laid and the inevitable extermination of the shrimps specie" , and that,
"the trawls ram and destroy the fish corrals. The heavy trawl nets dig deep into the ocean bed. They
destroy the fish food which lies below the ocean floor. Their daytime catches net millions of shrimps
scooped up from the mud. In their nets they bring up the life of the sea".
Consequently, when the President, in response to the clamor of the people and authorities of
Camarines Sur issued Executive Order No. 80 absolutely prohibiting fishing by means of trawls in all
waters comprised within the San Miguel Bay, he did nothing but show an anxious regard for the
welfare of the inhabitants of said coastal province and dispose of issues of general concern (Sec. 63,
R.A.C.) which were in consonance and strict conformity with the law.
h. Lacson-Magallanes Company, Inc. v. Pano

(G.R. No. L-27811. November 17, 1967)
Sanchez, J.
FACTS:
In 1932, Jose Magallanes was a permittee and actual occupant of a 1,103-hectare pasture
land situated in Tamlangon, Municipality of Bansalan, Province of Davao. On January 9, 1953,
Magallanes ceded his rights and interests to a portion (392,7569 hectares) of the above public land
to Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc., and, on April 13, 1954, the portion Magallanes ceded to plaintiff was
officially released from the forest zone as pasture land and declared agricultural land. On January 26,
1955, Jose Paño and nineteen other claimants applied for the purchase of ninety hectares of the
released area. Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc., in turn filed its own sales application covering the entire
released area. This was protested by Jose Paño and his nineteen companions upon the averment
that they are actual occupants of the part thereof covered by their own sales application. The Director
of Lands, following an investigation of the conflict, rendered a decision giving due course to the
application of plaintiff corporation, and dismissing the claim of Jose Paño and his companions.
A move to reconsider failed. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources — on appeal
by Jose Paño for himself and his companions — held that the appeal was without merit and dismissed
the same. The case was elevated to the President of the Philippines, and, the Executive Secretary
Juan Pajo, "by authority of the President" decided the controversy, modified the decision of the
Director of Lands as affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and (1) declared
that "it would be for the public interest that appellants, who are mostly landless farmers who depend
on the land for their existence, be allocated that portion on which they have made improvements;"
and (2) directed that the controverted land (northern portion of Block I, LC Map1749, Project No. 27,
of Bansalan, Davao, with Latian River as the dividing line) "should be subdivided into lots of
convenient sizes and allocated to actual occupants, without prejudice to the corporation's right to
reimbursement for the cost of surveying this portion." Plaintiff corporation took the foregoing decision
to the Court of First Instance praying that judgment be rendered declaring: (1) that the decision of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has full force and effect; and (2) that the decision of
the Executive Secretary is contrary to law and of no legal force and effect.
ISSUES:
1. Whether decisions of the Director of Lands "as to questions of facts shall be conclusive when
approved" by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, is controlling not only upon courts
but also upon the President.
2. Whether the decision of the Executive Secretary herein is an undue delegation of power (It is
argued that it is the constitutional duty of the President to act personally upon the matter)
3. Whether one department head, on the pretext that he is an alter ego of the President, cannot
intrude into the zone of action allocated to another department secretary
RULING:
1. NO. The President can rule on the correctness of a decision of a department Secretary. The
President's duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of all executive
departments. Thus it is, that department heads are men of his confidence. His is the power to appoint
them; his, too, is the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure. Naturally, he controls and directs their
acts. Implicit then is his authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his
department secretaries. Parenthetically, it may be stated that the right to appeal to the President
reposes upon the President's power of control over the executive departments. And control simply
means "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the
latter."
2. NO. the Chief Executive may delegate to his Executive Secretary acts which the Constitution does
not command that he perform in person. The President is not expected to perform in person all the
multifarious executive and administrative functions. The Office of the Executive Secretary is an
auxiliary unit which assists the President. The rule which has thus gained recognition is that "under
our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the
President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order" that the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue.
3. NO. The Executive Secretary acts "by authority of the President," his decision is that of the
President's. Such decision is to be given full faith and credit by our courts. The assumed authority of
the Executive Secretary is to be accepted. For, only the President may rightfully say that the Executive
Secretary is not authorized to do so. Therefore, unless the action taken is "disapproved or reprobated
by the Chief Executive," that remains the act of the Chief Executive, and cannot be successfully
assailed.
i. Hontiveros-Baraquel v. Toll Regulatory Board

(G.R. No. 181293, February 23, 2015)
Sereno, C.J.
FACTS:
The Toll Regulatory Board was created under Presidential Decree No. 1112 in order to
regulate the collection of toll fees and the operation of toll facilities. Presidential Decree No. 1113 was
also enacted granting Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (now Philippine
National Construction Company or PNCC) the right, privilege and authority to construct, operate and
maintain toll facilities at the North and South Luzon Expressways for a period of thirty years starting
May 1, 1977. Presidential Decree no. 1894 amended 1113, granting PNCC the right, privilege and
authority to construct, operate, and maintain toll facilities not only in the North and South Luzon
Expressways but also Metro Manila Expressway, provided that the franchise granted a thirty-year
term to PNCC from the date of completion of the project.
PNCC and CITRA, an Indonesian company, passed a Joint Investment Proposal of the
financing, design and construction of the Metro Manila Skyways. It was approved by the TRB. PNCC
and CITRA entered into a Business and Joint Venture Agreement. They established CITRA Metro
Manila Tollways Corporation. In the Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement (STOA), the
construction and design of the roads were primary and exclusive privilege of the CMMTC while
maintenance and operation was given to PNCC Skyway Corporation.
In 1997, an Amendment to the Supplemental Toll Operations Agreement was issued by TRB, PNCC
and CITRA and replaced PSC with Skyway O & M Corporation (SOMCO) for the operation and
maintenance of the Metro Manila Skyway.
ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioners have standing;
2. Whether the TRB has the power to grant authority to operate a toll facility;
3. Whether the assumption of toll operations by SOMCO is disadvantageous to the government.
RULING:
1. Petitioner filed as a legislator in her capacity as party-list representative of Akbayan. Hence,
petitioners do not have the requisite legal standing, and as such, she was only allowed to sue to
question the validity of any official action when it infringes on their prerogatives as members of
Congress.
2. The Court has ruled that first, it is clear that Congress does not have the sole authority to grant
franchises for the operation of public utilities. Congress is not required before each and every public
utility may operate. Unless there is a law that specifically requires a franchise for the operation of a
public utility, particular agencies in the executive branch may issue authorizations and licenses for
the operation of certain classes of public utilities. The authority to operate a public utility can be
granted by administrative agencies when authorized by law.
3. The allegations of petitioners are nothing more than speculations, apprehensions, and
suppositions. It is understandable that SOMCO does not yet have a proven track record in toll
operations, considering that it was only the Amendment to the Supplemental Toll Operation
Agreement (ASTOA) and the Memorandum of Agreement that gave birth to it.
j. Angangco v. Castillo
(G.R. No. L-17169, November 30, 1963)
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.
FACTS:
Pepsi-Cola Far East Trade Development Co. wrote a letter to the Secretary of Commerce
and Industry requesting a special permit to withdraw certain items from the customs house which
were imported without dollar allocation or remittance of foreign exchange. These were Pepsi-Cola
concentrates which were not covered by any Central Bank release certificate. The company also sent
a letter to the Secretary of Finance who was also Chairman of the Monetary Board of the Central
Bank. After failure to secure the permit from the Central Bank, its counsels approached Collector of
Customs Angangco to secure the immediate release of the concentrates, but advised the counsel to
secure the release certificate from the No-Dollar Import Office. The Non-Dollar Import Office wrote a
letter to Angangco that stated that his office had no objection to the release of the concentrates but
could not take action on the request as it was not in their jurisdiction. Angangco telephoned the
Secretary of Finance who expressed his approval of the release on the basis of said certificate.
Collector Angangco finally released the concentrates. When Commissioner of Customs learned of
the release he filed an administrative complaint against Collector of Customs Angangco. For three
years Angangco had been discharging the duties of his office. Then, Executive Secretary Castillo, by
authority of the President, rendered his judgment against the petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President has the power to remove officials under the classified civil
service.
RULING:
The President does not have the power to remove officers or employees in the classified
civil service.
It is clear that under the present provision of the Civil Service Act of 1959, the case of
petitioner comes under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service, and having
been deprived of the procedure laid down in connection with the investigation and disposition of his
case, it may be said that he has been deprived of due process as guaranteed by said law.
The Power of control of the President may extend to the Power to investigate, suspend or remove
officers and employees who belong to the executive department if they are presidential appointees
but not with regard to those officers or employees who belong to the classified service for as to them
that inherent power cannot be exercised.
This is in line with the provision of our Constitution which says that "the Congress may by
law vest the appointment of the inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in heads of
department" (Article VII, Section 10 [3], Constitution). With regard to these officers whose
appointments are vested on heads of departments, Congress has provided by law for a procedure
for their removal precisely in view of this constitutional authority. One such law is the Civil Service Act
of 1959.
It well established in this case that it is contrary to law to take direct action on the
administrative case of an employee under classified service even with the authority of the President
without submitting the case to the Commissioner of Civil Service
k. Hutchison Ports Philippines Limitedv.Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority

(G.R. No. 131367, August 31, 2000)
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
FACTS:
The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SMBA) called for bidders for the development and
operation of a modern marine container terminal within the Subic Bay Freeport Zone, which declared
three pre-qualified bidders, which included the International Container Terminal Services, Inc.
(ICTSI), a consortium consisting of Royal Port Services, Inc. and HPC Hamburg PortConsulting
GMBH (or RPSI); and (3) Hutchison Ports Philippines Limited (or HPPL) a corporation organized in
the British Virgin Islands, representing a consortium composed of HPPL, Guoco Holdings (Phils.),
Inc. and Unicol Management Services, Inc. After evaluation of the bids, and resolution of issues
concerning ICTSI’s qualification, SMBA awarded the project to HPPL. The award was protested to
by ICTSI with the President, which later on prompted the President to direct SMBA to conduct a re-
bidding, which led HPPL to file an injunction against the re-bidding, arguing that there was already a
perfected contract since it was the winning bidder in the first bidding. During the pendency of the
case, a re-bidding was ultimately conducted where ICTSI was declared as the winning bidder. In the
petition, aside from the legality of the re-bidding, HPPL’s standing to file the case was questioned
due to the lack of license to engage in business in the Philippines, thus this petition.
ISSUE: Whether participating in the bidding is a mere isolated transaction, or did it constitute
engaging in or transacting business in the Philippines such that HPPL needed a license to do
business in the Philippines before it could come to Court.
RULING:
It was engaged in business in Philippines There is no general rule or governing principle
laid down as to what constitutes "doing “or "engaging in" or "transacting" business in the Philippines.
Each case must be judged in the light of its peculiar circumstances. Thus, it has often been held that
a single act or transaction may be considered as "doing business" when a corporation performs acts
for which it was created or exercises some of the functions for which it was organized. The amount
or volume of the business is of no moment, for even a singular act cannot be merely incidental or
casual if it indicates the foreign corporation’s intention to do business. Participating in the bidding
process constitutes "doing business" because it shows the foreign corporation’s intention to engage
in business here. The bidding for the concession contract is but an exercise of the corporation’s
reason for creation or existence. Thus, it has been held that "a foreign company invited to bid for
IBRD and ADB international projects in the Philippines will be considered as doing business in the
Philippines for which a license is required." In this regard, it is the performance by a foreign
corporation of the acts for which it was created, regardless of volume of business, that determines
whether foreign corporation needs a license or not.
l. Pimentel v. Aguirre
(G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000)
Panganiban, J.
FACTS:
On December 27, 1997, The President issued Administrative Order No 372 stating that all
government departments and agencies, including state universities and colleges, government-owned
and controlled corporations and local government units will identify and implement measures in Fiscal
Year 1998 that will reduce total expenditures for the year by at least 25% of authorized regular
appropriations for non-personal services items.
This is a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking to annul Section 2 of the
Administrative Order No. 372, insofar as it requires local government units to reduce their
expenditures and enjoin the implementation of sec. 4 of the Order, withholding a portion of the internal
revenue allotments.
ISSUE: Whether Secs. 1 & 4 of AO 372 are valid exercises of the President’s power of general
supervision over LGUs.
RULING:
Sec. 1 – YES; Sec. 4 – NO
The Court held that Sec. 1 of AO 372, being merely an advisory is well within the powers of
the President. It is not a mandatory imposition, and such directive cannot be characterized as an
exercise of the power of control.
Local fiscal autonomy does not rule out any manner of national government intervention by
way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with
national goals. The AO is intended only to advise all government agencies and instrumentalities to
undertake cost-reduction measures that will help maintain economic stability in the country. It does
not contain any sanction in case of noncompliance.
The Local Government Code also allows the President to interfere in local fiscal matters,
provided that certain requisites are met:
(1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government;

(2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of Representatives
and the presidents of the various local leagues;
(3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance,
Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management; and
(4) any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than 30% of the collection of
national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current one.
However, Sec. 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is
the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by
the Constitution and the Local Government Code. Section 4 which orders the withholding of a portion
of the LGU’s IRA clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law.
m. AMPATUAN V. HON. RONALDO PUNO

(G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011)
Panganiban, J.
FACTS:
The day following the massacre of 57 men and women, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
issued Proclamation 1946, placing the province of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and the city of
Cotabato under a state of emergency. She then directed the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
to undertake such measures to prevent and suppress all forms of lawlessness as may be provided
by law. Three days later, Arroyo issued Administrative Order No. 273 (AO 273), transferring
supervision of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) from the Office of the President
to the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). Due to issues on terminology however,
AO 273-A was issued, amending the term “transferring” to “delegating” supervision instead.
Datu Zaldy Ampatuan and other ARMM officials subsequently filed a petition for prohibition,
claiming that the aforesaid issuances encroached upon ARMM’s local autonomy, as it granted the
DILG Secretary the power to exercise control over the ARMM, instead of mere administrative
supervision, which in effect empowered the DILG Secretary to take over ARMM’s operations and
seize its regional government’s powers.
In its comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) insisted that the President issued
the Proclamation to restore peace and order in the places in concern, that the issuance was pursuant
to her “calling out” power, and that she merely delegate through the AOs her supervisory powers over
the ARMM to the DILG Secretary as her alter ego.
• In November 2009, the day after the gruesome massacre, PGMA issued Proclamation 1946,
which placed Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City under the state of emergency
(i.e., calling out the AFP and PNP). This was to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless
violence in the mentioned places.
• Similarly, PGMA issued AO 273-A, which delegated the President’s supervision over ARMM
to DILG Secretary.
• Petitioners assailed the said presidential issuances on the ground that it encroached on the
ARMM’s autonomy pursuant to the Expanded ARMM Act and CONST., art. 10, sec. 16 and
that there was no factual basis on the declaration of the state of emergency.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the said presidential issuances violate the principle of local autonomy? NO
2. Whether or not PGMA invalidly exercised the emergency powers stated in CONST. art. 7,
sec. 18? NO
3. Whether or not PGMA had factual basis for her actions? YES
RULING:
1. No. The DILG Secretary did not take over control of the powers of the ARMM. After law
enforcement agents took respondent Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged complicity in the
Maguindanao massacre, the ARMM Vice¬Governor, petitioner Ansaruddin Adiong, assumed the
vacated post. The DILG Secretary did not take over the administration or operations of the ARMM.
2. No. The President did not proclaim a national emergency as contemplated in CONST. art. 6, sec.
23(2), only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. The calling out of the armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests
in the President as stated in CONST. art. 7, sec. 18.
3. Yes. It is clearly to the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for
calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence. In IBP v. Zamora, SC held
that If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the President acted without
factual basis, then this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings –
the burden of proof is with the petitioner asserting the lack of basis on the part of the president.
Both the military and police had to prepare for and prevent reported retaliatory actions from
the Mangudadatus, as they have ~1,800 personnel with ~200 firearms. On the other hand, the
Ampatuans have ~2,400 personnel with ~2,000 firearms. Likewise, intelligence reports showed the
potential involvement of rebel armed groups (RAGs) – both the Ampatuans and Mangudadatus are
supported by different RAGs. The imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President issued
Proclamation 1946 was too grave to ignore and she had to act to prevent further bloodshed and
hostilities in the places mentioned. PNoy even, has not withdrawn the declaration of state of
emergency.
The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

4. MILITARY POWERS
a. GUDANI V SENGA
(G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006)
TINGA, J.
FACTS:
Senator Rodolfo Biazon (Sen. Biazon) invited several senior officers of the AFP to appear
at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security scheduled on 28
Sept. 2005. The hearing was scheduled after topics concerning the conduct of the 2004 elections
emerged in the public eye, particularly allegations of massive cheating and the surfacing of copies of
an audio excerpt purportedly of a phone conversation between President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
and then COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano.
At the time of the 2004 elections, Petitioner Gen. Gudani had been designated as
commander, and co-petitioner Col. Balutan a member, of Joint Task Force Ranao by the AFP
Southern Command. Joint Task Force Ranao was tasked with the maintenance of peace and order
during the 2004 elections in the provinces of Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur. Gen. Gudani, Col.
Balutan, and AFP Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Generoso Senga were among the several AFP
officers who received a letter invitation from Sen. Biazon to attend the 28 Sept. 2005 hearing.
On 26 Sept. 2005, the Office of the Chief of Staff of the AFP issued a Memorandum directing
Gudani and Balutan to attend the 28 Sept. 2005 meeting. Gen. Senga wrote a letter to Sen. Biazon,
requesting the postponement of the hearing scheduled for the following day. Then, on the evening of
27 Sept. 2005, a message was transmitted to the PMA Superintendent from the office of Gen. Senga
PGMA, NO AFP PERSONNEL SHALL APPEAR BEFORE ANY CONGRESSIONAL OR SENATE
HEARING WITHOUT HER APPROVAL.
The next day, before the hearing, Gen. Senga called Commodore Tolentino on the latter’s
cell phone and asked to talk to Gen. Gudani, but Gen. Gudani refused. In response, Gen. Senga
instructed Commodore Tolentino to inform Gen. Gudani that it was an order, yet Gen. Gudani still
refused to take Gen. Senga’s call.
A few hours after Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had concluded their testimony, the office of
Gen. Senga issued a statement which noted that the two had appeared before the Senate Committee
in spite of the fact that a guidance has been given that a Presidential approval. The two were held to
have disobeyed a legal order, in violation of Articles of War 65 (Willfully Disobeying Superior
Officer), hence they will be subjected to General Court Martial proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the AFP
preventing them from testifying before a legislative inquiry.
RULING:
Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power
as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is
liable under military justice. At the same time, any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance
before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law
to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be
compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be
commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders
have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.
SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior
consent on executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In
doing so, the Court recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that
the privilege must be formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the President to
prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on
the Chief Executive’s power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of
the armed forces. The President’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the
same limitations as in executive privilege.
At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear
before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the
legislature’s functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. In as much as it is ill-advised for
Congress to interfere with the President’s power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for
the President to unduly interfere with Congress’s right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse
did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential
prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that the President has the right
to require prior consent from members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.
The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the
appearance of the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with
the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless
obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts.
b. DAVID V MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
(G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006)
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People
Power I, President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation (PP) 1017 and GO No.6 as to implement
it.
The reasons that the President stated for declaring such General Order to implement the
Presidential Proclamation were that over the past several months, elements in political opposition
have conspired with extreme left represented by NDF-CCP-NPA and military adventurists. This
presented a clear danger to the president as political opposition tried to oust her as president and
take over the government. On March 3, Presidential Proclamation 1017 was lifted by President
Arroyo. The Solicitor General defended the basis of President Arroyo for declaring PP 1017, was that
the intent of the Constitution was to give the President full discretionary powers in determining the
necessity to call out the AFP. Notwithstanding the SG’s contentions, the Magdalo group instigated
the Oakwood mutiny and wearing or read bands on their left arms to show disgust.
Simultaneously, Oplan Hackle I (plans of bombings and attacks on the PMA alumni
homecoming in Baguio, where the President was invited) was discovered. The next morning, after
the discovery of the plan, a bomb was discovered in the campus. Also, information was intercepted
by PNP Chief Arturo Lomibao regarding PNP-SAF members that are planning to defect from the
Arroyo administration, along with Congressman Peping Cojuanco who planned out moves to bring
down said administration.
A large number of soldiers joined the rallies as critical mass and armed components to anti-
arroyo protests. Another factual basis after the issuance of the Presidential Proclamation and General
Order was the bombings of telephone communication towers and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan.
These events show a clear and present critical situation, leading the President to cancel all events
related to EDSA People Power I. Executive Secretary Mike Arroyo, declared that warrantless arrest
and takeover of facilities can be implemented. One of these warrantless arrests was Randy David
(Filipino journalist, UP professor), due to mistake of fact that he was a participant in the street rallies.
Also, Congressman Crispin Beltran (representative of Anakpawis party). The following facilities were
taken over: Seizure of Daily Tribune, Malaya and Abante (local news publications). This was done,
according to the PNP. to show a strong presence to tell media outlets not to connive or help-out rebels
to take down the government.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Article 6 Section 23 was violated.
2. Whether PP 1017 is constitutional.
RULING:
1. The provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize the President to take
over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest without prior legislation.
It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above provision refers not only to
war but also to “other national emergency.” If the intention of the Framers of our Constitution was to
withhold from the President the authority to declare a “state of national emergency” pursuant to
Section 18, Article VII (calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the existence
of a state of war), then the Framers could have provided so.
But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public
utility or business affected with public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation from
Congress.
The said powers of the President is additionally recognized during the state of national
emergency under PP 1017, can call the military not only to enforce obedience “to all the laws and to
all decrees x x x” but also to act pursuant to the provision of Section 17 which reads:
In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during
the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the
operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such
as the Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency
contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion.
The SC made a distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency, but her
exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise needs authority
from Congress. The authority from Congress must be based on the following:
• There must be a war or other emergency.

• The delegation must be for a limited period only.
• The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
• The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
Thus, the warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and
warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies are
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
2. PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by President Gloria Macapagal-

Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the provisions of PP 1017
commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated
by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Petitioners contend that PP 1017 is void on its face because of its “overbreadth.” They claim
that its enforcement encroached on both unprotected and protected rights under Section 4, Article III
of the Constitution and sent a “chilling effect” to the citizens.
Overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing ‘on their faces’ statutes in
free speech cases. A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or
even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence.
The said powers of the President is recognized in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution
wherein it is stated that the President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. (Calling-out powers)
The Court ruled that the only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that
“whenever it becomes necessary,” the President may call the armed forces “to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
In the present case it is stated that, owing to her Office’s vast intelligence network, she is in
the best position to determine the actual condition of the country.
However, a President must be careful in the exercise of his powers. He cannot invoke a
greater power when he wishes to act under a lesser power. There lies the wisdom of our Constitution,
the greater the power, the greater are the limitations.
Thus according to Justice Mendoza, the PP 1017 is merely an exercise of President Arroyo’s
calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence.
The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, a ‘sequence’ of graduated powers.
The said powers of the President is also recognized in Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution wherein it is stated that The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. (Take Care powers). As
the Executive in whom the executive power is vested, the primary function of the President is to
enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing laws. He sees to it that
all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. In the exercise of such
function, the President, if needed, may employ the powers attached to his office as the Commander-
in-Chief of all the armed forces of the country, including the Philippine National Police under the
Department of Interior and Local Government.
President Arroyo’s ordinance power is limited to the foregoing issuances. She cannot issue
decrees similar to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081. She can only order the
military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President
Arroyo the authority to promulgate “decrees.” Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the
Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that “[t]he legislative power shall be vested in
the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” To
be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President
Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.
c. AMPATUAN V PUNO
(G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011)
ABAD, J.
FACTS:
The day after the infamous Ampatuan massacre happened, President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946, placing the provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and
Cotabato City under a state of emergency. She then directed the AFP and PNP to undertake
measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of
lawless violence in the said areas. Three days later, President Arroyo issued Administrative Order
273 which “transfers” the supervision of the ARMM from the Office of the President to the Department
of Interior and Local Government (DILG). The word “transfer” was then changed to
“delegate/delegating” because of some issues raised over the terminology. It was amended by AO
273-A.
Petitioner contends that the President unlawfully exercised emergency powers when she
ordered the deployment of AFP and PNP personnel in the places mentioned in the proclamation. But
such deployment is NOT by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood under Section
23(2), Article VI of the Constitution. They also claim that the issuance of the AO273/AO273-A
encroached the autonomy of ARMM as a local government unit. Thus the petition of prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate the principle of local
autonomy under Section 16, Article X of the Constitution, and Section 1, Article V of the
Expanded ARMM Organic Act
2. Whether President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out the AFP
and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan
Kudarat, and Cotabato City
RULING:
1. No. the DILG Secretary did not take over control of the powers of the ARMM. After law
enforcement agents took respondent Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged complicity
in the Maguindanao massacre, the ARMM Vice-Governor, petitioner Ansaruddin Adiong,
assumed the vacated post on December 10, 2009 pursuant to the rule on succession found
in Article VII, Section 12, of RA 9054. In turn, Acting Governor Adiong named the then Speaker
of the ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner Sahali-Generale, Acting ARMM Vice-Governor.
In short, the DILG Secretary did not take over the administration or operations of the ARMM.
2. No. The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the
three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that
authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent
or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in
the President a stated in Section 18 of Article 7. Therefore, she did not need a congressional
authority to exercise the same.
d. INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES V ZAMORA

(G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000)
KAPUNAN, J.
FACTS:
Because of the growing number of criminal incidents around Metro Manila, then President
Estrada gave a verbal directive to the PNP and Marines to conduct a joint visibility patrols to prevent
and suppress crimes. The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the AFP, the Chief of
Staff of the PNP and the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government were tasked to execute and
implement the said order. A Letter of Instruction 02/2000 (“LOI”) which detailed the manner of the
“TASK FORCE TULUNGAN” was released by PNP.
The IBP questioned the necessity of calling for the Marines and filed petition to annul LOI
02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Marines, unconstitutional on the ground that: (a) There
was no emergency situation obtains in Metro Manila as would justify such deployment (violates Art
2, Sec. 3 of the constitution), (b) Deployment constitutes an insidious incursion by the military in a
civilian function of government (violates Art. 16, Sec. 5) (c)Deployment creates a dangerous tendency
to rely on the military to perform civilian functions of the government. Unwittingly making the military
more powerful than hat it should be under the constitution Prescinding from its argument that no
emergency situation exists to justify the calling of the Marines, the IBP asserts that by the deployment
of the Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is “militarized” in violation of Section 3, Article II.
ISSUE: Whether the deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian supremacy clause nor
does it infringe the civilian character of the police force.
RULING:
We disagree. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian
supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military
assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility
patrols is appropriately circumscribed. The limited participation of the Marines is evident in the
provisions of the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of the Marines’ authority.
It is noteworthy that the local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times,
the real authority belonging to the PNP.
In fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall leader of the PNP-Philippine Marines
joint visibility patrols. Under the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or orient the soldiers on
police patrol procedures. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines.
Chief of Staff of the AFP, by his alleged involvement in civilian law enforcement, has been virtually
appointed to a civilian post in derogation of the aforecited provision. The real authority in these
operations, as stated in the LOI, is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with
the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there
can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Additionally, the Philippine experience reveals
that it is not averse to requesting the assistance of the military in the implementation and execution
of certain traditionally “civil” functions (e.g. elections, Red Cross, disaster response, etc.)
e. LACSON V PEREZ
(G.R. No. 147780, May 10, 2001)
MELO, J.
FACTS:
On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an "angry and violent mob armed
with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons" assaulting and
attempting to break into Malacañang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a state of
rebellion in the National Capital Region. She likewise issued General Order No. 1 directing the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress the rebellion in the National
Capital Region. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the "rebellion" were
thereafter effected. Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the declaration of a "state of rebellion,"
which allegedly gave a semblance of legality to the arrests, the following four related petitions were
filed before the Court
ISSUE: Whether the Court can inquire into factual basis of “state of rebellion”.
RULING:
Petitioner Lumbao, leader of the People's Movement against Poverty (PMAP), for his part,
argues that the declaration of a "state of rebellion" is violative of the doctrine of separation of powers,
being an encroachment on the domain of the judiciary which has the constitutional prerogative to
"determine or interpret" what took place on May 1, 2001, and that the declaration of a state of rebellion
cannot be an exception to the general rule on the allocation of the governmental powers.
The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot
be objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a combination of
several factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of textual
standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at such judgment
might also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify,
or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the President might
decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical
proof.
On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to
gather information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of
the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary
in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property
The Court, in a proper case, may look into the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise
of this power. However, this is no longer feasible at this time, Proclamation No. 38 having been lifted.
DISMISSED.
f. GUAZON V DE VILLA
(G.R. No. 80508, January 30, 1990)
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
FACTS:
The 41 petitioners alleged that the "saturation drive" or "aerial target zoning" that were
conducted in their place (Tondo Manila) were unconstitutional. They alleged that there is no specific
target house to be search and that there is no search warrant or warrant of arrest served. Most of the
policemen are in their civilian clothes and without nameplates or identification cards. The residents
were rudely rouse from their sleep by banging on the walls and windows of their houses. The residents
were at the point of high-powered guns and herded like cows. Men were ordered to strip down to their
briefs for the police to examine their tattoo marks. The residents complained that they're homes were
ransacked, tossing their belongings and destroying their valuables. Some of their money and
valuables had disappeared after the operation. The residents also reported incidents of maulings,
spot-beatings and maltreatment. Those who were detained also suffered mental and physical torture
to extract confessions and tactical informations. The respondents said that such accusations were all
lies. Respondents contends that the Constitution grants to government the power to seek and cripple
subversive movements for the maintenance of peace in the state. The aerial target zoning were
intended to flush out subversives and criminal elements coddled by the communities were the said
drives were conducted. They said that they have intelligently and carefully planned months ahead for
the actual operation and that local and foreign media joined the operation to witness and record such
event.
ISSUE: Whether or not the saturation drive committed consisted of violation of human rights.
RULING:
It is not the police action per se which should be prohibited rather it is the procedure used
or the methods which "offend even hardened sensibilities" .Based on the facts stated by the parties,
it appears to have been no impediment to securing search warrants or warrants of arrest before any
houses were searched or individuals roused from sleep were arrested. There is no showing that the
objectives sought to be attained by the "aerial zoning" could not be achieved even as th rights of the
squatters and low-income families are fully protected. However, the remedy should not be brought by
a tazpaer suit where not one victim complaints and not one violator is properly charged. In the
circumstances of this taxpayers' suit, there is no erring soldier or policeman whom the court can order
prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts, no permanent relief can be given.
In the meantime, where there is showing that some abuses were committed, the court
temporary restraint the alleged violations which are shocking to the senses. Petition is remanded to
the RTC of Manila.
g. SANLAKAS V REYES
(G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004)
TINGA, J.
FACTS:
AFP-- demanded the resignation of the President and other executive officials because of
the worsening corruption. Due to this, President issued Proclamation 427 and General Order 4 both
of which declared a state of rebellion and calling the AFP to suppress such rebellion. Petitioners
assert that the issuance of the respective Proclamation order 427 and General order 4 is
unconstitutional claimed:
• Section 18 Article 8 of the constitution in so far that it does not authorize a declaration of a
state of rebellion.
• Also they contend that the presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of
emergency powers as the congress has not delegated any power to the president.
• Also, it was an unwarranted and abuse of power to exercise martial law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proclamation calling the state of rebellion is proper.
RULING:
According to Article 18 Article 8 of the constitution the President is granted a “sequence of
graduated powers”: calling out power, power to suspend and the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
and power to declare martial law. The constitution requires the concurrence of two conditions namely
1) an actual invasion or rebellion and that 2) public safety requires the exercise of such power. The
Article not only vests to the president the commander-in-chief power but also with executive powers.
The Commander-in-chief Powers are broad enough when taken together with the provision on
executive power. Thus, the president’s authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main
from her powers as chief executive and draws strength from the commander-in-chief powers.
The Solicitor-general points out Sec. 4 Chapter 2 Book III (Office of the President) of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1987. This provision states that the president’s proclamation gives
notice to the nation that such state exists and that the AFP may be called upon to prevent or suppress
it. Mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights.
These are purely executive powers vested on the President by Sec. 1 and 18 Art. 8 as opposed to
the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2) of Article 6.
h. KULAYAN V TAN
(G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012)
SERENO, J.
FACTS:
Three members of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped
by three armed men who were confirmed as members of the Abu Sayaf Group (ASG). Due to the
said kidnapping of Andres Notter, Eugenio Vagni and Marie Jean Lacaba, who were all members of
the ICRC, the Sulu Crisis Management, headed by Governor Abdusakur Mahail Tan, subsequently
created the Civilian Emergency Forces. Embodied in the “Memorandum of Understanding” are the
intents and purposes of the said creation which was for the main purpose of the prevailing situation
in Sulu as well as the willingness of the civilian supporters to offer their services to “rescue the
hostages”.
Ronaldo Puno, then Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government,
confirmed that the government troops have already cornered the said military group but was forced
to pull back due to the threat of the ASG of beheading one of its hostages. This instance triggered
Gov. Tan to issue Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009 declaring a state of emergency in the province,
due to the terrorist act of kidnapping of the ASG and the need of the ‘carrying out’ of emergency
measures. The Proclamation included the setting up of checkpoints and chokepoints, general
searches and seizures and other public safety measures.
Due to the implementation of the said Proclamation, several alleged ASG supporters were
held under the custody of the local government; hence this petition filed by respondents Jamar
Kulayan, Temogen Tulawie, Hadji Mohammand Yusop Ismi, Ahajan Awadi and SPO1 Sattal H.
Jadjuli.
Petitioners claim that the Provincial Governor is not authorized by any law to create civilian
armed forces under his command, nor regulate and limit the issuances of PTCFORs to his own private
army.
ISSUE: Whether or not a governor can exercise the calling-out powers of a President.
RULING:
No. It has already been established that there is one repository of executive powers, and
that is the President of the Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution
speaks of executive power, it is granted to the President and no one else. Corollary, it is only the
President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under Section
23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became known as the calling-out powers under
Section 7, Article VII thereof.
Additionally, Section 24 of Article XVIII of the Constitution prohibits private armies and other
armed groups. Section 21 of Article XI states that, “The preservation of peace and order within the
regions shall be the responsibility of the local police agencies which shall be organized, maintained,
supervised, and utilized in accordance with applicable laws. The defense and security of the regions
shall be the responsibility of the National Government.”
Taken in conjunction with each other, it becomes clear that the Constitution does not
authorize the organization of private armed groups similar to the CEF (Civilian Emergency Force)
convened by the respondent Governor. Governor Tan is not endowed with the power to call upon the
armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his
authority when he declared a state of emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and
his own Civilian Emergency Force.
i. RUFFY V. CHIEF OF STAFF

(G.R. No. L-533, AUGUST 20, 1956)
TUASON, J.
FACTS:
During the Japanese insurrection in the Philippines, military men were assigned at
designated camps or military bases all over the country. Japanese forces went to Mindoro thus forcing
petitioner and his band move up the mountains and organize a guerilla outfit and call it the "Bolo
area". Capt. Beloncio relieved Ruffy and fellow petitioners of their position and duties in the "Bolo
area" by the new authority vested upon him because of the recent change of command. Capt.
Beloncio was thus allegedly slain by Ruffy and his fellow petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Chief of Staff and the General Court Martial of the Philippine Army should
desist from further proceedings in the trial of petitioners before them.
RULING:
No. The Court RULING that the petitioners were still subject to military law since members
of the Armed Forces were still covered by the National Defense Act, Articles of War and other laws
even during an occupation. The constitutionality of the 93d Article of War is assailed. This article
ordains "that any person subject to military law who commits murder in time of was shall suffer
death or imprisonment for life, as the court martial may direct." The act of unbecoming of an officer
and a gentleman is considered as a defiance of 95th Article of War RULING petitioners liable to
military jurisdiction and trial. Moreover, they were operating officers, which makes them even more
eligible for the military court's jurisdiction. Courts martial are agencies of executive character, and
one of the authorities "for the ordering of courts martial has been held to be attached to the
constitutional functions of the President as Commander in Chief, independently of legislation."
(Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, 2d Edition, p. 49.) Unlike courts of law, they are not a
portion of the judiciary. The petition thus has no merits and is dismissed with costs.
j. KURODA V. JALANDONI
(G.R. No. L-2662. MARCH 26, 1949)
MORAN, C.J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Kuroda, the Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the
Philippines during the Japanese occupation, was charged before the Philippine Military Commission
of war crimes. He questioned the constitutionality of E.O. No. 68 that created the National War Crimes
Office and prescribed rules on the trial of accused war criminals. He contended the Philippines is not
a signatory to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore
he is charged of crimes not based on law, national and international.
ISSUE: Whether or not E.O. No. 68 is valid and constitutional.
RULING:
Yes. The promulgation of said executive order is an exercise by the President of his power
as Commander in chief of all our armed forces as upheld by this Court in the case of Yamashita vs.
Styer (L-129, 42 Off. Gaz., 664) 1 when we said —
War is not ended simply because hostilities have ceased. After cessation of armed hostilities
incident of war may remain pending which should be disposed of as in time of war. An importance
incident to a conduct of war is the adoption of measure by the military command not only to repel and
defeat the enemies but to seize and subject to disciplinary measure those enemies who in their
attempt to thwart or impede our military effort have violated the law of war. (Ex parte Quirin 317 U.S.,
1; 63 Sup. Ct., 2.) Indeed the power to create a military commission for the trial and punishment of
war criminals is an aspect of waging war. And in the language of a writer a military commission has
jurisdiction so long as a technical state of war continues. This includes the period of an armistice or
military occupation up to the effective of a treaty of peace and may extend beyond by treaty
agreement. (Cowles Trial of War Criminals by Military Tribunals, America Bar Association Journal
June, 1944.)
Consequently, the President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to consummate

this unfinished aspect of war namely the trial and punishment of war criminal through the issuance
and enforcement of Executive Order No. 68.
k. OLGAUER V. MILITARY COMMISSION

(G.R. No. L-54558. MAY 22, 1987)
GANCAYCO, J.
FACTS:
In 1979, Olaguer and some others, all civilians, were detained by military personnel and
they were placed in Camp Bagong Diwa. They were charged conspiracy and proposal to commit
rebellion and other various crimes. On 1980, the petitioners went to the Supreme Court and filed the
instant Petition for prohibition and habeas corpus.
ISSUE: Whether or not a military tribunal has the jurisdiction to try civilians while the civil courts are
open and functioning.
RULING:
No. Military tribunals pertain to the Executive Department of the Government and are simply
instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by the legislature for the President as Commander-
in-Chief to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing discipline therein, and
utilized under his orders or those of his authorized military representatives. Following the principle of
separation of powers underlying the existing constitutional organization of the Government of the
Philippines, the power and the duty of interpreting the laws as when an individual should be
considered to have violated the law is primarily a function of the judiciary. It is not, and it cannot be
the function of the Executive Department, through the military authorities. And as long as the civil
courts in the land remain open and are regularly functioning, as they do so today and as they did
during the period of martial law in the country, military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction
over civilians for offenses committed by them and which are properly cognizable by the civil courts.
To have it otherwise would be a violation of the constitutional right to due process of the civilian
concerned.
l. QUILOÑA V. GENERAL COURT MARTIAL

(G.R. No. 96607, MARCH 4, 1992)
PADILLA, J.
FACTS:
The petitioner, a policeman assigned at the Western Police District (WPD), was charged
before respondent General Court Martial with the crime of murder on two (2) counts, under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code. The case is entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Patrolman Oscar
Quiloña."
On 14 December 1990, petitioner, through counsel, wrote a letter to President Corazon C.

Aquino, expressing his desire to be tried by a civilian court and sought a waiver of military jurisdiction,
for the reason, among others, that the "enactment of the Philippine National Police Law creates his
honest belief that he should now be under the actual and real jurisdiction of a civilian court."
Although set for oral argument on 3 January 1991, respondent court decided to have the
motion argued on the day it was filed — 28 December 1990. And after a ten-minute closed-door
deliberation among the members of respondent court martial, it resumed session where it denied the
petitioner's "MOTION FOR THIS HONORABLE COURT MARTIAL TO INHIBIT ITSELF FROM
PURSUING THE ARRAIGNMENT OF THE ACCUSED AND TO HAVE HIS CASE INVESTIGATED
BY THE CIVILIAN PROSECUTOR OR AT LEAST TRIED BY A CIVILIAN COURT.”
ISSUE: Whether or not member of the Philippine National Police are within the jurisdiction of a military
court?
RULING:
The Court RULING that pursuant to R.A. 6975 which states that "SEC. 46. Jurisdiction in
Criminal Cases. —
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, criminal cases involving PNP members
shall be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts: Provided, That the courts-martial
appointed pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1850 shall continue to try PC-INP members who have
already been arraigned, to include appropriate actions thereon by the reviewing authorities pursuant
to Commonwealth Act No. 408, otherwise known as, the Articles of War, as amended by Executive
Order No. 178, otherwise known as the Manual for Courts-Martial: Provided, further, that criminal
cases against PC-INP members who may have not yet been arraigned upon the effectivity of this it
shall be transferred to the proper city or provincial prosecutor or municipal trial court judge.
The statute clearly provides for the jurisdiction of regular courts over PNP members. Even
if the statute is not yet effective on the day the petition was arraigned, it is presumed that the court
had knowledge of the statute which was signed by the President and had been submitted for general
circulation before the petition took place.
m. NAVALES V. GENERAL ABAYA

(G.R. 162318, OCTOBER 25, 2004)
CALLEJO, SR., J.
FACTS:
At past 1:00 a.m. of July 27, 2003, more than three hundred junior officers and enlisted men,
mostly from the elite units of the AFP — the Philippine Army's Scout Rangers and the Philippine
Navy's Special Warfare Group (SWAG) — quietly entered the premises of the Ayala Center in Makati
City. They disarmed the security guards and took over the Oakwood Premier Apartments (Oakwood).
They planted explosives around the building and in its vicinity. Snipers were posted at the Oakwood
roof deck. They claimed that they went to Oakwood to air their grievances against the administration
of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Around 9:00 a.m., Pres. Arroyo gave the soldiers until 5:00
p.m. to give up their positions peacefully and return to barracks. At about 1:00 p.m., she declared the
existence of a "state of rebellion" and issued an order to use reasonable force in putting down the
rebellion. An agreement was forged between the two groups at 9:30 p.m. Shortly thereafter, Pres.
Arroyo announced that the occupation of Oakwood was over. The soldiers agreed to return to
barracks and were out of the Oakwood premises by 11:00 p.m. Under the Information dated August
1, 2003 filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, the Department of Justice (DOJ)
charged 321 of those soldiers who took part in the "Oakwood Incident" with violation of Article 134-A
(coup d'etat) of the Revised Penal Code. Several of the accused filed for a motion praying that the
trial court would assume jurisdiction over all the charges filed before the military tribunal in accordance
with Republic Act No. 7055. While the said motion was pending resolution, the DOJ issued the
Resolution dated October 20, 2003 finding probable cause for coup d'etat against only 31, including
the petitioners, of the original 321 accused and dismissing the charges against the other 290 for
insufficiency of evidence. Petitioners herein where charged before the general martial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court may assume jurisdiction.
RULING:
No. Charges filed under the RTC has been moot and academic with the resolution of the
DOJ. Petitioners now are facing charges on violation of Articles of War before the general court
martial.
In enacting R.A. 7055, the lawmakers merely intended to return to the civilian courts
jurisdiction over those offenses that have been traditionally within their jurisdiction, but did not divest
the military courts jurisdiction over cases mandated by the Articles of War. In view of the clear
mandate of R.A. 7055, the RTC (Branch 148) cannot divest the General Court-Martial of its jurisdiction
over those charged with violations of Articles 63 (Disrespect Toward the President etc.), 64
(Disrespect Toward Superior Officer), 67 (Mutiny or Sedition), 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer
and a Gentleman) and 97 (General Article) of the Articles of War, as these are specifically included
as service-connected offenses or crimes under Section 1 thereof. Pursuant to the same provision of
law, the military courts have jurisdiction over these crimes or offenses.
n. LANSANG V. GARCIA
(G.R. No. L-33964, December 11, 1971)
CONCEPCION, C.J.
FACTS:
Two hand grenades caused 8 deaths and injury to people in the event of the Liberal Party
of the Philippines holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of its
candidates in the 1971 general elections. President Marcos then announced the issuance of
Proclamation No. 889 which suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to suppress
insurrection and rebellion by Marxist-Leninist-Maoist groups. Presently, petitions for writs of habeas
corpus were filed, by a number of persons including the petitioner, who, having been arrested without
a warrant therefor and then detained, upon the authority of said proclamation, assail its validity, as
well as that of their detention.
ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is constitutional?
RULING:
Yes. The court abandoned the Barcelon and Montenergro doctrine that "the authority to
decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension (of the privilege or the writ of habeas
corpus) belongs to the President and his 'decision is final and conclusive' upon the courts and upon
all other persons." It has been ruled that the Court had authority to and should inquire into the
existence of the factual bases required by the Constitution for the suspension of the privilege of the
writ. Proclamation to suspend must satisfy two (2) conditions for the valid exercise of the authority to
suspend the privilege to the writ, to wit: (a) there must be "invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" or —
pursuant to paragraph (2), section 10 of Art. VII of the Constitution — "imminent danger thereof," and
(b) "public safety" must require the suspension of the privilege. In the petitions involved, some of it
became moot and academic for the fact that they have been already released. After deliberations,
including closed-door hearings, the Supreme Court upholds the suspension of the privilege of writ of
habeas corpus after finding satisfying evidences of a massive and systematic Communist-oriented
campaign to overthrow the government by force.
o. FORTUN V. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
(G.R. NO. 190293, MARCH 20, 2012)
ABAD, J.
FACTS:
On November 23, 2009 heavily armed men, believed led by the ruling Ampatuan family,
gunned down and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians on a highway in Maguindanao. In
response to this carnage, on November 24 President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1946,
declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City to prevent and
suppress similar lawless violence in Central Mindanao. On December 4, 2009 President Arroyo
issued Presidential Proclamation 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus in that province except for identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.
On December 9, 2009 Congress, in joint session, convened pursuant to Section 18, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution to review the validity of the President's action. But, two days later or on
December 12 before Congress could act, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 1963, lifting
martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao.
ISSUE: Whether or not Presidential Proclamation 1959 is constitutional.
RULING:
It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in tandem
in exercising the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
They exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after the President has
initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only the Congress can maintain the same based on its
own evaluation of the situation on the ground, a power that the President does not have.
Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that
the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather than
initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through such
review should the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the
Presidents proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political
question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court.
Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of Congress,
which had in fact convened, could act on the same. Consequently, the petitions in these cases have
become moot and the Court has nothing to review. The lifting of martial law and restoration of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any
justiciable controversy.
p. LAGMAN, ET AL. V. MEDIALDEA, ET AL.

(G.R. NO. 231658, JULY 4, 2017)
DEL CASTILLO, J.
FACTS:
Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo Roa
Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. The President submitted to Congress on May
25, 2017, a written Report on the factual basis of the proclamation. The Report pointed out that for
decades, Mindanao has been plagued with rebellion and lawless violence which only escalated and
worsened with the passing of time. The President went on to explain that on May 23, 2017, a
government operation to capture the high-ranking officers of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the
Maute Group was conducted. The lawless activities of the ASG, Maute Group, and other criminals,
brought about undue constraints and difficulties to the military and government personnel, particularly
in the performance of their duties and functions, and untold hardships to the civilians. The Report
highlighted the strategic location of Marawi City and the crucial and significant role it plays in
Mindanao, and the Philippines as a whole. In addition, the Report pointed out the possible tragic
repercussions once Marawi City falls under the control of the lawless groups. In addition to the Report,
representatives from the Executive Department, the military and police authorities conducted
briefings with the Senate and the House of Representatives relative to the declaration of martial law.
After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate issued P.S. Resolution No. 3888
expressing full support to the martial law proclamation and finding Proclamation No. 216 "to be
satisfactory, constitutional and in accordance with the law". In the same Resolution, the Senate
declared that it found "no compelling reason to revoke the same".
ISSUE: Whether the exercise of the power of judicial review by this Court involves the calibration of
graduated powers granted the President as Commander-in-Chief, namely calling out powers,
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and declaration of martial law.
RULING:
The powers to declare martial law and to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
involve curtailment and suppression of civil rights and individual freedom. Thus, the declaration of
martial law serves as a warning to citizens that the Executive Department has called upon the military
to assist in the maintenance of law and order, and while the emergency remains, the citizens must,
under pain of arrest and punishment, not act in a manner that will render it more difficult to restore
order and enforce the law. As such, their exercise requires more stringent safeguards by the
Congress, and review by the Court.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the
functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies... The provision is put there, precisely, to
reverse the doctrine of the Supreme Court. A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of
the Constitution; therefore, it does not suspend the principle of separation of powers.
During martial law, the President may have the powers of a commanding general in a theatre
of war. In actual war when there is fighting in an area, the President as the commanding general has
the authority to issue orders which have the effect of law but strictly in a theater of war, not in the
situation we had during the period of martial law. In a theater of war, civil courts are unable to function.
If in the actual theater of war civil courts, in fact, are unable to function, then the military commander
is authorized to give jurisdiction even over civilians to military courts precisely because the civil courts
are closed in that area. But in the general area where the civil courts are open then in no case can
the military courts be given jurisdiction over civilians. This is in reference to a theater of war where
the civil courts, in fact, are unable to function. It is a state of things brought about by the realities of
the situation in that specified critical area and it is not something that is brought about by a declaration
of the Commander-in-Chief.
A state of martial law is peculiar because the President, at such a time, exercises police
power, which is normally a function of the Legislature. In particular, the President exercises police
power, with the military’s assistance, to ensure public safety and in place of government agencies
which for the time being are unable to cope with the condition in a locality, which remains under the
control of the State.
In David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court stated that under a valid declaration of
martial law, the President as Commander-in-Chief may order the "(a) arrests and seizures without
judicial warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c) [takeover] of news media and agencies and press
censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees x x x". Worthy to note, however, that the above-
cited acts that the President may perform do not give him unbridled discretion to infringe on the rights
of civilians during martial law. This is because martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, neither does it supplant the operation of civil courts or legislative assemblies. Moreover,
the guarantees under the Bill of Rights remain in place during its pendency. And in such instance
where the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is also suspended, such suspension applies only to
those judicially charged with rebellion or offenses connected with invasion.
Clearly, from the foregoing, while martial law poses the most severe threat to civil liberties,
the Constitution has safeguards against the President's prerogative to declare a state of martial law.
q. LAGMAN, ET AL. V. PIMENTEL III

(G.R. NO. 235935, FEBRUARY 6, 2018)
GESMUNDO, J.
FACTS:
Congress approved the extension of martial law for one year pursuant to the letter, dated
December 8, 2017, of President Rodrigo R. Duterte.
The AFP strongly believes that on the basis of the foregoing assessment, the following are
cited as justification for the recommended extension, to wit: (1) The DAESH-Inspired DIWM groups
and allies continue to visibly offer armed resistance in other parts of Central, Western, and Eastern
Mindanao in spite of the neutralization of their key leaders and destruction of their forces in Marawi
City; (2) Other DAESH-inspired and like-minded threat groups remain capable of staging similar
atrocities and violent attacks against vulnerable targets in Mindanao; (3) The CTs have been pursuing
and intensifying their political mobilization, terrorism against innocent civilians and private entities,
and guerilla warfare against the security sector, and public government infrastructures; (4) The need
to intensify the campaign against the CTs is necessary in order to defeat their strategy, stop their
extortion, defeat their armed component, and to stop their recruitment activities; and (5) The threats
being posed by the CTs, ASG, and the presence of remnants, protectors, supporters and
sympathizers of the DAESH/DIWM pose a clear and imminent danger to public safety and hinders
the speedy rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction efforts in Marawi City, and the attainment
oflasting peace, stability, economic development and prosperity in Mindanao;
The 2nd extension of the implementation of Martial Law coupled with the continued
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao will significantly help not only
the AFP, but also the other stakeholders in quelling and putting an end to the on-going DAESH
inspired DIWM groups and CT-staged rebellion, and in restoring public order, safety, and stability in
Mindanao; and In seeking for another extension, the AFP is ready, willing and able to perform anew
its mandated task in the same manner that it had dutifully done so for the whole duration of Martial
law to date, without any report of human rights violation and/or incident of abuse of authority.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is sufficient factual basis for extending the period of martial significantly
longer than the first.
RULING:
Indeed, with these factual bases, the military needs to intensify their efforts against these
terrorist groups through the continued imposition of martial law. Lifting martial law would remove the
leverage of the military against these terror groups during their on-going operations and would
weaken the rigorous campaign against them and allow them to continuously threaten the civilian
population. The rebellion has not been quelled. What the military has done is to resolve the Marawi
conflict but the rebellion continues to exist. Although, the conflict in Marawi has already been resolved
but still there are some elements there that continue to operate.
With respect to the extension of martial law, the last sentence of the first paragraph of
Section 18 clearly states that Congress is empowered to extend the duration of martial law. The
President's only role in such an extension is that he is the one who initiates it. Notably, even if the
President initiates the said extension, it is not immediately effective. It is only when Congress grants
the extension, after determining that invasion or rebellion persists and public safety requires it, that it
becomes operational. Evidently, the power of Congress is more potent than that of the President
when it comes to the extension of martial law. If Congress does not find any basis to grant the
requested extension, then it shall not exceed the sixty (60) day period of its initial declaration.
The framers of the Constitution gave Congress flexibility on the period of the declaration of
martial law. There is no specific period stated in the extension of the period of martial law because
the Constitution leaves it to Congress to decide the reasonable period for such an extension. The
rule-making power of Congress is a grant of full discretionary authority in the formulation, adoption
and promulgation of its own rules. As such, the exercise of this power is generally exempt from judicial
supervision and interference, except on a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the
power as will constitute a denial of due process.
In the event that the President requires more time to quell a rebellion or invasion beyond
the granted period of extension, then his remedy is to ask for another extension from Congress. It
was emphasized therein that the final decision to extend the said declaration rests with Congress.
Whether the President states a specific period of extension or not, Congress ultimately decides on
the said period. Until it grants the extension, the sixty (60) day period of the initial declaration of martial
law prevails. In effect, by becoming the granting authority, Congress limits the President's power to
extend the period of martial law.
5. PARDON
a. People v Salle
(G.R. No. 103567, December 4, 1995)
DAVIDE, JR., J.
FACTS:
The President granted pardon to Francisco Salle and Ricky Mengote, Gencilla and ten John
Does who were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals of the compound crime of
murder and destructive arson.However, Atty. La'o informed this Court that her verification disclosed
that Salle signed the motion without the assistance of counsel on his misimpression that the motion
was merely a bureaucratic requirement necessary for his early release from the New Bilibid Prison
(NBP) following the grant of a conditional pardon by the President on 9 December 1993. He was
discharged from the NBP on 28 December 1993. She further informed the Court that appellant Ricky
Mengote was, on the same dates, granted a conditional pardon and released from confinement, and
that he immediately left for his province without consulting her. She then prays that this Court grant
Salle's motion to withdraw his appeal and consider it withdrawn upon his acceptance of the conditional
pardon. Until now, Mengote has not filed a motion to withdraw his appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conditional pardon is valid.
RULING:
Pardon can be granted only whether full or conditional after conviction by final judgment. No
pardon may may be extended before a judgement of conviction becomes final, and it becomes final
when 1) when no appeal is seasonably perfected, 2) when the accused commences to serve the
sentences, 3) when the right to appeal is expressly waived in writing except where death penalty is
imposed by the trial court and 4) when the accused applies for probation, thereby waiving his right to
appeal. The rational of final conviction is that to prevent the President from exercising executive power
in derogation of judicial power, thus appealed conviction must be brought to finality. Furthermore,
acceptance of pardon does not operate abandonment of appeal.
b. People v Bacang
(G.R. No. 116512, July 30, 1996)
DAVIDE, JR., J.
FACTS:
Leopoldo Bacang, Francisco Palacio et al were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of murder. William Casido and Franklin Alcorin then filed a notice of appeal on December 8, 1993
which the court accepted. On January 11, 1996, the court received a motion to withdraw appeal of
Casido and Alcorin, it was filed on their own free will. Court required the counsel of Casido and Alcorin
to comment, it was only at that time when the court was informed that the latter were released on
conditional pardon. The Court then ordered to furnish them copies of the conditional pardon and
discharge order.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conditional pardon is valid.
RULING:
No. The practice of processing applications for pardon or parole despite pending appeals
appears to be a clear violation of the law because pardon can only be granted after conviction by final
judgment which is clearly stated in Section 19, Article VII of 1987 Constitution. No pardon, whether
full or conditional, may be extended before a judgement of conviction becomes final or during the
pendency of appeal from his conviction. The rule that acceptance of pardon does not operate
abandonment of appeal, fully binds pardon extended after January 31, 1995 which is during the
pendency of the accused’s appeal.
c. People v Casido
(G.R No. 116512, March. 7, 1997)
DAVIDE, JR., J.
FACTS:
The Office of the Solicitor General alleged that the accused-appellants in this case, "in an
effort to seek their release at the soonest possible time, applied for pardon before the Presidential
Committee on the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon (PCGBRP), as well as for amnesty before the
National Amnesty Commission (NAC)"; then contended that since amnesty, unlike pardon, may be
granted before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes even after conviction.
On August 11, 1992, a Presidential Committee for Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon is
constituted, with Secretary of Justice as Chairman, and the Secretary of National Defense and
Secretary of DILG as members. On December 9, 1992, President Aquino issued guidelines for the
committee. The Secretariat then process and evaluated the prisoners, they have an agreement to the
counsels of applicant Casido and file motion to withdraw the applicant’s appeal. The committee failed
to verify the counsel of the accused and no intention to violate the Section 19, Article VII of the
Constitution, and they were not also aware if Hino and Salle rulings. Applications of for amnesty were
favorably acted by National Amnesty Commission on February 22, 1996.
ISSUE: Whether or not the amnesty is valid.
RULING:
Yes. Amnesty carry with it the extinguishment of criminal liability and restoration of civil and
political rights and unlike pardon, it may be granted before or after the institution of the criminal
prosecution. While the pardon in this case was void for having been extended during the pendency
of the appeal or before conviction by final judgment and, therefore, in violation of the first paragraph
of Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution, the grant of the amnesty, for which accused-appellants
William Casido and Franklin Alcorin voluntarily applied under Proclamation No. 347, was valid. This
Proclamation was concurred in by both Houses of Congress in Concurrent Resolution No. 12 adopted
on 2 June, 1994. The release then of accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin can
only be justified by the amnesty, but not by the "pardon."
d. People v. Nacional
(G.R No. 111294, September 7, 1995)
PUNO, J.
FACTS:
Walter Nacional, Absalon Millarnina, Efren Musa et al were charged with two counts of
murder attended by conspiracy and were convicted on those crimes. On March 1, 1994, Walter
Nacional, Zacarias Militante and Efren Musa, through counsel, moved to withdraw their appeal. They
claimed that the charges against them were political in nature "committed while they were members
of the New People's Army (NPA)." They informed the Court that as political prisoners, they applied
for and were recommended by then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon for conditional pardon by
the President of the Philippines. The Court granted their motion on May 11, 1994.
On February 1, 1995, Rudy Luces, through counsel, also moved to withdraw his appeal for
becoming moot and academic. He claimed that he had been granted conditional pardon by the
President of the Philippines and had been released from prison per instruction. In its Comment, the
Office of the Solicitor General opined that Rudy Luces abandoned his appeal when he accepted the
pardon granted him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the grant of pardon extinguish payment for civil indemnity.
RULING:
No. When pardon is granted, civil indemnity is not extinguished unless expressly remitted.
We rule that the grant of conditional pardon and the consequent dismissal of the appeals of Walter
Nacional, Zacarias Militante, Efren Musa and Rudy Luces does not exempt them from payment of
the civil indemnity. A conditional pardon, when granted, does not extinguish the civil liability arising
from the crime. The indemnity of P50,000.00 imposed by the trial court for each of the deaths of
Quirino and Joel Lagason must be shared solidarily by all the accused.
e. Monsanto v Factoran
(G.R. No. 78239, February 9, 1989)
FERNAN, C.J.
FACTS:
Salvacion A. Monsanto, Assistant Treasurer of Calbayog City, and three others were
accused of the crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents and sentenced them to
imprisonment. They were further ordered to jointly and severally indemnify the government in the sum
of P4,892.50 representing the balance of the amount defrauded and to pay the costs
proportionately.She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she
was extended on December 17, 1984 by then President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted
on December 21, 1984.|||
Monsanto requested that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since
the same was still vacant, she also asked for the back pay for the entire period of her suspension.
Finance Ministry ruled that Monsanto may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new
appointment. Deputy Secretary Factoran said that that acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former
public officer is the only ground for reinstatement to his former position and entitlement to payment
of his salaries, benefits and emoluments due to him during the period of his suspension pendente
lite. Monsanto argued that general rules on pardon cannot apply to her case by reason of the fact
that she was extended executive clemency while her conviction was still pending appeal in this Court.
There having been no final judgment of conviction, her employment therefore as assistant city
treasurer could not be said to have been terminated or forfeited.
ISSUE: Whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief
Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment.’
RULING:
No. Pardon cannot restore forfeited public office. To insist on automatic reinstatement
because of a mistaken notion that the pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa would
be grossly untenable. Pardon cannot mask the acts of constituting the crime. The absolute
disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of public documents. Hence, the pardon granted to
Monsanto has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot
go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo
the usual procedure required for a new appointment.
f. Sabello v DECS
(G.R. No. 86787, December 26, 1989)
GANCAYCO, J.
FACTS:
Sabello is an elementary school Principal of Talisay and also the Assistant Principal of the
Talisay Barangay High School. The barangay high school was in deficit at that time due to the fact
that the students could hardly pay their tuition fees. Sabello was authorized by the the barrio council
to withdraw the P2000.00 allotted by the President in each barrio which was subsequently deposited
to the City Treasurer’s Office in the name of Talisay Barrio High school. Sabello together with the
barrio council was then charged of the violation of R.A 3019 and sentenced to suffer one year
imprisonment and disqualification to hold public office. Sabello was then granted by the President an
absolute pardon. With this, he applied for the reinstatement on his office. However, he was reinstated
not to the former position but as a mere classroom teacher.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sabello merits reappointment to the position he held prior to the conviction.
RULING:
Affirmative. The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the
punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code and that pardon frees the individual from all the
penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. Sabello was reinstated as
classroom teacher; justice and equity dictate that he be returned to his former position prior to
conviction but he was not entitled to payment of his back salaries because this is only afforded to
those illegally dismissed.
g. Torres v Sumulong
(G.R. No. 76872, July 23, 1987)
FELICIANO, J.
FACTS:
Of two counts of estafa Torres was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila some
time before 1979. These convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The maximum sentence
would expire on November 2, 2000.
1. On April 18, 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to Torres by the President of the Philippines
on condition that Sumulong would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines."
Sumulong accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement.
2. On May 21, 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the President the
cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to Torres because Torres had been charged with
twenty counts of estafa before, and convicted of sedition by, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
3. On 4 June 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice wrote to the President of the Philippines
informing her of the Resolution of the Board recommending cancellation of the conditional pardon
previously granted to petitioner.
4.. On September 8, 1986, the President canceled the conditional pardon of Torres.
5. On October 10, 1986, then Minister of Justice Neptali A. Gonzales issued "by authority of the
President" an Order of Arrest and Recommitment against Sumulong. He was accordingly arrested
and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President may cancel the conditional pardon granted.
RULING:
Affirmative. The grant of pardon and determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional
pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny. The determination of a
branch of a condition of a purely pardon and the proper consequences of such breach may either be
a purely executive act not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 4 of the Revised Administrative
Code or it may be a judicial act consisting of a trial for and conviction of violation for conditional pardon
under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a
subsequent crime is necessary in order that the convict may be recommended for violation of the
conditional pardon.
h. In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Wilfredo S. Sumulong

(G.R No. 135457, December 29, 1995)
HERMOSISIMA JR., J.
FACTS:
Of two counts of estafa Torres was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila some
time before 1979. These convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The maximum sentence
would expire on November 2, 2000. On April 18, 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to Torres
by the President of the Philippines on condition that Sumulong would "not again violate any of the
penal laws of the Philippines." Sumulong accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently
released from confinement.
On May 21, 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the President
the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to Torres because Torres had been charged with
twenty counts of estafa before, and convicted of sedition by, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
On September 8, 1986, the President canceled the conditional pardon of Torres. On October 10,
1986, then Minister of Justice Neptali A. Gonzales issued "by authority of the President" an Order of
Arrest and Recommitment against Sumulong. He was accordingly arrested and confined in
Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence. Now, Torres, apparently through his wife
and children, seeks anew relief from this court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the cancellation of pardon is constitutional.
RULING:
Affirmative. A conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the sovereign power
or the Chief Executive and the convicted criminal to the effect that the former will release the latter
subject to the condition that if he does not comply with the terms of the pardon, he will be recommitted
to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence or an additional one. By the pardonee's
consent to the terms stipulated in this contract, the pardonee has thereby placed himself under the
supervision of the Chief Executive or his delegate who is duty-bound to see to it that the pardonee
complies with the terms and conditions of the pardon. The Chief Executive, who in the first place was
the exclusive author of the conditional pardon and of its revocation, is the corollary prerogative to
reinstate the pardon if in his own judgment, the acquittal of the pardonee from the subsequent charges
filed against him, warrants the same. There is likewise nil a basis for the courts to effectuate the
reinstatement of a conditional pardon revoked by the President in the exercise of powers undisputedly
solely and absolutely loaded in his office.
i. People v. Patriarca
(G.R. No. 135457, September 29, 2007)
BUENA, J.
FACTS:
On June 30, 1987 at about 10:00 PM in the Municipality of Donsol, Province of Sorsogon,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, New People’s Army (NPA) members
led by Jose Patriarca Jr. conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with
guns, forcibly took away ALFREDO AREVALO from his residence and brought him to Sitio Abre,
Mabini, Donsol, Sorsogon, and did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to
kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault and shoot ALFREDO AREVALO thereby
inflicting upon him mortal wounds, which directly caused his death to the damage and prejudice of
his legal heirs. They were charged with murder. Prior with this, Patriarca was also charged with
murder for the killing of one Rudy de Borja and a certain Elmer Cadag. The RTC found him guilty and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Patriarca then filed his appeal and it was
accepted by the court.
Patriarca applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724 entitled "Granting Amnesty to
Rebels, Insurgents, and All Other Persons Who Have or May Have Committed Crimes Against Public
Order, Other Crimes Committed in Furtherance of Political Ends, and Violations of the Article of War,
and Creating a National Amnesty Commission." In 1999, his application was favorably granted by the
National Amnesty Board concluding that his activities were done in pursuit of his political beliefs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the amnesty is proper.
RULING:
Yes, it is proper. Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or
other high political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another,
who have offended, by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and
puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is
charged, that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had
committed no offense.
The Court takes judicial notice of the grant of amnesty upon Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. Once
granted, it is binding and effective. It serves to put an end to the appeal.
j. Vera v. People
(G.R. No. L-18184, January 31, 1963)
BARRERA, J.
FACTS:
Gaudencio Vera, Restituto Figueras, Lorenzo Ambas, Justo Florido, Paulino Bayran, and 92
others, as John Does, were charged with the complex crime of kidnapping with murder of Amadeo
Lozanes, alias Azarcon.
The Commission is convinced that the motive for the kidnapping and killing of Lt. Amadeo
Lozanes of the Hunters was the keen rivalry, between the Vera's Guerrilla Party and the Hunter's
ROTC Guerilla organizations. It is noteworthy that the Hunters were driven away by General Vera
from Pitogo in December, 1944, and that after said kidnapping and killing on February 13 and 14,
1945, Mayor Ramon Isaac of Unisan, was in turn kidnapped by the Hunters, Leopoldo Miciano,
secretary of Col. de Luna, of the Vera's Guerrilla Party, testified that General Vera told him of his
(Vera's) suspicion that Mayor Isaac was kidnapped by way of reprisal as he, Vera, had ordered the
liquidation of Lt. Lozañes
It is an established fact that when Lozañes was kidnapped, tortured, and later killed, he was
actually a lieutenant of the Hunter's ROTC Guerrilla organization then engaged in the resistance
movement, it may not be said with any amount of truth that the aforesaid killing was to further the
resistance movement at the time, as the defense intimates.
Vera contend that to be entitled to the benefits of Amnesty Proclamation No. 8, dated
September 7, 1946, it is not necessary for them to admit the commission of the crime charged, citing
in support of their submission the cases of Barrioquinto, et al. vs. Fernandez, et al "in order to entitle
a person to the benefits of Amnesty Proclamation (No. 8) of September 7, 1946, it is not necessary
that he should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non, admit having committed the criminal act or
offense with which he is charged, and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the
evidence, either of the complainant or the accused, shows that the offense committed comes within
the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation."
ISSUE: Whether or not persons invoking the benefit of amnesty should first admit having committed
the crime of which they were accused.
RULING:
Affirmative.The benefits of an amnesty proclamation, one must admit his guilt of the offense
covered by the proclamation. The invocation of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and
avoidance, which means that the leader admits the allegation against him, but disclaims liability
therefor on account of intervening facts which, if proved, would bring the crime charged within the
scope of the amnesty proclamation. Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 extends its provisions to "all persons
who committed any act penalized under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance to
the enemy," and, hence, may not invoked, where the commission of a crime was not in furtherance
of the resistance movement, but was due to rivalry between two guerilla outfits.
6. DIPLOMATIC
a. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS V. EASTERN SEA TRADING

(G.R. No. L-14279, October 31, 1961)
CONCEPCION, J.
FACTS:
Eastern Sea Trading (EST) was a shipping company which imports from Japan onion and
garlic into the Philippines. In 1956, the Commissioner of Customs ordered the seizure and forfeiture
of the import goods because EST was not able to comply with Central Bank Circulars 44 and 45. The
said circulars were pursuant to Executive Order 328. On the other hand, EO 328 was the
implementing law of the Trades and Financial Agreements, an executive agreement, entered into
between the Philippines and Japan. The said executive agreement states, among others, that all
import transactions between Japan and the Philippines should be invoiced in dollar. In this case, the
said items imported by EST from Japan were not invoiced in dollar.
EST questioned the validity of the said EO averring that the executive agreement that the EO
was implementing was never concurred upon by the Senate. The issue was elevated to the Court of
Tax Appeals and the latter ruled in favor of EST. The Commissioner appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Agreement is subject to the concurrence by the Senate.
RULING:
No, Executive Agreements are not like treaties which are subject to the concurrence of at
least 2/3 of the members of the Senate. Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of
treaties are commonly referred to as executive agreements and are no less common in our scheme
of government than are the more formal instruments — treaties and conventions. They sometimes
take the form of exchanges of notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated
‘agreements’ or ‘protocols’.
The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and
agreements — whether denominated executive agreements or exchanges of notes or otherwise —
begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It would be useless to undertake to discuss
here the large variety of executive agreements as such, concluded from time to time. Hundreds of
executive agreements, other than those entered into under the trade- agreements act, have been
negotiated with foreign governments. . . . It would seem to be sufficient, in order to show that the
trade agreements under the act of 1934 are not anomalous in character, that they are not treaties,
and that they have abundant precedent in our history, to refer to certain classes of agreements
heretofore entered into by the Executive without the approval of the Senate.
They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income tax on
shipping profits, the admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and commercial relations generally,
international claims, postal matters, the registration of trade-marks and copyrights, etc. Some of them
were concluded not by specific congressional authorization but in conformity with policies declared in
acts of Congress with respect to the general subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still others,
particularly those with respect to the settlement of claims against foreign governments, were
concluded independently of any legislation.
b. BAYAN V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

(G.R. NO. 138570, OCTOBER 10, 2000)
BUENA, J.
FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an agreement
called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine
government and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the
total membership of the Philippine Senate.
The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It
provides for the guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the
Philippine governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft,
importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.
Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines
except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the VFA is unconstitutional.
RULING:
NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions, held
that the petitioners did not commit grave abuse of discretion, and sustained the constitutionality of
the VFA.
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country,
unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must
be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the
votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting state.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The
concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions
of the Constitution the provision in Article XVIII requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in
a national referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it.
This Court is of the firm view that the phrase “recognized as a treaty” means that the other
contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other contracting
state, the United States of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for
concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase.
Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus
attached to them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in common use.
Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive
agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be
sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the said
agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty
The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C.
Hubbard, has stated that the United States government has fully committed to living up to the terms
of the VFA. For as long as the United States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a
treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked
compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.
XI. THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
1. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
a. General Principles
i. ANGARA V. ELECTORAL COMMISSION

(G.R. No. L-45081, JULY 15, 1936)
LAUREL, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member of the
National Assembly of the Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly
passed a resolution confirming the election of those who have not been subject of an election protest
prior to the adoption of the said resolution.
On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest
against the petitioner before the Electoral Commission of the National Assembly. The following day,
December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted its own resolution providing that it will not
consider any election protest that was not submitted on or before December 9, 1935.
Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner sought the
dismissal of respondent’s protest. The Electoral Commission however denied his motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly.
RULING:
No, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly.The Court DENIED the petition.
The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative
in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election of
the petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot in any manner
toll the time for filing election protests against members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the
filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the
Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly.
The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative
in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. [W]here a
general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the
one or the performance of the other is also conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional
provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission,
therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its
exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members
of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the
Electoral Commission.
ii. BONDOC V. PINEDA

(G.R. NO. 97710, SEPTEMBER 26, 1991)
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.
FACTS:
In 1987 congressional election, Marciano M. Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino
(LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for the position
of Representative for the Fourth District of the province of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed as
winner, in turn, Bondoc filed a protest before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.
After the revision of the ballots, the presentation of evidence, and submission of memoranda,
Bondoc's protest was submitted for decision. Therein the decision it was held that Bondoc won over
Pineda. Congressman Camasura, HRET member and member of LDP, voted with the Supreme Court
Justices and Congressman Cerilles to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.
Congressman Camasura admitted to Congressman Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr., LDP Secretary

General, that he voted for Bondoc not only in the final tally but also in the election itself. Congressman
Cojuangco then expelled Congressman Camasura for betraying and disloyalty to LDP. Pineda also
moved for the withdrawal of Congressman Camasura from HRET and was later on was removed by
HRET’s chairwoman.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the act of HRET.
RULING:
Yes. What is assailed in the case at bar is the act of the House of Representatives of
withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of Congressman Juanito Camasura as a
member of the HRET. The said case is a judicial one and not encroaching upon the separation of
powers since what is in question is not the act of the congress but the act of HRET. The Supreme
Court has the jurisdiction over actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
iii. YNOT V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

(G.R. NO. 74457, MARCH 20, 1987)
CRUZ, J.
FACTS:
On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate
to Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for
the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of
executive order and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering the merits of the case, the
confiscation was sustained and the court declined to rule on the constitutionality issue. The petitioner
appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not lower courts has jurisdiction on examining the constitutionality of a law.
RULING:
Yes. As the Constitution provides, the Court may "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on
appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide." In the case at bar the Court held that
“while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions, they
are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to review
by the highest tribunal.
The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify EO 626-A
amending EO 626 in asic rule prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions.
The supreme court said that The reasonable connection between the means employed and the
purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing the Supreme Court do not see
how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate
slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in
another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any
more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there
The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the
prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out
forthright. Due process was not properly observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily
confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a
complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The measure struck at once
and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying due process.
iv. GARCIA V. DRILON

(G.R. NO. 179267, JUNE 25, 2013)
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary
Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining
Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims,
Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of physical,
emotional, psychological and economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of her
children and of financial support and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.
The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set forth
by the said TPO, private-respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The
trial court issued a modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to comment on why
the TPO should not be modified. After the given time allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer
submitted the required comment as it would be an “axercise in futility.”
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on,
questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal protection
clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being “an unwanted product of an invalid law.”
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for
failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the petition for
prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral attack on said law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of constitutionality
was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the petition constitutes a collateral attack on the
validity of the law.
RULING:
Yes. Petitioners’ contention that RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction, inadequate to
tackle the complex issue of constitutionality has no basis. He should have questioned the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 while the case is still in the RTC. Family Courts have authority and
jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute. The question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest possible time. Thus, if such question of constitutionality is not in the pleadings,
it may not be raised in the trial. Moreover, if it was not raised in the trial court, it may not be considered
in appeal.
v. MIRASOL V. COURT OF APPEALS

(G.R. NO. 128448, FEBRUARY 1, 2001)
QUISUMBING, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner spouses, sugarland owners and planters, entered into several crop loan financing
schemes secured by chattel and real estate mortgages with respondent Philippine National Bank
(PNB). In this scheme, PNB is authorized to negotiate and sell sugar produced and to apply the
proceeds to the payment of the Mirasol’s loan. Pursuant to Presidential Decree 579, Philippine
Exchange Co. Inc. was authorized to purchase sugar allotted for export with PNB. Petitioners herein
requested for liquidation but was ignored by PNB. Petitioners filed a case before the trial court
averring that their obligations had been already paid by virtue of compensation with the unliquidated
amounts owed to them by PNB. Then the trial court, without notice to the Solicitor General, rendered
judgment holding PD No. 579 unconstitutional ordering private respondents to pay petitioners the
whole amount corresponding to the residue of the unliquidated actual cost price of sugar exported
and to pay moral damages and attorney's fees. Respondents appealed on the Court of Appeals which
reversed the findings of the constitutionality of PD No. 579 ruled by the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Regional Trial Court has authority and jurisdiction to rule on PD No. 579
constitutionality.
RULING:
Yes. It has been held that Regional Trial Court have the authority and jurisdiction to rule on
the constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree or executive order. However, the Solicitor
General must be notified any action assailing the validity of a statute, treaty, presidential decree, order
or proclamation in pursuant to Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. ‘Without the required notice
the government is deprived of its day in court and it was improper for the trial court to pass upon the
constitutionality of the questioned PD.’
Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of this power: First, there
must be before the Court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review. Second, the
question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person challenging the validity of
the act must have standing to challenge. Fourth, the question of constitutionality must have been
raised at the earliest opportunity, and lastly, the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of
the case.
vi. CORONA V. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES

(G.R. No. 200242, JULY 17, 2012)
VILLARAMA, JR., J.
FACTS:
This is a petition filed by the former Chief Justice of the Court, Renato C. Corona, assailing
the impeachment case initiated by the members of the House of Representatives (HOR) and trial
conducted by Senate of the Philippines. Petitioner was charged with culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of public trust and graft and corruption because it is provided for in Art. XI,
Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution that "a public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office
and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets,
liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet,
and other constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the
declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law." Respondent failed to
disclose to the public his statement of assets, liabilities, and net worth as required by the Constitution.
It is also reported that some of the properties of Respondent are not included in his declaration of his
assets, liabilities, and net worth, in violation of the anti-graft and corrupt practices act. The petition
argued that the Impeachment Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when it: (1) proceeded to trial on the basis of the complaint filed by respondent
Representatives which complaint is constitutionally infirm and defective for lack of probable cause;
(2) did not strike out the charges discussed in Art. II of the complaint which, aside from being a
"hodgepodge" of multiple charges, do not constitute allegations in law, much less ultimate facts, being
all premised on suspicion and/or hearsay; (3) allowed the presentation of evidence on charges of
alleged corruption and unexplained wealth and (4) issued the subpoena for the production of
petitioner's alleged bank accounts as requested by the prosecution despite the same being the result
of an illegal act ("fruit of the poisonous tree") considering that those documents submitted by the
prosecution violates the absolute confidentiality of such accounts under Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6426
(Foreign Currency Deposits Act) which is also penalized under Sec. 10 thereof.
ISSUE: Whether or not the case becomes moot and academic.
RULING:
Yes.The present petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief/s is
DISMISSED on the ground of MOOTNESS.
An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy so that a determination thereof would be without practical use and value.[18] In such
cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would... be entitled to and which
would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.
Impeachment, described as "the most formidable weapon in the arsenal of democracy," was
foreseen as creating divisions, partialities and enmities, or highlighting pre-existing factions with the
greatest danger that "the decision will be regulated more... by the comparative strength of parties,
than by the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt." Given their concededly political character, the
precise role of the judiciary in impeachment cases is a matter of utmost importance to ensure the
effective... functioning of the separate branches while preserving the structure of checks and balance
in our government. Moreover, in this jurisdiction, the acts of any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including those traditionally entrusted to the political departments, are proper subjects
of judicial review if tainted with grave abuse or arbitrariness.
Petitioner was impeached through the mode provided under Art. XI, par. 4, Sec. 3, In the
meantime, the impeachment trial had been concluded with the conviction of petitioner by more than
the required majority vote of the Senator-Judges. Petitioner immediately accepted the verdict and
without any protest vacated his office. In fact, the Judicial and Bar
Council is already in the process of screening applicants and nominees, and the President of
the Philippines is expected to appoint a new Chief Justice within the prescribed 90-day period from
among those candidates shortlisted by the JBC. Unarguably, the constitutional issue raised by
petitioner had been mooted by supervening events and his own acts.
b. Requisites for Judicial Review

i. Actual Case or Controversy
1. Guingona v. Court of Appeals

(G.R. No. 125532, July 10, 1998)
PANGANIBAN, J.
FACTS:
The NBI conducted an investigation on the alleged participation and involvement of national
and local government officials in "jueteng" and other forms of illegal gambling. Potenciano Roque,
claiming to be an eyewitness to the networking of politicians and gambling lords, sought admission
into the Government's Witness Protection Security and Benefit Program (RA 6981). The Department
of Justice admitted Roque to the program. Thereafter, Roque executed a sworn statement before the
NBI, and on the basis thereof, the latter recommended the filing of the necessary charges. Private
respondent Pineda was included in the list of government officials who offered Roque money and
other valuable considerations, which he accepted, upon his agreement to cease conducting raids on
their respective gambling operations.
Thereafter, Pineda filed a Petition for Reconsideration of Admittance of Potenciano Roque to

the Witness Protection Program, but the Secretary denied the same. Thus, Pineda filed a Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction with the respondent Court of Appeals. It disposed in favor of the government.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not this case presents an actual controversy.
RULING:
No. The petition must fail, because the facts and the issue raised by petitioners do not warrant
the exercise of judicial power. The Constitution provides that judicial power "includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable." One of the requisites of judicial review is that there must be an actual case calling for
the exercise of judicial power; An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal
rights or an assertion of opposite legal claims, which can be resolved on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence. A justiciable controversy admits of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in
character, whereas an opinion only advises what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.
The question must be ripe for adjudication. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act
being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. In the case at bar,
it is at once apparent that petitioners are not requesting that this Court reverse the ruling of the
appellate court and disallow the admission in evidence of Respondent Roque's testimony, inasmuch
as the assailed Decision does not appear to be in conflict with any of their present claims. Petitioners
filed this suit out of fear that the assailed decision would frustrate the purpose of said law, which is to
encourage witnesses to come out and testify. But their apprehension is neither justified nor
exemplified by this particular case. A mere apprehension, does not give rise to a justiciable
controversy.
2. John Hay People v. Lim

(G.R. No 119775, October 24, 2003)
CARPIO MORALES, J.
FACTS:
The Baguio City government passed a number of resolutions in response to the actions taken
by BCDA as owner and administrator of Camp John Hay. BCDA entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement and Escrow Agreement with private respondents Tuntex (B.V.I.) Co., Ltd. (TUNTEX) and
Asiaworld Internationale Group, Inc. (ASIAWORLD), private corporations registered under the laws
of the British Virgin Islands, preparatory to the formation of a joint venture for the development of
Poro Point in La Union and Camp John Hay as premier tourist destinations and recreation centers.
They stressed the need to declare Camp John Hay a SEZ as a condition precedent to its full
development in accordance with the mandate of R.A. No. 7227.
Thus, the issuance of Proclamation No. 420 by then President Ramos declaring a portion of
Camp John Hay as a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) and creating a regime of tax exemption within
the John Hay Special Economic Zone. A petition for prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief
was filed challenging, in the main, its constitutionality or validity as well as the legality of the
Memorandum of Agreement and Joint Venture Agreement between public respondent BCDA and
private respondents TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was an actual case or controversy.
RULING:
The court is convinced that the present petition embodies crucial issues, therefore assumes
jurisdiction over the petition. More than the economic interests at stake, the development of Camp
John Hay as well as of the other base areas unquestionably has critical links to a host of
environmental and social concerns. Whatever use to which these lands will be devoted will set a
chain of events that can affect one way or another the social and economic way of life of the
communities where the bases are located, and ultimately the nation in general.
An actual case or controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or

ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory. The controversy needs to be definite and
concrete, bearing upon the legal relations of parties who are pitted against each other due to their
adverse legal interests. There is in the present case a real clash of interests and rights between
petitioners and respondents arising from the issuance of a presidential proclamation that converts a
portion of the area covered by Camp John Hay into a SEZ, the former insisting that such proclamation
contains unconstitutional provisions, the latter claiming otherwise. Other requisites of a judicial review
were complied.
3. Imbong v. Ochoa
(G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS:
Despite the forgoing legislative measures, the population of the country kept on galloping at
an uncontrollable pace. To rein in the problem, the RH law was enacted to provide Filipinos, especially
the poor and the marginalized, access and information to the full range of modern family planning
methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide for the people’s right to reproductive health be
achieved. To make it more effective, the RH Law made it mandatory for health providers to provide
information on the full range of modern family planning methods, supplies and services, and for
schools to provide reproductive health education.
After the President placed its imprimatur (signed) on the said law, challengers from various
sectors of society came to the Supreme Court; 14 petitions and 2 petitions-in-intervention have been
filed, on the ground that the petitioners, as citizens and taxpayers, the matter is of transcendental
importance.
The OSH asserts that the issue is political in nature it being “a product of a majoritarian
democratic process”. The OSG further claimed that the Court has no authority to review social
legislation like the RH Law. Moreover, it contends that as an “applied challenge”, the petition cannot
prosper considering that the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied to the petitioners, and
that the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive. It claims that
RH law cannot be challenged “on its face” as it is not a speech-regulating measure.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
RULING:
The Court partially granted the Petition and declared RA 10354 as not unconstitutional except
some provisions.
In the case at bar, an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial
determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and
that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject
petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch
is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of
the Judiciary to settle the dispute. Moreover, under the RH Law, medical practitioners or medical
providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted for vague violations thereof, particularly public
health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and
other benefits.
In view of the novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to the bench
and bar, the issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically
affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of religion and
expression and other constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of
contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep division among a broad spectrum
of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental importance
warranting immediate court adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is the right to life of the
mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue.
4. Belgica v. Ochoa
(G.R No. 208566, November 11, 2013)
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
First petition came from Samson Alcantara, President of Social Justice Society who filed a
petition for prohibition assailing that the pork barrel is unconstitutional and a writ of prohibition be
issued against respondents Franklin Drilon and Sonny Belmonte in their capacities as President of
the Senate and Speaker of the House. Another petition came from Greco Belgica and others filed an
urgent petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for an issuance of a TRO and writ of
preliminary injunction to declare the Pork Barrel System which provided for the PDAF and Malampaya
Funds be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being an abuse of discretion. They also pray
for a TRO against cabinet secretaries Ochoa, de Leon, Abad, and to immediately cease any
expenditure under the funds. A third petition came from Pedrito Nepomuceno filed a petition seeking
that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional and a cease and desist order be issued against President
Noynoy Aquino and Secretary Abad from releasing the funds to Congress and instead allow their
release to fund priority projects identified and approved by the local development councils in
consultation with the respective departments.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy.
RULING:
Yes. Judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy as is embodied
in Art VIII Sec 1 of the 1987 Constitution. Actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights,
an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a
hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. There must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be
interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. It must also be ripe for
adjudication such as questions raised for constitutional scrutiny. A question is ripe when the act being
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that
something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into
the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself
as a result of the challenged action. Courts are without authority to resolve hypothetical or moot
questions. The Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases.
5. Dumlao v. COMELEC
(G.R No. L-52245, January 22, 1980)
FACTS:
Patricio Dumlao is a former candidate for Governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He filed his certificate
of candidacy for the January 30, 1980 elections. He questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process
guarantees of the Constitution which provides a special disqualification that “Any retired elective
provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he
is entitled under the law, and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term
of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office
from which he has retired.” A colleague also assailed said law. Dumlao assails that said law is violative
of the equal protection clause and it was directed insidiously against him, and that the classification
provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation. He sought to
prohibit COMELEC to implement the said law.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an actual controversy.
RULING:
No, Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application of that provision. No petition
seeking Dumlao's disqualification has been filed before the COMELEC. His is a question posed in
the abstract, a hypothetical issue, and in effect, a petition for an advisory opinion from this Court to
be rendered without the benefit of a detailed factual record. His case is clearly within the primary
jurisdiction of COMELEC as sole judge of all contests relating to the qualifications if all members of
elective provincial officials as provided by section 2, Art. XII-C of the Constitution.
6. Province of Batangas v. Romulo

(G.R No. 152774, May 27, 2004)
CALLEJO, SR., J.
FACTS:
On December 7, 1998, then President Estrada issued EO No. 48 establishing the “Program
for Devolution Adjustment and Equalization” to enhance the capabilities of LGUs in the discharge of
the functions and services devolved to them through the LGC. The Oversight Committee under
Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora passed Resolutions No. OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006 and OCD-
99-003 which were approved by Pres. Estrada on October 6, 1999. The guidelines formulated by the
Oversight Committee required the LGUs to identify the projects eligible for funding under the portion
of the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) and submit the project proposals and
other requirements to the DILG for appraisal before the Committee serves notice to the DBM for the
subsequent release of the corresponding funds.
Hon. Herminaldo Mandanas, Governor of Batangas, petitioned to declare unconstitutional and

void certain provisos contained in the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 1999, 2000, and 2001,
insofar as they uniformly earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of P5 Billion for the
Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) &
imposed conditions for the release thereof. He invokes Sec. 6. Local government units shall have a
just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an actual controversy.
RULING:
Yes. The question of whether or not the assailed provisos contained in the GAAs of 1999,
2000 and 2001, and the OCD resolutions infringe the Constitution and the Local Government Code
of 1991 is undoubtedly a legal question, thus it is justiciable. There is also no need to remand the
case to the lower courts since the factual issues needed to answer the legal question are not disputed.
The assailed provisos in the General Appropriations Acts of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the assailed
OCD Resolutions, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for violating of the principle of local autonomy.
7. Pormento v. Estrada
(G.R. No. 191988, August 31, 2010)
CORONA, C.J.
FACTS:
Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected as President of the Republic of the Philippines in the
general elections held on May 11, 1998. He sought the presidency again in the general elections held
on May 10, 2010. Petitioner Atty. Evillo C. Pormento opposed private respondent's candidacy and
led a petition for disqualification. However, his petition was denied by the Second Division of public
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC).His motion for reconsideration was subsequently
denied by the COMELEC en banc. Private respondent was not elected President the second time he
ran.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an actual case for controversy.
RULING:
Since the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase "any re-election" will be premised
on a person's second--whether immediate or not--election as President, there is no case or
controversy to be resolved in this case. No live conflict of legal rights exists. There is in this case no
definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy that touches on the legal relations of parties having
adverse legal interests. No specific relief may conclusively be decreed upon by this Court in this case
that will benefit any of the parties herein. As such, one of the essential requisites for the exercise of
the power of judicial review, the existence of an actual case or controversy, is sorely lacking in this
case.
As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. The Court is not
empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law
which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. In other words, when a
case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable. Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the
proclamation of a President who has been duly elected in the May 10, 2010 elections; the same is no
longer true today. Following the results of that election, private respondent was not elected President
for the second time. Thus, any discussion of his "re-election" will simply be hypothetical and
speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose.
8. Enrile v. Senate Electoral Tribunal

(G.R No. 132986, May 19, 2004)
FACTS:
Senator Pimentel filed with the Senate Electoral Tribunal an election protest Against Enrile
and other senators who won in the 1995 elections. Thereafter, petitioner filed his answer with counter-
protest. The SET conducted revision of the ballots in various provinces. Then, the SET directed the
parties to submit their evidence and memoranda.
On August 1997, the SET without resolving the election protest, held a press conference at
the SC Session Hall announcing the partial and tentative results of the revision of ballots in the pilot
precincts. In the result, the name of petitioner dropped from number 11 to number 15.On September
of 1997, petitioner filed a motion to set aside the partial results in Pimentel’s protest and to conduct
another appreciation of ballots in the presence of all parties. He alleged that the partial results were
erroneous. In its assailed Resolution No. 97-22, the SET admitted there was an "oversight," hence,
the tally of votes for Paoay, Ilocos Norte should be made. Consequently, the 30,000 votes deducted
by the SET from those garnered by petitioner were "given back to him." But the SET denied the
motion on the ground that there was no sufficient basis to discard the partial tabulation. Petitioner
filed his motion for reconsideration but was denied by the SET in Resolution 98-02.Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not SET committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion.
RULING:
The case is moot and academic, because the process of how the SET arrived in the
determination of partials results was different to that of petitioner. The tenure of the contested
senatorial position subject of this petition expired as early as June 30, 1998. A case becomes moot
and academic when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose
can be served in passing upon the merits. In Garcia vs. COMELEC, we held that "where the issues
have become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, thereby rendering the resolution
of the same of no practical use or value."
9. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo
(G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006)
FACTS:
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan
(Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA)
issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented by General Order No. 5
(GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring
down the government. Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the
same time revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting.
Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David
proceeded to rally which led to his arrest. Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is
the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups.
Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day,
Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest
issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because
of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5. In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that
the state of national emergency ceased to exist.
David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has
no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in
Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred
that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is
an over breadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an over breadth because it encroaches upon
protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and academic
by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that
PP 1017 is within the president’s calling out power, take care power and take over power.
ISSUE: hether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and academic.
RULING:
The power of judicial review may be exercised only when the following requisites are present:
first, there must be an actual case or controversy; second, petitioners have to raise a question of
constitutionality; third, the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
fourth, the decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case
itself.
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an opposite legal claims
susceptible of judicial resolution. It is “definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interest;” a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief. The
Solicitor General refutes the existence of such actual case or controversy, contending that the present
petitions were rendered “moot and academic” by President Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021.
Such contention lacks merit.

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally,
courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness.
The Court holds that President Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present
petitions moot and academic. During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police
officers, according to petitioners, committed illegal acts in implementing it. Are PP 1017 and G.O. No.
5 constitutional or valid? Do they justify these alleged illegal acts? These are the vital issues that must
be resolved in the present petitions. It must be stressed that “an unconstitutional act is not a law, it
confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it affords no protection; it is in legal contemplation,
inoperative.”
The “moot and academic” principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade
the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there
is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved; third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review.
All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify the Supreme Court’s assumption of
jurisdiction over the instant petitions. Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No.
5 violates the Constitution. There is no question that the issues being raised affect the public’s
interest, involving as they do the people’s basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and of
the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional
precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar, and in
the present petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of the protection given by constitutional
guarantees. And lastly, respondents’ contested actions are capable of repetition. Certainly, the
petitions are subject to judicial review.
10. Lacson v. Perez

(G.R. No. 147780, May 20, 2001)
MELO, J.
FACTS:
Gloria Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring a state of rebellion in the National Capital
Region. Such declaration was rooted on a the violent behavior of the angry mob who assaulted and
attempted to break into Malacanang using explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones, and
other deadly weapons. General Order No. 1 was subsequently issued to direct the AFP and the PNP
to prevent and suppress such rebellion which led to warrantless arrests against several alleged
leaders and promoters of such rebellion. Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests and the declaration of
a state of rebellion, which gave a semblance of legality to arrests, the four consolidated petitions were
filed before the Court. Significantly, on May 6, 2001, President Macapagal Arroyo ordered the lifting
of the declaration of a "state of rebellion" in Metro Manila. Accordingly, the instant petitions have been
rendered moot and academic.
ISSUE: Whether or not the case can be dismissed because it is moot and academic since the state
of rebellion has ceased to exist.
RULING:
No, according to Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez dissenting in this case, the lifting of the assailed
Proclamation and General Order by the President does not render moot and academic the very
serious and unprecedented constitutional issues at hand, considering their grave implications
involving the basic human rights and civil liberties of our people.
A resolution of these issues becomes all the more necessary since, as reported in the papers,
there are saturation drives being conducted by the police wherein individuals in Metro Manila are
picked up without warrants of arrest. Moreover, the acts sought to be declared illegal and
unconstitutional are capable of being repeated by the respondents. In Salva vs. Makalintal, this Court
held that "courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is 'capable of repetition, yet
evading review' . . ."
11. Salonga v. Pano

(G.R. No. 59524, February 18, 1985)
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
FACTS:
This is a petition by Jovito Salonga invoking the his constitutional rights of life and liberty as
guaranteed by the due process clause, alleging that no prima facie case has been established to
warrant the filing of an information for subversion against him. Ex-Senator Jovito Salonga, a victim of
the still unresolved and heinous Plaza Miranda bombings, was arrested at the Manila Medical Center
while hospitalized for bronchial asthma. When arrested, he was not informed of the nature of the
charges against him. Neither was counsel allowed to talk to him until this Court intervened through
the issuance of an order directing that his lawyers be permitted to visit him. Only after four months of
detention was Salonga informed for the first time of the nature of the charges against him. After the
preliminary investigation, he moved to dismiss the complaint but the same was denied. Subsequently,
the respondent judge issued a resolution ordering the filing of an information after finding that a prima
facie case had been established against all of the forty persons accused.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court can pursue a case against Salonga even if there is no prima
facie evidence against petitioner.
RULING:
No, but the Supreme Court denied the Petition of Salonga for being moot and academic,
because the Respondents Fiscal and Judge manifested that they will drop Salonga in the information
filed against his co-accused, as a co-conspirator. The respondent, Judge Rodolfo Ortiz granted the
motion of City Fiscal Segio Apostol to drop the subversion case against the petitioner. Pursuant to
instructions of the Minister of Justice, the prosecution restudied its evidence and decided to seek the
exclusion of Jovito Salonga as only of the accused in the information. Insofar as the absence of a
prima facie case to warrant the filing of subversion charges is concerned, this decision has been
rendered moot and academic by the action of the prosecution. The Court has been constrained by
said actions.
12. ACOP v. GUINGONA

(G.R. No. 134855, July 2, 2002)
Austria – Martinez, J.
FACTS:
In 1995, eleven suspected members of the gang, Kuratong Baleleng, were killed in an alleged
shootout with PNP. SPO2 delos Reyes, who was one of the officers assigned to investigate on the
incident, made a public disclosure of his findings that there was no shootout and the said members
of the gang were summarily executed. This was attested by SPO2 dela Cruz. The Senate conducted
hearings to determine the circumstances surrounding the subject incident and SPO2 delos Reyes
and SPO2 dela Cruz testified before the Senate hearings. Former Senator Roco recommended that
SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz be admitted to the government’s witness protection program.
Petitioners, who are among the PNP officers implicated in the alleged rubout, contend that under Sec.
3(d) for R.A. No. 6981, law enforcers are disqualified from being admitted into the witness protection
program even though they may be testifying against other law enforcers. According to the Solicitor
General, the petition has been rendered moot and academic because the coverage of SPO2 delos
Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz under the Program has already been terminated, as evidenced by the
letter of the Director of the Program addressed to OSG.
ISSUE: WON petition for judicial review should prosper despite having become moot
RULING:
Yes. Although the issue had become moot and academic, the Court find it necessary to
resolve the case for the future guidance of both bench and bar as to the applications of Sec. 3(d) and
4 of R.A. No. 6981, and for the proper disposition of the issue on whether the two policemen should
return the monetary benefits they may have received under the program.
13. SANLAKAS v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

(G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004)
Tinga, J.
FACTS:
In 2003, three hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP stormed into the Oakwood
Premiere apartments in Makati City armed with high-powered ammunitions and explosives. They
demanded among other things, the resignation of Pres. Arroyo, the Secretary of Defense, and the
Chief of the PNP. The President then issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order 4, both
declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion. Despite the
occupation ending on the same night, the President did not immediately lift the declaration and did
so after 5 days. In the interim, several petitions were filed challenging the petition of Proclamation No.
427 and General Order 4.
The Solicitor General argues that the petitions have been rendered moot by the lifting of the
declaration.
ISSUE: WON petition for judicial review should prosper despite having become moot
RULING:
Yes. The Court agrees with Solicitor General that the issuance of Proclamation has rendered
the case moot. Nevertheless, courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is “capable of
repetition yet evading review”.
14. FUNA v. CHAIRMAN, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

(G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014)
Bersamin, J.
FACTS:
In 2010, President Arroyo appointed Duque as Chairman of the CSC. The Commission on
Appointments confirmed Duque’s appointment. Thereafter, Pres. Arroyo issued Executive Order No.
864 in which Duque was designated as a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the
following government owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs): a. GSIS, b. Philhealth, c. ECC and
d. HDMF. Petitioner Funa filed the instant petition challenging the constitutionality of EO 864.
However, during the pendency of the petition, Duque’s designation could have terminated or been
rendered invalid by the enactment of RA 10149, thus causing this petition and the main issue
tendered herein moot and academic.
ISSUE: WON petition for judicial review should prosper despite having become moot and academic
RULING:
Yes. The Court has exercised its power of judicial review in cases otherwise rendered moot
and academic by supervening events on the basis of certain recognized exceptions:
(1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution;

(2) the case involves a situation of exceptional character and is of paramount public interest;
(3) the constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench,
the Bar, and the public; and
(4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
The Court proceeded to resolve the substantive issue concerning the constitutionality of
Duque’s ex officio designation for the guidance of and as restraint upon the future.
15. ARAULLO v. AQUINO III

(G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014)
Bersamin, J.
FACTS:
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth
of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary
Florencio “Butch” Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program
(DAP). The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables
the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next
year’s appropriation.
In 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé claiming that he, and other Senators,
received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then
Chief Justice Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but was
disbursed upon the request of the Senators. Petitioner Araullo and several other concerned citizens
filed various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP.
Sec. Abad manifested during his oral arguments that the DAP as a program had been
meanwhile discontinued. The Solicitor General then quickly confirmed the termination of the DAP as
a program, and urged that its termination had already mooted the challenges to the DAP's
constitutionality.
ISSUE: WON the Court may exercise the power of judicial review.
RULING:
Yes. The first requisite in order for the Court to exercise the power of judicial review demands
that there be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power by the Court. An actual and
justiciable controversy exists in the cases at bar. The incompatibility of the perspectives of the parties
on the constitutionality of the DAP and its relevant issuances satisfy the requirement for a conflict
between legal rights. The issues being raised herein meet the requisite ripeness considering that the
challenged executive acts were already being implemented by the DBM, and there are averments by
the petitioners that such implementation was repugnant to the letter and spirit of the Constitution.
Moreover, the implementation of the DAP entailed the allocation and expenditure of huge sums of
public funds. The fact that public funds have been allocated, disbursed or utilized by reason or on
account of such challenged executive acts gave rise, therefore, to an actual controversy that is ripe
for adjudication by the Court.
16. OPLE v. TORRES

(G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998)
Puno, J.
FACTS:
In 1996, Administrative Order No 308, otherwise known as “Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System” was issued by President Fidel Ramos. Senator Blas
Ople filed a petition to invalidate the said order for violating the right to privacy. He contends that the
order must be invalidated on two constitutional grounds, (1) that it is a usurpation of the power to
legislate; and (2) that it intrudes the citizen’s right to privacy.
Respondents raise the issue of justiciability of the case at bar since the implementing rules of
A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated.
ISSUE: WON the Court may exercise the power of judicial review even though the implementing rules
of the order have yet to be promulgated.
RULING:
Yes. The ripeness for adjudication of the petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the
implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308
as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be
promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects.
All signals from the respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and
we need not wait for the formality of the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this light,
the dissenters insistence that we tighten the rule on standing is not a commendable stance as its
result would be to throttle an important constitutional principle and a fundamental right.
17. MONTESCLAROS v. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 152295, July 9, 2002)
Carpio, J.
FACTS:
The Local Government Code of 1991 renamed the Kabataang Barangay to Sangguniang
Kabataan and limited its membership to youths “at least 15 but no more than 21 years of age.”
Montesclaros demanded from COMELEC that SK elections be held as scheduled on 6 May 2002.
COMELEC Chairman Benipayo wrote to the House of Representatives and the Senate, inquiring on
the status of pending bills on SK and Barangay elections and expressed support to postpone the SK
election. On 11 March 2002 the Bicameral Committee consolidated Senate Bill 2050 and House Bill
4456, resetting the SK election to 15 July 2002 and lowered the membership age to at least 15 but
no more than 18 years of age. This was approved by the Senate and House of Representative on 11
March and 13 March 2002 respectively and signed by the President on 19 March 2002. The
petitioners filed prohibition and mandamus for temporary restraining order seeking the prevention of
postponement of the SK election and reduction of age requirement on 11 March 2002.
ISSUE: WON the proposed bill presents an actual justiciable controversy.
RULING:
No. This petition presents no actual justiciable controversy. Petitioners do not cite any
provision of law that is alleged to be unconstitutional. Petitioner’s prayer to prevent Congress from
enacting into law a proposed bill does not present actual controversy. A proposed bill is not subject
to judicial review because it is not a law. A proposed bill creates no right and imposes no duty legally
enforceable by the Court. Having no legal effect it violates no constitutional right or duty. At the time
petitioners filed this petition, RA No. 9164 was not yet enacted into law. After its passage, petitioners
failed to assail any provision in RA No. 9164 that could be unconstitutional.
18. MARIANO v. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 118577, March 7, 1995)
Puno, J.
FACTS:
At bench are petitions for prohibition and declaratory relief, assailing provisions of Republic
Act No. 7854 "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known
as the City of Makati" as unconstitutional. Mariano together with the other petitioners, assail as
unconstitutional Sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the following grounds:
1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati
by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code;
2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the 'three consecutive term' limit for local
elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.
3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:
(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter in violation of
the constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress
within three (3) years following the return of every census;
(b) the increase in legislative district, was not expressed in the title of the bill; and
(c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5 (3), Article
VI of the constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands
at only 450,000.
ISSUE: WON the petition presents a justiciable controversy.
RULING:
No. The petitions are based on the occurrence of contingent events, and are merely
hypothetical, such as Mayor Binay’s re-election which at some point may or may not happen. Thus,
said petition is not yet ripe to be an actual case or controversy.
Petitioners failed to comply with the requirements before a litigant can challenge the
constitutionality of a law. They are: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question
of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised
at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be
necessary to the determination of the case itself.
19. FERNANDEZ v. TORRES

(G.R. No. 102940, November 6, 1992)
Feliciano, J.
FACTS:
Petitioners seek prohibit and restrain the enforcement and implementation of Item No. 1 of
DOLE Circular No. 01-91 entitled "Prescribing Additional Requirements, Conditions and Procedures
for the Deployment of Performing Artists." Item No. 1 of the assailed DOLE Circular provides as
follows:
"1. No Filipino entertainer shall be deployed outside the Philippines except for legitimate
performing artists consisting of musicians, singers and members of dance troupes. In all cases, the
performing artists must have a track record of legitimate and reputable performance in the Philippines
for at least one year. In no case shall the performing artist be below 23 years old. The Secretary of
Labor and Employment may, for justifiable reasons, exempt performing artists from coverage hereof."
The labor representatives recommended that the minimum age for performing artists seeking
overseas deployment be raised from eighteen (18) years to twenty three (23) years. In the present
proceeding, petitioners allege themselves to be "qualified performing artists, mostly singers and
dancers," of ages eighteen (18) to twenty-two (22) years. Through counsel, they challenge the
constitutional validity of Item No. 1 of DOLE Circular No. 01-91. Solicitor General urges that the
petition at bar does not present a justiciable controversy.
ISSUE: WON the petition presents a justiciable controversy.
RULING:
No. The petitioners never sought exemption from the Secretary of Labor, and therefore cannot
claim that they have been denied of such. More so, petitioners cannot say that respondent have
continually threatened to deny all applications which may lead to their assumption that they will likely
be denied if they seek such exemption. There is no actual case or controversy for this petition is
grounded on mere hypothetical circumstances, which in fact, may or may not happen.
20. PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE v. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 119694, May 22, 1995)
Feliciano, J.
FACTS:
Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing newspapers to provide free
Comelec space of not less than one-half page for the common use of political parties and candidates.
The Comelec space shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates to
enable them to make known their qualifications, their stand on public Issue and their platforms of
government. The Comelec space shall also be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital
election information.
Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of newspaper and
magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772
unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution
upon the government against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation.
On behalf of the respondent Comelec, the Solicitor General claimed that the Resolution is a
permissible exercise of the power of supervision (police power) of the Comelec over the information
operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair,
impartial and credible election.
ISSUE: WON the petition presents an actual case or controversy.
RULING:
No for Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772. Petitioner failed to allege any act by the COMELEC
to enforce said provision. Neither has it claimed that it sustained any actual injury.
Yes for Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772. Even though the petition may have been considered
as moot and academic upon COMELEC’s resolution to clarify on May 1995, the Court still deemed it
appropriate to pass upon this issue due to an invalid exercise of the power of eminent domain. The
Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that to compel print media
companies to donate “Comelec space” amounts to “taking” of private personal property without
payment of the just compensation required in expropriation cases. Moreover, the element of necessity
for the taking has not been established by respondent Comelec, considering that the newspapers
were not unwilling to sell advertising space. The taking of private property for public use is authorized
by the constitution, but not without payment of just compensation. Also Resolution No. 2772 does not
constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. In the case at bench, there is no showing
of existence of a national emergency to take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers.
21. MACASIANO v. NATIONAL HOUSING INSTITUTE

(G.R. No. 107921, July 1, 1993)
Davide, Jr., J.
FACTS:
Petitioner seeks to declare as unconstitutional Sections 28 and 44 of Republic Act No. 7279
or the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992. He alleges that said Sections "contain the seeds
of a ripening controversy that serve as drawback" to his "tasks and duties regarding demolition of
illegal structures"; because of the said sections, he "is unable to continue the demolition of illegal
structures which he assiduously and faithfully carried out in the past." Petitioner maintains that the
said provisions are unconstitutional because:
(a) They deprive the government, and more so, private property owners of their property
without due process of law and without compensation;
(b) They reward, instead of punish, what this Honorable Court has categorically declared as
unlawful acts;
(c) They violate the prohibition against legislation that takes away one's property to be given
to plain interlopers;
(d) They sweep over broadly over legitimate concerns of the police power of the State; and
(e) They encroach upon the judicial power to execute its valid judgments and orders.
The Solicitor General contends: that there is no actual case or controversy with litigants
asserting adverse legal rights or interests; that the petitioner merely asks for an advisory opinion; and
that there is no showing that the question of constitutionality is the very lis mota presented. He argues
that Sections 28 and 44 of the Act are not constitutionally infirm.
ISSUE: WON the petition presents an actual case or controversy.
RULING:
No. The Court finds indubitable ground for the constitutional challenge, not even a necessity
to resolve it. In the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary, acts of political
departments are presumed to be valid based on the Doctrine of Separation of Powers.
22. BOARD OF OPTOMETRY v. COLET

(G.R. No. 122241, July 30, 1996)
Davide, Jr., J.
FACTS:
The Congress enacted RA 8050, regulating the practice of optometry education, integrated
optometrists, among others. In Civil Case No. 95-74770, private respondents herein filed with the
RTC Manila a petition for declaratory relief, assailing the validity of the Act on the grounds that it
derogated the orderly procedure essential to the legislative process and vitiating legislative consent,
violates the due process clause of the Constitution; violates the principle against undue delegation of
legislative power; and in violation of the guarantee of freedom of speech and press. In his decision,
public respondent Judge Colet issued an order prohibiting the petitioners "from undertaking in any
form or manner, the enforcement or implementation of the Revised Optometry Law (RA 8050) or any
regulations or Code of Ethics issued thereunder."
The petitioners then filed this special civil action alleging that the respondent judge acted with
grave abuse of discretion when he issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the
implementation of R.A. No. 8050, there being no actual case or controversy.
ISSUE: WON there is an actual case or controversy in Civil Case No. 95-74770.
RULING:
No. An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate
or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory. It cannot be disputed that there is yet no
actual case or controversy involving all or any of the private respondents on one hand, and all or any
of the petitioners on the other, with respect to rights or obligations under R.A. No. 8050. This is plain
because Civil Case No. 95-74770 is for declaratory relief.
ii. Proper Party
1. SALONGA V. WARNER BARNES & CO., LTD.

(G.R. No. L-2246, JANUARY 31, 1951)
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.
FACTS:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila ordering the
defendant, as agent of Westchester Fire Insurance Company of New York, to pay to the plaintiff the
sum of P717.82 with legal interest thereon from the filing of the complaint until paid, and the costs.
The case was taken to this court because it involves only questions of law.
On August 28, 1946, Westchester Fire Insurance Company of New York entered into a
contract with Tina J. Gamboa whereby said company insured one case of rayon yardage which said
Tina J. Gamboa shipped from San Francisco, California, on steamer Clovis Victory, to Manila,
Philippines and consigned to Jovito Salonga, plaintiff herein. According to the contract of insurance,
the insurance company undertook to pay to the sender or her consignee the damages that may be
caused to the goods shipped subject to the condition that the liability of the company will be limited
to the actual loss which is not to exceed the sum of P2,000. The ship arrived in Manila on September
10, 1946. Upon examination the surveyors found a shortage in the shipment in the amount of
P1,723.12. Plaintiff filed a claim for damages in the amount of P1,723.12 against the American
President Lines, agents of the ship Clovis Victory, demanding settlement, and when apparently no
action was taken on this claim, plaintiff demanded payment thereof from Warner, Barnes & Co., Ltd.,
as agent of the insurance company in the Philippines, and this agent having refused to pay the claim.
In the meantime, the American President Lines, in a letter dated November 25, 1946, agreed
to pay to the plaintiff the amount of P476.17 and when this offer was rejected, the claim was finally
settled in the amount of P1,021.25. As a result, the ultimate liability of the defendant under the
insurance contract was reduced to P717.82 only. After trial, the court rendered judgment as stated in
the early part of this decision. The motion for reconsideration filed by the defendant having been
denied, the case was appealed to this court.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioner is the proper party to raise the issue.
2. Whether or not petitioner may proceed with the case against Warner Barnes & Co., Ltd.
HELD:
1. Yes. Petitioner Jovito Salonga has suffered a direct injury in the case at bar, due to the
consignment deal with Tina Gamboa who shipped the rayon yardage from San Francisco.
2. No. It is claimed that a judgment, for or against an agent, in no way binds the real party in
interest. If the party sued upon is not the proper party, any decision that may be rendered
against him cannot be enforced or executed. Such would be the result of this case if it will be
allowed to proceed against the defendant, for even if a favorable judgment is obtained against
it, it cannot be enforced because the real party is not involved. The defendant cannot be made
to pay for something it is not responsible.
2. ADVOCATES OF TRUTH IN LENDING, INC. V. BANKO SENTRAL MONETARY BOARD

(G.R. No. 192986. JANUARY 15, 2013)
REYES, J.
FACTS:
Petitioners, claiming that they are raising issues of transcendental importance to the public,
filed directly with this Court this Petition for Certiorari seeking to declare that the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas Monetary Board (BSP-MB), replacing the Central Bank Monetary Board (CB-MB) has no
authority to continue enforcing Central Bank Circular No. 905, which "suspended" Act No. 2655, or
the Usury Law of 1916.
Petitioner "Advocates for Truth in Lending, Inc." (AFTIL) is a non-profit, non-stock corporation
organized to engage in pro bono concerns and activities relating to money lending issues. It filed this
petition, joined by its founder and president, Eduardo B. Olaguer, suing as a taxpayer and a citizen.
R.A. No. 265, which created the Central Bank (CB) of the Philippines, empowered the CB-MB to set
the maximum interest rates which banks may charge for all types of loans and other credit operations,
within limits prescribed by the Usury Law. On March 17, 1980, the Usury Law was amended by
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1684, giving the CB-MB authority to prescribe different maximum rates
of interest which may be imposed for a loan or renewal thereof or the forbearance of any money,
goods or credits, provided that the changes are effected gradually and announced in advance. In its
Resolution No. 2224 dated December 3, 1982, the CB-MB issued CB Circular No. 905. Under its
General Provisions, it removed the ceilings on interest rates on loans or forbearance of any money,
goods or credits.
Petitioners contend that under Section 1-a of Act No. 2655, as amended by P.D. No. 1684,
the CB-MB was authorized only to prescribe or set the maximum rates of interest for a loan or renewal
thereof. Thus, according to petitioners, CB Circular No. 905 is void because it violated Article 5 of the
New Civil Code. They further claim that just weeks after the issuance of CB Circular No. 905, the
benchmark 91-day Treasury bills (T-bills), then known as "Jobo" bills shot up to 40% per annum, as
a result. Finally, petitioners point out that R.A. No. 7653 did not re-enact a provision similar to Section
109 of R.A. No. 265, and therefore, BSP-MB has been stripped of the power either to prescribe the
maximum rates of interest or to suspend Act No. 2655 and continue enforcing CB Circular No. 905.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have locus standi to file the petition.
RULING:
No. The petitioners failed to show that they sustained any injury brought by CB Circular No.
905. Even as taxpayers, petitioners also do not claim that public funds were being misused in this
issue.
Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question."
The real party in interest is the one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit
or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." Succinctly put, a party's standing is based on his own
right to the relief sought.
3. CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATION V. ENERGY REGULATORY

COMMISSION
(G.R. No. 174697, JULY 8, 2010)
BRION, J.
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction to nullify Section 2.6 of the Distribution Services and Open
Access Rules (DSOAR), promulgated by respondent Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC.
Petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders' Associations, Inc. asserts that Section 2.6 of the
DSOAR, is unconstitutional and contrary to Republic Act No. 9136, otherwise known as "The Electric
Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA)." Pursuant to its rule-making powers under the EPIRA,
the ERC promulgated the Magna Carta for Residential Electricity Consumers (Magna Carta), which
establishes residential consumers' rights to have access to electricity and electric service, subject to
the requirements set by local government units and distribution utilities (DUs). Article 14 of the Magna
Carta pertains to the rights of consumers to avail of extension lines or additional facilities. The same
article specifies that if a developer initially pays the cost of the extension lines but passes it to the
registered customer, the customer would still be entitled to recover the cost in the manner provided.
On January 18, 2006, the ERC modified this provision when it issued the DSOAR. Section 2.6.1
reiterates the old rule requiring consumers located beyond 30 meters from existing lines to advance
the costs of the requested lines and facilities. Section 2.6.2 likewise provides that the costs advanced
by consumers may be refunded at the rate of 25% of the annual gross distribution revenue derived
from all customers connected to the line extension. However, Section 2.6.2 amends Article 14 of the
Magna Carta by limiting the period for the refund to five years, whether or not the amount advanced
by the consumer is fully paid. The petitioner seeks to nullify Section 2.6 of the DSOAR, on the
following grounds: (1) it is unconstitutional since it is oppressive and it violates the due process and
equal protection clauses; (2) it contravenes the provisions of the EPIRA; and (3) it violates the
principle of unjust enrichment. Petitioner claims that Section 2.6 of the DSOAR is unconstitutional as
it is oppressive to the affected end-users who must advance the amount for the installation of
additional facilities.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners has legal standing to challenge a statute or government act.
RULING:
No. Petitioners do not question the DSOAR provision as a residential end-user and it cannot
do so because the challenged provision only refers to the rights and obligations of DUs and residential
end-users. Thus, neither the petitioner nor its members can claim any injury, as residential end-users,
arising from the challenged Section 2.6 of the DSOAR. Nor cite any benefit accruing to them as
residential end-users that would result from the invalidation of the assailed provision.
Legal standing refers to a party's personal and substantial interest in a case, arising from the
direct injury it has sustained or will sustain as a result of the challenged governmental action. The
term "interest" means a material interest, affected by the governmental action.
4. PEOPLE V. VERA
(G.R. No.L-45685, NOVEMBER 16, 1937)
LAUREL, J.
FACTS:
This is an original action instituted in this court on August 19, 1937, for the issuance of the
writs of certiorari and of prohibition to the Court of First Instance of Manila so that this court may
review the actuations of the Court of First Instance in criminal case No. 42649 entitled "The People
of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", more particularly the application of the
defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng therein for probation under the provisions of Act No. 4221, and
thereafter prohibit the said Court of First Instance from taking any further action or entertaining further
the aforementioned application for probation, to the end that the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng may
be forthwith committed to prison in accordance with the final judgment of conviction rendered by this
court in said case. Petitioners herein, the People of the Philippine Islands and the Hongkong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation, are respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and the
respondent herein Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants in the criminal case.
Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by Court of First Instance of Manila. Upon appeal, the
court, on March 26, 1935, modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty of from five years and
six months of prision correccional to seven years, six months and twenty-seven days of prison mayor,
but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. Unjieng filed for reconsideration which was elevated
to the Supreme Court and the was remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While
awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was
convicted of. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office
(IPO). The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner
allowed the petition to be set for hearing.
The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under
probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature
granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere
in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein
that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because
Sec. 1 Art. 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws for the reason that its applicability
is not uniform throughout the islands. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards
and this also constitutes undue delegation of power because providing probation, in effect, is granting
freedom, as in pardon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the People of the Philippines is a proper party in the case.
RULING:
Yes. The People of the Philippines is a proper party, which has a substantial interest, as
represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of Manila. It is a rule that the person who
challenges the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest. Also, it has been
held that the State can validly challenge the validity of its own laws.
5. INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ZAMORA

(G.R. No.141284, AUGUST 15, 2000)
KAPUNAN, J.
FACTS:
At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a
temporary restraining order seeking to nullify on constitutional grounds the order of President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines to join the Philippine National
Police in visibility patrols around the metropolis for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression.
In compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police Chief
Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000 which detailed the manner
by which the joint visibility patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted. Task Force
Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila. Invoking his powers
as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President directed the
AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and
utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence.
The President also declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely
temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have
improved.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the "IBP") filed the instant petition to annul LOI 02/2000
and to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional, arguing
that the deployment of marines in Metro Manila is violative of the Constitution because no emergency
situation would justify, even only remotely, the deployment of soldiers for law enforcement work;
hence, said deployment in derogation of Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner IBP has the legal standing to challenge the President’s Order.
RULING:
No. Petitioner has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in this case, lacking
a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case. IBP primarily anchors its standing on
its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration,
however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP
of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to
clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups
and the whole citizenry.
6. DAVID V. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
(G.R. No. 171396. MAY 3, 2006)
LAUREL, J.
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People
Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency. In their
presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate
cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist
insurgents of the New People’s Army (NPA), and some members of the political opposition in a plot
to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the
President and take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present danger.
During the oral arguments held on March 7, 2006, the Solicitor General specified the facts
leading to the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Significantly, there was no refutation from
petitioners’ counsels. The Solicitor General argued that the intent of the Constitution is to give full
discretionary powers to the President in determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces. He
emphasized that none of the petitioners has shown that PP 1017 was without factual bases. While
he explained that it is not respondents’ task to state the facts behind the questioned Proclamation,
however, they are presenting the same, narrated hereunder, for the elucidation of the issues.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have a legal standing in questioning the constitutionality of the
proclamation.
RULING:
Yes. This Court adopted the “direct injury” test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that
the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” Therefore, the court ruled
that the petitioners have a locus standi, for they suffered “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest”
and “unlawful search” committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.
7. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION V. COMMISSION ON

HUMAN RIGHTS
(G.R. No.155336. NOVEMBER 25, 2004)
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
FACTS:
Before this Court is a petition for review filed by petitioner Commission on Human Rights
Employees' Association (CHREA) challenging the Decision dated 29 November 2001 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59678 affirming the Resolutions dated 16 December 1999 and 09 June
2000 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which sustained the validity of the upgrading and
reclassification of certain personnel positions in the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) despite the
disapproval thereof by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM). Also assailed is the
resolution dated 11 September 2002 of the Court of Appeals denying the motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioner.
On 14 February 1998, Congress passed Republic Act No. 8522, otherwise known as the
General Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional
Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. On the strength of its special provisions, the CHR, promulgated
Resolution No. A98-047 on 04 September 1998, adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme
among selected positions in the Commission. Annexed to said resolution is the proposed creation of
ten additional plantilla positions, namely: one Director IV position, with Salary Grade 28 for the Caraga
Regional Office, four Security Officer II with Salary Grade 15, and five Process Servers, with Salary
Grade 5 under the Office of the Commissioners. By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062 dated 17
November 1998, the CHR "collapsed" the vacant positions in the body to provide additional source
of funding for staffing modification. The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading
scheme to the DBM with a request for its approval, but then DBM secretary Benjamin Diokno denied
the request. The officers of petitioner CHREA, in representation of the rank and file employees of the
CHR, requested the CSC-Central Office to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office.
The CSC-Central Office denied CHREA's request and reversed the recommendation of the
CSC-Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be censured. CHREA filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the CSC-Central Office denied the same.
CHREA elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. It affirmed the pronouncement of the
CSC-Central Office and upheld the validity of the upgrading, retitling, and reclassification scheme in
the CHR on the justification that such action is within the ambit of CHR's fiscal autonomy. Petitioner
CHREA grouses that the Court of Appeals and the CSC-Central Office both erred.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has locus standi.
RULING:
Yes. Petitioner, which consists of rank and file employees of respondent CHR, protests that
the upgrading and collapsing of positions benefited only a select few in the upper level positions in
the Commission resulting to the demoralization of the rank and file employees. This sufficiently meets
the injury test.
8. AGAN V. PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TERMINALS, CO.

(G.R. No.155001. MAY 5, 2003)
PUNO, J.
FACTS:
Petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention filed the instant petitions for prohibition under Rule
65 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to prohibit the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA)
and the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and its Secretary from
implementing the following agreements executed by the Philippine Government through the DOTC
and the MIAA and the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO).
On October 5, 1994, Asia's Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC) submitted an unsolicited proposal
to the Government for the development of Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger
Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) under a build-operate-and-transfer arrangement pursuant to RA 6957, as
amended. It was endorsed to the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA), which, in turn,
reviewed and approved it for bidding. The Paircargo Consortium was the only company that submitted
a competitive proposal. Later, Paircargo Consortium incorporated into Philippine International Airport
Terminals Co., (PIATCO). And for failure of AEDC to match the price proposal submitted by PIATCO,
the project was awarded to PIATCO. On July 12, 1997, the Government signed the 1997 Concession
Agreement.
Thereafter, the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA) and three
Supplements thereto were signed by the Government and PIATCO. Consequently, the workers of
the international airline service providers, claiming that they stand to lose their employment upon the
implementation of the said agreements, filed before this Court a petition for prohibition. Later, the
service providers joined their cause. Congressmen Salacnib Baterina, Clavel Martinez and
Constantino Jaraula, alleging that the said contracts compelled government expenditure without
appropriation, filed a similar petition. And several employees of the MIAA likewise filed a petition
assailing the legality of these agreements.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners, NAIA concessionaires and service contractors, have locus standi.
RULING:
Yes. Petitioners are facing a direct injury or threat of losing their source of income or livelihood
upon implementation of PIATCO Contracts. Thus, conferring upon them legal standing due to the
financial prejudice brought by these said contracts.
9. BAGATSING V. COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION

(G.R. No.112399. JULY 14, 1995)
QUIASON, J.
FACTS:
The petition for prohibition in G. R. No. 112399 sought: (1) to nullify the bidding conducted for
the sale of a block of shares constituting 40% of the capital stock (40% block) of Petron Corporation
(PETRON) and the award made to Aramco Overseas Company, B.V. (ARAMCO) as the highest
bidder in the bidding conducted on December 15, 1993; and (2) to stop the sale of said block of
shares to ARAMCO. The Supplemental Petition in said case sought to annul the bidding of the 40%
block held on December 15, 1993 and to set aside the award given to ARAMCO. The petitioners all
in their capacity as members of Congress, taxpayers and concerned citizens, except in the case of
Mr. Saguisag, who sued as a private law practitioner, member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
taxpayer and concerned citizen.
PETRON was originally registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in
1966 under the corporate name "Esso Philippines, Inc." (ESSO) as a subsidiary of Esso Eastern, Inc.
and Mobil Petroleum Company, Inc. In acquiring PETRON, the government aimed to have a buffer
against the vagaries of oil prices in the international market. Indeed, PETRON helped alleviate the
energy crises that visited the country.
President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 50, in the exercise of her
legislative power under the Freedom Constitution, entitled "Proclaiming and Launching a Program for
the Expeditious Disposition and Privatization of Certain Government Corporations and/or the Assets
thereof, and Creating the Committee on Privatization and the Asset Privatization Trust."
On January 12, 1993, the Cabinet approved the privatization of PETRON as part of the Energy
Sector Action Plan. COP Chairman, President Ramos approved the privatization of PETRON up to a
maximum of 65% of its capital stock. The Petron Privatization Working Committee (PWC) was thus
formed. In a meeting of the Petron PWC held on December 15, 1993 at 12:00 noon, it decided that
Westmont Holdings (WESTMONT) was disqualified from participating in the bidding for its alleged
failure to comply with the technical and financial requirements for a strategic partner.
On February 3, 1994, PNOC and ARAMCO signed the Stock Purchase Agreement and on
March 4, 1994, the two companies signed the Shareholders' Agreement.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners, as Members of Congress, have locus standi to challenge the
contract in question.
RULING:
No. Petitioners, as members of Congress, in the absence of a claim that the contract in
question violated the rights of petitioners or impermissibly intruded into the domain of the Legislature,
petitioners have no legal standing to institute the instant action in their capacity as members of
Congress. However, petitioners can bring the action in their capacity as taxpayers under the doctrine
laid down in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona.
10. KMU Labor Center v. Garcia

(G.R. No. 115381, December 23, 1994)
KAPUNAN, J.
FACTS:
Then DOTC Secretary Oscar M. Orbos issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-395 to then
LTFRB Chairman, Remedios A.S. Fernando allowing provincial bus operators to charge passengers
rates within a range of 15% above and 15% below the LTFRB official rate for a period of one (1) year.
This range was later increased by LTFRB thru Memorandum Circular No. 92-009 providing,
among others, that “The existing authorized fare range system of plus or minus 15 per cent for
provincial buses and jeepneys shall be widened to 20% and -25% limit in 1994 with the authorized
fare to be replaced by an indicative or reference rate as the basis for the expanded fare range.”
In March, 1994, private respondent PBOAP, availing itself of the deregulation policy of the
DOTC allowing provincial bus operators to collect plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribed fare
without first having filed a petition for the purpose and without the benefit of a public hearing,
announced a fare increase of 20% of the existing fares.
Petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) opposed the move and filed a petition before LTFRB,
which was denied. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for a TRO.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to raise issues on transportation fares.
RULING:
Petition granted. The rule requires that a party must show a personal stake in the outcome of
the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision so as to warrant an
invocation of the court’s jurisdiction and to justify the exercise of the court’s remedial powers in his
behalf. Petitioner, whose members had suffered and continue to suffer grave and irreparable injury
and damage from the implementation of the questioned memoranda, circulars and/or orders, has
shown that it has a clear legal right that was violated and continues to be violated with the enforcement
of the challenged memoranda, circulars and/or orders. KMU members, who avail of the use of buses,
trains and jeepneys everyday, are directly affected by the burdensome cost of arbitrary increase in
passenger fares. They are part of the millions of commuters who comprise the riding public. Certainly,
their rights must be protected, not neglected nor ignored.
11. Paguia v. Office of the President

(G.R. No. 176276, June 25, 2010)
CARPIO, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Alan F. Paguia, as citizen and taxpayer, filed an original action for the writ of
certiorari to invalidate President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's nomination of respondent former Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. as permanent representative to the United Nations (UN) for violation of
Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7157 (RA 7157), the Philippine Foreign Service Act of 1991. Petitioner
argues that respondent Davide's age at that time of his nomination in March 2006, 70, disqualifies
him from holding his post.
In their separate Comments, respondent Davide, the Office of the President, and the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs raised the following issues: 1) petitioner’s standing to bring the suit
because of his indefinite suspension from the practice of law; 2) neither petitioner's citizenship nor
his taxpayer status vests him with standing to question respondent Davide's appointment because
he remains without personal and substantial interest in the outcome of a suit which does not involve
the taxing power of the state or the illegal disbursement of public funds; and 3) the suit is in truth a
petition for quo warranto, which can only be filed by a contender for the office in question.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner, as a citizen and taxpayer, has legal standing to bring the subject
suit.
RULING:
The SC held that access to citizen suits is granted on the narrowest ground, when issues of
“transcendental” importance calling urgent resolution are raised. The parameters for the
determination of allowing third party suits are: (1) character of the funds or assets involved in the
controversy; (2) clear disregard of constitutional and statutory prohibition; and (3) lack of any other
party with a more direct and specific interest to bring suit. None of the foregoing is present in the
case.
Petitioner Paguia is incapacitated to bring legal actions. Paguia’s suspension from the practice
of the law bars him from performing “any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of
law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.” Petitioner’s act of preparing a petition
raising carefully crafted arguments on equal protection grounds and employing highly legalistic rules
of statutory construction falls within the proscribed conduct.
12. Automotive Industry Workers Alliance v. Romulo

(G.R. No. 157509, January 18, 2005)
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
FACTS:
Executive Order No. 292 was issued whereby the National Labor Relations Commission
became an agency attached to the Department of Labor and Employment for policy and program
coordination and for administrative supervision. On 02 March 1989, Article 213 of the Labor Code
was expressly amended by Republic Act No. 6715 declaring that the NLRC was to be attached to the
DOLE for program and policy coordination only while the administrative supervision was turned over
to the NLRC Chairman. Executive Order No. 185 dated 10 March 2003 supervision of NLRC reverted
to the Sec. of Labor and Employment. Petitioners, composed of ten labor unions assailed the
constitutionality of EO 185 for allegedly revert the set-up prior to RA 6715, which only Congress can
do. Solicitor General contend that petitioners have no locus standi to assail the validity of E.O. No.
185, not even in their capacity as taxpayers, considering that labor unions are exempt from paying
taxes, citing Sec. 30 of the Tax Reform Act of 1997. Even assuming that their individual members are
taxpayers, respondents maintain that a taxpayer suit will not prosper as E.O. No. 185 does not require
additional appropriation for its implementation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the labour unions have legal standing to assail the constitutionality of EO 185.
RULING:
Petition dismissed for lack of merit. For a citizen to have standing, he must establish that he
has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action. Petitioners have not shown that they have sustained or are in danger
of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the enactment of E.O. No. 185. As labor unions it
cannot be said that E.O. No. 185 will prejudice their rights and interests considering that the scope of
the authority conferred upon the Secretary of Labor does not extend to the power to review, reverse,
revise or modify the decisions of the NLRC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
13. Domingo v. Carague

(G.R. No. 161065, April 15, 2005)
FACTS:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari is the legality of Resolution No. 2002-05 of the
Commission on Audit (COA) providing for Organizational Restructuring Plan. The petitioners alleged
therein that this Plan is intrinsically void for want of an enabling law authorizing COA to undertake the
same and providing for the necessary standards, conditions, restrictions, limitations, guidelines, and
parameters. Petitioners further alleged that in initiating such Organizational Restructuring Plan
without legal authority, COA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), countered that petitioners
have no legal standing to file the present petition since they have not shown "a personal stake in the
outcome of the case" or an actual or potential injury that can be redressed by our favorable decision.
In essence, it is alleged that the petitioners are not a party in interest, but the petitioners claim
otherwise by reason that the matter is of public concern. The said Organizational Restructuring Plan
is not just a mere reorganization but a revamp or overhaul of the COA, with a "spillover effect" upon
its audit performance. This will have an impact upon the rest of the government bodies subject to its
audit supervision, thus, should be treated as a matter of transcendental importance.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to institute the instant petition.
RULING:
Petitioners have not shown any direct and personal interest in the COA Organizational
Restructuring Plan. There was also an admission that "they do not seek any affirmative relief nor
impute any improper or improvident act against the respondents" and "are not motivated by any desire
to seek affirmative relief from COA or from respondents that would redound to their personal benefit
or gain." Hence, the petitioners do not have any legal standing to file the instant suit.
He who is directly affected and whose interest is immediate and substantial has the standing
to sue. A party must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can
be redressed by a favorable decision in order to warrant an invocation of the court.
14. Cutaran v. DENR

(G.R. No. 134958, January 31, 2001)
GONZAGA-REYES, J.
FACTS:
Cutaran et al. assails the validity of DENR Special Orders 31 and 25, and Department
Administrative Order 2 for being issued without prior legislative authority.
In 1990, the Assistant Secretary for Luzon Operations of the DENR issued Special Order no.
31 entitled "Creation of a Special Task force on acceptance, identification, evaluation and delineation
of ancestral land claims in the Cordillera Administrative Region". The special task force created was
authorized to accept and evaluate and delineate ancestral land claims within the said area, and after
due evaluation of the claims, to issue appropriate land titles in accordance with existing laws. On
January 15, 1993, the Secretary of the DENR issued Special Order no. 25 entitled "Creation of
Special Task Forces provincial and community environment and natural resources offices for the
identification, delineation and recognition of ancestral land claims nationwide" and Department
Administrative Order no. 02, containing the Implementing Rules and Guidelines of Special Order no.
25.
In 1990, the same year Special Order no. 31 was issued, the relatives of herein petitioners
filed separate applications for certificate of ancestral land claim (CALC) over the land they
respectively occupy inside the Camp John Hay Reservation. In 1996 the applications were denied by
the DENR Community Special Task Force on Ancestral Lands on the ground that the Bontoc and
Applai tribes to which they belong are not among the recognized tribes of Baguio City. Hence, this
petition for prohibition originally filed with the Court of Appeals. CA held that the assailed DENR
Special Orders Nos. 31, 31-A, 31-B issued in 1990 prior to the effectivity of RA 7586 known as the
National Integrated Protected Areas Systems (NIPAS) Act of 1992, are of no force and effect "for pre-
empting legislative prerogative" but sustained the validity of DENR Special Order No. 25, and its
implementing rules by the appellate court on the ground that they were issued pursuant to the powers
delegated to the DENR.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi.
RULING:
There is no justiciable controversy for the court to resolve. The adverse legal interests involved
are the competing claims of the petitioners and heirs of Carantes to possess a common piece of land.
Since the CALC application of the Heirs of Carantes has not yet been granted or issued, and which
the DENR may or may not grant, there is yet no actual or imminent violation of petitioner’s asserted
right to possess the disputed land.
The Court cannot rule on the basis of petitioners’ speculation that the DENR will approve the
application of the heirs of Carantes. There must be an actual governmental act, which directly causes
or will imminently cause injury to the alleged legal right of the petitioner to possess the land before
the jurisdiction of the Court may be invoked. There is no showing that the petitioners were being
evicted from the land by the heirs of Carantes under orders from the DENR.
15. Joya v. PCGG

(G.R. No. 96541, August 24, 1993)
BELLOSILLO, J.
FACTS:
All thirty-five (35) petitioners in this Special Civil Action for Prohibition and Mandamus r
seeking to enjoin the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) from proceeding with
the auction sale by Christie's of New York of the Old Masters Paintings and 18th and 19th century
silverware seized from Malacañang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila.
Petitioners claim that as Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists deeply concerned with the
preservation and protection of the country's artistic wealth, they have the legal personality to restrain
respondents Executive Secretary and PCGG from acting contrary to their public duty to conserve the
artistic creations as mandated by the 1987 Constitution, particularly Art. XIV, Secs. 14 to 18, on Arts
and Culture, and R.A. 4846 known as "The Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection Act,"
ISSUE: Whether petitioners have legal standing to file the subject petition.
RULING:
None. They themselves allege that the paintings were donated by private persons from
different parts of the world to the Metropolitan Museum of Manila Foundation, which is a non-profit
and non-stock corporations established to promote non-Philippine arts. Similarly, as alleged in the
petition, the pieces of antique silverware were given to the Marcos couple as gifts from friends and
dignitaries from foreign countries on their silver wedding and anniversary, an occasion personal to
them.
The confiscation of these properties by the Aquino administration however should not be
understood to mean that the ownership of these paintings has automatically passed on the
government without complying with constitutional and statutory requirements of due process and just
compensation. If these properties were already acquired by the government, any constitutional or
statutory defect in their acquisition and their subsequent disposition must be raised only by the proper
parties — the true owners thereof — whose authority to recover emanates from their proprietary rights
which are protected by statutes and the Constitution. Having failed to show that they are the legal
owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have become publicly owned, petitioners do not
possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question their alleged unauthorized disposition.
Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. Not every action filed by a taxpayer
can qualify to challenge the legality of official acts done by the government. A taxpayer's suit can
prosper only if the governmental acts being questioned involve disbursement of public funds upon
the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for the purpose of
administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds, which may be
enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. Obviously, petitioners are not challenging any expenditure
involving public funds but the disposition of what they allege to be public properties. It is worthy to
note that petitioners admit that the paintings and antique silverware were acquired from private
sources and not with public money.
16. TELEBAP v. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 132922, April 21, 1998)
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP)
is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. They are suing as
citizens, taxpayers, and registered voters.
Petitioners challenge the validity of §92 on the ground (1) that it takes property without due
process of law and without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television broadcast
companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the
COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication or information during
the period of election.
ISSUE: Whether TELEBAP has standing in this suit.
RULING:
None. In the case at bar, as will presently be shown, petitioner's substantive claim is without
merit. To the extent, therefore, that a party's standing is determined by the substantive merit of his
case or preliminary estimate thereof, petitioner TELEBAP must be held to be without standing.
Indeed, a citizen will be allowed to raise a constitutional question only when he can show that he has
personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; the injury fairly is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action. Members of petitioner have not shown that they have suffered harm
as a result of the operation of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881.
Nor do members of petitioner TELEBAP have an interest as registered voters since this case
does not concern their right of suffrage. Their interest in §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 should be precisely in
upholding its validity.
Much less do they have an interest as taxpayers since this case does not involve the exercise
by Congress of its taxing or spending power. A party suing as a taxpayer must specifically show that
he has a sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that
he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute.
Nor indeed as a corporate entity does TELEBAP have standing to assert the rights of radio
and television broadcasting companies. Standing jus tertii will be recognized only if it can be shown
that the party suing has some substantial relation to the third party, or that the third party cannot
assert his constitutional right, or that the eight of the third party will be diluted unless the party in court
is allowed to espouse the third party's constitutional claim. None of these circumstances is here
present. The mere fact that TELEBAP is composed of lawyers in the broadcast industry does not
entitle them to bring this suit in their name as representatives of the affected companies.
17. Kilosbayan v. Guingona, Jr.

(G.R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994)
DAVIDE, JR., J.
FACTS:
This action seeks to prohibit and restrain the implementation of the "Contract of Lease"
executed by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming
Management Corporation (PGMC) in connection with the on-line lottery system, also known as "lotto."
Petitioner Kilosbayan, Incorporated (KILOSBAYAN) avers that it is a non-stock domestic

corporation composed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors, priests, nuns, and lay leaders who are
committed to the cause of truth, justice, and national renewal.
Petitioners submit that the PCSO cannot validly enter into the assailed Contract of Lease with
the PGMC because it is an arrangement wherein the PCSO would hold and conduct the on-line lottery
system in "collaboration" or "association" with the PGMC, in violation of Section 1(B) of R.A. No.
1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting charity
sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other similar activities "in collaboration, association or joint venture
with any person, association, company or entity, foreign or domestic."
On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioners do not appear to have the legal
standing or real interest in the subject contract and in obtaining the reliefs sought.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have legal standing to maintain this suit.
RULING:
Yes. A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the
exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. In the landmark
Emergency Powers Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality because "the transcendental
importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing
aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2821)." Insofar as
taxpayers' suits are concerned, this Court had declared that it "is not devoid of discretion as to whether
or not it should be entertained,” or that it "enjoys an open discretion to entertain the same or not."
In line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi, ordinary taxpayers, members of
Congress, and even association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations were allowed to initiate
and prosecute actions before this Court to question the constitutionality or validity of laws, acts,
decisions, rulings, or orders of various government agencies or instrumentalities.
We find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The issues it
raised are of paramount public interest and of a category even higher than those involved in many of
the aforecited cases. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and
moral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counter-
productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the
billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition
and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier
which the respondents tried to take advantage of.
18. Tatad v. Secretary of Energy

(G.R. Nos. 124360 and 127867, November 5, 1997)
PUNO, J.
FACTS:
The petitions at bar challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180 entitled "An Act
Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes" which ends twenty six (26) years
of government regulation of the downstream oil industry.
The petition is anchored on three arguments:
First, that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined
petroleum products violates the equal protection clause. Petitioner contends that the 3%-7% tariff
differential unduly favors the three existing oil refineries and discriminates against prospective
investors in the downstream oil industry who do not have their own refineries and will have to source
refined petroleum products from abroad.
Second, that the imposition of different tariff rates does not deregulate the downstream oil
industry but instead controls the oil industry, contrary to the avowed policy of the law.
Third, that the inclusion of the tariff provision in Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 violates Section 26(1)
Article VI of the Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which shall be expressed
in its title. Petitioner contends that the imposition of tariff rates in section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 is
foreign to the subject of the law which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have the standing to assail the validity of the subject law and
executive order.
RULING:
Yes. In language too lucid to be misunderstood, this Court has brightlined its liberal stance on
a petitioner's locus standi where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance
to the people. In Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, we stressed:
Objections to taxpayers' suit for lack of sufficient personality, standing or interest are,
however, in the main procedural matters. Considering the importance to the public of the cases at
bar, and in keeping with the Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not
the other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the
laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside
technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of these petitions.
19. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION v. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 159139, January 13, 2004)
PANGANIBAN, J.
FACTS:
For the automation of the counting and canvassing of the ballots in the 2004 elections,
Comelec awarded the Contract to "Mega Pacific Consortium" an entity that had not participated in
the bidding. Despite this grant, the poll body signed the actual automation Contract with "Mega Pacific
eSolutions, Inc.," a company that joined the bidding but had not met the eligibility requirements.
On May 29, 2003, petitioner and four other individuals and entities protested the award of the
Contract to Respondent MPC "due to glaring irregularities in the manner in which the bidding process
had been conducted."
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have locus standi in this case.
RULING:
Yes. As taxpayers, they are allowed to sue when there is a claim of "illegal disbursement of
public funds," or if public money is being "deflected to any improper purpose"; or when petitioners
seek to restrain respondent from "wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law." In the Petition, they claim that the bidding was defective, the winning bidder not
a qualified entity, and the award of the Contract contrary to law and regulation. Accordingly, they seek
to restrain respondents from implementing the Contract and, necessarily, from making any
unwarranted expenditure of public funds pursuant thereto. Moreover, our nation's political and
economic future virtually hangs in the balance, pending the outcome of the 2004 elections. Hence,
there can be no serious doubt that the subject matter of this case is "a matter of public concern and
imbued with public interest"; 18 in other words, it is of "paramount public interest" and "transcendental
importance."
20. LIM v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

(G.R. No. 151445, April 11, 2002)
DE LEON, JR. J.
FACTS:
Pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the
Philippines and the United States in 1951, personnel from the armed forces of the United States of
America started arriving in Mindanao to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in
"Balikatan 02-1”. The entry of American troops into Philippine soil is proximately rooted in the
international anti-terrorism campaign declared by President George W. Bush in reaction to the tragic
events that occurred on September 11, 2001.
On February 1, 2002, petitioners Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed this petition for
certiorari and prohibition, attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.
RULING:
Yes. The Court relaxed stringent rule on parties’ standing to file suit because of the primordial
importance of the issue involved. Although the Court agreed with the Solicitor General in his
contentions that (1) they may not file suit in their capacities as taxpayers inasmuch as it has not been
shown that "Balikatan 02-1" involves the exercise of Congress' taxing or spending powers, (2) their
being lawyers does not invest them with sufficient personality to initiate the case, and (3) petitioners
have failed to demonstrate the requisite showing of direct personal injury, it reiterated its decision in
Kilosbayan v. Guingona, Jr. In cases of transcendental importance, the Court may relax the standing
requirements and allow a suit to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the
right of judicial review.
21. KILOSBAYAN v. MORATO

(G.R. No. 118910, July 17, 1995)
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS:
In Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, the Court declared invalid the contract between Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the privately owned Philippine Gaming Management Corporation
(PGMC) for the operation of a nationwide on-line lottery system. The contract violated the provision
in the PCSO Charter which prohibits PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries through a
collaboration, association, or joint venture. Both parties again signed an Equipment Lease Agreement
(ELA) for online lottery equipment and accessories on January 25, 1995.
Kilosbayan again filed a petition to declare amended ELA invalid because (1) It is the same
as the old contract of lease; (2) it is still violative of PCSO’s charter; (3) it is violative of the law
regarding public bidding – it has not been approved by the President and it is not most advantageous
to the government.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has standing to sue.
RULING:
No. The parties in the previous and the present case may be the same, but the case is not.
Strictly speaking, standing is concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is
actually involved. The issue in this case is whether petitioners are the "real parties-in-interest". It is
true that the present action involves not a mere contract between private individuals but one made
by a government corporation. There is, however, no allegation that the public funds are being
misspent so as to make this action a public one and justify relaxation of the requirement that an action
must be prosecuted in the name of the real party-in-interest. Question as to the nature or validity of
public contracts or the necessity for a public bidding before they may be made can be raised in an
appropriate case before the Commission on Audit or before the Ombudsman.
22. CHAVEZ vs PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY

(G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002)
CARPIO, J.
FACTS:
The petition seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority ("PEA" for brevity) to disclose all
facts on PEA's then on-going renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation
("AMARI" for brevity) to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. PEA sought the transfer to the Amari Coastal
Bay and Development Corporation, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares of the
Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to
Amari.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has legal standing to sue.
RULING:
Yes. The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer's suit because the petition seeks to
compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties. There are two constitutional issues involved here.
First is the right of citizens to information on matters of public concern. Second is the application of a
constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable distribution of alienable lands of the public
domain among Filipino citizens. The thrust of the first issue is to compel PEA to disclose publicly
information on the sale of government lands worth billions of pesos, information which the Constitution
and statutory law mandate PEA to disclose. The thrust of the second issue is to prevent PEA from
alienating hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public domain in violation of the Constitution,
compelling PEA to comply with a constitutional duty to the nation. Moreover, the petition raises
matters of transcendental importance to the public.
23. TATAD vs GARCIA

(G.R. No. 114222, April 6, 1995)
QUIASON, J.
FACTS:
In 1989, DOTC planned to construct a light railway transit line along EDSA to provide a mass
transit system along EDSA and alleviate the congestion and growing transportation problem in the
metropolis. Certain corporations were invited to prequalify for the bids and it was awarded to EDSA
LRT Consortium. DOTC and the latter then entered into an agreement to build the light railway transit
under a Build, Operate, and Transfer (BOT) scheme. Upon full or partial completion and viability
thereof, ESDA Consortium shall deliver the use and possession of the completed portion to DOTC
which shall operate the same. DOTC shall pay private respondent rentals on a monthly basis through
an Irrevocable Letter of Credit. The rentals shall be determined by an independent and internationally
accredited inspection firm to be appointed by the parties. As agreed upon, EDSA Consortium’s capital
shall be recovered from the rentals to be paid by the DOTC which, in turn, shall come from the
earnings of the EDSA LRT III. After 25 years and DOTC shall have completed payment of the rentals,
ownership of the project shall be transferred to the latter for a consideration of only US $1.00.
Petitioners opposed the implementation of the said agreement insofar as it grants EDSA LRT
CORPORATION, LTD., a foreign corporation, the ownership of EDSA LRT III, a public utility, and that
it violates the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have standing to sue.
RULING:
Yes. The prevailing doctrines in taxpayer's suits are to allow taxpayers to question contracts
entered into by the national government or government-owned or controlled corporations allegedly in
contravention of the law (Kilosbayan vs Guingona) and to disallow the same when only municipal
contracts are involved (Bugnay vs. Laron). For as long as the ruling in Kilosbayan on locus standi is
not reversed, we have no choice but to follow it and uphold the legal standing of petitioners as
taxpayers to institute the present action.
24. BRILLANTES vs COMELEC

(G.R. No. 163193, June 15, 2004)
CALLEJO, SR., J.
FACTS:
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8436 authorizing the COMELEC
to use an automated election system (AES) for the process of voting, counting of votes and
canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local elections. It also mandated the
COMELEC to acquire automated counting machines (ACMs), computer equipment, devices and
materials; and to adopt new electoral forms and printing materials. On October 29, 2002, the
COMELEC adopted, in its Resolution No. 02-0170, a modernization program for the 2004 elections
consisting of three (3) phases, to wit: (1) PHASE I – Computerized system of registration and voters
validation or the so-called "biometrics" system of registration; (2) PHASE II – Computerized voting
and counting of votes; and (3) PHASE III – Electronic transmission of results.
The SC, in a previous ruling, declared COMELEC Resolution No. 6027, implementing Phase
II of the AES, unconstitutional. Despite that, the COMELEC nevertheless ventured to implement
Phase III of the AES through an electronic transmission of advanced "unofficial" results of the 2004
elections for national, provincial and municipal positions, also dubbed as an "unofficial quick count."
Petitioners claimed that it would allow the usurpation of the exclusive power of Congress to canvass
the votes for President (Pres.) and Vice-President (VP) and encroach upon the authority of the
National Citizens Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) to conduct the "unofficial" quick count.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.
RULING:
Yes. Since the implementation of the assailed resolution obviously involves the expenditure
of funds, the petitioner and the petitioners-in-intervention, as taxpayers, possess the requisite
standing to question its validity as they have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of
money raised by taxation. Most of the petitioners-in-intervention are also representatives of major
political parties that have participated in the May 10, 2004 elections. On the other hand, petitioners-
in- intervention Concepcion and Bernas represent the National Citizens Movement for Free Elections
(NAMFREL), which is the citizens' arm authorized to conduct an "unofficial" quick count during the
said elections. They have sufficient, direct and personal interest in the manner by which the
respondent COMELEC would conduct the elections, including the counting and canvassing of the
votes cast therein. Moreover, the petitioners-in-intervention Drilon and De Venecia are, respectively,
President of the Senate and Speaker of the House of Representatives, the heads of Congress, which
is exclusively authorized by the Constitution to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President.
They have the requisite standing to prevent the usurpation of the constitutional prerogative of
Congress.
25. JUMAMIL vs CAFÉ

(G.R. No. 144570, September 21, 2005)
CORONA, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Jumamil questioned the constitutionality of Municipal Resolution No. 7 which
provided for an initial appropriation of P 765,000 for the construction of stalls around a proposed
terminal fronting the Panabo Public Market which was destroyed by fire. The same was amended by
Resolution No. 10 appropriating a further amount of P1,515,000 for the construction of additional
stalls in the same public market.
Prior to the passage of these resolutions, respondent Mayor Cafe had already entered into
contracts with those who advanced and deposited (with the municipal treasurer) from their personal
funds the sum of P40,000 each. Some of the parties were close friends and/or relatives of the public
respondents. After completion, the stalls were leased through a public raffle limited to said individuals.
Jumamil, as taxpayer, filed a petition questioning the constitutionality of the ordinances. The lower
courts declared Jumamil to lack legal standing because he was not a party to the contract entered
into.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has legal standing.
RULING:
No. A taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to challenge its validity but parties suing as
such must specifically prove sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised
by taxation. In the case at bar, petitioner did not seasonably allege his interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of public funds or the specific injury to him as a result of the enforcement of the
questioned resolutions and contracts. It was only in the "Remark to Comment" he filed in this Court
did he first assert that "he (was) willing to engage in business and (was) interested to occupy a market
stall." Such claim was obviously an afterthought.
26. ESTRADA vs SANDIGANBAYAN

(G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001)
BELLOSILLO, J.
FACTS:
Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659, wishes to impress
upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which
divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to
subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it
suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal
prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The
Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the
accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
The terms which the petitioner challenges for vice for vagueness are “combination”, “series” and
“unwarranted”. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of the law.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has legal standing to sue.
RULING:
Yes. The onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party challenging
the validity of the statute. He must demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there is indeed an
infringement of the constitution, for absent such a showing; there can be no finding of
unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely put by Justice Malcolm,
"To doubt is to sustain."
Petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The

doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute
establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of
ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked
against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified
either by a saving clause or by construction. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is
permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated.
27. IMBONG vs OCHOA

(G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS:
R.A. 10354, The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law),
was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012. A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the
petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds: The RH Law violates
(1) the right to life of the unborn; (2) the one subject-one title rule; (3) he right to health and the right
to protection against hazardous products; (4) the right to religious freedom; among others.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have locus standi in this case.
RULING:
Yes. Notwithstanding the fact that the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied against
the petitioners and the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive,
the Court leaned on the transcendental importance doctrine. It states that "the rule on standing is a
matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest."
In cases of paramount importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing
requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury
to the party claiming the right of judicial review. Considering that it is the right to life of the mother and
the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking
action.
iii. Earliest Opportunity
1. MATIBAG V. BENIPAYO
(G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002)
CARPIO, J.
FACTS:
COMELEC en banc appointed petitioner as “Acting Director IV” of the Education and
Information Department (EID) on February 1999. On February 2000, Chairperson Demetriou
renewed the appointment of petitioner in a “Temporary” capacity. Commissioner Javier again
renewed the appointment of petitioner to the same position in a “Temporary” capacity. On February
2001.
On March 2001, The President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed ad interim, Benipayo as
COMELEC Chairman and Borra and Tuason as COMELEC Commissioners, each for a term of seven
years and all expiring on February 2008. Benipayo took his oath of office and assumed the position
of COMELEC Chairman. Borra and Tuason likewise took their oaths of office and assumed their
positions as COMELEC Commissioners.
On June 2001, The President renewed the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason to the same positions and for the same term of seven years, expiring on February 2008.
In his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, Benipayo issued a Memorandum addressed to

petitioner as Director IV of the EID and to Cinco as Director III also of the EID, designating Cinco
Officer-in-Charge of the EID and reassigning petitioner to the Law Department.
During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department Petitioner then filed an
instant petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively.
Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the
constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC, as well as on the prohibitions on
temporary appointments and reappointments of its Chairman and members.
ISSUE: Whether or not the instant petition provides for all the requisites before the Court may
exercise its power of judicial review.
RULING:
Yes. The requisites are all present, which earliest opportunity is thus present.
Petitioner filed the instant petition only on August 3, 2001, when the first ad interim
appointments were issued as early as March 22, 2001. However, it is not the date of filing of the
petition that determines whether the constitutional issue was raised at the earliest opportunity. The
earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in the pleadings before a competent
court that can resolve the same, such that, "if it is not raised in the pleadings, it cannot be considered
at the trial, and, if not considered at the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal." Petitioner questioned
the constitutionality of the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason when she filed her
petition before this Court, which is the earliest opportunity for pleading the constitutional issue before
a competent body. Furthermore, this Court may determine, in the exercise of sound discretion, the
time when a constitutional issue may be passed upon. There is no doubt petitioner raised the
constitutional issue on time.
2. ESTARIJA V. RANADA
(G.R. No. 159314, June 26, 2006)
QUISUMBING, J.
FACTS:
Respondent Ranada, a member of the Davao Pilots Association, Inc. (DPAI) and Davao
Tugboat and Allied Services, Inc. (DTASI) filed an administrative complaint for Gross Misconduct
before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, against petitioner Estarija, Harbor Master of the
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), Port in Davao City.
Thereafter, the Ombudsman rendered a decision in the administrative case, finding Estarija
guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct.
Estarija filed a motion for reconsideration and assails RA 6770, otherwise known as "The
Ombudsman Act 1989" as unconstitutional because it gives the Office of the Ombudsman additional
powers that are not provided for in the Constitution. The Court of Appeals (CA) held that the attack
on the constitutionality of RA 6770 was procedurally and substantially flawed. The constitutionality
issue was belatedly raised in the motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Ombudsman.
ISSUE: Whether or not the question of constitutionality of RA 6770 was raised at the earliest possible
opportunity.
RULING:
Yes, the question of constitutionality of RA 6770 was raised at the earliest possible
opportunity.
Petitioner raised the issue of constitutionality of Rep. Act No. 6770 in his motion for the
reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s decision. Verily, the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to entertain
questions on the constitutionality of a law. Thus, when petitioner raised the issue of constitutionality
of RA 6770 before the CA, the constitutional question was raised at the earliest opportune time.
Furthermore, this Court may determine, in the exercise of sound discretion, the time when a
constitutional issue may be passed upon.
3. UMALI V. GUINGONA
(G.R. No. 131124, March 29, 1999)
PURISIMA, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner was appointed Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. President Fidel
V. Ramos, received a confidential memorandum against petitioner for alleged violations of internal
revenue laws, rules and regulations.
On receipt of the said confidential memorandum, former President Ramos authorized the
issuance of an Order for the preventive suspension of Umali and immediately referred the Complaint
against the latter to the Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption (PCAGC), for
investigation.
The PCAGC found prima facie evidence to support six (6) charges of malfeasance,
misfeasance, and nonfeasance against petitioner. Acting upon the recommendation of the PCAGC,
President Ramos issued an Administrative Order dismissing petitioner with forfeiture of retirement
and all benefits under the law.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Office of the President, petitioner
brought a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction before the RTC of Makati which dismissed
the same. The Court of Appeals likewise dismissed the petition when its jurisdiction was invoked,
hence, petitioner found its way to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner raised the issue at its earliest opportunity for judicial review.
RULING:
As regards the issue of constitutionality of the PCAGC, it was only posed by petitioner in his
motion for reconsideration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. It was certainly too late to raise
the said issue for the first time at such late stage of the proceedings below.
4. ZANDUETA V. DELA COSTA

(G.R. No. 46267, November 28, 1938)
VILLA-REAL, J.
FACTS:
Prior to the promulgation of Commonwealth Act No. 145, the petitioner, the Honorable
Francisco Zandueta was discharging the office of judge of first instance, Ninth Judicial District,
comprising solely the City of Manila, and was presiding over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First
Instance of said city, by virtue of an ad interim appointment issued by the President of the Philippines
in his favor on June 1936, and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments of the National
Assembly on September of the same year.
On November 1936, the date on which Commonwealth Act No. 145, otherwise known as the
"Judicial Reorganization Law", took effect, the petitioner received from the President of the
Commonwealth and new ad interim appointment as judge of first instance, this time of the Fourth
Judicial District, with authority to preside over the Courts of First Instance of Manila and Palawan,
issued in accordance with said Act.
As the National Assembly adjourned on November 1937, without its Commission on

Appointments' having acted on said ad interim appointment, another ad interim appointment to the
same office was issued in favor of said petitioner, pursuant to which he took a new oath, before
discharging the duties thereof.
On May 1938, the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly disapproved the
aforesaid ad interim appointment of said petitioner, who was advised thereof by the Secretary of
Justice on the same month and year.
President of the Philippines appointed the herein respondent, Honorable Sixto de la Costa,
judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over the Fifty Branch of
the Court of First Instance of Manila and the Court of First Instance of Palawan, and his appointment
was approved by the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can question the Constitutionality of the Commonwealth Act No.
145.
RULING:
No, the petitioner cannot question the Constitutionality of the Commonwealth Act No. 145.
The respondent, in answer to the petition, admits some of the facts alleged therein and denies
the rest, and alleges, as one of his special defenses, that the petitioner is estopped from attacking
the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 145, for having accepted his new appointment as
judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, issued by virtue thereof, to preside over the Courts
of First Instance of Manila and Palawan, and for having taken the necessary oath, entering into the
discharge of the functions of his office and performing judicial as well as administrative acts.
iv. Lis Mota
1. KALIPUNAN NG DAMAY ANG MAHIHIRAP V. ROBREDO

(G.R. No. 200903, July 22, 2014)
BRION, J.
FACTS:
The members of petitioners Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap, Inc. and Corazon de Jesus
Homeowners' Association as well as the individual petitioners, Fernando Sevilla, Estrelieta Bagasbas,
Jocy Lopez, Elvira Vidol and Delia Frayres, were/are occupying parcels of land owned by and located
in the cities of San Juan, Navotas and Quezon (collectively, the LGUs).
These LGUs sent the petitioners notices of eviction and demolition pursuant to Section 28 (a)
and (b) of RA 7279 in order to give way to the implementation and construction of infrastructure
projects in the areas illegally occupied by the petitioners.
On March 23, 2012, the petitioners directly filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus
before the Court, seeking to compel the Secretary of Interior and Local Government, et al. (the public
respondents) to first secure an eviction and/or demolition order from the court prior to their
implementation of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279.
The petitioners argue that Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 offend their constitutional right
to due process because they warrant evictions and demolitions without any court order. They point
out that Section 6, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution expressly prohibits the impairment of liberty of
abode unless there is a court order. Moreover, Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 violate their right to
adequate housing, a universal right recognized in Article 25 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and Section 2 (a) of RA 7279. The petitioners further complain that the respondents had previously
conducted evictions and demolitions in a violent manner, contrary to Section 10, Article 13 of the
1987 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not can the Court can exercise their power of judicial review in this case.
RULING:
No. The issue of the case is not the lis mota of the case.
Lis mota literally means "the cause of the suit or action"; it is rooted in the principle of
separation of powers and is thus merely an offshoot of the presumption of validity accorded the
executive and legislative acts of our co-equal branches of the government.
This means that the petitioner who claims the unconstitutionality of a law has the burden of
showing first that the case cannot be resolved unless the disposition of the constitutional question
that he raised is unavoidable. If there is some other ground upon which the court may rest its
judgment, that course will be adopted and the question of constitutionality should be avoided. Thus,
to justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution,
and not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative.
2. PLANTERS PRODUCTS V. FERTIPHIL

(G.R. No. 166006, March 14, 2008)
REYES, R.T., J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) and private respondent Fertiphil are private
corporations incorporated under Philippine laws. They are both engaged in the importation and
distribution of fertilizers, pesticides and agricultural chemicals.
On June 3, 1985, then President Ferdinand Marcos, exercising his legislative powers, issued
Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 1465 which provides for, to include in its fertilizer pricing formula a
capital contribution component of not less than P10 per bag. This capital contribution shall be
collected until adequate capital is raised to make PPI viable. Such capital contribution shall be applied
by FPA to all domestic sales of fertilizers in the Philippines.|
After the 1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the P10 levy. With
the return of democracy, Fertiphil demanded from PPI a refund of the amounts it paid under LOI No.
1465, but PPI refused to accede to the demand.
Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damages against FPA and PPI with the RTC in
Makati. It questioned the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 for being unjust, unreasonable, oppressive,
invalid and an unlawful imposition that amounted to a denial of due process of law. Fertiphil alleged
that the LOI solely favored PPI, a privately owned corporation, which used the proceeds to maintain
its monopoly of the fertilizer industry.
In its Answer, FPA, through the Solicitor General, countered that the issuance of LOI No. 1465
was a valid exercise of the police power of the State in ensuring the stability of the fertilizer industry
in the country. It also averred that Fertiphil did not sustain any damage from the LOI because the
burden imposed by the levy fell on the ultimate consumer, not the seller.
ISSUE: Whether or not the constitutionality of LOI 1465 cannot be collaterally attacked.
RULING:
No, LOI cannot be collaterally attacked in a complaint for collection.
The resolution of the constitutional issue is not necessary for a determination of the complaint
for collection.
Fertiphil counters that the constitutionality of the LOI was adequately pleaded in its complaint.
It claims that the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 is the very lis mota of the case because the trial
court cannot determine its claim without resolving the issue.
The constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 is also the very lis mota of the complaint for collection.
Fertiphil filed the complaint to compel PPI to refund the levies paid under the statute on the ground
that the law imposing the levy is unconstitutional. The thesis is that an unconstitutional law is void. It
has no legal effect. Being void, Fertiphil had no legal obligation to pay the levy. Necessarily, all levies
duly paid pursuant to an unconstitutional law should be refunded under the civil code principle against
unjust enrichment. The refund is a mere consequence of the law being declared unconstitutional. The
RTC surely cannot order PPI to refund Fertiphil if it does not declare the LOI unconstitutional. It is the
unconstitutionality of the LOI which triggers the refund. The issue of constitutionality is the very lis
mota of the complaint with the RTC.
3. TARROSA V. SINGSON
(G.R. No. 111243, May 25, 1994)
QUIASON, J.
FACTS:
Appointment of Respondent Gabriel Singson as Governor of the Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas
for not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, is being questioned by the
petitioner as a "taxpayer".
The petition seeks to enjoin respondent Singson from the performance of his functions as
such official until his appointment is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments and respondent
Salvador M. Enriquez, Secretary of Budget and Management, from disbursing public funds in
payment of the salaries and emoluments of respondent Singson.
Respondents claim that Congress exceeded its legislative powers in requiring the
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the appointment of the Governor of the Bangko
Sentral. They contend that an appointment to the said position is not among the appointments which
have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, citing Section 16 of Article VII of the
Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue raised is the lis mota of the case at bar.
RULING:
The instant petition is in the nature of quo warranto proceeding as it seeks the ouster of
respondent Singson and alleges that the latter is unlawfully holding or exercising the powers of
Governor of the Bangko Sentral. Such a special civil action can only be commenced by the Solicitor
General or by a "person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position unlawfully held or
exercised by another. To uphold the action would encourage every disgruntled citizen to resort to the
courts, thereby causing incalculable mischief and hindrance to the efficient operation of the
governmental machinery.
The Court refrains from passing upon the constitutionality of Section 6, R.A. No. 7653 in
deference to the principle that bars a judicial inquiry into a constitutional question unless the resolution
thereof is indispensable for the determination of the case.
4. TY V. TRAMPE
(G.R. No. 117577, December 1, 1995)
PANGANIBAN, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Alejandro B. Ty is a resident of and registered owner of lands and buildings in the
Municipality (now City) of Pasig, while petitioner MVR Picture Tube Inc. is a corporation duly
organized and existing under Philippine laws and is likewise a registered owner of lands and buildings
in said Municipality.
Respondent Aurelio C. Trampe is being sued in his capacity as presiding judge of Branch
163, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region. sitting in Pasig, whose Decision
dated 14 July 1994 and Order dated 30 September 1994 in Special Civil Action No. 629 (entitled
"Alejandro B. Ty and MVR Picture Tube. Inc. vs. The Hon. Secretary of Finance, et al.") are sought
to be set aside.
Respondent Secretary of Finance is impleaded as the government officer who approved the
Schedule of Market Values used as basis for the new tax assessments being enforced by
respondents Municipal Assessor and Municipal Treasurer of Pasig and the legality of which is being
questioned in this petition.
On 06 January 1994, respondent Assessor sent a notice of assessment respecting certain

real properties of petitioners located in Pasig. Metro Manila in a letter dated 18 March 1994,
petitioners through counsel "requested the Municipal Assessor to reconsider the subject
assessments."
Not satisfied, petitioners on 29 March 1994 filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Judicial Region, Branch 163, presided over by respondent Judge, a Petition for Prohibition
with prayer for a restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to declare null and void the new
tax assessments and to enjoin the collection of real estate taxes based on said assessments. In a
Decision 4 dated 14 July 1994, respondent Judge denied the petition "for lack of merit".
ISSUE: Whether or not the approval of the Schedule of Market Values used as a basis for the new
tax assessments can be questioned.
RULING:
It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that the constitutionality of an act of the
legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised and presented
in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case.
The Court does not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions unless these questions are
properly raised in appropriate cases and their resolution is necessary for the determination of the
case. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record
if the case can be disposed of on some other found such as the application of a statute or general
law.
5. ARCETA V. JUDGE MAGROBANG

(G.R. No. 152895, JUNE 15, 2004)
QUISUMBING, J.
FACTS:
The City Prosecutor of Navotas, Metro Manila charged Ofelia V. Arceta with violating Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22 in an Information, which was docketed as Criminal Case No.
The information reads that Arceta issued a check amounting to P740,000 to an Oscar Castro
payable to cash.
The said accused well-knowing that at the time of issue did not have sufficient funds or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment.
Arceta did not move to have the charge against her dismissed or the Information quashed on
the ground that B.P. Blg. 22 was unconstitutional. She reasoned out that with the Lozano doctrine
still in place, such a move would be an exercise in futility for it was highly unlikely that the trial court
would grant her motion and thus go against prevailing jurisprudence.
Thereafter, Arceta was arraigned and pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. However, she
manifested that her arraignment should be without prejudice to the present petition or to any other
actions she would take to suspend proceedings in the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not B.P. Blg. 22 may be question on the issue of the case.
RULING:
No, the Court did not find the question to be very lis mota.
After minute scrutiny of petitioners' submissions, we find that the basic issue being raised in
these special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus concern the unconstitutionality or
invalidity of B.P. Blg. 22.
When the issue of unconstitutionality of a legislative act is raised, it is the established doctrine
that the Court may exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1)
an actual and appropriate case and controversy exists; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the
party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question raised is the very lis mota of the case. Only when
these requisites are satisfied may the Court assume jurisdiction over a question of unconstitutionality
or invalidity of an act of Congress. With due regard to counsel's spirited advocacy in both cases, we
are unable to agree that the abovecited requisites have been adequately met.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification,
there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful,
speculative or argumentative.
c. Fiscal Autonomy
i. Bengzon v. Drilon
(G.R. No. 103524, April 15, 1992)
Gutierrez, Jr., J.
FACTS:
In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e. Republic Act No. 1797) that were
“repealed” during the time of former President Ferdinand Marcos. These old laws provided certain
retirement benefits to retired judges, justices, and members of the constitutional commissions.
Congress felt a need to restore these laws to standardize retirement benefits among government
officials. However, President Corazon Aquino vetoed the bill (House Bill No. 16297) claiming the law
should not give preferential treatment to certain or select government officials.
Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition with the Supreme Court
asking the court to readjust their pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797 was never repealed (by
P.D. No. 644) because the said PD was one of those unpublished PDs which were subject of the
case of Tañada v. Tuvera. Hence, the repealing law never existed due to non-publication and in
effect, RA 1797 was never repealed. The Supreme Court then readjusted their pensions.
Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in the General Appropriations Bill (GAB)
for 1992, Congress allotted additional budget for pensions of retired justices. Congress however did
the allotment in the following manner: Congress made an item entitled: “General Fund Adjustment”;
included therein are allotments to unavoidable obligations in different branches of the government;
among such obligations is the allotment for the pensions of retired justices of the judiciary.
However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which provided for the pensions of the
retired justices in the judiciary in the GAB. She explained that that portion of the GAB is already
deemed vetoed when she vetoed H.B. 16297.
This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired judges and justices to question the
constitutionality of the veto made by the President. The President was represented by then Executive
Secretary Franklin Drilon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill is
constitutional.
RULING:
No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them
in accordance to Republic Act 1797 which was never repealed. The president has no power to set
aside and override the decision of the Supreme Court neither does the president have the power to
enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws.
The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is unconstitutional since the power of the president
to disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of
an item and to approve the remaining portion of said item. It appears that in the same item, the
Presidents vetoed some portion of it and retained the others. This cannot be done. The rule is: The
Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all; the Executive must veto an entire line item in its
entirety or not at all. In this case, the president did not veto the entire line item of the general
adjustment fund. She merely vetoed the portion which pertained to the pensions of the justices but
did not veto the other items covering obligations to the other departments of the government.
ii. Nitafan v. CIR

(G.R. No. 78780, July 23, 1987)
Melencio-Herrera, J.
FACTS:
Judge David Nitafan and several other judges of the Manila Regional Trial Court seek to
prohibit the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) from making any deduction of withholding taxes
from their salaries or compensation for such would tantamount to a diminution of their salary, which
is unconstitutional. Earlier however, or on June 7, 1987, the Court en banc had already reaffirmed
the directive of the Chief Justice which directs the continued withholding of taxes of the justices and
the judges of the judiciary – but the SC decided to rule on this case nonetheless to settle the issue
once and for all.
ISSUE: Whether or not the members of the judiciary are exempt from the payment of income tax.
RULING:
No. The clear intent of the framers of the Constitution, based on their deliberations, was NOT
to exempt justices and judges from general taxation. Members of the judiciary, just like members of
the other branches of the government, are subject to income taxation. What is provided for by the
constitution is that salaries of judges may not be decreased during their continuance in office. They
have a fix salary which may not be subject to the whims and caprices of congress. But the salaries
of the judges shall be subject to the general income tax as well as other members of the judiciary.
But may the salaries of the members of the judiciary be increased? Yes. The Congress may
pass a law increasing the salary of the members of the judiciary and such increase will immediately
take effect thus the incumbent members of the judiciary (at the time of the passing of the law
increasing their salary) shall benefit immediately.
Congress can also pass a law decreasing the salary of the members of the judiciary, but such
will only be applicable to members of the judiciary which were appointed AFTER the effectivity of
such law.
iii. In Re: Clarifying and Strengthening The Organizational Structure and Administrative Set-
Up of the Philippine Judicial Academy
(A.M. No. 01-1-04-SC-PHILJA, January 31, 2006)
CALLEJO, SR., J.
FACTS:
The instant administrative matter has its roots in the Resolution of the Court promulgated on
February 24, 2004, clarifying and strengthening the organizational structure and administrative set-
up of the Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA).1 Pursuant to said resolution, the positions of SC
Chief Judicial Staff Officer and Supervising Judicial Staff Officer with Salary Grades (SG) 25 and 23,
respectively, were created in the following Divisions of the PHILJA: Publications Division, and
External Linkages Division (Research, Publications and Linkages Office); Mediation Education and
Management Division (Judicial Reforms Office); Corporate Planning Division, and Administrative
Division (Administrative and Finance Office).
However, in its Notice of Organization, Staffing, and Compensation Action (NOSCA) dated
May 5, 2005, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) downgraded said positions and
their corresponding salary grades.
Meantime, pursuant to the recommendation of the Office of Administrative Services, the Court
issued a Resolution on July 5, 2005, retaining "the originally proposed titles and salary grades of SC
Chief Judicial Staff Officer (SG 25) and Supervising Judicial Staff Officer (SG 23) in the [PHILJA]".
Thereafter, in a Memorandum addressed to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. dated
October 10, 2005, PHILJA Chancellor, Justice Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera, requested the Court
to issue another resolution retaining the position titles and salary grades of SC Chief Judicial Staff
Officer and Supervising Judicial Staff Officer, in light of the NOSCA issued by the DBM downgrading
said positions. Chancellor Melencio- Herrera invoked the Court’s Resolution of November 21, 1995
(Re: Requests for Upgrading of the Positions of Chief Justice Staff Head, Judicial Staff Head, Director
IV [Chief, Fiscal Management and Budget Office], Director III, Chief of Division and Assistant Chief
of Division with corresponding change in Position Titles, if Warranted),3 which she alleged the DBM
violated by such downgrading. According to the PHILJA Chancellor, to allow the DBM to disregard
such resolution would "undermine the independence of the Judiciary and impinge on the Supreme
Court’s exercise of its fiscal autonomy expressly granted by the Constitution."
Upon the recommendation of the Office of Administrative Services, the Court issued a
Resolution on November 8, 2005, resolving to "deny the request of Justice Ameurfina A. Melencio-
Herrera for the issuance of another resolution retaining the position titles and salary grades of SC
Chief Judicial Staff Officer (SG 25) and Supervising Judicial Staff Officer (SG 23), as the resolution
dated 5 July 2005 will suffice."
In compliance with the Court’s Resolution dated October 18, 2005 referring the Memorandum
of Justice Melencio-Herrera for evaluation, report and recommendation, Atty. Edna E. Diño, Office of
the Chief Attorney, submitted her Report dated December 1, 2005. She recommended that the Court
reiterate its July 5, 2005 Resolution (retaining the originally proposed titles and salary grades of the
positions of SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer [SG 25] and Supervising Judicial Staff Officer [SG 23]).
She, likewise, recommended that the DBM be directed to implement the Court’s Resolutions of
February 24, 2004 and July 5, 2005, as it (DBM) had "no authority to revise a Resolution of this Court
issued in the exercise of its constitutional mandates of fiscal autonomy and administrative supervision
over court personnel."
ISSUE: Whether or not DBM has authority to revise a Resolution of the Court issued in the exercise
of its constitutional mandates of fiscal autonomy and administrative supervision over court personnel.
RULING:
The primary role of the DBM is to breathe life into the policy behind the Salary Standardization
Law of "providing equal pay for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon
substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions."
Pursuant to its mandate, the DBM is authorized to evaluate and determine whether a proposed
reclassification and upgrading scheme is consistent with applicable laws and regulations. The task of
the DBM is simply to review the compensation and benefits plan of the government agency or entity
concerned and determine if it complies with the prescribed policies and guidelines issued in this
regard. Thus, the role of the DBM is "supervisorial in nature, its main duty being to ascertain that the
proposed compensation, benefits and other incentives to be given to [government] officials and
employees adhere to the policies and guidelines issued in accordance with applicable laws."
As such, the authority of the DBM to review Supreme Court issuances relative to court
personnel on matters of compensation is even more limited, circumscribed as it is by the provisions
of the Constitution, specifically Article VIII, Section 37 on fiscal autonomy and Article VIII, Section 68
on administrative supervision over court personnel. Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside
control.
The authority of the DBM to "review" the plantilla and compensation of court personnel
extends only to "calling the attention of the Court" on what it may perceive as erroneous application
of budgetary laws and rules on position classification. The DBM may not overstep its authority in such
a way as to cause the amendment or modification of Court resolutions even if these pertain to
administration of compensation and position classification system. Only after its attention to an
allegedly erroneous application of the pertinent law or rule has been called by the DBM may the Court
amend or modify its resolution, as its judgment and discretion may dictate under the law.
In this instance, the change of two position titles was made apparently to conform to position
titles indicated in the personnel services itemization for all government positions, clearly oblivious of
the fact that positions in the Judiciary are peculiar only to that branch of government. It appearing
that the salary grades of 25 and 23 are proper positions equivalent to those of SC Chief Judicial Staff
Officer and Supervising Judicial Staff Officer, respectively, under the Salary Standardization Law, and
that the Court prescribed those position titles only after consideration of the nature of work and
functions that the holders of those positions must perform, there is no reason to amend the
Resolutions of 24 February 2004, and of 5 July 2005, so as to reflect the position titles and salary
grades stated in the NOSCA for the same positions.12
CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, the Court REITERATES its Resolution of July 5, 2005
retaining the originally proposed titles and salary grades of the positions of SC Chief Judicial Staff
Officer (SG 25) and Supervising Judicial Staff Officer (SG 23) in the Philippine Judicial Academy. The
Department of Budget and Management is DIRECTED to implement the Resolutions of the Court
dated February 24, 2004 and July 5, 2005.
iv. Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the Properties Purchased
by the Retired Chief/Associate Justices of the Supreme Court.
(A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC, July 31, 2012)
FACTS:
This issue has its roots in the June 8, 2010 Opinion issued by the Legal Services Sector,
Office of the General Counsel of the Commission on Audit (COA), which found that an underpayment
amounting to P221,021.50 resulted when five (5) retired Supreme Court justices purchased from the
Supreme Court the personal properties assigned to them during their incumbency in the Court.
The COA attributed this underpayment to the use by the Property Division of the Supreme
Court of the wrong formula in computing the appraisal value of the purchased vehicles. According to
the COA, the Property Division erroneously appraised the subject motor vehicles by applying
Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) Joint Resolution No. 35 dated April 23, 1997 and its
guidelines, in compliance with the Resolution of the Court En Banc dated March 23, 2004 in A.M. No.
03-12-01,3 when it should have applied the formula found in COA Memorandum No. 98-569-A4 dated
August 5, 1998.
Recommendations of the Office of Administrative Services In her Memorandum dated August

10, 2010, Atty. Candelaria recommended that the Court advise the COA to respect the in-house
computation based on the CFAG formula, noting that this was the first time that the COA questioned
the authority of the Court in using CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 and its guidelines in the appraisal
and disposal of government property since these were issued in 1997. As a matter of fact, in two
previous instances involving two (2) retired Court of Appeals Associate Justices,5 the COA upheld
the in-house appraisal of government property using the formula found in the CFAG guidelines. More
importantly, the Constitution itself grants the Judiciary fiscal autonomy in the handling of its budget
and resources. Full autonomy, among others,6 contemplates the guarantee of full flexibility in the
allocation and utilization of the Judiciary’s resources, based on its own determination of what it needs.
The Court thus has the recognized authority to allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided
or required by law in the course of the discharge of its functions. To allow the COA to substitute the
Court’s policy in the disposal of its property would be tantamount to an encroachment into this judicial
prerogative.
ISSUE: Whether or not in-house computation should be followed.
RULING:
The COA’s authority to conduct post-audit examinations on constitutional bodies granted
fiscal autonomy is provided under Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, which states:
Section 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine,
audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of
funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices
that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution. emphasis ours
This authority, however, must be read not only in light of the Court’s fiscal autonomy, but also
in relation with the constitutional provisions on judicial independence and the existing jurisprudence
and Court rulings on these matters.
v. RE: REQUEST FOR COPY OF 2008 STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND

NETWORTH [SALN] AND PERSONAL DATA SHEET OR CURRICULUM VITAE OF THE
JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT AND OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE
JUDICIARY and RE: REQUEST OF PHILIPPINE CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM
[PCIJ] FOR THE 2008 STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND NET WORTH [SALN] AND
PERSONAL DATA SHEETS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS JUSTICES.
(A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC, August 26, 2014)
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS:
In a letter, dated July 30, 2009, Rowena C. Paraan, Research Director of the Philippine Center
for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ), sought copies of the Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Networth
(SALN) of the Justices of this Court for the year 2008. She also requested for copies of the Personal
Data Sheet (PDS) or the Curriculum Vitae (CV) of the Justices of this Court for the purpose of updating
their database of information on government officials.
In her Letter, dated August 13, 2009, Karol M. Ilagan, a researcher-writer also of the PCIJ,
likewise sought for copies of the SALN and PDS of the Justices of the Court of Appeals (CA), for the
same above-stated purpose.
The two requests were ordered consolidated by the Court on August 18, 2009. On the same
day, the Court resolved to create a special committee (Committee) to review the policy on requests
for SALN and PDS and other similar documents, and to recommend appropriate action on such
requests.
On November 23, 2009, the Committee, chaired by then Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-
Nazario submitted its Memorandum dated November 18, 2009 and its Resolution dated November
16, 2009, recommending the creation of Committee on Public Disclosure that would, in essence, take
over the functions of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) with respect to requests for copies
of, or access to, SALN, and other personal documents of members of the Judiciary.
Meanwhile, several requests for copies of the SALN and other personal documents of the
Justices of this Court, the CA and the Sandiganbayan (SB) were filed.
ISSUES: Whether or not the SALN and other personal documents of the Justices should be released.
RULING:
In essence, it is the consensus of the Justices of the above-mentioned courts and the various
judges associations that while the Constitution holds dear the right of the people to have access to
matters of concern, the Constitution also holds sacred the independence of the Judiciary. Thus,
although no direct opposition to the disclosure of SALN and other personal documents is being
expressed, it is the uniform position of the said magistrates and the various judges associations that
the disclosure must be made in accord with the guidelines set by the Court and under such
circumstances that would not undermine the independence of the Judiciary.
d. Appointment
i. In Re Appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta

(A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, November 9, 1998)
NARVASA, CJ.
FACTS:
Referred to the Court en banc are the appointments signed by the President dated March 30,
1998 of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta as judges of the RTC of Bago City and
Cabanatuan City, respectively. These appointments appear prima facie, at least, to be expressly
prohibited by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution. The said constitutional provision prohibits the
President from making any appointments two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
ISSUE: Whether or not, during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Sec. 15, Art. VII of
the Constitution, the President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of
Secs. 4 (1) and 9 of Art. VIII
RULING:
During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution “two months immediately before
the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term” the President is neither required to make
appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Secs. 4(1) and 9 of Art. VIII simply mean
that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein
unless prohibited by Sec. 15 of Art. VII. This prohibition on appointments comes into effect once every
6 years.
The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were unquestionably made during the period of
the ban. They come within the operation of the prohibition relating to appointments. While the filling
of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in this case of
any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments during the period of the ban.
ii. De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council

(G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010)
Bersamin, J.
FACTS:
The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just
days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential
election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be filled within
ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three nominees prepared by the
Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive
Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments
within two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term,
except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process
of filling up the position of Chief Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the position of
Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice
Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales;
Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura.
However, the last two declined their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January
25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because
the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the
Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from
its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers intended
the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so
in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department)
was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article
VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the President’s power to appoint members of the Supreme
Court to ensure its independence from “political vicissitudes” and its “insulation from political
pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the
specified period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the
process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only
do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether
the JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of Section
4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the short list to fill the
vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from
the occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his
retirement.
RULING:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the
Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting
President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court
shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its
discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days
from the occurrence thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not
have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the
prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President
making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of
the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not
have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the
prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President
making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of
the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect
the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to
appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only
to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute
must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together
with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd
to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if
they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in
respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely
inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.
e. Judicial and Bar Council
i. Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council

(G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012)
Mendoza, J.
FACTS:
The case is in relation to the process of selecting the nominees for the vacant seat of Supreme
Court Chief Justice following Renato Corona’s departure.
Originally, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to create a separate,
competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the President. Thus, it conceived of a
body representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process and called it the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)
In particular, Paragraph 1 Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution states that “(1) A Judicial
and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief
Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex
officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the
Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.” In compliance therewith, Congress, from
the moment of the creation of the JBC, designated one representative from the Congress to sit in the
JBC to act as one of the ex officio members.
In 1994 however, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only
seven (7) members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from
Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate,
with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. During the existence of the case, Senator Francis Joseph
G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sat in JBC as
representatives of the legislature.
It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.
The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established, the framers originally
envisioned a unicameral legislative body, thereby allocating “a representative of the National
Assembly” to the JBC. The phrase, however, was not modified to aptly jive with the change to
bicameralism which was adopted by the Constitutional Commission on July 21, 1986. The
respondents also contend that if the Commissioners were made aware of the consequence of having
a bicameral legislature instead of a unicameral one, they would have made the corresponding
adjustment in the representation of Congress in the JBC; that if only one house of Congress gets to
be a member of JBC would deprive the other house of representation, defeating the principle of
balance.
The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2) representatives of Congress to
be members of the JBC does not render JBC’s purpose of providing balance nugatory; that the
presence of two (2) members from Congress will most likely provide balance as against the other six
(6) members who are undeniably presidential appointees
Supreme Court held that it has the power of review the case herein as it is an object of concern, not
just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all the citizens who have the right to seek judicial
intervention for rectification of legal blunders.
ISSUE: Whether the practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of
whom are members of Congress, defeats the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.
RULING:
No. The current practice of JBC in admitting two members of the Congress to perform the
functions of the JBC is violative of the 1987 Constitution. As such, it is unconstitutional.
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute
are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language
employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed. As such, it can be clearly and unambiguously discerned from Paragraph 1, Section 8,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution that in the phrase, “a representative of Congress,” the use of the
singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves no room for any
other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind,
that is, Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that
more than one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have,
in no uncertain terms, so provided.
Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous
in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and
specific by considering the company of words in which it is founded or with which it is associated.
Every meaning to be given to each word or phrase must be ascertained from the context of the body
of the statute since a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or
phrases and its meaning may be modified or restricted by the latter. Applying the foregoing principle
to this case, it becomes apparent that the word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the
Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the
Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular
representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC.
Considering that the language of the subject constitutional provision is plain and
unambiguous, there is no need to resort extrinsic aids such as records of the Constitutional
Commission. Nevertheless, even if the Court should proceed to look into the minds of the members
of the Constitutional Commission, it is undeniable from the records thereof that it was intended that
the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. The underlying reason leads the Court to conclude
that a single vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or
among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter.
With the respondents’ contention that each representative should be admitted from the
Congress and House of Representatives, the Supreme Court, after the perusal of the records of
Constitutional Commission, held that “Congress,” in the context of JBC representation, should be
considered as one body. While it is true that there are still differences between the two houses and
that an inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of the legislative powers
conferred to them by the Constitution, the same cannot be applied in the case of JBC representation
because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No mechanism is
required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening and nomination of
judicial officers. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.
The framers of Constitution, in creating JBC, hoped that the private sector and the three branches of
government would have an active role and equal voice in the selection of the members of the
Judiciary. Therefore, to allow the Legislature to have more quantitative influence in the JBC by having
more than one voice speak, whether with one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each, would “negate
the principle of equality among the three branches of government which is enshrined in the
Constitution.”
It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7)
members only. Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether with one whole vote or half (1/2) of
it, goes against that mandate. Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, providing Congress with
an equal voice with other members of the JBC in recommending appointees to the Judiciary is explicit.
Any circumvention of the constitutional mandate should not be countenanced for the Constitution is
the supreme law of the land. The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws
must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer.
Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter what the tides of time may be. It cannot be
simply made to sway and accommodate the call of situations and much more tailor itself to the whims
and caprices of the government and the people who run it.
Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its
prior official actions are nonetheless valid. In the interest of fair play under the doctrine of operative
facts, actions before the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not
nullified.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial
and Bar Council IS declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined
to reconstitute itself so that only one (1) member of Congress will sit as a representative in its
proceedings, in accordance with Section 8 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. This disposition
is immediately executory.
ii. Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council

(G.R. No. 202242, April 16, 2013)
Mendoza, J.
FACTS:
The Judicial Bar Council (JBC) as mandated by the constitution is composed of only seven-
members, however on 1994 it was substantially altered. An eighth member was added to the JBC as
two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting simultaneously having one-half (1/2) vote each.
The JBC En Banc, on 2001, decided to allow the two representatives be entitled with one full vote
each. At present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr.
(respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature.
SECTION 8. (1) A JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL IS HEREBY CREATED UNDER THE
SUPERVISION OF THE SUPREME COURT COMPOSED OF:
• The Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman,

• The Secretary of Justice, and
• A representative of the Congress as ex officio Members,
• A representative of the Integrated Bar,
• A professor of law,
• A retired Member of the Supreme Court, an
• A representative of the private sector.
It is this issue that petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued that the crux of
the controversy is the phrase “a representative of Congress.” It is their theory that the two houses,
the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory components of
“Congress,” such that the absence of either divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed
under the Constitution.
In simplistic terms, the House of Representatives, without the Senate and vice-versa, is not
Congress. Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise
their respective powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of “a representative from Congress,” it should
mean one representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress.
ISSUE: Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members,
two (2) of whom are members of Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of Section 8 (1), Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
RULING:
Yes. The word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its
generic sense. No allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of
Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be
allowed to sit in the JBC. The seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that
is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting.
It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function
in government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of
the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers. An
inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid
dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC
representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence,
the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department. The Constitution
mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.
Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its
prior official actions are nonetheless valid. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to
the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified.
iii. Jardeleza v. Sereno

(G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014)
Mendoza, J.
FACTS:
Associate Justice Roberto Abad was about to retire and the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)
announce an opening for application and recommendation for the said vacancy. Francis H. Jardeleza
(Jardeleza), incumbent Solicitor General of the Republic was included in the list of candidates. Hence,
he was interviewed.
However, he received calls from some Justices that the Chief Justice herself – CJ Sereno,
will be invoking unanimity rule against him. It is invoked because Jardeleza’s integrity is in question.
During the meeting, Justice Carpio disclosed a confidential information which characterized
Jardeleza’s integrity as dubious. Jardeleza answered that he would defend himself provided that due
process would be observed. His request was denied, and he was not included in the shortlist.
Hence, Jardeleza filed for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for TRO to compel the JBC to
include him in the list claiming the JBC and CJ Sereno acted with grave abuse of discretion in
excluding him, despite having garnered enough votes to qualify for the position.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to due process is available during JBC proceedings in cases where
an objection or opposition to an application is raised.
RULING:
Yes. While it is true that the JBC proceedings are sui generis, it does not automatically
denigrate an applicant’s entitlement to due process.
The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC proceedings.
Notwithstanding being “a class of its own,” the right to be heard and to explain one’s self is availing.
In cases where an objection to an applicant’s qualifications is raised, the observance of due

process neither contradicts the fulfillment of the JBC’s duty to recommend. This holding is not an
encroachment on its discretion in the nomination process. Its adherence to the precepts of due
process supports and enriches the exercise of its discretion. When an applicant, who vehemently
denies the truth of the objections, is afforded the chance to protest, the JBC is presented with a
clearer understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from making an unsound
and capricious assessment of information brought before it. The JBC is not expected to strictly apply
the rules of evidence in its assessment of an objection against an applicant. Just the same, to hear
the side of the person challenged complies with the dictates of fairness because the only test that an
exercise of discretion must surmount is that of soundness.
Consequently, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been included in the
shortlist submitted to the President for the vacated position of Associate Justice Abad. This
consequence arose from the violation by the JBC of its own rules of procedure and the basic tenets
of due process.
True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a nomination, but this does not prescind from the fact
that the JBC failed to observe the minimum requirements of due process.
iv. Aguinaldo, et al v. Aquino, et al

(G.R. No. 224302, November 29, 2016)
Leonardo-De Castro, J.
FACTS:
On June 11, 1978, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) issued Presidential Decree
No. 1486, creating a special court called the Sandiganbayan, composed of a Presiding Judge and
eight Associate Judges to be appointed by the President, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal
and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public
officers and employees, including those in government owned or controlled corporations. A few
months later, on December 10, 1978, President Marcos also issued Presidential Decree No. 1606,
which elevated the rank of the members of the Sandiganbayan from Judges to Justices, co-equal in
rank with the Justices of the Court of Appeals; and provided that the Sandiganbayan shall sit in three
divisions of three Justices each.5 Republic Act No. 7975 was approved into law on March 30, 1995
and it increased the composition of the Sandiganbayan from nine to fifteen Justices who would sit in
five divisions of three members each. Republic Act No. 10660, recently enacted on April 16, 2015,
created two more divisions of the Sandiganbayan with three Justices each, thereby resulting in six
vacant positions.
On July 20, 2015, the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) published in the Philippine Star and
Philippine Daily Inquirer and posted on the JBC website an announcement calling for applications or
recommendations for the six newly created positions of Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan.8
After screening and selection of applicants, the JBC submitted to President Aquino six shortlists
contained in six separate letters, all dated October 26, 2015.
President Aquino issued on January 20, 2015 the appointment papers for the six new
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, namely: (1) respondent Musngi; (2) Justice Reynaldo P. Cruz (R.
Cruz); (3) respondent Econg; (4) Justice Maria Theresa V. Mendoza-Arcega (Mendoza-Arcega); (5)
Justice Karl B. Miranda (Miranda); and (6) Justice Zaldy V. Trespeses (Trespeses). The appointment
papers were transmitted on January 25, 2016 to the six new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, who
took their oaths of office on the same day all at the Supreme Court Dignitaries Lounge. Respondent
Econg, with Justices Mendoza-Arcega and Trespeses, took their oaths of office before Supreme
Court Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Sereno); while respondent Musngi, with Justices R.
Cruz and Miranda, took their oaths of office before Supreme Court Associate Justice Francis H.
Jardeleza (Jardeleza).
According to petitioners, the JBC was created under the 1987 Constitution to reduce the
politicization of the appointments to the Judiciary. It is the function of the JBC to search, screen, and
select nominees recommended for appointment to the Judiciary. It shall prepare a list with at least
three qualified nominees for a particular vacancy in the Judiciary to be submitted to the President,
who, in turn, shall appoint from the shortlist for said specific vacancy. Petitioners emphasize that
Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution is clear and unambiguous as to the mandate of the
JBC to submit a shortlist of nominees to the President for "every vacancy" to the Judiciary, as well as
the limitation on the President's authority to appoint members of the Judiciary from among the
nominees named in the shortlist submitted by the JBC.
In this case, the JBC submitted six separate lists, with five to seven nominees each, for the
six vacancies in the Sandiganbayan, particularly, for the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th and 21st
Associate Justices. Petitioners contend that only nominees for the position of the 16th Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice may be appointed as the 16th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, and the same
goes for the nominees for each of the vacancies for the 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. However, on January 20, 2016, President Aquino issued the
appointment papers for the six new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.
ISSUES: Whether President Aquino, under the circumstances, was limited to appoint only from the
nominees in the shortlist submitted by the JBC for each specific vacancy.
RULING:
The Court answers in the negative.
The JBC was created under the 1987 Constitution with the principal function of recommending
appointees to the Judiciary. It is a body, representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial
appointment process, intended to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary of the evils of
political pressure and partisan activities. The extent of the role of the JBC in recommending
appointees vis-a-vis the power of the President to appoint members of the Judiciary was discussed
during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission (CONCOM) on July 10, 1986
It should be stressed that the power to recommend of the JBC cannot be used to restrict or
limit the President's power to appoint as the latter's prerogative to choose someone whom he/she
considers worth appointing to the vacancy in the Judiciary is still paramount. As long as in the end,
the President appoints someone nominated by the JBC, the appointment is valid. On this score, the
Court finds herein that President Aquino was not obliged to appoint one new Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice from each of the six shortlists submitted by the JBC, especially when the clustering
of nominees into the six shortlists encroached on President Aquino's power to appoint members of
the Judiciary from all those whom the JBC had considered to be qualified for the same positions of
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
f. Supreme Court
i. Jurisdiction
1. FORTICH vs. CORONA

(G.R. No. 131457, April 24, 1998)
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
FACTS:
On March 29, 1996, the Office of the President (OP) issued a decision converting a large
parcel of land from agricultural land to agro-industrial/institutional area. Because of this, a group of
farmer-beneficiaries staged a hunger strike in front of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
Compound in Quezon City in October 9, 1997. The strike generated a lot of publicity and even a
number of Presidential Candidates (for the upcoming 1998 elections) intervened on behalf of the
farmers.
Because of this “blackmail”, the OP re-opened the case and through Deputy Executive
Secretary Renato C. Corona issued the so-called, “politically motivated”, “win-win” resolution on
November 7, 1997, substantially modifying its 1996 decision after it had become final and executory.
ISSUE: WON the “win-win” resolution, issued after the original decision had become final and
executory, had any legal effect.
RULING:
No; When the OP issued the Order dated June 23,1997 declaring the Decision of March 29,
1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the
said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision. Having lost its
jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more authority to entertain the second motion for
reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the
assailed “Win-Win” Resolution. Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of
the Revised Rules of Court mandate that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be
taken from the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion for reconsideration was
permitted to be filed in “exceptionally meritorious cases,” as provided in the second paragraph of
Section 7 of AO 18, still the said motion should not have been entertained considering that the first
motion for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996
to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the President in re-opening the case and
substantially modifying its March 29,1996 Decision which had already become final and executory,
was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative
determinations.
The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court or

quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations. The noble
purpose is to write finis to disputes once and for all.
2. DE CASTRO VS. JBC

(G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010)
BERSAMIN, J.
FACTS:
This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the controversy that has arisen from
the forthcoming compulsory requirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 or seven days after
the presidential election. On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio
member of the JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to the
office of the Chief Justice be commenced immediately.
In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, the JBC passed a resolution which stated that they
have unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice to be vacated
on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice.
As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or recommendation,
and published for that purpose its announcement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine
Star.
In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing
the names of the following candidates to invite to the public to file their sworn complaint, written report,
or opposition, if any, not later than February 22, 2010.
Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno
in accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President its list of
nominees for the position due to the controversy in this case being unresolved.
The compiled cases which led to this case and the petitions of intervenors called for either the
prohibition of the JBC to pass the shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to pass the shortlist, or that the
act of appointing the next Chief Justice by GMA is a midnight appointment.
A precedent frequently cited by the parties is the In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998
of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the RTC of Branch 62, Bago
City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively, shortly referred to here as the Valenzuela case,
by which the Court held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited the exercise by the President of the
power to appoint to judicial positions during the period therein fixed.
ISSUES: W/N there is justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial determination?
RULING:
There is a justiciable issue
We hold that the petitions set forth an actual case or controversy that is ripe for judicial
determination. The reality is that the JBC already commenced the proceedings for the selection of
the nominees to be included in a short list to be submitted to the President for consideration of which
of them will succeed Chief Justice Puno as the next Chief Justice. Although the position is not yet
vacant, the fact that the JBC began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and practices,
although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of nominees to the incumbent outgoing
President or to the next President, makes the situation ripe for judicial determination, because the
next steps are the public interview of the candidates, the preparation of the short list of candidates,
and the “interview of constitutional experts, as may be needed.”
The resolution of the controversy will surely settle – with finality – the nagging questions that are
preventing the JBC from moving on with the process that it already began, or that are reasons
persuading the JBC to desist from the rest of the process.
3. LIMKETKAI SONS MILLING, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS

(G.R. No. 118509, December 1, 1995)
MELO, J.
FACTS:
On June 23, 1988, Pedro Revilla, Jr., a licensed real estatebroker was given formal authority
by BPI to sell the lot for P1,000.00 per square meter. The owners of the Philippine Remnants
concurred this arrangement. Broker Revilla contacted Alfonso Lim of petitioner company who agreed
to buy the land. On July 9, 1988, Revilla formally informed BPI that he had procured a buyer, herein
petitioner.
On July 11, 1988, petitioner's officials, Alfonso Lim and Albino Limketkai, went to BPI to
confirm the sale. Vice-President Merlin Albano and Asst. Vice-President Aromin entertained them.
The parties agreed that the lot would be sold at P1,000.00 persquare meter to be paid in cash. The
authority to sell was on a first come, first served and non-exclusive basis; there is no dispute over
petitioner's being the first comer and the buyer to be first served. Alfonso Lim then asked if it was
possible to pay on terms. The bank officials stated that there was no harm in trying to ask for payment
on terms because in previous transactions, the same had been allowed. It was the understanding,
however, that should the term payment be disapproved, then the price shall be paid in cash.
Two or three days later, petitioner learned that its offer to pay on terms had been frozen.
Alfonso Lim went to BPI on July 18, 1988 and tendered the full payment of P33,056,000.00 to Albano.
The payment was refused because Albano stated that the authority to sell that particular piece of
property in Pasig had been withdrawn from his unit. The same check was tendered to BPI Vice-
President Nelson Bona who also refused to receive payment.
An action for specific performance with damages was thereupon filed on August 25, 1988 by
petitioner against BPI. In the course of the trial, BPI informed the trial court that it had sold the property
under litigation to NBS on July 14, 1989.
Upon elevation of the case to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the trial court was reversed
and the complaint dismissed on 12 August 1994. It was held that no contract of sale was perfected
because there was no concurrence of the three requisites enumerated in Article 1318 of the Civil
Code.
On its decision in Dec. 1, 1995, the Supreme Court reversed and set aside the questioned
judgment of the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the 10 June 1991 judgment of Branch 151 of the
RTC of The National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Pasig, Metro Manila except for the award of
P10,000,000.00 damages, which was deleted.
On March 26, 1996, Motion for Reconsideration was granted. Petitioner’s opposition to the
MR was denied. The SC sets aside Dec. 1, 1995 decision and affirmed in toto the decision of CA.
Hence, this Motion for Reconsideration by Petitioner.
ISSUE: WoN the case should be referred to the court en banc.
RULING:
The Petitioner is contending that the case should be referred to the court en banc because as
the doctrines laid down in Abrenica v. Gonda and De Gracia, 34 Phil. 739, Talosig v. Vda. de Nieba,
43 SCRA 473, and Villonco Realty Co. v. Bormaheco, Inc., et. al., 65 SCRA 352, have been modified
or reversed.
The court held that a more circumspect analysis of these cases vis-a-vis the case at bench
would inevitably lead petitioner to the conclusion that there was neither reversal nor modification of
the doctrines laid down in the Abrenica, Talosig and Villonco cases. In fact, the inapplicability of the
principle enunciated in Abrenica and Talosig to this case has already been extensively discussed in
the Court’s resolution, hence the same will not be addressed anew. As regards the case of Villonco,
petitioner mistakenly assumes that its case has a similar factual milieu with the former. The Court
finds no further need to elaborate on the issue, but will simply point out the significant fact that the
offer of the buyer in Villonco, unlike in this case, was accepted by the seller, Bormaheco, Inc.;
andVillonco involves a perfected contract, a factor crucially absent in the instant case as there was
no meeting of the minds between the parties.
What petitioner bewails the most is the present composition of the Third Division which
deliberated on private respondents’ motions for reconsideration and by a majority vote reversed the
unanimous decision of December 1, 1995. More specifically, petitioner questions the assumption of
Chief Justice Narvasa of the chairmanship of the Third Division and arrogantly rams its idea on how
each Division should be chaired, i.e., the First Division should have been chaired by Chief Justice
Narvasa, the Second Division by Mr. Justice Padilla, the next senior Justice and the Third Division by
Mr. Justice Regalado, the third in line. We need only to stress that the change in the membership of
the three divisions of the Court was inevitable by reason of Mr. Justice Feliciano’s retirement. Such
reorganization is purely an internal matter of the Court to which petitioner certainly has no business
at all. In fact, the current “staggered” set-up in the chairmanships of the Divisions is similar to that
adopted in 1988. In that year, the Court’s Third Division was likewise chaired by then Chief Justice
Fernan, while the First and Second Divisions were headed by the next senior Justices--Justices
Narvasa and Melencio-Herrera, respectively.
ACCORDINGLY, petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and motion to refer the case to the
Court En Banc are hereby DENIED WITH FINALITY, without prejudice to any and all appropriate
actions that the Court may take not only against counsel on record for the petitioner for his
irresponsible remarks, but also against other persons responsible for the reckless publicity anent this
case calculated to maliciously erode the people’s faith and confidence in the integrity of this Court.
4. Francisco, Jr. v. Toll Regulatory Board

(G.R. No. 166910, October 19, 2010)
Velasco, Jr. J.
FACTS:
President Marcos issued PD 1112 authorizing the establishment of toll facilities on public
improvements. It acknowledged the huge financial requirements and the need to tap the resources
of the private sector to implement the government’s infrastructure programs. PD 1112 allowed the
collection of toll fees for the use of certain public improvements that would allow a reasonable rate of
return on investments. The same decree created the Toll Regulatory Board, vesting it with the power
to enter into contracts for the construction, maintenance, and operation of tollways, grant authority to
operate a toll facility, issue the necessary Toll Operation Certificate (TOC) and fix initial toll rates, and
adjust it from time to time after due notice and hearing. PD 1113 was issued granting the Philippine
National Construction Corporation for a period of 30 years, a franchise to operate toll facilities in the
North Luzon and South Luzon Expressways. Subsequently, PD 1894 was issued further granting the
PNCC a franchise over the Metro Manila Expressway and the expanded delineated NLEX and SLEX.
Then came the 1987 Constitution with its franchise provision. In 1993, the Government
Corporate Counsel held that the PNCC may enter into a joint venture agreement with private entities
without going into public bidding. On February 1994, the DPWH together with other private entities
executed a MOU to open the door for entry of private capital in the Subic and Clark extension projects.
PNCC entered into a financial and technical JVAs with entities for the toll operation of its franchised
areas. Several Supplemental Toll Operation Agreements (STOA) were entered for the South Metro
Manila Skyway, NLEX Expansion, and South Luzon Expressway Projects.
Petitioners seek to nullify the various STOAs and assail the constitutionality of Sections 3(a
and d) of PD 1112 in relation to Section 8(b) of PD 1894. Insofar as they vested the TRB the power
to issue, modify, and promulgate toll rate changes while given the ability to collect tolls.
ISSUE: Whether or not the TRB may be empowered to grant authority to operate the toll
facility/system.
RULING:
The TRB was granted sufficient power to grant a qualified person or entity with authority to
operate the toll facility/system. By explicit provisions of the PDs, the TRB was given power to grant
administrative franchise for toll facility projects. The limiting thrust of Article 11, Section 11 of the
Constitution on the grant of franchise or other forms of authorization to operate public utilities may, in
context, be stated as follows: (a) the grant shall be made only in favor of qualified Filipino citizens or
corporations; (b) Congress can impair the obligation of franchises, as contracts; and (c) no such
authorization shall be exclusive or exceed fifty years. Under the 1987 Constitution, Congress has an
explicit authority to grant a public utility franchise. However, it may validly delegate its legislative
authority, under the power of subordinate legislation, to issue franchises of certain public utilities to
some administrative agencies.
5. JARDELEZA v. SERENO
(G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014)
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS:
Associate Justice Roberto Abad was about to retire and the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)
announce an opening for application and recommendation for the said vacancy. Francis H. Jardeleza
(Jardeleza), incumbent Solicitor General of the Republic was included in the list of candidates. Hence,
he was interviewed.
However, he received calls from some Justices that the Chief Justice herself – CJ Sereno,
will be invoking unanimity rule against him. It is invoked because Jardeleza’s integrity is in question.
During the meeting, Justice Carpio disclosed a confidential information which characterized
Jardeleza’s integrity as dubious. Jardeleza answered that he would defend himself provided that due
process would be observed. His request was denied and he was not included in the shortlist.
Hence, Jardeleza filed for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for TRO to compel the JBC to
include him in the list on the grounds that the JBC and CJ Sereno acted with grave abuse of discretion
in excluding him, despite having garnered a sufficient number of votes to qualify for the position.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to due process is available in the course of JBC proceedings in cases
where an objection or opposition to an application is raised.
RULING:
Yes. While it is true that the JBC proceedings are sui generis, it does not automatically
denigrate an applicant’s entitlement to due process.
The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC proceedings.
Notwithstanding being “a class of its own,” the right to be heard and to explain one’s self is availing.
In cases where an objection to an applicant’s qualifications is raised, the observance of due
process neither contradicts the fulfillment of the JBC’s duty to recommend. This holding is not an
encroachment on its discretion in the nomination process. Actually, its adherence to the precepts of
due process supports and enriches the exercise of its discretion. When an applicant, who vehemently
denies the truth of the objections, is afforded the chance to protest, the JBC is presented with a
clearer understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from making an unsound
and capricious assessment of information brought before it. The JBC is not expected to strictly apply
the rules of evidence in its assessment of an objection against an applicant. Just the same, to hear
the side of the person challenged complies with the dictates of fairness because the only test that an
exercise of discretion must surmount is that of soundness.
Consequently, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been included in the
shortlist submitted to the President for the vacated position of Associate Justice Abad. This
consequence arose from the violation by the JBC of its own rules of procedure and the basic tenets
of due process.
True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a nomination, but this does not prescind from the fact
that the JBC failed to observe the minimum requirements of due process.
6. People v. Redulosa
(G.R. No. 94594, March 29, 1996)
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS:
Appellant Romeo Redulosa (alias Micmic Redulosa, Romeo Solon and Micmic Solon) and
Roselo Carton were accused of kidnapping for ransom with murder. The information alleged:
That on or about the 3rd day of December, 1981, at about 8:00 oclock A.M., and for sometime
subsequent thereto, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, armed with a deadly weapon, with the use of a motor vehicle, conniving and
confederating together and mutually helping with each other, with deliberate intent, did then and there
kidnap or detain one Christopher Jason Tan, aged 9 years, or deprive him of his liberty by bringing
him to Tan-awan, Carcar, Cebu, and at the same time demanding money in the amount of
P100,000.00 from the parents of said Christopher Jason Tan as ransom for the liberty of said
Christopher Jason Tan, and upon failure of said parents to come up with the full amount of P
100,000.00, with deliberate intent and intent to kill, with treachery, abuse of superior strength, evident
premeditation, and in disregard the respect due the offended party on account of his age, did then
and there stab with the use of a bladed weapon aforesaid Christopher Jason Tan several times on
different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him the following injuries:
STAB WOUNDS ON DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE BODY:
as a consequence of which said Christopher Jason Tan died.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can grant requests to dismiss an appeal for crimes with capital
punishment.
RULING:
In its resolution dated April 30, 1987, in Administrative Matter No. 87-5-3173-0, this Court
ruled:
(1) that notices be given to all the accused in the pending cases before the Court wherein the death
penalty has been imposed, advising said accused that the death penalty imposed upon them has
been officially commuted to reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment) by virtue of the abolition of the
death penalty under the 1987 Constitution and that with such abolition of the death penalty their cases
are no longer subject to automatic review by this Court, and
(2) to GRANT said accused a period of thirty (30) days from notice within which to file a written
statement, personally signed by them with the assistance of their counsel, stating whether or not they
wish to continue with their said cases as an appealed case.
(a) If they file such statement that they wish to continue with this Courts reviewing their conviction as
an appealed case, the Court will do so, rendering a judgment of affirmance, modification of the penalty
or reversal as may be warranted by the evidence and applicable law; and
(b) If they file a statement that they are satisfied with the judgment of the trial court whose death
penalty has now been commuted to reclusion perpetua, or if they fail to file any statement within the
30-day period herein given, the Court will dismiss the case and remand the same to the trial court for
execution of judgment.
This ruling is now embodied in Circular No. 9 dated May 20, 1987 of this Court. Consequently
this case has remained in this Court only because of appellants decision to continue his case as an
appealed case. However, as appellant had the right to continue with his case as an appealed one, so
does he have a right - subject to the approval of this Court - to terminate the appeal by withdrawing
it.[1] Both the appellants counsel and the Solicitor General urge approval of appellants motion.
7. Garcia v. People
(G.R. No. 106531, November 18, 1999)
PARDO, J.
FACTS:
On September 29, 1986, the Provincial Fiscal of Guimaras filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Iloilo City, an information charging petitioners with murder for the killing of one Jose Estrella.
After due trial, on September 21, 1990, the trial court promulgated its decision convicting
petitioners of the crime charged and sentencing each of them to the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to
pay jointly and severally, the heirs of Jose Estrella the sum of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, to suffer
the accessory penalties of the law and to pay the costs.
On September 24, 1990, petitioners filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of
the decision. However, on September 2, 1991, the trial court denied the motion. On September 5,
1991 petitioner received notice of the order of denial. Petitioners did not interpose an appeal from the
decision by the filing of a notice of appeal. Thus, the decision became final on September 17, 1991.
Accordingly, the trial court issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners.
On November 13, 1991, petitioners filed with the trial court a motion to lift warrant of arrest
and to allow accused to appeal, arguing that there was no need for them to appeal the decision as
the same was subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court.
On January 17, 1992, the trial court denied the motion.
On February 14, 1992, the trial court also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the present recourse.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court must automatically review a trial court’s decision
convicting an accused of a capital offense and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
RULING:
No. The issue is not new. We have consistently ruled that it is only in cases where the penalty
actually imposed is death that the trial court must forward the records of the case to the Supreme
Court for automatic review of the conviction.
As the petitioners did not file a notice of appeal or otherwise indicate their desire to appeal
from the decision convicting them of murder and sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua, the
decision became final and unappealable.
8. Republic v. Sandiganbayan
(G.R. No. 135789, January 31, 2002)
PARDO, J.
FACTS:
The Case is a petition for certiorari to nullify two (2) resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, namely:
(1) Resolution dated April 13, 1998 ordering the lifting of the writ of sequestration over the assets,
shares of stocks, property, records and bank deposit of Hans M. Menzi Holdings and Management
Inc. (HMHMI); and
(2) Resolution dated August 21, 1998 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was prima facie factual basis for the issuance of a writ of sequestration
over the assets, shares of stock, property records and bank deposits of HMHMI.
RULING:
We deny the petition. The issue is factual.
It is well settled that the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over decisions or final
orders of the Sandiganbayan is limited to questions of law.[19] A question of law exists when the
doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts;
or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented,
the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted.[20] A question of facts exists when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole
evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific
surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability
of the situation.[21]
The Supreme court is not a trier of facts. It is not the Courts function to examine and weigh all
over again the evidence presented in the proceedings below.[22]
At any rate, we agree with respondents that the Sandiganbayan has full authority to decide
on all incidents in the ill-gotten case, including the propriety of the writs of sequestration that the
PCGG initially issued. Based on the evidence the PCGG submitted so far to the Sandiganbayan, the
late Hans M. Menzi owned the Bulletin Publishing Corporation almost one hundred (100%) per cent
since 1957, except those Bulletin shares sold to U.S. Automotive corporation in 1985, those converted
to treasury shares in 1986, and those sold to the general public at public offerings. In the absence of
competent evident showing thus far that President Ferdinand E. Marcos or his cronies ever acquired
Bulletin shares of the late Hans M. Menzi or HMHMI that might be subject to sequestration, we may
not void the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan in question.
9. Fabian v. Desierto
(G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998)
REGALADO, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Teresita G. Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT
Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT) which participated in the bidding for government
construction projects including those under the First Manila Engineering District (FMED), and private
respondent Nestor V. Agustin, incumbent District Engineer, reportedly taking advantage of his official
position, inveigled petitioner into an amorous relationship. After misunderstandings and unpleasant
incidents, Fabian eventually filed the aforementioned administrative case against Agustin in a letter-
complaint. The Graft Investigator of the Ombudsman issued a resolution finding private respondent
guilty of grave misconduct and ordering his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all benefits
under the law. On a motion for reconsideration, Agustin was exonerated of the administrative charges.
In the present appeal, petitioner argues that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
(Ombudsman Act of 1989) pertinently provides that —
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10)
days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for
reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Emphasis supplied)
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can resolve the constitutionality of Section 27 of Republic Act No.
6770 not raised in the trial.
RULING:
Yes. Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are
ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate court is involved
in which case it may be raised at any time or on the court’s own motion. The Court ex mero motu
may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case where that fact is developed. The
court has a clearly recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction in any proceeding.
10. CARPIO-Morales vs. CA

(G.R. No. 217126-27, Nov 10, 2015)
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed on March 25, 2015 by petitioner
Conchita Carpio Morales, in her capacity as the Ombudsman (Ombudsman), through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), assailing: (a) the Resolution dated March 16, 2015 of public respondent
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, which granted private respondent Jejomar
Erwin S. Binay, Jr.'s (Binay, Jr.) prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) against
the implementation of the Joint Order dated March 10, 20,15 of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-15-
0058 to 0063 (preventive suspension order) preventively suspending him and several other public
officers and employees of the City Government of Makati, for six (6) months without pay; and (b) the
Resolution5 dated March 20, 2015 of the CA, ordering the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s
petition for contempt6 in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a TRO and/or WPI enjoining
the implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman.
RULING:
OMB contends that the CA has no jurisdiction to issue any provisional injunctive writ against
her office to enjoin its preventive suspension orders. As basis, she invokes the first paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770 in conjunction with her office's independence under the 1987 Constitution. She
advances the idea that "[i]n order to further ensure [her office's] independence, [RA 6770] likewise
insulated it from judicial intervention,"157particularly, "from injunctive reliefs traditionally obtainable
from the courts,"158 claiming that said writs may work "just as effectively as direct harassment or
political pressure would."
Gonzales III v. Office of the President is the first case which grappled with the meaning of the
Ombudsman's independence vis-a-vis the independence of the other constitutional bodies. the
concept of Ombudsman's independence covers three (3) things:
First: creation by the Constitution, which means that the office cannot be abolished, nor its
constitutionally specified functions and privileges, be removed, altered, or modified by law, unless the
Constitution itself allows, or an amendment thereto is made;cralawlawlibrary
Second: fiscal autonomy, which means that the office "may not be obstructed from [its]
freedom to use or dispose of [its] funds for purposes germane to [its] functions;168hence, its budget
cannot be strategically decreased by officials of the political branches of government so as to impair
said functions; and
Third: insulation from executive supervision and control, which means that those within the
ranks of the office can only be disciplined by an internal authority.
Evidently, all three aspects of independence intend to protect the Office of the Ombudsman
from political harassment and pressure, so as to free it from the "insidious tentacles of politics."
That being the case, the concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be invoked as basis
to insulate the Ombudsman from judicial power constitutionally vested unto the courts. Courts are
apolitical bodies, which are ordained to act as impartial tribunals and apply even justice to all. Hence,
the Ombudsman's notion that it can be exempt from an incident of judicial power - that is, a provisional
writ of injunction against a preventive suspension order - clearly strays from the concept's rationale
of insulating the office from political harassment or pressure.
11. ESTIPONA V. LOBRIGO

(G.R. No. 226679, August 15, 2017)
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Estipona, Jr. was charged with violation of Section 11 of RA 9165.
On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining
Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation
of Section 12 (NOTE: should have been Section 15?) of the same law, with a penalty of rehabilitation
in view of his being a first-time offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his
possession.
Petitioner argues that Section 23 of RA 9165 which prohibits plea bargaining in all violations
of said law violates:
1. The intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof;

2. The rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution; and
3. The principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches of the government.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional as it encroached upon the power
of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure.
RULING:
YES.
The Supreme Court held that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure is now Their exclusive domain and no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative
departments.
The Court further held that the separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of
our government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province of this Court. The other branches trespass
upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of
the procedural rules promulgated by the Court.
Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court asserted its
discretion to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure, to the exclusion of the
legislative and executive branches of government. To reiterate, the Court’s authority to promulgate
rules on pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive and one of the safeguards of Our institutional
independence.
12. Republic v. Sereno

(G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)
Tijam, J.
FACTS:
From 1986 to 2006, Sereno served as a member of the faculty of the University of the
Philippines-College of Law. While being employed at the UP Law, or from October 2003 to 2006,
Sereno was concurrently employed as legal counsel of the Republic in two international arbitrations
known as the PIATCO cases, and a Deputy Commissioner of the Commissioner on Human Rights.
The Human Resources Development Office of UP (UP HRDO) certified that there was no
record on Sereno’s file of any permission to engage in limited practice of profession. Moreover, out
of her 20 years of employment, only nine (9) Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN)
were on the records of UP HRDO. In a manifestation, she attached a copy of a tenth SALN, which
she supposedly sourced from the “filing cabinets” or “drawers of UP”. The Ombudsman likewise had
no record of any SALN filed by Sereno. The JBC has certified to the existence of one SALN. In sum,
for 20 years of service, 11 SALNs were recovered.
On August 2010, Sereno was appointed as Associate Justice. On 2012, the position of Chief
Justice was declared vacant, and the JBC directed the applicants to submit documents, among which
are “all previous SALNs up to December 31, 2011” for those in the government and “SALN as of
December 31, 2011” for those from the private sector. The JBC announcement further provided that
“applicants with incomplete or out-of-date documentary requirements will not be interviewed or
considered for nomination.” Sereno expressed in a letter to JBC that since she resigned from UP Law
on 2006 and became a private practitioner, she was treated as coming from the private sector and
only submitted three (3) SALNs or her SALNs from the time she became an Associate Justice. Sereno
likewise added that “considering that most of her government records in the academe are more than
15 years old, it is reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all of those files,” and that the
clearance issued by UP HRDO and CSC should be taken in her favor. There was no record that the
letter was deliberated upon. Despite this, on a report to the JBC, Sereno was said to have “complete
requirements.” On August 2012, Sereno was appointed Chief Justice.
On August 2017, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon against Sereno,
alleging that Sereno failed to make truthful declarations in her SALNs. The House of Representatives
proceeded to hear the case for determination of probable cause, and it was said that Justice Peralta,
the chairman of the JBC then, was not made aware of the incomplete SALNs of Sereno. Other
findings were made: such as pieces of jewelry amounting to P15,000, that were not declared on her
1990 SALN, but was declared in prior years’ and subsequent years’ SALNs, failure of her husband
to sign one SALN, execution of the 1998 SALN only in 2003
On February 2018, Atty. Eligio Mallari wrote to the OSG, requesting that the latter, in
representation of the Republic, initiate a quo warranto proceeding against Sereno. The OSG, invoking
the Court’s original jurisdiction under Section 5(1), Article VIII of the Constitution in relation to the
special civil action under Rule 66, the Republic, through the OSG filed the petition for the issuance of
the extraordinary writ of quo warranto to declare as void Sereno’s appointment as CJ of the SC and
to oust and altogether exclude Sereno therefrom. [yourlawyersays]
Capistrano, Sen. De Lima, Sen. Trillianes, et. al., intervened. Sereno then filed a Motion for
Inhibition against AJ Bersamin, Peralta, Jardeleza, Tijam, and Leonardo-De Castro, imputing actual
bias for having testified against her on the impeachment hearing before the House of
Representatives.
Contentions:
Office of the Solicitor General (petitioner):
OSG argues that the quo warranto is an available remedy because what is being sought is to
question the validity of her appointment, while the impeachment complaint accuses her of committing
culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust while in office, citing Funa v.
Chairman Villar, Estrada v. Desierto and Nacionalista Party v. De Vera. OSG maintains that the
phrase “may be removed from office” in Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution means that Members
of the SC may be removed through modes other than impeachment.
OSG contends that it is seasonably filed within the one-year reglementary period under
Section 11, Rule 66 since Sereno’s transgressions only came to light during the impeachment
proceedings. Moreover, OSG claims that it has an imprescriptible right to bring a quo warranto petition
under the maxim nullum tempus occurit regi (“no time runs against the king”) or prescription does not
operate against the government. The State has a continuous interest in ensuring that those who
partake of its sovereign powers are qualified. Even assuming that the one-year period is applicable
to the OSG, considering that SALNs are not published, the OSG will have no other means by which
to know the disqualification.
Moreover, OSG maintains that the SC has jurisdiction, citing A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC which
created a permanent Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards, tasked to investigate complaints
involving graft and corruption and ethical violations against members of the SC and contending that
this is not a political question because such issue may be resolved through the interpretation of the
provisions of the Constitution, laws, JBC rules, and Canons of Judicial Ethics.
OSG seeks to oust Sereno from her position as CJ on the ground that Sereno failed to show
that she is a person of proven integrity which is an indispensable qualification for membership in the
Judiciary under Section 7(3), Article VIII of the Constitution. According to the OSG, because OSG
failed to fulfill the JBC requirement of filing the complete SALNs, her integrity remains unproven. The
failure to submit her SALN, which is a legal obligation, should have disqualified Sereno from being a
candidate; therefore, she has no right to hold the office. Good faith cannot be considered as a defense
since the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA No. 3019) and Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA No. 6713) are special laws and are thus governed
by the concept of malum prohibitum, wherein malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial.
Sereno (respondent):
Sereno contends that an impeachable officer may only be ousted through impeachment, citing
Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution, and Mayor Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, Cuenca v. Hon.
Fernan, In Re: First lndorsement from Hon. Gonzales, and Re: Complaint-Affidavit for Disbarment
Against SAJ Antonio T. Carpio. Sereno contends that the clear intention of the framers of the
Constitution was to create an exclusive category of public officers who can be removed only by
impeachment and not otherwise. Impeachment was chosen as the method of removing certain high-
ranking government officers to shield them from harassment suits that will prevent them from
performing their functions which are vital to the continued operations of government. Sereno further
argues that the word “may” on Section 2 of Article XI only qualifies the penalty imposable after the
impeachment trial, i.e., removal from office. Sereno contends that the since the mode is wrong, the
SC has no jurisdiction.
Sereno likewise argues that the cases cited by OSG is not in all fours with the present case
because the President and the Vice President may, in fact, be removed by means other than
impeachment on the basis of Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution vesting in the Court the
power to be the “sole judge” of all contests relating to the qualifications of the President and the Vice-
President. There is no such provision for other impeachable officers. Moreover, on the rest of the
cases cited by the OSG, there is no mention that quo warranto may be allowed.
Sereno also argues that since a petition for quo warranto may be filed before the RTC, such
would result to a conundrum because a judge of lower court would have effectively exercised
disciplinary power and administrative supervision over an official of the Judiciary much higher in rank
and is contrary to Sections 6 and 11, Article VIII of the Constitution which vests upon the SC
disciplinary and administrative power over all courts and the personnel thereof.
Sereno likewise posits that if a Member of the SC can be ousted through quo warranto initiated
by the OSG, the Congress’ “check” on the SC through impeachment would be rendered inutile.
Furthermore, Sereno argues that it is already time-barred. Section 11, Rule 66 provides that
a petition for quo warranto must be filed within one (1) year from the “cause of ouster” and not from
the “discovery” of the disqualification.
Moreover, Sereno contends that the Court cannot presume that she failed to file her SALNs
because as a public officer, she enjoys the presumption that her appointment to office was regular.
OSG failed to overcome the presumption created by the certifications from UP HRDO that she had
been cleared of all administrative responsibilities and charges. Her integrity is a political question
which can only be decided by the JBC and the President.
Regarding her missing SALNs, Sereno contends that the fact that SALNs are missing cannot
give rise to the inference that they are not filed. The fact that 11 SALNs were filed should give an
inference to a pattern of filing, not of non-filing.
Intervenors’ arguments:
The intervenors argue that it is not incumbent upon Sereno to prove to the JBC that she
possessed the integrity required by the Constitution; rather, the onus of determining whether or not
she qualified for the post fell upon the JBC. Moreover, submission of SALNs is not a constitutional
requirement; what is only required is the imprimatur of the JBC. The intervenors likewise contend that
“qualifications” such as citizenship, age, and experience are enforceable while “characteristics” such
as competence, integrity, probity, and independence are mere subjective considerations.
ISSUE: Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition for
quo warranto.
RULING:
A quo warranto petition is allowed against impeachable officials and SC has jurisdiction.
The SC have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and RTC to issue the extraordinary writs,
including quo warranto. A direct invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction to issue such writs is
allowed when there are special and important reasons therefor, and in this case, direct resort to SC
is justified considering that the action is directed against the Chief Justice. Granting that the petition
is likewise of transcendental importance and has far-reaching implications, the Court is empowered
to exercise its power of judicial review. To exercise restraint in reviewing an impeachable officer’s
appointment is a clear renunciation of a judicial duty. an outright dismissal of the petition based on
speculation that Sereno will eventually be tried on impeachment is a clear abdication of the Court’s
duty to settle actual controversy squarely presented before it. Quo warranto proceedings are
essentially judicial in character – it calls for the exercise of the Supreme Court’s constitutional duty
and power to decide cases and settle actual controversies. This constitutional duty cannot be
abdicated or transferred in favor of, or in deference to, any other branch of the government including
the Congress, even as it acts as an impeachment court through the Senate.
To differentiate from impeachment, quo warranto involves a judicial determination of the

eligibility or validity of the election or appointment of a public official based on predetermined rules
while impeachment is a political process to vindicate the violation of the public’s trust. In quo warranto
proceedings referring to offices filled by appointment, what is determined is the legality of the
appointment. The title to a public office may not be contested collaterally but only directly, by quo
warranto proceedings. usurpation of a public office is treated as a public wrong and carries with it
public interest, and as such, it shall be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines through the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor. The SolGen is given
permissible latitude within his legal authority in actions for quo warranto, circumscribed only by the
national interest and the government policy on the matter at hand.
iii. Rule-Making Power
1. PRIMICIAS v. OCAMPO
(G.R. No. L-6120, June 30, 1953)
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.
FACTS:
Section 129 of the Revised Administrative Code. He chartered a vessel of Philippine registry
to an alien without the approval of the President, and iled to submit to the Collector of Customs the
manifests and authenticated documents for the vessel “Antarctic.” He also failed to obtain the
necessary clearance from the Bureau of Customs prior to the departure of the vessel to a foreign
port. Before the trial, petitioner invokes Section 49 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, which
provides that the aid of assessors in the trial of any civil or criminal action in the Municipal Court or
the Court of First Instance may be invoked in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure.
The CFI dismissed the petition stating that the rule-making power vested in the Supreme Court
expressly omits the portions of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding assessors in the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: W/N the right to trial with the aid of assessor is impaired by the rule-making power of the
Supreme Court
RULING:
NO. The right to trial with the aid of assessors is a substantive right and as such, are not
embraced by the rule-making power of the Supreme Court. Section 154 of the Code of Civil Procedure
and Section 2477 of the Administrative Code grant this right to a party litigant. This right has been
declared absolute and substantial by the Supreme Court in several cases where the aid of assessors
had been invoked. Inclusion of trial by assessor in the Rules of Court would be a travesty of its rule-
making power, as directed by the Constitution to be limited to powers referring to pleading, practice,
and procedure. While our Constitution has given the power to adopt the rules of procedure to the
Supreme Court, such grant did not preclude Congress from enacting any procedural law or altering,
amending, or supplementing any of the rules that may be promulgated by the Supreme Court.
2. FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS v. COURT OF APPEALS

(G.R. No. 110571, March 10, 1994)
NOCON, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner, First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. was granted its application to amend its Board of
Investments Certificate of Registration by changing the scope of its registered product from “glazed
floor tiles” to “ceramic tiles.” Mariwasa filed a motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals
required petitioner to comment on the case, and issued a temporary restraining order against the
implementation of the BOI decision. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that
the CA has no appellate jurisdiction over the BOI case, contending that it is exclusively vested in the
Supreme Court pursuant to Article 82 of EO 226. CA dismissed the petition, hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N CA has jurisdiction over the BOI case.
RULING:
YES. Circular 1-91 effectively repealed Article 82 of EO 226 insofar as the manner and method
of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned. Appeals from decisions of
the BOI, which by statute was previously allowed to be filed directly with the Supreme Court, should
now be brought to the CA. The argument that Article 82 of EO 226 cannot be validly repealed by
Circular 1-91 because the former grants a substantive right, which under the Constitution cannot be
modified, diminished or increased by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making power is not entirely
defensible as it seems. Respondent correctly argued that Article 82 grants the right of appeal from
decisions of the BOI and in granting such right, it also provided where and in what manner such
appeal can be brought. These latter portions simply deal with procedural aspects which this Court
has the power to regulate by virtue of its constitutional rule-making powers.
3. IN RE: INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES

(49 SCRA 22, 9 January 1973)
PER CURIAM
FACTS:
The Supreme Court created the Commission on Bar Integration to ascertain the advisability
of unifying the Philippine Bar. The Congress then passed House Bill 3277, an act providing for the
integration of the Philippine bar and appropriating funds therefor. President Marcos signed the
measure and became Republic Act No. 6397, which authorizes the Supreme Court to adopt rules of
court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar.
ISSUE: W/N the integration of the Philippine Bar is constitutional
RULING:
YES. RA 6397 neither confers a new power nor restricts the Court’s inherent power, but is a
mere legislative declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote public interest or, more
specifically, will raise the standards of the legal professions, improve the administration of justice, and
enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively. The Courts have inherent power
to supervise and regulate the practice of law. Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with
public interest, it is far and just that the exercise of that privilege be regulated to assure compliance
with the lawyer’s public responsibilities. Given existing Bar conditions, the most efficient means of
doing so is by integrating the Bar through a rule of court that requires all lawyers to pay annual dues
to the Integrated Bar.
4. ECHEGARAY v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

(G.R. No. 132601, 19 January 1999)
PER CURIAM
FACTS:
Petitioner was convicted for rape of his common law spouse’s ten year old daughter and was
sentenced to death penalty. He filed for a motion for reconsideration raising the constitutionality of
RA 6759 or the Death Penalty Law. The motion were denied. Thereafter, RA 8177 was passed
amending Article 8 of the RPC, in which the mode of execution was changed from electrocution to
lethal injection. The Secretary of Justice promulgated the rules and regulations to implement RA 8177
and directed the Director of Bureau of Corrections to prepare the Lethal Injection Manual. Petitioner
filed a petition for prohibition to enjoin the Secretary of Justice and Director of Bureau of Prisons from
carrying out the execution. The Supreme Court issued a TRO. Respondent assailed the issuance of
the TRO arguing that the action not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached
on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.
ISSUE: W/N the TRO issued by SC encroached upon the powers of the Executive in granting a
reprieve, and the Legislature in promulgating such rules
RULING:
NO. The Supreme Court has the constitutional power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts as provided in Art. VII Sec. 5(5) of the Constitution.
There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction
to amend, modify, or alter the same. The former continues even after the judgment has become final
for the purpose of enforcing the judgment, while the latter terminates when the judgment becomes
final. The power of Congress under the 1937 and 1973 Constitution to repeal, alter or supplement
rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure was taken away by the present constitution in the
expansion of the rule-making power of the Supreme Court in the furtherance of its independence.
5. Writ of Amparo
a. CANLAS V. NAPICO HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION

(G.R. No. 182795, 5 June 2008)
REYES, R.T., J.
FACTS:
Petitioners are settlers in a certain pace of land. Their dwellings have been demolished or is
about to be demolished pursuant to a court judgment. They filed a petition for writ of amparo to
summon some unprincipled Land Officials as they allege to answer their participation in the issuance
of fraudulent titles to NAPICO.
ISSUE: W/N writ of amparo is proper in this case
RULING:
NO. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides that it shall be available to any person whose
rights to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission
of a public official. The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of final judgment of the court is
not included among the enumeration of rights covered by the writ. There must be a clear allegation
of the supposed factual and legal basis of the right sought to be protected for a writ of amparo to be
issued. Their claim to dwelling does not constitute right to life, liberty an security.
b. TAPUZ V. DEL ROSARIO

(G.R. No. 182484, 17 January 2008)
BRION, J.
FACTS:
Spouses Sanson filed a complaint before the MCTC of Baruanga-Malay, Aklan for forcible
entry with damages against the Tupaz’s. The Sansons allege that they own 1 hectare of land as
evidenced by the TCT in their name, and that the Tupaz’s came in to the property armed with bolos
and suspected firearms, with force and intimidation, and took possessions of the disputed property
and built a nipa and bamboo structure. The MCTC ruled in favor of the Sansons. Petitioners appealed
to the RTC, which was denied. The sheriff of Aklan served the notice to vacate and for demolition to
the Tupaz’s. Petitioners came to the Supreme Court praying for three remedies: certiorari, writ of
habeas data, and writ of amparo.
ISSUE: W/N writ of amparo may be issued for the Tupaz’s in this case
RULING:
NO. The writ of amparo is fatally defective with respect to content and substance. The writ of
amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and
enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address
these extraordinary concerns. It was not conceived to protect concerns that are purely property or
commercial. It cannot be issued as well on the basis of amorphous and uncertain grounds. As the
threat posed to petitioners seemed to be purely properly-related and focused on a land dispute, the
proper remedy sought for may lie more in the realm of ordinary criminal prosecution rather than on
the use of the extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo.
c. CARAM v. SEGUI
(G.R. No. 193652, 5 August 2014)
VILLARAMA, JR., J.
FACTS:
Petitioner had an amorous relationship with Marcelino Constantino III, to which she became
pregnant without the benefit of marriage. She intended to have the child adopted through Sun and
Moon Home for Children, which shouldered all her hospital and medical expenses. She voluntarily
surrendered the baby by way of a Deed of Voluntary Commitment to the DSWD. Thereafter, a
certificate was issued declaring the baby as legally available for adoption. The baby was matched
with Spouses Medina and supervised trial custody was commenced. Petitioner changed her mind
about the adopted and asked DSWD to suspend the adoption proceedings. DSWD responded,
through Atty. Segui, informing her that the certificate effectively terminated her parental authority.
Petitioner then filed a petition for the issuance of writ of amparo seeking custody of the baby.
ISSUE: W/N a petition for a writ of amparo is proper
RULING:
No. There was no enforced disappearance in this case. The Court enumerated the three
elements constituting “enforced disappearances”: (1) there be an arrest, detention, abduction, or any
form of deprivation of liberty; (2) it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence
of the State or a political organization; (3) that it be followed by the State or political organization’s
refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person; (4) that the
intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of law for a prolonged period
of time. There was no disappearance because the respondent DSWD never concealed the baby’s
whereabouts, and the adoption proceedings were conducted in accordance with law.
6. Writ of Habeas Data
a. Lee v Ilagan
(G.R. No. 203154, 8 October 2014)
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
Ilagan, a police officer, filed a petition for the issuance of Writ of Habeas Data against Joy,
her former common law partner. According to him, sometime in July 2011 he visited Joy’s
condominium and rested or a while. When he arrived at his office, he noticed his digital camera
missing. On August 23, 2011, Joy confronted him about a purported sex video she discovered from
the digital camera showing him and another woman. He denied the video and demanded the return
of the camera, but she refused. They had an altercation where Ilagan allegedly slammed Joy’s head
against a wall and then walked away. Because of this, Joy filed several cases against him, including
a case for violation of republic Act 9262 and administrative cases before the Napolcom, utilizing the
said video. The use of the same violated his life to liberty, security and privacy and that of the other
woman, thus he had no choice but to file the petition for issuance of the writ of habeas data.
RTC issued the writ and directed Lee to appear before the court and produce Ilagan’s digital
camera, as well as the original and copies of the video, and to make a return within five days from
receipt. In her return, Lee admitted keeping the memory card of the digital camera and reproducing
the video but only or use as evidence in the cases she filed against Ilagan. Ilagan’s petitions should
be dismissed because its filing was only aimed at suppressing the evidence in the cases she filed
against him and she is not engaged in the gathering, collecting, or storing of data regarding the person
of Ilagan.
The RTC granted Ilagan’s petition and ordered the turnover of the video to Neri and enjoined
Lee from reproduction of the same. It disregarded Lee’s defense that she is not engaged in the
collection, gathering and storage of data, and that her acts to reproducing the same and showing it
to other persons (Napolcom) violated Ilagan’s right to privacy and humiliated him. It clarified that it
ruling only on the return of the video and not on its admissibility as evidence. Dissatisfied, Lee filed
the instant petition before the Supreme Court
ISSUE: WON the RTC correctly extended the privilege of the writ of habeas data in favor of Ilagan
RULING:
AM No. 08-01-16 SC, or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule), was
conceived as a response given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances. It was conceptualized as a
judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of
individuals, which is defined as the right to control the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination
of data about oneself.
As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of the habeas data now stands as
a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person,
family, home, and correspondence of the aggrieved party. Thus, in order to support a petition or the
issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule essentially requires the petition sufficiently
alleges, among others, “the manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects
the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party. In other words, the petition must adequately
show that there exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand and the right to life, liberty,
or security of the victim. In this relation, it bears pointing out that the writ of habeas data will not issue
to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the
petitions therefor are vague of doubtful.
In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan has not able to sufficiently alleged that his right to
privacy in life, liberty, or security was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction of the
subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this video, which he
fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public consumption,
he failed to explain the connection between such interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty
or security.
b. Gamboa v Chan
(G.R. No. 193636, 24 July 2012)
Sereno, J.
FACTS:
Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos Norte)
conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and her aides, and classified her as
someone who keeps a Private Army Group (PAG). Purportedly without the benefit of data verification,
PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa Commission, thereby
causing her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs. Contending that
her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition
for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents in their capacities as officials of the
PNP-Ilocos Norte.
ISSUE: WON the petition for the issuance of writ of habeas data is proper when the right to privacy
is invoked as opposed to the state’s interest in preserving the right to life, liberty or security.
RULING:
NO. The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the
image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum
to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to
control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being
collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in
order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy
on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.
In this case, the Court ruled that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence
that her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible
to harassment and to increased police surveillance. In this regard, respondents sufficiently explained
that the investigations conducted against her were in relation to the criminal cases in which she was
implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome.
[T]he state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of
Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was
pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.
c. Vivares v St. Theresa’s College

(G.R. No. 202666, 29 September 2014)
Velasco,Jr., J.
FACTS:
In January 2012, Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresa’s College (STC), uploaded
on Facebook several pictures of her and her classmates (Nenita Daluz and Julienne Suzara) wearing
only their undergarments. Thereafter, some of their classmates reported said photos to their teacher,
Mylene Escudero. Escudero, through her students, viewed and downloaded said pictures. She
showed the said pictures to STC’s Discipline-in-Charge for appropriate action.
Later, STC found Tan et al to have violated the student’s handbook and banned them from
“marching” in their graduation ceremonies scheduled in March 2012. The issue went to court but
despite a TRO (temporary restraining order) granted by the Cebu RTC enjoining the school from
barring the students in the graduation ceremonies, STC still barred said students.
Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother of Nenita, and the other mothers filed a petition for
the issuance of the writ of habeas data against the school. They argued, among others, that:
1. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at “Friends Only.” They,
thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be respected.
2. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced without
their consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of the photos
and by subsequently showing them to STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of the
children were intruded upon;
3. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data, and
digital images happened at STC’s Computer Laboratory;
They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed
copies of the subject data and have such data be declared illegally obtained in violation of the
children’s right to privacy.
The Cebu RTC eventually denied the petition. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas data is proper.
RULING:
Yes, it is proper but in this case, it will not prosper.
Contrary to the arguments of STC, the Supreme Court ruled that:
1. The petition for writ of habeas data can be availed of even if this is not a case of extralegal killing
or enforced disappearance; and
2. The writ of habeas data can be availed of against STC even if it is not an entity engaged in the
business of “gathering, collecting, or storing data or information regarding the person, family, home
and correspondence of the aggrieved party”.
First, the Rule on Habeas Data does not state that it can be applied only in cases of extralegal
killings or enforced disappearances. Second, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data
protection shall be available only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the business of
gathering, storing, and collecting of data.
Right to Privacy on Social Media (Online Networking Sites)
The Supreme Court ruled that if an online networking site (ONS) like Facebook has privacy
tools, and the user makes use of such privacy tools, then he or she has a reasonable expectation of
privacy (right to informational privacy, that is). Thus, such privacy must be respected and protected.
In this case, however, there is no showing that the students concerned made use of such privacy
tools. Evidence would show that that their post (status) on Facebook were published as “Public”.
Facebook has the following settings to control as to who can view a user’s posts on his “wall” (profile
page):
(a) Public – the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
(b) Friends of Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can view the photo;
(c) Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;
(d) Custom – the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the Facebook
user; and
(e) Only Me – the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The default setting is “Public” and if a user wants to have some privacy, then he must choose
any setting other than “Public”. If it is true that the students concerned did set the posts subject of this
case so much so that only five people can see them (as they claim), then how come most of their
classmates were able to view them. This fact was not refuted by them. In fact, it was their classmates
who informed and showed their teacher, Escudero, of the said pictures. Therefore, it appears that
Tan et al never use the privacy settings of Facebook hence, they have no reasonable expectation of
privacy on the pictures of them scantily clad.
STC did not violate the students’ right to privacy. The manner which the school gathered the
pictures cannot be considered illegal. As it appears, it was the classmates of the students who
showed the picture to their teacher and the latter, being the recipient of said pictures, merely delivered
them to the proper school authority and it was for a legal purpose, that is, to discipline their students
according to the standards of the school (to which the students and their parents agreed to in the first
place because of the fact that they enrolled their children there).
7. Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (AM No. 09-6-8-SC): MMDA v Concerned
Residents of Manila Bay
(G.R. No. 17947-48, 8 December 2008)
Velasco, Jr., J.
FACTS:
The complaint by the residents alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had
fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No.
(PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code and that ALL defendants (public officials) must be
jointly and/or solidarily liable and collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its water
quality to class B, waters fit for swimming, diving, and other forms of contact recreation.
ISSUES:
(1) WON Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of Water Quality and
Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited only to the cleanup
of specific pollution incidents;
(2) WON petitioners be compel led by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay.
RULING:
(1) Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned ought to
confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a specific
pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence
of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality “has deteriorated to a degree where its
state will adversely affect its best usage.” Section 17 & 20 are of general application and are not for
specific pollution incidents only. The fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such magnitude
and scope that it is well -nigh impossible to draw the line between a specific and a general
pollution incident.
(2) The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus. While the
implementation of the MMDA's mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the
enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial
in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. Under what other judicial discipline describes
as “continuing mandamus ,” the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives
with the end in view of ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by administrative
inaction or indifference.
ii. Change of Venue
1. People v Gutierrez
(G.R. No. 142905, March 18, 2002)
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
FACTS:
A group of armed persons descended on barrio Ora Centro, municipality of Bantay, Province
of Ilocos Sur, and set fire to various inhabited houses therein. On the afternoon of the same day, in
barrio Ora Este of the same municipality and province, several residential houses were likewise
burned by the group, resulting in the destruction of various houses and in the death of an old woman
named Vicenta Balboa.
After investigation by the authorities, the provincial fiscal, filed in the Court of First Instance of
Vigan, Ilocos Sur, two information for arson with homicide and for arson, charging that the seventeen
private respondents herein, together with 82 other unidentified persons, for the crimes.
On 22 June 1970, the prosecution moved the respondent judge for a transfer of cases 47V
and 48-V to the Circuit Criminal Court, issued at the instance of the witnesses seeking transfer of the
hearing from Vigan to either San Fernando, La Union, or Baguio City, for reasons of security and
personal safety, as shown in their affidavits. The respondent judge declined the transfer.
Because of the lower court’s denial, they filed a case for certiorari and mandamus to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer of venue can be allowed.
RULING:
Though the Secretary of Justice is not authorized to transfer specific and individual cases, the
Constitution has vested the Judicial Power in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be
established by law (Article VIII, Section 13), and such judicial power connotes certain incidental and
inherent attributes reasonably necessary for an effective administration of justice. The courts "can by
appropriate means do all things necessary to preserve and maintain every quality needful to make
the judiciary an effective institution of government". One of these incidental and inherent powers of
courts is that of transferring the trial of cases from one court to another of equal rank in a neighboring
site, whenever the imperative of securing a fair and impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of
justice, so demands.
The requirements for proper jurisdiction have been satisfied in the filing of the criminal case
in Ilocos Sur. The holding of the trial is a matter of venue rather than jurisdiction. There is factual
basis that the witnesses claim: (1) 82 of the armed suspects are still unidentified; (2) Vincent
Crisologo, private respondent, belongs to an influential family in the province; (3) it is not shown that
the Executive branch is able or willing to give these witnesses full security during the trial and possible
murderous assault after; (4) confirmation and promotion of Judge Gutierrez was actively supported
by Cong. and Gov. Crisologo.
iv. Administrative Supervision
1. Fuentes v Ombudsman Mindanao

(G.R. No. 124295, October 23, 2001)
PARDO, J.
FACTS:
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao filed a criminal complaint charging Judge
Renato A. Fuentes with violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3(e). The Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao through Graft Investigation Officer II Marivic A. Trabajo-Daray issued an
order directing petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit within ten days. Petitioner filed with the Office
of the Ombudsman-Mindanao a motion to dismiss complaint and/or manifestation to forward all
records to the Supreme Court. The Graft Investigation Officer, however, denied the motion of
petitioner. Hence, the present petition. Petitioner maintained that the respondent Ombudsman-
Mindanao committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he
initiated a criminal complaint against petitioner for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Section 3[e]. According
to petitioner, public respondent encroached on the power of the Supreme Court of administrative
supervision over all courts and its personnel.
The Supreme Court granted the petition. According to the Court, the Ombudsman may not
initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative complaint before his office against petitioner judge,
pursuant to his power to investigate public officers. The Ombudsman must indorse the case to the
Supreme Court for appropriate action. The Court stressed that Article VIII, Section 6 of the
Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and
court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court
clerk. Hence, it is the Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the judges and court personnel and
take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation of the laws of the land.
No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the independence
of the judiciary and the doctrine of separation of powers.
ISSUE: WON the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation of acts of a judge in the exercise of his
official functions alleged to be in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in the absence
of an administrative charge for the same acts before the Supreme Court.
RULING:
No. Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides:
“Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions and duties: (1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by
any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at
any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases.”
Thus, the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative complaint
before his office against petitioner judge, pursuant to his power to investigate public officers. The
Ombudsman must indorse the case to the Supreme Court, for appropriate action. Article VIII, Section
6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts
and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals to the lowest municipal trial
court clerk. Hence, it is the Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the judges and court personnel
and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation of the laws of the
land. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the
independence of the judiciary and the doctrine of separation of powers.
Petitioner’s questioned order directing the attachment of government property and issuing a
writ of execution were done in relation to his office, well within his official functions. The order may
be erroneous or void for lack or excess of jurisdiction. However, whether or not such order of
execution was valid under the given circumstances, must be inquired into in the course of the judicial
action only by the Supreme Court that is tasked to supervise the courts. “No other entity or official of
the Government, not the prosecution or investigation service of any other branch, not any functionary
thereof, has competence to review a judicial order or decision--whether final and executory or not--
and pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis for a criminal or administrative complaint for
rendering an unjust judgment or order.
2. Maceda v Vasquez
(G.R. NO. 102781, 22 April 1993)
Nocon, J.
RULING:
Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman
against petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner
Maceda has falsified his certificate of service by certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have
been submitted for decision for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before
January 31, 1989, when in truth and in fact, petitioner Maceda knew that no decision had been
rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera
alleged that petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates of service for 17 months.
ISSUE: Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into
the SC’s constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts.
RULING:
A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the SC for serious
misconduct and under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under
the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with regard to his
certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the
Court’s power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the
doctrine of separation of powers.
Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision over
all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest municipal trial
court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the SC that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s
compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any
violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul
of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their
administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the
SC for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their
administrative duties.
v. Consultations/Decisions
1. Prudential Bank v. Castro

(A.C. No. 2756, March 15, 1988)
En banc
FACTS:
In the Macro Textile Mills Corporation (Macro) v. Prudential Bank, Macro filed the complaint
alleging that Go Cun Uy, President and General Manager of Macro, had no authority to mortgage
their property and that his execution of the mortgage was due to the fraudulent manipulations of the
petitioner Prudential Bank. Through a summary judgment, respondent Judge Jose Castro resolved
the case declaring the mortgage null and void and ordering Prudential Bank to pay Macro more than
PHP 33 million in damages plus attorney’s fees. The latter moved for reconsideration, however it was
denied “not only for pro forma but also for lack of merit.” Consequently, respondent judge considered
his decision to be final and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. Petitioner instituted an
administrative complaint against respondent judge for committing serious and grave misfeasance.
The Supreme Court found respondent judge to be guilty for showing partiality towards Macro
and was accordingly dismissed from service. The latter filed for a motion for reconsideration, however,
the Court denied it with finality upon a Minute Resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court disregarded the Constitutional provision in promulgating the Minute
Resolution against respondent judge.
RULING:
NO. Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is inapplicable because this is an administrative
case. And even if it were, the Minute Resolution stated the legal basis for their denial of the motion
for reconsideration. Lack of merit, which was one of the grounds for denial, is a legal basis pursuant
to the Rules of Court.
2. Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources

(G.R. No. 13585, December 6, 2000)
En banc
FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa and several intervenors to the case assail the
constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act (RA) No. 8371, otherwise known as the
Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. They
contend that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public
domain, as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. Petitioners also contend that, by providing for
an all-encompassing definition of “ancestral domains” and “ancestral lands”, such may violate the
rights of private landowners.
In addition, petitioners also question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and
jurisdiction of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) and making customary law
applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the
ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution.
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1 which they claim
infringes upon the President’s power of control over executive departments.
ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.
RULING:
After deliberation of the petition, the Supreme Court en banc were equally divided. Seven
members voted to dismiss the petition, while seven others voted to grant such. The case was
redeliberated upon, however, after such, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule
56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is dismissed.
3. Mendoza v. Court of First Instance of Quezon, 9th Judicial District, Gumaca Branch
(G.R. No. L-35612-14, June 27, 1973)
Fernando, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Norberto Mendoza motioned for reconsideration for the Supreme Court Minute
Resolution dismissing his petitions for habeas corpus, certiorari and mandamus for lack of merit. The
Court ruled that petitioner failed to sustain the burden of showing that his confinement was marked
by illegality or that the order cancelling the bail previously issued was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the minute resolution violated Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution
RULING:
NO. According to jurisprudence (Jose v. Santos), what is expected of the judiciary is that the
decision rendered makes clear why either party prevailed under the applicable law to the facts as
established. Nor is there any rigid formula as to the language to be employed to satisfy the
requirement of clarity and distinctness. The discretion of the particular judge in this respect, while not
unlimited, is necessarily broad. There is no sacramental form of words which he must use upon pain
of being considered as having failed to abide by what the Constitution directs.
4. Borromeo v. Court of Appeals

(G.R. No. 82273, June 1, 1990)
En banc
FACTS:
Petitioner Joaquin Borromeo filed a complaint for damages against personnel of the Third
Division of the Supreme Court, namely Atty. Julieta Carreo, Division Clerk of Court; Atty. Afredo
Marasigan, Asst. Division Clerk of Court; and Atty. Jose Ilustre, Chief of the Judicial Records Office.
All three allegedly usurped judicial functions by issuing a biased, fake and unconstitutional
‘Resolution’ and ‘Entry of Judgment’ in his case docketed as G.R. No. 82273 which caused Borromeo
grave moral shock, mental anguish, sleepless nights, severe embarrassment and endless worry,
thus, the group must be condemned to pay moral damages in the amount of not less that PHP
50,000.00. The alleged fake resolution which disposed of Borromeo’s petition complies with the
constitutional requirements governing resolutions refusing to give due course to petitions for review.
Borromeo’s motion for reconsideration was received by the Court more than a month after the release
of the resolution, so it was noted to have merely reiterated the same arguments and already passed
upon by the Court and was, therefore without merit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged minute resolution was valid.
RULING:
YES. The Court disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as
final and executory, as where a case is patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual in
nature, where the decision appealed from is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with
the facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the petition is led
merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-compliance with the rules. The
resolution denying due course or dismissing the petition always gives the legal basis. As emphasized
in jurisprudence (In Re: Wenceslao Laureta), the Court is not ‘duty bound‘ to render signed Decisions
all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate Decisions and/or Minute Resolutions, provided a
legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case.
5. Solid Homes v. Laserna

(G.R No. 166051, April 8, 2008)
Chico-Nazario, J.
FACTS:
Respondents Evelina Laserna and Gloria Cajipe bought a parcel of land from petitioner Solid
Homes, Inc. (SHI). Both parties agreed upon a systematic payment wherein a down-payment shall
be paid upon signing of the contract, with the remaining balance payable for a period of three years
at a monthly installment. When 90% had been paid, the respondents demanded the execution and
delivery of the property upon final payment of the balance, but SHI did not comply. Respondents filed
a complaint before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), which then directed the
petitioner to comply with the execution.
SHI appealed to the HLURB Board of Commissioners, who in turn, modified the decision
rendered previously. Upon appeal, the Office of the President (OP) affirmed the same, who later,
denies their move for reconsideration. The case was elevated Court of Appeals (CA), but was
dismissed for lack of merit. The same denied the motion for reconsideration, hence, this petition
alleging that the Decision made was in violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Decision runs afoul of the mandate of the Constitution.
RULING:
NO. The constitutional mandate that the decision shall state clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which it is based does not preclude the validity of ‘memorandum decisions’, which
adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior
tribunals. Memorandum decisions are a species of succinctly written decisions by appellate courts in
accordance with the provisions of Sec. 40, B.P. 129, as amended, on the grounds of expediency,
practicality, convenience and docket status of our courts.
To be valid, it cannot incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower
court only by means of remote reference, which is to say that the challenged decision is not easily
and immediately available to the person reading the memorandum decision. For the incorporation by
reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law being adopted,
which must be contained in a statement attached to the said decision. In other words, the
memorandum decision should actually embody the findings of facts and conclusions of law of the
lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the decision.
6. Dizon v. Judge Lopez

(A.M. No. RTJ-96-1339, September 5, 1997)
Mendoza, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Engr. Fernando Dizon filed a complaint charging respondent Judge Lilia Lopez with
the violation of the Constitution, serious misconduct, inefficiency and falsification in connection with
her decision in the criminal case wherein petitioner was a respondent. The promulgation of the
judgment in the case consisted of reading the dispositive portion of the decision sentencing him to
imprisonment, without serving him a copy of the decision.
Dizon alleged that the failure of respondent judge to furnish him a copy of the decision until
almost one (1) year and eight (8) months after the promulgation of its dispositive portion constitutes
a violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, which prohibits courts from rendering
decisions without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which they are based;
and Section 15 of the same, which provides that in all cases lower courts must render their decisions
within three (3) months from the date of their submission.
Judge Lopez claimed that when the decision was promulgated, her decision was already
prepared. She simply withheld its dispositive portion to prevent leakage in the process of preparing
it. She further stated that she gave it to Ma. Cleotilde Paulo (Social Worker II) for typing and
incorporating into the text of the decision the dispositive portion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Judge Lopez violated Section 15 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution.
RULING:
YES. Pursuant to Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, merely reading the dispositive
portion of the decision to the accused is not sufficient. It is the judgment that must be read to him,
stating the facts and the law on which such judgment is based. Thus, it is obvious that the respondent
failed to render her decision within three (3) months as required by Section 15 (1), Article VIII of the
Constitution. The proper recourse for the judge should have been an application for an extension of
time to decide the case and put off the promulgation of the decision until she had finished it. What
must be promulgated must be the complete decision, as there would be no more reason to keep the
dispositive portion a secret, once the judgment has been promulgated.
7. People v. Baring
(G.R. No.137933, January 28, 2002)
En banc
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Valentin Baring was convicted of statutory rape committed against the
seven-year old granddaughter of his common-law wife. Because of the penalty imposed, his case
was automatically sent to the Supreme Court for review. Through his counsel, he filed a petition
before the Court to dismiss the cause that is subject for automatic review claiming that the decision
rendered by the lower court is bereft of material facts supporting the conviction; the medico-legal
certificate is not reliable since the physician who conducted the examination was not presented as a
witness, depriving him of his right to cross-examination; the case of attempted homicide filed by the
victim’s grandmother was provisionally dismissed; and that he was merely a “fall guy” and another
person is responsible for the crime charged against him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the case should be dismissed on account of the decision rendered by the
lower court.
RULING:
NO. The trial court's decision may cast doubt as to the guilt of accused-appellant. Such doubt
may be engendered not by the lack of direct evidence against accused-appellant, but by the trial
court's failure to fully explain the correlation of the facts, the weight or admissibility of the evidence
presented for or against the accused, the assessments made from the evidence presented, and the
conclusions drawn therefrom after applying the pertinent law as basis of the decision. A decision need
not be a complete recital of the evidence presented, so long as the factual and legal bases are clearly
and distinctly laid down.
8. Martinez v. Court of Appeals

(G.R. No. 123547, May 21, 2001)
Mendoza, J.
FACTS:
Private respondents Godofredo De la Paz and his sister, Manuela, sold a vacant lot at Villa
Fe Subdivision in Cabanatuan City to petitioner Rev. Fr. Dante Martinez, then Assistant parish priest
of Cabanatuan City, for the sum of PHP 15,000.00. They agreed upon that Martinez would give a
down-payment of PHP 3,000.00 and that the balance would be payable by installment. After
construction of their house on the lot and completion of payment, the deed of sale, however, was
never delivered.
After some time, Martinez discovered that De la Paz had sold three lots, including the one
sold to him, to private respondent spouses Reynaldo and Susan Veneracion after receiving a letter
from Reynaldo claiming ownership of the land and demanding that they vacate the property and
remove their improvements thereon. Martinez, through his counsel, demanded the execution of the
deed of sale from De la Paz and informed Veneracion that he was the rightful owner of the property.
Veneracion, in turn, brought an action for ejectment before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) against
Martinez, which ruled adversely against him and held that Martinez and his mother were, in good
faith, the rightful possessors of the land. Veneracion then appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
which found them the rightful owners of the land, and ordered for Martinez to vacate said land.
Martinez thereafter filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the
ruling of the RTC. Martinez assailed the ruling, alleging that the CA overlooked relevant facts which,
if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion, and that the denial his motion for
reconsideration is in violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA violated Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution in denying petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration.
RULING:
NO. The requirement embedded in Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution was fully
complied with when the CA, in denying reconsideration of its decision, stated in its resolution that it
found no reason to change its ruling because petitioner had not raised anything new. It is provided
for in their resolution that the points and arguments raised by Martinez have been considered and
passed upon in the Decision, therefore, they find no reason to disturb the same.
9. Komatsu Industries v. Court of Appeals

(G.R. No. 127682, April 24, 1998
Regalado, J.
FACTS:
National Investment and Development Corp. (NIDC) granted Komatsu Industries Phils. Inc.
(Komatsu) a direct loan of PHP 8 million and a PHP 2 million guarantee to secure Philippine National
Bank (PNB). As security thereof, a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was executed by Komatsu in favor
of NIDC, covering among others, a parcel of land in Makati. A Mortgage Deed was then executed
concerning the same land, in favor of PNB and NIDC. Upon full payment of petitioner’s account with
NIDC and credit line with PNB, NIDC executed a Deed of Release and Cancellation of Mortgage for
the return of the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) of the mortgaged land. It was then found that there
were some accounts chargeable to Komatsu on deferred letters of credit opened and established
settled by PNB with foreign suppliers, but came only to the latter’s knowledge after several years.
Upon making the request, the TCT of the land in question was returned to PNB. However, the land
covered by the TCT was extra-judicially foreclosed by way of Chattel Mortgage. Petitioner then
contested the foreclosure, alleging that the release by the NIDC had the effect of releasing the real
estate mortgage. The Court of Appeals (CA) ruled adversely against petitioner, thus, was prompted
to file a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. For failure to sufficiently show that
the CA committed any reversible error in its judgment, the petition was denied, rendered in a minute
resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the minute resolution is in violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution.
RULING:
NO. As stated in jurisprudence (Novino, et. al. v. Court of Appeals, et. al), “resolutions” are
not “decisions” within the constitutional requirements of Section 14, Article VIII. They merely hold that
the petition for review should not be entertained and the petition to review the decision of the Court
of Appeals is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, hence there is no need to fully
explain the Court's denial since, for one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the
Court of Appeals' decision.
10. Tichangco v. Enriquez

(G.R. No. 150629, June 30, 2004)
Panganiban, J.
FACTS:
Sometime in March 1996, Renato Tichangco, in behalf of the occupants of various parcels of
land in Gagalangin and Sunog Apog in Tondo, Manila, filed a land title verification request with the
Land Registration Authority (LRA). The verification request was prompted by an alleged claim of
ownership of a certain Manotok over the land which petitioners occupy, and which allegedly have
been identified as Area for Priority Development under the Urban Poor Law.
The LRA-Task Force issued a report stating that a part of the land belonged to Ricardo
Manotok. Public respondent LRA Administrator Alfredo Enriquez, upon being directed to review and
evaluate the records on the issuance of Transfer Certificate Titles (TCT) by the Office of the Solicitor
General, rendered the assailed decision finding no legal ground to initiate an action for the nullification
of the assailed certificates of title.
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the resolution of public respondent. In its decision, no
mention of the completion of the magnetic survey was made. Petitioners, in elevating the case to the
Supreme Court, argue that the CA did not comply with the requirement laid down in Section 14, Article
VIII of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA complied with Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution.
RULING:
NO. Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution deals with the disposition of petitions for review
and of motions for reconsideration. In appellate courts, the rule does not require any comprehensive
statement of facts or mention of the applicable law, but merely a statement of the "legal basis" for
denying due course. Thus, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement when a
collegiate appellate court, after deliberation, decides to deny a motion; states that the questions raised
are factual or have already been passed upon; or cites some other legal basis. There is no need to
explain fully the court's denial, since the facts and the law have already been laid out in the assailed
Decision.
g. Tenure of Justices/Judges
i. In Re First Indorsement from Hon. Raul M. Gonzales

(A.M. No. 88-4-5433, 15 April 1988)
PER CURIAM:
FACTS:
The Court considered the 1st Indorsement dated March 16, 1988 from Mr. Raul M. Gonzalez,
“Tanodbayan/Special; Prosecutor” forwarding to Mr. Justice Marcelo B. Fernan a “letter-complaint,
dated 14 December 1987 with enclosure of the concerned employees of the Supreme Court,”
together with a telegram of Miguel Cuenco, for “comment within (10) days from receipt hereof.” Mr.
Justice Fernan had brought this first Indorsement to the attention of the Court en banc in view of the
important implications of policy raised by said 1st Indorsement.
Gonzales was the Tanodbayan or Special Prosecutor. He forwarded to Mr. Justice Marcelo
B. Fernan a letter-complaint. The letter was said to be from concerned employees of the SC as an
anonymous letter.
The letter was originally addressed to Gonzales referring to the charges for disbarment sought
by Mr. Miguel Cuenco against Justice Fernan, and asking Gonzales to do something about the matter.
The second attachment is a copy of a telegram from Mr. Miguel Cuenco addressed to Hon. Raul
Gonzalez, where Mr. Cuenco refers to pleadings he apparently filed on 29 February 1988 with the
SC Court in an administrative case, which, in the opinion of Mr. Cuenco, made improper any
‘intervention’ by Mr. Raul Gonzalez. Mr. Cuenco, nonetheless, encourages Mr. Gonzalez ‘to file
responsive pleading to the Supreme Court en banc.
The Court furnished to Mr. Raul M. Gonzalez a copy of the per curiam Resolution which the
Court resolved to dismiss the charges made by complaint Cuenco against Mr. Justice Fernan for utter
lack of merit. In the same Resolution, the Court resolved to require complainant Cuenco to show
cause why he should not be administratively dealt with for making unfounded serious accusations
against Mr. Justice Fernan. Upon request of Mr. Cuenco, the Court had granted him an extension of
up to 30 March 1988. Mr. Cuenco filed a pleading which appears to be an omnibus pleading relating
to, inter alia, Administrative Case No. 3135. Insofar as a per curiam Resolution dated 15 April 1988,
the Court denied with finality Mr. Cuenco’s Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE: WON a Supreme Court Justice can be disbarred during his term of office.
RULING:
NO. A public officer who, under the Constitution, is required to be a Member of the Philippine
Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from office only by
impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such police officer.
Further, such public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be charged criminally before the
Sandiganbayan, or any other court, with any offense which carries with it the penalty of removal from
office.
Another reason why the complaint for disbarment should be dismissed is because under the
Constitution, members of the SC may be removed only by impeachment. The above provision
proscribes removal from office by any other method. Otherwise, to allow such public officer who may
be removed solely by impeachment to be charged criminally while holding his office with an office
which carries the penalty of removal from such, would be violative of the clear mandate of the
Constitution.
The impeachment is limited to the loss of position and disqualification to hold any office of
honor, trust or profit under the Republic. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further
than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office. But the party convicted shall
nevertheless be held liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law.
The court is not saying that its Members or other constitutional officers are entitled to immunity
from liability for possibly criminal acts or for alleged violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics or other
supposed misbehavior. What the court is saying is that there is a fundamental procedural requirement
that must be observed before such liability may be determined and enforced. A member of the
Supreme Court must first be removed from office, via the constitutional route of impeachment, and
then only he may be held liable either criminally or administratively (that is, disbarment), for any wrong
or misbehavior that may be proven against him in appropriate proceedings.
ii. People v Gacott

(G.R. No. 116049, 13 July 1995)
Regalado, J.
FACTS:
The Second Division of the SC resolved to reprimand Judge Gacott of the RTC and fine him
with P10,000 for gross ignorance of the law. In this motion for reconsideration, he questions the
competence of the Second Division to administratively discipline him. He claims that the clause “The
SC en banc shall have the power to discipline judges xxx or order their dismissal xxx” of Sec 11, Art
VIII of the Constitution means that only the full Court, not a division thereof, can administratively
punish him.
ISSUE: WON only the Court sitting en banc that can administratively discipline judges
RULING:
No. There are two situations envisaged in Art VIII, Sec 11. The first clause which states that
“the SC en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts” is a declaration of the grant
of that disciplinary power to, and a determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof by, the
Court en banc. It was not therein intended that all administrative disciplinary cases should be heard
and decided by the Court en banc since it would result in an absurdity. To require the entire Court to
participate in all administrative cases would result in a congested docket and undue delay in the
adjudication of cases in the Court. This would subvert the constitutional injunction for the Court to
adopt a systematic plan to expedite decisions/resolutions and the very purpose of authorizing the
Court to sit en banc or in divisions. The second clause declares that the Court en banc can “order the
dismissal by a vote of majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations xxx and
voted thereon”. Evidently, in this instance, the administrative case must be deliberated upon and
decided by the full Court itself. Nonetheless, it is only when the penalty imposed does not exceed
suspension of one year or a fine of P10,000 or both that the administrative matter may be decided in
division.
iii. Caiobes v Ombudsman

(G.R. No. 132177, 19 July 2001)
Buena, J.
FACTS:
On May 23, 1997, respondent Florentino M. Alumbres, Presiding Judge of Branch 255 of the
RTC of Las Pinas City, filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, a criminal complaint for physical
injuries, malicious mischief for the destruction of complainants eyeglasses, and assault upon a person
in authority. On June 13, 1997, the respondent Judge lodged another complaint against the petitioner,
this time and administrative case with the Supreme Court praying for the dismissal of petitioner from
the judiciary on the ground of grave misconduct or conduct unbecoming a judicial officer. On June
25, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman required petitioner to file a counter-affidavit within 10 days
from the receipt thereof. Instead of filing a counter-affidavit, petitioner filed on an “Ex-Parte Motion for
referral to the Honorable Supreme Court,” praying that the Office of the Ombudsman hold its
investigation of the case, and refer the same to the SC which is already investigating the case.
Petitioner contended that the SC, not the Office of the Ombudsman, has the authority to make a
preliminary determination of the respective culpability of petitioner and respondent Judge who, both
being members of the bench, are under its exclusive supervision and control.
On August 22, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman denied the motion for referral to the SC
stating that under Sec 15 (1) of RA 6770, it s within its jurisdiction to investigate on the criminal
charges. It likewise denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: WON the Office of the Ombudsman should defer action on the criminal complaint pending
resolution of the SC for appropriate action.
RULING:
YES. Under Sec. 6, Art. VIII f the Constitution, it is the SC which is vested with exclusive
administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel. Prescinding from this premise, the
Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge, or
court employee, involves an administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases
against judges and court personnel filed before it, referred to the SC for determination as to whether
an administrative aspect is involved therein. This rule should hold true regardless of whether as
administrative case based on the act subject of the complaint before the Ombudsman is already
pending with the Court. For, aside from the fact that the Ombudsman would not know of this matter
unless he is informed of it, he should give due respect for and recognition of the administrative
authority of the Court, because in determining whether an administrative matter is involved, the Court
passes upon not only administrative liabilities but also other administrative concerns.
The Ombudsman cannot dictate to, and bind the Court, to its findings that a case before it
does or does not have administrative implications. To do so is to deprive the Court of the exercise of
its administrative prerogatives and to arrogate unto itself a power not constitutionally sanctioned. This
is a dangerous policy which impinges, as it does, on judicial independence. It is only the SC that can
oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative
action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude
into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
iv. Fuentes v Ombudsman-Mindanao

(G.R. No. 124195, 23 Oct 2001)
Pardo, J.
FACTS:
On Jan. 15, 1996, Director Valenzuela of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao
recommended that petitioner Judge Fuentes be charged before the Sandiganbayan with violation of
RA 3019, Sec 3 (e) and likewise be administratively charged before the SC with acts unbecoming of
a judge for the anomalous implementation of the writ of execution the petitioner issued. Petitioner
alleged that the respondent encroached on the power of the SC of administrative supervision over all
courts and its personnel. The Solictor General submitted that the Ombudsman may conduct an
investigation because the Supreme Court is not in possession of any record which would verify the
propriety of the issuance of the questioned order and writ. Moreover, the Court Administrator has not
field any administrative case against petitioner judge that would pose similar issues on the present
inquiry of the Ombudsman-Mindanao.
ISSUE: WON the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation of acts of a judge in the exercise of his
official functions alleged to be in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in the absence
of an administrative charge for the same acts before the Supreme Court.
RULING:
NO. The Ombudsman must indorse the case to the Supreme Court, for appropriate action.
Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision
over all courts and court personnel, form the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals to the lowest
municipal trial court clerk. Hence, it is the Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the judges and
court personnel and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation
of the laws of the land. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running
afoul of the independence of the judiciary and the doctrine of separation of powers. Petitioner’s
questioned order directing the attachment of government property and issuing a writ of execution
were done in relation to his office, well within his official functions. The order may be erroneous or
void for lack of excess jurisdiction. However, whether or not such order of execution was valid under
the given circumstances, must be inquired into in the course of the judicial action only by the Supreme
Court that is tasked to supervise the courts.
h. Periods for Decision
i. Young v. De Guzman
(A.M. No. RTJ-96-1365, February 18, 1999)
VITUG, J.
FACTS:
In verified letter-complaint, dated 26 March 1996, Robert G. Young, President of Banawe
Realty Development Corporation, Charged Judge Pastor V. De Guzman, Jr., of the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio City, Branch 60, with unreasonable delay in the disposition of Civil Service No. 873-
R, entitled "La Commercial Company, et al. vs. China Banking Corporation," for recovery of unpaid
rentals owing from store space lessees and accounting of all rentals due and demandable, as well as
the proceeds and receivables from the sales of units, over a condominium property. During the
pendency of the case, La Commercial Company was substituted by Inter Realty Development
Corporation, While China Banking Corporation was substituted by Banawe Realty Development
Corporation. On 16 July 1990, the condominium building was destroyed by a relatively strong
earthquake, prompting the parties to file a manifestation to the above effect along with a joint motion
to dismiss the case, with the Court. On 01 December 1994, counsel for both parties submitted,
reiterating the above motion to dismiss, an opposition to a request for answers by written
interrogatories caused to be made by the manager of Prudential Bank of Baguio City. The motion
remained unresolved until the institution, months later, of the instant administrative case. Instead,
complainant averred, Judge De Guzman had acted "with indecent haste" on a collateral issue
granting Atty. Helenea M. Dauz, former counsel of Banawe Realty Development Corporation,
attorney's fees amounting to P250,000.00 issuing forthwith a writ of execution to enforce the award.
It was unfortunate, he said, that the issue on the withdrawn rentals, submitted for resolution on 04
August 1995, remained unresolved because he had to take a prolonged leave of absence due to
sickness until, in fact, he finally had to file, on 16 February 1996, an application for retirement on total
disability which the Court approved on 18 June 1996. Respondent Judge denied that he had hastily
decided the motion for payment of attorney's fees to Atty. Helenea Dauz, which, he said, indeed took
him three months to resolve in favor of Atty. Dauz and only because no opposition was filed by
Banawe Realty. The petition to reverse the said order, he stressed, was even dismissed by the Court
of Appeals on 26, June 1996.
The Office of the Court Administrator, to which the case was referred for evaluation, report
and recommendation, opined that respondent Judge had failed to abide by paragraph 1.2 of
Administrative Circular No. 4.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent judge failed to abide to the rules of periods of decision.
RULING:
No. It is truly the duty of every judge to resolve cases filed before him with good dispatch; no
less than the Rules of Court commands that justice must be administered without unnecessary delay.
Likewise, the Code of Judicial Conduct generally admonishes a judge to dispose of the business of
his court promptly. Nevertheless, the judge must not sacrifice for expediency's sake the fundamental
requirements of due process nor to forget that he must conscientiously endeavor each time to seek
the truth, to know and aptly apply the law, and to dispose of the controversy objectively and impartially,
all to the end that justice is done to every party.
Respondent Judge, in this instance, evidently felt that the issues raised could only be resolved
properly if and after all the parties concerned would have been fully heard. He made it clear in his
order of 20 December 1990 that the issue presented, i.e., the entitlement to the rental deposits
demanded, would require the question of ownership to be first resolved. The matter was judicial in
nature. This administrative case would not be the right forum for it. There was utterly no showing that
respondent Judge had been motivated by, or had acted in, bad faith or malice. With regard to the
claim that respondent resolved the motion for payment of attorney's fees to Atty. Helenea Dauz with
undue haste, the order of 11 April 1995 would show that the motion was granted only when Banawe
Realty had failed to file any comment thereon, let alone an opposition thereto, despite the opportunity
given by the trial court.
ii. Sanchez v Vestil

(A.M No. RTJ-98-1419, October 13, 1993)
PANGANIBAN, J.
FACTS:
In a complaint dated July 3, 1996, Atty Raul A. Sanchez charged Presiding Judge Augustine
A. Vestil of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 56, with (1) grave misconduct, (2) graft,
(3) gross ignorance of the law and (4) falsification of his certificate of service in relation to Special
Proceedings No. MAN 185 entitled Intestate Estate Proceedings of the Deceased Jose D. Sanchez.
Aside from the mentioned case, so far as known to this representation, the following some criminal
cases submitted to the court for decision which has gone beyond the NINETY (90) day reglementary
period. In this connection, respondent would like to respectfully inform this Honorable Supreme Court
that he has been exerting utmost efforts reducing his case load which at one time reaches more than
one thousand one hundred (1,100) cases including the almost seven hundred (700) unloaded to him
in 1993. Almost EVERY SATURDAY and during some holidays, respondent with two or three of this
staff have been reporting for work at no additional compensation.
After the judicial audit was conducted, the Court, in its Resolution dated December 3, 1997,
adopted the following recommendations of the OCA and directed respondent (1) to concentrate
meanwhile in deciding with dispatch those cases which have remained unresolved beyond the
constitutionality prescribed ninety days and (2) to explain within ten days from notice the reason for
the delay in the resolution of said cases. The Court further directed the Fiscal Management and
Budget Office of the OCA to withhold the salary of respondent until he has decided the said cases
and has submitted copies of the decision to the Office of the Court Administrator.
ISSUE: Whether respondent Judge should be sanctioned.
RULING:
Yes. The Court reiterate that a "judge, as the person presiding over the court, is the visible
representation of the law and justice, “and that " a judge's official conduct should be free and untainted
by the appearance of impropriety, and his or her personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in
performance of judicial duties, but also in his or her everyday life, should be beyond reproach.
“Evidently, the acts of herein respondent judge have not been consistent with the conduct expected
of his stature and profession. Judges, when burdened by heavy caseloads which prevent them from
disposing their cases within the reglementary period, may ask for additional time. While the certificate
of service of respondent judge contained a statement that there were cases before his sala that were
still undecided beyond the reglementary period, he made no attempt to request an extension of time.
iii. Bernardo v. Fabros

(A.M. No. MTJ-99-1189, May 12, 1999
PANGANIBAN, J.
FACTS:
The Court stresses this principle in resolving the February 29, 1996 sworn Complaint of Fe T.
Bernardo, in which Judge Amelia A. Fabros (Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9) was
charged with failure to decide Civil Case No. 150796, an ejectment case, within the reglementary
period of thirty days. In her Comment filed on June 26, 1997, Judge Fabros admitted that she failed
to decide the said case within the prescribed period due to oversight. She offered no excuse for the
omission, but assailed the legal standing of complainant. In her own words: “While the case was
submitted for decision on June 11, 1996 it was only on December 23, 1996 that it was decided. The
explanation is simply that in the course of [my] working as the Presiding Judge of Branch 9 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila there was an oversight. There was a failure to record the due date
when it should be decided. I offer no excuses. I cannot even say that because of the volume of work
now facing Metropolitan Trial Court Judges it is virtually impossible to monitor each and every case.
My court receives an average monthly input of raffled cases at the rate of 157 a month. I have 994
pending cases as of April 1997. Despite this I am able xxx to the best of my ability xxx resolve an
average of 42 cases a month.”
ISSUE: Whether the act of the judge constitute gross dereliction of duty .
RULING:
Yes. The failure of a judge to decide a case within the reglementary period constitutes gross
dereliction of duty. The gravity of this offense depends on several factors, including the number of
cases not decided on time, the damage suffered by the parties as a result of the delay, and the
presence of other aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
Respondent admits that she failed to decide the aforementioned case within the thirty-day
period prescribed by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. For this reason, she should be
administratively sanctioned.

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DIGESTED CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1| ATTY.

ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA | 1B, 1H, 1N 2018-2019

VII. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

a. Aldaba vs. COMELEC

b. Aquino III v. COMELEC

ISSUE: Whether a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7854 is unconstitutional.

The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

e. Montejo vs. COMELEC

f. Sema vs Commission on Elections

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence

b. AQUINO vs. COMELEC

The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to

3. PARTY-LIST SYSTEM (REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7941)

a. Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion

Political Law- Party-list system

Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly

Political Law- parameters in qualifying party- lists

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or

5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the

b. Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) v. Commission on Elections

ISSUES: WON COMELEC erred in delisting PGBI.

c. ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC

The principle of non-discrimination requires the laws of general application relating to

e. Abang Lingkod Party-list vs COMELEC

h. Bantay Republic Act. v. COMELEC

(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats Available

(220 ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = 55

How is this done?

Applying the formula above:

Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79

4. ELECTION, SALARIES, PRIVILEGES

ISSUE: Whether or not Ligot is entitled to such retirement benefit.

ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeña’s immunity has been violated

The Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished

5. DISQUALIFICATIONS AND OTHER INHIBITIONS

6. SESSIONS, OFFICERS, QUORUM, RULES OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISCIPLINE OF

(1)the transcript of audio-sound recording of the proceedings in the session hall

c. Pacete v Commission on Appointments

ISSUE: WoN petitioner’s appointment must be confirmed.

In petitioner's memorandum submitted on August 1, 1966, it was contended that his

That would be moreover tantamount to imparting to a move of a single member of a collective

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished

e. Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan

But on the other hand, Section 13 of RA 3019 provides:

7. RECORDS AND BOOKS OF ACCOUNTS; LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL AND CONGRESSIONAL

c. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez

The enrolled bill however used the term “urea formaldehyde”

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4065 was validly enacted.

c. ABBAS V. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

d. PIMENTEL V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of jurisdiction.

i. VILANDO V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition has merit.

j. ANGARA V. ELECTORAL COMMISSION

k. PEÑA V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political realignment in the

d. Drilon v. De Venecia and Madrigal v. Villar

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is the proper party concerned.

VIII. POWERS OF CONGRESS

As regards the question whether an executive or an international agreement may be

2. ONE SUBJECT RULE

a. TIO v. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY COMMISSION

ISSUE: WON the tax provision of PD 1987 is a ‘rider’.

Title of RA 3836: "AN ACT AMENDING SUBSECTION (c), SECTION TWELVE OF