CHAPTER V

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU AND INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

 Jawaharlal Nehru one of the most outstanding statesmen of the

twentieth century, had left his indelible imprint on all aspects of Modern

India. An intense nationalist, a romantic revolutionary, a charismatic

leader committed to social justice and individual freedom, Nehru was

also an internationalist conscious of the cross currents of global politics

and India's emerging role in the world scene. The two major strands of

nationalism and internationalism blended into an ideal mould in this

unique yet humane, personality.

It is very difficult to fit in Jawaharlal Nehru into any ideological

framework. He was a product of evolution, of the stresses and strains as

much as hope and aspirations which characterised the prolonged

nationalist struggle.1

The Attitude of the Indian National Congress on crucial questions

of imperialism, colonial exploitation and racial discrimination were fairly

well known even before 1927, when Jawaharlal Nehru gained a decisive

influence on Congress thinking on foreign policy. But it was Nehru who

infused flesh and blood into them; as N.V.Rajkumar has written, Nehru

was the "mentor of the Congress's foreign policy; it was he who gave

"Congress and India a precise scheme of thought with regard to their

action in specific matters concerning international relations."2

Nehru's keen interest in international affairs and his conviction

that India should make its stand clear on crucial global issues was a
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logical corollary of the manner in which Indian National Movement,

developed in the 19th and 20th centuries. The Indian National Congress,

the main institutional expression of Indian nationalist aspirations, evinced

keen interest in matters relating to foreign policy from its very inception.3

Though in the initial stages, it was confined to resolutions in the annual

sessions of the Congress, it became more pronounced with Mahatma

Gandhi occupying the centre of the political stage. Gandhi took a global

view of the Indian nationalist movement.4

The nationalist horizon further widened and interest in

international affairs became more intense with Jawaharlal Nehru

emerging as the "acknowledged spokesman on foreign affairs.5 Through

his speeches and writings, Nehru influenced the Indian National

Congress to pay greater attention to international affairs. In an article in

New Era published from Madras in May 1928, Nehru wrote: "We must^

end the isolation of India and try to understand world currents and world

happenings. We must, in addition to our nationalism, develop an

internationalism which is prepared to profit by the good things of other

countries and to co-operate with the progressive forces of the world."6

Nehru underlined the need for a reorientation of Indian outlook on world

affairs and was mainly instrumental in making the Indian National

Congress take positive stance on issues relating to freedom from colonial

domination and fight against Fascism and Nazism.7

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 Nehru's maiden venture into the international arena came quite

late in life, in 1927, when he was 38 years old.8 His extensive reading, his

visit to Europe - a fundamentally altered Europe after the first world war

in 1926-27, his brief contacts with revolutionary experiments in U.S.S.R.

his contacts with progressive socialist intellectuals and interactions with

representatives of the national liberation movement in Asia, Africa and

Latin America - all these enabled him to crystallise his views on foreign

policy. His first,9 but significant, essay on "A Foreign Policy for India"

published in September 1927 sketch out his thinking on several relevant

issues and is extremely important for understanding the genesis of Indian

foreign policy.10 The essay should be read along with his speeches and

statements during the Congress of the oppressed Nationalities in Brussels

in February 1927. A foreign policy, according to Nehru, is essential "to

end the isolation in which India has lived for generations and for

developing contacts with other parts of the world. Whether we wish or

not, India cannot remain, now or hereafter, cut off from the rest of the

world."11

He condemned, in particular, the imperialist policy of deploying

Indian soldiers to put down the nationalist aspirations of other peoples.12

Nehru foresaw the emergence of new imperialist powers,

especially U.S. imperialism. In his report to the AICC on the Brussels

Congress, Nehru wrote: "Most of us, specially from Asia, were wholly

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ignorant of the problems of South America, and how the rising

imperialism of the United States, with its tremendous resources and

immunity from external attack, is gradually taking a stranglehold of

Central and South America. But we are not likely to remain ignorant

much longer for the great problem of the near future will be American

imperialism, even more than British imperialism."13

In the pursuit of foreign policy, Nehru pointed out India will

naturally stretch its hand of friendship to other Asiatic neighbours. To

quote Nehru: "In developing our foreign policy, we shall naturally first

cultivate friendly relations with the countries of the East, which have so

much in common with us. Nepal will be our neighbour and friend; and

China and Japan, Indonesia, Annam and Central Asia, we shall have the

closest contact. So also with Afghanistan, Persia, Turkey and Egypt."14

Friendship with Asian countries will be on the basis of perfect

equality and it will have no tinge of dominance dependency syndrome.

Nehru made this point absolutely clear by referring to the Burmese

problem.15

"We shall hope in the future Federation of India, Burma will be an

honourable member. But it should be made perfectly clear that it is for

the people of Burma to make the decision, and should they are perfectly

welcome to do so."16

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 Jawaharlai Nehru also clearly expressed his views on India's stand

in future imperialist wars. In Foreign Policy for India, he wrote: "India

should also declare unequivocally that she will be no party to any war

without her consent and if she is bullied or hustled into such a war, she

will not heap in any way."17

Dealing with India's stand if Britain were to declare war on other

Asian countries, Nehru said: "If a war breaks out in the East, India must

necessarily play a decisive role in it. A country rising against British rule

and trying to get rid of it will not only hamper such a war but will

obstruct all British plans."18

"From this stand point, it was only natural for the Indian National

Congress to assert during the Second World War that India can only be

defended by Indians and, that too, only when it is completely free from

foreign domination."19

It is interesting to note that even in the late 1920s Nehru devoted

great attention to India's relations both with Soviet Union and China. He

repudiated the bogey of "Russian expansionism", carefully nurtured by

imperialist historians and affirmed that friendly relations with Soviet

r Union will be one of the cardinal tenets of Indian foreign policy. Nehru

explained Soviet foreign policy as follows: "The principles and, what is

more important, the practice of Soviet Russia have always been in favour

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of the fullest self determination of various people. She has always been

for the oppressed and exploited."20

After his visit to the Soviet Union in 1928, Nehru remarked,

"ordinarily Russia and India should live as the best of neighbours with

the fewest points of friction." China and Chinese struggle against

imperialism naturally evoked friendly feelings in Nehru. In Brussels,

Nehru declared, "India today is with China not only because she has

every sympathy for her, but because she feels that China's successful fight

is the most hopeful sign for the future downfall of imperialism."21

The Congress of the oppressed Nationalities was the first

international conference of its kind and provided an opportunity for

Jawaharlal Nehru to establish close links with other national liberation

movements.22 The Congress was attended by 174 delegates from 31

countries. The chief organiser of the Congress was Willi Muenzenberg

and other distinguished delegates included Henri Barbusee, George

Lansbury, Ellen Wilkinson, Fenner Brockway, Harry Pollitt, Reginal

Bridgman, Ernast Toiler, Mohammad Hatta and Ho Chih Minh. In a

"Statement to the Press" on 9 February 1927, Nehru pointed out that there

was "much in common" in the struggle of various "subject and

oppressed peoples."23 Their opponents, Nehru said, "are often the same,

although they sometimes appear in different guises and the means

employed for their subjection are often similar."24 He appealed for

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"Greater contacts" and "closer co-operation" among the nationalists

fighting for freedom. In a moving speech to the Congress on 10 February

1927, Nehru attacked British imperialism for its exploitation and

underlined the necessity to forge close links among Asian nationalists.

Nehru pointed out that freedom of India was the essential pre-requisite

for the freedom of mankind. "It is important for you that we win

freedom." Nehru said, "not only internal freedom but freedom also to

make contacts with out neighbours and other lands as we wish."25

Thus a close scrutiny of Nehruiana clearly makes it evident that

major aspects of Indian foreign policy - except perhaps non-alignment

which was an off shoot of the cold war - were articulated by Jawaharlal

Nehru as early as 1927-28.

Nehru's Contribution to India' Foreign Policy

As the first Prime Minister - (interim government) in September

1946, Nehru informed the world that India would develop an active role

in world affairs, pursuing an "independent policy compatible with our

national interest."26 This perhaps brought some confusion in

international politics because of his statement appeared to be a bit

vague." India said Nehru, could play a positive role in the stretch from

Australia and New Zealand to East Africa, and as the first Asian and

African country to have gained freedom would adopt an uncommitted an

influential stand on international issues."27 This approach of Nehru

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reflected the foreign policy evolved during the period of our freedom

struggle. After India became independent, naturally reflected that striving

for freedom on India's part in the world affairs. Nehru always felt that

India should preserve her freedom to judge every international issue on

its merits without any partisan bias. The time factor of India's

achievement of Independence (the age of bipolarism) also was a big factor

for Nehru's independent foreign policy; and the most important

consideration which Nehru attached for India's foreign policy is solidly

related to 'Economic Development' of India. Besides the geo-political

location of India was also in this context a decisive factor. As General

Auchinleck puts it in 1946.28

"Should India be unfriendly or liable to be influenced by a power,

such as Russia China or Japan, hostile to the British Commonwealth, our

strategic position in the Indian Ocean world become untenable and our

communication with New Zealand and Australia most insecure."29

In 1940s, it was a period in the history of Indian civilization, for

those who struggled for freedom and worked to consolidate it worked

upon the early years of Independence as a crucial period in establishing

India's domestic institutions and its position in the world. Nehru himself

reflected his view in eloquent words - Long years ago we made a tryst

with destiny...." A moment comes, which comes but rarely in history,’

when an age ends, and when the source of a nation long suppressed,

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 finds utterance/' these word reflected the widespread awareness that a

unique moment was at hand."30

Nehru always tried to carve out a new role for itself and if possible,

to play the role of bridge-builder between the blocks, and thus promote

world peace and international understanding, and non-alignment became

the keystone to that policy. Besides, the concept of non-alignment was the

result of the experiences which the leaders (especially Nehru) had during

the freedom struggle. "In 1958, Nehru himself had asserted that he was

not the architect or originator of India's foreign policy. Nehru drew the

- contours of the foreign policy by declaring that India would always keep

away from the power politics. He also asserted the "wherever freedom is

menaced or justice threatened or where aggression takes place, we cannot

be and shall not be neutral."31

This approach of Nehru in international politics did not receive

instant recognition from the many important countries of the world, and

India did not receive early recognition. Obviously Nehru's thinking was

more in touch with many of the realities of post war. Asia than was the

British Indian tradition, and it was India's efforts to apply these precepts

that attracted the attention of the world in the early years of Indian
*

Independence. The British Indian tradition was centred on the vital issues

of territorial integrity. Great Britain accorded instant recognition to the

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genuineness of India's non-aligned policy, while other's viewed her with

an eye of suspicion.32

For many years the momentous was maintained, but the setbacks

of India's progress during Nehru's regime had been more striking than

the advances. Nehru gained importance in the international politics; but it

is equally true that, in the international sphere, there had been some*

decline in India's prestige and influence and war with her principal

neighbours had magnified all her problems.33

In its broader international context, however, the foreign policy of

the British Indian Government was clearly directed towards advancing

British rather than Indian interest. Secondly, Nehru declined Imperialism,

favoured Independence for colonial territories and saw no basis for

British claims about external threats to India's frontiers. This was also one

of the major criticism of Nehru's foreign policy. Stalin and his colleagues

were suspicious of every one who was not fully with them. "Nehru set

about building up the foreign policy of India brick by brick". At times

Nehru complained "how naive the naive the Americans are in their

foreign policy. It is only their money and their power that carries them

thoroughly not their intelligence or any other quality". And in context of

U.S.S.R, he pointed, that Russians denounced non-alignment as a policy

of collaboration with British imperialism and help all of the Kashmir

issue".34 Ail this had no effect on Nehru's approach towards international

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politics, who further stated 'we want friendship and co-operation with

Russia, and fate and circumstances have thrust, a tremendous

responsibility of the United States. It may stumble often, but it has the

capacity, to stand up again and take some more steps forward. This

approach of Nehru was regarded as predominately successful during the

early years of independence. India held the most valuable part of Kashmir

and was able to deal with Pakistan very strongly. India's efforts on behalf,

on non-alignment and anti-colonialism won, great attention and

considerable respect in many parts of the world, and because of which

India's foreign which also helped to enhance national unity. Nehru

during this period strived to explain his concept of non-alignment; and in

efforts of which helped to lay down the foundations of India's foreign

policy.35

"The major challenge to Nehru's foreign policy came from the

northeast. Prime Minister Nehru had always placed great importance on

good relations with Peking in view of Chinese strength and Pakistani

hostility towards India. His policy seemed to be working during the mid

fifties." ... Indian apprehension increased with the discovery if 1958 of a

Chinese road in the Aksai China area of Ladakh section of Kashmir, and

in 1959 Chou En-Lai first informed Nehru that China did not accept

India's border claims, Border clashes also occurred in this period, and by

August 1959 Nehru felt compelled to inform Parliament of the Sino-

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.Indian border dispute, Asia's tow largest nations were now enemies, and

the Panch Sheet period was over a scant five years after it had begun.36

In response to these developments, "India's defence budget more

than doubled to 1.8 billion within two years, as New Delhi attempted to

develop a military machine capable of facing China and Pakistan at the

same time".37

India's policy had undergone a change which stood against

acceptance of Military aid, and India had to accept a continuous flow of

Western and Soviet arms". (The Afro-Asian countries also generally took

a neutral position - which was one of the crudest blows of all to India).

Under the circumstances, "Nehru did not want to rely on the West alone,

lest this may lead to the end of non-alignment and the Soviet support to

China".38

Thus all this infers to state that Nehru's contribution to non-align

foreign policy has been more philosophical rather than practical.39

Nehru certainly has laid down the foundations of India's foreign

policy. He was very sure that "India has much to give not in gold or silver

or even in exportable commodities, but by all over the world that the

future of Asia will be powerfully determined by the future of India. India

becomes more and more pivot of Asia". He was a man of great foresight,

but the policy of non-alignment; which has resulted in sort of "informal

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double alignment" as some critics have pointed. The true partice of non-

alignment", or the movement of non-alignment has been the result of

emergence of Mrs. Indira Gandhi as the Prime Minister.40

The conflict with China introduced a new element in the Indo-U.S

relations quite close and intimate. In the wake of the border war with

China came the war with Pakistan in September 1965. The U.S. had

maintained neutrality in this war and reportedly refused Pakistan

President Ayub Khan's request for intervention. Washington was also

reported to have privately warned China against intervention in the Indo-

Pak war.41

Nehru's non-alignment policy was continued despite its conflicts

with China and Pakistan and the major changes in some key relationships

involving South Asia. The formation and decline of United States -

Pakistan alliance, the development of close relations between India and

the U.S.S.R. and the shift from friendship to animosity in Sino-Indian

relations - India has held to its policy of non-alignment and its support

for Asian and African nationalism through the past forty years this has

been a source of considerable pride to Indians. Prime Minister Indira

Gandhi's meeting with Presidents Tito and Nasser in 1966, was an effort

to assert the continuity of Indian policy as well as to demonstrate that

non-alignment still had a practical meaning in a world in which both

Western and Communist alliance system were crumbling. Mrs.Indira

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Gandhi's first decade in office January 1966 - March 1977 can be stated to

be a decisive and controversial period in history of contemporary foreign

policy.42 Decisive because Mrs. Gandhi led her country through different

situations at home and abroad, than those that had prevailed in during

the Nehru era. Controversial, because no unanimity of informed opinion

has emerged on the balance of costs and benefits to India of Mrs.Gandhi's

leadership. Mrs.Gandhi's personality and disposition, her interpretation

of the nations interests; were as important as the external setting in

shaping India's foreign policy. Indira was Nehru's confidence, his closest

companion, his political courier. One thing certain that Indira learned

from Nehru's mistakes and failures. Not with standing this training,

Indira did not set herself on a course of emulation of her father as a

person or as a national leader. Some who worked with both suggest that

she consciously did the opposite though as Prime Minister she quoted

Nehru on appropriate occasions - she followed a policy in foreign

relations which was different from his. Her own perspective is best

summed up in her remarks, off quoted, "He was a Saint who strayed into

politics, I am a touch politician."43

In any form of Government, those responsible for formulation of

foreign or domestic policy yield more power and influence, and occupy

positions of eminence, save such extreme situations which do not lead to

personality cult like that of Stalin. Nehru, as the Prime Minister and

Foreign Minister for nearly two decades, was a pivot in shaping India's
148
Foreign Policy based on the principles of peace, freedom and prosperity,

Michael Brecher has pointed out that "in no other state does one man

dominate Foreign policy as does Nehru in India."44 Indeed, so

overwhelming was his influence that India's Foreign policy has come to

mean in the minds of people everywhere as personal policy of Pandit

Nehru.

Policy of Non-Alignment

The policy of non-alignment enunciated by Nehru embodied the

heritage of the long Indian struggle for freedom and was not something

contrived in haste on the morrow of Independence because of India's

military weakness or its being new in the field of diplomacy.45

Non-alignment has a negative meaning. But its positive

connotation objects to national lining up for war purposes, military

blocks, military alliances and the like. In effect, it means that in a crisis

involving the possibility of war, we are unaligned and feel that more than

ever it is up to us to do whatever we can to prevent such a calamity

coming down upon us.46 Nehru saw in non-alignment a guarantee of

India's independence in the field of foreign policy. According to him

joining block would mean only one thing to "give up your view about a

particular question and adopt the other party's view on that question, to

please it and gain its favour."47

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Policy Towards Afro-Asian Countries

Some of the speeches of Nehru at the international gatherings of

the Asian and African countries highlighted the thoughts and aspirations

of millions of people in the coloured world. The speeches provided a

strong base to Nehru not only to champion the cause of the countries in

question, but to attain a unique position in the international sphere, and

emerge as their spokesman. India being the victim of modern imperialism

and her freedom after long struggle had marked the beginning of process

of decolonisation after the second world war. Nehru's personality and his

Oratorical skill, clear perception of historical forces operating in the post

world war period made a decisive impact on the minds of people in far-

flung countries. The Afro-Asian countries have their part in the history of

the world. This was referred at the inaugural session of the Asian

Relations Conference held in New Delhi on 23rd March 1947 - that "for

long have we of Asia been petitioners in Western courts and chancelleries.

That story must now belong to the past, we propose to stand on our own

legs and to cooperate with all others who are prepared to cooperate with

us."48 His speech at the Asian-African Conference at Bounding in 1955

reiterated his earlier stand and emphasised in unequivocal terms the need

for maintenance of world peace, cooperation and co-existence.49

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Kashmir Issue

Kashmir as a most important single factor of India's external

relations brought cold war to the Indian subcontinent, resulting in a

heavy expenditure to its exchequer. Since Indian independence, and

accentuated further after 1962, it continued to be a major factor in India's

defence. Nehru, as the Minister for External Affairs, took up Kashmir

issue and ;made known to the external world that it was an integral part

;of India, and proceeded on the idealistic approach, which did not yield

any positive results. Nehru admitted that "we have indeed

overscrupulous in this matter," and that "we went out of our way to

make an unilateral declaration that we would abide by the will of the

people of Kashmir as declared in a plebiscite or referendum.50 The

idealistic elements of Nehru's approach to Kashmir question was also

revealed when the issue was referred to the U.N. The U.N. then was yet

an infant and an experimental organization heavily weighed in favour of

the Western powers. On the issue being referred to the U.N. Nehru, in the

Constituent Assembly in March 1948, stated that "our making a reference

on this issue to the Security Council of the U.N. was an act of faith,

because we believe in the progressive realisation of a world order and a

world government,51 and Pakistan has a reason to the U.N. but not India.

It was Pakistan not India that was unsuccessful in occupying the major

part of Kashmir. Further, India's reference on the Kashmir issue to the

U.N. should be on the provisions of Chapter IV (U.N.O.) which deals with

the specific settlement of International disputes through negotiations

mediation and conciliation."52

Referring to aggression on India-Pakistan, Nehru stated that "it is

my contention that if India regarded Kashmir as incontestably an Indian

territory after the accession - and regarded Pakistan action in Kashmir as

an aggression on India."53 Nehru's attempts to solve the issue of Kashmir

through all peaceful means proved futile because of geo-political

importance attached to it.

Goa Issue

On India's policy with regard to Goa, Nehru said54 that: (a) We

may not abandon or permit any degradation of our identification with the

cause of our compatriot under Portuguese rule, and (b) Equally we may

not adopt, advocate or deliberately bring about any situation of violence.

In the subsequent years also Nehru reiterated that "we rule out

completely non-peaceful methods, and emphasised that India's policy

had been one of "waiting and exercising some patience even though it has

been rather painful to do so." In Nehru's Foreign Policy in general, and

Goa issue in particular the features of realism seem to establish a firm

base.55 At no stage had Nehru stated before 1961 that India would use

armed forces to free Goa if peaceful methods failed, although he

occasionally remarked that "the iron has gone into our soul, and that

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India's patience had been exhausted. India opted deliberately the policy

of non-violence when it suited her interests, and of course, she had no

right to urge the other stages to adhere to peaceful methods in their

Foreign policy.56

Suez Crisis

The Suez and Hungarian crisis of 1956 showed how far India had

travelled from her special relations with Britain and how much value she

attached to the maintenance of friendly ties with the Soviet Union. The

two crises were not similar and certainly did not call for identical

reactions. The British invasion of Suez dearly showed that it was not in

any way inhibited by India's close ties with Britain and felt to denounce

invasion in as strong a language as possible. While sympathising with the

plight of the Hungarian people he was extremely cautious in his choice of

timing as well as of words and took care to keep India scrupulously aloof

from various Western moves to denounce the Soviet Union.57 At that

time Nehru's nature of understanding of world situation was appreciated

by the Asian and African countries.

Tibet and China and Indo-China

Nehru's positive and idealistic approach towards China also did

not yield and positive result. For India, it was most inappropriate to do

her eyes and ignore emergence of new China. Of course, India's prompt

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recognition of the new government was a step in the right direction.

Nehru realised that to defend Tibet (in 1950) against China through any

military action would have been quixotic. In such a context, Nehru stated

in the Parliament that "the matter would be settled by peaceful

negotiations, but was shocked with the outbreak of news that the Chinese

armies were marching into Tibet."58 In such a background, Nehru

believed that through Pancha Sheel Agreement (1954) with China, peace

could be established not only between these two countries, but in East

Asia also.

Turning to Indo-China relations, they do not appear to have been

based on realistic approach. Nehru, being guided by the principle of

'peaceful settlement/ underestimated the politico-military threat, and did

not take any firm action when China attacked India. India then was ill-

equipped, whereas Chinese forces were superior to the former's forces

both in number and in equipment, and therefore, could not effectively

counter the attack, ordering Indian troops to evict the Chinese from

Indian territory seem to have stem primarily from a disbelief in the

possibility of any strong military action by China. From the short-term

point of view, Nehru's China policy was only a question59 of degree, and

future Indo-China policy may probably be based on his long-term policy.

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 Indo-Pak Relations

Nehru was sincere in his desire for general improvement in

relations with Pakistan and was searching for a long-term settlement

encompassing all matters.60 After cease fire on December 22, 1949, the

Government of India handed over to the Pakistan High Commissioner in

India, a draft on a joint declaration denouncing the use of force for the

settlement of disputes between the two countries. The draft on no war

declaration states that "The Government of India and the Government of

Pakistan desirous of promoting friendship and goodwill between their

peoples who have many committees hereby declare that they condemn

. resort" to war for the settlement of any existing or future disputes

between them. But, Pakistan did not agree for "Pakistan looks at every

issue from the point of view of its possible effect on India, and how they

can harm India. They regard India as an enemy. But I feel that we should

while protecting our rights should not try to quarrel with Paskitan."61

U.S. and U.S.S.R,

After independence, India has chosen the path of non-alignment

with either U.S. or U.S.S.R. because of cold war power politics and

military alliances. But India has to be dependent on two countries for

their economic help. Nehru said that "When I say that we should not

align ourselves with any power block it does not mean that we should not

be closer in our relations with some countries than with others. That
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depends on entirely different factors."62 In the early years, India's

relations were much closer with Britain and U.S. India's trade relations

were closer to Britain than to any other country. British policy towards

Kashmir indicated a strong prediction for Pakistan and seemed to be in

continuation of the earlier imperialist policy encouraging Muslim League

in its anti-Congress stance. The U.S. also have a similar objective in South

Asia. Both seemed to be moving in the direction of limiting India's

influence while encouraging Pakistan.

From the beginning Indo-American relations were not dependent

on any ideology or geographical interest Nehru went to seek aid from the

U.S. inl949. They were not inclined to invest in Indian Public Sector.63

Nehru's perception of non-alignment was misunderstood by American

officials and they saw that Pak was more suitable to fulfil their ambitions

than India. Nehru, however, rejected the deal providing facilities to the

Voice of America and steadfastly refused to respond to the loud clamour

in India for the abandonment of the Policy on non-alignment.64 That

policy, he asserted again and again, and had been fully vindicated by the

aftermath of the Chinese invasion and also by the fact that India was able

to secure the support of both the super powers. He agreed in the Lok

Sabha on September 3, 1963 that because of the Chinese aggression we

had developed closer bonds with some countries which helped us. This,

however, did not mean that "we have weakened our desire to adhere to

non-alignment."65
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 In regard to the Indo-USSR relations, we remember that our

national movement had inspiration from the Soviet people. Nehru's visit

to the Soviet Union and its help to our industrial sector was appreciable.

The case of Kashmir at the U.N.O. and Goa's merger into India were

supported by the USSR. Kruchchev's support to the peaceful in the

Economic Development of India were noteworthy. The then Prime

Minister of USSR Bulgainin said "If we Russians are friends, we are

friends unto death and if we are enemies we are enemies unto death." In

reply Nehru said that India had no enemies66 which reflects Nehru's

intensive desire to have friendly relations with all the nations and enmity

with none.

Nehru's Role in the Commonwealth

Pandit Nehru's decision of keeping India in the Commonwealth

was a great contribution to that Organisation and India's continued

membership provided the basis for the present structure of the

Commonwealth. The whole concept of the Commonwealth changed after

India's Independence and its decision laid the political and psychological

foundations for the profound transformation of the Commonwealth after

the Second World War.67

Nehru's decision to remain in the Commonwealth in 1947 and later

as a republic changed the existing association of Anglo-Saxon

Communities into a multi-racial one. This brought a complete

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transformation in the character of the Commonwealth. It was a

transformation both of political practice and outlook. As a result, the

mighty British empire underwent a change in its composition, conception,

legal position and function. The condition for membership was no longer

that of allegiance to the British Crown, but acceptance of the Crown as the

head of the Commonwealth in which the equality of all races was

established and the political equality of all member States recognized.

India became the first non-white Asian member of the Commonwealth

along with Pakistan. Thus India blazed a trial, and set into motion, a

process which has over the years, metamorphosed the very character of

the Commonwealth.68

Today, it is universally accepted that the Nehru's decision created

the new Commonwealth and helped enlarge and broaden the area of its

discussion on the pressing problems of the world. Nehru's rejection of the

grossly inadequate theme of a bipolar world enabled newly independent

Asian, African Caribbean and Pacific countries to adopt non-alignment as

their policy.69 A vast majority of the non-white members of the

Commonwealth are with non-alignment today. India led the van as

regards independence and republicanism. Had India left the

Commonwealth after January 1950, there would have been definitely

powerful and widespread nationalist feeling in Ceylon demanding that

Ceylon too should follow India, In July 1956, S.W.R.D. Bandaranayake

decided to follow India. Even after becoming a republic Ceylon decided

to remain in the Commonwealth although the then ruling party i.e., Sri

Lanka Freedom Party had once stood for Ceylon becoming a republic

outside the Commonwealth.

Besides, India's adoption of the Parliamentary system of

government of the British pattern gave it "a stature and prestige which it

did not have before." India's endorsement made it easier for other

independent nations to adopt the Parliamentary form and strengthened

the impression in the world at large that the Commonwealth represented

democratic institution.70

India's large size and the scale of the problems she faces as well as

her moral prestige and the fact that she is the only possible counterweight

to China make her, whether she likes it or not, the focus in the East-West

struggle. Should she fail in her democratic attempt to become a modern

state and turn to communism, the Commonwealth as a whole and Britain

in particular will have failed too. Indian Sensitivity to British attitudes

and behaviour on the one hand has been matched by the political

maturity which has played so significant a part in making the new

Commonwealth work as well as it has done so far.71

Tracing the evolution of the Commonwealth, Ramphal said

"Pandit Nehru had conceived the idea in 1949 and ever since it has

evolved in a manner worthy of Nehru's vision." He further said that

159
Nehru's creativity and the role played by him had made this "modern

Commonwealth a possibility."72

After 1957, there was no looking back, not even after India became

a Republic, a new formula was taking shape that the ex-colonies would

remain within the Commonwealth with the Crown as the symbolic head

of this free association and each member nation enjoying full freedom to

order its own domestic and international affairs.73

The Indian leaders are of the view that membership of the

Commonwealth is in India's national interest. On the other hand, the

British apparently regard India1' continuance in the Commonwealth as

advantageous to themselves and the Commonwealth. Indeed, this

awareness of. mutual interest is the natural foundation of any

international relationship.74

Nehru's patience gave the Commonwealth time to surmount the

strain. Nehru was not just the creator and leader of the new

Commonwealth; he was also its demonstrate fresh vitality. The exact of

South Africa was final testimony to the discarding of the concept of the

"white" nations as the core of the association, and the acceptance of the

equal status of the Asian and African members.75

At the 1961 Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, Nehru

played a decisive role in demonstrating the incompatibility between

160
apartheid and the principles which the Commonwealth was assumed to

embody. Certainly, South Africa's departure removed an important

irritant in Indo-Commonwealth relations.76 In the fifties India had played

a pioneering role in the struggle against colonialism and racism in

international forums. But in sixties, although there could be no doubting

the sincerity of India's support and here readiness to extend material

help, if necessary. India's pioneering role was taken over by the African

countries of Tanzania and Zambia. There was also, perhaps, a general

feeling in India, articulated by Pandit Nehru as early as 1961, at the

Belgrade Non-aligned Conference, that "the classic era of colonialism is

gone ... is dead", and along with Indian preoccupations nearer home, it

contributed to a declining interest in the Commonwealth.77

Britain came under persistent and powerful pressure from "the

voice of Non-European anticolonialism."78 By the late sixties, the

Commonwealth gradually became politically less controversial and there

were indications that India's assessment of the organisation was

beginning to be far more pragmatic than it had been, sentimental ties

making way to growing difference.79

161
 REFERENCES:

1. Indira Gandhi, "Foreword," Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second

Series, Vol.I, (New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1984).

2. Raj Kumar, N.N., The Background of India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi,
All India Congress Committee, 1952), p.2.

3. Bimal Prasad, The Origins of Indian Foreign Policy: The Indian National
Congress and World Affairs, 1885-1947, (Calcutta, Book Land Private
Ltd., 1960).

4. The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi (New Delhi, The Publication

Division, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Govt, of India,
1969), Vol.33, p.41.

5. Ibid., Vol.35, p.457.

6. Michael Brecher, Nehru: A Political Biography, (London: 11959), p.565.

7. "India and the Need for International Contacts," Selected Works of

Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol.3, (New Delhi, Teen Murthy House, 1972),
pp.379-86.

8. Sarvepalli Gopal, Jaxoaharlal Nehru: A Biography, Part I, (New Delhi,

Oxford University Press, 1976), p.5.

9. "A Foreign Policy for India" (September 13, 1927), Selected Works of
Jaxoaharlal Nehru, Vol.2, pp.348-64.

10. Ibid.

11. "Statement to the Press in Brussels," Selected Works of Jaxoaharlal Nehru,

Vol.2, pp.270-2.

„ 12. "The Situation in China and India's Duty," Selected Works of Jawaharlal
Nehru, Vol.2, pp.326-28.

13. "Report on the Brussels Congress," Ibid., pp.353-54.

14. "A Foreign Policy for India," n.9.

15.Ibid.

16.Ibid.
162
 17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid., p.451.

20. "Statement to the Press in Brussels," n.ll,

21. "Report on the Brussels Congress," n.13.

22. Gopal, n.8, pp.100-01.

23. "Statement to the Press in Brussels," n.ll.

24. "Speech at Brussels Congress," Ibid., pp.272-76.

25. "Report on the Brussels Congress," n.13.

26. Dr.Mohammed Hatta (Interviewee) Recorded by Indian Embassy,

Jakarta, September 1972, Oral History Interview, (Nehru Memorial
History and Museum Library), p.2.

27. Jawaharlal Nehru, "Inter-Asian Relations," India Quarterly (New

Delhi), Vol.2, pp.323-27.

28. Interview reported in Nexv York Times, 1st Sept. 1946.

29. Interview reported in National Herald, 17th August 1946.

30. Das, M.N., Partition and Independence of India, (New Delhi, Vision
Books, 1982), p.266.

31. Jawaharlal Nehru: India's Foreign Policy, (New Delhi, The

Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting,
Govt, of India, 1961), p.80.

32. Sarvepalli Gopal, J.Nehru: A Biography, (London, Oxford, Vol.II), p.43.

33. Ibid., p.44.

34. Ibid.

. 35. Ibid., p.44.

36. Nehru to hoy Henderson, January 1949.

37. Foreign Affairs: 'India Friends and Neighbours, William j.Barnads, p.553.

38. Ibid., p.554.

163
39. Ibid., p.554.

40. To the Chief Minister, 2nd October, 1949.

41. Foreign Affairs, India Friends and Neighbours, Vol.46, No.3, p.555,
April 1968.

42. Asian Recorder, 2nd-7th October 1965, pp.6700-1.

43. Oriana Fallaci: A Talk with Indira Gandhi, (Mecalls, June 1973).

44. Michael Brecher, Nehru: A Political Biography, (London, OUP, 1959),

p.315.

45. For details see Bimla Prasad, The Origins of Indian Foreign Policy,
(Calcutta, Book Land Private Ltd., 1962), 2nd edition.

46. J.L.Nehru speeches, Vol.IV (Delhi, 1963), p.36 & 99.

47. Nehru's 'Foreign Policy/ Op. Cit., p.36.

48. Ibid., p.251.

49. Ibid., p.7.

50. Michael Brecher, Op.cit., p.428.

51. Nehru, J.L., India's Foreign Policy, Op.cit., p.377.

52. United National Chapter, (New York, 1952).

53. Nehru, J.L., India's Foreign Policy, Op.cit., p.451.

54. Ibid., p.378.

55. Gopal, S., Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, Vol.III, (Delhi, Oxford

University Press, 1984), p.185.

56. Ibid., p.260.

57. Gopal, S., Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, Vol.I, (Delhi, Oxford

University Press, 1984), p.210.

58. Nehru, J.L., India's Foreign Policy, Op.cit., p.377.

59. Ibid., p.378.

60. Gopal, S., Op.cit, Vol.III, p.260.

61. Ibid., p.261.

164
62. Jawaharlal Nehru Speeches, Vol.IV, (New Delhi, Publication Division,
1969), p.489.

63. Whereas U.S.S.R. readily agreed to help India to tide over the scarcity
of foodgrains during 1949-50 and again she wanted to invest and
provided technology to the Indian industry at the beginning. Nehru's
ideological inclination was in favour of USSR rather than America.

64. Ibid., p.386.

65. Ibid.,

66. Jawaharlal Nehru Speeches, Vol.II, (New Delhi, Publications Division,

1963), p.47.

67. Vivekananda, B. 'The Commonwealth Secretariat' International Studies,

No.3, January 1968, p.309.

68. Chandra Prakash, International Relations, (New Delhi, Vikas Publishing

House, 1983), pp.177-178.

69. Nandhini Iyer, India and the Commonwealth: A Critical Appraisal, (New
Delhi, A.B.C. Publishing House, 1983), pp.28-29.

70. Raj Darbari and Jenis Darbari, Commonwealth and Nehru, (New Delhi,
Vision Books, 1983), p.34.

71. De Smith, S.A., The Vocabulary of Commonwealth Relations, (London:

University of London, The Athlone Press, 1954), p.300.

72. Madan Gopal Gupta, International Relations Since 1919, (Allahabad,

Chaitanya Publishing House, 1958), p.161.

73. Sisir Gupta, Kashmir, Study of India-Pakistan Relations, (Bombay, Asia,

1966), p.42.

74. Hamilton, W.B., Robinson, Kenneth & C.D.W. Goodwin, A Decade of

the Commonwealth, 1955-1964, (North Carolina, Duke University Press,
1966), p.140.

75. Nandhini Iyer, India and the Commonwealth: A Critical Appraisal,

(New Delhi, ABC Publishing House, 1983), p,40.

76. Sir W. Ivor Jenings, Commonwealth in Asia, Oxford Clarendon Press,

1951), p,141.

77. Sir W. Ivor Jenings, Problems of the New Commomvealth (North Carolina,
Duke University Press, 1958), p.120.

165
78. Anup Chand Kapur, Select Constitutions, (New Delhi, S.Chand & Co.,
1981), p.52.

79. Khilaani, N.M., Panorama of Indian Diplomacy, (New Delhi, S.Chand &
Co., 1981), p.30.

166