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Abstract: The choice between fair value and historical cost accounting is the subject of long-
standing controversy among accounting academics and regulators. Nevertheless, the market-
based evidence on this subject is very limited. We study the choice of fair value versus historical
cost accounting for non-financial assets in a setting where market forces rather than regulators
determine the outcome. In general, we find a very limited use of fair value accounting. However,
the observed variation is consistent with market forces determining the choice. Fair value
accounting is used when reliable fair value estimates are available at a low cost and when they
convey information about operating performance. For example, with very few exceptions, firms’
managers commit to historical cost accounting for plant and equipment. Our findings contribute
to the policy debate by documenting the market solution to one of the central questions in the
accounting literature. Our findings indicate that despite its conceptual merits, fair value is
unlikely to become the primary valuation method for illiquid non-financial assets on a voluntary
basis.
This paper previously circulated under the title: "Who uses fair-value accounting for non-financial assets after
IFRS adoption?" This research was funded in part by the Initiative on Global Markets at the University of Chicago
Booth School of Business. We benefited from helpful comments from two anonymous referees, Ray Ball, Philip
Berger, Jannis Bischof, Alexander Bleck, Christof Beuselinck, Johan van Helleman, S.P. Kothari, Laurence van
Lent, Christian Leuz, Paul Madsen, Karl Muller, Edward Riedl, Douglas Skinner, Richard Sloan, Abbie Smith,
Stephen A. Zeff, Ross Watts, Li Zhang, workshop participants at the EAA 2009 Annual Meeting, University of
Chicago, University of North Carolina’s GIA Conference, Harvard University’s IMO Conference, ISCTE, and
Tilburg University. Michelle Grise, SaeHanSol Kim, Shannon Kirwin, Ilona Ori, Russell Ruch, and Onur Surgit
provided excellent research assistance.
1. Introduction
The choice between fair value and historical cost accounting is one of the most widely
debated issues in the accounting literature. While the debate dates back to the 1930s (Paton 1932,
pp. 739-747, Fabricant 1936), it is still unsettled (e.g., Schipper 2005, Ball and Shivakumar
2006, Watts 2006, Hail, Leuz and Wysocki 2010, Laux and Leuz 2009). One impediment to
moving the debate forward is the lack of evidence on the choice between the two accounting
practices, when the choice is determined by market forces rather than regulators (Kothari et al.
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) to study the “market solution” for the choice
between historical cost and fair value accounting methods. Our approach follows Leftwich
(1983), who documents that private markets often differ from regulators in their accounting
method choice.
Our setting has a number of advantages. First, unlike most other accounting standards,
IFRS provides a free choice between fair value and historical cost accounting for non-financial
assets. The second and more important advantage of the current setting is that IFRS requires ex
ante commitment to one of the two accounting policies.1 It is, ex ante, in management’s interest
to limit the scope for future opportunistic actions, e.g., earnings management (Jensen and
Meckling 1976, Watts 1977, Watts and Zimmerman 1986, Ball 1989). Therefore, firms’
1
A number of prior studies have examined settings where firms were not required to commit to either fair value or
historical costs but could ex post revalue non-financial assets. Evidence from the US prior to 1940 is provided in
Fabricant (1936) and ARB (1940). Evidence from Australia is provided in Whittred and Chan (1992), Brown et al.
(1992), Easton et al. (1993), Cotter and Zimmer (1995), and Barth and Clinch (1996, 1998). Evidence from the UK
is provided in Amir et al. (1993), Barth and Clinch (1996), Aboody et al. (1999), Muller (1999), and Danbolt and
Rees (2008).
1
managers have stronger incentives to respond to market demands and commit to the accounting
treatment that maximizes the value of the firm (i.e., is more efficient).2
We study valuation practices for arguably the most controversial (non-financial) asset
groups: property, plant and equipment (PPE), investment property, and intangibles. Out of the
twenty-nine European countries that mandated IFRS from 2005, we select the United Kingdom
(UK) and Germany because they have the largest financial markets in Europe and are historically
at opposite ends of the spectrum in terms of using fair value accounting under the local GAAP.
Specifically, for non-financial assets, German GAAP allows only historical cost accounting,
whereas UK GAAP either allows (for PPE) or mandates (for investment property) fair value
accounting. As a result, IFRS expands the available valuation practices in both the UK and
Germany. Indeed, under IFRS, both fair value and historical cost are allowed for PPE and
investment property; and, if an active market exists, for intangibles.3 The free choice under IFRS
allows managers representing outside stakeholders to reveal preferences with respect to valuation
practices.
demand and supply forces, we analyze the observed choices from an economic cost-benefit
perspective. On the demand (benefit) side, fair value accounting seems superior to historical cost
(FASB) conceptual framework (e.g., Hermann et al. 2006). The only exception is, arguably, the
reliability criterion on which historical cost is likely to score higher. Indeed, consistent with the
merits of fair value outweighing the cost of potentially lower reliability, some commentators
2
Note that distinguishing between opportunism and value maximizing explanations is central to understanding
accounting choices but rarely achieved in practice (Fields et al. 2001).
3
An active market rarely exists for intangibles and, hence, the managerial choice of valuation policies for
intangibles cannot be consider as free as for PPE and investment property.
2
have explicitly or implicitly criticized the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) de facto
ban on upward revaluations of non-financial assets in effect since 1940 (see Graham and Dodd
1951, Weston 1953, Paton and Dixon 1958, Hermann et al. 2006). Therefore, our prediction is
that the IFRS adoption is associated with a significant shift towards fair value accounting for
non-financial assets among firms that were constrained to historical cost accounting under local
GAAP.
between the two valuation practices. First, we expect that local economic, governance, and legal
institutions influence the market solution in a predictable manner. Second, as reliability is the
principal dimension on which historical cost arguably dominates fair value, the costs of
constructing reliable fair value estimates are expected to be a key cross-sectional determinant of
the choice between the two accounting practices. We predict that fair value accounting is more
likely chosen for property than other non-financial assets because property markets are generally
more liquid. Our third prediction is that managers are more likely to adopt fair value when it
facilitates performance measurement: (1) value changes in investment property are informative
of operating performance when capital gains are part of the business model, and thus we expect
the use of fair value among real estate firms that hold investment property; (2) fair value
adversely affects key performance measures (e.g., ROA) if the management chooses to hold
unproductive assets (assets with high value in alternative use) and thus can benefit in governing
influences the choice of fair value, although the direction of this relation is unclear ex ante: on
the one hand debtholders can demand a greater degree of verifiability, but, on the other hand,
3
they also require estimates of the value of the collateral. We elaborate on these predictions in
Section 3.
To test the above predictions, we manually collect data on valuation practices used in
Germany and the UK around the IFRS adoption. Our sample comprises the Worldscope universe
of companies domiciled in the UK and Germany for which we can obtain an annual report – in
total 1,539 companies. We identify the valuation practices by reading the accounting policy
sections of the companies’ annual reports. There is significant variation in the chosen accounting
Our findings are as follows: (1) For PPE, we find that only 3% of the sample firms use
fair value accounting for at least one asset class following the IFRS adoption. With very few
exceptions, these companies use fair value accounting for the property asset class only; members
of the plant and equipment asset classes are valued at historical cost in almost all cases. An even
more striking observation emerges for companies that used fair value under local GAAP: 44% of
these firms switch to historical cost accounting upon the IFRS adoption. In contrast, among
companies that previously recognized all PPE asset classes at historical cost under the local
GAAP, only 1% switches to fair value for at least one asset group; (2) For investment property
(i.e., property held for the purpose of earning rental income or for capital appreciation), we find
that companies are equally likely to use historical cost and fair value accounting; (3) For
intangible assets, we find that all firms in the sample pre-commit to historical cost, consistent
with the stricter requirements under IFRS for valuing intangibles at fair value. Overall, our
results do not support the prediction that firms’ managers find the shift towards fair value
4
However, further tests do indicate that the choice to use fair value varies meaningfully
with its economic costs and benefits. Consistent with our first prediction, we find that
institutional differences are important determinants of the choice to use fair value. Consistent
with the second prediction, managers use fair value when the costs of obtaining reliable
estimates are relatively low, i.e., for more liquid (or re-deployable) assets such as property and
investment property. Consistent with our third prediction, fair value is more common when it is
expected to facilitate performance measurement. Specifically, we find that for firms holding
investment property, the fair value choice is positively associated with real estate being a
primary activity. We also find some evidence that companies with lower investment
opportunities use fair value. Finally, consistent with our last prediction, the reliance on debt
financing is positively associated with the use of fair value for both investment property and
PPE. This finding is robust and holds both when measuring the reliance on debt by leverage and
the frequency of accessing debt markets. In sum, while our evidence suggests that market supply
(cost) and demand (benefit) factors influence the choice of fair value versus historical cost
accounting, historical cost is by far the dominant accounting practice when market forces
Our paper contributes to the policy debate over fair value accounting by documenting a
market solution for the choice between historical cost and fair value for non-financial assets.
Understanding the market solution provides input into regulators’ decision-making process.
While market solutions are often the efficient (welfare increasing) outcomes, this is not always
the case due to possible market failures. First, managements’ choice should be exercised under
the principles of free exchange and in the absence of externalities (e.g., coercion on part of
5
promote the interests of outside investors, e.g., due to governance failure or the presence of
information asymmetry, managers may choose accounting practices opportunistically (in their
private interest). However, if the more than 95% of firms that chose historical cost do so for
opportunistic reasons, the governance failure should take a rather extreme form. Furthermore,
two additional features of our setting render opportunism to be unlikely: (1) the IFRS
requirement to pre-commit to either fair value or historical cost, and (2) the absence of
information asymmetry between the principal (investors) and the agent (management) with
respect to the agents’ actions (choice of accounting practice). For these reasons, management is
likely to ultimately bear the cost of its opportunistic choices and to be subject to market
discipline in our setting. Nevertheless, regulators need to consider potential market failures and
We also contribute to the debate over fair value by adding to the studies that document
the benefits of fair value accounting for non-financial assets such as increased value relevance
and information content (Sharpe and Walker 1975; Standish and Ung 1982, Easton et al. 1993;
Barth and Clinch 1996, 1998; Aboody et al. 1999; Danbolt and Rees 2008), reduced information
asymmetry (Muller et al. 2011), and increased comparability (Cairns et al. 2011). Our findings
suggest that the choice to use fair value is not random and occurs when benefits outweigh the
costs. Yet, our evidence suggests that the vast majority of managers find the net benefits from
fair value accounting to be rather limited. Indeed, our evidence is consistent with opportunistic
6
mandatory (e.g., Ramanna and Watts 2012) and the acclaimed opportunism in revaluations in the
1920s, which initially motivated the SEC to ban upward revaluations in 1940 (Zeff 1995, 2007).4
Section 2 describes the accounting traditions in the UK and Germany, as well as the
valuation methods available to companies under German GAAP, UK GAAP, and IFRS; Section
3 develops testable hypotheses; Section 4 describes the sample selection procedure and presents
The current setting that exploits the IFRS adoption has a valuable distinction from the
Australian, UK, and US settings used in prior research. The choice between historical cost and
fair value must be stated in the accounting policy section of the annual report following the IFRS
adoption and must be applied consistently going forward (analogous to, e.g., revenue recognition
or inventory valuation methods).5 A company that chooses to use fair value must revalue assets
every time the book value is materially different from the market value (IAS 16 and IAS 40). A
company that chooses historical cost cannot perform upward revaluations in the future. A switch
between historical cost and fair value is considered a voluntary change in accounting principles
and needs to be justified to auditors, lenders, equity investors, and potentially to regulators.
Therefore, the choice between fair value and historical cost in our setting effectively represents
considerations. Indeed, the early studies argued that discretionary revaluations are related to
4
Agents have incentives to pre-commit against ex post opportunism if a pre-commitment mechanism exists –
otherwise the agent will bear the costs (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Under IFRS, historical cost is a pre-
commitment mechanism against future revaluations.
5
Note that both the UK and Australia adopted accounting standards in 1999 and 2000 that are similar to IAS 16,
however, the prior literature we refer to rely on data before this change.
7
contracting motives – consistent with the finding that leveraged companies in danger of violating
covenants are more likely to revalue assets (Brown et al. 1992; Whittred and Chan 1992; Cotter
The problem with discretionary revaluations is that managers decide whether to revalue
assets ex post after they know the effect of the fair value estimate on the financial statements. For
instance, managers may only revalue assets when they need to manipulate reported performance.
Alternatively, managers may revalue assets when reliable fair value estimates are available. Our
setting isolates this issue as we examine ex ante choices to use fair value with limited ex post
(accounting) practices that minimize agency costs is efficient (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Watts
and Zimmerman 1986). Thus, pre-commitments to fair value are more likely to be informative
about firm-specific net benefits, rather than managerial opportunism, as compared to ex post
revaluations.
Despite the EU’s accounting harmonization that began decades prior to the mandatory
IFRS adoption, the UK and Germany arguably have the two most distinct asset valuation
traditions in Europe at the time of IFRS adoption. The differences in their accounting traditions
are due to institutional differences in economic, governance, and legal systems. Germany was
traditionally characterized by the existence of private companies who raised capital from banks
and communicated via private information channels (Leuz and Wüstemann 2004). Accounting
was mainly used to establish taxable income; hence, accounting regulation was codified and
6
Whittred and Chan argue that asset revaluations reduce underinvestment problems that arise from contractual
restrictions, while Cotter and Zimmer argue that upward revaluations increase borrowing capacity. While debt
contracting is the main explanation for asset revaluations, Brown et al. also find that bonus contracts, as well as
signaling and political cost explanations, play an important role.
8
focused mainly on legal entity statements. As revaluations are often in conflict with the
objectives of tax authorities, German GAAP only allowed historical cost accounting. Today in
Germany, there is no formal link between legal entity reports, which are still used primarily for
tax purposes, and consolidated financial statements. Thus, financial reporting choices in the
consequences.
In contrast, the UK’s accounting practices have historically developed separately from
tax accounting and in the private sector rather than in company law. UK ownership is dispersed,
and even middle-sized companies are commonly listed on the London Stock Exchange. Such an
ownership structure requires that financial reporting reduces information asymmetry, and in this
context revaluations can serve the purpose of conveying information about the assets’ current
values.
investment property, PPE, and intangible assets—under UK GAAP, German GAAP, and IFRS.
In brief, German GAAP prescribes historical costs for all three asset groups, whereas UK GAAP
allows a choice between fair value and historical costs for PPE and intangibles but requires fair
value for investment property. In contrast, IFRS allows a choice between fair value and historical
costs for all three asset groups, although an active market is a requirement for using fair value for
intangibles. See Appendix A for a detailed explanation of the accounting treatments under each
accounting regime.
3. Empirical predictions
The choice between fair value and historical cost accounting of accounting standard
setters such as the FASB and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) is guided by
9
their conceptual frameworks that emphasize and promote the decision-usefulness of accounting
information. The decision-usefulness perspective faces a central trade-off between the relevance
and the reliability of accounting information.7 In recent years, both FASB and IASB have
emphasized relevance as more important than reliability that manifests itself in a shift towards
fair value accounting.8 This change in focus is reflected, for example, in the conclusion of a
discussion of relevance and reliability by L. Todd Johnson, a senior project manager at FASB:
The Board has required greater use of fair value measurements in financial statements
because it perceives that information as more relevant to investors and creditors than
historical cost information. Such measures better reflect the present financial state of
reporting entities and better facilitate assessing their past performance and future
prospects. In that regard, the Board does not accept the view that reliability should
outweigh relevance for financial statement measures (Johnson 2005).
Fair value measurement is justified on the grounds of being more relevant for the
decisions by users of financial statements. For example, revaluations to fair value allow
managers to convey their private information on asset values (Aboody et al. 1999). Fair value is
information (Schipper 2005). In line with the benefits of fair value accounting, many studies on
asset revaluations find that fair value possesses superior relevance. These studies find that
upward revaluations have a positive association with equity returns in the month of the
revaluation (Sharpe and Walker 1975; Standish and Ung 1982), and that they have association
with long-window stock returns, future cash flows, and the market value of equity (e.g., Amir et
al. 1993; Easton et al. 1993; Barth and Clinch 1996, 1998; Aboody et al. 1999; Danbolt and Rees
7
See IASB's Framework paragraph 45 and FASB's Conceptual Statement 2 paragraph 15.
8
See for example IASB Discussion Paper July 2006, paragraph BC2.62.
10
2008). In contrast, historical cost is likely to conceptually dominate fair value on the reliability
However, an important question that remains unanswered is whether, in a free market for
accounting principles, managers choose fair value over historical cost. Managers, who represent
outside stakeholders, have economic incentives to respond to market demands and to select a set
of accounting principles that reflect the interests of the firms’ stakeholders. Thus, the observed
choice outcomes represent the market solution to fair value vs. historical cost accounting. IFRS
consistent with IASB’s (and FASB’s) shift towards fair value accounting in accounting
standards. In such a case, one should expect that the IFRS adoption is associated with a shift
market supply and demand factors related to the costs and benefits of fair value accounting. In a
market, fair value is expected to be used when the economic benefits net of its costs compare
First, as discussed earlier, there are important distinctions in economic and legal
institutions across the UK and Germany. While we cannot exploit variation in the institutional
factors because we only have two countries, we do expect that the market solution will exhibit
important differences across the two countries (Ball 2006). In particular, based on the discussion
9
Barth et al. (2001) argue that the value relevance tests are joint tests of relevance and reliability, because a certain
degree of reliability is also established by rejecting the null of no association. Although value relevance tests
establish a minimum level of reliability of observed revaluations, the level is presumably below the reliability of
historical cost where the accounting treatment generally leaves little discretion to management.
11
in subsection 2.2 we expect that the German economic institutions are less suitable to fair value
H1: Fair value is more likely to be used in the UK than Germany following the IFRS adoption.
Second, the effort and resources a company needs to expend in order to obtain reliable
fair value estimates are likely to play an important role in determining a manager’s choice of
valuation practice. The ability to obtain reliable fair value estimates is closely related to the
existence of liquid markets for assets that provide an independent source of verification (Watts
2006). Because property is typically more re-deployable than other non-financial assets and has
relatively liquid markets (Shleifer and Vishny 1992) we predict that fair value is more frequently
H2: Managers are more likely to choose fair value accounting for property than plant,
On the benefit side, we expect fair value accounting to be used when it is more likely to
First, changes in the value of investment property are likely informative about the operating
performance of firms that primarily invest in real estate, because realizing capital gains are often
part of their business model. Second, fair value can discipline investment activity among
companies with relatively few investment opportunities. Such firms can be prone to
overinvestment (or the failure to discontinue bad projects) because the historical cost does not
reflect the investments’ opportunity costs, e.g., a company’s headquarters purchased many years
ago may be fully depreciated. In contrast, fair value forces managers to incur rent on their
investments’ current values, regardless of the time of purchase and their historical cost. More
12
are more likely to reflect economic performance under fair value because the depreciated cost
(which is usually lower than market value) does not account for the value in alternative use (see
Appendix D). In other words, fair value accounting dilutes the return on assets, makes it more
costly for management to hold unproductive assets, and can improve performance measurement
(subject to reliability concerns). Given the above arguments, our third prediction is:
H3: Fair value is more likely to be used when recognizing asset-value changes in a timely
Finally, we explore whether reliance on debt financing influences the use of fair value
accounting. On the one hand, debtholders have a demand for reliable information as it limits the
extent of managerial discretion in accounting measurement (e.g., Watts 2003). To this end, they
are likely to favor contracts written in terms of historical-cost-based measures. At the same time,
most contracts exclude the revaluation reserve and hence contracting, in the case of PPE, is not
directly influenced by fair value accounting (Citron 1992). On the other hand, companies that
access debt markets are commonly required, under their credit arrangements, to provide
valuations of collateral. The fact that lenders are willing to lend against these valuations implies
that a company invests in measuring them reliably (e.g., independent valuation and
certification).10 Therefore, recognizing the fair values of these assets in general purpose financial
statements is associated with low incremental costs (Holthausen and Watts 2001). Thus, our
H4: Fair value accounting has a positive association with reliance on debt financing.
10
Muller and Riedl (2002) document that fair value estimates produced by independent valuators are viewed by
capital markets as being more reliable than fair value estimates produced by managers.
13
4. Results
We manually verify the accounting standards that a given company follows in either the
accounting policy section or the auditor’s opinion section of its annual report(s). To identify the
asset valuation practice a company follows, we read the accounting policy section of its annual
report(s). We begin with all of the UK and German companies (active and inactive) in
Worldscope and further restrict the sample to the companies that comply with IFRS in either
2005 or 2006. For inclusion in the German and UK cross-sectional samples, we further require
that a company has an annual report under IFRS in Thomson One Banker. We construct a cross-
sectional sample to examine the valuation practices after the mandatory IFRS adoption and a
switch sample (UK only) to examine whether companies use the IFRS adoption to switch their
accounting practices. For inclusion in the UK switch sample, we also require that a company has
Worldscope as well as in the German sample, the UK cross-sectional sample, and the UK switch
and Germany. A company is classified as applying fair value accounting if it recognizes at least
one asset class (within an asset group) at fair value. Similarly, a company is classified as
applying historical cost if it recognizes at least one asset class (within an asset group) at
11
For companies both in Germany and the UK, we obtain their first annual report under mandatory IFRS, which is
typically for fiscal year 2005. In addition, for companies in the UK, we look for their last UK-GAAP annual report,
which is typically for fiscal year 2004. In the rare cases where we cannot find these annual reports, we take the next
annual report available in Thomson One Banker (e.g., for fiscal year 2006).
14
historical cost. Appendix B presents examples of fair value accounting and historical cost
a complete absence in the use of fair value accounting for intangible assets; instead, all
companies in our sample rely on historical cost for this asset group. For PPE, 5% of companies
use fair value accounting while all companies use historical cost for at least one asset class
within this asset group. We observe that the fair value use differs across industries, with higher
Table 3 presents the results from the UK switch sample. For PPE, we find that 6% of
companies use fair value under UK-GAAP and 5% use fair value under IFRS. A large number of
switches occur for this asset group. Specifically, 44% of the companies that use fair value for at
least one asset class in PPE under UK GAAP switch to historical cost (for all asset classes) upon
the IFRS adoption. In contrast, only 1% of companies that use historical cost for all asset classes
under UK GAAP switch to fair value for at least one asset class upon IFRS adoption. The joint
evidence in both tables implies that, almost uniformly, the market solution is given by historical
cost accounting.
An intriguing question is why 44% of the firms that used fair value under UK GAAP
switched to historical costs upon the IFRS adoption. IFRS and UK GAAP are very similar when
it comes to the valuation of PPE (see subsection 2.2 and Appendix A). Thus, the switches
observed upon the IFRS adoption are voluntary in the sense that IFRS did not force a switch to
historical cost. If managers find historical cost to be more beneficial, why did these firms not
15
switch to historical cost under UK GAAP?12 One explanation is that switching accounting
principles is uncommon and costly due to consistency requirements.13 The costs of switching
convincing auditors that the new practice better reflects the underlying economics of the
company, and communicating and justifying the change to financial statement users. Most of
these costs are fixed (i.e., they are independent of the number of accounting principle changes)
so the incremental cost of voluntary changes is lower when combined with a mandatory change
such as IFRS adoption. Even if these managers did want to switch to historical cost before IFRS
adoption, the associated costs could have made switching unattractive. However, the observation
that a switch is more likely from fair value to historical cost than from historical cost to fair value
We do find, however, that after IFRS adoption, fair value is more common for investment
property, for which UK companies had to use fair value under local GAAP, than it is for PPE.
Nevertheless, managers of 23% of the companies reveal preferences for historical cost by
switching from fair value to historical cost once they are no longer constrained to the use of fair
value by the accounting regulation. Significant industry variation is present: whereas only 2% of
the financial companies switch to historical cost, 45% of the non-financial companies perform
the switch.
12
We contacted those non-financial companies that switched to historical cost and received several replies
indicating that IFRS was a convenient opportunity for them to make the switch.
13
Consistency in accounting policies across time is highly regarded by the accounting profession. Comparability is a
qualitative characteristic expressed in IASB’s Framework (paragraph 39): “. . . the measurement and display of the
financial effect of like transactions and other events must be carried out in a consistent way throughout an entity and
over time for that entity.” In U.S. literature, consistency is expressed in several places, including the Accounting
Research Study No. 1 of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (postulate C-3). See Ball (1972) for
an extensive discussion of the accounting profession’s reliance on consistency.
16
4.2.2 Valuation practices in Germany
Table 4 documents the valuation practices in the German sample. As in the UK, we find
no use of fair value accounting for intangible assets in Germany. For PPE, 1% of companies
switch to fair value for at least one asset class upon IFRS adoption (note that under German
GAAP fair value was not allowed). Only one company applies fair value to all asset classes in
PPE, while all other companies use historical cost for at least one asset class. These findings
indicate that the market solution generally reveals preferences for historical cost accounting.
Consistent with prediction H1, fewer German than UK firms commit to fair value accounting.
For investment property, we find that the managers of 23% of the German companies
reveal preferences for fair value by switching from historical cost to fair value once they are no
longer constrained to historical cost by the accounting regulation. The German evidence is in
contrast to the 77% of UK companies that commit to fair value for investment property, which is
also in line with H1. However, we also observe substantial industry variation. Among financial
companies, 49% switch to fair value, while only 6% of the non-financial companies switch.
In summary, we find that a small number of companies use fair value accounting for at
least one asset class under PPE after the IFRS adoption. The absence of fair value accounting for
intangibles and its limited use for PPE in both the UK and Germany suggests that only a small
subset of managers perceive net benefits of fair value accounting in their setting. In contrast to
the expectation, there is virtually no shift towards fair value accounting for non-financial assets,
with the exception of investment property among German financial institutions. However, the
shift towards fair value for investment property is intuitively consistent with benefits of fair
value outweighing the costs for this asset class. Next, we provide evidence on H2 by exploiting
17
4.2.3 Does the choice to use fair value for PPE vary with asset liquidity?
We collect evidence on which asset classes within the PPE asset group are recognized at
fair value as opposed to historical cost. Table 5 presents the distribution of the use of fair value
across the three asset classes. We find that 69 companies in the sample use fair value accounting
either before the mandatory adoption of IFRS, after the adoption, or both. Of these companies,
93% use fair value accounting for property. Only 3% use fair value for plant, and only 4% use
fair value for several asset classes in PPE. The distributions of fair value use in the UK and
Germany are rather similar. The evidence suggests that the application of fair value accounting
is, in practice, not only limited in terms of the number of companies using it, but also in terms of
the assets to which it is applied: fair value is largely limited to property. This result supports H2
and suggests that the existence of liquid markets decrease the costs of committing to fair value
accounting.
In this section, we examine the determinants of the decision to use fair value accounting
by using a regression analysis. We first revisit H1 more formally and further test H3 and H4. Our
analysis draws on two different subsamples and controls for common company-specific
characteristics. First, we analyze the sample of companies that hold investment property. Second,
we examine the choice to use fair value for PPE. Table 6 reports the summary and correlation
statistics for variables used in this analysis. All variables are defined in Appendix C.
4.3.1 What are the determinants of the commitment to fair value for investment property?
IFRS gives managers of both German and UK companies an option to move to the asset
valuation method not previously available under local GAAP in these countries (recall that UK
companies face the first opportunity to switch to historical cost for investment property, whereas
18
in Germany the opposite is the case). In such a setting, observing switches from historical cost to
fair value in Germany and from fair value to historical cost in the UK is difficult to reconcile
with factors other than the existence of considerable net benefits associated with the alternative
Our sample consists of the 275 companies (124 UK companies; 151 German companies)
that hold investment property. Depending on the specification, additional data requirements limit
the sample further. We begin with a basic regression that examines whether accounting methods
vary based on country of domicile, and whether real estate is a primary industry,
where UK (Germany) is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for UK
(German) companies and zero otherwise, Sic65 is an indicator that takes the value of one when a
company has the SIC code 65 (real estate) among its first five SIC codes and zero otherwise,
Leverage is one of the proxies for reliance on debt financing, and Control denotes other control
variables such as log of market capitalization and an IFRS early adoption dummy (Muller et al.
2011). H1 predicts that the institutional differences across the UK and Germany, as opposed to
accounting standards, influence the market solution to the choice of accounting practice. Thus,
under H1, we expect to find the country differences reflected by significant β1 and β3
coefficients. The coefficients β2 and β4 measure country differences when real estate is among a
company's primary business activities. Recall that the real estate industry is unique in that value
changes in its main assets (investment property) convey information about operating
performance. Consequently, H3 predicts that German real estate firms are more likely to switch
to fair value than German firms in other industries, while UK real estate firms are less likely to
19
switch to historical cost than UK firms in other industries. Finally, H4 indicates that leverage
Table 7 presents the regression estimates for several specifications nested in Equation (1).
The pseudo R-squared in Column (1) indicates that the baseline model specification explains a
substantial portion (34%) of the variation in the choice to use fair value. Consistent with H1, the
estimates indicate that companies domiciled in Germany are significantly more likely to use
historical cost after IFRS adoption (β3). This effect, however, is significantly smaller for
companies whose primary industries include real estate (β3 + β4), which in turn is consistent with
H3. Companies domiciled in the UK are more likely to use fair value under IFRS and this effect
is stronger (and more significant) for companies in the real estate business (β1 + β2), which also
supports H3. Observed switches to fair value among German real-estate companies and to
historical cost among UK non-real-estate companies, when companies are no longer constrained
by the local accounting regulation, suggest that the real estate industry has net firm-specific
benefits of fair value accounting for investment property. In sum, the evidence indicates that the
observed accounting practices vary with country institutions (H1), which supports the argument
in Ball (2006) that the application of the GAAP needs not be uniform under one set of standards,
and is specific to the institutional setting. The evidence is also consistent with fair value for
investment property being a superior measure of economic performance in the real estate
industry (H3).
Columns 2 through 6 of Table 7 examine whether the choice of fair value is positively
associated with reliance on debt as predicted by H4. The specification in Column 2 shows that
companies relying on debt financing more heavily are more likely to commit to fair value
accounting for investment property. This is consistent with the incremental costs of obtaining
20
reliable fair value estimates for financial reporting purposes being low when they are already
produced for financing purposes (Holthausen and Watts 2001). The other columns examine other
“leverage” proxies potentially used in debt contracts.14 We find that the ratio of total debt to
operating income has a positive relation to the use of fair value, while the coverage of interest
and the current ratios are negatively related to the use of fair value. The results are consistent
The split of leverage into its different components deserves some additional attention.
Prior literature suggests that companies may choose to revalue assets because the revaluations
allow them to relax covenants (Cotter and Zimmer 2003). While, as discussed earlier,
opportunistic motives are unlikely to explain the pre-commitment to fair value accounting that
comes with IFRS, we further investigate the role of opportunism by decomposing leverage into
its long- and short-term components, and add a proxy for reliance on convertible debt (i.e.,
column 3). We find that short-term leverage is as important as long-term debt in explaining the
use of fair value (both coefficients have similar economic magnitudes and exhibit no statistically
accounting-based covenants are less common in short-term and convertible-debt contracts, the
results are inconsistent with the conclusion that companies use fair value opportunistically to
To provide further evidence for H4, we examine whether fair value companies access
debt markets more frequently than historical cost companies following IFRS adoption in 2005. If
indeed the availability of reliable fair value estimates relates to debt financing activities, fair
value choices should predict more frequent debt market access. Based on Worldscope data for
14
We exclude leverage because these variables are highly correlated with leverage and therefore capture aspects of
the same construct.
21
2006 and 2007, we construct several proxies for debt financing. Specifically, we proxy for future
debt financing with the following variables: DebtIss1 (DebtIss2) indicates whether by 2007 total
debt (long-term debt) had increased by more than 10% of the current market value of assets;
FtrLev1 (FtrLev2) proxies for the level of future total debt (long-term debt) in 2007 while
controlling for the level of current debt in the regression; and DbtGrow1 (DbtGrow2) indicates
growth in total debt (long-term debt). We regress these financing proxies on the fair value
indicator variable and the controls for the company characteristics that include country, size,
Table 8, Columns (1) through (6) present regressions with the six proxies for debt
issuance used as the dependent variables. All proxies for debt issuance are statistically significant
and indicate a positive relation between fair value use and future debt financing. 15 The relation
between fair value use and future debt issuance is in line with the costs of recognizing fair value
estimates being lower when firms regularly access debt markets (H4).
4.3.2 What are the determinants of the commitment to fair value for PPE?
While the investment property sample offers richer variation, an understanding of the
choice of fair value for PPE, which is held by a much broader sample of firms, is potentially
more interesting. Unlike the investment property sample, we are able to hand-collect the data for
the fair value revaluation reserve from the annual reports (there is no revaluation reserve for
investment property, see Appendix A). This enables us to compute the book values of equity,
PPE, and total assets as if companies used historical cost. Thus, we can add book-to-market and
book leverage as explanatory variables without being concerned with a possible mechanical
15
While we have no strong prior for why equity market access should relate to fair value use, it can correlate with
debt market access. To rule out the possibility that our debt proxies are picking out equity issuance, we use two
proxies for future equity financing activity (first, an indicator of whether combined net proceeds of equity issuance
less proceeds from stock options exceed 10% of market value of current assets; and second, the ratio of net proceeds
to current market value of assets) and find that they are insignificantly related fair value use.
22
relation between book-to-market and fair value indicators. Similarly, this data also allows us to
use the ratio of PPE to total assets to examine whether PPE-heavy companies are more likely to
Table 9 presents the results of the logistic regression analysis for our pooled cross-
sectional sample. In line with the prior results for H1, German firms are significantly less likely
to use fair value for PPE (despite low economic magnitudes). The coefficient on book-to-market
indicates that companies with relatively low investment opportunities are more likely to use fair
value. Recall that H3 indeed suggests that fair value facilitates performance measurement for
In line with the evidence for investment property, we find a positive and significant
association between market leverage as well as book leverage and the commitment to fair value
accounting. Further analysis in column (3) reveals that, once again, short-term debt is at least as
important as long-term debt in this association. The portion of convertible debt now exhibits no
significant relation with the fair value choice. As earlier, the evidence supports our conjecture
that the incremental costs of committing to fair value accounting decrease with the reliance on
debt financing.
Finally, two additional results are worth mentioning here. First, consistent with the costs
of fair value outweighing the benefits when an asset represents a small portion of the balance
sheet, we find a positive coefficient on PPE. Thus the likelihood of using fair value increases
with the proportion of PPE to total assets. Second, the positive coefficient on FairInvPr (Column
5) suggests that companies applying fair value to investment property are more likely to also
apply fair value to PPE. Controlling for this effect, however, does not alter our findings with
23
5. Conclusion
Whether fair value accounting dominates historical cost accounting in a free market for
accounting policies is an important question that has been subject to much controversy among
academics and regulators. We study the choice between fair value and historical cost for non-
financial assets when market forces, rather than regulators, determine the outcome of this choice.
In light of the long-standing debate over fair value accounting, understanding this choice is
useful from both regulatory and academic perspectives. Under the assumption of free market
discipline, the choices by management should be informative as to whether the net firm-specific
economic benefits associated with fair value accounting outweigh those of historical cost. In
addition, the advantage of our setting is that IFRS allows companies to choose between historical
cost and fair value accounting for non-financial assets, but requires pre-commitment to either
practice. This ex ante nature of the accounting choice strengthens managers’ incentives to choose
an accounting practice, which limits ex post opportunism (Watts and Zimmerman 1986).
We collect and analyze data on accounting policies for intangible assets, investment
property, and PPE for a sample of 1,539 companies. With very few exceptions, we find that fair
value is used exclusively for property. We find that 3% of the companies use fair value for
owner-occupied property, compared with 47% for investment property. The striking lack of
companies that use fair value for all other non-financial assets is inconsistent with large net firm-
specific benefits of fair value accounting relative to historical cost for those assets. The use of
fair value for property alone is likely explained by lower costs to reliably measure fair values in
the presence of relatively liquid property markets. Among the strongest cross-sectional
determinants of fair value for both investment property and PPE is the reliance on debt financing.
24
When fair value estimates are constructed for financing purposes, they are likely to be relatively
reliable, and the incremental costs of also recognizing them in financial reports are low.
Overall, our evidence indicates standard setters need to be careful in requiring fair value
accounting for certain asset classes. We find that, for non-financial asset classes, the market
solution for the choice between the two alternative valuation methods lies with historical cost
accounting: firms’ managers, who represent outside stakeholders, generally reveal preferences
for historical cost accounting for a broad range of non-financial assets. The limited cross-
sectional variation in the choice between fair value and historical cost does indicate that market
forces influence preferences. The evidence broadly suggests that managers’ resistance to the use
of fair value is likely to be driven by the costs of establishing reliable fair value estimates rather
than a disagreement with standard setters on the potential benefits of fair value accounting – firm
managers appear to view fair value accounting for non-financial assets as costly. As a result,
unless compelling reasons exist to believe that there is a market failure (i.e., the market fails to
discipline management or valuation choices involve externalities), then fair value regulation can
25
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Appendix A: The accounting treatment of long-term non-financial assets under UK GAAP,
German GAAP, and IFRS.
29
Appendix B: Examples of accounting practice
This appendix presents examples of fair value and historical cost accounting from the accounting
policy section of annual reports of companies in our samples. Panel A presents an example of a
switch from fair value under UK-GAAP to historical cost under IFRS. Panel B presents an
example of fair value accounting under both UK-GAAP and IFRS. Panel C presents an example
of a German company that uses fair value accounting under IFRS.
30
as part of the 2004 external revaluation, certain properties were revalued downwards.
Under UK-GAAP, these deficits were charged against previous revaluations held in the
revaluation reserve. Under IFRS, these downward revaluations have been taken as
indicators that the value of the relevant properties is impaired and as such, they have been
charged to the income statement as impairment charges in 2004. This reduces the profit
for the year ended 31 December 2004 and the value of property, plant and equipment as
at 31 December 2004 by £1.8 million.
31
Land is not depreciated.
Valuation of properties - Properties are revalued by qualified valuers on a regular basis using
open market value so that the carrying value of an asset does not differ significantly from its fair
value at the balance sheet date. When a valuation is below current carrying value, the asset
concerned is reviewed for impairment. Impairment losses are charged to the revaluation reserve
to the extent that a previous gain has been recorded, and thereafter to the income statement.
Surpluses on revaluation are recognized in the revaluation reserve, except where they reverse
previously charged impairment losses, in which case they are recorded in the income statement.
Fair_IFRS = one if the company uses fair value after adoption of IFRS, and zero otherwise.
UK = one if a company is domiciled in the UK, and zero otherwise.
UkSic65 = one if a company has SIC 65 (real estate) among its first five SIC codes and is
domiciled in the UK, and zero otherwise.
Germany = one if a company is domiciled in Germany, and zero otherwise.
GermanySic65 = one if a company has SIC 65 (real estate) among its first five SIC codes and is
domiciled in Germany, and zero otherwise.
Early = one if the company adopted IFRS before 2005, and zero otherwise.
Size = log of market value of equity.
PPEA = property, plant, and equipment less revaluation reserve divided by total assets less
revaluation reserve.
MktLev = total liabilities divided by market value of assets (defined as book value of liabilities
plus market value of equity) as of December 2005.
MktLevLong = long-term debt divided by market value of assets (liabilities plus market value of
equity) as of December 2005.
MktLevShort = short-term liabilities defined as total liabilities less long-term debt divided by
market value of assets (liabilities plus market value of equity) as of December 2005.
32
LevBook = book leverage defined as total liabilities divided by total assets net of fair value
revaluation reserve.
LevBookLong = long-term debt divided by total assets net of fair value revaluation reserve.
LevBookShort = ratio of total liabilities minus long-term debt to total assets net of fair value
revaluation reserve.
Convertible = ratio of convertible debt to long-term debt.
DebtToOi = total liabilities divided by operating income.
Coverage = operating income divided by interest expense.
Current = current assets divided by current liabilities.
Dividend = one if company pays dividends, and zero otherwise.
FairInvPr = one if company holds investment property recorded at fair value, and zero
otherwise.
DbtIss1 = change in total liabilities that took place from 2005 to 2007 scaled by beginning-of-
period market value of assets (liabilities plus market value of equity).
DbtIss2 = change in long-term debt that took place from 2005 to 2007 scaled by beginning-of-
period market value of assets (liabilities plus market value of equity).
FtrLev1 = total liabilities as of 2007 scaled by beginning-of-period market value of assets
(liabilities plus market value of equity).
FtrLev2 = long-term debt as of 2007 scaled by beginning-of-period market value of assets
(liabilities plus market value of equity).
DbtGrow1 = logarithmic growth in total liabilities from 2005 to 2007.
DbtGrow2 = logarithmic growth in long-term debt from 2005 to 2007.
EqIss1 = dummy variable; one if total net proceeds from issuance of common and preferred
stock less proceeds from stock options over 2006 and 2007 exceeded 10% of 2005 market
value of assets (liabilities plus market value of equity), and zero otherwise.
EqIss2 = net proceeds from issuance of common and preferred stock less proceeds from stock
options combined over 2006 and 2007 and scaled by 2005 market value of assets (liabilities
plus market value of equity).
Note: Unless otherwise stated, variables are measured as of December 2005 using the
Worldscope database.
Companies that follow historical cost accounting must periodically test their assets for
impairment. An asset is considered impaired under the IFRS when its carrying amount is higher
than (i) its fair value less costs to sell and (ii) the present value of the future cash flows it is
expected to generate (IAS36.18). Thus, under historical cost accounting, companies in practice
value assets close to fair value if the depreciated historical costs exceed the fair value. In
contrast, under fair value accounting, companies revalue assets either upward or downward
33
depending on the change in the fair value estimate. This revaluation implies that the book values
of assets (equity) are likely to be higher for companies that use fair value accounting. We
emphasize that one should not interpret these results as causal because they are conditional on
the company’s decision to use fair value. To provide evidence on the differences in balance sheet
amounts of fair value versus historical cost companies, we carry out the following analysis.
Table 1D compares the book value of total assets (book value of equity) divided by the market
value of total assets (market value of equity) for companies that use fair value with that of
companies that use only historical cost. We compute the market value of total assets by the sum
of the market value of equity and the book value of liabilities. Panel A of Table 1D presents the
evidence for investment property, and Panel B of Table 1D presents the evidence for property,
plant, and equipment (PPE). Each company that recognizes PPE at fair value is matched on
country, industry, and market capitalization with a company that recognizes all assets at
historical cost. For investment property, we include all of the companies that hold investment
property because there is no pronounced imbalance between the fair value and historical cost
subgroups. We find that, on average, the ratio of book value of total assets to market value of
total assets is 16% higher for companies that recognize investment property at fair value; the
ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity is 27% higher. Among companies that
apply fair value to PPE, we find that the ratio of the book value of total assets to the market value
of total assets and the ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of equity are,
respectively, 31% and 87% higher than those of matched companies that use only historical cost.
The differences in the book values of assets and equity in both the investment property and the
PPE samples are all significant at the 1% level. We also examine how the return on assets (ROA)
differs between fair value and historical cost companies. We find a lower ROA in the PPE
sample among companies that recognize assets at fair value. In the investment property sample,
we also find a lower ROA among companies that use fair value accounting; this difference,
however, is statistically insignificant. [It is not surprising that fair value accounting for property
decreases ROA because while, on average, fair value accounting increases the book value of
assets, upward revaluations do not affect the net income. For investment property this effect is
smaller because upward revaluations increase both net income and total assets (see Appendix
A).]
The evidence in Table 1D indicates that the decision to use the fair value method is associated
with economically significant differences in companies’ balance sheets, which makes companies
that use fair value accounting appear less conservative in terms of their book-to-market ratios.
34
Figure 1: The accounting treatment of long-term non-financial assets under German GAAP,
UK GAAP, and IFRS
Asset type Balance Income statement Balance Income statement Balance Income statement
sheet sheet sheet
Property, plant and HC Depreciations / HC or FV Both HC and FV: HC or FV Both HC and FV:
equipment (PPE) impairments / Depreciations / Depreciations /
realized gains and impairments / impairments / realized
losses realized gains and gains and losses
losses
Note: FV is defined as fair value accounting and HC is defined as historical cost accounting adjusted for depreciations, amortizations, and
impairments.
35
Table 1: Sample selection process
Table 1 presents the sample selection process and industry distribution. Panel A presents the selection process for
the UK samples. The cross-sectional sample consists of companies for which we can identify an annual report
according to IFRS. Our switch sample further requires that an annual report (according to UK-GAAP) be available
prior to mandatory IFRS adoption. Panel B presents the selection process for the German sample. To be included in
the German sample, companies must have available an annual report according to IFRS. Percentages are rounded
and thus may not exactly sum to 100%.
Panel A: UK samples
Active companies (FBRIT, March 2008) 2,312
Inactive companies (DEADUK, March 2008) + 5,597
UK listed companies in Worldscope 7,909
39
Table 4: German companies’ valuation practices after IFRS adoption
Table 4 presents the valuation practices among companies in the German sample (defined in Table 1). The industry
classification is based on Worldscope's major industry groups. The "With PPE" ("With inv. prop.") ["With intan."] column
presents for each industry how many companies have property, plant, and equipment (investment property) [intangible
assets]. The historical cost (fair value) columns present how many companies use historical cost (fair value) for at least one
asset class within property, plant, and equipment and intangible assets.
40
Table 5: Asset classes and the application of fair value accounting
Table 5 presents evidence regarding which asset classes under property, plant, and equipment are recognized at fair value.
The No. columns present the number of companies that recognize assets at fair value within the respective asset classes.
The % columns present the values in the No. columns as a percentage of those companies in the UK, Germany, and the full
sample that use fair value for any class of assets under property, plant, and equipment.
1
Includes companies that use fair value under UK-GAAP or IFRS, or both.
Companies that use fair value for PPE 62 100% 7 100% 69 100%
Plant 2 3% 0 0% 2 3%
Equipment 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
PPE in general 2 3% 1 14% 3 4%
41
Table 6: Summary statistics for logistic regression analysis
Table 6, Panel A presents the summary statistics for our pooled (largest) sample. Panel B reports Pearson correlation
statistics. All variables are defined in Appendix C. Information regarding the use of fair value is hand-collected from
companies’ annual reports in Thompson One Banker. Other data is collected from the Worldscope database as of
December 2005.
42
Table 6 continued
Panel B: Correlation Table
Variable/Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
1. Fair PPE 1.00
2. Fair IP 0.06 1.00
3. IP 0.00 0.45 1.00
4. Germany -0.07 -0.13 0.17 1.00
5. Sic65 0.07 0.30 0.28 0.01 1.00
6. Early -0.01 -0.06 0.03 0.61 0.00 1.00
7. Size -0.10 -0.03 0.12 -0.19 0.02 -0.02 1.00
8. PPEadj 0.07 0.02 0.12 -0.08 0.08 -0.13 0.10 1.00
9. Btm 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.19 0.09 0.05 -0.39 0.14 1.00
10. MktLev 0.03 0.04 0.14 0.11 0.07 -0.05 -0.15 0.17 0.43 1.00
11. MktLevShort 0.04 0.05 0.12 0.14 -0.03 0.04 -0.19 -0.08 0.37 0.80 1.00
12. MktLevLong -0.01 0.00 0.08 -0.01 0.15 -0.13 0.02 0.39 0.20 0.54 -0.07 1.00
13. LevBook -0.01 0.01 0.06 -0.09 -0.02 -0.14 0.16 0.07 -0.23 0.68 0.51 0.41 1.00
14. LevBookShort 0.01 0.03 0.05 -0.01 -0.10 -0.01 0.05 -0.20 -0.18 0.46 0.77 -0.31 0.68 1.00
15. LevBookLong -0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.12 0.09 -0.17 0.16 0.33 -0.09 0.34 -0.24 0.90 0.50 -0.29 1.00
16. DebtToOI -0.08 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.10 -0.06 0.01 0.26 0.19 0.51 0.13 0.67 0.41 -0.10 0.65 1.00
17. Coverage 0.03 0.00 -0.05 -0.12 -0.08 0.00 0.17 -0.21 -0.28 -0.62 -0.34 -0.55 -0.42 -0.07 -0.47 -0.76 1.00
18. Current -0.03 -0.07 -0.09 0.16 0.07 0.16 -0.09 -0.32 0.05 -0.39 -0.30 -0.22 -0.50 -0.38 -0.21 -0.25 0.30 1.00
19. Convertible -0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.10 -0.04 0.11 0.07 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.02 -0.06 -0.06 -0.01 -0.06 0.01 0.04 1.00
20. FairInvPr 0.06 1.00 0.45 -0.13 0.30 -0.06 -0.03 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.07 -0.03
43
Table 7: Choice of fair value for investment property group
Table 7 presents the estimates from the logistic regression of the IFRS fair value indicator on a set of company-specific
variables. All variables are defined in Appendix C. Information on the use of fair value is hand-collected from companies’
annual reports in the Thompson One Banker. The data is taken from the Worldscope database as of December 2005. The
sample consists of 275 companies (124 UK companies; 151 German companies) that hold investment property. Requiring
non-missing values for explanatory variables further limits the sample in some specifications. ***, **, * indicate statistical
significance at less than 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
44
Table 8: Future financing and the use of fair value accounting
Table 8 presents the estimates from OLS regressions of future financing choices on the IFRS fair value indicator and a set
of company-specific controls. All variables are defined in Appendix C. Information on the use of fair value is hand-
collected from companies’ annual reports in the Thompson One Banker. All other data is taken from the Worldscope
database between December 2005 and 2007. The sample consists of 275 companies (124 UK companies; 151 German
companies) that hold investment property. Requiring non-missing values for explanatory variables further limits the sample
in some specifications. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at less than 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
45
Table 9: Use of fair value for property, plant, and equipment
Table 9 presents the estimates from the logistic regression of the IFRS fair value indicator on a set of company specific
variables. All variables are defined in Appendix C. Information on the use of fair value is hand-collected from companies’
annual reports in the Thompson One Banker. The data is taken from the Worldscope database as of December 2005. The
results are based on a matched sample of companies that began using fair value after IFRS adoption. We match each fair
value company to historical cost companies on country, two-digit industry group, and the log of market value of equity and
take the closest match. This procedure, which requires non-missing market value of equity, yields 90 observations.
Requiring non-missing values for other explanatory variables further limits the sample. Standard errors are clustered at
industry level. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at less than 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
46
Table 1D: The effect of fair value accounting on asset values
Table 1D illustrates the differences in the book value of assets for fair value versus historical cost companies.
Information regarding the use of fair value is hand-collected from companies’ annual reports in Thompson One Banker.
The data is taken from the Worldscope database as of December 2005. Panel A presents a sample of 275 companies
(124 UK companies; 151 German companies) that hold investment property. Panel B is based on a matched sample of
companies that began using fair value after IFRS adoption. We match each fair value company with historical cost
companies on country, two-digit industry group, and the log of market value of equity, and take the closest match. This
procedure, which requires non-missing market value of equity, yields 90 observations. BTM is book value of equity
divided by the market value of equity, TA is total value of assets, MKT(TA) is market value of assets plus book value of
liabilities, ROA is return on assets, and PPE/MKT(EQUITY) is book value of property, plant, and equipment divided by
the market value of equity.
Mean:
Historical cost mean 0.68 0.80 5.75
Fair value mean 0.87 0.93 4.98
Difference –0.18 –0.13 0.77
% –26.78 –16.11 13.46
t-stat –3.24 –4.20 0.56
p-value 0.001 0.000 0.574
Median:
Historical cost median 0.64 0.83 4.81
Fair value median 0.88 0.97 3.79
Difference –0.25 –0.14 1.02
% –38.55 –16.45 21.12
z-stat –3.74 –4.56 1.12
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.26
Panel B: Property, plant, and equipment
Mean:
Historical cost mean 0.50 0.71 7.47 0.40
Fair value mean 0.94 0.93 4.33 0.94
Difference –0.43 –0.22 3.14 –0.55
% –86.60 –31.20 42.00 –136.86
t-stat –4.40 –4.06 2.24 –2.81
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.01
Median:
Historical cost median 0.44 0.73 5.97 0.11
Fair value median 0.83 0.93 3.33 0.46
Difference –0.40 –0.20 2.64 –0.35
% –90.89 –26.65 44.22 –309.86
z-stat –3.91 –3.60 1.83 –3.12
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00