Contitutional Law II

Case Digests
Araya, Yuri
Biglaen, Mark Angelo
Bries, Avril
Co, Charles
Fernandez, Maite
Marcelo, Pamela
Ng, Audrey
 KILOSBAYAN, INC. v. MORATO
July 17, 1995 | Mendoza, J. | Judicial Power (In General) RATIO:
1. Stare decisis? Stare decisis does not apply since the previous ruling was
SUMMARY: After the   SC   invalidated   PCSO   and   PGMC’s   Contract   of   Lease,   itself   a   departure   from   settled   rulings   on   “real   parties   in   interest”;;   5   years  
they made a revised Equipment Lease Agreement which Kilosbayan and several before, the Court denied standing to a party who questioned the validity of
lawmakers now contest. SC rules that the issue is not a constitutional one, but one another form of lottery. In Philconsa v Enriquez, legislators do not have
of contract law, which requires that petitioners  be  “real  parties  in  interest”.   standing to question the validity of any law or official action if the
DOCTRINE: While standing is required in constitutional law (direct & personal complaint   isn’t   grounded   on   the   impairment   of   powers   of   Congress.   In  
interest),  contract  law  has  the  stricter  requirement  of  “real  parties  in  interest”,  or addition, the vote for the 1st case was a narrow 7-6, and there have been
those who are parties to the agreement or are prejudiced in their rights with changes in the membership of the SC.
respect to one of the contracting parties and can show the detriment which would 2. Law of the Case?No. This present case is a sequel of the 1st case and not its
result to them from the contract even though they did not intervene in it. continuation – the parties are the same but the cases are not. The ELA is
essentially different from the 1993 Contract of Lease, and hence the ruling
FACTS: in  the  prior  case  that  petitioners  had  standing  doesn’t  preclude  the  Court  to  
1. In Kilosbayan Inc. v Guingona, the SC invalidated the Contract of Lease determine their standing in this present case.
between the Phil. Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and Philippine 3. Standing vs Real Party in Interest: Strictly speaking, the issue in this case
Gaming   Management   Corp.   (PGMC)   for   being   against   PCSO’s   charter.In is  not  even  petitioners’  standing  since  standing  is  a  concept  in  constitutional  
response, PCSO & PGMC made a new agreement that would conform to law and here no constitutional question is actually involved. While
the  SC’s  decision,  known  as  an  Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) where petitioners did invoke several state policies in Article II, these are not self-
PGMC leased online lottery equppment and accessories to PCSO in executing provisions and hence do not give rise to a cause of action. And
consideration  of  PCSO’s  4.3%  of  the  gross  amount  of  ticket  sales,  with  the   even if constitutional policies are invoked, this case basically involves
minimum of P35k per terminal annually. Said ELA lasts 8 years, with questions of contract law – WON petitioners  are  “real  parties  in  interest”.  
PCSO having the option to purchase said equipment at the sum of P25M at
the end. Rule 3, Section 2  of  the  Rules  of  Court  requires  that  “Every  action  be  prosecuted  
2. The current case is a petition for Prohibition, Review, and injunction filed and  defended  in  the  name  of  the  real  party  in  interest.” Real parties, in an action
by Kilosbayan (an organization composed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors, for annulment of contracts such as this, are those who are parties to the
priests, nuns and lay leaders who are committed to the cause of truth, agreement or are bound either principally or subsidiarily or are prejudiced in
justice, and national renewal), its trustees who are also suing in their their rights with respect to one of the contracting parties and can show the
individual and collective capacities as taxpayers and concerned citizens, and detriment which would result to them from the contract even though they did not
some members of Congress (Freddie Webb, Wigberto Tanada, Joker intervene in it. Even if PCSO is a government corporation, there is no allegation
Arroyo) suing as such and as taxpayers and concerned citizens. They seek that public funds are being misspent so as to make this action a public one and
to declare the ELA between the PCSO and PGMC invalid on the ground of justify relaxation of this requirement.
the Contract of Leases nullified in the 1st case.
3. Respondents claim that petitioners have no right to bring the suit since they In the present case, petitioners do not have such present substantial interest in
are not parties to the contract of lease which they seek to nullify since they the ELA as would entitle them to bring this suit. As in Valmonte, petitioners fail
have no personal and substantial interest likely to be injured by the to show any direct and personal injury incurred by them because of the act
enforcement of the contract. On the other hand, petitioners claim that the complained of. Petitioners may still choose to raise an appropriate case before
rling in the 1st case sustaining   their   standing   has   become   the   “law   of   the   the COA or Ombudsman on the validity of public contracts or public bidding.
case”  and  can  no  longer  be  reopened.  

ISSUE: Won Kilosbayan has standing – NO.

RULING: Petition DISMISSED.

 TAÑADA v. ANGARA from unfair foreign competition, not to create an isolationist policy and shut
May 2, 1997 | Panganiban, J. | Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus | Judicial out foreign investments, goods and services.
Power (In General) 3. There is a built-in provision to protect weak economies and developing
countries, which puts every member on equal footing and obliges them to
abide in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at
SUMMARY: Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the WTO Agreement different levels of economic development, and eliminates discriminatory
for   contravening   the   Constitution’s   “Filipino   First”   policy   and   for   impairing   treatment in international trade. It is also more lenient to developing
Philippine  sovereignty,  as  well  as  the  Senate’s  concurrence  in  its ratification. countries and gives them preferential treatment regarding economic
DOCTRINE: Constitutional mandates are read together and balanced. measures and protection from unfair competition and trade practices, like
Sovereignty is restricted by the voluntary act of nations. anti-dumping measures.
4. The inherent nature of treaties limits or restrict the absoluteness of
FACTS: sovereignty. Nations may voluntarily surrender some aspects of state power
1. Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of the concurrence by the for greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact. When
Philippine Senate with the President’s   ratification   of   the   international   the Philippines joined the UN, it consented to restrict its sovereign rights
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO), arguing that under   “auto-limitation”.   The   underlying   consideration   is   that   reciprocal
the  Agreement  violated  the  mandate  of  the  1987  Constitution  to  “develop  a   commitment of the contracting states in granting the same privilege and
self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by immunities to the Philippines
Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the
preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced
goods.”  
2. Petitioners   also   contended   that   the   “national   treatment”   and   “parity  
provisions”   of   the   WTO   Agreement   “place   nationals   and   products   of  
member  countries  on  the   same   footing  as  Filipinos  and  local  products,”   in  
contravention  of  the   “Filipino  First”  policy  of  our  Constitution,  and  render  
meaningless  the  phrase  “effectively  controlled  by  Filipinos.”

ISSUE/S: WoN the provisions of the WTO Agreement contravene Sec. 19, Art
II and Secs. 10 and 12, Art XII of the Constitution. – NO.

RULING: DISMISSED for lack of merit.

RATIO:
1. Art II (declaration of principles and state policies) are not self-executing.
They do not embody judicially enforceable rights, but are merely used as
aids by the judiciary in exercising judicial review, and by the legislature in
enacting laws.
2. Economic self-reliance does not mean economic seclusion. Economic
nationalism principles must be read with other constitutional mandates to
attain a balanced economic development. Although it mandates a a pro-
Filipino bias, it also recognizes the need to exchange business with the
world based on equality and reciprocity. Its aim is to protect the economy
 SANTIAGO, JR. v. BAUTISTA
March 30, 1970 | Barredo, J. | Judicial Power (In General)
SUMMARY: Petitioner Santiago, Jr.filed a case against the teachers
composing the Committee on the Rating of Students for Honor for alleged
grave abuse of discretion in favoring Socorro Medina in the making of the
roll of honor students. The SC dismissed the petition stating that the
committee is not a body exercising judicial functions for which certiorari
may lie to correct errors in their judgment.
DOCTRINE: Certiorari is a   special   civil   action   instituted   against   “any   1. Certiorari is a special civil action  instituted  against  “any  tribunal,  board,  or
tribunal board or officer exercising judicial functions.
FACTS:
1. Teodoro Santiago, Jr. was a grade 6 pupil at Sero Elementary School in
Cotabato City. At the end of school year 1964-65, Socorro Medina, Patricia
Liñgat, and Santiago, Jr. were adjudged as first, second, and third honors
respectively by the Committee on the Rating of Students for Honor
composed by the school principal and other teachers.
2. Santiago, represented by his mother, disputes the said ranking primarily on
the grounds that he was prejudiced by the actions of the teachers while
Medina was benefited. They claim that the members of the committee
committed grave abuse of discretion in making the ranking for the honor
pupils of the graduating class.
3. Among the acts cited to support their claim are the following:
a. Socorro Medina was coached and tutored during the summer vacation of 1964
by Mrs. Alpas who became the teacher of both pupils in English in Grade VI,
thus supposedly giving Medina an advantage.
b. The committee had been illegally constituted as the same was composed of all
the Grade VI teachers only, in violation of the Service Manual for Teachers of
the Bureau of Public Schools which provides that the committee to select the
honor students should be composed of all teachers in Grades V and VI.
c. Some teachers gave a starting grade of 75% to Santiago in Grade VI, while the
final ratings on the grading sheets of Socorro Medina and Patricia Liñgat from
were changed 80% to 85%, allegedly to pull Santiago, Jr. to a lower rank.
Medina also was given a perfect score, which was allegedly unnatural.
d. The words "first place" in petitioner's certificate in Grade I was erased and
replaced with the words "second place."
4. Santiago, Jr. personally appealed his case to the principal, district supervisor
and  the  academic  supervisor  but  they  just  “passed  the  buck  to  each  other”.  
Later, a prayer for injunction was denied and the graduation exercises were
held with the disputed ranking. Also, a case was filed but was dismissed on
grounds that certiorari was an improper remedy, all administrative remedies
have not been exhausted, and there was no finding of grave abuse of
discretion. The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied, hence
this petition with the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has a cause of action such that certiorari may
lie - NO
RULING: Petition dismissed. Judgment appealed from affirmed.
RATIO:
 
officer   exercising   judicial   functions.”   The   following   circumstances   must  
exist so that certiorari may be invoked:
a. There must be a specific controversy involving rights of persons or property
and said controversy is brought before a tribunal, board or officer for hearing
and determination of their respective rights and obligations.
b. The tribunal, board or officer before whom the controversy is brought must
have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision on
the controversy construing and applying the laws to that end.
c. The tribunal, board or officer must pertain to that branch of the sovereign
power which belongs to the judiciary, or at least, which does not belong to the
legislative or executive department.
2. Based from the following circumstances, the Committee on the Rating of
Students for Honor does not exercise or are automatically vested with
judicial or quasi judicial functions since there is nothing on record about
any rule of law that provides that when teachers sit down to assess the
individual merits of their pupils for purposes of rating them for honors, such
function involves the determination of what the law is, as well as to apply
the law in order to adjudicate the adverse claims of contending parties to
rights which the law gives rise to.
3. Even assuming that judicial intervention may be sought in this case, the fact
that petitioner did not attach to his petition the pertinent documents to
support his claims (e.g. copy of the graduation programme containing the
disputed ranking, the Service Manual for Teachers allegedly violated by the
teachers in the constitution of their committee; altered grading sheets; and
erasures in his Grade I certificate) is fatal to his cause due to noncompliance
with Rule 65 on certiorari.
 PEOPLE v. FERRER
December 27, 1972 | Castro, J. | Judicial Power (In General)
SUMMARY: The Government of the Philippines appealed to the SC the
decision of the Trial Court of Tarlac declaring the Anti-Subversion Act void
for being a bill of attainder and for dismissing the criminal complaints against
accused Feliciano Co and Nilo Tayag pursuant to said Act.
DOCTRINE: A bill of attainder must necessarily be an ex post facto law as
well, applying retroactively and reaching past conduct, and that the penalties
imposed are inescapable.
FACTS:
1. Criminal complaints were filed against Feliciano Co (May 10, 1970), and
Nilo Tayag and 5 others (May 25) in the CFI of Tarlac for violating Sec. 4,
Anti-Subversion Act, alleging that they were officers of the Communist
Party of the Philippines and Kabataang Makabayan, subversive
organizations, respectively; Co, as an instructor in Mao Tse Tsung
University, a training ground for NPA recruits, and the latter for instigating
the people to rise against the government.
2. The accused moved to quash, impugning the validity of the Anti-Subversion
Act for being a bill of attainder, as well as for being vague, embracing more
than 1 subject not expressed in the title thereof and for denying the equal
protection of the laws.
3. In its resolution dated Sept. 15, 1970, the Trial Court declared the statute
void for being a bill of attainder, vague and overbroad, and dismissed the
informations, to which the Government appealed.
ISSUE/S: WoN the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder – NO
. 7.
RULING: Resolution SET ASIDE. Cases REMANDED to the court a quo for
trial on the merits.
RATIO:
1. Art.  3,  Sec.  1  (11)  of  the  Constitution  states  that  “No  bill  of  attainder  or  ex   pursue the objectives which led Congress on 1957 to declare it to be an
post  facto  law  shall  be  enacted”.  A  bill  of  attainder  is  a  legislative  act  which   organized conspiracy, b) Accused joined CPP; c) Did so willfully,
inflicts punishment without trial. It substitutes a legislative act for a judicial
determination of guilt. The singling out of a definite class, imposition of a
burden on it, and a legislative intent, suffice to stigmatize a statute as a bill
of attainder.
2. The term CPP is used solely for defining purposes. The Act does not
specify the CPP or its members but merely declares such to be an organized
conspiracy for the overthrow of the government for the purposes of the
prohibition against membership in the outlawed organization. It applies to
all other subversive organizations.
3. If the Act is a bill of attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to charge
Communists in court, as the law alone would suffice to secure their
punishment. But their guilt still has to be judicially established. The
Government still has to prove at trial that the accused joined the Party
knowingly, willfully and by overt acts; knowing its subversive character
and with the specific intent to further its basic objective.
4. The statute does not punish by membership alone. It specifically requires
that membership must be knowing or active, with specific intent to further
the   illegal   objectives   of   the   Party   which   must   be   shown   by   “overt   acts”.  
“Membership”   is   distinct   from   “guilty   knowledge”:   the   former   requires  
proof  of  direct  participation  in  the  organization’s  unlawful activities, while
the   latter   requires   proof   of   mere   adherence   to   the   organization’s   illegal  
objectives.
5. Moreover, a statute only becomes a bill of attainder when it applies either to
named individuals or groups in such a way as to inflict punishment on them
without a judicial trial. But when the judgment expressed in legislation is so
universally  acknowledged  to  be  certain  as  to  be  “judicially  noticeable”,  the  
legislature may apply its own rules and judicial hearing is not needed fairly
to make such determination.
6. Furthermore, the statute is prospective in nature. A bill of attainder must
necessarily be an ex post facto law as well, applying retroactively and
reaching past conduct, and that the penalties imposed are inescapable.
Section 4 prohibits acts committed after the approval of the Act. Members
of the party were given the opportunity to exempt themselves from liability
by renouncing in writing and under oath their membership to the Party,
making the penalties prescribed not inescapable.
Basic Guidelines: (1) Subversive organizations other than CPP: a) Purpose
of the organization is to overthrow the present Government of the
Philippines and to establish a totalitarian regime under the domination of a
foreign power, b) Accused joined such organization; c) Did so knowingly,
willfully and by overt acts. (2) In the case of CPP: 1) CPP continues to
knowingly and by overt acts.
Fernando, J., dissenting: Legislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply
either to named individuals or easily ascertainable members of a group in such a
way as to inflict on them punishment amounting to a deprivation of any right,
civil or political, without judicial trial are bills of attainder prohibited by the
Constitution. The mere fact that a criminal case would have to be instituted
would not save the statute.
 DIRECTOR OF PRISONS v. ANG CHIO KHO
June 23, 1970 | Zaldivar, J. | Judicial Power (In General)
SUMMARY: The SolGen filed an appeal by certiorari in behalf of the
Director of Prisons praying that the SC strike out from the decision of the
CA the recommendation to the Executive Secretary to allow respondent
Ang Chio Kho to leave this country in the 1st available transportation
abroad, but affirm the dismissal for habeas corpus.
DOCTRINE: Courts are not concerned with the wisdom and morality of
laws, but only in the interpretation and application of the law.
FACTS:
1. Ang Chio Kho had been convicted of various offenses committed in the
Philippines. After serving 6 ½ years, respondent was granted conditional
pardon on July 4, 1959 by the President of the Philippines: that upon his
release, he would voluntarily leave the country, never to return. Respondent
accepted the conditions and left the Philippines for Taipei, Nacionalist
China on July 28, 1959.
2. In the evening of June 22, 1966, respondent, travelling under the name of
“Ah  Ming  Huy”,  arrived  at  the  Manila  International  Airport  on  a  PAL  plane   Sec   64(i)   of   the   Revised   Administrative   Code,   has   ordered   Ang’s
from Taipei to Honolulu, for a 72hr stop-over. He surrendered his passport
to the immigration authorities of MIA and was issued a note that his
departure was scheduled for June 29, 1966 at 6:30 pm. He registered for a
3-day stay at the El Presidente Hotel at Parañaque, Rizal and contacted his 2
friends, Lim Pin and Go Bon Kim, who invited him to stay longer in the
Philippines.
3. On June 28, 1966, the 3 of them went to the Bureau of Immigration, with
Lim requesting for a 14-day extension of his stay. Inspector Mariano Cristi
identified him Ang Chio Kho who was deported to Taipei. After his identity
was established, he was arrested and was not allowed to proceed with his
trip to Honolulu. On July 5, 1966, the Executive Secretary ordered his
recommitment to prison to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence for
violating the condition of his pardon.
4. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration on August 29, 1966 which
the Exec Sec failed to act on. Thus, on Oct 5, he filed for a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus with the CFI of Rizal. On Oct 10 and 17, the officer-
in-charge of the Bureau of Prisons and the SolGen filed their returns,
respectively.
5. On January 31, 1967, CFI of Rizal dismissed the petition for habeas corpus,
to which respondent appealed to the CA which rendered a decision
dismissing the petition for habeas corpus, but with the majority opinion
recommending that he be deported at once. SolGen filed a motion for
reconsideration, praying for the deletion of the recommendation, which the
CA, voting 3-2 in a special division, denied.
ISSUE/S: WoN  the  CA  correctly  recommended  respondent’s  deportation  – NO.
RULING: Writ of certiorari DENIED. (1 vote less than the necessary
majority.10 members. 5-in favor of deletion, 2-against, 3-did not take part)
RATIO:
1. The case before the CA was for habeas corpus. The only question to be
resolved   by   CA   was   WoN   the   CFI   of   Rizal   had   rightly   dismissed   Ang’s  
petition for habeas corpus. It was not called upon to review any sentence
imposed upon Ang.
2. The deportation of aliens sentenced by the courts for violation of the laws of
the land is an act of state that is political in nature, and is exercised solely in
the discretion of the Chief Executive. There is no such law that gives the
court the authority to recommend to the President the voluntary departure of
undesirable aliens lawfully committed to jail.
3. The recommendatory power of the courts is limited to those expressly
provided in the law, Art 5 of the RPC, making the questioned
recommendation unauthorized. The CE exercising his powers pursuant to
 
recommitment. For the court to suggest that the CE modify his decision to
recommit Ang is to interfere on the exercise of the political political
powers of his office.
4. Under the principle of separation of powers, it is not within the province of
the judiciary to express opinion, or express a suggestion, that would reflect
on the wisdom or propriety of the action of the CE on matters political in
nature.
5. It may be   said   that   the   recommendation   simply   represents   the   3   judges’  
private opinion. However, the SC believes that court decisions should only
contain opinions relevant to the issue at hand. After all, courts are not
concerned with the wisdom and morality of laws, but only in the
interpretation and application of the law.
 J.M. TUASON & CO., INC. v. LAND TENURE
ADMINISTRATION
February 8, 1970 | Fernando, J. | Prohibition | Judicial Power (In General)
SUMMARY: The Tatalon Estate owned by J.M Tuason & Co., Inc. was to be
expropriated by virtue of RA 2616. The trial court declared the law as
unconstitutional.  The  SC  reversed  the  lower  court’s  ruling.
DOCTRINE: The power to expropriate lands is not one without limit as it
requires the payment of just compensation and that the expropriated land be
used for public purposes. It is also limited by the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Constitution.
FACTS:
1. J.M Tuason & Co., Gregorio Araneta and Company, Inc., and Florencio
Deudor, et al. owned a particular piece of land (comprising of Tatalon
Estate, Quezon City) which is to be expropriated by virtue of Republic Act.
No. 2616.
2. The constitutionality of the said law authorizing such expropriation was
successfully challenged by J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. when the lower court
declared the said law as unconstitutional and a writ of prohibition was
issued.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the expropriation of lands comprising the Tatalon Estate is a
valid exercise of the power of eminent domain – YES
2. Whether or not RA 2616 is unconstitutional for violating the equal
protection clause – NO
RULING: Ruling of the lower court reversed. Writ of prohibition denied and
preliminary injunction set aside.
RATIO:
1. Verba legis: From the reading of the language of the provision itself (Art.
XIII, 4), there is no doubt that Congress is granted the power to determine
what lands may be expropriated so that they could be subdivided for resale
to those in need of them. Even the courts are deprived of the power of
curtailing such broad power of Congress.
2. Resorting to the extrinsic aids of constitutional construction, such as the
deliberations of the Constitutional Convention, to ascertain the historical
basis, reveals that the provision was included in order to resolve the
problems of unequal land ownership by prohibiting the ownership of large
estates, to break up existing large estates, and to provide for their
acquisition by purchase or through expropriation and sale to their
occupants.
However, while historical discussion is valuable, it is not necessarily
decisive since social and economic conditions are always changing. To
construe the Constitution with the particular circumstances during which it
was created may render it incapable of being responsive to future needs.
The words employed by the Constitution are not to be construed to yield
fixed and rigid answers but as impressed with the necessary attributes of
flexibility and accommodation to enable them to meet adequately whatever
problems the future has in store.
3. The power to expropriate lands is not one without limit, as it requires the
payment of just compensation and that the expropriated land be used for
public purposes. It is also limited by the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution.
Just compensation means the equivalent for the value of the property at the
time of its taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained,
which is the measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to
the expropriating entity. The market value of the land taken is the just
compensation to which the owner of the expropriated property is entitled,
the market value being that sum of money which a buyer and a seller would
agree on as a price to be given and received for such property.
4. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. claims that RA 2616 violates the equal protection
clause since it singled out the Tatalon Estate. Such argument, however, was
unsuccessful since petitioner has failed to overcome the presumption of
validity. It appears that the purpose for expropriation was to make the bona
fide occupants purchase the lots at minimum costs and to address the
housing problem in Quezon City. It was not proven that petitioner was
singled out to bear the burden of government regulation.
5. On the other hand, petitioner led the occupants of Tatalon Estate to believe
that they were dealing with the representatives of the real owners, the
Veterans Subdivision, in the purchase of their lots. This belief was bolstered
by the fact that the petitioners even entered into a compromise agreement on
March 16, 1953 with the Deudors, agreeing to give the latter millions of
pesos in settlement of their claim over the Tatalon Estate. Petitioner
admitted   that   they   had   knowledge   of   Veterans   Subdivision’s   activities   but  
did not do anything to stop them. It was only after that the estate became
developed that petitioner began asserting ownership.
Separate Opinions
(Barredo, J., Concurring)
- The   power   granted   to   Congress   by   the   Constitution   to   “authorize,   upon  
payment of just compensation, the expropriation of lands to be subdivided
into   small   lots   and   conveyed   at   cost   to   individuals”   is   unlimited   by   any  
other provision of the Constitution.
- Just compensation is in reality a part of the power granted rather than a
limitation thereto, just as just compensation is of the essence in any exercise
of the power of eminent domain
- While the taking must be for public use as a matter of principle, in the
judicial proceeding, the Government need not present evidence of such
public use as a fact.

(Teehankee, J., Concurring and dissenting)

- Where Congress itself directly exercised the power to expropriate and
singles out a specific property under the Act, rather than have the Executive
agencies institute the corresponding expropriation proceeding under the
general laws it has enacted in pursuance of its constitutional power, Court
may pass upon necessity of taking of property for public use.
 MUSKRAT v U.S.
January 23, 1911 | Day, J. | Judicial Power (Case or Controversy Requirement)
SUMMARY: Pursuant to a 1907 statute passed by Congress that granted the
Judiciary to determine the validity of Congressional acts pertaining to distribution
and sale of Cherokee lands, several Cherokees filed suits. SC refused to hear the
case since there was no case or controversy, which Judicial power is limited to.
DOCTRINE: Judicial power is the right to determine actual controversies arising
between adverse litigants, duly instituted in courts of proper jurisdiction. Without
an actual case or controversy,  the  Court’s  opinion  on  the  validity  of  certain  acts   2.
would amount to an advisory opinion, contrary to the separation of powers.
FACTS:
1. Congress passed a statute in 1907 that conferred original jurisdiction to the
Court of Claims and appellate jurisdiction on the SC to determine the
validity of certain Congressional acts related to the distribution and
allotment of lands and funds to members of the Cherokee tribe.
2. Under the authority of said statute, 2 consolidated claims were brought in
the Court of Claims – the 1st by David Muskrat and Henry Dick who
opposed a 1906 Act (increased number of persons entitled to share in the
distribution of Cherokee lands), and the 2nd by William Brown and Levi
Gritts which opposed a 1904 Act (prohibition against the sale of Cherokee
lands). Both sought a declaration that the Congressional acts of 1904 and
1906 be declared unconstitutional so that an earlier 1902 Act be declared
controlling. The Court of Claims held the 1904 and 1906 Act as valid; SC
granted certiorari.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON there is an actual case or controversy – NO.
2. WON   Congress   may   expand   the   Judiciary’s   jurisdiction   beyond   what   is   Congress.”
provided for in the Constitution (i.e. issue advisory opinions) – NO.
RULING: Reversed & remanded with orders to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
RATIO:
1. The Court has consistently declined to exercise any powers not judicial in
nature. Judicial power is defined by Justice Miller as the power of a court to
decide and pronounce a judgment and carry it into effect between persons
and parties who bring a case before it for a decision.
Under the Constitution, judicial power is limited to cases and controversies.
Cases   and   controversies   are   “the   claims   of   litigants   brought   before   the  
courts for determination by such regular proceedings as are established by
law or custom for the protection or enforcement of rights, or the prevention,
redress,   or   punishment   of   wrongs.”   A   case   or   controversy   implies   the  
existence of present or possible adverse parties whose contentions are
submitted to the court for adjudication.
In the present case, Congress has no power to provide for a suit of this
nature to be brought in federal court to test the constitutionality of prior acts
of Congress because it is not a case or controversy. This court has no veto
power over legislation enacted by Congress, and its right to delare an act of
Congress unconstitutional can only be exercised when a proper case
between opposing parties is submitted for determination.
The Court extensively cited Marbury v Madison and several other cases,
where they said that neither the legislative nor executive branch can assign
to the judicial branch any duties other than those that are properly judicial
and to be performed in a judicial manner. When Secretary of State Jefferson
solicited   the   justices’   advice   for the Executive branch in the matter of
construction of laws, Chief Justice Jay and his associates answered that in
lieu of the separation of powers, and being judges of a court of last resort,
it’s  improper  to  extrajudicially  decide  the  Executive’s  questions. Also, they
said  that  the  President’s  power  to  call  on  heads  of  departments  for  advisory  
opinions is limited to the Executive.
“Judicial   power   is   the   right   to   determine   actual   controversies   arising  
between adverse litigants, duly instituted in courts of proper jurisdiction.
The right to declare a law unconstitutional rises because an act of Congress
relied upon by one or the other of such parties in determining their rights is
in conflict with the fundamental law. The exercise of this duty is not given
to it as a body with revisory power over the action of Congress, but because
the rights of the litigants in justiciable controversies require the court to
choose between the fundamental law and a law purporting to be enacted
within constitutional authority, but in fact beyond the power delegated to
 PACU v. SECRETARY of EDUCATION naturally need no relief in the form they now seek to obtain. Mere
October 31, 1955 | Bengzon, J. | Judicial Power (Standing) apprehension that the Secretary of Educaion might under the law withdraw
one   of   the   petitioners’   permits   isn’t   a   justiciable   controversy.   Courts   will  
SUMMARY: Several colleges and universities petition the court to declare Act not pass upon the constitutionality of a law who fails to show that he is
2706 unconstitutional since it infringes on the right of a citizen to own and injured by its operation, since the power of the courts to declare a law
operate a school, despite failing to present any actual injury incurred by them unconstitutional is a last resort – it arises only when the interests of litigants
from  the  law’s  operation.  Court dimisses the case for their lack of standing. require the use of that judicial authority for their protection against actual
DOCTRINE: Courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a law who fails to (and not hypothetical) interference.
show that he is injured by its operation, since the power of the courts to declare a 2. Act No. 2706 was granted in 1917 and has granted the Department of
law unconstitutional is a last resort – it arises only when the interests of litigants Education for the past 37 years to supervise and regulate all private schools
require the use of that judicial authority for their protection against actual (and not in the country without any protests from the general public and parents
hypothetical) interference. concerned. And when a law has long been treated constitutional and
important rights have become dependent on it, the Court may refuse to
FACTS: consider an attack on its validity.
1. The petitioning colleges and universities of the Philippine Association of
Colleges and   Universities   request   that   Act   No.   2706   entitled   “An   act  
making the inspection and recognition of private schools and colleges
obligatory   for   the   Secretary   of   Public   Instruction”   be   declared  
unconstitutional.
2. They contend that said law deprives school owners, teachers, and parents
liberty w/o due process of law, parents are deprved of their natural aright
and duty to rear their children for civil efficiency, and the conferral of
power to the Education Secretary to prescribe rules and standards constitue
an unlawful delegation of legislative power.
3. The Government argues that there is no justiciable controversy exhibiting
unavoidable necessity of deciding the constitutional question, petitioners are
in estoppel, and the Acts are constitutional.

ISSUE: WON petitioning colleges and universities have standing – NO.

RULING: Petition for prohibition DENIED.

RATIO:
1. As a general rule, the constitutionality of a statute will be passed only if,
and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable
controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the parties
concerned. In this case, petitioners claim that Section 3 of the Act (which
requires a permit to be obtained from the Secretary of ducation before a
privates school may be opened to the public) violates the right of a citizen
to own and operate a school.
However, none of the petitioners has cause to present said issue because all
of them have permits to operate and are actually operating by virtue of their
permits. They have suffered no wrong under the terms of the law and
 GONZALES v. HECHANOVA
October 22, 1963 | Concepcion, J. | Judicial Power (Standing)
SUMMARY: Petitioner Gonzales prays for a writ of preliminary injunction
restraining respondents, their agents and representatives from implementing
the decision of Executive Secretary to import foreign rice. SC denied writ of
injunction for lack of the requisite majority.
DOCTRINE: A taxpayer has sufficient personality and interest to seek
judicial assistance to restrain what he believes to be an attempt to unlawfully
disburse public funds.
FACTS:
1. On September 22, 1963, respondent ExecSec authorized the importation of
67,000 tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources and created a
rice procurement committee for the implementation of the importation.
Ramon Gonzales, a rice planter and President of Iloilo Palay and Corn
Planters Assoc., filed a petition averring that respondents are acting with
grave abuse of discretion by attempting the importation of foreign rice, since
such is explicitly prohibited by RA 3452 which repeals or amends RA 2207.
2. Respondents:  Petitioner’s  has  no  sufficient  interest to file petition and secure
relief prayed for; RAs 3452 and 2207 are not applicable since importation was
authorized by Pres. as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 2 of Commonwealth
Act No. 1, allowing him during times of necessity to take preventive measures
and prepare for threats of war and emergency; Prohibition of importation of
“any   government   agency”   does   not   apply   to   importations   made   by   the   RAs 3452, 2207, and CA 138 are such laws.
“Government  itself”.
ISSUE/S:
1. WoN petitioner has sufficient interest. – YES.
2. WoN RA 3452 and RA 2207 are applicable to the importation. – YES.
3. WoN RA 3452 prevails over the 2 contracts which have the force of executive
agreements Pres. Macapagal entered into with Burma and Vietnam for the
purchase of rice. – YES.
RULING: Injunction DENIED for lack of the requisite majority.
RATIO:
1. RA 3452, Sec I declares that the policy of the Government is to purchase
basic foods directly from tenants, farmers, growers, producers and landowners
in the Philippines who wish to dispose their products at a price which affords
them fair and just return for their labor and capital investment. Petitioner, as a
planter and landowner, which necessarily makes him a taxpayer, is entitled to
a chance to sell to the Government the rice it now seeks to buy abroad.
Moreover, the purchase of said commodity will be effected with public funds
mainly raised by taxation, and as a taxpayer, it follows that he has sufficient
personality and interest to seek judicial assistance to restrain what he believes
to be an attempt to unlawfully disburse public funds.
2. 2 Acts are applicable. Language of the laws include within their purview ALL
importations of rice and corn in the Phil. RA 2207: Unlawful for any person,
assoc., corp., or government agency to import rice and corn into any point in
the Philippines. RA 3452: Explicitly enjoins the Rice and Corn
Administration or any government agency from importing rice or corn.
Dept of Natl Defense, AFP, respondents and every officer of our Government
are government agencies and/or agents. Applicability to Government is shown
through: a) Importation permitted in RA 2207 is to be authorized by the
President of the Philippines, hence, by or on behalf of the Government; b) RA
3452  indicates  that  only  “private  parties”  may  import  rice  under  its  provisions;;  
c) Punishment   for   violation   made   by   “public   official   and/or   employees”.  
Public official is an officer of the Government itself, as distinguished from
employees of instrumentalities of government. Hence, duly authorized acts of
the former are those of the Government.
Sec. 1, CA 138: All purchases by the Government shall give preference to
materials produced in the Phil.
Provisions of Sec. 2 of CA No. 1 are not self-executory. The Government can
secure   resources   for   our   national   defense   only   “during   a   national  
mobilization”.   In   absence   of   such,   resources   shall   be   produced   in   such   a  
manner as Congress by law provides; in so far as rice and corn are concerned,
Refers  to  power  of  Pres.  during  “war  time”  or  “martial  law”,  neither  of which
obtains in the case at bar.
3. Main function of Executive is to implement laws made by Congress. He may
not defeat legislative enactments that acquired the status of laws by indirectly
repealing the same through executive agreements providing for the
performance of the very act prohibited by said laws. Conflict with a treaty and
a statute: latest in point of time shall prevail is not applicable: Hechanova
admits and insists that the contracts are not treaties. To justify executive
agreements not authorized by previous legislation will upset the principle of
separation of powers and system of checks and balances. Also, the
Constitution authorizes nullification of treaties in conflict with the
fundamental   law   and   which   runs   counter   to   an   act   of   Congress:   “all cases
which  the  constitutionality  or  validity  of  any  treaty…  are  questioned”.  
 GONZALES v. MARCOS
July 31, 1975 | Fernando, J. | Judicial Power (Standing)
SUMMARY: Petitioner Gonzales questioned the validity of EO 30 creating
the Cultural Center of the Philippines which was funded by donations and
contributions, alleging that it was an encroachment by the President on the
legislative prerogative.
DOCTRINE: With the absence of any pecuniary or monetary interest owing
from the public, a taxpayer may not have the right to question the legality of an
issuance creating a trust for the benefit of the people but purely funded by
charity.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Gonzales questioned the validity of EO 30 creating the Cultural
Center of the Philippines. Its Board of Trustees, with Imelda Marcos as its
Chairman, accepted donations from the private sector, secured a $5M loan
from Chemical Bank of New York, guaranteed by the National Investment
and Development Corporation, as well as received $3.5M from US Pres.
Johnson in the concept of war damage funds, all intended for the
construction of the Cultural Center building estimated to cost P48M.
2. A suit of prohibition was filed with the CFI of Manila, alleging the illegality
of the issuance of EO 30, which was dismissed.
3. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss this appeal by certiorari, and was
granted in a resolution dated March 5, 1970. Such a pleading was submitted
to SC 12 days later contending that EO 30 represented a legitimate exercise
of executive power, there being no invasion of the legislative domain and
that it was supplementary to RA 4165 creating the National Commission on
Culture. It was likewise raised that petitioner did not have the requisite
personality to contest the validity of the EO as a taxpayer, as the funds came
from donations and contributions, and not raised by taxation.
4. On October 5, 1972, PD 15 was promulgated, creating the CCP, defining its
objectives, powers and functions and other purposes. Sec. 4 thereof was
later amended on April 26, 1973 by PD 179. With the promulgation of said
PDs, done by the President in the exercise of legislative powers under the
martial law, EO 30 has ceased to exist, making the discussion on its
constitutionality moot and academic.
ISSUE/S:
1. WoN a taxpayer has the capacity to question the validity of EO 30, given
the circumstances. – NO.
2. WoN there was an encroachment on legislative prerogative in the issuance
of EO 30. – NO.
RULING: DISMISSED.
RATIO:
1. The funds administered by the President of the Philippines came from
donations and contributions, not from taxation. Accordingly, there was an
absence of the requisite pecuniary or monetary interest.
Even assuming that public funds raised by taxation were involved, it does
not   necessarily   follow   that   a   taxpayer’s   suit,   assailing   the   validity   of   a  
legislative or executive act has to be passed upon. The Court is not devoid
of discretion as to whether or not it should entertain such action (Tan v.
Macapagal).
2. No encroachment on legislative prerogative in the issuance of EO 30. There
was an exchange of diplomatic notes between the Philippines and the US
wherein the latter gives the former a special fund to be used for a Philippine
cultural development project. In issuing EO 30, the President, in accord
with the constitutional injunction to promote arts and letters (Sec. 4, Art.
XIV, Constitution of the Philippines), merely carried out the purpose of the
trust in establishing the CCP as the instrumentality through which this
agreement between the 2 governments would be realized. As head of state,
in behalf of the state as parens patriae, the President has the authority to
implement for the benefit of the Filipino people by creating the Cultural
Center. For the President to refrain from taking positive steps and await the
action of the then Congress could be tantamount to dereliction of duty.
3. Legislative action is not precluded when the President acts in absence of
either congressional grant or denial of authority. However, if Congress
would continue to keep its peace notwithstanding the action taken by the
executive   department,   it   may   be   considered   as   a   “silently   vocal”,   that   is,  
silence meaning consent. The assailed EO was issued on June 35, 1966.
Congress until the time of the filing of the petition on August 26, 1969
remained quiescent. Congress could have supplied the remedy by asserting
itself. Instead, there was apparent conformity on its part to the way the
President saw fit to administer governmental property.
 PEOPLE and HSBC v. VERA and UNJIENG
November 16, 1937 | Laurel, J. | Judicial Power (Standing)
SUMMARY: Judge Vera, pursuant to the Probation Act, heard the application by
Unjieng. People and HSBC challenged it as unconstitutional but said judge
dismissed it for lack of standing. SC declared the Act unconstitutional.
DOCTRINE: The State has standing challenge the validity of its own laws, for it
has substantial interest in setting aside a statute repugnant to the fundamental law.
FACTS:
1. People of the Philippines is the plaintiff, and HSBC the offended party in a
criminal case against Mariano Unjieng, where final judgment and an order
for execution of judgment had been entered on Nov 24, 1936.
2. In Nov 27, 1936, Unjieng applied for probation under Act No. 4221,
otherwise known as Probation Act. The application was referred to the
Insular Probation Office, which recommended denial. Notwithstanding this,
Judge Vera of the Court of First Instance of Manila set the petition for
hearing, where HSBC argued that the Act was unconstitutional.
3. Sec. 11 of Act No. 4221, which was raised as violative of equal protection
states,  “This  Act  shall  apply  only  in  those  provinces  in  which  the  respective  
provincial boards  have  provided  for  the  salary  of  a  probation  officer.”  While   b. Undue Delegation of Legislative Power—UC. The Act does not provide a
declining to pass upon the constitutionality of the statute on the ground that
HSBC is not the party whose rights are affected by the statute, the judge
denied the application.
4. A motion for reconsideration was filed but due to delays regarding a motion
for leave to intervene in the case as amici curiae for Unjieng, petitioners
brought it up to the Supreme Court, praying that J. Vera be prohibited from
further taking cognizance of the case due  to  the  statute’s  unconstitutionality.   made arbitrarily or capriciously, is permitted even under the scrutiny of
In the supplementary petition for this petition, the city fiscal concurred for
the first time with the constitutional issues raised by HSBC.
ISSUES:
1. WoN the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been properly raised in these
proceedings—YES
2. WoN the Act is unconstitutional—YES
RULING: Writ of prohibition GRANTED. Act No. 4221 declared
unconstitutional and void.
RATIO:
1. Although as a general rule, only those who are parties to a suit may question
the constitutionality of a statute involved in a judicial decision, it has been
held that where the jurisdiction and decree of a court depend entirely on the
validity of a statute, the issue of constitutionality may be raised by persons
interested in the effect to be given to the statute. But even granting the
HSBC was not the proper party to raise the question of constitutionality, the
People of the Philippines, represented by the OSG and city fiscal, is such a
proper party in the proceedings. The Court held if Act 4221 truly violates
the Constitution, the State had a substantial interest in having it set aside,
and would sustain a direct injury in the form of a mortal wound inflicted
upon the fundamental law. Thus, the well-settled rule is that the State can
challenge the validity of its own laws. Furthermore, the Court held that the
OSG   or   city   fiscal   themselves   have   the   standing   to   challenge   a   statute’s  
validity for it is his duty to enforce the constitutional law where 2
conflicting statutes exist.
2. a. Encroachment   Upon   the   Executive’s   Power   to   Grant   Pardon—C. The
Court held that the Probation Act did not conflict with the pardoning power
of the Executive. Probation is merely a substitution of the imprisonment
prescribed by the criminal laws and is thus a judicial act as any other
sentence, while pardon is outside and above the criminal law and binds and
directs the judges.
sufficient standard in exercising granted discretion, leaving its applicability
to various provincial boards to determine. This Act is a matter of general
legislation that treats of criminals in general, and must not be granted such
unqualified and absolute discretion.
c. Equal Protection—UC. Classification based on reasonable basis, not one
equal protection. In this case, the inequality flows from the unwarranted
delegation of legislative power, allowing a person coming w/in the purview
of the law to enjoy its benefits in one province and not in the other. And so
although the statute may appear fair on its face, its effect in operation reveal
that equal protection of the law is denied.
Although Sec. 11 is the one declared unconstitutional, the Court held that
the clear policy of the law is to defray the salaries of the probation officers
to the provinces should they desire the Probation Act to apply; without this,
the system would be illusory. Thus, the whole statute should be declared
unconstitutional.
 FLAST v. COHEN
June 10, 1968 | Warren, J. | Judicial Power (Standing)
SUMMARY: Appellants filed suit in the United States District Court of New
York to enjoin the allegedly unconstitutional expenditure of federal funds under
Titles I and II of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. Standing
which was granted was the only concern of the case. Adjudication for the merits
of  appellant’s  claim  is  to  be  determined  by  the  proper  court.
DOCTRINE: Taxpayers must establish a logical link between that status and the
type of legislative enactment attacked, as it will not be sufficient to allege an
incidental expenditure of tax funds in the administration of an essentially
regulatory statute.
FACTS:
1. A complaint,   rested   on   appellant’s   standing   as   federal   taxpayer was filed
alleging that the Commissioner of Education Cohen together with others,
committed unconstitutional expenditure of federal funds under Titles I and
II of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.
2. According to the Act, federal funds will appropriated to finance instruction
in reading, arithmetic, and other subjects in religious schools, and to
purchase textbooks which Flast sought to be declared unauthorized, or if
authorized, declared unconstitutional because of the bar against favoring a
religion.   Cohen’s   prerogative   to   determine   which   religious   or   sectarian  
schools shall have grants will be in effect, giving aid to one religion over
another. Such disbursements can also be concluded as petitioners paying tax
in favor of a certain religion which is in violation of the Free Exercises
Clause of the First Amendment.
3. Flast sought judicial relief but the three-judge panel favored Cohen holding
that the former did not have standing because of failure to allege the
particular injury sustained. The court relied on the ruling in Frothingham vs
Mellon elaborating that being taxpayers alone can merit standing to sue.
that "the effect upon future taxation, of any payment out of the Treasury's
funds is remote, fluctuating and uncertain, to the point that complainant
failed   to   prove   the   “direct   injury”   he   will   sustain   to   merit   standing.  
Following the logic of the defense, a taxpayer’s  suit  can  only  be  entertained  
if  his  tax  bill  is  not  qualified  as  “minute  and  indeterminable”.  More  plainly,  
the taxpayer in Frothingham was denied standing not because he was a
taxpayer but because his tax bill is not large enough.
2. Petitioner was also able to establish a link between his status as taxpayer
and the injury he sustained when the questioned disbursements were
executed. He alleged that such disbursements will cause him injury thru a
violation of his Free Exercise rights whenever disbursements “favor”   a
certain religion. This shows the personal stake of taxpaying complainant.
3. Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of federal disbursements under
the cloak of taxing and spending laws specified in the constitution. He has
alleged that the disbursements according to the Act subject of contention
can   be   a   violation   of   the   constitution’s   assertions   regarding   Establishment  
and Free Exercise of the First amendment. This is an action by the Congress
that is beyond the scope of its power that sufficient for the court to confer
standing.

ISSUE: WoN appellants have standing to sue only on the basis of being
taxpayers? — YES

RULING: Decision is reversed. Appellants have standing.

RATIO:
1. Government’s  defense  was  rooted  in  the  decision  in  Frothingham  v  Mellon  
wherein the taxpayer complained that she will increase her future federal
tax liability due to the unconstitutional law which includes grants for
maternity   care.The   court   held   that   a   federal   taxpayer’s   "interest in the
moneys   of   the   Treasury   is   comparatively   minute   and   indeterminable”   and  
 SIERRA CLUB v. MORTON RATIO:
April 19, 1972 | Stewart, J. | Judicial Power (Standing) 1. Where the party does not rely on a statute authorizing invocation of the
judicial process, the question of standing depends upon whether the part has
alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. Where,
SUMMARY: Sierra Club filed a suit to restrain officials from allowing Disney to
however, Congress has authorized public officials to perform certain
develop a ski resort in Mineral King, invoking an interest in the conservation of
functions according to law, and has provided the statute for judicial review
national parks, game refuges and forests. SC held that this is not sufficient to
under certain circumstances (APA), the inquiry as to standing must begin
infuse them with standing, for they must also allege an injury-in-fact suffered as a
with a determination of whether the statute in question authorizes review at
consequence to the challenged administrative action.
the behest of the plaintiff.
DOCTRINE: The injury-in-fact test requires more than an injury to a cognizable
2. The Court previously held that persons had standing to obtain judicial
interest. It requires that the party seeking review be himself among the injured.
review where they alleged that the challenged action had caused them an
“injury   in   fact”   and   where   the   alleged   injury   was   to   an   interest   arguably  
FACTS:
w/in the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statutes that the
1. A prospectus was published in 1965, inviting bids from private developers
agencies were claimed to have violated. The Court held that the injury
for the construction and operation of a ski resort in Mineral King, which is
alleged by Sierra Club will be entirely by reason of the change in uses
part of the Sequoia National Forest. The proposal of Walt Disney
Mineral King will be put, and the attendant change in the aesthetics and
Enterprises was chosen from 6 bidders, and was granted a 3-yr permit to
ecology of the area, injuries previously ruled by the Court as applicable to
conduct surveys and explorations.
the  APA.  However,  the  “injury  in  fact”  test  requires  more  than  an  injury  to  
2. The plan outlines a $35M complex of motels, restaurants, swimming pools,
a cognizable interest. It requires that the party seeking review be himself
parking lots, and other structures to be constructed on 80 acres of the valley
among the injured. In other words, the injury that gives a person standing to
floor under a 30-yr use permit. A special-use permit was also issued to
seek judicial review is prerequisite to arguing before the court, whether the
construct ski lifts, ski trails, a cog-assisted railway and utility installations
argument invokes public interest or not. In this case, Sierra Club failed to
on the mountain slopes. The State of California proposed to construct a
allege that it or its members would be affected in any of their activities or
highway 20 miles in length and a high-voltage power line that would
pastimes by the Disney development.
traverse through Sequoia National Park, which required approval of
Morton, the Secretary of the Dept of Interior.
3. Representatives  of  Sierra  Club  objected  to  Disney’s  plan  and  filed  a  suit  in  
the   District   Court   as   a   membership   corporation   with   “a   special   interest   in  
the conservation and the sound maintenance of the national parks, game
refuges,  and  forests  of  the  country”,  invoking  the  judicial  review  provisions  
of   the   Administrative   Procedure   Act.   Said   APA   provides,   “A   person  
suffering a legal wrong because of agency action, or aversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action w/in the meaning of a relevant statute, is
entitled to judicial review thereof. The District Court granted the petition
for preliminary and permanent injunction, which the CA reversed for lack
of standing.

ISSUE: WoN the Sierra Club has alleged facts that entitle it to obtain judicial
review of the challenged action—NO

RULING: Petition DISMISSED.

 U.S. v. SCRAP 7. SCRAP filed a suit requesting for a preliminary injunction against the Feb 1
June 18, 1973 | Steward, J. | Judicial Power (Standing) and April 24 orders of ICC that allowed collection of surcharges.

SUMMARY: Railroad companies requested additional 2.5% surcharge in all

freight rates which was granted. This is to address their need for revenues ISSUES: WoN SCRAP has standing to sue? - YES
pending the approval of their permanent selective rate increases. Various
groups challenged the constitutionality of the surcharges and they were RULING: District court’s  grant for preliminary injunction is reversed. Case
declared with standing. remanded to that court.
DOCTRINE: A party has standing ifheestablishes that "the challenged action
had caused him `injury in fact'. Standing cannot be denied to a party who is RATIO:
suing for harm experienced by many. 1. For a party to have standing, he must be able toestablish that "the
challenged action had caused them `injury in fact,' and where the alleged
injury was to an interest `arguably within the zone of interests to be
FACTS:
protected or regulated' by the statutes that the agencies were claimed to
1. On Dec 1971, all railroads companies (railroad) in the U.S. requested
have violated."
Interstate  Commerce  Commission  (ICC),  on  5  days’  notice,  to  have  a  2.5%  
2. In the case at bar, the pleadings sufficiently alleged that the SCRAP
surcharge on nearly all freight rates to compensate the worsening profit loss
members were "adversely affected" or "aggrieved". They pointed to their
while a selective rate increase on a permanent basis is pending. ICC
use of forests, streams, and other resources as adversely affected by the
determined it too short for public participation so refiling with not less than
surcharge that would increase use of nonrecyclable commodities as
30  days’  notice  was  determined.
compared to recyclable goods. Increase in demand for nonrecyclables will
2. Railroad did the refiling effective Feb 5, 1972 as suggested then various
then increase need for raw materials, thus destroying the environment.
groups including Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
3. Railroad’s  argument  that  SCRAP  and  various  groups  do  not  have  standing  
(SCRAP) requested ICC to suspend said 2.5% tariff claiming that failure to
because  in  the  latter’s  argument, too many people suffer the same injury is
do   so   would   cause   “economic,   recreational   and   aesthetic   harm”   to   their  
untenable. They argued that allowing them to file a suit claiming harm
members. This harm will be brought by the rate structure that would
would allow all people to do the same. This is erroneous since this would
discourage the   use   of   “recyclable”   materials   that   will   adversely   affect   the  
mean that the most injurious and widespread Government actions affecting
environment. The negative impact of this surcharge shall be felt when the
all people could be questioned by nobody.
members’   use   the   forest,   streams,   and   other   resources   as   there   will   be   a  
decrease in the use of recyclable materials.
3. On Feb 1, 1972, ICC did not suspend the surcharge for a seven month
period allowed so by law due to the great need of the companies to offset
their losses and the pending status of the selective rate increases. This was
done under the condition that said tariff will not last later than June of the
same year.
4. The alleged harm that SCRAP will sustain was determined by ICC as
without basis so railroad is not in violation of the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969.
5. Railroad subsequently filed proposed permanent selective increases
averaging 4.1% to the ICC. Various parties again requested suspension of
such increase. On Mar 6, railroad’s request to take effect on April 1 was
disapproved but republication was again recommended so there would be
more time for public participation.
6. On April 24, ICC suspended the proposal after republication but eliminated
the June expiration date for the 2.5% surcharge.
 KILOSBAYAN v. GUINGONA, JR.
May 5, 1994 | Davide, J. Judicial Power (Standing)
SUMMARY: PCSO and PGMC entered into a Contract of Lease, which
Kilosbayan, its Board of Trustees (as citizens and taxpayers), and members of
Congress (as citizens, lawmakers, and taxpayers), seek to invalidate. Court
discussed their liberal policy on standing based on settled jurisprudence.
DOCTRINE:In matters of transcendental importance, the Court has the wide
discretion to waive the requirement of standing to allow it to resolve the serious
constitutional questions raised.
FACTS:
1. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and Philippine Gaming
Management   Corporation   (PGMC)   entered   into   a   “Contract   of   Lease”,   Tan: objections to taxpayers suits for lack of standing are
whose implementation petitioners seek to prohibit and restrain.
2. Petitioner Kilosbayan, Inc. is a non-stock domestic corporation composed
of civic-spirited citizens, pastors, priests, nuns, and lay leaders who are
committed to the cause of truth, justice, and national renewal. The rest of
the petitioners, except Senators Freddie Webb and Wigberto Tanda and
Rep. Joker Arroyo, are suing in their capacities as members of
KILOSBAYAN’s   Board   of   Trustees   and   as   taxpayers   and   concerned  
citizens. Senator Webb, Tanada, and Rep Arroyo are suing in their
capacities as members of Congress, taxpayers, and concerned Philippine
citizens.
3. PCSO and PGMC, in citing Valmonte v PCSO, allege that petitioners have
no standing to maintain the instant suit.
general interest shared in common with the public. Transcendental
importance to the public of these cases demands that they be
settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside technicalities of
procedure.
b. In De La Llana v Alba, the Court said that while the general rule
for standing is that the person must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct
injury as a result of its enforcement, this rule has been relaxed in
previous jurisprudence such as Pascual v Secretary of Public
Works and People v Vera. In Alba, the Court decided to continue
their progressive stance and also found petitioners to have standing
as taxpayers.
c. Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas v
procedural issues that must be subordinated to the importance of
the  case  at  issue  &  Court’s  duty  to  uphold  the  Constitution  
d. Association of Small Landowners in the Phils, Inc. v Secretary of
Agrarian Reform: The Court has the wide discretion to waive the
requirement of standing to allow it to resolve the serious
constitutional questions raised

ISSUE: WON petitioners have standing – YES.

RULING: Petition GRANTED. Contract of Lease invalid.

RATIO:
1. A  party’s  standing  is  a  procedural  technicality which the Court may, in the
exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues
raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers Cases, the Court pushes aside
this technicality since the transcendental importance to the public demands
that the cases be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside
technicalities of procedure. In a taxpayer suit, the Court is also not devoid
of discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained.
2. The Court discussed their liberal stance on standing:
a. Emergency Powers Cases: Ordinary citizens and taxpayers were
allowed   to   question   the   constitutionality   of   Pres.   Quirino’s  
Executive Orders even if they were invoking only an indirect and
 STEFFEL v. THOMPSON RATIO:
March 19, 1974 | Brennan, J. Judicial Power (Standing) 1. The   alleged   threats   of   prosecution   are   not   “imaginary   or   speculative”.   He  
has been warned twice to stop handbilling and has been told that, if he
SUMMARY: Steffel, who was twice stopped from handbilling and was continued handbilling, he will likely be prosecuted, a concern amply
threatened by police with arrest, brought an action for injunctive and demonstrated   by   his   companion’s   prosecution.   It   is   not   necessary   that  
declaratory relief in the District Court, claiming that the application to him of petitioner first expose himself to actual arrest to be entitled to challenge a
the Georgia criminal trespass law would violate his 1A and 14A rights. statute he claims deters his exercise of his constitutional rights.
DOCTRINE: It is not necessary that petitioner first expose himself to actual Nonetheless,   the   reduction   of   the   Nation’s   involvement   in   Vietnam,   his  
arrest to be entitled to challenge a statute he claims deters his exercise of his cause for engaging in handbilling, shall be determined by the District Court
constitutional rights. if   subsequent   events   have   altered   petitioner’s   desire   to   engage   in  
handbilling, that it can be said that the case no longer presents a substantial
controversy to warrant the issue of declaratory relief.
FACTS:
2. When no state proceeding is pending and thus considerations of equity,
1. On October 8, 1970, petitioner and other individuals were distributing
comity, and federalism have little vitality, the propriety of granting federal
handbills protesting against American involvement in the Vietnam on a
declaratory relief may properly be considered independently of a request for
sidewalk of the North DeKalb Shopping Center. They were asked to leave
injunctive relief. The Congress, in enacting the Declaratory Relief Judgment
by the employees, and when they declined, police officers were summoned
of 1934, intended declaratory relief to act as an alternative to the strong
who told them that they would be arrested if they do not refrain from
medicine of the injunction and to be utilized to test the constitutionality of
handbilling. The group left but returned 2 days after to continue handbilling.
state criminal statutes, where injunctive relief would be unavailable.
The manager of the center called the police, and they were once again told
3. Declaratory relief was to provide a milder alternative to the injunction
that failure to stop their handbilling would result in their arrests. Petitioner
remedy. It has less intrusive effect on the administration of state criminal
left to avoid arrest but his companion stayed and was subsequently
laws (challenge constitutionality v. interference and disruption of state
arraigned on a charge of criminal trespass (Georgia statute).
proceedings). A state statute may be declared unconstitutional in toto
2. Petitioner alleged in his complaint his desire to continue distributing
(incapable of constitutional applications/total unconstitutionality), or
handbills but did not do so for fear of arrest.
unconstitutionally vague or overboard (incapable of being applied to its full
3. District Court denied all relief and dismissed the action, ruling that there
extent/partial unconstitutionality). The declaration does not necessarily bar
was no meaningful contention that the state has or will act in bad faith, thus,
prosecutions under the statute, as a broad injunction would.
lacking the rudiments of an active controversy.
4. A requirement that all the traditional equitable prerequisites to the issuance
4. Petitioner appealed only from the denial of declaratory relief, which the
of an injunction be satisfied before declaratory judgment is considered
Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit affirmed, ruling that irreparable injury
would   defy   Congress’   intent   to   make   declaratory   relief   available   in   cases  
must be measured by bad faith harassment, a test applied to a request for
where an injunction would be inappropriate.
injunctive relief against threatened state court criminal prosecution, as well
5. A federal district court has the duty to decide the appropriateness and the
as pending; and that the same test of bad faith is a prerequisite for
merits of the declaratory request irrespective of its conclusion as to the
declaratory relief.
propriety of the issuance of the injunction.
6. The solitary individual who suffers a deprivation of his constitutional rights
ISSUE/S:
is no less deserving of redress than one who suffers together with others.
1. WoN there is an actual controversy under Art III and the Declaratory
Judgment Act. – YES.
2. WoN the District Court and the Court of Appeals correctly found
petitioner’s  request  for  declaratory  relief  inappropriate.  – NO.

RULING: REVERSED.
 FRANCISCO, JR. v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES complaint barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
November 10, 2003 | Carpio-Morales, J.
RATIO:
1. While it was CJ Davide's personal rights that will be injured by the actions
SUMMARY: A second impeachment complaint was filed against Chief Justice
Hilario Davide a year within the filing of the first complaint. The court held that of the HoR, the petitioners in this case did not sue for the CJ's rights—they
the action is barred as it violates the constitutional prohibition against the sued for their own rights.
initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the
within a one-year period. constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. The petitioner
DOCTRINE/S: In not a few cases, this Court has adopted a liberal attitude on must be able to show that he sustained or is in imminent danger of
the locus standi of a petitioner when the issues raised are of paramount sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely
importance to the public. Such liberality does not, however, mean that the that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. The petitioners suing as
requirement that a party should have an interest in the matter is totally citizens were given standing because the case involved a public right. The
eliminated. A party must, at the very least, still plead the existence of such mere fact of being a citizen satisfied the requirement of Personal Interest.
interest. A petitioner is allowed to sue as a taxpayer where there is a claim that
public funds are being illegally disbursed. He must however, specifically
FACTS: prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of
1. Four months and three weeks after the filing of the first impeachment money raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a
complaint by former President Estrada-- for culpable violation of the result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. The court
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes--against CJ granted standing to petitioners who sued as taxpayers because of the
Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices, a second impeachment complaint allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of
against the Chief Justice was filed by Reps. Gilbert Teodoro and Felix Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily
Fuentebella. The second complaint was founded on the alleged results of involve the expenditure of public funds.
the legislative inquiry conducted regarding the manner of disbursements A legislator is allowed to question the validity of any official action when it
and expenditures by the Chief Justice of theJudiciary Development Fund. infringes on his prerogatives as a legislator. The two legislators who were
The   second   complaint   was   accompanied   by   a   “Resolution   of   petitioners were given standing because of their task of ensuring that the
Endorsement/Impeachment”  signed  by  at  least  1/3  of  all  the  members  of  the   powers and privileges of their office remain inviolate.
HoR. Petitions against the HoR were filed, most of which are contending An association may represent its members specially if the taxpayers and
that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it citizens in the association are substantial in number and the outcome of the
violates  the  provision  of  Section  5  of  Article  XI  of  the  Constitution  that  “no   suit will affect their interests. In the case of the Integrated Bar of the
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more Philippines, the court held that the mere invocation of the duty to preserve
than  once  within  a  period  of  one  year.”   the rule of law does not suffice. The court gave them standing however,
because of the issues they presented.
ISSUES: For class suits, petitioners must be numerous to fully protect the interests of
1. WoN the petitioners have standing – Petitioners who met the requirements those concerned to enable the court to deal properly with all the interests in
were given standing the suit as the outcome will be binding on them under the principle of res
2. WoN Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules judicata. The UP Law Alumni Cebu wouldn't have been given standing
adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the because of their divergent interests that cannot be sufficiently represented
provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution - YES but because they additionally alleged that they were suing as citizens and
taxpayers, they were given standing by the court.
RULING: Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in All those who invoked the issue of transcendental importance were given
Impeachment Proceedings are unconstitutional hence, second impeachment standing by the court because the determinants formulated by Justice
 Feliciano--(1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same
(2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory impeachable officer within a one-year period.
prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the
government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and
specific interest in raising the questions raised-- were present.
Petitioner Vallejos, for failing to allege any interest in the case, was not
given standing.

As regards intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of Court requires an

intervenor to possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation. While
intervention is not a right, it may be given if the applicant shows that he can
satisfy the requirements of the law.

2. The resolution of the issue hinges on the interpretation of the word

“initiate”.  The  HoR  bases  its  argument  on  Sec  16  Rule  V  of  the  “Rules  of  
Procedure  in  Impeachment  Proceedings” of the 12th Congress which states
that an impeachment complaint is deemed initiated through the following:
(1) upon finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint
filed by a member of the HoR or a citizen endorsed by a member is
sufficient in substance or (2) when a third of the member of the HoR files a
verified complaint with the Secretary General. The HoR believes that filing
of a complaint does not mean initiating it and that one-year bar could not
have been violated as as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House of
Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it. The court
held   however   that   based   on   the   intent   of   the   framers,   the   term   “initiation”  
starts with the filing of the complaint and that the vote of one-third of the
house in a resolution of impeachment does not initiate the proceedings. The
court also cited Fr. Bernas' explanation using reddendo singula singulis in
Sec 3 paragraphs 1 and 5 on the constitutional provision on impeachment
that   “impeachment  case”  and  “impeachment  proceeding”  are  two  different  
objects—that the case is to be decided by the senate but that a proceeding,
must first be initiated at  the  HoR;;  that  the  “impeachment  proceeding”  is  not  
initiated when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because
that is the end of the House proceeding and the beginning of another
proceeding,   namely   the   trial   and;;   that   neither   is   the   “impeachment
proceeding”   initiated   when   the   House   deliberates   on   the   resolution   passed  
on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has already been
done. Thus, the proceeding is initiated when a verified complaint is filed
and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. Clearly, Sec 16 and 17
Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules of the 12 th Congress contravene
Sec 3(5) of Article XI. Therefore, the second impeachment complaint filed
by Reps Teodoro and Fuentebella violates the constitutional prohibition
 SANLAKAS v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
February 3, 2004 | Tinga, J. | Petition to declare unconstitutional Proclamation
No. 427 and General Order No. 4 | Judicial Power (Standing)
SUMMARY: Some 300 officers and enlisted men of AFP stormed into
Oakwood   Premiere   demanding   the   resignation   of   several   gov’t   officials  
including the president. President GMA then declared Proclamation No. 427
and General Order No. 5 declaring a state of rebellion and directing AFP and
PNP to suppress it, respectively. The petitions were dismissed and
constitutionality of the  President’s  declarations  was upheld.
DOCTRINE: A party only has legal standing or locus standi if it has a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The only exception is if the case is of transcendental importance.
FACTS:
1. On July 26, 2003, some 300 junior officers and enlisted men of AFP
stormed into Oakwood Premiere apartments armed with high-powered
ammunitions and explosives. They demanded the resignation of the
President, Secretary of Defense, and PNP chief.
2. In the wake of the Oakwood occupation, Pres. GMA declared a state of
rebellion thru Proclamation No. 427. She then called out the AFP to
suppress the said rebellion thru General Order No. 4. By the evening of the
same day, the occupation ended and the soldiers agreed to return to the
barracks. The President, however, lifted the declaration of state of rebellion
five days later.
3. Seven petitions were then filed challenging the validity of the Proclamation
and the General Order. Some of which are:
GR No 159085: Sanlakas and Partido ng Manggagawa Party list
organizations vs. Executive Sec. arguing that Sec. 18 Art. 7 does not require
declaration of state of rebellion to call out armed forces. There is also no
sufficient basis for President to proclaim a state of rebellion for an
indefinite period
GR No. 159103: Social Justice Society Officers and members vs. Hon.
Exec. Sec. et.al arguing that Sec. 18 Art. 7 does not authorize declaration of
state of rebellion and it is a simple circumvention of the report requirement
to the Congress found in the same article.
GR No. 159185: Rep. Suplico et al. vs. Pres. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and
Exec. Sec. Romulo arguing that declaration of state of rebellion is a
superfluity and is actually an exercise of emergency powers which belongs
to the Congress by virtue of Art. 6 Sec. 23(2) of the Constitution and is thus
a usurpation of power of Congress
GR No. 159196: Senator Pimentel vs. Romulo, et al. arguing that the
presidential issuances are an unwarranted, illegal, and abusive exercise of
martial law power.It serves as gateway to unconstitutional implementation
of warrantless arrests for the crime of rebellion
ISSUES:
1. WoN petitioners had legal standing to challenge the constitutionality of the
Proclamation and General Order – NO except for Rep. Suplico and Sen.
Pimentel
2. WoN the declarations and issuances are considered as exercises of
emergency and martial law powers? – NO
RULING: Petitions dismissed.
RATIO:
1. Only Rep. Suplico and Sen. Pimental, as members on Congress, have legal
standing to challenge the subject issuances. These petitioners claim that the
declaration of a state of rebellion by the President is tantamount to an
exercise   of   Congress’   emergency   powers,   thus   impairing   the   lawmakers’  
legislative powers. Petitioners also maintain that the declaration is a
deceptive scheme to   avoid   congressional   scrutiny   into   the   President’s  
exercise of martial law powers.
2. Other   petitioners   like   the   people’s   organizations SJS, Sanlakas, and PM
lacked standing because there were not able to prove that they have
sustained or will sustain a direct injury from the issuances. Argument as
taxpayers   will   also   not   hold   because   a   taxpayer’s   suit   must   involve   an  
illegal disbursement of funds by government.
3. A citizen will be allowed to raise aconstitutional question only when he can
show that he haspersonally suffered some actual or threatened injury as
aresult of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; theinjury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to beredressed by
a favorable action. No such injury was presented by the other petitioners.
4. The   President’s   declaration   of   state   of   rebellion   and   general   order   are   not  
the same as emergency powers granted by the Congress. The calling out
power of the President is granted by the constitution to address immediate
exigencies and threats to the government. The alleged usurpation of
legislative   powers   by   the   President’s   supposed   exercise   of   emergency
powers is of no basis. No specific instance was cited wherein the President
attempted to exercise powers beyond her scope as Chief Executive and
Commander-in-Chief.
5. The issuances cannot be considered as an exercise of martial law powers
because there is no indication that military courts have replaced civil courts.
 Neither are there signs that military authorities have taken over the
functions of civil government. So the allegation that the President has
exercised martial law powers is beyond reason.
TAN v. MACAPAGAL
February 29, 1972 | Fernando, J. | MR| Judicial Power (Ripeness)
SUMMARY: The SC denies motion for reconsideration because sustaining
the said motion is tantamount to violating the principle of separation of
powers.
DOCTRINE: As long as a Constitutional Convention has not yet acted upon
any proposed amendment, it is beyond the jurisdiction of the Courts. Only
when it has made clear what it plans to submit for ratification can appropriate
suits be filed.
FACTS:
1. On October 6, 1971, the petitioners filed a 5-page petition for declaratory
relief as taxpayers but purportedly suing on behalf of themselves and the
Filipino people in assailing the validity of the Laurel-Leido Resolution
dealing with the range of authority of the Constitutional Convention praying
for  the  Court  to  declare  that  it  is  “without  power  under  Section  1,  Article  XV  
of the Constitution and Republic Act 6132 to consider, discuss and adopt
proposals to seek to revise the present Constitution through the adoption of a
form of government other than the form now outlined in the present
Constitution, the Convention merely empowered to propose improvements to
the  present  Constitution   without  altering  the  general  plan  laid  within.”  Two  
days later, the said petition was dismissed.
2. On the last day of October came a printed 32-page motion for
reconsideration that relied mainly on American Jurisprudence.
person who impugns the validity of a statute must have personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained or will sustain as
a result of its enforcement. Second, taxpayers who seek to nullify laws
providing for the disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the
“expenditure  of  public  funds  by  an  officer  of  the  State  for  unconstitutional  
acts   constitutes   a   misapplication   of   such   funds”.   Third,   when   a  
constitutional question is raised, a Senator is usually considered as having
the required legal standing to bring a suit. The petitioners of the case at bar
fail to qualify under the said categories.
2. The doctrine of separation of powers calls for the branches of government
to be left alone to discharge their duties as they see fit. Something must
first be accomplished or performed by the other branches of government
before the judiciary may come into the picture--it is only then that it can
pass judgment as to the validity of what was done and only when properly
challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. The same doctrine applies
to inquiries regarding the scope of the competence lodged in a
Constitutional Convention. The judiciary cannot and must not tell the
ConCon what it can or cannot do. As long as any proposed amendment is
still not acted upon by a Constitutional Convention, it is beyond the
jurisdiction of the Courts. Only when it has made clear what it plans to
submit for ratification can appropriate suits be filed.

ISSUES:
1. WoN the petitioners have the necessary standing – NO
2. WoN the Court has the jurisdiction over the range of authority of the
Constitutional Convention – NO

RULING: The motion for reconsideration is DISMISSED.

RATIO:
1. There are three instances wherein a person is considered as having the
requisite standing to challenge the validity of a statute. First is that the
 POE v. ULLMAN
June 19, 1961 | Frankfurter, J. | Appeal | Judicial Power (Ripeness)
SUMMARY: Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the Connecticut
statutes prohibiting the use of contraceptives as well as giving medical advice
about them. Court held that the issue is not yet ripe for adjudication since the
law was never enforced.
DOCTRINE: A case is not yet ripe for adjudication if the law being attacked
on constitutional grounds has not been reinforced, such that no one has
sustained an actual injury or is in imminent danger of sustaining injury.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners (spouses Poe, Doe and Dr. Buxton) sought declaratory judgment
to have certain Connecticut statutes (53-32 and 54-196 of the General
Statutes of Connecticut) prohibiting the use of contraceptive devices and the
giving of medical advice on their use violate the Fourteenth Amendment by
depriving the plaintiffs of life and property without due process of law.
2. The spouses Poe had no children but Mrs. Poe had had 3 pregnancies
terminating in infants with multiple congenital abnormalities from which
each died shortly after birth. Dr. Buxton, obstetrician and gynecologist,
explained that the abnormalities in the infants were genetic and is of the
opinion that contraception would be the best medical treatment for the
spouses to prevent psychological stress that can affect their physical and
mental health arising from another pregnancy.
3. Jane Doe, on the other hand, is a 25-old housewife who lives with her
husband and has no children. She recently underwent a pregnancy which
induced in her a critical physical illness, and another pregnancy might be
extremely dangerous to her life. She also consulted Dr. Buxton who
believes that contraception would be the safest treatment for her.
4. Dr, Buxton, however, cannot give advice about contraception under the fear
that he may be punished for violation of the Connecticut statutes. The
State's Attorney (respondent Ullman) intends to prosecute offenses against
the State's laws, and claims that the giving of contraceptive advice and the
use of contraceptive devices would be offenses forbidden by Connecticut
Gen. Statutes. Rev., 1958, 53-32 and 54-196.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the case is ripe for adjudication – NO
RULING: Petition dismissed.
RATIO:
1. Even though the Connecticut statutes prohibiting the use of contraceptive
devices and the giving of medical advice regarding contraceptives has been
in the statute books for quite a long time now (enacted in 1879), it would
seem that a prosecution for its violation has never been initiated, except for
one case (State v. Nelson) which was later dismissed. Furthermore, the
unreality of these law suits is proven by the circumstance that sale of
contraceptives is rampant in Connecticut, and there were no prosecutions
are recorded with regard to this, nor there was any attempt to enforce the
ban against use and distribution of contraceptives.
2. Because the law has never been enforced, there is no actual injury nor
imminent danger of sustaining injury to the plaintiffs. No suit has been
brought up against Dr. Buxton or his patients. The fact that Connecticut has
not chosen to press the enforcement of this statute and in effect, to not
prosecute anyone for violation thereof deprives these controversies of the
immediacy which is an indispensable condition of adjudicating
constitutional questions.
Also, it was not alleged that Ullman threatens to prosecute the plaintiffs for
use of, or for giving advice concerning, contraceptive devices. The
allegations are merely that, in the course of his public duty, he intends to
prosecute any offenses against Connecticut law, and that he claims that use
of and advice concerning contraceptives would constitute offenses.
DISSENTING OPINION (Harlan, J.):
The statute allows the State to enquire into, prove and punish married people for
the private use of their marital intimacy.
The Connecticut statute does not invade the privacy of the home in the usual
sense, since the invasion involved here may be accomplished without any
physical intrusion into the home. It undertakes, however, to create a crime which
is grossly offensive to this privacy, while the Constitution refers only to methods
of punishing substantive wrongs, and the procedure it requires presupposes that
substantive offenses may be committed and sought out in the privacy of the
home.
Adultery, homosexuality and the like are sexual intimacies which the State
forbids altogether, but the intimacy of husband and wife is necessarily an
essential and accepted feature of the institution of marriage, an institution which
the State not only must allow, but which always and in every age it has fostered
and protected. It is one thing when the State exerts its power either to forbid
extra-marital sexuality altogether, or to say who may marry, but it is quite
another when, having acknowledged a marriage and the intimacies inherent
in it, it undertakes to regulate by means of the criminal law the details of
that intimacy.
Even though the State has determined that the use of contraceptives is as
iniquitous as any act of extra-marital sexual immorality, the intrusion of the
whole machinery of the criminal law into the very heart of marital privacy,
requiring husband and wife to render account before a criminal tribunal of their
uses of that intimacy, is surely a very different thing indeed from punishing
those who establish intimacies which the law has always forbidden and which
can have no claim to social protection.
 U.S. v. RICHARDSON
June 25, 1974 | Burger, C.J. | Certiorari | Judicial Power (Ripeness)
SUMMARY: Respondent challenged the constitutionality of the CIA Act
as a federal taxpayer. Court held that he did not have standing to sue in such
capacity.
DOCTRINE: The gist of standing is whether or not the party seeking relief
alleged   a   personal   stake   in   the   controversy’s   outcome   so   as   to   assure   constitutionality of executive or legislative action must show that he
concrete adverseness. A private individual challenging the constitutionality
of executive or legislative action must show that he sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining direct injury
FACTS:
1. Respondent William Richardson, as a federal taxpayer, challenged the
constitutionality of Central Intelligence Agency Act, which permitted the
CIA to account for its expenditures solely on the certificate of the Director.
He alleged that it violated Art I, Sec. 9, cl. 7 of the Constitution as the
clause required a regular statement and account of public funds.
supposed failure to require the Executive to supply a more detailed report of
the  CIA’s  expenditures.
5. Respondent claims that without detailed information on CIA expenditures
he cannot intelligently follow the actions of Congress or the Executive, nor
properly fulfill his obligations as a member of the electorate in voting for
candidates seeking national office. This is a generalized grievance common
to all members of the public.
6. The established principle is that a private individual challenging the
sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining direct injury; it is
insufficient that he has a general interest common to all the public.
7. It can be argued that if respondent is not allowed to litigate the case, no one
can. But the absence of any particular individual or class to litigate the
claims supports the argument that the subject matter is committed to
Congress’s  surveillance,  and  ultimately  to  the  political  process.

ISSUE: WoN the party has standing to sue - NO

RULING: Respondent lacks the standing to sue. Judgment of the CA reversed.

RATIO:
1. The gist of standing is whether or not the party seeking relief alleged a
personal   stake   in   the   controversy’s   outcome   so   as   to   assure   concrete  
adverseness upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.
2. The Court announced a two-pronged standing test requiring allegations: (a)
challenging an enactment under the Taxing and Spending Clause of Art I
Sec 8 of the Constitution, and (b) claiming that the challenged enactment
exceeds specific constitutional limitations imposed on the taxing and
spending power.
3. Respondent’s   challenge   is   not   addressed   to   the   taxing   or   spending   power,  
but to the statutes regulating the CIA (specifically 50 U.S.C. 403 j(b), which
provides different accounting and reporting requirements and procedures for
the CIA).
4. Respondent does not claim that the appropriated funds are being spend in
violation of a specific constitutional limitation imposed on the taxing and
spending power; instead, he asks that the Government be compelled to give
information on how precisely the CIA spends its funds. Thus, there is no
“logical   nexus”   between   his   asserted   taxpayer   status   and   the   Congress’s  
 DeFUNIS v. ODEGAARD RATIO:
April 23, 1974 | Per Curiam | Certiorari | Judicial Power (Mootness) 1. Case is already moot since DeFunis will complete his law school studies at
the end of the term for which he has now registered regardless of any
SUMMARY: DeFunis was initially denied admission to a law school. By decision this Court might reach on the merits of the litigation.
virtue of a preliminary injunction, he was admitted to the law school. By the 2. Not one where there is voluntary cessation by defendant of act
time the Court was to render a decision to the case, he was already in his complained of: Mootness here does not depend upon a "voluntary
last quarter of his final year in law school. The Court held that the case is cessation" of the school's admissions practices but upon the simple fact that
already moot and does not fall within the exceptions to the mootness rule. petitioner is in his final term, and the school's fixed policy to permit him to
DOCTRINE: Exceptions to the mootness rule: (a) voluntary cessation by complete the term.
defendant of act complained of; (b) capable of repetition yet evading 3. Not one capable of repetition yet evading review: DeFunis will never
review. again have to go through the school's admissions process and just because
this particular case did not reach the Court until the eve of the petitioner's
FACTS: graduation from law school, it hardly follows that the issue he raises will in
1. In 1971, Marco DeFunis applied for admission as first-year law student at the future evade review.
the University of Washington Law School. He was denied admission and Furthermore,   assuming   the   school’s   admissions   policy   remains   unchanged  
filed a suit at the Washington trial court on behalf of himself questioning others may still challenge such policies in subsequent cases in the future
the  school’s  denial  to  accept  him  on  equal protection grounds. The suit also which the courts may render judgment.
prayed for preliminary injunction to command respondents (officers, faculty
members, and members of the Board of Regents of the University of
Washington) to accept DeFunis as a first-year law student, which was
granted.
2. By the time DeFunis was in second year of law school, the Washington
Supreme Court reversed ruling of the trial court and declared that nothing
was unconstitutional with the admissions policy. DeFunis then filed a
petition for certiorari, and Justice Douglas, as Circuit Justice, stayed the
judgment of the Washington Supreme Court pending the "final disposition
of the case by this Court. DeFunis was already in his third year when the
Washington Supreme Court first considered the petition for certiorari.
Petition for certiorari was granted on No. 19, 1973.
3. After oral argument (Feb. 26, 1974), the Court was informed that petitioner
had registered for his final quarter. Respondents have assured the Court that
this registration is fully effective regardless of the ultimate disposition of
the case.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the case has been rendered moot- YES
2. Whether or not case falls within the exceptions to the mootness rule – NO

RULING: Judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington is vacated.

 BANCO ESPAÑOL FILIPINO v. PALANCA
March 26, 1918 | Street, J. | Appeal |Procedural Due Process
SUMMARY:Vicente Palanca challenged the decision of the CFI regarding
the foreclosure of the property of the original defendant. He alleged that the
lower court did not acquire the jurisdiction over the matter and that the
original defendant was not informed, thus violating due process. SC denied
the petition.
DOCTRINE: Notice to the defendant in cases is essential. But in
foreclosure cases, the type of notification required does not involve any
assurance that the absent owner shall receive the actual notice.
FACTS:
1. Defendant Palanca owed BancoEspanol P218k and executed a mortgage of
his house as security for the debt he owed. After the execution of the
instrument by the mortgagor, he returned to China, there he died in 1910
without returning to the Philippines.
2. Plantiff in the foreclosure proceeding gave notice to the defendant pursuant
to Section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure. An order for publication was
obtained from the court, and publication was made in due form in a
newspaper in Manila. The court further directed the clerk of the court to
deposit in the post office in a stamped envelope the summons and complaint
directed to the defendant in his last place of residence. Whether the clerk
complied does not affirmatively appear.
3. The proceedings continued and defendant was declared in default for not
appearing in the hearings. A decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiff
by the CFI and defendant was ordered to pay his debt or his mortgaged
property will be exposed to public sale.
4. After the confirmation of the sale, a motion was set by Vicente Palanca who
is the administrator of the estate of the original defendant, assailing the
decision of the CFI. He alleged that the clerk of the court did not obey the
order in the matter of mailing the papers directed to the defendant, which
led to the court not acquiring jurisdiction over the foreclosure of the
mortgaged property constituting a violation of due process of law.
power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be
acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is
subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given opportunity to be
heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
2. The required notification proceedings in foreclosure cases to a non-resident
owner is everywhere recognized as essential. To answer this necessity,
statutes provide for publication and mailing of the notice to the defendant if
his residence is known. But this type of notification does not constitute a
service of process in any true sense. It is merely a means provided by law
whereby the owner may be admonished that his property is the subject of
judicial proceedings.
3. This mode if notification in foreclosure cases does not involve any absolute
assurance that the absent owner shall receive the actual notice. The idea
upon which the law proceeds in recognizing the efficacy of a means of
notification which may fall short of actual notice is this: Property is always
assumed to be in the possession of its owner and it can be safely held that
under certain conditions, he has knowledge that proceedings have been
instituted for its sale.
4. It is the duty of the owner of real estate who is a nonresident, to take
measures that he shall be represented when his property is called into
requisition. His failure to do this and failure to get the notice by ordinary
publications do not exempt him from the consequences of his actions.

ISSUE/S: WoN the lower court violated the due process required in law? - NO

RULING: Petition denied. There was no error in the judgment of the lower
court.

RATIO:
1. Requirement of due process is satisfied if the following conditions are
present, namely: (1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial
 ANG TIBAY v. CIR 2. In Goseco v CIR, it was emphasized that the CIR is not narrowly
February 27, 1949 | Laurel, J. | Dec on MR on Motion for New Trial | Procedural constrained by technical rules of procedure, and Section 20 of CW 103
Due Process requires  it  to  “act  according  to  justice  and  equity  and  substantial   merits  of  
the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be
SUMMARY: The SolGen files in behalf of CIR on the cases of National Labor bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in
Union Inc., praying that their labor case be remanded to the CIR for a new trial, such manner as it may deem just and equitable.
which AngTibay opposes. SC grants the motion for a new trial and lays down 3. Due Process Requirements in Administrative Trials & Investigations:
due process requirements in trials and investigations of administrative character. i. Right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or
DOCTRINE: 7  due  process  reqt’s  in  administrative  trials  &  investigations  (#3) affected to present his own case and submit evidence in suppor thereof
ii. Tribunal must consider the evidence presented
iii. The decision must be supported
FACTS:
iv. Evidence   must   be   “substantial”,   meaning   such   relevant   evidence   as   a  
1. The SolGen files in behalf of CIR on the cases of National Labor Union
reasonable mind accepts as adequate to support a conclusion. CW 103
Inc., praying that their labor case (which did not prosper, w/ some
states that the rules of evidence prevailing in courts should not be
documents and exhibits offered as evidence were not admitted) be
controlling – this is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of
remanded to the CIR for a new trial. AngTibay opposes.
technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be
2. In their case, The National Labor Union alleged that ToribioTeodoro,
deemed inadmissible/incompetent in judicial proceedings would not
manager   and   proprietor   of   the   National   Workers’   Brotherhood   of  
invalidate the administrative order. However, this desirable flexibility in
AngTibay, falsely claimed that there was a shortage of leather soles in
administrative procedure will not justify orders without a basis in
AngTibay which made it necessary for him to lay off workers. However,
evidence having rational provative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay
said claim was unsupported by records of the Bureau of Customs or the
or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.
accounts of native dealers of leather, and the scheme was allegedly adopted
v. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing,
to systematically discharge all NLU members from AngTibay, amounting
or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected, to
to unfair labor practice and discrimination against NLU.
protect   the   parties’   right   to   know   and   meet   the   case   against   them.
3. In addition, NLU claims that the attached exhibits submitted for evidence
However,   this   must   not   detract   CIR’s   duty   to   enforce   the   law   actively  
were  so  inaccessible  to  them  that  even  w/  due  diligence,  they  couldn’t  have  
and use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and
been expected to have obtained such evidence and offered tot eh CIR. Said
informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy.
documents and exhibits are supposedly of such far-reaching importance and
vi. The CIR or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent
effect that their admission would result in the modification and reversal of
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply
the judgment herein.
accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that
the volume of work in such that it is literally Relations personally to
ISSUE: WON a new trial should commence to allow NLU to present new
decide all controversies coming before them.
evidence – YES.
vii. CIR must render its decisions in such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
RULING: MR denied, motion for new trial granted.
decisions rendered.
4. Except as to the alleged agreement between AngTibay& NWU, the record
RATIO:
is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to
1. The Court of Industrial Relations, as an administrative court, exercises
predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law. Therefore, in the interest
judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between
of justice, a new trial should commence giving NLU opportunity to present
employers and employees. It has national jurisdiction to consider,
new evidence.
investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter, controverysy, or dispute
arising between, and/or affecting employers and employees or laborers and
regulation the relations between them in accordance with Commonwealth
Act No. 103.
 PHILCOMSAT v. ALCUAZ
December 18, 1989 | Regalado, J. | Petition for Review of NTC order |
Procedural Due Process
SUMMARY: PHILCOMSAT was placed under the jurisdiction, control
and regulation of NTC, including all of its facilities and services and fixing
of rates, pursuant to EO 196. NTC ordered PHILCOMSAT to reduce its
present rates by 15%. PHILCOMSAT questions the order, stating that it
violates procedural due process and substantive due process for being
issued without notice and hearing and
DOCTRINE: When an administrative body acts in a judicial/quasi-judicial
manner, the persons whose rights and property may be affected by the
action are entitled to notice and hearing.
FACTS:
1. By virtue of RA 5514, PHILCOMSAT was granted a franchise to establish
and operate in the Philippines, stations and associated equipment and
facilities for international satellite communications, as well as the authority
to construct and operate such ground facilities as needed to deliver
telecommunications services from the communications satellite system and
ground terminals.
2. Under Sec. 5 of RA 5514, petitioner is exempt from the jurisdiction of then
Public Service Commission, now NTC. However, pursuant to EO 196 (June
19, 1987), it was placed under jurisdiction, control and regulation of
respondent NTC, including all of its facilities and services and fixing of
rates.
3. Petitioner was required to apply for the certificate of public convenience
and necessity covering its facilities and the services it renders, and authority
to charge rates. On Sept 16, 1987, it was granted provisional authority for 6
months to continue operating its existing facilities, render the services it
was offering, and to charge rates. It was extended for 6 months more, twice,
but was directed to reduce its present rates by 15%.
ISSUE/S:
1. WoN EOs 546 and 196 constitute undue delegation of legislative power for
not having a fixed standard for the rate-fixing power– NO
2. WoN the order violated procedural due process for being issued without
notice and hearing – YES.
3. WoN the rate reduction violated substantial due process for being unjust,
unreasonable, and confiscatory – YES.
RULING: Writ prayed for is GRANTED. Order of NTC, set aside.
RATIO:
1. NTC, in exercising its rate-fixing powers, is limited by the requirements of
public safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates,
which conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of
legislative power.
2. Generally, notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of
administrative action where the administrative body acts in the exercise of
executive, administrative or legislative functions; but where it acts in a
judicial or quasi-judicial manner, and its acts are particular and immediate
rather than a general and prospective, the person whose rights and property
may be affected by the action is entitled to notice and hearing.
The order in question is a quasi-judicial adjudication. It pertains exclusively
to petitioner, no rationalization was offered which prompted the imposition
of a 15% rate reduction, and petitioner was not afforded the opportunity to
cross-examine the inspector who issued the report on which respondent
based its order.
A rate-fixing order, be it temporary, is not exempt from statutory procedural
requirements of notice and hearing, as well as the requirement of
reasonableness. Sec 16(c) of the Public Servant Act provides that: The
Commission shall have power, upon proper notice and hearing in
accordance with their rules and provisions of this Act, subject to the
limitations and exceptions mentioned and saving provisions to the contrary:
xxx c) to fix and determine individual or joint rates xxx which shall be
imposed, observed and followed thereafter by any public service.
3. Any regulation which operates as an effective confiscation of private
property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of
property rights is void for being repugnant to the constitutional guaranties
of due process and equal protection of the laws.
4. The inherent power and authority of the State, or its agent, to regulate rates
charged by public utilities should be reasonable and just. What is just and
reasonable is based on sound business judgment based upon evidence. In
determining whether a rate is confiscatory, it is essential that to consider the
given situation, requirements and opportunities of the utility, as well as
competition. A cursory perusal of the order reveals that the rate reduction is
solely and primarily based on the initial evaluation made on the financial
statements of petitioner. It also did not elaborate on how it arrived at the
prescribed rates nor how the financial statements influenced its decision to
impose a rate reduction.
 ATENEO v. CA RULING: Petition GRANTED. CA Decision reversed.
October 16, 1986 | Gutierrez Jr., J. | Petition for Review of CA resolution |
Procedural Due Process RATIO:
1. Rev  Welsh  did  not  stop  at  Guanzon’s  admission  and  interviewed  the  latter’s  
SUMMARY: Ramon   Guanzon’s   parents   file   for   damages   against   Ateneo   for   friends who were present during the incident. The Discipline Board was
expelling their son (for unbecoming conduct in slapping a cafeteria waitress) composed of distinguished faculty members and nothing in the records casts
without observance of due process, since they weren’t   informed   of   the   any doubt on their competence and impartiality. Guanzon himself appeared
proceedings. SC rules that due process was accorded and damages unwarranted. before the Discipline Board and admitted the slapping incident and even
DOCTRINE: The lack of notice given to parents of college students begged to be excused. He was given notice of the proceedings, he actually
undertaking   disciplinary   proceedings   doesn’t   equate   to   lack   of   due   process,   appeared to present his side, the investigating board acted fairly and
provided that the student is 18 and was advised to seek guidance from parents objectively, and all requisites of administrative due process were met.
and guardians. 2. The  claim  that  there  was  no  due  process  because  Guanzon’s  parents  weren’t  
given notice  of  the  proceedings  can’t  stand  since  Ramon  was  already  18  at  
FACTS: the time and a college student, intelligent and mature enough to know his
1. On Dec 12, 1967 at 5:15pm, 1st year student & dormer Juan Ramon Guanzon responsibilities.   In   Rev   Welsh’s   interview,   he   even   asked   if   he   would   be  
asked for a siopao from Carmelita Mateo, a dormitory cafeteria waitress. expelled, showing that he was fully aware of the gravity of his offense. He
When   she   asked   him   to   wait   for   it   to   be   heated,   he   called   her   “bilatni   bay”   was even asked to seek advice and assistance from his parents. Ramon is
(sex organ in Ilonggo) in the presence of other dormers and made threatening assumed to have reported the serious matter to his parents, and the fact that
gestures at her, prompting her to shout & throw a cardboard box top at he   chose   to   remain   silent   and   didn’t   inform   them   isn’t   Ateneo’s   fault.
Guanzon. Guanzon slapped Mateo and was restrained by the dormers. Moreover,   notwithstanding   his   parents’   non-participation, the university
2. Mateo sent a letter-complaint a day later to Rev Welsh, the Dean of Men & undertook a fair and objective investigation. Due process in administrative
Resident Students and Discipline Board Chairman, prompting him to conduct proceedings also requires consideration of the evidence presented and the
a  preliminary  inquiry  by  interviewing  Guanzon’s  friends  and  companions  who   existence of evidence to support the decision.
were at the cafeteria (they confirmed the incident). Finding probable cause, he 3. While  Mateo   wasn’t  entirely   blameless  since   she  also  shouted  at  Guanzon  
filed a memo to the Discipline Board members. Guanzon was fully informed and tried to hit him with a cardboard box top, her reaction was normal and it
of the   accusation   against   him   when   Fr.   Welsh   read   Mateo’s   letter,   and   doesn’t   justify   the   slapping.   The   incident   was   public,   which   added   to  
Guanzon admitted that the charge was true. Mateo’s   humiliation. There was unbecoming conduct and pursuant to
3. On Dec 19, notice of the meeting of the Board of Discipline was posted at the Ateneo’s  Rules  of  Discipline  and  Code  of  Ethics,  this  offense  constituted  a  
College Bulletin Board and the Dormitory Halls, with the Dean of Discipline ground  for  dismissal  from  the  college.  Ateneo’s  action  is  sanctioned  by  law  
personally notifying Guanzon of the Board meeting. He was told to seek the under Section 107, Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (violation of
help of his guardians, parents, and friends including the student counsellors. disciplinary regulations as valid ground for refusing re-enrollment).
However,   he   didn’t   inform   his   parents   or   guardians   despite   knowing   the   4. Before Guanzon was permitted to enroll, he received the College Handbook
gravity of his offense. He spoke for himself and admitted to slapping Mateo, (general regulations) and College catalog (disciplinary rules) and Dorm
then asked to be excused so he could catch a boat for Bacolod for the Rules and Regulations. A   provision   states   “Dining   Room   – The kitchen
Christmas vacation. help   &   server   should   always   be   treated   w/   civility.”   Mateo,   b/c   of   her  
4. The Discipline Board unanimously dropped Guanzon from the rolls, the Dean service to boarders & her sex, deserved more respect & gracious treatment.
of Arts and Sciences and the President of the University reviewed and
confirmed  the  decision,  with  the  Student  Council’s  MR  denied. Other Issues:
5. In  the  current  case,  Guanzon’s  parents  are  seeking  damages,  alleging  that  their   On Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Issue is a purely legal question,
son was not accorded due process of law in the whole process. brought pursuant to the Civil Code law on damages. Hence, jurisdiction
belongs to Civil Courts and nothing of an administrative nature can be done.
ISSUE/S: WON Guanzon was accorded due process of law – YES.
 On Damages: No basis. Guanzon, before dismissal, was granted an
honorable dismissal when he asked for it. He was able to promptly enroll to
another school and his father was able to reimburse his full 2 ndsem tuition.
ALCUAZ et al v. PSBA
May 2, 1988 | Paras, J. | Review on Certiorari, Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction | Procedural Due Process
SUMMARY: PSBA   students   were   blacklisted   for   “anarchic   acts”   against   the  
school. They were not allowed to reenroll upon recommendation by a special
investigation committee, and they complained, saying this was violative of due
process. The Court held that min requirements for due process were complied w/.
DOCTRINE:Due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail
proceedings and hearings similar to those in courts of justice. Such proceedings
may be summary and cross-examination is not even an essential part.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners are students of PSBA and respondents are the PSBA, a non-
stock institution of higher learning organized and existing under laws of the
Phils. In March 22, 1986, students and PSBA had an agreement on rules
regarding protest actions, because students were not allowed to directly
participate in policy-making, as this is provided by law.
2. Despite this, petitioners demanded negotiation of a new agreement, which
was turned down, resulting in mass assemblies. On Oct 8, the students were
sent uniform letters asking them to explain why the school should not take
any  administrative   action  against   their   “anarchic  acts”.  This   was  answered   3. The right of a school to refuse reenrollment of students for violation of
by counsel in Oct 22. However, they were blacklisted and denied admission
during enrollment, which prompted petitioners to resort to the courts. A
motion for intervention was filed by the PSBA Faculty Union, which was
granted.
3. On Nov 12, the SC issued a temporary mandatory order directing the
respondents 1) to enroll the petitioners, and 2) to readmit the intervenors to
their former positions w/o prejudice to the investigation to be conducted by
the school authorities.
4. On Apr 27, 1987, PSBA filed their manifestation and submitted a report w/
recommendations by a special investigating committee. Findings included
the dismissal of Alcuaz, exoneration of the other 3 students, termination of
the services of some teachers, and exoneration of some. On Jun 29, the
motion to compel PSBA to re-enroll petitioners was denied by the Court,
except for the 3 exonerated students, holding that the results of the
investigation indicate prima facie the violation of rules and regulations of
the school.
5. Petitioners allege, however, that they were deprived of due process, w/c
requires due notice and hearing; and or substantial due process, w/c requires
that the body to conduct the investigation be competent to act and decide
free from bias or prejudice.
ISSUE: WoN there has been deprivation of due process for petitioner-students
and teachers—NO
RULING: Petition DISMISSED.
RATIO:
1. A student, once admitted, is considered enrolled for 1 semester. The same is
true for teachers, since the Manual provides that written contracts are for 1
semester. As such, the denial of due process is untenable. The school cannot
be compelled to enter into another contract with said students and teachers.
2. Due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail
proceedings and hearings similar to those in courts of justice. Such
proceedings may be summary and cross-examination is not even an
essential part. The minimum standards laid down by the Court are: 1)
students be informed in writing of the nature and cause of the accusation, 2)
they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, w/ assistance
of counsel if desired, 3) they shall be informed of evidence against them, 4)
they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf, and 5) the
evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee. While
there was initially no hearing, violating Nos. 3 to 5, the requirements were
complied with when PSBA complied with the Court Nov 12 Order for the
investigation.
disciplinary regulations is sanctioned by law. The Court ordinarily accords
respect if not finality to factual findings of administrative tribunals, unless
1) the findings are not supported by evidence, 2) vitiated by fraud,
imposition or collusion, 3) the procedure is irregular, 4) palpable errors are
committed, 5) grave abuse of discretion is manifest. In this case, the
investigation was fair, open, exhaustive and adequate, thus complying with
the requirements for due process.
 NON v. J. DAMES
May 20, 1990 | Cortes, J. | Certiorari | Procedural Due Process
SUMMARY: Petitioners were refused readmission for participating in student
mass actions against Mabini College.
DOCTRINE: See ratio no. 2.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet,
Camarines Norte, were not allowed to re-enroll for AY 1988-1989 for
leading or participating in student mass actions against the school in a
preceding semester.
ISSUE/S: WoN the students were afforded due process before they were
refused re-enrollment. – NO.
3. Refusal of re-enrollment due to failing grades was a mere afterthought.
Excluding students because of failing grades when the cause for the action
taken against them undeniably related to possible breaches of discipline not
only is a denial of due process by also constitutes a violation of the basic
tenets of fair play.
This does not mean that no disciplinary action can be taken against
petitioners’  breach  of  discipline.  Penalty  that  could  have  been  imposed  must  
be commensurate to the offense committed and must be imposed only after
the requirements of procedural due process have been complied with.
NOTE:
Assailed doctrine: A student, once admitted by the school, is considered enrolled
only for one semester and, hence, may be refused readmission after the semester
is over, as the contract between the student and the school is deemed terminated.
(Alcuaz, et. al. v. Philippine School of Business Administration, et. al.)

RULING: Petition GRANTED. Assailed decision ANNULLED. Mabini

College ordered to readmit and allow petitioners to re-enroll, without prejudice *The academic freedom aspect of Alcuaz and Non will be discussed in other
to its taking the appropriate action. digests found later in this compilation (see case digests for academic
freedom)
RATIO:

1. While the highest regard must be afforded the exercise of the rights to free
speech and assembly, this should not be taken to mean that school
authorities are virtually powerless to discipline the students: Conduct by the
student, in class or out of it, which for any reason disrupts classwork or
involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is not
immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.
2. The imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural
due process.
Standards to be met to satisfy the demands of due process:
a. Students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them;
b. They shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the
assistance of counsel, if desired;
c. They shall be informed of the evidence against them;
d. They shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
e. The evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee
or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the
case.
Moreover, the penalty imposed must be proportionate to the offense
committed.
 REYES v. CA
February 25, 1991 | Midealdea, J. | Petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction and TRO, Petition for certiorari and mandamus with
preliminary injunction and TRO | Procedural Due Process
SUMMARY: The BOR resolved to direct the UPCM to admit students
dismissed because they failed to meet the admission requirement of 90
percentile in the NMAT even though during their NMAT, the UC-approved
cut-off grade was 70 percentile. SC held that the BOR acted within and in
accordance with its power of governance and administration of the University.
DOCTRINE: Students have the right to select a profession or course of
study subject to a fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements.
FACTS:
1. Respondent-students obtained scores greater than 70 percentile on the
NMAT which was the cut-off rate of the UP College of Medicine (UPCM)
for AY 1986-1987 as prescribed by the UPCM faculty and approved by the
University Council (UC) on April 8, 1986.
2. On October 8, 1986, the UPCM Faculty prescribed a 90 percentile cut-off
score for admission effective academic year 1987-1988.
3. BOR and UP Chancellor recommended the admission of applicants
obtaining a percentile rating from 70-90 but the Dean of UPCM refused to
admit the students.
4. The students filed a petition for mandamus with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) and on June 11, 1987, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary
injunction for their admission.
5. The students were admitted and spent three years in the College.
6. Before the onset of school year 1990-1991, the students wrote a letter to the
UPCM faculty stating that they would leave to the faculty the determination
of their case and that they would like to appeal to remain in the College. The
said letter was attached to a motion to dismiss submitted to the RTC. The
RTC dismissed the case with prejudice on June 15, 1990.
7. The UPCM faculty then held an emergency meeting on June 22, 1990 where
it denied the appeal of the students by a vote if 86 on the grounds that they
are not qualified for admission to the UPCM.
8. The students then filed a motion the RTC to reconsider its order of dismissal
and, on June 27, 1990, the RTC issued an order for the admission of the
students to the college.
9. The BOR, in 1031st meeting dated June 28, 1990, resolved to approve the
admission of the students and order the petitioners to admit them. When the
Dean and Secretary of the UPCM failed to follow the order of the BOR, the
UP President issued a formal charge of Grave Misconduct and, later, Order
for Preventive Suspension against them.
10. On July 20, 1990, the RTC issued an Order which (a) required petitioners to
show cause why they should not be held in contempt for disobeying and
resisting its order dated June 27, 1990 and (b) denied the petitioners' motion
to lift injunction.
11. Petitioners’  appeals  to  the  CA  were  all  denied.
ISSUES
1. WoN the BOR could validly direct the petitioners to admit the students to
the college of medicine – YES
2. WoN the BOR acted beyond its power when it retained the NMAT cut-off
score of 70th percentile – NO
3. WoN the BoR violated the academic freedom related to the right of the
University to fix admission requirements – NO
4. WoN the decision of the CA was against justice and equity because the
students themselves judicially confessed that they have no right to
admission – NO
RULING: The petition is DISMISSED and the decisions of the CA are
AFFIRMED
RATIO:
1. To the BOR belongs the governance and the general powers of
administration of the university. The UC has the power to fix the admission
requirements to any college in the university while the College Faculty has
the power to determine the entrance requirements of the college subject to
the approval of the autonomous UC. At the time that the students took the
NMAT, the new UPCM Faculty prescribed 90 percentile cut-off grade was
without the UC's approval. Consequently, the UPCM Faculty cannot legally
implement a change in the NMAT cut-off grade. It then follows that the
previously approved 70 percentile cut-off remains the prescribed passing
grade for the students. Thus, the students have all the right to stay in the
college inasmuch as they met the cut-off score of 70 percentile imposed by
the UC and such right could not be abridged or denied by the resolutions of
the UC Manila dated July 20, 1990 and September 5, 1990 which sustained
the Faculty's refusal to admit the students. Under the Constitution, the
students have the right to select a profession or course of study subject to a
fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements
(Article XIV, Section 5(3)). The UC can ratify acts of the College regarding
admission requirements but the same should be done within a reasonable
time. To validate the resolutions at this point in time would not be fair and
equitable to the students who have proved their mettle by passing the
academic requirements of the college for three years.
2. The BOR did not exercise the power to prescribe entrance requirements
 (powers that it does not have) but merely upheld the power of the
University Council under the law to fix the requirements for admission to
the UPCM and rendered ineffective the action of the UPCM Faculty, which
attempted to exercise that power to increase the cut off score in NMAT to
90 percentile without the approval of the University Council and President
of the University in accordance with the exercise of its power of governance
and its duty in seeing to it that all the units abide with the law, university
rules and regulations.
3. The BOR in its order upholding the admission requirement approved by the
University Council in 1986 did not violate academic freedom but rather
supported the right of the University Council to fix or approve admission
requirements against the UPCM faculty and Dean who changed the
admission requirements approved by the University Council without
following the prescribed rules and procedures of the University.
4. There is no categorical admission of the absence of a right in the letter
submitted by the students and, even if there was, it cannot be accepted as it
involves a conclusion of law based on the students' misapprehension of their
legal right. The court found that the letter was predicated more on
overwhelming sense of hopelessness in view of the circumstances which
they  perceived  was  against  them  and  the  “three  agonizing  years  of  uncertain  
relationship  spent  in  the  college”.  

NOTE: The BOR's claim of plenary power over admission requirements is not
officially approved by the SC as such claim has no basis in law. The UC has the
final say in admission requirements provided the same conforms with law, rules
and regulations of the university. In the event the power is abused or misused, it
becomes the duty of the BOR, being the highest governing body in the
university, to step in and to correct the anomaly.
 GOLDBERG v. KELLY
March 23, 1970 | Brennan, J. | Procedural Due Process
SUMMARY: Procedures for termination of financial aid, including post-
termination evidentiary hearings, were enacted by the State of NY but are
being challenged as violative of due process. SC held that due process
requires fair hearing before termination.
DOCTRINE:The extent to w/c procedural due process must be afforded the
recipient depends upon whether the interest in avoiding a grievous loss
outweighs governmental interest in summary adjudication. The fundamental
requisite of due process, the opportunity to be heard, must be tailored to the
capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard.
FACTS:
1. Residents of New York receiving financial aid under the federal or state
program brought a complaint alleging that officials terminated or were
about to terminate aid w/o notice or hearing, denying them due process if
law. Before the suit was brought, there was no requirement of prior notice
or hearing before termination of financial aid. Thereafter, procedures were
adopted by the State and the constitutional adequacy of these procedures is
now being challenged before the Court.
2. The procedures provide that a caseworker must first discuss eligibility
issues with the recipient, and recommend such to a supervisor, who has the
power to approve the same. It also provides that 1) notice must be given on
proposed discontinuance at least 7 days from its effective date; 2) with
notice that the recipient may request a review of the proposal; 3) written
notice of the decision be given to the recipient. Thereafter, aid is to be
discontinued. However, the letter informs the recipient that he may request
a  “fair  hearing”  post-termination.
the welfare bureaucracy. Also, there exists a governmental interest in
affording a pre-termination evidentiary hearing to the recipients—for public
assistance is not mere charity but a means to promote general welfare.The
government’s   competing   interest   in   summary   adjudication   is   on  
conservation of both fiscal and administrative time and energy by reducing
the number of evidentiary hearings actually held. However, these
governmental interests are not overriding in the welfare context.
3. The Court held that the purpose of a fair hearing is to produce an initial
determination of the validity of the grounds for discontinuance in order to
protect the recipient against an erroneous termination of benefits. However,
the Court is not prepared to impose upon the State any procedural
requirement beyond those demanded by rudimentary due process; thus only
the barest minimum procedural safeguards are imposable. Accordingly, the
fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard at
a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, as tailored to the capacities
and circumstances of those who are to be heard. Also, to ensure fairness and
proper determination on questions of fact, due process requires an
opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. Finally, the
decision   maker’s   conclusions   must   then   rest   solely   on   the   legal   rules   and  
evidence adduced at the hearing. In this case, written submissions do not
provide the flexibility of oral arguments, and are additionally unrealistic for
recipients who cannot write nor afford professional help.

ISSUE/S: WoN the due process clause requires that the recipient be afforded
evidentiary hearing before the termination of benefits—YES

RULING: Judgment AFFIRMED.

RATIO:
1. The extent to w/c procedural due process must be afforded the recipient is
influenced by the extent to which he may be condemned to suffer grievous
loss, and depends upon whether the interest in avoiding that loss outweighs
governmental interest in summary adjudication.
2. In this case, the termination of aid pending resolution on eligibility may
deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by w/c to live while he waits.
This might make him desperate and affect his ability to seek redress from
 BELL v. BURSON
May 24, 1971 | Brennan, J. | Certiorari | Procedural Due Process
SUMMARY:   Petitioner   challenged   Georgia’s   Motor   Vehicle   Safety   issuance of licenses to all motorists who did not carry liability insurance or
Responsibility Act as violative of due process because it excluded any
consideration of fault or responsibility at a pre-suspension hearing and
suspended  an  uninsured  motorist’s  vehicle  registration  and  driver’s  license   under penalty of loss of the licenses.
unless he posts security for the amount of damages claimed. The Court
held that the statutory scheme was unconstitutional.
DOCTRINE: Except in emergency situations, due process requires that
when the State seeks to terminate an interest, it must afford notice and
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case before the
effectivity of the termination. Different forms of due process are needed in
varying contexts.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner, a clergyman, was in an accident when five year old Sherry Capes
rode  her  bicycle  into  the  side  of  his  car.  The  child’s  parents  filed  an  accident   of the procedural due process which must be afforded the licensee regarding
report with the Director of the Georgia Department of Public Safety
indicating that she suffered substantial injuries for which they claimed
$5,000 in damages.
2. The Director informed the petitioner that unless he was covered by a
liability insurance policy effective at the time of the accident, he had to file
a bond or cash security deposit of $5,000 or present a notarized release from
liability, plus proof of future financial responsibility, or suffer the
suspension   of   his   driver’s   license   and   vehicle   registration,   pursuant to
Georgia’s  Motor  Vehicle  Safety  Responsibility  Act.
3. Petitioner asserted that he was not liable since the accident was unavoidable
and that he needed his license for his ministerial duties, and requested an
administrative hearing before the Director. Said hearing was scheduled, but
the Director informed him that the only evidence that could be accepted was
that (a) WoN petitioner/his vehicle was involved in the accident; (b) WoN
petitioner complied with the provisions of Law as provided; or (c) WoN
petitioner falls under any of the exceptions of law. At the hearing, the
Director  rejected  petitioner’s  proffer  of  evidence  on  liability.
4. Petitioner   challenged   the   Act’s   constitutionality   due   to   denial   of   due  
process, in failing to afford him a hearing on the question of his fault or
liability before suspending the licenses.
ISSUE/S: WoN the statute is unconstitutional for violation of due process –
YES.
RULING: Judgment reversed and remanded.
RATIO:
1. The statute would not violate the Fourteenth Amendment if it barred the
post security; but the Fourteenth Amendment does not permit the scheme
where only motorists involved in accidents are required to post security
2. Licenses are not to be taken away without procedural due process required
by the Fourteenth Amendment where their suspension involves state action
that adjudicates important interests of the licensees. Relevant constitutional
constraints limit state power to terminate an entitlement whether it is a
‘right’  or  a  ‘privilege’.
3. It is fundamental that except in emergency situations, due process requires
that the State afford notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the
nature of the case before the effectivity of the termination of an interest
such as that involved in the case at bar.
4. Different forms of due process are needed in varying contexts. The nature
his fault or liability for the accident need not take the form of a full
adjudication of the question of liability, which can only be made in
litigation between the involved parties. The procedural due process in the
case at bar will be satisfied by an inquiry limited to ther determination
whether there is a reasonable possibility of judgments being rendered
against the licensee in the amounts claimed.
5. Georgia’s   argument   that   fault   and   liability   are   irrelevant   to   the   statutory  
scheme does not hold as liability in the sense of an ultimate judicial
determination of responsibility plays a crucial role in the Safety
Responsibility  Act  and  is  an  important  factor  in  the  State’s  determination  of  
depriving an individual of his licenses. As an essential element, due process
requires its inclusion in the preliminary hearing.
6. The Court holds that before the State may deprive petitioner of the license
and registration, it must provide a forum for the determination of the
question whether there is a reasonable possibility of a judgment being
rendered against him as a result of the accident. Georgia has several
alternative methods for compliance with such requirement.
 DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. 5. Upon motion of LAND, The Labor Arbiter ordered the DBP be impleaded
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and required the same to intervene in the case between Lirag and Albay and
March 19, 1990 | Melencio-Herrera, J. | Certiorari | Procedural Due Process LAND.
6. The Writ of Garnishment prayed for by LAND was granted by the Labor
Arbiter and DBP was ordered to remit to the NLRC the sum of P6,
SUMMARY: Lirag was ordered by the NLRC to pay their former employees
292,380.00 out of the proceeds of the foreclosed properties of LIRAG sold
who were dismissed from service, but were unable to do so because DBP had
at public auction in order to satisfy the judgment previously rendered in
extrajudicially foreclosed their mortgaged properties after they failed to pay
favor of the complainants (Albay and LAND).
their obligations. The Labor Arbiter then ordered the DBP be impleaded and
7. DBP argues that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over them since they were
required them to intervene. Later, the NLRC ordered the DBP to pay the
not a party to the case and that they were denied due process of law.
complainant employees out of the proceeds of the foreclosure sale. DBP argues
that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over them and they were deprived due
ISSUE/S:
process of law as they were not an original party to the case. The Court, with
Whether or not DBP was deprived of due process of law – NO
respect to this issue of due process, held otherwise.
Whether  or  not  DBP  may  be  ordered  to  satisfy  the  claims  of  LIRAG’s  workers  
DOCTRINE: A body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions that retains
by virtue of preference of credit to workers under the Labor Code - NO
jurisdiction and control over a case can issue such orders necessary for the
execution of the final judgment, including the impleading of those who are not
RULING: Petition granted. LIRAG’s  creditors  ordered  to  institute  insolvency  
original parties to the case, if such was an incident to the execution of the final
proceedings.
judgment.
There is no deprivation of procedural due process if a party to the case was
RATIO:
given the opportunity to be heard and to present its evidence.
1. While the DBP was not an original party to the case of Albay and LAND,
they had to be impleaded, however, for the proper satisfaction of a final
FACTS:
judgment after the Writs of Execution were not satisfied because the
1. On Feb., 1982, Joselito Albay filed a case at the NLRC against Lirag
properties levied upon on execution had been foreclosed extrajudicially by
Textile Mills, Inc. (Lirag) for illegal dismissal, while on March 1, 1982, the
it.
Labor Alliance for National Development (LAND) also filed a case against
2. The NLRC retained jurisdiction and control over the case and could issue
Lirag on behalf of their 180 members for separation pay, 13th month pay,
such orders as were necessary for the implementation of that award. As
gratuity pay, sick leave and vacation leave pay and emergency allowance.
such it could order the DBP be impleaded since such was an incident to the
The complainants in these 2 cases are former employees of Lirag who were
execution of the final judgment award. The DBP could not have been
dismissed from service due to the retrenchment policy by Lirag.
impleaded earlier in the proceedings because the cause of action of Albay
2. The Labor Arbiter, through a July 30, 1982 decision, ordered Lirag to pay
and LAND was only against Lirag.
the complainants. Said decision was affirmed by the NLRC and became
3. DBP cannot rightfully contend that it was deprived of due process. It was
final and executory.
given the opportunity to be heard and to present its evidence. Furthermore,
3. On Apr. 15, 1983, a Writ of Execution was issued with respect to the NLRC
the Order granting the motion of LAND for a Writ of Execution and
decision, while at the same time the DBP extrajudicially  foreclosed  Lirag’s
Garnishment was issued only after hearing. The fact that they filed an
mortgaged properties due   to   the   latter’s failure to pay their mortgage
opposition to said motion filed by LAND and that they appealed to the
obligations. As such, the Writ of Execution issued in favor of the
NLRC after the Order was issued proves that they had submitted to the
complainants was unsatisfied; thus, a Notice of Levy on Execution on the
NLRC’s  jurisdiction.
properties of LIRAG was then entered.
4. NLRC, however, committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the Writ
4. As the sole bidder in the foreclosure sale, the DBP acquired the foreclosed
of   Garnishment   out   of   the   proceeds   of   LIRAG’s   properties   foreclosed   by  
properties   and   the   proceeds   were   credited   to   partially   satisfy   Lirag’s  
DBP to compensate the monetary claims of the workers. The right to
indebtedness.
preference given to workers under Article 110 of the Labor Code is a
preference in application adopted to determine and specify the order in
 which credits should be paid in the final distribution of the proceeds of the
insolvent’s   assets.   It   is   a right to a first preference in the discharge of the
funds of the judgment debtor. It is not, however, a lien creating a charge on
property which is enforceable against the whole world like the mortgages of
DBP   on   LIRAG’s   properties.     A recorded mortgage credit (like the one
DBP   has   over   LIRAG’s   properties)   is   a   special   preferred   credit   under  
Article 2242 (5) of the Civil Code on classification of credits. The
preference given by Article 110, when not falling within Article 2241 (6)
(claims  for  laborers’  wages,  on  the   goods  manufactured  or  the  work  done)  
and Article 2242 (3) (claims of laborers and other workers engaged in the
construction, reconstruction or repair of buildings, canals and other works,
upon said buildings, canals and other works, upon said buildings, canals and
other works) of the Civil Code and not attached to any specific property, is
an ordinary preferred credit although its impact is to move it from second
priority to first priority in the order of preference established by Article
2244 of the Civil Code.
5. Right to preference given to workers under Article 110 of the Labor Code
will find application in the insolvency proceedings where such unpaid
wages  shall  be  paid  in  full  before  the  “claims  of  the  Government  and  other  
creditors”   may be paid. For   an   orderly   settlement   of   a   debtor’s   assets,   all  
creditors must be convened, their claims ascertained and inventoried, and
thereafter the preferences determined in the course of judicial proceedings
which have for their object the subjection of the property of the debtor to
the payment of his debts or other lawful obligations. Thereby, an orderly
determination  of  preference  of  creditors’ claims is assured.
 UP v. HON. LIGOT-TELAN March 29 meeting. The preliminary injunction was granted, hence the
October 21, 1993 | Romero, J. | Procedural Due Process instant petition.

SUMMARY: Nadal, a senior UP Law student who got suspended for 1 year ISSUE/S: WON Nadal was accorded due process in the administrative
because of falsification of his STFAP application, sues UP for not according disciplinary proceedings against him – YES
him due process in not giving him notice of a Board of Regents meeting
reviewing his sentence. SC rules that he was accorded due process. RULING: Petition GRANTED. CA Decision reversed.
DOCTRINE: What constitutes due process in a university is that which is
governed under its rules, since admission and the power to impose RATIO:
disciplinary  sanctions  falls  under  the  ambit  of  the  school’s  academic  freedom.   1. In Garcia v LST, the Court stated that a school or college with the right of
academic freedom decides for itself its aims and objective and how best to
attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interference, save possibly
FACTS:
when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. In ADMU v
1. Ramon Nadal, a student from the College of Law, applied for a scholarship
Hon. Capulong, the Court stated that the admission to an institution of
under the STFAP a.k.a. Iskolarng Bayan program for 2 schoolyears. A
higher learning is discretionary upon a school, the same being a privilege,
precautionary   measure   to   ensure   the   program’s   integrity   included   the  
and that the establishment of rules particularly on student discipline is
falsification or suppression of any material information as a punishable act
regarded as vital for the smooth operation and survival of the school.
under Section 2(a) of the Rules and Regulations on Student Council
2. Admission to UP and its power to impose disciplinary sanctions falls under
Discipline of the University. Also, a fact-finding team was created to visit
the   ambit   of   the   school’s   academic   freedom;;   hence,   what   constitutes   “due  
the  applicants’  homes  and  verify  the  truth  of  the  information  provided  in  the  
process”   is   that   which   is   governed   under   UP rules. UP rules does not
application/sworn statement.
necessitate the attendance in BOR meetings of individuals whose cases are
2. Accordingly,   Nadal’s   home   in   Blue   Ridge,   QC   was   visited   and   the   team  
included as items on the agenda of the Board. Additionally, the March 29
found out that he withheld information about his ownership of a 1977
meeting was meant only to reconsider the previous decision laid down, so
Toyota  Corolla  and  that  his  mom  worked  in  the  US  to  support  his  brothers’  
Nadal’s   attendance was unnecessary. And since the issue falls within the
schooling. This prompted UP to charge him before the Student Disciplinary
school’s   academic   freedom,   it   is   beyond   the   court’s   jurisdiction   and   the  
Tribunal (SDT), which found him not guilty for withholding information
Court cannot give him any legal remedy regarding the matter.
about   the   car   but   guilty   regarding   his   mom’s   income.   This   charge   was  
3. Hon.Ligot-Telan’s   Grave   Abuse   of   Discretion: Mandamus is not issued in
tantamount to acts of dishonesty, which had the penalty of expulsion from
doubtful cases, a showing of a clear and certain right on the part of the
the  University.  The   UP  Diliman  Executive   Committee  affirmed  the  SDT’s  
petition being required. Hence, by issuing the writ of preliminary
decision upon automatic review. Nadal appealed to the Board of Regents,
injunction, the lower court dared to tread upon legally forbidden grounds in
which was unable to decide on March 28 (4 guilty, 3 not guilty, 3
curtailing   UP’s   exercise of academic freedom. If Nadal had his way, it
conditional votes). Upon the prompting of Regent Antonio T. Carpio, the
would not only undermine the authority of UP to discipline its students who
BOR decided that they would rule on the issue once the information that
violate its rules and regulations, but would subvert the very concept and
Nadal was a scholarship grant recipient in Ateneo HS was affirmed.
intent to give financial assistance to poor but deserving students.
3. Upon   Ateneo’s   certification   that   Nadal   was   a   recipient,   a   special   BOR  
executive  session  in  March  29  at  night,  without  Nadal’s  presence  to  witness  
as such, found Nadal guilty, but lowered his penalty out of compassion to a
1-year suspension, non-issuance of certificate of good moral character, and
reimbursement of STFAP benefits w/ 12% interest, non-settlement of which
would constitue non-issurance of his ToR until he has paid.
4. Nadal files with RTC QC a petition for mandamus with preliminary
injunction and prayer for TRO against the BOR and other UP officers
stating that he was denied due process since he was not present during the
 SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. LANTION
January 18, 2000 | Melo, J. | Petition for Review of RTC decision | Procedural ISSUE/S:
Due Process 1. WoN at the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, Jimenez is
entitled to the 2 basic due process rights of notice and hearing – YES.
SUMMARY: DOJ conducted an evaluation procedure (which function was 2. If yes, WoNentitlement constitutes a breach of the legal commitments and
conferred to DFA but was not exercised) regarding a request for the obligations of the Phil Govt under the RP-US Treaty – NO.
extradition of Mark Jimenez to the US. Jimenez requested copies of the 3. If  yes,  WoN  there  is  conflict  between  respondent’s  basic  due  process  rights  
extradition documents, ample time to comment on the request and that the and the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty – NO.
proceeding be held in abeyance, which the DoJ denied. SC ruled that
evaluation procedure partakes in the nature of criminal investigation which RULING: DISMISSED for lack of merit.
may lead to the deprivation of liberty. Therefore, extraditee must be accorded
due process rights of notice and hearing. RATIO:
DOCTRINE: The basic rights of notice and hearing pervade not only in 1. The evaluation procedure sets into motion the extradition process, and
criminal and civil proceedings, but in administrative proceedings as well. would ultimately lead to the deprivation of liberty of the prospective
extraditee, which can be affected in 2 stages: 1) Provisional arrest of the
prospective extraditee pending submission of request. 2) Temporary arrest
FACTS:
of extraditee during pendency of the extradition petition in court. The
1. On  Jan  13,  1977,  Pres.  Marcos  issued  PD  1069  “Prescribing  the  Procedure  
evaluation process essentially partakes the nature of a criminal
for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign
investigation. Although certain constitutional rights are ordinarily available
Country”,  founded  on  the  doctrine  of  incorporation.
only in criminal prosecution, the Court has ruled that where the
2. On Nov 13, 1994, Sec. of Justice Franklin Drilon signed in Manila the
investigation of an administrative proceeding may result in forfeiture of life,
“Extradition   Treaty   between   the   Government   of   the   Republic   of   the  
liberty or property, the administrative proceedings are deemed criminal and
Philippines   and   the   Government   of   the   United   States   of   America”,   which  
such forfeiture partakes the nature of penalty. Since the evaluation
was concurred by the Senate by way of Res. No. 11.
proceedings may lead his arrest, extradite must be accorded due process
3. On June 18, 1999, DoJ received from the DFA US Note Verbale No. 0522
rights of notice and hearing.
containing a request for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the US, who
The basic rights of notice and hearing pervade in criminal, civil and
was charged in the US for violating the ff provisions of the United States
administrative proceedings, non-observance of which will invalidate
Code: 1) Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US, 2) Attempt to
proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case
evade or defeat tax, 3) Fraud by wire, radio or television, 4) False statement
affecting their interests and upon notice, they may claim the right to appear
of entries, 5) Election contributions in the name of another. Petitioner issued
therein and present their side.
DO 249 designating and ordering a panel of attys to take charge and handle
Rights and notice to hearing, dispensable in 3 cases: 1) Urgent need for
the case pursuant to PD 1069.
immediate action, 2) Tentativeness of administrative action and respondent
4. On July 1, 1999, pending evaluation, Jimenez, through counsel, wrote a
is prevented from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time, 3)
letter requesting 1) copies of the official extradition request from the US
twin rights have been offered, but right to exercise them had not been
Gov’t,   and   all   documents   submitted   therewith,   2) be given ample time to
claimed.
comment on the request, 3) and that the proceedings be held in abeyance.
2. Both U.S. and Philippines accord common due process protection to their
Petitioner denied foregoing requests.
citizens. The administrative investigation does not fall under the exceptions
5. On Aug 6, 1999, Jimenez filed with the RTC of NCR a petition for
stated above, in Sec. 3, Rule 122, RoC.
mandamus, certiorari and prohibition, which was presided over by Hon.
3. Doctrine of incorporation, under international law, decrees that rules of
Ralph Lantion who ordered the DoJ Sec., DFA Sec. and the Director of
international law are given equal standing with national legislative acts.
NBI, their agents to refrain from conducting proceedings in connection with
They can repeal each other. There is also no conflict. Veil of secrecy is
the extradition of Jimenez, from filing the corresponding petition with a
lifted during trial. The request should impose the veil at any stage.
RTC and from performing any act directed to the extradition of Jimenez for
a period of 20 days from service of the Order.
 SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. LANTION (RESOLUTION)
October 17, 2000 | Puno, J. | Procedural Due Process
SUMMARY: DoJ conducted an evaluation procedure regarding a request for
the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the US. Jimenez requested copies of the
extradition documents, ample time to comment on the request and that the
proceeding be held in abeyance, which the DoJ denied. SC ruled in favor of
respondent. Upon an Urgent MR, SC, en banc, reversed the decision, holding
that respondent is not entitled to notice and hearing during the evaluation
process.
DOCTRINE: Procedural due process requires a prior determination of whether
procedural protections are at all due and when they are due, which in turn
depends on the extent to which an individual will be condemned to suffer a
grievous loss.
FACTS:
1. The DoJ received from the DFA a request for the extradition of Mark
Jimenez to the US. Petitioner designated and ordered a panel of attorneys to
take charge and handle the case pursuant to PD 1069.Pending evaluation,
Jimenez requested copies of the extradition request documents, ample time
to comment on the request, and to hold the proceedings in abeyance.
Petitioner denied foregoing requests.
2. SC, in its decision dated January 18, 2000 dismissed the petition and
ordered petitioner to furnish respondent copies of the extradition request
and its supporting documents and to grant him a reasonable period within
which to file his comment with supporting evidence.
3. Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, to which respondent
opposed. SC granted MR.
ISSUE/S: WoN private respondent is entitled to the due process right to notice
and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process – NO.
RULING: Urgent Motion for Reconsideration GRANTED. Jan. 18, 2000
decision REVERSED. Assailed order SET ASIDE.
RATIO:
1. RP-US Extradition Treaty provides the time when an extraditee shall be
furnished with the extradition documents – after the filing of the petition for
extradition in the extradition court. The Treaty and PD 1069 are silent on an
extraditee’s  right  to  demand  copies  of  the  extradition  documents  while  the   loss. Right to notice and hearing is simply momentarily withheld during the
request is still under evaluation.
2. Treaties should be interpreted according to their intent: Assurance that the
punishment of international and transnational crimes are not frustrated.
Minimize the escape of extradites from the law and expedite their trial. The
demand for advance notice can delay the extradition evaluation process,
which, in turn, may delay the service of justice.
3. Understanding of the parties: Both RP (through the DoJ and DFA) and US,
as well as other countries with similar extradition treaties do not grant
extraditee a right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
extradition process.
4. An extradition proceeding is sui generis, not a criminal proceeding that
determines   an   accused’s   guilt   or   innocence   which   affords   him   the  
constitutional guarantees. Similarly, the evaluation stage is not akin to a
preliminary investigation.
Extradition Proceedings Criminal Proceedings
Summary in nature Full-blown trial
Prima facie case: less stringent Proof beyond reasonable doubt
standards
Final discretion resides in the Judgment is final and executory
President
Procedural due process must begin with a determination of the nature of the
government function and the private interest affected by governmental
action. Not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same
kind of procedure.
5. No   threat   to   extraditee’s   liberty:   Private   respondent   may   be   provisionally  
arrested only pending receipt of the request for extradition. DFA has long
since received the extradition request, therefore, the threat has already
passed. Likewise, a warrant of arrest for temporary detention may only be
issued upon the filing of the petition for extradition. The extradition is still
in the evaluation stage. It is still uncertain if a petition for extradition will be
filed, thus, the threat is merely hypothetical.
6. Right to liberty v. State interest: Given that the extradition is still in the
evaluation process, the nature of the right claimed is vague and the degree
of prejudice suffered is weak, greater weight is accorded to the interest of
the state – suppressing crimes.
7. Procedural due process requires a prior determination of whether procedural
protections are at all due and when they are due, which in turn depends on
the extent to which an individual will be condemned to suffer a grievous
evaluation stage. This is a soft restraint on his right to due process which
will not deprive him of fundamental fairness.
 ESTRADA v. SANDIGANBAYAN
November 19, 2001 | Bellosillo, J. | Petition | Procedural Due Process
SUMMARY: Petitioner Joseph Estrada assailed RA 7659 as
unconstitutional. He cited three reasons which allegedly constitute a
violation of his right to due process. The Supreme Court did not find them
sufficient to merit a grant in the petition.
DOCTRINE: A law must be clear enough that it will provide the accused
definite parameters for the nature and cause of the accusation so he can
prepare for an intelligent defense, in accordance with due process.
FACTS:
1. On April 2001, the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight
separate Informations against petitioner for the violation, inter alia, of the
Plunder law. Estrada then filed an Omnibus Motion for remand of case to
the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation and for reconsideration of the
offenses charged, to give the accused an opportunity to file counter-
affidavits and other documents to prove lack of probable cause.
2. Sandiganbayan ruled in a resolution that probable cause for plunder exists
which the petitioner moved to quash to no avail.
3. Petitioner Joseph Estrada assailed the Plunder Law in the SC alleging that
(1) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the
“reasonable  doubt”  standard  in  criminal prosecution; and (c) it abolishes the
element of mens rea in crimes punishable under the RPC. These all
constitute a violation of his fundamental rights to due process and be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
3. Petitioner’s   argument   that   the   Plunder   Law   is   vague   and   overbroad   is  
beyond reason. He contended that there is a failure to inform him of the
nature of the accusation which seems for the court to be pure sophistry.
It is well settled that words of a statute will be interpreted by their natural
signification unless it is evident that a technical meaning was applied to
those   words.   The   words   “combination”   and   “series”   assailed   by   the  
petitioner for vagueness cannot hold for the law and the ConCom records
show enough meaning to it. A statute may only be considered as vague
when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess its meaning. In the case at bar, ambiguity where
none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts of the statute.
4. Petitioner’s  contention  that  the  “reasonable  doubt”  has  been  forgone  is  not  
true. The legislature only intended to supply proof even for only a single
allegation which is mixed in the Information and does not require proof in
every allegation.
5. It is also stated that plunder is malum in se which requires proof of criminal
intent. In the information filed, it was alleged that plunder was committed
“willfully,   unlawfully   and   criminally”   which   alleges   the   guilty   knowledge  
of the petitioner. It was also held that plunder is a heinous offense, which
implied malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral,
they are deemed mala in se.

ISSUE/S: WoN the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague thus
violating right to due process? - NO

RULING: Petition denied. Plunder law is constitutional.

RATIO:
1. The constitutionality of a challenged law will not be touched as long as the
case can be decided on other available grounds. Unconstitutionality must be
based on an infringement of the constitution so defined, that doubt even if
well-founded will not suffice.
2. As it is written in the Plunder law, standards and parameters are
ascertainable   to   determine   an   accused’s   nature   of   violation.   Conducts  
required and forbidden have been prescribed and the law was able to afford
some comprehensible guide that leads to its validity.
 CALDER v. BULL
August  8,  1798  |  Chase,  J.  |  “Old”  Substantive  Due  Process
SUMMARY: The Connecticut Legislature passed a law or resolution in
1795 granting a new trial and a period of appeal to Bull and his wife with
respect to a will executed by Morrison in their favor which was earlier
disapproved by the court in 1793. By virtue of the said law or resolution,
the will was approved. Calder and his wife, claiming a right to recover
property from Morrison, challenges the 1795 legislative act, claiming that it
was an ex post facto law. Petition denied.
DOCTRINE: The prohibition against ex post facto laws only applies to
penal statutes. If the prohibition was to be construed to include all laws with
retrospective effect this would render the prohibitions such as those against
impairment of obligation of contracts taking of private property for public
use without just compensation and deprivation of vested rights from citizens
under existing laws as unnecessary.
FACTS:
1. Normand Morrison executed a will (Aug. 21, 1779) in favor of Bull and
wife, his grandparents. Said will was disapproved by the court of Probate
for Harford on March 21, 1793 and the court refused to record that said
will.
2. Calder and his wife, on the other hand, claim the property which is the
subject   of   Morrison’s   will   by   virtue   of   the   right   of   the   wife   as   heiress   of   court to which they had acquired the right to recover property. The right to
Morrison as physician. As a consequence of the disapproval by the court of
Morrison’s  will,  the  right  to  recover  the  property was vested in Calder and
wife.
3. On May, 1795, the Legislature of Connecticut passed a law or resolution
that set aside the aforementioned decree and granted a new hearing, and
appeal within 6 months. By virtue of this legislation, The Court of Probate
then approved the said will (July, 27, 1795) and ordered for it to be
recorded.
4. The ruling of the Court of Probate was affirmed by the superior court at
Harford (Feb., 1795), and was later affirmed by the Supreme Court of errors
of Connecticut (June, 1796).
5. Calder and wife are challenging the legislation which granted a new hearing
claiming that it is an ex post facto law prohibited under the U.S.
Constitution.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the challenged law or resolution is an ex post facto law - NO
2. Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to decide that any law
made by Congress, contrary to the Constitution of the United States, is void
– NO
HELD/RULING: Petition denied. Judgment affirmed
RATIO:
1. Kinds of ex post facto laws:
Every law that makes an action , done before the passing of the law, and
which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action
Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when
committed.
Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment,
than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.
Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or
different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of
the offence, in order to convict the offender.
2. There is a distinction between ex post facto laws and laws with retrospective
effect. The former are always retrospective in application and are the ones
prohibited by the Constitution. The latter, on the other hand, are not prohibited
per se and may even be enacted for the benefit of the community or individuals.
In the present case, no fact done by Calder and wife was affected by the
operation of the law or resolution. What it only affected was the judgment of the
recover property, in contrast to the right to property, was not a perfect and
exclusive right. The decree against the will of Morrison (1793) did not vest or
transfer any property to Calder and wife.
3. The Court held that this was not something that falls within the prohibition
against ex post facto laws. If the prohibition was to be construed to include all
laws with retrospective effect, this would render the prohibitions such as those
against impairment of obligation of contracts, taking of private property for
public use without just compensation, and deprivation of vested rights from
citizens under existing laws, as unnecessary.
4. The Court held that it has no jurisdiction to decide whether any law or
resolution passed by Congress was against the Constitution, thus void. Even if it
has such jurisdiction, there is nothing in the law or resolution passed by the
Legislature that is contrary to the Connecticut constitution. Furthermore, the
courts of Connecticut would be the proper venue to settle those matters.
Also, while a question of very great importance, it not necessary to determine
whether the Legislature of any of the States can revise and correct by law, a
decision of any of its Courts of Justice, although not prohibited by the
Constitution of the State, because the resolution or law in question does not go
so far.
 LOCHNER v. PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
April 17, 1905 | Peckham,  J.  |  “Old”  Substantive  Due  Process
SUMMARY: Lochner was charged under the NY statute prohibiting
employees to work more than 10 hrs a day. He challenged its validity and SC
found for him.
DOCTRINE:The mere assertion that the subject relates to public health does
not make the enactment valid. It must have a direct relation, as a means to an
end, and the end itself must be appropriate and legitimate, before an act that
interferes with the general right of an individual to be free in his person can
be held to be valid.
FACTS:
1. Joseph Lochner was charged with violation of the 110th section of Article 8,
Chapter 415 of the Laws of 1987 (Labor Law of the State of New York),
which   states,   “no   employee   shall   be   required   or   permitted   to   work   more   labor and right of free contract.
than   10   hours   per   day.”   His   violation   consisted   in   requiring   his   employee
(baker/confectioner) to work more than 60 hours in 1 week.
2. Lochner challenged the validity of the statute. The lower courts upheld the
statute as a valid exercise of police power for public health.
ISSUE/S: WoN the statute is enacted in the valid exercise of police power—
NO.
RULING: Petition GRANTED. Decisions REVERSED.
RATIO:
1. The Court held that the statute does not merely fix the number of hours
which shall constitute a legal day's work, but absolutely prohibits the
employer to permit, under any circumstances, more than ten hours' work to
be done in his establishment. This necessarily interferes with the right of
contract between employer and employee, even should the latter desire to
earn extra money by working longer hours. This right to make a contract in
relation to his business, and consequently the right to purchase or sell labor,
is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the 14 th amendment of
the Federal Constitution.
2. However, police power can impose reasonable conditions upon property
and liberty as they relate to the safety, health, morals, and general welfare of
the public. Thus, if the contract be one which the state has the right to
prohibit in the legitimate exercise of its police power, the 14th Amendment
would offer no protection. Similarly, there is a limit to the valid exercise of
police power by the state, else the 14th Amendment would have no efficacy
and the legislatures of the states would have unbounded power to say that a
regulation covers safety, health, etc no matter how unfounded the claim
may be and essentially override personal liberties. The question to be asked
is whether this is a fair, reasonable, and appropriate exercise of police
power.
3. Here the Court held that there is no reasonable ground for interfering with
liberty in the name of public health because:
a. Consumer health: Clean and wholesome bread does not depend on
whether the baker works 10 hrs per day or 60 hrs per week. The
mere assertion that the subject relates to public health does not make
the enactment valid. It must have a direct relation, as a means to an end,
and the end itself must be appropriate and legitimate, before an act that
interferes with the general right of an individual to be free in his person
can be held to be valid.
b. Baker’s   health:   The   trade   of   the   baker   is   not   an   unhealthy   one   to   the  
degree w/c would authorize the legislature to interfere with the right to
There must be more than the mere
fact of the possible existence of a small amount of unhealthiness to
warrant legislative interference with liberty.
4. These statutes remain interferences with the right of the individual and are
not saved from condemnation by the claim that they are passed under the
exercise of police power. There has to be some fair ground, reasonable in
and of itself, to say that there is material danger to public health, or to the
employees, if the labor hours are not curtailed.
5. The purpose of a statute must be determined from the natural and legal
effect of the language employed; and whether or not it is repugnant to the
Constitution must be determined from the natural effect of such statutes
when put into operation, and not from their proclaimed purpose. The Court
opined that the real object and purpose of the statute seems to be to regulate
hours between employer and employee in a private business, not dangerous
in any degree to morals, or in any real and substantial degree to health.
Under such circumstances, the freedom of master and employee to contract
with each other cannot be prohibited or interfered with w/o violating the
14th Amendment.
DISSENT, Holmes:
- The case was decided upon an economic theory which a larger part of the
country does not entertain. Courts ought to conclude judgment on whether
statutes embodying certain views are in conflict with the Constitution of the US,
infringing upon fundamental principles as they have been understood by the
traditions of our people and our law—not on the basis of the dominant opinion.
 PEOPLE v. POMAR
November 3, 1924 | Johnson,  J.  |  Appeal  from  CFI  judgment  |  “Old”  Substantive   US Supreme Court held that the minimum wage statute was void on the
Due Process
SUMMARY: Pomar was found guilty for violating Sec 13 of Act 3071 which
requires owners or managers of a factory, shop, or place of labor to grant
pregnant laborers employed in a 30-day leave with pay before delivery and
another 30-day leave after confinement. SC held that this created a term in
every contract w/o consent of the parties, in depriving them of their liberty to
contract.
DOCTRINE: The right to contract about one's own affairs is a part of the
liberty of the individual under the constitution. Contracting parties may
establish any agreements, terms, and conditions they may deem advisable,
provided they are not contrary to law, morals or public policy.
FACTS:
1. Julio Pomar is the manager and person-in-charge of La Flor de la Isabela, a
tobacco factory, who granted Macaria Fajardo (a cigar-maker in the factory)
vacation leave by reason of her pregnancy. However, he failed and refused
to pay her the sum of P80, which she was entitled to as her regular wages
corresponding to 30 days before the delivery and 30 days after confinement.
Fajardo filed a complaint alleging a violation of Sec 13 of Act No. 3071 of
the Philippine Legislature.
2. Said   act   states,   “Every   person,   firm   or   corporation   owning   or   managing   a  
factory, shop or place of labor of any description shall be obliged to grant to
any woman employed by it as laborer who may be pregnant, thirty days
vacation  with  pay  before  and  another  thirty  days  after  confinement.”  Pomar  
contended that the provisions on which the complaint was based were
illegal, unconstitutional, and void.
3. The judge found him guilty and sentenced him to pay a fine of P50.
2. In  the  case  of  Adkins  v  Children’s  Hospital  of  the  District  of  Columbia,  the  
ground that the right to contract about one's own affairs was a part of the
liberty of the individual under the constitution. In making such contracts,
the parties have an equal right to obtain from each other the best terms they
can as the result of private bargaining. However, this liberty is not absolute
and must yield to the common good.
3. Here, Sec 13 creates a term or condition in every contract made by every
person, firm, or corporation with any woman who may, during the course of
her employment, become pregnant, and a failure to include in said contract
the terms fixed to a fine and imprisonment. This interferes with their rights
to enter into contracts of employment upon such terms employer-employee
may agree upon. It creates a term in every such contract without the consent
of the parties, depriving them of their liberty to contract. Such liberty to
contract is only deprived when such is used for the violation of a valid
existing law. Thus, the rule is that contracting parties may establish any
agreements, terms, and conditions they may deem advisable, provided they
are not contrary to law, morals or public policy.
4. The state, in the exercise of its police power for providing legislation for the
protection of public health, public morals or public safety, remains subject
to the paramount authority of the constitution, and it will not be permitted to
violate rights secured and guaranteed by the same.

ISSUE/S: WoN the Act has been adopted in the reasonable and lawful exercise
of the police power of the state—NO

RULING: Petition GRANTED. Decision of lower court REVOKED.

RATIO:
1. The Court first established that the purpose of Sec 13 was to safeguard the
health of pregnant women laborers in "factory, shop or place of labor of any
description," and of insuring to them reasonable support for 1 month before
and 1 month after their delivery. But whether or not this was adopted in the
reasonable and lawful exercise of police power is another question.
 NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY v. PHILIPPINE Records show that no decree by Marcos was deemed unconstitutional by the
VETERANS BANK high court during his reign.
December 10, 1990 | Cruz, J. | Petition for Review of RTC decision |“Old”   2. PD 1717 is not a valid exercise of police power. It does not identify or
Substantive Due Process explain the public interest involved in the creation of the New Argix, Inc.
and the extinction of the property rights of creditors of AGRIX. The property
rights of the creditors of AGRIX, as protected by the Bill of Rights, are
SUMMARY: SC ruled that PD 1717 is not a valid exercise of police power arbitrarily destroyed in favor of another contrary to the principle that private
and it violates both the right to due process and equal protection clause. property cannot simply be taken by law from one person and given to
DOCTRINE: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without another without compensation and any known public purpose.
due process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the PD 1717 violates the equal protection clause since the secured creditors are
law. treated in the same manner as the unsecured creditors with respect to the
prosecution of their claims contrary to the principle that that there should be
FACTS: equality only among equals.
1. Presidential Decree No. 1717 ordered the rehabilitation of the Agrix Group PD 1717impairs the obligation of the contracts between ARGIX and private
of Companies to be administered mainly by the National Development respondents without justification: No public interest is shown to warrant the
Company (NDC) and outlined how claims can be filed against the said group deprivation of the private respondent's vested property rights.
of companies. Earlier, a real estate mortgage was executed by Agrix New Agrix, Inc. was created by special decree notwithstanding the provision
Marketing, Inc. (AGRIX) in favor of Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB). of Article XIV, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution.
During the course of the mortgage, AGRIX went bankrupt. PVB filed a
claim pursuant to PD 1717 for the payment of its loan credit. The New
Argix, Inc. and the NDC filed a petition with the RTC of Calamba, Laguna
for the cancellation of the lien invoking Section 4(1) of PD 1717 which
provides that "all mortgages and other liens presently attaching to any of the
assets of the dissolved corporations are hereby extinguished." A second case
was filed with the same court when PVB took steps to extrajudicially
foreclose the mortgage.
2. The RTC annulled not only Sec. 4 (1), but the entire decree on the grounds
that it was a violation of the principle of the separation of powers; impaired
the obligation of contracts; and violated the equal protection clause.

ISSUES:
1. WoN the respondents are estopped from contesting PD 1717 – NO
2. WoN PD 1717 is unconstitutional – YES

RULING: The petition is DISMISSED. Pres. Decree No. 1717 is declared

UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

RATIO:
1. The respondent should not be considered estopped for having abided with
the decree instead of boldly assailing it at a time when President Marcos was
the absolute ruler of the country and whose decrees were absolute law. To do
so would turn a blind eye to the reality during those oppressive times.
 PEOPLE v. NAZARIO 2. The act must be utterly vague on its face (i.e. cannot be clarified by either
August 31, 1988 | Sarmiento, J. | Appeal from judgment of TC | “Old”   saving clause or construction), not merely imprecise or defectively phrased.
Substantive Due Process Nor can it refer to statutes that are apparently ambiguous yet are fairly
applicable to certain types of activities.
SUMMARY: Petitioner admitted to violation of certain municipal ordinances, 3. In no way are the ordinances in the case at bar vague. By their very
but contended that they were unconstitutional due to vagueness and therefore provisions, it is evident that the appellant falls within their scope. As the
he incurred no liability. The Court ruled that the ordinances set forth sufficient fishpond’s  actual  operator,  he  is  the  manager  of  the  same.  Nor  does  he  deny  
standards to clarify the imagined ambiguities and therefore were not vague. that he financed the construction of the fishponds, introduced fish fries into
DOCTRINE: A statute or act is vague when it lacks comprehensible standards the fishponds, and maintained laborers to maintain them. While it appears
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and that it is the National Government which owns them, the government never
differ as to its application; but it must be utterly vague on its face. shared in the generated profits, and the Government is immune from taxes.
As the actual operator of the fishponds in question, and the recipients of
FACTS: their profits, the petitioner is clearly liable for the municipal taxes in
1. Petitioner was charged with violation of Ordinances No. 4, series of 1955, question.
No. 15, series of 1965, and No. 12, series of 1966, of the municipal council 4. The claim of vagueness as to dates of payment has no merit. Ordinance No.
of Pagbilao in Quezon province. 15,  in   making  the  tax  payable  “after   the  lapse  of  three   years  starting   from  
2. The pertinent provisions taxed fishpond owners/managers within the the date said fishpond is approved by the   Bureau   of   Fisheries”   and   its  
territorial limits of Pagbilao P3/hec of fishpond per annum (Sec 1 of amendment   by   Ordinance   No.12   which   reckons   liability   “beginning   and  
Ordinance No.4), the date of such payment beginning after the lapse of taking effect from the year 1964 is the fishpond started operating before the
three  years  starting  from  the  fishpond’s  approval  by  the  Bureau  of  Fisheries   year   1964”,   both   definitely   establish   the   dates   of   payment.   Appellant’s  
(Sec 1(a) of Ordinance No. 15), and beginning and taking effect from 1964, alleged uncertainty for his liability for 1964-1966 is a mere problem in
if the fishpond started operating before 1964 (Sec 1 of Ordinance No. 12). computation, but does not make the ordinances vague. As it is, the liability
3. Petitioner admitted committing the acts charged, but claimed that the accrues from 1 Jan 1964 for fishponds in operation prior thereto (Ordinance
ordinances were unconstitutional or, assuming arguendo their No.12), and for new fishponds, three years after their approval for the
constitutionality, did not apply to him. As the petitioner was a lessee of a Bureau of Fisheries (Ordinance No. 15). Ordinance No.12 merely granted
fishpond, he contended that he was not covered since the ordinances amnesty unto old, delinquent fishpond operators, but did not repeal the old
referred  to  ‘owner  or  manager’,  and  maintained  that  they  are  vague  insofar   ordinances.
as reckoning the date of payment, since the Ordinances appear to refer to 5. While the standards which clarify the imagined ambiguities are not apparent
different dates. from their face, they are visible in the intent of the ordinances.

ISSUE/S: WoN the statues are unconstitutional

RULING: Appeal dismissed. Costs against appellant.

RATIO:
1. As a rule, a statute or act is vague when it lacks comprehensible standards
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application. Such is unconstitutional in two ways: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially he parties it
targets, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes arbitrary
flexing of the government muscle.
 BALACUIT v. CFI
June 30, 1988 | Gancayco, J. | Petition for Review | “Old”  Substantive  Due   interest requires, but also what measures are necessary to protect such
Process
SUMMARY: Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of Ordinance No.
640, which mandated selling admission tickets to establishments like
theaters to children at half price. Court ruled that there was no public
interest which justified the ordinance and declared it unconstitutional.
DOCTRINE: The exercise of police power may adversely affect individual
rights only to the extent that may be fairly required by the legitimate
demands of public interest or public welfare. (aka two-part test: Must be in
pursuit of state interest, and measures pursuant to the same must fit)
FACTS:
1. Petitioners, who were theater managers, challenged the constitutionality of
Ordinance 640 passed by the Municipal Board of Butuan City, which
mandated the selling of tickets to any movie or other public exhibition at
half-price to children between 7-12 y/o. Violation was penalized with a fine
of not less than P200 but not more than P600 or imprisonment of not less
than two months and not more than six months; if such violator be a firm or
corporation, the penalty shall be imposed upon its manager, agent or
representative.
2. Petitioners contended that the ordinance is unconstitutional for violation of
the due process clause as it is oppressive, unfair, unjust, confiscatory, an
undue restraint of trade, and violative of the right of persons to enter into
contracts since theater owners are bound under contract with film owners
for just admission prices for general admission, balcony and lodge.
Respondent City of Butuan invoked the police power delegated to it under
the general welfare clause to justify  the  ordinance’s  enactment.
ISSUE: WoN the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the due
process clause - YES
RULING: TC decision reversed and set aside. Ordinance No. 640 declared
unconstitutional and null and void.
RATIO:
1. The authority of municipal corporations to regulate is essentially police
power. The exercise of police power may adversely affect individual rights
only to the extent that may be fairly required by the legitimate demands of
public interest or public welfare.
2. There must be public necessity which demands the adoption of proper
measures   to   secure   the   ends   sought   by   the   ordinance’s   enactment,   and   the  
discretion of the legislative authority is not only to determine what public
interests.
3. As shown by a reading of the minutes of the regular session when the
ordinance was passed, the reason behind it was the complaints of parents
that paying full admission for their children was too financially
burdensome. There is no discernible relation between the ordinance and the
promotion of public health, safety, morals and general welfare. Moreover,
the Court agreed with petitioners that the ordinance is not justified that the
ordinance is unreasonable, if not   unduly   oppressive,   on   the   petitioners’  
businesses, since:
a. The corresponding savings for the parents burdens petitioners with the
cost of the savings.
b. The ordinance does not only make petitioners suffer loss of earnings,
but also penalizes them for failure to comply.
c. The ordinance is difficult to implement as since its effectivity children
above 12 y/o have attempted to pass as below 12 y/o to avail of the
ordinance’s  benefits,  as  there  are  no  safeguards  against  this  undesirable  
practice. City of Butuan’s  suggestion  that  birth  certificates  as  proof  be  
required is not practicable.
4. Respondent’s   claim   that   it   aimed   to   protect   the   youth   from   the   pernicious  
practice of movie operators and the like of demanding equal price for
admission tickets along with adults does not hold. There is nothing
pernicious, immoral or exploitative in charging equal price for both children
and adults. The object of every business is to profit from a venture, and
petitioners are conducting legitimate business. No one is compelled to
purchase a ticket.
5. Respondent’s   very   claim   that   movies   are   attractive   nuisances   also   fails   to  
justify reduction in price, and in fact encourages the obverse. The ordinance
would then encourage patronizing attractive nuisances by children of tender
age, rather than more productive activities. Logically, exhibiting wholesome
movies   for   general   patronage,   much   less   children’s   films,   would   also   be  
discouraged, if only to avoid compliance with the ordinance and still earn
profits.
 AGUSTIN v. EDU
February  2,  1979  |  Fernando,  J.  |  Prohibition  |“Old”  Substantive  Due  Process
SUMMARY: Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of an LOI requiring
motor vehicles to install EWDs for being oppressive and arbitrary, and for
constituting an undue delegation of legislative power. The SC upheld the
validity of the said LOI as a valid exercise of police power.
DOCTRINE: Police power is nothing more or less than the powers of
government   inherent   in   every   sovereignty   which   is   identified   with   “state   2.
authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare.
FACTS:
1. Pres. Marcos issued Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 229 providing for the 3.
installation of early warning devices (EWDs) on motor vehicles. The LOI
also provides that such EWDs be issued by the Land Transportation
Commissioner to all registered owners of motor vehicles, except
motorcycles and trailers, with charge of 15% of the acquisition cost, and the
same shall promulgate rules and regulations for the proper implementation 4.
of the LOI. Later, LOI No. 229 was amended by LOI No. 476 to the effect
that the motor vehicle owner is required to procure from any source and
present at the registration of his vehicle a pair of a EWD of any brand of the
owner’s  choosing.   standards set by the LOI and the order. Also, the allegation that the LOI will
2. Petitioner, an owner of a Volkswagen Beetle which already had blinking
lights fore and aft that can serve as EWD, alleged that the Letter of
Instruction and the implementing rules set out in Administrative Order No. 5.
1 issued by the Land   Transportation   Commission   “violate   the   provisions   there is a standard that defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out
and  delegation  of  police  power”  as  well  as  the  provisions  of  due  process  of   its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. In this case, the
law and equal protection of law. He alleged that the measure was arbitrary
and unconstitutional, creating a burden on motorists who could very well 6.
provide a practical alternative road safety device, and that it unfairly
benefited manufacturers and dealers.
3. Petitioner prayed for judgment that the said LOI be declared void and
unconstitutional.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the LOI is a valid exercise of police power – YES
RULING: Petition dismissed.
RATIO:
1. The LOI was issued in the exercise of police power. Police power is
“nothing   more   or   less   than   the   powers   of   government   inherent   in   every  
sovereignty,”   which   is   identified   with   “state   authority   to   enact   legislation  
that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general  welfare”  (Calalang v. Williams).
It   is   a   “dynamic   agency,   suitably   vague   and   far   from   precisely   defined,  
rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon
its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend
thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct
unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to insure
communal  peace,  safety,  good  order,  and  welfare.”
Petitioner has failed to either rebut the presumption of validity or
substantiate his own claims regarding the arbitrariness of the LOI, while the
respondents, represented by the Solicitor General, were able to show the
necessity for enacting the LOI for preventing vehicular accidents especially
during nighttime backed by statistical information and data.
The EWD requirement is not an expensive redundancy for vehicles with
blinking lights or petroleum lamps since the EWD being required by the
LOI is universal among signatories of the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road
Signs and Signals that would indicate a stationary vehicle along the road
that could endanger other passing vehicles.
The LOI as amended and Administrative Order No. 1 also does not compel
the motor owners to purchase the EWD required since it only requires that
they equip their motor vehicles with an EWD either (1) procured from
whatever source or (2) personally made as long as it conforms to the
only benefit the dealers and manufacturers of EWDs is largely
unsubstantiated.
The LOI does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative power since
clear legislative objective is public safety.
The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with
the  character  of  “generally  accepted  principles  of  international  law”  which  
under the Constitution the Philippines adopts as part of the law of the land.
 OLMSTEAD v. U.S.
June  4,  1928  |  Taft,  C.J.  |  “New”  Substantive  Due  Process
SUMMARY: Olmstead, the lead conspirator, and several other individuals were
convicted of a conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act by committing
liquor related crimes. Court held that the wiretapping is not within the scope of the
4th and 5th Amendments: Pertains only to material things and must involve actual
search and seizure.
DOCTRINE: Dissent: 4th and 5th Amendments apply to all invasions on the part
of the Government and its employes of the sanctities   of   a   man’s   home   and   the   criminals greater immunity.
privacies of life.It is not the means of the commission that constitutes the essence
of the offense, but the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security,
personal liberty and private property.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners were convicted in the District Court for the Western District of
Washington of a conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act by
unlawfully possessing, transporting and importing intoxicating liquors and
maintaining nuisances and by selling intoxicating liquors.
2. The information was largely obtained by intercepting messages on the
telephones of the conspirators by 4 federal prohibition officers. Small wires
were inserted along the ordinary telephone wires from the residences of 4 of
the petitioners and those leading from the chief office.
3. The gathering of evidence continued for many months. The evidence
revealed the large business transactions of the partners and their
subordinates, as well as parts of the criminal acts, all of which disclosed the
conspiracy charged.
4. 4th Amendment: The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall
not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.5 th Amendment: No
person…  shall  be   compelled,  in  any  criminal  case,  to  be  a   witness  against   of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense, but the invasion
himself.
ISSUE/S: WoN the evidence intercepted through wiretapping amounted to a
violation of the 4th and 5th Amendments. – NO, according to the main opinion.
RULING: Affirmed.
RATIO:
1. 5th Amendment does not apply: No evidence of compulsion to induce the
defendants to talk over their many phones.4th Amendment: Amendment
itself shows that the search is to be of material things – the person, the
house, his papers, or his effects – and that it must involve search and
seizure. There was no searching nor seizure, nor was there an entry into the
houses or offices of the defendants. The evidence was secured through the
sense of hearing only. Also, English common law prevailed in Washington,
and the common law rule is that the admissibility of evidence is not affected
by the illegality of the means by which it was obtained. A standard which
would forbid the reception of evidence if obtained by other than nice ethical
conduct by government officials would make society suffer and give
Justice Brandeis, dissenting:
Evidence obtained by wiretapping are inadmissible. Where the physical
connection with the telephone wires was made and the intrusion being in
aid of law enforcement are immaterial.
Clauses guaranteeing to the individual protection against specific abuses of
power must have a similar capacity of adaptation to a changing world. Its
general language should not be necessarily confined to the form that evil
had theretofore taken. Time works changes, brings into existence new
conditions   and   purposes…   In   the   application   of   a   constitution,   therefore,  
our contemplation cannot be only of what has been, but of what may be. Its
general principles would have little value, and be converted by precedent
into impotent and lifeless formulas. Rights declared in words might be lost
in reality.
When the 4th and 5th amendment were adopted, force and violence were the
only means known to man by which the Government could effect self-
incrimination, and could secure possession of articles by breaking and
entry. Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have
become available to the government.
4th and 5th Amendments apply to all invasions on the part of the
Government and its employees   of   the   sanctities   of   a   man’s   home   and   the  
privacies of life. It is not the breaking of the his doors, and the rummaging
of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private
property.
The  tapping  of  a   man’s  telephone  line  involves  the   tapping  of  every  other  
person who he may call or who may call him.
4th and 5th Amendments are liberally construed in order to give effect to
their principles.
Wiretapping is a crime in Washington. The evidence was obtained by crime
at   the   Government’s   expense   by   its   officers   while   acting   on   its   behalf.
Permitting the admission of evidence illegally obtained would make the
Government itself the lawbreaker. To declare that the Government may
 commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal (the ISSUE/S: Whether or not the Act is unconstitutional -YES
ends justify the means) would bring terrible retribution.
The court will not redress a wrong when he who invokes its aid has unclean RULING: Judgment of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma reversed.
hands.
RATIO:
1. Due Process: it was argued that the defendant is given no opportunity to be
heard on the issue as to whether he is the probable potential parent of
SKINNER v. OKLAHOMA socially undesirable offspring, but the Court did not pass upon this issue as
June  1,  1942  |  Douglas,  J.  |  Certiorari  |  “New”  Substantive  Due  Process
the constitutional challenge on grounds of the equal protection clause was
more apparent.
SUMMARY: The Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act punishes habitual
2. Equal Protection: the Act fails to pass the requirements of the equal
criminals with sterilization. Petitioner, who was twice convicted for two
protection clause because certain offenses do not fall within the scope of the
different crimes, challenges the constitutionality of the Act.
Act (see Fact No. 3). For example, larceny and embezzlement both involve
DOCTRINE: A law punishing habitual criminals with sterilization but with
the unlawful taking of property, but under the Act, those guilty of
exceptions as to certain crimes violates the equal protection clause because
embezzlement would never be sterilized regardless of the amount
it only applies to certain categories crimes while excluding others from its
embezzled or how many times it was committed, while those who are guilty
scope.
of other crimes (such as larceny) would be sterilized once they are
convicted two or more times.
FACTS: The Act failed to pass the strict scrutiny test especially that it involves a
1. The Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act defines "habitual criminal" as a basic civil right of man, which is that of procreation and that the power of
person who, having been convicted two or more times for crimes State to sterilize people has far-reaching consequences, which can also
"amounting to felonies involving moral turpitude," either in an Oklahoma cause irreparable injury to a person.
court or in a court of any other State, is thereafter convicted of such a felony
in Oklahoma and is sentenced to a term of imprisonment in an Oklahoma SEPARATE OPINION:
penal institution. Stone, C.J.
2. The law provides defendants notice, an opportunity to be heard, and the - Concurs in the result but   dissents   from   the   majority   opinion’s   too   much  
right to a jury trial, but once the defendant is found to be   a   “habitual   reliance on the equal protection clause. Argues that the Act is also in
criminal”   under   the   Act,   judgment   is   rendered   to   the   effect   that   the   violation of the due process clause since it does not give a hearing to
defendant is made to undergo vasectomy (male) or salpingectomy (female), defendant on whether his criminal tendencies are inheritable that would
making him or her sexually sterile. merit sterilization to prevent fathering socially undesirable offspring.
3. Offenses arising out of the violation of the prohibitory laws, revenue acts,
embezzlement, or political offenses are not considered within the terms of
this Act.
4. Petitioner was convicted of many crimes (stealing chickens in 1926;
robbery with firearms in 1934). While he was in the penitentiary in 1935,
Oklahoma passed the Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act.
5. In 1936, proceedings under the Act were instituted against him. A jury trial
was conducted, with the court instructing the jury that the offenses he
committed involved moral turpitude and the only issue was whether
conducting the vasectomy would be safe for his health. The Supreme Court
of Oklahoma affirmed the judgment ordering vasectomy be performed on
petitioner.
6. Petitioner challenges the Act on grounds of due process and equal
protection of the law.
 GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT
June 7, 1965 | Douglas, J. |Appeal  |“New”  Substantive  Due  Process

SUMMARY: Appellants were convicted of violating a statute that prohibits

contraceptives and spreading information about it. They assailed the statute as
violative of the constitutional right to privacy. SC granted the petition and
dismissed the charges against appellants.
DOCTRINE: Government may not control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulation by means which invade the area of
protected freedoms, such as the right to privacy.

FACTS:
1. Appellants Griswold and Buxton were arrested after they gave information
and medical advice to married persons as to the means of preventing
conception, violative of the General Statutes of Connecticut penalizing
those who will use any drug or instrument preventing conception and those
who will assist other persons to commit such offense. Appellate Division of
the Circuit Court and the Supreme Court of Errors affirmed the judgment
convicting the appellants.

ISSUE/S: WoN the Connecticut statute violated due process when it invaded the
right to privacy of the husband and wife with their physician? – YES

RULING: Petition granted. Decision of lower courts reversed.

RATIO:
1. The association of people is not mentioned in the Constitution nor in the
Bill of Rights. The right to educate to educate a child in a school of the
parents’   choice   is   also   not   mentioned.   Yet   the   first   amendment has been
construed to include certain of those rights. In other words, the first
amendment has a penumbra of rights not specifically stated – including the
right to privacy which is protected from government intrusion.
2. In the case at bar, the relationship lying within the zone of privacy was
created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees. The Connecticut
statute is a law, which, in forbidding the use of contraceptives, seeks to
achieve its goals by means having a maximum destructive impact upon that
relationship.
3. It has been established that governmental purpose to control or prevent
activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms. As an example, to allow the police to search the sacred
precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives
is repulsive to the notions of privacy.
 EISENSTADT v. BAIRD
March 22, 1972 | Brennan, J. | “New”  Substantive  Due  Process
SUMMARY: Baird was convicted for giving an unmarried woman vaginal
foam, in violation of a statute forbidding contraceptives from being distributed
(a) by anyone other than a physician or registered pharmacist and (b) to anyone
other than married persons. The Court ruled that distribution to contraceptives
for both married and unmarried persons should be equal.
DOCTRINE: To ensure justice, Courts should require that laws be equal in
operation.
FACTS:
1. Appellee William Baird gave an unmarried woman vaginal foam at the end
of his lecture on contraception. He was charged and convicted with
violation of Massachusetts law which made it a felony for contraceptives to
be distributed by anyone other than a physician or registered pharmacist,
and to anyone other than married persons.
2. The  District  Court  dismissed  appellee’s  petition  for  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus.   principles of law which should be imposed on a minority be imposed
CA held that the statute conflicted with fundamental human rights, was
violative of the Equal Protection Clause due to providing dissimilar
treatment to similarly situated married and unmarried persons, and its
supposed purpose of protection of public health made it discriminatory and
overbroad.
2. As neither a deterrent to fornication nor a health measure, it also cannot be
sustained as a prohibition on contraceptives itself. To say that
contraceptives are immoral and thus forbidden to unmarried persons who
still persist in having intercourse means that they risk for themselves
unwanted pregnancy, for the child illegitimacy, and for society a possible
obligation of support. It is not sensible and conflicts with fundamental
human rights.
3. In Griswold, the Court spoke of the right of privacy in the marital
relationship. However, the marital couple is not an independent entity with
a unique mind and heart, but an associate of two individuals each with a
separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting
a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.
4. Whatever the rights to contraception, they must be equal for married and
unmarried persons alike. Since Griswold rules that distribution cannot be
denied to married persons, banning unmarried persons from obtaining them
is equally impermissible. It is against the Constitution to require that
generally (overbroad); conversely, the Court also cannot pick and choose
only a few to whom they will apply the legislation (discriminatory). To
ensure justice, Courts should require that laws be equal in operation.

ISSUES:
WoN the statute is a health measure or deterrent to fornication - NO
WoN the statute is unconstitutional - YES

RULING: CA judgment affirmed.

RATIO:
1. The statute is clearly not a health measure. If there is a need to have a
physician prescribe contraceptives, it is equally great for married and
unmarried persons. It would be illogical to hold that a physician who can
prescribe for married persons is not sufficiently skilled to protect the health
of patients who are have no marriage certificate or are divorced. Moreover,
the   law   is   under   the   chapter   ‘Crimes   Against   Chastity,   Morality, Decency
and  Good  Order’,  which  contradicts  such  conclusion.  Nor  is  it  a  deterrent  to  
fornication, which is already punished by a separate law with a 90-day
sentence for offenders.
 ROE v. WADE
January 22, 1973 | Blackmun, J. | “New”  Substantive  Due  Process
SUMMARY: Jane Roe, an unmarried and pregnant woman residing in Dallas,
sought to have the Texas criminal abortion statutes declared unconstitutional
for being unconstitutionally vague and abridging her right of personal privacy.
SC held that the statutes, as paralleled with legitimate state interests, sweeps
unnecessarily broadly and is thus an unconstitutional infringement on liberty.
DOCTRINE: Where fundamental rights are involved, regulation limiting these
may be justified only by a compelling state interest, and legislative enactments
must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake.
FACTS:
1. Jane Roe, an unmarried and pregnant woman residing in Dallas, Texas,
brought an action against the DA, Wade, seeking 1) declaratory relief from
Texas criminal abortion statutes for being unconstitutionally vague and
abridging her right of personal privacy, and 2) an injunction to restrain
Wade from enforcing the statutes. She alleged that she was unable to get a
“legal”   abortion   in  Texas,   which  permits  abortion  only   when  the   mother’s   State   retains   a   definite   interest   in   protecting   the   woman’s   own   health
life is threatened by the continuation of her pregnancy. She also alleged that
neither could she afford to travel to another jurisdiction to secure a legal
abortion under safe conditions.
2. James Hallford, a licensed physician, was previously arrested for violating
the statute and 2 prosecutions were pending. He sought to have the statute
declared   unconstitutional   for   violating   his   own   and   his   patients’   right   to   interests become sufficiently compelling to sustain regulation of the factors
privacy and his own right to practice medicine.
3. John and Mary Doe, a childless couple, filed a companion complaint to Roe
alleging that their physician advised against pregnancy and should she get
pregnant, she would like to have it legally aborted.
ISSUES:
1. WoN petitioners have standing—Only Roe
2. WoN the Texas criminal abortion statute is unconstitutional—YES
RULING: Art. 1196 of the Texas Penal Code declared unconstitutional.
RATIO:
1. Standing: Roe was given standing for presenting an actual case or
controversy at the time of filing. Although her case is now moot because
she is no longer pregnant, it is capable of repetition yet evading review. Dr.
Hallford makes no allegation of any substantial and immediate threat to any
federally protected right against state prosecutions. The Court held that he
only has status as a potential defendant, which does not grant him standing.
John  and  Mary  Doe’s  claim  is  based  on  a  possible  failure  of  contraceptive
measure and a future intent to procure an abortion, which cannot stand.
2. The principal thrust of the attack on the Texas statutes is that they
improperly invade a right possessed by a pregnant woman, the right to
terminate her pregnancy. Such right is embodied  in  “liberty”,  protected  by  
the  due  process  clause,  or  in  “personal,  marital,  familial  and  sexual  privacy”  
protected by the Bill of Rights or its penumbras.
3. The Court held that the right of personal privacy includes the abortion
decision, but that the right is not unqualified and must be considered against
important state interests. For the criminal abortion statutes, the Court
outlined 3 possible legitimate interests by the State:
a. Victorian social concern to discourage illicit sexual conduct—not a
proper state purpose for it is overbroad for the law would fail to
distinguish between married and unwed mothers.
b. High abortion mortality in the 1900s—Modern medical techniques
have altered this situation. Mortality rates for women undergoing
abortion in the early stages of pregnancy appears lower than normal
childbirth. But because risk increases as the pregnancy continues, the
 
and safety when an abortion is proposed at a later stage of pregnancy.
c. Protecting prenatal life—Dispute as when life begins need not belabor
the Court. As long as potential life is involved, the State may assert
interests beyond the protection of the pregnant woman alone.
Thus 3b and 3c shows that at some point in pregnancy, these respective
that govern the abortion decision.
4. The Court held that where certain fundamental rights are involved,
regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a compelling state
interest, and legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only
the legitimate state interests at stake.
a. With respect to maternal health, the compelling point is approximately
at the end of the 1st trimester, where medicine has shown that abortion
mortality is less than mortality in normal childbirth. Thus, prior to this
compelling point, abortion must be free of state interference; and after
this point, the State may regulate abortion procedure to the extent that
the regulation reasonably relates to the protection of maternal health.
b. With   respect   to   State’s   legitimate   interest   in   potential   life,   the  
compelling point is at viability, which is when the fetus can presumably
have  the  capacity  of  meaningful  life  after  the  mother’s  womb.  
Measured against these standards, Art 1196 of the Texas Penal Code, in
restricting legal abortions to those "procured or attempted by medical advice
for the purpose of saving the life of the mother," sweeps too broadly. The
statute makes no distinction between abortions performed early in
 pregnancy and those performed later, and it limits to a single reason,
"saving" the mother's life, the legal justification for the procedure.
BOWERS v. HARDWICK
June  30,  1986  |  White,  J.  |  “New”  Substantive  Due  Process
SUMMARY: Hardwick was arrested and charged with homosexual sodomy,
pursuant to a Georgia statute criminalizing the same. He challenged the
constitutionality of said statute for placing him in imminent danger of arrest for
being a practicing homosexual and for violating his fundamental rights. US SC
held that sodomy is not a fundamental right conferred by the Constitution.
DOCTRINE: Fundamental liberties are those which are implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if
they were sacrificed,   and   which   are   deeply   rooted   in   the   nation’s   history   and   3.
tradition.
FACTS:
1. August 1982: Hardwick was charged with violating the Georgia statute
criminalizing sodomy by committing said act with another adult male in the
bedroom of  respondent’s  home.  Respondent  brought  the  suit  in  the  Federal   J. Blackmun, dissenting: case presents a privacy issue first and foremost. SC
District Court challenging the constitutionality of the statute insofar as it
criminalizes consensual sodomy. District Court dismissed the action for
failure to state a claim.
2. A divided panel on the Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit reversed,
holding  that  the  statute  violated  respondent’s  fundamental  rights  because  his   *Statute criminalizes sodomy in general. It criminalizes sexual activity between
homosexual activity is a private and intimate association that is beyond the
reach of state regulation by reason of the 9th Amendment and the due
process clause of the 14th Amendment.
ISSUE/S: WoN the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon
homosexuals to engage in sodomy – NO.
RULING: REVERSED.
RATIO:
1. The act of consensual sodomy is not protected under the fundamental right
to privacy or any right protected under the United States Constitution.There
is no nexus between family, marriage or procreation on one hand, and
homosexual activity on the other, as found in previous sexual liberty cases
before the US SC.
Fundamental  liberties  are   “implicit  in   the  concept  of  ordered  liberty”  such  
that   “neither   liberty   nor   justice   would   exist   if   they   were   sacrificed”.   They  
are   also   characterized   as   those   liberties   that   are   “deeply   rooted   in   this  
Nation’s   history   and   tradition”. Proscriptions against the conduct have
ancient roots. Sodomy was a criminal offense at common law and was
forbidden by the laws of the original 13 States when they ratified the Bill of
Rights. Today, 24 States and the District of Columbia continue to penalize
sodomy performed in private and between consenting adults. Against this
background,  it  cannot  be  said  that  it  is  deeply  rooted  in  this  Nation’s  history  
and tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.
2. There should be great resistance to expand the substantive reach of the Due
Process Clauses, particularly if it requires redefining the category of rights
deemed to be fundamental. Otherwise, the Judiciary necessarily takes to
itself further authority to govern the country without express constitutional
authority.
Although the act was committed in the privacy of the home, illegal conduct
is not always immunized whenever it occurs in the home. It would be
difficult to limit the claimed right to homosexual conduct while leaving
exposed to prosecution adultery, incest, and other sexual crimes even
though they are committed in the home.
misconstrued the question as whether there is a right to homosexual sodomy,
rather than if the State can control all such activities.
J. Stevens, dissenting: statute does not create a class of homosexuals being
singled out, but rather affects all sexually active adults, even married couples.
married individuals which fits within the reproductive and marital privacy cases
of the SC.
 ROMER v. EVANS discrimination and prohibitions in state colleges based on sexual orientation
May 20, 1996 | Kennedy, J. | Certiorari  |“New”  Substantive  Due  Process will be forbidden because of the amendment.
3. In reality, the amendment imposes a special disability upon the
SUMMARY: State of Colorado tried to amend their constitution, prohibiting homosexuals. They are forbidden the safeguards that others enjoy or may
any law that would ban discrimination against homosexuals and prohibiting seek without constraint.
any  action  by  the  government  to  make  homosexuals  a  “special”  class.  SC  that  
the amendment classified the homosexuals not to further a proper legislative
end but to make them unequal to everyone else.
DOCTRINE: A law must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate
governmental purpose. It can be sustained even if the law seems unwise or
works to the disadvantage of a particular group or if the rationale is tenuous.

FACTS:
1. The State of Colorado amendment their constitution in 1992. The parties
referred  to  it  as  “Amendment  2”.  This  was  due  to  the  contentious  campaign  
against ordinances that have been passed in various Colorado municipalities
which banned discrimination in many transactions and activities.
Amendment 2 also prohibited all legislative, executive or judicial action at
any level of the government designed to protect the homosexual class.
2. After the adoption of Amendment 2, several plaintiffs (respondents herein)
alleged that this amendment would subject them to risk of discrimination
based on their sexual orientation.
3. The trial court first granted a preliminary injunction to stay enforcement of
Amendment 2 which the Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed and
remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the State advanced various
arguments to show that it served compelling interests but the trial court
found none. It enjoined the enforcement of Amendment 2 and the Supreme
Court of Colorado affirmed the ruling on second opinion.

ISSUE/S: WoN Amendment 2 can be sustained as a prohibition on specific

legal protection against special rights for homosexuals? - NO

RULING: Assailed judgment of the State Supreme Court is affirmed.

RATIO:
1. Sweeping and comprehensive is the change in legal status effected by
Amendment 2. Homosexuals, by state decree, are put in a solitary class with
respect to transactions and relations in both the private and governmental
spheres. The amendment withdraws from homosexuals, but no others,
specific legal protection from the injuries caused by discrimination.
2. Amendment 2 deprived the homosexuals from their right of securing
protection against what the discrimination laws address because they have
been repealed by said amendment. Specifically, laws against employment
 LAWRENCE v. TEXAS seek to control a personal relationship which people are free to choose
June  26,  2003  |  Kennedy,  J.  |  New”  Substantive  Due  Process without being punished as criminals.
3. Adults may choose to enter upon relationships in the confines of their
SUMMARY: Petitioners, both male, were found engaged in a private, homes  and  still  retain  their  dignity  as  free  persons.  The  expression  of  one’s  
consensual sexual act, and were charged with violation of the Texas Penal sexuality through intimate conduct with another is only a single element in
Code which criminalized homosexual sexual intercourse. The SC held that the a more enduring personal bond. The Constitution protects the liberty which
statute was unconstitutional and violative of individual liberty and the right to allows homosexuals the right to make this choice.
privacy. 4. Petitioners were two adults who, with full and mutual consent, engaged in
DOCTRINE:   “It   is   the   promise   of   the   Constitution   that   there   is   a   realm   of   sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. Their private lives are
personal  liberty  which  the  government  may  not  enter.” entitled to respect; the State cannot demean their existence or control their
destiny by criminalizing their private sexual conduct, which is protected by
FACTS: their  right  to  liberty  under  the  Due  Process  Clause.  “It  is  the  promise of the
1. Responding to a weapons disturbance report, Houston police officers Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the government
entered   petitioner   John   Lawrence’s   apartment   where   they   saw   him   and   may  not  enter.”
petitioner Tyron Garner engaging in a sexual act. Petitioners were both 5. Historically, laws prohibiting sodomy were not enforced against consenting
adults at the time, and the conduct was private and consensual. adults acting in private, but against predatory, non-consensual acts (e.g.
2. Petitioners were arrested and held in custody overnight, and subsequently victim was a minor or an assault victim); these were the target of such
charged  and  convicted  for  ‘deviate  sexual  intercourse,  namely  anal  sex,  with   statutes. Such statutes were also largely not gender-discriminatory.
a   member   of   the   same   sex’,   in   violation   of   the   Texas   Penal   Code   which   Homosexuals   only   began   to   be   targeted   by   State   laws   in   the   1970’s,   and  
provided that deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same only nine states have done so; over the last decades, most are moving to
sex constituted an offense. abolish same-sex prohibitions.
3. Petitioners challenged the statute as violative of the Equal Protection 6. The consideration of whether or not homosexual conduct is immoral and
Clause, both in the Fourteenth Amendment and a similar provision in the that it has been subject to state intervention for many years does not
Texas Constitution. consider social changes showing otherwise (e.g. non-enforcement and
repeals of laws punishing homosexual conduct, decisions in courts abroad,
ISSUE: WoN the Texas statute was unconstitutional and the Bowers ruling recent cases upholding Constitutional protection of personal dignity and
should be overturned - YES autonomy involved in intimate and personal choices).

RULING: CA judgment reversed. Case remanded for further proceedings not

inconsistent with the opinion.

RATIO:
1. Bowers v Hardwick was the original controlling decision. In Bowers, a
police officer observed Hardwick, in his own bedroom, having sex with
another adult male, in violation of a Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy,
irrespective of the gender of the participants. The statute was sustained by
the SC, which held that the Constitution does not confer a fundamental right
upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and to hold otherwise would
invalidate the laws of many States which had for a long time held that such
was illegal.
2. While the statutes purport to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual
act, their penalties and purposes have more far-reaching consequences,
touching upon private human conduct, sexual behavior, and the home. They
 U.S. v. WINDSOR It has the avowed purpose and practical effect of imposing a disadvantage, a
June 26, 2013 | Kennedy, J. |  Certiorari  |  “New”  Substantive  Due  Process separate status, and a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex marriages made
lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States.
SUMMARY: Windsor, the surviving spouse in a same-sex marriage, 3. DOMA deprives a person of the liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment of
challenges the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) after the Constitution, and this liberty contains within it the protection against denial
she was denied estate tax exemption for surviving spouses since the DOMA of the equal protection of the laws. It creates an inequality between same-sex
does not include same-sex spouses in its definition  of  “spouse”.  The  Supreme   couples and heterosexual couples, as it deprives the former of rights, duties, and
Court declared the DOMA unconstitutional. responsibilities that are an essential part of married life which in most cases
DOCTRINE: A law that singles out a certain class of persons and directs its would be honored to accept were DOMA not in force. It also imposes a
restrictions and restraints violates to that certain class violates the equal disability on the class by refusing to acknowledge a status the State finds to be
protection guarantee of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment dignified and proper. It also has implications pertaining to: social security,
housing,  taxes,  criminal  sanctions,  copyright,  and  veterans’  benefits.  
.
- raises the cost of health care for families by taxing health benefits provided
FACTS:
by  employers  to  their  workers’  same-sex spouses
1. Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer, then residents of New York were married in a
- denies or reduces benefits allowed to families upon the loss of a spouse and
lawful ceremony in Ontario, Canada, in 2007. Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer
parent, benefits that are an integral part of family security
returned to their home in New York City.
- makes it inapplicable to same-sex couples the provision in the federal penal
2. When Spyer died in 2009, she left her entire estate to Windsor. Windsor
code   that   it’s   a   crime   to   “assault,   kidnap,   or   murder   .   .   .   a   member   of   the  
sought to claim the estate tax exemption for surviving spouses.
immediate  family”  of  “a  United  States  official,  a  United  States  judge,  or  a  
3. She was barred from doing so, however, by a federal law, the Defense of
Federal   law   enforcement   officer,”   since   a   same-sex spouse does not fall
Marriage Act (DOMA), which excludes a same-sex partner from the definition
within  the  definition  of  “spouse”  as  an  “immediate  family”
of  “spouse”  as  that  term  is  used  in  federal  statutes.  
- makes it inapplicable to same-sex couples federal ethics rules
4. Windsor paid the taxes but filed suit to challenge the constitutionality of this
- prevents same-sex married couples from obtaining government healthcare
provision.
benefits they would otherwise receive
5. The United States District Court and the Court of Appeals ruled that this
- prohibits  them  from  being  buried  together  in  veterans’  cemeteries
portion of the statute is unconstitutional and ordered the United States to pay
- forces them to follow a complicated procedure to file their state and federal
Windsor a refund
taxes jointly
- deprives   them   of   the   Bankruptcy   Code’s   special   protections   for   domestic-
ISSUE/S:   Whether   or   not   the   DOMA   violates   the   Due   Process   Clause’s  
support obligations
guarantee of equal protection under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution –
YES

RULING: Court of Appeals ruling affirmed. DOMA unconstitutional

RATIO:
1.  The  “regulation  of  domestic  relations”  is  “an  area  that  has  long  been  regarded  
as  a  virtually  exclusive   province  of  the   States”   (Sosna v. Iowa) such that State
laws may define and regulate domestic relations, including marriage, subject to
constitutional guarantees.
2. DOMA unusually deviates from the usual tradition of recognizing and
accepting state definitions of marriage such that it operates to deprive same-sex
couples of the benefits and responsibilities that come with the federal
recognition of their marriages.
 ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY v. COMELEC essential foundations of a democratic society, and this freedom applies not
April 8, 2010 | Del Castillo, J. | Certiorari  |  “New”  Substantive  Due  Process only to those that are favourably received but also to those that offend,
shock, or disturb. Absent of any compelling state interest, it is not for the
SUMMARY: Ang Ladlad LGBT party filed a petition for registration with COMELEC or the Supreme Court to impose its views on the populace.
COMELEC for 2010 elections. COMELEC denied the petition which the Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with
Supreme Court reversed.   The   SC   averred   that   defendant’s   basis   for   refusing   speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or
accreditation is against equal protection of laws and freedom of speech and discouraging a disfavoured one.
assembly. 3. Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and
DOCTRINE: Laws of general application should be applied with equal force they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other
to all. The Constitution and laws should be applied uninfluenced by public marginalized and under-represented sectors. This is in accord with the
opinion. country’s   international   obligations   to   protect   and   promote   human   rights.  
The Constitution and laws should be applied uninfluenced by public
FACTS: opinion. True democracy should be resilient enough to withstand vigorous
1. Plaintiff Ang Ladlad filed a petition for registration with the COMELEC debate due to conflicting opinions.
(respondent) in 2009. Respondent denied the registration averring the party
is neither enumerated in the partylist sectors in Constitution and RA 7941,
nor is it related to any that is in the enumeration. COMELEC also stated
that   plaintiff’s   group   tolerates   immorality   and   should   likewise   be   denied  
accreditation  for  misrepresentation  when  asked  if  “any  of  its  nominees  have  
not violated or failed to comply with laws relating to elections.
2. Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration but was denied by the defendant.
Plaintiff then filed a petition praying that the Supreme Court annul
COMELEC’s  resolutions  and  to  grant  them  accreditation.   Ang Ladlad also
sought the mandatory injunction against COMELEC which previously
announced tht it would begin printing final ballots for the May 2010
elections.

ISSUE/S: WoN the Assailed Resolutions contravened the constitutional rights

to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protectionof laws? - YES

RULING: Petition granted. Resolution of COMELEC were set aside and

accreditation was given to petitioner.

RATIO:
1. The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act
performed by Ang Ladlad. Even the Office of the Solicitor General opined
that there should   have   been   a   finding   by   the   COMELEC   that   the   group’s  
members have committed or are committing immoral acts. Respondent has
failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why
special protection is required for the youth.
2. Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda
and attempt to persuade society of the validity of its position through
normal democratic means. Freedom of expression constitutes one of the
 OPLE v. TORRES RATIO:
July 23, 1998| Puno, J. | Petition for review of decision of Executive Secretary 1. The Executive’s   authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not an
and Members of Inter-Agency Coordinating  Committee  |  “New”  Substantive   independent source of power to make laws. While the President has the
Due Process power to exercise administrative power in issuing AOs, rules, and
regulations, AO 308’s   subject   isinappropriate for an AO since it does not
SUMMARY: Pres. Ramos promulgates AO 308 or “Adoption   of   a   National   relate  to  particular  aspects  of  gov’t  operation  as  required  in  Section  3,  1987  
Computerized  Identification  Reference  System”  that  will  streamline  delivery  of   Administrative Code. While AOs must be in harmony with and for
basic services by collecting biometric & other data, which Sen Ople assails. implementing the law’s   legislative   policy,   AO 308 violates this in
SCfinds law as unconstitutional on its face as an undue usurpation of establishing, for the first time, a National Computerized Identification
legislative power & as violative of the right to privacy (overbroad, lacking Reference System. It requires a delicate adjustment of various contending
safeguards). state policies such as national security and privacy that should be left to the
DOCTRINE: The right to privacy is a Constitutionally-guaranteed legislature. Also, the claim that the AO does not confer any right, impose
fundamental right. Hence, it is subject to strict scrutiny – it is the  government’s   any duty, afford any protection, & create an office is false – w/o the ID, a
burden to show that AO 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and citizen will have difficulty in exercising his rights &enjoying his privileges.
that it is narrowly drawn. 2. Right to Privacy: is a Constitutionally-guaranteed fundamental right
independent of the right to liberty (as acknowledged in Morfe v Mutuc).
FACTS: Hence,   it   is   the   government’s   burden   to   show   that   AO   308   is   justified   by  
1. AO 308 issued by Pres Ramos on Dec 12, 1996 (1) to provide Filipinos & some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. The concept of
foreigners the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service & limited government has always included that governmental powers stop
social security providers and other gov’t  instrumentalities  and (2) to reduce short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. Also, the
fraudulent transactions, misrepresentation of persons seeking basic services. Constitution recognizes the rights to privacy in Sections 1, 2, 3(1), 6, 8, and
2. Under Sec 4, the NSO-issued Population Reference Number (PRN) will 17 of the Bill of Rights. The zones of privacy are also recognized and
serve as the common reference number to establish linkages among protected in the RPC, the Anti-Wire-Tapping Act, the Secrecy of Bank
agencies such as GSIS, SSS, etc. through use of Biometrics technology & Deposits Act, the Civil Code, and the Intellectual Property Code.
computer application designs. An Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee is 3. Overbroad and Indefinite: AO 308 is too overbroad. It does not state what
designated to draw-up implementing guidelines, oversee implementation of specific biological characteristics and what particular biometrics technology
said law. shall be used to identify people who will seek its coverage, nor does it state
3. Senator Blas Ople assails AO 308 and files case against IACC members, whether encoding of data is limited to biological information alone for
including Exec. Sec. Ruben Torres on its usurpation of the power to identification   purposes.   AO308’s   indefiniteness   can   give   the   gov’t   the  
legislate and its impermissible  intrusion  on  the  citizenry’s  protected  zone  of   roving authority to store and retrieve information for a purpose other than
privacy. the identification of the individual through his PRN. It also does not tell us
4. Respondents argue that (1) petition is not a justiciable case because it has how the information gathered shall be handled, or who will control and
yet   to   be   implemented,   (2)   AO   308’s   issuance   w/in   Executive   &   access  the  date,  under  what  circumstances,  and  for  what  purpose.  AO  308’s  
Administrative Powers of the President, (3) funds necessary for penal aspect must also be clarified. These factors are essential to safeguard
implementation   may  be   sourced  from  concerned  agencies’  budgets,(4)  law   the privacy and guaranty the integrity of the information.
protects  the  individual’s  right  to  privacy 4. Hypothetical Danger? A   sophisticated   data   center’s   ability   to   generate   a  
comprehensive cradle-to-grave dossier on an individual and transmit it over
ISSUE/S: a national network is a real threat. Once extracted, the information is putty
WoN  AO  308  usurps  Congress’  legislative  power – YES in the hands of any person and the end of privacy begins. The Court, as the
WoN AO 308 violates right to privacy – YES. ultimate   guardian   of   the   people’s   liberty,   must   smother   the   sparks   that  
endanger rights immediately.
RULING: Petition granted. AO 308 null & void for being unconstitutional. 5. No Reasonable Expectation of Privacy: The test is (1) WON by his conduct,
the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy, and (2) WON the
 expectation   is   one   that   society   recognizes   as   reasonable.   AO   308’s   use   of  
biometrics in computer technology is so widely drawn that a minimum
standard for a reasonable expectation of privacy, regardless of technology
used, cannot be inferred from tits provisions. As technology advances, the
level of reasonably expected privacy decreases.
6. SC’s  Disclaimer: The Court, per se, is not against the use of computers in
data handling to improve the bureaucracy. The right to privacy   isn’t  
intended to stifle technological advancements that enhance public service
and the common good. It merely requires that the law be narrowly focused
and a compelling interest to justify such intrusions.
 DUNCAN v. GLAXO WELLCOME
September  17,  2004  |  Tinga,  J.  |  Certiorari  |  “New”  Substantive  Due  Process
SUMMARY: Glaxo's policy of preventing its employees from having
relationships with employees of competitor companies was assailed as against
the equal protection clause of the constitution.
DOCTRINE: While our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy
on social justice and the protection of labor, it does not mean that every labor
dispute will be decided in favor of the workers; The law also recognizes that
management has rights which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in the
interest of fair play.
FACTS:
1. Pedro Tecson was hired by Glaxo Wellcome as a medical representative
after undergoing training. He signed a contract with them which stipulates,
among others, that he will disclose to the company's management any future
relationships that he will have with competing companies' employees and
that if the management finds that the relationship poses a conflict of
interest, he will resign from the company. The same stipulation can be
found in the company's Employee Code of Conduct.
2. Tecson was assigned in the Camarines Area where he met Bettsy an
employee of Astra Pharmaceuticals and a competitor of Glaxo. They fell in
love.
3. Before they got married, Tecson received several reminders from his
District Manager regarding the conflict of interest which his relationship
with Bettsy might engender. Still, love prevailed, and Tecson married
Bettsy in September 1998.
4. In   January   1999,   Tecson’s   superiors   informed   him   that   his   marriage   to   to give life to the constitutional policy on social justice and the protection of
Bettsy  gave  rise   to  a   conflict   of  interest.   Tecson’s  superiors  reminded him
that he and Bettsy should decide which one of them would resign from their
jobs, although they told him that they wanted to retain him as much as
possible because he was performing his job well. Tecson asked for some
time to resolve the problem which his bosses gave him. He then applied to
be transferred to Glaxo's milk division to remove the conflict of interest but
this was denied. Subsequently, the company transferred him to the Butuan
sales area, a transfer he did not want so he asked the company to reconsider.
It did not.
5. Tecson defied the order and stayed in Bicol. He was still paid his salary but
he was excluded from product conferences.
6. The parties failed to resolve the issue so they submitted to voluntary
arbitration. The National Conciliation and Mediation Board favored Glaxo
and affirmed its right to transfer Tecson. The case was brought to the CA
which affirmed the NCMB's decision.
ISSUE(S):
1. WoN  Glaxo’s  policy  against  employees  marrying  employees  of  competitor  
companies violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution by
creating invalid distinctions among employees on account of marriage – NO
2. WoN Tecson was constructively dismissed - NO
RULING: Petition DENIED.
RATIO:
1. Glaxo's policy is a valid exercise of its management prerogatives and does
not violate the equal protection clause. Aside from the fact that Tecson
agreed to abide by the company's policies as shown by his signing of the
contract, Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing
formulas, marketing strategies and other confidential programs and
information from competitors, especially so that it and Astra are rival
companies in the highly competitive pharmaceutical industry. The
prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of
competitor   companies   upon   Glaxo’s   employees   is   reasonable   under   the  
circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the
interests of the company. In laying down the assailed company policy,
Glaxo only aims to protect its interests against the possibility that a
competitor company will gain access to its secrets and procedures. Glaxo
possesses the right to protect its economic interests and this cannot be
denied. The Constitution recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt and
enforce such a policy to protect its right to reasonable returns on
investments and to expansion and growth. Indeed, while our laws endeavor
labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of
the workers. The law also recognizes that management has rights which are
also entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play. The
challenged company policy does not violate the equal protection clause of
the Constitution because it is a settled principle that the commands of the
equal protection clause are addressed only to the state or those acting under
color of its authority. The equal protection clause erects no shield against
merely private conduct, however, discriminatory or wrongful. The court
also held that it is clear that Glaxo does not impose an absolute prohibition
against relationships between its employees and those of competitor
companies. Its employees are free to cultivate relationships with and marry
persons of their own choosing. What the company merely seeks to avoid is
a conflict of interest between the employee and the company that may arise
out of such relationships.
2. Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting, an involuntary resignation
resorted to when continued employment becomes impossible, unreasonable,
or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay; or when
a clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes
unbearable to the employee. None of these conditions are present in the
instant case. Tecson was not demoted nor discriminated against. His
transfer to Butuan was an exercise of Glaxo's management prerogative.
 SILVERIO v. REPUBLIC
October  19,  2007  |  Corona,  J.  |  Certiorari  |  “New”  Substantive  Due  Process
SUMMARY: Petitioner is a male transexual who has undergone sex
reassignment surgery and sought to change his first name and sex in his birth
certificate via a petition to the RTC of Manila who granted his petition. The
RP, thru the OSG, filed a petition to the CA alleging that no laws allow for
changes in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. CA ruled in favor of
the Republic. SC held that the decision of the CA was correct.
DOCTRINE: The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. Courts
cannot engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or
interpret the law, not to make or amend it.
FACTS:
1. On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a
petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the
RTC of Manila impleading the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.
2. Petitioner alleges that he is a male transexual and has undergone
psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. He
underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand on January 27,
2001 and, from then on, lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be
married. He sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from
“Rommel  Jacinto”  to  “Mely,”  and  his  sex  from  “male”  to  “female.”   birth,   if   not   attended   by   error,   is   immutable.   The   words   “male”   and
3. The RTC granted the petition
4. On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the
OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals alleging that there
is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of
sex alteration and on February 23, 2006, the CA ruled in favor of the
Republic.
ISSUE/S
1. WoN a person's first name can be changed on the grounds of sex
reassignment – NO
2. WoN it is allowable for a person's sex in his/her birth certificate to be
change on the grounds of sex reassignment – NO
3. WoN the entries in a person's birth certificate as to first Name or sex may be
changed on the grounds of equity – NO
RULING: Petition is DENIED.
RATIO
1. RA 9048 governs the change of first names providing the reasons and
venues for which first names may be changed. RA 9048 does not sanction a
change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. The petition in the
trial  court  in  so  far  as  it  prayed  for  the  change  of  petitioner’s  first  name  was  
not   within   that   court’s   primary   jurisdiction   and   was   filed   in   the   wrong  
venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila
where his birth certificate is kept as provided for the RA 9048. More
importantly, the petition had no merit as the petitioner failed to show, or
even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true
and official name.
2. There is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the
entries in his birth certificate. Art. 412 of the Civil Code states that no entry
in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without judicial order.
Under RA 9048, change of sex in the civil registry is not a mere clerical or
typographical error but a substantial change guided by Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court. Art. 407 and 408 of the Civil Code enumerate the acts,
events, and judicial decrees that will be recorded in the civil register. Sex
reassignment is not among those acts or events. Neither is it recognized nor
even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly. Art. 413. states that all
other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed
by special laws but there is no such special law in the Philippines governing
sex reassignment and its effects. Lastly, under the Civil Registry Law, a
birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time
of  birth.  The  determination  of  a  person’s  sex  made at the time of his or her
 
“female”  as  used  in  the  law  should  be  understood  by  their  ordinary  meaning  
as there is no legislative intent to the contrary. The ordinany meaning do
not include persons who have undergone sex reassignment. It cannot be
argued  that  the  term  “sex”  as  used  in  the  law  is  something  alterable  through  
surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to- female
transsexual  to  be  included  in  the  category  “female.  
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal
and public policy consequences. First, to grant the changes sought by
petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on
marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another
man who has undergone sex reassignment. Second, the laws that apply
particlarly to women and underscore the public policy in relation to women
could  be  substantially  affected  if  petitioner’s  petition  were  to  be  granted. It
is up to the legislature, should it decide to do so, and not to the Courts to
determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of
sex reassignment.
 WHITE LIGHT CORP. v CITY OF MANILA
January 20, 2009 | Tinga, J. | Certiorari | “New”  Substantive  Due  Process
SUMMARY: The constitutionality of the City of Manila's ordinance prohibiting
short time admission to hotels was assailed by an organization of hotel and motel
operators. The court held that the ordinance curtailed the individual's liberty to
make choices.
DOCTRINE: Individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that
may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public
welfare—the State is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly
intruding into the lives of its citizens.
FACTS:
1. On December 3, 1992, Manila Mayor Alfredo Lim passed an ordinance—
Ordinance NO. 7774-- prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels,
lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of
Manila. On December 15 of that same year, The Malate Tourist and
Development Corporation sought to have the ordinance invalidated and
declared unconstitutional. On December 21, petitioners White Light
Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and
Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene and to admit
attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the Ordinance
directly affects their business interests as operators of drive-in hotels and
motels in Manila. The RTC granted the motion and later on directed the city
from enforcing the ordinance. The RTC declared the ordinance null and
void on the ground that it strikes at the personal liberty of the individual,
guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution. The Court of Appeals
reversed the RTC's decision. It held that the ordinance aimed to punish only
the owners of lodging areas who allowed short time stays and that the
ordinance was a valid exercise of police power since its objective was to
curb illicit activities for the welfare of the general public.
ISSUE/S:
1. WoN the petitioners had standing - YES
2. WoN the ordinance is valid and constitutional – NO
RULING: CA decision reversed, RTC decision reinstated. Ordinance No. 7774
declared unconstitutional.
RATIO:
1. The petitioners alleged that as owners, their businesses were unlawfully
being interfered with by the ordinance. They also alleged that the equal
protection rights of their clients were also being interfered with. The court
agreed that the petitioners had standing because of their direct and personal
interest in the outcome of the case. The court also agreed that the owners
had the third party standing to plead for the rights of their patrons. The court
also said that assuming that the owners cannot assert the rights of their
patrons, the overbreadth doctrine can be used by the owners, as the doctrine
applies to statutes that restrain constitutionally guaranteed rights. The court
believes that the ordinance suffers from overbreadth as it makes a sweeping
intrusion on the right to liberty of the owners' clients.
2. Although the goal of the ordinance was to minimize the use of the
establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and other similar
activities, and the goals are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the
ambit of the police power of the state, the means with which to achieve the
end however, must align with the Constitution. It is here that the court uses
the rational basis test which tries to find less restrictive measures for the
furtherance of governmental interests, and the strict scrutiny test which
measures the quality and amount of governmental interest which justifies
the regulation of freedom. With the exercise of police power, it must appear
that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means
must be reasonably necessaryfor the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other
alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private
rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between
the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest,
personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted
to be arbitrarily invaded. The ordinance however, lacked the
aforementioned requisites and must be struck down as unconstitutional for
the following reasons:
a. The Ordinance makes no distinction between places frequented by
patrons engaged in illicit activities and patrons engaged in legitimate
actions. Thus it prevents legitimate use of places where illicit activities
are rare or even unheard of. A plain reading of Section 3 of the
Ordinance shows it makes no classification of places of lodging, thus
deems them all susceptible to illicit patronage and subject them without
exception to the unjustified prohibition.
b. The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already
prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing
laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of
prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more
effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of
existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use.
 These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the
petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that
the Ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole
day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities.
Moreover,  drug  dealers  and  prostitutes  can  in  fact  collect  “wash  rates”  
from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for
motel rooms and even apartments.
c. Even as the implementation of moral norms remains an indispensable
complement to governance, that prerogative is hardly absolute,
especially in the face of the norms of due process of liberty. The
government must avoid constitutional conflict by employing more
judicious, less drastic means to promote morality.
 CHURCHILL AND TAIT v. RAFFERTY
December 21, 1915 | Trent, J. | Appeal from a judgement of the CFI of Manila|
Protected Interests in Property
SUMMARY: The plaintiffs assail the constitutionality of a portion in section
100 of Act 2339 empowering the CIR to remove billboards that are objectionable
to the sight. The court held that the act is a valid exercise of police power.
DOCTRINE: If police power may be exercised to encourage a healthy social
and economic condition in the country, and if the comfort and convenience of the
people are included within those subjects, everything that encroaches upon
private property is amenable to police power.
FACTS:
1. The plaintiffs are owners of private lands in the Province of Rizal. On their
property are billboards which some residents—British and German
Consuls-- find offensive. The Collector of Internal Revenue, after due
investigation, found that the billboards were offensive to the sight and
consequently directed the removal of the said billboards in accordance with
subsection b of section 100 of Act 2339 which states that if the Collector of
Internal Revenue decides that a billboard is offensive to the sight or is
otherwise a nuisance, he may direct the removal of such billboard.
ISSUE(S):
1. WoN subsection b of section 100 of Act No. 2339 is unconstitutional
because it constitutes a deprivation of property without due process of law –
NO.
RULING: Judgement appealed from reversed. (The perpetual restraint on the
CIR from removing the billboards is lifted.)
RATIO:
1. In the United States, the enjoyment of private property, specifically in
business and industry, was regulated through the use of police power. Police
power was exercised by the state through the laws that it passed limiting
business-owners from exploiting its workers and thus preventing them from
fully enjoying autonomy over their property. The state had to regulate the
businesses because it is its duty to ensure the physical well-being of its
citizens. Although the laws had little direct bearing on health and public
safety, it had direct bearing on economic and social conditions and which
safeguarded the citizens' physical well-being.
2. Offensive noises and smells have also been suppressed in some areas. Some
ordinances prohibited the location of garages near churches, hospitals or
schools and some barred livery stables from specific locations. The court
observed that though the reason for upholding the ordinances were for
health, they had little bearing on health but had a great deal to do with
comfort, convenience and peace of mind. It is from this take-off point that
the court launches its argument against the billboards.
3. The court held that the sense of sight gives contentment as much as the
other senses can. Hence, the state must protect sight--like it protected the
other senses mentioned before--for the public's attainment of contentment,
peace and comfort.
4. Billboards, placed along the arteries of travel, obstruct the range of vision
points where travelers are most likely to direct their eyes. They mar and
cover the beautiful landscapes which travelers and workers derive leisure
from. Hence, it is not unnatural for travelers and workers to protest against
this intrusion. The main contention of the plaintiffs however was that the
billboards were on private land anyway and that restricting their erection on
private land means restricting the use and enjoyment of those lands. They
also contend that such restriction would cause the death of billboard
advertising. The court held however, that billboard advertising depended
not upon the unrestricted use of private property but upon the unrestricted
use of public highways. Hence, the regulation of billboards and their
restriction is not a regulation of private property but a regulation of the use
of the streets and other public thoroughfares. The court furthermore iterated
that if police power may be exercised to encourage a healthy social and
economic condition, and if the comfort and convenience of the people are
included in the condition, then everything which encroaches upon private
property is amenable to police power.
 U.S. v. TORIBIO
January 26, 1910 | Carson, J. | Appeal from the CFI of Bohol | Protected
Interests in Property
2.
SUMMARY: Toribio was charged for slaughtering a carabao for human
consumption without a permit. He challenged the law as violative of due process.
SC held that it was not an unlawful appropriation of property interest for public
use (eminent domain) but a legitimate exercise of police power.
DOCTRINE: Eminent domain pertains to appropriating property interests for
public use, while police power pertains to restricting private use that is deemed
detrimental to public welfare.
FACTS:
1. Luis Toribio was charged for violating Sec 30 of Act No. 1147, an Act 3.
regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle. It appears
that Toribio applied for a permit from the municipal treasurer of the
municipality for the slaughter of a carabao for human consumption. This
was   denied   on   the   ground   that   the   carabao   was   not   “unfit   for   agricultural   appear 1) that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
work   or   for   draft   purposes”,   in   accordance   with   Sec   31   of   the   same   Act.   those of a certain class, require such interference, and 2) the means are
Nevertheless, Toribio slaughtered or caused to have it slaughtered in
Carmen, Bohol, thus violating the prohibition.
2. Sec  30  of  the  Act  states,   “No  large  cattle  shall  be  slaughtered  or  killed  for   4.
food at the municipal slaughterhouse except upon permit secured from the
municipal   treasurer.”   Toribio   argues   that   the   prohibition   does   not   cover   in the Islands and largely affected agriculture, which was the principal
municipalities not provided with a municipal slaughterhouse. He also
argues that the statute is unconstitutional for violating section 5 of the
Philippine Bill (due process clause).
ISSUES:
WoN the prohibition extends to municipalities w/o a municipal 5.
slaughterhouse—YES
WoN the statute violates due process—NO
RULING: Appeal DENIED. Statute UPHELD.
RATIO:
1. The Court held that the Act primarily seeks to protect large cattle against
theft,   even   providing   for   an   “elaborate   and   compulsory   system   of  
identification”.  This  purpose   would be impaired if animals were permitted
to be slaughtered w/o requiring proof of ownership privately outside a
municipal slaughterhouse. Thus, the construction adopted should be one
which tends to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker. In effect,
the prohibition in Sec 30 is taken to refer to 1) slaughter of large cattle for
human consumption anywhere, w/o a permit secured from the municipal
treasurer; 2) killing for food of large cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse
w/o such permit.
In challenging the validity of a statute under due process, it is important to
establish whether it constitutes 1) a taking of property for public use in the
exercise of eminent domain, without providing for compensation of the
owner, or 2) an undue and unauthorized exercise of police power. Here, the
restraint placed on slaughter of carabaos for human consumption fit for
agricultural work and draft purposes is not an appropriation of property
interests to a public use, and is not within the principled of the exercise of
the State of the right of eminent domain. It is in fact a mere restriction or
limitation upon a private use, which the legislature deemed to be
detrimental to public welfare.
In the exercise of police power, the State may interfere whenever public
interest demands, and large discretion is vested in the legislature to
determine what public interest requires and what measures are necessary for
the protection of such interests. But to justify such state interference, it must
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals.
The Court outlined the events that led to the enactment of the statute—A
contagious and infectious disease threatened the total extinction of carabaos
occupation in the country. Thus, people were forced to import rice,
resources began to drain, and people became impoverished. The govt then
effected measures to increase supply of carabaos by importation, but scant
supply kept prices high, and the crime of cattle stealing became increasingly
prevalent.
From the circumstances that surrounded the enactment of the statute, it
appears that the prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human
consumption fit for agricultural work and draft purposes was a reasonably
necessary limitation on private ownership. This is to protect the community
from the loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by
improvident owners, for the productive power of the community may be
measurably and dangerously affected.
 PEOPLE v. FAJARDO
August 29, 1958 | J.B.L. Reyes, J. |Appeal from CFI judgment | Protected
Interests in Property
SUMMARY: Former Mayor Fajardo questions his conviction by questioning
the constitutionality of the ordinance he violated, which required that he seek
the   mayor’s   permission   for   a   building   permit. SC: ordinance is invalid for
lacking standard and amounts to unjust taking property
DOCTRINE: While property may be regulated in the interest of the general
welfare, and in its pursuit, the State may prohibit structures offensive to the
sightthe State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest
owners of the beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them
solely  to  preserve  or  assure  the  community’s  appearance.
FACTS:
1. During defendant-appellant   Juan   Fajardo’s   incumbency as Baao, CamSur
mayor, the municipal council passed Ordinance 7, Series of 1950 which
requires that any person who seeks to construct or repair a building should
first secure a written permit from the Mayor, w/ a minimum charge of P2
for a building permit and P1 for repair permit.
2. After   Fajardo’s   term,   he   and   his   son-in-law, appellant Babilonia, filed a
written request with the incumbent mayor for a permit to construct a
building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in
Fajardo’s  name,  located  along  the  national  highway  and  separated  from  the   own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in question – they are in
public plaza by a creek. The request was denied since among other reasons,
the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza.
Defendants reiterated their request for a building permit but was again
turned down by the mayor. They then proceeded with construction without
a permit since they needed a place of residence very badly, their former
house  having  been  destroyed  by  a  typhoon  and  they’d  been  living  on  leased
property.
3. On Feb 26, 1954, apellants were charged and convicted by the Justice of the
peace for violating the ordinance, which CFI confirmed and sentenced them
to pay a P35 fine each, costs, and to demolish the building. The accused
appealed to the CA, which forwarded the records to the SC since the appeal
attacks  the  ordinance’s  constitutionality.     while the latter would relieve him of the burden.
ISSUE/S: WON assailed municipal ordinance was valid – NO.
RULING: Appeal GRANTED. Ordinance null and void. Conviction is reversed
and said accused are acquitted.
RATIO:
1. The ordinance fails to state any policy, or to set up any standard to guide or
limit  the  mayors’  action,  which  confers  upon  him  arbitrary  and  unrestricted  
power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits, and such undefined
and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity, per se
lawful, is invalid (People v. Vera). Such ordinance makes possible arbitrary
discrimination and abuses in its execution, depending solely on the
unregulated arbitrary will of the city authorities. Fundamental rights under
our government do not depend for their existence upon such a slender and
uncertain threat. Ordinance which thus invest a city council with purely
arbitrary discretion, which may be exercised in the interest of a favored few
are unreasonable and invalid.
2. Even if arguendo, the mayor can refuse a permit solely on the basis that it
would destroy the view of the public plaza (Section 3), the ordinance is
unreasonable and oppressive since it operates to permanently deprive
appellants of the right to use their own property. Hence, it oversteps the
bounds of police power amounts to a taking of propery without just
compensation. While property may be regulated in the interest of the
general welfare, and in its pursuit, the State may prohibit structures
offensive to the sight (Churchill and Tait v Rafferty), the State may not,
under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the
beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to
preserve   or   assure   the   community’s   appearance.   As   the case now stands,
every   structure   that   may   be   erected   on   appellants’   land,   regardless   of   its  
effect constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious
purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in character. To legally
achieve that result, the municipality must give appellants just compensation
an opportunity to be heard.
Supporting jurisprudence
Arverne Bay Constr. Co v Thatcher: An ordinance which permanently so
restricts  the  use  of  property  that  it  can’t  be  used  for  any  reasonable  purpose  
goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property.
The only substantial difference between restriction and actual taking is that
the former leaves the owner subject to the burden of payment of taxation
Tews v Woolhiser: Zoning which admittedly limits property to a use which
can’t  reasonably  be  made  of  it  amounts  to  taking  without  just  compensation.  
Use of property is an element of ownership. If it be of public benefit that
property remain open and unused, then certainly the public and not the
private individual should bear the cost of reasonable compensation for such
property under the rules of law governing the condemnation of private
property for public use.
 YNOT v. IAC cases may be made in the first instance by these lower courts. Also,
March 20, 1987 | Cruz, J. | Certiorari | Protected Interests in Property presumption of constitutionality is rebuttable.
2. There is no reasonable connection between the means employed and the
purpose sought to be achieved to for the EO to be considered a valid
SUMMARY:   Ynot’s   carabaos   were   confiscated   by   the   police   commander   in  
exercise of police power. It should be taken note that the amended EO does
Iloilo as they were being transported from Masbate to Iloilo. The confiscation
not prohibit and penalize the slaughter of carabaos, rather their transport.
was the penalty prescribed by EO 626-A which prohibits the interprovincial
Restraining their transport and retaining them in one province will not
transportation of carabaos. Ynot challenged the constitutionality of the said EO
prevent their slaughter; any more than moving them to another province
but the RTC and the IAC declined to rule on the constitutional question raised.
will make it easier to kill them there.
The SC declared the EO as an invalid exercise of police power, a violation of
As for the prohibition on carabeef, there is also no reason to prohibit
the due process clause, and an invalid delegation of legislative power.
transport thereof since it does not also prohibit their slaughter.
DOCTRINE: To be considered a valid exercise of police power there must be a
3. Even if there was a reasonable connection between the means employed and
reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to
the purpose sought to be achieved, the penalty prescribed was unduly
be achieved by the law.
oppressive (outright confiscation by the police). While there is a
justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, namely, the
FACTS:
immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the
1. On January 13, 1984, Restituto Ynot transported from Masbate to Iloilo six
need to correct it, the property involved in the present case is not inimical
carabaos which the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo City
per se to warrant their instant destruction.
confiscated for violating EO 626-A.
4. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is
2. EO 626-A imposes an absolute ban on the interprovincial transportation of
denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned
carabaos or carabeef, regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose.
and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the
This EO amended EO 626, which bans the slaughter of carabaos unless 7
power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment
years old for male and 11 years old for female.
on judicial functions and violates the doctrine of separation of powers.
3. Petitioner sued for recovery, but the Iloilo City RTC upheld the confiscation
5. The EO, being penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been
of the carabaos. It also ordered the confiscation of the supersedeas bond of
pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone
P12, 000 filed by Ynot for the return of the carabaos, for the carabaos could
would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only
no longer be produced by Ynot. The court declined to rule on the
after trial and conviction of the accused.
constitutionality of EO 626-A for lack of authority, as well as for its
6. There is also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the Chairman of
presumed validity.
National Meat Inspection Commission and the Director of Animal Industry
4. Petitioner appealed the decision to the IAC which upheld said decision.
who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties
arbitrarily taken, as seen by the provision   “seized   property   shall   be  
ISSUE/S:
distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the
1. Whether or not lower courts may pass upon the constitutional questions –
Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the
YES
case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director
2. Whether or not EO 626-A is a valid exercise of police power – NO
of Animal Industry may see fit, in  the  case  of  carabaos.”
3. Whether or not EO 626-A violates the due process clause – YES

RULING: EO 626-A declared unconstitutional. IAC decision reversed.

RATIO:
1. While they should exercise modesty in examining constitutional questions,
lower courts may pass upon the same when it is warranted, subject to the
review of the Supreme Court through the latter’s   appellate   jurisdiction  
(Article VIII, Sec. 5 (2)). This simply means that the resolution of such
 U.S. v. CAUSBY
May 27, 1946 | Douglas, J. | Protected Interests in Property
SUMMARY: The Causbys assert property rights against US aircrafts that
frequently pass over their property, causing its value to diminish. SC held that this
was  considered  a  “taking”  of  property  and  they  were  entitled  to  compensation.
DOCTRINE: Flights over private land are not a taking, unless they are so low
and so frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment
and use of the land.
FACTS:
1. Respondents own 2.8 acres of land near an airport outside Greensboro,
North Carolina, which has on it their dwelling house and outbuildings
mainly used for raising chickens. The use of the airport by the US is
pursuant to a lease for a term commencing June 1, 1942 to June 30, 1942,
with provisions for renewals until June 60, 1967, or 6 months after the end
of the national emergency, whichever is earlier. The path of glide to the
runway passes directly over the property—67 feet above the house, 63 feet
above the barn, and 18 feet above the highest tree.
2. Respondents allege that the noise was startling. As a result, they had to give
up their chicken business—6 to 10 chickens were killed in a day by flying
into walls from fright, w/c cost them a total of 150 chickens. Court of
Claims also found that the property had depreciated in value.
3. US contends that under the Air Commerce Act of 1926, the US has
complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the air space over this
country; and any citizen is granted a public right of freedom of transit in air
commerce through the navigable air space (above the minimum safe
altitudes prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Authority) of the US.
2. The 83 feet minimum safe altitude placed by the Civil Aeronautics
Authority does not apply to the path of glide—the landing and takeoff. The
minimum prescribed is 500 ft during the day and 1000 ft at night. Thus, the
flights in question were not within the navigable air space which Congress
placed within the public domain.
3. If the landowner is to have full enjoyment of the land, he must have
exclusive control of immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere.
Otherwise buildings could not be erected and trees could not be planted.
Thus, the landowner owns at least as much of the space above the ground as
the can occupy or use in connection with the land.The fact that he does not
occupy it in a physical sense—by the erection of buildings and the like—is
not material. What matters is whether there is an intrusion so immediate and
direct as to subtract from the owner's full enjoyment of the property and to
limit his exploitation of it. Here, the Court of Claims established that there
was a diminution in value of the property and that the frequent, low-level
flights were the direct and immediate cause. Thus, a servitude has been
imposed upon the land.

ISSUE/S: WoN  respondents’  property  was  “taken”  by  frequent  and  regular  
flights over their land at low altitudes—YES

RULING: Case REMANDED to Court of Claims.

RATIO:
1. The argument by the United States does not control this present case; for
they themselves conceded that if flights over respondents' property rendered
it uninhabitable, there would be a taking compensable under the 5 th
Amendment.   It   is   the   owner’s   loss,   not   the   taker’s   gain,   which   is   the  
measure of the value of property taken; such that if respondents could no
longer use the land due to frequency of flights, the taking would be as
complete as if the US entered upon the surface of the land.
 REPUBLIC v. PLDT PLDT should have known that plaintiff is not limited to servicing
January 27, 1969 | Reyes, J.B.L., J. | Appeal | Protected Interests in Property government, in accordance with the executive order that created it.

SUMMARY: Bureau of Telecommunications filed a suit against PLDT ISSUE/S: WoN government may exercise its power of eminent domain to
praying that the latter be mandated to enter into a contract with the former, utilize the trunk lines of PLDT for public welfare – YES
granting the plaintiff use of the trunk lines. Court held that he may not coerce a
party to enter into a contract but the government may exercise its power of RULING: Case remanded. Judgment by CFI is affirmed insofar as it dismissed
eminent domain to utilize the trunk lines of PLDT for public welfare. the petition to compel PLDT to enter into agreement and continue servicing
DOCTRINE: Government, in the interest of national welfare, may exercise government telephone system.
the power of eminent domain and transfer utilities to public ownership upon
payment of just compensation. RATIO:
1. Parties cannot be coerced to enter into a contract where there is no
FACTS: agreement between them. Freedom to stipulate their own terms is the
1. In 1947, defendant PLDT entered into an agreement with RCA essence of our contractual system. But CFI overlooked that although they
Communications, Inc. (not a party herein) whereby telephone messages may not compel PLDT to engage in a contract, the Republic may exercise
coming   from   the   US   and   received   by   RCA’s   domestic   station   could   its power of eminent domain and require PLDT to permit interconnection
automatically be transferred to the lines of PLDT and vice-versa for with government subject to just compensation, for the benefit of public
outgoing international calls. The contracting parties agreed to divide the interest.
tolls but PLDT decided to rescind from the contract in 1958. 2. Under Section 6 of Article XIII, the State may, in the interest of national
2. In the same year PLDT and RCA entered into a contract, plaintiff Republic welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just
of the Philippines thru the Bureau of Telecommunications set up its own compensation. Moreover, the executive order which created the Bureau of
Government Telephone System by renting trunk lines of PLDT to enable Telecommunications also stipulates that operation throughout the
gov’t  officer  to  call  private  parties.  In  1948,  the  bureau  extended  its  services   Philippines by utilizing existing facilities under terms with owners as
to the general public. agreed upon to the satisfaction of all concerned is allowed. But nowhere
3. After 10 years of going public, the plaintiff entered into an agreement with does it state that condemnation proceedings are not allowed when situations
RCA for a joint overseas telephone service. with unjust conditions for the bureau require so.
4. The defendant then filed a complaint to the bureau alleging that the latter 3. What the lower court should have done is to treat the case herein as one of
was in violation of the conditions under which PLDT allowed the use of its condemnation, independent of any contract, and proceeded to determine the
trunk lines. PLDT claimed that the bureau was already in competition with just compensation for the same.
their business so they threatened to sever the telephone connections they
provided, which they eventually did.
5. The bureau tried to compromise by proposing an interconnecting agreement
which, after negotiations, remained futile.
6. Plaintiff then filed a suit against PLDT praying for judgment ordering
defendant   to   execute   a   contract   with   plaintiff   for   the   use   of   defendant’s  
facilities and a writ of preliminary injunction against the severance of
existing telephone lines of the plaintiff. It claimed that severance of the
phone line prejudiced public interest.
7. Defendant filed a counterclaim denying that it had any obligation to execute
a contract with the bureau and that the latter used its facilities in fraud of its
rights when it went commercial to the prejudice of PLDT
8. Trial court rendered a decision that it could not compel PLDT to enter into
an agreement with the bureau but the latter is not guilty of fraud because
 REPUBLIC v. VDA DE CASTELLVI
August 15, 1974| Zaldivar, J | Appeal from CFI decision | Protected Interests in
Property
SUMMARY: After expiration of their lease with the defendant-appellant, the
government instituted expropriation proceedings. The Republic contended that
the taking of the property for purposes of eminent domain should begin from
the time when such property was occupied by virtue of the lease. The Court
held that their occupancy under the lease lacked two of the essential elements
of taking for eminent domain, and that to sanction their contention would be to
sanction a deceptive practice.
DOCTRINE: The essential elements of taking for purposes of eminent domain
are: (1) Expropriator must enter a private property, (2) for more than a
momentary period, (3) and under warrant of legal authority, (4) devoting it to
public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in
such a way as (5) substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all
beneficial enjoyment thereof.
FACTS:
1. In 1947, the government leased a parcel of land from defendant-appellee
Carmen de Castellvi. After she refused to extend the lease, in 1959 they
initiated complaints for eminent domain against defendant-appellee,
alleging that the fair market value was not more than P2,000 / hec, and
prayed that they be authorized to take immediate possession of the lands
upon deposit of the price with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga..
2. Castellvi filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the land was residential
and had a total market value of P11, 389, 485, and that despite repeated
demands, the AFP, particularly the Philippine Air Force, had been illegally
occupying her property since 1 July 1956, causing her damages in
unrealized profits since it prevented her from disposing of or using it.
3. The Republic alleged that it had taken the property when the contract of
lease commenced, not when proceedings began (i.e. 1947, not 1959).
ISSUE/S: WoN the taking of the property began in 1947 - NO
RULING: Lands expropriated. Republic must pay appellee Castellvi the sum of
P3,796,495.00 as just compensation, minus P151,859.80 that she withdrew out
of the amount that was deposited in court as the provisional value of the land,
with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from July 10, 1959 until the day full
payment is made or deposited in court;
RATIO:
1. ‘Taking’   of   property   for   purposes   of   eminent   domain   requires   the  
following:
a. The expropriator must enter a private property – This was present when
by virtue of the lease agreement the AFP took possession.
b. The entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary
period – When applied to occupancy of real property, the term
‘momentary’  is  construed  to  mean  “a  limited  period”,  one  not  indefinite  
or permanent. The lease contract was for a one-year period, renewable
each year. Thus it is temporary and considered transitory. The fact that
the AFP constructed installations of a permanent nature does not alter
that fact. By express stipulation in the agreement, as lessee the
Republic undertook to return the premises in substantially the same
condition as it was when they first occupied them. Although it is
claimed that they intended permanent occupation, this cannot prevail
over the clear and express terms of the contract.
c. The entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal
authority – This is present since the Republic entered as a lessee.
d. The property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected – This is present since the property
was used by the AFP.
e. The utilization must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive
him of all the beneficial enjoyment of the property – This was not
present since Castellvi remained the owner and was continuously
recognized as owner by the Republic, as shown by the year to year
renewal of the contract and the provision in the contract whereby the
Republic undertook to return the property upon termination of the
lease. Moreover, Castellvi gained the monthly rentals.
2. The  Republic’s  contention  that  the  contract was actually a permanent right
to occupy the premises under the guise of a lease is unacceptable, since it
contradicts the very nature of a lease and to sustain such contention would
sanction a deceptive practice that would deprive owners of the true and fair
value of their property at the time when the expropriation proceedings were
actually instituted. Moreover, under Sec 4, Rule 67, RoC, just compensation
is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.
 BEL-AIR v. IAC RATIO:
December 22, 1988 | Sarmiento, J. | Review of MR from CA decision | 1. There was no breach of contract since there was no contract to begin with.
Protected Interests in Property Petitioners  rely  on  an  alleged  promise  by  Ayala’s  manager  to  build  a  fence  
with  a  gate  for  entrance/exit  as  evidence  of  Ayala’s  continuing  obligation to
SUMMARY: The Mayor of Makati directed BAVA to open several streets to maintain a wall between the residential and commercial sections. Assuming
the general public. All but Jupiter St. was voluntarily opened, but subsequently arguendo he had the authority to bind the corporation in such promise, it
it was forced open. Petitioners filed actions for breach of contract, arguing that would be with respect to building a fence; a fence is not a wall. From the
there was an agreement that the area would stay residential but due to the circumstances, it also cannot be said that there was a meeting of minds
opening it became commercial. Court held that there was no breach since there between the parties; thus, there was no contract.
was no contract, but assuming that there was a contract the opening of the 2. Petitioners have not shown why the questioned ordinances do not represent
street was a legitimate exercise of police power. a   legitimate   exercise   of   police   power   other   than   the   supposed   ‘non-
DOCTRINE: The non-impairment guaranty in the Constitution is secondary to impairment’   guaranty of the Constitution with respect to contracts.
more compelling interests of general welfare. However, the non-impairment guaranty is secondary to more compelling
interests of general welfare. Police power is elastic and must be responsive
FACTS: to various social conditions; there is no reason why when public welfare
1. After a series of changes in zoning regulations, the Mayor of Makati clashes with the individual right to property the former should not be made
ordered the opening of the streets of Bel-Air Village to the general public, to prevail through the state exercise of police power. The Ordinance has not
in the interest of public welfare and for the purpose of easing traffic been shown to be capricious or arbitrary or unreasonable to warrant the
congestion. reversal of the appealed judgments.
2. The Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA) expressed the concerns of
residents and requested the indefinite postponement of the plan, but
subsequently they voluntarily opened all streets except Jupiter Street.
3. After a request and an advisory were made regarding the opening of Jupiter
Street, the municipal officers of Makati forcibly opened, destroyed and
removed the gates at the corner of Reposo St. and Jupiter St., and at Jupiter
St. and Makati Ave, and opened the entire length of Jupiter Street to public
traffic.
4. The residents filed actions for damages were filed against Ayala
Corporation and BAVA. Among other things, they alleged that there was a
bilateral contract between the parties, which Ayala and BAVA had
breached by allowing the commercialization of Jupiter Street despite
restrictions which Ayala and BAVA had themselves authored.
5. The lower courts relied on Ordinance No. 81 enacted by the Government of
the Municipality of Makati and Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance No. 8101
promulgated by the Metropolitan Manila Commission. The two ordinances
allowed the use of Jupiter Street both for residential and commercial
purposes. The lower courts also held that these were valid exercises of
police power.

ISSUE/S: WoN the opening of the street was a legitimate exercise of police
power - YES

RULING: Petitions denied.

 MMDA v. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as granted
March 27, 2000 | Puno, J. | Certiorari | Protected Interests in Property by the national legislature.
2. Congress delegated police power to LGUs in the Local Government Code
of 1991, Sec. 16 (general welfare clause). LGUs are empowered to exercise
SUMMARY: Petitioner wrote to BAVA requesting the opening of Neptune St. police power through their respective legislative bodies, primarily by
and demolishment of a perimeter wall in the interest of public welfare. BAVA enacting ordinances.
resorted to the courts, which held that the authority necessary was in the City 3. The powers of the MMDA are limited to the ff.: formulation, coordination,
Council of Makati, not the MMDA. The MMDA invoked their police power as regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting
justification. The Court held that the MMDA had no police power. of policies, installation of a system and administration. Nothing in R.A.
DOCTRINE: The exercise of police power is confined to those to whom it is No.7942 grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. As
validly delegated. termed   by   its   charter,   the   MMDA   is   “a   development   authority”;;   it   was  
created to lay down policies and coordinate with various agencies for the
FACTS: delivery of basic services in the metropolitan area. All its functions, as
summed up in their charter, are administrative in nature.
1. On 30 Dec 1995, Petitioner MMDA sent a letter to respondent Bel-Air
Village Association (BAVA) a notice requesting respondent to open
Neputne St. to public vehicular traffic effective 2 Jan 1996. On the same
day, respondent was informed that the perimeter wall separating the
subdivision from Kalayaan Ave would be demolished.
2. On 2 Jan 1996, respondent instituted proceedings praying for a TRO and
preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune St. and prohibiting
the demolition of the perimeter wall. The TC issued the TRO the following
day, but after due hearing, they denied issuance of the preliminary
injunction on 23 Jan 1996.
3. On appeal to the CA, the writ of preliminary injunction was issued, and the
CA held that the MMEDA had no authority to order the opening of Neptune
St. and cause the demolition of the perimeter walls, since such authority is
vested by ordinance in the City Council of Makati.
4. Petitioner appealed, invoking its regulatory and police powers. They alleged
that one of its basic services is traffic management, which involves the
regulation  of  the  use  of  thoroughfares  to  insure  the  general  public’s  safety,  
convenience and welfare, and that there is no need to wait for the City of
Makati to enact an ordinance opening Neptune St. to the public.

ISSUE/S: WoN petitioner may open Neptune St. by virtue of police power - NO

RULING: Petition denied. CA ruling affirmed.

RATIO:
1. Police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature, which may
delegate this power to the President, administrative boards, lawmaking
bodies of municipal corporations, or local government units. Once
 ORTIGAS & CO. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP v. FEATI 3. The resolution of the municipality declaring the area of the lots as an
BANK and TRUST CO. industrial zone was passed in the exercise of police power to safeguard the
December 14, 1979 | Santos, J. | Appeal | Protected Interests in Property welfare of the people. The area is along the highway where different
commercial establishments have flourished and heavy traffic passes every
day. It cannot be considered as conducive to the health and safety of the
SUMMARY: Ortigas Partnership sued FEATI bank for not following the
residents in its route. The said resolution by the municipality is justified.
building restrictions of the lands sold to the latter as indicated when plaintiff
4. The motive behind the resolution, it being a legitimate response to a felt
executed deeds of sale. Court held that legitimate exercise of police power
public   need,   not   whimsical   or   oppressive,   will   not   bar   the   municipality’s  
supersedes any type of contract stipulation.
exercise of police power. Otherwise, the non-impairment of contracts clause
DOCTRINE: Non-impairment of contracts, although constitutionally
in the Constitution will prohibit it.
guaranteed, is not absolute. Laws created in the proper exercise of police
power do not bow down to the constitutional guarantee of non-impairment of
contracts.

FACTS:
1. Plaintiff, as vendor, sold two parcels of land to Augusto and Natividad
Angeles. The said vendees then transferred their rights of Emma Chavez to
whom the plaintiff executed corresponding deeds of sale after completion of
payment. Part of the deeds of sale contained a stipulation that said lots can
only be used for residential purposes.
2. Later on, FEATI Bank (defendant-appellee) bought the two parcels of land.
He constructed a building on said lots which the plaintiff immediately
demanded to be stopped to no avail. Defendant argued that the lots were
part of an area declared by the municipality as a commercial and industrial
zone.
3. The lower court submitted a decision favoring the defendant and declaring
the municipal resolution as prevailing over the building restrictions of the
said lots.

ISSUE/S: WoN the stipulations in the contract supersede the resolution of the
municipality for the commercial and industrial zone? - NO

RULING: Decision dismissing the complaint is affirmed.

RATIO:
1. Private interest should bow down to the exercise of police power. The
resolution of the municipality, presumed to be valid because of lack of
contention, roots from the Local Autonomy Act which empowers Municipal
Councils to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for the
municipality.
2. Non-impairment of contracts, although constitutionally guaranteed, is not
absolute. Police power has been construed as the legitimate exercise of
power to prescribe regulations to promote health, morals, peace, education,
good order or safety and general welfare of the people.
 EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY v. DULAY
April 29, 1987 | Gutierrez, Jr., J. | Certiorari and Mandamus | Protected Interests
in Property
SUMMARY: EPZA expropriated private lands for the establishment of an
export processing zone, which was granted. EPZA, however, questions the
decision of Judge Dulay regarding the computation of just compensation, and
argued that the determination is not in accordance with P.D. 1533. The SC
declared P.D. 1533 as unconstitutional and void.
DOCTRINE: See Ratio No. 1 on definition and rules on just compensation.
Various factors must be taken into consideration in valuating properties to be
expropriated. Tax values may be used as guides but cannot be absolute
substitutes for just compensation.
FACTS:
1. P.D. 1811 reserved a parcel of land for the establishment of an export
processing zone. A part of this reserved area, however, was not a part of the
public domain. EPZA then move to have the private land expropriated, so
expropriation proceedings were instituted.
2. Judge Dulay granted the order for condemning the properties, and set the
value of just compensation at Php 15.00 per square meter based on the
consolidated report of 3 commissioners. EPZA filed an MR stating that the just
compensation must not exceed the maximum provided for by P.D. 1533, and the
said P.D. has superseded the Rules on Court regarding the determination of just
compensation. The P.D. provides that the basis of just compensation shall be the
fair and current market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is
lower.
3. The MR was denied, hence this petition in the SC.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not P.D. 1533 is unconstitutional for imposing a
mandatory mode of determining just compensation – YES
RULING: Petition dismissed. P.D. 1533 is declared unconstitutional and void
RATIO:
1. The Court reiterated the rules on computing for just compensation:
a. Municipality of Daet v. CA: just compensation means the equivalent for the value
of the property at the time of its taking. Anything beyond that is more and anything short
of that is less, than just compensation. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss
sustained, which is the measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to the
expropriating entity (J.M. Tuason & Co. v. LTA.)
b .Garcia v. CA: in estimating the market value, all the capabilities of the property and
all the uses to which it may be applied or for which it is adapted are to be considered and
not merely the condition it is in the time and the use to which it is then applied by the
owner. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its
improvements and capabilities may be shown and considered in estimating its value.
c. Republic v. Santos: according to Sec. 8 of Rule 67, the court is not bound by the
commissioners' report. It may make such order or render such judgment as shall secure to
the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his right of condemnation, and to the
defendant just compensation for the property expropriated. This Court may substitute its
own estimate of the value as gathered from the record.
2. Presidential Decrees 76, 464, 794 and 1533, however, have practically set
aside the doctrines laid down by the Court. The provision common among these
P.D.s is that just compensation for private property shall not exceed the value
declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the
property or determined by the assessor, whichever value is lower.
3. The Court held these decrees as unconstitutional for encroaching on judicial
prerogatives in determining the value of just compensation. Under these P.D.s,
while the courts have the power to determine just compensation for expropriated
property, such determination is only limited between the value declared by the
owner/administrator   or   the   assessor,   thus   limiting   the   courts’   discretion   in  
determining what is just and fair.
4. Various factors must be taken into consideration in valuating properties to be
expropriated. Tax values may be used as guides but cannot be absolute
substitutes for just compensation. Under P.D. 1533, in particular, the assessor
may use tax declarations as basis for just compensation. In the present case,
EPZA used the tax declarations which were already outdated and made before
the present owners had acquired the property. Such would be arbitrary and
confiscatory. The Court held that these values stated in the P.D. may be used as
guides   or   factors   to   be   considered   but   it   should   not   substitute   for   the   court’s  
judgment of award of just compensation.
5. It is also a violation of due process if private owners are not given the chance
to prove the correctness of such tax declarations. It is unfair that the work of
minor bureaucrats (the assessors) be made to prevail over judicial determination
of just compensation done after presentation of evidence and consideration of all
relevant factors.
 NPC v. CA and B.E. SAN DIEGO, INC
June 22, 1984 | Melencio-Herrera, J. | Certiorari | Protected Interests in Property
SUMMARY: NPC expropriated the land originally owned by Lachica and
Sadang, which was later acquired by San Diego, for the construction of an
access road to the Angat River Hydroelectric Project. The RTC and the CA
arrived at different conclusions on the value of just compensation. The SC
reversed the CA ruling and reinstated the RTC ruling with a modification as
regards the legal interest.
DOCTRINE: The basis for just compensation should be the price or value at the
time it was taken from the owner and appropriated by the Government taking
into account the nature of the land at the time of such taking. It is the time of
taking  and  not  as  “potential  building”  site  that  is  the  determining factor.
FACTS:
1. The National Power Corporation (NPC) commenced negotiations in 1961
with Maria Lachica and Esteban Sadang, owners of a parcel of land in San
Mateo, Norzagaray, Bulacan, for the construction of an access road to the
Angat River Hydroelectric Project.
2. The spouses gave permission to NPC to begin construction of the road
while the negotiations have not yet been concluded. In the meantime, B. E.
San Diego, Inc, acquired the said parcel of land at a public auction and a
title was issued to them (Dec. 7, 1962).
3. NPC then instituted expropriation proceedings against the spouses Sadang,
and also, San Diego. The Trial Court then granted the Order of
Condemnation to have the land expropriated.
4. The only issue being presented in this case is the valuation of the land. The
RTC held that the value was at Php 3.75 per square meter, with interest at
12% per annum from March 11, 1963 until fully paid. The CA held that it
was Php 7.00 per square meter, taking as a basis the convertibility of the
land into a subdivision, which San Diego was planning to develop.
be the price or value at the time it was taken from the owner and
appropriated by the Government.
In this case, NPC took possession of the land and constructed the access
road in 1961, when the land was still described as agricultural in use (in
fact,  it  was  described  as  “cogonal”).  When it was taken during that time, it
was still owned by the spouses Sadang.
2. The convertibility of the property into a subdivision, the criterion relied
upon by the CA, is not controlling. The Supreme Court, in a number of
cases, has categorically ruled that it is the time of taking and not as
“potential   building”   site   that   is   the   determining   factor.   Furthermore,   the  
nature of the land at the time of taking by the Government is the principal
criterion for awarding compensation to the landowner. When NPC first
entered the property; the subdivision was not yet in existence.
3. On The Issue of Legal Interest: since the value of just compensation
should   be   fixed   as   of   the   time   of   the   “taking”,   and   not   of   filing   of   the  
complaint (March 11, 1963), then the legal interest should also accrue from
the  time  of  the  “taking”.  
With respect to San Diego, the title was only issued to them on Dec. 7,
1962, so the taking with respect to them should commence only from that
date; thus, the legal interest should accrue from December 7, 1962, 6% per
annum, up to the time that payment is made by NPC.

ISSUE/S: Whether the CA correctly pegged the value of the land at Php 7.00
per square meter – NO

RULING: CA decision reversed. RTC decision reinstated. NPC directed to

payment legal interest at six per cent (6%) per annum on the amount adjudged
from December 7, 1962, until fully paid.

RATIO:
1. In the case of Alfonso vs. Pasay, the Court held that to determine due
compensation for lands expropriated by the Government, the basis should
 NPC v. CA and MANGONDATO
March 11, 1996 | Panganiban, J. | Certiorari | Protected Interests in Property
SUMMARY: NPC sought to expropriate the land owned by Mangondato for
the construction of a hydroelectric power plant. It argued that the just
compensation  should  be  fixed  from  the  time  of  “taking”  (1978).  However the
RTC and the CA ruled that the just compensation should be fixed from the
time of filing of the suit for eminent domain (1992). The SC affirmed the CA
decision with modification as to the legal interest.
DOCTRINE: While the general rule in determining just compensation is that
is fixed from the date of the filing of the complaint (Sec. 4, Rule 69) there is an
exception where the owner would be given undue incremental advantages
arising  from  government’s  use  of  the  property  expropriated.   ISSUE/S: Whether the value of just compensation should be fixed from the time
FACTS:
1. In 1978, the National Power Corporation (NPC) took possession of a land in
Marawi City to be utilized for hydroelectric power purposes. Believing that
the land taken was purely a public land, NPC paid the Marawi City a
“financial  assistance”  of  Php  40  per  square  meter.  Part  of  the  land  taken  was   RATIO:
actually owned by Macapanton Mangondato.
2. In 1979, while NPC was constructing the Agus I (HE Hydroelectric Plant
Project), Mangondato claimed just compensation for the land, arguing that
he was not privy to any agreement between NPC and Marawi City such that
payment to the city cannot be considered as payment to him.
3. At first, NPC refused   to   acknowledge   Mangondato’s   claim   but   changed   and use was the direct cause of the increase in valuation of the property
their position after more than a decade. In 1990, NPC resolved to pay
Mangondato Php 40 per square meter with legal interest of 12% from 1978,
with a total value of Php 1,184,088 pending determination of the fair market
value of the property. In another resolution in 1991, NPC resolved to pay
Mangondato Php 100 per square meter excluding 12% interest per annum.
4. Mangondato, however, claimed that the value of the land was even greater
than Php 300 per square meter, but settled for the Php 100 per square meter
value in the meantime without prejudice to other claims he may have
against NPC. Mangondato was paid Php 1,015,412 in addition to the Php
1,184,088 earlier paid to him pursuant to a Deed of Sale of a Registered
Property executed between the parties in March, 1992.
5. On  May  25,  1992,  NPC’s  board  resolved  to  pay  Mangondato  Php  100  per   property  in  1978,  and  even  refused  to  acknowledge  Mangondato’s  claim  for
square meter with 12% legal interest minus the amount already paid to him
and to Marawi City, with provisos that said authorized payment shall be
effected only after Agus I HE Project has become operational and that said
payment shall be covered by a deed of absolute sale with a quitclaim
executed by Mangondato.
6. Mangondato later filed a case for recovery of possession of the property, to
which a TRO was issued against NPC. While the resolution for the
preliminary mandatory injunction in the same case was pending, NPC filed
a case for eminent domain against Mangondato (July 27, 1992) over the
subject property.
7. The lower court denied recovery of possession of the property but ordered
NPC to pay a monthly rent of Php 15000 from 1978 up to July 1992 with
12% interest per annum and condemning the property in favor of NPC
effective July, 1992 upon payment of P1, 000 per square meter or a total of
Php 21,995,000 as just compensation based on the commissioners report.
Said decision was affirmed by the CA.
of taking or the from filing of complaint - FROM FILING OF COMPLAINT
RULING: Petition dismissed. CA decision affirmed but legal interest is reduced
from 12% to 6% per annum.
1. While the general rule in determining just compensation is that is fixed
from the date of the filing of the complaint (Sec. 4, Rule 69), there is an
exception. That is, where the owner would be given undue incremental
advantages  arising  from  government’s  use of the property expropriated.
In the present case, however, NPC has failed to prove that their occupancy
from 1978 to 1992. Therefore, the CA was correct in pegging the value at
Php 1000 per square meter as of 1992.
2. A number of circumstances must be present in the "taking" of property for
purposes of eminent domain: (1) the expropriator must enter a private
property; (2) the entrance into private property must be for more than a
momentary period; (3) the entry into the property should be under warrant
or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to a public use
or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the
utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way to oust the
owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
3. In the present case, the 3rd circumstance is lacking when NPC entered the
more than a decade. The fact that the parties executed a Deed of Sale over
the property means that NPC opted to buy the property instead of exercising
the power of eminent domain. It was only in May, 1992 when NPC passed
the resolution providing for the payment to Mangondato and effectively
repudiated the Deed of Sale that its intent to expropriate the land became
manifest. Since there was a valid contract, there was no need for
 expropriation. Expropriation lies only when it is made necessary by the
opposition of the owner to the sale or by the lack of any agreement as to the
price.
DE KNECHT v. BAUTISTA
October 30, 1980 | Fernandez, J. | Certiorari and Prohibition | Protected Interests
in Property
Expressway, therefore extension must point southward not detour to the
north.
7. Respondent: No sudden change in selection of site, residents were duly
notified by the project, minimize social impact factor.
ISSUE/S: WoN the expropriation of the properties in Fernando Rein-Del Pan
Streets are arbitrary – YES.

RULING: Certiorari and prohibition GRANTED.

SUMMARY: DPWC changed its original plan course for the extension of
EDSA, from passing through Cuneta Ave (mostly motels) to passing through
Fernando Rein-Del Pan Streets (residential area). RP sought to expropriate the RATIO:
1. Right of the RP to take private property for public use upon just
properties, which affected residents, De Knecht among them, assails for being
compensation is provided in the Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. IV). However,
arbitrary and capricious. SC ruled in favor of petitioner residents.
the government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose what private
DOCTRINE: Government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose what
property should be taken.
private property should be taken.
a. HSC’s   report   which   considered   functionality,   social   impact   and   cost,  
stated that: a) EDSA extension is necessary and desirable for the
FACTS:
overall Metro Manila Transport system; b) Cost difference factor is so
1. The Govt, through the Department of Public Works and Communications
minimal as to influence in any way the choice of either alignment; c)
(now MPH) prepared a plan to extend EDSA to Roxas Blvd, which would
Negotiated sale approach to compensation apply to which ever
pass through Cuneta Ave up to Roxas Blvd. said extension plan is an
alignment selected; d) Factor of functionality militates strongly against
adjunct to the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road Project. On Dec 13, 1974, Sec.
Alignment 2 (Fernando Rein-Del Pan) while factor of great social and
Baltazar Aquino of DPHC decided to make the proposed extension pass
economic impact bears grievously on the residents of Alignment 1
through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets which are lined with old
(Cuneta Ave).
substantial houses.
2. The issue seems to boil down to a choice between the people and progress
2. On April 15, 1977, the affected owners of the residential houses filed a
and development. However, progress and development are carried out by
formal petition to Pres. Marcos asking him to order the Ministry of Public
the State precisely and ultimately for the benefit of the people, therefore,
Highways to adopt the original plan.
HSC recommends the reversion to Cuneta Ave.Based on the facts of record
3. Pres. Marcos, referred the matter to Human Settlements Commission (HSC)
and recommendations of HSC, the choice of Fernando Rein-Del Pan Streets
which recommended the reversion of the EDSA extension to the original
is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval.
plan, passing through Cuneta Ave. Nonetheless, MPH insisted on
implementing the 2nd plan.
Notes:
4. On Feb 20, 1979, RP filed with CFI of Rizal in Pasay City an expropriation
proceeding against the owners of the houses standing along Fernando Rein- Functionality: Alignment 1: Straighter, shorter, contour confirming to
Del Pan Streets. De Knecht, on Mar 19, filed a motion to dismiss alleging EDSA, better for interchange construction. Alignment 2: Serious
lack of jurisdiction, pendency of appeal with the Pres. of the Phil, repercussions on energy conservation drive and perspective of national
prematureness of complaint, and arbitrary and erroneous valuation of the economy.
properties. Social Impact: Alignment 1: More residents and property owners
5. In June, RP filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession of the Cost difference: P269, 796
property sought to be expropriated on the ground that RP had made the
required deposit with the Philippine National Bank. Respondent Judge
issued said writ.
6. Petitioner: choice of property must be examined for bad faith, arbitrariness
or capriciousness. EDSA extension was envisioned to be linked to Cavite
 REPUBLIC v. DE KNECHT
February 12, 1990| Gancayco, J. | Review of CA decision and resolution |
Protected Interests in Property
SUMMARY: Following the De Knecht v. Bautista decision, BP Blg. 340 was
enacted expropriating the same properties for the same purpose. Republic
moved to dismiss the motion for dismissal of the expropriation action filed by
defendants, pursuant to said BP, in order to proceed with the expropriation
proceedings.
DOCTRINE: The Government may undertake expropriation proceedings by
1) voluntary negotiation with landowners, 2) taking appropriate court action, or
3) by legislation.
FACTS:
1. See De Knecht v. Bautista.
2. Aug. 8, 1981: Defendants moved to dismiss the expropriation action in
compliance with the dispositive portion of De Knecht v. Bautista decision
which has become final and executory. Republic had no objection, pursuant
to said decision.
3. Sept 2, 1983: Republic filed motion to dismiss said case due to the
enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 340 expropriating the same properties
and for the same purpose. Lower court dismissed said case by reason of
enactment of said law.
4. De Knecht appealed said order to the CA which dismissed the expropriation
proceedings on the ground that choice of Fernando Rein-Del Pan as line
through which EDSA should be extended is arbitrary and should not receive
judicial approval.
5. Petitioner: Construction of Metro Manila Flood Control and Drainage
Project and EDSA extension are essentially to alleviate the worsening
traffic problem in Baclaran and Pasay City areas and the perennial
problems.  BP  Blg.  340  was  enacted  to  hasten  “The  Project”  and  thus  solve  
these problems. It has already acquired through negotiated purchase about
80-85 percent of the lands involved whose owners did not object the choice.
It is only with respect to the remaining 10-15 percent along the route that
petitioner cannot negotiate, including De Knecht whose holding is hardly
5% of the whole route area.
6. Respondent:  Decision  has  become  final  and  executory  and  petitioner’s  right  
should no longer be disturbed, and the same has become the law of the case
between parties involved.
RULING: Petition GRANTED.
RATIO:
1. While the final judgment becomes the law of the case between the parties, it
is equally true that the right of petitioner to take private properties for public
use upon the payment of just compensation is so provided in our
Constitution and our laws. Expropriation proceedings may be undertaken by
1) voluntary negotiation with landowners, 2) taking appropriate court
action, or 3) by legislation.
2. The enactment of BP Blg. 340 was based on supervening evens following
the decision in De Knecht v. Bautista. The social impact factor has
disappeared. All residents in the area have been relocated and duly
compensated, 80% of the EDSA outfall and 30% of the Edsa extension has
been completed. Only private respondent remains as an obstacle to the
project that will solve the traffic, drainage and flood control problems in the
area.
3. Due to the aforestated supervening events, court finds justification on
proceeding with said expropriation proceedings. BP Blg. 340 therefore
superseded the aforesaid decision of this court.
Cruz, J., concurring:  BP  Blg.  340  is  not  a  reversal  of  the  court’s  finding  in  De  
Knecht v. Bautista that  the  expropriation  of  petitioner’s  property  was  arbitrary.  
Supervening events have changed the factual basis of the decision to justify the
subsequent enactment of the statute. Sustaining said legislation is not a
nullification   of   the   court’s   findings. It is simply because the court itself found
that under the changed situation, present expropriation is no longer arbitrary.

ISSUE/S: WoN the enactment of BP Blg. 340 justifies the expropriation of

properties previously held arbitrary in the court’s decision on De Knecht v.
Bautista/ - YES.
 MANOTOK v. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY
May 21, 1987 | Gutierrez, Jr, J. | Protected Interests in Property
SUMMARY: President issues PDs 1669 & 1670 to automatically expropriate the
Tambunting Estate & Estero de Sunog-Apog  area  to  provide  for  squatters’  social   process must be observed in the taking.
housing. SC: Unconstitutional for failing to meet 3 eminent domain requisites.
DOCTRINE: Power of eminent domain is inherent in every state; Constitution
only limits its exercise in that (1) taking must be for a public use, (2) payment of
just compensation must be made, (3) due process must be observed in the taking.
FACTS:
1. Pursuant to nationwide slum improvement and resettlement program as a
national housing policy, as well as EO 6-77 adopting the Metropolitan
Manila Zonal Improvement Program, the Tambunting Estate and Estero de
Sunog-Apog area was included in said programbecause of the City of
Manila and NHA’s   finding   that   said   properties   included   blighted   directly expropriated them by decree without the slightest semblance of a
communities. Pursuant to this, PD 1669 and PD 1670 declared the
Tambunting Estate and Sunog-Apog area expropriated. Both PDs provide:
a. NHA is designated administrator with authority to immediately
take possession, control, and disposition with power of demolition
of the expropriated properties and their improvements.
b. City Assessor is to determine market value (MV) of the property
pursuant to PD 76. City Assessor shall consider existing conditions
in the area notably, that no improvement has been undertaken on
the land and that the land is squatted upon by resident families w/c
should considerably depress expropriation cost
c. A maximum amount for just compensation is imposed (17M for
Tambuinting, 8M for Sunog-Apog)
2. 2 petitions: Property owners of Tambunting Estate and Estero de Sunog-
Apog challenge PD 1669 and PD 1670 on the grounds of:deprivation of
property without due process and equal protection, since the PDs provided
for automatic expropriation without them being given chance to oppose
such or to contest the just compensation to which they are entitled to. They
also   contest   the   maximum   amount   imposed   and   the   City   Assessor’s   sole   the expropriated area to commercial use in order to defray the
authority to determine just compensation.
ISSUE/S:
WON the PDs deprive petitioners of due process – YES.
WON taking is for public use – NO.
WON the PDs violate the just compensation guarantee – YES.
RULING: Petition GRANTED. PD 1669 and 1670 declared unconstitutional
and void.
RATIO:
1. Power of eminent domain is inherent in every state and the Constitution
only limits its exercise. The 3 Constitutional limitations are (1) taking must
be for a public use, (2) payment of just compensation must be made, (3) due
2. Due Process not Observed: Although due process does not always
necessarily demand that a proceeding be had before a court of law upon
exceptional situations, it still mandates some form of proceeding wherein
notice and reasonable opportunity to be hard are given to the owner to
protect his property rights. Even in exceptional situations, once it is alleged
that  one’s  right  of  due  process  of  law  has  been  violated,  the  courts  will  have  
to step in and probe such alleged violation.
In   this   case,   Gov’t   should   have   filed   a   complaint   with   the   proper court
under Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court to fulfill the requirement of
due process. Instead, they declared the two properties as blighted areas and
hearing or any proceeding. Expropriation was instant and automatic upon
the signing of the decree. And not only are the owners given no opportunity
to contest the expropriation or question the amount of payments fixed by
the PDs, but the decisions and orders of the NHA are expressly declared
beyond the reach of judicial review. The PD only provides that an appeal be
made to the Office of the President, but the courts are completely enjoined
from any inquiry of participation whatsoever.
3. Public Purpose not Proven: The very foundation of the right of eminent
domain is necessity of a public character. In this case, there is no showing
whatsoever as to why the properties involved were singled out for
expropriation through decrees or what necessity impelled the particular
choices or selections. At least in expropriation thru legislation, debates open
to the public, Congressional records, and public hearings are involved. In
this  case,  the  anonymous  adviser  who  drafted  the  decrees  for  the  President’s  
signature cannot be questioned as to any possible error, partiality, act of
vengeance, or other personal motivations.
In particular, theprovision allowing NHA at its sole option to put portions of
developmental costs of its housing projects is unconstitutional. TheGov’t  
still has to prove that expropriation of commercial properties in order to
lease  them  out  also  for  commercial  purposes  should  be  “public  use” under
the Constitution. The Tambunting estate is very valuable property at the
junction of 3 main city streets and housing valuable businesses. The favored
squatters allowed to buy these choice lots would obviously lease out or sell
their lots to wealthy merchants, and the public use and social justice ends
would not be served. Also,there is no showing how the President concluded
that the Sunog-Apog area is a blighted community. Petitioners were able to
 show that the area is a well-developed residential area without squatters,
and with roads, electric and telephone connections, etc. There are many
squatter   colonies   in   Metro   Manila   in   need   of   pupgrading   which   the   Gov’t  
should have attended to first. There is no showing for a need to demolish
the existing valuable improvements in order to upgrade Sunog-Apog.
4. No just compensation: Pursuant to PD 1533, the basis of just
compensation   is   the   MV   of   the   property   “prior   to   re   recommendation or
decision  of  the  appropriate  Gov’t  office  to  acquire  the  property”.   The time
of reckoning to determine said MV is when the government has made it
known to the property owner through a formal notice e.g. a hearing or
judicial proceeding.In this case,   the   Gov’t   improperly   fixed   the   maximum  
amounts of compensation and the bases thereof at the 1987 assessed values
(when  the  President,  after  a  fire  razed  the  squatters’  homes,  declared  that  the  
President would acquire the land and give it to the squatters). Thisdeprives
petitioners of the opportunity to prove a higher value, since the actual or
symbolic taking of the property occurred only in 1980 when the PDs were
promulgated.
Also, the PDs make no mention of any MV declared by the owner, only at
the MV determined by the City Assessor (which is also limited by the
provision   to   “consider   existing   conditions…no   improvement   has   been  
undertaken…squatted   upon...considerably   depress   depreciation   costs”. The
so called conditions, and the valuation vested solely to the City Assessor
should not be determined through a decree but in a proper proceeding for
the valuation of the property and also for the owner to be heard. Also, the
maximum amounts based on the tax documents provided for in the
questioned decrees cannot adequately reflect the property value and should
not be binding since there are other factors to be considered.
 ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL v. CITY MAYOR OF MANILA
July 31, 1967 | Fernando, J. | Appeal from CFI | Protected Interests in Property
SUMMARY: Petitioners challenged the validity of an ordinance issued by the
acting mayor of Manila (Astorga) in his capacity as mayor and claimed that such
ordinance is violative of the due process clause and vague. Lower court favored
the petitioners and issued a preliminary injunction against the implementation of
the ordiance. SC reversed the decision averring that there was no strong and
conclusive evidence that supports the allegations by petitioners and there is
always a presumption for validity in laws.
DOCTRINE: For a statute to be declared invalid, there must be clear and strong
evidence that shows such intrusions of the state against the fundamental right.
There is always a presumption of validity of enacted laws and statutes.
invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police power,
which is the most essential, insistent and least limitable power of the state.
2. There is no question that the ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize
certain practices hurtful to public morals. Moreover, the increase of annual
fees was to discourage establishments of the kind from operating for
purpose other than the legal and at the same time, increase the income of the
city  gov’t.
3. A  person’s  liberty  must  be  justifiably  limited  for  order  and  common  good;;  a  
balance   must   exist   between   a   person’s   freedom   and   the   impositions   made  
on it by the state. In the instant case, no such imbalance has been proved.

FACTS:
1. Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Hotel del Mar and a
certain  Go  Chiu  as  president  of  Hotel  del  Mar  sued  the  Mayor’s  Office  of  
Manila and prayed for a preliminary injunction against Ordinance No. 4760.
At the same time, they tried to assail the validity of the ordinance averring
that it is unconstitutional.
2. According to petitioners herein, the ordinance is violative of the due process
clause for being arbitrary, vague and intrusive of the rights to privacy and
guaranty against self-incrimination. Pertinent provisions of the ordinance
include: (1) additional fee per annum on first and second class motels; (2)
requirement of executing a prescribed form in each hotel that contains there
personal details of customers like name, companion, hours of stay, etc; and
(3) prohibition against accepting people less than 18 years old in such hotels
more than twice every 24 hours.
3. Mayor’s  office  contended  that  the  ordinance  bears  a  reasonable  and  proper  
purpose which is to curb immorality in the area and argued that it was a
valid exercise of police power.
4. Instead of presenting evidence, both parties submitted a stipulation of facts.
The lower court ruled in favor of the petitioners. Hence, the instant appeal.

ISSUE/S: WoN Ordinance No. 4760 is unconstitutional? - NO

RULING: Petition denied. Decision of lower court is reversed.

RATIO:
1. The court recognizes the fact that no evidence was presented to offset the
presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance.
As was expressed by J. Malcolm, presumption is all in favour of validity.
Judiciary cannot set aside legislative action in when there is not a clear
 ASSOC. OF SMALL LANDOWNERS v. SECRETARY OF RULING: R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and
AGRARIAN REFORM 229 are SUSTAINED against all the constitutional objections raised in the
July 14, 1989 | Cruz, J. | Review | Protected Interests in Property herein petitions. Petitions dismissed.

RATIO:
SUMMARY: Petitioners assailed P.D. No. 27, E.O. 228 and 229, and Proc. No.
1. Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated
131 contending, among others, that they were unconstitutional as they violated
must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities
the equal protection clause, and the due process by depriving the ownership of
imposed. Classification is the grouping of similar persons or things; to be
property without just compensation. The SC upheld the constitutionality of the
valid, a classification: (1) must be based on substantial distinctions; (2)
measures, holding that the requisites for a valid classification were satisfied and
must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to
just compensation was made prior to transferring title and ownership.
existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the
DOCTRINES: Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of
class. The Court found that all these requisites were satisfied by the
the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly
challenged measures.
stressed   by   this   Court   that   the   measure   is   not   the   taker’s   gain   but   the   owner’s  
2. Petitioners have not shown that they belong to a distinct class entitled to
loss. Just compensation need not always be in payments of money, and may be
different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also other
paid in bonds and stocks etc.
property owners must share the burden of implementing land reform is
Equal protection: all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike
untenable, as there is a substantial and clear distinction between these two
both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed.
classes of owners. Moreover, Congress is allowed leeway in providing for a
For a classification to be valid, it: (1) must be based on substantial distinctions;
valid classification. Its decision is accorded respect by the courts except
(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to
when there is abuse of discretion to the detriment of the Bill of Rights.
existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the class.
3. The laws challenged are not in the exercise of police power, but constitutes
taking under eminent domain – therefore, just compensation is imperative:
FACTS:
is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the
1. The various petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the ff:
surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and
a. P.D. No. 27 - providing for the compulsory acquisition of private lands
all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary.
for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property
retention limits for landowners.
taken from its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by
b. E.O. 228 - declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of
this  Court  that  the  measure  is  not  the  taker’s  gain  but  the  owner’s  loss.  The  
P.D. No. 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands
word  “just”  is  used  to  intensify  the  meaning  of  the  word  “compensation”  to  
covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment
convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be
c. Proc. No. 131 - instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program
taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample.
(CARP), and
4. Determination of just compensation addressed to the courts of justice
d. E.O. No. 229 - providing   the   mechanics   for   Proc.   No.   131’s
and may not be usurped by any other branch: the determination of the
implementation.
just compensation by the DAR is not by any means final and conclusive
2. Among others, they contended that the above were violative of due process,
upon the landowner or any other interested party - is only preliminary
equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property
unless accepted by all parties concerned. Otherwise, the courts of justice
shall be taken for public use without just compensation.
will still have the right to review with finality the said determination in the
exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.
ISSUE/S:
5. However, the measure here is not traditional exercise of the power of
WoN the above-stated measures were violative of equal protection – NO
eminent domain, but revolutionary (for the benefit of the Filipino nation)
WoN the above-stated measures were violative of due process by arbitrarily
- just compensation need not always be in payments of money, and may
transferring title before the land was fully paid - NO
be paid in bonds and stocks etc: Court assumed that the framers of the
Constitution were aware of this difficulty when they called for agrarian
 reform as a top priority project of the government. It is a part of this
assumption that when they envisioned the expropriation that would be
needed, they also intended that the just compensation would have to be paid
not in the orthodox way but a less conventional if more practical method,
taking into consideration the financial limitations of the government.
6. The measures conform to the constitutional requirement that full payment
of just compensation must made first before title and ownership is to be
transferred:
a. Although P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-
farmer   as   21   Oct   1972   and   declared   that   he   shall   “be   deemed   the  
owner”   of   a   portion   of   land   consisting   of   a   family-sized farm except
that  “no  title  to  the  land  owned  by  him  was  to  be actually issued to him
unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly
recognized  farmers’  cooperative”,  it   was   understood  that  full  payment  
of just compensation had to take place first.
b. E.O.   No.   228   Sec.   1   categorically   stated   that   “All   qualified   farmer-
beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the
land  they  acquired  by  virtue   of  Presidential  Decree  No.  27.”  It  clearly  
referred to lands already validly acquired under said decree, after proof
of full-fledged membership in the farmers' cooperatives and full
payment of just compensation. Hence, it was also perfectly proper for it
to also provide in Sec 2 that the "lease rentals paid to the landowner by
the farmer-beneficiary after October 21, 1972 (pending transfer of
ownership after full payment of just compensation), shall be considered
as advance payment for the land."
c. The CARP Law conditioned the transfer of possession and ownership
of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or deposit by DAR of the compensation in cash
or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title remained with
the landowner.

“Eminent   domain   is   an   inherent   power   of   the   State   that   enables   it   to   forcibly  

acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation
to the owner. Obviously, there is no need to expropriate where the owner is
willing to sell under terms also acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an
ordinary deed of sale may be agreed upon by the parties. It is only where the
owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the price or other conditions offered
by the vendee, that the power of eminent domain will come into play to assert
the paramount authority of the State over the interests of the property owner.
Private rights must then yield to the irresistible demands of the public interest on
the time-honored justification, as in the case of the police power, that the
welfare of the people is the supreme law.”  
 SUMULONG v. GUERRERO
September 30, 1987 | Cortes, J. | Review | Protected Interests in Property
SUMMARY: NHA filed a complaint for expropriation of petitioners’   land   in   recognized   as   a   public   need   in   the   Constitution:   “just   and   dynamic   social
Antipolo pursuant to PD 1244. Petitioners challenge the exercise of eminent
domain re: the requirements of public purpose and just compensation. SC held
that it was for public purpose but remanded because it deprives the Court of
discretion in fixing just compensation and to allow petitioners hearing.
DOCTRINE: The requirement of public purpose is satisfied as long as the
purpose of taking is public, including indirect benefit or advantage. The State is
generally granted wide discretion in determining lands for expropriation.
FACTS:
1. On Dec 5 1977, the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed complaint for
expropriation of 25 ha of land in Antipolo, including the lots of Sumulong
(6,667 m2) and co-petitioner Vidanes-Balaoing (3,333 m2). This was for the
expansion of Bagong Nayon Housing Project. The land was at P1/m2 as the
market value fixed by the provincial assessor in accordance w/ PD 1224,
which   defines   “the   policy   on   the   expropriation   of   private   property   for   much thereof may be expropriated. Absent a clear showing of fraud, bad
socialized housing upon payment of just compensation. The NHA deposited
the amount of P158,980 with the complaint, representing the total market
value. The judge issued a writ of possession without notice or hearing.
2. Petitioners argue that PD 1244 is unconstitutional for being violative of due
process: 1) not really for a public purpose since it benefits only a number of
people and thus not public, 2) allows taking of property regardless of size 3)
deprivation of judicial discretion in fixing just compensation. Petitioners
also challenge  the  judge’s  order  for  violating  procedural  due  process  for  not   2.
giving notice and hearing.
ISSUE/S:
1. WoN socialized housing is a public purpose—YES
2. WoN PD 1244 constitutes a deprivation of judicial discretion in
determination just compensation—YES
RULING: Orders ANNULLED. Case REMANDED.
RATIO:
1. The exercise of the power of eminent domain is subject to certain
limitations, that the property be for public use. Socialized housing is defined
as the construction and/or improvement of dwelling units of middle and
lower class income groups. The requirement  “public  use”  is  a  flexible  and  
evolving   concept.   The   strict   meaning   previously   attached   to   “public   use”  
was that it should be for the public to enjoy ie streets or roads. This
definition has been expanded and the requirement satisfied as long as the
purpose of taking is public, including indirect benefit or advantage. Urban
renewal and redevelopment and construction of low-cost housing is
 
order”:   II,   9;;   “continuing   program   of   urban   reform   and   housing”:   XIII,   9.  
Also, housing is a basic human need and shortage is a matter of state
concern since it directly and significantly public health, safety, the
environment, and in sum, the general welfare.
The Court justified socialized housing as a public use. According to a
NEDA report, 50% of urban families cannot afford adequate shelter even at
reduced rates and will need the government support to provide them with
social housing, either partially or totally.
Also, expropriation is not confined to landed estates. The exercise of
eminent domain does not depend on a quantitative area basis. There is no
cogent reason why the government, in its quest for social justice, should
focus on large proportions of land (JM Tuason v LTA). The State acting
through the NHA is vested with broad discretion to designate the particular
property/properties to be taken for socialized housing purposes and how
faith, or gross abuse of discretion, which petitioners herein failed to
demonstrate, the Court will give due weight to and leave undisturbed the
NHA's choice and the size of the site for the project. The property owner
may not interpose objections merely because in their judgment some other
property would have been more suitable, or just as suitable, for the purpose.
The right to the use, enjoyment and disposal of private property is tempered
by and has to yield to the demands of the common good.
Invoking the ruling in EPZA v Dulay, vesting provincial assessors with the
authority to fix market value is a deprivation of judicial discretion in fixing
just compensation.
 CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY v. J. ERICTA
and HIMLAYANG PILIPINO
June 24, 1983 | Gutierrez, Jr, J. | Review | Protected Interests in Property
SUMMARY: The City Government of Quezon City passed an ordinance which
orders private memorial type cemeteries to set aside 6% of their total land areas
for charity burials. Himlayang Pilipino sought to annul the ordinance. The court
held that the city government could not do this as this was not a valid exercise of
police power and the city charter does not have any provision that can justify the
ordinance.
DOCTRINE: Police power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation
or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general
welfare. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the
exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property
in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of
promoting the general welfare. There is no reasonable relation between the
setting aside of at least 6% of the total area of private cemeteries for charity
burial grounds and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the
general welfare of the people.
FACTS:
1. The Quezon City council passed an ordinance, Ordinance No. 6118 which
regulates the establishment, maintenance and operation of private memorial
cemeteries in Quezon City. Sec 9 of the ordinance provides that at least 6%
of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity
burials of paupers who have been residents of Quezon City. For several
years, Sec 9 of the ordinance was not enforced. It was only on the 7 th year
after the ordinance was passed that Sec 9 was enforced.
2. Himlayang Pilipino sought to annul Sec 9 of the ordinance. They alleged
that the ordinance was against the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter,
the Local Autonomy Act and the Revised Administrative Code. The CFI
declared Sec 9 of Ordinance No. 6118 null and void.
ISSUE/S: WoN Sec 9 of Ordinance No. 6118 is a valid exercise of Police
Power – NO
RULING: Petition for review DISMISSED. CFI decision AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
1. An examination of the Charter of Quezon City does not reveal any
provision that would justify the ordinance in question except the provision
granting police power to the city. Sec 9 cannot be justified under the power
to tax, fix the license fee and regulate such other businesses, trades and
occupation as may be established or practiced in the city.
2. The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit and to
confiscate. The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits
the operation of a memorial park cemetery because Sec 13 of the said
ordinance punishes with imprisonment and cancellation of permit to operate
violators of the Sec 9. The confiscatory clause and the penal provision
deters the operation of memorial park cemeteries.
3. Art III Sec 1 of the Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law. Police power on the
other hand, is defined by Freund as the power of promoting the public
welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property and is
usually exerted in order to regulate the owner's use and enjoyment of the
property. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the
exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private
property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and
order and of promoting the general welfare. Sec 9 of the ordinance is not a
mere police regulation but an outright confiscation as it deprives the person
of his private property without due process of law and without
compensation. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of
at least 6% of the total area of private cemeteries for charity burials and the
promotion of health, morals, or the general welfare of the people. The
ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a
private cemetery for the benefit of paupers who are charges of the municipal
corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this
purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.
4. Also, the questioned ordinance was passed after Himlayang Pilipino had
commenced operation. The sequestration of 6% of the cemetery cannot
even be considered as having been impliedly acknowledged by private
respondent when it accepted the permits to commence operations.
 LUZ FARMS v. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
December 4, 1990 | Paras, J. | Prohibition | Protected Interests in Property
SUMMARY: Luz Farms assails certain provisions of RA 6657 (Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law) for including livestockpoultry and swine farms within the
coverage   of   “agricultural   lands”   for   purposes   of   the   comprehensive   agrarian  
reform program. The Court ruled in favor of Luz Farms and declared such
provisions as unconstitutional.
DOCTRINE: The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the
meaning of the word "agricultural" clearly show that it was never the intention of
the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the
coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the
Government. Therefore the inclusion of "private agricultural lands devoted to
commercial livestock poultry and swine raising" in the definition of "commercial
farms”  under  RA  6657  is  invalidfor  purposes  of  the  coverage  of  agrarian  reform.  
FACTS:
1. Luz Farms, a corporation engaged in livestock and poultry business, assails
the constitutionality of certain provisions of RA 6657, also known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Refrom Law, as well as the IRR of the said law
with respect to production and profit sharing. The constitutional provision
invoked is Article XIII Sec. 4 of the 1987 Constitution on Agrarian and
Natural Resources Reform:
“The  State  shall,  by  law,  undertake  an  agrarian  reform  program  founded  on  the  right   It adopted the definition of "agricultural land" as defined under Section 166 of
of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively
the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the
fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just
distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable
retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological,
developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just
compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the rights of
small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land
sharing.”
2. The specific provisions of the said law being assailed as they are made to
apply to petitioner are as follows:
- Section 3(b)which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in the
definition of "Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity."
- Section 11which defines "commercial farms" as "private agricultural lands
devoted to commercial, livestock, poultry and swine raising x x x."
- Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing plan.
- Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the
authority to summarily determine the just compensation to be paid for lands
covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
- Section 32 which spells out the production sharing plan mentioned in Section
13
3. Petitioner primarily argues that the constitutional provision does not include
in  its  definition  and  scope  of  “agricultural  lands”  those utilized for livestock
and poultry and swine raising, alleging among others, that land is not the
primary resource in the undertaking, unlike crop or tree farming. Therefore,
Congress has transcended the constitutional mandate of agrarian reform by
including  within  its  scope  lands  which  are  not  “agricultural”.      
ISSUE/S: Whether or not livestock, poultry and swine farms are included in the
definition of agricultural lands for purposes of RA 6657 – NO
RULING: Petition granted. Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No.6657 on the
inclusion of the raising of livestock,poultry and swine in its coverage as well as
theImplementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith are
declared null andvoid for being unconstitutional.
RATIO:
In construing constitutional provisions which are ambiguous or of doubtful
meaning, the courts may consider the debates in the constitutional convention as
throwing light on the intent of the framers of the Constitution. In the
deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the meaning of the
word "agricultural”  clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of
the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the
constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the Government.
R.A. 3844, as land devoted to any growth, including but not limited to
croplands, saltbeds, fishponds, idle and abandoned land.
SEPARATE OPINION (Sarmiento, J.)
The case is not just one of constitutional construction, since Article XIII Sec. 4
provides a basis for a clear and possible coverage of livestock, poultry and
swine raising within the scope of the comprehensive agrarian reform program.
The case is more of an issue of equal protection, of whether or not agricultural
lands, on one hand, and livestock, poultry and swine raising, on the other hand,
be treated alike or differently. Here, the two kinds of lands are not similarly
situated and hence, cannot be treated alike since in the latter, land is not really
the primary resource and most of the investments needed are fixed assets which
are industrial in nature. The assailed provisions must be struck down as
unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause.
 CARIDAY INVESTMENT CORPORATION v. CA
August 2, 1989 | Griño-Aquino, J. | Review | Protected Interests in Property
SUMMARY: Cariday leased its residential building (which could house 2
occupants) in Forbes Park to 2 people, in violation of the restriction,
prohibiting the use of the lot for more than a single family. FPA disallowed
the occupancy of the other tenant and disconnected the water supply of the
building for its violation. SC upheld the restriction.
DOCTRINE: Dissent: Private property does not constitute an absolute and
unconditioned right. When a situation where one man is very wealthy and
another is very poor exists on a national scale, it becomes a matter of social
justice.
FACTS:
1. A   “Deed   of   Restrictions”   is   annotated   on   the title of lot owners in Forbes
Park Subdivision which limits the use of the lot for residential purposes
only and in allowing not more than one single family residential building to
be constructed thereon (restrictions are for a period of 50 years from Jan 1,
1949). Violation of such empowers the disconnection of water service until
violation ceases.
2. Cariday Investment Corp, an owner of a residential building, made
“repairs”  which  made  additions  and  deletions  in  the  existing  residence,  and   embrace extended family. But leasing to 2 or more families who are not
that it can be used by more than one family. Cariday admitted that the
building has the exterior appearance of a single residence but is designed to
allow occupancy of two families. The Forbes Park Association (FPA)
demanded correction.
3. On July 1, 1987, Cariday leased 1 portion to James Duvivier who occupied
it on July 5. Cariday also leased the other half to Procter and Gamble for the
use of Robert Haden, who notified the FPA of his moving in. Cariday also
requested for the issuance of a clearance for such move.
4. However, when Haden tried to move in, was stopped by the security guards.
FPA advised Cariday that it will not allow the latter to lease its house to
more than 1 tenant, and threatened to disconnect the water service of its
property.
5. Cariday filed an injunction praying that the FPA be ordered to desist from
cutting-off the water supply to its building and to desist from preventing its
tenants’   ingress   into   and   egress   from   its   building.   TC   issued   writ   of   social, economic, and political inequalities through equitable diffusion of
preliminary injunction which was annulled by the CA which upheld  FPA’s   wealth and political power.
right to prohibit entry of additional tenants and to disconnect water service
for the violation of the restrictions.
ISSUE/S: WoN   restriction   against   construction   of   “more   than   a   single-family
residential  building”  is  also  a  restriction  against  the use of the building by more
than one family – YES.
HELD/RULING: Petition DENIED.
RATIO:
1. Restriction clearly defines not only the type and number of structures (1
residential building), but also the number of families (single family) who
may use it as residence.
2. Purpose of restriction: avoid overcrowding both in houses and in the
subdivision which would result in pressure upon common facilities such as
water, power and telephone connections, accelerate deterioration of roads,
and create sanitary and security problems. Restrictions are for aesthetic
consideration and for the preservation of the peace, beauty, tranquility and
serenity of living at Forbes Park.
3. Prohibition may not be circumvented by building a house with an external
appearance of a single family dwelling but whose interior is designed for
multiple occupancy. What may not be done directly, may not also be done
indirectly.
4. Recognizing Filipino customs, concept of single-family dwelling may
related to the owner nor to each other would be impermissible.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., dissent:
No showing that 2 families living in one big residence would lead to any of
the above unpleasant consequences.
Single family restriction is intended to insure that Forbes Park real estate
values remain higher that the values in any other residential area. The Court
is protecting not sanitation, peace and order, comfort or aesthetic
surroundings, which would not in the least bit be affected by 2 families
sharing 1 house, but inflated land values and elitist lifestyle (one family
could hire a battalion of servants without violating the restriction).
Constitutional provisions on Social Justice and Human Rights emphasize
the social function of land. Highest priority should be given to measures
which enhance the right of all the people to human dignity and reduce
State is mandated to undertake housing programs and urban land reforms
which seek to make available decent housing and basic services to the
underprivileged and homeless citizens.
 Private property does not constitute an absolute and unconditioned right. ISSUE/S: WON the State, in promoting the health and welfare of a special
When a situation where one man is very wealthy and another is very poor group of citizens, can impose upon private establishments the burden of partly
exists on a national scale, it becomes a matter of social justice. subsidizing  a  gov’t  program  – YES.
Police power as an attribute to promote the common weal would be diluted
considerably of its reach and effectiveness if on the mere plea that liberty to RULING: Petition DISMISSED. RA 9257 legitimate exercise of police power.
contract would be restricted, the statute complained of may be characterized
as a denial of due process. RATIO:
1. Tax deduction =/= just compensation: Theoretically, the treatment of the
discount as a deduction reduces   the   establishments’   net   income   since   the  
discounts   would’ve   been   part   of   their   gross   sales   was   it   not   for   RA   9257.  
CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORP. v. DSWD Said permanent reduction is a forced subsidy corresponding to the taking of
June 29, 2007 | Azcuna, J. | Prohibition | Protected Interests in Property
private property for public use or benefit, which would ordinarily entitle the
establishments to just compensation. In this case, the tax deduction would
SUMMARY: RA  9257  or  the  Expanded  Senior  Citizens’  Act  of  2003  provides  a  
not meet the definition of just compensation since it does not offer full
20% discount to medicines for senior citizens and provides a tax deduction
reimbursement of the senior citizen discount.
scheme   where   32%   of   the   discount   is   shouldered   by   the   gov’t   through   a   tax  
2. Legitimate exercise of police power:RA 9257 was enacted primarily to
deduction while the other 64% is shouldered by the private establishments.
maximize  senior  citizens’  contribution  to  nation-building and to grant them
Drugstore proprietors and corporations assail said law for being confiscatory. SC:
benefits for their well-being since the State considers them an integral part
Valid exercise of police power & presumed constitutional.
of   society.   The   Act’s   Declaration   of   Policies   cites   Article   XV,   Section 4
DOCTRINE:. When the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature,
(duty of the family to take care of its elderly members); Art II, Sec 10
property rights must bow to the primacy of police power b/c property rights,
(social justice); Art XIII, Sec 11 (integrated and comprehensive approach to
though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare.
health   dev’t…make   essential   goods,   health…available   to   all   people   at  
affordable  cost…priority  for  elderly…”.  Pursuant  to  this,  the  Act’s  declared  
FACTS:
policy  is  to  recognize  the  private  sector’s  important  role  in  the  improvement  
1. Domestic corporations and proprietors of operating drugstores in the
of  senior  citizens’  welfare  and  to  actively  seek  their  partnership.  The  means
Philippines assailthe tax deduction scheme provided for in Section 4(a) of
employed in invoking the active participation of the private sector to
RA   9257   or   the   “Expanded   Senior   Citizens’ Act of 2003”.Said   provision  
achieve  the  law’s  objective  is reasonably & directly related. Hence, the law
grants a 20% discount to the purchase of medicines (branded & generic) in
is a legitimate exercise of police power.
all establishments for senior citizens. In turn, the establishment is granted a
3. Police Power > Right to Property: Similar to eminent domain, police
tax deduction based on the net cost of the medicines sold.
power has general welfare for its object and is described   as   “the   most  
2. While the old tax credit scheme deducts the credit from total tax due, the
essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to
new tax deduction scheme allows the establishment concerned to subtract
all  the  great  public  needs.”  For  this  reason,  when  the  conditions  so  demand  
the tax deduction (32% of the 20% discounts granted) from gross income.
as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of
The government then loses in terms of foregone tax revenues an amount
police power b/c property rights, though sheltered by due process, must
equivalent to the marginal tax rate the said establishment is liable to pay the
yield to general welfare. Moreover, the right to property, while provided for
government – an amount equivalent to 32% of the 20% discounts so
in Article XIII, has a social dimension – it can be relinquished upon the
granted. However, the establishment is still forced to shoulder 64% of the
State’s   command   for   the   public   good.   And in as much as pricing is a
granted discount.
property  right,   it’s unfair for petitioners to criticize said law as oppressive
3. Because of this, petitioners assail the validity of the tax deduction scheme as
just b/c they made the business decision of imposing only a small mark-up
a reimbursement mechanism for the 20% discount for being confiscatory
on their medicines b/c of the competitive nature of the industry.
and infringing upon Art III Sec 9, since it will result in a loss of profit and
4. Presumption of Constitutionality: In the absence of evidence
capital b/c (1) drugstores impose only a 5-10% mark-up on branded
demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in question,
medicines and (2) the law failed to provide a scheme whereby drugstores
there is no basis to invalidate said law since every law is presumed valid.
will be justly compensated.
 Petitioners failed to come up with a financial report to properly show WON
the   tax   deduction   scheme   greatly   disadvantages   them.   Petitioners’   claim   resolution on Nov 2007, the Former 22 nd Division issued a TRO against the
that they are burdened with P0.68 for every P1 senior citizen discount is
flawed since it is (1) unsubstantiated in tehe basene of any financial
statement presented; (2) computation is erroneously based on the
assumption that all their customers are senior citizens; (3) 32% tax rate is to
be imposed on income and not on the amount of the discount.
PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS AND EXPORTERS
ASSOCIATION v. CITY OF DAVAO
January 9, 2009 | Lantion, J. | Appeal | Protected Interests in Property
SUMMARY: The City of Davao passed an ordinance banning aerial spraying as
an agricultural practice in all agricultural activities by all agricultural entities in
Davao City. The Court of Appeals held that the ordinance is void and
unconstitutional.
DOCTRINE: Since the ordinance forbids aerial spraying even of vitamins and
minerals, the ordinance amounts to an arbitrary intrusion into the petitioners'
prerogatives in pursuing a lawful endeavor and in protecting its investments. A
reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and
the means employed for its accomplishment for even under the guise of
protecting public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property
will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. Also, Sec 6 of the ordinance
which requires a buffer zone violates the due process clause because it
unreasonably deprives plantation owners of the lawful and beneficial use of such
areas to be ceded, without just compensation.
FACTS:
1. The City of Davao passed an ordinance which bans the method of aerial
spraying as an agricultural practice in all agricultural activities by all
entities in Davao. Sec 5 of the ordinance provides that the ban shall be
enforced 3 mos after the ordinance' effectivity. Sec 6 of the ordinance also
requires that a 30-meter buffer zone be created within the boundaries of the
plantations. The ordinance was published in the Mindanao Pioneer and was
scheduled to be enforced starting June 2007. The Sangguniang Panlungsod
did not transmit an official copy of the ordinance to the Official Gazette.
2. On Apr 2007 the petitioners filed for a TRO and a preliminary injunction.
The TC granted the writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) and found that the
period of 3 mos was unreasonable. The TC enjoined respondents from
enforcing the ordinance for another 3 mos.
3. On Sep 2007 the TC found the ordinance valid and constitutional. The
petitioners filed an urgent motion for the issuance of a TRO and WPI. In a
execution of the ordinance. On Jan 2008, a WPI was granted, hence a
petition for certiorari was filed by respondents.
4. The court had 6 mos to decide the case but the appeal was submitted and re-
raffled only on July 23 2008, 5 days before the deadline. The ponente
received the case July 25 2008. Because of this, an extension was requested
from the SC. The CA however, decided to decide the case before the SC
shall have acted on the request.
ISSUE/S: WoN the ordinance constitutes an unreasonable exercise of Police
Power – YES
RULING: Appeal GRANTED. TC Decision upholding validity and
constitutionality of the ordinance REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
RATIO: The court held that the enactment of the ordinance is an unreasonable
exercise of the City of Davao of its delegated police power. Local governments
may be considered as having properly exercised their police power only if the ff
requisites are met: (1)the interest of the public generally as distinguished from
those of a particular class require its exercise and (2)the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. There must be a concurrence of a lawful subject
and a lawful method.
1. Sec 5 is unreasonable and impossible to comply with – There are 3 forms of
ground spraying as distinguished from aerial spraying: truck-mounted boom
spraying, manual spraying and sprinkler spraying. The truck-mounted
spraying requires road networks which is impossible to achieve in three
months while manual spraying and sprinkler spraying raises concerns on the
health of the workers as well as its inefficiency in protecting plantations.
Although the truck-spraying method is the most feasible, it is physically
impossible for petitioners to adopt it within 3 mos. Sec 5 compels them to
abandon aerial spraying without affording them enough time to convert and
adopt other spraying practices. Also, the whole ordinance must be declared
unconstitutional because it lacks a separability clause. A separability clause
is a part of a statute which states that if any provision of the act is declared
invalid, the remainder shall not be affected thereby. The absence of a
separability clause rules out the presumption of separability, thus, the
measure should be treated as a whole and the nullity of one provision
invalidates the rest. Since Sec 5 was declared infirm and the ordinance has
no separability clause, the whole measure must be struck down as
unconstitutional.
2. The ordinance violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution – The
 equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the without the payment of just compensation. Sec 6 of the ordinance therefore
laws on all persons or things without distinction. What it requires is equality constitutes an unlawful taking of the property without due process.
among equals as determined according to a valid classification or a
grouping of things similar to each other in certain particulars and different
from all others in these same particulars. The total ban on aerial spraying
runs afoul with the equal protection clause because it does not classify
which substances are prohibited from being applied aerially even as
reasonable distinctions should be made in terms of the hazards, safety or
beneficial effects of liquid substances to the public health, livelihood and
the environment. The measure also fails to differentiate among classes of
pesticides or fungicides and does not distinguish levels of concentration of
each substance when aerially sprayed, such that even substances beneficial
to agricultural production are covered by the ban.
3. The means employed provided for in the ordinance has no relation to the
purpose sought to be achieved – Even if the ordinance was enacted to
protect the public and the environment against the harmful effects of
aerially spraying pesticides or fungicides, there is no reasonable relation
between such purpose and the measure to ban aerial spraying of all forms of
substances, not only fungicides or pesticides, as the ordinance imposes. In
effect, the ordinance forbids the aerial spraying of vitamins or minerals and
other substances which are safe and normally enhance growth and harvest.
This amounts to an arbitrary intrusion into petitioners' prerogatives in
pursuing a lawful endeavor and in protecting its investments, exceeding
what may be fairly required by the legitimate demands of public welfare.
The indiscriminate ban on aerial spraying has no reasonable relation to the
public purpose for which the ordinance was enacted. Without a lawful
method concurring with the lawful subject, the measure is an arbitrary
intrusion into private rights and therefore offends due process.
4. The ordinance is tantamount to confiscation of property without due process
of law – Sec 6 of the ordinance requires that all agricultural entities must
provide for a 30-meter buffer zone within the boundaries of their
agricultural farms/plantations. The requirement however, makes no fair
distinction as to the area or size of the plantation over which the buffer zone
would be established. Owners of small farms which could meagerly
accommodate low-budget agricultural activity would have to cede portions
of their land for the buffer zone, downsizing the area to be cultivated and
constricting the viability of their lands for profitable endeavors. Thus, the
requirement violates the due process clause because it unreasonably
deprives plantation owners of the lawful and beneficial use of the land to be
ceded without just compensation. Moreover, the area to be ceded is not a
noxious property. Banana plantations per se are not noxious to the public
welfare. Police power therefore, cannot be invoked to justify a compulsion
for plantation owners to cede a portion of their property as a buffer zone
 ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY v.TREASURER 2. In the case at bar, the aforementioned requisites were not met for it taxes
February 17, 1968 | Bengzon, J.P., J. | Certiorari | Equal Protection only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by Ormoc Sugar Company
and none other. For a classification in a law to be reasonable, it should be in
SUMMARY: The City of Ormoc passed an ordinance levying tax on Ormoc terms applicable to future conditions. The ordinance must not be singular
Sugar Company alleging that it is not violative of the equal protection clause and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central of
since it is the only sugar mill in the city during that time. The SC thought the same class as plaintiff.
otherwise and averred that for an ordinance to be constitutional it must not isolate 3. Although during the time of enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company is the only
a single entity and must be applicable to all in the same class. sugar central in the city, Section 1 conclusively states that even if a later
DOCTRINE:See Ratio 1. company is set up, it cannot be subject to tax because the ordinance
expressly points to Ormoc Sugar Company as the entity to be levied upon.
FACTS:
1. On Jan 9, 1964, Municipal Board of Ormoc passed Ordinace No. 4
imposing "on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to
one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and
other  foreign  countries.”  
2. Ormoc Sugar Company paid said tax and filed a complaint in the CFI
against the Municipal Board, Mayor and Treasurer alleging that the
ordinance is violative of the equal protection clause and rule of uniformity
in taxation. Furthermore, the tax is allegedly not a production or license tax
which is allowed to be imposed under the Local Autonomy Act.
3. Defendants answered by asserting that said tax is allowed within the
defendant  city’s  power  and  it  did  not violate any constitutionally protected
right.
4. The CFI ruled for the constitutionality of the Ordinance. Ormoc Sugar
Company appealed.

ISSUE/S: WoN the tax imposed is violative of the equal protection clause? -
YES

RULING: Assailed decision is reversed. Ordinance is unconstitutional.

RATIO:
1. We ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or things
identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the
subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is based
on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to
present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially
identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those
who belong to the same class.
 DUMLAO v. COMELEC
January 22, 1980 | Melencio-Herrera, J. | Prohibition, Injunction | Equal
Protection
SUMMARY: Dumlao, retired Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, sought to run for the
same office but is prohibited by Sec 4 of BP 52 (retired who received retirement
benefits from office and over 65 disqualified from running for the same office).
Petitioners also assail the provision for disqualifying people accused of crimes
from running for public office. SC upheld the validity of the special
disqualification for being a reasonable classification but declared invalid the
prohibition based on a judgment of conviction for failing to place a classification.
DOCTRINE: The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is
subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real
differentiations, one class can be treated differently from another class.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners seek to prohibit COMELEC from implementing certain
provisions of BP 52 for being unconstitutional. Sec 4 of said BP presents a
special   disqualification   for   elective   officials,   “Any   retired   elective
provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the
retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law, and who shall have
been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he
seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local
office from which he has retired.”  They  also  assail  2nd paragraph of Sec 4,
“a   judgment   of   conviction   for   any   of   the   aforementioned   crimes   shall   be   accused shall enjoy the right to be heard. Here, the accused is disqualified
conclusive  evidence  of  such  fact.”
2. Petitioner Dumlao is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya who filed his
certificate of candidacy for position of Governor in the upcoming elections.
He argues that par. 1 of Sec 4 is discriminatory and contrary to
constitutional guarantees of equal protection & due process. Co-petitioners
Igot and Salapatan assail the constitutionality of par. 2.
ISSUE/S:
1. WoN the special disqualification is unconstitutional—NO.
2. WoN the presumption of guilt is unconstitutional—YES.
RULING: Sec 4 of BP 52 re Special Disqualification VALID. Par 2 INVALID.
RATIO:
1. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to
rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real
differentiations, one class can be treated differently from another class.
Here, for purposes of public service, employees over 65 have been validly
classified differently from younger employees for those of that age are
subject to compulsory retirement. Possible classifications:
a. Age (No): OSG argues that the policy was good insofar as it
promotes the emergence  of  younger  blood  in  “our  political  elective  
echelons”.  This  cannot  hold  for  persons  more  than  65  may  also  be  
good elective officials.
b. Retirement (No): 1) There may also be retirees below 65. 2) It is
not reasonable to disqualify retirees above 65 for they could be
good officials like one aged 65 but is not a retiree.
c. 65, elective local official retired from the same local office
(Yes): There is reason for disqualifying him from running for the
same office. There is a new blood for the tiredness of the retiree
from government work is present, so far as he has already declared
himself tired and unavailable for the same government work,
which by change of mind, he would like to assume again. Here
distinction becomes reasonable.
2. The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification; what is
merely proscribed is classification w/c is arbitrary and unreasonable.
Reasonable classification must be based on substantial distinctions, where
classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all those
belonging to the same class. To justify the nullification of law, there must
be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution for it is a legislative
prerogative to prescribe qualifications.
3. On Par 2: presumption of innocence in criminal proceedings and the
from running for public office once charges have been filed against him. He
is in effect placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a
crime with a penalty of arresto mayor, w/c carries with it the accessory
penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the term of his
sentence. A legislative or administrative determination of guilt should not
be allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination.
Teehankee (Separate Opinion): Persons similarly situated are not similarly
treated ie retired vice-governor, mayor or councilor can run for governor both
are 65 and retirees but one is barred from running for the office of governor.
Also, if they have not received their retirement benefits, they are not disqualified
disqualification  and  consequent  classification  as  “old  blood”  or  “new  blood”  
must not hinge on an irrelevant question of WoN they have received their
retirement benefits. Thus, classification is not based on substantial distinctions.
 QUINTO v. COMELEC
February 22, 2010 | Puno, C.J. | Motion for Reconsideration | Equal Protection
SUMMARY: COMELEC, Senators Roxas and Drilon, and Tom Apacible filed
for motions of reconsideration asking the reversal of the decision for the petition
of Quinto and Tolentino. This petition declared provisions of the law and
resolution of COMELEC, prohibiting public appointive officials from continuing
to discharge their duties upon filing for candidacy and not holding elective
officials in the same breadth, as unconstitutional. SC: reversed assailed decision.
DOCTRINE: Four requisites to determine if classification by legislature is valid.
First, classification rests on substantial distinctions. Second, it is germane to the
purposes of law. Third, it is not limited to existing conditions only. Last, it applies
equally to all members of the same class.
FACTS:
1. This is a motion for reconsideration from COMELEC and movant-
intervenors with regard to a decision that declared the 2 ndproviso in the 3rd
paragraph of Sec 13 of RA 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election and
Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 as unconstitutional.
2. This allowed public appointive officials to continue discharging the powers,
prerogatives & functions of their office despite their entry unto the political
arena.
3. The motion argued that: (1) the assailed decision is contrary to the
constitutional proscription against participation of public appointive
appointive officials and members of the military in partisan activity; (2) the
assailed provisions do not violate the equal protection clause when they
give differential treatment to elective and appointive officials because the
treatment rests on material distinction and is germane to the purposes of
law; (3) assailed provisions do not suffer from overbreadth; and (4) there is
a compelling need to reverse the assailed decision for public interest.
ISSUE/S: WoN declaring public appointive officials ipso facto resigned from
their positions upon filing for candidacy and not including elective officials,
violative of the equal protection clause? - NO
RULING: Decision reversed. Assailed provisions, resolution constitutional.
RATIO:
1. The assailed provisions of the law implement Section 2(4) of Article IX-B
of the 1987 Constitution which prohibit civil service officers and employees
from engaging in any electioneering or partisan political activity. At the
same time, this section of the Constitution applies only to civil servants
holding apolitical offices and does not cover elected officials. Elective
officials are not covered because the very nature of their office is to engage
in partisan political activities.
2. TheFarinas, et al. v Executive Secretarydecision is controlling in this case.
This case held that the difference created by the Legislature in the
classification of elective and appointive officials is proper for there are
significant and material distinctions between the two. The equal protection
of the law is not absolute but is subject to reasonable classification. It does
not demand absolute equality among people because it merely requires that
all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions.
3. There are 4 requisites to determine if classification is valid. 1st,
classification rests on substantial distinctions. 2nd, it is germane to the
purposes of law. 3rd, it is not limited to existing conditions only. Last, it
applies equally to all members of the same class. In the case at bar, only the
2nd req. can be deemed questioned if applicable. For example, a member of
the cabinet could wield the same influence as the vice-president who at the
same time is appointed to a cabinet post. With the fact that they both head
executive offices, there is no valid justification to treat them differently.
4. Aforementioned example is an injustice that Congress needs to address but
they can proceed  at  it  “1  step  at  a  time.”  In  addressing  a  societal  concern,  
Congress must draw lines & make choices, thereby creating some inequity
as to those included or excluded. But as long as the bounds of reasonable
choice  aren’t  excluded,  courts  must  defer  to  legislative judgment. The fact
that   a   legislative   classification,   by   itself,   is   underinclusive   won’t   render   it  
unconstitutional   b/c   there’s   no   constitutional   req’t   that   Congress   must   be  
rigidly held to the choice of regulating all or none.
5. Any person who poses an equal protection challenge must convincingly
show that the law creates a classification that is arbitrary and capricious. He
must refute all rational bases for the differing treatment and respondents
herein failed to discharge this heavy burden.
6. The assailed provisions are neither overbreath. It was argued that the evils
sought to be prevented is when incumbent appointive officials who run for
elective posts hold influential posts. The provisions are therefore
overreaching for it indiscriminately includes all civil servants, with or
without influence that can be used during elections. This argument is
erroneous because it fails to account for the large and growing bureaucracy.
There is always the possible danger of systematic abuse by a powerful
political machine that has control on the masses of government workers,
giving itself unbreakable grasp on the reins of power.
7. Courts have always taken a careful approach when it comes to the
overbreadth doctrine. Claims of such have been entertained only when, for
example, the possibility that the negative effect of muted protected speech
of others outweighs the possible harm to society in allowing some
unprotected speech to go unpunished. In the case at bar, the probable harm
 in permitting the incumbent appointive officials to remain in office, even as
they actively pursue elective posts, far outweighs the less likely evil of
having protected candidacies blocked by the possible effect of potentially
overly broad statutes.
LEAGUE OF CITIES v. COMELEC
February 15, 2011 | Bersamin, J. | Motion for Reconsideration | Equal Protection
SUMMARY: The League of Cities of the Philippines and several other
petitioners assailed the constitutionality of 16 laws (Cityhood Laws) which
converted the municipalities covered by the laws into component cities and
sought to enjoin the COMELEC from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the
subject laws. The court held that the laws are constitutional.
DOCTRINE: The Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a
valid classification provided that it: (1) rests on substantial distinctions (2) is
germane to the purpose of law (3) is not limited to existing conditions only and
(4) applies equally to all members of the same class. The existence of substantial
distinction with respect to respondent municipalities covered by the laws lies in
the capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become component
cities of their provinces.
FACTS:
1. Before RA 9009—which increased the income requirement for
municipalities to become cities from P20M to P100M—was introduced by
Sen. Pimentel, there were 57 bills filed for conversion of 57 municipalities
into component cities. During the 11th Congress, 33 of these bills were
enacted into law, while 24 remained as pending bills. Among these 24 were
the 16 municipalities that were converted into component cities through the
Cityhood laws.
2. The League of Cities of the Philippines, the City of Iloilo, the City of
Calbayog and Jerry Trenas assailed the constitutionality of the 16 laws.
3. On Nov 18 2008, the Court En Banc granted the petitions and struck down
the laws as unconstitutional for violating Secs 10 and 6, Article X, and the
equal protection clause.On Dec 21 2009 the Court En Banc declared the
Cityhood Laws as constitutional.On Aug 24, 2010 the Court En Banc
resolved the Ad Cautelam MR and Motion to Annul Dec 2009 Decision.
Hence, the case at bar.
ISSUE/S:
1. WoN the Cityhood Laws violate Art X. Sec 10 of the Constitution -NO
2. WoN the Cityhood Laws violate Sec 6, Art X and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution -NO
RULING: The Cityhood Laws are declared constitutional.
RATIO:
1. The Nov 2008 decision and the Aug 2010 resolution hold that the Cityhood
Laws are unconstitutional because they are not written in the Local
Government Code particularly Sec 450 as amended by RA 9009 which
states that:
“Section   450.   Requisites for Creation. –a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be
converted into a component city if it has a locally generated annual income, as certified by the
Department of Finance, of at least One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000.00) for at least
two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following
requisites:
xxxxx
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the
general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring
income.”
The Congress however, intended that those with pending Cityhood bills
during the 11th Congress would not be covered by the new law and higher
income requirement. Also, the exemption clauses found in the individual
Cityhood Laws are the express articulation of the intent to exempt the
municipalities from RA 9009. Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted
the municipalities from RA 9009, the Cityhood Laws are therefore
amendments to the Local Government Code itself. Hence, the Nov 2008
decision and Aug 2010 resolution which hold that the exemption clauses in
the Cityhood Laws are not found in the Local Government Code are
reversed.
2. The Cityhood Laws do not violate the equal protection clause. The Equal
Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification
provided that it: (1) rests on substantial distinctions (2) is germane to the
purpose of law (3) is not limited to existing conditions only and (4) applies
equally to all members of the same class. The petitioners argue that there is
no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood
bills in the 11th Congress and those that did not have pending bills and that
the pendency is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality
from another for the purpose of income requirement. The court held
however that:
o The imposition of the income requirement of P100M was to make it
difficult for municipalities to become component cities. There was no
empirical evidence to support this amount. This being the case, P100M
cannot be conclusively said to be the only amount sufficient to provide
 for all essential government facilities and services. This is evident from
the existing cities which do not comply with the P100M requirement,
some of which have even lower that P20M average annual income.
o The existence of substantial distinction with respect to respondent
municipalities covered by the Cityhood Laws is measured by the
purpose of the Local Government Code and not RA 9009. The
substantial distinction lies in the capacity and viability of respondent
municipalities to become component cities. Congress, by enacting the
cityhood laws, recognized this capacity of the municipalities to become
the State's partners in accelerating economic growth and development
in the provincial regions which is the very thrust of the Local
Government Code. By allowing respondent municipalities to convert
into component cities, Congress desired only to uphold the purpose of
the Local Government Code which is to make the local government
units enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to
attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make
them more effective partner in the attainment of national goals which is
the very mandate of the Constitution.
o The petitioners' complaint about the purported reduction of their share
in the IRA was proved false when after the implementation of the
Cityhood Laws, their respective shares increased, not decreased. The
court held that the petitioners' issue all boils down to money and how
much more they would receive if respondent municipalities remain as
municipalities and not share in the 23% fixed IRA from the national
government to the cities.
o In the enactment of the Cityhood Laws, the Congress merely took the
16 municipalities which were at a disadvantaged position and were
really on the same footing as the 33 municipalities which were
converted into cities prior to RA 9009.
o The petitioners complained of the projects they will not be able to
pursue. The court held however that the petitioners ignored the
respondents' obligations arising from contracts and projects they have
initiated and completed as component cities.
 PEOPLE v. CAYAT
May 5, 1939 | Moran, J. | Appeal | Equal Protection Clause
SUMMARY: Cayat was found guilty of violating Act 1639 which prevents
members of non-Christian Tribes from possessing intoxicating liquor. He
challenged the act and assailed its constitutionality. The court held that the act
does not violate the equal protection clause as it satisfies the requirements on
reasonable classification.
DOCTRINE: It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty
of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on
reasonable classification. For the classification to be reasonable, it must: (1) rest
on substantial distinctions (2) be germane to the purposes of the law (3) not be
limited to existing conditions only and (4) apply equally to all members of the
same class. The act satisfies these requirements.
FACTS:
Cayat was found guilty of violating Secs 2 and 3 of Act 1639 which makes it
unlawful for members of non-Christian tribes to buy, receive, possess or drink
intoxicating liquors other than the native wines which the members of such
tribes were accustomed to making. He was sentenced to pay P50.00 or suffer
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Cayat challenged the
constitutionality of the act.
ISSUE/S:
1. WoN the act denies the equal protection of the laws – NO
2. WoN the act violates the due process clause -NO
3. WoN the act is an improper exercise of police power – NO
RULING: TC judgement AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
1. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the
equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on
reasonable classification. For the classification to be reasonable, it must: (1)
rest on substantial distinctions (2) be germane to the purposes of the law (3)
not be limited to existing conditions only and (4) apply equally to all
members of the same class. The act satisfies these requirements.
a. The classification rests on real or substantial distinctions for the act was
intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-christian
tribes. The exceptional cases of certain members of the non-christian
tribes who have reached a position of cultural equality with their
Christian brothers cannot affect the reasonableness of the classification
established.
b. The classification is germane to the purposes of law. The prohibition is
designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-christian
tribes. It has been the sad experience of the past that the free use of
intoxicating liquors by the non-christian tribes have often resulted in
lawlessness and crimes thereby hampering the efforts of the
government to raise their standard of life and civilization.
c. The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the
time of its enactment. The act was not predicated upon the assumption
that the non-christian tribes are impermeable to any civilizing
influence. On the contrary, the legislature understood that the
civilization of a people is a slow process and that hand in hand with it
must go measures of protection and security.
d. The act applies equally to all members of the class. The argument that
the act is unfair to non-christian tribes by reason of their culture is not
an argument against the equality of the act's application.
2. The provision that empowers (Sec 2) authorized agents of the government
to seize and destroy prohibited liquor in the possession of members of non-
christian tribes does not violate the due process clause because due process
does not always require notice and hearing. This rule is especially true
where much must be left to the discretion of administrative officials in
applying a law to particular cases. Due process of law simply means: (1)that
there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the
legislative department of the government (2)that it shall be reasonable in its
operation (3)that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of
procedure prescribed and (4)that it shall be applicable alike to all citizens of
the state or to all of a class.
3. Any measure intended to promote the health, peace, morals, education and
good order of the people or to increase the industries of the state, develop its
resources, and to add to its wealth and prosperity is a legitimate exercise of
police power. Act 1639 is designed to promote peace and order in the non-
christian tribes so as to remove all the obstacles to their moral and
intellectual growth and eventually hasten their equalization and unification
with the rest of their Christian brothers. The law does not seek to mark the
non-christian tribes as an inferior race. On the contrary, the measure
adopted is for the promotion of their inherent right to equality in the
enjoyment of the privileges that their Christian brothers enjoy.
 ICHONG v. HERNANDEZ
May 31, 1957 | Labrador, J. | Injunction and Mandamus | Equal Protection
SUMMARY: RA 1180 prohibiting and limiting alien residents from engaging in
retail trade, was upheld by the Court as constitutional for providing a reasonable
classification.
DOCTRINE: Requirements for equal protection: applies alike to all persons w/in
such class, and 2) reasonable ground exists for making a distinction between
those who fall within such class and those who do not.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Lao Ichong, for and in his own behalf of other alien residents,
partnerships and corporations adversely affected by RA 1180, brought this
action to obtain judicial declaration of unconstitutionality and to enjoin the
Secretary of Finance and city and municipal treasurers from enforcing its
provisions.
2. RA  1180,  “An  Act  to  Regulate  the  Retail  Business”,  nationalizes  the  retail   the exercise of police power. Aliens are under no special constitutional
trade business. Its main provisions include: 1) prohibitions against aliens
from engaging directly or indirectly in retail trade; 2) an exception is made
for aliens (natural persons) actually engaged in retail allowed to continue
until forfeiture of license, death, or retirement; and for 10 years in case of
juridical persons; 3) exception in favor of citizens and juridical entities of
the US; 4) prohibition against aliens actually engaged from opening
additional branches, etc.
3. Petitioner argues that the Act is violative of equal protection, and is merely
the result of racialism and pure and unabashed nationalism.
2. In this case, the Court held that there is a general public sentiment that the
alien   retailer   holds   a   controlling   and   dominant   position   in   the   nation’s  
economy (as proven by statistics)—controlling food, clothing, and almost
all articles of daily life. The dangers arising from alien control and
domination in retail is founded on their ability to endanger national interest,
economy, and security in its power to fix prices and supply. This factual
milieu   reflects   the   legislation’s   purpose   and   target   in   the   enactment   of   the  
disputed nationalization law. The Court also held that such reasonable
distinction exists primarily in the fact that alien residents owe no such
allegiance to the country and the control and is naturally lacking in that
spirit of regard, sympathy and consideration for his Filipino consumers as
would prevent him from taking advantage of their weaknesses and
exploiting them. Also, the alien makes no genuine contribution to national
income and wealth, his stay being transient and temporary, not investing in
industries that would help the economy and increase national wealth.
3. Citizenship has been held to be a legal and valid ground for classification in
protection which forbids a classification otherwise justified simply because
the limitation of the class falls along the lines of nationality. This would
require a higher degree of protection for aliens as a class than for similar
classes of citizens. And when the classification is actual, real and
reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike, legislation is
generally upheld to be within legislative prerogative, since the wisdom of
the law shall not be adjudged by the Court.

ISSUE/S: WoN the Act is violative of equal protection of the laws—NO.

RULING: Petition DENIED. Act NOT unconstitutional.

RATIO:
1. The equal protection clause is against undue favor and individual or class
privilege, but is not intended to prohibit legislation. Police power and
constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection are supposed
to co-exist; and the balancing is the indispensable means for the attainment
of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. While constitutional
guarantees make no distinction accdg to race, color or nationality, equal
protection does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely
requires that all persons be treated alike under like circumstances and
conditions. Thus, the requirements for its exercise are 1) it applies alike to
all persons w/in such class, and 2) reasonable ground exists for making a
distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.
 KOREMATSU v. U.S.
December 18, 1944 | Black. J. | Equal Protection
SUMMARY: Korematsu was convicted of violating an order that prohibits
people of Japanese descent from entering or remaining in areas designated as
military areasas a measure against espionage and sabotage. The Court upheld the
conviction as well the validity of the exclusion orderstating that the exclusion was
necessary since the U.S. was at war with Japan.
DOCTRINE: Compulsory exclusion of large groups of citizens from their
homes, except under circumstances of direst emergency and peril, is inconsistent
with basic governmental institutions. But when under conditions of modern
warfare the country is threatened by hostile forces the power to protect must be
commensurate with the threatened danger.
. released conditionally or unconditionally by the military authorities.
FACTS:
1. Toyosaburo Korematsu, an American citizen of Japanese descent, was
convicted in a federal district court for remaining in San Leandro,
California, a 'Military Area', contrary to Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34
(issued May 3, 1942) of the Commanding General of the Western
Command, U.S. Army. Said Order directed that after May 9, 1942, all
persons of Japanese ancestry should be excluded from that area. No
question was raised as to his loyalty to the United States.
2. The said Order was issued pursuant to Executive Order 9066,a measure
issued as a protection against espionage and against sabotage to national-
defense material, national-defense premises, and national-defense utilities,
and also the March 21, 1942 Act of Congress.
3. The 1942 Act provides a penalty of fine or imprisonment for an act of
misdemeanor with the following elements: (1) anyone who enters, remains
in, leaves, or commits any act in any military area or military zone;(2) such
area or zone is prescribed by the authority of the President, the Secretary of
War or any military commander designated by the Secretary of War; (3) the
act was contrary to the restrictions in such area or contrary to the orders of
the Secretary of War or any such military commander; (4) he is aware of the
existence and extent of such restrictions and that he was in violation thereof.
4. Korematsu, however, contends that by the time the Order was issue, all
threat of Japanese invasion in the West Coast had disappeared.
Furthermore, it is to be noted that on May 19, 1942, (11 days before he was
charged)Civilian Restrictive Order No. 1 was issued which provided for
detention of those of Japanese ancestry in assembly or relocation centers. In
connection with this, he alleges that there were conflicting orders on
whether they should vacate the area or remain there, and contends that the
orders must be treated as one and inseparable such that if detention in the
assembly or relocation center would have illegally him of his liberty, the
exclusion order and his conviction under is also illegal.
ISSUE/S:  Whether  or  not  the  exclusion  order  as  well  as  Korematsu’s  conviction  
for violation thereof was valid – YES
RULING: Conviction affirmed.
RATIO:
1. The various orders imposed separate requirements for the evacuation of
those with Japanese ancestry namely, (1) depart from the area; (2) report to
and temporarily remain in an assembly center; (3) go under military control
to a relocation center there to remain for an indeterminate period until
2. These orders impose obligations which are separate from each other, insofar
as they were promulgated pursuant to congressional enactment, and
violations of each of them may be treated as separate offenses. The issue of
the validity of the exclusion order is separate from that of the validity of a
detention order after exclusion has been effected.
Korematsu’s   conviction   was   based   on   violation   on   the   order   of   exclusion  
order, not for failing to report or to remain in an assembly or relocation
center.. It cannot pass upon the issue regarding the validity of the other
provisions since they have not been raised as issues.
3. The Court employed strict scrutiny, stating that all legal restrictions which
curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. In
doing so, it sustained the validity of the exclusion order at the time it was
made and when Korematsu violated it, since the exclusion of those with
Japanese ancestry was deemed necessary because of the presence of certain
people within the group that are disloyal to the U.S. (It is alleged that some
of them do not want to pledge unconditional allegiance to the U.S. and to
renounce allegiance to the Japanese Emperor, while others have requested
to be repatriated to Japan).
4. Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to
him or his race. He was excluded because of the war with Japan. There fear
of an invasion of the West Coast and the military felt constrained to take
proper security measures. As such, they decided that the military urgency of
the situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated
from the West Coast temporarily. Finally, Congress, reposing its confidence
during wartime in the military, has determined that they should have the
power to do the exclusion.
 PLESSY v. FERGUSON
May 18, 1896 | Brown, J. | Equal Protection
SUMMARY: Plessy was arrested for violating a Louisiana statute which
requires for the segregation of the white and the colored races in railway
compartments. The US Supreme Court upheld the segregation.
DOCTRINE: Separate but equal: Facilities which segregate based on race is
consistent with the 14th Amendment so long as they are equal.
FACTS:
1. The State of Louisiana passed an act requiring railroad companies to
provide separate but equal accommodations for the white and colored races,
with an exception for nurses attending to the children of the other race. A
fine of $25 or imprisonment of not more than 25 days is imposed on
passengers who occupies a compartment not designated for his race, and on
officers who assign the same. Anyone who refuses to occupy a coach
assigned by the officer will be refused carriage without any liability for
damages.
2. Plessy, who was 7/8 Caucasian (but predominantly black in appearance),
took a vacant seat in the section for whites. He was ordered to vacate the
coach and take a seat in the colored section but he refused and was forcibly
ejected and arrested.
3. Plaintiff: Act conflicts with the 13th Amendment, abolishing slavery, and
the 14th Amendment, which prohibits certain legislation on the parts of the
states.
ISSUE/S: WoN the act providing for segregation of whites and colored races in
railway carriages is unconstitutional – NO.
RULING: Judgment of lower court AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
1. 13th A: No conflict. Slavery implies involuntary servitude; ownership of
mankind as a chattel. The act of a mere individual refusing accommodations
to colored people cannot be justly regarded as imposing any badge of
slavery or servitude upon the applicant, but only as an ordinary civil injury
properly cognizable by the laws and subject to redress until contrary
appears. A statute which implies merely a legal distinction between the
white and colored races has no tendency to destroy the legal equality of the
two races or re-establish a state of involuntary servitude.
2. 14th A: Although the object of the amendment was to enforce the absolute
equality of the two races before the law, in the nature of things, it could not
have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce
social, as distinguished from political, equality or a commingling of the two
races upon terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws permitting or requiring their
separation do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other
and have been generally recognized as within the competency of state
legislatures in the exercise of their police power.
3. Every exercise of police power must be reasonable, and extend only to such
laws as are enacted in good faith for the promotion of the public good, and
not for the annoyance or oppression of a particular class. As such, the
statute is reasonable.
4. When the government has secured to each of its citizens equal rights before
the law, and equal rights for opportunities and improvements, it has
accomplished the end for which it was organized. Legislation is powerless
to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish distinctions based upon physical
differences. If the civil and political rights of both races be equal, one
cannot be inferior to the other civilly or politically. If one race be inferior to
the other socially, the constitution of the US cannot put them upon the same
plane. (In other words, so long as the government affords them equality
before the law, civilly and politically, whatever inequality that happens in
the social sphere is immaterial. The government cannot do anything about
it.)
Justice Harlan, dissenting:
Purpose of the statute is to exclude the colored people from coaches
occupied by whites.
The constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens.
State enactments regulating the enjoyment of civil rights upon the base of
race, and cunningly devise to defeat the purpose of the [civil] war, under the
pretense of recognizing equality of rights, can have no other result than to
render permanent peace impossible, and to keep alive a conflict of races, the
continuance of which must do harm to all concerned.
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA REGENTS v. BAKKE
June 28, 1978 | Powell, J. | Equal Protection Clause
SUMMARY: Allan Bakke, a white male, was twice rejected from UC Medical
School. He contested their special admissions program, which allowed certain
disadvantaged minority applicants to be ranked only against each other and not
against the general applicant pool, and exempted them from the GPA cut-off.
The Court held that the program violated the Equal Protection Clause but
considering race was a factor was not in itself unconstitutional as it was in
pursuit of a legitimate state interest.
DOCTRINE: Strict racial quotas are unconstitutional, but affirmative action is
permissible. Equal protection is not merely based on a two-class theory.
FACTS:
1. Respondent Allan Bakke, a white male, twice applied to the Medical School
of the University of California at Davis, and was rejected both times. Davis
had two programs: regular admission and the special admissions program.
the  latter  program  allowed  “disadvantaged”  applicants  of  a  minority  group   race against the Negro minority. But they need not be read as depending
to be exempt from certain requirements in the former program, such as by
exempting them from the 2.5 GPA cut-off and by not ranking them against
candidates in the general admission program. No disadvantaged whites
were admitted under the special program although many had applied.
2. Respondent filed for mandatory, injunctive and declaratory relief to compel
his admission to Davis, alleging that the special admissions program
operated to exclude him on the basis of his race in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause, a provision of the California Constitution, and Sec. 601,
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.
3. The TC found that the special program operated as a racial quota since the
minority applicants were only rated against each other and had 16 reserved
slots in the class of 100, and held the special program as violative of the
Federal   and   State   Constitutions   and   Title   VI.   However,   respondent’s   4. Classification is justifiable when there is a compelling governmental
admission was not admitted. The California SC, using the strict scrutiny
standard, held that the special admissions program was not the least
intrusive means of achieving the goals of the compelling state interest of
integrating the medical profession and increasing doctors willing to serve
minority patients, and that the special admissions program violated the
Equal Protection  Clause,  and  ordered  respondent’s  admission  to  Davis.
ISSUE/S: WoN the special admissions program violated the equal protection
clause - YES
WoN considering race as a factor in admissions violated the equal protection
clause – NO
RULING: Judgment affirmed   insofar   as   it   ordered   respondent’s   admission   to  
Davis and invalidated the special admissions program, but reversed insofar as it
prohibited petitioner from using race as a factor in future admissions decisions.
RATIO:
1. Petitioner argues that the program  is  a  “goal”  of  minority  representation  in  
the Medical School, while respondent labels it a racial quota. The
distinction is immaterial. The special admissions program is a classification
based on race and ethnic background. To the extent that there existed a pool
of at least minimally qualified minority applicants to fill the 16 special
admissions seats, white applicants could compete only for 84 seats in the
entering class, rather than the 100 open to minority applicants. Whether the
limitation is described as a quota or a goal, it is a line drawn on the basis of
race and ethnic status, and thus violates the Equal Protection Clause.
2. Because the landmark decisions in equal protection arose in response to the
continued exclusion of Negroes from mainstream American society, they
could be characterized as involving discrimination by the "majority" white
upon that characterization for their results. Over the years the Court
consistently repudiated   “distinctions   between   citizens   solely   because   of  
their ancestry" as being "odious to a free people whose institutions are
founded upon the doctrine of equality." Equal protection is not merely
based  on  a  “two-class  theory”,  i.e.  differences  between white and Negro.
3. Granting preferential treatment is intractable. There is no principled basis
for  deciding  which  groups  would  merit  “heightened  judicial  solicitude”  and  
which would not. Political judgments regarding the necessity for the
classification may be weighed in the constitutional balance, but the standard
of justification will remain constant.And although petitioner cited
jurisprudence with race-conscious remedies,they were inapplicable as there
was no history of racial discrimination at Davis to remedy.
interest   and   appropriate   fit   with   such   interest.   Petitioner’s   assertions   that  
there was a compelling interest in increasing the number of minority doctors
and that the program would help bring doctors to underserved parts of
California were rejected, but they held that there was an interest in
promoting a diverse student body that would have students that will
contribute   most   to   the   “robust   exchange   of   ideas”;;   in   pursuit   of   such
diversity, considering race or ethnic background is permissible, but it
should be done through less restrictive programs which would not set rigid
quotas for minorities.
 GRATZ v. BOLLINGER
June 23, 2003 | Rehnquist, C.J. | Equal Protection
SUMMARY: An admission policy of the University of Michigan provides
for an automatic distribution of 20 pts to underrepresented minority
applicants. Gratz and Hamacher contends that the policy violates EPC for
using racial preferences.
DOCTRINE: Admission criteria based on race must be narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling interest. Race may be considered in an individual
assessment, but not as a sole or contributing factor for admission.
FACTS:
1. Jennifer Gratz and Patrick Hamacher both applied for admission to the
University  of  Michigan’s  College  of  Literature,  Science  and  the  Arts  (LSA)   able and ready to perform and that a discriminatory policy prevents it from
as residents of the State of Michigan but were both rejected, even though
Gratz  was  “well  qualified”,  Hamacher  “in  the  qualified  range”.
2. The   University’s   Office   of   Undergraduate Admissions uses the guidelines
for each academic year (which have been changed a number of times).
OUA considers a number of factors in making admission decisions,
including HS grades, standardized test scores, HS quality, curriculum
strength, geography, alumni relationships, leadership, and race. The
University considers African –Americans, Hispanics and Native Americans
to be underrepresented minorities and admits virtually every qualified
applicant from these groups.
1995- GPA   +   “SCUGA”   factors:   quality of HS (S), strength of HS
1996 curriculum (C), unusual circumstances (U), geographical residence
(G) and alumni relationships (A). = GPA 2 score. Put into guideline
tables: GPA 2: Y axis, ACT/SAT score: X axis. Tables divided into
cells: admit, reject, delay for add. info, postpone for reconsideration.
*diff admission outcomes based on racial status.
1997 Additional  points  for  “U”:  underrepresented  minority,  socioeconomic   being contemplated. The only consideration that accompanies this
disadvantage, etc.
1998 Selection index: applicant can score max of 150 pts.100-150: admit;
95-99: admit or postpone; 90-94: postpone or admit; 75-89: delay or
postpone; 74 and below (delay or reject).
*members of underrepresented minority entitled to 20 pts
*95-98: qualified minority applicants admitted as soon as possible. Eligible
for protected seats: athletes, foreign students, ROTC candidates,
underrepresented minorities.
1999- Additional level of consideration: counselors may, in their discretion,
2000 flag an application for the ARC to review after determining that
applicant is: 1) academically prepared to succeed at the Uni, 2)
achieved minimum selection index score, and 3) possesses a quality
important  to  the  Uni’s  composition  of  its  freshman  class.
ISSUE/S:
1. WoN petitioners have standing – YES.
2. WoN  the  University’s  use  of  racial preferences in undergraduate admissions
violate the Equal Protection Clause – YES.
RULING: District   Court’s   decision   granting   respondents   summary   judgment  
REVERSED with respect to liability. Case remanded.
RATIO:
1. Hamacher: The injury-in-fact necessary to establish standing is the denial of
equal treatment resulting from the imposition of the barrier, not the ultimate
inability to obtain the benefit. 1) A party need only to demonstrate that it is
doing so on an equal basis: University denied him the opportunity to
compete for admission on an equal basis and he demonstrated that he was
“able  and  ready”  to  apply  as  a  transfer  student  should  the  university  cease  to  
use race in undergraduate admissions. 2) Criteria used to determine whether
a transfer applicant will contribute to diversity are identical to those used to
evaluate freshman applicants.
2. Strict scrutiny:  University’s  policy  which  automatically  distributes  20  pts  or  
1/5 of the points needed to guarantee admission, to every single
underrepresented minority applicant solely because of race (means) is not
narrowly tailored to achieve the interest in educational diversity (purpose).
3. In Bakke, Justice Powell states that employing an admission program in
which   race   may   be   deemed   a   plus   in   an   applicant’s   file   would   be  
permissible, provided that each particular applicant be considered
individually, assessing all that the individual possesses, and evaluating his
ability to contribute to the unique setting of higher education.
4. The current LSA policy does not provide the individualized consideration
distribution is whether or not an individual is a member of one of these
minority groups. Instead of considering how the differing backgrounds,
experiences and characteristics of students might benefit the University,
admission counselors would simply award 20 points to minority applicants
because their applications indicate that they belong to the minority.
5. The   possibility   of   an   applicant’s   file   to   be   flagged   for   individualized  
consideration is of little consequence. Such consideration is merely an
exception and not the rule. The individualized review is only provided after
admissions counselors have already automatically distributed the additional
20 points. Such has the effect of making race a decisive factor for virtually
every minimally qualified underrepresented minority applicant.
 GRUTTER v. BOLLINGER RULING: Judgment AFFIRMED.
June  23  2003  |  O’Connor, J.| Certiorari to US SC | Equal Protection Clause
RATIO:
SUMMARY: Bakke,  a  Caucasian,  assails  the  U  of  Michigan  Law  School’s  race- 1. All  gov’t  racial  classifications  must  be  analyzed  by  a  reviewing  court  under  
conscious admissions program under the Equal Protection Clause after being strict scrutiny. Race-based action necessary to   further   a   compelling   gov’t  
denied admission. SC: Valid. Compelling interest of diversity, narrowly tailored. interest does not violate the equal protection clause so long as it is narrowly
DOCTRINE:Race-based action necessary   to  further  a  compelling   gov’t  interest   tailored to further that interest (Shaw v Hunt).
does not violate the equal protection clause so long as it is narrowly tailored to 2. Diversity, not just Race, as Compelling Interest: The Court endorses
further that interest. Justice   Powell’s   view   in   the Bakke case that student body diversity is a
compelling state interest in the context of university admissions, w/c has
FACTS: been the touchstone for constitutional analysis of race-conscious admissions
1. The University of Michigan Law School follows an official admissions policies. Grounding his analysis in academic freedom, he emphasized that
policy that seeks to achieve student body diversity by complying with the the  nation’s  future  depends  upon  leaders  trained  through  wide  exposure  to  
Bakke case. The policy evaluates applicants on scores (LSAT, GPA, the ideas and mores of students as diverse as the nation. However, he also
recommendations)   &   the   “soft   variables”   (recommenders’   enthusiasm,   says   that   ‘diversity’   does   not   amount   merely   to   simple   ethnic   diversity  
quality of undergraduate institution, essay, etc). The policy does not define (where a specified percentage of the student body is in effect guaranteed to
diversity solely in terms of racial and ethnic status nor does it restrict the be members of selected ethnic groups) but one that encompasses a far
types  of  diversity  contributions  eligible  for  ‘substantial  weight’,  but  it  does   broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic
reaffirm  the  Law  School’s  commitment  to  diversity  with  special reference origin  is  but  a  single  though  important  element.”   In this case, Court defers
to including African-American, Hispanic, and Native American students to the Law School’s judgment that diversity is essential to its educational
who otherwise might not be represented in the student body in meaningful mission. Expert studies show that diversity promotes cross-racial
numbers.   By   enrolling   a   “critical   mass”   (e.g.   meaningful   representation   understanding, learning outcomes, better prepares students for the diverse
only; no number/percentage/range involved) of underrepresented minority workforce and legal profession. Since universities, esp. law schools, serve
students, the policy seeks to ensure their ability to contribute to the Law as   the   training   ground   for   many   of   the   Nation’s   leaders,   the   path   to  
School’s  character  and  the  legal  profession.     leadership must be open to talented individuals of every race and ethnicity.
2. Barbara Grutter, a white Michigan resident with 3.8 GPA and 161 LSAT 3. Narrowly Tailored: To be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions
score, was denied admission. She filed this suit, alleging that respondents program  may  consider  race  or  ethnicity  only  as  a  ‘plus’-factor in a particular
had racially discriminated against her in violation of the 14 th Amendment, applicant’s   file,   i.e.   it   must   be   flexible   enough   to   consider   all   pertinent  
Civil Rights Act of 1964, and that she was rejected because the Law elements  of  diversity  in  light  of  each  applicant’s  qualifications,  and  to  place  
School uses race as a predominant factor, giving applicants belonging to them on the same footing for consideration. Universities may not establish
certain minority groups a significantly greater chance for admission than quotas for members of certain racial/ethnic groups or put them on separate
students with similar credentials from disfavored racial groups, and that admissions tracks. The Law School’s   individualized,   holistic   admission  
the School had no compelling interest to justify said use of race. program satisfies such – it ensures that all factors that may contribute to
3. District Court: use of race as admissions factor unlawful. CA 6th Circuit diversity are meaningfully considered alongside race. Court rejects the
reversed,  ruling  that  Justice  Powell’s  opinion  Bakke  was  binding  precedent   argument that the Law School should have used other race-neutral means to
establishing diversity as a compelling state interest and that the Law obtain the educational benefits of student body diversity – narrow tailoring
School’s  use  of  race  was  narrowly  tailored  b/c  race  was  merely  a  potential   does not require exhaustion of every conceivable race neutral alternative or
‘plus’   factor  and  b/c  the   Law  School’s  program   was   virtually  identical  to   mandate that a university choose between maintaining a reputation for
the Harvard admissions program described approvingly by Justice Powell excellence or fulfilling a commitment to provide education opportunities to
& appended to his Bakke opinion. members  of  all  racial  groups.  It’s  enough  that  that  Law  School’s  admissions  
program does not unduly harm nonminority applicants. Finally, race-
ISSUE/S: WON   the   Law   School’s   race-conscious admission program violates conscious admissions policies must be limited in time. Court takes the Law
the Equal Protection Clause – NO. School at its word that it would like nothing better than to find a race-
 neutral admissions formula and will terminate its use of racial preferences
as soon as practicable. Court expects that in 25 years such use of racial
preferences will no longer be necessary.
FRAGRANTE v. CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU
March 6, 1989 | Trott, J. | Equal Protection
SUMMARY: Fragrante, a Filipino immigrant, was not selected for a clerk of
court position, a job which required oral communication duties, due to his heavy
accent. He claimed that he was discriminated against based on national origin.
The Court held that a heavy accent was a legitimate reason for non-selection
since it was relevant to performance of the job.
DOCTRINE: The presumption of employment discrimination may be
overcome by articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for adverse
action.
FACTS:
1. Plaintiff-appellant Manuel Fragrante, a Filipino immigrant, applied as a
clerk with the defendant-appellee, City and County of Honolulu. The
position involved tasks such as filing, processing mail, cashiering, orally
providing   routine   information   to   the   “sometimes   contentious   public”   over   Fragrante’s   non-selection, but cautioned that an adverse employment
the telephone and at an information counter, and obtaining supplies.
2. Fragrante scored the highest of 721 test takers on the written Civil Service
Examination for the position; however, after an interview conducted by
Asst. Licensing Administrator George Kuwahara and Division Sec. Kalani
McCandless, he was not selected due to a perceived deficiency in relevant
oral communication skills by his heavy Filipino accent. Both interviewers
had difficulty understanding Fragrante due to his accent and judged that it
would interfere with his performance of certain aspects of the job.
3. Fragrante alleged that he was discriminated against based on his national
origin, violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The district court held
that effective communication abilities were a bona fide occupational
qualification for the job in question and that the failure to hire Fragrante
was caused by his deficiencies in oral communication, not his national
origin. Hence the instant appeal.
ISSUE/S: WoN there was a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act - NO
RULING: District court is affirmed.
RATIO:
1. Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, colour,
sex, religion and national origin; a plaintiff may bring an action against an
employer under a disparate treatment and/or disparate impact theory. The
case at bar falls under the former.
2. In disparate treatment cases, the employer is normally alleged to have
treated  a  person  less  favourably  based  on  the  person’s  race,  colour,  religion,  
sex or national origin. To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment,
plaintiff must show these four factors: (1) that he has identifiable national
origin; (2) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the
employer was seeking applicants; (3) that he was rejected despite his
qualifications; and (4) after his rejection, the position remained open and
the   employer   continued   to   seek   applicants   from   persons   of   complainant’s  
qualifications. However, the burden of establishing the prima facie case for
disparate treatment is not onerous and varies from case to case. The Court
did not pass upon whether or not Fragrante sufficiently established a prima
facie case and worked on the assumption that he did so.
3. Once the prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the employer
to rebut the presumption of discrimination by articulating some legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for the adverse action. The Court held that
defendant-appellees had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
decision may be predicated upon an individual’s   accent   only   when   it  
interfered materially with job performance. The record showed that
interviewers   both   recorded   their   evaluation   of   Fragrante’s   problem   in  
separate written remarks on their rating sheets; thus, there was a legitimate
factual basis for the conclusion that Fragrante would be less able than his
competition to perform the required duties. The district court also noted that
Fragrante had difficult manner of pronunciation and would often not
respond directly the propounded questions.
4. After the employer presents legitimate reasons for plaintiff's non-selection,
the burden shifts to the plaintiff, and he must show that the employer's
purported reason for non-selection was "a pretext for invidious
discrimination". Fragante essentially argued that the selection and
evaluation procedures were so deficient as to render the proffered reason for
non-selection nothing more than a pretext for national origin discrimination.
However, on examination it showed such was only a charge without
substance. The process may not have been perfect, but it revealed no
discriminatory motive or intent.
 BRADWELL v. ILLINOIS
April 15, 1873 | Miller, J. | Equal Protection Clause
SUMMARY: Mrs. Bradwell is denied the license to practice law in Illinois by
the Illinois SC, since the law allegedly did not contemplate women practicing
law. She questions the denial in Federal Court by invoking the 14 th Amendment
and the supposed right of every person, man or woman, to engage in any lawful
employment for a livelihood. SC rules that
DOCTRINE:.While there are privileges and immunities belonging to US citizens
which a State is forbidden to abridge, the right to admission to practice in the
courts of a particular State is not one of them.
FACTS:
1. Mrs. Myra Bradwell, after obtaining the requisite qualifications, applied to
the judges of the Illinois Supreme Court for a license to practice law in said
State. This was accompanied by an affidavit claiming that she was born in
Vermont and was formerly a citizen of that state. However, she is now both
a US and Illinois citizen after residing in Chicago for many years.
According to the Chicago Statute, no individual is allowed to practice law
without obtaining a license from 2 justices of the State SC.
2. Illinois SC refused to issue Bradwell a license because her marital status
would prevent her from being bound by her express or implied contracts
which the law upholds between attorney and client. Said refusal was
anchored on an existing state statute prohibiting persons from practicing
law without a license obtained from 2 SC justices and the requirement of a
certificate of good moral character. Other rules of admission are left to the
discretion to SC members, provided that (1) terms of admission must
promote the proper administration of justice and (2) SC should not admit
any persons or class of persons who are not intended by the legislature to be
admitted, even though their exclusion is not expressly required by the
statute. The court said that granting Mrs. Bradwell a license would violate
the 2nd limitation, since admitting women to engage in the practice of law
was   not   contemplated   by   the   legislature   since   at   the   time   of   the   statute’s   existence, and were incapable of making bindingcontracts without  her  husband’s
establishment,   the   US   had   adopted   England’s   Common   Law   System   in   consent. This played heavily in the Supreme Court of   Illinois’   decision.   The
which female attorneys are unknown
3. Mrs. Bradwell brought the case to the Federal SC. Her counsel, Mr.
Carpenter, alleges that whatever the Illinois statute meant, the 14 th
amendment opens to every US citizen the honorable professions and servile
employments   of   life   under   the   ‘broad   shield   of   the   Constitution’.   Hence,  
only integrity, intelligence, and honor are the qualifications that can be
prescribed as conditions precedent to an entry upon any honorable pursuit
or profitable avocation.
ISSUE/S: WON  Bradwell’s  right  to  practice  law/admission to the bar in Illinois
is protected by the 14th Amendment – NO.
RULING: Judgment AFFIRMED. Mrs. Bradwell not granted license to practice
law in Illinois.
RATIO:
1. The Constitutional protection that  ‘citizens  of  each  State  shall  be  entitled  to  
all the privileges and immunities of citizens   in   the   several   States’ is
inapplicable to a citizen of the State whose laws are complained of, nor
does  it  afford  protection  against  Illinois’  courts  or  legislation.  Plaintiff  must  
have seen this difficulty and attempts to avoid it by stating that she was
born in Vermont. However, it is clear that at the time of her application, she
was a US and Illinois citizen nor does she state anything to take her case out
of the definition of citizenship of a State ubnder Section 1,14 th Amendment.
2. While there are privileges and immunities belonging to US citizens which a
State is forbidden to abridge, the right to admission to practice in the courts
of a State is not one of them. Said right in no sense depends on citizenship.
And on whatever basis this right may be placed, as to the courts of a State,
it would relate to citizenship of the State; as to Federal Courts, to
citizenship of the US. Slaughter-House Cases clarifiy that the right to
control and regulate the granting of license to practice law in the courts of a
State is one of those powers which are not transferred for its protection to
the  Federal  gov’t,  and its exercise is in no manner governed or controlled by
citizenship of the United States in the party seeking such license.
J. Bradley, concurring: Historically the right to engage in every profession has
not been one of the established fundamental privilege and immunities of the sex.
The law has alwaysrecognized a wide difference in the respective spheres and
destinies of man and woman. The harmony of interests and views that belong to
the family institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and
independent careerfrom her husband.Also, historically women had no legal
 
 
paramount destiny of women is to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife
and mother.
 GOESAERT v. CLEARY
December 20, 1948 | Frankfurter, J. | Appeal | Equal Protection Clause
SUMMARY: Valentine Goesaert challenged the Michigan law which prohibited
women who do not have fathers or husbands who are licensed owners of bars
from being licensed bartenders in cities with a population of 50K or more. The
court affirmed the judgement of the Detroit Michigan District Court.
DOCTRINE: The oversight assured through ownership of a bar by a barmaid's
husband or father minimizes hazards that may confront a barmaid without such
protecting oversight.
FACTS:
1. Michigan passed a law which prohibited women who do not have fathers or
husbands who are licensed owners of bars from being licensed bartenders in
cities with a population of 50,000 or more.
2. Goesaert was the owner of a bar in Dearborn Michigan. The city had a
population which exceeded 500,000.
3. Goesaert and her daughter challenged the law, arguing that the law denied
them of equal protection of the laws and deprived them of their property
without due process of law. The district court did not rule in their favor.
need not go to the full length of prohibition if it believes that as to a defined
group of females other factors are operating which either eliminate or
reduce the moral and social problems otherwise calling for prohibition.
Michigan evidently believes that the oversight assured through ownership
of a bar by a barmaid's husband or father minimizes hazards that may
confront a barmaid without such protecting oversight. The court is not in a
position to contradict the legislature's position. Hence, Michigan has not
violated its duty to afford equal protection of its laws.
DISSENTING: (Justices Rutledge, Douglas and Murphy)
The law arbitrarily discriminates between male and female owners of liquor
establishments as a male owner, although absent, may employ his wife and
daughter as barmaids. A female owner or her daughter may not work as
barmaids even if there was a man present in the bar to keep order. The
classification belies the assumption that the statute was for the moral and
physical well-being of women. Since there could be no other conceivable
justification for such discrimination against women owners of liquor
establishments, the statute should be held invalid as a denial of equal protection.

ISSUE/S: WoN the Michigan law denied Goesaert of the equal protection of
laws -NO

RULING: Judgement AFFIRMED.

RATIO:
1. The regulation of liquor traffic is one of the oldest and most untrammeled of
legislative powers. Although there is a vast change in the status of women,
Michigan could, beyond question, forbid all women from working behind a
bar. The fact that women may now have achieved the virtues that men have
long claimed as their prerogatives and now indulge in vices that men have
long practiced, does not preclude the States from drawing a sharp line
between the sexes, certainly, in such matters as the regulation of the liquor
traffic. While Michigan may deny to all women opportunities for
bartending, Michigan cannot play favorites among women without rhyme
or reason. The Constitution in enjoining the equal protection of the laws
upon States precludes irrational discrimination as between persons or
groups of persons in the incidence of a law. Since bartending by women
may, in the allowable legislative judgment, give rise to moral and social
problems against which it may devise preventive measures, the legislature
 GEDULDIG v. AIELLO new administrative guidelines were issued and Aiello, Armendariz and
June 17, 1974 | Stewart, J. | Equal Protection Johnson became eligible, rendering the cases with respect to them already
moot. Only Jaramillo is the one who has a live case.
SUMMARY: Four women suffered an employment disability after becoming
pregnant, but were ruled ineligible under the disability insurance program since ISSUE/S: WON the disability insurance program discriminates against those
the program itself excludes disabilities arising from pregnancy. When it was women suffering employment disabilities arising from normal pregnancy – NO
ruled that the exclusion only applies to normal pregnancy, the cases of the 3 out
of the 4 women became moot. The remaining one, Jaramillo, continues to RULING: District Court judgment reversed.
challenge the constitutionality of the program. The Court held that it does not
violate the equal protection clause, citing the primacy of the State interest in RATIO:
maintaining the fiscal integrity of its program. 1. California does not discriminate with respect to the persons or groups which
DOCTRINE: The Equal Protection Clause does not require a State to sacrifice are eligible for disability insurance protection under the program. The
the financial integrity of its programs just for the purpose of making it more classification challenged in this case relates to the fact that not all the set of
comprehensive in scope. risks has been selected by the State has selected to insure.
In this case, there is no evidence to show that the selection of risks to be
compensated to discriminate against any definable group or class in terms
FACTS:
of the aggregate risk protection derived by that group or class from the
1. California’sdisability   insurance   system   compensates   private   employees  
program.
temporarily disabled from working by "mental or physical illnesses and
2. The State has a legitimate interest in (1) maintaining the self-supporting
mental or physical injuries"not covered by workmen's compensation, under
nature of its insurance program; (2) distributing the available resources in
which an employee contributes to an Unemployment Compensation
such a way as to keep benefit payments at an adequate level for disabilities
Disability Fund 1% of his salary up to an annual maximum of $85.
that are covered, rather than to cover all disabilities inadequately; (3)
2. A disability lasting less than 8 days is not compensable, except when the
maintaining the contribution rate at a level that will not unduly burden
employee is hospitalized. Benefits are not payable for a single disability
participating employees, particularly low-income employees who may be
exceeding 26 weeks. A disability resulting from an individual's court
most in need of the disability insurance.
commitment as a dipsomaniac, drug addict, or sexual psychopath is not
It is because widening the coverage of the program to include more
compensable, nor are certain disabilities attributable to pregnancy.
disabilities might result to a reduction of the benefits payable for covered
3. In this case, four women were held to be ineligible even though they have
disabilities, or an increase in the maximum employee contribution rate just
made sufficient contributions into the Fund to become eligible for the
to provide protection against another risk of disability, which would be
benefits thereof, after each of them became pregnant and suffered
burdensome on the workers as well.
employment disability as a result of the pregnancy. For the three of them,
“The   Equal   Protection   Clause   does   not   require   that   a   State   must   choose  
Carolyn Aiello, Augustina Armendariz, and Elizabeth Johnson, the
between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at
disabilities were attributable to abnormal complications encountered
all." (Dandridge v. Williams)
during their pregnancies. The fourth, Jacqueline Jaramillo, experienced a
normal pregnancy, which was the sole cause of her disability.
DISSENTING OPINION (Brennan. J.)
4. When they sued against the reinforcement of the program, the District
- The program covers disabilities arising from illnesses only suffered by men
Court ruled in favor of them holding that the exclusion of pregnancy-
(ex. prostatectomies, circumcision, hemophilia, and gout), but not normal
related disabilities is not based upon a classification having a rational and
pregnancy, which can only happen to women. Court should have employed
substantial relationship to a legitimate state purpose and violates the Equal
strict scrutiny due to a suspect classification based on gender.
Protection Clause.
- The  State’s  legitimate  interest  in  fiscal  integrity  may  be  achieved  through  more  
5. Prior   to   the   District   Court’s   decision,   a   similar   case   was   brought   to   the  
sexually  neutral  means.  Even  if  the  worker’s  contribution  is  to  be  increased,  this  
California Court of Appeals by a woman suffering from ectopic pregnancy.
will not destroy the program.
In that case, the appellate court ruled that what are excluded from the
benefits are those disabilities arising from normal pregnancy only. As such,
 MISSISSIPPI UNIVERSITY FOR WOMEN v. HOGAN
July  1,  1982  |  O’Connor,  J.  |  Equal  Protection
SUMMARY: Joe Hogan applied for a baccalaureate degree in nursing at an all-
female university (MUW) but was denied for being a male. SC held that the
female-only policy violates the EPC of the 14th Amendment.
DOCTRINE: A state may not preclude one gender or the other from
participating in a unique educational environment solely on the basis of gender.
FACTS:
1. MUW is an all-female collegiate institution maintained by the State of
Mississippi. In 1971, it established a School of Nursing, which offered a 2-
year associate degree, 4-year baccalaureate program, and a graduate
program.
2. Joe Hogan, a registered nurse but does not hold a baccalaureate degree in
nursing applied for admission to the MUW School   of   Nursing’s   coeducational nursing schools do not dominate the classroom. Record is
baccalaureate program. Although qualified, he was denied admission solely
because of his sex. He was informed that he could audit the courses he was
interested in, but he could not enroll for credit.
3. Hogan filed an action in the US District Court for the Northern District of
Mississippi, claiming the single-sex  admissions  policy  of  MUW’s  School  of   “exceedingly   persuasive   justification”   needed   to   sustain   the   gender-based
Nursing violated EPC of the 14th Amendment.
ISSUE/S: WoN the single-sex   admissions   policy   of   the   MUW’s   School   of   congressional legislation which permits the institution to exist as it has in
Nursing violates equal protection – YES.
RULING: CA judgment AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
1. Intermediate scrutiny (heightened): to withstand test, there must be a
showing   that   the   classification   serves   “important   governmental   objectives   no power to restrict, abrogate or dilute these guarantees. Neither Congress
and   that   the   discriminatory   means   employed”   are   “substantially related to
the  achievement  of  those  objectives”.
2. Purpose: compensates for discrimination against women and, therefore,
constitutes educational affirmative action. Means: Women-only admissions
policy.
3. A gender-based classification favoring one sex can be justified if it
intentionally and directly assists members of the sex that is
disproportionately burdened. Mississippi made no showing that women
lacked opportunities to obtain training in the field of nursing or to attain
positions of leadership in that field when the MUW School of Nursing
opened its door or that women currently are deprived of such
opportunities.(almost 98% of all registered nurses were women) The labor
force reflects the predominance of women in nursing. (In contrast, for
example, to women in the Naval Force).
4. Rather than compensate for discriminatory barriers faced by women,
MUW’s   policy   of   excluding   males   from   admission   to   Nursing   tends   to  
perpetuate the stereotype view of nursing as  exclusively  a  woman’s  job.  It  
lends credibility to the old view that women, not men, should become
nurses, and the assumption that nursing as a field for women is a self-
fulfilling prophecy.
5. No fit: The policy made no showing that the gender-based classification is
substantially and directly related to its proposed compensatory objective.
MUW permits men who audit to participate fully in classes. Also, both men
and women take part in continuing education courses offered by the School
of Nursing. Record reveals that: 1) admitting men to nursing classes does
not affect teaching style, 2) the presence of men in the classroom would not
affect the performance of the female nursing students, and 3) men in
flatly inconsistent with the claim that excluding men from the School of
Nursing   is   necessary   to   reach   any   of   MUW’s   educational   goals.   Thus,  
considering the interest and the relationship between the interest and the
method used by the State, the State has fallen far short of establishing the
classification.
6. Additional attempt at justification: MUW: direct beneficiary of specific
the past. 901(a), Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972: prohibits
gender discrimination in education programs that receive federal financial
assistance but exempts admission policies of undergraduate institutions that
traditionally and continually have had a policy admitting only student of
one   sex   from   the   general   prohibition.   SC:   Congress’   power   is   limited   to  
adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the 14 th Amendment. It has
nor a State can validate a law that denies the rights guaranteed by the 14 th
Amendment.
 MICHAEL M. v. SUPERIOR COURT
March 23, 1981 | Rehnquist, J. | Certiorari | Equal Protection
SUMMARY: Petitioner was convicted for statutory rape when he allegedly had
sex with a 16 ½ year old female. Petitioner appealed arguing that the statutory
rape law is violative of the Equal Protection clause because it prosecuted only
males. He further contended that the law is overbroad for including females
below 18 who are not even capable of pregnancy. SC dismissed the petition.
DOCTRINE:See Ratio 1
FACTS:
1. At midnight of June 1978, petitioner and two friends approached Sharon
(16 ½ years old) and her sister as they waited at a bus stop. Petitioner and
Sharon had already been drinking and moved away from the others and
began kissing. After striking him because of initial advances, Sharon
submitted to sexual intercourse with petitioner.
2. On July 1978, a complaint was filed against petitioner alleging that the 17 ½
year old male then had unlawful sexual intercourse with a female under 18.
3. Petitioner sought to set aside the information asserting that the law is
unlawfully discriminated on the basis of gender. The trial court up to the
Supreme Court of California held that the law in constitutional. The
respondent court held that the assailed law discriminates on the basis of sex
because only females me be victims and only males may violate the law. It
further stated that it is justified by a compelling sate interest and that the
gender classification is supported by the physiological fact that females are
exclusively the ones who can be pregnant.
4. Petitioner appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
illegitimate teenage pregnancies. This is a legitimate goal by the legislature
when they enacted the law.
3. Young men and young women are not similarly situated with respect to
problems and risks of sexual intercourse. Virtually, all the significant and
harmful consequences of teenage pregnancy fall on the female. This is a
reasonable reason for legislature to exclude minor females from the penalty
provided in law. Moreover, pregnancy itself constitutes a substantial
deterrence to young females unlike for males. A criminal sanction imposed
solely on males thus serve to equalize the deterrents on the sexes.
4. Petitioner contends that the assailed statute is overbroad because it makes
unlawful sexual intercourse with prepubescent females who are incapable of
becoming pregnant. This is untenable because it is irrational to limit the
scope of its rape statute to older teenagers and exclude young girls.
5. Petitioner argues that the statute is flawed because it presumes that as
between two persons under 18, the male is a culpable aggressor. This is
unpersuasive because the statute does not rest on the assumption that males
are generally the aggressors. It is instead an attempt by legislature to
prevent illegitimate teenage pregnancy by providing an additional deterrent
for mane. The age of man is irrelevant since males, regardless of age, can
inflict the same harm sought to be prevented.

ISSUE/S: WoN California’s  “statutory  rape”  law  violates  the  Equal  Protection  
clause against men alone? - NO

RULING: Petition dismissed. Decision of California Supreme Court is

affirmed.

RATIO:
1. A gender-based   classification   will   be   upheld   if   it   bears   a   “fair   and  
substantial   relationship”   to   legitimate   ends.   As   principle,   the   legislature  
cannot make overbroad generalizations based on sex which are unrelated to
any differences between men and women or which demean the status of the
affected class. But the court recognizes that fact that sexes are not similarly
situated in certain circumstances.
2. In the case at bar, the assailed statute was enacted to criminalize illicit
sexual intercourse with a minor female that will eventually prevent
 PERSONNEL ADMIN. et al. v. FEENEY justification to withstand a constitutional challenge under the EPC. But even
June 5, 1979 | Stewart, J. | Equal Protection Clause if a neutral law has a disproportionately adverse effect upon a minority, it is
unconstitutional under the EPC only if the impact can be traced to a
SUMMARY: Feeney, who had repeatedly been ranked below male veterans in discriminatory purpose.
civil service exams even though they scored lower, challenged the statute 3. When a statute gender-neutral on its face is challenged on the ground that it
granting veterans preference as gender-discriminatory. The Court used a twofold disproportionately has an adverse effect on women, a twofold inquiry is
inquiry and held that the there was no purpose to discriminate against women. appropriate. First, whether the classification is indeed neutral; and second,
DOCTRINE: When a statute neutral on its face is challenged on the ground that whether the adverse effect reflects invidious gender-based discrimination.
it disproportionately has an adverse effect on a certain group, a twofold inquiry 4. Appellee herself conceded that the statute is neutral on its face and
is appropriate. First, whether the classification is indeed neutral; and second, acknowledged that state hiring preferences are not per se invalid, as she
whether the adverse effect reflects invidious discrimination. limited her challenge to the absolute lifetime preference to the veterans. The
District Court found that the statute served legitimate and worthy purposes,
FACTS: and that the preference was not established for the purpose of discriminating
1. Appellee Helen Feeney, who was not a veteran, had passed a number of against women.
open competitive civil service examinations for better jobs during her 12-yr 5. The statute does not exclude significant numbers of women from preferred
tenure as a state employee, but due to Massachusetts veterans’   preference   state jobs because they are women or because they are nonveterans. The
statute, she was ranked below male veterans with lower scores. The definition   of   “veterans”   in   the   statute   has   always been gender-neutral and
statutory  preference  was  available  to  “any  person,  male  or  female,  including   Massachusetts consistently defined it to be inclusive of women who had
a  nurse”  honourably  discharged  from  the  US  Armed  Forces  after  at  least  90   served in the military. Also, although few women benefited from the
days of active service, at least one day of which was during wartime. preference, the nonveteran class is not substantially male. Contrarily,
2. Feeney challenged the statute on the ground that it discriminated against significant numbers of nonveterans are men, and all nonveterans, both male
women in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, claiming that the and female, are placed at a disadvantage. Too many men are adversely
preference operated overwhelmingly to the advantage of males. The district affected by the statute to permit the inference that the statute is a pretext of
court agreed and declared the statute unconstitutional and reaffirmed the preferring men over women.
same  upon  remand,  finding  that  the  statute  had  adverse  impact  on  women’s   6. Feeney also contended that the consequences were inevitable and
employment opportunities and required the State to find a more limited foreseeable, and thus could not be considered unintended by the framers.
form of preference to achieve its goals. Hence the instant appeal. But   again,   the   preference   formula   itself   was   consistently   offered   to   “any  
person”   who   was   a   veteran,   including   women.   The   statute   is a preference
ISSUE/S: WoN the statute discriminated against women - NO for veterans of either sex over nonveterans of either sex, not for men over
women. The statute may reflect unwise policy in the sense that absolute and
RULING: Judgment reversed. Case remanded for further proceedings. permanent preferences have been criticized by proponents of merit-based
employment policies, but the appellee simply failed to demonstrate that the
RATIO: law in any way reflects a purpose to discriminate based on sex.
1. The  equal  protection  guarantee  does  not  take  away  all  of  the  State’s  power  
Dissent, J. Marshall and Brennan: The law is unconstitutional based on discriminatory
of classification. Classification is ordinarily of no concern so long as it is
impact. Any veteran with a passing grade on the civil service exam must be placed ahead
rationally based. In assessing an equal protection challenge, a court is called of a nonveteran, regardless of scores. Because less than 2% of Massachusetts women are
upon  only  to  measure  the  legislative  classification’s  basic  validity.    Certain   veterans, the absolute preference rendered desirable state civil service employment an
classifications (e.g. racial) are presumptively invalid and can be upheld only almost exclusively male prerogative. It created a gender-based civil service hierarchy,
upon an extraordinary justification, including that of gender. with women occupying low-grade clerical and secretarial jobs and men holding more
2. Although public employment is not a constitutional right and the States responsible and remunerative positions. Where the foreseeable impact of a facially
have wide discretion in framing employment qualifications, precedent neutral policy is so disproportionate, the burden should rest on the State to establish that
dictates that any state law overtly or covertly designed to prefer males over sex-based considerations played no part in the choice of the particular legislative scheme
females in public employment requires an exceedingly persuasive
 YICK WO v. HOPKINS
May 10, 1886 | Matthews, J. | Equal Protection Clause
SUMMARY: Statutes prohibiting laundries in buildings other than those of
brick or stone without the consent of a board of supervisors were challenged as
racially discriminatory. The SC ruled that the statutes were unconstitutional and
that the Fourteenth Amendment was not limited to citizens.
DOCTRINE: The  Fourteenth  Amendment’s  constitutional  guarantee  applies  to   seemed intended to—and actually did—confer naked and arbitrary power to
all  persons  within  the  U.S.’s  territorial  jurisdiction.
FACTS:
1. San Francisco passed an order prohibiting laundries within the city and
county’s   corporate limits without having first obtained the consent of the
board of supervisors, except if the same was located in a brick or stone
building. Violators would be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and was
punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 or imprisonment of not more
than six months, or both.
2. Petitioner Yick Wo, a Chinese native, had been engaged in the laundry
business in the same premises for 22 years and had a license from the board
of fire wardens and a certificate from the health officer. Petitioner applied to
the board of supervisors for their consent to maintain and carry on his
laundry, but the same was denied. Petitioner continued to operate his
laundry and was convicted and fined for violating the ordinance. He then
challenged the ordinances as discriminatory against the Chinese.
3. It  was  argued  that  petitioner’s  business,  and  that  of  many  of  other  Chinese,   permanently or temporarily residing in the territory of the United States,
was impaired by the ordinance; that the locations of the laundries were in
unpopulated areas, when previously regulation had been limited to thickly
settled portions of the city; that all the Chinese applications were denied and
those of Caucasians granted; that the right to give consent reserved in the
ordinance showed that carrying on a laundry business in a wooden business
was not in itself dangerous; and that other regulations could have been
prescribed without vesting the board with arbitrary and unregulated
discretion to grant special consent, among others.
ISSUE/S:
WoN the statutes were racially discriminatory – YES
WoN aliens with temporary or permanent rights to reside within the US are
entitled to the protections guaranteed by the Constitution and the laws - YES
RULING: California SC judgment reversed. Cases remanded to the proper
court.
RATIO:
1. The California SC considered the ordinances as vesting in the board of
supervisors a not unusual discretion in granting or withholding their assent
to use wooden buildings as laundries, to be exercised on a case-to-case basis
with a view to protect the public against the dangers of fire. The Court
disagreed, holding that nothing in the ordinances pointed to such a
regulation of the business of keeping and conducting laundries. The statutes
give and withhold consent not only as to places, but as to persons.
2. The ordinance did not prescribe rules and conditions for the regulation of
the use of property for laundry purposes. It unrestrainedly allowed the use
of brick or stone buildings for laundries, but, as to wooden buildings,
constituting nearly all those in previous use, it divided the owners or
occupiers into two classes, not as to their personal character and
qualifications nor the situation, nature and adaptation of the buildings
themselves, but merely by an arbitrary line: (1) those permitted to pursue
their industry by the mere will and consent of the supervisors, and (2) those
from whom consent is withheld at their mere will and pleasure. Both classes
were  alike  only  in  that  they  were  tenants  at  the  supervisors’  will.  There was
no call for discretion of a judicial nature.
3. The rights of the petitioners were not less because they were aliens and
subjects of the Chinese Emperor. By the third article of the treaty between
the US government and China, concluded November 17, 1880, it was
stipulated:   “If   Chinese   laborers,   or   Chinese   of   any   other   class,   now   either  
meet with ill treatment at the hands of any other persons, the Government of
the United States will exert all its powers to devise measures for their
protection, and to secure to them the same rights, privileges, immunities and
exemptions as may be enjoyed by the citizens or subjects of the most
favored nation, and to which they are entitled by treaty.”
4. Nor is the Fourteenth Amendment confined to citizens. It states: Nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the  laws.”  This applies to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction of the
US. It is enacted by Sec. 1977 of the Revised Statutes, that all persons
within the US’s   jurisdiction shall have the same right in every State and
Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence,
and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens and shall be subject
to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every
kind, and to no other.
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS
v. QUISUMBING
June 1, 2000 | Kapunan, J. | Equal Protection
SUMMARY: Foreign-hires of the international school are paid 25% more than
local-hires, in addition to housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home
3.
leave travel allowance benefits. SC held that salary differential is discriminatory
and local-hires are entitled to equal pay as compensation for equal work.
DOCTRINE:Salary is a reward or compensation for services performed, and
must not be used as an enticement to the prejudice of local hires.
tenure”   cannot   serve   as   valid   bases   for   the   distinction   in   salary   rates.   The  
dislocation factor and limited tenure are adequately compensated by other
benefits they receive exclusively like housing, transportation, shipping
costs, taxes and home leave travel allowance – which have a reasonable
relation with their status as foreign-hires and justify the exclusion of local
hires.
Sub-issue: They do not belong to the same collective bargaining unit; for
inclusion of foreign-hires into the same bargaining unit would not assure
either group of its respective collective bargaining rights.

FACTS:
1. In June 1995, negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement were
held and Intl School Alliance of Educators (ISAE) contested the difference
in salary rates between foreign-hires and local-hires (25%). In Sept 7, 1995,
ISAE filed a notice of strike and they filed to strike a compromise,
necessitating DOLE to assume jurisdiction. In June 10, 1996, DOLE issued
an Order resolving the issue in favor of the school.
2. Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the
school is discriminatory and amounts to racial discrimination. The School
contends that foreign-hires have to endure 1) dislocation factor: deviation
from a promising career path, and 2) limited tenure: uncertainty of
obtaining suitable employment after a long period in a foreign land; and that
this justifies the disparity.

ISSUE/S: WoN the salary differential constitutes racial discrimination—YES

RULING: Petition GRANTED as to salary differentials.

RATIO:
1. Public policy abhors inequality and discrimination, as embodied in the
Constitution   itself:   XIII,   1:   “to   give   highest   priority to the enactment of
measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity,
reduce   social,   economic   and   political   inequalities”.The   Labor   Code   also  
frowns upon discrimination, w/c penalizes payment of a lesser
compensation to a female employee as against a male employee for work of
equal value. Similar provisions institutionalize the long honored legal
truism  of  “equal  pay  for  equal  work.”
2. Salary   is   defined   as   “a   reward   or   recompense   for   services   performed”.  
While the Court recognizes the need of the School to attract foreign-hires,
salaries should not be used as an enticement to the prejudice of local hires.
Local hires perform the same services and ought to be paid the same as
foreign-hires.   For   the   same   reason,   the   “dislocation   factor”   and   “limited  
 BOARD OF DIRECTORS v. ROTARY CLUB
May 4, 1987 | Powell, J | Equal Protection RATIO:
1. Freedom of Association is afforded constitutional protection in two senses –
SUMMARY: After the Duarte Rotary admitted 3 women members, Rotary (1)   private   association   (the   individual’s   choice   to   enter   into   and   maintain  
International revoked their charter and terminated their membership for violating certain intimate or private relationships such as marriage, begetting and
the Rotary Constitution. Duarte Rotary and 2 women file a complaint, alleging bearing of children, child rearing and education, cohabitation with relatives)
that this violated the Unruh Act w/c requires them to admit women members. SC: and (2) expressive association (freedom of individuals to associate for the
Unruh  Act  does  not  violate  Rotary  Intl’  right  of  private  &  expressive  association. purpose of engaging in protected speech or religious activities). To
DOCTRINE: To determine the nature and degree of constitutional protection of determine the nature and degree of constitutional protection, the Court must
a questioned association, the Court must consider the challenged   state   action’s   separately consider the effect of the challenged state action on both the
effect on the freedom of private association & freedom of expressive association. freedom of private association and freedom of expressive association.
2. X Private Association: 1st Amendment protects those relationships that
FACTS: presuppose deep attachments and commitments to the few other individuals
1. Rotary   International,   “an   organization   of   business   and   professional   men   with   whom   a   person   shares   personal   aspects   of   one’s   life.   Hence   in  
united worldwide who provide humanitarian service, encourage high ethical determining WON a particular association is sufficiently private to warrant
standards in all vocations, and help build goodwill and peace in the world” constitutional protection, size, purpose, selectivity, and whether others are
is comprised of 19,788 Rotary Clubs in 157 countries w/ a 907,750 total excluded from critical aspects of the relationship are considered. In this
membership. Individuals are admitted to membership in a local Rotary Club case, relationship among Rotary Club members is not the kind of intimate
according   to   a   classification   system,   whose   general   rule   is   that   “1   active   or private relation contemplated. While Rotary membership is not open to
member is admitted for each classification, but he in turn may propose an the general public, each club promotes an inclusive, not exclusive, approach
addt’l   active   member,   who   must   be   in   the   same   business   or   professional   so that all useful local occupations are recognized end enable the club to be
classification.” Aside from these requirements, each local Rotary Club is a true cross-section   of   the   community’s   business   and professional life.
free to adopt its own rules and procedures for admitting members. Local membership ranges from 20-900 without any upper limit. Also, many
2. Membership in Rotary Clubs is men-only,   primarily   for   an   “aspect   of   of   the   Club’s   activities   are   carried   on   in   the   presence   of   strangers   and  
fellowship,   that   is   enjoined   by   the   present   male   membership”   and   also   to   inviting business associates and competitors are encouraged, to keep their
allow the Rotary to operate effectively in foreign countries w/ varied “windows  and  doors  open  to  the  whole  world.”
cultures and social mores. However, women are permitted to attend 3. X Expressive Association: Expressive association is the right to associate
meetings,   give   speeches,   and   receive   awards.   Members’   women   relatives   with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic,
may form their own associations, and are authorized to wear their lapel pin. educational, religious, and cultural ends. In this case, admitting women to
Young women aged 14-28 may join Interact and Rotaract, organizations Rotary   Clubs   doesn’t   significantly   affect   the   existing   members’   ability   to  
sponsored by Rotary International. carry  out  their  various  purposes.  As  a  matter  of  policy,  the  Clubs  don’t  take  
3. The Duarte, California Rotary Club admitted 3 women to active positions on public (e.g. political or international) issues. While the Rotary
membership in 1977. Rotary International notified the Duarte Club that Clubs engages in 1st Amendment-protected  activities,  the  Unruh  Act  doesn’t  
admitting women members is contrary to the Rotary Constitution, and after require them to abandon this or its classification system. By opening
hearing   revoked   Duarte   Club’s   charter and terminated its membership. In membership  to  the  community’s  leading  business  and  professional  women,  
response, the Duarte Rotary and 2 women members filed a complaint to the Rotary Clubs are more likely to obtain a more representative membership of
California   Superior   Court,   alleging   that   Rotary   International’s   actions   community leaders with broadened capacity for service. And even if there
violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act in the California Cibil Code. was   an   infringement   to   the   Rotary   Club’s   right   to   expressive   association,  
it’s   justified   since   it   serves   the   State’s   compelling   interest   in   eliminating  
ISSUE/S: WON the Unruh Act, which requires California Rotary Clubs to discrimination against women, which extends to the acquisition of
admit women members, violates the 1st Amendment (right of association) – NO. leadership skills, business contacts, and tangible goods and services.

RULING: CA California Decision AFFIRMED.

 BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA v. JAMES DALE
June 28, 2000 | Rehnquist, C.J. | Equal Protection
SUMMARY: James Dale, a gay rights activist, had his adult membership in the
Boy Scouts of America revoked because of his sexual orientation. The majority
held  that  the  group  engages  in  expressive  association,  instilling  values  ie  “morally   association w/c they concluded from its 1) general mission, 2) Scout Oath
straight”  and  “clean”,  and that forced inclusion of Dale would significantly affect
their ability to advocate public or private viewpoints.
DOCTRINE: Associations, especially private non-profit ones, have federal
constitutional rights to enter and maintain private relationships and to associate
for the purpose of engaging in protected speech.
FACTS:
1. James Dale entered scouting in 1978. He was an exemplary scout and
received  the  rank  of  Eagle  Scout  in  1988,  one  of  Scouting’s  highest  honors.   disagree   with   them.   Also,   Dale’s   presence   as   asst scoutmaster would
He applied for adult membership in 1989 and BSA approved his application
for the position of asst scoutmaster. Around the same time, he attended
Rutgers University, where he first acknowledged to himself and others that
he was gay. He eventually became co-president of Rutgers University
Lesbian/Gay Alliance. He was interviewed by a local newspaper when he
attended a seminar addressing psychological and health needs of lesbian
and gay teenagers.
2. After the local newspaper published the article, Dale received a letter
revoking his adult membership. When he inquired for the reason, he was
told  Boy  Scouts  “specifically  forbid  membership  to  homosexuals.”
3. In 1992, Dale filed a complaint with the New Jersey Superior Court alleging
that   BSA   violated   NJ’s   public   accommodations   law   (prohibits   leadership (forbidding membership to homosexuals). The Boy Scout Handbook
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in places of public
accommodation) by revoking his membership based solely on sexual
orientation. NJSC held that BSA was a place of public accommodation
because its large size, non-selectivity and inclusive policy establish that the
org is not sufficiently personal or private to warrant constitutional
protection under the freedom of intimate association.
ISSUE/S: WoN  applying  NJ’s  public  accommodations  law  in  this  way  violates   From the brief discussion on its rules, it is apparent that there is no shared goal
the  Boy  Scouts’  First  Amendment  right  of  expressive association—YES
RULING: NJSC judgment REVERSED (5-4).
RATIO:
1. The Court previously held that there is a right to associate with others in
pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational,
religious and cultural ends to prevent the majority from imposing its views
on groups that would rather express other ideas. Govt actions that may
unconstitutionally burden this freedom may present itself as a regulation
that forces the group to accept members it does not desire, which may
impair the ability of the group to express those views.
2. In this case, the Court held that the group engages in expressive
and  Law,  3)  position  statements.  Its  general  mission  is  to  “instill  values  in  
young  people”  and  these  values  are  reflected  in  the  Scout Oath and Law: to
be  “morally  straight  and  clean”.  Position  statements  executed  by  BSA  state  
that they did not believe that homosexuality and leadership in Scouting are
appropriate. The BSA asserts that its desire is to not promote homosexual
conduct as a legitimate form of behavior. The Court gave deference to
their assertions regarding the nature of its expression and opined that it is
not   the   role   of   courts   to   reject   a   group’s   expressed   values   because   they  
significantly burden their expression because his membership would force
the organization to send a message, both to the youth and the world, that
Boy Scouts accept homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.
3. Application of NJ’s  public  accommodations  law  to  require  BSA  to  accept  
Dale  would  run  afoul  the  Scouts’  freedom  of  expressive  association.  First  
of all, these statutes were enacted to prevent discrimination in traditional
places of public accommodation ie trains and inns; thus it was
inappropriate to apply it to a private entity.
J. Stevens, DISSENT:
- At the time of the revocation, BSA had not publicly expressed such standard of
defines   “morally   straight”   as   courage   to   do   what   is   right   and   to   refuse   what   is  
wrong;;   and   “clean”   as   referring   to   body   and   mind,   choosing   the   company   of  
those  who  live  by  the  same  ideals.  Furthermore,  BSA’s  published  guidance  for  
Scoutmasters show that sex education is not for the organization but for home or
school, and instructs Scoutmasters not to teach Scouts on the subject of sex.
- The Court previously ruled that it is not sufficient to articulate some
connection  between  the  groups’  expressive  activities  and  its  exclusionist policy.
or collective effort to foster a belief about sexuality at all, let alone one that is
significantly burdened by admitting homosexuals.
- The  majority’s  holding implies that homosexuals are simply so different from
the rest of society that their presence alone should be singled out for special First
Amendment treatment.
 GOODRIDGE v. DEPT. OF PUBLIC HEALTH
November 18, 2003 | Marshall, C.J. | Equal Protection
SUMMARY: Same-sex couples in Massachusetts were denied of obtaining
marriage licenses.
DOCTRINE: Limiting the protections, benefits and obligations of civil
marriage to opposite-sex couples violates the basic premises of individual
liberty and equality under the law.
FACTS:
1. The Department of Public Health, among its responsibilities, oversees the
registry of vital records and statistics, which enforce all laws relative to the
issuance of marriage licenses and the keeping of marriage records, and
which promulgates policies and procedures for the issuance of marriage
licenses by city and town clerks and registers.
2. Advocates for GLAD (Gay and Lesbian Advocates ad Defenders) filed a
suit against the Massachusetts Department of Health on behalf of 7 same-
sex couples in Mass. These couples are all in long-term relationships, some
of whom had children, attempted to obtain marriage licenses but were
refused or denied the licenses on the ground that Mass. Does not recognize
same-sex marriage.
ISSUE/S: WoN the denial of marriage license to same-sex couples violate the
EPC – YES.
RULING: Declaratory relief prayed for granted. Exclusion of qualified same-
sex couples from access to civil marriage violates Mass. Law.
RATIO:
1. Scrutiny used by the court: rational basis (since the statute did not meet
even the lowest standard of review, strict scrutiny was no longer applied).3
legislative rationales:
a. Providing favorable setting for procreation: General Laws contain
no requirement that the applicants for a marriage license attest to
their ability or intention to conceive children by coitus. Fertility is
not a condition of marriage, nor is it grounds for divorce. It is the
exclusive and permanent commitment of the marriage partners to
one another, not the begetting of children, that is the sine qua non
of civil marriage. Furthermore, same-sex couples, through
adoption or other assistive technologies, could procreate.
b. Ensuring optimal setting for child rearing: State policy of
protecting  the  welfare  of  children.  The  “best  interests  of  the  child”  
does   not   depend   on   a   parent’s   sexual   orientation.   There   is   no  
evidence that forbidding same-sex marriage will increase the
number of couples who enter into opposite-sex marriage in order to
have and raise children. Also, prohibiting same-sex marriage will
not make children of opposite-sex marriages more secure, but it
does prevent children of same-sex couples from enjoying the
advantages of a stable family structure. It cannot be rational to
penalize children by depriving them of State benefits because the
State  disapproves  of  their  parent’s  sexual  orientation.
c. Preserving scarce State and private financial resources: The
department’s   generalization   that   same-sex couples are more
financially independent than married couples, thus less needy of
public marital benefits, ignores the fact that many same-sex
couples have children and other dependents in their care.
Moreover, Mass. Marriage laws do not condition receipt of public
and private financial benefits to married individuals on a
demonstration of financial dependence on each other. Benefits are
available regardless of whether they mingle their finances or
actually depend on each other for support.
d. Additional rationales: broadening civil marriage to include same-
sex marriage will trivialize or destroy the institution of marriage:
plaintiffs do not seek to abolish marriage. Recognizing the right of
an individual to marry a person of the same sex will not diminish
the validity or dignity of opposite-sex marriage.
NOTES:
The Court refined the common-law meaning of civil marriage (from legal union
of man and woman as husband and wife) to mean the voluntary union of two
persons a spouses, to the exclusion of all others. Reformulation furthers aim of
marriage to promote stable, exclusive relationships and advances 2 legitimate
State interests: providing stable setting for child rearing and conserving State
resources,  leaving  intact  the  Legislature’s  broad  discretion  to  regulate  marriage.
Marital Benefits: joint income tax filing, tenancy, extension of benefit of
homestead protection to spouse and children, automatic rights to inherit property
of deceased spouse who does not leave a will, entitlement to wages owed to
deceased  spouse,  right  to  share  medical  policy  of  one’s  spouse,  presumption  of
legitimacy and parentage of children born to married couple, evidentiary rights,
priority rights to administer estate of deceased spouse who dies without a will,
etc.
 TECSON v. COMELEC
March 3, 2004 | Vitug, J. | Certiorari | Equal Protection
SUMMARY: Petitioners sought to have FPJ, a candidate to the 2004
presidential elections, disqualified after he represented himself as Filipino
citizen in his certificate of candidacy. They alleged, among others, that he was
an illegitimate child such that his citizenship would not follow the citizenship of
his father. The Court dismissed the petitions, stating that legitimacy/illegitimacy
is irrelevant to citizenship under the Constitution.
DOCTRINE: The 1935 Constitution confers citizenship to all persons whose
fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or
illegitimate.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners (Tecson and Desiderio, Velez and Fornier) sought the
disqualification of Fernando Poe Jr. (FPJ) from running in the 2004
presidential elections as well as the cancellation of his certificate of
candidacy. Of these three petitions, only that of Victorino Fornier was
granted due course by the Court.
2. It is alleged that he misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino
citizen, named “Fernando,   Jr.,”   or   “Ronald   Allan”   Poe,   born   on   Aug.   20,   that those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines are also citizens of
1939 in Manila. Petitioner alleges that FPJ is not a natural-born citizen
based on the ff: (1) His parents were foreigners: his mother, Bessie Kelley
Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national,
being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject; (2) Granting, however,
that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his
Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien
mother.
3. Petitioner   based   the   allegation   of   FPJ’s   illegitimacy   on   two   assertions:   make an illegitimate distinction between the illegitimate child of a Filipino
(1)Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez
before his marriage to Bessie Kelley; (2) Even if no such prior marriage had
existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie   Kelley   only   a   year   after   FPJ’s   birth   illegitimacy remain and should remain only in the sphere of civil law and
(on Sept. 16, 1940).
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the 1935 Constitution takes into account the
legitimacy/illegitimacy of a child for purposes of conferring Philippine
citizenship – NO
RULING: Petitions dismissed.
RATIO:
1. Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage
certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ,
constitute prima facie proof of their contents under Section 44, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court.   Both   Lorenzo’s   death   certificate   and   the   marriage  
certificate  of  Allan  and  Bessie  indicate  that  Lorenzo  and  Allan’s  citizenship  
is Filipino.
2. The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on Sept.
11, 1954 (at 84 years old) in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could be assumed
that Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines
was still a colony of Spain.
Petitioner alleges that Lorenzo was not in the Philippines during the period
of 1898-1902, but has also failed to prove that Lorenzo may have been
somewhere else during that time since there were no records pertaining to
that period. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be
sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a
person at the time of his death was also his residence before death.
As such, Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the “en   masse  
Filipinization”   under   the   Philippine   Bill   of   1902 and his Philippine
citizenship would pass to his son, Allan Poe.
3. Assuming Allan Poe is a Filipino, whether FPJ is a legitimate or illegitimate
child of the former is immaterial. The 1935 Constitution, which follows the
jus sanguinis principle and was in force at the time FPJ was born, provides
the Philippines (Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 3). The conferment of such citizenship
is without any condition or distinction.
4. Father Joaquin G. Bernas, as amicus curiae, stated that aside from having
no textual basis in the 1935 Constitution, prescribing distinctions, such as
with respect to legitimacy or illegitimacy, would violate the equal
protection clause even twice. First, it would make an illegitimate distinction
between a legitimate child and an illegitimate child, and second, it would
father and the illegitimate child of a Filipino mother.
5. Furthermore, the Court held that such distinctions between legitimacy and
not unduly impede or impinge on the domain of political law.
6. The Court held that while the totality of the evidence may not establish
conclusively that FPJ is a natural--born citizen of the Philippines, the
evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that
he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74,
of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner was not able substantiate his case
regarding the material misrepresentation.
 NEAR v. MINNESOTA
June 1, 1931 | Hughes, C.J. | Freedom of Speech: Protected Speech (Prior
Restraint)
SUMMARY: The Saturday Press, owned by Near, was abated under a
Minnesota statute for publishing malicious, scandalous and defamatory articles
against Minneapolis public officers. SC held that the statute which generally
provides for censorship is inconsistent with the freedom of the press guaranteed
by the 14th Amendment.
DOCTRINE: The freedom of press is essential to the nature of a free state but
that freedom may be restricted by the government in exceptional situations.
FACTS:
1. A Minnesota statute provides for the abatement, as a public nuisance, of a)
obscene, lewd and lascivious newspaper, magazine or other periodical, or b)
malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other
periodical.
2. The Saturday Press, published in Minneapolis, published and circulated
malicious, scandalous and defamatory articles about Charles Davis (special
law enforcement officer), Frank Brunskill (Chief of Police), George Leach
(Mayor of Minneapolis), the Jewish Race, and other officials and persons,
accusing the public officers named and others in connection with the
prevalence of crimes and the failure to expose and punish them (that they
were in cahoots with the Jewish gangsters who were in control of gambling,
bootlegging and racketeering, and were neglecting their duties).
3. Minnesota officials obtained an injunction in order to abate the publishing
of the Press newspaper under said law. The state court order abated the
Press and enjoined the Defendants, publishers of the Press, from publishing
or  circulating  such  “defamatory  and  scandalous”  periodicals.
able to prove that the charges were true and published with good motives
and for justifiable ends, his newspaper is suppressed and further publication
is made punishable as a contempt. This is of the essence of censorship.
2. It has been generally considered that the chief purpose of the guaranty of
freedom of the press is to prevent previous restraints or censorship upon
publication. The security of the freedom of the press requires that it should
be exempt not only from the restraint by the executive but also from
legislative restraint. However, the protection as to restraint is not absolutely
unlimited. Nonetheless, such limitation has been recognized only in
exceptional cases (e.g. during war).
3. The statute cannot be justified by reason of the fact that the publisher is
permitted to show that the matter published is true and is published with
good motives and for justifiable ends. If such is constitutionally valid, the
legislature may provide machinery for determining in the complete exercise
of its discretion what are justifiable ends and restrain publication
accordingly: it could lead to a complete system of censorship.
4. Charges of reprehensible conduct, and office malfeasance, unquestionably
create public scandal. However, the theory of the constitutional guaranty is
that even a more serious public evil would be caused by authority to prevent
publication.

ISSUE/S: WoN the statute authorizing such proceedings in restraint of

publication is consistent with the conception of the liberty of the press as
historically conceived and guaranteed – NO.

RULING: Judgment REVERSED. The statute, in so far as it authorized the

proceedings in this action under clause (b) of section one, to be an infringement
of the liberty of the press guaranteed by the 14th Amendment.

RATIO:
1. Under the statute, the public authorities may bring the owner or publisher of
a newspaper or periodical before a judge upon a charge of conducting a
business of publishing scandalous and defamatory matter – charges against
public officers of official dereliction, in particular – and unless the owner is
 NEW YORK TIMES v. U.S. The word "security" is broad, vague and general and should not be invoked to
June 30, 1971 | Per Curiam | Freedom of Speech: Protected Speech (Prior abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment. The guarding
Restraint) of military and diplomatic secrets at the expense of informed representative
government provides no real security for the Republic.
SUMMARY: The US Government sought to prevent the NYT and WP from
publishing classified material on the US relative to the Vietnam war. The Court
held that the Government failed to justify the imposition of prior restraint on the
publications.
DOCTRINE: Any system of prior restraints of expression bears a heavy
presumption against its constitutional validity. Thus, the Government carries a
heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint.

FACTS:
1. The United States sought to enjoin the New York Times and Washington
Post   from   publishing   classified   material   entitled   “History   of   US   Decision-
Making  Process  on  Viet  Nam  Policy”.

ISSUE/S: WoN enjoining the publication was unconstitutional - YES

RULING: CA judgment for District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. CA order for

the Second Circuit reversed. Case remanded.

RATIO:
1. Any system of prior restraints of expression bears a heavy presumption
against its constitutional validity. Thus, the Government carries a heavy
burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint. In the
instant case, the Government failed to meet said burden.

Black, J. Concurring - The Government's power to censor the press was

abolished so that the press would be free to censure the Government. The press
was protected so that it could   bare   the   government’s   secrets   and   inform   the  
people. Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in
government.   Paramount   among   the   free   press’s   responsibilities   is   the   duty   to  
prevent any part of the government from deceiving the people and sending them
off to distant lands to die of foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell.

To find that the President has "inherent power" to halt the publication of news
by resort to the courts would wipe out the First Amendment and destroy the
fundamental liberty and security of the very people the Government hopes to
make "secure." The First Amendment was intended to outlaw injunctions such
as those in the instant case.
 FREEDMAN v. MARYLAND
March 1, 1965 | Brennan, J. | Freedom of Speech: Protected Speech (Prior
Restraint)
SUMMARY: Appellant was convicted under the Maryland censorship statute.
He challenged it as unconstitutionally impairing freedom of expression. The SC
held   that   the   statute’s   prescribed   scheme   did   not   satisfy   the   criteria   for   a   valid   that the film is unprotected expression must rest on the censor; and (2)
prior restraint.
DOCTRINE: Criteria for a valid prior restraint: (1) The burden of proving that
the material is unprotected expression must rest on the censor; (2) Finality rests
with the courts; (3) Judicial determination must be prompt.
FACTS:
1. Appellant Freedman was convicted of exhibiting  ‘Revenge  at  Daybreak’  in   Any restraint in advance of a final judicial determination must be limited to
his theatre without submitting it to the Maryland State Board of Censors for
prior approval as required by Sec(2) of the Maryland motion picture
censorship statute. He contended that the statute unconstitutionally impaired
freedom of expression.
ISSUE/S: WoN the censorship statute constituted an invalid prior restraint –
YES
RULING: CA decision reversed.
RATIO:
1. Appellant argues that Sec(2) of the statute constitutes an invalid prior
restraint because, in the context of the rest of the statute, it presents a danger
of unduly suppressing protected expression, read together with the other
sections of the law:
a. The censorship   board’s   procedure   for   initial   decision,   without   any  
judicial participation, bars exhibition of any disapproved film, unless
and until the exhibitor undertakes a time-consuming appeal to the
Maryland courts and succeeds in having the Board's decision reversed.
b. Per Sec(17), no time limit is imposed for completion of Board action.
c. Sec(19) shows that if the film is disapproved or elimination ordered,
there is no judicial participation, nor assurance of prompt judicial
review. Experience on the only reported case showed that to complete
an appeal, initial judicial determination was four months and final
vindication on appellate review took six months.
2. Any system of prior restraints of expression bears a heavy presumption
against its constitutional validity. Unlike prosecution for obscenity, a
censorship proceeding puts the initial burden on the exhibitor or distributor.
Because the censor's business is to censor, he may be less responsive than a
court to the constitutionally protected interests in free expression; and if it is
made unduly onerous, by reason of delay or otherwise, to seek judicial
review, the censor's determination may in practice be final.
3. A noncriminal process which requires prior submission of a film to a censor
is constitutional only if it takes place under procedural safeguards designed
to prevent the dangers of a censorship system: (1) The burden of proving
While the State may require advance submission of all films, the
requirement cannot be administered in a manner which would lend finality
to the censor's determination whether a film constitutes protected
expression. Hence, (3) the exhibitor must be assured, by statute or
authoritative judicial construction, that within a specified brief period, the
censor will either issue a license or go to court to restrain showing the film.
preservation of the status quo for the shortest fixed period compatible with
judicial resolution. Moreover, even after expiration of a temporary restraint,
an administrative refusal to license, signifying the censor's view that the
film is unprotected, may deter the exhibitor. Therefore, the procedure must
also assure a prompt final judicial decision, to minimize the deterrent effect
of a temporary and possibly erroneous denial of a license.
4. The Maryland scheme does not satisfy the criteria: (1) once the censor
disapproves the film, the exhibitor must assume the burden of instituting
judicial proceedings and persuading the courts that the film is protected
expression; (2) once the Board has acted against a film, exhibition is
prohibited pending judicial review, however protracted; and appellant could
have been convicted for showing the film while unsuccessfully seeking a
license even without judicial determination; (3) the statute provides no
assurance of prompt judicial determination.
 PHARMACEUTICAL HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION OF
THE PHILIPPINES v. DUQUE III
October 9, 2007| J. Austria-Martinez | Certiorari | Freedom of Expression:
Protected Speech (Prior Restraint)
SUMMARY: Petitioner seeks to invalidate the Revised IRR of the Milk Code for
being unconstitutional and going beyond the law in prescribing an absolute ban
on advertisements and promotion on infant formula, breastmilk substitutes etc. SC
held that in prescribing an absolute ban on advertising, the DOH exceeded the
authority vested by the Revised Administrative Code and the Milk Code.
DOCTRINE: Commercial speech is protected speech. There must be substantial
state interest that would justify a restriction, which must not be overbroad.
FACTS:
1. On Oct 28, 1986, President Aquino issued EO 51 (The Milk Code) to give
effect to the Intl. Code of Marketing Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS)
adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) to the effect that
breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected.
2. On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued the assailed Revised IRR (RIRR), which
was to take effect on July 7, 2006. On June 28, 2006, petitioner, on behalf
of its members that are manufacturers of breastmilk substitutes filed a
petition for certiorari with prohibition to enjoin the DOH Secretary Duque
from promulgating the IRR.
3. Provisions mainly assailed are: 4f (declaration of principles prohibiting
advertisements on breastmilk substitutes), and 11 (actual prohibition).
4. Petitioner claims that the RIRR is not in accord with The Milk Code (w/c
does not prohibit ads); to which respondents argue that the intl. agreements
entered into by the Philippines form part of the law of the land and the
RIRR was in accord with these agreements (ICMBS).
ISSUE/S:
1. WoN the ICMBS was legally binding and in effect the RIRR issued in
accord with this was issued not in excess of its authority—NO
2. WoN the DOH may implement said provisions of the WHA by virtue of its
powers under the RAC of 1987—NO
3. WoN the prohibition in the RIRR on advertisements is valid—NO
RULING: PARTLY GRANTED. Articles 4f, 11, and 46 NULL and VOID.
RATIO:
1. Under the 1987 Constitution, intl. law can become part of the sphere of
domestic law through transformation (requiring a constitutional mechanism
such as ratification of treaty or local legislation), and incorporation (by
mere constitutional declaration). Here, there was no transformation
regarding the ICMBS prohibition on advertising since the Milk Code did
not adopt such provisions embodied in the former. Instead, the Milk Code
expressly provides that advertising may be allowed if duly authorized by the
Inter-Agency Committee. Under incorporation, customary intl. law is
deemed incorporated in domestic legal system (generally-accepted
principles). Here, the ICMBS was adopted as a mere recommendation and
thus legally non-binding.
2. Under the RAC, the DOH shall define the national health policy and
implement a national health plan in line with this. AO 2005-0014, which
embodies the national policy on infant and young child feeding, merely
focuses on ideal breastfeeding practices and does not declare that
advertisement of breastmilk substitutes is against national policy. Thus, the
DOH cannot ban such practices by virtue of its powers under the RAC; and
can only do so pursuant to law (the Milk Code).
3. The Milk Code authorized the DOH to control the content of any
information on breastmilk vis-à-vis breastmilk substitutes, supplement or
related products; but such control is not absolute. Such control does not
encompass the power to absolutely prohibit advertising, because such is not
contemplated in the Code. The Code merely authorizes regulation, to which
Sec.   13   is   applicable,   w/c   states   that   “total   effect”   of   the   ads   should   not  
undermine breastfeeding. Even the SolGen concedes that Sec. 11 on the
absolute prohibition is not operational, and that it is actually Sec. 13 w/c is
operational in line with the Milk Code.
4. Petitioners contend that the RIRR is an undue restraint on trade. SC held
that despite recognition of free enterprise as a policy, it is still subject to
regulation if it affects public interest. Here, the RIRR was not shown to
unreasonably hamper the trade of breastmilk substitutes.
Puno (Concurring and Separate Opinion)
Advertising and promotion of breastmilk substitutes falls within the ambit
of commercial speech—speech that proposes an economic transaction.
This is a separate category of speech not on the same level of protection
given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is
nonetheless entitles to protection.
Before, commercial speech was well within the broad powers of the
government to regulate. But in the 1970s,the Court held that consumers
have a strong 1st Amendment interest in the free flow of info about goods
and services and any state regulation must support a substantial interest.
The landmark case of Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service
Commission established a 4-part analysis for evaluating constitutionality of
commercial speech regulations: 1) the commercial speech must concern
lawful activity and must not be misleading, 2) the asserted govt interest
 must be substantial, 3) the state regulation must directly advance the govt
interest asserted, and 4) the regulation cannot be more extensive than
necessary to serve that interest. Here, the absolute ban is unduly restrictive.
CHAVEZ v. GONZALES
February 15, 2008 | Puno, C.J. | Certiorari and Prohibition | Freedom of
Expression: Protected Speech (Prior Restraint)
SUMMARY: Respondents NTC and DOJ Sec Gonzales issued statements
giving warnings to the press and media that publication or airing of the alleged
wiretapped conversations between the President and COMELEC Commissioner
Garcillano are violations of the law. SC held that such restraint is
unconstitutional for failing to past the clear and present danger rule.
DOCTRINE: In challenges against freedom of speech, whether in broadcast or
print media, the clear and present danger rule must always be satisfied for the
acts to attain constitutionality. When restricting content-based media, the
presumption on unconstitutionality prevails and the burden of proof is on the
government.
FACTS:
1. (June 5, 2005) Press Secretary Bunye told reporters that opposition was
trying to destabilize the administration by releasing  the  “Hello  Garci”  tape.   reviewing applied differently on each category.
The Sec also produced two versions of the tape, one supposedly the
complete version, and the other a spliced or altered version which suggests
that the President instructed a COMELEC official to manipulate the
election results in favor of the President. He also admitted that the voice
was that of the President, but subsequently made a retraction.
2. (June 7, 2005) Atty. Paguia subsequently released an alleged authentic tape
recording of the wiretap. Included were conversations of the President, the
First Gentleman, COMELEC Commissioner Garcillano, and Senator
Barbers.
3. (June 8, 2005) Respondent DOJ Sec Gonzales then warned reporters that
those who had copies of the CD and those broadcasting or publishing its
contents could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He also
stated that persons possessing or airing said tapes were committing a
continuing offense.
4. (June 9, 2005) Respondent then in another press briefing ordered NBI to go
after organizations found to have caused the spread of the wiretapped
conversation. Gonzales said he was going to start with Inq7.net.
5. (June 11, 2005) NTC issued a press release giving a warning to radio and
television owners to observe the Anti-Wiretapping law and pertinent
circulars on program standards. They claimed that they will not hesitate to
apply with full force the provisions of said Circulars and their
accompanying sanctions on erring radio and television stations.
6. (June 14, 2005) NTC held a dialogue with Kapisanan ng ga Brodkaster ng
Pilipinas and assured the latter that the press release did not violate the
constitutional freedom of speech, of expression, and of press, and the right
to information.
ISSUE/S: WoN the respondents exercised authority beyond their scope which
infringed on the constitutional right of free speech – YES
RULING: Petition granted. Official statements of respondents warning media
on airing the alleged wiretapped conversation is unconstitutional restraint of the
freedom of speech and of the press.
RATIO:
1. Freedom of expression is a preferred right that stands on a higher level than
substantive economic freedom or other liberties. The same right is so broad
that it extends protection to nearly all forms of communication. However,
the freedom of film, television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in
scope than the freedom accorded to newspapers and other print media.
2. Freedom of expression is not an absolute immunity for every possible use
of language. Thus, all speech are not treated the same with techniques of
3. Generally, restraints on freedom of speech are evaluated by three tests: (a)
the dangerous tendency rule which permits limitations on speech once a
rational connection has been established between the speech restrained the
danger contemplated; (b) the balancing of interests test used as a standard
when there is need to balance the conflicting social values and individual
interests, and requires a detailed consideration of the interplay of interests in
a given situation; and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on
the premise that speech may be restrained because there is a substantial
danger that the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has to
prevent. The last test in the one generally adhered to for free speech cases.
4. Freedom of press has four aspects. These are (1) freedom from prior
restraint; (2) freedom from punishment subsequent to publication; (3)
freedom of access to information; and (4) freedom of circulation.
5. Prior restraint refers to official government acts which restrict forms of
expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination. Certain
previous restraints may be permitted by the constitution but determined
only upon a careful evaluation of the challenged act. There are two kinds of
restraints. The first one is a content-neutral regulation which is merely
concerned with the incidents of speech, or one that merely controls the time,
place, or manner under well-defined standards. It is not subject to strict
 scrutiny but only to intermediate approach which requires a substantial the DOJ Secretary who is the alter ego of the President, who wields the
governmental interest for its validity. The second test is a content-based awesome power to prosecute those perceived to be violating the law.
restraint which is based on subject matter of the speech. This act demands
strict scrutiny and only when it has overcome the clear and present danger
rule will it pass constitutional muster. In this regulation, government has the
burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality. It must serve an
important government interest which is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression. Moreover, the incidental restriction on speech must be no
greater that what is essential to the furtherance of that interest. It cannot be
broad that it encompasses more than what is required to satisfy the
governmental interest.
6. Broadcast media is very different from print media. This is because of the
scarcity of the frequencies by which the medium operated, its pervasiveness
as a medium, and its unique accessibility to children. Although freedom in
the first form is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to the
second form, both still require satisfaction of the clear and present danger
rule when restricted.
7. In the case at bar, what is being regulated is the content of the speech so
respondents have the burden of showing that their acts do not abridge the
freedom of expression. It appears that the great evil which government
wants to prevent is the airing of a tape recording in alleged violation of the
wiretapping law. However, evidence presented fall short of satisfying the
clear and present danger test. Firstly, the various statements of the Press
Secretary obfuscate the identity of the voices in the recording. Secondly, the
integrity of the taped conversation is wanting because of the two versions
presented by him. Thirdly, evidence on the details of who and how the
wiretapping is ambivalent. Lastly, given all the unsettled facets of the tape,
it is even arguable whether airing it would violate the anti-wiretapping law.
8. The court should not be interpreted as devaluing violations of the law. But
the need to prevent violation cannot immediately trump the exercise of free
speech, a preferred right whose breach can lead to greater evils. There is
even no proof that the violation of the anti-wiretapping law endangers the
national security of the state.
9. Respondents also content that mere press statements do not constitute a
form of content-based restraint. This is unacceptable for it is not decisive
that press statements be reduced with formal orders or circulars because it is
sufficient that they were made in the exercise of official functions. If every
statement needs to be an official order, it would result in the easy
circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint.
10. There is also enough evidence of chilling effect of the complained acts. The
warning came from no less than the NTC which is empowered to cancel the
Certificate of Authority of the radio and broadcast media. It also came from
 REQUEST FOR LIVE RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE
TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER
CASES AGAINST FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E.
ESTRADA
June 29, 2001 | Vitug, J. | Administrative Matter | Freedom of Expression:
Protected Speech (Prior Restraint)
SUMMARY: KBP requested to be allowed to cover live the trial of the
criminal cases against then Pres. Estrada. SC denied the request, stating that the
presence of the media in the trial proceedings may impair the fair
administration of justice and prejudice the accused.
DOCTRINE: While the press must be allowed maximum freedom in carrying
out the important function of informing the public in a democratic society, its
exercise must necessarily be subject to the maintenance of absolute fairness in
the judicial process.
FACTS:
1. The Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) requested the Court
for a live media coverage of the trial of the plunder and other criminal cases
filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan
“to   assure   the   public   of   full   transparency   in   the   proceedings   of   an   arrogate unto themselves the task of judging the guilt of the accused, such
unprecedented  case  in  our  history”.
2. The Secretary of Justice submitted the instant petition submitting that the
prosecution involves a matter of public concern and interest which the
entire citizenry has a right to know, that the constitutional right of the
people to be informed can be best served by allowing a live media coverage
of the court proceedings, and that the same will ensure transparency in the
administration of justice. Likewise, the petition seeks a re-examination of
the 23 Oct 1991 resolution of the Court in a case for libel filed by then Pres.
Corazon Aquino which forbids the broadcasting and televising of a trial.
harassment, excessive public exposure and distracts him from the effective
presentation of his defense.
2. Massive intrusion of the media into the trial poses a prejudice to the
defendant’s   right   to   due   process   as   well   as   to   the   fair   and   orderly  
administration of justice, due to the influence and pressure that media has
on the behavior of the people it focuses on and its ability to shape public
opinion.
3. The propriety of granting or denying the petition involves the weighing out
of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to
public information against rights of the accused to a fair and impartial trial.
Jurisprudence states that the right of the accused must be preferred, given
the  possibility  of  losing  one’s  life  and  liberty.  Therefore, a verdict must be
based solely on the presentation of credible evidence testified by unbiased
witnesses, bereft of any influence or pressure, and decreed by an unbiased
judge.
4. A public trial is not synonymous with a publicized trial. While the press
must be allowed maximum freedom in carrying out the important function
of informing the public in a democratic society, its exercise must
necessarily be subject to the maintenance of absolute fairness in the judicial
process.
5. Other possible problems: live coverage  could  allow  the  “hooting  throng”  to  
that the verdict of the court will be acceptable only if popular.

ISSUE/S: WoN live media coverage should be allowed in the trial – NO.

RULING: Petition DENIED.

RATIO:
1. In Estes v. Texas, the US SC held that television coverage of judicial
proceedings involves an inherent denial of the due process rights of a
criminal defendant: Witnesses become subject to extraordinary out-of-court
influences which might affect their testimony, telecasting increases a
judge’s  responsibility  to  avoid  actual  prejudice   to  the  defendant  as   well  as  
affect his own performance, and subjects the defendant to mental
 PEOPLE v. PEREZ
December 22, 1923 | Malcolm, J. | Appeal | Freedom of Expression: Protected
Speech (Subsequent Punishment)
SUMMARY: Accused Perez had an altercation with Lodovice because of
difference in opinion about the administration of Gov-Gen Wood. He uttered
phrases   including   cutting   Wood’s   head   for   killing   Philippines’   independence.   the laws or the Constitution. This act must not be interpreted to abdrige the
TC convicted him violation of Art 256 of the Penal Code which the SC modified
to a violation of Treason and Sedition Law.
DOCTRINE: When the intention and effect of the act is seditious, the
constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and press and of assembly and
petition must yield to punitive measures designed to maintain the prestige of
constituted authority, the supremacy of the constitution and the laws, and the
existence of the State.
FACTS:
1. Perez, a municipal secretary, had a discussion with a citizen named
Lodovice about the administration of Governor-General Wood. The accused
shouted"The Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood's
head for having recommended a bad thing for the Filipinos, for he has killed
our independence" several times which led to a charge in the CFI for
violation of article 256 of the Penal Code.
2. Two witnesses were presented by the government including Lumbao,
municipal president, who affirmed that the accused did say what he said.
Second witness Cresencio corroborated the testimony of Lumbao and
understood the speech as Perez inviting the Filipinos including himself to
get their bolos and cut off the head of Governor-General Wood.
3. Witnesses of the defense did not deny that the altercation happened but
argued that the discussion was held in a peaceful manner and that what he
said was that Wood should be replaced by another. Counsel for defense
further argued that the Spanish Penal Code was no longer in effect so
accused cannot be convicted for violating Article 256 thereof.
4. This article contained provisions having to do with contempt of ministers of
Crown or other persons in authority. Perez was convicted and appealed to
this court.
ISSUE/S: WoN Perez should be convicted for his speech? - YES
RULING: Judgment affirmed with modification as to the law violated.
much tend to insult a person in authority as they did to raise a disturbance in
the community.
2. In criminal law, there are offenses which are not directed to individuals but
rather against the existence of the state and public peace. As defined in Act
No. 292, sedition is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State.
A revolt against legitimate authority and an aim and open violence against
freedom of speech. Criticism penetrated to the foundations of government
are allowed unless the intention and effect be seditious, in which case,
constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and press must yield to the
punitive measures designed to protect the State.
3. In the case at bar, the accused maligned the Chief Executive of the
Philippines in ways that pass the bounds of free speech and decency. More
than a figure of speech was intended and there is a seditious tendency in the
words used, which could easily produce disobedience and disloyalty to the
government.
4. The Governor-General is the representative of executive civil authority in
the Philippines and of the sovereign power appointed by the U.S. President
with consent of the U.S. Senate. A seditious attack on him is an attack on
the rights of the Filipino people and in American sovereignty.
5. An accused may be found guilty and convicted for a graver offense than
that designated in the information. The designation of the crime by the
fiscal is not conclusive. The Court found that there is information and
evidence during the trial that justifies the conviction of the graver offense of
violation of Act No. 292.
Concurring and Dissenting:
J. Villamor: I agree that the accused should be convicted for violating Article
256 of the Penal Code and not for Act. No. 292. There is no allegation nor proof
that when the accused uttered the words that gave rise to the proceedings, he
intended to incite others to gather for an illicit purpose. It also appears evident
that the accused expressed himself in biting and poignant language, unbecoming
and improper of a lawabiding citizen and highly detrimental and insulting to the
authority of the Governor-General which is the thing prohibited and punished by
article 256 of the Penal Code.
J. Johnson: I agree with J. Villamor because I cannot give assent to a doctrine
which permits a complaintto be presented upon one theory and the trial to be
carried through upon that theory and then to condemn the defendant upon a
theory which was not even alleged by the prosecution.

RATIO:
1. The petitioner was guilty for violating the Treason and Sedition Law and
not Article 256 of the Penal Code. The words of the accused did not so
 DENNIS v. U.S.
June 4, 1951 | Vinson, C.J. | Freedom of Expression: Protected Speech
(Subsequent Punishment)
SUMMARY: Dennis, et al are convicted under the Smith Act (law criminalizing
the  advocacy  of  overthrowing  the  US  Gov’t  by  force  and  violence)  for  conspiring   evaluate   ideas   without   fear   of   gov’t   sanction.   Rather,   Congress   was
to organize the US Communist Party. They allege that the statute violates their
freedom of speech. SC: Convictions affirmed.
DOCTRINE: Clear and Present Danger Test, as reformulated by Justice Hand:
WON the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such
invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.// Any conspiracy
teaching and advocating the overthrow of the government of the US by force and
violence is a clear and present danger w/c the State has the right to prevent.
FACTS:
1. The Smith Act (Section 2 &3) makes it a crime for any person to knowingly
and willfully advocate the overthrow or destruction of the US Government
by force or violence, to organize or help to organize any group which does
so, or conspire to do so. It includes the printing, circulating, and publicly
displaying any written or printed matter advocating and teaching such.
2. Eugene Dennis and others were convicted under this act for conspiring to
organize the Communist Party of the United States, which was an
organization who advocated the Marxist-Leninist doctrine and whose
primary goal is to achieve a successful overthrow of the existing order by
force and violence. Hence, they   assailed   the   Smith   Acts’   constitutionality   and not just the advocacy itself, can be constitutionally restrained.  It’s  the
for violating their freedom of speech and that it is void for its vagueness.
ISSUE/S: WON the exercise of free speech in advocating the overthrow of the
government by force and violence is protected by the 1st Amendment – NO.
RULING: Smith Act VALID. Convictions AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
1. The   Smith   Act’s   purpose   is   to   protect   the   existing   US   Government from
change by violence, revolution, and terrorism – not from change by
peaceable, lawful, and constitutional means. It’s   undisputable   that   this  
purpose  is  within  Congress’  power  – it is the ultimate value of any society,
for  if  a  society  can’t  protect  its very structure from armed internal attack, no
subordinate value can be protected. The only question is WON the means
employed conflict with the 1st and 5th Amendment.
2. Petitioners contend that the statute, on its face, prohibits academic
discussion of the merits of Marxism-Leninism, which is contrary to the
concept of free speech and a free press. However, the Statute is directed at
advocacy, not discussion. Petitioners wouldn’t  have  been  convicted  if  they  
were merely pursuing peaceful studies and discussions or conducting a
course explaining the philosophical theories set forth in the books which
had  been  placed  in  evidence.  The  Smith  Act  doesn’t  intend  to  eradicate  the  
free discussion of political theories nor to destroy the right to discuss and
 
concerned with the kind of activities the petitioners were engaged in.
3. The 1st Amendment’s  basis  is  that  speech can rebut speech, propaganda will
answer   propaganda,   free   debate   of   ideas   will   result   in   the   wisest   gov’t  
policies. However, free speech must be occasionally subordinated to other
values  &  considerations.  Here,  the  Court  employs  Justice  Holmes’  clear  and
present danger test in the Schenk Case: whether the words used are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a
right to prevent. In this case, Justice Hand reinterpreted the rule as WON
the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such
invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.
4. In   this   case,   requisite   danger   is   the   petitioners’   actions   in   1945-1948 in
conspiring   to   overthrow   the   government.   The   mere   fact   that   the   CP’s  
activities   hasn’t   resulted   in   an   attempt   to   overthrow   the   Government   yet  
doesn’t  matter.  Their  formation  of  such  a  highly  organized  conspiracy  with  
rigidly disciplined members subject to call by their leaders, coupled with
the similar uprisings in other countries and the inflammable nature of world
conditions,  justify  the  petitioners’  convictions.  The  conspiracy  to  advocate,  
 
existence of the conspiracy to advocate such ideology which creates the
danger. If the ingredients of the reaction are present, we cannot bind the
Government to wait until the catalyst has been added. The success or the
probability of success is also not a factor, because an attempt by itself is a
sufficient evil for Congress to prevent.
5. The clear and present danger test is not vague– the Court has attempted to
sum  up  the  factors  which  are  included  within  its  scope,  and  believes  it’s  a  
clear enough standard.
 ABRAMS v. U.S.
November 10, 1919 | Clarke, J. | Freedom of Speech: Protected Speech
(Subsequent Punishment)
SUMMARY: The Court held that there was sufficient evidence to convict the
defendants for inciting resistance to the war effort and for urging curtailment of
production of essential war materials and that there was no violation of their
Constitutional rights to free speech. Justice Holmes, in his dissenting opinion,
argues that there was insufficient evidence to show the necessary intent provided
for by the Espionage Act and that the conviction was in clear violation of the
defendants First Amendment Rights.
DOCTRINE: (Court): When prosecuted under the Espionage Act, persons who
sought to effectuate a plan of action which necessarily, before it could be realized,
involved the defeat of the plans of the US for the conduct of the war with Germany
must be held to have intended that result notwithstanding their ultimate purpose
may have been to prevent interference with the Russian Revolution.
(Holmes): Speech could be punished if it posed a clear and present danger of
causing some harm. A person does not do an act w/ intent to produce it unless the
aim to produce it is the proximate motive of the specific act.
FACTS:
1. The defendants were convicted and sentenced to 20 years in prison under the
Espionage Act on the basis of two leaflets they printed and threw from
windows of a building – one denouncing the sending of American troops to
Russia and the other denouncing the war and US efforts to impede the
Russian Revolution.
2. The defendants had united to print and distribute the described circulars, and
that five thousand of them had been printed and distributed about the 22nd
day of August, 1918.
3. The defendants were charged on four counts: That the defendants conspired,
when the United States was at war with the Imperial Government of
Germany, to unlawfully utter, print, write and publish: (1) "disloyal,
scurrilous and abusive language about the form of Government of the United
States;" (2) language "intended to bring the form of Government of the
United States into contempt, scorn, contumely and disrepute;" (3) language
"intended to incite, provoke and encourage resistance to the United States in
said war.", and that (4) they conspired to unlawfully and willfully, by
utterance, writing, printing and publication, to urge, incite and advocate
curtailment of production of things and products, to-wit, ordnance and
ammunition, necessary and essential to the prosecution of the war.
4. Defendants argue that there is no substantial evidence to support the
judgment upon the verdict of guilty, and that the motion of the defendants
for an instructed verdict in their favor was erroneously denied.
ISSUE/S: WON there was some evidence, competent and substantial, before the
jury, fairly tending to sustain the verdict – YES
RULING: The ruling of the trial court is AFFIRMED
RATIO:
1. (Court): Citing excerpts from the two leaflets, the Court concluded that these
leaflets: (1) appealed to the "workers" of this country to arise and put down
by force the Government of the United States which they characterize as
their "hypocritical," "cowardly" and "capitalistic" enemy; (2) to persuade the
persons to whom it was addressed to turn a deaf ear to patriotic appeals in
behalf of the Government of the United States, and to cease to render it
assistance in the prosecution of the war; (3) to create an attempt to defeat the
war plans of the Government of the United States by bringing upon the
country the paralysis of a general strike, thereby arresting the production of
all munitions and other things essential to the conduct of the war; and (4)
culminated with a definite threat of armed rebellion. While the actions of the
defendants may have been cause by their resentment over the Government's
sending troops into Russia as a strategic operation against the Germans on
the eastern battle front, the plain purpose of their propaganda was to excite,
at the supreme crisis of the war, disaffection, sedition, riots, and, as they
hoped, revolution, in this country for the purpose of embarrassing, and, if
possible, defeating the military plans of the Government in Europe. It is then
clear that the language of these circulars was obviously intended to provoke
and to encourage resistance to the United States in the war, as the third count
runs, and the defendants, in terms, plainly urged and advocated a resort to a
general strike of workers in ammunition factories for the purpose of
curtailing the production of ordnance and munitions necessary and essential
to the prosecution of the war as is charged in the fourth count. Since the
sentence does not exceed that which might lawfully have been imposed
under any single count, a verdict of guilty on the third and fourth counts
sustains a verdict of guilty on all counts.
(Holmes, Dissenting): The conviction of the defendants curtails their First
Amendment Rights. The United States constitutionally may punish speech that
produces or is intended to produce a clear and imminent danger that it will
bring about forthwith certain substantive evils that the United States
constitutionally may seek to prevent. It is only the present danger of immediate
evil or an intent to bring it about that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the
expression of opinion where private rights are not concerned. By itself, printing
leaflets do not present an immediate danger to the Government's war efforts but
printing them for the purpose of obstructing that war effort would indicate a
greater danger and have the quality of an attempt. For the second leaflet to be
punishable, it must have been published with the intent charged in the fourth
count or with a specific and actual intent to hinder the war efforts. When the
success of an attempt depends upon others, it is necessary to show that the actor
has intent to do something evil since, without this intent, the actor's aim may be
accomplished without bringing about the evils sought to be checked. In the case
at hand, Holmes argues that intent to prevent interference with the revolution in
Russia might have been satisfied without any hindrance to carrying on the war
in which we were engaged. In fact it is evident that the only object of the paper
is to help Russia and stop American intervention there against the popular
government -- not to impede the United States in the war that it was carrying on.
The third count charges an intent to provoke resistance to the United States in its
war with Germany. From the concerned statute, Holmes finds resistance to the
United States means some forcible act of opposition to some proceeding of the
United States in pursuance of the war. Again, Holmes argues that there is no
actual or specific intent to start a resistance on the leaflets. In the case of the first
and second count, there is no evidence to support them.
EASTERN BROADCASTING v. DANS, JR
July 19, 1985 | Gutierrez, Jr., J. | Resolution | Freedom of Speech: Protected
Speech (Subsequent Punishment)
SUMMARY: Petitioner Eastern Broadcasting Corporation sought to allow the
reopening of their radio station (DYRE) which had been closed on grounds of
national security. Petitioner contended the issue of freedom of speech. However,
the motion was withdrawn after petitioner sold its rights and interest in the radio
station. The court still ruled on the motion for guidance of the other courts.
DOCTRINE: Freedom in broadcast media is somewhat lesser in scope than the
freedom accorded to newspaper and print media. Material in broadcast media is
so accessible and pervasive in all parts on the country that the clear and present
danger test, employed in cases of freedom of speech, must be used meticulously
and with extreme care.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner was closed on the allegation that the radio station was used to
incite people to sedition. It alleged that no hearing was held and not a bit of
proof was submitted to establish factual basis for the closure. Petitioner also
raised the issue of freedom of speech. It appears from the records that the
respondent’s  general  charge  of  “inciting  people  to  commit  acts  of  sedition”  
arose  from  the  petitioner’s  shift  towards  what  it  stated  was  the  coverage  of  
public events and the airing of programs.
2. Before the court could decide on the matter, the president of petitioner, Mr.
Rene Espina, filed a motion to withdraw or dismiss the petition.
3. The court will decide nevertheless for the guidance of inferior courts and all
others.
RULING: Petition to withdraw or dismiss granted (case having become moot
and academic)
RATIO:
1. All forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad
protection of the freedom of speech and expression clause. The test for
limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and present
danger rule - that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.
2. All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the
freedom of expression clause. Necessarily, however, the freedom of
television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the
freedom accorded to newspaper and print media.
3. Broadcast media have established a pervasive influence in the lives of all
citizens. Material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only
in public, but in the privacy of his home. Moreover, broadcasting is
uniquely accessible to children. Bookstores and motion pictures may be
prohibited from making certain material available to children, but the same
selectivity cannot be done in radio or television, where the listener or
viewer is constantly tuning in and out.
4. Ordinarily, newspapers and current books are found only in metropolitan
areas where low income masses find the cost of books, newspapers, and
magazines beyond their humble means. On the other hand, the transistor
radio is found everywhere and is very cheap. The television set is also
becoming universal. The materials broadcast over the airwaves reach every
person of every age whose reactions to inflammatory or offensive speech
would be difficult to monitor or predict.
5. The clear and present danger test, therefore, must take the particular
circumstances of broadcast media into account. The supervision of radio
stations, whether by government or through self-regulation by the industry
itself calls for thoughtful, intelligent and sophisticated handling.
 U.S.  v.  O’BRIEN
May 27, 1968 | Warren, C.J. | Freedom of Expression: Protected Speech
(Symbolic Speech)
SUMMARY: O’Brien  was  convicted  after  he  burned  his  Selective  Registration   purpose and they can be disposed off by the possessor according to the
Certificate to show his antiwar beliefs. He argues that the law penalizing the
mutilation and destruction of such certificates violates free speech. The Court
held that the law serves a legitimate State interest which is not at all connected
with speech.
DOCTRINE: When "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the
same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in
regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First
Amendment freedoms.
FACTS:
1. David   O’Brien   was   charged   with   violation   of   Universal   Military   Training   of changes in their address and status, and such continued awareness of the system is
and Service Act of 1948 after he and three other companions burned their
Selective Registration Certificates before a sizeable crowd in order to show
his opposition to the war.
2. The said law, as amended in 1965, penalizes any person who forges, alters,
knowingly destroys, knowingly mutilates, or in any manner changes any
such certificate (such as the Registration Certificate). Said certificates are
issued to males who upon reaching the age of 18 are required to register
with a local draft board for the military under the Universal Military
Training and Service Act.
3. O’Brien  claims  that  he  knew  he  was  violating  the  law  by  committing  the  act  
in order to communicate his antiwar beliefs. He also argues that his act of
burning the certificate was a symbolic speech protected by the First
Amendment, and the purpose of Congress in enacting the 1965 Amendment
(on mutilation and destruction of certificates) was to abridge free speech.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the law penalizing the mutilation and destruction of
certificates curtail free speech – NO
RULING:  O’Brien’s  conviction  affirmed.  
RATIO:
1. When "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the same course
of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the
nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment
freedoms.
A governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government and furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of free
expression, and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedom is no greater than is essential to that interest.
2. Contrary   to   O’Brien’s   position   that   the certificates served no legitimate
latter’s   will   and   convenience,   the   certificates   serve   many   purposes   that  
would be frustrated once they are mutilated or destroyed.
The registration certificate serves as proof that the individual described thereon has
registered for the draft. These certificates may be used to know who among the
people are delinquent in their obligations under the Selective Service System, and
makes it easier for the Selective Service System to verify the classification and
registration status of the registrants.
The availability of the certificates also benefits the registrant since it is easier for the
board to locate his file, or for purposes of inquiry especially through a local board
other than his own.
The certificates carry continual reminders for the registrants to notify the local board
vital to the smooth operation of the system.
Protection against mutilation of the certificates may also serve to deter people from
using these documents for fraudulent purposes.
3. The purposes sought to be achieved by these certificates are in line with the
legitimate State interest of raising armies. These certificates, which form
part of the Selective Service System, substantially furthers the smooth and
proper functioning of the system that Congress has established to raise
armies. It has been held that the constitutional power of Congress to raise
and support armies and to make all laws necessary and proper to that end is
broad and sweeping. Furthermore, the power of Congress to classify and
conscript  manpower  for  military  service  is  "beyond  question.”
4. In this case, what the law only penalizes is the act of mutilating or
destroying the certificates, independent of the communicative aspect of
such  act.  O’Brien  is  convicted  for  burning  the  certificate,  which  caused  the  
frustration of a legitimate State interest. The act of mutilation or destruction
of the certificate bears no connection with speech, and there is nothing
expressive in such conduct. The law, as amended, does not distinguish
between public and private destruction, and it does not punish only
destruction engaged in for the purpose of expressing views.
5. On   O’Brien’s   argument   that   Congress   passed   the   amendment   in   order   to  
curtail free speech, the Court held that it will not strike down an otherwise
constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive.
However, even if they are to resort to the reports of the Senate and House
Armed Services Committees, the amendment penalizing the mutilation and
destruction of the certificates stemmed from the concern regarding
unrestrained destruction of cards would disrupt the smooth functioning of
the Selective Service System.
 TINKER v. DES MOINES SCHOOL DISTRICT
February 24, 1969 | Fortas, J. | Freedom of Expression: Protected Speech
(Symbolic Speech)
SUMMARY: Petitioners were suspended from school for wearing black
armbands to show their opposition to the war in Vietnam. The Court held that
their act falls within the constitutional guarantee of free speech and that it did
not cause any material and substantial   interference   with   the   school’s   work   nor   classrooms, there were no threats or acts of violence on school premises.
infringe on the rights of others.
DOCTRINE: In order for the State in the person of school officials to justify
prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that its
action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort
and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint. The
prohibition on certain acts can only be sustained when it can be shown that
engaging in the forbidden conduct would "materially and substantially interfere
with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school."
FACTS:
1. Petitioners John Tinker, his sister Mary Beth Tinker, and Christopher
Eckhardt were high school students in Des Moines, Iowa. They and their
parents joined the plan of a group of students and adults in Des Moines to
wear  black  armbands  and  to  fast  on  Dec.  16  and  New  Year’s  Eve  as  a  sign   3. Furthermore, the school officials did not purport to prohibit wearing of all
of  protest  against  the  Government’s  involvement  in  the  Vietnam  War.   symbols of political or controversial significance. It appears that what was
2. The principals of Des Moines became aware of this plan and they adopted a
policy to request any student wearing an armband to remove the same, and
to suspend him/her from school if he/she refused until he/she returns to
school without the armband. Petitioners were aware of the regulation that
the school authorities adopted.
3. The petitioners were sent home and suspended from school after they went
to school wearing their armbands. They did not return to school until after
New   Year’s   Day,   which   was   the   period   after   which   they   would   no   longer   Students in school as well as out of school are "persons" under the
wear the armbands according to the plan.
4. Petitioners, through their fathers, filed a suit for nominal damages and
injunction against the school officials to prevent them from disciplining the
petitioners. The District Court dismissed the complaint (ruling sustained by
the CA), holding that it was reasonable for the school to suspend the
students in order to prevent disturbance of school discipline.
ISSUE/S: WoN the wearing of armbands as a sign of protest was
constitutionally protected free speech – YES
RULING: District Court ruling reversed. Case remanded for further
proceedings as to the relief to be granted.
RATIO:
1. The wearing of armbands as a sign of protest against U.S. involvement in
the Vietnam War was a silent and passive expression of opinion on the part
of the students. There is no evidence to show that it interfered with the
school’s   work,   caused   disruption   in   classes,   or   collided   with   the   rights   of  
other students to be secure and let alone. While some of the children
wearing armbands received hostile remarks from other children outside the
2. Undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to
overcome the right to freedom of expression. In order for the State in the
person of school officials to justify prohibition of a particular expression of
opinion, it must be able to show that its action was caused by something
more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that
always accompany an unpopular viewpoint. The prohibition on certain acts
can only be sustained when it can be shown that engaging in the forbidden
conduct would "materially and substantially interfere with the requirements
of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school."
In this case, there was no showing that the school officials had reason to
anticipate such disruption. Also, it appears that the policy was enacted in
order to prevent any controversy arising from the expression of opposition
to the Vietnam War.
prohibited only was the wearing of said armbands, but not of other symbols
pertaining to national political campaigns or even the Iron Cross
(traditionally symbolic of Nazism). Prohibition of expression of a particular
opinion is not constitutionally permissible unless it is shown that it is
necessary to avoid material and substantial interference with schoolwork or
discipline.
4. School officials do not possess absolute authority over their students.
Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights which the State
must respect, just as they themselves must respect their obligations to the
State. Students may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that
which the State chooses to communicate. They may not be confined to the
expression of those sentiments that are officially approved. In the absence
of a specific showing of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their
speech, students are entitled to freedom of expression of their views.
 PRIMICIAS v. FUGOSO
January 27, 1948 | Feria, J. | Mandamus | Freedom of Expression: Protected
Speech (Assembly and Petition)
SUMMARY: Primicias instituted an action to compel Mayor Fugoso to issue a
permit for the holding of a meeting/ indignation rally at Plaza Miranda. The
court, because of the urgency of the prayer and after mature deliberation, issued
the writ without prejudice to a reasoned decision. The court eventually came up
with the reasoned decision. Justice Hilado dissented however, stating that what
was really regulated was not free speech but the use of a public place.
DOCTRINE: (Majority) Fear of serious injury alone cannot justify suppression
of free speech and assembly. To justify suppression of free speech, there must be
reasonable ground to feel that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced.
Moreover, even imminent danger cannot justify resort to prohibition of these
functions essential for effective democracy, unless the evil apprehended is
relatively serious. Prohibition of free speech and assembly is a measure so
stringent that it would be inappropriate as the means for averting a relatively
trivial harm to a society. Among freemen, the deterrents ordinarily to be applied
to prevent crimes are education and punishment for violations of the law, not
abridgment of the rights of free speech and assembly.
(J. Hilado's Dissent) The right of peaceful assembly and petition is not absolute
but subject to regulation as regards the time, place, and manner of its exercise.
FACTS: Congressman Cipriano Primicias, the campaign manager of the
Coalesced Minority Parties, wrote a letter to Manila Mayor Valeriano Fugoso to
request for a permit to hold a public meeting at Plaza Miranda in Quiapo for the
purpose of denouncing the alleged fraudulent manner in which the last elections
have been conducted. Mayor Fugoso however, did not grant the request as the
Mayor's office adopted a policy of not permitting meetings of that nature until
the results of the elections have been officially announced because the meetings
are likely to incite the people and disrupt the peace. Hence, the action for
mandamus in the present case.
ISSUE/S: WoN the Mayor is vested with unregulated discretion to grant permit
for holding lawful assembly in the streets or other public places of Manila – NO
RULING: Petition for Mandamus GRANTED.
RATIO:
1. The right of freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the
people recognized and guaranteed by the Constitutions of democratic
countries. But it a settled principle that the exercise of those rights is not
absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal
enjoyment of others having equal rights. The power to regulate the exercise
of such and other constitutional rights is termed police power. The
Philippine legislature has delegated the exercise of the police power to the
Municipal Board of the City of Manila, which according to section 2439 of
the Administrative Code is the legislative body of the City. Section 2444 of
the same Code grants the Municipal Board, among others, the following
legislative power, to wit: "(p) to provide for the prohibition and suppression
of riots, affrays, disturbances, and disorderly assemblies, (u) to regulate the
use of streets, avenues ... parks, cemeteries and other public places" and "for
the abatement of nuances in the same," and "(ee) to enact all ordinances it
may deem necessary and proper for sanitation and safety, the furtherance of
prosperity and the promotion of morality, peace, good order, comfort,
convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants." The board
enacted Sec 1119 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila.
2. Sec 1119 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila prohibits the
holding of any parade or procession in any streets or public places unless a
permit is first secured from the Mayor not less than twenty-four hours prior
to the holding of such parade or procession. As there was no express and
separate provision in the Revised Ordinance of the City regulating the
holding of public meeting or assembly, the provisions of Sec 1119 was
applied.
3. The provision is susceptible of two constructions: one is that the Mayor is
vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse to grant permits for the
holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets
and other public places of the City of Manila; and the other is that the
applicant has the right to a permit which shall be granted by the Mayor,
subject only to the latter's reasonable discretion to determine or specify the
streets or public places to be used for the purpose, with the view to prevent
confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public
places by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to minimize
the risk of disorder.
4. The court adopted the second construction. Section 2434 of the
Administrative Code, a part of the Charter of the City of Manila, which
provides that the Mayor shall have the power to grant and refuse municipal
licenses or permits of all classes, cannot be cited as an authority for the
Mayor to deny the application of the petitioner, because the said general
power is predicated upon the ordinances enacted by the Municipal Board
requiring licenses or permits to be issued by the Mayor. It is not a specific
or substantive power independent from the corresponding municipal
ordinances which the Mayor, as Chief Executive of the City, is required to
enforce under the same section 2434. Moreover, one of the settled maxims
in constitutional law is that the power conferred upon the Legislature to
 make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or
authority except certain powers of local government, specially of police
regulation which are conferred upon the legislative body of a municipal
corporation. Taking this into consideration, and that the police power to
regulate the use of streets and other public places has been conferred by the
Legislature upon the Municipal Board of the City it is to be presumed that
the Legislature has not conferred upon the Mayor the same power, specially
if we take into account that its exercise may be in conflict with the exercise
of the same power by the Municipal Board.
5. Assuming that the legislature has the power to confer to the Mayor the
powers mentioned, under our democratic system of government no such
unlimited power may be validly granted to any officer of the government,
except in cases of national emergency.
6. The reason alleged by the respondent in his defense is, "that there is a
reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the
fact that passions, specially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter
and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the
faith and confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly
constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a
disruption of public order." The court held however that fear of serious
injury alone cannot justify suppression of free speech and assembly. To
justify suppression of free speech, there must be reasonable ground to feel
that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. Moreover, even
imminent danger cannot justify resort to prohibition of these functions
essential for effective democracy, unless the evil apprehended is relatively
serious. Prohibition of free speech and assembly is a measure so stringent
that it would be inappropriate as the means for averting a relatively trivial
harm to a society. Among freemen, the deterrents ordinarily to be applied to
prevent crimes are education and punishment for violations of the law, not
abridgment of the rights of free speech and assembly.
HILADO, Dissenting:
1. The right to free speech and assembly is not absolute but subject to
reasonable regulations. - The Mayor of Manila had the duty and the power
to grant and refuse municipal permits of all classes for any good reason of
general interest and to comply with and enforce and give the necessary
orders for the faithful enforcement and execution of the laws and ordinances
in effect within the jurisdiction of the city. Among the general powers and
duties of the Municipal Board, whose ordinances the said Mayor was at
once bound and empowered to comply with and enforce, were such as
regulate the use of streets, parks and other public places. Plaza Miranda is a
public square or plaza used by a great number of people. The holding of the
meeting contemplated by the petitioner, if granted, must have been expected
to greatly inconvenience and interfere with the right of the public in general
to devote said plaza to the public uses for which it has been destined since
time immemorial. The regulatory action is predicated upon the general
comfort and convenience and is in consonance with peace and good order.
Hence,   it   is   not   a   “guise   of   regulation”     and   does   not   abridge   or   deny   the  
right.
2. There is no constitutional right to use public places under government
control for the exercise of the right of assembly and petition - The action
taken by the City Mayor was not even a regulation of the constitutional
right of assembly and petition, or free speech but rather of the use of a
public place under the exclusive control of the city government for the
exercise of that right. No political party or section of our people has any
constitutional right to freely and without government control make use of
such a public place as Plaza Miranda, particularly if such use is a deviation
from those for which said public places have been by their nature and
purpose immemorially dedicated. When the use of public streets or places is
involved, public convenience, public safety and public order take
precedence over particular civil rights. For if the citizen asserting the civil
right were to override the right of the general public to the use of such
streets or places just because it is guaranteed by the constitution, it would be
hard to conceive how upon the same principle that citizen be prevented
from using the private property of his neighbor for the exercise of the
asserted right. The constitution, in guaranteeing the right of peaceful
assembly and petition, the right of free speech, etc., does not guarantee their
exercise upon public places, any more than upon private premises, without
government regulation in both cases.
3. The discretion of the City Mayor is not unregulated, for the phrase "any
good reason of general interest" is certainly an effective regulatory
condition precedent to the exercise of the power one way or the other.
The Mayor's action was not an absolute denial of the permit, but a mere
postponement of the time for holding the "rally" for good reasons "of
general interest" because there were allusions in the papers that in case of
defeat of the candidates in the petitioner's side, there will be minority
resignations in the congress, rebellion and even revolution in the country.
Judging from the tenor of the request for permit and taking into
consideration the circumstances under which said meeting will be held, it is
safe to state that once the people are gathered thereat are incited, there will
surely be trouble between the opposing elements, commotion will follow,
and then peace and order in Manila will be disrupted.
 NAVARRO v. VILLEGAS
February 26, 1970 | Resolution | Freedom of Expression: Protected Speech
(Assembly and Petition)
SUMMARY: Navarro applied for a permit to hold a public rally at Plaza
Miranda. The Mayor stated that he would be willing to grant the permit if it was
held on Saturdays, Sundays, or holiday; or in another venue less prejudicial to
public  order.  The  Court  upheld  the  Mayor’s decision.
DOCTRINE: The mayor possesses reasonable discretion in determining the
public places to be used for the assembly, provided that such discretion is not
exercised arbitrarily.
Castro and Fernando, DISSENTING:
1. The right to freedom of assembly while not unlimited is entitled to be
accorded the utmost deference and respect. The mayor was empowered to
refuse issuance of said permit if done under the criteria in Primicias.
2. The grounds for his refusal (fact 1 letter excerpt) do not meet the standard
of the Primicias ruling. Under the circumstances, the effect is one of prior
restraint of a constitutional right. This is not allowable. A law subjecting the
exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license,
without narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing
authority, is unconstitutional.

FACTS:
1. Navarro applied for a permit to hold a public rally or demonstration at Plaza
Miranda.  Mayor  Villegas,  in  his  letter  addressed  to  the  petitioner,  said,  “In
the greater interest of the general public, and in order not to unduly disturb
the life of the community, this Office, guided by a lesson gained from the
events of the past few weeks, has temporarily adopted the policy of not
issuing any permit for the use of Plaza Miranda for rallies or demonstrations
during week days.”
2. Mayor Villegas further offered Sunken Gardens as an alternative venue, for
holding it in Plaza  Miranda  poses  a  “clearer and more imminent danger of
public disorders, breaches of the peace, criminal acts, and even bloodshed
as an  aftermath  of  such  assemblies”.

ISSUE/S: WoN Navarro is entitled to the issuance of the permit, pursuant to his
constitutionally protected right of assembly—NO

RULING: Petition DISMISSED.

RATIO:
As stated in Primicias v. Fugoso, the mayor possesses reasonable discretion in
determining the public places to be used for the assembly in order to 1) secure
convenient use thereof by others and 2) provide adequate and proper policing to
minimize the risks of disorder and maintain public safety and order. Here, the
mayor has not denied nor absolutely refused to grant the permit; rather, he
expressed his willingness to grant a permit if it was not held during weekdays
and further offered the Sunken Gardens as an alternative venue. He ratiocinated
that every time assemblies are announced, the community is placed in such a
state of fear and tension that offices are closed early and employees dismissed,
storefronts boarded up, classes suspended, and transportation disrupted, to the
general detriment of the public.
 PBM EMPLOYEES v. PBM
June 5, 1973 | Makasiar, J. | Review of CIR decision | Freedom of Expression:
Protected Speech (Assembly and Petition)
SUMMARY: PBMEO, despite being forewarned by PBM, proceeded with its
demonstration  against  Pasig  Police,  resulting  in  the  PBMEO  officer’s  dismissal.   rights is recognized. The rights of free expressions and of assembly occupy
PBM contends that the demonstration prejudices the operation of the company.
PBMEO argues that it is an exercise of their right to freedom of expression. SC
ruled in favor of PBMEO.
DOCTRINE: Human rights, like the freedom of expression and assembly,
have a primacy over property rights.
FACTS:
1. Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization, a legitimate labor
union of PBM Co, Inc. employees, decided to stage a mass demonstration at
Malacañang on March 4, 1969 in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig
Police, to be participated by the 1st shift (6:00-14:00), regular 2nd (07:00-
16:00) and 3rd shifts (08:00-19:00) workers. They informed PBM of
proposed demonstration, and that it was not directed towards the Company
but towards said police.
2. The Management of PBM informed them that the demonstration is an
inalienable right guaranteed by the Constitution, but that any demonstration
should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. It
forewarned the PBMEO representatives that workers in the 1 st and regular
shifts, primarily the officers of PBMEO, who fail to report for work on
March 4th shall be dismissed for violating the existing CBA provision of
“No   Lockout-No  Strike”.  It  proposed  to  utilize  the  2 nd and 3rd shifts (non-
regular), instead of the 1st and regular shifts in order to not violate the
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
3. Despite the pleas, petitioners proceeded with the demonstration. PBM
charged the petitioners and other employees in the 1 st shift with a violation
of Secs 4(a)-6,   13,   14,   15   of   RA   875   and   of   the   CBA   providing   for   “No   demonstration. PBM could have made arrangements to counteract or
Strike  and  No   Lockout”.  The   order  found  PBMEO  guilty   of  bargaining in
bad faith and for perpetrating a unfair labor practice, thus, considered
petitioners to have lost their status as employees of PBM.
ISSUE: WoN   PBM’s   property   rights   can   thwart   the   Union’s   rights   to   free  
expression and assembly – NO.
RULING: Orders of Court of Industrial Relations NULL AND VOID. 8
petitioners reinstated with full back pay from date of dismissal until reinstated.
RATIO:
1. The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil
rights but also political rights  essential  to  man’s  enjoyment  of  his  life,  to  his  
happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. While the Bill of Rights
also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property
a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of
our civil and political institutions.
2. Property rights: can be lost thru prescription; minimum test: rational
relation between means and purpose of law– not arbitrary, discriminatory or
oppressive. Human rights: imprescriptible; stringent criterion – an existence
of a grave and imminent danger of a substantive evil that the State has a
right to prevent.
3. Demonstration was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom of
expression in general and of their right of assembly and of petition for
redress of grievances – harassment of local officers. The pretension of PBM
that it would suffer loss by reason of the absence of its employees from 6 to
2 is a plea for the preservation of merely their property rights. Material loss
can be adequately compensated, while the debasement of a human being
can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms.
4. To regard the demonstration against police officers as evidence of bad faith
in the CBA and a cause for dismissal, stretches unduly the compass of the
CBA and is a potent means of inhibiting speech; therefore, it infringes on
the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression, peaceful assembly
and petition.
5. PBM’s   claim that it only suggested that the 1st and regular shifts should
report for work fails to appreciate the sine qua non of an effective
demonstration – the complete unity of the Union members and their total
presence. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of expression, if the
demonstrators are to be reduced by 1/3, then by that much the circulation of
the issues raised by the demonstration is diminished.
6. At any rate, the PBMEO notified PBM 2 days in advance of the projected
prevent whatever losses it might sustain by reason of absence of its workers
for a day.
 NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN THE HOTEL RATIO:
RESTAURANT & ALLIED INDUSTRIES v. CA 1. Strike: any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of
November 11, 2008 | Velasco, J. | Certiorari (Review and Special Civil Action) employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. 6 categories of an
Freedom of Expression: Protected Speech (Assembly and Petition) illegal strike: (1) contrary to a specific prohibition of law; (2) violates a
specific requirement of law; (3) declared for an unlawful purpose; (4)
employs unlawful means in the pursuit of the objective; (5) declared in
SUMMARY: Because of a bargaining deadlock with the Hotel (employer), the
violation of an existing injunction; (6) contrary to an existing agreement
Union (employees) shaved their heads/sported closely cropped hair then attended
(e.g. no-strike clause or conclusive arbitration clause)
work with such hair, in protest. Hotel prevented them from entering premises for
2. Head Shaving an Unprotected Action:Union is liable for conducting an
violating Hotel Grooming Standards, setting off a series of strikes involving
illegal  strike.  The  Union’s  violation  of  the  Hotel’s  Grooming  Standards  was  
picketing and unlawfully blocking the entry and exit of Hotel premises, ending w/
not merely an expression of grievance or displeasure, but clearly a
the Hotel firing many Union officers/members. SC: Illegal Strike.
deliberate, calibrated and calculated act designed to inflict serious damage
DOCTRINE: Acts which are not merely an expression of grievance or
to  the  Hotel’s  finances  or  its  reputation  – an unprotected action. The Hotel
displeasure, but a deliberate, calibrated and calculated act designed to inflict
employees’   appearances   directly   reflect   the   Hotel’s   character   and   well-
serious damage to another, is unprotected. // 6 requisites of illegal strike (Ratio 1)
being as a 5-star hotel that provides service to top-notch   clients.   It’s  
important to note that being bald or having cropped hair per se does not
FACTS:
evoke negative or unpleasant feelings. But the reality that many employees
1. The Union is the certified bargaining agent of the regular rank-and-file
assigned   to   the   Hotel’s   food   and   beverage   outlets   with   full   heads   of   hair  
employees of Dusit Hotel Nikko, a 5-star service establishment. Due to a
suddenly deciding to come to work bald-headed/cropper hair suggests that
bargaining deadlock between the Union and the Hotel in negotiating their
something was wrong. Hotel does not need to advertise its labor problems
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), the Union filed a Notice of Strike
with its clients. By shaving their heads, the Union succeeded in forcing the
and a Strike Vote where the Union decided to strike. 3 days later, the Union
Hotel to choose between allowing its inappropriately hairstyled employees
held   a   general   assembly   at   the   Hotel’s   basement,   where   some   members  
to continue working to the detriment of their reputation, or to refuse them
decided to shave their heads or sport closely cropped hair then going to
work even if it had to cease operations in affected service units.
work the next day w/ the same hairstyles.
3. Other  Reasons  why  the  Union’s  actions  amounted  to  an  illegal  strike.
2. Because of this, the Hotel prevented the workers from entering the premises
a. Violated  CBA’s  No  Strike,  No  Lockout  provision
for violating the Hotel’s   Grooming   Standards.   The Union then staged a
b. Violated  Union’s  duty  and responsibility to bargain in good faith
picket outside the Hotel premises. Later, other workers were also prevented
c. Violated mandatory 30 day cool off period and 7 day strike ban
from entering the Hotel causing them to join the picket. For this reason, the
d. Union committed illegal acts in the conduct of its strike – formed
Hotel experienced a severe lack of manpower which forced them to
human  barricades  of  obstructed  the  Hotel’s  driveway
temporarily cease operations in 3 restaurants.
4. Union’s  Liability  under  the  Law: The dismissal of the Union Officers is
3. Subsequently, the Hotel suspended the Union members, and the Union
upheld but the 61 Union members are reinstated without backwages. Labor
continued the picket. The Hotel then terminated the services of 29 Union
Code Art 264(a), par 3: Any union officer who knowingly participates in an
officers and 61 Union members and suspended many other employees. The
illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in
Union again conducted a strike for unfair labor practice and union-busting,
the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost
where they unlawfully blocked the ingress and egress of Hotel premises.
his employment status. In this case, while firing of Union Officers is
justified,   individual   Union   members   weren’t   proven   to   have   committed  
ISSUE/S: WON the Union conducted an illegal strike – YES.
illegal acts during the strike for them to lose their employment.
RULING: AFFIRMED. Union liable for illegal strike. Union officers
dismissed, 61 Union members reinstated.
 J.B.L REYES v. BAGATSING
November 9, 1983 | Fernando, C. J. | Mandamus with Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction | Freedom of Expression: Protected Speech (Assembly and Petition)
SUMMARY: J.B.L. Reyes files the present petition on behalf of the Anti-Bases
Coalition after their permit to conduct a peaceful march and rally from Luneta to
the U.S. Embassy on Oct. 26, 1983 was not granted. The Court granted the
petition stating that there was no clear and present danger that would justify the
withholding of the permit.
DOCTRINE: Freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less denied,
except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the
state has a right to prevent.
FACTS:
1. JBL Reyes, retired SC Justice, filed the petition on behalf of the Anti-Bases
Coalition after their permit to conduct a peaceful march and rally from
Luneta to the U.S. Embassy on Oct. 26, 1983 from 2-5 PM, to be followed
by a short program, was not granted. The said activity is in connection with
forwarding a petition to the US Ambassador based on the resolution
adopted on the last day of the Intl Conference for General Disarmament,
World Peace and the Removal of All Foreign Military Bases held in Manila.
2. Manila Mayor Ramon Bagatsing denied the permit on the grounds that there
were persistent intelligence reports of criminal and subversive elements that
may infiltrate and disrupt gatherings involving many people. Nonetheless,
he recommended that a permit to rally may still be issued if the rally is to be
held at the Rizal Coliseum or any enclosed area to ensure the safety of the
participants as well as the public. He also cited Ordinance 7295 of the City
of Manila prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or demonstrations
within a radius of 500 feet from any foreign mission or chancery.
ISSUE: WoN a clear and present danger has been sufficiently shown that would
justify the withholding of the granting of the permit to rally – NO
RULING: Petition for mandatory injunction granted.
RATIO:
1. Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for
consultation and discussion of matters of public concern. It is accorded the
utmost deference and respect, and is not to be limited, much less denied,
except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that
the state has a right to prevent. However, what is constitutionally
guaranteed is peaceful assembly, not disorder or tumult attending an
assembly or rally. One may not advocate disorder in the name of protest;
much less preach rebellion under the cloak of dissent.
2. The choice of Luneta and the front of the US Embassy as staging places for
the rally cannot be legally objected to in the absence of a clear and present
danger. Citing the case of Hague v. CIO, it was stated that the use of streets
and parks for communication of views is not absolute, but relative, such that
it may be regulated in the interest of peace and order and the general
comfort and convenience of the public, but may not be abridged or denied.
Also, it is settled law that there is freedom of access as to public places,
especially so as to parks and streets. Their use is not dependent on whether
an individual or a group applies for the permit. If it were, freedom of access
becomes discriminatory access, giving rise to an equal protection question.
3. Furthermore, while the official vested with the power of granting permits
(in this case, the Mayor) is given discretion whether such permits must be
granted, this discretion is not an unregulated one.
The general rule is that while a permit should recognize the right of the
applicants to hold their assembly at a public place of their choice, another
place may be designated by the licensing authority if it be shown that there
is a clear and present danger of a substantive evil if no such change were
made. In this case, mere assertion of subversives and criminals infiltrating
gathering is not sufficient to qualify as a clear and present danger.
4. Ordinance 7295 finds its basis from the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations (1961) w/c provides  that  “The receiving State is under a special duty
to take appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion
or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment
of  its  dignity.”The Philippines is a signatory to the Convention, which, as a
restatement   of   the   “generally   accepted   principles   of   international   law”,  
becomes part of the law of the land under the Constitution.
Even so, absent the showing of the clear and present danger of any intrusion
or damage, or disturbance of the peace of the mission, or impairment of its
dignity, there would be no justification for the denial of the permit insofar
as the terminal point would be the Embassy.
NOTE: (Guidelines on Grant of Permits)
Applicants for permit for an assembly must inform the licensing authority of public
place where and the time it will take place.
If it is a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal
possession is required.
Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official
concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the
permit or to its grant but at another public place.
It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and
present danger test be the standard for the decision reached.
 Applicants must be heard on the matter if the licensing authority is of the view that
there is an imminent and grave danger of substantive evil.
The decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to the applicants at
the earliest opportunity so they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority.
MALABANAN v. RAMENTO
May 21, 1984 | Fernando, C.J. | Review of decision of Ministry of Education
NCR Director | Freedom of Expression: Protected Speech (Assembly and
Petition)
SUMMARY: Petitioners held a rally at a place other than that specified in the
permit granted by the school authorities, causing disturbances in classes and in
non-academic works, to which they were suspended for 1 academic year. SC
held that the penalty was severe. Imposed 1 week suspension.
DOCTRINE: Authority of school officials over the conduct of their students
cannot go so far as to be violative of the right to free speech and assembly.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners, Officers of the Supreme Student Council of Gregorio Araneta
University Foundation sought and were granted by the school authorities a
permit to hold a meeting from 8-12 on Aug 27, 1982. Petitioners, along
with other students, held a general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and
Animal Science 2nd floor lobby, instead of the basketball court as specified
in the permit, where they manifested in vehement language their opposition
to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute
of Agriculture. They marched toward the Life Science Building (not
covered by the permit) and continued on their rally, causing disturbances of
classes, as well as the work of non-academic employees. On the same day,
they were asked to explain why they should not be held liable for illegal
assembly.
2. On Sept 9, 1982, they were informed that they were under a preventive
suspension for failure to explain the holding of an illegal assembly in front
of the Life Science Building.
3. Ramento, Director of NCR, Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports,
found petitioners guilty of the charge of having violated par 146(c) of the
Manual for Private School –holding of illegal assembly for violation of the
permit resulting in the disturbance of classes and oral defamation. They
were suspended for 1 academic year.The Court issued a TRO, enjoining
respondents from enforcing the order of the MECS.
ISSUE/S: WoN the MECS order violates the constitutional rights of peaceable
assembly and free speech of the students – Yes, insofar as the penalty was
excessive.
RULING: Petition GRANTED. Decision of Ramento nullified and set aside.
TRO made permanent.
RATIO:
1. Though it is undeniable that petitioners held a rally at a place other than that
stipulated in the permit and continued on longer than the time allowed, and
that they caused class disturbances and caused the work of non-academic
employees, the penalty of 1 year suspension is out of proportion to their
misdeed.
2. Petitioners are entitled to invoke their rights to peaceable assembly and free
speech – they do not shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate. While the authority of educational
institutions over the conduct of students must be recognized, it cannot go so
far as to violate the constitutional safeguards. However, conduct by the
student which materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder
or invasion of rights of others is not immunized by the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech.
3. Regarding the tenor of the speeches made by the student leaders: The
critical and spiteful utterances made by the leaders are quite understandable.
Student leaders are likely to be assertive and dogmatic and would be
ineffective if, during a rally, they speak in the guarded way. At any rate,
even a sympathetic audience is not disposed to accord full credence to their
utterances. They may applaud the speakers, but with the activity taking
place inside the school premises at day time, no clear and present danger of
public disorder is discernable, without prejudice to disciplinary action.
4. Nevertheless, petitioners cannot be totally absolved of their actions.
Respondents can take disciplinary action, to which an admonition or a
censure would suffice. 1 year suspension is too severe. If the concept of
proportionality of offense committed and sanction imposed is not followed,
and element of arbitrariness intrudes – give rise to a due process question.
Court imposed a 1 week suspension.
5. Guidelines: Utmost leeway is accorded the content of placards or
utterances made. If assembly is to be held in school, permit must be sought
from school authorities who cannot deny such request arbitrarily.
Conditions may be imposed as to avoid disruption of class or work of non-
academic personnel. If there are violations, penalty should not be
disproportioned to the offense.
 BAYAN v. ERMITA
April 25, 2006 | Azcuna, J.| Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus | Freedom of
Expression: Protected Speech (Assembly and Petition)
SUMMARY: Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of BP No. 88, under
which rallies were dispersed, and the Calibrated Pre-Emptive Response policy.
The SC held that BP No. 88 was constitutional as it merely regulated the
exercise  the  right  to  peaceful  assembly,  and  only  to  the  extent  of  the  ‘clear  and   concerted  action  held  in  a  public  place”;;  hence,  it  does  not  cover  any  and  all
present  danger’  test,  but  that  the  CPR  was  unconstitutional.   kinds of gatherings.
DOCTRINE: The right to peaceful assembly and petition is not absolute. The
clear and present danger test provides a recognized exception to said right.
FACTS:
1. The groups in the three separate petitioners (Bayan et al., Jess Prado et al.,
and KMU et al.) all took part in rallies and mass actions which were
dispersed by policemen in September – October 2005. Petitioners assailed
BP No. 880, seeking primarily to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the
“no   permit,   no   rally”   policy   and   the   Calibrated   Pre-Emptive Response
(CPR) policy. They argued that it violated the Constitution and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights
treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory.
ISSUE/S: WoN BP No. 880 is constitutional – YES
WoN CPR is constitutional - NO
RULING: Petitions granted in part. CPR null and void.
RATIO: (Note: Court explicitly stated they applied heightened scrutiny)
1. BP No 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies, but a restriction that
simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. It is content-
neutral, not content-based (i.e. would be biased against mass actions against
the government) and applies to all kinds of public assemblies that would use
public   venues.   The   term   “lawful   cause”   does   not   make   it   content-based
because assemblies really must be for lawful causes, otherwise they would
not  be  “peaceable”  and  entitled  to  protection.  Nor  are  the  words  “opinion”,  
“protesting”   and   “influencing”   to   define   public   assembly   content-based,
since  they  can  refer  to  any  subject.  “Petitioning  the  government  for  redress  
of grievances comes from the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided.
Finally,   “maximum   tolerance”   is   for   the   protection   and   benefit   of   all  
rallyists, independent of the content of the expressions in the rally.
2. The permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to
public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public
health, which is a recognized exception to the exercise of the right to
peaceful assembly and association even under the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
3. The  law  is  not  vague  in  its  provisions.  “Public”  need  not  be  defined  since  its  
ordinary meaning (an organized body of people; a group of people
distinguished by common interests of characteristics) is well-known. Not
every  expression  of  opinion  is  a  public  assembly.  The  law  refers  to  “rally,  
demonstration, march, parade, procession, or any other form of mass or
 
4. The law is not overbroad, since it regulates the exercise of the right to
peaceful assembly and petition only to the extent necessary to avoid a clear
and present danger of substantive evils Congress has the right to prevent.
5. There is no prior restraint since the content of the speech is irrelevant to the
regulation. Moreover, for those who cannot obtain the permit, Sec 15
provides for the creation of freedom parks in every city and municipality,
where no prior permit is needed for peaceful assembly. However, the Court
ruled that no prior permit could be required for the exercise of the right to
public assembly in any city or municipality unless said city or municipality
complied with Sec 15.
6. In view of the maximum tolerance mandated by B.P. No. 880, CPR serves
no valid purpose if it means the same thing as maximum tolerance and is
illegal if it means something else. Accordingly, what is to be followed is
and should be that mandated by the law itself, i.e. maximum tolerance.
7. Situations where mayors do not act on applications for a permit and police
immediately disperse rallies when the rallyists cannot produce a permit on
demand must also be addressed. In such situation, based on maximum
tolerance, rallyists who can show the police an application duly filed on a
given date can, after two days from the same, rally in accordance with their
application without the need to show a permit, with the grant of such permit
presumed under the law. It will then be the burden of the authorities to show
that the application was denied, in which case the rally may be peacefully
dispersed following the maximum tolerance procedure prescribed by law.
 IBP v. ATIENZA
February 24, 2010 | Carpio-Morales, J. | Certiorari | Freedom of Expression:
Protected Speech (Assembly and Petition)
SUMMARY: Mayor Atienza modified the application for a permit to rally
filed by IBP, changing the venue to Plaza Miranda instead of in Mendiola
Bridge, as indicated in the application.
DOCTRINE: Freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less denied,
except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent.
FACTS:
1. IBP filed with the Office of the City Mayor of Manila a letter application
for a permit to rally at the foot of Mendiola Bridge on June 22, 2006 from
2:30-5:30 pm to be participated in by IBP officers and members, law
students and multi-sectoral organizations. Respondent issued a permit but
indicated Plaza Miranda as venue.
2. Petitioners filed for certiorari before CA, but having been unresolved within
24 hrs, filed a petition before SC. The court denied the petition for being
moot and academic, the relief in view of pendency of action in CA, and
MR.
3. The rally pushed through at Mendiola Bridge, after Cadiz discussed with
P/Supt. Paglinawan whose contingent from the Manila Police District
earlier barred petitioners from proceeding thereto. They alleged that the
participants voluntarily dispersed after the program.
4. MPD instituted a criminal action against Cadiz for violating the Public
Assembly Act in staging a rally at a venue not indicated in the permit. Cadiz
filed a Counter-Affidavit.CA ruled that that the petition became moot and
lacked merit, and also denied the MR.
ISSUE/S: WoN   the   modification   in   the   venue   in   IBP’s   rally   permit   constitute  
grave abuse of discretion – YES
RULING: Decision REVERSED.
RATIO:
1. Case became moot and academic, but is capable of repetition yet evading
review – arise each time the terms of an intended rally are altered by the
concerned official, yet it evades review due to limited time in processing
application where the shortest allowable period is 5 days prior to the
assembly.
2. Sec 6 of Public Assembly Act: c) If the mayor is of the view that there is
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial or
modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the applicant who
must be heard on the matter. e) If the mayor or any official acting in his
behalf denies the application or modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the
applicant   may   contest   the   decision   in   an   appropriate   court   of   law.   f)   …   a  
decision granting such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the
applicant shall be immediately executory.
3. Freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a
showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent.
4. The rights to freedom of speech, the press, assembly, and petition for
redress and grievances, while not identical, are inseparable.
5. In objections or modifications in the grant of permits, it is an indispensable
condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger
test be the standard for the decision reached. If the public official concerned
is of the view that such imminent and grave danger exists, the applicants
must be heard on the matter.
6. In modifying the permit outright, respondent gravely abused his discretion
when he did not immediately inform IBP who should have been heard first
on the matter of his perceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive
evil that may warrant the changing of the venue. Respondent failed to
indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit against
said standard test.
7. Although the Mayor is not devoid of discretion in granting permits, such
discretion is not unrestrained. There is an assumption, especially where the
assembly is scheduled for a specific public place that the permit must be for
the assembly being held there. The exercise of such right cannot be
abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.
 GONZALES v COMELEC
April 18, 1969 | Fernando, J. | Declaratory Relief w/ Preliminary Injunction |
Freedom of Expression: Protected Speech (Free Speech and Suffrage)
SUMMARY: Petitioners ask that RA 4880 which prohibits the (too early)
nomination of candidates for election and limits the period of election campaign or
partisan political activity be declared unconstitutional for violating the freedom of
speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and freedom of association.
The court was unable to obtain the 2/3 vote necessary to nullify the act thus RA
4880 could not be declared unconstitutional.
DOCTRINE: Congress has the power, under narrowly drawn legislation, to
impose necessary restrictions on liberties such as the freedom of speech, etc. –
pursuant  to  the  “clear  and  present  danger”  rule  and    the  “dangerous  tendency”  rule.
FACTS
1. Petitioner Cabigao was a City Councilor of the 4 th District of Mania and an
official candidate under the Nacionalista Party for Vice Mayor to which he
was elected. Petitioner Gonzales was a private individual who was a
registered voter in Manila and political official of Cabigao.
2. Petitioners argue that portions of RA 4880 violate their freedoms of
speech, freedom of press, freedom of assembly, and freedom of
association.
3. These portions are: (1) Sec 50-A which prohibits the (too early)
nomination of candidates within 90 days prior to the elections, and (2) Sec
50-B which limits the period of election campaign or partisan political
activity.
4. RA   4880   defined   the   terms   “candidate”,   “election   campaign”,   and   considered   part   of   a   political   campaign”   and   that   nothing   in   the   Act   “shall   be
“partisan   political   activity”.   Likewise,   there   is   a   provision   stating   that   understood to prevent any person from expressing his views on current political
nothing   in   the   Act   “shall   be   understood to prevent any person from
expressing his views on current political problems or issues, or from
mentioning the names of the candidates from public office whom he
supports.”
5. Petitioners  assert  that  “there  is  nothing  in  the  spirit  or  intention  of  the law
that would legally justify its passage and enforcement. They allege further
that the regulation and limitation of political matters through police power
with the absence of clear and present danger would render their
constitutional rights meaningless.
6. Respondent stresses that RA 4880 is an exercise of police power designed
to  ensure  a  free,  orderly,  and  honest  election  by  “regulating  conduct  which   election purposes are restricted and that the prohibition against giving, soliciting,
Congress  has  determined  harmful.”
ISSUE/S: WON RA 4880 should be annulled – NO
RULING: The Court was unable to arrive at the needed 2/3 vote. Thus, the
petition is DISMISSED and the writ of prohibition prayed for is DENIED.
RATIO
1. There are two tests that supply an acceptable criterion for permissible
restriction of constitutional liberties – (1)   the   “clear   and   present   danger”   rule,  
and  (2)  the  “dangerous  tendency”  rule.  In  the  first,  there  must  be  a  danger  or  evil  
of substantive character that the state has the right to prevent in order to justify
the limitation on freedom of expression. This danger must not only be clear (that
there is a causal connection between the evil and the utterance questioned) but
also present (the danger must be imminent, immediate, or inevitable. The
freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom to assemble, and freedom to
association being invoked by the petitioners can be constitutionally limited or
restricted   in   the   presence   of   “clear   and   present   danger”.   In   the   case   at   hand,   it  
cannot be denied that the statute was enacted to address and in response to a
serious substantive danger in the electoral process, not only in danger of
happening, but already in existence and would likely continue unless curbed or
remedied. In fact, the main author of the Act, Sen. Tanada, as amicus curiae,
explained  that  the  provisions   in  the  act  restricting  the  “election  campaign”  and  
“partisan  political  activity”  were  deemed  by  the  legislature  to  be  part  and  parcel  
of the necessary and appropriate response to the existence of a grave and actual
evil of excessive partisanship, dishonesty and corruption, as well as violence
that has marred elections and partisan political activities in the country.
Re: Freedom of Speech and Freedom of the Press
(Minority) The   provision   that   “the   simple   statement   of   opinion   shall   not   be  
 
problems or issues, or from mentioning the names of the candidates from public
office   whom   he   supports”   if   properly   implemented,   as   they   ought   to   be,  
minimizes the bar to free expression feared by the petitioners.
Re: Freedom of Association and Freedom to Assemble
(1) In Sec 50-A – The scope of legitimate activities by political parties are not
unduly narrowed. They can also assemble but not for the purpose of nominating
a candidate.
(2) In Sec 50-B – The Court is of the opinion that no unconstitutional
infringement exists insofar as the formation of organization, associations for
or receiving contribution for such purposes is constitutional. The restriction on
the freedom to assemble was to be decided but the Court concluded it was not
enough to annul RA 4880.

(Majority) However, the majority of the Court views that the prohibition of
actions (speeches, interviews, announcements) in Sec 50-B prohibits the
constitutional right to freedom of expression (speech, assembly) and that, on its
face, the challenged statute must be nullified. In other words, the challenged
statute could have been more narrowly drawn and the practices prohibited more
precisely delineated to satisfy the constitutional requirements as to a valid
limitation under the clear and present danger doctrine.
SANIDAD v. COMELEC
January 29, 1990 | Medialdea, J.| Certiorari | Freedom of Expression: Protected
Speech (Free Speech and Suffrage)
SUMMARY: Petitioner contested a COMELEC resolution preventing media
practitioners from discussing plebiscite issues through their columns, radio or
TV time during the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on
plebiscite day. The Court granted his petition, ruling that there was no basis for
the resolution.
DOCTRINE: Freedom of expression may not be restricted without justifiable
reason.
FACTS:
1. Under RA 6766, the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras would take part in a
plebiscite for the ratification of an Organic Act for the Cordillera
Autonomous Region. The COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2167 to
govern the conduct of said plebiscite.
2. Petitioner  Pablito  Sanidad,  newspaper  columnist  of  the   ‘Overview’  for  the  
‘Baguio   Midland   Courier’,   assailed   the   constitutionality of Sec 19 of the
COMELEC resolution, which prohibited mass media columnists,
commentators, announcers or personalities from using their columns or
radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues
during the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on plebiscite
day. Sanidad alleged that it violated the constitutional guarantee of freedom
of expression and the press. He also maintained that it was a prior restraint
and imposed subsequent punishment for those who violated it, since it
contained a penal provision.
ISSUE/S: WoN the COMELEC resolution violated freedom of the press and
freedom of expression - YES
RULING: Petition granted.
RATIO:
1. Although the limitation imposed by the resolution does not absolutely bar
petitioner’s   freedom   of   expression,   it   is   still   a   restriction   on   his   choice   of  
forum where he may express his view. COMELEC gave no reason to justify
such restriction. This form of regulation is tantamount to restriction of
freedom of expression for no justifiable reason.
2. Plebiscite  issues  are  matters  of  public  concern  and  importance.  The  people’s  
right to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently decide would
be better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the issues. The
people affected by the issues should not be unduly burdened by restrictions
on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised.
3. COMELEC spaces and COMELEC radio time provide a forum for
expression, but do not guarantee full dissemination of information to the
public because they are limited to either specific portions in newspapers or
to specific radio/TV times.
4. The laws cited by COMELEC are not on point as they are relevant to
issuance of permits to franchises and to limiting space and time for public
information and campaigns among candidates. These statutes cannot be
construed to mean that COMELEC has the right to supervise and regulate
the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression
during plebiscite periods, as they are neither franchise holders nor
candidates. In fact, the plebiscite has no candidates. Besides, the evil sought
in prohibiting certain forms of election propaganda (favouring a specific
candidate) does not apply in a plebiscite.
 NATIONAL PRESS CLUB v. COMELEC
March 5, 1992 | Feliciano, J. | Review of COMELEC decision | Freedom of
Expression: Protected Speech (Free Speech and Suffrage)
SUMMARY: Petitioners assailed Sec 11(b) of RA 6646 as violative of freedom
of the press and freedom of speech. The Court considered the constitutional
value of equal access to opportunities to public service and that the restrictive
impact was limited, and held that it was valid.
DOCTRINE: Free speech and free press are not unlimited rights, for they are
not the only important and relevant values, and may be restricted in view of
other values.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners assailed Sec 11(b) of RA 6646 as violative of the freedom of
expression. Said section prohibited certain forms of election propaganda,
including for any newspapers radio, TV station, or other mass media, or any
person making use of the mass media to sell or to give free of charge print
space or air time for campaign or other political purposes except to the
COMELEC as provided under Secs 90 (COMELEC space– allocating all
candidates free and equal space in newspapers) and 92 (COMELEC time–
allocating all candidates free and equal radio and TV time) of BP Blg. 881.
ISSUE/S: WoN Sec 11(b) is unconstitutional - NO
access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as
may  be  defined  by  law”.  
3. Sec   11(b)’s   restrictive   impact   on   freedom   of   speech   and   freedom of the
press is limited in duration since it only applies to election periods, and in
its scope, since it applies only to purchase and sale, including purchase and
sale disguised as donation, of print space and air time for campaign and
other political purposes, i.e. only paid political advertisements of political
candidates, not everything newsworthy related to the candidates or
commentaries or expressions of belief or opinion from the media.
4. In a sense, the listeners and viewers in the Philippines are a   “captive  
audience”,   and   repetitive   political   commercials   when   fed   into   electronic  
media constitute invasions of the privacy of the general electorate. The paid
political advertisements injected into the electronic media and repeated with
mind-deadening frequency are commonly intended and crafted, not to
inform and educate but to condition and manipulate, not to provoke rational
and   objective   appraisal   of   candidate’s   qualifications   or   programs   but   to  
appeal to the non-intellective faculties of the captive and passive audience.
The right of the general listening and viewing public to be free from such
intrusions and their subliminal effects is at least as important as the right of
candidates to advertise themselves through modern electronic media and the
right of media enterprises to maximize their revenues from the marketing of
“packaged”  candidates.

RULING: Petitions dismissed.

RATIO:
1. The legitimacy and importance of the objective of the assailed provision,
which is to equalize rich and poor candidates by preventing the former from
enjoying   the   undue   advantage   of   huge   campaign   “war   chests”,   is  
indisputable. It is also mandated by Art IX (C) (4) of the Constitution,
which expressly authorizes the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of the franchises of permits for the operation of
media of communication and information, for the purpose of equal
opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, and uniform and
reasonable rates of charge for the use of the same, in connection with public
information campaigns and forums among candidates.
2. Free speech and free press are not unlimited rights, for they are not the only
important and relevant values even in the most democratic of polities. In
Philippine society, equality of opportunity to proffer oneself for public
office,  without  regard  to  one’s  financial  resources,  is  clearly  important. Art
II  Sec  26  of  the  Constitution  provides  that  “the  State  shall  guarantee  equal  
 ADIONG v. COMELEC
March 31, 1992 | Gutierrez Jr, J. | Petition for Review | Freedom of Expression:
Protected Speech (Free Speech and Suffrage)
SUMMARY: Adiong assailed the COMELEC's resolution that prohibits the
posting of decals and stickers which are election propaganda, in mobile places
like cars and other moving vehicles. The court held that the prohibition is null
and void.
DOCTRINE: The qualitative significance of freedom of expression arises from
the fact that it is the matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every other
freedom. It is difficult to imagine how the other provisions of the Bill of Rights
and the right to free elections may be guaranteed if the freedom to speak and to
convince or persuade is denied and taken away.
FACTS:
1. On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution 2347. A
portion of the resolution prohibits the posting of decals and stickers which
are election propaganda, in mobile places like cars and other moving
vehicles and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting
areas that it fixes.
2. Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992
elections, assails the COMELEC's Resolution. According to him, such
prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and
Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646. In addition, the petitioner believes
that with the ban on radio, television and print political advertisements, he,
being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave and
irreparable injury with this prohibition. The posting of decals and stickers
on cars and other moving vehicles would be his last medium to inform the
electorate that he is a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections.
Finally, the petitioner states that as of February 22, 1992 (the date of the
petition) he has not received any notice from any of the Election Registrars
in the entire country as to the location of the supposed Comelec Poster
Areas.
ISSUE/S: WoN The COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and stickers
on mobile places whether public or private except in designated areas provided
for by the COMELEC is null and void - YES
RULING: Petition GRANTED. The portion of Section 15(a) of Resolution No.
2347 of the Commission on Elections providing that decals and stickers may be
posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of
Section 21 of the resolution is DECLARED NULL and VOID.
RATIO:
1. The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free
speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). There is no public
interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of restriction involved in this
case. Free speech is accorded the status of a preferred freedom because it is
an indispensable condition of nearly every freedom. It is difficult to imagine
how the other provisions of the Bill of Rights and the right to free elections
may be guaranteed if the freedom to speak and to convince or persuade is
denied and taken away. Too many restrictions will deny people the robust,
uninhibited, and wide open debate, the which is essential for our elections
to truly be free, clean and honest. Although the COMELEC is granted
powers to regulate the conduct of elections, the COMELEC should lean in
favor of freedom as there can be no free and honest elections if in the efforts
to maintain them, the freedom to speak and the right to know are unduly
curtailed.
2. The regulation of election campaign activity may not pass the test of
validity if it is too general in its terms or not limited in time and scope in its
application, if it restricts one's expression of belief in a candidate or one's
opinion of his or her qualifications, if it cuts off the flow of media reporting,
and if the regulatory measure bears no clear and reasonable nexus with the
constitutionally sanctioned objective. The posting of decals and stickers in
mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles does not endanger any
substantial government interest. There is no clear public interest threatened
by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen's
right of free speech and expression. Under the clear and present danger rule
not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly present but the
evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over
one's mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled.
3. Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned
prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the political party. The
regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference
and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him. A
sticker may be furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to
have it placed on his private vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by
the owner, primarily his own and not of anybody else.
4. The prohibition is also void for overbreadth because the restriction as to
where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it
encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in this case is a
privately-owned vehicle. In such a case, the prohibition would not only
deprive the owner who consents to such posting of the decals and stickers
the use of his property but more important, in the process, it would deprive
the citizen of his right to free speech and information. The provisions
 allowing regulations are so loosely worded that they include the posting of
decals or stickers in the privacy of one's living room or bedroom. This is
delegation running riot.
5. The constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate
equal opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies s not
impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles.
Compared to the paramount interest of the State in guaranteeing freedom of
expression, any financial considerations behind the regulation are of
marginal significance. It is to be reiterated that the posting of decals and
stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving vehicles
needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the
citizen becomes crucial in this kind of election propaganda not the financial
resources of the candidate. Whether the candidate is rich and, therefore, can
afford to dole out more decals and stickers or poor and without the means to
spread out the number of decals and stickers is not as important as the right
of the owner to freely express his choice and exercise his right of free
speech.
 ABS-CBN v. COMELEC
January 28, 2000 | Panganiban, J. | Certiorari | Freedom of Expression: Protected
Speech (Free Speech and Suffrage)
SUMMARY: COMELEC banned ABSCBN and others from erecting exit polls
for the 1998 elections arguing that it would cause disruption and confusion among
the populace. SC held that such an abridgement, although it may have legitimate
causes, does not overcome the drastic effect of curtailing the fundamental right of
the people to free speech.
DOCTRINE: In the  exercise  of  police  power,  even  if  the  government’s  purposes   conflicted between freedom of the electorate to know and actions allegedly
are legitimate and substantial, they cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle
fundamental personal liberties, where the end can be more narrowly achieved.
Moreover, interest of the state must outweigh the curtailment of a fundamental
right in order to justify a restriction.
FACTS:
1. COMELEC issued a resolution that approved the issuance of a restraining
order to stop ABSCBN or any other groups from erecting exit polls for the
1998 elections.
2. The resolution was issued upon information that ABSCBN has prepared a
project to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections and to make exit
surveys for President and Vice President, results of which will be
broadcasted immediately.
3. The COMELEC believed that such a project might conflict with the official
COMELEC count as well as the unofficial quick count of NAMFREL
Respondent also argued that the exit surveys indirectly violate the sanctity
of ballots as voters are lured to reveal the contents of the same. Such polls
also were designed to condition the minds of people and cause confusion as
to who are the winners and losers in the election which in turn might result
in violence and anarchy. It was further argued that their only goal in issuing
the resolution is to maintain clean and free elections.
4. Petitioner on the other hand contended that in precipitately and
unqualifiedly restraining the holding and reporting of exit polls, the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion and grossly violated the
petitioner’s  constitutional  rights.
ISSUE: Won the COMELEC resolution banning exit surveys violated the
freedom of speech and of press? - YES
RULING: Petition granted. Resolution by the COMELEC is nullified.
RATIO:
1. An exit poll is a species of electoral survey conducted by qualified
individuals for the purpose of determining the probable result of an election
by confidentially asking randomly selected voters whom they have voted.
The results are announced to the public to give an advance overview of how
the electorate voted.
2. The court has always ruled in favor of freedom of expression, and any
restriction is treated an exemption. To justify a restriction, the promotion of
a substantial government interest must be clearly shown. Furthermore, when
made to assure clean and free elections, the court shall lean in favor of
freedom.
3. In the exercise of   police   power,   even   if   the   government’s   purposes   are  
legitimate and substantial, they cannot be pursued by means that broadly
stifle fundamental personal liberties, where the end can be more narrowly
achieved.
4. In the case at bar, the government has a stake in protecting the fundamental
right to vote and the duty to secure the secrecy of the ballot. However,the
responsibility of ensuring orderly votingdid not outweigh the restriction of
the  people’s  freedom  of  speech.
5. Respondent’s   argument   that   the   exit   polls has the tendency to cause
confusion with the results of COMELEC, which could compromise the
integrity of the electoral process and cause anarchy, thus passing the clear
and present danger test, is untenable. First, the survey result is not meant to
replace the official COMELEC count. It is merely an opinion of the polling
group as to who the general has probably voted for. Second, the assailed
resolution is too broad since its application is without classification as to
whether the polling is disruptive or not. There is no showing that exit polls
cause chaos in voting centers. Moreover, the prohibition incidentally
prevents collection of exit poll data and their use for any purpose. The
valuable information derived from them will remain unknown and can
deprive people of studies on the impact of current events and factors on
voter’s  choices.
6. Conclusively, the interest of the state in reducing disruption is outweighed
by the drastic abridgment of the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the
media and the electorate.
 SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS v. COMELEC RATIO:
May 5, 2001 | Mendoza, J. | Prohibition | Freedom of Expression: Protected 1. As a prior restraint on freedom of speech, expression, and the press, the
Speech (Free Speech and Suffrage) provision is presumed to be invalid. While COMELEC is granted
supervisory power to regulate the enjoyment/utilization of franchise for the
SUMMARY: Section 5.4 of the Fair Election Act prohibits publishing of surveys operation of media of communication under Article IX-C, Sec 4 of the
affecting national candidates (15 days before election) and local candidates (7 Constitution,   such   power   is   limited   to   ensuring   “equal   opportunity,   time,  
days b4 elections). SWS & Manila Standard assail it as a prior restraint to free space,   and   the   right   to   reply”   as   well   as   “uniform   and   reasonable   rates   of  
speech, press, and expression. SC: Unconstitutional for being a direct and total charges   for   the   use   of   such   media   facilities   for   “public information
suppression of a category of protected speech even if only for a limited period; campaigns  and  forums  among  candidates.”
failing 3rd and 4th criterion  of  the  O’Brien  test.   2. O’Brien   Test: A   government   regulation   is   sufficiently   justified   if   (1)   it’s  
DOCTRINE: Prior restraint on election surveys affecting candidates is within  the  Government’s  constitutional  power  (2)  furthers  an  important  and  
unjustifiable, be it by duration/scope. The prohibition may be for a limited time, substantial  gov’t  interest  (3)  gov’t  interest  is  unrelated  to  the  suppression  of  
but the total suppression of a category of speech is direct, absolute,& substantial. free expression (4) incidental restriction on free speech, expression, and
press is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of such interest. In this
FACTS: case, the provision fails the 3rd and 4th criterion.
1. RA 9006 or the Fair Election Act, Section 5.4, prohibits the publishing of 3. Total Suppression of a Category of Expression: Section 5.4 shows a bias
surveys affecting national candidates 15 days before an election and local for a particular subject matter/viewpoint by preferring personal opinion to
candidates 7 days before an election. Election surveys are defined as the statistical results by allowing the former but suppressing all forms of the
measurement of opinions and perceptions of the voters regarding a latter on the very same subject matter. And government has no power to
candidate’s   popularity,   qualifications,   platforms,   or   a   matter   of   public   make content-based restrictions on protected speech, which elections fall
discussion   in   relation   to   the   election,   including   voters’   preference   for   under. In this case, the prior restraint which Section 5.4 imposes on
andidates or publicly discussed issues during the campaign period. protected speech is unjustifiable. The prohibition may be for a limited time,
2. SWS, who wishes to conduct, release, and publish election surveys, and but the curtailment of the right of expression is direct, absolute, and
Manila Standard, who wishes to publish the same, brings this action for substantial. It constitutes a total suppression of a category of speech and is
prohibition to stop COMELEC from enforcing said provision. Petitioners not  made  less  so  just  because  it’s  limited  for  15/7  days  before  an  election.
allege that the provision constitutes a prior restraint without any clear and
present danger to justify such, and that no similar restriction is imposed on Restriction   Greater   than   is   Necessary   to   Further   Gov’t   Interest: Section 5.4
politicians from explaining their opinion or on newspapers or broadcast aims to prevent last-minute pressure on voters, the creation of bandwagon effect,
media from writing and publishing articles concerning political issues up to junking of weak or losing candidates, and resort to the form of election cheating
the day of the election. called   ‘dagdag-bawas’.   Such   interests   can   be   more   narrowly   pursued   by  
3. As defense, COMELEC justifies the restriction by saying that the law has a punishing unlawful acts rather than speech because of apprehension that such
rational connection to its objective – to prevent the debasement of the speech creates the danger of such evils. COMELEC has the power under the
electoral process resulting from manipulated surveys, bandwagon effect, Administrative Code of 1987 to stop any illegal activity, or confiscate, tear
and absence of reply. Also, they allege that such impairment is minimal down, and stop an unlawful, libelous, misleading, or false election propaganda,
since  it’s  restricted  both  in  duration  and  in  scope.   after due notice and hearing. They can confiscate bogus survey results calculated
to   mislead   voters,   candidates   can   have   their   own   surveys   conducted,   and   it’s  
ISSUE/S: WON RA 9006, Sec 5.4 is an unconstitional abridgment of free doubtful if government can do anything with the natural tendency of bandwagon
speech, expression, and press – YES. effect.

RULING: Section 5.4 of RA 9006 unconstitutional.

 PRUNEYARD SHOPPING CENTER v. ROBINS
June 9, 1980 | Rehnquist, J. | Appeal | Freedom of Expression: Protected Speech
(Use  of  Private  Property  as  Forum  for  Other  People’s  Speech)
SUMMARY: Several high school students engaged in a public expressive
activity inside Pruneyard, a privately owned shopping center, which prohibits
such activities. The California Supreme Court favored the students which the US
Supreme Court affirmed.
DOCTRINE: The state may exercise its police power to uphold the fundamental
right to free speech. To strike down the government regulation, it must be shown
that its action has curtailed a very essential right to the prejudice of the contender
and that such regulation can be considered beyond the limitation prescribed by the
constitution.
FACTS:
1. Appellant Pruneyard is a privately owned shopping center that is open to
the public for the purpose of encouraging the patronizing of tis commercial
establishments. It has a policy not to permit any visitor or tenant to engage
in any publicly expressive activity, including the circulation of petitions,
which is not directly related to its commercial purposes.
2. Appellees are high school students who sought to solicit support for their
opposition to a United Nations resolution against Zionism. So they set up a
table  in  a  corner  of  Pruneyard’s  central  courtyard  and  distributed  pamphlets   pamphlets or seeking signatures for a petition thus will not likely be
and asked people to sign petitioners. Their activity was peaceful and orderly
and  was  not  objected  to  by  Pruneyard’s  patrons.  Soon  after,  a  security  guard   by the State to be displayed on appellants' property. There consequently is
informed them that they would have to leave because their activity violated
Pruneyard regulations. The guard suggested they move to the public
sidewalk so appellees left and later filed a lawsuit.
3. Superior court held that appellees were not entitled under either Federal or
California constitution to exercise their asserted rights on the shopping
center property which the California Supreme Court reversed.
ISSUE/S: Won regulation and actions of Pruneyard violated the constitutional
right to exercise free speech? - YES
RULING: California Supreme Court decision is affirmed.
RATIO:
1. The State has the authority to exercise its police power or its sovereign right
to adopt in its own constitution individual liberties more expansive than
those conferred by the Federal Constitution. It is established that the State
may adopt reasonable restrictions on private property so long as the
restrictions do not amount to a taking without just compensation.
2. Appellant contends that his right to exclude others from his property has
been violated when the Supreme Court of California has interpreted the
State Constitution to entitle its citizens to exercise free expression. This
allegedly is tantamount to a taking of his property, but it is well known that
not every destruction or injury to property by governmental actions has
been held to be a taking in the constitutional sense. In this case, there is
nothing to suggest that preventing appellant from prohibiting the appellees
activity will unreasonably impair the value or use of their property as a
shopping center. The decision of the California Supreme Court makes it
clear that the Pruneyard may restrict expressive activityby adopting time,
place and manner regulations that will minimize interference with its
commercial function, but not prohibiting expression all in all. Appellants
failed to demonstrate that their right to exclude others is so essential to the
use or economic value of their property that the state-authorized limitation
has exceeded its boundaries.
3. Appellants finally contend that a private property owner has a First
Amendment right not to be forced by the State to use his property as a
forum for the speech of others. Here, by contrast, there are a number of
distinguishing factors. Most important, the shopping center, by choice of its
owner, is not limited to the personal use of appellants. It is instead a
business establishment that is open to the public to come and go as they
please. The views expressed by members of the public in passing out
identified with those of the owner. Second, no specific message is dictated
no danger of governmental discrimination for or against a particular
message. Finally, appellants can expressly disavow any connection with the
message by simply posting signs in the area where the speakers stand.
 POLICARPIO v. MANILA TIMES
May 30, 1962 | Concepcion, J. | Appeal from CFI decision | Freedom of RATIO:
Expression: Unprotected Speech (Defamatory Speech) 1. Plaintiff Presented in Unfavorable Light The mistake on who filed the
complaint in the Aug 11 article and omitting the small number of stencils/
SUMMARY: Policarpio sues Manila Times as publisher, for 2 news items amount  involved  presented  Policarpio  in  an  unfavorable  light.   It’s  obvious  
covering the malversation and estafa charges against her which she alleged that if another agency of the Government filed the criminal complaint,
presented her in an unfavorable light and omitted/made mistakes on key details. accused would look guiltier than if the complaint was filed by a begrudged
SC: Entitled to damages. former subordinate who got fired. And prior to the publishing of the article
DOCTRINE: To enjoy immunity, a publication containing derogatory the   defendant   could’ve   ascertained   the   details   on   the   number   of   stencils/  
information must be true, fair, made in good faith, and w/o comments or remarks. amount involved from the witnesses, contrary to their claim that they had no
way of knowing. Also, the amount/value of property embezzled in estafa is
FACTS: material to the offense since the penalty partly depends on such.
1. Plaintiff Lumen Policarpio, member of the Philippine Bar and the Executive 2. ‘True   &   Fair’   Requirement:   Presenting news items in a sensational
Secretary of the local UNESCO National Commission, filed charges against manner is not per se illegal; newspapers must enjoy a certain degree of
her subordinate Reyes, causing her to be dismissed. In turn, Reyes filed discretion in determining manner in presenting an event to the public and
counter-charges which were referred to a Special Investigator Alba in the the importance to be attached to it. Newspapers may publish news items
Office of the President. While the administrative investigation was pending, relative to judicial/legislative/official proceedings, which are official and
Reyes filed a complaint against Policarpio for malversation of public funds non-confidential, since the public is entitled to know the truth about it. But
& estafa through falsification of public documents. to enjoy immunity, a publication containing derogatory information must be
2. On August 11, The Saturday Mirror published an article with the plaintiff’s   true, fair, made in good faith, and without comments or remarks.
picture  on  its  front  page  entitled  “WOMAN  OFFICIAL  SUED”.  Its  subtitle,   3. Defamatory Imputations Presumed Malicious: Defendants assert that
which   was   not   true   was   “PCAP   RAPS   L.POLICARPIO   ON   FRAUD”.   their alleged malice in publishing the news   items   wasn’t   established   by  
Similarly,   the   statement   in   the   article’s   1st paragraph, to the effect that Policarpio.   But   under   RPC   Art   354,   “Every defamatory imputation is
plaintiff  “was  charged  with  malversation and estafa in complaints filed with presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and
the   city   fiscal’s   office   by   the   Presidential   Complaint   and   Action   justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the ff. cases: (1) private
Commission  (PCAC)”,  is  false  since  the  complaints  were  filed  by  Reyes.  It   communication made by any person to another in the performance of any
was   also   not   true   that   said   “criminal   action   was   initiated   as   a   result   of   legal, moral, or social duty; and (2) a fair and true report, made in good
current  administrative  investigation”.  A  similar  article  was  published  in  the   faith without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other
Daily Mirror on August 13, 1956. official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any
3. Now, plaintiff seeks to recover from Manila Times, the author, and editors, statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other
P150k as actual damages + moral, exemplary, etc. for the 2 published act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
articles which she claims to be per se defamatory, libelous, and false, 4. In this case, the August 11 article contained information derogatory to the
exposing her to ridicule, jeopardized her good name and business, causing plaintiff and presented her in a worse predicament than that in which she in
her grave embarrassment, anguish, incalculable damages. She claims that fact  was.  It  wasn’t  a  fair  and  true  report  of  the  proceedings  alluded  to,  and  
the false statements (that PCAC filed the case, not Reyes) gave the general the   subtitle   “PCAC   RAPS   L.   POLICARPIO   ON   FRAUD”   is   false   and   a  
impression that she was most likely guilty of the crimes and that the comment or remark. Hence, such remarks are presumed malicious. And the
omission of details on the number of stencils involved for the malversation mistake in saying that PCAC was the one who filed the case would either
charge (only 18-20) and alleged misappropriated sum (only P54) conveyed make the publication actually malicious (if they knew) or negligent (if they
that the offenses imputed to her were more serious than they really were. didn’t),  which  would  still  make  them  liable  either  way.  
5. Rectification only Mitigating: Their rectifying this mistake in the August
ISSUE/S: WON Policarpio is entitled to damages for the 2 articles – YES. 13   article   and   including   the   number   of   stencils   involved   doesn’t   wipe   out  
their  responsibility  from  the  August  11  article,  although  it’s  mitigating.
RULING: REVERSED.  P3k  moral  damages,  P2k  attorney’s  fees,  +  costs
 EUGENIO LOPEZ v. CA
July 31, 1970 | Fernando, J. | Appeal by Certiorari | Freedom of Expression:
Unprotected Speech (Defamatory Speech)
SUMMARY: Fidel G. Cruz sued Lopez (publisher) and Gatbonton (editor) after
the Manila Chronicle erroneously published his photo as that of another Fidel
Cruz who was the author of a hoax. The SC held that the erroneous publication
was actionable for libel but the timely correction by the magazine will entitle
Lopez and Gatbonton to mitigation of damages to be paid.
DOCTRINE: Pressure of deadline is not a defense in libelous publication in a
weekly magazine. Retraction will not extinguish liability for the libelous
publication but may provide justification for mitigation of damages to be paid
FACTS:
1. The Manila Chronicle published an article wherein a sanitary inspector
named Fidel Cruz assigned to the Babuyan Islands sent a distress signal to a
passing U.S. Airforce plane which in turn relayed message to Manila. Later,
an American Army plane dropped an emergency kit (including a two-way
radio) on the beach of the island. Through this, he communicated to Manila
that there was a series of killings happening in the island.
2. As a response, the Phil. government sent a group of scout rangers to the
island led by Major Wilfredo Encarnacion. They found out that there were
no killers on the island and that Fidel Cruz merely wanted to be transported
home to Manila.
3. On two occasions (Jan. 13, 1956 with a Year End Quiz and Jan. 15, 1956
issue), the Manila Chronicle published articles with regard to the hoax
perpetrated by Fidel Cruz, with a photo supposedly of Cruz. It turns out,
however, that the photo they attached was the photo of Fidel G. Cruz,
former Mayor of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, businessman and contractor. The
Manila Chronicle had photos of both persons which were on file in
accordance with the standard procedure observed in other newspaper
offices, and were inadvertently switched in the course of the preparation of
the newspaper format. Necessary corrections were made when the error was
brought  to  petitioners’  attention,  stating  as  reason  for  the  error  the  pressure   publication but may provide justification for mitigation of damages to be
to meet the publishing deadlines.
4. Fidel Cruz sued Eugenio Lopez (Manila Chronicle publisher) and Juan
Gatbonton (editor) for recovery of damages arising from the defamatory
nature of the publication, w/c the TC granted and the CA affirmed.
ISSUE/S: WoN petitioners are liable for damages for libelous publication –
YES (but mitigated due to retraction)
RULING: CA decision modified as to award of damages.
RATIO:
1. The  erroneous  publication  of  Fidel  G.  Cruz’s  photo  as  the  author  of  a  hoax  
is  basis  for  an  action  for  libel.  Newell  states  that  “Publication  of  a  person’s  
photograph in connection with an article libelous of a third person is a libel
on the person whose picture is published, where the acts set out in the
article  are  imputed  to  such  person.”  This  proposition  has  been  supported  by  
several cases.
2. Hale: The civil aspect of libel deals with the award of damages as a redress
for   a   personal   wrong   when   a   person’s   good   reputation   has   been   impaired.  
On the other hand, publication of defamatory statements tends strongly to
induce breach of the peace by the person defamed, and it is in the interest of
the state that peace is maintained to the extent that the offender committing
libel is penalized with fine or imprisonment.
3. It was held that when man publishes, he does so at his own peril. Libel on
its face is harmful. The usual principles of tort will make him liable if the
statements are false, or are true only of someone else, if one publishes
manifestly hurtful statements concerning an individual without any
justification other than for advertisement or a piece of news. However, it
must be noted that in safeguarding the interest of the party allegedly
offended, the judiciary must not also ignore the obligation of a news media
to disseminate information of a public character, to provide comment
thereon as well as the conditions attendant on the business of publishing. No
encroachments to press freedom should be allowed in the guise of a
punitive action inflicted on what otherwise would be characterized as libel.
4. Pressure of deadline is not a defense in libelous publication in a weekly
magazine. While a newspaper should not be held to account for honest
mistakes owing to pressure of a daily deadline, there is no such pressure to
meet, and no occasion to act with haste in a weekly magazine. Furthermore,
there is the added requirement of reasonable care imposed, which in this
case was not satisfied.
5. Even so, the correction promptly made by the Manila Chronicle, which has
the force of retraction, will not extinguish their liability for the libelous
paid.
DISSENTING OPINION (Dizon , J.)
- For liability in damages to arise from an alleged libelous publication,
without offending press freedom, there is need to prove that the publication
was made with actual malice, that is, with the knowledge of its falsity or
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not (New York Times v.
Sullivan; Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts). In this case, actual malice was not
 proven such that petitioners were aware of the false imputation to Cruz and
that they disregarded the truth when they published the same.
- Similarly, liability based on tort is also not justified since the hoax ascribed
to Cruz did not impute to him immorality or moral turpitude. At most,
petitioners or their subordinates only committed excusable negligence.
NEW YORK TIMES v. SULLIVAN
March 9, 1964 | Brennan, J. | Certiorari | Freedom of Expression: Unprotected
Speech (Defamatory Speech)
statements that reflect upon the agency of which he is in charge. Once libel
per se is established, malice & legal injury is presumed to exist unless the
speaker can fully prove that the speech was true on all counts. Good
motives   and   belief   in   truth   doesn’t   overturn   the   presumption.   In   this   case,  
the ad was found to be libelous per se without Sullivan proving actual
damages to himself, the defense claiming that the ad was truthful was
unavailable since the ad contained factual errors, and he got $500k.
ISSUE/S: WON   Alabama’s   libel   law   infringes   freedom   of   speech   &   press   –
YES.

SUMMARY: City Commissioner Sullivan files a civil libel suit against NY RULING: REVERSED & REMANDED. No actual malice proved.
Times for an ad that allegedly criticized him as a public officer. The ad, which
was false at some points, claimed that the police arrested Martin Luther King Jr. RATIO:
several times to destroy King’s  black  movement  and  imputed  actions  against  civil   1. Paid Ads Covered by Free Speech Protection: A civil suit is still subject
rights   protestors   to   the   police.   Alabama’s   libel   laws   rewarded   damages.   SC:   to the 14th Amendment. Also, expression does not lose constitutional
Alabama’s  libel  laws  infringe  on  free  speech/press.  No  damages  rewarded.   protection  just  because  it’s  a  paid  advertisement.  The  ad  here  communicated  
DOCTRINE:Actual malice standard – To recover damages in a defamation/libel information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed
suit, plaintiff must prove that the publisher/speaker knew that the statement was abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose
false or acted in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity. existence and objectives are matters of the highest public interest and
concern. That NY Times got paid for publishing the ad is immaterial.
FACTS: 2. The present advertisement, as an expression of grievance and protest on one
1. The New York Times published a full-page  ad  entitled  “Heed  Their  Rising   of the major public issues of our time, clearly qualifies for constitutional
Voices”  seeking to solicit funds to defend Martin Luther King Jr. to defend protection. Public discussion is a political duty long-recognized by the
him against an Alabama perjury indictment. The ad alleged that the Government. The question is whether it forfeits that protection by the falsity
Montgomery,  Albama  police’s  arrest  of  the  Rev.  Martin  Luther  King,  Jr.  for   of some of its factual statements and by its alleged defamation of Sullivan.
perjury was part of a campaign to destroy King's efforts to integrate public 3. On Errors and Damages to Reputation: Erroneous statements are
facilities and encourage blacks to vote. Ad says that the police arrested King inevitable in free debate, and it must be protected if free speech is to have
7 times even if it was only 4 times. The ad also described/ criticized alleged “breathing   space”   to   survive.   Likewise,   injury   to   someone’s   official  
police actions against civil rights protesters (such as padlocking them in the reputation   doesn’t warrant the repression of speech. And if neither factual
school, etc), some of which were false. error nor defamatory content suffices to remove the constitutional shield
2. Despite not being explicitly mentioned in the ad, Montgomery city from criticism of official conduct, the combination of the two is likewise
commissioner Sullivan filed a libel action against NY Times and 4 black inadequate to support the suppression of speech.
ministers who were listed as endorsers of the ad, claiming that the 4. Alabama’s  Civil  Libel  Law  Suppresses  Free  Speech: A rule such as this
allegations against the Montgomery police defamed him personally since one which compels the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all
one of his duties included supervision of the police department. The NY his factual assertions, lest he be punished with unlimited and exorbitant
Times   refused   to   retract   the   ad,   saying   that   they   didn’t   think   any   of   the   libel  judgments,  amounts  to  “self-censorship”.  And  imposing  the  burden  of  
language therein referred to Sullivan. truth on the speaker may deter not just false speech but even true ones.
3. Under Alabama Law, as applied in this case, a publication is libelous per se Under such a rule, would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from
if the words are such as to injure him/impute misconduct in his public voicing  their  criticism  even  though  it’s  believed  or/and  in  fact true, because
office.  It  must  be  shown  that  speech  was  “of  and  concerning”  the  plaintiff.   of the doubt on WON it can be proved in court and fear of the expense of
If the plaintiff is a public official, his place in the government hierarchy is having to do so. Hence, it dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public
sufficient evidence to show that his reputation has been affected by debate and infringes upon free speech and press.
5. The Actual Malice Standard: The constitutional guarantees require a
federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that
the statement was made with actual malice – that is, with knowledge that it
was false or with reckless disregard of WON it was false. In this case,
Sullivan fails to prove actual malice.
ROSENBLOOM v. METROMEDIA
June 7, 1971 | Brennan, J. | Freedom of Expression: Unprotected Speech
(Defamatory Speech)
SUMMARY: Metromedia’s   WIP   broadcasted   about   Rosenbloom’s   arrest  
concerning the seizure of his magazines, which they reported as obscene
without   adding   “allegedly/reportedly”.   SC,   in   affirming   CA,   upheld   the  
freedom of the press since the broadcast concerns public interest.
DOCTRINE: Constitutional protection extends to all communication and
discussion involving matters of public or general concern, without regard to
whether the persons involved are famous or anonymous.
FACTS:
1. 1963: The Special Investigations Squad of Philadelphia PD purchased
various magazines from more than 20 newsstands in relation to the
enforcement   of   the   city’s   obscenity   laws.   George   Rosenbloom,   a   importance to the community.
distributor of nudist magazines, arrived at one newsstand to deliver some
of his magazines while an arrest was being conducted, and was
immediately apprehended along with the newsboy. The police obtained a
warrant to search his home and warehouse, and seized the inventory of
magazines and books found therein. Petitioner, who had been released on
bail, surrendered and was arrested for a 2nd time (poor guy).
2. Captain Ferguson of the PPD, telephoned local radio stations and
newspapers to inform them of the raid and of the arrest of petitioner.
Metromedia’s   WIP   broadcasted   about   said   seizure   and   arrest   (no
“allegedly/reportedly”  qualifying  “obscene”). When it was broadcasted for
a 3rd time, WIP corrected the 3rd sentence   to   read   “reportedly   obscene”.   lives while private individuals kept theirs shrouded is but a legal fiction.
The amended item was broadcasted 5 more times.
3. Petitioner filed an action praying for injunctive relief prohibiting further
police interference and publicity of the earlier arrests. WIP again reported
about the lawsuit, none of which mentioned petitioner by name.
4. Petitioner was acquitted of the criminal obscenity charges. He then filed a
diversity action alleging   that   WIP’s   unqualified   characterization   of   the   Allowing private individuals to obtain damage judgments (determined by
books seized as obscene constituted libel per se and was proved false by
his   acquittal,   and   that   the   characterization   of   petitioner   as   “smut  
distributor”  and  “girlie-book  peddler”  was  false  and  defamatory.
5. Petitioner’s  argument:  1)  Public  figures  have  more  access  to  the  media  to  
counter the defamatory material, and they assumed the risk of defamation
by thrusting themselves into the public arena, unlike the private individual;
2) The important values served by the law of defamation in preventing and
redressing attacks upon reputation.
6. Respondent:   matter   of   public   interest,   reports   were   “hot”   news   written  
under deadline pressure.
ISSUE/S: WoN  NYT’s  “knowing  or  reckless  falsity  standard”  applies  in  a  libel  
action brought by a private individual for a defamatory falsehood uttered in a
broadcast involving an event of public or general interest – YES.
RULING: AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
1. The 1st Amendment extends to a myriad of matters of public interest.
Debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open.
(OMG. Sexual innuendo. haha) If a matter is a subject of public or general
interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private
individual   is   involved.   The   public’s   primary   interest   is   not   whether an
individual is well-known or private, but if the information is of interest and
2. The NYT standard – that the defamatory falsehood must be uttered with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not – was  applied  to  give  effect  to  the  Amendment’s  function  to  
encourage ventilation of public issues, not because the public official has
any less interest in protecting his reputation than a private individual.
3. Argument 1: Public and private individuals have the same ability to
respond:  depends  on  media’s  continuing  interest  in  the  story.  The  solution  
lies  in  ensuring  the  private  citizens’  ability  to  respond,  not  in  the  stifling  of  
public discussion of matters of public concern. Also, we are   all   “public”  
men to some degree. The idea that public figures voluntarily exposed their
Argument 2: libel  law  protects  the  person’s  desire  to  preserve  his  privacy  
and his reputation. In this case, privacy does not apply: involved in a public
matter. Reputation applies but such interest yields to other important social
goals.
4. Publishers   should   be   allowed   “breathing   space”   in   their   pursuit   of   truth.  
jury) because a publisher failed to use reasonable care would lead to self-
 censorship  for   fear  of   guessing   how  a   jury   might  assess   “reasonableness”   violated his right to privacy. Petitioners contended that the project would
wrongly, thus, creating the danger of deterring legitimate utterance as well. not involve the private life of JPE or his family, and that a preliminary
5. Petitioner failed to prove actual malice on the part of Metromedia: timely injunction would be a prior restraint on their right of free expression.
correction of error, information was supplied by police officials, checked
with the judge presiding over the case involving the last report following ISSUE/S:
petitioner’s  complaint. 1. WoN the injunction would violate the right to free expression – YES
2. WoN JPE may enjoin production based on the right to privacy – NO
Standard used in TC: conditional privilege of media may be defeated by want of
reasonable care and diligence to ascertain the truth. Rosenbloom: reckless RULING: Petitions granted. TRO modified. Judge required to dismiss the case
disregard for truth or malicious intent. However, Rosenbloom was abandoned – and set aside and dissolve his TRO and any preliminary injunction.
can recover for libel damages without using New York Times standard.
RATIO:
1. The freedom to film, produce and exhibit motion pictures is included in
freedom of speech and expression, and such freedom is available to both
AYER PRODUCTION v. JUDGE CAPULONG locally-owned and foreign-owned motion picture companies. That the
April 29, 1988 | Feliciano, J. | Petition to Review | Freedom of Expression: production of films is a commercial activity expected to yield profits does
Unprotected Speech (Defamatory Speech) not disqualify it from availing of freedom of speech and expression.
2. The right to privacy, like the right of free expression, is not an absolute
SUMMARY: Juan Ponce Enrile sought to enjoin the production of a film on right.  A  limited  intrusion  into  a  person’s  privacy  is  permissible  where  that  
People Power, claiming it would violate his right to privacy. The Court held that person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him
the right to privacy was subject to limitation, that he was a public figure and or to be published about him is public in character. The right of privacy
therefore had a narrower right  to  privacy  than  an  ordinary  citizen’s,  and  that  it   cannot be invoked to resist publication and dissemination of matters of
would   constitute   a   prior   restraint   to   enjoin   the   film’s   production   without   public interest. The interest which the right to privacy seeks to protect is the
knowing its contents. right to be free from unwarranted publicity, wrongful publicizing of private
DOCTRINE:   A  limited  intrusion  into  a   person’s  privacy  is  permissible   where   affairs and activities of an individual which are outside the realm of
that person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him legitimate public concern.
or to be published about him is public in character. 3. Whether   the   ‘balancing   of   interests’   test   or   the   ‘clear   and   present   danger’  
test is applied in the instant case, the Court believes that the production of
FACTS: ‘The   Four   Day   Revolution   does   not   constitute   an   unlawful   intrusion   upon  
1. Petitioner Hal McElroy and his film production company Ayer Productions JPE’s   right   to   privacy.   At   the   outset,   it   may   be   observed   that   what   is  
Pty.  Ltd.  Intended  to  film  a   motion  picture   on  People  Power  entitled  “The involved  is  a  prior  and  direct  restraint  upon  petitioners’  exercise  of  speech  
Four   Day   Revolution”.   McElroy   wrote   to   private   respondent   Juan   Ponce   and expression, upon which there is a weighty presumption of invalidity.
Enrile enclosing a synopsis of the film, which was to be a 6-hr mini-series The project was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any
in docu-drama style. audience. Neither private respondent nor the respondent judge knew what
2. JPE replied that he would not approve the use, appropriation, reproduction the completed film would precisely look like. There was, in other words, no
and/or exhibition of his name or picture, or that of any member of his "clear and present danger" of any violation of any right to privacy that
family in any cinema or television production, film or other medium for private respondent could lawfully assert.
advertising or commercial exploitation. He further advised them that no 4. The  film’s  subject  matter  is  about  the  events  of  People  Power  and  the  events  
reference whatsoever should be made to him or any member of his family in surrounding it, and is clearly a matter of public interest and concern, and
said film or similar film, much less any matter purely personal to them. even international interest. It does not relate to individual life and certainly
3. Petitioners   acceded   to   this   demand   and   JPE’s   name   was   deleted   from   the   not  JPE’s  private  life.  It  is  not  principally  about  nor  focused  upon  JPE,  but  
script. They proceeded to film the project. However, on 23 Feb 1988, JPE it is compelled, if it is to be historical, to refer to the role he played in the
filed for a TRO seeking to enjoin petitioners from producing the film, events of the change of government in February 1986. The extent of the
alleging that their production without his consent and over his objection
 intrusion   upon  JPE’s  private   life   entailed  by  the  production  and  exhibition  
of film would therefore be limited in character, and may be generally
described as such intrusion as is reasonably necessary to keep that film a
truthful historical account. JPE does not claim that petitioners threatened to
depict in "The Four Day Revolution" any part of his or any member of his
family’s  private  life. To the extent that the film limits itself in portraying the
participation of Enrile in the EDSA Revolution to those events which are
directly and reasonably related to the public facts of the EDSA Revolution,
the intrusion into his privacy cannot be regarded as unreasonable and
actionable. Such portrayal may be carried out even without a license from
him.
5. JPE is a public figure precisely because of his participation as a principal
actor in the culminating events of the change of government in Feb 1986.
Because his participation was major in character, a film re-enactment of the
events without referencing the role he played would be grossly unhistorical.
A   public   figure’s   right   to   privacy   is   necessarily   narrower   than   that   of   an  
ordinary citizen. JPE has not retired into the seclusion of simple private
citizenship and continues to be a public figure as a Senator.

“A public figure has been defined as a person who, by his accomplishments,

fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the
public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character, has
become a 'public personage.' He is, in other words, a celebrity. Obviously to be
included in this category are those who have achieved some degree of reputation
by appearing before the public, as in the case of an actor, a professional baseball
player, a pugilist, or any other entertainment. The list is, however, broader than
this. It includes public officers, famous inventors and explorers, war heroes and
even ordinary soldiers, an infant prodigy, and no less a personage than the
Grand Exalted Ruler of a lodge. It includes, in short, anyone who has arrived at
a position where public attention is focused upon him as a person.”  (Prosser  and  
Keaton)
 SOLIVEN v. MAKASIAR
November 14, 1988 | Per Curiam | Resolution (Certiorari and Prohibition) |
Freedom of Expression: Unprotected Speech (Defamatory Speech)
SUMMARY: Beltran wrote that Cory hid under her bed during the 1987 coup
attempt. She filed a suit for libel and SC held that she had a right to do so.
DOCTRINE: WoN a communication is privileged, w/c is a valid defense to the
charge of libel, must be established at trial.
FACTS:
1. Louie Beltran was a columnist in a paper and he wrote that Pres. Aquino hid
under her bed during the 1987 coup attempt. Maximo Soliven, his EIC, and
several others, were prosecuted with him for libel. Pres. Aquino herself
filed the complaint-affidavit.
2. Beltran argues that he was denied due process because the RTC judge
issued a warrant of arrest w/o personally examining the complainant. He
also contends that presidential immunity from suit imposes a correlative
disability to file suit; else it would indirectly defeat her privilege through
exposure to possible contempt of court or perjury.
ISSUE/S:
1. WoN Beltran was denied due process—NO
2. WoN he may be sued by the president—YES
3. WoN Beltran can be held liable for libel—TC
RULING: Petition DISMISSED.
RATIO:
1. The constitution (in the right to be secure in their persons and no warrant
shall issue except upon probable cause) does not require that the judge
personally examine the complainant and witnesses, but that he merely
examines the report and supporting documents submitted by the fiscal
regarding the existence of probable cause.
2. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity
from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free
from any hindrance or distraction. But this privilege of immunity from suit,
pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by
the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf as
defense. The president may waive the immunity as part of her prerogatives.
3. Beltran contends that he could not be held liable for libel because of the
privileged character or the publication. SC held that it is not a trier of facts
and that such a defense is best left to the trial court to appreciate after
receiving the evidence of the parties. As to Beltran's claim that to allow the
libel case to proceed would produce a chilling effect on press freedom, the
Court found no basis at this stage to rule on the point.
Gutierrez, CONCURRING:
1. Gutierrez   questions   the   Court’s   resolution   in   not   addressing   the   issue   of  
chilling effect on press freedom. There is always bound to be harassment in
any criminal prosecution. Where the harassment goes beyond the usual
difficulties encountered by any accused and results in an unwillingness of
media to freely criticize government or to question government handling of
sensitive issues and public affairs, this Court and not a lower tribunal
should draw the demarcation line.
2. This case is an unusual situation where the complainant is the highest
official of the Republic against a newspaper columnist. It is from these
circumstances that a Court must determine whether speech is libelous. Fact
of the matter is, high official positions, instead of affording immunity from
slander and libel, would actually invite attacks; thus, what would ordinarily
be slander if directed to a typical person might just be an honest criticism
against the high official.
3. A prosecution for libel should not be allowed to continue, where after
discounting the possibility that the words may not be really that libelous,
there is likely to be a chilling effect, a patently inhibiting factor on the
willingness of newspapermen, especially editors and publishers to
courageously perform their critical role in society.
4. Ordinarily, libel is not protected by the free speech clause; but some
provocative words, which if taken literally may appear to shame or
disparage a public figure, may actually be intended to provoke debate on
public issues when uttered or written by a media personality. It is here that
a chilling effect produced by threat of prosecution must not be permitted.
 CHAPLINSKY v. NEW HAMPSHIRE ISSUE/S: WoN the law is unconstitutional for violating freedom of speech -
March 9, 1942 | Murphy, J. | Freedom of Expression: Unprotected Speech NO
(“Fighting  Words”)
RULING: Judgment affirmed.
SUMMARY: Chaplinsky  called  the  City  Marshal  “a  damned  racketeer”  and  “a  
damned   Fascist”.   He   was   charged   for   violating   Chapter   378   Sec   2   of   New   RATIO:
Hampshire’s  Public   Laws.   He   claimed  that  the   statute   was  unconstitutional   for  
violating freedom of speech. The Court held that the statute was constitutional 1. Only an attack on the basis of free speech is warranted, since it is the
as it punished specific conduct within the domain of state power, i.e. the use in a spoken, not the written word that is involved, and cursing a public officer is
public place of words likely to cause a breach of the peace. not an exercise of religion.
DOCTRINE: Fighting words are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, 2. The right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all
and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit they give is circumstances. There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality, and thus may be of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought
prohibited or punished. to raise any constitutional problem, i.e. those which, by their very utterance,
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. These are
no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social
FACTS:
value as a step to truth that any benefit they give is clearly outweighed by
1. Appellant Chaplinsky,  a  Jehovah’s  Witness,  was  convicted for violation of
the social interest in order and morality.
Chapter 378 Sec 2 of the Public Laws of New Hampshire: "No person shall
3. The statute has two provisions, which are distinct and severable. The first
address any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other person who is
relates to words or names addressed to another in a public place, and the
lawfully in any street or other public place, nor call him by any offensive or
second to noises and exclamations. The Court limited their consideration to
derisive name, nor make any noise or exclamation in his presence and
the  first  and  held  that  the  statute’s  purpose  was to preserve public peace, no
hearing with intent to deride, offend or annoy him, or to prevent him from
words  being  forbidden  “except  such  as  have  a  direct  tendency  to  cause  acts  
pursuing his lawful business or occupation."
of violence by the persons to whom, individually, the remark is addressed."
2. Appellant   was   distributing   his   sect’s   literature   on   the   streets.   Members   of  
4. The   word   ‘offensive’   is   subject   to   the   test   of   what   men   of   common  
the local citizenry complained that to the City Marshal Bowering that
intelligence would understand would be words likely to cause an average
Chaplinsky  was  denouncing  all  religion  as  a  “racket”.  Bowering  told  them  
addressee to fight, i.e. fighting words. The statute, thus construed, does no
Chaplinsky was lawfully engaged, then warned appellant that the crowd
more than prohibit face-to-face words plainly likely to cause a breach of the
was getting restless. A disturbance later occurred, and the traffic officer on
peace by the addressee, words whose speaking constitutes a breach of the
duty at the intersection started with Chaplinsky for the police station, but
peace by the speaker. Thus construed, the statute does not contravene the
did not inform him that he was under arrest or going to be arrested. On the
Constitution. It is narrowly drawn and limited to define and punish specific
way, they encountered Bowering, who had been advised that a riot was
conduct within the domain of state power, the use in a public place of words
underway and was thus hurrying to the scene. Bowering repeated his earlier
likely to cause a breach of the peace.
warning   to   appellant.   Appellant   then   said   to   Bowering,   “You   are   a   God  
5. Argument is unnecessary to demonstrate that "damned racketeer" and
damned   racketeer”   and   “a   damned   Fascist   and   the   whole   government   of  
"damned Fascist" are epithets likely to provoke the average person to
Rochester are Fascists or agents of Fascists”,   on   the   public   sidewalk   near  
retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace.
the entrance of City Hall.
(Note:  appellant’s  version  is  that   when  he   met  Bowering,   he  asked   him  to  
arrest the ones responsible for the disturbance, and Bowering cursed him
and told him to come along. But he admitted saying the words charged, with
the  exception  of  using  God’s  name.)
3. Appellant contended that the statute was unconstitutional for placing an
unreasonable restraint on freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and
freedom of worship, and because it was vague and indefinite.
 COHEN v. CALIFORNIA
June 7, 1971 | Harlan, J. | Freedom of Expression: Unprotected Speech
(“Fighting  Words”)
SUMMARY: Cohen was convicted for violating a California law which prohibits
maliciously and willfully disturbing peace by offensive conduct, for wearing a
jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" in the LA Courthouse. The US SC
reversed   the   decision   and   held   that   Cohen's   action   was   more   “speech”   than  
“conduct”  and  that  such  speech  was  protected by the Constitution.
DOCTRINE: Absent a more particularized and compelling reason for its actions,
the State may not make the public display of a four-letter expletive a criminal
offense. Emotive speech that seeks to get attention is protected by the Constitution.
FACTS:
1. On April 26, 1968, Paul Robert Cohen was arrested in the L.A. County
Courthouse in the corridor outside the municipal court for wearing a jacket
bearing the words "Fuck the Draft", w/c were plainly visible. There were
women and children present in the corridor. Cohen testified that he wore the
jacket as a means of informing the public of the depth of his feelings against
the Vietnam War and the draft. He did not engage in, nor threaten to engage
in, nor did anyone as the result of his conductin fact commit or threaten to
commit any act of violence. The defendant did not make any loud or unusual
noise, nor was there any evidence that he uttered any sound prior to his
arrest. He was convicted to 30 days in jail for violating California Penal
Code §415 which prohibits "maliciously and willfully disturbing the peace or
quiet of any neighborhood or person by offensive conduct."
2. The California CA affirmed the decision holding that "offensive conduct"
means "behavior w/c has a tendency to provoke others to acts of violence or
to in turn disturb the peace," and that the State had proved this element
because, on the facts of the case, it was certainly reasonably foreseeable that
such conduct might cause others to rise up to commit a violent act against
Cohen or attempt to forcibly remove his jacket.
ISSUE/S: WON California convicted Cohen w/o violating the 1 st amendment-
NO
RULING: Ruling of the California CA is REVERSED.
RATIO:
1. The conviction rests upon the asserted offensiveness of the words Cohen
used to convey his message. The only "conduct" which the State sought to
punish is the fact of communication. Thus, the conviction rested solely upon
"speech”  and  not  upon  any  separately identifiable conduct w/c was allegedly
intended by Cohen to be perceived by others. The State lacks power to
punish Cohen for the underlying content of his message so long as there is
no showing of an intent to incite disobedience to or disruption of the draft.
First, the statute is absent of language that would have put him on notice that
certain kinds of otherwise permissible speech or conduct would, under
California law, not be tolerated in certain places. No fair reading of the
phrase "offensive conduct" can be said sufficiently to inform the ordinary
person that distinctions between certain locations are thereby created.
Second, the case cannot be said to fall w/in those relatively few instances
where govthas the power to deal more comprehensively w/ certain forms of
individual expression,ie obscenity. Cohen's message cannot be considered
“fighting   words”   –personally abusive epithets w/c, when addressed to the
ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to
provoke violent reaction – the simple use of which, the States are free to ban.
There is no evidence to show that anyone who saw Cohen was violently
aroused, or that appellant intended such result. Lastly, the argument that
Cohen's message was thrust upon innocent and unsuspecting people is
untenable since the ability of govt to shut off discourse solely to protect
others from hearing it is dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy
interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner. The fact that
some unwilling "listeners" in a public building may have been briefly
exposed does not justify the breach of a person's right to speech. The
principle contended by the State (as the guardian of public morality w/ the
power to remove offensive words from the public vocabulary) is boundless
as it provides no means to distinguish between offensive words which may
result in its abuse if it is affirmed. It must also be stated that language or
speech conveys not only ideas but emotions as well. Emotive speech, like
cognitive speech, is protected by the Constitution as well. The court cannot
indulge the assumption that particular words can be forbidden w/o running
the risk of suppressing ideas in the process for the threat that govts might
soon seize upon the censorship of particular words as a convenient guise for
banning the expression of unpopular views.
2. (Dissent) Cohen's action was mainly conduct and little speech and is not
protected by the 1st amendment. Cohen's actions also involve the use fighting
words. The California SC, in Bushman a case decided after the California
CA decision in Cohen and the California SC's decision to not review Cohen's
case – has construed §415 of the statute in question saying that it "is not
unconstitutionally   vague   and   overbroad,"   and   further   said:   “That   part of
Penal Code section 415 in question here makes punishable only willful and
malicious conduct that is violent and endangers public safety and order or
that creates a clear and present danger that others will engage in violence of
that nature. It does not make criminal any nonviolent act unless the act
incites or threatens to incite others to violence. Therefore, the case ought to
 be remanded to the California CA for reconsideration in the light of the
subsequently rendered decision by the State's highest tribunal in Bushman.
ROTH v. U.S.; ALBERTS v. CALIFORNIA
June 24, 1957 | Brennan, J. | Freedom of Expression: Unprotected Speech
(Obscenity)
SUMMARY: Roth was convicted under a federal obscenity statute for mailing
obscene publication. Alberts, on the other hand, was convicted under the
California Penal Code for keeping for sale obscene materials and making
advertisements of them. The Court held that obscenity is unprotected speech but
adopted a stricter test for obscenity.
DOCTRINE: The test of obscenity is whether to the average person (not just a
person belonging to a particular class) applying contemporary community
standards the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole (not just
detached or separate portions thereof) appeals to prurient interest.
FACTS:
1. Roth, who was engaged in the business of publication and sale of books,
photographs and magazines in New York, was convicted of mailing
obscene circulars and advertising, and an obscene book in violation of the
federal obscenity statute. Alberts, on the other hand, was conducting a mail-
order business from Los Angeles and was convicted for lewdly keeping for
sale obscene and indecent books, and with writing, composing and
publishing an obscene advertisement of them, in violation of the California
Penal Code. Their convictions were affirmed on appeal to the higher courts.
2. Roth challenges the constitutionality of the federal statute stating that it
violates the guarantee of freedom of expression under the 1 st Amendment,
and that it also violates the 9th (rights specifically enumerated in the Bill of
Rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people) and 10th (powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people) Amendments since the power to punish
speech offensive to morals and decency is vested in the States alone.
Alberts, on the other hand, challenges the obscenity provisions of the
California Penal Code for being violative of the Due Process Clause under
the 14th Amendment.
ISSUE/S: WoN obscene publications are w/in the realm of protected speech –
NO
RULING: Judgments of conviction affirmed.
RATIO:
1. The guaranties of freedom of expression gave no absolute protection for
every kind of utterance. At the time of the adoption of the First
Amendment, obscenity law was not as fully developed as libel law, but
there is sufficiently contemporaneous evidence to show that obscenity was
also outside the protection intended for speech and press.
2. The protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes
desired by the people. All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social
importance (unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the
prevailing climate of opinion) have the full protection of the guaranties,
unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of more
important interests. But implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the
rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance.
3. In this case, the Court rejected the early leading standard of obscenity as
laid down in Regina v. Hicklin (1868) as unconstitutionally restrictive of the
freedoms of speech and press, which judges obscenity by the effect of
isolated passages upon the most susceptible persons since this test might
well encompass material legitimately treating with sex.
4. In lieu of the Hicklin test, the Court adopted this test: whether to the
average person (not just a person belonging to a particular class), applying
contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material,
taken as a whole (not just detached or separate portions thereof), appeals to
prurient interest.
5. The argument that the use of the federal obscenity statute and the California
Penal   Code   of   the   words   “obscene,   lascivious,   indecent,   etc.”   are   vague  
such that it violates the due process does not deserve merit. Lack of
precision is not itself offensive to due process requirements. The
Constitution does not require impossible standards; all that is required is
that the language "conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed
conduct when measured by common understanding and practices.”   In   this  
case, the words as applied using the test of obscenity (see Ratio No. 4) give
adequate warning of the conduct proscribed and mark boundaries
sufficiently distinct for judges and juries to fairly administer the law.
6. The federal obscenity statute does not violate the 9th and 10th amendments.
Since it has been ruled that obscenity is unprotected speech not falling
within the protection of the First Amendment, it is within the postal power
delegated to the U.S. Congress to punish the use of mails for obscene
material. On the other hand, the California Penal Code provisions on
obscenity does not conflict with the federal obscenity statute since the latter
only covers actual mailing, and does not eliminate the power of the state to
regulate keeping of sale and advertising obscene material.
Note: Sex and obscenity are not synonymous. Obscene material is material which deals 2. Hard core pornography is not protected by the First Amendment. What the
with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest. The portrayal of sex, e. g., in art, First Amendment protects are works which taken as a whole has a literary,
literature and scientific works, is not itself sufficient reason to deny material the artistic, political, or scientific value, regardless if the government or a
constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press. majority of the people approve of the ideas these works represent. The
protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes
MILLER v. CALIFORNIA desired by the people. But the public portrayal or hard core sexual conduct
June 21, 1973 | Burger, C.J. | Appeal | Freedom of Expression: Unprotected for its own sake, and for the ensuing commercial gain is clearly a different
Speech (Obscenity) matter.
3. The court recognizes the adverse effects of establishing a national standard.
SUMMARY: Appellant   was   convicted   for   violation   of   the   State’s   obscenity   Under the National Constitution, the first amendment limitations on the
statute  after  causing  the  mail  of  adult  material  to  complainants  without  the  latter’s   powers of the States do not vary from community to community but this
request. California SC declared it a violation of the law and convicted the does not mean that there should be uniform national standards of what is
appellant. U.S. SC remanded the case for further proceedings based on the “prurient   interest”   or   “patently   offensive”.   The   US   nation   is   too   big   and  
standard established by their opinion. diverse for the US Supreme Court to be able to generate such standards
DOCTRINE: Obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment if it is that could be articulated for all States. Triers of fact must draw on the
without a redeeming social value based on contemporary community standards. It standards of their community, guided always by limiting instructions on
must have a literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. the law.

FACTS:
1. Appellant conducted a mass mailing campaign to advertise the sale of
illustrated books called adult material. He caused five unsolicited brochures
to be sent through mail in an envelope addressed to a restaurant in
California. The envelope was opened by the manager and his mother.
2. Complainants never requested the brochures so they complained to the
police.  The  brochures  contained  4  books  and  a  film  entitled  “Intercourse.”  
After a jury trial, he was   found   in   violation   of   the   State’s   criminal  
obscenity statue, which prohibits knowingly distributing obscene matter.

ISSUE/S: WoN distribution of hard core pornography is protected by the

freedom of speech? - NO

RULING: Case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings not
inconsistent with the First Amendment standards established by the US Supreme
Court.

RATIO:
1. Basic guidelines to determine if a work is obscene is if: (a) the average
person, applying contemporary community standards would find that work,
taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interest; (b) the work depicts or
describes in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined
by the applicable state law; and (c) the work taken as a whole lacks serious
literary, artistic or scientific value.
 GONZALES v. KALAW KATIGBAK 2.
July 22, 1985 | Fernando, C.J. | Certiorari | Freedom of Expression: Unprotected
Speech (Obscenity)
SUMMARY: The Board granted a license to exhibit Kapit sa Patalim under the
classification  “For  Adults  Only”  after  deletion  of  certain  scenes  enumerated.  SC
held that motion pictures are within press freedom and thus entitled to protection.
DOCTRINE: Clear and present danger test must be employed to overcome the
presumption of invalidity of a prior restraint on the freedom of expression.
FACTS:
1. On Oct 23, 1984, the Board of Review for Motion Pictures granted a
permit to exhibit the film Kapit sa Patalim under   the   classification   “For   be under the patronage of the State.
Adults  Only”,  with  certain  changes  and  deletions  enumerated.  An  MR  was   3.
filed by Gonzales, as President of Malaya Films, to the Board, questioning
the  classification  “For  Adults  Only”,  which  was  denied. (Note: the film had
scenes showing women erotically dancing naked or at least nearly naked at
the theather stage.)
2. Gonzales filed a petition on certiorari to review the findings of the Board,
where Kalaw Katigbak was impleaded as Chairman. Gonzales contends
thatthe classification as adult film was without legal and factual basis and
is an impermissible restraint of artistic expression. Viewed as a whole,
such should not be   classified   as   “For   Adults   Only”.   Also, the film is an 4.
integral whole and all its portions, including those the Board objects to, are
essential for the integrity of the film.
3. The Board contends that the case is moot because it subsequently granted
the license to exhibit the film w/o any deletions or cuts.
ISSUE/S: WoN the Board committed grave abuse of discretion—NO
RULING: Certiorari DENIED. Abuse of discretion NOT grave.
RATIO:
1. The film comes within press freedom guaranteed by the Constitution.
Motion pictures are important both as a medium for communication of
ideas and the expression of artistic impulse; these have profound effects on
perception by the people of issues, public officials, and prevailing cultural
traits. Thus, it comes within press freedom, w/c may be identified with the
liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully and matter of public concern w/o
censorship or punishment. However, such freedom is not absolute, and
may be limited if there is a clear and present danger of a substantive evil
that the State has a right to prevent.
Because of this Constitutional right, the power of the Board is limited to
classification of films to safeguard other constitutional objections. This is
to abide by the principle that freedom of expression is the rule, and
restriction is the exemption. The power to exercise censorship, a form of
prior restraint, is not to be presumed; rather, the presumption is against its
validity. The clear and present danger test should be employed. What is
feared must be reasonable and imminent; and there must be no doubt of the
casual connection between the danger and the expression complained of. In
essence, censorship is allowable only under the clearest proof of a clear
and present danger of a substantive evil to public safety, morals, health or
other legitimate public interest. The power of censorship by the State must
also be balanced with the constitutional command that arts and letters shall
It has been established that the law frowns on obscenity as utterly w/o
redeeming social importance. The test of obscenity is whether to the
average person, applying contemporary standards, the dominant theme of
the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest. The portrayal of
sex in art, literature and scientific works, is not itself sufficient to deny the
material the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press. EO
876 provides that the standard to be applied was contemporary Filipino
cultural values. In this case, the Court  held  that  the  Board’s  perception  of  
obscenity was unduly restrictive.
Note: The ruling in this case is to be limited to the concept of obscenity
applicable to motion pictures, where patrons have to pay their way. Where
television is concerned, a less liberal approach would be observed because
the TV reaches wider audiences, including children.
 PITA v. CA
October 5, 1989 | Sarmiento, J. | Petition to Review CA decision | Freedom of
Expression: Unprotected Speech (Obscenity)
SUMMARY: Pursuant to his Anti-Smut Campaign, Mayor Bagatsing seizes
obscene magazines and reading materials from vendors in Manila and burns them
publicly. Pinoy Playboy Publisher assails such. SC: Search and seizure invalid for
lack of a court order/search warrant.
DOCTRINE: Obscenity still presumed speech that warrants protection until
judicially found to be obscene // 6-step process by which authorities may search
and seize allegedly obscene materials (Ratio 5)
FACTS:
1. On December 1 & 3 1983 and pursuant to his Anti-Smut Campaign, Manila
Mayor Bagatsing along with police seized and confiscated magazines,
publications, and other reading materials believed to be obscene &
pornographic from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners, and peddlers
along Manila Sidewalks. They then burned the seized materials in public at
the University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue in the presence of Mayor
Bagatsing and several officers/ members of various student organizations..
2. Pita, publisher of Pinoy Playboy, files a complaint for injunctive relief
against Mayor Bagatsing and Western Police District Superintendent
Cabrera from confiscating his magazines or preventing the sale or
circulation thereof. He claims that the magazine is decent, artistic, and
educational which is not per se obscene and protected by the guaranty of
free speech and press. He also invokes the guaranty against unreasonable
searches and seizures & the prohibition against deprivation of property
without due process of law. Petitioner also questions WON defendants
could confiscate or seize such without a court order or seize the magazine
before any judicial finding is made on WON said magazine is obscene.
Defendants allege that confiscation was merely undertaken pursuant to P.D.
No 960 amending RPC Art 201 (law on obscenity).
ISSUE: WON   Mayor   Bagatsing’s   seizure   &   destroying   of   the   magazines   is   a judge, if in their opinion, an obscenity rap is in order (2) Authorities must
valid – NO.
RULING: REVERSED. But since magazines have been destroyed, Court
declines to grant affirmative relief. To that extent, case is moot and academic.
RATIO:
1. The Court has long flip-flopped on the issue of defining obscenity and
setting up tests to identify it. Kalaw-Katigbak,  it’s  important  to  note,  made  
the determination of obscenity essentially a judicial question and tempered
the wide discretion Kottinger gave to law enforcers. Likewise, the
American  Courts  have  had  a  downward  trend  in  trying  to  find  the  ‘perfect  
solution’,   such   as   the   Miller   test.   But   the   point   is   that   until   the   Court  
recognizes that obscene speech is speech nonetheless, the flipflop and
climate of diverging opinions will not cease.
2. Obscenity is still Speech: Immoral lore or literature is still within the ambit
of free expression, although not in its protection. Hence, the presumption is
that such speech is protected may validly be said. The State/authorities have
the burden to demonstrate the existence of a clear and present danger to
justify  State   Action  to  stop  the  speech.  The  authority  can’t  rely   merely  on  
his own appraisal of what the public welfare may require. Meanwhile, due
process demands that the Government must allow the speech to subsist.
3. Obscenity a Judicial Determination: Clearly, the State has the right to
suppress smut in the legitimate exercise of police power – provided it is
smut. But smut is not smut simply because one insists it is smut, especially
taking  into  account  people’s  individual  and  diverging  tastes  as  well  as  rapid  
developments in society. Were the magazines confiscated actually found to
be pornographic? Has Pita been found guilty under the law on obscenity
(Art 201  amended  by  PD  960  and  969)?    Mere  invocation  of   the   Mayor’s  
police power is not a license to seize property in disregard of due process.
PDs   960   &   969,   while   police   measures,   don’t   exempt   law   enforcers   who  
carry  out  the  decrees  from  the  Constitution’s  commandment on right to due
process and reasonable search and seizures.
4. No Court Order/Search Warrant:   Mayor   Bagatsing   hasn’t   shown   the  
required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature.
They  didn’t  even  have  a  lawful  court  order finding the said materials to be
pornography and authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure by way
of a search warrant. The fact that the instant case involves an obscenity rap
makes it no different from the Burgos case (Metropolitan Mail) because
speech is speech, whether political or obscene. Leaving it to the Mayor to
determine WON there is violation of penal laws is out of the question.
5. Process by which authorities may search & seize allegedly obscene
properties: (1) Authorities apply for the issuance of a search warrant from
convince  the  court  that  the  materials  sought  to  be  seized  are  “obscene”,  and  
pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant
State interference and action (3) Judge must determine WON same are
indeed obscene; case-to-case   basis   and   Judge’s   sound   discretion   (4)   If  
probable cause found to exist, may issue search warrant (5) Proper suit then
brought in court under RPC A201 (6) Any conviction subject to appeal.
Appellate court may assess WON such are obscene
 RENO v. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
June 26, 1997 | Stevens, J. | Freedom of Expression: Unprotected Speech
(Obscenity)
SUMMARY: The CDA is being challenged for vagueness. Said law penalizes
with fine or imprisonment persons who knowingly transmit to other persons
under  18  years  of  age  “indecent”  and  “patently  offensive”  material.  The  SC  held   the special factors cited by the Court to justify regulation of broadcast
that the law was vague with respect to its anti-indecency provisions.
DOCTRINE: The Internet enjoys the highest level of protection guaranteed by
the 1stAmendment since the special factors that justify regulation of broadcast
media are not present in cyberspace.
FACTS:
1. The U.S. Congress passed the Communications Decency Act (CDA) of
1996 which seeks to protect minors from harmful material on the Internet. It
contains 2 provisions which prohibits under penalty of fine or imprisonment
not more than 2 years: (1) knowing transmission of obscene or indecent messages
to any recipient under 18 y/o; (2)knowing sending or displaying of patently
offensive messages as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or
excretory activities or organs, regardless of whether the user of such service placed
the call or initiated the communication, in a manner that is available to a person
under 18 y/o. Persons who may be held liable under these provisions are
those who use telecommunications devices for the said prohibited acts or
and those who allow other people to use their devices to be used for these
prohibited acts.
2. The prohibitions are also qualified by 2 affirmative defenses: 1) those who
take "good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions" to restrict
access by minors to the prohibited communications; 2) those who restrict
access to covered material by requiring certain forms of proof of age, such
as a verified credit card or an adult identification number or code.
3. ACLU et al. challenged the constitutionality of the provisions of the CDA
for being vague to become the basis for criminal prosecution. District Court
issued an injunction against its enforcement on grounds that it is overbroad
under the 1st Amendment and vague under the 5th Amendment. U.S. Atty.
Gen. Reno petitioned to the SC to have the judgment reversed.
ISSUE/S:
1. WoN the CDA anti-indecency prohibitions are vague – YES
2. WoN  CDA’s  anti-indecency provisions abridge freedom of speech – YES
RULING: District Court judgment affirmed.
RATIO:
1. The CDA’s  vagueness is important in two respects. First, CDA is a content
based regulation such that it may raise concerns because of the chilling
effect on free speech. Second, it is a penal statute such that the severity of
the penalties may cause people to remain silent rather than communicate.As
to the level of scrutiny, the Court gave the highest level of protection since
media (i.e. history of extensive govt regulation; scarcity of available
frequencies at its inception; invasive nature) are not present in cyberspace.
2. The CDA effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a
constitutional right to receive and address one another in order to deny
minors access to potentially harmful speech. Such burden is unacceptable if
less restrictive alternatives would be as effective in achieving the legitimate
purpose that the statute was enacted to serve. The open-ended prohibitions
embrace all nonprofit entities and individuals posting indecent messages or
displaying them on their own computers in the presence of minors. The
general terms "indecent" and "patently offensive" cover large amounts of
non-pornographic material w/ serious educational or other value. Moreover,
the "community standards" criterion as applied to the Internet means that
any communication available to a nationwide audience will be judged by
the standards of the community most likely to be offended by the message.
3. Government’s  defenses  that  the  CDA  is  narrowly  tailored are unpersuasive:
Leaves open alternative channels of communication – CDA is a content-based
regulation so time, place, and manner analysis is inapplicable.
"Knowledge" and "specific person" requirements significantly restrict its
application to communications knowingly sent to persons below 18 y/o –
most Internet forums are open to all comers and even the strongest reading of
"specific person" requirement would confer broad powers of censorship, in the
form of a heckler's veto, upon any opponent of indecent speech
Prohibitions are "almost always" limited to material lacking redeeming
social value - no textual basis that material having scientific, educational, or
other redeeming social value will fall outside CDA's prohibitions.
4. Affirmative defenses (fact 2) are not enough to make it narrowly tailored:
Transmitters may take protective good faith action by tagging indecent
communications to indicate their contents – Proposed screening does not exist,
and even if it does, there would be no way of knowing whether a potential
recipient would actually block the encoded material
Verification would significantly reduce CDA's burden on adult speech –
while verification is actually being used by some commercial providers of
sexually explicit material, the District Court's findings indicate that it is not
economically feasible for most noncommercial speakers.
5. The Government argues that it has an equally significant interest in
fostering the growth of the Internet as that of protecting children since the
availability of patently offensive material has driven many people away
from the Internet. There is no basis—records indicate that the growth of the
 Internet continues to be phenomenal. In the absence of evidence to the
contrary, it will be presumed that any content-based regulation of speech is
more likely to interfere with the free exchange of ideas rather than
encourage it.

NOTE:
Due   to   the   severability   clause   of   the   CDA,   the   Court’s   decision   will   only   render  
unconstitutional   the   provisions   with   respect   to   “indecent”   material.   As   to   the  
provisions   on   “obscene”   material,   this   will   be   upheld   since   total   ban   on   obscene  
material may be enacted since it is unprotected speech.
Possible alternatives cited in the arguments include: requiring that indecent material
be "tagged" to facilitate parental control, making exceptions for messages with
artistic or educational value, providing some tolerance for parental choice, and
regulating some portions of the Internet differently than others (commercial websites
vs. chat rooms).
 ASHCROFT v. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
May 13, 2002 | Thomas, J. | Certiorari | Freedom of Speech: Unprotected Speech
(Obscenity)
SUMMARY: The COPA of 1998 made it illegal for any commercial sources to
allow  minors  access  to  “harmful”  content.  In defining "material that is harmful to
minors," COPA draws on the three-part obscenity test set forth in Miller v.
California. The court held that COPA's reliance on "community standards" to
identify what material "is harmful to minors" does not by itself render the statute
substantially overbroad for First Amendment purposes.
DOCTRINE: Due to the narrowed range of content restricted by COPA in a
manner analogous to Miller's definition of obscenity, any variance caused by the
statute's reliance on community standards is not substantial enough to violate the
1st Amendment.
FACTS:
1. The CDA of 1996 was struck down as abridging the freedom of speech.
Congress then passed the Child Online Protection Act (COPA). Unlike the
CDA, COPA applies only to material displayed on the World Wide Web,
covers only communications made for commercial purposes, and restricts
only   "material   that   is   harmful   to   minors”.   In   defining   "material   that   is   component would effectively force all speakers on the Web to abide by the
harmful to minors," COPA draws on the three-part obscenity test set forth in
Miller v. California and thus requires jurors to apply "contemporary
community standards" in assessing material.
2. Respondents-- who post or have members that post sexually oriented
material on the Web--filed a facial challenge before COPA went into effect,
claiming that the statute violated adults' First Amendment rights because it
effectively banned constitutionally protected speech, was not the least
restrictive means of accomplishing a compelling governmental purpose, and
was substantially overbroad. They alleged that, although they believed that
the material on their Websites was valuable for adults, they feared that they
would be prosecuted under COPA because some of that material "could be
construed as `harmful to minors' in some communities. The District Court
issued a preliminary injunction barring the enforcement of COPA because it
concluded that the statute was unlikely to survive strict scrutiny. The Third
Circuit (CA) affirmed but based its decision on a ground not relied upon by
the District Court: that COPA's use of "contemporary community
standards”  to  identify  material  that  is  harmful  to  minors  rendered  the statute
substantially overbroad because "Web publishers are currently without the
ability to control the geographic scope of the recipients of their
communications.
ISSUE/S: WoN COPA's use of community standards to identify "material that
is harmful to minors" violates the 1st Amendment – NO
RULING: CA decision reversed. Case remanded to CA for further proceedings.
Injunction still effective since petitioners did not ask the SC to have it vacated.
RATIO:
1. Obscene speech has long been held to be unprotected by the 1st Amendment
but the Court had difficulty in the past defining obscenity in a manner that
did not impose an impermissible burden on protected speech. This because
of the belief that in the area of freedom of speech and press the courts must
always remain sensitive to any infringement on genuinely serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific expression. Miller test of obscenity: (a)
Whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards'
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest;
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c)
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value.
2. Because juries would apply different standards across the country, and Web
publishers currently lack the ability to limit access to their sites on a
geographic basis, the CA feared that COPA's "community standards"
"most puritan" community's standards. The court held however that to fall
within COPA, works must not only "depict, describe, or represent, in a
manner patently offensive with respect to minors," particular sexual acts or
parts of the anatomy, they must also be designed to appeal to the prurient
interest of minors and "taken as a whole, lack serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value for minors." These additional restrictions
substantially limit the amount of material covered by the statute making a
specific material's value not vary from community to community based on
the  acceptance  it  had  won.  The  serious  value  requirement  “allows  courts  to  
impose some limitations and regularity on the definition by setting, as a
matter  of  law,  a  national  floor  for  socially  redeeming  value.”
3. Requiring a speaker disseminating material to a national audience to
observe varying community standards does not violate the 1 st Amendment.
If a publisher chooses to send its material into a particular community,
jurisprudence teaches that it is the publisher's responsibility to abide by that
community's standards. The publisher's burden does not change simply
because it decides to distribute its material to every community in the
Nation. If a publisher wishes for its material to be judged only by the
standards of particular communities, then it need only take the simple step
of utilizing a medium that enables it to target the release of its material into
those communities.
 ASHCROFT v. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
June 29, 2004 | Kennedy, J. | Certiorari | Freedom of Expression: Unprotected
Speech (Obscenity)
SUMMARY: The United States Congress passed COPA to make the internet
safe for minors by criminalizing certain internet speech. The court held that the
government has not shown that the less restrictive means of controlling internet
material seen by children proposed by the respondents should be disregarded.
DOCTRINE: Content-based prohibitions, enforced by severe criminal penalties,
have the constant potential to be a repressive force in the lives and thoughts of a
free people. To guard against that threat the Constitution demands that content-
based restrictions on speech be presumed invalid and that the Government bear
the burden of showing their constitutionality.
FACTS:
1. The United States Congress passed COPA to make the internet safe for
minors by criminalizing certain internet speech. COPA is the second
attempt made by congress to protect minors from obscene internet content
after the CDA which was declared unconstitutional because it was not
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest and because
less restrictive alternatives were available. While the statute labels all
obscene speech as criminal speech, it also provides an affirmative defense
to those who employ specified means to prevent minors from gaining
access to the prohibited materials on their Web site—by requiring the use
of credit cards or adult personal identification numbers, the use of digital
certificates that verify age and other measures that are feasible under the
available technology.
2. Respondent Internet Content Providers and others concerned with
protecting the freedom of speech filed a suit seeking preliminary injunction
against the enforcement of the statute. The district court issued an order
granting the preliminary injunction on the ground that filtering technology
can be as effective in blocking obscene content. The CA affirmed the DC's
decision   but   on   the   ground   that   the   “community   standards”   language   in   proposed by respondents should be disregarded. Those alternatives, indeed,
COPA rendered the statute constitutionally overbroad. The government
appealed but the court remanded it to the CA where the CA affirmed the
DC's decision, hence, the petition for certiorari.
ISSUE/S: WoN the DC abused its discretion in granting the injunction – NO.
RULING: The District Court did not abuse its discretion when it entered the
preliminary injunction. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, and
the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with the court's opinion.
RATIO:
1. The DC held that a statute that effectively suppresses a large amount of
speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address to
one another is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be at least
as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted
to serve. The government must prove that the other alternatives are not as
effective as the challenged statute.
2. The primary alternative considered by the District Court was blocking and
filtering software. Blocking and filtering software is an alternative that is
less restrictive than COPA, and, in addition, likely more effective as a
means of restricting children's access to materials harmful to them. They
impose selective restrictions on speech at the receiving end, not universal
restrictions at the source. Under a filtering regime, adults without children
may gain access to speech they have a right to see without having to
identify themselves or provide their credit card information. Even adults
with children may obtain access to the same speech on the same terms
simply by turning off the filter on their home computers. Above all,
promoting the use of filters does not condemn as criminal any category of
speech, and so the potential chilling effect is eliminated, or at least much
diminished. Filters also may well be more effective than COPA. A filter
can prevent minors from seeing all pornography, not just pornography
posted to the Web from America. Effectiveness is likely to diminish even
further if COPA is upheld, because the providers of the materials that
would be covered by the statute simply can move their operations overseas.
The requirement of credit cards may also be circumvented by children who
have credit cards.
3. Filtering software, of course, is not a perfect solution to the problem of
children gaining access to harmful materials. It may block some materials
that are not harmful to minors and fail to catch some that are. Whatever the
deficiencies of filters, however, the Government failed to introduce
specific evidence proving that existing technologies are less effective than
the restrictions in COPA.
4. The Government has not shown that the less restrictive alternatives
may be more effective than the provisions of COPA. The District Court did
not abuse its discretion when it entered the preliminary injunction.
 AGLIPAY v. RUIZ
March 13, 1937 | Laurel, J. | Prohibition | Separation of Church and State:
Establishment Clause
SUMMARY: Aglipay sought the issuance of a writ of prohibition to prevent the
selling of stamps commemorating the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress
organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The Court denied the petition as no
money was given to the church nor was the issuance and sale of the stamps
intended to benefit the church, but rather to promote tourism and publicize the
Philippines.
DOCTRINE: Religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of
profound reverence for religion, nor denial of its influence in human affairs. / A
legitimate purpose undertaken by appropriate legislation should not be frustrated
by mere incidental religious results not contemplated.
FACTS:
1. In May 1936, the Director of Posts ordered the issuance and sale of postage
stamps commemorating the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress,
organized by the Roman Catholic Church. Petitioner Gregorio Aglipay,
Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church (Iglesia Filipina
Independiente), sought the issuance of a writ of prohibition to prevent the
further selling of the same, alleging that it was violative of Sec 23 (3), Art
VI of the Constitution.
ISSUE/S: WoN issuance and sale of the stamps violated Sec 23(3), Art VI of
the Constitution – NO
RULING: Petition denied.
RATIO:
1. The cited provision is a direct corollary of the doctrine of the separation of
church and state. What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty,
not mere religious tolerance. But religious freedom as a constitutional
mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion, nor denial of
its influence in human affairs. Religion is recognized as a profession of faith
to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator, and insofar as
it instills principles of morality, it is deeply felt and highly appreciated. The
Constitution’s   preamble   itself   implored   the   aid   of   the   Divine   Providence,  
and certain concessions to religious sects are recognized in the Constitution
and our laws.
2. In the case at bar, the Director of Posts issued the postage stamps under Act
No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature. An examination of the Act shows
that it appropriates P60,000 for plates and printing of postage stamps with
new designs and other expenses incident thereto, and authorizes the
Director of Posts, with the Secretary of Public  Works  and  Communications’  
approval, to dispose of the appropriated amount in the manner indicated and
as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government. Act No. 4052
contemplates no religious purpose. It gives the Director of Posts
discretionary power to determine when the issuance of postage stamps will
be advantageous to the Government. Naturally, this does not authorize
violation of the Constitution.
3. In the instant case, the issuance of the postage stamps was not inspired by
any sectarian denomination. The stamps were not issued or sold for the
benefit of the Roman Catholic Church, nor was money derived from the
sale given to said church. Contrarily, from the   Director   of   Posts’   letter   of  
June 5, 1936, the purpose was take advantage of an event of international
importance to give publicity to the Philippines and its people, and attract
more tourists. It is also noteworthy that the stamps as actually designed and
printed, instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned,
contained a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila,
and   the   inscription:   “Seat   XXXIII   International   Eucharistic   Congress,   Feb  
3-7,  1937”.  The  emphasis  is  not  the  Eucharistic  Congress  itself,  but  Manila  
as the seat of that Congress. Any resulting religious propaganda is merely
incidental. A legitimate purpose undertaken by appropriate legislation
should not be frustrated by mere incidental results not contemplated.
Sec 23(3), Art VI: No public money or property shall ever be appropriated,
applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any
sect, church, denomination, sectarian, institution, or system of religion, or for
the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious
teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or
dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage,
or leprosarium.
 GARCES v. ESTENZO RULING: Judgment affirmed.
May 25, 1981 | Aquino, J. | Petition from CFI judgment | Separation of Church
and State: Establishment Clause RATIO:
1. The resolutions do not directly or indirectly establish any religion, nor
SUMMARY: Fr. Osmeña attacked resolutions of the barangay council of abridge religious liberty, nor appropriate public money or property for the
Valencia, which among others provided for the acquisition of an image of the benefit of any sect, priest or clergyman. The image was purchased with
barrio’s  patron  saint  and  the  display  of  the  same  in  the  church  during  the  barrio’s   private funds, not tax money. The part of the resolution regarding the
feast day, with the image placed in the custody of the hermano mayor until the construction of a waiting shed is an entirely secular matter.
next feast day. He alleged that they violated the provisions of the Constitution 2. The wooden image was not purchased to favor the Catholic religion or
against the establishment of religion and appropriation and use of public funds interfere   with   the   residents’   religious   matters   or   religious   beliefs,   but   in  
for sects, churches and ministers. The Court held that the resolutions were valid connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring their patron
and that the cited provisions were not violated in the instant case. saint.  One  of  the  fiesta’s  highlights  was  the  mass.  Consequently,  the  image  
DOCTRINE: Not every governmental activity which involves the expenditure of the patron saint had to be placed in the church when the mass was
of public funds and which has some religious tint is violative of the celebrated. There is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta or
constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of having a patron saint for the barrio. Hence, there is also nothing illegal
worship and banning the use of public money or property. about an activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint.
3. Petitioners also presented contradictory positions (e.g. resolutions favored
FACTS: the Catholic Church, but it also prejudiced Catholics because they could see
1. On 23 March 1976, the barangay council of Valencia, Ormoc City adopted the image in the church only once a year).
resolutions for the “revival of the traditional socio-religious   celebration”   4. This is a petty dispute. The barangay council as the owner of the image has
every 5th of   April,   the   feast   day   of   Senor   San   Vicente   Ferrer,   Valencia’s   the right to determine who should have custody thereof. Fr. Osmeña could
patron saint. Part of the resolutions was the acquisition of the image of San have gone to the trouble of causing contributions from his own parishioners
Vicente Ferrer, which would be done through selling tickets and through for the purchase of another image of San Vicente Ferrer to be installed in
cash donations. It was provided that the image would be made available to his church. Not every governmental activity which involves the expenditure
the   Catholic   parish   church   during   the   celebration   of   the   saint’s   feast   day,   of public funds and which has some religious tint is violative of the
and that the Chairman or hermano mayor of  the  fiesta  would  be  the  image’s   constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom
caretaker and that the image would remain in his residence for one year and of worship and banning the use of public money or property.
until  his  successor’s  election  as  chairman  of  the  next  feast  day.
2. On 5 April 1976, the image was temporarily placed in the altar of Barangay
Valencia’s  Catholic  Church  so  that  devotees  could  worship  the  saint  during  
the mass for the fiesta. However, after the mass, the parish priest, Fr. Sergio
Marilao Osmeña, refused to return the image to the barangay council on the
pretext that it was the church’s  property  because  church  funds  were  used  in  
its acquisition.
3. Fr. Osmeña had to turn over the image following the filing of a replevin
case against him. In answer to the complaint for replevin, he assailed the
constitutionality of the resolutions, contending that it contravened Sec 8,
Art IV (no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion) and
Sec 18(2), Art VIII (no appropriation or use of money for sects, churches or
ministers) of the Constitution.

ISSUE/S: WoN the resolutions violated the cited provisions of the Constitution
- NO
 LEMON v. KURTZMAN
June 28 1971 | Burger, C.J. | Appeal | Separation of Church and State:
Establishment Clause 2.
SUMMARY: 2 Statutes from Rhode Island and Pennsylvania that make state
financial aid available to all nonpublic schools (most of which are Catholic) are
assailed for violating the Establishment Clause. SC: Both statutes promote
excessive entanglement between the government and religion..
DOCTRINE: Lemon Test: (1) statute must have a secular legislative purpose (2)
its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion  (3)  statute  must  not  foster  an  excessive  gov’t  entanglement  w/  religion.
FACTS:
1. Rhode  Island’s  Salary  Supplement  Act: to keep the quality of nonpublic
elementary schools, the Act provides direct supplemental salary payments
to   said   schools’   teachers.   To   qualify,   teachers   must   teach   only   courses   3.
offered and using only materials used in public schools, and must agree not
to teach religious courses. The average per-pupil expenditure on secular
education   should   also   be   less   than   average   in   public   schools.   The   Act’s   the Catholic faith and inculcating religious doctrine. They involve
beneficiaries   had   25%   of   the   State’s   elementary   students,   about   95%   of   substantial religious activity and purpose, which gives rise to entangling
which attended Roman Catholic affiliated schools, About 250 teachers at
Roman  Catholic  schools  are  the  Act’s  sole  beneficiaries.   4.
2. Pennsylvania’s  Nonpublic   Elementary  & Secondary Education Act: to
solve the nonpublic school crisis due to rising costs, the Act reimburses
nonpublic schools on expenditures   for   teachers’   salaries,   textbooks,   and   government has no way of ascertaining if the teachers can totally avoid
instructional materials. However, reimbursement is limited to courses also
taught in public schools and secular subjects. Textbooks must be
government-approved.   Act’s   beneficiaries   composed   20%   of   the   State’s   Fine, the Act provides additional safeguards like limiting subjects and
pupils, 96% of which attended Roman Catholic Schools.
3. The Rhode Island District Court found that the Rhode Island Statute fosters
excessive entanglement between government and religion. On the other
hand, the complaint against the Pennsylvania Statute was dismissed. 5.
ISSUE/S: WON the Statutes violate the Establishment Clause - YES
RULING: Rhode Island District Court decision AFFIRMED. Pennsylvania
District Court decision REVERSED & REMANDED for further proceedings.
RATIO: 6.
1. The Establishment Clause: The Clause commands that there be no law
respecting an establishment of religion. Religion must be a private matter,
and while some government entanglement is inevitable, lines must be
drawn. The 3 main evils which it seeks to prevent are sponsorship,
financial support, and government’s   active   involvement   in   religious  
activity.
Lemon Test: (1) statute must have a secular legislative purpose (2) its
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion (3) statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement
with religion. The legislative intent of both statutes is clearly not to advance
religion.   The   statutes   clearly   state   that   they’re   intended to enhance the
quality of secular education, which is a legitimate concern. However, SC
skipped the 2nd test since the cumulative impact of the entire relationship
arising under the 2 Statutes involves excessive entanglement between
government & religion. To determine whether there is excessive
government entanglement, the ff must be considered: (1) character and
purposes of institutions benefited; (2) nature of the aid that the State
provides, and (3) resulting relationship between the government and
religious authority.
Religious Institutions Benefited: The schools benefited (near parish
churches, nuns as teachers, impressionable kids, religious symbols,
religious extracurricular activities), are powerful vehicles for transmitting
church-state relationships the Religion Clauses seek to avoid.
Teacher-Recipients: The legislatures did create restrictions designed to
guarantee the separation between secular and religious educational
functions and to ensure that State support goes only to the former. But the
injecting  religious  aspects  to  their  lessons  since  they’re  dedicated  religious  
people, teaching in a religious school, subject to religious authorities, etc.
materials to those taught and used in public schools – but a comprehensive,
discriminating, and continuing state surveillance will inevitably be required
to ensure that these restrictions are obeyed.
Cash Grants: The Pennsylvania statue has the further defect of providing
state financial aid directly to church-related   school.   There’s   a   chance   that  
the comprehensive measures of surveillance and controls that usually follow
cash grants may follow. In particular, the government’s  post-audit power to
inspect and evaluate a church-related   school’s   financial   records   and   to  
determine if its expenses are religious or secular creates an intimate and
continuing relationship between Church & State.
Divisive Political Impact along Religious Lines: State assistance to these
religious schools will entail considerable political activity – divisions will
occur between those for and against state aid. And political division along
religious lines was one of the principal evils the 1 st Amendment seeks to
prevent. This will be aggravated by the  Statutes’  need  for  continuing  annual  
 appropriations and the likelihood of larger financial aid as costs and regard for their religious affiliation. In Everson, for example, the Court
populations grow. allowed New Jersey to pay the bus fares of parochial school pupils as a part
of a general program under which it pays the fares of pupils attending
public and private schools. Similar to police and fire protection & streets
BOARD OF EDUCATION v. ALLEN and sidewalks, payment of bus fares was of some value to the religious
June 10, 1968 | White, J. | Appeal | Separation of Church and State: school,  but  it  doesn’t  amount  to  a  prohibited  establishment  of  religion.  The  
Establishment Clause test employed in this case was that (1) law must have a secular legislative
purpose; (2) primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion.
2. Further   the   Youth’s   Education: In this case, the express purpose of the
SUMMARY: New  York’s  Education  Law  (701)  requires  local  school  boards  to  
statute was the furtherance of educational opportunities for the young. Its
purchase textbooks and lend these textbooks free of charge to all students in
effects   aren’t   contrary   to   this   purpose.  The   law   merely   makes   available   to  
grades 7-12, including students in private schools. SC: Valid.
all children the benefits of a general program to lend school books free of
DOCTRINE:. The  Establishment  Clause  doesn’t prevent a State from extending
charge. The ownership of the books still belongs to the State; no funds or
the benefits of state laws to all citizens without regard for their religious
books are furnished to parochial schools, and the financial benefit is to
affiliation. Religious schools, in addition to religious instruction, also perform the
parents and children, not to schools.
task of secular education, which the State has an interest in.
3. Secular Books Only: The   language   of   701   doesn’t   authorize   the   loan   of  
religious books, and only secular books may receive approval in the
FACTS:
program.  There’s  no  evidence  that  religious  books  have  been  loaned,  and  it  
1. New  York’s  Education  Law  (701)  requires  local  school  boards  to  purchase  
can’t  be  assumed  that  school   authorities are unable to distinguish between
textbooks and lend these textbooks free of charge to all students in grades 7-
secular and religious books or that they will not honestly discharge their
12, including students in private schools. The books loaned are textbooks
duties to approve only secular books.
which are designated for use in any public, elementary, or secondary
4. Parochial  Schools  Don’t  Just  Teach  Religion  Alone: The main argument
schools of the state or are approved by any boards of education, and which a
of petitioners are that books, but not buses, are critical to the teaching
pupil is required to use as a text for a semester or more in a particular class
process, and in a sectarian school that process is employed to teach religion.
in the school he attends.
But religious schools, in addition to religious instruction, also perform the
2. The Board of Education of Central School District 1 assails the law in New
task of secular education. Private education plays a significant and valuable
York courts against James Allen since he would remove the members of the
role in raising the quality of education, which is indispensable to the
Board from office if they fail to lend books to parochial school students.
development   of   the   nation.   Without   lack   of   proof,   the   Court   can’t   agree  
3. TC:   Unconstitutional.   CA:   Valid.   Law’s   purpose   was   to benefit all school
with the petitioners that all the teaching in a sectarian school is religious or
children, regardless of the type of school they attended, and that only
that the intertwining of secular and religious training is such that secular
textbooks approved by public school authorities could be loaned. The law
textbooks furnished to students are in fact instrumental in teaching religion.
was also completely neutral with respect to religion, merely making secular
5. Since appellants have not shown that the law coerces them in any way in
textbooks available at the request of the individual student and asking no
the practice of religion, there is no violation of the Free Exercise Clause.
question about what school he attends.

ISSUE/S: WON the New York Education Law, in allowing the loan of
textbooks to students attending parochial schools, violates the Establishment
Clause - NO

RULING: AFFIRMED. 701 not unconstitutional.

RATIO:
1. Everson v. Board of Education: The  Establishment  Clause  doesn’t  prevent  
a State from extending the benefits of state laws to all citizens without
 COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY v. AMERICAN CIVIL RATIO:
LIBERTIES UNION (GREATER PITTSBURGH CHAPTER) 1. The Establishment Clause today is recognized as a guarantee of religious
July 3, 1989| Blackmun, J. | Certiorari | Establishment Clause liberty and equality to the infidel, atheist, or the adherent of a non-Christian
faith such as Islam or Judaism. This precludes the government from any
form of endorsement (conveying a message that a particular religion or
SUMMARY: ACLU challenges the constitutionality of 2 displays in public
belief is favored or preferred), favoritism, or promotion for any sect or
buildings: 1) the crèche in the Courthouse, and 2) the menorah beside the tree in
religion. The Lemon analysis provides these guidelines: 1) a statute or
the City-County under the Establishment. SC held that the crèche display is
practice w/c touches upon religion must have a secular purpose, 2) it must
unconstitutional, while the menorah display as valid.
neither advance nor inhibit religion in its principal or primary effect, and 3)
DOCTRINE: Government’s   use   of  religious   symbolism   is  unconstitutional  if  it  
it must not foster an excessive entanglement with religion. Thus,
has the effect of endorsing religious beliefs, and such symbolic effect depends on
government’s   use   of   religious symbolism is unconstitutional if it has the
its context or overall message.
effect of endorsing religious beliefs, and the effect of such use depends on
its context.
FACTS:
2. Crèche: In itself, the crèche is capable of communicating a religious
1. This litigation concerns the constitutionality of 2 recurring holiday displays
message;;  and  “Gloria  in  Excelsis Deo”  is  praise  to God in Christian terms
governmentt buildings in Pittsburgh. 1) A crèche depicting the Christian
that is indisputably religious. Unlike Lynch, nothing in the context of the
Nativity, with red and white poinsettia plants around it and a small
display detracts from the religious message. In Lynch, the display
evergreen tree on each end, on the Grand Staircase of the Allegheny County
comprised   a   series   of   figures   and   objects   (Santa’s   house,   reindeer,   talking  
Courthouse, the main, most beautiful, and most public part of the
wishing well, etc); and the crèche was neither the center nor single element
courthouse. The crèche was donated by a Catholic group, and bore a sign to
of display, as in the Grand Staircase in this case. The floral decoration
that effect. Its manager had at its crest an angel bearing a banner
cannot be said to be equivalent to secular symbols in Lynch that serve to
proclaiming "Gloria in ExcelsisDeo."2) An 18-foot Chanukah menorah,
detract the religious meaning because as a frame,   it   serves   to   draw   one’s  
owned by Chabad, a Jewish group, was placed outside the City-County
attention to the message inside the frame. Also, the carols, being religious,
Bldg next to the city's 45-foot Christmas tree. At the foot of the tree was a
augment the religious quality of the scene. Neither does the fact that it bears
sign bearing the mayor's name and containing text declaring the city's
a sign disclosing ownership by a Catholic Org save it from
"salute to liberty".
unconstitutionality.
2. The Greater Pittsburgh Chapter of the ACLU and 7 local residents filed suit
3. The   ponente   disagrees   w/   Justice   Kennedy’s   proposal   of   using   the  
seeking to permanently enjoin the county from displaying the crèche and
proselytization test, w/c requires proof of an obvious allegiance between the
the city from displaying the menorah on the ground that the displays
government and the favored sect. The Court has never imposed a burden to
violated the Establishment Clause. The District Court denied relief, relying
demonstrate that government favors a particular sect; on the contrary, it
on Lynch v. Donnelly, saying that the crèche was but a part of the holiday
requires strict scrutiny of practices suggesting a denominational preference.
decoration of the stairwell and a foreground for the carols. The CA reversed
4. Menorah: The menorah is a religious symbol (to commemorate the miracle
holding that the crèche and the menorah in public buildings devoted to core
of the oil lamp w/c burned for 8 days), but its message is not exclusively
functions of the government are impermissible governmental endorsements
religious; it has a secular dimension (the political rebellion against the
of Christianity and Judaism.
Greeks and rededication of the temple in Jerusalem). The Christmas tree,
w/c has typified the celebration of the winter-holiday season, stands at 45 ft,
ISSUE/S:
and is clearly the predominant element in the display. Thus, it is sensible to
1. WoN the crèche display violates the Establishment Clause—YES
interpret the meaning of the menorah in the light of the tree w/c is simply a
2. WoN the menorah displayed violates the Establishment Clause—NO
recognition that Christmas is not the only traditional way of celebrating the
winter-holiday season. In addition,   the   mayor’s   sign   diminishes   the  
RULING: AFFIRMED in part; Remand to discuss other issues raised in CA.
possibility that the tree and menorah will be interpreted as a dual
endorsement of Christianity and Judaism—“saluting   liberty”   and   confirms  
the context that cultural diversity is recognized. Given all this, it is not
 sufficiently likely that the residents of Pittsburgh will perceive the
combination display as an endorsement or disapproval of their individual
religious choices.
LYNCH v. DONNELLY
March 5, 1984 | Burger, C.J. | Certiorari | Establishment Clause
SUMMARY: A city sponsors a Christmas display yearly which includes, among
other things that represent the Holiday season, a crèche. Residents then filed a suit
against the city alleging that the sponsorship of the display is in violation of the
Establishment clause. District Court sided with the plaintiffs which the CA
affirmed. The SC reversed the CA decision.
DOCTRINE: See Ratio 1.
FACTS:
1. Each year, the city of Pawtucket erects a Christmas display as part of its
observance of the Christmas holiday season. The display is in a park owned
by a nonprofit organization in the middle of a shopping district.
2. The display comprises of many figures and decorations traditionally
associated with Christmas, including, among other things, a Santa Claus
house, Christmas tree, etc., and the crèche which is at issue here.
3. The crèche has been included in the display for forty years which consists
of Infant Jesus, Mary and Joseph, angels, shepherds, kings and animals. The
crèche was acquired in 1973 at the cost of $1365. The erection and
dismantling of the crèche costs the city about $20 per year and lighting
expenses are also incurred.
4. Pawtucket residents and the Civil Liberties Union brought action
challenging   the   city’s   inclusion   of   the   crèche   in   the   annual   display.   The  
District Court   held   that   the   city’s   inclusion   of   the   crèche   in   the   display  
violates the Establishment Clause and it is an endorsement and
promulgation of religious beliefs. This crèche is supposedly conferring a
remote and incidental benefit on Christianity. This was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE/S: WoN the display of crèche by the city is a violation of the
Establishment Clause? - NO
RULING: Judgment of CA reversed.
RATIO:
1. The   purpose   of   the   Establishment   Clause   (EC)   is   “to   prevent,   as   far   as   of religion. Endorsement sends a message to non-adherents that they are
possible, the intrusion of either the church or state into the precincts of the
other.”  But  the  court  has  recognized  that  total  separation  is  impossible  in  an  
absolute sense. Some relationship between government and religious
organizations is inevitable.
2. Furthermore, the EC like the Due Process Clauses is not a precise, detailed
provision capable of ready application. The former creates a blurred,
indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a
particular situation.
3. In EC cases, the Court has invalidated governmental action on the ground
that a secular purpose was lacking, but only when it has concluded there
was no question that the statute or activity was motivated wholly by
religious considerations. In the case at bar, when the crèche is viewed in the
proper context of the Christmas Holiday season, it is apparent that the
inclusion of the crèche is not a purposeful effort to express some kind of
subtle governmental advocacy of a particular religious message. The
display is sponsored by the city to celebrate the Holiday and to depict the
origins of that Holiday. The creche is passive and is just a reminder of the
origins of Christmas. These are legitimate secular purposes.
4. To forbid the use of this one passive symbol - the creche - at the very time
people are taking note of the season with Christmas hymns and carols in
public schools and other public places, and while the Congress and
legislatures open sessions with prayers by paid chaplains, would be an
overreaction.
5. Also, if display of crèche violates the EC, then the expenditure of large
sums of public money for textbooks supplied to students attending church-
sponsored schools or federal grants for college buildings of church-
sponsored institutions should also be held unconstitutional.In all these
situations, whatever benefit there is to a religion, is indirect and incidental.
6. Moreover, it is ironic if the inclusion of a single symbol of a particular
historic religious event, as part of a celebration acknowledged in the
Western World for 20 centuries would taint the city's exhibit as to render it
violative of the Establishment Clause
CONCURRING OPINION (O’Connor,  J.)
The Establishment Clause prohibits government from making adherence to a
religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political community.
Government can run afoul of that prohibition in two principal ways. One is
excessive entanglement with religious institutions, which may interfere with the
independence of the institutions, give the institutions access to government or
governmental powers not fully shared by non-adherents of the religion, and
foster the creation of political constituencies defined along religious lines. The
second and more direct infringement is government endorsement or disapproval
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political RATIO:
community. Disapproval sends the opposite message. 1. One of the challenges to the statute is for vagueness, in violation of the due
The proper inquiry under the purpose prong of Lemon is whether the process clause—whether   the   Act   prohibits   “explanation”   of   the   theory   or  
government intends to convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of merely  forbids  “teaching  that  the  theory  is  true”.  In  either  case,  the  Court  
religion. In this case, there was no message of endorsement of Christianity or here held that the sole reason for the proscription is that it is deemed to be
disapproval of non-Christian religions by displaying the crèche but only for the in conflict with a particular religious doctrine, violating the neutrality that
purpose of celebration of the public holiday through its traditional symbols. the State should observe regarding religious matters.
Celebration of public holidays, which have cultural significance even if they 2. Government in a democracy must be neutral in matters of religious theory,
also have religious aspects, is a legitimate secular purpose. doctrine, and practice. It may not be hostile to any religion or to the
advocacy of no-religion; and it may not aid, foster, or promote one religion
or religious theory against another or even against the militant opposite.
EPPERSON v. ARKANSAS The First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion
November 12, 1968 | Fortas, J. | Declaratory Injunctive Relief | Separation of and religion, and between religion and non-religion.
Church and State: Establishment Clause 3. Although academic freedom is accorded respect, Courts have a duty to
intervene in resolution of conflicts w/c directly and sharply implicate basic
constitutional values. There is no doubt that the 1st Amendment does not
SUMMARY: The anti-evolution statute of Arkansas makes it unlawful for a
permit the State to require that teaching and learning must be tailored to the
public school teacher to teach the Darwinian theory. The Court held that purpose
principles or prohibitions of any religious sect or dogma. The Court used
and primary effect of the statute is to advance a dogma on the origin of man from
the test in Abington School District v Schempp: if either advancement or
the Book of Genesis, a clear violation of the Establishment Clause.
inhibition of religion serves as the purpose or primary effect of the statute,
DOCTRINE: The State is not permitted to require that teaching and learning
then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power. Here, Arkansas
must be tailored to the principles or prohibitions of any religious sect or dogma.
sought to prohibit teachers from discussing the theory of evolution because
it is contrary to the belief of some that the Book of Genesis must be the
FACTS:
exclusive source of the  doctrine  of  the  origin  of  man.  In  fact,  the  statute’s  
1. The State of Arkansas   adopted   an   “anti-evolution”   statute   in   1928,   w/c  
antecedent, the monkey law expressly declared that the purpose was to
makes it unlawful for a teacher in any state-supported school or university
make it unlawful to teach any theory that denies the story of the Divine
to teach the theory or doctrine that mankind ascended or descended from a
Creation of man as taught in the Bible, and to teach instead that man has
lower order of animals; or to adopt or use in any such institution a textbook
descended from a lower order of animals.
that teaches this theory. Violation is a misdemeanor and subjects the
4. Arkansas’   law   cannot   be   defended   as   an   act   of   religious   neutrality.   The  
violator to dismissal from his position.
State did not seek to excise from the curricula of its schools and all
2. For the academic year 1965-66, the school administration of Little Rock
discussion of the origin of man. The law's effort was confined to an attempt
prescribed a textbook w/c contained a chapter on the Darwinian theory of
to blot out a particular theory because of its supposed conflict with the
evolution. Susan Epperson, who was employed by the school to teach 10 th
Biblical account, literally read.
grade biology w/c presumably includes teaching the statutorily condemned
chapter, sought a declaration of the statute as void, and to enjoin the State
and officials of the Little Rock school system from dismissing her for
violation  of  the  statute’s  provisions.  
3. The Chancery Court held that the statute was void; but the Supreme Court
of Arkansas reversed and held that the statute was an exercise of the State’s  
power to specify the curriculum in public schools.

ISSUE/S: WoN the statute violates the Establishment Clause—YES

RULING: Statute declared VOID.

 ABINGTON SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SCHEMPP purpose of the 1st Amendment is not merely to strike down the official
June 17, 1963| Clark, J. | Certiorari | Separation of Church and State: establishment of a religion; but to create a complete and permanent
Establishment Clause separation of the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by
forbidding every form of public aid or support for religion. This neutrality
SUMMARY: Pursuant to a Pennsylvania statute, Abington High School adopts stems from a recognition of the teachings of history that powerful sects or
morning exercises w/c include reading 10 verses of the Bible and reciting the groups might bring about a fusion of governmental and religious functions
Lord’s  prayer  in  unison.  The  Court  held  that  the  practices  and  the  statute  violate   to the end that official support of the State or Federal Government would
the Establishment Clause for having the effect of advancing religion and violating be placed behind the tenets of one or of all orthodoxies.
neutrality in religious matters. 2. The Establishment Clause (freedom to believe) withdrew all legislative
DOCTRINE: If either advancement or inhibition of religion serves as the power respecting religious belief or the expression thereof, and the test is:
purpose or primary effect of the statute, then the enactment exceeds the scope of “what  are  the  purpose  and  primary  effect  of  the  enactment?  If  either is the
legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope
of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. Free Exercise
FACTS: (freedom to act), on the other hand, withdraws from legislative power the
1. The  Commonwealth  of  Pennsylvania  requires  that  “At  least  10  verses  from   exertion of any restraint on the free exercise of religion. Violation of the
the Holy Bible shall be read, w/o comment, at the opening of each public Free Exercise Clause is predicated on coercion, while the Establishment
school on each school day. Any child shall be excused from such Bible Clause need not be so attended. Thus, the fact that students may absent
reading, or attending such Bible reading, upon the written request of his themselves from the exercises is irrelevant in a constitutional challenge on
parent or guardian." the Establishment Clause.
2. The Schempp family (Unitarians): husband, wife, and 2 children attending 3. The exercises as described in Fact 2 show its religious character, and the
Abington High School, sought to enjoin enforcement of the statute for practices and the law requiring them are thus in violation of the
being violative of the Establishment Clause. Each school day at Abington Establishment Clause. The petitioners insist that unless religious exercises
High between 8:15 to 8:30 am while children in homeroom, opening are  permitted,  a  “religion  of  secularism”  is  established  in  the  schools.  The  
exercises are conducted pursuant to the law. These exercises broadcast to Court agrees that the State also cannot affirmatively opposing or showing
each classroom include 1) readings by one of the students of 10 Bible hostility to religion; but there is nothing in this Decision that proscribes
verses  (Jewish  scriptures  allowed),  2)  recitation  of  the  Lord’s  prayer  by  all   study of religion presented objectively as part of a secular program of
students in unison. The students and parents are advised that the student education. The petitioners further argue that the concept of neutrality
may absent himself from the classroom, or should he elect, not participate collides   with   the   majority’s   free   exercise   of   religion.   The   Court   held   that  
in the exercises. Despite this, the father argues that he decided against while the Free Exercise Clause clearly prohibits the use of state action to
excusing   his   children   from   attendance   on   the   belief   that   his   children’s   deny the rights of free exercise to anyone, it has never meant that a
relationships with teachers and classmates would be adversely affected. majority could use the machinery of the State to practice its beliefs.
3. The Trial Court struck down the practices and the statute requiring them,
holding that the reading of the verses possesses devotional and religious
character and constitutes in effect a religious observance.

ISSUE/S: WoN the statute violates the Establishment Clause—YES

RULING: Statute declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

RATIO:
1. Govt argues that by allowing other texts (Jewish) to be read, it does not
favor only the Christian faith. Court held that the Establishment Clause
does not only forbid govt preference of one religion over another. The
 ENGEL v. VITALE government. It is this very practice which caused many of the early
June 25, 1962 | Black, J. | Certiorari | Separation of Church and State: colonists to leave England and seek religious freedom in America.
Establishment Clause 2. The 1st Amendment was added to the Constitution to stand as a guarantee
that neither the power nor the prestige of the Federal Government would be
SUMMARY:the State Board of Regents of NY recommended an official used to control, support or influence the kinds of prayer the American
prayer to be recited daily in public schools. Parents of 10 pupils alleged that people can say – that   the   people’s   religious   must   not   be   subjected   to   the  
the authorization of the use of the official prayer violates the establishment pressures of government for change each time a new political
clause, and therefore the separation of the Church and the State. SC held that administration is elected to office. The government, state or federal, is
the official prayer is unconstitutional. without power to prescribe by law any particular form of prayer which is to
DOCTRINE: The government is without power to prescribe by law any be used as an official prayer in carrying on any program of governmentally
particular form of prayer which is to be used as an official prayer in carrying sponsored religious activity.
on any program of governmentally sponsored religious activity. 3. The fact that the prayer may be denominationally neutral or that its
observance is voluntary does not free it from the limitations of the
FACTS: Establishment Clause, as it might from the Free Exercise Clause. The
1. The State Board of Regents of New York, a governmental agency granted establishment clause, unlike the free exercise clause, does not depend upon
with   broad   supervisory,   executive   and   legislative   powers   over   the   State’s   any showing of direct governmental compulsion, and is violated by the
public school system, composed, recommended and published a prayer as a enactment of laws which establish an official religion, whether they directly
part   of   their   “Statement   on   Moral   and   Spiritual   Training   in   the   Schools”.   coerce non-observing individuals or not. When the power, prestige and
The Board of Education of the Union Free School No. 9, New Hyde Park, financial support of the government is placed behind particular religious
NY   directed   the   school   district’s   principal   to   adopt   the   prayer,   to   be   said   beliefs, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform
aloud by each class in the presence of a teacher at the beginning of each to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain.
school   day.   The   prayer   read:   “Almighty   God,   we   acknowledge   our   4. The purpose of the Establishment Clause is rested on the belief that 1) a
dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our union of government and religion tends to destroy government and to
teachers  and  our  Country”. degrade religion. The history of governmentally established religion showed
2. Parents of 10 pupils brought an action in the New York State Court, that whenever the government allies itself with one particular form of
insisting that the use of the official prayer in public schools was contrary to religion, it incurs the hatred, disrespect and contempt of those who held
the beliefs, religions, or religious practices of both themselves and their contrary beliefs, and that people lose their respect for any religion that relies
children. They also alleged that the state laws authorizing the use of the on the support of the government to spread its faith. Religion is too
prayer violate the 1st Amendment   which   commands   that   “Congress   shall   personal, too sacred, and too holy to permit its unhallowed perversion by a
make  no  law  respecting  an  establishment  of  religion”  (establishment  clause)   civil magistrate. Another purpose rests upon the awareness that 2)
which breaches the separation between Church and State. governmentally established religions and religious prosecutions go hand in
3. Defense:  prayer  is   “non-denominational”   and program does not require all hand (Church of England – Act of Uniformity: made it a criminal offense to
pupils  to  recite  the  prayer  over  his/her  parents’  objection. conduct or attend religious gatherings of any other kind, which contributed
to widespread persecutions).
ISSUE/S: WoN the authorization of the official prayer violates the 5. Although  the  establishment  of  the  Regent’s  prayer  as  an  officially  approved  
establishment clause – YES. religious doctrine does not amount to total establishment of one particular
religious sect (being so brief and general), it still promotes a family of
RULING: Reversed and Remanded. religions, therefore still violating the Establishment clause. (It may not
promote Roman Catholicism, for example, but it still promotes
RATIO: Christianity).
1. The establishment clause means that it is no part of the business of
government to compose official prayers for any group of the American
people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by the
 TILTON v. RICHARDSON
June 28, 1971 | Burger, C.J. | Appeal | Separation of Church and State:
Establishment Clause
SUMMARY: Appellants brought a suit for injunctive relief against officials who
administer the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963 and four church-related
colleges and universities in Connecticut who received federal grant under the Act
by arguing that these  schools  are  “sectarian”.  The  District  Court  held  that  the  Act  
authorized grants to church- related colleges and universities and upheld its
constitutionality. The Federal SC held the same but added that the part of the Act
providing for a 20-year limitation on the religious use of the facilities constructed
with federal funds is unconstitutional.
DOCTRINE: It is not whether some benefit accrues to a religious institution as a
consequence of the legislative program, but whether its principal or primary effect
advances religion.
FACTS:
1. The Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963 provides federal construction
grants for college and university facilities, excluding "any facility used or to
be used for sectarian instruction or as a place for religious worship,   or   …   activity violates the Religion Clauses was rejected long ago in Bradfield v.
primarily in connection with any part of the program of a school or
department of divinity." The U.S. retains a 20-year interest in facilities
constructed with funds under the Act, and if, during this period, the recipient
violates the statutory conditions, the government is entitled to recovery of
funds.
2. Four church-related colleges and universities in Connecticut received federal
construction grants for five facilities - (1) a library building at Sacred Heart
University; (2) a music, drama, and arts building at Annhurst College; (3) a
science building at Fairfield University; (4) a library building at Fairfield;
and (5) a language laboratory at Albertus Magnus College.
3. Appellants are citizens and taxpayers of the United States and residents of
Connecticut and attempted to show, in a three-judge court, that the recipient
institutions were "sectarian" by introducing evidence of their relations with
religious authorities, the curricula content, and other indicia of religious
character.
4. Appellee colleges introduced testimony that they had fully complied with the
statutory conditions and that their religious affiliations did not interfere with
their secular educational functions.
5. The District Court held that the Act authorized grants to church-related
schools, and sustained its constitutionality, finding that the Act had neither
the purpose nor the effect of promoting religion.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963 authorizes aid to church-
related institutions – YES
2. WON the Act is constitutional – YES
RULING: The Act is CONSTITUTIONAL except for that portion providing
for a 20-year limitation on the religious use of the facilities constructed with
federal funds. The case is remanded to the District Court.
RATIO:
1.) Congress defined "institutions of higher education," which are eligible to
receive aid under the Act, in broad and inclusive terms. Certain institutions are
expressly excluded and the Act expressly prohibits use of the facilities for
religious purposes but it makes no reference to religious affiliation or non-
affiliation. Under these circumstances "institutions of higher education" must be
taken to include church- related colleges and universities.
2.) Four questions regarding the constitutionality of the Act:
I. Does the Act reflect a secular legislative purpose?
The simplistic argument that every form of financial aid to church-sponsored
Roberts where the constitutionality of federal construction grant to a hospital
operated by a religious order was upheld. The crucial question is not whether
some benefit accrues to a religious institution as a consequence of the legislative
program, but whether its principal or primary effect advances religion. In this
case, the preamble of the Act expresses a legitimate secular objective entirely
appropriate for governmental action – the security and welfare of the United
States by encouraging and assisting colleges and universities accommodate the
rapidly those who seek higher education. The Act itself was carefully drafted to
ensure that the federally subsidized facilities would be devoted to the secular
and not the religious function of the recipient institutions.
The arguments of the appellants depend on the validity of the proposition that
religion so permeates the secular education provided by church-related colleges
and universities that their religious and secular educational functions are in fact
inseparable. However, there is no evidence that religion seeps into the use of any
of the facilities in the case.
II. Is the primary effect of the Act to advance or inhibit religion?
The limitation of federal interest in the facilities to a period of 20 years violates
the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, as the unrestricted use of valuable
property after 20 years is in effect a contribution to a religious body. However,
the unconstitutionality of this part of the Act does not mean that the entire Act
must be invalidated. Nothing was found in the statute or its objectives intimating
that Congress considered the 20-year provision essential to the statutory
program as a whole. There is no basis for assuming that the Act would have
failed of passage without this provision; nor will its excision impair either the
operation or administration of the Act in any significant respect.

III. Does the administration of the Act foster an excessive government

entanglement with religion?
The entanglement of the government and religion is lessened in this case, as
distinguished from Lemon v Kurtzman, because: (a) there is less danger that
religion will permeate the area of secular education since religious
indoctrination is not a substantial purpose or activity of these church-related
colleges and the students are less impressionable and less susceptible to
religious indoctrination than in church-related primary and secondary schools
dealing with impressionable children. (b) there is less need for government
surveillance since the facilities provided here religiously neutral which have
been permitted by the Court from cases such as Emerson to Allen unlike those in
Lemon and DiCasio where state programs who were not subsidized teachers
who are not necessarily religion-neutral, and (c) the government aid is a one-
time, single-purpose construction grant, with only minimal need for inspection.
Cumulatively, these factors lessen substantially the potential for divisive
religious fragmentation in the political arena.

IV. Does the implementation of the Act inhibit the free exercise of religion?
Appellants claim that the Free Exercise Clause is violated because they are
compelled to pay taxes, the proceeds of which in part finance grants under the
Act. However, they are unable to identify any coercion directed at the practice
or exercise of their religious beliefs. Their share of the cost of the grants under
the Act is not fundamentally distinguishable from the impact of the tax
exemption sustained in Walz or the provision of textbooks upheld in Allen.
 BROTHER MIKE VELARDE v. SOCIAL JUSTICE “The  constitutionality  of  a  statute  [or  act]  will  be  passed  upon  only  if,  and  to  the  
SOCIETY extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and
April 28, 2004 | Panganiban, J. | Certiorari | Separation of Church and State: is  essential  to  the  protection  of  the  rights  of  the  parties  concerned”
Establishment Clause

SUMMARY: SJS filed a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the

endorsements of candidates by religious leaders in elections. TC held such as
a violation of the separation of the church and the state. SC held that the issue
is of transcendental importance;;  however,  due  to  the  failure  of  SJS’s  counsel  
to present factual and legal bases, the issue could not be resolved.
DOCTRINE: I   don’t   even   know   why   this   case   was   assigned   under   the  
establishment clause. The court said NOTHING about the separation of the
church and state.

FACTS:
1. SJS, a registered political party, filed a petition for declaratory relief against
Bro. Mike Velarde, His Eminence Jaime Cardinal Sin, Exec. Minister Eraño
Manalo, Bro. Eddie Villanueva, and Bro. Eliseo Soriano, seeking an
interpretation of constitutional provisions, particularly the separation of
church and state, and a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the
acts of religious leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective office, or
urging or requiring the members of their flock to vote for a specified
candidate.
2. TC held that the endorsement of specific candidates in an election to any
public office is a clear violation of the separation clause, but failed to
include a dispositive portion, thus, Velarde and Soriano filed separate MRs
which were denied by the lower court.

ISSUE/S: WoN endorsements of candidates by religious leaders violate the

separation clause -

RULING: petition GRANTED. Order of RTC Manila declared NULL AND

VOID and thus SET ASIDE. SJS petition for declaratory relief DISMISSED.

RATIO:
Although the issue is of transcendental importance and presents a novel issue,
the counsel for SJS utterly failed to present enough factual and legal bases to
resolve the paramount issue. Petition failed to state directly the ultimate facts
that it relied upon for its claim. No factual allegations, nor factual findings in the
decision. At best, SJS merely asked a hypothetical question – an advisory
opinion  which  is  beyond  the  court’s  constitutional  mandate  and  jurisdiction.
 NEWDOW v. U.S. CONGRESS et al 1.
th
June 26, 2002 | Goodwin, J. | U.S. CA decision (9 Circuit) | Separation of
Church and State: Establishment Clause/Free Exercise Clause
SUMMARY: Newdow, an atheist whose daughter attends the EGUSD,
challenges  the  statement  “under  God”  included  in  the  Pledge  of  Allegiance  to   Flag. Aside from that, the profession a nation is under God is almost similar
the Flag of the U.S.A as violative of the Establishment Clause. The CA held
that the statement violated the Establishment Clause after applying the
Endorsement, Coercion and Lemon tests.
DOCTRINE: Parents have a right to direct the religious upbringing of their
children and, on that basis, have standing to protect their right from a measure
which interferes with such right (see Note).
Endorsement Test; Coercion Test; Lemon Test.
FACTS:
1. Michael Newdow is an atheist. His daughter attends school at the Elk Grove
Unified   School   District   (EGUSD),   California.”   The   EGUSD   has   2.
implemented a policy requiring the reciting of the Pledge of Allegiance to
the Flag of the U.S.A once each day, in accordance with the California
Education   Code   mandating   that   school   days   begin   with   the   “appropriate   that   the   religious   content   of   “one   nation   under   God”   is   minimal,   it   may
patriotic   exercises.”   Every   morning   of   a   school   day,   a   teacher   leads   the   appear as an attempt to enforce monotheism for an atheist or a non-believer
students in reciting the Pledge.
2. The  text  of  the  Pledge  (after  several  amendments  over  the  years):  “I pledge
allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America, and to the Republic for which
it stands, one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.”  (The
phrase  “under  God”  was  added  by  a  1954  federal  statute)
3. Newdow does not allege that his daughter is being required by the teachers
or the school district to participate in the reciting of the Pledge. He alleged,
however, that his daughter is injured when she is compelled to watch and
listen as their teacher leads the other students in proclaiming that there is a
God and that their nation is under one God. As such, he argues that the
inclusion  of  the  words  “under  God”  violates  the  Establishment  Clause.  The
3.
case, however, was dismissed due to lack of cause of action.
ISSUE/S:  WoN  the  statement  “one  nation  under  God”  in  the  Pledge  as  well  as  
the EGUSD school policy violated the Establishment Clause – YES
RULING: Judgment of dismissal reversed. Case remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this ruling.
2003 decision – Defendants’  petition  for  rehearing  en  banc  is  denied.  
RATIO:
The Court applied three tests:
Endorsement Test (failed): the statement that the U.S. is a nation under
God is an endorsement of religion. It is profession of a religious belief,
namely   monotheism.   The   words   “one   nation   under   God”   does   not   merely  
describe the historical significance of religion to the founding of the U.S. It
is for the purpose of swearing allegiance to the values represented by the
to a profession that the nation is under a particular supreme being (Jesus,
Vishnu, etc.).Furthermore, the school district's practice of teacher-led
recitation of the Pledge aims to inculcate in students a respect for the ideals
set forth in the Pledge, and thus amounts to state endorsement of these
ideals. Although students cannot be forced to participate in reciting the
Pledge, the school district is nonetheless conveying a message of state
endorsement of a religious belief when it requires public school teachers to
recite, and lead the recitation of, the current form of the Pledge. For an
atheist who does not believe in God, this has the effect of feeling that he is
an outsider who is not a full member of the political community.
Coercion Test (failed): the school policy and the 1954 Act places the
students in a position wherein they have to choose participating in an
exercise with religious content or protesting. While the defendants argue
 
of Judeo-Christian monotheism. In this case, the coercive effect is more
pronounced in the school setting given the age and impressionability of the
children, and the understanding that they are required to adhere to the norms
set by the school, teachers and their fellow students. While they are not
required to recite the Pledge, there is still the coercive effect given that they
have  to  listen  to  “one  nation  under  God”  being  repeatedly  recited  every  day.  
Furthermore, the coercive effect is apparent from the context and legislative
history   of   the   1954   Act   (President   Eisenhower   stated   during   the   Act’s  
signing ceremony: “From this day forward, the millions of our school children
will daily proclaim in every city and town, every village and rural schoolhouse, the
dedication  of  our  Nation  and  our  people  to  the  Almighty.”)
Lemon Test (failed):(1) must have a secular purpose; (2) must have a principal or
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion: (3) must not foster an
excessive government entanglement with religion
The 1954 Act fails the first prong of the Lemon Test. The federal
defendants (U.S. Congress et al) argue that the Pledge as a whole in the
final version serves a secular purpose. However, the amendment which
added  the  words  “under  God”  reveals the intent to advance religion in order
to distinguish the U.S. from the atheistic communist states.
The EGUSD policy, on the other hand, survived the first prong (there is a
secular purpose of fostering patriotism), but not the second prong. The
school policy is highly likely to convey a message of endorsement to
 adherents and disapproval to non-adherents of their beliefs regarding the RULING: Judgment affirmed.
existence of a monotheistic God.
RATIO:
NOTE: The CA held that Newdow has standing as a parent to challenge a practice that 1. For Establishment Clause claims based on non-economic harm, the
interferes with his right to direct the religious education of his daughter. plaintiffs must identify a personal injury they suffered as a consequence of
the alleged constitutional error, other than the psychological consequence
presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one disagrees.
GLASSROTH v. MOORE In this type of case, plaintiffs have standing if they are directly affected by
July 1, 2003 | Carnes, J. | U.S. CA decision (11th Circuit) | Separation of Church the laws and practices against which their complaints are directed. In the
and State: Free Exercise Clause instant case, the attorneys were offended by the monument, and two of them
altered their behavior. One of them incurred expenses by purchasing law
SUMMARY: Alabama C.J. Moore had a monument to the Ten Commandments books and doing online research to minimize use of the state law library,
installed   in   the   Alabama   State   Judicial   Building’s   rotunda.   It   was   assailed   as   and   hiring   messengers   to   file   documents   in   the   building’s   courts,   all   to  
violative of the Establishment Clause. The SC ruled that it failed two of the minimize contact with the monument. Thus, they have standing. The
three prongs of the Lemon test and violative of the Establishment Clause. injuries  they  assert  are  not  based  solely  on  their  disagreement  with  the  CJ’s  
DOCTRINE: The three-pronged Lemon test: (1) must have valid secular views on religion or government, but because of the monument itself.
purpose; (2) must not have the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion; and (3) 2. The Ten Commandments are undeniably a sacred text in the Jewish and
must not foster excessive government entanglement with religion. Christian faiths, and no legislative recitation of supposed secular purpose
can deny that fact. But not all government uses of the Ten Commandments
FACTS: are impermissible, if it withstands scrutiny under the prevailing three-step
1. Under cover of night and without the knowledge of the eight other justices, legal test provided in Lemon v Kurtzmann: (1) must have valid secular
the   Alabama   SC’s   CJ   Moore,   known   as   the   ‘Ten   Commandments   Judge’   purpose; (2) must not have the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion;
(advertised as such in his campaign for CJ, wherein he promised to restore and (3) must not foster excessive government entanglement with religion.
the   law’s   moral   foundation)   installed   a   monument to the Ten 3. CJ  Moore  candidly  testified  that  his  purpose  in  the  monument’s  placement  
Commandments  as  the  centerpiece  of  the  Alabama  State  Judicial  Building’s   was to acknowledge the law and sovereignty of the God of the Holy
rotunda, where everyone could see it, to remind all Alabama citizens of, Scriptures   and   to   acknowledge   God’s   overruling   power   over   the   affairs   of  
among other things, his belief in the sovereignty of the Judeo-Christian God men. He also repeatedly referenced God in his unveiling speech and refused
over both the state and the church. He also rejected a request to permit a a request to give a famous speech of equal position and prominence. Given
monument displaying a historically significant speech in the same space, on all this evidence,  the  argument  that  the  monument’s  purpose  is  clearly  non-
the   grounds   that   “the   placement   of   a   speech   of   any   man   alongside   the   secular. Thus, it fails the first prong in the Lemon test.
revealed law of god would tend in consequence to diminish the purpose of 4. Using the additional test of WoN the monument had the primary effect of
the  Ten  Commandments  monument”. advancing religion (effect prong) the Court concluded that a reasonable
2. The monument and its placement created the impression of being in the observer  would  view  the  monument’s  effect  as  an  endorsement  of  religion  
presence of something holy and sacred, causing some building employees based on its appearance, setting and the quotations and text therein, in
and visitors to consider the monument an appropriate and inviting place for addition   to   CJ’s   campaign   as   the   Ten   Commandments   Judge   and   his  
prayer. Three attorneys brought two separate lawsuits to have the unveiling speech. Thus, it fails the second  of  Lemon’s  three  prongs.  As  the  
monument taken out, alleging that the monument offended them and made monument  failed  two  of  Lemon’s  three  prongs,  it  violates  the  Establishment  
them   feel   like   ‘outsiders’,   and   that   the   CJ’s   actions   violated   the   First   clause.
Amendment’s   Establishment   Clause.   The district court ordered the
monument affirmed. The CJ appealed.

ISSUE/S: WoN plaintiffs have standing to sue - YES

WoN the monument violated the Establishment Clause - YES
 MARTIN et al v. THE CORPORATION OF THE
PRESIDING BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS
CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS
May 16, 2001| Marshall, C.J. | Injunction | Separation of Church and State:
Establishment/Free Exercise Clause
SUMMARY: The Mormon church sought an exemption from the zoning board
from the height limit requirement for uninhabited projections. Residents of
Belmont challenged the board’s   decision   granting   it.   SC   held   that   the   Dover   applicability of the Dover Amendment is warranted.
Amendment preventing local discrimination against religious uses applied; and
that  the  board’s  decision  was  valid  as  balanced  with  municipal  concerns.
DOCTRINE: The Dover Amendment seeks to strike a balance between
preventing local discrimination against religious use, and honoring legitimate
municipal concerns by taking into account special characteristics of exempt use.
FACTS:
1. In 1995, the president of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
announced plans to construct a temple on a 9-acre wooded lot in Belmont
owned by the church since 1979. The construction of the temple was of
deep religious significance for the members believe that the location and
design of temples are revealed by God to the president of the church.
2. The site was in a single-residence zoning district, and the church had a right
to construct a temple up to 60 ft or 4 stories. The plan complied with the
zoning requirements, but the 83 ft proposed steeple (w/c included at the top
a 10-ft statue of the Angel Moroni) did not comply with the Belmont bylaw
governing   uninhabited   “projections”   w/c   only   allowed   12   ft.   The   church   of steeple to building height. Finally, a rigid  application  of  the  Belmont’s
applied for a special permit, w/c the board granted after applying the Dover
Amendment, w/c requires a degree of accommodation between protected
uses and matters of municipal concern.
3. The plaintiffs, owners of residential properties that abut the temple site,
challenged  the  board’s  decision  in  the  Superior  Court.  The  Court  held  that  
the Dover Amendment did not apply because neither the presence nor the
height of the steeple represents a necessary element of Mormon religion.
ISSUE/S:
1. WoN the Dover Amendment applies—YES
2. WoN  the  Board’s  decision  was  valid—YES
RULING: Judgment REVERSED.
RATIO:
1. The Dover Amendment precludes the adoption of zoning ordinances or
bylaws restricting the use of land for religious purposes, but authorizes
“reasonable   regulation”   of   bulk,   height,   yard   size,   lot   area,   setbacks,   open  
space, and parking requirements. The amendment seeks to strike a balance
between preventing local discrimination against religious use, and honoring
legitimate municipal concerns that typically find expression in local zoning
laws. The Superior Court erred in its decision, for it is not for judges to
determine whether the inclusion of a particular architectural feature is
necessary for a particular religion ie church kitchen, church parking lot, rose
window etc. It is sufficient to conclude that temples are places where
Morons conduct their sacred ceremonies, and no further inquiry as to the
2. The judge in the Superior Court stated that even if the Dover Amendment
applied, the church failed to prove that application of the Belmont bylaw to
its temple was unreasonable, and that its desire to build a steeple was
purely aesthetic. The Court held that the test is whether the requirement
takes into account the special characteristics of the exempt use, and a
zoning requirement that results in something less than a nullification of a
proposed exempt use may be unreasonable w/in the meaning of the Dover
Amendment. In this case, the character of the temple with its steeple
encompasses both its architectural beauty, as well as its religious
symbolism. The church’s  architect  based  its  design  on  the  value  placed  by  
the church on ascendancy of space for religious ceremonies performed in
the temples. Again, it is not for the judge to determine what is and what is
not a matter of religious doctrine.
3. The board found that no municipal concern was served by controlling the
steeple height of the churches and found the height exemption reasonable
in light of the function of the steeple, and the importance of proportionality
 
height  restrictions  for  uninhabited  “projections”  would  impair  the  character  
of the temple w/o advancing any municipal concern.
 AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY v. CITY OF MANILA
April 30, 1957 | Felix, J. | Appeal from CFI judgment | Separation of Church and
State: Free Exercise Clause
SUMMARY: The American Bible Society, which is engaged in the sale,
distribution and translation of bibles and religious pamphlets, were required to
secure permit, license and to pay the license fees pursuant to the ordinances of
the City of Manila. The ABS then filed suit challenging the ordinances as
impairing their free exercise of religious profession. The SC held that the
ordinances were inapplicable to the American Bible Society.
DOCTRINE: see Ratio No. 1.
FACTS:
1. American Bible Society (ABS) is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious,
missionary corporation duly registered and doing business in the Philippines
through its Philippine agency established at 636 Isaac Peral, Manila in
November, 1898. It sells and distributes Bibles and Gospels and translates
them into several Philippine dialects.
2. On May 29, 1953, the acting City Treasurer of Manila informed ABS that it
violated certain ordinances (Ordinance No. 3000 and Ordinance No. 2529
as amended) by operating without  a  Mayor’s  permit  and  municipal  license   general application and not particularly directed against institutions like the
from Nov., 1945 – 1953. It then required ABS to secure the necessary
permit and license and pay the license fees in the total amount of Php 5,
821.45 + Php 70 for compromise and permit dues during the litigation of
the case.
3. In order to avoid inconvenience and to avoid the closing of their business,
the ABS paid the fees in protest. In addition to that, they filed a complaint
in court to have the ordinances declared void and unconstitutional for
providing for religious censorship, restraining free exercise and enjoyment
of religious profession, and to have the paid amount refunded.
4. ABS proved that it and its parent society in the U.S. were exempt from the
payment of real estate tax, sales tax, and license fees. It also tried to prove
that it never made profit out of selling bibles, which defendant rebutted by
citing  the  testimony  of  ABS’  lone  witness  upon  cross-examination that the
bibles were being sold at prices higher than their actual cost as reflected by
ABS New York office. TC dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE/S: WoN Ordinance No. 3000 and 2529 apply to ABS – NO
WoN Ordinance No. 2529 is unconstitutional if applied to ABS – YES
RULING: Judgment of dismissal reversed. City of Manila ordered to return
amount paid by American Bible Society.
RATIO:
1. The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious
information. Any restraint of such right can only be justified like other
restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is a clear and
present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to
prevent (Tañada and Fernando).
2. Ordinance No. 3000 requires   the   securing   of   a   Mayor’s   permit   and   the
necessary  license  from  the  City  Treasurer,  but  ABS’  business  is  not  among  
those mentioned or enumerated under Sec. 3 of the Ordinance. There is
nothing on record that shows requirement of a permit for proper supervision
and enforcement of provisions on the sanitation, security and welfare of the
public and the health of the employees engaged in the business of the ABS.
Also,  item  no.  79  of  Sec.  3  requires  permits  for  “all  other  businesses,  trades  
or occupations not mentioned in this Ordinance, except those upon which
the  City  is  not  empowered  to  license  or  to  tax”  (read in relation to Note below
No. 3). Therefore, the necessity of the permit is made to depend upon the
power of the City to license or tax said business, trade or occupation.
Hence, this ordinance does not apply to ABS.
Even assuming that it applies to ABS, it is not unconstitutional since it is of
ABS, and it does not contain any provision prescribing religious censorship
or restraining the free exercise and enjoyment of any religious profession.
3. On the other hand, Ordinance No. 2529 (as amended), which requires
payment of license fees on quarterly basis based on gross sales and receipts,
is not imposed directly upon any religious institution but upon those
engaged in any of the business or occupations therein enumerated, such as
“retail dealers in general merchandise" which, ABS alleged, covers the
business or occupation of selling bibles, books, etc.
While it may be true that the selling price for the bibles and other religious
pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than their actual cost,
this cannot mean that ABS was engaged in the business or occupation of
selling said "merchandise" for profit such that they would fall within the
scope of the Ordinance. This Ordinance cannot be applied to ABS, for
doing so would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious
profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious
beliefs.
Also, under the National Internal Revenue Code, corporations or associations
organized and operated exclusively for religious purposes are exempted from
paying income taxes, and the Collector of Internal Revenue, as argued by ABS,
has granted tax exemption to the same, clearly indicating that the act of
distributing and selling bibles, etc. is purely religious.
 GERONA v. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION
August 12, 1959 | Montemayor, J. | Appeal | Separation of Church and State:
Free Exercise Clause 2.
SUMMARY: The Secretary of Education issued a Department Order prescribing
the proper conduct of flag ceremony in schools. Some students, petitioners herein,
refused to follow such order on the ground that it was against their religion and 3.
were expelled as a result thereof. SC held that the order did not violate the
Constitutional provision about freedom of religion and petitioners were properly
excluded and dismissed from the public school there were attending.
DOCTRINE: See Ratio 1.
FACTS:
1. In 1955, RA no. 1265 was approved which authorized and directed the 4.
Secretary of Education to issue rules and regulations for the proper conduct
of the flag ceremony. Pursuant to this act, said Secretary issued Department
Order No. 8 which required flag ceremonies daily in every school and
mandated students to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and to recite
the patriotic pledge.
2. Petitioners’  children  refused  to  salute  and  sing  which  led  to  their  expulsion   5.
from school. They then prayed thru a letter addressed to the Secretary that
they be allowed to attend school and to remain silent and stand at attention
instead of the prescribed actions in the Order. The Secretary denied the
request.
3. Petitioners then commenced an action to restrain the Secretary from
enforcing the Order   as   applied   to   petitioners   and   all   Jehovah’s   Witnesses   during the formative period of their life, love of country and love of the
and   to   prevent   the   students’   exclusion   from   public   schools   on   account   of   flag, all of which make for united and patriotic citizenry.
their refusal to execute a formal salute to the flag, the singing of the national 6.
anthem and recitation of the patriotic pledge. Their refusal to do such stems
from their religious belief in a literal version of Exodus 20:4-5: "Thou shalt
not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of anything that is in
heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the
earth; thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them."
ISSUE/S: WoN  the  petitioners’  right  to  free  exercise  of  religion  was  violated  by   ceremony.
the Department Order? - NO
RULING: The appealed decision is AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
1. There is difference between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said
belief. If the exercise of said religious belief clashes with the established
institutions of society and with the law, then the former must yield and give
way to the latter. The Government steps in and either restrains said exercise
of even prosecutes the one exercising it.
The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and
cannot mean exemption from or non-compliance with reasonable and non-
discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent
authority.
In the case at bar, petitioners believe that the Filipino flag is an image and
to salute the same is to go against their religious belief. This argument is
untenable since appellants themselves concede that the flag is a symbol of
the State. That the flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic and an
emblem of national sovereignty. Considering the separation of church and
state, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance. Saluting the
flag consequently does not involve any religious ceremony.
In enforcing the flag salute on the petitioners, there was absolutely no
compulsion involved, and for their failure or refusal to obey school
regulations about the flag salute they were not being persecuted. If they
chose not to obey the regulation, there merely lost the benefits of public
education being maintained at the expense of their fellow citizens. Having
elected not to comply, they forfeited their right to attend public schools.
In requiring school pupils to participate in the flag salute, the State thru the
Secretary of Education was not imposing a religion or religious belief. It
was merely enforcing a non-discriminatory school regulation applicable to
all alike whether Christian, Protestant or Jehovah's Witness. The State was
merely carrying out the duty imposed upon it by the Constitution. It does
nothing more than try to inculcate in the minds of the school population
The trouble with exempting petitioners from participation in the flag
ceremony aside from the fact that they have no valid right to such
exemption is that the latter would disrupt school discipline and demoralize
the rest of the school population. If the children of Jehovah Witnesses are
exempted, then the other pupils, seeing no reason for such exemption,
would naturally ask for the same privilege because they might want to do
something else. This would eventually undermine the purpose of the flag
 EBRALINAG v. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT RATIO:
March 1, 1993 | Griño-Aquino, J. | Certiorari, Mandamus, and Prohibition | 1. Right to religious profession and worship has a 2-fold aspect: the freedom
Separation of Church and State: Free Exercise Clause to  believe,  and  freedom  to  act  on  one’s  belief.  The  1st  is  absolute  as  long  as  
the belief is confined within the realm of thought. 2 nd is subject to regulation
SUMMARY: Students   who   are   members   of   Jehovah’s   Witnesses   are   expelled   where the belief is trained into external acts that affect the public welfare.
because they refused to participate in the flag ceremony, which is contrary to their 2. No Grave & Present Danger: Petitioners   emphasize   that   they   don’t  
beliefs. SC: Expulsion null & void. Jehovah’s   Witnesses   may   be   exempted   in   engage in any disruptive behavior that would offend their countrymen who
observing the flag ceremony out of respect for their religious beliefs, provided observe the flag ceremony. They merely stand at attention during the
they not cause any disruption to such patriotic exercises. ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who choose to
DOCTRINE: Right  to  religious  profession  &  worship’s   2-fold aspect: freedom participate.   And   pursuant   to   Justice   Teehankee’s   Dissent   in   German v
to  believe,  &  freedom  to  act  on  one’s  belief.  The  1st  is  absolute.  The  2 nd is subject Barangan, in the absence of a grave and present danger to public safety, etc
to  regulation  where  it’s  trained  into  external  acts  that  affect  public  welfare. that the State has a right to prevent,   the   petitioners’   expulsion   from   the  
schools is not justified.
FACTS: 3. Allowing   Exemptions   Won’t   Make   the   Flag   Ceremony   a   Thing   of   the  
1. Petitioners are 68 high school and elementary students who are members of Past: Court is not persuaded that by exempting the few students who are
Jehovah’s   Witnesses.   They   were   expelled   from   their   classes   by   the   public   members   Jehovah’s   Witnesses   from   the   flag   ceremony, they would
school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national suddenly produce a nation lacking in patriotism and love of country. And
anthem,  and  recite  the  patriotic  pledge  as  required  by  RA  1265  and  DECS’   besides, the petitioners are seeking exemption only from the flag ceremony
Department Order No. 8 which makes the flag ceremony compulsory to all – they may still study the Constitution, Philippine history and culture, and
educational   institutions.   Jehovah’s   Witnesses teach their kids not to salute be taught the virtues of patriotism, respect for human rights, appreciation
the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge since such for national heroes in the curriculum. In fact, forcing the small religious
are   “acts   of   worship”   or   religious   devotion”   which   they   can’t   group through the iron hand of the law to participate in a ceremony that
conscientiously give to anyone or anything except God based on 1 John violates their religious beliefs will be hardly conducive to love of country or
5:21. They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State. respect for duly constituted authorities.
2. The same issue was raised in Gerona v Secretary of Education, where the 4. Hence,   the   Jehovah’s   Witnesses   may   be   exempted   in   observing   the   flag  
Court upheld the expulsion of the students, finding the flag to be devoid of ceremony out of respect for their religious beliefs. However, they may not
religious significance and merely a symbol of the Republic and the flag disrupt such patriotic exercises; if they do, they are subject to the school
salute to be a mere non-discriminatory school regulation applicable to all authorities.
students. Since then, the doctrine has been codified in the Administrative
Code   of   1987:   “Any   teacher   or   student   or   pupil   who   refuses   to   join   or  
participate  in  the  flag  ceremony  may  be  dismissed  after  due  investigation.”
3. Petitioners do not question the Administrative Code provision, but merely
RA  1265  &  DECS’  Orders.  They  seek  their  expulsion  to  be  declared  void.

ISSUE/S: WON schoolchildren who are Jehovah’s  Witnesses  may  be  expelled  
from school for refusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to take part in the
flag ceremony - NO

RULING: Petition for certiorari & prohibition GRANTED. Expulsion orders

annulled and set aside.
 ANUCENSION v. NATIONAL LABOR UNION
November 29, 1977 | Makasiar, J. | Certiorari | Separation of Church and State:
Free Exercise Clause
SUMMARY: Petitioners are members of INC who resigned from the Union in
accordance with their faith as protected by RA 3350. Private respondents filed a
case against them where the respondent court found RA 3350 to be
unconstitutional. SC held that the Act is constitutional.
DOCTRINE: The government should not be precluded from pursuing valid
objectives secular in character even if the incidental result would be favorable to a
religion or sect.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners are workers at Hacienda Luisita and are members of INC.
2. Private respondents (Union and Hacienda) entered into a collective
bargaining agreement on August 2, 1966 which provided that persons who
may be employed by the bargaining unit must become members of the Union
within 15 days from inclusion except present members of the INC who are
not yet members of the Union. The agreement was to take effect from July 1,
1962 to June 30, 1965, or for a period of three years
3. In a letter to the union president, Rufino D. Lagman, dated May 8, 1964, a
group of more than 150 persons representing themselves to be members of
the Union and INC tendered what they believed to be their legal resignation
from the Union within the purview of the freedom of religion guaranteed by
the Constitution. Evidence showed they were prompted to resign from the
union because of the circular, dated April 1, 1959, from the INC enjoining
all members not to join or disaffiliate themselves from any outside
association, otherwise they would be expelled from the church. The circular
reads: “Buong higpit na aming ibinababala sa inyo na sinomang kapatid sa
Iglesia ay huwag aanib sa anumang uri ng kapisanan o samahang labas sa
Iglesia Ni Cristo. Ang sinomang kapatid na sa kasalukuyan ay kaanib sa
anumang uri ng kapisanan o samahan, ay dapat na umalis at huwag ng
kailanman uugnay sa mga ito. Ito ay salig sa utos ng Dios na tayo ay
Âhuwag   makikipamatok   ng   kabilang   sa   mga   hindi   sumasampalataya” (II
Cor. 6:14).
4. On May 22, 1964, the Union informed the Hacienda by letter that 115
followers of Iglesia ni Cristo have resigned from the Union as of May 8,
1964   and   asked   in   another   letter   the   “immediate   lay-off of employment of
those  laborers”  as  provided  by  their  present  collective  bargaining.  
5. On June 1, 1964, petitioners filed a notice of strike against the Hacienda for
alleged   “mass   dismissal   of   INC   agricultural   laborers   in   violation   of   RA  
3530, for violation of collective bargaining contract to favor contracting
union and unlawful encouragement of union membership. On July 7, 1964,
they filed a complaint with the Court of Agrarian Relations. Their prayer for
an interlocutory order was denied by said Court in an order dated July 9,
1964 .
6. Meanwhile, the Union, on June 8, 1964, filed a notice of strike against the
Hacienda for violation of the collective contract dated August 2, 1962. The
case was certified to the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) who ruled in
favor of respondents and held that RA 3350 is unconstitutional.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the case was within the jurisdiction of the respondent court – NO
2. WON RA 3350 is unconstitutional – NO
RULING: The appealed decision is VACATED and SET ASIDE.
RATIO:
1.) Respondent Hacienda is an agricultural enterprise. The petitioners and the
members of the Union are all agricultural workers. In Santos v Court of
Industrial Relations, the Court held that in the case of agricultural laborers, the
CIR cannot, under RA 875, take cognizance of a claim of unfair labor practice
“not  only  because  an  agricultural  laborer  does  not  come   within  the  purview  of  
the word employee defined in Section 2(d) of RA 875 but also because any
matter that may pertain to the relation of tenant and landlord comes under the
Agricultural Tenancy Act (RA 1199, as amended by RA 2263), and any
controversy that may arise between them as an incident of their relationship
comes under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations
created  by  RA  1267.”
2.) Respondent Court argued that the Act suffers from the following
constitutional infirmities:
(a) It abridges the freedom of workers to form associations for purposes not
contrary to law. – RA 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application and
coverage of the closed shop agreement the employees belonging to any religious
sects which prohibit affiliation of their members with any labor organization. If,
notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of said religious sects prefer
to sign up with the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty to their
religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce
them to join; neither does the law prohibit them from joining ; and neither may
the employer or labor union compel them to join .
(b) It impairs the obligation of contracts. – Legislation impairing the obligation
of contracts can be sustained when it is enacted for the promotion of the general
good of the people, and when the means adopted to secure that end are
reasonable. The purpose of RA 3350 was to insure freedom of belief and
religion, and to promote the general welfare by preventing discrimination
against those members of religious sects which prohibit their members from work and from being dismissed from their work because of union shop security
joining labor unions. It also protects members of said religious sects against agreements.
three aggregates of group strength from which the individual needs protection –
the Union, the management, and the collective bargaining relationship.
Moreover, the US SC has continuously held that First Amendment Rights,
including rights to religious freedom, are preferred rights and can only be
curtailed in the presence of clear and present danger. Contractual rights,
therefore, must yield to freedom of religion.

(c) It discriminates in favor of the religious sect known as Iglesia ni Cristo in

violation of the constitutional provision prohibiting legislation for the support of
any religious sect. – In Aglipay vs. Ruiz, the Court stated that the government
should not be precluded from pursuing valid objectives secular in character even
if the incidental result would be favorable to a religion or sect. It has likewise
been held that the statute, in order to withstand the strictures of constitutional
prohibition, must have a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion. In this light, RA 3350 does not violate the
no-establishment clause of the Constitution. The purpose of Republic Act No.
3350 is secular, worldly, and temporal, not spiritual or religious or holy and
eternal. It is intended to serve the secular purpose of advancing the
constitutional rights to free exercise of religion against the risk of being refused,
dismissed, or dispossessed of their right to work by reason of union security
agreements. It is in accordance with the 1935 and 1973 Constitution which
mandates   that   the   State   “shall   afford   protection to labor, promote full
employment and security in employment, ensure equal work opportunities
regardless of sex, race or creed and regulate the relation between workers and
employers.”

(d) It denies to the workers their constitutional right to equal protection of the
laws. – The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution guarantees
equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things
which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. It
allows for classification that is reasonable, which means that the classification
should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that
it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally
to each member of the class. RA 3350 satisfies the aforementioned
requirements. The act classifies employees and workers, as to the effect and
coverage of union shop security agreements, into those who can join the union
and those who cannot by virtue of their religious beliefs. The classification rests
on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions in the
beliefs, feelings and sentiments of employees. The classification introduced by
said Act is also germane to its purpose to avoid those who cannot, because of
their religious belief, join labor unions, from being deprived of their right to
 IGLESIA NI CRISTO v. CA and BRMPT RULING:  CA  ruling  affirmed  as  to  the  jurisdiction  of    MTRCB  to  review  “Ang  
July 26, 1996 | Puno, J. | Review of CA decision | Separation of Church and Iglesia  ni  Cristo”  but  reversed  and  set  aside  insofar  as  it  sustained  the  action  of  
State: Free Exercise Clause the MTRCB x-rating TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, and 121.

SUMMARY:  INC’s  TV  program,  Ang  Iglesia  ni  Cristo”,  was  given  “X”  rating   RATIO:
by the BRMPT after it was found that the series involved attacks against other 1. Freedom of religion is designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
religions. SC held that the MTRCB has the power to review the said program conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to
but held that they acted with grave abuse of discretion in censoring the program. profess his beliefs and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with
DOCTRINE: See Ratio No. 1 the liberty of others and with the common good.
Exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring Two-fold aspect of right to religious profession and worship – (1) freedom
about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil which the State is to  believe  and  (2)  freedom  to  act  on  one’s  beliefs:  The   first  is  absolute  as  
duty bound to prevent. long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is
subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that
FACTS: affect the public welfare.
1. Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), a duly organized religious organization, has a TV 2. P.D. 1986 grants the Board the power to screen, review and examine all
program  entitled  “Ang  Iglesia  ni  Cristo”  aired  on  Channel  2  every  Saturday   “television   programs”. It can, among others, approve, delete, and/or
and on Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents and propagates prohibit the exhibition and/or broadcast of television programs. The law
INC’s   religious   beliefs,   doctrines and practices oftentimes in comparative also   directs   the   Board   to   apply   “contemporary Filipino cultural values as
standard to determine those which are objectionable for being immoral, indecent,
studies with other religions.
contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the
2. Private respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television Philippines and its people, or with a dangerous tendency to encourage the
(BRMPT)   classified   certain   VTR   tapes   of   the   INC’s   TV   program   series   commission of violence or of a wrong or crime.”  
(Nos.  115,  119,  121  &  128)  as  “X”  or  not   for public viewing because they In  this  case,  the  public  TV  broadcast  of  INC’s  religious belief brings it out
“offend   and   constitute   an   attack   against   other   religions”   (such   as   of the scope of the first aspect, and the exercise of religious freedom can be
Catholicism and Protestantism) which is expressly prohibited by law. INC regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present danger
appealed  the  Board’s  decision  to  the   Office  of  the  President,  the  appeal  of   of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent.
which was granted and allowed them to air No. 128. 3. However,   the   Board’s   decision   of   classifying   the   series   as   “X”   and  
3. INC also filed a case in the RTC vs. the Board alleging the latter to have prohibited its airing cannot be sustained.
acted w/ grave abuse of discretion in requiring the INC to submit tapes of The heavy presumption of invalidity accompanying prior restraint of speech, such as
the series to the Board before being aired. TC ordered the Board to grant the religious speech, has not been overthrown by the Board.
INC the necessary permits to air the series but also directed INC to refrain The CA upheld the x-rating   of   the   Board   on   INC’s   TV   program   even   if   it   did  not  
from   offending   and   attacking   other   existing   religions   in   showing   “Ang   view  the  tapes  (they  were  not  presented  as  evidence).  Such  ruling  suppresses  INC’s  
Iglesia  ni  Cristo”  program.  The  Board  appealed  to  the  CA,  which  reversed   freedom of speech and right to free exercise of religion. While the Board may
the RTC ruling, stating that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the disagree   with   INC’s   criticisms   of   other   religions’   beliefs   or   practices,   they   cannot  
part  of  the  Board  and  found  INC’s  series  as  “indecent,  contrary  to  law  and   restrain  INC’s  speech  in  order  to  protect  other  religions.  It  is  not  the  task  of  the  State  
contrary  to  good  customs.” to favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion. Religious
dogmas and beliefs are often at war, and to preserve peace among their followers,
especially the fanatics, the establishment clause prohibits the State from leaning
ISSUE/S:  WoN  the  Board  has  the  power  to  review  “Ang  Iglesia  ni  Cristo”  – towards any religion. If there ought to be no difference b/w the appearance and
YES reality of freedom of religion, the remedy against bad theology is better theology.
WoN the Board acted w/ grave abuse of discretion in x-rating  INC’s  TV   The bedrock of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by
program – YES encouraging the marketplace of dueling ideas.
P.D.  1986  does  not  involve  “attack  on  another  religion”  as  a  ground  for  censorship.
Furthermore, the Board cannot also use Art. 201 (2)(b)(3) of the Revised Penal Code
punishing  anyone  who  exhibits  “shows  which   offend any  race  or  religion”  because  
 (1)   “attack”   is   not   synonymous   to   “offend”   and   (2)   the   RPC   provision   should   be  
invoked to justify subsequent punishment but not prior restraint.
There   is   a   failure   to   apply   the   clear   and   present   danger   rule   since   the   Board’s  
decision is completely bereft of factual findings to justify the conclusion that the
subject video tapes constitute impermissible attacks against another religion. There
is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially
as to its gravity and imminence. Prior restraint on speech, including religious
speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a
substantive and imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already on
ground.

Note: Applicability of the clear and present danger rule – in U.S. jurisprudence, the test is
still applied to four types of speech: (1) speech that advocates dangerous ideas, (2) speech
that provokes a hostile audience reaction, (3) out of court contempt and (4) release of
information that endangers a fair trial.
There is reason to apply the clear and present danger test to this case which concerns
speech that attacks other religions and could readily provoke hostile audience reaction. It
cannot be doubted that religious truths disturb and disturb terribly.
 PAMIL v. TELERON
November 20, 1978 | Fernando, J. | Certiorari | Separation of Church and State:
Free Exercise Clause
SUMMARY: Fr. Gonzaga gets elected as mayor of Albuquerque. Rival Pamil
files suit to disqualify him pursuant to prohibition in Admin Code. SC: Provision
a religious test contrary to the Constitution. However, upheld for lack of votes.
DOCTRINE: No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or
political rights.
FACTS:
1. In 1971, Fr. Margarito Gonzaga was elected as municipal mayor of
Albuquerque, Bohol and was proclaimed as such. Pamil, who was an
aspirant for the office, files a suit for his disqualification based on the
Administrative   Code,   Section   2175:   “In   no   case   shall   there   be   elected   or   more significant and powerful. And the national experience with
appointed to a municipal office, ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service,
persons receiving salaries from provincial or national funds, or contractors
for  public  works  of  the  municipality”
2. Suit   did   not   prosper,   since   Judge   sustained   Father   Gonzaga’s   right   to   the   Hence, the ecclesiastic should be free to seek public office and place his
office of municipal mayor. He ruled that such statutory ineligibility was
impliedly repealed by the Election of 1971. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: WON ecclesiastics are eligible for an elective municipal position –
YES. But for lack of the necessary 8 votes - NO.
RULING: Petition for certiorari GRANTED. Gonzaga ordered to vacate the
mayoralty of Albuquerque, Bohol, there being a failure to elect.
RATIO:
1. Provision Imposes Religious Test: The 1935 & 1973 Constitution provide
that  “No  religious  test  shall  be  required  for  the  exercise of civil or political
rights.”   The   challenged   provision   imposes   a   religious   test   by   declaring   clause  only  implements  and  supplements  one’s  freedom  to  entertain  vies  of
ecclesiastics ineligible to any elective or appointive office; hence, it is, on
its face, inconsistent with the religious freedom guaranteed by the
Constitution.
2. Lack of Necessary Votes: It  isn’t  even   necessary  to  annul  the  challenged   religious belief & gain for his Church dominance over the State.
provision since it is declared inoperative by virtue of the 1935
Constitution’s   mandate.   However,   for   lack   of   the   necessary   8   votes   (7-5),
the assailed provision is upheld.
Teehankee, Dissenting:
1. I concur with the main opinion that the archaic Administrative Code
provision violates religious freedom. The Constitution guarantees the fullest
religious freedom, and to assure this, the Constitution commands that no
religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
2. The no-religious test clause constitutionally bars the state from
disqualifying non-believers & even Satanists. In the opposite end, to
disqualify   ‘full   believers’   from   being   voted   for   an elected to a municipal
office amounts to compelling them to shed off their religious ministry for
the exercise of their political rights to run for public office.
3. The   main   thrust   of   the   concurring   Justices   is   the   fear   of   “religious  
intolerance and persecution   by   ecclesiastics”   and   the   oppression,   abuses,  
misery,  immorality,  and  stagnation”  wreaked  by  the  Spanish  friars.  But  they  
didn’t   consider   that   those   were   due   to   the   union   of   the   State   and   Church  
then, which is now categorically proscribed by the Constitution.
4. The statutory prohibition is limited to appointments and elections for
municipal offices. There is no ban for national office, which is politically
ecclesiastics   show   that   they’ve   discharged their task competently – like
Msgr. Aglipay, Minister Sobrepena, Aglipayan Bishop Castro, etc as
delegates to Constitutional Conventions, and even Fr. Gonzaga himself.
qualifications for public service before the electorate, who will pass
judgment upon hm.
Makasiar, Concurring:
1. The assailed provision is not a religious test for the exercise of civil and
political liberties. It merely defines a disqualification for a public office, not
by reason of his religion or lack of it, but b/c of his religious profession/
vocation. Any citizen  who  isn’t  a  priest/  minister  can  run  for  office.  
2. Section 2175 was designed to preserve the indestructible wall of separation
between Church and State – the basic pillar of our democratic regime,
which is a sharp reaction to the historical lesson that the union of Church &
State   tends   to   destroy   gov’t   and   degrade   religion.   The   no-religious test
 
his relations to his Creator and to evangelize his religious belief, but it
doesn’t  guarantee him the right to run for or be appointed to a public office
and then such public office to compel the citizenry to conform to his
3. If a priest/minister is elected/appointed to public office, it will violate the
constitutional prohibitions for priests/ministers to have public funds
appropriated for his salary and enjoy the use or benefit of any property of
the municipality. And the Church, even without registering as a political
party, will field its own candidates for municipal offices all over the
Country.
 MCDANIEL v. PATY
April 19, 1978 | Burger, C.J. | Appeal from Tennessee SC | Separation of Church
and State: Free Exercise Clause
SUMMARY: Paty sought to have McDaniel, a Baptist minister running for a
position as delegate to the constitutional convention, disqualified by virtue of the
statute providing the qualifications of the delegates to the same as to that of
legislators. Under Tennessee Constitution, priests or ministers of any sect are
disqualified from serving as legislators. U.S. SC held that the statute violated
McDaniel’s  right  to  free  exercise  of  religion.
DOCTRINE: The right to free exercise of religion is violated if it is conditioned
upon the surrender of other rights.
FACTS:
1. Selma Cash Paty, a candidate to the 1977 Tennessee constitutional
convention, filed a declaratory judgment at the Chancery Court that
McDaniel, a Baptist minister also running as candidate to the convention,
was disqualified from serving as delegate by virtue of a statute stating that
“any   citizen   of   the   state   who   can   qualify   for   membership   in   the   House   of   religion is consistent with the Establishment Clause and thus of the highest
Representatives of the General Assembly may become a candidate for
delegate   to   the   convention”.   She   also   prayed   for   judgment   striking   Tennessee, however, has failed to show that the dangers sought to be
McDaniel’s  name  from  the  ballots.   avoided by the clergy-disqualification provisions in the past (i.e. ministers if
2. Under Tennessee State Constitution, ministers or priests (regardless of their
denomination) are disqualified from serving as legislators. The statute,
therefore, by establishing the qualifications of the delegates to be the same
as that of legislators, has the effect of disqualifying ministers from
becoming delegates to the convention as well.
3. Chancery Court held that the statute violated the 1st and 14th Amendment
guarantee of free exercise of religion. and held that McDaniel was eligible
for serving as delegate. His name was retained in the ballots and
subsequently won as delegate.
4. Tennessee SC reversed the Chancery Court, holding that disqualification of
clergy imposed no burden upon "religious belief" and restricted religious
action only in the lawmaking process of government - where religious
action is absolutely prohibited by the establishment clause.
ISSUE/S: Whether the adoption of the clergy-disqualification provision to the
statute governing qualifications of delegates   violated   McDaniel’s   right   to   free  
exercise of religion – YES
RULING: Tennessee SC decision reversed. Case remanded to said court for
further proceedings consistent with this ruling.
RATIO:
1. Historically, the rationale for disqualification of members of the clergy from
public office was primarily to assure the success of the separation of church
and state and to prevent establishment of religion. In time, however, many
of the states which adopted clergy-disqualification provisions in the past
have chosen to abandon the same, with Tennessee the only one retaining
such disqualification. The essence of this is that in all but a few States the
selection or rejection of clergymen for public office soon came to be viewed
as something safely left to the good sense and desires of the people.
2. The right to the free exercise of religion unquestionably encompasses the
right to preach, proselyte, and perform other similar religious functions, like
being   a   minister   like   McDaniel.   However,   due   to   Tennessee’s   clergy-
disqualification provision, McDaniel cannot exercise simultaneously his
right to hold office as legislator or delegate to the constitutional convention
(w/c is afforded by the state to its adult citizens) on one hand, and his right
to free exercise of religion as a minister. In such case, the exercise of one
right is made conditioned on the surrender of another.
3. Tennessee argues that its interest in preventing the establishment of a state
order which can overbalance legitimate claims to free exercise of religion.
elected to public office will necessarily exercise their powers and influence
to promote the interests of one sect and/or thwart the interests of another,
thus pitting one against the others, contrary to the anti-establishment
principle commanding neutrality) are still valid up to the present time.
American experience provides no persuasive support for the fear that
clergymen in public office will be less careful of anti-establishment
interests or less faithful to their oaths of civil office than their unordained
counterparts.
Note:
What was declared as violating the free exercise clause was the statute providing the
delegates’   qualifications   as   the   same   as   that   for   legislators,   not   the   constitutional  
provision of clergy-disqualification.
The prohibition here applies to the status, acts and conduct of clergy members, not to
their beliefs (freedom  to  act  on  one’s  beliefs  vs.  freedom  to  believe)
 GERMAN v. BARANGAN
March 27, 1985 | Escolin, J. | Mandamus and Injunction | Separation of Church
and State: Free Exercise Clause
SUMMARY: The petitioners, wearing yellow T-shirts marching with raised
clenched fists and shouting anti-government invectives, were prevented by the
respondents from entering St. Jude Chapel on JP Laurel St. because it was
located in the Malacañang security area. Petitioners argue that their
constitutional freedom to religious worship and locomotion were violated. SC
held that the exercise of religious freedom must be done in good faith and that
the manner of translating this freedom of religion into action can be curtailed if
the exercise of such beliefs clash with the institutions of society or the law. The
restriction imposed on the use of J.P. Laurel Street is allowed under the
fundamental law and was made in the interest of national security.
DOCTRINE: Exercise of right to religious freedom must he done in good faith
without any ulterior motive, e.g., political. Freedom to translate religious belief
into action may be curtailed.
(Dissenting) Exercise of religious belief can be curtailed only to the extent
warranted by clear and present danger rule. Freedoms of religion, speech and
assembly are preferred rights. There can be no restraints on preferred
constitutional rights except when justified by a grave and present danger to
public safety.
FACTS:
1. At about 5:00 in the afternoon of October 2, 1984, petitioners converged at
J.P. Laurel Street, Manila, for the ostensible purpose of hearing Mass at the
St. Jude Chapel which adjoins the Malacañang grounds. They were wearing
the familiar inscribed yellow T-shirts and started to march down said street
with raised clenched fists and shouts of anti-government invectives.
2. Along the way, they were barred by respondent Major Isabelo Lariosa,
upon orders from co-respondent Gen. Santiago Barangan, on the ground
that St. Jude Chapel was located within the Malacañang security area.
When the petitioners' pleas to be allowed inside were rebuffed, they decided
to leave. They were warned that any similar attempt to enter the church in
the future would also be prevented.
3. Petitioners allege that their constitutional rights to religious worship and
locomotion were violated.
4. Respondents answer that have never restricted, and will never restrict, any
person or persons from entering and worshipping at said church. They
maintain, however, that petitioners' intention was not really to perform an
act of religious worship, but to conduct an anti-government demonstration
near the residence and offices of the President of the Republic. Respondents
further lament petitioners' attempt to disguise their true motive with a ritual
as sacred and solemn as the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass.
ISSUE/S: WON the constitutional rights to freedom to religious exercise and
locomotion of the petitioners were violated – NO
RULING: The petition is DISMISSED.
RATIO:
1.) The context of the events casts serious doubts as to the sincerity and good
faith of petitioners in invoking the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
religious   worship  and  of  locomotion.   As  per  Art.   19  of  the  CC:   “Every  person  
must in the exercise of his  rights  and  in  the  performance  of  his  duties  …  observe  
honesty   and   good   faith”   Even   assuming   that   petitioners   claim   are   genuine   and  
valid, the action of the respondents do not constitute a violation of their
constitutional freedoms. The restriction on the use of JP Laurel St. is designed to
protect the lives of the President and his family, as well as other government
officials, diplomats and foreign guests transacting business with Malacañang
and to secure the several executive offices within the Malacañang grounds from
possible external attacks and disturbances. From Cantwell v Connecticut: The
First   Amendment   “embraces   two   concepts   freedom:   to   believe   and   freedom   to  
act.  The  first  is  absolute,  but  in  the  nature  of  things,  the  second  cannot  be.  ”  In  
the case at bar, petitioners are not denied or restrained of their freedom of belief
or choice of their religion, but only in the manner by which they had attempted
to translate the same into action. This curtailment is in accord with the
pronouncement of the Court in Gerona v. Secretary of Education that   “if   the  
exercise of such beliefs clash with the established institutions of society and
with the law, then the former must yield and give way to the latter. The
government steps in and either restrains said exercise or even prosecutes the one
exercising  it.”  With  regards  to  their  freedom  of  locomotion,  Sec  5,  Art  IV  of  the  
Constitution   provides   that   “the   liberty   of   abode   and   of   travel   shall   not   be  
Impaired except upon lawful order of the court, or when necessary in the interest
of   national   security,   public   safety,   or   public   health.”   Suffice   it   to   say   that   the  
restriction imposed on the use of J.P. Laurel Street is allowed under the
fundamental law, the same having been established in the interest of national
security.
(Dissenting)
a) Fernando, C.J.: The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship may be restricted only to the extent allowable by the clear and present
danger doctrine. The opinion fails to state the limits of such allowable
restriction.
b) Teehankee, J.: The right of free worship and movement is a preferred right
that enjoys precedence and primacy and is not subject to prior restraint except
where there exists the clear and present danger of a substantive evil sought to be
prevented. There was and is manifestly no such danger in the case.
c) Opinions of Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos & Melencio-Herrera argue that
there is no clear and present danger to public peace and order shown in the case.
CANTWELL v. CONNECTICUT
May 20, 1940 | Roberts, J. | Separation of Church and State: Free Exercise
Clause
SUMMARY:   The   Cantwells   were   Jehovah’s   Witnesses   who   played   records   society. However, the power to regulate must be so exercised so as not to
with the permission of listeners, one of which described a book that attacked the
Roman Catholic Faith. They were charged, among others, for violation of a
statute which required that they obtain a certificate prior to soliciting for
religious purposes. The Court held that the statute was violative of religious
freedom.
DOCTRINE: Placement of special requirements on people engaged in
spreading a religious message (prior restraint) violates religious freedom.
FACTS:
1. Appellants  Newton  Cantwell  and  his  two  sons  Jesse  and  Russell,  Jehovah’s   3. The Act requires an application to the Secretary of the public welfare
witnesses claiming to be ordained ministers, went house to house on
Cassius St, a 90% Roman Catholic, densely populated neighbourhood in
New Haven, each equipped with books, pamphlets on religious subjects and
a portable phonograph and set of records with descriptions of the books.
One   of   the   books   was   entitled   ‘Enemies’   and   included   an   attack   on   the   formation of an opinion. He is authorized to withhold his approval if he
Catholic religion.  None  of  their  interviewees  were  Jehovah’s  witnesses.
2. Each appellant asked the person who responded to him for permission to
play a record; if granted, he asked the person to buy the described book and,
upon refusal, solicited such contribution for the publication of the
pamphlets as the listener was willing to give. If a contribution was received,
pamphlet was delivered upon condition that it would be read.
3. Appellants were charged for violation of a Connecticut statute prohibiting
the solicitation of money, services, or any valuable thing for any alleged
religious, charitable or philanthropic cause from other than a member of the
organization for whose benefit such person is soliciting or within the
country in which such person or organization is located unless the Secretary
of the public welfare council approves such cause and issues a certificate of
such approval.
4. Appellants contended that their activities were not within the statute as they
consisted only of distribution of materials. It was also contended that the
Act abridged or denied religious freedom and liberty of speech and press.
ISSUE/S: WoN the statute was violative of religious freedom - YES
RULING: Judgment reversed and remanded.
RATIO:
1. The constitutional inhibition of legislation on religion has a double aspect.
First, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the
practice of any form of worship. Individual choice of religious organization
or form of worship cannot be restricted by law. This aspect is absolute.
Second, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. This
aspect is not absolute and is subject to regulation for the protection of
unduly infringe upon the protected freedom.
2. A state may by general and non-discriminatory legislation regulate the time,
place and manner of soliciting upon its streets and of holding meetings
thereon,  and  may  in  other  respects  safeguard  the  community’s  peace,  good  
order and comfort, without unconstitutionally invading the liberties
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. But the Act in question is not such
a regulation. Under the statute, if a certificate is procured, solicitation is
permitted without restraint, but in the absence of the same, solicitation is
altogether prohibited.
council, who is empowered to determine whether the cause is religious, and
the issue of a certificate depends upon his affirmative action. If he finds that
the cause is religious, to solicit for it becomes a crime. His decision to issue
or refuse it involves appraisal of facts, the exercise of judgment, and the
determines that the cause is not a religious one. Such censorship of religion
as the means of determining its right to survive is a denial of liberty
protected by the First Amendment and included in the liberty which is
within the protection of the Fourteenth.
4. It is evident that the appellant who was convicted (Jesse) only intended to
interest hearers in his propaganda, not to insult or affront them, by playing
the   record.   The   phonograph   was   not   shown   to   have   disturbed   the   street’s  
residents, to have drawn a crowd, or have impeded traffic. The record
played embodied a general attack on all religious systems, then singled out
the Roman Catholic Church. The listeners were highly offended, but when
he was told off, Jesse picked up his books and left the street. His conduct,
considered apart from the effect of his communication, did not amount to a
breach of the peace.
 COMMONWEALTH v. TWITCHELL
August 11, 1993 | Wilkins, J. | Separation of Church and State: Free Exercise
Clause
SUMMARY: Spouses Twitchell were convicted for involuntary manslaughter
for the death of their son. They failed to seek medical attention and merely
relied on spiritual treatment in line with their religion, the Christian Science.
They also relied on a church publication which quoted a Massachusetts statute
which states that spiritual treatment bars prosecution for failure to provide
medical services. SC held that the spiritual provision does not bar prosecution
for involuntary manslaughter. However, the case was remanded for trial due to
the misleading opinion of the Attorney General which the Church relied on in
its publication.
DOCTRINE: Freedom of religion or spiritual treatment in particular, does not
bar the prosecution for involuntary manslaughter.
FACTS:
1. David and Ginger Twitchell, practicing Christian Scientists, were convicted
for involuntary manslaughter for the death of their 2 ½ year old son, Robyn,
who died from peritonitis caused by a bowel obstruction which could have
been corrected by surgery with a high success rate. The Twitchells relied on
the spiritual treatment which stemmed from their practice of Christian
Science.
2. Commonwealth: defendants owed an affirmative duty of care to their son
which they wantonly or recklessly failed to perform when they intentionally
failed to seek medical attention.
3. Defendants: common law duty of care does not include a duty to provide
medical treatment and that there is no statute imposing such duty except for
GL c.273 S 1 (a Massachusetts statute) which in their view provides them
complete protection against any criminal charge based on their failure to
seek medical treatment for their son (a church publication quoted a section
of the statute which, in the context of the crimes described in that section,
accepted remedial treatment by spiritual means alone as satisfying any
parental obligation not to neglect a child or to provide a child with physical
care).
ISSUE/S: WoN the reliance to spiritual treatment bars prosecution for
involuntary manslaughter – NO.
RULING: REVERSED. Verdict SET ASIDE. REMANDED for trial.
RATIO:
1. There is a common law duty to provide medical services for a child. A
parent who made no effort to obtain medical help, knowing that her child
was gravely ill, could be found guilty of wanton or reckless involuntary
manslaughter  for  her  child’s  death  caused  by  her  omission  to  meet  her  duty  
to provide for the care and welfare of her child.
2. The spiritual treatment provision in Sec. 1 does not apply to involuntary
manslaughter. It is only concerned with the subject matter of Sec. 1 alone
(child support and care), and not directed towards changing the common
law of homicide. The provision only protects against criminal charges of
neglect and of willful failure to provide medical care, not against criminal
charges based on wanton or reckless conduct. (Wanton or reckless conduct
is not a form of negligence, and it does not involve a willful intention to
cause the resulting harm. An involuntary manslaughter verdict does not
require proof of willfulness). The fact that the spiritual provision protects
them in one circumstance and not in another does not violate the due
process  of  “fair  warning”.
3. However,   the   Attorney   General’s   misleading   opinion   which   “invites   a  
conclusion that parents who fail to provide medical services to children on
the basis of religious beliefs are not subject to criminal prosecution in any
circumstances”   (it   said   nothing   concerning the liability for manslaughter),
which   was   relied   upon   by   the   Christian   Science   Church’s   publication,  
which was in turn, relied upon by the Twitchells, presents an additional
element  to  the  fairness  of  the  assessment.  Although  “ignorance  of  the  law is
no   defence”,   there   is   substantial   justification   when   a   defendant   has  
reasonably relied on an official statement of the law made by a public
official who is charged by law with the interpretation and enforcement of
the law defining the offense – entrapment by estoppel.
Nolan, J., dissenting:
Defendants  were  not  aware  of  the  Attorney  General’s  actual  opinion  and  relied  
entirely  on  the  church’s  publication  (which  did  not  identify  the  source  as  part  of  
the  Attorney  General’s  opinion).  Entrapment  estoppel should be presented only
where the defendant experiences direct advice/opinion from the public official.
 ESTRADA v. ESCRITOR relationship because of legal impediments, thus it has been standard practice
August 4, 2003 | Puno, J. | Administrative Matter (Immorality) | Separation of within the congregation to ascertain the circumstances of the before
Church and State: Free Exercise Clause approving their pledges that will give imprimatur to their conjugal
arrangement. The declaration requires the approval of the elders of the
SUMMARY: A complaint was filed against Escritor, a court interpreter and a congregation and is binding within the congregation all over the world
member   of   the   Jehovah’s   Witnesses,   for   immorality   due   to   cohabiting   with   a   except in places where divorce is allowed. The declarations are valid for as
man not her husband while both of them were still legally married despite being long there are legal impediments for the couple to marry, and once these
separated from their respective spouses. Escritor claims that their cohabitation impediments cease to exist, their validity ceases and the couple can already
was not immoral and it was with the imprimatur of their congregation. Court register their marriage with civil authorities and the elders of the
remanded the case and required the OSG to intervene to prove a compelling congregation can now solemnize their marriages.
state  interest  that  may  override  Escritor’s  religious  freedom. 5. Investigating Judge Maceda recommended dismissal of the complaint
DOCTRINE: When general laws conflict with scruples of conscience, against Escritor acknowledging religious freedom. Deputy Court
exemptions   ought   to   be   granted   unless   some   “compelling   state   interest”   Administrator   Christopher   Lock,   however,   found   Escritor’s   defense   of  
intervenes. religious freedom unavailing to warrant dismissal of the charge of
immorality. Accordingly, he recommended that respondent be found guilty
FACTS: of immorality and that be penalized with suspension of 6 months and one
1. Alejandro Estrada filed a complaint against Soledad Escritor, a court day without pay with a warning that a repetition of a similar act will be
interpreter at the Las Piñas City RTC, alleging that the latter was living with dealt with more severely in accordance with the Civil Service Rules.
a man not her husband and has a child of 18-20 years of age with said man.
Estrada contends that Escritor should not be remained employed by the ISSUE/S:  WoN  Escritor’s  defense  of  religious  freedom  may  warrant exemption
Court for it tarnishes the image of the latter and might give the impression from a law of general application – Court did not pass upon the issue
that the Court is condoning her act.
2. Escritor, on the other hand, stated that when she was employed by the Court RULING: Case remanded to the Office of Court Administrator (OCA). OSG
in 1999, she was already widowed (her husband died in 1998). required to intervene to present evidence on a compelling state interest and to
Nevertheless, she admitted that she has been living with Luciano Quilapio, show that the means employed   are   the   least   restrictive   to   Escritor’s   religious  
Jr. without benefit of marriage for 20 years which started from the time her freedom.
(Escritor’s)   husband   started   living   with   another   woman,   and   that   she   and  
Quilapio had a son. Quilapio, on the other hand, was also still married RATIO:
during the time he started living with Escritor, but was separated in fact 1. Benevolent Neutrality/Accommodationist Approach vs. Strict
from his wife. Neutrality/Separationist Approach : The provisions of the Philippine
3. Escritor, however, argued that her relationship with Quilapio is not immoral constitutions (1935, 1973 and 1987) on tax exemption of church property,
since their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs salary of religious officers in government institutions, optional religious
as  Jehovah’s  Witnesses.   In   support of this contention, Escritor presented a instruction and the preamble all reveal without doubt that the Filipinos
“Declaration  of  Pledging  Faithfulness”  which  she  and  Quilapio  executed  in   adopted the benevolent neutrality approach in interpreting the religion
1991 after living together for 10 years and signed by them and three clauses of the constitution, recognizing the role of religion in society and
witnesses. the religious nature of the Filipinos.
4. According to Gregorio Salazar, a member of the Jehovah’s  Witnesses,  the   The benevolent neutrality approach gives room for accommodation of
pledge finds its scriptural basis in Matthew 5: 32 that “everyone  divorcing  his   religious exercises and allows for the breach of the wall of separation of
wife, except on account of fornication, makes her a subject for adultery, and church and state in order to uphold religious freedom which is the object of
whoever  marries  a  divorced  woman  commits  adultery”. Following this, when the the establishment and free exercises clauses. This is in contrast to the strict
spouse  commits  adultery,  the  offended  spouse  can  remarry.  The  Jehovah’s   neutrality or separationist approach, holds that government should base
Witnesses’   congregation   requires   that   at   the   time   the   declaration   is   made,   public policy solely on secular considerations, without regard to the
the   couple   cannot   secure   the   civil   authorities’   approval   of   the   marital   religious consequences of its actions. The present case involves
 constitutionally compelled (required by the Free Exercise Cluase)
accommodation where exemption is sought from a law of general
applicability that inadevertently burdens as religious exercise.
The accommodationist approach holds that it is good public policy, and
sometimes constitutionally required, for the state to make conscious and
deliberate efforts to avoid interference with religious freedom. On the other
hand, the strict neutrality or separationist approach believes that it is
good public policy, and also constitutionally required, for the government to
avoid religion-specific policy even at the cost of inhibiting religious
exercise.
In Philippine jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has adopted a posture of not
invalidating a law offensive to religious freedom, but carving out an
exception or upholding an exception to accommodate religious exercise
where it is justified.
While  there  is  that  mandate  for  benevolent  neutrality  approach,  this  doesn’t   God  and  men”.  It   was  executed long before the complaint against her was
mean that the Court will grant every exemption for every free exercise
claim, but that it will strive to accommodate religious beliefs and practices
when it can within flexible constitutional limits and will not look upon them
with hostility or difference.
2. Public and Secular Morality vs. Religious Morality: The morality
contemplated in the law is public and necessarily secular and not religious,
for the religion clauses of the Constitution prohibits establishment of
religion and the morality it sanctions. However, benevolent neutrality could
allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does
not offend compelling state interests. Furthermore, government action, such
as proscribing certain acts as immoral, must have a secular purpose, and
such proscription must be because of the detriment against existence and
progress of human society, and not because the conduct is proscribed by the
beliefs of a particular religion. Such distinction is important in order to
determine what acts may constitute immoral conduct within this public and
secular morality to which administrative liability may attach.
However, the issue of immorality in this case can only be resolved by
subjecting   Escritor’s   claim   of   religious   freedom   to   the   compelling   state   SEPARATE OPINIONS:
interest in the framework of benevolent neutrality to see whether such will
warrant an exemption from a law of general application (Civil Service
Law).
3. Compelling State Interest Test (from Sherbert v. Verner): employing this
test from the benevolent neutrality stance would determine whether
Escritor’s  claim  of  religious  freedom  may  warrant  exemption  from  a  law  of   standards have been changing as shown by the Solo   Parents’   Welfare   Act   of
general applicability. This requires inquiry whether the law or action places
a burden on the claimant's religious freedom. This also requires inquiry into
the sincerity of the claimant to his/her religious beliefs. After the burden
and the sincerity on the part of the claimant has been sufficiently proved,
the government must be able to show a compelling state interest that may
justify regulation in order to override the defense of religious freedom by
the claimant. Government must also show that the means employed are the
least restrictive to the claimant's religious freedom in pursuing the
compelling state interest. Under the exemption doctrine, when general laws
conflict with scruples of conscience, exemptions ought to be granted unless
some  “compelling  state  interest”  intervenes.  
Burden on Religious Freedom (Present): Escritor is made to choose
between keeping her employment and abandoning her religious belief and
practice and family on the one hand, and giving up her employment and
keeping her religious practice and family on the other hand.
Sincerity  to  One’s  Own  Religious  Belief  (Present): Escritor executed the
Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness not merely to avoid prosecution for
immoral   conduct,   but   to   make   her   union   with   Quilapio   “honorable   before  
lodged. Furthermore, the letters of Escritor to the Office of the Court
Administrator requesting for exemption from attending the flag ceremony
show that she is sincere in practicing her beliefs as a member of the
Jehovah’s  Witnesses.  
4. However, even   if   Escritor’s   evidence   regarding   her   sincerity   of   her  
religious belief and the centrality of her faith be adjudged sufficient,
the Court held that the case could not be decided since the parties were
not aware of the burden of proof they would have to produce in order
to satisfy the compelling state interest test employed by the Court. The
OCA has failed to demonstrate that preservation of the integrity of the
judiciary is so compelling an interest and that the means employed are
the  least  restrictive  upon  Escritor’s  religious  exercise.  
5. Furthermore, it is not for Estrada, a private complainant, to present
evidence that would show the compelling state interest that would
overcome   Escritor’s   defense   of   religious   freedom and that the means
employed are the least restrictive. Such burden is for the OSG to bear.
Bellosillo, J. (Concurring in the Result): For the charge of disgraceful and
immoral conduct, disgrace and immorality must both be present. In this case,
there is no disgraceful conduct since even her church or religion sanctifies her
relationship; Estrada himself admits that Escritor is a decent woman; no
question has been raised on her efficiency in the service; and community
 
2000 and the attitude of people who shape public opinion.
There is also no immoral conduct. Sec. 3, Art. XV, of the Constitution which
provides,   “The   State   shall   defend   …the   right   of   spouses   to   found   a   family   in  
accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible
parenthood…”   This   rule   is   broad   enough   to   include   de facto family relations and State is no defense against it. It is within the interest of the State to protect
since it would be absurd to deny the free exercise of religious convictions by marriage as the foundation of the family.
virtue of the existence or non-existence of marriage The   religious   teachings   of   the   Jehovah’s   Witnesses   cannot   amend   or   repeal  
Ynares-Santiago, J. (Dissenting): Escritor is being charged of disgraceful and Article 334 of the RPC on concubinage. Escritor clearly recognized this when
immoral conduct under the Civil Service Law. It is the law which provides the she  promised  “to  legalize” in the future her union with Quilapio, as stated in her
standard; whether an act is immoral is within the meaning provided by law and Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness.
not   within   Escritor’s   concept   of   morality   based   on   her   religious   beliefs.  
Furthermore, she is charged in her capacity as court employee and not as a
member  of  Jehovah’s  Witnesses.  
There still remains the fact that Quilapio and Escritor could have been
prosecuted for concubinage under the RPC at the instance of the offended party
(their spouses). While the offended party in this case did not press charges, this
does not mean that the act was approved, endorsed or commended. It was
merely tolerated.
Illegal conduct or adulterous relations should not be exempted from
governmental regulation simply because their practitioners claim it is part of
their free exercise of religious profession and worship. There is a distinction
between religious practices, including the seemingly bizarre, which may not be,
regulated, and unacceptable religious conduct which should be prevented despite
claims that it forms part of religious freedom.
There is a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that may justify
reasonable regulation of free exercise and enjoyment of religious worship and
profession - destruction of public morals, and the tearing down of morality, good
order, and discipline in the judiciary
Carpio, J. (Dissenting): While Escritor may not be held liable for disgraceful
and   immoral   conduct   in   view   of   the   acceptance   of   the   Jehovah’s   Witnesses   of  
her   cohabitation   with   Quilapio,   her   act   constitutes   “conduct   prejudicial   to   the  
best interest   of   the   service”   (Justice Puno notes in the ponencia that this is in
violation  of  Ecritor’s  due  process  since  she  was  not  given  opportunity  to  defend  
herself from this charge, and also, there is no evidence of the alleged prejudice).
Quilapio is liable for concubinage under Art. 334 of RPC, with Escritor as co-
accused; him still having a validly subsisting marriage and no evidence showing
that his wife consented to his cohabitation with Escritor.
Escritor openly admitted her cohabitation with Quilapio. Courts should not
condone those who openly and knowingly violate the law for they lose their
moral authority and credibility. There exists a compelling state interest to hold
Escritor to the same standards required of every court employee. If
unsanctioned,   Escritor’s   unlawful   conduct   would   certainly   impair   the   integrity  
and credibility of the judiciary.
The free exercise of religious belief is absolutely protected, but the freedom to
act according to such religious belief is subject to the police power of the State.
It is within the police power of the State to regulate conduct constituting
concubinage, bigamy or polygamy and the wall of separation between Church
 ESTRADA v. ESCRITOR (RESOLUTION) administration  of  justice”  that  must  be  weighed  against  Escritor’s  claim,  but  
June 22, 2006 | Puno, J. | Administrative Matter (Disgraceful and Immoral the   State’s   narrow   interest   in   refusing   to   make   an   exception   for   the  
Conduct) | Separation of Church and State: Free Exercise Clause cohabitation  which  Escritor’s  faith  finds  moral.
3. Even assuming that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to
SUMMARY: After remand to the  OCA,  Escritor’s  case  comes  to  the  SC  once   further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible
again. The SC finally dismissed the complaint after the OSG failed to prove the so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve
state’s   “compelling  interest”  to  override   Escritor’s  religious  belief  and  practice   the legitimate goal of the state.
to show that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least
restrictive  to  Escritor’s  religious  freedom. DISSENTING OPINION (Carpio, J):
DOCTRINE: The State’s  interest  in  enforcing  its  prohibition  cannot  be  merely   The compelling state interest test in Sherbert v. Verner (1963) has been
abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free overturned by Employment Division v. Smith (1985 and 1990). The majority
exercise claim. opinion ignores that whatever theory is current in U.S. jurisprudence (strict or
benevolent neutrality), the fact remains that the U.S. Supreme Court has
FACTS: consistently held that religious beliefs do not excuse any person from liability
1. See facts of Estrada v. Escritor (Aug. 4, 2003 Decision). for violation of a valid criminal law of general application.
2. After the Aug. 4, 2003 decision of this case, the SC remanded the case of Furthermore,  theories  are  only  guides  and  there  is  no  “magic  formula”  to  settle  
Soledad Escritor to the Office of the Court Administrator and ordered the Office all disputes between religion and the law.
of the Solicitor General (OSG) to intervene in the case so it can examine the Even assuming that the benevolent neutrality approach and compelling state
sincerity   and   centrality   of   Escritor’s   claimed   religious   belief   and   practice;;   interest test is applicable to this case, the State has a compelling interest in
present   evidence   on   the   state’s   “compelling   interest”   to   override   Escritor’s   demanding the highest standard of conduct on all those connected with the
religious belief and practice; and show that the means the state adopts in dispensation of justice. The  public’s   faith  and  confidence  in  the  administration  
pursuing its interest   is   the   least   restrictive   to   Escritor’s   religious   freedom.   The   of justice would certainly be eroded and undermined if the courts tolerate
case again comes to the SC from remand. employees blatantly violating criminal laws.
Equally   compelling   is   the   State’s   interest   in   protecting   the   institution   of  
ISSUE/S: WoN the Government has sufficiently proven a compelling state marriage and the family, which forms basis for penalizing concubinage, adultery
interest  that  would  override  Escritor’s  defense  of  religious  freedom  – NO and bigamy under the RPC. Observance of provisions of the RPC, whose
WoN the means employed in pursuing the interest are the least restrictive to validity or constitutionality are not even challenged, is a price that all religions
Escritor’s  religious  freedom  – NO in the Philippines must willingly pay for the sake of good order and peace in the
community.
RULING: Administrative complaint against Escritor dismissed. Even assuming that Sherbert is still good law, the case at bar is also different.
The questioned conduct in Sherbert (refusal  to   work  on  Saturdays  because   it’s  
RATIO: Sabbath Day) was not criminal and was part of the religious tenets of the
1. The OSG failed to prove the compelling state interest needed to override Seventh-Day  Adventists.  In  Escritor’s  case,  not  only  was  the  act  of  cohabitation  
Escritor’s   right   to   religious   freedom.   While   there   is   no   question   as   to   the   criminal; it also was not claimed as central to the beliefs and practices of the
State’s   interest   in   protecting   the   institution   of   marriage   and   family   or   the   Jehovah’s  Witnesses.  
sound administration of justice, it is not enough for the government to assert If the Court condones Escritor’s  act  of  concubinage  on  religious  grounds,  then  it  
these objectives which are at risk should the exemption be granted. It must will have to condone acts of concubinage by Catholics who have secured church
precisely show how and to what extent those objectives will be undermined annulment of their marriage even without a final annulment from a civil court.
if exemptions are granted. The State’s   interest   in   enforcing   its   prohibition  
cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling
to outweigh a free exercise claim.
2. Furthermore,   it   is   not   the   State’s   broad   interest   in   “protecting   the  
institutions   of   marriage   and   the   family,”   or   even   “in   the   sound  
 NOTES FROM ESTRADA v. ESCRITOR
DEFINITION OF RELIGION AND THE SCOPE OF THE RELIGION
CLAUSES OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
“Religion”   is   derived   from   the   Middle   English religioun, from Old French
religion, from Latin religio, vaguely referring to a  “bond  between  man  and  the  
gods.”  This  pre-Christian term for the cult and rituals of pagan Rome was first
Christianized in the Latin translation of the Bible.
Religion - The  term  ‘religion’  has  reference  to  one’s  views  of  his  relations  to  his
Creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverence for his being and
character, and of obedience to his will (Davis v. Beason , 1890)
Free  exercise  of  religion  “embraces  the  right  to  maintain  theories of life and
of death and of the hereafter which are rank heresy to followers of the
orthodox  faiths”  (U.S. v. Ballard, 1944)
Torcaso v. Watkins (1961)   expanded   the   term   “religion”   to   non-theistic
beliefs such as Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, and Secular Humanism.
U.S. v. Seeger (1965) - the  test  of  belief  ‘in  relation  to  a  Supreme  Being’  is   things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the
whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in
the life of its possessor parallel to the orthodox belief in God.
Proposed Criteria to Qualify as Religion under the First Amendment
(1) There must be belief in God or some parallel belief that occupies a central
place  in  the  believer’s  life.  
(2) The religion must involve a moral code transcending individual belief, i.e., it
cannot be purely subjective.
(3) A demonstrable sincerity in belief is necessary, but the court must not
inquire into the truth or reasonableness of the belief.
(4) There must be some associational ties
although there is also a view that religious beliefs held by a single person
rather than being part of the teachings of any kind of group or sect are
entitled to the protection of the Free Exercise Clause
*The purpose of the religion clauses is the protection and promotion of religious
liberty
U.S. JURISPRUDENCE ON THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
Belief-Action Test (Reynolds v. U.S., 1878) - allows absolute protection to
belief but not to action. The state was absolutely prohibited by the Free Exercise
Clause from regulating individual religious beliefs, but placed no restriction on
the ability of the state to regulate religiously motivated conduct.
This test proved unsatisfactory. Under this test, regulation of religiously
dictated conduct would be upheld no matter how central the conduct was to
the exercise of religion and no matter how insignificant was the
government’s  nonreligious  regulatory  interest  so  long  as  the  government is
proscribing action and not belief.
Scope of Protection Afforded by the Free Exercise Clause
The Free Exercise Clause accords absolute protection to individual
religious convictions and beliefs and proscribes government from
questioning a person’s   beliefs   or   imposing   penalties   or   disabilities   based  
solely on those beliefs. The Clause extends protection to both beliefs and
unbelief.
Religious speech and expressive religious conduct are accorded the
highest degree of protection next to belief which enjoys virtually absolute
protection,
*Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) - the Amendment embraces two concepts—
freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of
protection of society. In every case, the power to regulate must be so exercised
as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom.
The least protected under the Free Exercise Clause is religious conduct,
usually in the form of unconventional religious practices
Deliberate-Inadvertent Distinction - deliberate state interference of religious
exercise for religious reasons vs. government’s   inadvertent   interference   with
religion in pursuing some secular objective
Minersville School District v. Gobitis (1940) - Free Exercise Clause presented
no problem to interference with religion that was inadvertent no matter how
serious   the   interference,   no   matter   how   trivial   the   state’s non-religious
objectives, and no matter how many alternative approaches were available to the
state to pursue its objectives with less impact on religion, so long as government
was acting in pursuit of a secular objective.
West Virginia v. Barnette (1943) - freedoms of speech and of press, of
assembly, and of worship are susceptible only of restriction only to prevent
grave and immediate danger to interests which the state may lawfully protect
Two-Part Balancing Test (Braunfeld v. Brown, 1961) - (1) plaintiff must show
that the regulation placed a real burden on his religious exercise; (2) the burden
would be upheld only if the state showed that it was pursuing an overriding
secular goal by the means which imposed the least burden on religious practices
Compelling State Interest Test (Sherbert v. Verner, 1963) – similar to the SEPARATIONIST vs. ACCOMMODATIONIST APPROACH; STRICT
two-part balancing test, except that the state interest must not merely any vs. BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY
colorable state interest but must be paramount and compelling to override
the free exercise claim Table 1 (From  Justice  Puno’s  ponencia,  Aug.  4,  2003, Estrada v. Escritor)
Exemption Doctrine: when general laws conflict with scruples of
conscience,   exemptions   ought   to   be   granted   unless   some   ‘compelling   Strict Separation: Jefferson meant Benevolent Neutrality: allows for
state  interest’  intervenes. the   “wall  of  separation”   to  protect   the accommodation of religion under
state from the church. certain circumstances.
Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972): it must appear either that the State does not deny the *erects an absolute barrier to formal Accommodations are government
free exercise of religious belief by its requirement, or that there is a state interest interdependence of religion and state. policies that take religion specifically
of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under the into account not to promote the
Free Exercise Clause. Strict Neutrality: a tamer version of government’s   favored   form   of  
Only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can the strict separationist view. Requires religion, but to allow individuals and
overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion. the state to be neutral in its relations groups to exercise their religion
with groups of religious believers and without hindrance. Their purpose or
Employment Division, Oregon Department of Human Resources v. Smith non-believers; it does not require the effect therefore is to remove a burden
(1985 and 1990) – departed from the heightened scrutiny and compelling state state to be their adversary. State power on, or facilitate the exercise of, a
interest approach. Court held that the First Amendment has not been offended if is no more to be used so as to handicap person’s  or  institution’s  religion.  
prohibiting the exercise of religion is merely the incidental effect of a generally religions than it is to favor them.
applicable and otherwise valid law -congruent with the sociological
* while   Jefferson’s   wall   of   separation   proposition that religion serves a
U.S. JURISPRUDENCE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE “captures   the   spirit   of   the   American   function essential to the survival of
Everson v. Board of Education (1947): The   ‘establishment   of   religion’   clause ideal of church-state   separation”,   in   society itself, thus there is no human
of the Firsts-Amendment means at least that Neither a state nor the Federal real life church and state are not and society without one or more ways of
Government can set up a church neither can pass laws which aid one religion, cannot be totally separate performing the essential function of
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. religion
- recognizes that religion plays an
Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971): (1) statute must have a secular legislative purpose important role in the public life of the
(2) its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits United States as shown by many
religion (3) statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with traditional government practices
religion. which, to strict neutrality, pose
The proper inquiry under the purpose prong of Lemon is whether the Establishment Clause questions
government intends to convey a message of endorsement or
disapproval of religion (Separate   Concurring   of   J.   O’Connor   in  
Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984)

*In the area of government displays or affirmations of belief, the Court has
given leeway to religious beliefs and practices which have acquired a secular
meaning and have become deeply entrenched in history. In some cases, the
Court did not rely on the Lemon test and instead drew heavily from history and
the need for accommodation of popular religious beliefs.
Table 2 (From   Justice   Carpio’s   Dissenting Opinion, June 22, 2006, Estrada v. for secular entities are sometimes inappropriate for religious entities,
Escritor) thus the government must make special provisions to preserve a degree
of independence for religious entities for them to carry out their
Strict   Separation/   “No   Governmental Accommodation religious missions according to their religious beliefs.
Aid”  Theory Neutrality 3. The accommodationist interpretation is particularly necessary to protect
The establishment clause The establishment clause Any limitation derived adherents of minority religions from the inevitable effects of
viewed in conjunction requires government to from the establishment majoritarianism, which include ignorance and indifference and overt
with the free exercise be neutral on religious clause cannot be rigidly hostility to the minority
clause requires a strict matters applied so as to preclude 4. The accommodationist position is practical as it is a commonsensical way to
separation of church and - Concept of all aid to religion and deal with the various needs and beliefs of different faiths in a pluralistic
state and that governmental neutrality that in some situations nation
government can do can be interpreted in government must, and in
nothing which involves various ways— can be other situations may, *Benevolent neutrality approach gives room for different kinds of
governmental support of that   “anything   but   total   accommodate its accommodation:
religion or which is neutrality is anathema policies and laws in the 1. those which are constitutionally compelled, i.e., required by the Free
favorable to the “or   that     “neutrality   can   furtherance of religious Exercise Clause;
cultivation of religious only mean that freedom 2. those which are discretionary or legislative,
interests government policy must - First expressed in 3. those not required by the Free Exercise Clause but nonetheless permitted by
- First articulated in place religion at neither Zorach v. Clauson the Establishment Clause
Everson v. Board of a special advantage nor (1952)
Education (1947) a special disadvantage *It may also result to three situations of accommodation:
- First articulated in Required: to preserve free exercise protections and not unconstitutionally
Abington School District infringe on religious liberty or create penalties for religious freedom
v. Schempp (1963) Permissible: the state may, but is not required to, accommodate religious
interests.
Prohibited: establishment concerns prevail over potential accommodation
Strong and Compelling Reasons to Adopt the Benevolent interests
Neutrality/Accommodationist Approach Rather than the Strict Neutrality
Approach FRAMEWORK FOR REQUIRED ACCOMMODATION
1. The accommodationist interpretation is most consistent with the language of Has the statute or government action created a burden on the free exercise
the First Amendment of religion? - The courts often look into the sincerity of the religious belief, but
The substantive end of the religion clauses is the preservation of the without inquiring   into   the   truth   of   the   belief.   The   sincerity   of   the   claimant’s  
autonomy of religious life. It is not just the formal process value of belief is ascertained to avoid the mere claim of religious beliefs to escape a
ensuring that government does not act on the basis of religious bias. mandatory regulation.
2. The accommodationist position best achieves the purposes of the First Is there a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify this infringement of
Amendment religious liberty? - Government has to establish that its purposes are legitimate
The principle underlying the First Amendment is that freedom to carry for the state and that they are compelling. Government must do more than assert
out   one’s   duties   to   a   Supreme   Being   is   an   inalienable   right,   not   one   the objectives at risk if exemption is given; it must precisely show how and to
dependent on the grace of legislature. Although inalienable, it is what extent those objectives will be undermined if exemptions are granted.
necessarily limited by the rights of others, including the public right of Has the state in achieving its legitimate purposes used the least intrusive
peace and good order. means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than
With the pervasiveness of government regulation, conflicts with necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state?
religious practices become frequent and intense. Laws that are suitable
PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE ON FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
American Bible Society v. City of Manila (1957): The constitutional guaranty of
the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with
it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can
only be justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds
that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State
has the right to prevent.
Gerona v. Secretary of Education (1959) - The freedom of religious belief
guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption from or
non-compliance with reasonable and nondiscriminatory laws, rules and
regulations promulgated by competent authority. (Gerona was applied by the
majority in German v. Barangan, 1985)
(1) it is incumbent upon the Court to determine whether a certain ritual is
religious or not; (2) religious freedom will not be upheld if it clashes with the
established institutions of society and with the law such that when a law of
general applicability incidentally   burdens   the   exercise   of   one’s religion, one’s   establishment perspective and upheld the law as a safeguard against
right to religious freedom cannot justify exemption from compliance with the
law
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union (1974): Religious freedom,
although not unlimited, is a fundamental personal right and liberty and has a
preferred position in the hierarchy of values. Contractual rights, therefore, must
yield to freedom of religion. It is only where unavoidably necessary to prevent
an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community
that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest
extent necessary.
*The   “clear   and   present   danger”/”grave   and   imminent   danger”   test   has   been   (Sec. 2175), however, was upheld due to the lack of the required 8 votes to
applied in a number of cases, among them Ebralinag v. Division
Superintendent (1993) which overturned Gerona; Iglesia ni Cristo v. CA
(1996).
* The compelling state interest test was also applied partially in Ebralinag.
PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE ON ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
*Voluntarism and insulation of the political process from interfaith dissension
are values sought to be protected by the Establishment Clause
Voluntarism as personal value: refers to the inviolability of the human
conscience which is also protected by the free exercise clause
Voluntarism as social value: growth of a religious sect as a social force must
come from the voluntary support of its members because of the belief that both
spiritual and secular society will benefit if religions are allowed to compete on
their own intrinsic merit without benefit of official patronage. Such voluntarism
cannot be achieved unless the political process is insulated from religion and
unless religion is insulated from politics
Aglipay v. Ruiz (1937) - Religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not
inhibition of profound reverence for religion, nor denial of its influence in
human affairs. A legitimate purpose undertaken by appropriate legislation
should not be frustrated by mere incidental religious results not contemplated
Garces v. Estenzo (1981) - Not every governmental activity which involves the
expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is violative of the
constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of
worship and banning the use of public money or property.
Pamil v. Teleron (1978):
Minority (but prevailing opinion): approached the case from a non-
the constant threat of union of church and state that has marked
Philippine history (Justices Fernando, Teehankee, Munoz-Palma,
Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez, and Guerrero)
Majority: approached the issue from a free exercise angle and
considered the law a religious test offensive of the constitution (Chief
Justice Castro, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Aquino)
*The law involved is the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 which provides
that   “In no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office,
ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries from
provincial or national funds, or contractors for public  works  of  the  municipality”
render it unconstitutional.
Fonacier v. CA (1955):
Jurisdiction of Courts on Intramural Religious Disputes: Where a
decision of an ecclesiastical court plainly violates the law it professes to
administer, or is in conflict with the law of the land, it will not be
followed by the civil courts. . . In some instances, not only have the
civil courts the right to inquire into the jurisdiction of the religious
tribunals and the regularity of their procedure, but they have subjected
their decisions to the test of fairness or to the test furnished by the
constitution and the law of the church.
However, the amendments of the constitution, restatement of articles of
religion and abandonment of faith or abjuration alleged by appellant,
having to do with faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship,
 ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church and having reference to
the power of excluding from the church those allegedly unworthy of
membership, are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are
outside the province of the civil courts.
Adjudication of Property Disputes within Religious Congregations:
in property controversies within religious congregations strictly
independent of any other superior ecclesiastical association, the rules
for resolving such controversies should be those of any voluntary
association. If the congregation adopts the majority rule then the
majority should prevail; if it adopts adherence to duly constituted
authorities within the congregation, then that should be followed.
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE vis-à-vis FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
*There are tensions between the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause
such as when a case is decided to uphold the Free Exercise Clause and
consequently exemptions from a law of general applicability are afforded by the
Court to the person claiming religious freedom; the question arises whether the
exemption does not amount to support of the religion in violation of the
Establishment Clause.
*How the tension between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause will be resolved is a question for determination in the actual cases that
come to the Court
RELIGION CLAUSES IN THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
*The provisions of the Philippine constitutions (1935, 1973 and 1987) on tax
exemption of church property, salary of religious officers in government
institutions, optional religious instruction and the preamble all reveal without
doubt that the Filipinos adopted the benevolent neutrality approach in
interpreting the religion clauses of the constitution, recognizing the role of
religion in society and the religious nature of the Filipinos.
*In Philippine jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has adopted a posture of not
invalidating a law offensive to religious freedom, but carving out an
exception or upholding an exception to accommodate religious exercise
where it is justified.
*While there is that mandate for benevolent neutrality approach,   this   doesn’t   The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and
mean that the Court will grant every exemption for every free exercise claim,
but that it will strive to accommodate religious beliefs and practices when it can
within flexible constitutional limits and will not look upon them with hostility or
difference.
Constitutional Provisions (1987 Constitution):
Preamble: We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in
order to build a just and humane society, and establish a Government that shall embody
our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our
patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of independence and
democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality,
and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
Article II, Sec. 6: The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
Article III, Sec. 5: No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.
No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
Article VI, Sec. 5 (2): The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of
the total number of representatives including those under the party list. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated
to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election
from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and
such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
Article VI, Sec. 28 (3): Charitable institutions, churches and personages or convents
appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and
improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or
educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
Article VI, Sec. 29 (2): No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid,
or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church,
denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher,
minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher,
minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or
government orphanage or leprosarium.
Article VII, Sec. 5: Before they enter on the execution of their office, the President, the
Vice-President, or the Acting President shall take the following oath or affirmation: "I do
solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully and conscientiously fulfill my duties as
President (or Vice-President or Acting President) of the Philippines, preserve and defend
its Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every man, and consecrate myself to the
service of the Nation. So help me God." (In case of affirmation, last sentence will be
omitted.)
Article XIV, Sec. 3 (3): At the option expressed in writing by the parents or guardians,
religion shall be allowed to be taught to their children or wards in public elementary and
high schools within the regular class hours by instructors designated or approved by the
religious authorities of the religion to which the children or wards belong, without
additional cost to the Government.
Article XV, Sec. 3 (1): The State shall defend:
the demands of responsible parenthood;
 WISCONSIN v. YODER et al
May 15, 1972 | Burger, C.J. | Certiorari | Separation of Church and State: Free
Exercise Clause
SUMMARY: Respondents appealed after being convicted for violating the
Wisconsin law compelling parents to send their children to school until the age of
16. Respondents contended that it was against their beliefs in Amish religion to
send their children to high school for it exposes them to attitudes and
characteristics aiming for material possession and competitiveness. SC acquitted
the respondents.
DOCTRINE: Protection derived from the Religion Clauses are only applicable
for actions which are rooted in religious belief. An action may be subject to state
regulation if it is based on purely secular considerations.
FACTS:
1. Respondents Jonas Yoder, Wallace Miller and Adin Yutzy are members of
the Amish religion. They and their families are residents of Wisconsin
where a compulsory school-attendance law required them to cause their
children to attend schools until reaching age 16. The respondents declined
to send their children, ages 14 and 15, after they completed the eight grade.
Neither are they included in any recognized exception to the compulsory-
attendance law.
2. The school district administrator for public schools then filed a complaint
against the respondents who were convicted after trial. Respondents
defended on the ground that the application of the law violated their First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights. It was the belief of the respondents that
by sending their children to high school, it would expose them to the danger
of the censure of the church community and it would endanger their own
salvation and that of their children.
3. Respondents presented an expert witness to support their claims. The same
witness averred that Amish religion believes in de-emphasizing material
success and rejecting competitive spirit which the respondents believe are
contrary to what is instilled in high school. It was further elaborated that
Amish objection to formal education is part of their way of life and in place
of this education, parents expose their children to the vocational education
taught in their communities. In exchange of this formal education, the
witness further stated that Amish children are taught informal vocational
work by their communities.
4. The CA affirmed the conviction given by the District Court which the
Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed.
ISSUE/S: WoN the Wisconsin law is in violation of the First Amendment? -
YES
RULING: Decision of the Wisconsin SC is AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
1. A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be interposed as a
barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if it is based on purely
secular considerations; to have the protection of the Religion Clauses, the
claims must be rooted in religious belief. If a person asserts his claims
because of his subjective evaluation and rejection of the contemporary
secular values accepted by the majority, such belief does not rise to the
demands of the religion clauses.
2. In the case at bar, there is no record that the Amish way of life is a mere
matter of personal preference. It is a deep religious conviction shared by an
organized group.The respondents' religious beliefs and attitude toward life
and family have remained constant for a very long time despite the drastic
improvements  of  the  majority’s  lifestyle.
3. Moreover, the respondents were able to demonstrate the importance of their
beliefs to the survival of Amish communities and the hazards that the
Wisconsin law presented. They have also carried the burden of showing
adequacy of their alternative mode of continuing education as against the
overall interest of competitiveness that the State relies on, by proving that
lack of one or two years of high school education will not make their
children useless and burdensome to society.
4. State’s   argument   that   it   is   empowered,   as   parens patriae, to extend the
benefit of secondary education to children regardless of the wishes of their
parents cannot be sustained. The respondents have introduced enough
evidence that accommodating their religious objection by forgoing a few
years of compulsory education will not impair the physical or mental health
of the child or the ability of the same to be self-supporting.
5. As the record shows, compulsory school attendance to age 16 for Amish
children carries with it a very real threat of undermining the Amish
community and religious practice as they exist today; they must either
abandon belief and be assimilated into society at large, or be forced to
migrate to some other and more tolerant region
6. In sum, the unchallenged testimony of acknowledged experts in education
and religious history, almost 300 years of consistent practice, and strong
evidence of a sustained faith regulating respondents' entire mode of life
support the claim that enforcement of the State's requirement of compulsory
formal education until high school would gravely endanger if not destroy
the free exercise of respondents' religious beliefs.
 U.S. v. BALLARD practice of any form of worship but also safeguards the free exercise of the
April 24, 1944 | Douglas, J. | Certiorari | Separation of Church and State: Free chosen form of religion. There is freedom to believe and there is freedom to
Exercise Clause act.
2. Freedom of religious belief is basic in a society of free men. It embraces the
SUMMARY: Respondents were charged for defrauding people through a right to maintain theories of life and of death and of the beliefs which may
religion called I Am movement. They claimed to be healers and obtained money be considered as heresy to followers of the orthodox faiths. These heresy
and property through mails sent by them. District Court decided to exclude from trials are foreign to our Constitution. Moreover, men may believe what they
the  trial  the  verification  of  the  movement’s  doctrines  as  true  or  not.   CA reversed cannot prove and even if some of these doctrines and incomprehensible to
the judgment of the DC butSC affirmed the DC decision. others, they are not burdened to prove the same.
DOCTRINE: See Ratio 1. 3. In the case at bar, the religious views espoused by respondents might seem
incredible to most people. But if those doctrines are subject to trial before a
FACTS: jury charged with finding their truth or falsity, then the same can be done
1. Guy Ballard, together with Edna and Donald Ballard, claimed that because with the religious beliefs of any sect. When the triers of fact undertake that
of their high spiritual attainments and righteous conduct, they were selected task, they enter a forbidden domain protected by the Amendment for the
as divine   messengers   through   which   words   of   the   alleged   “ascended   Constitution does not select any one group or any one type of religion for
masters”  and  Saint  Germaie  would  be  communicated  to  mankind  under  the   preferred treatment
teachings commonly known as the I Am movement.
2. They claimed to have the power to heal persons of ailments and diseases
and did falsely represent themselves to have been able to heal hundreds of
persons afflicted with both curable and incurable ailments.
3. They were indicted for fraud and conspiracy. It was alleged that they knew
the misrepresentation and that they intentionally defrauded the people by
using mails to obtain from them money, property, and other things of value.
It was charged that certain corporations were formed, literature distributed
and sold, funds solicited, and memberships in the I Am movement sought
by false and fraudulent representations.
4. District Court excluded the religious beliefs of the defendants as part of the
issue but instead limited it to whether or not the defendants honestly and in
good faith believed in those beliefs. Defense counsel acquiesced but later
on, submitted a motion for a new trial averring that the truth of their
religious doctrines should have been submitted to the jury. District court did
not grant the motion but the CA reversed it and granted a new trial.

ISSUE/S: WoN the First Amendment covers the verity or truthfulness of a

religious belief? - YES

RULING: DC decision of exclusion is affirmed but case is remanded to address

other issues.

RATIO:
1. The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the
establishment of no sect. The First Amendment has a dual aspect. It not
only forestalls compulsion by the law of the acceptance of any creed or the
 U.S. v. SEEGER
March 8, 1965 | Clark, J. | Certiorari | Separation of Church and State: Unusual
Religious Beliefs and Practices
SUMMARY: Seeger, Jakobson and Peter were convicted for refusal to submit
to induction to the armed forces after their applications for exemption from the
draft by reason of conscientious objection were denied. The SC held that their
beliefs fall within the statutory definition required to be exempted as
conscientious objectors.
DOCTRINE: The test of religious belief within the meaning of the exemption is
whether it is a sincere and meaningful belief occupying in the life of its
possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualified
for the exemption.
FACTS:
1. These are three cases involving the exemption under the Universal Military
Training and Service Act of conscientious objectors not belonging to any
orthodox religious sect. Under the said law, persons who are
conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form may be
exempted from combatant training and service in the U.S. armed forces by
reason  of  their  “religious  training  and  belief”.
Seeger: did not answer the question in his Selective Service System (SSS) form
whether he believed in a Supreme Being, leaving the issue of his belief/disbelief an
open question, yet claims that his skepticism or disbelief in the existence of God did
not amount to lack of faith in anything. He claims that his conscientious objection
was based on belief in and devotion to goodness and virtue for their own sakes, and
a religious faith in a purely ethical creed, citing Plato, Aristotle and Spinoza as basis
for moral and intellectual integrity w/o belief in God, except in the remotest sense.
His conscientious objection was found to be based upon individual training and
belief, both of which included research in religious and cultural fields, and that this
belief was sincere, honest and made in good faith.
Jakobson: alleged  that  he  believed  in  a  Supreme  Being  as  man’s  creator  and  as  the   claimant's own opposition to war was based on "religious training and belief." Thus,
as the Supreme Reality which the existence of man is the result. He concluded man
must be "partly spiritual" and, therefore, "partly akin to the Supreme Reality"; and
that his "most important religious law" was that "no man ought ever to willfully
sacrifice another man's life as a means to any other end He applied for exemption as
conscientious objector because he felt that participation in any form of military
service would involve him in "too many situations and relationships that would be a
strain on his conscience that he felt he must avoid.
Forest Britt Peter: stated he was not a member of any religious sect or
organization. He claimed that his belief in a Supreme Being depended on the
definition and stated that he felt the taking of human life was a violation of his moral
code and that he considered this belief superior to his obligation to the state. He
quoted a definition of religion as the consciousness of some power manifest in
nature which helps man in the ordering of his life in harmony with its demands.
Furthermore, as to the reason for his objection to war, he stated that he derived them
from reading and meditation in the values of democratic American culture derived
from the western religious and philosophical tradition. As to his belief in a
“Supreme  Being”,  he  stated  that  his  belief  may  be  called  be  called  as  belief  in  such,  
although  he  doesn’t  use  those  words.  
2. The three were all convicted for refusal to submit to induction in the armed
forces. The CA however reversed the ruling for Seeger on ground that the
belief in the Supreme Being requirement of the section distinguished
"between internally derived and externally compelled   beliefs”   and   was   an  
impermissible classification under the 14th Amendment. It also reversed
Jakobson’s   conviction   on   reason   that   the   ground   for   his   indictment   was  
unclear, whether his beliefs failed to come within the statutory definition, or
whether it had concluded that he lacked sincerity. The conviction for Peter,
however, was affirmed.
ISSUE/S: WoN the beliefs which form the basis of Seeger, Jakobson and
Peter’s   conscientious   objection   to   war   fall   within   the   statutory   definition  
provided by the Universal Military Training and Service Act – YES
RULING: CA judgment for Seeger and Jakobson affirmed. Reversed for Peter.
Beliefs of the three all passed the test laid down by the Court to be exempted as
conscientious objectors
RATIO:
1. Legislative history of exemption in military conscription laws by reason of
conscientious objection:
Draft Act of 1917: afforded exemptions to conscientious objectors who were
affiliated with a "well-recognized religious sect or organization then organized and
existing and whose existing creed or principles [forbade] its members to participate
in war in any form
Selective Training and Service Act (1940): broadened exemption by making it
unnecessary by making it unnecessary to belong to a pacifist religious sect if the
the emphasis was on individual belief and not on membership in a church or sect.
Universal Military Training and Service Act (1948):   “religious training and
belief” was to be defined as "an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme
Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but
not including essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a
merely personal moral code.”
2. By comparing the statutory definition of these words, it becomes apparent
that Congress deliberately broadened them by substituting the phrase
"Supreme Being" for "God." In doing so, Congress did not elaborate on the
form or nature of this higher authority which it chose to designate as
"Supreme  Being.”
 On the other hand, since the Court adopted a broad definition of the scope
of  conscientious  objection,  the  exception  of  a  “merely  personal  moral  code”  
was construed as a moral code which is not only personal but which is the
sole basis for the registrant's belief and is in no way related to a Supreme
Being.
3. Under the 1940 Act, it was only necessary to have a conviction based upon
religious training and belief, and the same is true under the 1948 Act since
the latter was meant to reenact most of the provisions of the 1940 Act.
Within that phrase would come all sincere religious beliefs which are based
upon a power or being, or upon a faith, to which all else is subordinate or
upon which all else is ultimately dependent Therefore, the test of religious
belief within the meaning of the exemption is whether it is a sincere and
meaningful belief occupying in the life of its possessor a place parallel
to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualified for the
exemption.
4. The beliefs of the three appellants in these cases all passed the test laid
down by the Court. The applicants in these cases (Seeger, Jakobson and
Peter) claimed at the outset that their beliefs were religious.
Seeger:   professed   “religious   belief”   and   “religious   faith”.   He   grew   up   in   Roman  
Catholic family but his beliefs are derived from those of his Quaker friends. He did
not disavow any belief in relation to a Supreme Being and even stated that the
cosmic order does, perhaps, suggest a creative intelligence. He decried the
tremendous   “spiritual”   price   man   must   pay   for   willingness   to   destroy   human   life.  
The   Court   held   that   these   beliefs   and   Seeger’s   unquestioned   sincerity   to   them  
occupy the same place in his life as the belief in a traditional deity holds in the lives
of his Quaker friends.
Jakobson: CA found that his belief was in relation to a Supreme Being.
Peter:   acknowledged   “some   power   manifest   in   nature   which   helps   man   in   the  
ordering  of  his  life”  and  that  this  belief  is  akin  to  belief  in  a  Superior  Being  or  God,  
although he claims that he  doesn’t  use  those  words  to  refer  to  his  belief.    
 CLAY v. U.S.
June 28, 1971 | Per Curiam | Separation of Church and State: Free Exercise
Clause /Unusual Religious Beliefs and Practices
SUMMARY:  Cassius  Clay’s  application  for  conscientious  objector   was denied
after the DoJ advised the Appeal Board to deny it. No reason was given for the
denial, and Clay was convicted for wilful refusal to submit to induction into the
Armed Forces. The Court applied the three basic tests for conscientious
objectors, and reversed the judgment.
DOCTRINE: To qualify as a conscientious objector, a registrant must satisfy
three basic tests. (1) He must show that he is conscientiously opposed to war in
any form. (2) He must show that his opposition is based upon religious training
and belief. (3) He must show that this objection is sincere.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Cassius Clay (Muhammad Ali) applied for classification as a
conscientious objector, but was turned down by his local draft board. On
administrative appeal, an inquiry was conducted and the hearing officer
concluded that he was sincere in his objection on religious grounds to
participation in war in any form, and recommended that the conscientious
objector claim be sustained. However, the DoJ advised the Appeal Board
that the claim should be denied, and the Appeal Board did so without giving
any reason.
2. Petitioner was ordered to report for induction, but he refused. He was
convicted for wilful refusal to submit to induction into the Armed Forces.
ISSUE/S: WoN  the  Appeal  Board’s  denial  was  valid  - NO
RULING: Judgment reversed.
RATIO:
1. To qualify as a conscientious objector, a registrant must satisfy three basic
tests. (1) He must show that he is conscientiously opposed to war in any
form. (2) He must show that his opposition is based upon religious training
and belief. (3) He must show that this objection is sincere. In application of
these   tests,   the   Selective   Service   Systems’   concern   must   be   with   the  
registrant as an individual, not with its own interpretation of the religious
sect’s  dogma.
2. According to the DoJ:
a. First  test:  The  DoJ’s  letter  stated  that  petitioner’s  expressed  beliefs  did  
not appear to preclude military service in any form, but were limited to
military service in the US Armed Forces, i.e. only objections to certain
types of war in certain circumstances, not a general scruple against
participation in war in any form. Only a general scruple against
participation in war in any form can support an exemption as a
conscientious objector.
b. Second  test:  Islam’s  teachings  preclude  fighting  for  the  US  not  because  
of objections to participation of war in any form but because of
political and racial objections to US policies as interpreted by Elijah
Muhammad.
c. Third test: The DoJ stated that petitioner did not consistently manifest
his conscientious objector claim, and wrote several paragraphs reciting
the timing and circumstances of his claim, concluding that he had not
shown overt manifestations sufficient to establish his subjective belief
as his claim was not asserted until military service became imminent.
3. In the SC, the Government fully conceded   that   petitioner’s   beliefs   were  
based upon religious training and belief, as they were founded on the basic
tenets of Muslim religion as he understood them, and derived in substantial
part from his devotion to Allah as the Supreme Being. The Government also
acknowledged the sincerity of his beliefs. The DoJ was incorrect in advising
the   Board   that   it   should   disregard   the   hearing   officer’s   finding   simply  
because of the timing and circumstances of his claim.
4. Since the Appeal Board gave no reason for its denial of the claim, there was
no   way   to   know   which   of   the   three   grounds   in   the   DoJ’s   letter   it   relied  
upon. The Government acknowledged that two of those grounds were
invalid; moreover, it is indisputably clear that the Department was simply
wrong as a matter   of   law   in   advising   that   petitioner’s   beliefs   were   not  
religiously based nor sincerely held. Thus, he should be acquitted.
 GARCIA v. THE FACULTY ADMISSION COMMITTEE,
LOYOLA SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY
November 28, 1975 | Fernando, J. | Mandamus | Academic Freedom
SUMMARY: Garcia filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Loyola
School of Theology to admit her after she was denied readmission. SC held that
mandamus will not lie to compel the school to admit her by virtue of the
academic freedom accorded to institutions of higher learning.
DOCTRINE: Academic freedom of universities encompasses autonomy of the
university, as a corporate body, and the freedom of the individual university
teacher.
See also Ratio 4 on four essential freedoms of a university.
FACTS:
1. Epicharis Garcia was an M.A. student of Theology at the Loyola School of
Theology (LST). On May 30, 1975, she was informed by Fr. Antonio
Lambino  of  the  faculty’s  decision  to  deny  her  readmission.  The  letter  from   RULING: Petition dismissed.
the faculty stated as reason that her “frequent  questions  and  difficulties  were  not  
always pertinent and had the effect of slowing down the progress of the class; and
that she should have tried to give the presentation a chance and exerted more effort
to understand the point made before immediately thinking of difficulties and
problems”
2. She alleged that the reasons stated are not legal grounds for expulsion (such
as violation of any school regulation; gross misconduct) and that she tried to
arrive at compromises with the faculty that would allow her to continue her
studies while not causing inconvenience to the professors, but to no avail.
3. In  connection  with  the  school’s  decision  not  to  readmit  her,  she  was  advised   2. The Constitution recognizes the academic freedom of higher institutions of
to just seek admission with the UST Graduate School. She found out that
she could be admitted to said school, but she has to fulfill their requirements
for Baccalaureate in Philosophy in order to have her degree later in
Theology which would entail about 4-5 years more of studies (whereas in
the Loyola School of Studies, it would entail only about two years more).
Garcia then decided to cross-enroll subjects at UST to continue her studies
since time is of essence and she does not want to be deprived of the
opportunity to gain knowledge necessary for her work, even though her
subjects taken at UST may not be credited .
4. Since she could not have recourse to the President of the school, Fr. Jose
Cruz (who was with the Marcos entourage to China) nor with the Secretary
of Education (since it was his busiest time of the year), and June 11, 1975 is
the last day for registration, Garcia filed a petition for mandamus to compel
the Loyola School of Theology to allow her to enroll for the semester and to
accredit the units she took at UST.
5. The Admission Committee argued:
While lay students are allowed to take courses at LST due to its collaboration with
the Ateneo, the degree, if any, is to be granted by the Ateneo de Manila University
(ADMU) and not the LST. Garcia was technically not admitted to any degree
program since she was not admitted by the Asst. Dean of Graduate School of Ateneo
(who is the only one who can make such admission). As such, she was merely
admitted by the LST to take courses for credit (even free of charge accdg. to LST),
but was not admitted to any degree program.
LST has the discretion whether to admit and/or to continue admitting in the said
school any particular student, considering not only academic or intellectual
standards but also other considerations such as personality traits and character
orientation in relation with other students as well as considering the nature of Loyola
School of Theology as a seminary,
Mandamus will not lie since it has no clear duty to admit Garcia, and denial of her
readmission was based on reasonable grounds. .
ISSUE/S: WoN mandamus will lie to order the Loyola School of Theology to
admit Garcia – NO
RATIO:
1. Mandamus is not the proper remedy. The Loyola School of Theology has
no duty to admit her to said studies, since the school has clearly the
discretion to turn down even qualified applicants due to limitations of
space, facilities, professors and optimum classroom size and component
considerations. As to Garcia, what she possesses is a privilege, and not a
right.
learning. Academic freedom encompasses the autonomy of the university,
as a corporate body, and the freedom of the individual university
teacher. The collective liberty of the organization is by no means the same
thing as the individual liberty of its individual members, and they are not
necessarily connected; however, the latter is as equally as important as the
former.
3. Internal Conditions for Academic Freedom: academic staff should have
de facto control of the following functions: (i) admission and examination
students; (ii) curricula for courses of study; (iii) appointment and tenure of office of
academic staff; and (iv) allocation of income among the different categories of
expenditure. It would be a poor prospect for academic freedom if universities
had to rely on the literal interpretation of their constitutions in order to
acquire for their members control of these functions, for in one constitution
or another most of these functions are given to the lay governing body.
4. A university must provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to
speculation, experiment and creation -an atmosphere in which there prevail
the four essential freedoms of a university· to determine for itself on
 academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught,
and who may be admitted to study.
5. To yield conformity to the view that colleges and universities should be
looked upon as public utilities devoid of any discretion as to whom to admit
or reject would minimize the respect accorded to academic freedom of
higher institutions of learning. Education, especially higher education,
belongs to a different, and certainly higher, category.
ISABELO v. PERPETUAL HELP COLLEGE OF RIZAL
November 8, 1993| Vitug, J. | Mandamus | Academic Freedom
SUMMARY: Isabelo’s  enrollment  was  voided  on  the  ground  of  unit deficiencies,
but he claims that he was dismissed because of his opposition to the school.
PHCR invokes academic freedom. SC held that academic freedom is not absolute.
DOCTRINE: Like any other right, academic freedom has never meant to be an
unabridged license. It is a privilege that assumes a correlative duty to exercise it
responsibly and not arbitrarily. The contract between the school and the student,
imbued as it is with public interest, is not an ordinary contract.
FACTS:
1. Manuelito Isabelo was enrolled at the PHCR for a degree in BS
Criminology. He was elected Public Relations Officer and acting Secretary
of the Supreme Student Council. In this capacity, he was invited by the Vice
President for Academic Affairs to attend a meeting on May 8, 1991 to sign
Resolution 105, w/c would implement a 20% tuition fee increase for the
school year 1991-1992. Isabelo refused to sign and asked for a 2-week
period to discuss the matter with his fellow officers. During the meeting, the
student council presented a 9-point proposal. Upon assurance that this
would be considered favorably, Isabelo finally signed Resolution 105.
2. On Aug 6, 1991, PHCR announced that its application for increase in
tuition fees has been approved by the DECS. The student council filed with
the DECS a motion for reconsideration. In the meantime, CMT furnished
PHCR a memorandum containing a list of students dropped during the 1 st
semester, Isabelo being one of them. On Sept 4, 1991, the school
administration circulated a memorandum that Isabelo had been dropped
from   PHCR’s   list   of   students   because   of   deficiencies   (back   subjects).  
Isabelo sent a letter to DECS regarding this matter; and DECS directed the
school to allow Isabelo to continue attending classes pending resolution.
3. PHCR did not comply with the directive. And so Isabelo went to Court
questioning   PHCR’s   act   of   voiding   his   enrollment.   Isabelo   claims   that   the  
real reason for voiding his enrollment was his active participation in
opposing the application for tuition fee increase. PHCR invokes academic
freedom, saying that Isabelo was allowed to conditionally enroll during the
1st semester pending the completion of his remedial classes.
ISSUE/S: WoN  PHCR’s  act  was  within  the  exercise  of  academic  freedom—
NO.
RULING: Case  REMANDED  for  DECS’ own evaluation and determination.
*Petitioner prayed for readmission into the senior class. The Court said that it is
not a trier of facts re: the issue of whether he has a clear legal right to be
admitted in the senior year or has to overcome some school deficiencies.
RATIO:
1. The rule in this jurisdiction has been to uphold the rule that admission to an
institution of higher learning is discretionary upon the school and that such
admission is a mere privilege, rather than a right, on the part of the student.
Essential   freedoms   subsumed   in   the   term   “academic   freedom”   encompass  
not only the freedom to determine on academic grounds who may teach,
what may be taught, and how it shall be taught; but likewise who may be
admitted to study. Like any other right, however, freedom has never meant
to be an unabridged license. It is a privilege that assumes a correlative duty
to exercise it responsibly (Article 19, CC).
2. The Court has overturned Alcuaz v. PSBA and now recognizes the right of a
student to be enrolled for the entire period required in order to complete his
course. Furthermore, the contract between the school and the student,
imbued as it is with public interest, is not an ordinary contract.
3. While the Court does not ordinarily delve into the exercise of sound
judgment, it does so when it perceives taints of arbitrariness in the process.
In this case, Isabelo was unceremoniously dropped from the roll when the
1st semester was about to end. Furthermore, he took special training during
the semestral break and passed; but the school insisted that he was no longer
a student of PHCR and refused to give him accreditation. Also, the
punishment of expulsion is disproportionate to having unit deficiencies, as
DECS itself conceded.
 REYES v. CA
February 25, 1991 | Medialdea, J. | Certiorari, Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction and TRO | Academic Freedom
SUMMARY: The BOR resolved to direct the UPCM to admit students
dismissed because they failed to meet the admission requirement of 90
percentile in the NMAT even though during their NMAT, the UC-approved
cut-off grade was 70 percentile. SC held that the BOR acted within and in
accordance with its power of governance and administration of the University.
DOCTRINE: The BOR in its order upholding the admission requirement
approved by the University Council in 1986 did not violate academic freedom
but rather supported the right of the University Council to fix or approve
admission requirements against the UPCM faculty and Dean who changed the
admission requirements approved by the University Council without following
the prescribed rules and procedures of the University.
FACTS
1. Respondent-students obtained scores greater than 70 percentile on the
NMAT which was the cut-off rate of the UP College of Medicine (UPCM)
for AY 1986-1987 as prescribed by the UPCM faculty and approved by the
University Council (UC) on April 8, 1986.
2. On October 8, 1986, the UPCM Faculty prescribed a 90 percentile cut-off
score for admission effective academic year 1987-1988.
3. BOR and UP Chancellor recommended the admission of applicants
obtaining a percentile rating from 70-90 but the Dean of UPCM refused to
admit the students.
4. The students filed a petition for mandamus with the RTC and on June 11,
1987, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction for their
admission. The students were admitted and spent three years in the College.
5. Before the onset of school year 1990-1991, the students wrote a letter to the
UPCM faculty stating that they would leave to the faculty the determination
of their case and that they would like to appeal to remain in the College. The
said letter was attached to a motion to dismiss submitted to the RTC. The
RTC dismissed the case with prejudice on June 15, 1990.
6. The UPCM faculty then held an emergency meeting on June 22, 1990 where
it denied the appeal of the students by a vote if 86 on the grounds that they
are not qualified for admission to the UPCM.
7. The students then filed a motion the RTC to reconsider its order of dismissal
and, on June 27, 1990, the RTC issued an order for the admission of the
students to the college.
8. The BOR, in 1031st meeting dated June 28, 1990, resolved to approve the
admission of the students and order the petitioners to admit them. When the
Dean and Secretary of the UPCM failed to follow the order of the BOR, the
UP President issued a formal charge of Grave Misconduct and, later, Order
for Preventive Suspension against them.
9. On July 20, 1990, the RTC issued an Order which (a) required petitioners to
show cause why they should not be held in contempt for disobeying and
resisting its order dated June 27, 1990 and (b) denied the petitioners' motion
to  lift  injunction.  Petitioners’  appeals  to  the  CA  were  all  denied.
ISSUE/S:
1. WoN the BOR could validly direct the petitioners to admit the students to
the college of medicine – YES
2. WoN the BOR acted beyond its power when it retained the NMAT cut-off
score of 70th percentile – NO
3. WoN the BoR violated the academic freedom related to the right of the
University to fix admission requirements – NO
RULING: The petition is DISMISSED and the decisions of the CA are
AFFIRMED.
RATIO
1. To the BOR belongs the governance and the general powers of
administration of the university. The UC has the power to fix the admission
requirements to any college in the university while the College Faculty has
the power to determine the entrance requirements of the college subject to
the approval of the autonomous UC. At the time that the students took the
NMAT, the new UPCM Faculty prescribed 90 percentile cut-off grade was
without the UC's approval. Consequently, the UPCM Faculty cannot legally
implement a change in the NMAT cut-off grade. It then follows that the
previously approved 70 percentile cut-off remains the prescribed passing
grade for the students. Thus, the students have all the right to stay in the
college inasmuch as they met the cut-off score of 70 percentile imposed by
the UC and such right could not be abridged or denied by the resolutions of
the UC Manila dated July 20, 1990 and September 5, 1990 which sustained
the Faculty's refusal to admit the students. Under the Constitution, the
students have the right to select a profession or course of study subject to a
fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements
(Article XIV, Section 5(3)). The UC can ratify acts of the College regarding
admission requirements but the same should be done within a reasonable
time. To validate the resolutions at this point in time would not be fair and
equitable to the students who have proved their mettle by passing the
academic requirements of the college for three years.
2. The BOR did not exercise the power to prescribe entrance requirements
(powers that it does not have) but merely upheld the power of the
University Council under the law to fix the requirements for admission to
 the UPCM and rendered ineffective the action of the UPCM Faculty, which
attempted to exercise that power to increase the cut off score in NMAT to
90 percentile without the approval of the University Council and President
of the University in accordance with the exercise of its power of governance
and its duty in seeing to it that all the units abide with the law, university
rules and regulations.
3. The BOR in its order upholding the admission requirement approved by the
University Council in 1986 did not violate academic freedom but rather
supported the right of the University Council to fix or approve admission
requirements against the UPCM faculty and Dean who changed the
admission requirements approved by the University Council without
following the prescribed rules and procedures of the University.

NOTE: The BOR's claim of plenary power over admission requirements is not
officially approved by the SC as such claim has no basis in law. The UC has the
final say in admission requirements provided the same conforms to the law,
rules and regulations of the university. In the event the power is abused or
misused, it becomes the duty of the BOR, being the highest governing body in
the university, to step in and to correct the anomaly.
 U.P. v. C.A.
February 9, 1993 | Romero, J. | Certiorari | Academic Freedom
SUMMARY: Two UP faculty – Bailen and Salazar – presented allegations that
the Tasaday find was a hoax at conferences here in the country and abroad which
was widely publicized in several dailies. Because of this, Elizalde (the finder of
the Tasaday) and Tasaday representatives filed a complaint for damages and
declaratory relief against Salazar and Bailen before the QC RTC. UP intervened
arguing that the actions of the two were within the protective mantle of academic
freedom and filed an answer-in-intervention. The trial court held that UP's answer-
in- intervention had not explicitly alleged lack of cause of action. UP then filed a
motion to dismiss. The CA held that a motion to dismiss may not be granted on the
ground of insufficiency of cause of action predicated on matters not raised in the
complaint. The SC affirmed the decision of the lower courts.
DOCTRINE: The defense of academic freedom falls within Section 1(g) Rule 16
of the Rules of Court wherein the lack of cause of action must be evident on the
face of the complaint inasmuch as in a motion to dismiss based on said ground.
FACTS:
1. On August 1986, at the "International Conference on the Tasaday
Controversy   and   Other   Urgent   Anthropological   Issue”,   two   UP   faculty   –
Bailen and Salazar – presented what constitutes a claim that the Tasaday
find was a hoax. The same was reiterated by them when they were allegedly
sent by UP to Yugoslavia for the 12th International Congress of
Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences on July 1988. The allegations
were widely publicized.
2. Because of this, Elizalde (the finder of the Tasaday) and Tasaday
representatives filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief against
Salazar and Bailen before the QC RTC on October 27, 1988.
3. On Nov 24, 1988, UP filed a motion to intervene asserting that it had a duty
to protect Bailen and Salazar as faculty members for acts and utterances
made in the exercise of academic freedom and that it was itself entitled to
the right of institutional academic freedom.
4. Salazar and Bailen filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds
that: the complaint failed to state a cause of action; the cause of action, if
any, had already prescribed; they are protected by the guarantees of free
speech and academic freedom; the court had no jurisdiction to grant
declaratory relief in a civil action and no justiciable controversy exists. On
Jan., 1989, the RTC denied the motion to dismiss and admitted UP's
answer-in-intervention. Bailen and Salazar's MR and their petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed at the SC were also dismissed.
5. In the interim, on May 15, 1989, the lower court issued an order denying
UP's defenses (in its answer in intervention), as grounds for a motion to
dismiss" noting that UP's answer-in- intervention had not explicitly alleged
lack of cause of action or that the court had no jurisdiction over the nature
of the action or suit.
6. UP's petition for certiorari and prohibition filed with the SC on June 23,
1989 was referred to the CA. The CA dismissed the petition holding that the
motion to dismiss may not be granted on the ground of insufficiency of
cause of action predicated on matters not raised in the complaint – that UP's
argument that Bailen and Salazar's actions are within the 'protective mantle
of academic freedom guaranteed by the Constitution' for which the
defendants cannot be made liable for damages fails fails to consider that
such allegations are not stated in the complaint since by filing a motion to
dismiss, the allegations of the complaint are hypothetically admitted. It
ruled that the lower court had jurisdiction over the complaint for damages
as the action was aimed at recovering relief arising from alleged wrongful
acts of the defendants.
ISSUE/S: WoN the complaint against Bailen and Salazar should be dismissed
for lack of cause of action based on the grounds the acts and utterances of the
two were under the protective mantle of academic freedom – NO
RULING: The RTC order and CA decision are AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
UP's special defenses that the complaint has no cause for action because Bailen
and Salazar are protected by academic freedom fall within Section 1(g), Rule 16
of the Rules of Court. Under the rule, the lack of cause of action must be evident
on the face of the complaint inasmuch as in a motion to dismiss based on said
ground. By filing the motion to dismiss the complaint or by alleging defenses in
its answer invoking lack of cause of action as a ground for dismissal, UP
confined itself to the allegations of the complaint. The complaint has no cause of
action against UP since UP is not an original defendant. On the other hand, a
cause of action against Bailen and Salazar can be made out from the complaint –
that their acts and utterances allegedly besmirched the reputation of the
plaintiffs. UP should have championed the cause for the academic freedom of
Bailen and Salazar in the course of the trial. It erred in trying to abort the
proceedings at its inception through filing the motion to dismiss. Even with this
procedural lapse, the petitioner may still, during the trial, invoke and prove the
special defense of institutional academic freedom and in the process invoke and
dwell upon the individual academic freedom of its faculty members.
With respect to the application of res judicata, the requisite of identity of subject
matter in the two petitions is wanting. Two motions to dismiss the same
complaint were filed and separately resolved.
 DECS v. SAN DIEGO
December 21, 1989 | Cruz, J. | Review of RTC decision | Academic Freedom
SUMMARY: Private respondent took the NMAT and failed it thrice. Under a
rule limiting NMAT attempts to three, he was barred from retaking it. He
challenged the rule, invoking his constitutional rights to academic freedom and
quality  education.  The  Court  upheld  the  rule’s  constitutionality.
DOCTRINE: The right to quality education is not absolute. The Constitution
also  states  that   “every  citizen  has  the   right  to  choose  a  profession  or  course  of   good while also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction. A person
study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements”.
FACTS:
1. Private respondent Roberto San Diego, a UE Zoology graduate, took the
NMAT and flunked it thrice. When he reapplied for the fourth time, he was
rejected on the basis of the rule in MECS Order No. 12 Series of 1972,
limiting NMAT attempts to only three.
2. Petitioner challenged the rule, invoking his rights to academic freedom and
quality education. He was allowed to take the 1989 NMAT, subject to his
petition’s  outcome.   like him who are found wanting. It is not enough to simply invoke the right
ISSUE/S:  WoN  the  rule  violates  the  petitioner’s  rights  to  academic  freedom  and   preparation and promise. He has failed thrice. While his persistence is
quality education - NO
RULING: Petition granted. Decision reversed.
RATIO:
1. The   NMAT’s   constitutionality   was   previously   challenged   and   upheld   in   equals. There is a substantial distinction b/w med students and other
Tablarin v. Gutierrez. The regulation of the practice of medicine is a
method of protecting public health and safety. That such power to regulate
includes the power to regulate admissions to those authorized to practice
medicine was recognized, and legislation and administrative regulations
requiring medical board exams and the establishment of minimum medical
educational requirements were recognized as valid exercises of
governmental power. There was a reasonable relation between the NMAT
and the goal of protecting the public.
2. The   same   rationale   applies   in   the   case   at   bar.   The   applicant’s   academic  
preparation can be gauged at least initially by the admission test, and even
more reliably by the three-flunk rule.
3. The exercise of police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject
and a lawful method. The subject is within the ambit of police power as it is
the  State’s  right  and  responsibility to ensure that the medical profession is
not   infiltrated   by   incompetents   to   whom   patients’   health   and   lives   are  
entrusted. The method is not irrelevant, arbitrary or oppressive, as it is
intended to insulate medical schools and ultimately the medical profession
from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.
4. While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a
constitutional right to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling involving
public interest; and the closer the link, the longer the bridge to one's
ambition. The State has the responsibility to harness its human resources
and to see to it that they are not dissipated or not used at all. These
resources must be applied in a manner that will best promote the common
cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his patients. If
one who wants to be a lawyer may prove better as a plumber, he should be
so advised and adviced. He may not be forced to be a plumber, but he may
not force entry into the bar.
5. The right to quality education is not absolute. The Constitution also states
that   “every  citizen   has  the  right  to  choose  a  profession  or  course  of  study,  
subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements”.   Private   respondent   must yield to those who are better
prepared. Where even those qualified may still not be accommodated in
already-crowded medical schools, there is even more reason to bar those
to quality education; one must show that he is entitled to it because of his
noteworthy, it is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless love. He may be
intended for another profession where he is more likely to succeed and even
be outstanding.
6. There is no violation of equal protection. A law does not have to operate
with equal force on all persons or things; it only requires equality among
students not subjected to the NMAT and the 3-flunk rule. The medical
profession directly affects the very lives of the people, unlike other careers
which, for this reason, do not require more vigilant regulation. There would
be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are
admitted and others who have also qualified are denied entrance.
 TABLARIN v. J. GUTIERREZ
July 31, 1987 | Feliciano, J. | Certiorari | Academic Freedom
SUMMARY: Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the law and admin
order requiring the passing of NMAT to become eligible for admission to med
schools.   SC   held   that   the   measure   was   a   valid   exercise   of   the   State’s   police   well as the body of RA 2382, when considered together, provide substantial
power.
DOCTRINE: See Ratio No. 2.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners Teresita Tablarin et al sought admission to med schools for AY
1987-88 but they either did not take or did not successfully take the
National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of
Medical Education (the Board) and administered by the Center for
Educational Measurement (CEM).
2. They filed the present petition in their behalf and in behalf of other med
school applicants for AY 1987-88 and future years who have not taken or
successfully hurdled the NMAT; in order to enjoin the Secretary of
Education, the Board and CEM from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of
Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985
(Aug. 23, 1985) w/c requires the passing of the NMAT as a condition for
certificates of eligibility for admission, and to enjoin the said respondents
from conducting and administering the NMAT scheduled on Apr. 26, 1987
and in the future.
3. Respondent Judge denied the petition for preliminary injunction, allowing
the NMAT to be administered on said date. Petitioners now come to the SC
to have the RTC ruling reversed and set aside. They argued that continued
implementation of RA 2382 and MECS Order No. 52 violates certain
constitutional provisions (see Note after Ratio):
ISSUE/S: WoN requiring the passing of NMAT for admission to med school
violates the Constitution – NO
RULING: Petition dismissed. RTC Order affirmed.
RATIO:
1. Petitioners have not discharged the burden of proof lying upon them to
show how the law and MECS order in question violates the Art II, Sections
11, 13 and 17 (State Policies) of the Constitution invoked. They have not
made their case, even a prima facie case.
2. Art. XIV, Sec. 1 of the Constitution must be read in conjunction with Art.
XIV, Sec. 5(3). The State is not really mandated to take appropriate steps to
make quality education accessible to all who might for a number of reasons
wish to enroll in a professional school but rather merely to make such
education accessible to all who qualify under "fair, reasonable and
equitable admission and academic requirements."
3. No Undue Delegation of Legislative Power: While the standards set for
the Board are necessarily broad and highly abstract, Sec. 1, 5(a) and 7 as
compliance w/ the non-delegation principle.
4. Petitioners’   arguments   that   the   NMAT   is   unnecessary   hinges   on   the  
desirability or wisdom of a legislation or admin regulation, to w/c courts do
not have competence or commission to pass upon.
5. Valid Exercise of Police Power: Legislation and admin regulations
requiring those who wish to practice medicine to take and pass medical
board exams first as well as the establishment of minimum medical
educational requirements for admission to the profession have long been
recognized as valid exercises of police power. The regulation of the practice
of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable
method of protecting the health and safety of the public. Also, it is well
recognized that the power to regulate and control the practice of medicine
includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to
practice medicine.
There is a reasonable relation b/w prescribing the passing of NMAT as a
condition for admission to med school and the securing of the health and
safety of the general community. The regulation of access to medical
schools for the purpose of upgrading the selection of students into med
schools and of improving the quality of medical education in the country,
by limiting admission to those who have the aptitude for medical studies
and, eventually, practice, is also within the regulatory power of the State in
connection with securing the ultimate end of protecting the health and
safety of the public.
6. The power of the Board under the MECS order to determine the cutoff
score for passing the NMAT for every year is not capricious and arbitrary
and does not violate of the equal protection clause. The appropriate cutoff
score for each school year may be a function of different factors (i.e. no. of
passers, difficulty of test, no. of slots available in med schools, average
score, etc.). The Order grants flexibility to the Board to meet circumstances
as they change. A permanent and immutable cutoff score may result in
unreasonable rigidity.
Note:
Art. XIV, Sec. 1: "The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality
education at all levels and take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to
all."
Art. XIV, Sec. 5 (3): "Every citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study,
subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements."
Art. II, Sec. 11: "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect  of  human  rights.”
Art. II, Sec. 13: "The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation building and
shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well
being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their
involvement in public and civic affairs."
Art. II, Sec. 17: "The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts,
culture and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress and to
promote total human liberation and development."

RA 2382 (Medical Act of 1959), as amended by RA 4224 and 5946

Section 1. Objectives. This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the standardization and
regulation of medical education; (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and
(c) the supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines
Section 5. Functions. The functions of the Board of Medical Education shall be:
(a) To determine and prescribe minimum requirements for admission into a recognized
college of medicine; xxx
Section 7. Admission requirements. The medical college may admit any student to its
first year class who has not been convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of any
offense involving moral turpitude, and who presents (a) a certificate showing completion
of a standard high school course, (b) a record showing completion of a standard
preparatory medical course as herein provided, (c) a certificate of registration as medical
student, (d) a certificate of good moral character issued by two former professors in the
pre-medicine course, and (e) birth certificate and marriage certificate, if any. Nothing in
this Act shall be construed to inhibit any college of medicine from establishing, in
addition to the preceding, other entrance requirements that may be deemed admissible.
xxx
 NON v. J. DAMES
May 20, 1990 | Cortes, J. | Certiorari | Academic Freedom
SUMMARY: Petitioners were refused readmission for participating in
student mass actions against Mabini College, and for allegedly incurring
failing marks.
DOCTRINE: Although educational institutions have the prerogative to set
academic standards, academic freedom cannot be utilized to discriminate
against students who exercise their constitutional rights. However,
disciplinary action may still be taken against students who cause disorderly
conduct, provided that the penalty is proportionate to the offense and that the
requirements of procedural process are complied with.
FACTS:
Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet,
Camarines Norte, were not allowed to re-enroll for AY 1988-1989 for leading or
participating in student mass actions against the school in a preceding semester.
As additional justification for their refusal to readmit said students, the school
stated that 8 of the 13 petitioners incurred failing grades: 1) Ariel Non – 1
subject and failed to submit for 137, a prerequisite for enrollment; 2) Rex
Magana – failed 1 subject, INC in 4, and no grade in 2 subjects; 3) Elvin Agura
– failed 2, INC 3; 4) Emmanuel Barba – 1 fail, has to take CMT 11 to 22 and is
already enrolled at Ago Foundation; 5) Joselito Villalon –INC 9; 6) Luis Santos
– failed 1; 7) George Dayaon – failed 4, INC 1; and 8) Daniel Torres – failed 5,
INC 5, no grade in 1 subject.
ISSUE/S: WoN the students were afforded due process before they were
refused re-enrollment. – NO.
WoN the school has the right to refuse readmission of the students – YES, but
with certain conditions
RULING: Petition GRANTED. Assailed decision ANNULLED. Mabini
College ordered to readmit and allow petitioners to re-enroll, without prejudice
to its taking the appropriate action.
RATIO:
1. Students do not shed their constitutionally protected rights at the school
gate. It is expected that disorder may mark the public assembly of people to
protest their grievances, for feelings are wrought to a high pitch of
excitement. If all instances of disorderly conduct are prosecuted upon, then
the right to assemble and petition for redress of grievances will be nothing
but an illusion. Although individuals who cause disorderly conduct must be
punished, utmost discretion must be exercised in drawing the line between
disorderly and seditious conduct and an essentially peaceable assembly.
While, therefore, the authority of educational institutions over the conduct
of students must be recognized, it cannot go so far as to be violative of
constitutional safeguards. Nevertheless, while high regard is afforded for
the exercise of the rights to free speech and assembly, it does not mean that
school authorities are virtually powerless to discipline students. If the
students’   conduct,   inside   or   outside   of   class,   materially   disrupts   classwork  
or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others, such
conduct is not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
speech.
2. The  court  cannot  anchor  its  decision  on  the  “termination  of  contract”  theory  
– that students are enrolled for one semester only, and that when the
semester is over, re-enrollment is dependent solely on the sound discretion
of the school. Such is not even supported by the Manual of Regulation for
Private Schools (contrary to what Alcuaz held). The contract between the
school and the student is not an ordinary contract. It is imbued with public
interest, considering the high priority given by the Constitution to education
and the supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational institutions
by the State. The theory is intended merely to protect the schools wherein
tuition fees are collected and paid on installment basis, wherein the student
may be required to pay for his tuition for the whole semester even if he does
not complete the semester for which he was enrolled but has stayed on for
more than 2 weeks. This, however, should not to be construed to mean that
a student is enrolled for one semester only. Every student has the right to be
enrolled in his course for the entire period he is expected to complete it,
except in cases of academic delinquency or violation of disciplinary
regulations (B.P. 232, Sec. 9, Education Act of 1982).
3. Academic  freedom  is  not  a  ground  for  denying  students’  rights.  Academic  
freedom includes the right to set academic standards to determine under
what circumstances failing grades suffice for the expulsion of the students;
standards which should be followed meticulously. However, such right
cannot be utilized to discriminate against students who exercise their
constitutional rights to speech and assembly. Otherwise, there will be a
violation of their right to equal protection.
4. Refusal of re-enrollment due to failing grades was a mere afterthought.
Excluding students because of failing grades when the cause for the action
taken against them undeniably related to possible breaches of discipline not
only is a denial of due process by also constitutes a violation of the basic
tenets of fair play. The 5 students who did not incur failing marks and were
refused readmission without just cause should all be allowed to reenroll.
Those who only had 1 or 2 failing marks, their failures cannot be considered
marked academic   deficiency   within   the   context   of   the   court’s   decision   in  
Villar. As to those who incurred several filing grades, it was not clear
 whether the failures were incurred in only 1 semester or through the course
of several semesters. Thus, while the prerogative of schools to set academic
standards   is   recognized,   we   cannot   affirm   the   school’s   action   because   of  
insufficient information.
5. This does not mean that no disciplinary action can be taken against
petitioners’  breach  of  discipline,  if  the  facts  so   warranted. But penalty that
could have been imposed must commensurate the the offense committed
and must be imposed only after the requirements of procedural due process
have been complied with.
 ALCUAZ et al v. PSBA
May 2, 1988 | Paras, J. | Review on Certiorari | Academic Freedom
SUMMARY: PSBA   students   were   blacklisted   for   “anarchic   acts”   and   were   not   accusation, 2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them,
allowed to reenroll upon recommendation by an investigation committee. They
complained that this was violative of due process. The Court held that the school
had a right to refuse reenrollment on the grounds of academic delinquency and
violation of disciplinary rules in the exercise of their academic freedom.
DOCTRINE: Institutional academic freedom includes the right to decide for
itself its aims and objectives and how best to achieve them, free from outside
coercion or interference, except when overriding public welfare calls for restraint.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners are students and teachers of PSBA and respondentis PSBA, a
non-stock institution of higher learning organized and existing under laws
of the Phils. In March 22, 1986, students and PSBA had an agreement on
rules regarding protest actions, since students were not allowed to directly
participate in policy-making, as this is provided by law.
2. Petitioners demanded negotiation of a new agreement, which was turned
down, resulting in mass assemblies on Oct 2, 3, 7 and 8, where they even
barricaded the entrances. On Oct 8, the students were sent uniform letters
asking them to explain why the school should not take any administrative
action   against   their   “anarchic   acts”.   This   was   answered   by   counsel   in   Oct   enjoyed by the school and enshrined under the Constitution.
22. However, they were blacklisted and denied admission during
enrollment, which prompted petitioners to resort to the courts.
3. On Nov 12, the SC issued a temporary mandatory order directing the
respondents to enroll the petitioners, and readmit the teachers to their
former positions w/o prejudice to investigation to be conducted by school
authorities. On Apr 27, 1987, PSBA filed their manifestation and submitted
a report w/ recommendations by a special investigating committee. Findings
included the dismissal of Alcuaz, exoneration of the other 3 students,
termination of the services of some teachers, and exoneration of some. On
Jun 29, the motion to compel PSBA to re-enroll petitioners was denied by
the Court, except for the 3 exonerated students, holding that the results of
the investigation indicate prima facie the violation of rules and regulations
of the school. Petitioners allege that they were deprived of due process
(notice and hearing and investigative body free from bias).
ISSUE/S: WoN the PSBA abused its discretion in not allowing the students to
reenroll—NO
RULING: Petition DISMISSED.
RATIO:
1. The minimum standards of due process in disciplinary cases for students
are: 1) students be informed in writing of the nature and cause of the
w/ assistance of counsel if desired, 3) they shall be informed of evidence
against them, 4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own
behalf, and 5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee. While there was initially no hearing, violating Nos. 3 to 5, the
requirements were complied with when   PSBA   complied   with   the   Court’s  
Nov 12 Order for the investigation; allowing counsel to file an answer.
2. A student, once admitted, is considered enrolled for 1 semester. This is
provided in the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools. The same is true
for teachers, since the Manual provides that written contracts are for 1
semester. As such, the denial of due process is untenable; the school cannot
be compelled to enter into another contract with said students and teachers.
In addition to the illegal assemblies conducted by the participants, the report
revealed that the students dismissed are academically deficient and the
teachers named have previously committed various acts of misconduct. The
right of a school to refuse reenrollment of students for academic
delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations has always been
recognized by the Court and such grounds are sanctioned by law (Manual).
To sustain the opposite view would do violence to the academic freedom
3. “This   institutional   academic   freedom   includes   not   only   the   freedom   of  
professionally qualified persons to inquire, discover, publish and teach the
truth as they see it in the field of their competence subject to no control or
authority except of rational methods by which truths and conclusions are
sought and established in their disciplines, but also the right of the school or
college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain
them the grant being to institutions of higher learning—free from outside
coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare
calls  for  some  restraint.”
Sarmiento, dissenting: It is true that academic freedom pertains to houses of
education, but it does not mean untrammeled liberty for schools and school
authorities. Educational institutions created by the State, as an exception to
academic   freedom,   are   subject   to   State   regulation.   The   Court’s   reliance   on  
precedent cases is misplaced, for neither case involved the exercise of
fundamental civil liberties. Those cases referred to pure questions of academic
delinquency and unbecoming conduct of a student for fighting. This case is
different for it carries a political color and an exercise of the freedom of
expression and assembly.
 HOME BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATION v.
BLAISDELL
January 8, 1934 | Hughes, C.J. | Appeal | Protected Interests in Liberty: Non-
Impairment of Obligations of Contracts
SUMMARY: Appellant appeals the decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court
extending the period of redemption of a mortgage between him and the appellee
by contesting the validity of a Minnesota statute extending the same during the
economic emergency of the time. SC held that the statute was constitutional, the
power wielded by the state when the statute is valid, and that it does not violate or
affect the obligations of contracts.
DOCTRINE: The state power may be addressed directly to the prevention of the
enforcement of contracts only when these are of a sort which the Legislature in its
discretion may denounce as being in themselves hostile to public morals, or public
health, safety, or welfare.
FACTS:
1. Appellant contests the validity of Part 1, 4, of the Minnesota Mortgage
Moratorium Law authorizing the district court of the county to extend the
period of redemption from foreclosure sales 'for such additional time as the
court may deem just and equitable,' to be made upon application to the court,
on notice, for an order determining the reasonable value of the income on the
property involved in the sale, or the reasonable rental value of the property,
and directing the mortgagor 'to pay all or a reasonable part of such income or
rental value, in or toward the payment of taxes, insurance, interest, mortgage
... indebtedness at such times and in such manner' as shall be determined by
the court and that the time for redemption from foreclosure sales, which
otherwise would expire less than thirty days after the approval of the act,
shall be extended to a date thirty days after its approval.
2. Subject to the provisions of the above law, appellees applied to the court of
Hennepin county for an extension of the period of redemption on a
foreclosure sale for a lot that they mortgaged for which the appellant holds a
sheriff's certificate of sale and, because of the economic conditions, the
appellees are unable to redeem.
3. The appellant moved the petition to be dismissed on grounds that the statute
was invalid under the federal and state Constitutions to which the district
court agreed. Upon appeal, the Minnesota SC reversed the district court's
judgment entered its judgment extending the period of redemption subject to
the condition that the appellees should pay to the appellant $40 a month
through the extended period from May 2, 1933 and all these amounts where
to go to the payment of taxes, insurance, interest, and mortgage
indebtedness.
ISSUE/S: WON the statute in constitutional – YES
RULING: The judgment is AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
1. The question is not whether the legislative actions affects contracts
incidentally, or directly or indirectly, but whether the legislation is addressed to
a legitimate end and the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate. The
state power may be addressed directly to the prevention of the enforcement of
contracts only when these are of a sort which the Legislature in its discretion
may denounce as hostile to public morals, or public health, safety, or welfare.
The constitutional prohibition on the impairment of the obligation of contracts
should not be so construed as to prevent limited and temporary interpositions
thereof if made necessary by a great public calamity such as fire, flood, or
earthquake. The police power of the state allows it to directly prevent the
immediate and literal enforcement of contractual obligations by a temporary and
conditional restraint, where vital public interests would otherwise suffer.
With these in mind, the SC concluded that:
(1) An emergency existed in Minnesota which furnished a proper occasion for the
exercise of the reserved power of the state to protect the vital interests of the community.
(2) The statute in question was addressed to a legitimate end; that is, the legislation was
not for the mere advantage of particular individuals but for the protection of a basic
interest of society.
(3) In order not to contravene with the constitutional provision the relief afforded and
justified by the emergency with regards to the affected contracts in question – mortgages
of unquestionable validity – could only be of a character appropriate to that emergency,
and could be granted only upon reasonable conditions.
(4) The conditions upon which the period of redemption is extended do not appear to be
unreasonable. The integrity of the mortgage indebtedness is not impaired. It continues to
accrue interest during the extended period and if the mortgagor fails to redeem within the
extended period, the validity of the sale and the rights attached to the mortgagee-
purchaser are maintained. The mortgagor during the extended period is not ousted from
possession, but he must pay the rental value of the premises as ascertained in judicial
proceedings and this amount is applied to the carrying of the property and to interest
upon the indebtedness. The mortgagee- purchaser during that time is not left without
compensation for the withholding of possession. Although the courts would have no
authority to alter a statutory period of redemption, the legislation in question permits the
courts to extend that period, within limits and upon equitable terms, thus providing a
procedure and relief which are cognate to the historic exercise of the equitable
jurisdiction. If it be determined, as it must be, that the contract clause is not an absolute
and utterly unqualified restriction of the state's protective power, this legislation is clearly
so reasonable as to be within the legislative competency.
(5) The legislation is temporary in operation. It is limited to the exigency which called it
forth. The operation of the statute itself could not validly outlast the emergency or be so
extended as virtually to destroy the contracts.
 RUTTER v. ESTEBAN decreed by the state, and is adopted during times of financial distress
May 18, 1953 | Bautista Angelo, J. | Appeal from CFI judgment | Protected (especially   war).   While   it’s   true   that   the   moratorium   law   impairs   the  
Interests in Liberty: Non-Impairment of Obligations of Contracts obligations of contracts, it’s  justified  since  such  is  a  valid  exercise  of  police  
power. In Blasdell, it was held that the policy of protecting contracts against
SUMMARY: Rutter’s  suit  for  recovery  against  Esteban  is  dismissed  b/c  the  latter   impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government by which
invoked RA 342/moratorium law. Rutter assails RA 342 for impairing contracts. contractual   relations   are   worthwhile   since   the   gov’t   retains adequate
SC: RA 342 void for imposing an unreasonable period. authority to secure the societal peace &order. All contracts are made subject
DOCTRINE: All contracts are subject to an implied reservation   of   the   state’s   to  an  implied  reservation  of  the  state’s  protective  power,  and  that  therefore  
protective power. Statutes which validly exercise this reserved power, rather than statutes which validly exercise this power, rather than impairing the
impairing the obligations of an existing contracts, are comprehended within them. obligations of existing contracts, are comprehended within them.
3. Limitations   of   State’s   Reserved   Power:   Application   of   the   State’s  
FACTS: reserved  power  to  protect  gov’t  integrity  and  security  may  only  be  invoked  
1. Royal Rutter sold 2 parcels of land to Placido Esteban on Aug 1941 for P9, and justified by an emergency, it must be temporary in nature, and can only
600, with a P4,800 remaining balance. To secure such balance, a mortgage be exercised upon reasonable conditions. The true test of a moratorium
over  the  2  parcels  of  land  was  constituted  in  Rutter’s  favor.  Esteban  failed   law’s  constitutionality  lies  in  determining  if  the  period  of  the  suspension  is  
to pay the balance, so Rutter instituted this action to recover the balance + definite   and   reasonable.   If   it’s   unreasonable,   only   then   will   such   a   law  
interest w/ a prayer for the sale of the properties mortgaged. constitute an impairment of contracts. Impairment should only refer to the
2. While   Esteban   admitted   those   in   Fact   1,   he   set   up   RA   342’s   moratorium   remedy and not to a substantive right. The State may postpone an
clause as a defense. He claims that this was a prewar obligation, that he is a obligation’s  enforcement  but  cannot  destroy  it  by  making  the  remedy  futile.  
war sufferer having filed a claim for the losses he suffered in the war, and 4. Commendable Purpose and Limited Recipients:RA 342 only extends
that  under  Section  2  of  the  RA,  payment  of  his  obligation  can’t  be  enforced   relief to debtors of prewar obligations who suffered from the ravages of the
until the lapse of eight years from the settlement of his claim by the last war and who filed a claim with the Commission. Its purpose is to afford
Philippine War Damage Commission, such period not having expired. prewar debtors an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves by giving them a
3. Complaint dismissed since obligation not yet demandable under the reasonable time within which to pay their prewar debts so as to prevent
moratorium law. Rutter assails constitutionality of RA 342, saying that if them   from   being   victimized   by   their   creditors.   While   it’s   admitted   that  
declared   applicable   to   the   present   case,   it’s   unconstitutional   for   impairing   liberation   conditions   have   gradually   returned   to   normal,   this   isn’t   so   with  
the obligation of contracts. regard to those who have suffered the ravages of war.
5. Period & Non-Imposition of Interest is Unreasonable: However,   it’s  
ISSUE/S: WON  RA  342’s  period of moratorium impairs contracts – YES. these obligations have been pending since 1945 as a result of EO 25 & 32
(President’s  moratorium  orders),  and  at  present  are  still  inhibited  because  of  
RULING: REVERSED. RA 342 is null and void. EO 25 & 32 also null and RA  342’s  grant  of  an  8  year  period.  This  means that creditors would have to
void, hence the revival clause will not take effect. Esteban to pay Rutter. wait for at least 12years before they could effect a liquidation of their
investment dating as far back as 1941. This is unreasonable, if not
RATIO: oppressive. While the purpose is commendable, the relief accorded works
1. RA 342, Section 2: All debts and monetary obligations contracted before injustice to  creditors  who  are  left  at  the  debtors’  mercy.  Their  hope  to  effect  
December 8, 1941, any provision in the contract creating the same or any collection becomes extremely remote, more so if the credits are unsecured.
subsequent agreement affecting such obligation to the contrary It’s   even   more   unjust   that   under   the   law,   the   debtor   isn’t   even   required   to  
notwithstanding, shall not be due and demandable for a period of 8 years pay interest during the operation of   the   relief.   The   country’s   financial  
from   settlement   of   the   debtor’s   war damage claim. Section 3: Should condition  had  recovered,  based  on  President’s  speeches.
Section  2  be  declared  void,  it’ll  revive  the  President’s  previous  moratorium  
orders  and  it’ll  cover  such  debts  and  monetary  obligations.  
2. Balancing Impairment Prohibition & State Power: Moratorium laws
aren’t   new.   Moratorium   is   a   postponement   of   fulfillment   of   obligations  
ORTIGAS & CO. LTD. PARTNERSHIP v. FEATI BANK and welfare of the people. Public welfare, when clashing with the individual right
TRUST CO. to property, should prevail thru police power.
December 14, 1979 | Santos, J. | Appeal from CFI decision | Protected Interests 3. The resolution of the municipality declaring the area of the lots as an
in Liberty: Non-Impairment of Obligations of Contracts industrial zone was passed in the exercise of police power to safeguard the
welfare of the people. The area is along the highway where different
commercial establishments have flourished and heavy traffic passes every
SUMMARY: Ortigas Partnership sued FEATI bank for not following the
day. It cannot be considered as conducive to the health and safety of the
building restrictions of the lands sold to the latter as indicated when plaintiff
residents in its route. The said resolution by the municipality is justified.
executed deeds of sale. Court held that legitimate exercise of police power
4. The motive behind the resolution, it being a legitimate response to a felt
supersedes any type of contract stipulation.
public need, not whimsical or oppressive,   will   not   bar   the   municipality’s  
DOCTRINE: Non-impairment of contracts, although constitutionally guaranteed,
exercise of police power. Otherwise, the non-impairment of contracts clause
is not absolute. Laws created in the proper exercise of police power do not bow
in the Constitution will prohibit it.
down to the constitutional guarantee of non-impairment of contracts.
5. Moreover, not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix
obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of essential attributes
FACTS:
of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a rule in legal order. The
1. Plaintiff, as vendor, sold two parcels of land to Augusto and Natividad
policy of protecting contracts against impairments presupposes the
Angeles. The said vendees then transferred their rights of Emma Chavez to
maintenance of a government adequate authority to secure the peace and
whom the plaintiff executed corresponding deeds of sale after completion of
good order of society. The law forms part of, and is read into, every contract,
payment. Part of the deeds of sale contained a stipulation that said lots can
unless clearly excluded therefrom in those cases where such exclusion is
only be used for residential purposes.
allowed.
2. Later on, FEATI Bank (defendant-appellee) bought the two parcels of land.
He constructed a building on said lots which the plaintiff immediately
C.J. Fernando (Concurring): The police power cannot be construed so as to
demanded to be stopped to no avail. Defendant argued that the lots were part
destroy the limitation of non-impairment, nor is the limitation to be construed to
of an area declared by the municipality as a commercial and industrial zone.
destroy the police power in its essential aspects. They must be construed in
3. The lower court submitted a decision favoring the defendant and declaring
harmony with each other. In the process of such balancing, the Constitution,
the municipal resolution as prevailing over the building restrictions of the
leaves no doubt that the claim to property rights based on the non-impairment
said lots.
clause  has  a  lesser  weight.  For  as  explicitly  provided  by  our  constitution:  “The  
State shall promote social justice to ensure the dignity, welfare, and security of
ISSUE/S: WoN the stipulations in the contract supersede the resolution of the
all   the   people.”  Put   simply,   the   State   shall   regulate the acquisition, ownership,
municipality for the commercial and industrial zone - NO
use, enjoyment, and disposition of private property, and equitably diffuse
property ownership and profits.
RULING: Decision dismissing the complaint is affirmed.
J. Abad-Santos (Dissenting): Enactment of the controversial resolution was not
RATIO:
by virtue of the police power of that municipality. Resolution No. 27, cannot be
1. Private interest should bow down to the exercise of police power. The
described as promotive of the health, morals, peace, education, good order or
resolution of the municipality, presumed to be valid because of lack of
safety and general welfare of the people of Mandaluyong. On the contrary, its
contention, roots from the Local Autonomy Act which empowers Municipal
effect is the opposite. For the serenity, peace and quiet of a residential section
Councils to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for the
would by the resolution be replaced by the chaos, turmoil and frenzy of
municipality.
commerce and industry. Where there would be no industrial and noise pollution
2. Non-impairment of contracts, although constitutionally guaranteed, is not
the bane of so-called progress would now pervade and suffocate the
absolute. It still has to be reconciled with police power which has been
environment to the detriment of the ecology. To characterize the ordinance as an
construed as the legitimate exercise of power to prescribe regulations to
exercise of police power would be retrogressive.
promote health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general
 JUAREZ  v.  CA  and  CETUS  DEV’T  CORP
October 7, 1992| Cruz, J. | Review on Certiorari | Protected Interests in Liberty:
Non-Impairment of Obligations of Contracts
SUMMARY: BP 887 took effect in June 1987, prohibiting lessees from
subleasing the property without written consent from the lessor. Juarez contends
that it should not be given retroactive effect for it would violate the impairment
clause. SC held that contracts affecting public interest are not inviolate.
DOCTRINE: As long as the contract affects public welfare so as to require
interference by the State, police power must prevail over the impairment clause.
The contract is protected by the guaranty only if it does not affect public interest.
FACTS:
1. The lot in question is located in Quezon Boulevard. It was leased to
Servillano Ocampo in the early 1900s, who built a house thereon where he
lived with his parents and sister Angela. He died in 1956 and the lease was
taken over by Angela Ocampo, who stayed in the house with her children,
including petitioner Virginia Ocampo Juarez. In 1976, they moved to
Virginia’s  house  in  Pasay;;  and  the  house  was  leased  to  Roberto  Capuchino.
2. In the meantime, the lot had been sold by the Aranetas to Susanna Realty,
which sold it in 1985 to Cetus Devt Corp. Immediately after acquiring the
lot, Cetus filed a complaint for ejectment against Juarez for violating BP
887 (took effect on June 12, 1985), by subleasing it to another without the
owner’s  consent.  The  RTC  dismissed  the  case  holding  that  the  sublease  was   is charging Capuchino for the use of the house and lot.
made  prior  to  the  BP’s  effectivity  and  was  therefore  inapplicable.  The  CA  
reversed holding that BP 887 was applicable, because the original contract
of lease did not specify a fixed term and payment was made on a monthly
basis (contract deemed terminated from month to month). Hence, when it
was renewed in July 1985, it became subject to BP 887.
2. SC held that even if the sublease was not terminable and had a fixed period
when the statute became effective, that period would still be cut short by
operation of BP 887. The Court held that the impairment clause is now no
longer inviolate, because the interests of the public have become involved
in what are supposed to be private agreements. It was useful before in
protecting the integrity of agreements from government meddling, when
such agreements did not affect the community in general. In the present,
however, these private agreements have come within the embrace of police
power—as long as the contract affects public welfare one way or another
so as to require interference by the State, police power must be asserted
and must prevail over the impairment clause. In fact, as the Court
previously held, non-impairment has become the exception rather than the
rule; and the contract is protected by the guaranty only if it does not affect
public interest.
3. In this case, housing is one of the most serious problems in the country,
giving rise to regulation of rentals, especially in the urban areas.
Regulations prohibit the lessor from arbitrarily increasing rentals, forcing
the lessee to either pay up or vacate; and the lessee from insisting payment
of inordinately low rentals grown absurd and unrealistic in view of rising
costs. BP 887 addresses the unconscionable practices of lessees that have
caused much prejudice to the lessor—as in this case. Juarez pays only
P69.70 per month and subleases it for P400. Thus SC held that she is not
paying the lessor enough for the use of the lot in light of the total rental she

ISSUE/S: WoN  petitioner’s  contention  (BP  887 should not be given retroactive
effect for it would violate the impairment clause) has merit—NO.

RULING: Petition DISMISSED.

RATIO:
1. Article 1687 of the Civil Code provides that if the contract of lease does not
fix a period but rental is made monthly, the period should be understood to
the month to month. This is also applicable to the contract of sublease with
Capuchino. Thus, even if the contract of sublease was valid when it was
made in 1976, it became invalid when renewed in July 1985 under the
provisions of BP 887 operating prospectively.
 CALEON v. AGUS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
April 7, 1992 | Bidin, J. | Certiorari | Protected Interests in Liberty: Non-
Impairment of Obligations of Contracts
SUMMARY: Caleon challenges the constitutionality of B.P. 25 for impairing
obligations of contracts after she was ejected from her leased premises by the
lessor   pursuant   to   B.P.   25’s   prohibition   on   subleasing   pf   residential units
without  the  lessor’s  consent.  SC  held:
DOCTRINE: Constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of
contracts is limited by and subject to the exercise of police power of the State in
the interest of public health, safety, morals and general welfare. Legislation
appropriate to safeguarding the vital interests of the people may modify or
abrogate contracts already in effect.
FACTS:
1. Agus   Dev’t   Corp.   owned   a   parcel   of   land   (Lot   39,   Block   28)   at   Lealtad,   3.
Sampaloc, Manila, which it leased to Rita Caleon for a monthly rental of
P180.00. Caleon constructed on the lot leased a 4-door apartment building.
2. Without the consent of Agus, Caleon sub-leased two of the four doors of the
apartment to Rolando Guevarra and Felicisima Estrada for a monthly rental
of P350.00 each. Upon learning of the sub-lease, Agus through counsel
demanded in writing that Caleon vacate the leased premises.
3. For failure of Caleon to comply with the demand, Agus filed an ejectment
suit against Caleon, citing Sec. 5 of B.P. 25, which prohibits unauthorized
sub-leasing of part of the leased premises to third persons without securing
the consent of the lessor within the required sixty (60)-day period from the
promulgation of the new law.
4. RTC ordered Caleon (a) to vacate the premises specified in the complaint;
(b) to remove whatever improvement she introduced on the property; (c) to
pay Agus P2,000.00 as attorneys fees; and (d) to pay the costs. CA affirmed
said decision.
5. Caleon argues that B.P. 25 is not applicable to her case since what she
subleased was her house and not the lot; that B.P. 25 is unconstitutional for
it impairs obligation of contracts since there is a perfected contract of lease
without any express prohibition on subleasing which had been in effect
between petitioner and private respondent long before the enactment of B.P.
25; and invokes the social justice policy of the 1987 Constitution
ISSUE/S:  WoN  B.P.  25  applies  to  Caleon’s  case  – YES
WoN B.P. 25 impairs the obligation of contracts – NO
RULING: Petition denied. CA decision affirmed.
RATIO:
1. Lease of a building naturally includes the lease of the lot, and the rentals of
the building include those of the lot. Under B.P. 25 subleasing of residential
units without the written consent of the owner/lessor is one of the grounds
for  judicial  ejectment.  Furthermore,  under  said  law  “residential  unit”  refers
to “an  apartment,  house  and/or  land  on  which  another’s  dwelling  is  located  used  for  
residential purposes and shall include not only buildings, parts or units thereof used
solely as dwelling places, except motels, motel rooms, hotels, hotel rooms, boarding
houses, dormitories, rooms and bedspaces for rent, but also those used for home
industries, retail stores, or other business purposes if the owner thereof and his
family  actually  live  therein  and  use  it  principally  for  dwelling  purposes.”
Thus,  B.P.  25  applies  to  Caleon’s  case.  
2. There is a presumption in favor of constitutionality. One who attacks a
statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a
reasonable doubt. Furthermore, the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota presented.
Constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contracts is
limited by and subject to the exercise of police power of the State in the
interest of public health, safety, morals and general welfare. Legislation
appropriate to safeguarding the vital interests of the people may modify or
abrogate contracts already in effect.
4. B.P. 25 (An Act Regulating Rentals of Dwelling Units or of Land On Which
Another’s   Dwelling   is   Located   and   For   Other   Purposes) is for the
regulation of rentals and is intended only for dwelling units with specified
monthly rentals constructed before the law became effective. It is derived
from P.D. No. 20 which has been declared by the Court as police power
legislation, applicable to leases entered into prior to July 4, 1971 so that the
applicability thereof to existing contracts cannot be denied.
5. While B.P. 25 is to remedy the plight of lessees, such objective is not
subject to exploitation by the lessees for whose benefit the law was enacted.
Thus, the prohibition provided for in the law against the sublease of the
premises without the consent of the owner. Social justice cannot be invoked
to trample on the rights of property owners, who under our Constitution and
laws are also entitled to protection. The social justice in the Constitution
was not intended to take away rights from a person and give them to
another who is not entitled thereto.
 RUBI v. PROVINCIAL BOARD
March 7, 1919 | Malcolm, J. | Original Action for Habeas Corpus | Protected
Interests in Liberty: Involuntary Servitude
SUMMARY: Rubi and the other non-Christian (uncivilized) members of their
tribe filed a petition for habeas corpus after being detained in a reservation
specifically designated for them as per the resolution adopted by the provincial
officials. They allege that said resolution imposed involuntary servitude in them
and violated their right to liberty. They challenged the constitutionality of the
resolution and the Administrative Code of 1917 which was the basis of the
former. SC held that the legislature only exercised their police power for the
greater good.
DOCTRINE: Slavery and involuntary servitude etc. all denote a condition of
enforced, compulsory service of one to another. Confinement in reservations does
not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude.
Right to liberty is not to be construed as unrestricted license to act according to
one’s  own  will.  It is only freedom from restraint under conditions essential to the
equal enjoyment of the same right by others. It is liberty regulated by law.
FACTS:
1. The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution no. 25 in 1917
directing the non-Christian inhabitants of the said province to take up their
cohabitation in the reservation of Tigbao. Furthermore, failing to remove
residence from the native habitat or attempts of escaping the sites of
relocation after passage of the resolution will warrant imprisonment.
2. Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro then petitioned for
habeas corpus after allegedly being illegally deprived of their liberty by the
provincial officials. They claimed that they were held on the reservation
established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, after failing to fix their
dwellings within the same after a certain period of time. A person name
Dabalos was also said to be held under custody of the provincial sheriff for
running away from the reservation.
3. The provincial officials averred that the basis of their action is section 2145
of the Administrative Code of 1917 which was also duly approved by the
Secretary of the Interior. According to that section, the provincial governor
of any province is authorized to take a course which he deems necessary of
directing non-Christian inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on
unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the
provincial board.
ISSUE/S: WoN section 2145 of the Administrative code and resolution no. 25
are unconstitutional for imposing involuntary servitude on the part of the
petitioners? - NO
RULING: Resolution no. 25 is VALID and constitutional.
RATIO:
1. Liberty consists in the ability to do what one ought to desire and in not
being forced to do what one ought not to desire. But liberty is not to be
construed   as   unrestricted   license   to   act   according   to   one’s   own   will.   It   is  
only freedom from restraint under conditions essential to the equal
enjoyment of the same right by others. It is a measure of freedom which
may be enjoyed in a civilized community, consistently with the peaceful
enjoyment of like freedom in others. It is liberty regulated by law.
2. In the case at bar, the resolution of the provincial board was for the
following reasons: (1) The failure of former attempts for the advancement
of the non-Christian people of the province; (2) the only successful method
for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent
settlement; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the
public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized
customs among the Manguianes. These are all objectives aimed to establish
friendly relations with the non-Christian tribes and promote their
educational, agricultural, and economic development in civilization. Slavery
and involuntary servitude etc. all denote a condition of enforced,
compulsory service of one to another. Confinement in reservations does not
constitute slavery and involuntary servitude.
3. The Manguinanes of Mindoro is leading a nomadic life, making
depredations on their more fortunate neighbors, uneducated in the ways of
civilization and doing nothing for the advancement of the Philippines
Islands.  Government’s  action  was  directed  to  bring  them  into  a  reservation  
for the purpose of educating their children and improving their health and
morals. Such improvement of a certain class requires the same to be
gathered together shunning a wayfaring life.
4. Legislature’s  intent  was  only  to  ensure  the  advancement  of  the  entire  nation.
If the country wishes to improve, every piece of land must be developed
and all regions must be productive. This cannot be achieved if certain
people continue to suffer illiteracy and thriftlessness. This is why the State
needs to protect itself from destruction brought about by people who are
uncivilized, unproductive, and who constantly burn and destroy forests.
5. Moreover, the legislation on the subject of non-Christian people has tended
more and more towards the education and civilization of such people and
fitting them to be citizens. The progress of those people under the tutelage
of the Government is indeed encouraging and foresees the time when they
will become useful citizens.
6. The legislature displayed only a pure exercise of police power. The idea to
unify the Filipino people may only be achieved with the highest conception
of nationality and if all are to be equal before the law; all must be
approximately equal in intelligence. The public policy of the Government of
the Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino people as
a whole. The Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental policy, must
be confined for a time for their own good and the good of the country.
 KAISAHAN v. GOTAMCO
March 29, 1948 | Hilado J. | Certiorari | Protected Interests in Liberty:
Involuntary Servitude
SUMMARY: Petitioners allege that an order requiring them to return from their
strike was not issued in conformity with Sec 19, CA 143 and that, even if the order
was conformal to the said section, said provision is unconstitutional for being in
violation of the organic proscription of involuntary servitude. The CIR held that
the order was issued in conformity with CA 143 and the challenged provision is
constitutional. The SC affirmed the decision of the CIR that the provision of Sec
19 CA 143 does not violate the proscription against involuntary servitude.
DOCTRINE: An employee entering into a contract of employment after CA 143
went into effect voluntarily accepts, among other things, the conditions in Sec 19
of the said law. The voluntariness of the employee's entering into such a contract
of employment with such an implied condition, negatives the possibility of
involuntary servitude ensuing.
FACTS:
1. The petitioners went on strike on Sept. 10, 1946 which suspended all the
work in the respondent company. After a series of conferences, the labor
leader decided to accept a temporary arrangement of the wage problem as
proposed by the management On Sept. 23, 1946, the Court on Industrial
Relations issued an order for the striking workers to return to work under the
conditions agreed upon.
2. On Jan. 7, 1947, the respondent Gotamco Saw Mill filed with the CIR an
urgent motion asking that the petitioning union be held for contempt of court
for staging a strike during the pendency of the main case to which the
petitioners answered with a counter-petition that the respondent be held for
contempt for having employed 4 new Chinese laborers during the pendency
of the hearing of the main case on Jan 9, 1947. On the same day, the
respondent filed another urgent motion for contempt against the petitioning
union for picketing on the premises of the respondent's saw mill and for
grave threats which prevented the remaining laborers from working .
3. The CIR, in a resolution dated July 11, 1947, held that the petitioners
violated the Sept. 23 Order and that the respondent was exonerated from the
liability in connection with the alleged employment of four Chinamen.
4. In the course of said resolution, the union argued that the order was not
issued in conformity with Sec 19, CA 143 and that, even if it was, the said
provision is unconstitutional for being in violation of the constitutional
protection against involuntary servitude. The CIR held that the order was
issued in conformity with CA 143 and the challenged provision is
constitutional.
ISSUE/S: WoN Section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 143 is unconstitutional
for being in violation of the proscription of involuntary servitude – NO
WoN Sept. 23, 1946 order was issued in conformity with the requisites of the
Sec. 19, CA 143 – YES
RULING: The orders and resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations
assailed by the instant petition are AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
1. An employee entering into a contract of employment after CA 143 went into
effect, voluntarily accepts, among other conditions, those in Sec. 19 of the
said law, including the "implied condition that when any dispute between the
employer or landlord and the employee, tenant or laborer has been submitted to the
Court of Industrial Relations for settlement or arbitration, pursuant to the provisions
of this Act, and pending award or decision by it, the employee, tenant or laborer shall
not strike or walk out of his employment when so enjoined by the court after hearing
and when public interest so requires, and if he has already done so, that he shall
forthwith return to it, upon order of the court, which shall be issued only after
hearing when public interest so requires or when the dispute cannot, in its opinion,
be promptly decided or settled. The voluntariness of the employee's entering
into such a contract of employment – he has a free choice between entering
into it or not – with such an implied condition, negates the possibility of
involuntary servitude ensuing.
2. The petitioners argue that before the issuance of the order, there had been no
proper hearing and there was no express finding by the court that public
interest required the return of the striking workers. The resolution of July
11, 1947, states that the order of September 23, 1946, was issued after a
series of preliminary hearings whose results were then reported at a formal
hearing. As to public interest requiring that the court enjoin the strike or
walk out, or the return of striking laborers, considering the destruction
brought by the late war, the economic and social rehabilitation of the country
demands the reconstruction of buildings which in turn demands building
materials which lumber figures prominently. As such, a most vital, public
interest of a most real and positive character has attached to the lumber
business. It is obvious that any undue stoppage or diminution in the
production of lumber or allied products will inevitably tend to paralyze,
impede or slow down the country's program of rehabilitation. Lastly, the
order of the CIR for the employees to return to work was made after hearing
pursuant to Sec. 19 of CA 143. Such an order is authorized under Sec. 19 of
CA 143 which provides that the order to return, if the dispute can be
promptly decided or settled, may be issued "only after hearing when public
interest so requires", but if in the court's opinion the dispute cannot be
promptly decided or settled, then it is also authorized after hearing to issue
the order. This is construed to mean that the very impossibility of prompt
 decision or settlement of the dispute confers upon the court the power to
issue the order for the reason of public interest. As pointed out in court's July
11 resolution, this impossibility of prompt decision or settlement was a fact
which was borne out by the entire record of the case and did not need
express statement in the order.
LOZANO v. MARTINEZ
December 18, 1986 | Yap, J. | Review of RTC order | Protected Interest in
Liberty: Imprisonment for Non-Payment of Debt
SUMMARY: Defendants challenged BP22, alleging among others that it was
unconstitutional for violation of the constitutional prohibition against
imprisonment for debt. The SC upheld BP22 as a valid exercise of police power.
DOCTRINE: The scope of constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for
debt was for liabilities arising from actions ex contractu and was never meant to
include damages arising in actions ex delicto / Valid police power measures do
not necessarily violate the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for
debt, and may even override the constitutional guaranty
FACTS:
Defendants who were prosecuted under BP 22 contended that the law was
unconstitutional contending, among others, that it offends the constitutional
provision forbidding imprisonment for debt.
ISSUE/S: WoN BP 22 violates the constitutional prohibition against
imprisonment for debt - NO
RULING: Petition granted in GR No. 75789; Other petitions dismissed. TROs
lifted.
RATIO:
1. The   Bill   of   Rights   states   that   “No   person shall be imprisoned for debt or
non-payment   of   a   poll   tax”.   Petitioners   argue   that   since   the   offense   under   circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can pollute the channels of trade and
the law is consummated only upon the dishonour or non-payment of the
check  upon  presentation  to  the  drawee  bank,  the  statute  is  really  a  ‘bad  debt
law’,   not   a   ‘bad   check   law’,   i.e.   that   it   punishes   the   non-payment of the
check, not the act of issuing it.
2. Scope of provision:
a. J. Malcolm in Ganaway - the  ‘debt’  intended  in  the  guaranty  was  for  liabilities   in the broader environment under which they were made. Also, police
arising from actions ex contractu and was never meant to include damages
arising in actions ex delicto, since damages recoverable therein do not arise
from any contract entered into between the parties but are imposed upon the
defendant for the wrong he did and are considered punishment, nor to fines and
penalties imposed by the courts in criminal proceedings.
b. People v Vera Reyes – a statutory provision which made illegal and punishable
an   employer’s   refusal   to   pay   salaries   of   employees   on   the   15th or last day of
every month or Saturday every week was challenged as unconstitutional as
violative for the non-imprisonment for debt prohibition. The law was upheld as
an exercise of police power, viewed not as a measure to coerce payment of an
obligation but to banish a practice considered harmful to public welfare.
3. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is making and issuing a
worthless check or a check dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It
is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes, but the
making of worthless checks and putting them into circulation. Because of
its deleterious effects on public interest, the practice is prescribed by law. It
punishes not an offense against property, but against public interest.
4. It may be constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to penalize a
person for non-payment of a debt ex contractu, but it is within their
prerogative to proscribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to
public welfare. An act may not be inherently wrong (mala in se) but
because of the harm it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and
criminally punished as malum prohibitum in the exercise of police power.
5. It is not for the Court to question the wisdom or impolicy of the statute; it is
sufficient that a reasonable nexus exists between the means and end. The
factual antecedents of the statute were that there was close to P200M
approximate value of bouncing checks per day, and when the Central Bank
banned overdrafts, it averaged between 50-80M a day.
6. There is therefore an element of certainty or assurance that a check will be
paid upon presentation, and checks are perceived as convenient substitutes
for currency in commercial and financial transactions. The basis of such
perception is confidence; if this is shaken, the usefulness of checks as
currency will be greatly diminished or become nil. Any practice therefore
tending to destroy that confidence should be deterred. The effects of the
issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties
directly involved and touches on the interests of the community, as it injures
the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in
commerce, injure the banking system, and eventually hurt the welfare of
society and public interest.
7. Although there is conflicting jurisprudence in the US on the
constitutionality  of  ‘worthless  check’  acts,  it  must  be  noted  that  BP  22  was  
not lifted from any existing statute and that judicial decisions must be read
power is a dynamic force which enables the state to meet the exigencies of
changing times; it may even override a constitutional guaranty.
 U.S. v. NAVARRO
January 11, 1904 | McDonough, J. | Protected Interests in Liberty: Right against
Self-Incrimination
SUMMARY: Navarro   et   al   are   convicted   under   RPC   Art   483’s   2ndpar, which
imposes a heavier penalty to those guilty of illegal detention if they failed to give
information   concerning   the   victim’s   whereabouts   or   didn’t   prove   that   they   gave   deduction  upon  the  accused’s  silence.  And  in  our  current law, inquisitorial
him his liberty back. SC: RPC Art 483 (2) violates right against self-
incrimination.
DOCTRINE: The right against self-incrimination covers any disclosure by the
victim that can be used against him as a confession of crime, or an admission of
facts tending to prove the commission of an offense.
FACTS:
1. The accused Navarro, de Leon, and Feliciano are charged with illegal
detention of Felix Punsalan in Bulacan. They were convicted under Article
483’s   2nd paragraph, imposing a heavier penalty than that of Article 481,
since   they   failed   to   give   information   concerning   Punsalan’s   whereabouts   disclosure can be used against him as a confession of crime, or an
and  didn’t  prove  that  they  gave  him  his  liberty  back.
2. RPC Article 481 provides that a private person who shall lock up or detain
another, or in any way deprives him of his liberty shall be punished with
prision mayor.  On  the  other  hand,  Article  483’s  2nd paragraph provides that
one who illegally detains another and fails to give information concerning
his whereabouts, or does not prove that he set him at liberty, shall be
punished with cadena temporal (max) to life imprisonment. In other words,
for   failure   on   defendant’s   part   to   testify regarding the whereabouts of the
person deprived of his liberty, or to prove that he was set at liberty, the
punishment may be increased from imprisonment for a term of 6 years to
life imprisonment.
3. The accused claims that such violates the Philippine   Bill   of   1902’s   the case (e.g. the whereabouts of the defendant), and the prosecution must
provision that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself. Likewise, Gen Order 58 provides that a defendant
is presumed innocent and that the burden of proof is on the prosecution.
ISSUE/S: WON RPC Art 482 (2) violates right against self-incrimination - YES
RULING: CFI Decision REVERSED. Defendants guilty of illegal detention.
RATIO:
1. Article 483, 2nd paragraph has the effect of forcing a defendant to
punishment. The burden is put upon him of giving evidence if he desires to
lessen the penalty, or, in other words, of criminating himself, for the very
statement of the whereabouts of the victim or the proof that the defendant
set him at liberty amounts to a confession that the defendant unlawfully
detained the person. So, the evidence necessary to clear the defendant,
under Article 483, would have the effect of convicting him under Art 481.
2. Any prosecution under article 483 would require a procedural provision
which  allows  an  inquisitorial   investigation  of  crime,   making  the  accused’s  
duty to testify, and allowing the prosecution to draw an unfavorable
investigations  of  crime  are  prohibited  the  accused’s  silence  is  not  penalized  
– it’s  an  accused’s  exercise  of  his  rights.  
3. The provision of the right against self-incrimination is traceable to English
common law and predicated on public policy (since if party were required
to testify, it would place the witness under the temptation of committing
perjury) and humanity (prevent the extorting of confessions by duress). It is
seeks to wipe out the inquisitorial methods of interrogation.
4. This   right   applies   equally   to   any   compulsory   disclosure   of   the   offender’s  
guilt, whether sought directly as the object of the injury, or indirectly and
incidentally for the purpose of establishing facts in an issue. If the
admission of facts tending to prove the commission of an offense, such
disclosure would be an accusation against himself. In this case, if the
defendant   disclosed   Punsalan’s   whereabouts   or   showed   that   he   freed   him,  
such disclosure may be used to obtain a conviction under RPC Art 481.
5. In Boyd v US, a law stipulating that the silence of the accused will be taken
as a confession was unconstitutional. Likewise, in People v Courtney, a law
which authorized a presumption of guilt from   an   accused’s   omission   to  
testify was found unconstitutional. The same principle of law applies here.
If   the   defendant   doesn’t   do   certain   things   or   doesn’t   make   certain  
statements/proof, he is severely punished.
6. It may be argued that the defendant is only required to speak on one point in
still prove the illegal detention. But as CJ Marshall said in the trial of Aaron
Burr, many links composed the chain of testimony which is necessary to
convict an individual of a crime. The right against self-incrimination entails
that no witness should be compelled to furnish any one of those links
against himself. A witness, by declaring a single fact, may complete the
testimony against himself as if he provided the whole chain.
7. It’s   the   prosecution’s   duty,   in   order   to   convict   someone,   to   produce  
evidence   showing   guilt   beyond   a   reasonable   doubt.   The   accused   can’t   be  
called upon to assist in the production of such evidence, nor should his
silence be taken as proof against him. He has a right to rely on the
presumption of innocence until the prosecution proves him guilty of every
element of the crime with which he is charged.
 VILLAFLOR v. SUMMERS
September 8, 1920 | Malcolm, J. | Habeas Corpus | Protected Interests in Liberty:
Right against Self-Incrimination
SUMMARY: Villafor, accused of adultery, was ordered by the court to submit
to the examination of one or two competent doctors to determine if she was
pregnant or not. She refused on the ground that such examination was a
violation of the constitutional provision relating to self-incrimination. SC held:
DOCTRINE: The constitutional guaranty that no person shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself is limited to a prohibition
against compulsory testimonial self incrimination. The corollary to the
proposition is that, on a proper showing and under an order of the trial court, an
ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible with the proviso that
torture or force shall be avoided. Whether facts fall within or without the rule
with its corollary and proviso must be decided as cases arise.
FACTS:
Emeteria Villaflor and Pedro Souingco were charged with adultery. The court
ordered Villaflor to submit to the examination of one or two competent doctors
to determine if she was pregnant or not. The accused refused to obey the order
on the ground that such examination of her person was a violation of the
constitutional provision relating to self-incrimination. Thereupon she was found
in contempt of court and was ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until she
should permit the medical examination required by the court.
3. The constitutional guaranty that no person shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself is limited to a prohibition
against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the
proposition is that, on a proper showing and under an order of the trial
court, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible with
the proviso that torture or force shall be avoided. Whether facts fall within
or without the rule with its corollary and proviso must be decided as cases
arise.
4. It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by reputable and
disinterested physicians due care will be taken not to use violence and not to
embarrass the patient any more than is absolutely necessary.
Carson, J. (Concurring):
Scope of ruling in this matter should be expressly limited, in positive and
definite terms, so as to make it clear that the examination of the person of the
accused shall not be carried beyond a mere ocular inspection, wherein the use of
instruments or of physical force upon the person of the accused would be
prohibited.

ISSUE/S: WoN ordering a person to submit to examination his/her body upon

order of the court violates his/her right against self-incrimination – NO

RULING: Writ of habeas corpus denied.

RATIO:
1. The object of having criminal laws is to purge the community of persons
who violate the laws to the great prejudice of their fellow men. Criminal
procedure, the rules of evidence, and constitutional provisions, are then
provided, not to protect the guilty but to protect the innocent. No rule is
intended to be so rigid as to embarrass the administration of justice in its
endeavor to ascertain the truth.
2. Under the due process clause, every person has a natural and inherent right
to the possession and control of his own body. However, even superior to
the complete immunity of a person to be let alone is the interest which the
public has in the orderly administration of justice.
 RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION PURPOSE OF CRIMINAL TRIAL
(Notes from Villaflor v. Summers, 1920) *The object of having criminal laws is to purge the community of persons who
violate the laws to the great prejudice of their fellow men.
CONFLICTING AUTHORITIES *Criminal procedure, the rules of evidence, and constitutional provisions, are
People v. McCoy (1873): criminal case involving a woman charged with then provided, not to protect the guilty but to protect the innocent. No rule is
infanticide.  Coroner  directed  2  physicians  to  examine  the  woman’s  private  parts   intended to be so rigid as to embarrass the administration of justice in its
to determine whether she recently had a delivery. Evidence produced by the endeavor to ascertain the truth.
physicians were introduced as evidence but ruled out
- Court held that the evidence is inadmissible and it has no right to compel a Under the due process clause, every person has a natural and inherent right to
prisoner to have her body parts examined by physicians and have the latter the possession and control of his own body. However, even superior to the
testify from such examination about her virginity. complete immunity of a person to be let alone is the interest which the public
State v. Height (1902): reported by the writer with the tentative recommendation has in the orderly administration of justice.
that the court should lay down the general rule that a defendant can be
compelled to disclose only those parts of the body which are not usually covered
Justice Holmes in Holt v. U.S. (1910): The prohibition of compelling a man in
a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an
exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material.

*The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, in two decisions (U.S. v. Tan
Teng, 1912; U.S. v. Ong Siu Hong, 1917), has seemed to limit the protection to
a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The
constitutional limitation was said to be "simply a prohibition against legal
process to extract from the defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission
of his guilt
* Other courts have likewise avoided any attempt to determine the exact location
of the dividing line between what is proper and what is improper in this very
broad constitutional field. Even Justice Holmes in Holt stated that "we need not
consider how far a court would go in compelling a man to exhibit himself."

HISTORY OF THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare (no one is bound to accuse or incriminate
himself), was recognized in England in early days, but not in the other legal
systems of the world
*A legal shield was raised against odious inquisitorial methods of interrogating
an accused person by which to extort unwilling confessions with the ever
present temptation to commit the crime of perjury. The kernel of the privilege as
disclosed by the text writers was testimonial compulsion.
*This was later adopted in the American Constitution, which was later brought
to the Philippines.
 BELTRAN v. SAMSON
September 23, 1929 | Romualdez, J. | Prohibition | Protected Interests in Liberty:
Right against Self-Incrimination
SUMMARY: The fiscal tried to order petitioner to take dictation to furnish a
sample of handwriting to compare to documents he allegedly falsified. Petitioner
refused, claiming it violated his right against self-incrimination and prayed for
issuance of a writ of prohibition. The SC granted the writ of prohibition.
DOCTRINE: The scope of the privilege against self-incrimination is not limited
precisely to testimony, but extends to all giving or furnishing of evidence.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner, a municipal treasurer, was ordered by respondent judge to appear
before the provincial fiscal to take dictation in his own handwriting from
the   latter,   to   compare   petitioner’s   handwriting   and   determine   whether   he   shoes, or the requirement that the party move his body to enable the
wrote certain documents he supposedly falsified. Petitioner refused, seeking
refuge in the constitutional provision in the Jones Law and incorporated in
General  Orders,  No.  58:  “Ni  se  obligara  a  declarer  en  contra  suya  en  ningun   assertion as to handwriting, except People v Molineux where the defendant
proceso  criminal”  i.e.  “Nor  shall  he  be  compelled  in  any  criminal  case  to  be   supplied his handwriting voluntarily.
a  witness  against  himself.”
2. Respondents contended that he was not entitled to the writ for prohibition
since the order was based on Sec 1697 of the Administrative Code, which
allows the fiscal, and the proper judge upon motion of the fiscal, to compel
witnesses to be present at the investigation of any crime or misdemeanor,
though this power must   be   exercised   without   prejudice   to   the   person’s   against himself; but it is even more serious, because the witness is
constitutional rights.
ISSUE/S: WoN ordering the witness to take dictation to obtain handwriting to
compare to documents he supposedly falsified violates the prohibition against
self-incrimination - YES
RULING: Writ granted.
RATIO:
1. The scope of the privilege against self-incrimination is not limited precisely
to testimony, but extends to all giving or furnishing of evidence. Due to the
sacredness of the rights intended to be protected and the great pressure
towards their relaxation, it is the duty of the courts to liberally construe the
prohibition in favor of personal rights and to refuse to permit any steps
towards their invasion. Hence, it is not merely limited to the giving of oral
testimony, but any other means of divulging any fact which the accused has
a right to hold secret.
2. Whenever a defendant testifying on his own behalf denies that a certain
writing or signature is his own, he may on cross-examination be compelled
to write in open court so the jury can compare his handwriting with that in
question. In Sprouse v Com., the defendant did so voluntarily. In Bradford v
People, the defendant waived his personal privilege since he offered himself
as a witness on his own behalf.
3. But in the present case, no information was filed against petitioner for the
supposed falsification, not was he on trial testifying and under cross-
examination. It was merely an investigation prior to the information and
with a view to filing it. In People v Molineux, the court there gave
prominence   to   the   defendant’s   right   to   decline   to   write,   although   he  
voluntarily wrote, before the criminal action was instituted against him.
4. Professor Wigmore said that the ff are not within the privilege: Measuring
or photographing the party, removal or replacement of his garments or
foregoing; requiring him to make specimens of handwriting is no more than
requiring him to move his body. However, he cited no case to support his
5. Writing is more than moving the body, hand or fingers. It is not purely
mechanical, since it requires intelligence and attention. Here, it would
furnish a means to determine whether or not petitioner is the falsifier, as the
respondent   fiscal’s   petition   clearly   states.   It   is   similar   to   production   of  
documents or chattels, and thus requires the witness to furnish evidence
compelled to write and create evidence which does not exist, and which
may identify him as the falsifier.
6. The act herein is a positive, testimonial act, unlike in other cases. E.g.
Villaflor v Summers where she was examined by physicians – she was not
compelled to execute any positive act, much less a testimonial one, and was
merely enjoined from something, i.e. preventing the examination.
7. It cannot be contended that if permission to obtain his handwriting is not
granted, petitioner will go unpunished. He is a municipal treasurer, the
fiscal can obtain genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even if it were
impossible to obtain the same without resorting to the means complained of
herein, that is no reason to trample upon a personal right guaranteed by the
constitution. It may be true that in some cases criminals may succeed in
evading justice, but these are accidental and not the reason for the privilege,
which exists to protect the innocent.
 CABAL v. KAPUNAN
December 29, 1962 | Concepcion, J. | Certiorari and Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction | Protected Interests in Liberty: Right against Self-
Incrimination
SUMMARY: During the first investigation of a Presidential Committee tasked to
investigate  the  charge  of  “unexplained  wealth”  against  petitioner  Manuel  Cabal,  he  
was asked to take the witness stand which he refused invoking his constitutional
right against self-incrimination. The committee insisted but Cabal still refused.
The committee referred the matter to the City Fiscal of Manila which subsequently
filed   a   charge   against   Cabal   being   “guilty   of   contempt   of   the   Presidential  
Committee”   at   the   Court   of   First   Instance of Manila that was then assigned to
respondent Judge Kapunan. The petitioner filed a motion to quash which was
denied by the respondent judge. The SC held that the proceedings before the
Presidential Committee were criminal in nature thus exempting the petitioner from
being a witness against himself. Therefore, he could not be found guilty of being
in contempt.
DOCTRINE: Proceedings for forfeiture to the State of property of a public officer
or employee as authorized by the Anti-Graft Law (RA 1379) partakes the nature of
a penalty and are deemed criminal or penal. Hence, the right of a defendant against
self-incrimination is applicable.
FACTS:
1. On or about August 19, 1961, a letter-complaint against petitioner Manuel
Cabal for "graft, corrupt practices, unexplained wealth, conduct unbecoming
of an officer and gentleman dictatorial tendencies, giving false statements of
his assets and liabilities in 1958 and other equally reprehensible acts" was
filed by Col. Jose Maristela with the Secretary of National Defense. To
investigate the matter, the President created a Presidential Committee.
2. During the first investigation of the Committee, Cabal was asked to take the
witness stand and be sworn into as a witness. He refused invoking his
constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Committee insisted
saying that he may refuse to answer incriminating questions but Cabal
refused still. The committee referred the matter to the City Fiscal of Manila
which  subsequently  filed  a  charge  against  Cabal  being  “guilty  of contempt of
the  Presidential  Committee”  at  the  CFI  of  Manila  that  was  then  assigned  to   provision applies whenever the proceeding is not "purely remedial", or intended
respondent Judge Kapunan who issued an order for the petitioner to show
cause or respond to the charge against him within ten days on Oct. 2, 1961.
3. As a response, petitioner filed a motion to quash on the following grounds:
(1) that the City Fiscal had no personality to file the case, the same being
null and void because if criminal, there was no preliminary investigation and
if civil, the City Fiscal was limited to civil cases representing the city of
Manila; (2) Art 580 of the Revised Administrative Code which the charge is
based violates due process; (3) that more than one offense is charged; and (4)
that the Committee had no power in order to require petitioner to take the
witness stand inasmuch as said order violates petitioner's constitutional right
against self-incrimination.
4. Respondents allege that the investigation by the Committee is administrative
in character and not criminal.
ISSUE/S: WoN the proceedings before the Presidential Committee was criminal
in character thus exempting the petitioner from being a witness against himself –
YES
RULING: Writ granted. Respondent Judge hereby enjoined permanently from
proceeding further in the criminal case.
RATIO:
The proceedings against Cabal are criminal in character, thus, he enjoys the
rights against self-incrimination. The purpose of the charge against petitioner is
to apply the provisions of the Anti-Graft Law, which authorizes the forfeiture to
the State of property of a public officer or employee which is manifestly out of
proportion to his salary. Such forfeiture has been held, however, to partake of
the nature of a penalty. As a consequence, proceedings for such forfeiture are
deemed criminal or penal, and, hence, the exemption of defendants in criminal
case from the obligation to be witnesses against themselves is applicable thereto.
Boyd v US held that a proceeding seeking the declaration of forfeiture of
property because of the evasion of certain revenue laws   “though   technically a
civil proceeding is in substance and effect a criminal one" and that suits for
penalties and forfeitures are within the reason criminal proceedings for the
purposes of that portion the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the U.S.
which declares that no person shall be compelled in a criminal case to be a
witness against himself. Thurston v Clark held the said portion of the Fifth
Amendment applies "to all cases in which the action prosecution is not to
establish, recover or redress private and civil rights, but to try and punish
persons charged with the commission of public offenses" and "a criminal case is
an action, suit or cause instituted to punish an infraction the criminal laws, and,
with this object in view, it matters not in what form a statute may clothe it; it is
still   a   criminal   case   …"   It has been concluded that the said constitutional
"as a redress for a private grievance", but primarily to punish "a violation of
duty or a public wrong and to deter others from offending in likewise manner.
...".
 REPUBLIC v. SANDIGANBAYAN
November 18, 2003| Corona, J. | Resolution of an MR | Protected Interests in
Liberty: Right against Self-Incrimination
SUMMARY: The   SC   previously   ordered   the   forfeiture   of   the   Marcoses’   Swiss   or penal. If they are under a statute such that if an indictment is presented,
deposits in favor of the State. They argue that they were deprived of due process
because the prosecution was not able to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
being that RA 1379 is penal in nature. SC held that RA 1379 is merely civil.
DOCTRINE:Criminal cases are actions in personam, directed against the person
on the basis of one’s personal liability. This is where the law imposes the burden
on the prosecution of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt. A forfeiture
proceeding is an action in rem, against the thing itself, and requires no more than
a preponderance of evidence.
FACTS:
1. On July 15, 2003, the SC ordered the forfeiture in favor of the Republic of
the Philippines (in accordance with RA 1379) of the Swiss deposits in
escrow at the PNB in the estimated amount of $658,175,373.60.
2. Imelda Marcos, Irene Marcos-Araneta, Ma. Imelda Marcos, and Ferdinand
Marcos, as estate heirs of Ferdinand Marcos, filed a motion for
reconsideration. Their main contention is that they were deprived of due
process because of the following: 1) the decision was rendered on
summary judgment: RA1379 provides for specific jurisdictional allegations
in the petition and mandates a well-defined procedure to be strictly
observed before forfeiture judgment may be rendered, and they were not
given an opportunity to overthrow the disputable presumption; and 2) RA
1379 is penal in substance and effect, so they are entitled to all the rights of
the accused, that the prosecution has the burden of proving guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and that denials raised in their answer was sufficient to
traverse the allegations in the petition for forfeiture.
ISSUES:
1. WoN they were deprived of due process by the order of forfeiture—NO
a. WoN RA1379 is penal in character—NO
b. WoN a summary judgment is allowed—YES
RULING: Petition DENIED. Judgment AFFIRMED WITH FINALITY.
RATIO:
1. Insofar as substantive due process is concerned, which refers to the
intrinsic validity of the statute affecting the rights of a person or his
property, there is no showing that RA 1379 is unfair, unreasonable, or
unjust because they are not being deprived of their property for arbitrary
reasons or flimsy grounds.
2. Forfeiture proceedings under RA 1379 are civil in nature. Almeda v Perez
laid down the test in determining whether forfeiture proceedings are civil
and the forfeiture can be included in the criminal case, the forfeiture is
criminal in nature. If the proceeding does not involve the conviction of the
wrongdoer for the offense charged, or if the statute specifically provides
that the act/omission for which the forfeiture is imposed is not also a
misdemeanor, it is civil. In other words, if it is criminal, it is in personam;
whereas it is in rem if it is civil. RA 1379 terminates not upon the
imposition of a penalty but merely forfeiture of the properties illegally
acquired in favor of the State, a proceeding in rem. Even the procedure in
RA 1379 shows that only a petition, an answer by the respondent, and
hearing are required. If it were criminal in nature, there would have to be,
after preliminary investigation, a reading of the information, plea, trial, and
reading of judgment in the presence of respondents. Furthermore, EO 14
provides that civil suits to recover unlawfully acquired property under RA
1379 may be proven by preponderance of evidence.
3. Summary judgments are generally allowed if pleadings raise only a legal
issue, not a genuine issue as to any material fact. The government was able
to establish a prima facie presumption of illegal provenance, and so the
burden of proof shifted to the respondents to show by clear and convincing
evidence that the Swiss deposits were lawfully acquired. The Marcoses
failed, or rather, refused to raise any genuine issue of fact warranting a trial
for the reception of evidence therefor.  “Trial”  and  “hearing”  have  different  
connotations.   “Trial”   refers   to   reception   of   evidence   and   other   processes;;  
whereas   “hearing”   embraces   the   several   stages   of   litigation   and   does   not  
always require the formal introduction of evidence at trial. In this case, the
Marcoses participated at every stage of the case, by arguing their case
before the Sandiganbayan, presenting demurrer to evidence, submitting all
the pleadings and motions for reconsideration. Thus, they were not
deprived of procedural due process. Due process, a constitutional precept,
does not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. The
essence of due process is found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard
and  submit  one’s  evidence  in  support  of  his  defense.
4. Imelda argues that judgment in the forfeiture proceedings would adversely
affect the criminal proceedings filed by the Republic against her. The SC
disagreed, reiterating that criminal cases are actions in personam, directed
against her on the basis of her personal liability.This is where the law
imposes the burden on the prosecution of proving guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, and the trial judge in evaluating the evidence must find that all the
elements of the crime charged have been established by sufficient proof to
 convict. A forfeiture proceeding is an action in rem, against the thing itself, 5. Plaintiffs contend that the Anti-Graft  Law,  as  a  general  law,  can’t  impliedly  
and requires no more than a preponderance of evidence. repeal   RA   1405   since   implied   repeals   aren’t   favored,   and   to   construe   the  
Anti-Graft Law as allowing inquiry into bank deposits would defeat RA
1405’s   policy   to   encourage   people   to   deposit   their   money   in   banking  
P.N.B. v GANCAYCO institutions and discourage private hoarding.
September 30, 1965 | Regala, J. | Appeal from CFI decision | Protected Interests
in Liberty: Right against Self-Incrimination ISSUE/S: WON a bank can be compelled to disclose the records of accounts of
a depositor who is under investigation for unexplained wealth – YES.
SUMMARY: Pursuant to an investigation against Jimenez for unexplained
wealth,  DOJ  Prosecutors  required  PNB  to  produce  Jimenez’  bank  deposit  records.   RULING: AFFIRMED.  PNB  may  be  compelled  to  disclose  Jimenez’  accounts.
PNB refused & invoked RA 1405, Sec 2 (Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits).
Prosecutors invoked RA 3019 (Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act). SC ruled that RATIO:
DOCTRINE: RA  3019  exempts  prosecutions/investigations  for  public  officials’   1. Contrary   to   PNB’s   claim   that   they   seek   to   reconcile   the   two   laws,   they’re  
unexplained wealth against the rule against disclosure of bank deposits. actually making RA 1405 prevail over those of the Anti-Graft Law. The 2
laws are repugnant to each other; reconciliation is impossible. While RA
1405  provides  that  “bank deposits shall be confidentialxxx and may not be
FACTS:
1. Ernesto Jimenez, former administrator of the Agricultural Credit and examined, inquired or looked into,”   except   in   those   cases   enumerated  
Cooperative Administration, was under investigation for unexplained therein, the Anti-Graft Law directs in mandatory terms that bank deposits
wealth. DOJ Special Prosecutors Gancayco and Flor then required PNB to “shall   be   taken   into   consideration   in   the   enforcement   of   this   section,  
produce at a hearing the records of the bank deposits of Jimenez. notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary. The only conclusion
2. PNB   refused,   invoking   RA   1405,   Section   2,   which   provides   that   ‘All   possible is that section 8 of the Anti-Graft Law is intended to amend
deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Section 2 of RA 1405 by providing an additional exception to the rule
Philippines xxx are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential against the disclosure of bank deposits.
nature and may not be examined, inquired, or looked into by any person, 2. The   disclosure   of   such   bank   records   in   prosecutions   for   public   officials’  
gov’t   official,   bureau   or   office,   except   (1)   upon   written   permission   of   the   unexplained   wealth   is   not   inconsistent   with   RA   1405’s   policy.   RA   1405  
depositor, (2) cases of impeachment (3) upon order of a competent court in clearly allows  disclosure  in  certain  cases  (fact  2),  including  “upon  order  of  a  
cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or (4) in cases competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public
when the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation. officials”.   Cases   of   unexplained   wealth   are   similar   to   cases   of   bribery   or  
They also cited Section 5, which said that any violator of the law will be dereliction  of  duty.  There’s  no  reason  why  these  two  classes  of  cases  can’t  
punished with 5 years imprisonment or a fine, or both. be exempted from the rule making bank deposits confidential. This policy
3. Defendants cited RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, expresses the motion that a public office is a public trust and any person
demanding upon bank president Romualdez to produce the records or he who enters upon its discharge does so with the full knowledge that his life,
would be prosecuted for contempt. RA 3019, Section 8 provides that in an so far as relevant to his duty, is open to public scrutiny.
investigating  a  public  official  for  unexplained  wealth,  “bank deposits shall
be taken into consideration in the enforcement of this section, Annotation: Under the Rules of Court, the court in which an action is pending
notwithstanding any provision of law in the contrary.” may order any party to appear before it or at any investigation conducted under
4. PNB filed an action or declaratory judgment, where Senator Arturo Philippine laws, and produce and permit the inspection and copying of any
Tolentino, author of RA 3019, testified. CFI sustained the prosecutors’   designated documents, papers books, accounts, etc., not privileged, which
power to compel the disclosure of bank accounts of ACCFA Administrator constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action.
Jimenez,   saying   that   RA   3019   showed   Congress’   intent   to   provide   an   However, savings and current accounts are privileged documents protected by
additional ground for bank deposits, so as not to hamper prosecution of RA  1405,  Section  2  and  generally  doesn’t  fall  under  this  rule.  
those charged with having acquired unexplained wealth while in public
office. Hence, this appeal.
 BENGZON v. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE
November 20, 1991 | Padilla, J. | Review of Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
decision | Protected Interests in Liberty: Right against Self-Incrimination
SUMMARY: Petitioners seek to enjoin the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
from requiring petitioners to testify and produce evidence into the alleged sale
of the equity of Benjamin Romualdez to the Lopa Group in 36/39 corporations.
DOCTRINE: Right of witnesses to invoke the right against self-incrimination
extends not only to criminal proceedings but also in all other types of suit.
FACTS:
1. The PCGG filed a case with the Sandiganbayan against petitioners and
Benjamin  “Kokoy”  Romualdezfor  unjustly  enriching  themselves  in concert
with the Marcoses, at the expense of the Filipino people by taking control of
some of the biggest business enterprises in the Philippines. It was alleged,
among others, that petitioners schemed to conceal and place beyond the
inquiry and jurisdiction of the PCGG their individual and collective funds,
properties and assets, and by anomalously selling the subject 36
corporations to PNI Holdings, Inc (allegedly controlled by Romualdez) for
only 5M to deceive and preempt the PCGG by making it appear that
Romualdez has already divested himself of his ownership of the same.
2. Senate Minority Leader, JP Enrile delivered his privilege speech alleging
that Ricardo Lopa took over various subject government owned
corporations, and called upon the Senate to investigate possible violations
of the law, particularly the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019).
The matter was referred to the Blue Ribbon Committee (accountability of
public officers). Petitioners and Lopa were subpoenaed to testify what they
know regarding the sale of the 36 corporations.
3. Lopa declined to testify, stating that it may unduly prejudice the defendants
in the case before the Sandiganbayan. Jose Bengzon, Jr. invoked due
process   and   that   the   Committee’s   inquiry   could   adversely   affect   his and
other  petitioners’  rights.  Committee  rejected  their  plea.   face of the Bill of Rights. The critical element is the existence of, and the
ISSUE/S: WoN  the  Senate  Blue  Ribbon  Committee’s  inquiry  was  in  aid  of   disclosures from an unwilling witness.
legislation – NO.
RULING: Petition GRANTED. SBRC enjoined from compelling petitioners
and intervenor to testify before it and produce evidence at the said inquiry.
RATIO:
1. A  perusal  of  Sen.  Enrile’s  speech  shows  that  it  contained  no  suggestion  of   sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party or not.
contemplated legislation and merely called upon the Senate to look into a
possible violation of RA 3019. In other words, the purpose of the inquiry
was  to  find  out  WoN  Lopa,  Pres.  Aquino’s  brother-in-law, had violated the
law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations
belonging to Romualdez to the Lopa Group, therefore, no intended
legislation involved.
2. It cannot  be  said  as  well  that  the  subject  of  Sen.  Enrile’s  speech,  the  alleged  
sale of 36 corporations to Lopa, is to be conducted pursuant to Senate Res.
212 (charges against the PCGG filed by 3 stockholders of Oriental
Petroleum in connection with the implementation of Sec 26, Art XVIII of
the Constitution) since: 1) Sen. Enrile did not indict PCGG, and 2) Lopa
and petitioners are not connected with the government but are private
citizens.
3. The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not
absolute.  The  investigation  must  be  “in  aid  of  legislation  in  accordance  with  
its   duly   published   rules   of   procedure”   and   that   “the   rights   of   persons  
appearing  in  or  affected  by  such  inquiries  shall  be  respected”.  Inquiry,  to  be  
within the jurisdiction of the legislative body, must be material or necessary
to the exercise of a power vested in it by the Constitution, such as to
legislate or to expel a member. As broad as the power of legislative inquiry
is, there is no general authority to expose the private affairs of individuals
without justification in terms of the functions of congress. No inquiry is an
end in itself; it must be related to and in furtherance of a legitimate task of
Congress. Investigations conducted solely for the personal aggrandizement
of the investigators or to punish those investigated are indefensible.
4. Furthermore, the issue sought to be investigated by the Committee is one
over which jurisdiction has been acquired by the Sandiganbayan. To allow
the investigation would pose the possibility of conflicting judgments
between a legislative committee and a judicial tribunal, as well as influence
the ultimate judgment of the Sandiganbayan. The inquiry into the same
controversy would be an encroachment into the exclusive domain of
judicial jurisdiction.
5. Mere semblance of legislative purpose would not justify an inquiry in the
weight to be ascribed to, the interest of the Congress in demanding
6. Right against self-incrimination may be availed of by the accused in a
criminal case, and may be invoked by other witnesses only as questions are
asked of them. This right of the accused extends to administrative
investigations, but only if they partake of the nature of or analogous to a
criminal proceeding. This privilege has consistently been held to extend to
all proceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases in which punishment is
 GALMAN v. PAMARAN
PEOPLE v. SANDIGANBAYAN, VER et al
August 30, 1985 | Cuevas, J. | Protected Interests in Liberty: Right against Self-
Incrimination
SUMMARY: The testimonies of Gen. Fabian Ver and 7 others made before the
Agrava Board were offered as evidence against them in the criminal cases for
the killing of Ninoy Aquino and Rolando Galman, to w/c they were charged as
accessories. Ver et al moved to have their testimonies excluded as evidence. SC
held that their testimonies are inadmissible as evidence, stating that:
DOCTRINE: The right to remain silent is not limited to confessions made
under custodial investigation;
The right against self-incrimination does not only apply in favor of an accused
in criminal cases;
Exclusionary  Rule:  Admissions  and  confessions  made  in  violation  of  a  person’s  
right to remain silent and against self-incrimination are inadmissible in
evidence.
FACTS:
1. The Agrava Fact Finding Board was created as an ad hoc board under P.D.
1886  in  order  to  investigate  the  Aug.  21,  1983  killing  of  Benigno  “Ninoy”   inadmissible  in  evidence.”
Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman. Under Sec. 12 of P.D. 1886, it can initiate
the filing of the proper complaint with the appropriate government agency,
should the findings warrant the prosecution of any person/s.
2. Among the witnesses who appeared, testified and produced evidence in the
public hearings of the Board were Gen. Fabian C. Ver, Maj. Gen. Prospero
Olivas, Sgt. Pablo Martinez, Sgt. Tomas Fernandez, Sgt. Leonardo Mojica,
Sgt. Pepito Torio, Sgt. Prospero Bona and AIC Aniceto Acupido, who are
private respondents to this case. Except for Ver and Olivas, all private
respondents were members of the military contingent that escorted Aquino
in the airport at the time of his assassination and were already detained by
the time they were summoned by the Board.
3. After termination of the investigation, two reports were submitted by the
members of the Board to Pres. Marcos, and were later referred to the
Tanodbayan for appropriate action. After conducting the preliminary
investigation, the Tanodbayan then filed two cases of murder (one for the
killing of Aquino; the other for the killing of Galman who was also found
dead  in  the  airport  tarmac  near  Aquino’s  body).   not constitute a waiver of their rights; it would only do so if they were given
4. The private respondents were impleaded in the murder cases as accessories
along with several principals and one accomplice, to w/c they pleaded not
guilty. In the course of the trial of the murder cases, the testimonies offered
by the private respondents before the Agrava Board were marked and
offered as evidence by the prosecution. Gen. Ver and other private
respondents move to have their testimonies excluded as evidence, invoking
their right against self-incrimination and the immunity granted by P.D.
1886. The Tanodbayan argues that the testimonies are admissible as
evidence for failure of private respondents to invoke their right against self-
incrimination when they appeared before the Agrava Board.
5. Sandiganbayan issued a resolution excluding from the evidence the
testimonies of Ver et al before the Agrava Board. The Tanodbayan and the
heirs of Galman filed 2 petitions before the Court to have the
Sandiganbayan resolution set aside.
ISSUE/S: WoN the testimonies of private respondents before the Agrava Board
are admissible as evidence in the murder cases – NO
RULING: Petitions dismissed.
RATIO:
Art.   IV   Sec.   20   (1973   Constitution):   “No   person   shall   be   compelled   to   be   a   witness  
against himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force,
violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be
used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be
1. Right to Remain Silent Not Limited to Confessions Made under
Custodial Investigation: While it has been categorically declared that a
person detained for the commission of an offense undergoing investigation
has a right to be informed of his right to remain silent, to counsel, and to an
admonition that any and all statements to be given by him may be used
against him, there has been no pronouncement that a person similarly
undergoing investigation for the commission of an offense, if not detained,
is not entitled to such rights. The fact that the provision does not include the
term   “custodial”   means   that   the   Constitution   did   not   adopt   in toto the
doctrine enunciated in Miranda v. Arizona. Also, use of the word
“confession”   does   not   limit   the   application   of   the   provision   to   police  
investigations,   since   the   protection   also   extends   to   “admissions   “made   in  
violation of the section.
The rights of Ver and Olivas to remain silent and against self-incrimination
were not lost by appearing before the Board. Their continued testifying did
the option for it.
2. Right Against Self-Incrimination Not Limited to an Accused in
Criminal Cases: Illustrative is the case of Cabal v. Kapunan, which is not a
criminal case but a proceeding for forfeiture of ill-gotten wealth under RA
1379, wherein Cabal was afforded the right against self-incrimination.
 Furthermore,  the  deletion  of  the  phrase  “in  a  criminal  case”  in  the  provision  
“No   person   shall   be   compelled   to   be   a   witness   against   himself”   under   the  
1973 Constitution makes it applicable to all cases other than criminal, such
as the proceedings before the Agrava Board. What is controlling is not the
character of the suit but the nature of the proceedings. It has been
consistently held that protection against self-incrimination extends to all
proceedings sanctioned by law and in all cases wherein punishment may
befall a witness, whether he is a party or not.
3. Inadmissibility   of   Respondents’   Testimony   as   Evidence: Sec. 5 of PD
1886   grants   “use   immunity”   to   witnesses   appearing   before   the   Agrava
Board after they have invoked the right against self-incrimination. This
prohibits  use  of  witness’  compelled  testimony  and  its  fruits  in  any  manner  
in connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness (as distinguished
from   “transactional   immunity”, w/c grants immunity to the witness from
prosecution for an offense to which his compelled testimony relates). This
merely protects him from the use of such testimony against him, but not
from prosecution by reason or on the basis thereof. Sec. 4 of the same PD,
however, grants power to the Board to cite persons in contempt for refusal
to answer as a witness, w/c effectively forecloses the claim of privilege
against self-incrimination. This leaves the witnesses with no choice but to
answer and to forfeit the   claim   of   “use   immunity.”Thus, Sec. 5, viewed
together   with   Sec.   4,   violates   the   witness’   right   against   self-incrimination;
under the exclusionary rule, admissions and confessions made in violation
thereof are inadmissible as evidence.
To harmonize the conflicting provisions of the P.D. and to save it from
unconstitutionality, testimonies made by persons before the Board are
afforded   “use   immunity”   under   Sec.   5   even without invoking the right
against self-incrimination, in view of the Agrava   Board’s     power   to   cite  
persons in contempt under Sec. 4. The applicability of the immunity granted
by P.D. 1886 cannot be made to depend on a claim of the privilege against
self-incrimination which the same law practically strips away from the
witness under fear of being cited for contempt. Thus, even with this
construction, the testimonies are still inadmissible as evidence by virtue of
the  “use  immunity”  granted  under  PD  1886.
4. Denial of Due Process: Since private respondents may still be prosecuted
even  with  the  “use  immunity”,  they  should’ve  been  informed  of  their  right  
to remain silent and that all statements to be given by them may be used
against them, as demanded by the dictates of fair play w/c is the hallmark of
due process. This they were denied under the pretense that they are not
entitled to it and that the Board has no obligation to so inform them.
 MIRANDA v. ARIZONA
June 13, 1966 | Warren, C.J. | Certiorari | Protected Interests in Liberty: Right
against Self-Incrimination
SUMMARY: Faced with 4 cases where individuals were convicted on the basis
of   statements   derived   from   interrogation   (where   they   weren’t   apprised   of   their  
constitutional rights to remain silent, for counsel, etc), the SC ruled that
DOCTRINE: Any statement obtained from custodial interrogation are
inadmissible unless several procedural safeguards are followed (See Ratio 3)
FACTS:
In the 4 cases before the Court, the defendant while in police custody was
questioned by police officers, detectives, or a prosecuting attorney in an isolated
room. None of the defendants was given a full and effective warning of his
rights at the outset of the interrogation process. In all four cases, the questioning
elicited oral admissions, and in 3 of them signed statements as well, which were
admitted at their trials. All defendants were convicted, and all convictions,
except in California v Stewart, were affirmed on appeal.
Miranda v. Arizona: After interrogation, police officers produced a written
confession signed by Ernesto Miranda, indicating that the confession was made
voluntarily and with full knowledge of his legal rights, which was admitted into
evidence in the trial. He was convicted for kidnapping and and rape.
Vignera v. New York: Michael Vignera was arrested in connection with a robbery of
a Brooklyn dress shop days before. He orally admitted the crime to the detective.
While at the custody of the detective squad, he was indetified by the store owner and
saleslady as the robber. During trial, the trial court sustained objection by the
prosecution on the question of whether Vignera was of his right to counsel. Thus,
the defense was not able evidence on the matter. Vignera was found guilty of 1st
degree robbery.
Westover v. U.S.: Carl Calvin Westover was arrested as a suspect in 2 Kansas City
robberies.  Records  don’t  show  that  he  was  informed  of  his  rights  by  the  police,  but   3. Procedural Safeguards Necessary for Custodial Interrogations: In order
the agents who testified in the trial argued otherwise. Immediately, after
interrogation by the local police for these robberies, he was also interrogated by the
FBI about a robbery of a savings and loan association and a bank in Sacramento,
California (interrogation by these two authorities almost lasted 14 continuous hours
according to the Court). After these interrogations, he signed separate confessions
prepared by one of the agents present thereat regarding the robberies. He was
convicted for these charges.
California v. Stewart: Roy Allen Stewart was arrested in his home together with his
wife and 3 other persons visiting him, and his house was searched after the police
got his approval. All of them were interrogated (but his wife and 3 other persons
were later released for failure to press charges). During the 9th interrogation session,
he admitted that he robbed the deceased but had no intention to hurt the latter. Later,
Stewart was brought to a magistrate for the first time. Records do not show WoN he
was warned of his rights before being interrogated, but the officers who testified
during trial (upon being asked to recount what happened during the interrogation)
did not indicate that Stewart was warned of his rights.
ISSUE/S: WoN statements obtained in custodial investigations, without
procedures  safeguarding  one’s  right  to  self-incrimination, are admissible– NO.
RULING: Reversed as to 3 cases (as to the admissibility of their statements
from the interrogation). Affirmed as to California v Stewart.
RATIO:
1. Psychological Impact of Incommunicado Interrogation: The atmosphere
and environment of incommunicado interrogation is inherently intimidating
and works to undermine the privilege against self-incrimination. Police
manuals indicate that being alone with the person under interrogation is key
for a successful interrogation, since the accused is placed in isolated and
unfamiliar surroundings, without any support, where the interrogator may
relentlessly overwhelm the subject or trick a confession out of him. Unless
preventive measures are taken to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial
surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the
product of his free choice.
2. Privilege against Self-Incrimination: This privilege has an extensive
history and the essential mainstay of our adversary system. Its essence is
that a government must respect the dignity and integrity of its citizens, and
that a government seeking to punish an individual produces the evidence
against him through its own effort, rather than by compelling it from the
accused’s  own  mouth.  It  guarantees  the  individual  the  right  to  remain  silent  
unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will in all
setting  which  undermine  the  individual’s  will  to  resist  and  to  compel to him
where he would otherwise do so freely.
to  safeguard  the  individual’s  right  against  self-incrimination, the following
warnings waiver needed are, in the absence of a fully effective equivalent,
prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant:
The person in custody must, prior to the interrogation, be clearly informed that he
has the right to remain silent, and that anything he says will be used against him in
court; he must be clearly informed that the has the right to consult with a lawyer and
to have the lawyer with him during interrogation, and that, if he is indigent, a lawyer
will be appointed to represent him.
If the individual indicates, prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain
silent, the interrogation must cease; if he states that he wants an attorney, the
questioning must cease until an attorney is present
 When an interrogation is conducted without the presence of an attorney and a California v. Stewart:  an  intelligent  waiver  of  one’s  rights  cannot  be  presumed  from  
statement   is   taken,   a   heavy   burden   rests   on   the   Gov’t   to   demonstrate   that   the   a silent record.
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights to counsel
Where the individual answers some questions during in custody interrogation he has Note: Custodial interrogation – questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
NOT waived his privilege and may invoke his right to remain silent thereafter. person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way.
4. Limitations on Interrogation not Undue Interference: Such limitations
above  are  required  for  the  protection  of  the  individual’s  constitutional  rights  
and should not cause an undue interference with a proper system of law
enforcement. This is demonstrated by FBI procedures as well as the
safeguards afforded in other jurisdictions like England and India. Besides,
voluntary  statements  aren’t  barred  by  such  safeguards.  
5. SC’s   Conclusion: The prosecution may not use statements, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken in custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way, unless it
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the 5 th
Amendment’s  privilege  against  self-incrimination.
6. As Applied in the 4 Cases before SC: In each of these cases the statements
were  obtained  under  circumstances  that  didn’t  meet  constitutional  standards  
for protection of the privilege against self-incrimination. They were all
subjected to incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-
dominated and oppressive atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating
statement without full warnings of constitutional rights. Hence, the
statements are inadmissible in evidence.
Miranda v. Arizona: Miranda was not apprised of his right to counsel during
interrogation, as shown by the testimonies of the officers themselves.
Vignera v. New York:   No   warning   of   Vignera’s   rights   given   by   the   interrogation  
officers and no other steps were taken to protect his rights
Westover v. U.S.: No evidence of Westover being apprised of his rights before the
FBI interrogation as well as of knowing and intelligent waiver of rights after the
same was commenced. Records only show that he confessed after being turned over
to the FBI after interrogation by the local police. Furthermore, he has been held in
custody for more than 14 hours and was interrogated continuously by the police and
the FBI for different crimes during that period.
Despite the fact that the FBI agents gave warnings at the outset of their interview,
from Westover's point of view the warnings came at the end of the interrogation
process. This does not mean that law enforcement authorities are precluded from
questioning any individual who has been held for a period of time by other
authorities and interrogated by them without appropriate warnings. It  would’ve  been  
different if an accused were taken into custody by the second authority, removed
both in time and place from his original surroundings, and then adequately advised
of his rights and given an opportunity to exercise them. But here the FBI
interrogation was conducted immediately following the state interrogation in the
same police station - in the same compelling surroundings, such that they became
beneficiaries of the pressure applied by the local in-custody interrogation
 MAPP v. OHIO
June 19, 1961 | Clark, J. | Appeal from Decision | Protected Interests in Liberty:
Unlawful Search and Seizure
SUMMARY: Appellant stands convicted of knowingly having had in her
possession and under her control certain lewd and lascivious books, pictures, and
photographs in violation of Ohio's Revised Code. As officially stated in the
syllabus to its opinion, the Supreme Court of Ohio found that her conviction was
valid though "based primarily upon the introduction in evidence of lewd and
lascivious books and pictures unlawfully seized during an unlawful search of
defendant's  home”.  The  US  SC  held  that  “All evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Federal Constitution is inadmissible in a criminal trial
in  a  state  court.”
DOCTRINE: All evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the
Federal Constitution is inadmissible in a criminal trial in a state court.
FACTS:
1. On May 23, 1957, three Cleveland officers arrived at the house of appellant,
Ms. Mapp, knocked on her door and demanded entrance. After telephoning
her attorney, the appellant refused to admit them without a search warrant.
2. The officers again sought entrance some three hours. When appellant did not
come to the door immediately, at least one of the several doors to the house
was forcibly opened. Appellant demanded to see the search warrant. A
struggle ensued between appellant and officers for the recovery of a piece of
paper said to be the warrant. As a result the appellant was handcuffed for
resisting. Afterwhich, her house was searched. The obscene materials for
possession of which she was ultimately convicted were discovered in the
course of that search. No search warrant was produced during the trial.
3. The Ohio SC believed a "reasonable argument" could be made that the
conviction should be reversed "because the `methods' employed to obtain the
[evidence] were such as to offend "a sense of justice," but found
determinative the fact that the evidence had not been taken "from defendant's
person by the use of brutal or offensive physical force against defendant."
4. The State says that even if the search were made without authority, or
otherwise unreasonably, it is not prevented from using the unconstitutionally
seized evidence at trial, citing Wolf v. Colorado, in which the US SC held
"that in a prosecution in a State court for a State crime the Fourteenth
Amendment does not forbid the admission of evidence obtained by an
unreasonable search and seizure."
ISSUE/S: WON unconstitutionally seized evidence may be used by the State in
a prosecution in a State court for a State crime – NO
RULING: The appealed judgment is REVERSED and REMANDED.
RATIO:
1. In Weeks v US (1914), the US SC held that "in a federal prosecution the
Fourth Amendment barred the use of evidence secured through an illegal
search  and  seizure.  ”  In   Wolf v. Colorado (1949), the same court held that
“were  a  State  affirmatively  to  sanction  such  police  incursion  into  privacy  it  
would run counter to the guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment." In the
same case, the Court held that the Weeks exclusionary rule would not then
be imposed upon the States as "an essential ingredient of the right."
2. However, recent jurisprudence shows that the failure of the Wolf Court to
include the Weeks exclusionary rule when it recognized the enforceability
of the right to privacy against the States in 1949 could not now be deemed
controlling. Examples include the discarding of the "silver platter" doctrine
allowing federal judicial use of evidence seized in violation of the
Constitution by state agents, Elkins v. United States; the relaxation of the
formerly strict requirements as to standing to challenge the use of evidence
thus seized, Jones v. United States; and, the formulation of a method to
prevent state use of evidence unconstitutionally seized by federal agents,
Rea v. United States. Also, since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy is
enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause, it is
enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used
against the Federal Government. The Court has enforced as strictly against
the States as it does against the Federal Government the rights of free
speech and of a free press, the rights to notice and to a fair, public trial, and
other  “basic  rights”.
3. The holding that the exclusionary rule is an essential part of both the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments is not only the logical dictate of prior cases,
but also makes very good sense. A federal prosecutor may make no use of
evidence illegally seized, but a State's attorney may, although the latter is
supposedly operating under the enforceable prohibitions of the same
Amendment. Thus, by admitting evidence unlawfully seized, the State
serves to encourage disobedience to the Federal Constitution which it is
bound to uphold.
4. One argument is that under the constitutional exclusionary doctrine "[t]he
criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered." Indeed, the
criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing
can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own
laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence. At the same
time, it cannot be assumed that, as a practical matter, adoption of the
exclusionary rule fetters law enforcement. In fact, the federal courts have
operated under the rule of Weeks for almost half a century yet it has not
been suggested that the FBI or the administration of criminal justice in the
 federal courts have been rendered ineffective or disrupted.
5. Having recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth
Amendment is enforceable against the States in the same manner as other
basic rights secured by the Due Process Clause, and that the right to be
secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is constitutional in
origin, the Court can no longer permit such right to be revocable at the
whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself,
chooses to suspend its enjoyment.
 STONEHILL v. DIOKNO
June 19, 1967 | Concepcion, C.J. | Certiorari, Prohibition | Protected Interests in
Liberty: Unlawful Search and Seizure
SUMMARY:   Petitioners   contested   search   and   seizure   of   their   corporations’   RATIO:
offices and their personal residence based on certain warrants. Warrants were
found null and void due to general nature and lack of probable cause, and the
searches and seizures made pursuant to the same illegal.
DOCTRINE:The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers,   and   effects   against   unreasonable   searches   and   seizures…shall   be   seizure’s legality can be contested only by the party whose rights have
inviolable, and no warrants shall issue except upon probable cause to be
examined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
FACTS:
1. Respondent-judge issued 42 warrants to respondent-prosecutors against
petitioners and/or their corporations for the search of their persons and
premises  and  the  seizure  of  certain  personal  properties,  “Books  of  accounts,   Revenue  (Code)  and  Revised  Penal  Code”.  No  specific  offense  was  alleged,
financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance
sheets  and  related  profit  and  loss  statements”,  which  were effected upon the
petitioners’  offices  and  residences.
2. Petitioners alleged that the warrants are null and void and unconstitutional
and contrary to the RoC because: (1) they do not particularly describe the
things to be seized; (2) cash, not mentioned in the warrants, was seized; (3)
they were fishing for evidence in deportation cases filed against petitioners;
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the
items seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be
disposed of according to law.
3. Respondent-prosecutors alleged: (1) the warrants are valid and issued in
accordance   with   law;;   (2)   any   defects   were   cured   by   petitioners’   consent;;   exclusionary rule which prevents the admission of evidence obtained
and (3) the effects seized are admissible evidence against petitioners
regardless of illegality of the searches and seizures.
ISSUES:
1. WoN petitioners have cause of action to assail the legality of the warrants
and seizures– PARTIALLY.
2. WoN the warrants violated the Constitution and the RoC – YES.
3. WoN the evidence seized pursuant to the warrants was admissible – NO.
RULING: Moncado doctrine abandoned. Warrants for residences null and void;
searches and seizures therein illegal; writ of preliminary injunction made
permanent; writs prayed for granted insofar as effects seized in the residences.
1. The things seized under the warrants are split into two groups:
a. Those found and seized in corporate offices–Petitioners have no cause
of action to assail the warrants and seizures since corporations have
separate  and  distinct  personalities  from  the  petitioners’  personalities.  A  
been impaired thereby, and the right to object is purely personal.
b. Those  found  and  seized  in  the  petitioners’  residences  –Petitioners have
cause of action since it affects their constitutional rights as their
property was seized and the privacy of their homes disturbed.
2. It is required that warrants (1) are issued only upon probable cause; and (2)
particularly describe the things to be seized. The contested warrants did not
comply with these. They were issued upon applications stating the cause as
“a   violation   of   Central   Ban   Laws,   Tariff   and   Customs   Laws,   Internal  
 
thus no probable cause could have been found. They also authorized the
search and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of
petitioners, whether legal or illegal, and thus were general in nature.
3. The Moncado doctrine, relied on by respondents, that the effects unlawfully
seized may still be admitted as evidence should be abandoned. The doctrine
evolved from the American common law rule that the criminal should not
be allowed to go free merely because the constable has blundered. The
theory was that there were means other than the exclusion of evidence for
protecting the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, such
as an action for damages against the officers who participated in the illegal
search (officer who procured the warrant, executed the illegal search).
4. However, most jurisdictions have given up this approach, realizing that the
only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction. The
through illegal search and seizure is essential to the right to privacy; without
it, the right against illegal search and seizure would be of no value. To hold
otherwise is to grant the right but in reality withhold its privilege and
enjoyment. The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter—to compel
respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available
way—by removing the incentive to disregard it. The constitutional guaranty
must not remain an empty promise, to be revocable at the whim of any
police officer. If the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence
to establish probable cause, there is no reason why the applicant should not
comply with the requirement of the fundamental law.
 BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (CID) v. DELA ROSA, et al
May 31, 1991 | Bidin, J. | Certiorari and Prohibition | Constitutional Protection:
Citizenship and Alienage
SUMMARY: Petitioners assail the decision of RTC Judges Dela Rosa and
Capulong for denying their motion to dismiss the case filed by William
Gatchalian for certiorari and prohibition with injunction against them, and for
issuing a TRO, restraining them from continuing with the deportation
proceedings against Gatchalian, respectively.
DOCTRINE: See underlined sentences in the ratio.
FACTS:
1. July  12,  1960:  Santiago  Gatchalian,  William  Gatchalian’s  grandfather,  was   jurisdiction, disregarding the Arocha and Vivo cases which put a finality on
recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino
(illegitimate. Mother, Mariana Gatchalian, was a Filipino). On June 27,
1961, William, then 12 yo, arrived in Manila from Hong Kong together
with his father, brother and aunt, Francisco, Johnson and Gloria,
respectively. They had with them Certificates of Registration and Identity
issued by the Phil. Consulate of HK based on a cablegram bearing DFA
Sec. Felixberto Serrano’s   signature,   and   sought   admission   as   Filipino  
citizens: approved by the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 (BSI1) on July 6,
1961.
2. Jan 24, 1962: DOJ Sec. issued Memo 9 directing the Board of
Commissioners (BC) to set aside all decisions and review all cases where
entry was allowed on the ground that entrant was a Filipino citizen. On July
6, 1962, the BC reversed the decision of BSI1 and ordered the exclusion of,
among others, Gatchalian. A warrant of exclusion was issued alleging that
said decision has become final and executory. The actual date of rendition
of said decision became a subject of controversy in Arocha v. Vivo (July 6
v. July 20: it appeared that 20 was erased and 6 was superimposed). The
Court held that it was rendered in July 6, within the reglementary period for
review.
3. 1973: those covered by the warrant of exclusion filed a motion for rehearing
with the BSI, which recommended to Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda
the reversal of the July 6, 1962 decision and the recall of the warrants of
arrest issued, who, in turn, approved the same, thereby admitting Gatchalian
as a Filipino citizen and recalled the warrant of arrest issued against him.
4. June 7, 1990: the NBI recommended to the DOJ Sec. that those covered by
the July 6, 1962 warrant of exclusion be charged with the violation of the
Immigration Act of 1940 (Sec. 37(a) , pars. 1 and 2, in relation to secs.45
(c), (d), and (e)). DOJ Sec indorsed said recommendation to the
Commissioner of Immigration for investigation and immediate action, who
ordered the arrest of Gatchalian (released upon posting 200k cash bond).
5. August 29, 1990: Gatchalian filed a petition for certiorari, and prohibition
with injuction before RTC Manila, presided by Judge Dela Rosa, who
issued the assailed order, denying petitioners’  motion  to  dismiss  for  lack  of  
jurisdiction over BC and/or BSI. Judge Capulong, on the other hand, in a
case filed before RTC Valenzuela, issued the questioned TRO, restraining
petitioners from continuing with the deportation proceedings.
6. Petitioners: 1) no jurisdiction over petitioners (quasi-judicial agencies are
co-equal with RTC. CA has exclusive jurisdiction); 2) assuming they have
jurisdiction, they acted with grave abuse of discretion in pre-empting
petitioners in hearing and determining the deportation case and citizenship
of Gatchalian; 3) J. Dela Rosa gravely abused his discretion in ruling that
issues   raised   in   the   deportation   proceedings   are   beyond   petitioners’  
Gatchalian’s  Chinise  citizenship;;  4)    J.  Capulong  should  have  dismissed  the  
case for forum shopping.
7. Respondent: 1) no jurisdiction to proceed with deportation case until the
courts have finally resolved the question of his citizenship; 2) petitioners
cannot fairly resolve his citizenship due to their bias and prejudice against
him; and 3) ground for his deportation has prescribed.
ISSUE/S:
1. WoN CA alone, and not RTC, has exclusive jurisdiction over all final
judgments and orders of quasi-judicial agencies – Partly.
2. WoN William Gatchalian is to be declared a Filipino Citizen, and if not,
whether it is barred by prescription – YES.
RULING: William Gatchalian declared a Filipino citizen. Petitioners
permanently enjoined from continuing with the deportation proceedings.
RATIO:
1. Sec. 21 (1), BP 129: RTCs are vested with the power to determine WoN
there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government. Only those quasi-judicial agencies which
are under the law, RA 5434, or their enabling acts are specifically
appealable to CA may be considered co-equal with the RTCs and are
beyond the control of the latter. The Bureau of Immigration is not among
those specified by law whose decisions, orders or resolutions are directly
appealable to the CA. The decision of an agency like BI should be subject
to review by the court specified by the statute or in the absence thereof, by
any court of competent jurisdiction (Sec. 25, Chapter 4, Book VII, 1987
Admin. Code). Not being co-equal   to   the   RTC,   BI’s   decisions   are  
appealable to RTC through certiorari.
 Although the BI has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and try cases against an the freedom and liberty of a person, the constitutional right of such person
alleged alien, an exception, insofar as deportation proceedings are to due process should not be denied. Rules on Prescription in the
concerned, states that, “when   the   evidence submitted by a respondent is Immigration Act: 1) deportation or exclusion proceedings under clauses 2,
conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate review should be 7, 8, 11 and 12 of Sec. 37 (a) – 8 years (prescription for acts punished by
recognized and the courts should promptly enjoin the deportation imprisonment for 2-6 years in special legislations); 2) any other clauses – 5
proceedings”. years after the cause of deportation or exclusion arises (Sec 39 of the
2. The Arocha and Vivo cases   have   not   conclusively   settled   Gatchalian’s Immigration Act).
alienage since the sole issue resolved therein was the actual date of 5. The power to deport an alien is an act of the State. It is an act by or under
rendition of the July 6, 1962 decision. Also, Gatchalian was not a party to the authority of the sovereign power. It is a police measure against
said  cases,  and  is  therefore  not  bound  by  the  decision  rendered.  BC’s  July  6,   undesirable aliens whose presence in the country is found to be injurious to
1962 decision finding respondent’s   claim   to   Philippine   citizenship   as   not   the public good and domestic tranquility of the people. – Respondent is not
satisfactorily proven does not constitute as res judicata: 1) the decision did undesirable. He was found helpful to the economy: provided employment to
not make any categorical statement that Gatchalian is Chinese, and 2) res 4k persons.
judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship. Every time the 6. On   Santiago’s  (grandfather)  and  Francisco’s  (father) marriage. Petitioners:
citizenship of a person is material in a judicial or administrative case, marriage  not  proved,  therefore,  citizenship  of  children  follows  the  mother’s.  
whatever decision as to such citizenship is generally not considered res In the absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign laws on a particular
judicata, hence, it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines:
may demand. The only exception to   such   rule   is   when:   1)   a   person’s   Testimonies of Santiago and Francisco are competent proof of filiation
citizenship is raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is under Sec 34, Rule 130 (statements regarding family reputations or tradition
a party; 2) SolGen or his representative took part in the resolution; and 3) in  pedigree)  and  CC  267  (in  the  absence  of  authentic  document…  legitimate  
the finding of citizenship is affirmed by SC – All conditions are not present filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by the RoC and special
in the Arocha and Vivo cases. laws). Also, CC 220 states that, in cases of doubt, all presumptions favor the
3. Regarding the arrest of respondent, Sec 37(a) of the Immigration Act of solidarity of family (validity of marriage, legitimacy of children). Since the
1940 states that, insofar as deportation of aliens are concerned, for a warrant marriages  are  valid,  it  follows  that  William’s  citizenship  is  Filipino.  Finally  
of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration to be valid, it must be (finally!), Gatchalian belongs to the class of Filipino citizens contemplated
issued for the sole purpose of executing a final order of deportation. A under Sec. 1, Art IV of the Constitution,   “Those   who   are   citizens   of   the  
warrant of arrest issued for purposes of investigation only is null and void Philippines  at  the  time  of  the  adoption  of  this  Constitution”.
for being unconstitutional. The warrant of arrest issued clearly indicates that
it was   issued   only   for   purposes   of   investigation   of   the   suspects   (“conduct  
custodial  interrogation”).  It  made  no  mention  that  the  same  was  pursuant  to  
a final order of deportation or warrant of exclusion.
Moreover,   BSI’s   recommendation   and   Acting   Commissioner   Nituda’s  
subsequent order admitting Gatchalian and the others as Filipino citizens,
and recalling the warrants of arrest and revalidating their Identification
Certificates, being the final act of the government, gives the presumption of
citizenship in favor of Gatchalian.
4. Sec. 37 (b) of the Immigration act states that deportation shall not be
effected unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within 5
years after the cause of deportation arises. The cause of action against
Gatchalian arose in 1962, yet the warrant of arrest was issued only Aug 15,
1990 – 28   years   after.   By   their   inaction,   petitioners’   cause   of   action   has  
prescribed and cannot be validly enforced against Gatchalian. Although a
deportation proceeding is not criminal in nature, considering that it affects
 QUA CHEE GAN v. DEPORTATION BOARD
September 30, 1963 | Barrera, J. | Appeal from CFI decision | Constitutional
Protection: Citizenship and Alienage
SUMMARY: Petitioners illegally purchased US dollars without the necessary 2.
license. They were arrested by the Deportation Board. They contended that: (1)
charges were not a legal ground for deportation, (2) Board had no jurisdiction,
and (3) Board had no authority to order arrest. The SC ruled against petitioners
on the first two but agreed with them on the third point.
DOCTRINE: Deportation may be effected: (1) by order of the President,
pursuant to Sec 69 of the RAC; and (2) by the Commissioner of Immigration,
upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners, under Sec 37 of CA No.
613. / Deportation may only be upon the grounds in CA No. 613
FACTS:
1. Petitioners Qua Chee Gan, James Uy, Daniel Dy, Chan Tiong Yu, Chua 3.
Chu Tian, Chua Lim Pao and Basilio King were charged before the
Deportation Board with having purchased $130,000 US dollars without the
necessary license from the Central Bank of the Philippines and having
clandestinely remitted the same to Hong Kong. Qua, Chua Lim Pao and
King were also charged with attempted bribery of officers of the Philippine
and US governments to evade prosecution for said purchase. They were
arrested by the Board for the same.
2. Petitioners filed to dismiss since, among others, the charges did not
constitute legal ground for deportation and the Board had no jurisdiction to
entertain the charges. In answer, the Board contended among others that as
the  President’s  agent,  it  had  jurisdiction  over  the  charges  and  the  authority   4.
to order their arrest.
ISSUE/S: WoN the Board had jurisdiction and the charges were legal ground
for deportation – YES
WoN  the  Board’s  issuance  of  a  warrant  for  their  arrest  was  valid  – NO
RULING: EO 398 series of 1951, insofar as it empowered the Deportation
Board to issue warrant of arrest upon filing of formal charges against aliens, fix 5.
bond and prescribe conditions for their temporary release declared null and void.
Order of arrest null and void. Bonds filed cancelled. Decision affirmed.
RATIO:
1. Under Sec 37, CA No. 613 (Immigration Act of 1940), the Commissioner
of Immigration is empowered to effect the arrest and expulsion of an alien
after previous determination of the Board of Commissioners of the grounds
therefor.  However,  the   Legislature   did  not  intend  that  the  law’s  enactment   ministerial.
delimit or concentrate the exercise the power to deport on the Immigration
Commissioner alone. Sec 52 provides that the Act substitutes and
supersedes all previous laws relating to alien entry, exclusion, deportation
and repatriation, except Sec 69 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Sec 69 of the RAC provides, among others, that the President of the
Philippines can only deport, expel, exclude or repatriate aliens upon prior
investigation conducted by him or his authorized agent of the ground upon
which the action was contemplated. It lays down other aspects of the
procedure for the same. The fact that such procedure was provided for
before the President could deport an alien is a ratification by the Legislative
of Executive power. The exercise of this power has also been sanctioned by
the Court in several decisions. Thus, under the laws, deportation may be
effected: (1) by order of the President, pursuant to Sec 69 of the RAC; and
(2) by the Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation of the
Board of Commissioners, under Sec 37 of CA No. 613.
Even if the President is invested with the power to deport, it is only upon
the grounds enumerated in CA No. 613. Whenever the Legislature believes
a certain act or conduct be just cause for deportation, it enacts a law to that
effect. Thus, in a number of amendatory acts, grounds have been added to
those originally contained in Sec 37 of CA No. 613, and other laws which
provide deportation as a penalty on alien violating the same. The charges
against petitioners constitute profiteering, hoarding or blackmarketing of
US dollars, in violation of Central Bank regulations—an economic
sabotage—a ground for deportation under RA 503 amending Sec 37 of CA
No. 613. The President may therefore order their deportation if after
investigation they are shown to have committed the act charged.
The  President’s  power  to  investigate  may  be  delegated  since  Sec  69  of  the  
RAC   refers   to   prior   investigation   “conducted   by   said   Executive   (the  
President)   or   his   authorized   agent”.   The   first   EO   on   the   subject   was Gov-
Gen.   Frank   Murphy’s   EO   No.33,   which   constituted   a   board   to   act   on  
complaints against foreigners, conduct investigations and make
recommendations. Pres Quezon created the Deportation Board primarily
pursuant to Sec 69. Since then, the Deportation Board has been conducting
the  investigation  as  the  President’s  authorized  agent.
However, unlike CA No. 613, Sec 69 of the RAC failed to provide the
President with the power to make arrests in connection with their
investigations. The order of arrest cannot be carried out merely during the
investigation;;   it   is   enough   that   a   bond   be   required   to   insure   the   alien’s  
appearance during the investigation. It is only in carrying out the order of
deportation   that   the   President   has   the   power   to   order   a   deportee’s   arrest.
Discretion as to the issuance of a warrant of arrest is personal to the one
upon whom such authority devolves, and cannot be delegated as it is not
 HARVEY v. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
June 28, 1988 | Melencio-Herrera, J. | Habeas Corpus | Constitutional Protection:
Citizenship and Alienage
SUMMARY: Petitioners are allegedly alien pedophiles who were arrested by
virtue of a written order by Commissioner Santiago, who subsequently questioned
the validity of their detention. SC held that it was upon probable cause.
DOCTRINE: The rights guaranteed in Article III, Section 2 is available to all
persons, including aliens, whether accused of a crime of not; but determination of
probable cause by a judge before a warrant of arrest can issue does not apply to
deportation proceedings, being administrative in nature.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners Andrew Harvey (52yo) and John Sherman (72), American
nationals, and Adriaan Van Den Elshout (58), Dutch, along with 19 others,
were apprehended on Feb 27, 1988 by the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation (CID) by virtue of Mission Orders issued by Comm. Miriam
Defensor-Santiago. They were suspected alien pedophiles apprehended after
3 months of close surveillance by CID agents.
2. During the apprehension, CID agents seized rolls of photo negatives and
photos of suspected child prostitutes shown in salacious poses, as well as
boys and girls engaged in the act of sex. There were also posters and other
literature advertising child prostitutes. The Operation Report dated Feb 29
stated that Harvey was found together with 2 young boys; Sherman with 2
naked boys inside his room; and Elshout with two children living in.
3. On Mar 4, deportation proceedings were instituted for being undesirable
aliens under Sec. 69 of the RAC, being pedophiles, as inimical to public
morals, health and safety. On Mar 7, warrants of arrest were issued for
violation of Section 37, 45, 46 of the Immigration Act and Sec. 69 of the
RAC; on the same date, the Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) commenced trial
against petitioners. On Mar 14, they filed an urgent petition for release
under bond based on health issues, which was denied because the CID
doctor certified that they were healthy. On Mar 22, they filed a petition for
bail, which was also denied. On April 4, petitioners filed a petition for the
writ of habeas corpus, questioning the validity of their detention on the ff.
grounds: 1) the Comm. Has no authority to issue warrants pending
investigation on the existence of probable cause, 2) 1987 Constitution
prohibition against searches and seizures on the Feb 27 seizures without
warrants, 3) being a pedophile is not punishable by any Philippine law.
ISSUE/S:
1. WoN petitioner-aliens are entitled to the constitutional protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures—YES
2. WoN the arrest, searches and seizures were unreasonable—NO
RULING: Petition DENIED.
RATIO:
1. The rights against unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by Article
III, Section 2 is available to all persons, including aliens, whether accused
of a crime of not.
2. One of the requirements of a valid search warrant or warrant of arrest is that
it must be based upon probable cause. In this case, the arrest was based on
probable cause determined after close surveillance of their activities for 3
months. Also, while they were not caught in the act, they were found with 2
boys, and this was reasonable ground to believe that pedophilia had been
committed. While it is not an offense punishable under the RPC, it is
behavior offensive to public morals and violative of the declared policy in
II,13 of the Constitution to promote and protect the physical, moral,
spiritual, and social well-being of the youth. The articles were seized as an
incident to a lawful arrest, and therefore, admissible in evidence. The SC
further held that assuming that the arrest was not valid at its inception,
records show that formal deportation charges were filed on Mar 4, warrants
issued on Mar 7, and hearings conducted by the BSI. Thus, the restraint
against their persons have become legal, the writ having served their
purpose and has become moot and academic. At any rate, their filing of bail
should be considered as a waiver of any irregularity attending their arrest
and estops them from questioning its validity.
3. RAC Sec. 37 (a) allows arrest upon the warrant by the CID commissioner
and deportation upon determination by the Board of Commissioners of the
existence of the ground for deportation as charged. It is constitutionally
valid, because the specific constraints (ie probable cause determined by the
judge after examining the complainant, describing the specific things)
contemplate prosecutions criminal in nature. Deportation proceedings are
administrative and an order is not considered punishment, but merely a
preventive measure, and need not be conducted strictly with ordinary Court
proceedings. In this case, deportation proceedings have been commenced
(probable cause shown to exist before the warrant of arrest was issued) and
the arrest was a step preliminary to their possible deportation. What is
essential is he be informed of the specific charge, given a fair hearing with
the assistance of counsel if desired, and that the charge be substantiated by
competent evidence. Also, in deportation proceedings, the right to bail is
not a matter of right but a matter of discretion on the part of the CID
Commissioner. The constitutional guarantee to bail may only be invoked in
criminal proceedings.
 YU v. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
March 24, 1989 | Padilla, J. | Habeas Corpus | Constitutional Protection:
Citizenship and Alienage
SUMMARY: Petitioner applied for a Portuguese passport after being naturalized.
He also renewed the same after the expiration date and represented himself as a
Portuguese   citizen   in   official   documents.   SC   held   that   the   petitioner’s   actions   pieces of documentary evidence which are not substantial enough. The gravity
implied renunciation of Philippine citizenship.
DOCTRINE: Philippine citizenship is not a commodity or something which is to
be displayed when required and suppressed when convenient. The act of applying
for a foreign passport is an express renunciation of your current citizenship.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Yu was originally issued a Portuguese passport in 1971, valid for
5 years. Despite his naturalization as a Philippine citizen in 1978, petitioner
still applied for and was issued a Portuguese passport in 1981.
2. Petitioner was detained in 1988. He then filed a petition for habeas corpus
and oral arguments commenced wherein parties, including respondent
Commissioner of the Commission of Importation and Deportation (CID),
submitted their exhibits and memoranda.
3. The petition was denied but Yu filed a motion for clarification with prayer
for restraining order because respondent Commissioner already had a
summary judgment of deportation against Yu issued by the CID board.
ISSUE/S: WoN petitioner is not a Filipino citizen anymore subject to
deportation? - YES
RULING: Petition for release from detention DENIED. TRO on deportment
lifted.
RATIO:
1. The act of the petitioner of obtaining a Portuguese passport after his
naturalization   is   an   express   renunciation   of   petitioner’s Philippine
citizenship. Express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is
made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or
implication.
2. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced
Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine citizen resumed
or reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen when he represented
himself as such in official documents even after he was naturalized.
3. Whether or not a person has renounced his Phil. Citizenship is normally
heard before a trial court of law in adversary proceedings but upon the
instance of the petitioner, the SC had to look in the facts and satisfy itself if
the petition is meritorious. Moreover, due process was given since
petitioner was given by the Court the opportunity to show proof of
continued Phil. Citizenship to which he has failed.
Dissenting by C.J Fernan; Due process was not followed. Petitioner is being
deprived of his Filipino citizenship through a summary procedure and upon
of stripping a person citizenship requires application of the correct procedures
according to law.
Dissenting by Gutierrez, Jr.:It is a dangerous precedent if administrative
officials on such informal evidence as that presented in the case are allowed to
rule   that   a   Filipino   “renounced”   his   citizenship   and   has   become   a   stateless  
person. The mere use of a foreign passport is not ipso facto express renunciation
of Filipino citizenship. A Filipino may get a foreign passport for convenience,
employment but he remains at heart a Filipino or he may do so because he wants
to give up his Phil. citizenship. Whatever the reason, it must be ascertained in a
court of law where a full trial is conducted instead of an administrative
determination of a most summary nature.
Dissenting by Cortes: The evidence on record, consisting of the photocopy of a
memorandum from the Portuguese Consular Office that petitioner applied for
and was issued a Portuguese passport in 1981 and that it expired in 1986 and
photocopies of commercial papers   manifesting   petitioner’s nationality as
Portuguese, without authentication by the appropriate Philippine Consul, to my
mind, do not constitute substantial evidence that under the law petitioner has lost
his Filipino citizenship by express renunciation.
Concurring by Cruz: I agree that the petitioner has failed to overcome the
presumption that he has forfeited his status as a naturalized Filipino by his
obtention of a Portuguese passport. However, I cannot agree that petitioner
expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship. Express renunciation of
citizenship as a mode of losing citizenship under Com. Act. No. 63 is an
unequivocal and deliberate act with full awareness of its significance and
consequences.   I   don’t   think   commercial   documents   signed   by   the   petitioner  
suggest such a categorical disclaimer.
 CENTRAL BANK v. MORFE
June 30, 1967 | Concepcion, C.J. | Original Action: Certiorari and Prohibition
with Preliminary Injunction | Constitutional Protection: Juridical Persons
SUMMARY: A search warrant was issued by the municipal court against the
First Manual Savings and Loan Organization upon the application of the
Central Bank, alleging that said Organization was engaged in illegal banking
transactions (no compliance with RA 337). The Organization prayed for a writ
of injunction, which was granted by respondent Judge Morfe, on the ground
that the warrant did not specify specific persons who were victims of the
alleged illegal transactions. SC held that probable cause is dependent upon the
circumstances surrounding each case and that, in the case at bar, the acts
imputed to the Organization refers to its general pattern of business, not
specific, isolated transactions which would require the identification of such
persons involved in the transactions.
DOCTRINE: Existence of probable cause is dependent upon the conditions
obtaining in given situations. | In re: 3rd issue raised by the Organization:
Organizations can be subject to criminal actions. *Note: made this one up.
FACTS:
1. First Manual Savings and Loan Organization, Inc., (Organization) is a
registered non-stock corporation that encourages savings among its
members and extends financial assistance thru loans. The Central Bank
made an announcement which states that all savings and loan associations
“have   never   been   authorized   by   the   Monetary   Board   to   accept   deposit of
funds for the public nor engage in the banking business not to perform any
banking   activity   or   function   in   the   Philippines”,   and   that   such   institutions   Organization consisted of isolated transactions, distinct and different from
violate Sec. 2 of the General Banking Act.
2. Pursuant to an investigation of the activities of such institutions, an
intelligence officer of the Bank filed an application for search warrant
against the Organization, alleging that the office of the Organization (2745
Rizal Ave., Manila) is being used unlawfully, because said Organization is
illegally engaged in banking activities by receiving deposits of money for
deposit, disbursement, safekeeping, or otherwise without complying to RA
337 (violation of Secs 2 and 6 of RA 337). The warrant was issued by Judge
Cancino of the municipal court, commanding the search and seizure of the
articles enumerated.
3. The Organization filed a case with CFI Manila to annul the search warrant
on the ground of grave abuse of discretion since: 1) SW was general in its
terms,   2)   use   of   “and   others”   permits   search   and   seizure   of   documents
which have no relation to any specific criminal act and 3) no court in the
Philippines has any jurisdiction to try a criminal case against a corporation.
The Organization also prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction
restraining the search and seizure, or if the acts have been partially
performed, to return the documents so far seized. Judge Morfe found the
searches and seizures unreasonable on the ground that it did not mention
specific persons who are victims of the purported illegal banking
transactions.
ISSUE/S: WoN the search warrant was unreasonable – NO.
RULING: Order of Respondent Judge Morfe and the writ of preliminary
injunction are ANNULLED.
RATIO:
1. Unreasonableness is a condition dependent upon the circumstances
surrounding each case. WoN probable cause exists is dependent upon the
conditions obtaining in given situations.
2. Failure of witness to name particular individuals does not necessarily prove
that he had no personal knowledge of specific illegal transactions of the
Organization, for the witness might be acquainted with such specific
transactions even if the names of the individuals concerned were unknown
to him.
3. The questioned order assumes that an illegal banking transaction must
always   connote   the   existence   of   a   “victim”   – actually injured. The law
which requires compliance with certain requirements before anybody can
engage in banking seeks to protect the public not only against actual, but as
well as potential injury.
4. Judge   Morfe’s   reasoning   may   be   justified   if   the   acts   imputed   to   the  
the type of business in which it is generally engaged, necessitating the
specific parties involved in the transactions. However, the transactions
objected to by the bank constitute the general pattern of the business as an
Organization – extend financial assistance in the form of loans to its
members with funds deposited by them. Therefore, the municipal judge did
not abuse his discretion in finding that there was probable cause that the
Organization had violated Secs 2 and 6 of the aforesaid law.
Note: the decision did not address the 3rd issue raised by the Organization. There
was no mention of juridical persons at all in the decision. It only discussed on
the  supposed  unreasonableness  of  the  search  warrant.  I  don’t  even  know  what  to  
state in the doctrine regarding juridical persons. Sorry!
 PEOPLE v. MARTI 5. Marti contended, among others, that the evidence was obtained in violation
January 18, 1991 | Bidin, J. | Appeal from RTC decision | Constitutional of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and
Prohibitions: State Action Requirement privacy of communication, and hence should be inadmissible.

SUMMARY: Marti was going to ship marijuana to Switzerland. Job Reyes, ISSUE/S: WoN the evidence was illegally obtained and inadmissible - NO
proprietor of the packing and exporting shop, inspected the packages and
discovered the drugs, and summoned the NBI. Marti was charged with violation RULING: Judgment affirmed.
of the Anti-Dangerous Drugs Act. He contended that the evidence was obtained
in violation of the prohibition against illegal search and seizure. The SC held RATIO:
that the constitutional prohibition did not apply. 1. Evidence obtained through defective search and seizure is inadmissible. In
DOCTRINE:  An  act  of  a  private  individual,  allegedly  in  violation  of  appellant’s   cases where the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule, evidence
constitutional rights, cannot be invoked against the State in the absence of was procured by the State acting through its law enforcers or authorized
governmental interference. The immunity against unreasonable search and government agencies. Here, the evidence was discovered and obtained by a
seizure is a restraint upon the government, not on private citizens. person acting privately and without State intervention and participation.
2. The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the
FACTS: state. Its concern is not the relation between individuals. What it does is to
1. On 14 Aug 1987 Andre Marti and his common-law wife went to the Manila declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any
Packing  and  Export  Forwarders’  in  the  Pistang  Pilipino  Complex,  carrying   power holder. An act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of
four gift-wrapped packages. Marti informed the proprietress, Anita Reyes, appellant’s  constitutional  rights,  cannot  be  invoked  against  the  State  in  the  
that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, and he filled the absence of governmental interference. The constitutional right against
contract necessary for the transaction, writing his name, passport number, unreasonable   search   and   seizure   refers   to   the   immunity   of   one’s   person,  
date  of  shipment,  consignee’s  name  Walter  Fierz,  and  consignee’s  address. whether citizen or alien, from interference by government. Burdeau v
2. Anita asked to inspect the packages. Marti refused, assuring that they McDowell held that the Fourth Amendment, which our constitutional
contained books, cigars and gloves; so Anita no longer insisted on guarantee against search and seizure was based on, was intended as a
inspecting the packages, which were sealed in a box for shipment. restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to
3. Before delivery to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts,  Anita’s   be a limitation upon other than governmental authorities. The same was
husband, Job Reyes, following standard operating procedure, opened the reiterated in several other cases.
boxes for final inspection. A strange odor was emitted. He squeezed a 3. In the instant case, Job Reyes was the one who made the search and
bundle supposedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Opening inspection, which was reasonable and SOP as a precautionary measure
one, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from one of the gloves. before delivery to the Bureau of Customs or Bureau of Posts. It was he who
He made an opening on a wrapper and took several grams of the contents, opened the box, took the samples to the NBI, summoned them to his place
and reported the shipment to the NBI, requesting a lab exam of the samples. of business, opened the rest of the shipment, and entrusted the same to the
4. Job,   three   NBI   agents   and   a   photographer   went   to   Reyes’   office. Job agents’   care   and   custody.   Clearly,   the NBI agents made no search and
brought   out   the   box   and   in   the   agents’   presence   opened   it,   removed   the   seizure, much less an illegal one. Their mere presence did not controvert the
Styrofoam and took out the cellophane wrappers from the gloves, which search into a warrantless search and seizure, as mere observation of that
were revealed to contain dried marijuana leaves. The package allegedly which is in plain sight is not a search. Where the contraband articles are
containing books was also opened and found to contain bricks of dried identified without trespass on the part of the arresting officer, there is no
marijuana-leaves, and the package containing cigars had dried marijuana constitutionally prohibited search.
leaves underneath the cigars. The agents made an inventory and took charge 4. The   argument   that   1987   Constitution’s   modified   phraseology   expressly  
of the box and its contents after signing a receipt. Information was filed declared inadmissible any evidence obtained in violation of the prohibition
against Marti for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. against constitutional search and seizure and that therefore it does not
matter whether it was procured by authorities or private individuals is
untenable. The modifications were only to the issuance of a search warrant
 or a warrant of arrest vis-à-vis   the   judge’s   responsibility.   The   restraint   RATIO:
stayed with the State and shifted to no one else. Such argument would result
in serious legal complications and absurd interpretations.
PRUNEYARD SHOPPING CENTER v. ROBINS
June 9, 1980 | Rehnquist, J. | Appeal | Constitutional Prohibitions: State Action
Requirement
SUMMARY: Several high school students engaged in a public expressive
activity inside Pruneyard, a privately owned shopping center, which prohibits
such activities. The California Supreme Court favored the students which the US
Supreme Court affirmed.
DOCTRINE: The state may exercise its police power to uphold the fundamental
right to free speech. To strike down the government regulation, it must be shown
that its action has curtailed a very essential right to the prejudice of the contender
and that such regulation can be considered beyond the limitation prescribed by the
constitution.
FACTS:
1. Appellant Pruneyard is a privately owned shopping center that is open to
the public for the purpose of encouraging the patronizing of tis commercial
establishments. It has a policy not to permit any visitor or tenant to engage
in any publicly expressive activity, including the circulation of petitions,
which is not directly related to its commercial purposes.
2. Appellees are high school students who sought to solicit support for their
opposition to a United Nations resolution against Zionism. So they set up a
table  in  a  corner  of  Pruneyard’s  central  courtyard  and  distributed  pamphlets
and asked people to sign petitioners. Their activity was peaceful and orderly
and  was  not  objected  to  by  Pruneyard’s  patrons.  Soon  after,  a  security  guard   by the State to be displayed on appellants' property. There consequently is
informed them that they would have to leave because their activity violated
Pruneyard regulations. The guard suggested they move to the public
sidewalk so appellees left and later filed a lawsuit.
3. Superior court held that appellees were not entitled under either Federal or
California constitution to exercise their asserted rights on the shopping
center property which the California Supreme Court reversed.
ISSUE/S: WoN regulation and actions of Pruneyard violated the constitutional
right to exercise free speech? - YES
RULING: California Supreme Court decision is affirmed.
1. The State has the authority to exercise its police power or its sovereign right
to adopt in its own constitution individual liberties more expansive than
those conferred by the Federal Constitution. It is established that the State
may adopt reasonable restrictions on private property so long as the
restrictions do not amount to a taking without just compensation.
2. Appellant contends that his right to exclude others from his property has
been violated when the Supreme Court of California has interpreted the
State Constitution to entitle its citizens to exercise free expression. This
allegedly is tantamount to a taking of his property, but it is well known that
not every destruction or injury to property by governmental actions has
been held to be a taking in the constitutional sense. But in this case, there is
nothing to suggest that preventing appellant from prohibiting the appellees
activity will unreasonably impair the value or use of their property as a
shopping center. The decision of the California Supreme Court makes it
clear that the Pruneyard may restrict expressive activity by adopting time,
place and manner regulations that will minimize interference with its
commercial function, but not prohibiting expression all in all. Appellants
failed to demonstrate that their right to exclude others is so essential to the
use or economic value of their property that the state-authorized limitation
has exceeded its boundaries.
3. Appellants finally contend that a private property owner has a First
Amendment right not to be forced by the State to use his property as a
forum for the speech of others. Here, by contrast, there are a number of
distinguishing factors. Most important, the shopping center, by choice of its
owner, is not limited to the personal use of appellants. It is instead a
business establishment that is open to the public to come and go as they
please. The views expressed by members of the public in passing out
pamphlets or seeking signatures for a petition thus will not likely be
identified with those of the owner. Second, no specific message is dictated
no danger of governmental discrimination for or against a particular
message. Finally, appellants can expressly disavow any connection with the
message by simply posting signs in the area where the speakers stand.
 BORJAL v. CA and WENCESLAO
January 14, 1999 | Bellosillo, J. | Certiorari | Constitutional Prohibitions: State
Action Requirement
SUMMARY: There were several articles published in the newspaper owned by
petitioners allegedly imputing statements of libelous character against respondent.
Respondent filed a civil action for damages which the TC granted and the CA
affirmed. SC reversed the decision averring that respondent was not positively
identified and even if he was, as a public figure, a fair comment by the petitioners
would not grant him recovery for damages.
DOCTRINE: A public official or public figure is a person acting on behalf of the
government who is subject to regulation under the Bill of Rights, therefore
prohibiting him from violating certain rights and freedoms.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners Borjal and Soliven are among the owners of The Philippine Star
and private respondent (Francisco Wenceslao) is an engineer, consultant
and journalist by profession. The latter served as a technical adviser of
Cong. Sison who is a chairman of the committee on Industrial Policy.
2. In one of the congressional hearings in 1988 undertaken by the Industrial
Policy committee, those who attended agreed to organize the First National
Conference on Land Transportation (FNCLT) to be participated in by
various stakeholders to find ways to solve the transportation crisis. Private
respondent became the Executive Director of the FNCLT and he intended to
fund the conference by soliciting around P1.8 million.
3. In 1989, a series of articles by petitioner Borjal was published which dealt
with   the   anomalous   activities   of   an   “organizer   of   a   conference”   without   consequently assumed the status of a public figure. Furthermore, even is
naming or identifying private respondent. Neither did it refer to the FNCLT
as the conference therein mentioned. Nevertheless, respondent reacted to
the articles by writing a letter to petitioner Borjal refuting the matters
contained in the article. Thereafter, respondent filed a complaint with the
National Press Club and accused petitioner of using his column as a form of
leverage to obtain contracts for his public relations firm.
4. Private respondent then filed a criminal case for libel against petitioners
which was dismissed. The former then instituted a civil action for damages
which was favored by the trial court. The CA affirmed the decision but
reduced the amount of the monetary award.
ISSUE/S: WoN petitioners are guilty of libel - NO
RULING: Petition granted. CA decision reversed.
RATIO:
1. In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable
although it is not necessary that he be named. In the case at bar, the
respondent was not able to establish that at least a third person could
identify him as the object of the libelous publication. For a libel case to
proceed, it is not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the
person attacked or defamed.
2. Evidence point to the fact that the questioned articles yield nothing to
indicate that the respondent was the person referred to therein. There could
be   dozens   of   “organizer   of   seminars”   who   participated   in   the   EDSA  
revolution. Neither was the identity of the conference mentioned and no less
than respondent himself admitted that there were several organizers for the
conference so he could not have been pinpointed by the articles.
3. Assuming arguendo that the articles indeed identified respondent, fair
commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a
valid defense in an action for libel. In the case at bar, there is no question
that the articles dealth with matters of public interest. The conference and
its subject, including the participants and its activities are imbued with
public interest.
4. Moreover, guarantees of freedom of speech and press prohibit a public
official or public figure from recovering damages for a defamatory
falsehood relating to his official conduct unless actual malice is proven. The
case herein identifies the private respondent as a public figure although he
may not be a public official within the common definition. Nonetheless, he
may be considered a public official since FNCLT is an undertaking infused
with public interest. As its Executive Director and spokesman, respondent
respondent will not be considered as a public figure, he could still be the
subject of a public comment as long as he was involved in a public issue.
5. Concededly,   petitioner   may   have   gone   overboard   in   describing   “the  
organizer  of  the  conference”  but  for  privileged  communication,  malice  must  
be established. Respondent failed to substantiate that petitioner desired to
inflict unjustifiable harm on his reputation or that the articles were written
without good motives. On the other hand, petitioner acted in good faith,
moved by a sense of civic duty to expose and denounce what he perceived
to be a public deception. Even if the contents of the articles are false, mere
error alone does not prove actual malice. Errors are inevitable in any
scheme of truly free expression and debate. Consistent with good faith, the
press should not be held to account for honest mistakes. Such leeway and
tolerance are the only means to make the press an effective critical agency
in our democracy.