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C H A N G I N G IDENTITIES O F T H E C H I N E S E IN T H E PHILIPPINES
by
A T H E S I S S U B M I T T E D IN P A R T I A L F U L F I L L M E N T OF
T H E R E Q U I R E M E N T S FOR T H E D E G R E E OF
M A S T E R OF A R T S
in
T H E F A C U L T Y OF G R A D U A T E STUDIES
T H E UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH C O L U M B I A
April 2004
and the Chinese Communist Party, Philippine opinionmakers, and the Chinese
triangulated vis-a-vis the colonizers and the Filipinos, the Chinese were valorized
relative to the natives for their economic skills but ostracized from the body
politic due to their perceived foreignness. Throughout their history, they have
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract ii
Introduction 1
Research Methods 6
A B r i e f Overview 6
Constructing Chineseness 22
Race as a Process 52
Conclusion 62
Bibliography 67
iii
Introduction
A s a third-generation Chinese, born and raised in the Philippines, I have had to deal
with issues o f identity throughout my life. I was raised as a 'Chinese,' which at that time
meant that I should speak Chinese, socialize with Chinese friends, and have 'Chinese' values.
I attended Chinese schools during primary and secondary schools, where the medium o f
instruction was English, and the afternoon Chinese classes were conducted in Mandarin. It
was not until I attended a Philippine university that I met and developed friendships with
Filipinos. It was also in university where I learned that although my ancestors came from
China, the Philippines is now my home and that as much as I am Chinese, I am also Filipino.
I have been asked many times whether I am more Chinese or Filipino, as i f being more
Chinese means being less Filipino, and vice versa. The tendency o f dichotomizing Chinese
and Filipino identities has lead Peter Pojol, S.J. (2003) to reflect on his own experience:
H o w am I Chinese? ... I have slits for eyes, my skin is yellow, and my native
tongue is Hokkien. Other answers get a bit entangled: I've been to Chinese
temples but I hardly know what goes on inside; I studied in a Chinese school
but must shamefully admit that I cannot read Chinese news; I value discipline
enough", not fluent in Mandarin, not well versed in Chinese worship, not
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This binarism reflects the relational nature of identities (Rutherford, 1990). Our identities are
oftentimes constructed in relation to others. However, there are material consequences when
differences are polarized. A s Rutherford (1990) argues, "difference in this context is always
perceived as the effect of the other" (p. 10). These polarities create hierarchies and
hierarchies and discriminatory acts are oftentimes created due to the'construction of polarities
between groups.
A s I examine my own identity as a Chinese Filipino, the quote from A n g ' s (2001)
[is] a double-edged sword: many people obviously need identity (or think they do), but
identity can just as well be a strait-jacket. ' W h o I am' or 'who we are' is never a matter of
free choice" (Preface). I have realized that identity is indeed a double-edged sword - it gives
me a sense of belonging, and yet 'who I a m ' is never entirely up to me to define. Sometimes
'who I should be' captures the condition of identity more than 'who I am.' N o matter how
' F i l i p i n o ' I have become, culturally and politically, my Filipino friends still see me as
'Chinese' and think that my 'culture' is different from them. They expect me to give them a
tour of Manila's Chinatown even though I have never lived there in my life and I often get
lost whenever I go there. First and second-generation Chinese think I am not 'Chinese'
enough because I have already been 'Filipinized' and 'Westernized.' To them, I have lost a
considerable amount of my 'Chineseness' because I speak better English and Filipino than
Mandarin. Even among my Chinese Filipino friends, we tend to characterize the Chineseness
of others by labeling those who are 'too Chinese' as ' G . I.' or 'genuine instik? {instik being a
derogative term used by Filipinos to refer to people of Chinese origin). These are the
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traditional Chinese who are not 'modern' enough in our eyes because their attitudes and
Even though I also see myself as Chinese, and other people perceive me as one, I
know we do not share the same concept of Chineseness, in the same way that my
grandparents, my parents and I have different views of what it means to be Chinese today,
things did not turn out well in his adopted country, I don't think my father had that choice
readily. Even though my father reads Chinese newspapers and keeps abreast with news from
China, he no longer sees himself as a sojourner in a foreign land. Despite holding citizenship,
however, the specter of racial taunts and anti-Chinese legislation during his time has
constantly reminded him of the precarious state of being Chinese in the Philippines. I did not
grow up in such an oppressive environment. Being Chinese to me meant I have to deal with
Although in my formative years I was ambivalent about being a Filipino, I realized at some
point that I had nowhere else to call my home but the Philippines, and I had to embrace it as
my own in order for me to belong. A n d yet, the terms 'Filipino' and 'Chinese' by
themselves, do not seem to capture the collective experience of an ethnic minority whose
identity has been constantly redefined by itself and by others through various historical,
political and social circumstances. A n d so the search for a Chinese Filipino identity begins.
In this paper, I examine the changing identities of Chinese Filipinos through three
'Chinese' illustrate how identity is "constituted out of different elements of experience and
subjective position" (Rutherford, 1990, p. 19). It demonstrates how historical processes shape
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our identities as Chinese in the Philippines and reveal how we ultimately become 'creatures
of our times.' This does not mean that 'Chineseness' has always been externally imposed, or
that we are mere products of external forces, over which we have no control. On the contrary,
experienced their identities differently from members of another generation. I therefore focus
on the interaction between the host government and the Chinese Filipino community in
shaping a Chinese Filipino identity by showing how the social and political structures of the
host country both promote and contain the expression of Chinese identities in the Chinese
Identity, like race, is a construct that has always been bitterly contested and
negotiated by individuals, state authorities and interest groups. It is also constantly changing
and "contains traces of its past and what it is to become. It is contingent, a provisional full
stop in the play of differences and the narrative of our own lives" (Rutherford, 1990, p. 24).
When Chang (1994) talks about inheriting a legacy of discrimination when he immigrated to
the United States, he is also talking about how "each individual is the synthesis not only of
existing relations but of the history of these relations. He is a precis of the past" (Gramsci, as
cited in Rutherford, 1990, pp. 19-20). B y looking at how Chinese Filipino identities have
evolved over three generations, I have realized that as a third-generation Chinese, I am also
inheriting a legacy of social relations between and among Chinese, Filipino and colonial
groups.
I also focus my analysis on the intersection of race and class in the identity formation
of Chinese Filipinos. The racial taunts that my grandparents and my parents experienced
during their times were those that made fun of old Chinese men who worked as manual
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laborers and street vendors. M y generation still gets racial taunts, but of a different kind.
People assume that I am rich just by looking at my physical features and my last name. These
assumptions and stereotypes are also carried over in transnational settings. I remember being
at a dentist's office in Vancouver and meeting the dental assistant who was Filipino. When
she found out that I was Chinese Filipino, she remarked matter-of-factly, " Y o u must be rich."
It was not a question but a statement. H o w could she have come to that conclusion, other
than basing it on my Chinese features and the meanings associated with being Chinese in the
Philippines?
Filipino identities. I utilize the theory of racial formation, as defined by O m i and Winant
Chinese Filipinos both by colonial governments and the Chinese government. They define
racial formation as "the sociohistorical process by which racial categories are created,
inhabited, transformed, and destroyed" (p. 372). I also utilize Gotanda's (2000) framework
for analyzing race through the analysis of the racial profile in examining the various factors
that led to the racialization of the Chinese in the Philippines. Racial profiling includes a
with the racial category" (p. 1691). The third approach captures the Philippines' history of
colonialism and how that has played a major part in the racialization of Chinese vis-a-vis
Filipinos. K i m ' s (1999) discussion on the racial triangulation of Asian Americans is useful in
my study. She observes that "public discourse about racial groups and their relative status
generates a field of racial positions in a given time and place" (p. 106). In the case of the
Chinese in the Philippines, I argue that they have been racialized relative to and through
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interaction with the colonial rulers and Filipinos. The racial triangulation of Chinese occurs
through the dual processes of relative valorization and civic ostracism ( K i m , 1999). B y
utilizing these theories, I have been able to develop a racialized construction of class in the
Research Methods
In the course of doing my research for the paper, I have mainly used secondary
interviews and archival data would have enriched my analysis by affording me my own
interpretation of events, I have dealt with this limitation by attempting to consult as many
sources as possible to document the history of the Chinese in the Philippines. A t various
times in the paper I have cited several authors for one specific historical event in order not to
depend on one scholar's interpretation. I have also performed a review o f the existing
literature regarding the construction of Chinese identities in Southeast A s i a and the theories
surrounding identity and race. I have utilized them to inform my analysis o f the evolution of
A Brief Overview
The first chapter situates the Chinese in the Philippines in the broader context of
through the use o f terms and labels that do not fully capture the various experiences of the
Chinese in their own geographical, social and political contexts. I review the existing
literature on Chinese identities in Southeast Asia, comparing the works of Wang (1988),
Hirschman (1988), Gosling (1983) and Tan (2001). I note the strengths and weaknesses of
their works and relate how their works can inform my analysis of Chinese Filipino identities.
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I also discuss the importance of Barth's (1969) study on the boundary maintenance of ethnic
groups. He analyzes the boundaries of groups, instead of their so-called cultural differences,
in order to explain how social relations are maintained between the dominant and minority
I compare the earlier scholarship that linked Chinese identities to a 'Cultural China'
with the more recent scholarship that view Chinese identity as a site of contestation,
operating in different historical and geographical contexts. In addition, I discuss the concept
of race and its social construction by reviewing the literature on race, particularly by O m i and
Winant (2001) and Lopez (2000). I show how theories of race inform my analysis of Chinese
In the second chapter, I examine the changing identities of Chinese Filipinos through
three generations. I briefly describe the history of the Chinese in the Philippines from the
Spanish colonial period to the present time. I try to demonstrate the different constructions of
'Chinese,' 'Filipino,' and 'Chinese Filipino' by various groups, such as colonial regimes, the
organizations, and the Chinese people themselves in each generation. I illustrate how Chinese
Filipino identities were contested and negotiated by different groups and I also try to portray
the struggles of these groups to represent the Chinese community. I explore the various
historical, social, economic and political factors that shape Chinese Filipino identities. I try to
show the transformation of the Chinese in the Philippines from sojourners to naturalized
Filipinos and finally, to Filipinos of Chinese descent whose orientation is entirely towards the
Philippines. I try to show the fluidity and multiplicity of identities within generation and
between generations. I note that despite the varied experiences of Chinese Filipinos brought
7
about by their different locations and social classes, as well as their cultural and political
The third and final chapter is an analysis of the multiple racialization processes of the
Chinese in the Philippines throughout their history in the Philippines. The 'Chinese race' has
been constructed through various political projects by colonial rulers, the Philippine
government, and the Chinese government. In particular, I explore the intersection of race and
class in the formation of Chinese Filipino identity. I apply O m i and Winant's (2001) theory
o f racial formation and Gotanda's (2000) study of racial profiling in the creation of the
Chinese racial category. I also utilize K i m ' s (1999) theory of racial triangulation, particularly
the field o f racial positions, in analyzing the relative status of Chinese Filipinos vis-a-vis
ethnic Filipinos and colonial rulers in Philippine history. I argue that throughout the history
of Chinese Filipinos, their identity has been formed through a racialized construction of
class. O n the one hand, they have always been racialized as alien and foreign; on the other,
being 'Chinese' has evolved from the poor, sojourning Chinaman to the economically
B y looking at how Chinese Filipino identities have evolved through three generations,
I hope to demonstrate how identities are shaped by competing publics and counterpublics,
which affirm the fluidity and multiplicity of identities. B y also examining how these
identities have been affected by multiple racialization processes throughout history, I hope to
illustrate how the categories of race are produced by conflicting social and political forces.
Even though there has not been any scientific basis for dividing groups into racial lines, race
continues to play an important role in structuring and representing the world. A s Wildman
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and Davis (2000) point out, there are patterns of domination and subordination within each
classification. Although racial tensions have always been present throughout history, calling
someone racist "lays the blame on the individual rather than the forces that have shaped that
individual and the society that the individual inhabits" (p. 657). This paper is not about the
racist attitudes of Filipinos, Chinese, or the colonizers. It is about exploring the systemic
nature of power systems like race in perpetuating patterns of domination and subordination,
and the material consequences of these systems on the identity formation of a minority
group.
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Chapter 1:
This chapter is a review o f the existing literature on Chinese identities and the social
construction o f race. While the changing identities o f the Chinese in the Philippines are the
focus o f the second chapter, the first chapter w i l l situate their experiences in the broader
context o f Southeast Asia. The first part o f this chapter examines the different discourses on
Chinese identities, including the various constructions o f Chineseness in Southeast Asia. The
second part o f this chapter focuses on the literature surrounding the social construction o f
race in order to examine the influence o f a 'Chinese race' and the racialized construction o f
class on the formation o f Chinese Filipino identity, which is the focus o f the third chapter.
O f the almost 31 million Chinese living outside o f mainland China, Hong K o n g and
Taiwan in 1990, the vast majority is found in Southeast A s i a (Pan, 1998). The Philippines
has one o f the smallest Chinese populations in Southeast A s i a , and an even smaller
proportion o f Chinese in the country compared to other Southeast Asian nations. In 1999, the
Singapore, 5 percent in Vietnam, 4 percent in the Philippines and the remainder in Myanmar,
Laos, Cambodia and Brunei. The proportion o f Chinese in each country also differs with the
largest proportions in Singapore, Malaysia and Brunei (Armstrong and Armstrong, 2001).
Most o f the early Chinese who migrated to Southeast A s i a came from the
southeastern provinces o f China, such as Fujian, Guangdong, and Hainan, and speak various
kinds o f spoken Chinese, such as Hokkien, Cantonese and Hokchiu. They were regarded as
sojourners, aliens and temporary residents. Some came to provide trading services while
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others were recruited to work in mines and plantations for the colonial regimes in the region.
They were mainly oriented to China and not directly active in local politics until the
twentieth century. Instead, they allied themselves with those holding political power that
served their own interests. The independence of new nation-states in the mid-twentieth
century forced the Chinese to redefine themselves as participants within a new national
context, and later took up citizenship offered in their host countries. Historically, they
managed to thrive under colonial rule and modern nation-states although their economic
success and wealth brought jealousy from the indigenous population. Chinese in Southeast
A s i a over many centuries have contributed substantially to the economic development and
growth of the region. They continue to be in transition from 'overseas Chinese' to fully
integrated local citizens of their adopted countries. They also found their identity as
'Chinese' to be an asset for doing business with China and overseas Chinese communities
acknowledged that there is no single Chinese identity but multiple Chinese identities - each
formed by its unique and historical circumstances (Wang, 1988; Hirschman, 1988; Gosling,
1983). Wang (1988) even maintains that "the Chinese have never had a concept of identity,
only a concept of Chineseness, of being Chinese and of becoming un-Chinese" (p. 1). If that
is the case, how then do we define the term 'Chinese?' A n d how do we measure the degree
of a person's 'Chineseness?' Many attempts have been made to define 'Chinese identity' and
to measure one's degree of'Chineseness.' A salient feature of being Chinese is to trace one's
biological line, as the legend goes, to the Y e l l o w Emperor. Another feature is simply being
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born in China. Being Chinese also means the ability to speak Mandarin or any of the Chinese
'dialects.' It can also mean practicing a code of ethics, such as filial piety, toward one's
There is also the problem of labels and language - what to call the people who are the
subject of study. Armstrong and Armstrong (2001) sum up the dilemma quite articulately in
When we speak and write in English are the Chinese populations of Southeast
These issues highlight the importance of treating Chineseness as a construct. A s the identities
defined by the Chinese themselves, the meaning of being Chinese is constantly changing (Tu,
1994).
The fluidity of Chinese identities can been seen in Wang's (1988) study of the
changing Chinese identities in Southeast Asia. He examines the ways different identities
were used to define a sense of Chinese identity during particular periods. Instead of
constructing a fixed identity of the Southeast Asian Chinese, he argues that the Chinese in
Southeast A s i a assume multiple identities throughout their history in the region. Before the
Second World War, the historical identity was used to define who was Chinese through the
emphasis of their family system, place of origin, traditional family values, as well as symbols
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of a glorious Chinese past. During the 1920s and 1930s, however, a predominant Chinese
nationalist identity was found among the overseas Chinese (Nanyang huaqiao) who
responded to the idea that their racial origins should enable them to identify with the new
nationalism in China propagated by Sun Yat-sen. A s can be expected, not all Chinese
changed in favor of Chinese nationalism. Some chose to identify with local indigenous
nationalist movement, while others found a new kind of identity that focused on economic
class. The national (local) identity in each of the new nation-states became the third kind of
This leads us to the cultural aspect of identity. The new awareness of culture
recognized the ways the Chinese communities could learn from modern non-Chinese
found that they had to choose between assimilation and integration - co-existence was no
longer a viable option. The concept of cultural identity enabled researchers to examine the
willingness of the Chinese to accept the local national identity even as they sustain their
Chinese identity, and to some extent accept a totally new non-Chinese identity. Some of
these cultural values included religious conversion, non-Chinese language skills, and
behavioral patterns influenced by non-Chinese customs. However, there were limits to the
usefulness of the concept of cultural identity. It did not address the relations between politics,
race and minority groups in Southeast A s i a in the late 1960s. The concept of ethnic identity
was used to deal with issues relating to racial origins and minority rights. In the 1980s there
was class identity, which crossed racial boundaries and was used to explain the role of
Chinese enterprise in the rapid growth of Southeast Asian economies and the willingness of
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most Southeast Asian Chinese to embrace Western capitalist institutions - events that could
In a critique of Wang's theories, Hirschman (1988) points out that there is insufficient
attention given to the causes of ethnic change, such as how and why the shift from traditional
to modern Chinese culture occurred. He argues that the study of identities needs to be linked
to the interaction between subjectivist approach (how people define themselves and are seen
by others) and objective conditions. The questions regarding the definition of ethnic groups
and the boundaries that divide them also need to be addressed. He pushes for the
measurement of differences between ethnic groups and how these differences narrow or
ethnicity in Southeast Asia. The first is socioeconomic inequality, which includes the
distribution of valued resources and rewards (i.e. education, occupation, income, power,
prestige). The second dimension is cultural differences, which include subjective identities
and ethnic variations (i.e. language, religion, values and beliefs). The third is structural
differentiation, which is the degree of ethnic participation in the social institutions of society.
Furthermore, Hirschman argues that the Chinese in Southeast A s i a "can be better understood
as minority groups who happen to be Chinese rather than as Chinese who happen to be living
Tan's (2001) study on the nature of Chinese identities in Southeast A s i a and in the
changing global context affirms the multiplicity of local Chinese identities. Because Chinese
in Southeast A s i a have adapted to different local cultural, social, and political environments,
they have developed their own local cultural identities. Tan terms this concept of state-bound
ethnic identity as national ethnic identity. In most cases, the state-sanctioned expression of
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ethnicity is the highest level of ethnic identification. It is the "expression of ethnic identity by
an ethnic group at the national level" (p. 230), such as Chinese Malaysians or Chinese
Filipinos.
Aside from one's national ethnic identity, Tan (2001) identifies another type of
identity that addresses the relationship of ethnic Chinese with China and the international
networks among ethnic Chinese. The concept of civilizational ethnic identity focuses on the
" ' c o m m o n ' identification as 'Chinese' by people of Chinese descent everywhere in the
transnational setting" (p. 212). He argues that "because of the identification with Chinese
civilization, the original source of Chinese cultures, Chinese worldwide can be said to have a
civilizational ethnicity" (p. 225). This particular identity does not involve a sense of
identification with Chinese civilization as expressed through their respective national ethnic
identities.
degrees of acculturation and accommodation to indigenous cultures. Some, such as the Baba
in Malaysia, even developed a 'new' identity. Gosling (1983) identifies the different forms
assimilation into indigenous societies and cultures. There could be a renewed emphasis on a
common Chinese culture or it could shift toward a Western or modern model of Chineseness,
one that is based on class rather than ethnicity. He also names several factors that could
influence the shifts in identity: the size of the Chinese community, economic role of the
Chinese, local political policies, intermarriage and the availability of Chinese partners,
communication within the Chinese community, and the Chinese perception of the local
15
population. O n the extreme end is total assimilation and on the other end is the maintenance
identities or situational ethnicity, the mixing of Chinese and indigenous cultures. He then
identifies three different levels of use of local identities by the Chinese and the
interchangeability of these identities. The first is the unconscious use of local identity, which
signifies a high degree of acculturation. This results from intermarriages, the use of native
language, and socialization by local domestic servants and peers. Those who use this identity
are more local than Chinese. The second level of use of local identities is the conscious use
through adoption of public behavior to offset the negative stereotypical view of the Chinese,
while maintaining 'Chinese' behavior in private. The third is the manipulative use of
alternative identities, where it involves a selective use of Chinese identity to achieve certain
Malay culture, including the wearing of sarong, the use of 'quiet and polite' Malay speech,
and having a 'humble and affable' disposition (p. 4). A t harvest time, when he would go to
the field to collect crops, he would put on his Chinese 'costume' and speak in a much more
particular situations and to achieve certain results, Wang (1988) offers a simultaneous
presence of many kinds of Chinese identities. Hirschman (1988), on the other hand, cites the
importance of studying the interaction between socio-political structures and the subjective
definition of identity, and the measurement of differences between the dominant and the
minority groups over time. The problem with the approaches of Gosling and Hirschman is
16
that they tend to essentialize Chinese and native identities and present them as static and
unchanging. Hirschman assumes that by measuring the differences between groups that the
dominant group itself is not undergoing any changes and that the interaction between the two
cultures does not have an effect on the dominant society, only on the ethnic minority.
Although these approaches address certain aspects of Chinese identity, they fail to capture
the complexities in the construction of Chinese identity and account for its fluidity and
permeability.
The various Chinese identities Wang (1988) explores in his study demonstrate how
identities change over time. These identities are not discrete categories but overlap in a
person's lifetime. Wang recognizes that while these identities have been used as a new way
of representing Chinese identity, what most Chinese really have is not a single, fixed identity,
but a mixture o f identities. Tan (2001) takes it further by stressing the importance of one's
show the causes of these changes over particular periods in Philippine history and
I also try to address the boundaries that divide the Chinese minority and the
mainstream Philippine society, as pointed out by Hirschman (1988). Barth (1969) explores
the different processes that take place in generating and maintaining ethnic groups. He
focuses on the ethnic boundary that defines the group and not on the 'cultural stuff that
comprises it. He argues that even though there may be a drastic reduction of cultural
differences between ethnic groups, as exemplified by the Chinese and Filipino ethnic groups
in the Philippines, this does not mean there is a "reduction in the organizational relevance of
17
ethnic identities, or a breakdown in boundary-maintaining processes" (p. 33). In fact, even
though there is frequent social interaction between ethnic groups, discrete categories may
individual life histories" (p. 10). A s Barth (1969) points out: "one finds that stable, persisting,
and often vitally important social relations are maintained across such boundaries, and are
In this paper, I explore the historical processes o f Chinese identities and their
negotiation by individuals, state authorities and interest groups. Like Wang (1988) and Tan
(2001), I try to demonstrate that there is no fixed Chinese Filipino identity but multiple
identities, each shaped by various political, social and cultural factors. I use Barth's essay in
social interaction between ethnic Chinese and Filipinos, I argue that there can be found
'stable and persisting social relations' that define the boundaries between the two ethnic
groups based on 'dichotomized ethnic statuses' (Barth, 1969). These social relations are
based on the mainstream society's view o f ethnic Filipinos as the dominant majority and the
ethnic Chinese as foreign and economically privileged. These 'ethnic statuses' are based on
the racialization processes o f Chinese and Filipinos throughout history. The concept o f race
Although scientists have tried to distinguish human groups along the line o f race, there has
been no biological basis for the categories employed to differentiate human groups along
racial lines. O m i and Winant (2001) defines race as " a concept which signifies and
18
symbolizes social conflicts and interests by referring to different types of human bodies" (p.
371). Lopez (2000), on the other hand, defines it as " a vast group of people loosely bound
ancestry" (p. 165). These two definitions provide a link between physical features and
selection of particular human features as signifiers of race has always been a social and
objective" (Omi and Winant, 2001, p. 371), as well as an opposite temptation to think of it as
a "mere illusion, a purely ideological construct which some ideal non-racist social order
would eliminate" (p. 371). O m i and Winant (2001) argue that there is a need to challenge
these two positions and transcend the seemingly rigid and bipolar relationships between
them. Lopez (2000) in fact argues that 'race is neither an essence nor an illusion, but rather
scientific basis for racial categories, O m i and Winant (2001) insist that we cannot simply get
rid of the concept of 'race' because it continues to play a fundamental role in structuring and
representing the world. Instead, we should think of race as "an element of social structure
rather than as an irregularity within it; we should see race as a dimension of human
In my analysis of Chinese Filipino identities in Chapter 3,1 have used the theoretical
process by which racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed" (Omi
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and Winant, 2001, p. 372). Race is a matter of both social structure and cultural
representation. It has no fixed meaning, but is constructed and transformed through " a
process of historically situated projects in which human bodies and social structures are
represented and organized" (p. 372), and via the power of hegemony - how society is ruled
and organized. Gramsci argued that in order to consolidate their hegemony, "ruling groups
must elaborate and maintain a popular system of ideas and practices - through education, the
media, religion, folk wisdom, etc. - which he called 'common sense.' It is through its
production and its adherence to this 'common sense'... that a society gives its consent to the
Vancouver's Chinatown. She argues that classifications of identity "bear the... stamp of a
dominant community conferring identity" (p. 8) and that the perception of the Chinese in
Canada as a different and distinct group is a "comparable cultural abstraction that belongs to
the beliefs and institutional practices of white European society..." (p. 8). Assumptions about
Chinese difference were then used to inform government policies toward the Chinese enclave
and its inhabitants. According to Anderson, race should not be invested with its own
Lopez (2000) uses the term 'racial fabrication' in explaining the social construction of
race. He argues that "races constitute an integral part of a whole social fabric that includes
gender and class relations" (p. 168). Races are also constructed relationally against one
another. In Chapter 3,1 argue that colonial rulers have racially triangulated the Chinese in the
20
(Gotanda, 2000), Chineseness in the Philippine context has come to signify alienness and
economic privilege.
The power o f racial formation is illustrated in W u ' s (1994) essay on the two
sentiments that identify all who see themselves as 'Chinese.' The first is a nationalist
sentiment, which is a feeling o f connectedness with the fate of China as a nation. It is also
associated with a "sense o f fulfillment, o f being the bearers o f a cultural heritage handed
down from their ancestors, o f being essentially separate from non-Chinese" (p. 149). The
second sentiment is membership o f a 'Chinese race' or the 'Chinese people,' a concept I have
been discussing in this section. According to W u , both sentiments represent " a n identity
based on concepts o f cultural and historical fulfillment rather than the more conventional
The overseas Chinese or huaqiao are considered to have identified with these two
identity outside o f China. These include rising nationalism since the early Republic, the
threat o f Japanese invasion, and discrimination experienced by overseas Chinese in most host
countries. The influence o f Chinese schools in propagating a 'Chinese race,' and eventually a
Chinese identity, has been profound in Southeast Asia. This nationalist ideology was brought
to overseas Chinese schools v i a branch organizations o f the Kuomintang party and other
overseas Chinese organizations (Wu, 1994). Overseas Chinese were subject to racialization
not only by their host countries and colonial rulers, but also by the Chinese government that
claimed them.
21
Constructing Chineseness
geopolitical concept and Chinese culture as a lived reality" (p. 1). It is associated with ethnic,
center, which in this case is China. The periphery, which consists of the communities outside
China, presents powerful and persistent economic and cultural challenges as well. Tu
suggests that the Chinese culture, or what is referred to as 'Cultural China,' can be examined
societies populated predominantly by cultural and ethnic Chinese (mainland China, Taiwan,
Hong K o n g and Singapore). The second consists of Chinese communities throughout the
world, and often referred to by political authorities in Beijing and Taipei as huaqiao
(overseas Chinese). They have also defined themselves as members of the Chinese diaspora.
These communities rarely exceed three percent of their country's population. The third
symbolic universe consists of scholars, journalists, industrialists and writers who try to
understand China intellectually and who continually attempt to shape the international
In his book, The Living Tree, T u (1994) attempts to examine the "fluidity of
Chineseness as a layered and contested discourse, to open new possibilities and avenues of
inquiry, and to challenge the claims of political leadership in Beijing, Taipei, Hong K o n g , or
viii). A n g (2001) takes it further by arguing that "Chineseness is not a category with a fixed
22
meanings are constantly renegotiated and rearticulated in different sections o f the Chinese
of the stability and certainty o f Chinese identity, but it does not "negate its operative power
without losing their sense o f Chinese identity. H e points out that many Chinese who have
acculturated to the indigenous population are still labeled Chinese and subject to suspicion,
discrimination or exclusion from social and political participation. This is particularly true
for overseas Chinese entrepreneurs who were behind the region's economic growth but are
still viewed with suspicion. This reflects the ongoing negotiation o f Chinese identity, both
within and outside the overseas Chinese community, depending on their host countries'
Wang (1999) expresses his reservations about the use o f the term 'diaspora' in
relation to overseas Chinese. This was brought about by the problems the Chinese
encountered with the concept o f huaqiao and the political use o f the term by China and
hostile governments:
From China's point o f view, huaqiao was a powerful name for a single body
of overseas Chinese. It was openly used to bring about ethnic i f not nationalist
or racist binding o f all Chinese at home and abroad. In the countries which
have large Chinese minorities, that term had become a major source o f the
suspicion that the Chinese minorities could never feel loyalty towards their
23
For Wang (1999), there is not a single Chinese diaspora but many different diasporas, just as
there are many kinds of Chinese. This is an important point because it allows us to see how
each Chinese community develops its own distinctive identity different from the one that
nationalist Chinese scholars and officials, as well as various governments, had tried to
impose on them. Political conditions in Southeast A s i a during the 1950s were crucial in
forcing the Chinese to re-consider what nationalism meant for them outside China.
In recent years we have also witnessed Chinese remigration, from a Southeast Asian
country to the United States, Canada or Australia. Globalization and more liberal
immigration policies have made it possible to affiliate with a new country. Identification with
different parts o f the world w i l l continue to shape Chinese identities. Ethnic identities are
dynamic and can be transformed and redefined. A s Tan (2001) predicts, "the trend is towards
global networking with each country as a base for national identity and Chinese civilizational
identity to long-standing roots in China or to China's civilization, Ong and Nonini (1997b)
seek to deconstruct modern Chineseness by arguing that identity is formed "out of the
strategies for the accumulation of economic, social, cultural, and educational capital as
diasporic Chinese travel, settle down, invest in local spaces, and evade state disciplining in
multiple sites throughout the A s i a Pacific" (p. 327). Although groups and persons in
Southeast A s i a have long engaged in movements of all kinds, what is new about the modern
Chinese transnationalism that started to occur in the last 20 years is its links to the "dynamics
of globalization, the workings of flexible Asian capitalism, and the related forms of cultural
24
production which generate new group and personal identities" (Nonini, 1997, p. 260). The
fluidity rather than fixity, as based on mobility rather than locality, and as the
playing out of these oppositions across the world... The varieties of Chinese
imaginaries marketed by late capitalism and its culture industries, (p. 327)
and place-bound theorizations implied in such terms as territory, region, nationality and
ethnicity. Chineseness is not measured by the 'Chinese' values or norms a person or group
possesses, but is understood only in terms of the multiple ways in which it is an "inscribed
relation of persons and groups to forces and processes associated with global capitalism and
its modernities" (p. 4). Modern Chinese transnational!sm decenters China as the ultimate
analytical reference for understanding diaspora Chinese and treats it as only one of many
sites in which Chinese transnational practices are played out. It is an "interplay between
Ong and Nonini (1997a) also mention the constraints on the strategies of
accumulation of the diaspora Chinese, which they call 'regimes of truth and power.' These
25
are the regimes o f the Chinese family, the capitalist workplace, and the nation-state. Each of
these regimes "disciplines persons under its control in different ways to form acceptable and
normal subjectivities" and requires "the localization of disciplinable subjects - that persons
be locatable and confinable... to specific spaces defined functionally by these regimes: the
home, the factory, the nation" (p. 23). Chinese transnationalists try to resist the localizations
imposed on them by these regimes by playing with different cultural fragments " i n a way that
allows them to segue from one discourse to another, experiment with alternative forms o f
identification... or evade imposed forms o f identifications" (p. 27). This has lead to the
proliferation o f various ways o f being Chinese, which has "engendered complex, shifting,
and fragmented subjectivities that are at once specific yet global" (p. 26).
in studying the changing identities o f Chinese Filipinos from the late 19 century to the late
th
20 th
century. These discourses provide historical context and background to the formation
discursive construct also opens up various forms o f inquiry, including the racial formation o f
the Chinese in the Philippine context and the effects o f this process on their identity. It also
demonstrates the complexity o f studying an ethnic group that is unbounded to a single place
26
Chapter 2: Changing Identities of Chinese Filipinos
The Chinese have a long history in the Philippines. They are said to have been in the
country much earlier than the Spanish, although knowledge about Chinese trade and
residence in the Philippines dates only from the 1 6 century. During this time, a sojourning
th
pattern prevented permanent settlement. It was only near the end o f the 1 9 century that a
th
exception is the case o f the Chinese mestizos, the mixed offspring o f male Chinese sojourners
and Filipina women during the Spanish period, whose history and unique status in Philippine
society is not within the scope o f this paper (Wickberg, 1998). The overwhelming majority o f
Chinese in the Philippines trace their regional origin to Fujian province. Hokkien, as they are
commonly called, make up 85-90 percent o f the Chinese population, mostly from South
Fujian regions such as Jinjiang, Zhangzhou, Quanzhou, and Shishi. A significant number also
came from Nan'an county and the Tongan-Xiamen area. The dialect spoken is Minnan, also
known as Hokkien. The Cantonese from Guangdong Province are the only other regional
Chinese group in the Philippines. They began to arrive in the Philippines only in the 19
century and comprise 8.8 percent o f the Chinese population (Wickberg, 1998; Pan, 1998).
This chapter primarily deals with the Hokkien and their changing identities as
Chinese Filipinos. They came to the Philippines in the 16 century and established trading
th
M a n i l a and M e x i c o in the 1570s. They provided silk and porcelain goods and monopolized
commercial and service occupations (Wickberg, 1998). B y 1600, there were 20,000 Chinese
in the M a n i l a area. The Philippines was considered as a "Hokkien hinterland o f jobs and
remittances. Chain migration o f individual family members from Fujian was the principal
27
historical feeder of the Philippine Chinese population" (Wickberg, 1998, p. 187). Fellow
villagers usually joined migrant pioneers who had established a base in the host country (Pan,
1998).
Both Spanish and American colonial policies have had a significant impact on the
cultural, political and economic orientation of the ethnic Chinese. These colonial regimes
sought to contain the Chinese population in order to exert control and management over the
country (Carino, 1994). The Spanish were ambivalent about the Chinese presence, resulting
in the creation of inconsistent policies and actions. O n the one hand, the Chinese were valued
for their skills as they monopolized commercial and service occupations. On the other hand,
their indispensability aroused suspicion from the Spaniards. They feared that the Chinese
would try to overthrow Spanish rule in the Philippines. A series of uprisings and massacres
as well as immigration controls and expulsions contained the Chinese population to about
5,000 to 10,000 by the late 18 century. However, in the mid-19 century, the Chinese were
th th
allowed to immigrate in greater numbers as Spain opened the Philippines to world trade and
needed their expertise. When the United States assumed colonial control over the Philippines
in 1898, the Chinese had already numbered around 100,000 and had dominated the export
and import business, rice and corn processing and sales. In 1946, Philippine independence
gave rise to increased Filipino nationalism, which was partly directed against the Chinese. A
number of anti-Chinese measures were passed aimed at reducing their economic power (Tan,
Today, there are over a million Chinese in the Philippines, or roughly 1.5 percent of
the total population. More than half live in Metro Manila, while smaller groups can be found
in provincial cities such as Cebu and Davao. About 90 percent of Chinese are citizens of the
28
Philippines. The size of the Chinese population in the Philippines is among the smallest in
Southeast A s i a (Wickberg, 1998). The relationship of the Chinese to Philippine society has
been oscillating from that of being excluded to that of being included at various times
throughout the country's history (Wickberg, 1998). Their economic clout and their perceived
cultural 'alienness' have made the Chinese a target of discriminatory laws and a scapegoat
for the country's poverty. A s Hau (2003) points out, "the contradiction between formal
political equality and actual economic equality... plagues Philippine nationalism and is
resolved only when it is expressed and manifested as anti-Chinese sentiment" (p. 279). Their
race and class have constantly been used by various administrations, whether colonial or
Filipino, to justify their exclusion from the dominant society. However, Wickberg (1998)
argues that the period from 1975 to present offers the most potential for inclusion. Almost all
ethnic Chinese are citizens and "there is every indication that most ethnic Chinese are in the
Philippines to stay and identify themselves with it" (p. 191). Although there has been some
progress in the past two decades towards the integration of ethnic Chinese into Philippine
society, they are still not completely accepted by the majority of Filipinos. Chinese are still
viewed as outsiders who dominate the Philippine economy. The next section w i l l examine
the factors that contributed to the multiple identities of Chinese Filipinos throughout their
Scholars have sought to capture the changing identities of Chinese Filipinos through
the passing of generations. Tan (1988) classifies these identities as the China-oriented, first
29
Wickberg (1998) calls them the Oldest, Middle and Youngest generations. Both scholars
have examined the factors that have influenced each generation's identity and cultural
orientation. Other scholars have tried to capture the multiple identities of Chinese Filipinos
through different stages. In a study on the political integration of Chinese Filipinos, Teresita
A n g See (1994) identifies three stages of transition of the Chinese community from the
huaqiao or sojourner stage to the Filipino-Chinese stage in post-World War II, where some
had acquired citizenship but had not socially and economically integrated with mainstream
society, and to the Chinese Filipino stage, where most have obtained citizenship and have
Other factors have also influenced the identity formation of Chinese Filipinos.
Chinben See (1988b) distinguishes between the China-born and the local-born Chinese, as
well as the Manila-based and province-based Chinese. Those who lived in the provinces had
more contact with the Filipino community due to their small numbers and were said to be
factor in shaping one's identity within the Chinese community. The upper-class, local-born
Chinese tended to identify with the 'Westernized' Filipino upper class rather than with the
Chinese community. Because half of the Chinese population lives in Metro Manila, they run
the Chambers, schools and major Chinese associations. They have played a major role in
shaping 'Philippine Chinese culture.' Carino (1994) argues that a crucial element in shaping
identity has been the attitude of government and its policies toward the Chinese. Decades of
process of integration depends partly on government perceptions and intentions, not only
with regard to the Chinese minority but also in terms of relations with China.
30
In the next section, I depict the changing identities of Chinese in the Philippines
show how various identities were formed and contested by various groups within each
generation, and how these processes has influenced the identity formation of succeeding
generations. I try to show how Chineseness has been differentially constructed and
present each generation as a homogenous group. There were often marked and bitter
differences regarding the cultural orientation and political loyalty of Chinese within a single
generation. Although most members of the first generation were culturally and politically
oriented towards China, there were others who had already identified with the host country.
Yet despite the varied experiences of Chinese Filipinos as well as their various locations and
social classes, most of them, whether they were in M a n i l a or the provinces, whether upper
class or lower class, male or female, were viewed as 'aliens' by the Philippine government
I have chosen to use the label(s) of Chinese in the Philippines depending on the
particular historical period. For example, while the term 'Chinese Filipino' is now commonly
used among the third generation, the term 'Overseas Chinese' were often used during the
time of the second generation. The next sections focus on the historical and social factors that
First Generation
The members of the first generation were born either in the Philippines or China.
Some were brought to the Philippines while they were very young. They came to maturity
during the 1930s and 1940s. Some came to the country to earn a living then returned home,
31
while others settled in the Philippines. The first-generation Chinese had more of the
'sojourner' mentality. Their orientation was towards their hometown in China, and they
regularly sent remittances to support their relatives who were left behind (Tan, 1988; Carino,
1994; Wickberg, 1998). Some invested in Fujian's local industries and supported its schools.
In the 1930s, Philippine remittances to China averaged over $6 million per year, up to 30
percent of which were sent to Fujian. The first-generation Chinese maintained ties with their
home community since they had minimal contact with the host population (Pan, 1998). The
major markers of Chinese identity for the first generation were family clan, native village,
and one's orientation towards the homeland. Pan (1998) explains the idea of native place in
To a Chinese sojourner abroad, 'home' or 'native place' may not be ' C h i n a '
so much as the county or village in Fujian where M i n is spoken - and not just
Because of this orientation, many Chinese established surname and native-place associations,
as well as Chinese newspapers and Chinese schools to express and, at the same, preserve
their culture. Chinese education was a very important factor in the maintenance and
propagation of a Chinese ethnic identity (Tan, 1988; See, 1988a; Wickberg, 1998).
It was during the Spanish era that Chinese started becoming conscious of their status
as a minority group. Tan (1972) argues that "grievances generated by Spanish colonial
policies and practices prepared the seedbed for the later development of nationalist
sentiment" (p. 39). These included discriminatory taxation, a system of travel pass that
restricted their mobility, and legal discrimination. The anti-Chinese policies made them
32
aware of their common fate and "made them more conscious of their ancestral ties, aroused a
sense of responsibility for assisting other Chinese in trouble, and stimulated a sense of
rt
identity" (p. 69). It was in 1880 that the local Chinese first appealed to China for consular
protection against the discriminatory practices of the Spanish colonial rule. Until then, China
had largely disregarded the overseas Chinese. A t the end of the Spanish rule, China started to
claim responsibility for the overseas Chinese and established its first consulate in M a n i l a in
1899. The first Chinese school was opened that same year and many more followed during
The American occupation of the Philippines in 1898 was a mixed blessing to the
Chinese. O n the one hand, the discriminatory Chinese Exclusion Act that was initially
implemented in the United States was extended to the Philippines in 1902. The purpose of
this legislation was to prohibit people of Chinese ancestry from entering the United States,
where a very strong anti-Chinese sentiment prevailed during that period. There were
exceptions to this rule, but it was enacted primarily to prevent an influx of Chinese
immigrants to the United States and later, to the Philippines. Although the Americans did not
object to the presence of Chinese immigrants in the Philippines, the Act was nonetheless
extended to the Philippines in order to prevent Chinese immigrants from using the colony as
In order to make the exclusion law applicable to the Philippines, the American
administration portrayed this act as preserving 'the Philippines for the Filipinos' (Tan, 1972;
Tan, 1988). O n the other hand, it was under the American occupation that the Chinese
immigrants were first granted the equal protection of the laws that enabled them to live in
relative freedom and economic security. The Chinese were permitted by the American
33
colonial regime to establish their own institutions and to expand their business networks all
over the Philippines. The Chinese settled in most parts o f the Philippines and entered new
types o f occupations. Having dominated the import and export business and rice and corn
mills, they went into the labor contractor business and the retail trade. This success brought a
backlash from the Filipino population. The Philippine legislature passed the Bookkeeping Act
of 1921 against the Chinese business community by requiring that all business accounts must
be kept in English, Spanish or a local dialect. This legislation was officially declared to end
the "defrauding o f the public treasury o f millions o f pesos annually by the 15,000 small
Chinese shopkeepers" (Purcell, 1965, p. 543) due to the inability o f Filipino officials to
check their books. The Chinese business community fought to repeal the law in the
Philippine legislature, and having failed to do so, took the case to the U.S. Supreme Court
Although the first Chinese daily newspaper appeared in 1888, it was not until the
1920s that the local Chinese press started to flourish. B y the 1930s there were five Chinese
daily newspapers and one weekly with a combined circulation o f 32,000. The Chinese press
was also used by different factions within the Chinese community to pursue political ends,
both locally and those involving events in China. The Chinese press was mostly divided into
of Commerce o f the Philippines was established in 1904 in order to nurture and protect
Chinese commerce. Its membership consisted o f trade associations, business firms and
individuals and worked closely with charitable organizations in Manila. The Chamber of
Commerce also organized protest actions against anti-Chinese laws and practices and was
34
instrumental in fending off the Bookkeeping Act of 1921. A s this organization became more
powerful, it represented the Chinese community as a whole (Tan, 1972; Wickberg, 1998).
Events in China also influenced Philippine Chinese identity. In 1909, the Nationality
L a w was passed in China, which was based on the principle of jus sanguinis - any person
born o f a Chinese father or mother was a Chinese citizen regardless o f birthplace. Interest in
overseas Chinese became stronger during Sun Yat-sen's Republican government. This was in
part due to the contributions o f the overseas Chinese to the Kuomintang party. In 1927 the
Sun Yat-sen government established an Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau and in succeeding
years passed numerous laws and regulations dealing with overseas Chinese education,
investment, migration and voluntary associations. It also guaranteed the protection and
political participation o f overseas Chinese in the country's draft constitution. In 1937, there
were more than 2,000 overseas Chinese schools to strengthen the emigrants' cultural and
patriotic ties to China (Pan, 1998). The growth o f Chinese schools in the Philippines
coincided with the development o f modern educational systems in China and the Philippines.
In 1935, there were 7,214 Chinese students enrolled in 58 Chinese schools. A s the Chinese in
the Philippines sought their identity in the host country, they turned to Chinese education as
one o f the means to achieve it. It served to instill 'Chineseness' and promote 'Chinese
culture' and, in a sense, assured the community's very survival (Tan, 1972; See, 1988a).
Most o f the first-generation Chinese identified with the growing nationalism in China
as they followed, and some even participated in, political events and movements in China
especially against Japanese aggression in the 1930s. After the war ended, the Kuomintang
and the Chinese Communist Party brought their battle overseas, in the schools and
35
politics in China, with some taking a 'pro-Kuomintang' or 'pro-Communist' stance (Tan,
1988; Wickberg, 1998). It almost seemed like most Chinese had no choice but to identify
with the nationalism in China. They realized that their fate as overseas Chinese was
somehow linked to the future of their homeland. Although there were 'pure-blooded'
Chinese who fought side by side with Filipinos against the Japanese, and there were those
who consider themselves as Filipinos, most of them were excluded from the political and
social structures of the country, and were resented by the Filipino population because of their
success in business (Pan, 1998; Tan, 1988; Wickberg, 1998). The Chinese were considered
"obnoxious because they were economically dominant, strange because they were culturally
alien, repulsive because they were socially clannish, and disloyal because they were
politically unreliable" (Tan, 1988, p. 179). In turn, the Chinese looked down on the Filipinos
Second Generation
The second-generation Chinese were those who were born in the Philippines between
the early 1920s and late 1930s. They were raised as 'Chinese,' both culturally and politically,
by the China-oriented first-generation elders. This meant that they attended Chinese schools
and were taught to regard China as their native land (Tan, 1988). However, many of them
were also increasingly being acculturated to the Filipino way of life, which prompted some
first-generation Chinese to regard them as neither truly Chinese nor truly Filipino - "they
were suspended between two cultures neither which claimed them" (p. 183). Yet a closer
look into the history of this generation reveals that it was actually this generation of Chinese
Filipinos that was being vigorously 'claimed' by various governments. These governments,
with their various ideologies and political interests, played pivotal roles in shaping the
36
identities of the second generation, as well as subsequent generations. The members of the
second generation reached maturity between 1946 and 1975, which was a crucial period in
the history of the Philippines. Major historical factors made tremendous impacts on the
structure and identity of the second-generation Chinese. These included the growing
nationalism of the new modern nation-state, the Cultural Revolution in the People's Republic
of China, the growing influence of the Republic of China on Taiwan on the overseas
Chinese, and the mass naturalization granted to 'alien' Chinese in 1975 by then-President
Ferdinand Marcos.
new kind of Filipino nationalism, which sought to preserve the Philippines for the Filipinos
and which also reinforced the identity of the Chinese as 'alien.' Laws were enacted to
nationalize various trades, occupations and professions. These policies were meant to
exclude those who were not Filipino citizens, and indirectly, the local-born Chinese who
controlled most of the retail trade and who were not citizens of the Philippines. The 1935
Constitution had already excluded 'foreigners' from owning land, developing natural
resources and running public utilities. The Retail Trade Nationalization A c t provided that
only Filipino citizens were allowed to engage in retail trade after M a y 1954. The
Nationalization of Rice and Corn Industries in 1960 required 'aliens' to liquidate their
businesses within two to three years from the date of the passage of the act. A number of
lawmakers continued to file more bills proposing the nationalization of lumber, the import
and export business, the restaurant business, among many others. This culminated in the
young nation-state's 'Filipino First' policy in 1961. Its aim was to enable the Filipinos to
37
obtain a substantial share of commerce and industry (Tan, 1988; See, 1994; Suryadinata,
citizens. In 1957, the Central Bank required that commercial banks must be fully owned by
natural-born citizens, which was later modified to 80% owned by natural-born citizens and
2 0 % owned by naturalized citizens. These laws severely affected the Chinese who dominated
the retail, rice, and corn trades, as well as in the import and export business. The second
generation who sought professional degrees from Philippine colleges and universities were
Chinese applied for naturalization. Before 1975, many Chinese immigrants had difficulty in
obtaining citizenship which created a large number of 'aliens' (Tan, 1988; See, 1994;
There were other factors that contributed to the shift in identity. When M a o Zedong's
People's Liberation Army defeated Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists in 1949, the Nationalists
fled to Taiwan. The rise to power of the Chinese Communist Party on the mainland led to the
termination of diplomatic ties between the Philippines and China and meant that the Chinese
community was cut off from the mainland. Immigration from China virtually stopped. In the
meantime, the Nationalists established the Republic of China on Taiwan under the
Kuomintang government. Using the overseas Chinese communities as their battleground, the
Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party resumed their rivalry and vied for supremacy
in the schools and community organizations in these communities and the ultimate authority
38
In 1955, the government of the People's Republic of China showed its willingness to
renounce its claim to overseas Chinese who wished to take up local nationality. Bent on
gaining the widest diplomatic recognition, this was considered a gesture o f goodwill towards
the newly independent nations in Asia, where overseas Chinese communities were "feared as
sources of subversion and a fifth column" (Pan, 1998, p. 102). The government in China also
encouraged overseas Chinese to take up local citizenship and integrate and assimilate into the
societies of the host countries. This move was viewed by the Kuomintang Party as a 'sell-
out' and an abandonment of the overseas Chinese (Pan, 1998). The government in Taiwan
quickly took up the role of a 'substitute C h i n a ' by recognizing citizenship on the basis of jus
sanguinis. This enabled those Chinese born in the Philippines to be citizens of the Republic
of China. It painted the image of communism in China as 'un-Chinese' because of its attitude
The shared hostility towards China between the Philippines and Taiwan led to a close
relationship between the two governments and paved the way for Taiwan to define
'Chineseness' in the Chinese Filipino context. The Kuomintang maintained branches in the
encouraged the overseas Chinese to remain 'Chinese.' The Overseas Chinese Affairs
Commission of the Republic of China identified Chinese education as the main thrust of its
work. It supervised the curriculum of the Chinese schools in the Philippines by requiring
them to follow the curriculum set by the Ministry of Education in Taiwan, which stressed the
teaching of Mandarin, Chinese culture and literature. Local Chinese teachers were trained
and systematically retrained in Taiwan. The schools were also used by the Kuomintang to
create political loyalty to the nationalist government in Taiwan. The version of 'Chineseness'
39
taught was the one sponsored by Taiwan. A t their height in the 1950s, there were 43,000
students in over 160 schools in the Philippines (Tan, 1988; Carino, 1994; See, 1994,
Wickberg, 1998).
In another development, the Chinese middle class had expanded over the 1954-1975
period. Their way of life was increasingly similar to middle-class Filipinos in terms of their
cultural and political orientation. Although most of the members of the second generation
attended Chinese schools, increasing numbers were attending Philippine universities as well.
In a bid to establish relations with China, the Philippines, under then-President Marcos,
granted mass naturalization to the Chinese in 1975. This policy has had the most dramatic
impact on Chinese identity in the Philippines. This also came at a time when China had
rescinded its policy of dual citizenship and encouraged overseas Chinese to adopt the
citizenship of their host countries. Although citizenship does not automatically endow a
nonetheless provides a condition to nurture this identity. For the first time, most Chinese
became officially 'Filipinos' and could practice within a wide variety of professions and
participate in the electoral process (Carino, 1994). This was significant since it created a
sense of security. Citizenship opened the way to integration and assimilation, as well as a
reevaluation of the ethnic group's place in Philippine society. Unlike the first-generation
Chinese who felt their future was tied up with China, the second-generation Chinese realized
that their fortune and future were now tied up with the adopted country (See, 1988b;
The members of the second generation created organizations that were modeled after
Western institutions, such as the Lions Club in the 1960s. There were various trade and civic
40
organizations that were established to voice the concerns o f the ethnic minority, such as the
Federation o f Chinese Chambers o f Commerce in 1954 and Pagkakaisa in 1970. One notable
organization is the Kaisa Para sa Kaunlaran (or Kaisa), established in the mid-1980s and
to hasten integration and enhance the mutual understanding between Chinese and Filipinos
Despite the legal status o f Chinese as citizens o f the Philippines, they were not fully
accepted by many Filipinos. Tensions, as well as stereotypes, remained between the two
groups. Being a predominantly business community, they were often accused o f price
manipulation and unfair trade practices. Another source o f conflict is the relation between
Chinese employers and Filipino employees. A s a letter writer to the Daily Globe explains her
husband's decision to leave a company owned by an ethnic Chinese: " . . . my husband left the
company for we have realized that no matter how hard one works for a Chinese, one would
never find upliftment in life, but have to remain slaves to these opportunists" (as cited in See,
1997, p. 20). Chinese were still being perceived as outsiders and immigrants from a foreign
land. A s another letter writer put it: "The Philippines is for us Filipinos. W h y don't you just
go home where you belong and leave the Filipinos at peace with whatever they may have?"
(as cited in See, 1997, p. 21). Ironically, many o f the second-generation Chinese had no
firsthand experience o f China, and know no other home but the Philippines (See, 1997).
Third Generation
If the first-generation Chinese was oriented towards China and the members o f the
second generation were torn between China and the Philippines, there seems to be an
overwhelming consensus that the third generation was oriented towards the Philippines. They
41
came to maturity during the 1980s and 1990s amidst unrestricted opportunities in the
Philippines (Wickberg, 1998). Their outlook, attitudes and values were more ' F i l i p i n o ' than
those of the second generation, and were further removed from the China-oriented first
generation (Tan, 1988). There is a tendency to homogenize the 'Filipino' society just as there
has been a tendency to 'Occidentalize' Europe and its construction of the Oriental (Anderson,
1991). It must be noted that Filipino culture and identity were simultaneously undergoing
changes during this time and were constantly being redefined. For the third-generation
Chinese, the main determinants in shaping their identity were the Filipinization o f Chinese
schools in 1973, the reopening of China, and the concerted actions of Chinese Filipino
In an effort to assimilate the Chinese into Philippine society, in 1973 the Philippine
government prohibited the ownership and operation of 'alien' schools in the country. Chinese
schools were given four years to be phased out. Permits of the Chinese schools were revoked
and all schools had to be administered by Philippine citizens. The teaching of Chinese was
made optional and classes were reduced to 120 minutes a day or 10 periods per week (from
18 periods). Since 1976, all Chinese schools in the Philippines had been 'Filipinized,' and the
medium o f instruction had been Filipino (based on Tagalog). The reduction of the Chinese
curriculum and the relegation of Chinese to the status of a foreign language affected the
young generation's command of the Chinese language and their appreciation of traditional
Other factors also contributed to this generation's decline in Chinese language skills.
B y this time, many families had moved out o f Chinatowns and were living in Filipino
neighborhoods. Most of the members of the third generation learned to speak the Filipino and
42
local dialects before they learned to speak Chinese. Hokkien might be spoken at home but an
increasing number had been unable to obtain a good command o f Mandarin, which was the
language taught in Chinese schools. Many students had difficulty in reading and writing
Chinese characters, and very few students read Chinese newspapers and other literature.
They were more fluent in English or Filipino and other local dialects than in Mandarin. The
shift in the language skills of third-generation Chinese reflected their increasing cultural
orientation to the Philippines rather than to China or Taiwan. Increasing numbers o f Chinese
in M a n i l a and the provinces attended Philippine schools at all levels. They interacted with
Filipino classmates and friends (Wickberg, 1998; Tan, 1988). Their acculturation to the
Filipino way of life was such that it led Tan (1988) to comment: "they think like Filipinos,
The mass naturalization of the Chinese provided many new economic opportunities to
the members of the third generation that were previously denied to the previous generations.
These opportunities often required a university education and English language skills, not
Chinese language skills. Many Chinese learned English at the cost of mastering Chinese,
whether Hokkien or Mandarin. This also affected the pool of qualified teachers for Chinese
schools since many graduates did not have the language skills to continue their education in
Taiwan and many preferred to stay in the Philippines (Wickberg, 1998). Intergeneration
conflicts occurred. Those who had chosen paths other than commerce faced disappointment
from their parents. Dy (2003) explains his parents' negative reaction to his decision to
become a priest as follows: "my parents were simply being creatures o f their times, times
when the Chinese in this country had very limited educational and professional opportunities
43
and practically all Chinese went into commerce to survive" (p. 182). After a long time, his
The opening of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China in 1975 had
lead to the resumption of travel to China and allowed many first-generation Chinese to revisit
their ancestral home and relatives in Fujian Province. It had also lead to the establishment of
a pro-Beijing faction in Chinatown, or what Tan (1988) called the anti-Kuomintang faction.
The absence of diplomatic relations with Beijing had enabled the pro-Taiwan group to
maintain power and influence in the Chinese community in the Philippines. The pro-Beijing
faction tried to undercut the power and influence of the Kuomintang on the Chinese
Filipino-Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry and its various branches. These
include various trade groups, charitable organizations, family associations, among others.
The cultural exchanges that had been sponsored by Taiwanese organizations were now also
possible with the mainland. There had even been talks about 'resinification' as some overseas
Chinese started to look towards China as it joined the global economy (Wickberg, 1998, Tan,
time when the country was also experiencing a shift in its attitude toward its ethnic minority.
This generation did not experience the discriminatory policies in the same way as the earlier
generations. They grew up in an environment where they enjoyed the same legal rights as the
Filipino population. They had taken part in elections and some Filipinos of Chinese descent
had been elected to public office. This shift is reflected in the change of terminology by
which the Chinese in the Philippines now identify themselves. The Chinese used to be known
44
as 'Filipino Chinese.' This implied that their primary identity was Chinese and they
happened to be living in the Philippines. It was in the 1980s that the new terminology,
'Chinese Filipinos' or Chinoys, was used to capture the new kind of Chinese living in the
Philippines: "primarily Filipino in nationality and allegiance, integrating into the mainstream
society without sacrificing their culture and legacy... in reversing the order of the modifier
and modified, proclaimed they are Filipinos, who happen to be o f Chinese origin" (Palanca,
2003a, p. 5). This new term was coined by Kaisa, an organization that has evolved into a
civic movement and a cultural institution documenting all aspects o f the Chinese in
Philippine life. It also plays a visible leadership role in the public affairs of the Chinese
community. It maintains a library on the history o f the Chinese Filipinos and a Chinese
heritage center. The founder, Teresita A n g See, also leads a crusade against the kidnappings
o f ethnic Chinese and other ethnic groups by kidnap-for-ransom gangs (Palanca, 2003b). Its
credo reads:
The Philippines is our country, it is the land of our birth, the home our people.
Our blood may be Chinese but our roots grow deep in Filipino soil, our bonds
are with the Filipino people. We are proud of the many cultures which have
made us what we are, it is our desire, our hope and aspiration - that with the
rest of our people, we shall find our rightful place in the Philippine sun. (Kaisa
Although there is more interaction and acceptance than ever on both sides,
relationships between Chinese and the Filipinos today are at times still clouded with mutual
suspicion and resentment. There are still some Filipinos who are ambivalent about the
presence of the Chinese minority. They suspect that the Chinese exploit the Philippine
45
economy without any commitment to the development of Philippine society (Wickberg,
1998). Chinese are still viewed as outsiders of the Philippine polity, as evidenced by the
(Filipinos o f same blood and race). This group maintained that the Chinese already controlled
the Philippine economy and called on 'Filipinos' to resist the attempts of the Chinese to
Their status as an outsider, in addition to their perceived wealth, has made Chinese
Filipinos vulnerable to kidnap-for-ransom gangs. Some Filipinos do not think that the
Chinese deserve any sympathy for their vulnerability to kidnappings and other problems
because they are economically better off than most Filipinos (Wickberg, 1998). The failure
of traditional Chinese organizations to demand the government into taking action against the
community. The traditional leaders of the community are still "wary about taking action that
could be interpreted as political in nature" (See, 1997, p. 128). Instead, these organizations
"used the old way of meeting and discussing the problem with the top-ranking government
officials, who often demanded logistics or financial support for solving the problem" (p.
128), to no avail.
The death of a high school student on January 7, 1993 was the catalyst that mobilized
the Chinese community. Members of the community, headed by Kaisa, organized a funeral
march to protest the government's inaction on the kidnapping problem. Chinese schools and
Chinese-owned businesses closed that day to allow their students and employees to join the
mass action. More than 25,000 people joined the funeral march. It was considered a
significant milestone in the history of Chinese Filipinos. A month later, the Citizens Action
46
Against Crime, a multi-sectoral organization composed of middle-class Filipinos, joined
forces with more than a hundred Chinese-Filipino organizations to protest the rising
criminality and kidnappings in the country. The mass actions forced then-President Ramos to
order a revamp of the Philippine National Police in order to solve the kidnapping problem
(See, 1997).
Some Chinese feel that they will always be treated as an ethnic minority that is
subjected to all kinds of harassment and discrimination - perennial scapegoats for the
problems facing the nation. There are others who would rather identify themselves with the
'diasporic' Chinese community than identify with a Third-world nation. However, there is a
growing number of Chinese Filipinos who are beginning to assert their rights as Filipino
citizens and to demand protection from the government against racism and harassment. The
pro-active approach of groups like Kaisa to construct the ethnic Chinese identity as part of a
integrate the ethnic Chinese to the dominant society - socially, culturally, politically and
economically.
47
Chapter 3:
The depiction of the changing identities of Chinese Filipinos in the previous chapter
colonial and postcolonial Philippines. For instance, it enables us to see how various
governments, journalists, commentators, and interest groups have shaped the category of
Chinese in the Philippines. This highlights the constructed nature of categories and
classification systems and focuses on the process of cultural classification itself (Ang, 2001).
By looking at the construction of Chinese Filipino identities, the purpose is "not to dispute
the fact that Chineseness exists... but to investigate how this category operates in practice, in
different historical, geographical, political and cultural contexts" (Ang, 2001, p. 40). It is
meant to demonstrate "how Chineseness is made to mean in different contexts, and who gets
to decide what it means or should mean" (p. 39) and the way it becomes the "object of
intense contestation, a struggle over meaning with wide-ranging cultural and political
implications" (p. 39). This approach also addresses the question of identity "as fluidity rather
than fixity" (Ong and Nonini, 1997b, p. 327) and shows how different identities - race, class,
nationality, subculture, dominant culture - intersect in and constitute an individual (Ong and
Nonini, 1997b).
The focus on Chinese Filipino identity brings us back to the study of race, particularly
the differential constructions of a 'Chinese race,' and its enduring effects on group identity.
Lopez (2000) explains that racial formation includes "both the rise of racial groups and their
constant reification in social thought" (p. 168). Sustained by the power of a hegemonic
culture, racial formation also has material consequences. As Anderson (1991) explains it,
48
"negative representations of racially defined people shaped adverse attitudes and repressive
policies in colonial and post-colonial states" (p. 26). It is important that we address "how
such categories came to be reproduced as dominant ideological and material forms" (p. 20).
Whereas racial ideology in North America has constructed Chinese identity as alien
and as a source of cheap labor (Anderson, 1991; K i m , 1999; Gotanda, 2000), the construction
both the force of ideological conceptions of the Chinese as a category and the effectiveness
of official representations of them as alien" (Anderson, 1991, p.22). It also requires the
tracing of the historical construction of Chinese categories "in such a way as to expose their
changing form and demonstrate their enduring connection to structures of domination" (p.
18). Examining the historical construction of Chinese categories in the Philippines enables us
to analyze how Chinese Filipino identities have developed in the historical and contemporary
periods. It also allows us to see how racial ideology had been institutionalized through
see how the category of race is constructed, through its negotiation and contestation by
Scholars on Chinese-Filipino relations have argued that the tensions between the two
groups are not merely based on racial bias but on class differences as well (See, 1997; G o ,
49
1996). Most Chinese immigrants who came to the Philippines i n the 19 century were not
rich - they worked as manual laborers and peddlers o f Chinese goods. Filipinos have always
referred to Chinese as Instik, a word which originally meant 'your uncle' but became
increasingly charged with negative connotations. They were discriminated by the Filipino
population and were subjected to racial taunts. Instik beho tulo loway describes the image o f
'an old drooling Chinaman,' usually peddlers and manual laborers, who dozed off in the
middle o f their sixteen-to-eighteen-hour days while instik baboy ('Chinaman pigs') made fun
Hau (2003) argues that the phrase Instik beho tulo laway is not simply a racial taunt,
"but one that carries within it a hidden class bias against manual labor and the kind of people
who submit to it" (p. 279): the " o l d , drooling Chinese... [whose] face [is] worn not by the
prosperous merchant but by the bottle collector or taho vendor or stevedore eking out a
living i n the only way he knows how and with the only means he has: by the sinew o f his
own physical labor" (p. 278). The evolution of Chinese upward mobility, from lowly laborers
to members o f a merchant middle class, has changed the attitudes o f Filipinos toward the
Chinese. Although these racial taunts are rarely used against the Chinese today, the issue o f
class remains. Hau (2003) reflects on her own reaction to that phrase and the construction o f
humiliation) to that word is simply the flipside o f the same class bias against
the Instik, a bias sharpened by the distancing effects of upward mobility and
connotation o f that phrase, I ended up assuming the very logic that I tried to
50
criticize, the one that said that being Chinese necessarily meant being well-
The impression that the Chinese in the Philippines are rich and the resentment by
Filipinos over the 'Chinese control' of their economy have lead several writers to address
these stereotypes. While the Chinese are predominantly involved in the trade and light
industry, See (1997) disputes the claim that they control the economy of the country. She
points out that not all Chinese are rich and that there are some who are also poor. See (1997)
further argues that racial tension between Chinese and Filipinos is caused mainly by
differences in economic status, which leads to disparities in class and ways of life. She
maintains that "cultural conflict can also arise out of the cultural differences spawned by
disparities in social and economic status. Such differences give rise to racial biases" (p. 8).
The racialized construction of class has often plagued Chinese Filipino identity:
efforts to claim an identity for themselves within the Philippines but also of
In this chapter, I examine the intersection of race and class in the identity formation
'foreign' and 'economically privileged' in the Philippine context. I argue that the Chinese
racialization, were permitted by those in power to form extensive business networks in the
country so long as they remain 'outsiders' in the Philippine polity. In the process, they were
51
racially triangulated relative to the colonizers and the Filipino people during the colonial
period. They were valorized relative to the natives for their economic skills but ostracized
from the body politic due to their perceived foreignness. In a parallel development, the idea
of a 'Chinese race,' promoted by the Nationalist government in China during the 1920s in a
bid to obtain the support of overseas Chinese, also contributed to the multiple racialization of
Chinese as permanently foreign and unassimilable in their host country, whose loyalty
belonged to their homeland. The "ongoing practices of racial triangulation laid an ideological
foundation" ( K i m , 1999, p. 115) that allowed for the passage of nationalization laws aimed at
excluding the Chinese from Philippine society especially after the birth of the Philippine
nation-state in 1946. Even as full-fledged Philippine citizens, Chinese Filipinos today still
have to wrestle with the issues o f race and class as they negotiate their changing identities in
the Philippines.
Race as a Process
The current use of the phrase racial profiling has been articulated by Gotanda (2000)
on his work on America's racialization of Asians. The profile, which is " a particular
characterization or social stereotype," is "linked to the raced individual's racial category" (p.
1691) and is "linguistically and conceptually separable from the racial classification or racial
category of the person being profiled" (p. 1691). Racial profiling does not necessarily
characterize the racial 'other' as inherently inferior - "instead of biological inferiority, the
associations attached to the racial category are properly identified as a racial profile" (p.
1691). Racial profiling is applied to culturally situated contexts and produces social and
racial profiling has allowed for the racialized construction of class. Chinese Filipinos have
52
been racialized as 'alien' and 'economically privileged' and these stereotypes have political
and material consequences, as evidenced by the nationalization laws aimed at this ethnic
group.
Taking it a step further, K i m (1999) points out that "racialization processes are
mutually constitutive of one another" (p. 106), in the sense that "groups become racialized in
comparison with one another and that they are differently racialized" (p. 107). In the context
of the United States, she argues that " A s i a n Americans have been racially triangulated vis-a-
vis Blacks and Whites, or located in the field of racial positions with reference to these two
other points" (p. 107). She describes the field of racial positions as " a normative blueprint for
who should get what... [it] profoundly shapes the opportunities, constraints, and possibilities
with which subordinate groups must contend, ultimately serving to reinforce White
dominance and privilege" (p. 107). It is also "continuously contested and negotiated within
and among racial groups, both at the elite level and at the level of popular culture and
everyday life" (p. 107). Racial triangulation occurs through the processes of 'relative
valorization' and 'civic ostracism.' O n the one hand, relative valorization refers to the
process whereby the dominant group valorizes one subordinate group relative to another
subordinate group on cultural and/or racial basis in order to dominate both groups. On the
other hand, civic ostracism is a process whereby the dominant group constructs the valorized
subordinate group "as immutably foreign and unassimilable with [the dominant group] on
cultural and/or racial grounds in order to ostracize them from the body politic and civic
The racial triangulation of Chinese in the Philippines during the colonial period is
53
Asian Americans have been racially triangulated vis-a-vis Blacks and Whites, Chinese
Filipinos have been racially triangulated vis-a-vis the colonizers and the colonized. In a field
of racial positions, Chinese Filipinos were considered inferior to the colonizers but superior
foreign and unassimilable, racial triangulation processes created a merchant class that would
fulfill an economic purpose "without making any enduring claims upon the polity" ( K i m ,
1999, p. 109). Although most Chinese chose to be sojourners during this period, the Spanish
and American colonizers, just like the White elites in the United States, "embraced and
reinforced this arrangement for their own purposes" (p. 109). One of these purposes is for
minorities have been known for the economic role they play in their adopted countries. In
contrast to other ethnic minorities, middleman minorities "occupy an intermediate rather than
particularly in trade and commerce, and "play the role of middleman between producer and
consumer, employer and employee, owner and renter, elite and masses" (p. 583). They thrive
in societies characterized by a marked division between elites and masses, and, as in the case
of the Philippines during colonial period, in "colonial societies with a gap between
representatives of the imperial power and the 'natives'" (p. 583). They are economically
dominant but feel essentially alien in their adopted countries. The native population resents
their power since they believe that their country is being 'taken over' by a foreign group.
54
... their foreignness enables them to be "objective" in the marketplace; they
do not have familistic ties with the rest o f the society which can intrude on,
and destroy business... [and] they act as a buffer for elites, bearing the brunt
of mass hostility because they deal directly with the latter, (p. 584)
Many o f the Chinese who came to the Philippines were merchants who traded goods
with the indigenous population and who eventually returned to China. During the Spanish
colonization o f the Philippines, the emergence o f a cash economy expanded the market for
Chinese goods in the country. Those who settled in the country were mostly laborers. These
were the 'drooling Chinamen' being referred to in the racial taunt Instik beho tulo law ay.
They provided manual labor and worked as peddlers o f Chinese goods, becoming the
"inheritors o f the early Filipino-Chinese trade" (Go, 1996, p. 45). They laid the earliest
foundation for Chinese economic expansion in the country. Before long Chinese had become
indispensable to the local economy which aroused the suspicions o f the Spaniards, who
"feared their economic power, cultural difference, and the possibility they might seek aid
from nearby China to overthrow Spanish rule i n the Philippines" (Wickberg, 1998, p. 188).
They were confined to a segregated residence called the parian, subjected to discriminatory
taxation and forced labor drafts, and pressured to convert to Catholicism. Their
"monopolization of economic activities, their cultural alienness, apparent ties to a nearby and
powerful China and the obvious mutual antipathies o f Spaniards and Chinese" (p. 189) also
influenced Filipinos to adopt "Spanish stereotypes and to despise the Chinese as a pariah
The series o f expulsions and massacres that targeted the Chinese during the Spanish
period drastically reduced their population to 5,000 - 10,000, most o f which were converted
55
Catholics living in Manila. Their economic roles were taken over by the Chinese mestizos,
the mixed offspring o f a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. B y the early 19 century they
th
had become the most powerful and influential group under Spanish rule, and regarded, rather
ironically, "not as a special kind o f Chinese but as a special kind o f F i l i p i n o " (p. 190). They
were born in the Philippines, promoted Spanish and Filipino values and practices, and were
not seen as a political threat. However, as Spain opened the Philippines to world trade in the
middle o f the 19 century, Chinese were allowed to immigrate in greater numbers than ever
th
and this time, were permitted to settle not just in Manila's parian but also in every part o f the
Philippines (Wickberg, 1998). During the Spanish colonial regime, Chinese were valorized
for their economic skills but were ostracized due to their 'cultural alienness' arising from
their resistance to genuine conversion to Catholicism and their ties to China. The Filipinos,
on the other hand, were racialized as 'inferior' and were called indios bravos ('savage
When the United States assumed colonial rule in 1898, Chinese were now settled in
most parts o f the Philippines and established business networks all over the country. That
subordinate groups are differentially racialized in order to serve the interests o f the dominant
group could not be more evident in the racialization o f Chinese by the U . S . government.
Although Chinese in both the United States and the Philippines were racialized as 'foreign'
by the United States (the Chinese Exclusion A c t was applied to both countries), the
consequences were vastly different. In the United States, Chinese were valorized relative to
Blacks because their 'unassimilability' made them "more docile and less demanding than
Black labor" ( K i m , 1999, p. 110). Their civic disenfranchisement also made them "useful
pawns in the game o f reasserting White dominance over Blacks" (p. 111). In the Philippines,
56
the Americans needed the business networks of the Chinese to promote its economic policies,
particularly the distribution of U.S.-made goods. The U.S. Department of Trade had even
credited the Chinese for being the "most important links in wholesale and retail trading" (Go,
1996, p. 76). G o (1996) argues this was the reason why the colonizers encouraged, instead of
restricted, the business activities of the Chinese. The Filipinos were not ready to take on that
While the Americans controlled the Philippine economy from behind the
scenes, they gladly allowed the ethnic Chinese businessmen to be the front
liners, thus hitting two birds with one stone. The ethnic Chinese not only sold
the goods for the Americans, they also took the risks and became convenient
Scholars have generally acknowledged that the Chinese community became fully
developed during the American colonial period (Go, 1996; See, 1997; Tan, 1972, See,
1988b). Chinese schools were established and Chinese language newspapers were published
after the community's affairs. However, it was also during this period that people in China
and the overseas Chinese were subjected to a racial conception of their homeland, "with its
emphasis on a people united by common Han ancestry" (Pan, 1998, p. 103). The Kuomintang
government, ushered to power by Sun Yat-sen's 1911 revolution, adopted the Nationality
L a w first enacted by the Qing in 1909 (Pan, 1998). It ruled that all persons of 'Chinese race'
Despite the strong anti-Chinese sentiments in the United States during that time, the
American regime tolerated the development of national consciousness of the Chinese in the
57
Philippines and their allegiance to the Nationalist government in China led by Sun Yat-Sen.
Apparently, this was not considered a threat by the Americans as long as it affected the
Chinese in the Philippines. G o (1996) opined that this was even beneficial to American
colonial rule in the country, and not simply due to the "spirit of 'freedom' and 'democracy'
Both Spanish and American colonial regimes have been accused of promoting
physical segregation between Chinese and the Filipinos, thus creating a gap between the two
groups. These territorial arrangements further contributed to the racialization of Chinese. The
Spaniards confined the Chinese to a parian, where Filipinos can go to shop but not to live
(Wickberg, 1998; G o , 1996; See, 1997). Although the Americans allowed the Chinese to
move freely around the country, they nevertheless permitted the Chinese to create their own
ethnic communities and their own institutions separate from the rest o f the population,
prompting G o (1996) to comment that "the whole country was actually transformed into a
'big parian'" (p. 79). Through these territorial arrangements, "the racial category 'Chinese'
became inscribed, both on the ground and in people's minds" (Anderson, 1991, pp. 27-28).
Chinese racialization emerged in the Philippines with the rise of colonialism. Their
racial profile of cultural alienness and economic dominance were perpetuated by the colonial
powers and adopted by the Filipino population. When the Philippines became fully
independent in 1946, Filipinos had a dilemma: although "the Chinese were indispensable to
the desired national development... they seemingly were alien at a time when nationalism
was at its height" (Wickberg, 1998, p. 188). O n hindsight, it seemed the implementation of
Nationalization laws was inevitable. After centuries of colonialism, "nationalism was equated
58
Subordinate groups are not passive participants in the racialization process. They do
not merely adopt the dominant group's racialization of themselves and other subordinate
groups. They also form their own racialization about themselves and other groups. A s K i m
(p. 129). Many Chinese chose to identify with the growing nationalism in China and this
enhanced their perceived 'disloyalty' to the host country. Although it can be argued that they
did not have any choice but to identify with the only country that claimed them, Chinese
nationalism produced not only the idea of a Chinese race but also a sense of cultural
superiority on the part of the Chinese in the Philippines over the colonized Filipinos. Because
of their marginalization from the mainstream society, most of the personal contacts first-
generation Chinese have had with Filipinos were limited to "their workers, their employees,
their maids at home, corrupt policemen and firemen, Bureau of Internal Revenue agents and
city hall inspectors who harass them regularly, and politicians who befriend or lambaste
them, depending on personal conveniences and purposes" (See, 1997, p. 39). Their economic
status relative to the Filipinos and their limited contacts with the native population led
Filipinos, on the other hand, perceived the Chinese as aliens - "they are immigrants
from foreign soil, and they are merely guests in the Philippines" (See, 1997, p. 8) - and
resented their economic success, which was facilitated by the colonial rulers. See (1997).
argues that "ambivalent feelings of nationalist pride combined with the reality of class and
status differences complicate the relationship" (p. 9). The racialization of Chinese as foreign
and economically privileged laid the ideological framework for the implementation of the
Nationalization laws targeted against the Chinese. Racial ideology gave the 'ruling sector' of
59
the newly independent country the power to define, in cultural and ideological terms, who
were included in and excluded from the Philippine society. These consisted of politicians,
police, bureaucrats, owners of capital, and other influential members of society. A s we have
seen throughout the racialization of Chinese in the Philippines, "their moral and legal
authority helped to give the race concept its remarkable material force and effect, embedding
it in structures that over time reciprocally reproduced it" (Anderson, 1991, p. 24).
discourse on the Chinese still hint on their foreignness and economic privilege. Politicians
and government officials, as well as opinion makers, have often blamed Chinese
businessmen for the economic problems afflicting the nation. Chinese have been accused of
"price manipulation, hoarding, unfair trade practices, or profiteering" (See, 1997, p. 9).
Journalists and community leaders have also portrayed Chinese as leaders of crime
syndicates. Even though they are Philippine citizens, Chinese Filipinos are still seen as being
unfit for public office. Groups have been formed to reject candidates of Chinese ancestry
during the past elections. Various stereotypes of the Chinese continue to persist, such as their
control of the Philippine economy, their enormous wealth, and the homogeneity and
inscrutability of the Chinese community. The refusal of some Chinese to marry outside the
Even as more Chinese Filipinos integrate into the mainstream society through their
participation in the cultural, political and economic activities of the country, there are still
incidents involving the Chinese Filipino community that continue to remind them of their
precarious status in the country. The kidnappings targeted against Chinese Filipinos have
60
been a recent 20 century phenomena. Although kidnap-for-ransom had been a problem ever
since, it had only become rampant against middle-class Filipinos of Chinese origin in the
early 1990s (See, 1997). Most of these kidnappings may be motivated by money, but the
targeting of Chinese victims reveals a racial bias. In one sense, it exposes the continued
society. In another, it exemplifies the racialized construction of class that has constituted
The upward mobility of the Chinese in the Philippines has produced a successful
group of Chinese businessmen, whom the Philippine press has recently referred to as
long-standing domination of these industries by the Spanish and other foreign elite
(Wickberg, 1998). The word 'taipan' means " a powerful businessman and especially
Dictionary, 2004). The connotation of the term 'taipan' as foreigner and its connections to
Hong K o n g or China implies that the success of Chinese Filipino entrepreneurs is still not
considered home-grown. This has prompted See (1997) to write that "the concept of the
Chinese as an ethnic and not an alien minority has not yet taken hold... growth in the
Chinese sector of the Philippine economy is not yet perceived as a growth in the domestic
economy" (pp. 126-127). The Chinese may have shed the image of a drooling Chinaman in
the minds of the Filipinos, but that has been replaced with a different kind of racialization,
which is that of the Chinese as foreign and economically privileged - the intersection of race
61
Conclusion
A s the Chinese in the Philippines move closer towards integrating into the Philippine
society, they have started to become conscious of their identity and place in the mainstream
society. Yet "many Chinese Filipino themselves do not understand their own identity. Some
have not come to terms with their identity, much less understand the culture that they
practice" (Palanca, E., 2003, xxvi). Their culture, heritage and the dilemmas surrounding
their identity are the subject of a recent coffee-table book entitled Chinese Filipinos. This
book "celebrates the coming of age of the Chinese - from being Filipino Chinese, who were
ambivalent about their status and loyalty, to the present generation of Chinese Filipinos, who
know only the Philippines as their home and country" (xxvi). Wickberg (2003) contrasts the
A s Chinese Filipinos become more confident of their status in mainstream Philippine society,
they would like their cultural heritage to be shared and remembered (Palanca, E., 2003).
Philippine mainstream society. It addresses the entrenched dichotomy between 'Chinese' and
'Filipino,' as well as the various constructs within each of these categories. Throughout this
paper, I have argued for the importance of racial formation in understanding how identities
are formed by various groups, and more importantly, as a means of perpetuating patterns of
domination and subordination (Omi and Winant, 2001; Lopez, 2000). Racial profiling leads
62
to an analysis of how racial categories are formed and the cultural meaning that came to be
attached to the racial category (Gotanda, 2000). Racial triangulation, on the other hand, helps
1999, p. 106) and these processes generate hierarchies based on racial groups. The racialized
construction of class as applied to the Chinese in the Philippines allows us to examine the
marginalization of Chinese Filipinos throughout most of the last century, and their continued
new avenues of inquiry and challenge the stereotypes and myths that have surrounded this
ethnic minority. A s K i m (1999) points out, "the field of racial positions has now been
rearticulated in cultural terms: rather than asserting the intrinsic racial superiority of certain
groups over others, opinionmakers now claim that certain group cultures are more conducive
to success than others" (p. 117). The 'unique' characteristics of ethnic Chinese, based on
Confucian values and Chinese culture, have been largely credited for the economic success
of overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. The emphasis on education, hard work, and other
'Chinese' qualities are supposed to be the 'formula' for their success (Go, 1996). Instead of
addressing the structural inequality present in the Philippines, the example of the ethnic
Chinese has been used to put the blame for the country's poverty squarely on the Filipinos
prejudice, poverty, and cultural isolation to turn their ghettoes into today's
prime real estate while the indigenous people bred chaos, mutual oppression,
and decay? ... The bottom line is that the Chinese community in the
63
Philippines is a shining example of the precept that we, as a people, have not
Philippines, 2004)
present-day discrimination ... and the present-day effects of past discrimination" (p. 359).
Worse, the racialization of Chinese Filipinos as 'alien' strips them of their right to demand
for protection against harassment and discrimination. Thus, like the A s i a n American
experience, when they complain about discrimination and call for remedial action, these are
seen as 'unwarranted and inappropriate' (Chang, 2000). In the United States, the model
minority myth does not claim that Asian Americans have been culturally assimilated into
White society. Instead, "it posits their material success and attributes this to their ongoing
cultural distinctiveness" ( K i m , 1999, p. 118). Racial formation allows us to examine past and
present forms of racialization and discrimination of the Chinese in the Philippines that
contribute to the ongoing formation of their identity and status in mainstream Philippine
society.
This paper has mainly focused on the role of government policies in shaping the
racialization processes of the Chinese in the Philippines. Admittedly, this is just one side of
the story. The other side of the story is the role of agency, on the part of Chinese Filipinos
and ethnic Filipinos, in contesting imposed racial meanings through movements and political
struggle. This study can serve as a prelude for future research on the agency of Chinese
Filipinos and ethnic Filipinos in resisting externally imposed racialization processes. The
other limitation of this paper is the lack of discussion on the gendered construction of the
64
'Chinese race' in the Philippine context. The images of the old, drooling Chinaman and the
successful taipan are masculine constructions of 'Chineseness.' This raises a lot of interesting
research questions, such as exploring the agency of Chinese women in forming their own
identities in the Philippine society, and the gender relations among Chinese Filipinos.
This past century has seen Chinese Filipino identities evolve from the Chinese
sojourner who was culturally and politically oriented to his native place in China, to the
Philippine-born Chinese who was politically marginalized from the mainstream Philippine
society, and finally, to the third-generation Chinese Filipino who has Philippine citizenship
and who has now fully identified with the country of her birth. Changes in the country's
political structure, its relations with China and Taiwan, among others, have lead to changes
in policies toward the Chinese in the Philippines, and these in turn have affected the
formation of their identities. Increased social interaction between ethnic Chinese and
Filipinos has also contributed to the transformation of Chinese Filipino identities as well.
So how are we to define the Chinese Filipino today? D o we still use McCarthy's
definition of the ethnic Chinese as "someone with a measure of Chinese immigrant parentage
who is sufficiently influence by Chinese culture, can use a Chinese language, and observes
Chinese customs enough to rightly call himself, and to be regarded by his neighbors, as
Chinese" (as cited by See, 1994, p. 141)? If this is the case, many of the members of the third
generation are immediately excluded from this definition. D o we identify them with the
modern Chinese diaspora, the 'imagined community' of huaren (Chinese) that binds all the
Chinese in the world together as one people? This is also problematic since 'Chineseness' as
a category does not have a fixed content; its meanings are constantly renegotiated and
rearticulated in various sections of the Chinese diaspora. The imagining of the 'Chinese race'
65
also tends to suppress the differences which have been constructed by heterogeneous
diasporic experiences (Ang, 2001). The full integration of the Chinese into the Philippine
society is also problematic since "even the Filipinos themselves do not as yet have a national
identity that could embrace different ethnic identities, indigenous or alien, into its f o l d " (See,
1988, p. 331). A n d as Hau (2003) points out, there is also a need to question the mainstream
These issues are complex and need to be carefully examined in order to allow for the
integration, not just of Chinese Filipinos, but of other ethnic groups as well into Philippine
and subordination in the Philippines "does not mean surrendering to it, but rather exposing it
once and for all to meaningful and effective challenge" ( K i m , 1999, p. 130). This paper
hopes to challenge existing constructions of Chinese Filipino identities so that they can break
66
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