Cayetano vs.

Monsod 201 SCRA 210 September 1991

201 SCRA 210

September 1991

Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of chairman of the COMELEC.
Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not posses required qualification of having been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on
Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective
position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.

Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or
litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceeding, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general,
all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s
claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.

The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of
industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor – verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years does In the view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.

Alawi vs. Alauya

268 SCRA 639

Facts: Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company.
Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City, They were classmates, and used to
be friends. Through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on instalments by Alauya of one of the housing units of
Villarosa. In connection, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the
company. He claimed that his consent was vitiated because Alawi had resorted to gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty
and abuse of confidence. He laso wrote similar letters to the Vice President of Villarosa and the Vice President of NHMFC. On
learning of Alauya's letters, Alawi filed an administrative complaint against him. One of her grounds was Alauya‟s usurpation of the
title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use. Alauya justified his use of the title,
"attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law." a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful
claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal" or the
Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.

Issue: Whether or not Alauya, a member of the Shari‟a bar, can use the title of Attorney

Held: He can‟t. The title is only reserved to those who pass the regular Philippine bar. As regards Alauya's use of the title of
"Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the
Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who
has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a
professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary
degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.

In Re: Argosino, 270 SCRA 26

F: Al Caparros Argosino had passed the bar examinations but was denied of taking the Lawyer’s Oath and to sign the Rolls of
Attorneys due to his conviction of “reckless imprudence resulting in homicide” from a hazing incident. Later in his sentence, he was
granted probation by the court. He filed a petition to the Supreme Court praying that he be allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath and
sign the Rolls of Attorneys. As a proof of the required good moral character he now possess, he presented no less than fifteen (15)
certifications among others from: two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of religious order. In addition, he,
together with the others who were convicted, organized a scholarship foundation in honor of their hazing victim.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Mr. Argosino should be allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath, sign the Rolls of Attorneys, and practice law.

HELD:

YES. Petition granted.

RATIO:

Given the fact that Mr. Argosino had exhibited competent proof that he possessed the required good moral character as required
before taking the Lawyer’s Oath and to sign the Rolls of Attorneys, the Supreme Court considered the premises that he is not
inherently in bad moral fiber. In giving the benefit of the doubt, Mr. Argosino was finally reminded that the Lawyer’s Oath is not
merely a ceremony or formality before the practice of law, and that the community assistance he had started is expected to
continue in serving the more unfortunate members of the society.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. MARIA NYMPHA MANDAGAN, Respondent.

DECISION

Petitioner (PNCC) hired respondent as Legal Assistant, with the rank of Assistant Manager, on probationary status while she was
waiting for the results of the Bar examinations. After successfully hurdling the Bar examinations, respondent was issued a regular
appointment by petitioner.

Petitioner issued a dismissed the respondent because of committing acts violative of the PNCC Code of Employee Discipline in
“Engaging in private law practice which is in violation of Section 6(a), Section 6(b)(26) and Section 11 of the PNCC Code of Employee
Discipline” for handling the constructive dismissal case of Mr. Ramirez against PNCC, in a conflict of interest with her employer.
Petitioner held that respondent’s handling of even only a single non-PNCC case already constituted a violation of the PNCC Code of
Employee Discipline, since moonlighting is strictly prohibited under existing company rules and regulations.

In defense, respondent claimed that the case she handled was only an accommodation, accepted by her upon the request and
authority of then PNCC President Melvin Nazareno and Mr. Ramirez, and that she was on leave at every scheduled hearing of the
said case.

Respondent initiated a complaint9 for illegal dismissal against petitioner. The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the complaint for being
unmeritorious, stating that petitioner was justified in dismissing respondent for loss of trust and confidence for handling the
constructive dismissal case of Mr. Ramirez against PNCC, in a conflict of interest with her employer.

Aggrieved, respondent appealed the said Decision to the (NLRC) which affirmed the dismissal. Respondent thus went to the CA
which annulled the Decision for lack of sufficient proof that respondent did engage in the private practice of law since there was
only a single case involved which had the corresponding authorization from her superiors. The CA denied petitioner’s motion for
lack of merit, citing Office of the Court Administrator v. Atty. Misael M. Ladaga14 which held that an isolated appearance did not
constitute private practice of law, especially when done with the permission of superiors.

ISSUE: WON CA erred in holding that respondent is not in the private practice of law base on Office of the Court Administrator v.
Atty. Misael M. Ladaga?

RULING: NO. The CA did not err in citing Office of the Court Administrator v. Atty. Misael M. Ladaga24 because the June 2, 1998
Memorandum enumerated among the violations committed by respondent the "private practice of law." In the cited case, we held
that "private practice of law" does not refer to an isolated court appearance but contemplates a succession of acts of the same
nature habitually or customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer.

However, it should be remembered that petitioner is a government-owned and controlled corporation. The handling by the lawyers
in its employ of cases of its employees, whether for a fee or not, and despite the "knowledge and approval" of management, while
not absolutely prohibited is, nonetheless, discouraged, as it could only breed corruption and cause distraction from the very duties
that the lawyers were precisely hired for. The fact that a number of lawyers in petitioner’s employ have handled private cases,
obviously with the tolerance of petitioner, does not validate the practice or make it an acceptable rule of conduct. A wrong done by
many does not make a right.

Thus, we agree with the CA that petitioner failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that respondent was indeed guilty of
moonlighting as defined under the PNCC Code of Employee Discipline, i.e., rendering services for another employer without the
knowledge OR approval of management. In the manner in which the rule is phrased, since the words "knowledge" and "approval"
are separated by the disjunctive OR, it is evident that even knowledge alone by the management of PNCC of the alleged
moonlighting is tantamount to an implied approval and is sufficient to exonerate respondent from liability.

Therefore, it cannot be said that her appearance in the ejectment case of PNCC Corporate Comptroller Ramirez was without the
knowledge of management considering that the former PNCC top officers were the ones who asked her to do so. Moreover, when
she filed her application for leave of absence during one of her hearings, she specifically stated in the leave form that her absence
was due to the filing of the ejectment complaint for Mr. Ramirez, and this application was approved by petitioner.
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic A.C. No. L-533

Topics:

“A lawyer, making known his legal services shall only use true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of
facts.”—Canon 3, Code of Professional Responsibility

“A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair
statement or claim regarding his qualifications for legal services.”—Rule 3.01, Code of Professional Responsibility

Facts of the Case:

In 1984, The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio Nogales. Its aim, according to Nogales, was to move toward specialization and
to cater to clients who cannot afford the services of big law firms.

Atty. Ulep files a complaint against The Legal Clinic because of its advertisements which states undignified phrases like-- “Secret
Marriage? P560.00 for a valid marriage. Information on DIVORCE, ANNULMENT, ABSENCE, VISA. The Legal Clinic, Inc. Please call:
5210767, 5217232, 5222041 8:30am to 6:00pm 7th Floor Victoria Bldg. UN Avenue, Manila.”

It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published an article entitled Rx for Legal Problems in The Philippine Star because it is composed
of specialists that can take care of a client’s situation no matter how complicated it is, especially on marriage problems like the
Sharon and Gabby situation.

Citing John Bates vs. The State Bar of Arizona, Atty. Nogales said that it should be allowed based on this American Jurisprudence.
According to him, there is nothing wrong with making known the legal services his Legal Clinic has to offer.

Issue:

Whether or not such advertisement may be allowed.

Court Ruling:

The Legal Clinic is composed mainly of paralegals, which is undoubtedly beyond the domain of the paralegals. As stated in a previous
jurisprudence, practice of law is only reserved for the members of the Philippine bar, and not to paralegals. As with the Legal Clinic’s
advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “a lawyer in making known his legal services must use only
honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts.

A lawyer cannot advertise his talents in a manner that a merchant advertise his goods. The Legal Clinic promotes divorce, secret
marriages, bigamous marriages which are undoubtedly contrary to law.

The only allowed form of advertisements would be: (1.) Citing your involvement in a reputable law list, (2.) An ordinary professional
card (3.) Phone directory listing without designation to a lawyer’s specialization.

CRUZ VS CABRERA

FERDINAND A. CRUZ, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. STANLEY CABRERA, RESPONDENT.

Facts:

Complainant alleges that he is a fourth year law student; since the latter part of 2001, he instituted several actions against his
neighbors; he appeared for and in his behalf in his own cases; he met respondent who acted as the counsel of his neighbors; during
a hearing on January 14, 2002, in one case before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 112, Pasay City, presided by Judge Caridad
Cuerdo.

Respondent’s imputations were uncalled for and the latter’s act of compelling the court to ask complainant whether he is a lawyer
or not was intended to malign him before the public, inasmuch as respondent knew that complainant is not a lawyer, having
appeared for and in his behalf as a party litigant in prior cases; respondent’s imputations of complainant’s misrepresentation as a
lawyer was patently with malice to discredit his honor, with the intention to threaten him not to appear anymore in cases
respondent was handling; the manner, substance, tone of voice and how the words “appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna!” were
uttered were totally with the intention to annoy, vex and humiliate, malign, ridicule, incriminate and discredit complainant before
the public.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent violated Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Whether or not complainant is not precluded from litigating personally his cases

Whether or not complainant is engaged in the practice of law

Ruling:
 1. We hold that respondent’s outburst of “appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna” does not amount to a violation of Rule 8.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Such single outburst, though uncalled for, is not of such magnitude as to warrant
respondent’s suspension or reproof. It is but a product of impulsiveness or the heat of the moment in the course of an argument
between them. It has been said that lawyers should not be held to too strict an account for words said in the heat of the moment,
because of chagrin at losing cases, and that the big way is for the court to condone even contemptuous language.

2. Nonetheless, we remind respondent that complainant is not precluded from litigating personally his cases. A party’s right to
conduct litigation personally is recognized by Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. —
In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him
for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an
attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

3. The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly, involves the exercise of a profession or vocation usually for gain, mainly
as attorney by acting in a representative capacity and as counsel by rendering legal advise to others. Private practice has been
defined by this Court as follows:

x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same
kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute [referring to the
prohibition for judges and other officials or employees of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General from engaging
in private practice] has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding
payment for such services. x x x.

Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not customarily or habitually holding herself out to the public as a lawyer. Neither
was she demanding payment for such services. Hence, she cannot be said to be in the practice of law.

On the other hand, all lawyers should take heed that lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear,
prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.
Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations. Mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, they must
conduct themselves honorably and fairly. Though a lawyer’s language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified
and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in
the dignity of judicial forum.

LIM SANTIAGO VS SAGUCIO VS. ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, RESPONDENT

Facts:

Complainant charges respondent with the following violations:

1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Respondent, being the former Personnel
Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew the operations of Taggat very well. Respondent should have inhibited himself from
hearing, investigating and deciding the case filed by Taggat employees. Furthermore, complainant claims that respondent instigated
the filing of the cases and even harassed and threatened Taggat employees to accede and sign an affidavit to support the complaint.

2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor

Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government
prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to prove that respondent received P10,000 as retainer’s fee for the months of January
and February 1995, another P10,000 for the months of April and May 1995, and P5,000 for the month of April 1996.

Issue:

whether or not being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with respondent’s role as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor

Whether or not respondent is engaged in the practice of law

Ruling:

1. The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (“Code”).
However, the Court finds respondent liable for violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility against
unlawful conduct. Respondent committed unlawful conduct when he violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act No. 6713 (“RA 6713”).

Canon 6 provides that the Code “shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official duties.” A government
lawyer is thus bound by the prohibition “not [to] represent conflicting interests.” However, this rule is subject to certain limitations.
The prohibition to represent conflicting interests does not apply when no conflict of interest exists, when a written consent of all
concerned is given after a full disclosure of the facts or when no true attorney-client relationship exists. Moreover, considering the
serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify
the imposition of the administrative penalty.
 Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in “unlawful x x x conduct.” Unlawful conduct includes
violation of the statutory prohibition on a government employee to “engage in the private practice of [his] profession unless
authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with [his] official functions.”

2. “Private practice of law” contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one’s self to the
public as a lawyer.

Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat intermittently and he was not a retained counsel of Taggat
from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This argument is without merit because the law does not distinguish between consultancy services
and retainer agreement. For as long as respondent performed acts that are usually rendered by lawyers with the use of their legal
knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of the term “practice of law.”

IN RE CUNANAN

FACTS:

Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title of the law was, “An Act to Fix the
Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955.”

Section 1 provided the following passing marks:

1946-1951………………70%

1952 …………………….71%

1953……………………..72%

1954……………………..73%

1955……………………..74%

Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.

Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any subject shall be deemed to have already
passed that subject and the grade/grades shall be included in the computation of the general average in subsequent bar
examinations.”

ISSUE:

Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.

RULING:

Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced in the title of the Act. As per its title, the Act
should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations. Section2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite
time. It was also struck down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to take account of the fact that laws and jurisprudence are not
stationary.

As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to 1955 was declared in force and
effect. The portion that was stricken down was based under the following reasons:

The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952 had inadequate preparation due to
the fact that this was very close to the end of World War II;

The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the petitions of the said candidates;

The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary prerogative to determine who may be admitted to practice of law and,
therefore, in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of Court. The rules laid down by Congress under
this power are only minimum norms, not designed to substitute the judgment of the court on who can practice law; and

The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.

As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough votes to declare it void. Moreover, the law was
passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme Court resolutions denying admission to the bar of
an petitioner. The same may also rationally fall within the power to Congress to alter, supplement or modify rules of admission to
the practice of law.
PHILIPPINE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION vs AGRAVA

FACTS:

Herein petitioner filed for prohibition and injunction against respondent Agrava, the Director of Philippines Patent Office due to a
circular the latter issued scheduling an examination for determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the
Philippines Patent Office.

Petitioner contended that one who has passed the bar examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the
Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office, and that Agrava is in excess
of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law for requiring such examination as condition precedent before members of the bar
may be allowed to represent applicants in the preparation and prosecution of applications for patents. Undaunted, Agrava argued
that that the prosecution of patent cases does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law and that the Rules of Court do not
prohibit the Patent Office from requiring further condition or qualification from those who would wish to handle cases before the
Patent Office.

ISSUE:

Whether appearance before the Patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is
included in the practice of law

HELD:

Yes. The practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other
persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent
cases. Although the transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use and application of technical and scientific
knowledge and training, still, all such business has to be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as well as other laws, including
the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office in accordance with law. All these things involve the applications of laws,
legal principles, practice and procedure. They call for legal knowledge, training and experience for which a member of the bar has
been prepared.

As stated in 5 Am. Jur,

“The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other
papers incident to actions and social proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before
judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected
with the law corporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the
foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings
in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice as do the preparation and
drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts
and conditions.”

The Supreme Court ruled that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by the Supreme Court to practice
law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office, since much of the business in said office involves
the interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the
presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so
much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are, taken to the Supreme Court.