Definition and Test of Negligence circumstances in which a person finds himself.
All that the
PNR v. CA and Heirs of Amores
Duty of railroad operators
FACTS: In the early afternoon of April 27, 1992, Jose
Amores (Amores) was traversing the railroad tracks in
Kahilum II Street, Pandacan, Manila. Before crossing the
railroad track, he stopped for a while then proceeded
accordingly.3 Unfortunately, just as Amores was at the
intersection, a Philippine National Railways’ (PNR) train
with locomotive number T-517 turned up and collided
with the car.
At the time of the mishap, there was neither a signal nor a
crossing bar at the intersection to warn motorists of an
approaching train. Aside from the railroad track, the only
visible warning sign at that time was the defective
standard signboard "STOP, LOOK and LISTEN" wherein the
sign "Listen" was lacking while that of "Look" was bent.5
No whistle blow from the train was likewise heard before
it finally bumped the car of Amores.6 After impact, the car
was dragged about ten (10) meters beyond the center of
the crossing.7 Amores died as a consequence thereof.
In their complaint, respondents averred that the train’s
speedometer was defective, and that the petitioners’
negligence was the proximate cause of the mishap for their
failure to take precautions to prevent injury to persons
and property despite the dense population in the vicinity.
They then prayed for actual and moral damages, as well as
attorney’s fees.9
In their Answer,10 the petitioners denied the allegations,
stating that the train was railroad-worthy and without any
defect. According to them, the proximate cause of the
death of Amores was his own carelessness and negligence,
and Amores wantonly disregarded traffic rules and
regulations in crossing the railroad tracks and trying to
beat the approaching train. They admitted that there was
no crossing bar at the site of the accident because it was
merely a barangay road.11 PNR stressed that it exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of the locomotive driver and train
engineer, Borja, and that the latter likewise used
extraordinary diligence and caution to avoid the accident.
RTC ruled in favour of PNR but was reversed by CA, ruling
that: The court based the petitioners’ negligence on the
failure of PNR to install a semaphore or at the very least, to
post a flagman, considering that the crossing is located in a
thickly populated area. Moreover, the signboard "Stop,
Look and Listen" was found insufficient because of its
defective condition as described above. Lastly, no
negligence could be attributed to Amores as he exercised
reasonable diligence in crossing the railroad track.
ISSUE: Whether PNR is negligent
RULING: YES, it is negligent
We have thoroughly reviewed the records of the case and
we find no cogent reason to reverse the appellate court’s
decision. Negligence has been defined as "the failure to
observe for the protection of the interests of another
person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which
the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury."15 Using the aforementioned
philosophy, it may be reliably concluded that there is no
hard and fast rule whereby such degree of care and
vigilance is calibrated; it is dependent upon the
law requires is that it is perpetually compelling upon a
person to use that care and diligence expected of sensible
men under comparable circumstances.16
We hold that the petitioners were negligent when the
collision took place. The transcript of stenographic notes
reveals that the train was running at a fast speed because
notwithstanding the application of the ordinary and
emergency brakes, the train still dragged the car some
distance away from the point of impact. Evidence likewise
unveils the inadequate precautions taken by petitioner
PNR to forewarn the public of the impending danger. Aside
from not having any crossing bar, no flagman or guard to
man the intersection at all times was posted on the day of
the incident. A reliable signaling device in good condition,
not just a dilapidated "Stop, Look and Listen" signage
because of many years of neglect, is needed to give notice
to the public. It is the responsibility of the railroad
company to use reasonable care to keep the signal devices
in working order. Failure to do so would be an indication
of negligence.
It is true that one driving an automobile must use his
faculties of seeing and hearing when nearing a railroad
crossing.1âwphi1 However, the obligation to bring to a full
stop vehicles moving in public highways before traversing
any "through street" only accrues from the time the said
"through street" or crossing is so designated and sign-
posted. From the records of the case, it can be inferred that
Amores exercised all the necessary precautions required
of him as to avoid injury to himself and to others.1âwphi1
The witnesses’ testimonies showed that Amores slackened
his speed, made a full stop, and then proceeded to cross
the tracks when he saw that there was no impending
danger to his life. Under these circumstances, we are
convinced that Amores did everything, with absolute care
and caution, to avoid the collision.
It is settled that every person or motorist crossing a
railroad track should use ordinary prudence and alertness
to determine the proximity of a train before attempting to
cross. We are persuaded that the circumstances were
beyond the control of Amores for no person would
sacrifice his precious life if he had the slightest opportunity
to evade the catastrophe. Besides, the authority in this
jurisdiction is that the failure of a railroad company to
install a semaphore or at the very least, to post a flagman
or watchman to warn the public of the passing train
amounts to negligence.
E.M. Wright v. Manila Electric
Is intoxication on the part of plaintiff a contributory
negligence
FACTS: On the night mentioned plaintiff drove home in a
calesa and in crossing the tracks to enter his premises the
horse stumbled, leaped forward, and fell, causing the
vehicle with the rails, resulting in a sudden stop, threw
plaintiff from the vehicle and caused the injuries
complained of.
It is undisputed that at the point where plaintiff crossed
the tracks on the night in question not only the rails were
above-ground, but that the ties upon which the rails rested
projected from one-third to one-half of their depth out of
the ground, thus making the tops of the rails some 5 or 6
inches or more above the level of the street.
It is admitted that the defendant was negligent in
maintaining its tracks as described, but it is contended that
1
the plaintiff was also negligent in that he was intoxicated
to such an extent at the time of the accident that he was
unable to take care of himself properly and that such
intoxication was the primary cause of the accident.
Trial court ruled that both are negligent, and by
jurisprudence mitigated the damages claimed by plaintiff.
ISSUE: Whether plaintiff’s intoxication contributed or
was the proximate cause of his injuries
RULING: NO, it is not the proximate nor a contributory
cause
A careful reading of the decision of the trial court leads us
to the conclusion that there is nothing in the opinion which
sustains the conclusion of the court that the plaintiff was
negligent with reference to the accident which is the basis
of this action. Mere intoxication establish a want of
ordinary care. It is but a circumstance to be considered
with the other evidence tending to prove negligence. It is
the general rule that it is immaterial whether a man is
drunk or sober if no want of ordinary care or prudence can
be imputed to him, and no greater degree of care is
required than by a sober one. If one's conduct is
characterized by a proper degree of care and prudence, it
is immaterial whether he is drunk or sober.
As is clear from reading the opinion, no facts are stated
therein which warrant the conclusion that the plaintiff was
negligent. The conclusion that if he had been sober he
would not have been injured is not warranted by the facts
as found. It is impossible to say that a sober man would not
have fallen from the vehicle under the conditions
described. A horse crossing the railroad tracks with not
only the rails but a portion of the ties themselves
aboveground, stumbling by reason of the unsure footing
and falling, the vehicle crashing against the rails with such
force as to break a wheel, this might be sufficient to throw
a person from the vehicle no matter what his condition;
and to conclude that, under such circumstances, a sober
man would not have fallen while a drunken man did, is to
draw a conclusion which enters the realm of speculation
and guesswork.
La Mallorca v. Valentin De Jesus
Fortuitous event not a valid defense if concurred with
negligence
FACTS: The suit arose by reason of the death of Lolita de
Jesus, 20-year old daughter of Valentin de Jesus and wife of
Manolo Tolentino, in a head-on collision between
petitioner's bus, on which she was a passenger, and a
freight truck traveling in the opposite direction, in a barrio
in Marilao Bulacan, in the morning of October 8, 1959. The
immediate cause of the collision was the fact that the
driver of the bus lost control of the wheel when its left
front tire suddenly exploded.
La Mallorca-Pambusco, filed this appeal by certiorari from
the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed that
rendered by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in its
civil case No. 2100, entitled "Valentin de Jesus and Manolo
Tolentino vs. La Mallorca-Pambusco." The court a quo
sentenced the defendant, now petitioner, to pay damages
Petitioner maintains that a tire blow-out is a fortuitous
event and gives rise to no liability for negligence
ISSUE: Whether the tire blow-out is considered as
fortuitous event
RULING: NO, it is not fortuitous event
The appellate Court there (in the case cited by petitioner
as support on their defense) made no findings of any
specified acts of negligence on the part of the defendants
and confined itself to the question of whether or not a tire
blow-out, by itself alone and without a showing as to the
causative factors, would generate liability. In the present
case, the cause of the blow-out was known. The inner tube
of the left front tire, according to petitioner's own evidence
and as found by the Court of Appeals "was pressed
between the inner circle of the left wheel and the rim
which had slipped out of the wheel." This was, said Court
correctly held, a mechanical defect of the conveyance or a
fault in its equipment which was easily discoverable if the
bus had been subjected to a more thorough, or rigid check-
up before it took to the road that morning.
Then again both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
found as a fact that the bus was running quite fast
immediately before the accident. Considering that the tire
which exploded was not new — petitioner describes it as
"hindi masyadong kalbo," or not so very worn out — the
plea of caso fortuito cannot be entertained.
Equitable Bank v. Tan
Negligence of the bank of debiting in advance a post dated
check
FACTS: Respondent Arcelito B.Tan maintained a current
and savings account with Philippine Commercial
International Bank (PCIB), now petitioner Equitable PCI
Bank.3 On May 13, 1992, respondent issued PCIB Check
No. 275100 postdated May 30, 19924 in the amount of
₱34,588.72 in favor of Sulpicio Lines, Inc. As of May 14,
1992, respondent's balance with petitioner was
₱35,147.59. On May 14, 1992, Sulpicio Lines, Inc.
deposited the aforesaid check to its account with Solid
Bank, Carbon Branch, Cebu City. After clearing, the amount
of the check was immediately debited by petitioner from
respondent's account thereby leaving him with a balance
of only ₱558.87.
Meanwhile, respondent issued three checks from May 9 to
May 16, 1992, specifically, PCIB Check No. 275080 dated
May 9, 1992, payable to Agusan del Sur Electric
Cooperative Inc. (ASELCO) for the amount of ₱6,427.68;
PCIB Check No. 275097 dated May 10, 1992 payable to
Agusan del Norte Electric Cooperative Inc., (ANECO) for
the amount of ₱6,472.01; and PCIB Check No. 314104
dated May 16, 1992 payable in cash for the amount of
₱10,000.00. When presented for payment, PCIB Check Nos.
275080, 275097 and 314014 were dishonored for being
drawn against insufficient funds.
As a result of the dishonor of Check Nos. 275080 and
275097 which were payable to ASELCO and ANECO,
respectively, the electric power supply for the two mini-
sawmills owned and operated by respondent, located in
Talacogon, Agusan del Sur; and in Golden Ribbon, Butuan
City, was cut off on June 1, 1992 and May 28, 1992,
respectively, and it was restored only on July 20 and
August 24, 1992, respectively.
Respondent claimed that Check No. 275100 was a
postdated check in payment of Bills of Lading Nos. 15, 16
and 17, and that his account with petitioner would have
had sufficient funds to cover payment of the three other
checks were it not for the negligence of petitioner in
immediately debiting from his account Check No. 275100,
2
in the amount of ₱34,588.72, even as the said check was
postdated to May 30, 1992.
In its defense, petitioner denied that the questioned check
was postdated May 30, 1992 and claimed that it was a
current check dated May 3, 1992. It alleged further that the
disconnection of the electric supply to respondent's
sawmills was not due to the dishonor of the checks, but for
other reasons not attributable to the bank.
RTC dismissed the case but was reversed by CA
ISSUE: Whether CA erred in reversing the decision of
RTC, holding petitioner herein liable
RULING: NO, CA did not erred in their decision
We agree with appellant that appellee Bank apparently
erred in misappreciating the date of Check No. 275100. We
have carefully examined the check in question (Exh.
DDDD) and we are convinced that it was indeed postdated
to May 30, 1992 and not May 3, 1992 as urged by appellee.
The date written on the check clearly appears as
"5/30/1992" (Exh. DDDD-4). The first bar (/) which
separates the numbers "5" and "30" and the second bar (/)
which further separates the number "30" from the year
1992 appear to have been done in heavy, well-defined and
bold strokes, clearly indicating the date of the check as
"5/30/1992" which obviously means May 30, 1992. On the
other hand, the alleged bar (/) which appellee points out
as allegedly separating the numbers "3" and "0," thereby
leading it to read the date as May 3, 1992, is not actually a
bar or a slant but appears to be more of an unintentional
marking or line done with a very light stroke. The presence
of the figure "0" after the number "3" is quite significant. In
fact, a close examination thereof would unerringly show
that the said number zero or "0" is connected to the
preceeding number "3." In other words, the drawer of the
check wrote the figures "30" in one continuous stroke,
thereby contradicting appellee’s theory that the number
"3" is separated from the figure "0" by a bar. Besides,
appellee’s theory that the date of the check is May 3, 1992
is clearly untenable considering the presence of the figure
"0" after "3" and another bar before the year 1992. And if
we were to accept appellee’s theory that what we find to
be an unintentional mark or line between the figures "3"
and "0" is a bar separating the two numbers, the date of
the check would then appear as "5/3/0/1992, which is
simply absurd. Hence, we cannot go along with appellee’s
theory which will lead us to an absurd result. It is
therefore our conclusion that the check was postdated to
May 30, 1992 and appellee Bank or its personnel erred in
debiting the amount of the check from appellant’s account
even before the check’s due date. Undoubtedly, had not
appellee bank prematurely debited the amount of the
check from appellant’s account before its due date, the two
other checks (Exhs. LLLL and GGGG) successively dated
May 9, 1992 and May 16, 1992 which were paid by
appellant to ASELCO and ANECO, respectively, would not
have been dishonored and the said payees would not have
disconnected their supply of electric power to appellant’s
sawmills, and the latter would not have suffered losses
The diligence required of banks, therefore, is more than
that of a good father of a family.17 In every case, the
depositor expects the bank to treat his account with the
utmost fidelity, whether such account consists only of a
few hundred pesos or of millions. The bank must record
every single transaction accurately, down to the last
centavo, and as promptly as possible. This has to be done if
the account is to reflect at any given time the amount of
money the depositor can dispose of as he sees fit, confident
that the bank will deliver it as and to whomever he
directs.18 From the foregoing, it is clear that petitioner
bank did not exercise the degree of diligence that it ought
to have exercised in dealing with its client.
The proximate cause of the loss is not respondent's
manner of writing the date of the check, as it was very
clear that he intended Check No. 275100 to be dated May
30, 1992 and not May 3, 1992. The proximate cause is
petitioner’s own negligence in debiting the account of the
respondent prior to the date as appearing in the check,
which resulted in the subsequent dishonor of several
checks issued by the respondent and the disconnection by
ASELCO and ANECO of his electric supply.
PNB v. Chowking
Proximate cause of negligence sustained is that of the bank’s
failure to observe extra-ordinary diligence
FACTS: Between March 15, 1989 and August 10, 1989, Joe
Kuan Food Corporation issued in favor of Chowking five
(5) PSBank checks the total amount reached P556,981.66
On the respective due dates of each check, Chowking's
acting accounting manager, Rino T. Manzano, endorsed
and encashed said checks with the Bustos branch of
respondent PSBank.3
All the five checks were honored by defendant Santos,
even with only the endorsement of Manzano approving
them. The signatures of the other authorized officers of
respondent corporation were absent in the five (5) checks,
contrary to usual banking practice.4 Unexpectedly,
Manzano absconded with and misappropriated the check
proceeds.5
When Chowking found out Manzano's scheme, it
demanded reimbursement from PSBank.6 When PSBank
refused to pay, Chowking filed a complaint7 for a sum of
money with damages before the RTC. Likewise impleaded
were PSBank's president, Antonio S. Abacan, and Bustos
branch head, Santos.
In its Answer, petitioner did not controvert the foregoing
facts, but denied liability to respondent for the encashed
checks.13 Petitioner bank maintained it exercised due
diligence in the supervision of all its employees. It even
dismissed defendant Santos after she was found guilty of
negligence in the performance of her duties.14
Defendant Santos, on the other hand, denied that she had
been negligent in her job. She averred that she merely
followed the bank's practice of honoring respondent's
checks even if accompanied only by Manzano's
endorsement.15
Defendant Abacan likewise denied any liability to
respondent. He alleged that, as president and officer of
petitioner bank, he played no role in the transactions
complained of.16 Thus, respondent has no cause of action
against him.
Petitioner, Santos and Abacan were unanimous in
asserting that respondent is estopped from claiming
reimbursement and damages since it was negligent in
allowing Manzano to take hold, endorse, and encash its
checks. Petitioner pointed out that the proximate cause of
respondent's loss was its own negligence.
RTC first ruled in favour of Chowking however, upon MR of
petitioner herein it was reversed and removed them of
liability. Upon appeal, CA then reversed and reinstated the
3
first ruling of RTC finding PNB liable for damages on the
ground that:
It is admitted that PSB cashed, over the counter,
the checks of the appellant indorsed by Manzano alone.
Since there is no more dispute on the negligent act of
Santos in honoring the appellant's checks, over the
counter, despite the proper indorsements, the categorical
finding of negligence against her, remaining
unrebutted, is deemed established. This in effect
warrants a finding that Santos is liable for
damages to the appellant. The lower court
therefore erred in dismissing the complaint
against her
However, with banks like PSB, the degree of
diligence required is more than that of a good father
of a family considering that the business of banking is
imbued with public interest due to the nature of its
functions. Highest degree of diligence is needed which PSB,
in this case, failed to observe.
ISSUE: Whether PNB’s negligence was the proximate
cause of the damages sustained by chowking
RULING: YES, it is their negligence that caused such
damage
We agree with the CA that Chowking did not make any
false representation or concealment of material facts in
relation to the encashments of the previous checks. As
adverted to earlier, respondent may have allowed
Manzano to previously encash its checks, but it has always
been accompanied with the endorsements of the other
authorized signatories. Respondent did not allow
petitioner to have its checks encashed without the
signature of all of its authorized signatories.
The CA pointed out:We find at the back of those checks,
whereon indorsement usually appears, the signature of
Manzano together with other signature/signatures though
mostly are illegible. It appears then that, assuming the
appellant impliedly tolerated the act of Manzano in
indorsing the checks, it did not allow Manzano "alone" to
indorse its checks as what actually happened in this case
because his previous indorsements were coupled with
other indorsements of the appellant's signatories. There is,
therefore, no sufficient evidence to sustain PSB's
submission. On this score alone, the defense of estoppel
must fail.
In its declaration of policy, the General Banking Law of
200035 requires of banks the highest standards of
integrity and performance. Needless to say, a bank is
"under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors
with meticulous care."36 The fiduciary nature of the
relationship between the bank and the depositors must
always be of paramount concern.37
Petitioner, through Santos, was clearly negligent when it
honored respondent's checks with the lone endorsement
of Manzano.
Proximate cause is determined by the facts of the case. It is
that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.40
Measured by the foregoing yardstick, the proximate cause
of the loss is not respondent's alleged negligence in
allowing Manzano to take hold and encash respondent's
checks. The proximate cause is petitioner's own negligence
in the supervision of its employees when it overlooked the
irregular practice of encashing checks even without the
requisite endorsements.
Standard of Conduct: Good Father of a Family
Heirs of Redentor Completo v. Albayalda Jr.
Required diligence of bicyclist vis-à-vis to diligence required
from motor vehicle drivers
FACTS: Respondent Amando C. Albayda, Jr. (Albayda) is a
Master Sergeant of the Philippine Air Force, 527th Base
Security Squadron, 520th Airbase, Philippine Air Force,
located at Villamor Air Base (VAB), Pasay City. Petitioner
Redentor Completo (Completo), now represented by his
heirs, was the taxi driver of a Toyota Corolla, bearing Plate
No. PYD-128, owned and operated by co-petitioner Elpidio
Abiad (Abiad).3 Albayda and Completo figured in an
accident along the intersection of 8th and 11th Streets,
VAB. Albayda filed a complaint for damages before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City.
The amended complaint alleged that, on August 27, 1997,
while Albayda was on his way to the office to report for
duty, riding a bicycle along 11th Street, the taxi driven by
Completo bumped and sideswiped him, causing serious
physical injuries. Albayda was brought to the Philippine
Air Force General Hospital (PAFGH) inside VAB. However,
he was immediately transferred to the Armed Forces of the
Philippines Medical Center (AFPMC) on V. Luna Road,
Quezon City, because there was a fracture in his left knee
and there was no orthopedic doctor available at PAFGH.
From August 27, 1997 until February 11, 1998, he was
confined therein. He was again hospitalized at PAFGH from
February 23, 1998 until March 22, 1998.
A separate civil case ensued, Albayda alleged that the
proximate cause of the incident which necessitated his
stay in the hospital for approximately seven (7) months
was the negligence of Completo who, at the time of the
accident, was in the employ of Abiad. The pain he suffered
required him to undergo medical physiotherapy for a
number of years to regain normality of his left knee joint,
and he claimed that he incurred actual damages totaling
Two Hundred Seventy-Six Thousand Five Hundred Fifty
Pesos (₱276,550.00), inclusive of his anticipated
operations.
Completo also asserted that he was an experienced driver
who, in accordance with traffic rules and regulations and
common courtesy to his fellow motorists, had already
reduced his speed to twenty (20) kilometers per hour even
before reaching the intersection of 8th and 11th Streets. In
contrast, Albayda rode his bicycle at a very high speed,
causing him to suddenly lose control of the bicycle and hit
the rear door on the right side of the taxicab.12
The deep indentation on the rear right door of the taxicab
was caused by the impact of Albayda’s body that hit the
taxicab after he had lost control of the bicycle; while the
slight indentation on the right front door of the taxicab
was caused by the impact of the bike that hit the taxicab
after Albayda let go of its handles when he had lost control
of it.13
Completo maintained that Albayda had no cause of action.
The accident and the physical injuries suffered by Albayda
were caused by his own negligence, and his purpose in
filing the complaint was to harass petitioners and unjustly
enrich himself at their expense.
4
RTC ruled in favour of Albayda
ISSUE: Whether Albayda’s negligence was the
proximate cause of his negligence
RULING: NO, it was the negligence of Completo that
caused the damages sustained by Albayda
The instant case involved a collision between a taxicab and
a bicycle which resulted in serious physical injuries to the
bicycle rider, Albayda. It is a rule in negligence suits that
the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance
of evidence the motorist’s breach in his duty of care owed
to the plaintiff, that the motorist was negligent in failing to
exercise the diligence required to avoid injury to the
plaintiff, and that such negligence was the proximate cause
of the injury suffered.
It was proven by a preponderance of evidence that
Completo failed to exercise reasonable diligence in driving
the taxicab because he was over-speeding at the time he
hit the bicycle ridden by Albayda. Such negligence was the
sole and proximate cause of the serious physical injuries
sustained by Albayda. Completo did not slow down even
when he approached the intersection of 8th and 11th
Streets of VAB. It was also proven that Albayda had the
right of way, considering that he reached the intersection
ahead of Completo.
The bicycle occupies a legal position that is at least equal
to that of other vehicles lawfully on the highway, and it is
fortified by the fact that usually more will be required of a
motorist than a bicyclist in discharging his duty of care to
the other because of the physical advantages the
automobile has over the bicycle.43
At the slow speed of ten miles per hour, a bicyclist travels
almost fifteen feet per second, while a car traveling at only
twenty-five miles per hour covers almost thirty-seven feet
per second, and split-second action may be insufficient to
avoid an accident. It is obvious that a motor vehicle poses a
greater danger of harm to a bicyclist than vice versa.
Accordingly, while the duty of using reasonable care falls
alike on a motorist and a bicyclist, due to the inherent
differences in the two vehicles, more care is required from
the motorist to fully discharge the duty than from the
bicyclist.44 Simply stated, the physical advantages that the
motor vehicle has over the bicycle make it more dangerous
to the bicyclist than vice versa.
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are
required to examine them as to their qualifications,
experience, and service records. On the other hand, with
respect to the supervision of employees, employers should
formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their
implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for
breaches thereof. To establish these factors in a trial
involving the issue of vicarious liability, employers must
submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence.50
Abiad testified that before he hired Completo, he required
the latter to show his bio-data, NBI clearance, and driver’s
license. Abiad likewise stressed that Completo was never
involved in a vehicular accident prior to the instant case,
and that, as operator of the taxicab, he would wake up
early to personally check the condition of the vehicle
before it is used.
The protestation of Abiad to escape liability is short of the
diligence required under the law. Abiad’s evidence
consisted entirely of testimonial evidence, and the
unsubstantiated and self-serving testimony of Abiad was
insufficient to overcome the legal presumption that he was
negligent in the selection and supervision of his driver.
Taylor v. Manila Electric
Negligence of a child who have sufficient discernment would
prevent recovery of damages sustained by it
FACTS: September 30, 1905 Sunday afternoon: David
Taylor, 15 years of age, the son of a mechanical engineer,
more mature than the average boy of his age, and having
considerable aptitude and training in mechanics with a
boy named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age,
crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the
purpose of visiting Murphy, an employee of the defendant,
who and promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature
engine
After leaving the power house where they had asked for
Mr. Murphy, they walked across the open space in the
neighborhood of the place where the company dumped in
the cinders and ashes from its furnaces they found some
twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the
ground.
They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting
charges of dynamite, and have in themselves a
considerable explosive power the boys picked up all they
could find, hung them on stick, of which each took end, and
carried them home
Opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was
filled with a yellowish substance they got matches, David
held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the
contents.
An explosion followed, causing more or less serious
injuries to all three; Jessie, who when the boys proposed
putting a match to the contents of the cap, became
frightened and started to run away, received a slight cut in
the neck; Manuel had his hand burned and wounded;
David was struck in the face by several particles of the
metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such an
extent as to the necessitate its removal by the surgeons
A case was filed against respondent herein and was found
guilty
ISSUE: Whether Manila Electric should be held liable
for damages sustained
RULING: NO, it should not be liable due to the fact that
David already have sufficient discernment.
It is clear that the accident could not have happened and
not the fulminating caps been left exposed at the point
where they were found, or if their owner had exercised
due care in keeping them in an appropriate place; but it is
equally clear that plaintiff would not have been injured
had he not, for his own pleasure and convenience, entered
upon the defendant's premises, and strolled around
thereon without the express permission of the defendant,
and had he not picked up and carried away the property of
the defendant which he found on its premises, and had he
not thereafter deliberately cut open one of the caps and
applied a match to its contents.
The reasoning which led the Supreme Court of the United
States to its conclusion in the cases of Railroad Co. vs. Stout
(supra) and Union Pacific Railroad Co. vs. McDonald
(supra) is not less cogent and convincing in this
jurisdiction than in that wherein those cases originated.
Children here are actuated by similar childish instincts and
5
impulses. Drawn by curiosity and impelled by the restless
spirit of youth, boys here as well as there will usually be
found whenever the public is permitted to congregate. The
movement of machinery, and indeed anything which
arouses the attention of the young and inquiring mind, will
draw them to the neighborhood as inevitably as does the
magnet draw the iron which comes within the range of its
magnetic influence. The owners of premises, therefore,
whereon things attractive to children are exposed, or upon
which the public are expressly or impliedly permitted to
enter or upon which the owner knows or ought to know
children are likely to roam about for pastime and in play, "
must calculate upon this, and take precautions
accordingly." In such cases the owner of the premises can
not be heard to say that because the child has entered
upon his premises without his express permission he is a
trespasser to whom the owner owes no duty or obligation
whatever. The owner's failure to take reasonable
precautions to prevent the child from entering his
premises at a place where he knows or ought to know that
children are accustomed to roam about of to which their
childish instincts and impulses are likely to attract them is
at least equivalent to an implied license to enter, and
where the child does enter under such conditions the
owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to guard
the child against injury from unknown or unseen dangers,
placed upon such premises by the owner, is clearly a
breach of duty, responsible, if the child is actually injured,
without other fault on its part than that it had entered on
the premises of a stranger without his express invitation
or permission. To hold otherwise would be expose all the
children in the community to unknown perils and
unnecessary danger at the whim of the owners or
occupants of land upon which they might naturally and
reasonably be expected to enter.
But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon
defendant's property without defendant's express
invitation or permission would not have relieved
defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred there
by plaintiff, without other fault on his part, if such injury
were attributable to the negligence of the defendant, we
are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case
the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps
exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of
the injury received by the plaintiff, which therefore was
not, properly speaking, "attributable to the negligence of
the defendant," and, on the other hand, we are satisfied
that plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap and
putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of
the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon
the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is not civilly
responsible for the injuries thus incurred.
Plaintiff contends, upon the authority of the Turntable and
Torpedo cases, that because of plaintiff's youth the
intervention of his action between the negligent act of the
defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises and
the explosion which resulted in his injury should not be
held to have contributed in any wise to the accident
"While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that to
entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from
the fault or negligence of another he must himself have
been free from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an
infant of tender years. The care and caution required of a
child is according to his maturity and capacity only, and
this is to be determined in each case by the circumstances
of the case."
In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a
well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and
physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to
sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a
mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was
incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he was
exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself. The
evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that, despite
his denials on the witness stand, he well knew the
explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing
himself. The series of experiments made by him in his
attempt to produce an explosion, as described by the little
girl who was present, admit of no other explanation. His
attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity,
followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a
hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought
about by the application of a match to the contents of the
caps, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor
can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to
anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous, in view
of the fact that the little girl, 9 years of age, who was within
him at the time when he put the match to the contents of
the cap, became frightened and ran away.
True, he may not have known and probably did not know
the precise nature of the explosion which might be
expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and
of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries which
he incurred; but he well knew that a more or less
dangerous explosion might be expected from his act, and
yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the
explosion. It would be going far to say that "according to
his maturity and capacity" he exercised such and "care and
caution" as might reasonably be required of him, or that
defendant or anyone else should be held civilly responsible
for injuries incurred by him under such circumstances.
We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient
capacity and understanding to be sensible of the danger to
which he exposed himself when he put the match to the
contents of the cap; that he was sui juris in the sense that
his age and his experience qualified him to understand and
appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of
caution which would have avoided the injury which
resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the injury
incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and
immediate result of his own willful and reckless act, so that
while it may be true that these injuries would not have
been incurred but for the negligence act of the defendant
in leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless
plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal cause
of the accident which inflicted the injury.
Jarco Marketing v. CA
Conclusive presumption of absence of negligence on part of a
minor below 9 yrs. Of age
FACTS: Petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation is the
owner of Syvel's Department Store, Makati City.
Petitioners Leonardo Kong, Jose Tiope and Elisa Panelo are
the store's branch manager, operations manager, and
supervisor, respectively. Private respondents are spouses
and the parents of Zhieneth Aguilar (ZHIENETH).
In the afternoon of 9 May 1983, CRISELDA and ZHIENETH
were at the 2nd floor of Syvel's Department Store, Makati
City. CRISELDA was signing her credit card slip at the
payment and verification counter when she felt a sudden
gust of wind and heard a loud thud. She looked behind her.
She then beheld her daughter ZHIENETH on the floor, her
young body pinned by the bulk of the store's gift-wrapping
6
counter/structure. ZHIENETH was crying and screaming
for help. Although shocked, CRISELDA was quick to ask the
assistance of the people around in lifting the counter and
retrieving ZHIENETH from the floor. 3
ZHIENETH was quickly rushed to the Makati Medical
Center where she was operated on. The next day
ZHIENETH lost her speech and thereafter communicated
with CRISELDA by writing on a magic slate. The injuries
she sustained took their toil on her young body. She died
fourteen (14) days after the accident or on 22 May 1983,
on the hospital bed. She was six years old.
After the burial of their daughter, private respondents
demanded upon petitioners the reimbursement of the
hospitalization, medical bills and wake and funeral
expenses 6 which they had incurred. Petitioners refused to
pay. Consequently, private respondents filed a complaint
for damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 7119 wherein they
sought the payment of P157,522.86 for actual damages,
P300,000 for moral damages, P20,000 for attorney's fees
and an unspecified amount for loss of income and
exemplary damages.
In their answer with counterclaim, petitioners denied any
liability for the injuries and consequent death of
ZHIENETH. They claimed that CRISELDA was negligent in
exercising care and diligence over her daughter by
allowing her to freely roam around in a store filled with
glassware and appliances. ZHIENETH too, was guilty of
contributory negligence since she climbed the counter,
triggering its eventual collapse on her. Petitioners also
emphasized that the counter was made of sturdy wood
with a strong support; it never fell nor collapsed for the
past fifteen years since its construction.
RTC ruling: In its decision 7 the trial court dismissed the
complaint and counterclaim after finding that the
preponderance of the evidence favored petitioners. It
ruled that the proximate cause of the fall of the counter on
ZHIENETH was her act of clinging to it. It believed
petitioners' witnesses who testified that ZHIENETH clung
to the counter, afterwhich the structure and the girl fell
with the structure falling on top of her, pinning her
stomach. In contrast, none of private respondents'
witnesses testified on how the counter fell. The trial court
also held that CRISELDA's negligence contributed to
ZHIENETH's accident.
CA Decision: decided in favor of private respondents and
reversed the appealed judgment. It found that petitioners
were negligent in maintaining a structurally dangerous
counter. The counter was shaped like an inverted "L" 11
with a top wider than the base. It was top heavy and the
weight of the upper portion was neither evenly distributed
nor supported by its narrow base. Thus, the counter was
defective, unstable and dangerous; a downward pressure
on the overhanging portion or a push from the front could
cause the counter to fall. Two former employees of
petitioners had already previously brought to the attention
of the management the danger the counter could cause.
But the latter ignored their concern. The Court of Appeals
faulted the petitioners for this omission, and concluded
that the incident that befell ZHIENETH could have been
avoided had petitioners repaired the defective counter. It
was inconsequential that the counter had been in use for
some time without a prior incident.
The Court of Appeals declared that ZHIENETH, who was
below seven (7) years old at the time of the incident, was
absolutely incapable of negligence or other tort. It
reasoned that since a child under nine (9) years could not
be held liable even for an intentional wrong, then the six-
year old ZHIENETH could not be made to account for a
mere mischief or reckless act. It also absolved CRISELDA of
any negligence, finding nothing wrong or out of the
ordinary in momentarily allowing ZHIENETH to walk
while she signed the document at the nearby counter.
ISSUE: Whether the proximate cause of the death of
Zhieneth was her own negligence
RULING: NO, she cannot be imputed of any negligence
Without doubt, petitioner Panelo and another store
supervisor were personally informed of the danger posed
by the unstable counter. Yet, neither initiated any concrete
action to remedy the situation nor ensure the safety of the
store's employees and patrons as a reasonable and
ordinary prudent man would have done. Thus, as
confronted by the situation petitioners miserably failed to
discharge the due diligence required of a good father of a
family.
Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply the
conclusive presumption that favors children below nine
(9) years old in that they are incapable of contributory
negligence. In his book, 28 former Judge Cezar S. Sangco
stated:
In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of
age is conclusively presumed to have acted without
discernment, and is, on that account, exempt from criminal
liability. The same presumption and a like
exemption from criminal liability obtains in a case of a
person over nine and under fifteen years of age, unless
it is shown that he has acted with discernment. Since
negligence may be a felony and a quasi-delict and required
discernment as a condition of liability, either
criminal or civil, a child under nine years of age is, by
analogy, conclusively presumed to be incapable of
negligence; and that the presumption of lack of
discernment or incapacity for negligence in the case of a
child over nine but under fifteen years of age is a
rebuttable one, under our law. The rule, therefore,
is that a child under nine years of age must be
conclusively presumed incapable of contributory
negligence as a matter of law.
Even if we attribute contributory negligence to ZHIENETH
and assume that she climbed over the counter, no injury
should have occurred if we accept petitioners' theory that
the counter was stable and sturdy. For if that was the
truth, a frail six-year old could not have caused the counter
to collapse. The physical analysis of the counter by both
the trial court and Court of Appeals and a scrutiny of the
evidence 29 on record reveal otherwise, i.e., it was not
durable after all. Shaped like an inverted "L," the counter
was heavy, huge, and its top laden with formica. It
protruded towards the customer waiting area and its base
was not secured.
Proof of Negligence
Mercury Drug Corporation v. Huang
Unsubstantiated defense
FACTS: Petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation (Mercury
Drug) is the registered owner of a six-wheeler 1990
Mitsubishi Truck with plate number PRE 641 (truck). It
has in its employ petitioner Rolando J. del Rosario as
driver. Respondent spouses Richard and Carmen Huang
are the parents of respondent Stephen Huang and own the
7
red 1991 Toyota Corolla GLI Sedan with plate number PTT
775 (car).
These two vehicles figured in a road accident on December
20, 1996 at around 10:30 p.m. within the municipality of
Taguig, Metro Manila. Respondent Stephen Huang was
driving the car, weighing 1,450 kg., while petitioner Del
Rosario was driving the truck, weighing 14,058 kg. Both
were traversing the C-5 Highway, north bound, coming
from the general direction of Alabang going to Pasig City.
The car was on the left innermost lane while the truck was
on the next lane to its right, when the truck suddenly
swerved to its left and slammed into the front right side of
the car. The collision hurled the car over the island where
it hit a lamppost, spun around and landed on the opposite
lane. The truck also hit a lamppost, ran over the car and
zigzagged towards, and finally stopped in front of Buellah
Land Church.
At the time of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario only had
a Traffic Violation Receipt (TVR). His driver’s license had
been confiscated because he had been previously
apprehended for reckless driving.
The car, valued at ₱300,000.00, was a total wreck.
Respondent Stephen Huang sustained massive injuries to
his spinal cord, head, face, and lung. Despite a series of
operations, respondent Stephen Huang is paralyzed for life
from his chest down and requires continuous medical and
rehabilitation treatment.
In contrast, petitioners allege that the immediate and
proximate cause of the accident was respondent Stephen
Huang’s recklessness. According to petitioner Del Rosario,
he was driving on the left innermost lane when the car
bumped the truck’s front right tire. The truck then
swerved to the left, smashed into an electric post, crossed
the center island, and stopped on the other side of the
highway. The car likewise crossed over the center island
and landed on the same portion of C-5. Further, petitioner
Mercury Drug claims that it exercised due diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
all its employees.
Both the lower courts found petitioner herein liable for
damages
ISSUE: Whether petitioner is liable for damages
sustained by respondent
RULING: YES, he is liable for such damages
We affirm the findings of the trial court and the appellate
court that petitioner Del Rosario was negligent. The
evidence does not support petitioners’ claim that at the
time of the accident, the truck was at the left inner lane
and that it was respondent Stephen Huang’s car, at its
right, which bumped the right front side of the truck.
Firstly, petitioner Del Rosario could not precisely tell
which part of the truck was hit by the car,6 despite the fact
that the truck was snub-nosed and a lot higher than the
car. Petitioner Del Rosario could not also explain why the
car landed on the opposite lane of C-5 which was on its left
side. He said that "the car did not pass in front of him after
it hit him or under him or over him or behind him."7 If the
truck were really at the left lane and the car were at its
right, and the car hit the truck at its front right side, the car
would not have landed on the opposite side, but would
have been thrown to the right side of the C-5 Highway.
Noteworthy on this issue is the testimony of Dr. Marlon
Rosendo H. Daza, an expert in the field of physics. He
conducted a study based on the following assumptions
provided by respondents:
1. Two vehicles collided;
2. One vehicle is ten times heavier, more massive
than the other;
3. Both vehicles were moving in the same
direction and at the same speed of about 85 to 90
kilometers per hour;
4. The heavier vehicle was driving at the
innermost left lane, while the lighter vehicle was at
its right.
Dr. Daza testified that given the foregoing assumptions, if
the lighter vehicle hits the right front portion of the
heavier vehicle, the general direction of the light vehicle
after the impact would be to the right side of the heavy
vehicle, not the other way around. The truck, he opined, is
more difficult to move as it is heavier. It is the car, the
lighter vehicle, which would move to the right of, and away
from the truck. Thus, there is very little chance that the car
will move towards the opposite side, i.e., to the left of the
truck.
To support their thesis, petitioners tried to show the
damages that the truck sustained at its front right side. The
attempt does not impress. The photographs presented
were taken a month after the accident, and Rogelio Pantua,
the automechanic who repaired the truck and
authenticated the photographs, admitted that there were
damages also on the left side of the truck.
The evidence proves petitioner Del Rosario’s negligence as
the direct and proximate cause of the injuries suffered by
respondent Stephen Huang. Petitioner Del Rosario failed to
do what a reasonable and prudent man would have done
under the circumstances.
In the instant case, petitioner Mercury Drug presented
testimonial evidence on its hiring procedure. According to
Mrs. Merlie Caamic, the Recruitment and Training Manager
of petitioner Mercury Drug, applicants are required to take
theoretical and actual driving tests, and psychological
examination. In the case of petitioner Del Rosario,
however, Mrs. Caamic admitted that he took the driving
tests and psychological examination when he applied for
the position of Delivery Man, but not when he applied for
the position of Truck Man. Mrs. Caamic also admitted that
petitioner Del Rosario used a Galant which is a light
vehicle, instead of a truck during the driving tests. Further,
no tests were conducted on the motor skills development,
perceptual speed, visual attention, depth visualization, eye
and hand coordination and steadiness of petitioner Del
Rosario. No NBI and police clearances were also presented.
Lastly, petitioner Del Rosario attended only three driving
seminars – on June 30, 2001, February 5, 2000 and July 7,
1984. In effect, the only seminar he attended before the
accident which occurred in 1996 was held twelve years
ago in 1984.
It also appears that petitioner Mercury Drug does not
provide for a back-up driver for long trips. At the time of
the accident, petitioner Del Rosario has been out on the
road for more than thirteen hours, without any alternate.
Mrs. Caamic testified that she does not know of any
company policy requiring back-up drivers for long trips.14
Petitioner Mercury Drug likewise failed to show that it
exercised due diligence on the supervision and discipline
8
over its employees. In fact, on the day of the accident,
petitioner Del Rosario was driving without a license. He
was holding a TVR for reckless driving. He testified that he
reported the incident to his superior, but nothing was
done about it. He was not suspended or reprimanded.15
No disciplinary action whatsoever was taken against
petitioner Del Rosario. We therefore affirm the finding that
petitioner Mercury Drug has failed to discharge its burden
of proving that it exercised due diligence in the selection
and supervision of its employee, petitioner Del Rosario.