10 2307@3629516 PDF

Two Meanings and Uses of Tradition
Author(s): Eugenia Shanklin

Source: Journal of Anthropological Research, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Spring, 1981), pp. 71-89
Published by: University of New Mexico
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TWOMEANINGSAND USESOF TRADITION'
EugeniaShanklin
TrentonStateCollege,Trenton,NJ 98625
of SociologyandAnthropology,
Department
This article reviews two meanings and uses of tradition: as a passive analytic construct in the
theoretical literature of anthropology, and as an active indigenous force, recorded in the ethno-
graphic literature. Directions are suggested for further study of the active uses of tradition.
TRADITION IS A COMMONPLACEWORD that has taken on technical meaning in

anthropology.Anthropologistsspeak of "a tradition,"or of "traditions,"(e.g., the
Easternand Westerntraditions);of "traditionalism";and of "traditional"societies,
as opposed to preliterateor modernones.A "tradition"in the anthropologicallitera-
ture often meansa time-honoredcustom, and a "traditionalpast" usuallymeansa
preconquestor precolonialpast. As a commonplaceterm, the meaningof tradition
is seldom spelled out; the consequence is that the term carries unspecified assump-
tions.2
Most anthropologistsare awareof the inaccuracyof these assumptions,but not
of the implicationsfor field researchthat a more systematicapproachto tradition
could have. My intention in this paperis to reviewtwo meaningsanduses of tradi-
tion in the anthropologicalliterature,then to suggestfurtherdirectionsfor research
into tradition.
In socioculturalanthropologythere have been two majorviews of tradition:the
first is the passiveidea of traditionborrowedfrom the theoreticalliteratureof the
social sciences;the second is the active, indigenoususe of traditionrecordedin the
ethnographicliterature.These two views have existed side by side in anthropology
for many decades;I suggestthat the passive,theoreticaluse of traditionhas hindered
anthropologicalresearchinto the active, empiricaluses of tradition.A systematic
study of the empiricaluses of traditionwould have many applications,one of the
most obviousof whichis to the study of ethnic groups.
There are manyprecedentsfor the divisionof "tradition"into activeandpassive
uses. Williams(1976:268-69) points to a split in definitionsbetween traditionas a
set of time-honored,respectedbeliefs, and traditionas an active processin which
beliefs are handed down from father to son and requireonly two generationsto
become traditions.Of more interest to anthropologists,perhaps,is Kroeberand
Kluckhohn's(1952:89) classificationof historicaldefinitionsof culture:their em-
phasison social heritageor traditionis of utility in drawingattentionto the social,
as well as the biologicalheritageof humanbeings.The drawbackof such definitions,
however,is their implicationof "too greatstabilityand too passivea role";humans
are "not only the carriersand creatures'ofculture-they are also creatorsand ma-
nipulatorsof culture. 'Social heredity' suggeststoo much of the dead weight of
tradition"(KroeberandKluckhohn1952:94).
Anthropologists' lapses in considering the meanings of tradition would not be
significant, were it not for the serious omissions that are engendered by an unre-
flective use of the term. Some of these are a reflection of the passive use of tradition;
others reflect a failure to record and investigate the active uses of tradition. Tradi-
tion is an important component in modernization theory, for instance, and as the
71
72 JOURNAL OF ANTHROPOLOGICALRESEARCH
assumptionsof this theory become more and more importantin anthropology,
attention must be paid to them, especiallyin relation to the sometimescontrary
argumentsmadeby ethnographers.
It is important,therefore,to reexaminethe uses of tradition.This paperwill
also indicatenew directionsfor researchinto the dynamicsof formulatingtraditions
and, most importantly,suggest ways of studyingreformulationsof traditionby
ethnicgroupswhoseideologydrawsheavilyon a shared,"traditional"past.
TRADITION AS A PASSIVE, ANALYTIC TERM

To understandhow the passiveuse of the term "tradition"came into anthro-
pology and how, ultimately, it causedanthropologiststo ignorethe activeuses of
tradition,it is necessaryto reviewits developmentas an analyticcategorythrough
the writingsof Durkheim,Marx,Tonnies,andWeber.Characteristics they attributed
to traditionwere adopted by Redfieldand others;they deserveclose examination
at the presenttime becauseof theirprominencein modernizationtheory andstudies
of socialchange.
Durkheim,Weber,Marx, and Tonnies were heirs to the dichotomousthinking
that beganwith the Greeksand reachedfull flower in the nineteenthcentury.Tra-
dition/modernityaccompaniedother dichotomiesin nineteenthand earlytwentieth
century theories, includingnature/nurture,primitive/civilized,mechanical/organic,
and mind/body distinctions.3In the writingsof social science theorists,tradition
was seen as an ideal type constructand as a usefulanalyticconcept;it was also seen
as a passive,stultifying force that engenderedand enforcedculturalhomogeneity.
Marx,the earliestof these theorists,did not use the traditional/modern distinc-
tion per se in his writings,but distinguishedbetweenAsiaticgovernmentsand those
of the West, i.e., between ancient (or traditional)and modernsystemsof govern-
ment.In the Asiaticworld,he suggested,"thesocialconditionhasremainedunaltered
since its remotest antiquity, until the first decenniumof the nineteenthcentury"
(1934:653; cf. Rudolph and Rudolph 1967:17-19). Marx sharedthe nineteenth-
centuryconvictionthat traditionwouldlose its hold once the modernizationprocess
was complete. In The Eighteenth Brumaireof Louis Bonaparte (first published
1855), he specifiedthe conditionsunderwhich"traditional ideas"wouldbe dissolved:
"developedformationof classes,"modernproductionconditions,and "an intellec-
tual consciousnessin which all traditionalideas have been dissolvedby the workof
centuries"(Marx and Engels1972:104).
WhileMarx adheredto an ideal type, passiveuse of traditionin his theoretical
work, he was also awareof the activeor ideologicaluses to whichtraditioncould be
put. He notes (MarxandEngels1972:97) that at preciselythe time whenrevolution-
ary change is taking place, people "anxiouslyconjureup the spiritsof the past to
their serviceand borrow from them names, battle cries and costumesin orderto
present the new scene of worldhistory in this time-honoreddisguiseand this bor-
rowedlanguage."
Tonnies, following Marx, emphasized in 1887 that tradition was part of "natural"
will, the opposite of which was "rational" will. Means and ends were sharply dif-
ferentiated in the rational form of will, while "inclination, habit, or memory"
played an important role in "natural"will (1963:4-5). Natural will, however, was not
TWO MEANINGSAND USES OF TRADITION 73
always irrational; it was, as Weber would later point out (1964:92), a deviation from
rational action only because it was "affectually determined."
Durkheim, in 1893, emphasized the contrast between tradition and rationality
even more strongly than most other theorists, by designating traditionalism as part
of nonrational, mechanical solidarity. Durkheim predicted the decline of tradition as
a force in human history as rationalism grew in modern, urban settings. "Thus it is
in the great cities that the moderating influence of age is at its minimum. At the same
time, one observes that nowhere have the traditions less sway over minds" (Durkheim
1964:297). Tradition was given its force by the old people who transmitted it; their
prestige and authority made them "the unique intermediary between the present and
the past" (1964:29). A person who remained in the environment in which he was
reared would continue to revere the old ways, whereas someone transplanted to a
new environment would not have the same feelings of reverence and respect.
Weber was the only early theorist to use tradition consistently, and to regard
tradition both as an active force in modernizing societies and as a passive force for
impeding change. He justified his use of the traditional/modern distinction by
stating that scientific analysis demanded such distinctions; he set up (1964:92) a
"conceptually pure type of rational action" with which he contrasted "all irrational,
affectually determined elements of behaviour." Like Marx, Weber recognized the
active or ideological uses of tradition, but he went on to describe it systematically,
in his discussion of one aspect of the routinization of charisma, the conversion of
an acceptable past into "tradition."
Tradition as a passive force, as a storage device inhibiting innovation and creativity,
was thus established early in the social science literature. Marx believed tradition to
be a stultifying device for enslaving people; T6nnies believed it to be an unthinking
emotional reaction, and, incidentally, one more common to women than to men in
the modern world. Durkheim believed that tradition would lose its force as people
were absorbed into the modern, urban world, but he did not share the nineteenth
century's optimism and faith in the modern world as one that would erase the evils
of the past.4 Durkheim and Weber were both concerned about the consequences of
increasing modernity. At the conclusion of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of
Capitalism, after discussing rational conduct as the fundamental spirit of modern
culture, Weber remarked (1958:182), "For of the last stage of this cultural de-
velopment, it might well be truly said: 'Specialists without spirit, sensualists without
heart; this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of civilization never before
achieved.' "
For anthropologists there are many difficulties with the tradition/modernity
dichotomy. The conceptual difficulties connected with the stagnant, stultifying, and
irrational qualities attributed to tradition are greater than the naive ethnocentrism
allied with them. Fieldworkers do tend to lose their ethnocentrism; whether they
lose their preconceptions about the attributes of "traditional" societies is another
matter.
Redfield, himself an active fieldworker, brought the ideal type, passive notions
about tradition into anthropology; in doing so, he summarized all the attributes
posited by earlier theorists. Redfield (1960) used tradition in two ways, both analytic:
(1) as a general classificatory term denoting two interacting levels within civilizations,
the great and little traditions; and (2) as a component of the folk-urban continuum.
Great traditions were maintained by an urban elite and little traditions by the
peasantry. These concepts have been widely used in the anthropological literature
(cf. Singer's 1972 review), most often with great and little traditions used as the
equivalents of high and low culture.
Redfield's use of tradition as a component of the folk-urban continuum repeats
the early theorists' assumptions of homogeneity, irrationality, and respect for age-old
custom at the folk end of the continuum. Because there was little communication
with the outside world, tradition was of great importance in the ideal "folk" com-
munity (Redfield 1968:501,505): "Whatis done in the ideal folk society is done not
because somebody or some people decided, at once, that it should be done, but be-
cause it seems 'necessarily' to flow from the very nature of things." "In short,
behavior in the folk society is traditional, spontaneous, and uncritical. In any real
folk society, of course, many things are done as a result of decision as to that par-
ticular action, but as to that class of actions tradition is the sufficient authority."
Redfield's ideal folk society had all the characteristics that earlier theorists had
adduced in constructing their ideal polarities, and tradition had an important role in
all such constructs. Particular qualities ascribed to tradition may be adduced from
Redfield's discussion:
1) tradition is a force in preventing change, growth, and creativity, i.e., acts as a storage
device;
2) traditionis an irrational,emotional response;
3) traditionpromotes internalsolidarity;
4) tradition will disappearor be eradicatedby modernity and rational choice, characteristics
of urbanenvironments.
More than any other anthropologist, Redfield was responsible for borrowing the
passive meaning of tradition and its ethnocentric attributes from the theoretical litera-
ture of the social sciences, in his effort to establish a basis for understanding the
relationship between peasant and urbanite. But instead of drawing on the empirical,
ethnographic renderings of tradition as an active, creative, and adaptive force for
social change, Redfield borrowed meanings that were not in accord with anthropo-
logical field experience, and thereby established a theoretical basis in anthropology
that has predisposed later fieldworkers to adopt modernization theory without con-
sidering its underlying premises.
TRADITION AS AN ACTIVE CONCEPT

At the same time that social science theorists were specifying the theoretical
attributes of tradition, anthropologists were noting its indigenous, active uses. In
1903 Robertson Smith noted discrepancies in genealogies and suggested that the
Arabian genealogists had deliberately falsified tradition when they applied patrony-
mic theory to the origin of tribal groups. They did so because, "it followed inevitably
from the assumption that the tribal bond and the law of tribal succession had always
been what they were at the time of the prophet" (Smith 1903:25).
In Tikopia land tenure and society as it "had always been" were connected
(Firth 1963:342):
Possession of the property in each case is validated by traditional associations,part clearly
historical, part mythological; these do not take the form of a specific tale which is narrated
as proof of title, but comprise a series of incidents which are interwoven into the general
theme of the emergence of Tikopia society in its present state . . . the existence and repeti-
tion of this body of current lore does serve to maintain and perpetuate the distribution of
land; it is the primitive counterpartof a Record Office in which parchmenthas not yet re-
placed the memory of men.
Among the Nuer Evans-Pritchard found that genealogies could not have been
accurate; the distinction he made (1940:199) between a "true genealogy and a
genealogy which Nuer deem to be true" resulted, he believed, from the operation
of the lineage system within Nuer political organization. Bohannan (1952) recorded
other fictitious African genealogies and Peters (1960;1967) did the same for the
Bedouin of Cyrenaica.
Another instance of genealogical manipulation was cited by Barth (1961), who
described the process of growth and segmentation of sections and oulads among the
Basseri (sections occupy adjoining grazing areas; oulads are groups that share grazing
areas and migratory routes). According to Barth (1961:62) very old informants
remembered "that in their childhood whole sections which now contain several
oulads used to camp together." Barth's analysis indicated that this memory was
accurate, while in other contexts (1961:63), " it is asserted that the schema of oulads
and sections is entirely static, and that the groups which exist now have always been."
In its passive sense as a storage device, tradition was seen to inhibit innovation.
In its active sense as recorded by ethnographers, tradition serves instead to evaluate
current circumstances, to explain why things are as they are, and in some instances-
as among the Basseri-to conceal or obscure innovations.
The second theoretical quality of tradition as an irrational, emotional response,
has also been contradicted in the ethnographic literature. Malinowski (1922) had
helped to establish the idea that myths and traditions serve as sociological "charters";
but in a later discussion he cited another use of tradition, a rational, calculated use.
Because traditions or legends "record singularly great achievements in all important
pursuits, they redound to the credit of some individual and his descendants or of a
whole community; and hence they are kept alive by the ambition of those whose
ancestry they glorify" (Malinowski 1948:107).
The context in which it is most often assumed that tradition is irrational and
emotional is that of economics. Yet the ethnographic literature records many in-
stances of rational traditional economic modes, among them Tardits and Tardits'
(1962) study of Dahomean markets, where prices are determined almost solely by
supply and demand and trading, previously handled by women, has given way to
banking, as women finance mens' farming expenses.
In India T.S. Epstein (1962) provided a classic study of two villages: in one, the
"wet" village, irrigation agriculture was introduced and adopted; while the innova-
tion contributed to material wealth, the "traditional social structure" remained
much the same. In the "dry" village nearby, villagers responded within the scope of
tradition by changing the village structure so as to take advantage of the modern
market. Neither response is irrational or "emotional."
Ecologists have also shown that some traditions are quite rational (Collier 1975).
Assumptions about rationality are most prominent in studies of development, where
short-term gains are believed to be the products of rational choice. It is of course
illogical to assume that short-term gains are necessarily more rational than the long-
term gains ensured by many "traditional" modes of enviornmental exploitation.
Tradition as a device for promoting internal solidarity has also been debated and
largely dismissed. In Argonauts of the WesternPacific (1922) and elsewhere, Malin-
owski had stressed that traditions and myths were recited as social sanctions, to
induce conformity or serve as charters for social action. Leach (1965) concluded
that traditions could promote either internal equilibrium or disequilibrium, depend-
ing on whose version of the tradition gained prominence. A similar debate-lengthy
but inconclusive-has centered around whether, in segmentary societies, genealogies
are paradigms of political alliances expressed in the idiom of patrilineal descent
(Meeker 1979) or whether political conflict produces genealogical alignments.
These debates over functionalism are familiar to most anthropologists and need not
be recalled at length here; their importance lies in the fact that ethnographers saw
and recorded indigenous versions of tradition used both to sustain internal solidarity
and to promote internal dissension.
A further quality attributed to tradition, its disappearance in urban environ-
ments, has also been dismissed by the ethnographic literature. At the same time
that Redfield's notions about the folk-urban continuum were gaining prominence,
ethnographers were recording the rise of ethnic groups whose ideologies depended
heavily on a shared "traditional" past. Before Redfield's theoretical synthesis,
Gluckman (1942) had discussed the empirical reality and pointed to the greater
emphasis placed on "endo-culture" as a result of cleavages in political life. Mitchell
(1956) pointed to the Kalela dance as an example of the selection and revival of a
traditional practice in an urban environment. Barnes (1951) described several uses
of tradition among the Ngoni, which deserve close consideration because Barnes
carefully recorded the contexts (history, ethnic identity, and legal precedent) in
which tradition was used indigenously.
According to their own legends the Ngoni were great warriorsand had defeated
all other groups until the British came in 1898. Historical accounts indicate that the
Ngoni were by no means undefeated, however, and Barnes says (1951:296-97), "the
distortion introduced is not only the elimination of defeat ... the Ngoni conquerors
of yesterday are made to look like the European conquerors of today." Traditional
legends were modified to conform to modern values; Barnes'sinformants even assured
him that the old Ngoni language was closer to English than to Nyanja.
The Ngoni also use tradition to evaluate their present circumstances; their de-
feat by the British explains present failures and expresses tribal identity. When
Barnes (1951:298-99) asked about Ngoni marriage payments and confronted in-
formants with the reality that such payments were often not made, even before the
British conquest of 1898, "Ngoni do not deny these facts but they do deny their
relevance. To them, the distinctively Ngoni way of marrying is with these two pay-
ments. . . They regret that people no longer marry in this way and blame the Euro-
peans for it, but it remains part of the distinctive cultural heritage of the tribe."
Tribal identity is emphasized by having-but not necessarily by following-such
distinctive customs.
Another use of tradition is made in the law courts, where Ngoni appeal to tra-
ditional practice in a different way; judges may maintain that a decision is in keeping
with tribal custom without quoting specific precedents and, "in this undocumented
environment new decisions, if they are not soon challenged, become part of what
has always been the custom since time immemorial" (1951:300; cf. Schapera 1957).
Many other ethnographers have recorded active uses of tradition, though not so
completely as Barnes. The literature is vast and worthwhile, e.g., Tardits 1958; Dube
1958; Savage 1964; Gulliver (1969) offered a review of these uses under the heading
of "tribalism" and Brode (1970) reviewed the role of "tradition" in modernization
theory. The important point is that the four passive qualities ascribed to tradition in
the theoretical literature have been abundantly tested and disproved in the ethno-
graphic literature. As a storage device, tradition serves not merely to store antique
behavior; it also serves to align past and present and to set new precedents for be-
havior. Instead of being an irrational, emotional response, ethnographers have found
traditions employed to promote rational innovation. In addition to promoting
internal solidarity, tradition is used as a divisive tool to further individual and group
ambitions. Instead of disappearing in urban environments, traditions have been refor-
mulated to serve as a basis for claims to political and economic power and privilege.
These active uses of tradition have not been systematically treated and reviewed
in the anthropological literature; neither have their implications for comparative
research been specified. Instead many hypotheses have been based on modernization
theory, which in turn relies on typological schemes originating in the binary opposi-
tion between tradition and modernity.6 In modernization theory the assumptions
of the passive use have gone unquestioned and untested against the active indigenous
uses of tradition. Rather than looking at the active uses of tradition, anthropologists
who adopted modernization theory have also accepted within it the passive assump-
tions contained in the opposition between tradition and modernity. Levi-Strauss
(1966:15) has pointed to the difference between the "Neolithic" and the "modern"
mind, suggesting that thousands of years of "stagnation" were responsible for Neo-
lithic thought. Gellner (1973) and others have discussed at length the differences
between the "savage" and the "modern" mind.
In modernization theory tradition is a midpoint on the way to modernity. Early
ethnographers would have denied this; anthropologists who have adopted moderniza-
tion theory have given little consideration to its premises. Rather than drawing on
the ethnographic material and considering carefully the assumptions of modernization
theory, anthropologists have tended to modify the assumptions of the theory or
have reported the failure of modernization schemes. A more systematic approach to
tradition through the study of its active uses is in order.
RESEARCHDIRECTIONSIN THE STUDY OF ACTIVEUSES OF TRADITION

From the foregoing discussion it is possible to abstract two important research
directions: the evaluative use of tradition, and the sanctifying use of tradition. Each
of these directions has both an internal and an external aspect. Implicit within both
these directions is the assumption that tradition has a storage function with respect
to selected traits only, not to a plethora of antique behaviors. These traits need not
be "old" or even indigenous.
Many authors make use of one or two of these directions in their accounts, but
Barnes's data on the Ngoni illustrate nearly all the directions. Internally the Ngoni
use tradition as a storage device to preserve the "distinctively Ngoni" marriage
payments; they use it as an evaluative tool for gaining certain goals, to rationalize be-
havior, to set legal precedents, and to account for present difficulties; they also use
tradition to sanctify such innovations as their present alignment with the British.
In their dealings with the outside world (externally) the Ngoni use their traditions to
sanction their ethnic identity as a group (the myth of Ngoni invincibility), and they
use tradition to contrast present hardships with past glories, thus founding in a
former order their claims to current rights and privileges.
The internal evaluative use of tradition, described by Barnes as "Ngoni invinci-
bility," is also described by Orans (1965). The Santal assert their equality to their
Hindu neighbors in order to establish a basis of solidarity from which to counter
threats of assimilation (1965:35):
Santalmythology of the nineteenth century and the present is replete with allusionsto former
days of independence and glory. One favorite myth reported in the nineteenth century and
still prevalent describes a mighty kingdom which the Santal once constituted...The Santal
are thus pictured as independent, powerful, and constituted exactly in the image of an ideal
Hindu kingdom. Like all current dreams of the past, this myth expressescurrent interests.
It says that 'we were once greatas the Hinduspresently are.'
Another evaluative use with both internal and external dimensions is illustrated
in Stevens's (1975) documentation of the Kisra tradition. The legend of Kisra, a
great African conqueror, is found among certain groups in the Western Sudan, par-
ticularly among groups under threat from outside. Stevens believes that the selective
alteration of traditions over time has enabled the threatened societies to: (1) assert
their equality to, if not superiority over, the threatening power; (2) justify their
successful maintenance of independence in spite of this threat; and (3) thus reestab-
lish a basis for societal unity.
Some internal evaluative uses may become external sanctifying devices; this is
suggested in Barth's (1961) study of the Basseri, among whom the process of group
formation is described historically in one context and as timeless in another.
The external sanctifying use of tradition has been an effective legitimating force
for innovation in Africa, as attested by the voluminous literature on the role of "tra-
ditional" rulers in implementing colonial policy (Banton 1957; Meynaud 1963).
The process works both ways, with traditional rulers being used by the government
to implement policy and in turn implementing their groups' wishes by reference to
indigenous tradition (Apter 1965, 1969; Drake 1960; Vengroff 1975; Fallers 1955;
Gluckman 1963; Crowder and Ikime 1970).
Another sanctifying use of tradition, with both internal and external aspects,
seems common in former colonies. Colson (1974) credits Barnes with being among
the first to suggest that colonial administrations allowed innovations only when they
were introduced as traditions. "The astute therefore legitimated the new with an
appeal to tradition, on which they and not the agents of the central power were the
recognized authorities (Barnes 1954). Instead of going to the district administrator
to ask if they might do something, they said, 'This is what we have always done' "
(Colson 1974:77-78).
The directions posited here have many applications to the existing literature,
but their more interesting applications are to the formulation of directions for fur-
ther research, especially in relation to ethnic-group formation and maintenance.
The internal evaluative use of tradition involves adducing a great and glorious
past, sometimes to counter assimilation, sometimes to establish a basis for societal
unity. Does this use satisfy political and social ambition within the group or does it
reflect the use of a deeper model of political and social conflict? What steps are
involved in reaching consensus as to what is traditional? Is inversion or reversal of
custom a likely outcome of evaluation of a custom as "traditional"?
The external evaluative uses of tradition function mainly to sanction ethnic
identity. How do changes come about in understanding and presenting tradition as
a rationale for ethnic identity? Are these changes a function of individual recasting,
or does the group as a whole adopt certain positions in response to political circum-
stances? Is the new understanding merely a matter of recasting the past in accord
with the present or, as one would suspect, is the matter more complex? From what
sources and with what methods can anthropologists gain an understanding of these
matters?
The internal sanctifying uses of tradition, e.g., to set legal precedents, can be
specified so as to make extrapolation possible. Are these uses more apt to occur in
economic or political contexts, for example, or are they commonplace in areas be-
lieved to be more stable, such as religion or kinship? The evidence bearing on this
problem "proves" several points but clarifies few (cf. Banton 1961; Van Velsen
1961; Tardits 1958).
The external sanctifying uses of tradition, e.g., the use of tradition or traditional
rulers to sanctify innovations, seem to vary according to political context. Is it mainly
or only in postcolonial contexts that the external sanctifying uses of tradition occur?
Did or do colonizing countries differ, as Colson suggests, in their responsiveness to
claims of sanctity with traditional referents? To what extent have such differences
influenced or produced reformulations of tradition? Are innovations sanctified by
tradition apt to be more successful than those not so grounded?
METHODOLOGICAL CHANGES REQUIRED BY THE ACTIVE CONCEPT OF TRADITION

While a number of research directions can be formulated if one assumes that
tradition is an active force for change that can be used in many ways, those of most
interest to anthropologists concern the role of tradition in the formation and main-
tenance of ethnic groups. First, however, it is necessary to clarify some changes in
orientation that must be made if the study of the active uses of tradition is to be
implemented. In contrasting the passive and active uses of the concept there are four
issues that deserve careful consideration: (1) temporal dimension; (2) directionality;
(3) ethnocentrism; and (4) obfuscation.7 In the passive use of the term these prob-
lems result, in large measure, from the assumptions of the binary model of tradition
and modernity, especially as these assumptions occur in modernization theory.
The temporal dimension implied in many uses of "tradition" suggests that in
precolonial or preconquest times things were very different, and many anthropolo-
gists believe the "always" in the statement, "we've always done it that way." Others,
however, have questioned the temporal dimension and found, as Leach did in Burma
that "the good old days" are now colonial times (Leach 1972). One solution to this
is to establish a specific baseline from which to consider certain things current and
others traditional, as Magnarella (1974) does.
In the view of tradition as an active force, the temporal dimension is taken as a
subject for investigation, not as a given. Schwartz (1977) notes that over a fifteen-
year period the folk historians of a Guatemalan town have revised their conceptions
80 JOURNALOF ANTHROPOLOGICAL RESEARCH
of the past considerably. In 1960 they claimed that the past had included long-stand-
ing social equality; in 1975 past social equality had expanded to include economic
equality. In 1975 political inequality was not held to be so great as had been stated
in 1960, and the victims of political inequality were not so defenseless as in earlier
accounts. Intertown differences in 1960 were ascribed to varying historical origins
of town founders; in 1975 the emphasis was not on differences but on similarities
of background of the founders, and vertical intertown differences are now ascribed
to the influence of outsiders (1977:346-49).
Schwartz found on inquiring that the folk historians recognized these changes
but they usually avoided inconsistencies by using "nonspecific temporal references
for their statements, such as 'the time of the grandfathers,' or 'in those (past) days' "
(1977:353). Schwartz believed that folk history was being used in this case to estab-
lish or revive certain standards and to make sense of the contemporary scene.
Alland (1972:117) earlierrecorded observations about what he called the "grand-
father response"-"that's the way our grandfathers did it." Alland analyzed the
grandfather response as an adaptation open to many interpretations, and concluded
that it is made in those situations in which behavioral traits are not accounted for
by ethnotheory. In Abron medical theory, as in Guatemalan folk history, changes or
innovations were explained with "nonspecific temporal referents."
Another implication of the passive use of tradition is that of directionality.
Groups are said to be moving towards modernity, which may mean Westernization,
industrialization, greater complexity, or individualism. Rising individualism is
especially common, but not always specified. The result is that many innovations
adapted to group values are not recognized as modern or adaptive innovations
(cf. Rice 1958, Savage 1964); so, too, with innovations such as the West African
cattle market described by Cohen (1973).
There are probably two reasons for the persistence of the ethnocentric assump-
tions involved in the dichotomy "we are modern, they are traditional." Like their
subjects, anthropologists are often inclined to be romantic about tradition, some-
times even proprietorial; a non-Western or exotic past is an important part of the
subjects' appeal. The second, pragmatic reason is merely that if "they" are the same
as "us," there is no particular reason to go abroad and study processes also occur-
ing at home.
The failure to recognize common forces at work in recasting traditions has been
an anthropological blind spot, leading to the adoption of theories and research strate-
gems ill-suited to anthropological techniques. Anthropologists are closer to their
subjects' daily lives and more aware of contradictions and controversies than most
other scientists. It is not surprising that ethnographers should have recorded many
different uses of tradition; what is surprising is that these uses should have gone so
long without being systemized.
The final methodological problem that anthropologists must surmount is the
tendency to use tradition as a residual term. Magnarella(1974) uses tradition in the
following ways: in his first chapter "traditional knowledge" (p. 6); "traditional
beliefs," "traditional beliefs and reciprocal rights," "traditional class structures,"
(p. 7); "forces of tradition," "traditional societies," "modernity and tradition,"
"traditional values and social structures," "traditional extended family," "all aspects
of tradition," "certain traditional practices," "modernization may enhance tradi-
tion," "traditionally prestigious pilgrimage," (p. 8); "study of tradition and modern-
ity," (p. 9); "traditional, as a stronghold of conservatism," "important traditional
functions such as regional markets, etc." (p. 10); "traditional context," "traditional
scene for interaction," (p. 11); and "traditional background" (p. 12). I point this
out not to take issue with the major points in Magnarella'sbook, but with his indis-
criminate use of the term. He does establish a baseline for the changes he analyzes,
and in that respect is more precise than many researchers.
Specifying the internal and external evaluative and sanctifying uses of tradition;
delineating the temporal dimension and the group identified; and abandoning the
directional, ethnocentric assumptions common in the study of tradition-all these
have obvious advantages in anthropological fieldwork, for a more rigorous delinea-
tion of the contexts in which "tradition" is employed will yield insights into social
change.
EXAMPLES OF THE ACTIVE USE OF TRADITION

To illustrate the heuristic value of the active directions posited, Gulliver's excel-
lent article (1969) is particularly useful. Gulliver is concerned with the conservative
commitment to tradition made by the Arusha and the Masai, and he points out that
neither group is politically influential or economically well-off; both cling to their
traditions and refuse involvement in "modern" Tanzanian institutions such as educa-
tion, outside labor, and Christianity. The Masai are almost prototypical East African
pastoral nomads, living in a harsh habitat where the margin of safety with herds is
very slim; the Arusha, or "agriculturalMasai," are the descendants of Masai refugees
who established their sedentary agriculturalcommunity on the slopes of Mt. Meru in
1830.
Gulliver investigated the sources of the commitment to tradition made by both
groups. He believes that the Arusha commitment springs from their political situ-
ation, i.e., their isolation and their economic plight (population pressure, land
shortage). The Masai commitment, however, springs from their unusual life style and
the failure of the government to offer them advantageous innovations. The breadth
of Gulliver's material is such that several examples could be given, but for the sake
of brevity I will use one set of facts, those involving Arusha-Masairelations.
Evaluativeinternal
The Arusha evaluate their internal social relations according to kinship ties within
the group, but they also extend those kin ties to the Masai. All Arusha trace their
descent from the originalMasaisettlers of 1830, but many other refugees have joined
the Arusha, among them Meru and Chaggarefugees, and Gulliver's samples indicated
that two-thirds of the present Arusha may be descended from these Meru and Chag-
ga refugees (Gulliver 1969:242, 1963:12). The Masai evaluate their internal social
relations according to age-set and kinship ties; further, they believe that being Masai
constitutes a kind of physical distinctness. They freely adopt neighboring Kikuyu
and Chagga as wives or herdboys, however; the distinctive physical characteristics
are illusory, Gulliver says, and are "principally the result of deportment, dress and
diet" (1969:237).
Evaluativeexternal
The Arusha believe that only Arusha have land rights (they settled on land con-
trolled by the Masai, who must have approved the settlement and ultimately profited
from it). The Arusha also believe that their distinctive agricultural practices set them
apart from their neighbors (Gulliver 1969:229), although to an outsider observer
their agricultural style resembles those of other African farming communities. The
Masai believe that their pastoral way of life is superior to all others; like the Arusha,
they reject Christianity, schooling, and other settled activities. The Masai also have
a myth which states that all cattle belong to the Masai, though some cattle may be
kept by inferior agriculturalneighbors.
Sanctifyinginternal
When the Arusha were faced by an "urgent need for innovation" (Gulliver 1969:
232) in the 1950s and 1960s, they renounced their subordinate status and began to
claim that the Masai were inferiors of the Arusha, that the "Masaihad a degenerate
form of the proper (i.e., Arusha) tradition and culture" (1969:232). This served as
a basis for internal solidarity among the Arusha, and also as a device for sanctify-
ing innovation. The Masaiuse the myth that they own all the cattle in the world as a
basis for raiding their neighbors to restock their own herds.
Sanctifying external
Neither group, to judge from Gulliver's data, participates in the larger political
structure in such a way as to necessitate claims to distinctive ethnic-group statuses,
but the predicates on which such claims could be based should be clear from the
foregoing discussion of Arusha-Masai relations. The Arusha have inverted their
"traditional" ties with the Masai to justify their own claims to economic rights and
privileges; the Masai refer to their own distinctive characteristics to justify their
claims. These distinctions are useful in understanding the different uses made of
"tradition" by the two groups, both under pressure from the central government.
In neither instance is it necessary to invoke notions of "age-old custom," irration-
ality, or any of the other attributes ascribed to tradition.
THE ROLE OF TRADITION IN ETHNICITY

There are many theories about the role of tradition in ethnicity; I will deal with
two views, represented by Barth (1969) and Cohen (1976). Barth's interpretation of
ethnic groups depends on economic and ecological factors, while Cohen's interpreta-
tion relies on political and symbolic factors; both theorists stress the importance of
the study of tradition for understanding ethnicity.
Barth (1969) suggests that while cultural boundaries had been investigated, the
constitution, boundaries, and nature of ethnic groups had not been similarly de-
lineated, although this is an important area of study for anthropologists where
cultural theory is not helpful.8 Barth emphasizes ethnic boundaries, suggesting their
persistence despite, not because of, a flow of people across them, thus entailing so-
cial processes of exclusion and incorporation. Ethnic boundaries are primarily social,
Barth suggests, although they might have territorial counterparts, and structure in-
teraction in such a way as to allow for the persistence of cultural differences. He
analyzes the interdependencies of ethnic groups within the framework of cultural
ecology; they take different forms, depending on competition for resource niches.
After citing several instances of change of ethnic identity he suggests that the gross
mechanisms of boundary maintenance have to do with access to the critical means
of production. In situations where an individual has access to the means of produc-
tion only through practicing a certain kind of subsistence, life-style changes, including
those of ethnic identity, will be pervasive; where control of the means of production
does not involve other activities, ethnic identity will not be affected. "Thus nomad,
peasant and city dweller can belong to the same ethnic group in the Middle East"
(1969:26).
In conditions of culture contact and change, there are elite groups that may pur-
sue participation in larger social systems by several means, among which is the
emphasis on ethnic identity. Ethnic identity becomes organizationally relevant to
new sectors by emphasizing one level of identity among the several provided by
established social organization. Barth indicated that the revival of traditional cul-
ture traits and the establishment of historical traditions to justify and glorify the
identity of ethnic groups is one of the most fascinating subjects of modern field
research.
Barth's emphasis on boundaries and interaction stimulated a number of studies.
Among the best of these is Nagata's (1974) careful description of situational selection
of ethnic identity in Malaysia. She suggests (1974:346) that "ethnic oscillation accord-
ing to situational requirements" is usual in modem, polyethnic Malaysian society,
and (1974:339) that "the only way in which the notion of situational ethnic se-
lection could initially be arrived at and tested was by intensive fieldwork of a
participant-observation variety." Far from being a "primordial" attachment to a
particular group, ethnic identification varies according to several factors, including
expediency and comparative and normative reference groups; comparative reference
groups are used to select a different reference point according to the affinities de-
sired in a given situation; normative reference groups are used to define social status
attached to particular groups. Nagata does not bear out Barth's focus on relationship
to the means of production as a critical determining factor in the selection of ethnic
identity, however. She looked at traditions in context, also, and asserted that the
same cultural features can be used to express differences or commonality of member-
ship.
Barth did not suggest a systematic study of the uses of tradition; he saw tradition
as a tool, used predominantly by elites to assert and maintain their privileged status.
Those who have used his ideas, however, have found tradition operating in a variety
of ways to serve a number of purposes. Cohen (1976) reviewed the concept of
tradition more systematically than Barth, pointing to its uses among different groups,
among them elites, ethnic, and religious groups.
In an attempt at definition, Cohen (1976:92) states that, "An ethnic group is a
collectivity of people who share some patterns of normative behaviour, or culture, and
who form a part of a larger population, interacting within a framework of a common
social system like the state. The term ethnicity refers to the degree of conformity to
these collective norms in the course of social interaction." He then narrows these
definitions by referring to the empirical evidence suggesting a continuum; at one end
are ethnic groups who are rapidly losing their cultural distinctiveness, and at the
other end are groups who are adjusting to new realities by reorganizing their tra-
ditional customs or developing new customs under traditional symbols. He notes
(1976:96) that while ethnicity is sometimes regarded as a symptom of reaction,
ignorance, or primitivity, it is best regarded as the "outcome of intensive interaction
between different culture groups, and not the result of a tendency to separatism."
Explanations for the rise of ethnic groups have sometimes been predicated on
cultural traditions, among these the notion, now disproved, that groups from seg-
mentary societies are predisposed to the formation of formal tribal associations.
Cohen was interested in power struggles and the processes of mobilization which
may cause a "new emphasis" to be placed on parts of traditional culture, "and
this gives the impression that there is here a return to tribal tradition and to tribal
separatism when in fact 'tribalism,' or ethnicity, in the contemporary situation is
one type of political grouping within the framework of the new state" (Cohen 1976:
96-97).
Cohen traces the emergence of ethnic, elite, and religious groups from informal
political organizations to fully legitimate interest groups. The articulation of an in-
formal group requires the mobilization of social relationships and the creation of
myths, beliefs, norms, values, and motives. Once created, these elements become
independent parts of an integrated ideological scheme. "This integrative function
of the ideology is the outcome of an ongoing process, involving the continual
adjustment of numerous parts that are continally changing" (Cohen 1976:81).
Unconscious modification of ideology takes place within the group, but as major
political groupings develop there emerge ideological guardians and specialists.
Ready-made ideologies, too, are sometimes available, such as the Sudanese Kisra
tradition, and newly developing groups may adopt them, taking advantage of "flexi-
ble symbols."
In ethnic-group formation, where there is a class cleavage coinciding with tribal
affiliation, cultural differences between the two will become entrenched, but with
new values and social significance. Ideology or tradition thus is emphasized for po-
litical purposes, "as the symbols of the traditional culture are used as mechanisms
for the articulation of political alignments" (1976:97). Thus defined, ethnicity and
tradition can be studied in both developed and developing societies; Cohen cites
(1976:97), among others, Hannerz's description of the role of ethnicity in the de-
velopment and maintenance of criminal organizations in the United States.
Among elites, tradition or agreement on ideology seems not so important as an
emphasis on life-style and ceremonials that reiterate the legitimacy of elite status,
though ideological specialists are also found in elite groups. Cohen uses the City men
of London and Hausa traders in Yoruba towns as examples; the symbols of their
respective backgrounds are critical to their membership in the elite community.
Religion is a powerful articulating form, which sometimes offers flexible, po-
tent symbols under which a group can unite. In Africa many ethnic groups whose
economic and political interests, as well as their distinctiveness, were denied by
postcolonial nationhood have adjusted to the new situation by reorganizing along
religious lines. In the Hausa quarter of Ibadan, men were initiated into a mystical
Islamic sect; the effect was to reorganize Hausa political, religious, and ritual group-
ings, to inhibit social interaction with Yoruba, and to increase informal social
interaction within the community. "A new myth of distinctiveness for the quarter
was founded. The community was now a superior, puritanical, ritual community,
a religious brotherhood distinct from the masses of Yoruba Muslims in the city"
(Cohen 1976:104). Cohen also mentions secret ritual groups and "cousinhoods"
as examples of informal organizations rendered politically potent through affirma-
tive ideologies.
The active role of tradition in the formation and maintenance of ethnic groups
is clear in both these theories. Cohen's theory has broader research implications
than Barth's, and less emphasis on modernization theory, but there is no reason not
to explore both boundary maintenance and ideological shifts among competing
economic groups in the struggle for political power. Silverman (1976) has suggested
that the theories of Barth and Cohen may be combined in a general study of stra-
tegies and competition.
Keyes (1979) has provided an interesting test case both for boundary mainten-
ance and ideological shifts in his data on the Karen, who constitute "the largest
indigenous minority group in mainland Southeast Asia" (1979:124). Karen ethnic
identity is not asserted or stressed by those whose economic life involves them only
minimally with the larger society; those who follow traditional patterns of cultiva-
tion, however, have recently become increasingly self-conscious ethnically, as the
governments of Thailand and Burma have moved to restrict their means of liveli-
hood. Another means of activating ethnic identity has been the adoption of religion
(Keyes 1979:123):
The Karen are particularlyfascinatingin that a sense of distinctive Karen morality has been
connected with a number of different religions. This fact can be interpreted, I maintain, as
indicative of Karen efforts to find an ideology which is appropriateto their subordinate
political status. On the one hand, some Karens choose religious ideologies which reinforce
their sense of apartness from the larger societies of Thailandand Burmain which they are
located. Other Karens, however, have turned to religious ideologies-Christianty as well as a
variety of millennialisms-which orient them to action of a nationalistic or, at least, proto-
nationalisticmode.
Barth's suggestion that elites use tradition for boundary maintenance more fre-
quently than other groups cannot be supported by Keyes's data or by Cohen's
tracing of ideological systems among ethnic, elite, and religious groups. But Barth
was right, of course, in singling out for investigation why ethnic groups come into
being and how they maintain their distinctiveness; whatever may be the difficulties
in the study of active uses of tradition, it is certain that the passive uses will not
help us find answers.
Whether used in combination or separately, Barth's and Cohen's theories point
to the necessity of understanding the several meanings and uses of tradition. Barth
focuses only on what I have called the external sanctifying use of tradition, among
elites; Cohen cites empirical evidence for what I have called the internal and external
sanctifying uses of tradition. In Cohen's theory, too, what I have called the evalua-
tive dimension is implied in the discussion of unconscious ideological modifications
and the appointment of ideological guardians and specialists, as ethnic identification
is "activated."
CONCLUSIONS
I have specified two meanings and uses of the concept of tradition in anthropol-
ogy: the first, the passive or ideal use, borrowed from the theoretical literature of
the social sciences; the second, the active or ideological use, recorded by ethnogra-
phers. I have traced the active uses of tradition in ethnographic works and indicated
how indigenous recastings of selected cultural elements may be used. This resulted
in the suggestion of two research directions for the further study of the active uses
of tradition: the investigation of sanctifying and evaluative uses, each with internal
and external dimensions. These directions are especially pertinent to current studies
of ethnic-group formation and maintenance, and should be useful in delineating and
interpreting indigenous reformulations of "tradition," especially where traditions
are used to support claims to economic and political rights and privileges.
Like culture, the term tradition has been used so often and in so many contexts
that, as Shils (1971) suggests, it may not have any meaning at all. While I see no rea-
son to attempt to arrive at a single meaning for the term, I believe there is every
reason to explore its implications, rather than to use it as a commonplace term
surrounded by hazy, ideal assumptions. It may be the case that substitution of a
different binary pair, such as modernity/premodernity (Apter 1965), would force
contemplation of the characteristics of different societies, but the most important
implication of this analysisis that the unreflective use of the term obscures important
areas of research.
Kaplan (1964:52) suggests that "the function of scientific concepts is to mark
the categories which will tell us more about our subject matter than any other cate-
gorical sets," but in their use of tradition anthropologists have behaved more in the
spirit of Humpty Dumpty, who declared, "WhenI use a word, it means just what I
choose it to mean-neither more nor less." Alice replied, "The question is whether
you can make words mean so many different things."
NOTES
1. Time for research on this paper was 3. Levi-Strauss (1966) would maintain that
accorded me by a National Endowment for the binary oppositions are a universal feature of hu-
Humanities Fellowship in Residence for College man consciousness, but these particular pairs
Teachers, No. F-76-293, 1976-77. The research gained prominence in nineteenth-century writ-
was funded by a grant from the National ings, evidence perhaps of an intellectual search
Institute of General Medical Sciences and for the firm grounding of ethnocentric notions,
Columbia University, No. 5-T01-GM-01797. An as Goody (1977:2) observes, rather than of a
earlier draft of this paper was presented at the changein human consciousness.
American Anthropological Association meet- 4. While Durkheim appears sanguine about
ings, Houston, Texas, November 29 to Decem- the consequences of modernity early in The Di-
ber 3, 1977. vision of Labor in Society, this was not always
I am indebted to Robert Anderson, Riva the case; in the later chapters of The Division of
Berleant-Schiller, Yehudi A. Cohen, David Labor and in Suicide (Durkheim 1951), he
Kaplan, Regina Kenen, Sidney W. Mintz, stressed that social disintegration and individual
Howard Robboy, and Alvin H. Schulman for alienation were characteristic of modern
useful and stimulating comments on the paper, societies.
and to Nita Krevans for research assistance; 5. Sociological critiques of tradition and
responsibility for errors, however, is mine modernity have produced some interesting
alone. insights. Bendix (1967) focuses on stratifica-
2. The uses I deal with are sociocultural, tion, Smelser (1967) on structural differentia-
not archaeological uses; less common but tion in four areas, and Eisenstadt (1972) on
interesting are Honigmann's (1976:243) refer- structural differetiation and institutional ab-
ence to "traditional anthropology," by which sorption of change.
he means humanistic, qualitative anthropology, Shils's (1971) critique of tradition and
and Tax's (1977) reference to the "anthropo- modernity develops a different argument,
logical tradition," by which he means the provocative but tangential to this discussion. In
liberal, generalist trends of anthropology. the hope of systematizing knowledge about
TWO MEANINGS AND USES OF TRADITION 87
tradition, he suggests that traditions may be uses the French Revolution to illustrate his
defined as beliefs accepted often (but not only) point that myth is timeless and history sequen-
because they have been believed before, and tial, noting that the French Revolution is both
posits what might be called a Great Man theory a sequence and a timeless pattern to a French
of change in tradition when he says, (1971: politician, a pattern that "can be detected in
146) "it is not because the traditionally trans- the contemporary French social structure
mitted beliefs have failed to remain in some and which provides a clue for its interpretation,
sort of 'appropriate' relationship to the circum- a lead from which to infer future develop-
stances of their believers but because the ments" (1962:250). According to this view,
intelligence and imagination of new recipients anthropologists should expect to find that
of the traditional beliefs have perceived defects traditions are an active, creative force. In "How
in what has been transmitted." Myths Die," Levi-Strauss notes that the trans-
All the sociological critiques have more formations a myth undergoes will eventually
bearing on modernization theory than on what exhaust it, but the myth will not disappear; it
I have called the active and passive views of will be fictionally elaborated or reactivated
tradition. "with a view to legitimizing history. This
6. One such three-stage typology was history, in its turn, may be of two types:
proposed by Almond and Powell (1966) in retrospective, to found a traditional order on a
their classification of political systems by distant past; or prospective, to make this
degree of structural differentiation and cultural past the beginning of a future which is starting
secularization. In primitive systems (Bergdama, to take shape" (Levi-Strauss 1976:268). Carr
Nuer) there are intermittent political structures; (1962:24-54) discusses history as a reflection of
in traditional systems (Inca, twelfth-century historians' views and positions in time. Cohn
France) there are differentiated governmental- (1961:242) suggests that there are two types of
political structures; in modern systems there are past: "a traditional past, which grows out of
differentiated political infrastructures with the mythology and sacred traditions of north
different degrees of mobilization. India, and a historic past, which is a set of ideas
7. Levi-Strauss draws a fine, and almost about the remembered experiences of a group
atemporal distinction between myth and of people in a local region. The traditional past
history, and between kinds of history. Myths, usually refers to matters religious and cultural,
while timeless, explain present, past, and and the historic past to matters social and
future, while history is of four kinds (1962: political."
250): "the history men make unconsciously, 8. Barth (1969:9) states that anthropologi-
history of men consciously made by historians, cal reasoning has rested on the premise that cul-
the philosopher's interpretation of the history tural variation is discontinuous, and that there
of men or his interpretation of the history of are aggregates of people who share a common
historians." His primary concerns are with culture, contained within an abstracted concept
historical sequence and mythical pattern; he of society.
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Two Meanings and Uses of Tradition

Author(s): Eugenia Shanklin

TRADITION IS A COMMONPLACEWORD that has taken on technical meaning in

TRADITION AS A PASSIVE, ANALYTIC TERM

TRADITION AS AN ACTIVE CONCEPT

RESEARCHDIRECTIONSIN THE STUDY OF ACTIVEUSES OF TRADITION

METHODOLOGICAL CHANGES REQUIRED BY THE ACTIVE CONCEPT OF TRADITION

EXAMPLES OF THE ACTIVE USE OF TRADITION

THE ROLE OF TRADITION IN ETHNICITY

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