Erkenn

DOI 10.1007/s10670-016-9866-y

ORIGINAL RESEARCH

The Ontology of Digital Physics

Anderson Beraldo-de-Araújo1 • Lorenzo Baravalle1

Received: 6 January 2016 / Accepted: 22 November 2016

Ó Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Abstract Digital physics claims that the entire universe is, at the very bottom, made
out of bits; as a result, all physical processes are intrinsically computational. For that
reason, many digital physicists go further and affirm that the universe is indeed a
giant computer. The aim of this article is to make explicit the ontological
assumptions underlying such a view. Our main concern is to clarify what kind of
properties the universe must instantiate in order to perform computations. We
analyse the logical form of the two models of computation traditionally adopted in
digital physics, namely, cellular automata and Turing machines. These models are
computationally equivalent, but we show that they support different ontological
commitments about the fundamental properties of the universe. In fact, cellular
automata are compatible with a rather traditional form of physicalism, whereas
Turing machines support a dualistic ontology, which could be understood as a
realism about the laws of nature or, alternatively, as a kind of panpsychism.

1 Introduction

Possibly many things in the universe are digital computers, that is, physical
realisations of computing machines. Nonetheless, there is no general agreement
about what kind of things should be regarded as such, nor about what exactly is the
relation of physical realisation in question (cf. Piccinini 2015). Notably, many
philosophers (following, for instance, Putnam 1960; Fodor 1975) have argued that

& Anderson Beraldo-de-Araújo

anderson.araujo@ufabc.edu.br
Lorenzo Baravalle
lorenzo.baravalle@ufabc.edu.br
1
Center for Natural and Human Sciences (CCNH), Federal University of ABC (UFABC),
São Bernardo do Campo, SP, Brazil

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human minds are Turing machines. This thesis, inspired by Turing himself (Turing
1950), is the core of the computational theory of mind also called computationalism.
More incisively, others scholars—frequently called ‘‘digital physicists’’—have
defended that the whole physical reality is digital and the universe may be best seen
as the realisation of a (quantum) Turing machine (cf. Deutsch 1997; Lloyd 2000;
Chaitin 2005) or, alternatively, of a universal cellular automaton (cf. Zuse 1967;
Wolfram 2002; Steinhart 2004). To be precise, digital physics is grounded on three
assumptions:
1. The physical world is a digital structure;
2. Physical objects perform computational processes;
3. The physical world is a universal computer.

We shall call the first assumption digitalism, the second pancomputationalism,

and the third Zuse thesis, in honour of its inventor.1 Very little attention has being
paid to the metaphysical import of these theses as a whole. We find in the literature
some recent works on digitalism (cf. Floridi 2009, as well as Berto and Tagliabue
2014), but no systematic analysis of all digital physics. We believe that the main
reason for this state of affairs is the absence of a rigorous logical formulation of
digital physics, which makes inferences about its metaphysical status questionable.2
In this article, we shall try to fill—at least partially—this deficiency. Our aim is to
make explicit what kind of properties has to be instantiated by the physical world in
order to be a digital structure and, thus, performs the computations that digital
physicists impute to it. Our strategy will be to analyse the ontological commitments
of the Zuse thesis using the tools of first-order logic. Since the Zuse thesis can be
formulated according to two alternative computational models, cellular automata
and Turing machines, it will be necessary to consider them both in detail. Even
though cellular automata and Turing machines are computationally equivalent (i.e.,
they can compute the same functions), this does not imply that they can be realised
by objects with the same properties. As a matter of fact, we shall prove that the
ontological commitments of the two formalisms are quite different.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Sect. 2, we prove that digitalism
implies a form of pancomputationalism. In Sect. 3, we present a general version of
the Zuse thesis and show that there is no logical or geometrical definitive reason to
formulate it in terms of cellular automata—as digital physicists usually defend—
instead of Turing machines, as some other authors believe: both formalisms are
perfectly suitable for the purpose. In Sect. 4, we argue that Turing machines and
cellular automata rely, respectively, on a dualism and a monism of properties.
Finally, in Sect. 5, we explore the metaphysical implications of these claims. To
conclude, we present some general remark.

1
Actually all three theses can be found in Zuse’s original work (Zuse 1967).
2
Nonetheless, see Tagliabue (2012) for a full-fledged characterisation of cellular automata as
mereological structures (carried out in first-order mere-topology) and a in-depth discussion about its
ontological import.

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2 Digitalism and Pancomputationalism

The first thesis of digital physics, which we have called digitalism, is that the
universe is made out of bits, it is digital. Digitalism is well exemplified by one of the
most celebrated slogan of digital physics, namely, Wheeler’s ‘‘It from bit’’:
‘‘It from bit’’ symbolizes the idea that every item of the physical world has at
bottom - a very deep bottom, in most instances - an immaterial source and
explanation; that which we call reality arises in the last analysis from the
posing of yes-no questions and the registering of equipment-evoked responses
(Wheeler 1990, p. 5).
In Sects. 4 and 5, we shall explain what kind of properties bits should have in
order to support digital physics. To achieve that, we need at first to present a
detailed description of all the three theoretical assumptions that ground digital
physics. Accordingly, in this section, we develop a formal approach to digitalism.
Our aim is to elucidate its relation with pancomputationalism. So let us begin with a
general definition of digital structure.3
Definition 2.1 A point x in a structure A is said to be isolated if inside the topology
over the domain of A there exists a neighbourhood of x which does not contain any
other points of A except x. A structure is discrete if every point in its domain is
isolated. A discrete structure A is digital if there is a finite subset B of its domain DA ,
called a base, such that every element in DA is equal to a finite concatenation of
elements in the base B.
Example 2.1 Any finite structure with a discrete topology is digital: for instance, a
set f0; 1g with the Sierpinski topology fø; f1g; f0; 1gg is digital. The set of natural
numbers is discrete and, given a numerical systems, for instance, the binary system,
it is also digital. Of course, intervals of real numbers are not digital, since not
discrete.
The definition of digital structure presented here follows Maley (2011) and
Frigerio et al. (2013). It differs, however, from both. On the one hand, our definition
is more general than Maley’s definition because not only numbers, but whatever,
can be the base of the structure. On the other hand, the definition given here is more
direct than the one presented by Frigero et al., since it does not presuppose a system
of codification. The aim of our definition is to allow a precise definition of
digitalism.
Digitalism The physical world is isomorphic to a digital structure.
It is important to emphasis that digitalism does not assert that the world is made
of concatenations of a finite base of objects. It affirms that the structure of the
physical world can be put into a bijection to a digital structure in such a way that all
of its properties and relations are preserved—this is what means to be isomorphic.
Zuse (1967) wondered whether typical phenomena of electromagnetism, mechanics
3
From now on, we assume some notions from model theory and topology. Cf. Hodges (1993) and
Munkres (2000) for these definitions. The set-theoretical notation will be used as in Jech (2002).

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and thermodynamics are digital or not. From his analysis, he concluded that, in a
sense, practically all physical observed phenomena allow a digital interpretation
and, therefore, can be conceived as computational processes. This is the core of
pancomputationalism. In order to elucidate this point, we need a notion of process.
Definition 2.2 A process is a function P : I ! O such that its domain I is a set
whose elements are called inputs and its codomain O is a set whose elements are
called outputs and both I and O are subsets of a physical world.
Given this notion of process, which presupposes a concept of physical reality, we
also assume some notion of computation, in order to define what are the
computational processes.
Definition 2.3 A computer is a function C : I ! O from a set of input symbols I to
a set of output symbols O such that Cð xÞ is generated from x via a computation. A
process P : I ! O is computational if P is generated by a computer C, i.e., Cð xÞ ¼
PðxÞ for all x 2 I, where x is a symbolic representation of x.
Pancomputationalism Physical objects perform computational processes.
To be precise, the term ‘‘pancomputationalism’’ designates many different
positions. Piccinini (2015) calls the kind of pancomputacionalism here at issue ontic
pancomputacionalism. According to ontic pancomputacionalism, each physical
object accomplishes, in virtue of some elementary property, exactly one kind of
computation at an instant of time. The main challenge to ontic pancomputacional-
ism is to provide an exact characterisation of the properties which enable objects to
perform specific computations. We postpone the discussion of this problem to
Sect. 5. By now, our aim is to exhibit an intrinsic relation between digitalism and
pancomputationalism.
Theorem 2.1 If digitalism is true, then pancomputationalism is true.
Proof Suppose that the whole physical reality R is isomorphic to a digital structure
A whose domain is DA . Then, for every process P : I ! O such that I  R and
O  R, i.e., for every physical process, there is a function fP : A ! A and an
isomorphism / : R ! A such that /ðPðxÞÞ ¼ fP ð/ðxÞÞ for all x 2 I. Since / is an
isomorphism, we can think about the inverse /1 . Now, /1 ð/ðPðxÞÞÞ ¼ PðxÞ and
/1 ð/ðPðxÞÞÞ ¼ /1 ðfP ð/ðxÞÞÞ. Hence, PðxÞ ¼ /1 ðfP ð/ðxÞÞÞ. But, fP ð/ðxÞÞ 2 DA ,
which means that fP ð/ðxÞÞ is a concatenation of elements from a finite base in DA ,
say that, fP ð/ðxÞÞ ¼ a1 . . .an . Now, we stipulate that x ¼ a1 . . .an and C ¼ /1 .
Since /ðxÞ is defined for each x 2 I and fP ð/ðxÞÞ is defined for each /ðxÞ, we
deduce that, for each x 2 I,
PðxÞ ¼ /1 ðfP ð/ðxÞÞÞ ¼ CðfP ð/ðxÞÞÞ ¼ Cða1 . . .an Þ ¼ CðxÞ:

Therefore, C can be considered as our desired computer. h

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Remark 2.1 The method behind the proof above is to use the isomorphism
between the physical reality and the alleged digital structure in order to define
physical processes as computational ones. Note that in this proof we have made a
crucial use of the digitalist hypothesis that the world is isomorphic to a structure
composed of concatenations.
Hence, digitalism implies pancomputationalism, which, as we shall see shortly,
grounds the Zuse thesis. The converse may not be true. The processes in the world
may be computational and yet generated by analogical computers; in that case, the
world would not be isomorphic to a digital structure. Furthermore, the notion of
pancomputationalism deduced from pure digitalism does not encompass any notion
of mechanicity: to be computational is not necessarily to be computable. It could be
that the world were computational but with incomputable processes—Wheeler
himself, for instance, adopts this position.4 To get a more substantial character-
ization of digital physics, we shall turn to the Zuse thesis.

3 The Zuse Thesis, Turing Machines and Cellular Automata

The third fundamental assumption of digital physics is the Zuse thesis, according to
which the physical world is a universal computing machine. In order to rigorously
characterise it, let us display some definitions.5
Definition 3.1 A process P is computable if P is generated by a computer M
equivalent to a Turing machine. A computer U is said to be universal if every
computable process P is generated by U, i.e., for every process P computable by
some computer M equivalent to a Turing machine, we have that Uð xÞ ¼ Mð
xÞ.
Given that, the Zuse thesis has now an exact sense.
The Zuse thesis The whole physical reality is a universal computer.
The formulation of this thesis relies on two previous assumptions, to know,
Church thesis (Church 1936) and Kreisel thesis (Kreisel 1965).
Church thesis Every effectively calculable function is recursive.
Kreisel thesis Every discrete physical process is recursive.
Given Theorem 2.1, if we assume digitalism, we shall have that every physical
process is computational. As we claimed in the previous section, this does not
exclude the existence of incomputable processes in the world. With Church and
Kreisel theses in hand that possibility can be rejected. The reason is the following.
Every recursive function is computable, and vice versa (Turing 1936). In addition
the converse of Church thesis is generally accepted, i.e., that recursive functions are
effectively calculable. Taking this for granted, it follows, from Church and Kreisel
theses, that the discrete physical processes are effectively calculable processes. This
4
Cf. Cooper (2015) too, for a similar viewpoint.
5
In this section, we assume the formal definitions of Turing machines and cellular automata. Cf. Barker-
Plummer (2016) and Berto and Tagliabue (2012) for details.

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means by turns they can be generated via computers equivalent to Turing machines.
Zuse (1967, 1993), and most of digital physicists, goes further: the best explanation
for such a state of affair is the Zuse thesis. That is to say, the world actually is a
universal computer.6
It should be clear that the Zuse thesis is not equivalent to Kreisel thesis. In virtue
of the existence of incomputable properties of Turing machines—think, for
instance, of the halting problem, if the Zuse thesis is true, then either Kreisel thesis
is false or we must accept that incomputable processes are non-physical. Digital
physics as conceived by Zuse adopts the latter option: only the functions that are
generated by a universal computer are part of the physical world; everything else is
outside it. To be precise, the factual Zuse conjecture—as he presented it in his
writings—was that the world is a kind of cellular automata. In order to make sense
of this choice, we need to go back to Turing’s and von Neumann’s analysis of
computability.
Turing (1936) defined the model of computation today known as Turing machine.
To get at such a model, he paid attention to the phenomenon of a person performing
automatic calculations with pencil and paper. Turing believed that some aspects of
this phenomenon were inessential for its mechanical character; e.g., the length of the
paper, its dimensionality, the size of the letters, the material used to write, etc. By
abstracting from these aspects, Turing obtained what we may call the Turing
components, which define a person as a person that performs a computation:
1. A uni-dimensional linear tape divided into cells;
2. A head connected to the tape with the capacity of performing two operations:
(1) To read and write symbols on the cells; (2) To move to the right and to the
left on the cells.

In this setting, the configurations of Turing machines are descriptions of the tape
and the head during computations. Hence, by looking at the configurations of
computations, Turing concluded that the minimal parts interact in the following
way:
T1 The head has a finite quantity of instructions inside it, which are ordered by a
finite quantity of internal states;
T2 At each instant of time, the instructions inside the head completely determine
the operations to be performed on the tape in the next instant;
T3 At each instant of time, the head follows one instruction to perform its
operations on the tape;

e0
s0 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 ···
Fig. 1 Turing machine intended model

6
But see Zenil (2013, especially p. 38) for a summary of some divergent positions.

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T4 At each instant of time, one cell of the tape can be either read or wrote by the
head;
T5 At each instant of time, one move can be made by the head on the tape.
From Turing’s analysis, we infer that the intended model of a universal computer
is a structure in which the instructions are inside the head of the machine and the
tape is linked to the head as shown in Fig. 1.7
Turing conditions T1–T5 make the intended model of Turing machines quite
stable. That is to say, it does not matter whether a Turing machine has n tapes or just
one, whether it has k heads or just one, whether it makes choices, etc.: the class of
processes that Turing machines generate is always the same, namely, the recursive
functions (cf. Sipser 2013, pp. 207–208). This is by turns the main motivation for
the Church thesis.
Given Turing’s concept of computing machine, Von Neumann (1966) looked for
an automaton capable of self-reproduction, a key feature of living beings. By
pursuing this, he devised the concept of cellular automaton, as a computing
structure with the following Neumann components:
1. An n-dimensional lattice, called grid, divided into cells;
2. A finite neighbourhood around each cell which permits to change symbols on
the cell.

In this setting, the configurations of cellular automata are descriptions of the

symbols on the cells at each instant of time, which involves following these rules:
N1 The grid has a finite quantity of instructions which are applied to update the
cells according the configuration of their neighbourhood;
N2 At each instant of time, the instructions completely determine the changes to
be performed inside the grid in the next instant;
N3 At each instant of time, the automaton follows one instruction to perform its
changes;
N4 At each instant of time, each cell of the grid has one symbol;
N5 At each instant of time, a fixed finite number of the symbols on the cells is
updated.
In, Fig. 2, we have the intended model of a cellular automaton with a two
dimensional grid.8
If we imagine the movement of elementary particles as forming a calculating
space, look to the spatial structure of cellular automata and assume that the symbols
are the particles, then it seems natural to infer that the world is indeed a universal
cellular automaton. This is the Zuse thesis. Let us show, however, that this

7
In the picture, the state e0 is inside the head of the Turing machine. The sequence s0 ; . . .; s8 is a
sequence of symbols wrote on its tape. At the present time, the machine is reading the symbol s0 . The
three dots at the right side of the tape means that it is unlimited to the right.
8
In the picture, s0 indicates that the cell changes according to its neighbourhood s1 ; . . .; s8 . The three dots
at the right side of the grid means that it is unlimited to the right—a necessary condition when
computability is at sake.

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Fig. 2 Cellular automaton

intended model s1 s2 s3 ···
s8 s0 s4 ···
s7 s6 s5 ···
···

preference for cellular automata instead of Turing machines has no mathematical

obvious justification.
At first glance, it could appear that cellular automata are much more powerful
than Turing machines because conditions N4 and N5 allow them to perform parallel
computations, whereas T4 and T5 restrict the actions of Turing machines to
sequential processing. Nonetheless, Turing machines and cellular automata are
computationally equivalent (cf. Smith 1971). Moreover, in spite of the different
geometrical dispositions, the symbols in both figures above are the same. Remember
that we have said above that Turing machines are stable: What about to define a
Turing machine with four tapes and stipulate that the head is in the second one?
Figure 3 intended model emerges.
Therefore, we get precisely the same geometrical representation in cellular
automata and Turing machines. The only difference is that in Turing machines we
have states and symbols and in cellular automata there are only symbols. By the
way, if we look at the proofs of computational equivalence between Turing
machines and cellular automata, the key passage usually covers a method to
represent the location of the states of Turing machines, something that is missing in
cellular automata (cf. Smith 1971). Nonetheless, this is not conclusive, because the
computations of cellular automata presuppose a distinction between the cell that
changes along the time and its neighbourhood, as it is expressed in the distinction
between the two Neumann components. This may imply a kind of necessary dual
distinction analogous to the head and tape duality of Turing components. In order to
assess this question, we need a careful logical analysis.

4 Digital Monism and Dualism

In the previous section we have shown that, as specifications of the Zuse thesis,
Turing machines and cellular automata provide two approaches intuitively different
but mathematically equivalent. We now turn to the main question of this article:
What kind of properties should the physical world instantiate to be a realisation of a
universal computer? In agreement with a standard criterion of ontological
commitment (Quine 1953; van Inwagen 1998), we shall respond to this question
by analysing the logical form of cellular automata and Turing machines; afterwards,
we shall try to interpret them. Let us begin with a little bit of terminology.

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Fig. 3 Multi-tape Turing

machine s1 s2 s3 ···
e0
s8 s0 s4 ···

s7 s6 s5 ···

···

Definition 4.1 A digital structure A is monistic if its domain DA has only one sort,
i.e., concatenations of elements from a finite base set. If DA has instead two sorts of
concatenations of elements from the base, we say that A is dualistic.
The technical term sort—from model theory (cf. Hodges 1993)—is used here to
express the idea of something sharing a certain property. According to the previous
definition, a monistic structure is composed by objects of exactly one kind, i.e.,
concatenations of the elements of its base. The existence of two sorts in a dualistic
structure indicates that the elements of the base cannot be conceived as a unique
kind of object, because they instantiate two distinct kinds of properties, expressed
by the two sorts. In order to denote a monistic structure, a first-order language for
Turing machines and cellular automata must have only one predicate to describe the
computations, while in order to denote a dualistic structure they must have exactly
two predicates. The number of predicates indicates how many sorts the structure in
question has and so establishes how many common properties are shared by all the
elements of the base. To formalise these intuitions, we are going to define first-order
languages for Turing machines and cellular automata. We follow the mathematical
approach originally presented by de Araújo and Carnielli (2012), making changes
associated to the ontological problem at stake in this article.
Definition 4.2 A computational language L is a first-order language with identity
whose signature contains the set S ¼ f0; þ1; 1; \g, wherein the elements are,
respectively, the constant zero, the unary function symbols successor and
(truncated) predecessor, and the binary relation symbol strict order. A computa-
tional language L is said to be monistic if it has only one more predicate M with an
ariety defined according to the model of computation; L is called dualistic if it has
two predicates E and S with arities also associated to the model of computation in
question.
The idea behind the concept of computational language is to represent the
locations in the space c0 ; c1 ; . . . and the instants of time t0 ; t1 ; . . . with the natural
numbers in the indexes. The signature S ¼ f0; þ1; 1; \g has this role. Likewise,
we can also represent the symbols s0 ; s1 ; . . .; sn and states e0 ; e1 ; . . .; em . We only
need to specify which parameters in M or E and S represent what. For instance, in

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the case of a Turing machine, we can establish that MT ðe; c; s; d; tÞ represents that
the machine has the state e inside its head at location c, and the symbol s on the cell
number d, all of this at instant t. Using this convention and assuming that the first
cell of the tape is at position 0, the configuration in Fig. 1—at instant, say, 10—can
be represented by the following first-order formula:
MT ð0; 1; 0; 1; 10Þ ^ MT ð0; 1; 1; 2; 10Þ ^ MT ð0; 1; 2; 3; 10Þ ^    ^ MT ð0; 1; 8; 9; 10Þ:

Instead of a monistic language, we could use a dualistic one, ET ðe; c; tÞ and

ST ðs; d; tÞ, with the same kind of parameters as above. In this case, the configuration
in Fig. 1 at instant 10 can be expressed by:
ET ð0; 1; 10Þ ^ ST ð1; 2; 10Þ ^ ST ð2; 3; 10Þ ^    ^ ST ð8; 9; 10Þ:

Remark 4.1 In a sense, both formulas above are logically equivalent, but they are
in two different languages for Turing machines. The first one has just one sort of
predicate, MT , the second has two sorts, ET and ST .
We can develop the same approach for cellular automata. We establish that
MC ðs; c; tÞ represents that the machine has symbol s located at cell c at instant of
time t. In order to deal with the fact that cellular automata can be n-dimensional, we
make the convention of representing the cells with an oblique path from up to down.
That is, the cell a00 is represented by c ¼ 0, a01 by c ¼ 1, a10 by c ¼ 2, a02 by c ¼ 3,
a11 by c ¼ 4, and so on. Using this convention, the configuration in Fig. 1 can be
represented by the following first-order formula at instant, say, 10:
MC ð0; 7; 10Þ ^ MC ð1; 1; 10Þ ^ MC ð2; 3; 10Þ ^ MC ð3; 6; 10Þ ^    ^ MC ð8; 4; 10Þ:

A dualistic language for cellular automata may have, for example, EC ðe; c; tÞ and
SC ðs; d; tÞ, where e is the symbol that changes according to the symbol s in the
neighbourhood, c and d represent the cells in the grid and t an instant of time. In this
formalization, the Fig. 2 can be represented by:
ET ð0; 7; 10Þ ^ SC ð1; 1; 10Þ ^ SC ð2; 3; 10Þ ^ SC ð3; 6; 10Þ ^    ^ SC ð8; 4; 10Þ:

Remark 4.2 Note again that both formulas above are logically equivalent, but in
the case of cellular automata there is no real difference between the formulas, just a
change of symbols.
The next result responds the question about how many sorts are necessary and
sufficient to represent computations of Turing machines and cellular automata.
Theorem 4.1 There is a class of first-order structures B that correspond to
computations of cellular automata and B interprets the monistic computational
language with predicate MC ðs; c; tÞ and all the others possible structures that
correspond to its computations are equivalent to this monistic language. On the
other hand, a class of first-order structures A corresponds to the class of
computations of Turing machines if, and only if, A is equivalent to the class of

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structures that interpret the dualistic computational language with predicates

ET ðe; c; tÞ and ST ðs; d; tÞ.
Proof Here we assume an intuitive notion of correspondence between computa-
tions and structures that interpret computational languages in order to sketch the
main steps in the proof of this theorem.9 The part of the theorem about cellular
automata is the easy one. To construct a structure A that interprets the monistic
computational language with predicate MC ðs; c; tÞ for a cellular automaton C, we
consider the domain DA as being the set of natural numbers N. Thus, the symbols
0; þ1; 1; \ can be interpreted in the regular way as, respectively, the number
zero, the successor function, the truncated predecessor function and the strict order
on the natural numbers. Thus, we define the interpretation of MC ðs; c; tÞ as we have
outlined above. According to this formulation, an instruction of C with, for instance,
one dimension is expressed by a formula
MC ðu; c  1; tÞ ^ MC ðs; c; tÞ ^ MC ðr; c þ 1; tÞ
! MC ðu; c  1; t þ 1Þ ^ MC ðs0 ; c; t þ 1Þ ^ MC ðr; c þ 1; t þ 1Þ;

meaning that if the machine has the symbols u, s, r on the consecutive cells c 
1; c; c þ 1 at time t, then it has the symbols u; s0 ; r on the consecutive cells c 
1; c; c þ 1 at time t þ 1. This clearly enables us to represent the computations in a
monistic language. Thus, we have a monistic structure associated to the computa-
tions of cellular automata. Besides, since there is a universal cellular automaton
with dimension one (cf. Smith 1971), all the others possible structures that corre-
spond to computations of cellular automata are equivalent to the monistic language
defined above.
To prove that the structures that correspond to computations of Turing machines
are dualistic we need much more effort. We prove two lemmas by reductio ad
absurdum. First, we prove that there is no such a class of structures defined over a
signature with unary relational symbols for each of the sorts of a Turing machine,
where, say, H, T, E, I are, respectively, predicates for the sorts state, symbol, space
and time. The reason is that the Turing conditions T1–T5 impose that the states and
symbols should be related in some way.10 Second, we prove that there is no class of
structures that correspond to computations of Turing machines and are defined over
a signature with relational symbols that have exactly one parameter for each sort of
a Turing machine, for instance, M(e, s, c, t) where e represents a state, s a symbol,
c a cell and t an instant. This can be proved to be impossible due to the fact that it
would imply that at each instant of time the machine has one state inside its head but
it would be located at different cells, what is not allowed by Turing conditions.11
From these two steps, by analysing the possible combination of parameter associ-
ated to computations of Turing machines, we verify that a monistic language for
Turing machines should has a predicate like the one MT ðe; c; s; d; tÞ exhibited above,

9
In de Araújo and Carnielli (2012), there are formal definitions of these notions.
10
Cf. Lemma 6.1 at ‘‘Appendix’’.
11
Cf. Lemma 6.2 at ‘‘Appendix’’.

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 A. Beraldo-de-Araújo, L. Baravalle

which is equivalent to a dualistic language with predicates ET ðe; c; tÞ and ST ðs; d; tÞ.
In such a dualistic language, an instruction of a Turing machine has the form
ET ðe; c; tÞ ^ ST ðs; c; tÞ ! ET ðe0 ; c0 ; t þ 1Þ ^ ST ðs0 ; c; t þ 1Þ;
meaning that if the machine is in the state e at position c and in this cell the symbol s
is written at time t, then the machine will be in state e0 and at cell c0 with either
c0 ¼ c  1 or c0 ¼ c þ 1, according the instruction says to it to go to the left or to the
right, and the machine has the symbol s0 at cell c, because it wrote something on the
that cell, all of this at instant t þ 1. This clearly enables us to represent the com-
putations of Turing machines in a dualistic language. Therefore, the structures that
correspond to computations of Turing machines are actually dualistic.12 h
It is important to emphasise that there is a lot of possible formulations of first-
order languages for cellular automata. For example, we could ask about the
possibility of a language with predicates P(s, t) and R(c, t) , where the symbols and
cells are related to time alone. Theorem 4.1 proves that there is no structure that
interprets this language and corresponds to computations of cellular automata.
Why? Because the language of cellular automata must be essentially monistic, it
must have formulas that are equivalent to the monistic one MC ðs; c; tÞ. The same is
true with respect to Turing machines. For instance, we could ask about the
representation of computations of Turing machines in a language with predicates
A(e, t), B(s, c) and C(e, s), where we would like to highlight that the states are
related to time alone, the symbols to the space and, to make a connection, the states
are related to the symbols. Theorem 4.1 shows that this is not possible. All of the
languages that correspond to computations of Turing machines should have the
states, symbols, cells and instants as in HT ðe; c; tÞ and ST ðs; c; tÞ. Why? Because
states and symbols require their own parameterisation in the space–time. In a
nutshell, the language of Turing machines is necessarily dualistic.
We are now ready to provide a more precise ontological interpretation of the
distinction between monistic and dualistic structures. In order to do this, we adopt a
simple analytic tool originally employed by Schaffer (2015). According to him,
from an ontological point of view, the distinction between monism and dualism (or
other forms of pluralism) is always relative to two terms: the term to which is
attributed ‘‘oneness’’ or ‘‘dualness’’ (or ‘‘pluralness’’), which is called the target,
and the unit according to which the target is counted. In this context, the target is the
set of fundamental properties that must be instantiated by physical objects to make
digital physics true. Since, according to digitalism, a physical object is fundamen-
tally composed of bits, we can say that the target is the set of properties that must be
instantiated by bits. Concerning the unit, our analysis over monistic and dualistic
structures provided us with a reliable method for counting kinds of properties, that
is, the number of predicates of a first-order language for Turing machines and
cellular automata. Therefore, on the one hand, we interpret the fact that cellular
automata structure can be expressed by a single predicate as evidence that their
physical realisations (according to the Zuse thesis, the entire universe itself) share

12
Cf. Theorem 6.1 at ‘‘Appendix’’.

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The Ontology of Digital Physics

exactly one kind of fundamental property. On the other hand, we believe that the
fact that Turing machines structure must be expressed through two predicates
suggests that the physical realisations of Turing machines (included, obviously, the
giant Turing machine postulated by the Zuse thesis) have to reflect a certain dualism
of properties. In next section, we shall explore some metaphysical implications of
these ontological commitments.

5 Metaphysical Implications of Digital Physics

At the end of the previous section, we have determined the number of fundamental
properties that must be instantiated by physical objects in order to make digital
physics true. However, we are not only interested in knowing the number of the
fundamental properties, but in what kind of properties they are too. We believe that
we can get some insight on this question by interpreting results obtained so far in the
light of the contemporary debate about physicalism and the ontological status of the
laws of nature. More precisely, we hold that, in digital physics, the choice of a
formalism instead of the others entails a specific position in these metaphysical
debates. Thus, we are going to argue that some of the metaphysical options
available to digital physicists which adopt the cellular automaton model are
strikingly incompatible with some of the options available to those who adopt the
Turing machine model.
The monistic interpretation of digital physics attached to the model of cellular
automata maintains that the entire universe is composed, at the very bottom, of
elementary entities—namely, symbols -, which are to some extent identical to each
other. This kind of monism seems to be implicit in Wheeler’s slogan and it is
intuitively supported by a commonly accepted physicalist view, for which non-
elementary properties are always realisable by fundamental, microphysical,
properties (cf. Kim 1998; Stoljar 2010).13 These fundamental properties are
generally assumed to be responsible for the ultimate causal structure of the universe.
If we combine this interpretation with another commonly accepted physicalist
principle, namely, the causal closure of the physical, we obtain that, according to
the monist interpretation of digital physics, symbols are causally sufficient for the
instantiation of any physical (and thus also biological or psychological) process.
13
It could be argued that Wheeler’s ‘‘It from bit’’ is not compatible with physicalism, since, as Wheeler
himself admits, the ultimate source of the physical world is somehow ‘‘immaterial’’ (see the quote above,
in Sect. 2). Saying it in another way: given that bits are information and information—in line, for
instance, with Sayre (1976)—is not properly physical, it would follow that digital physicists are not
physicalists. This interpretation is, in our view, admissible only if one accepts a rather narrow and
intuitive notion of what it is to be physical, which has been frequently defeated throughout the history of
science. Stoljar (2001) distinguished this notion of the physical, grounded on our everyday intuitions
about the materiality of the objects with which we are familiar, from the theoretical notion of the physical,
which relies on the acceptance of certain theoretical entities. According to the latter notion, ‘‘a physical
property is a property which either is the sort of property that physical theory tells us about or else is a
property which metaphysically (or logically) supervenes on the sort of the property that physical theory
tells us about’’ (Stoljar 2001, p. 256; emphases in the original). Since digital physics is a physical theory,
then the properties that are attributed to bits can be considered—in accordance with Stoljar’s definition—
as properly physical. Consequently, digital physics is fully compatible with physicalism.

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Specific computations would emerge, according to the monistic interpretation of

digital physics, from local interactions between symbols (cf. Wolfram 2002). This
view, in our opinion, supports a certain version of Humean supervenience (cf. Lewis
1986, 1994), namely, the thesis according to which the laws of nature are not
included into the basic furniture of the world. If, as a matter of fact, all of what
exists at the very bottom of the universe is a concatenation of symbols, then laws of
nature—that is, according to the formalism, the rules of the universal cellular
automaton—are not primitive, but supervenient on particular interactions or, even,
merely in ‘‘the eye of the beholder’’. Accordingly, cellular automata monism
excludes the interpretation of cellular automata rules in terms of universals or other
abstracta. Since, in fact, the structure of cellular automata has only one sort, which
means that the objects that compose it share exactly one kind of property, it is no
clear how such a structure might instantiate universals, in addition to the local
interactions between symbols.
On the other hand, the dualistic interpretation of digital physics prescribes that, in
order to be computable, any non-elementary property must be realised by a
conjunction of symbols and states of a Turing machine, whose properties are not
reducible to each other. According to the metaphysical framework that we have
outlined, this is compatible with two interpretations: realism—or, at least,
antireductionism—about the laws of nature and panpsychism. The former option
consists in taking the collection of the states of the universal Turing machine as the
rules, or the laws, of the universe. This perspective is diametrically opposed to
Humean supervenience, and well exemplifies the metaphysical trade-off involved in
the choice of a specific formalism for digital physics. According to this perspective,
in fact, laws are real and fundamental. States could be conceived as relational
properties, which establish beforehand what kind of physical process is admitted—
and what is not—in specific regions of the universe.14 Even though Humean
supervenience guarantees a more economical ontology, some authors (like Maudlin
2007, or Carroll 2008) have quite convincingly argued that it is inadequate to
account for the distinction between nomological and merely accidental regularities.
These authors argue—from slightly different standpoints—that, to account for this
distinction, laws must be considered as non-reducible entities. ‘‘Turing machine
realism’’ about laws of nature offers a way of characterising this intuition.
The second metaphysical option available to those who adopt the Turing machine
model of digital physics is panpsychism. Since it is a more controversial option, we
shall discuss it in some detail. Panpsychism is, in a nutshell, the thesis that ‘‘some
fundamental physical entities have mental states’’ (Chalmers 2016, p. 19). It may be
considered—although other interpretations are possible—as a kind of broad
physicalism (Chalmers 2016, pp. 27–28; see also Strawson 2006). More precisely,
panpsychism is a physicalism that includes as fundamental properties, in addition to
those which are admitted by physical theories (see note 12), phenomenal properties
instantiated together with the physical properties. Russell (1927), among others,

14
Notice, however, that digital physics is incompatible with more ‘‘Platonic’’ accounts of laws, for which
laws somehow subsist independently of the existence of particular realisations, for in a Turing machine
states are always co-instantiated with symbols.

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defended this perspective. For Russell, panpsychism provides an elegant solution to

the problem of consciousness: micro-phenomenal properties of matter are respon-
sible for macro-phenomenal properties, just like micro-physical properties of matter
are responsible for macro-physical properties. The relationship between micro-
physical and micro-phenomenal properties (and, consequently, macro-physical and
macro-phenomenal properties) can be interpreted in various ways (cf. Stoljar 2013).
In line with some interpretations (cf. Locke 1975; Lewis 2009), phenomenal
properties are dispositional properties realised by physical properties or vice versa,
in such a way that one kind of property underlies the other. We might call this
conception dispositional panpsychism. According to an alternative interpretation,
called by Chalmers Russellian property dualism (2016, p. 35), the two kinds of
properties are equally fundamental, and none is grounded in the other (despite their
co-instantiation). Physical and phenomenal properties are, according to Russellian
property dualism, mutually conditioning, and the causal structure of reality is the
result of the combined action of both—in different proportions, depending on the
ontological degree of complexity (corresponding to, respectively, physical,
biological and psychological domains).
Although dispositional panpsychism is compatible with the Turing machine
model, we believe that Russellian property dualism is the best way to conceive the
dualistic ontology of digital physics. This is because, according to this ontology,
symbols and states do not show any logical priority one over the other. Assuming
that the entire universe is a giant realisation of a Turing machine, symbols could be
considered as the basic constituents of the physical properties (as also assumed by
the monistic interpretation) and states could be conceived as the basic constituents
of the phenomenal properties. The universe would be unitary—as a whole and with
respect to its components, but any computation in it would instantiate processes that
are both physical and phenomenal, in the sense that they would cause—at least to
some extent—certain modification in both kinds of properties of the world. In light
of digitalism, no one kind of property would be more fundamental than the other: if
interpreted as two necessary aspects of Wheeler’s bits, physical properties could not
subsist without phenomenal properties and vice versa. While the monistic
interpretation of digital physics satisfies quite well the necessities of those—like
Wolfram (2002) and many of his followers (see, for instance, Tagliabue 2013)—
who aim to explain complexity from a minimal physicalist base, the panpsychist
conception here presented could be attractive to those who are interested in
integrating consciousness in a highly unified conception of the universe without
invoking concepts like that of emergence (cf. Nagel 1979).15
15
Some might argue that the state-symbol dualism that we have outlined here is compatible with a far
less interesting interpretation, according to which the dual properties instantiated by the hypothetical
universal Turing machine are both—in some relevant sense—physical. We cannot a priori exclude this
possibility, but we believe that it is not a very good option. First of all, if this were the case, then it would
be necessary to explain why the distinction between states and symbols is an intrinsic characteristic of the
physical nature. We have some intuitions about the distinction between the physical and the phenomenal,
but no idea about what these dual physical properties could be. Moreover, at least from the point of view
that we have defended here, metaphysical implications are intended to provide some insight on some
aspect of the contemporary debate on physicalism and laws of nature. In this sense, the monistic
interpretation of digital physics favours a typical physicalist and reductionist image of the world, while

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6 Conclusion

In the present article, we have spelt out the logical connections between the
fundamental assumptions of digital physics. In Sect. 2, we proved that there is a
logical entailment from digitalism to a broad pancomputationalism. In Sect. 3, we
argued that the Zuse thesis can be seen as a restriction of pancomputationalism to
the realm of computable processes and so it puts digitalism on solid ground.
Nonetheless, this last step has metaphysical implications. In the last two Sects. 4
and 5, we showed that different metaphysical conceptions are compatible with
digital physics, but the freedom to choose among them depends on the prior choice
of a proper model of the computational processes. We do not believe that there are
conclusive reasons for preferring one formalism over the other: cellular automata
and Turing machines are computationally equivalent, so they both allows to
interpret the Zuse thesis equally well.
Metaphysical hypotheses are usually not taken as conclusive reasons for the
adoption of a theory, or a model, rather than another. Yet, when one is faced to such
an abstract theory like digital physics, reasoning about its ultimate implications can
help to understand what it does mean to endorse it. The logical and mathematical
indetermination about what is the appropriate model for digital physics reinforces
the impression that, contrarily to what could seem at first glance, metaphysical
preferences not only contribute to understand the implications of a specific model,
but also guide the choice of it.

Acknowledgements The authors are grateful for David Chalmers’ and two anonymous reviewers’
comments to a previous version of the present paper. This research was supported by the FAPESP Grant
14/08922-7.

Appendix

In this appendix, we provide the details of the Proof of Theorem 4.1. We assume the
definitions of Turing structure and computations as they are defined in de Araújo
and Carnielli (2012). Let us begin by showing that the sorts of Turing structures
cannot be approached in an isolated form. That is to say, states, symbols, cells and
instants of computations must be related.
Lemma 6.1 There is no class of Turing structures A that corresponds to the class
of Turing computations C such that A is defined over a signature with unary
relational symbols for each of the sorts of a Turing machine.
Proof The proof is by reductio ad absurdum. Suppose that there is a class of Turing
structures A that corresponds to the class of Turing computations C and A is defined

Footnote 15 continued
the dualistic interpretation grounds more liberal views about laws and phenomenal properties. It is not
clear for us what profit we could gain—in explanatory terms—in adopting a dualism of physical prop-
erties instead of one of the previous alternatives.

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The Ontology of Digital Physics

over a signature with unary relational symbols for each of the sorts of a Turing
machine. Let us say, without loss of generality, that the signature of A is
S ¼ f0; S; P; \; H; T; E; Ig;
where H, T, E, I are, respectively, unary relational symbols for the sorts state,
symbol, space and time. This choice of signature indeed does not make our proof
below to loose generality, since in the case of the signature of A to have more or
less symbols it must have at least the four symbols for each sort and names for the
particular states, symbols, cells and instants, and so the method of proof below will
be applicable to such a case as well.
Because A corresponds to C, for each t 2 N and for each Turing structure
AaM 2 A, there is a formula / over S such that
AaM  / if; and only if, M a ðtÞ ¼ ðc; e; TÞ:

Let M be a machine that has among its instruction this one

ð0; 1; 0; 0; /Þ:
Consider the Turing structure AaM associated to the computation of M, for the input
a ¼ 1. Given the initial configuration of M a , it must be true that
AaM  TðS0Þ ^ Eð0Þ ^ Ið0Þ, that is to say, M has the symbol 1 on the tape at the cell
0 in the instant 0. By applying the instruction ð0; 1; 0; 0; /Þ, we also get at
AaM  Tð0Þ ^ EðP0Þ ^ IðS0Þ, which means that M erased the symbol 1 and it is still
on cell 0, because the tape is truncated to the left, but now M is at the instant 1.
Hence, AaM  Tð0Þ ^ TðS0Þ ^ Eð0Þ ^ Ið0Þ, i.e., the machine M has the symbols 0 and
1 on the cell 0 at the instant of time 0. But Turing conditions T1–T5 say that the
machine M cannot have different symbols on one cell at the same instant of time.
Therefore, we must have 0 ¼ 1, what is a contradiction. h
The second fact shows that there is no Turing structure that has all the sorts in
just one predicate. This means that states, symbols, cells and instants cannot be
regarded as a unique object. That is to say, the minimal parts defined by Turing,
head and tape, are necessarily different.
Lemma 6.2 There is no class of Turing structures A that corresponds to the class
of Turing computations C such that A is defined over a signature with relational
symbols that have exactly one parameter for each sort of a Turing machine.
Proof The proof is once again by reductio ad absurdum. Suppose the contrary of
the lemma. Due to the same reason of the previous proof, we may consider, without
lost of generality, the signature
S ¼ fS; P; \; Ag;
where A is a relation symbol of ariety 4, with one parameter for states, one for
symbols, one for cells and one for instants. Consider the machine M that has among
its instruction this one

123
 A. Beraldo-de-Araújo, L. Baravalle

ð0; 1; 0; 1; /Þ:

As before, take the computation for the input a ¼ 1. Given the initial configu-
ration of M a , it must be true that AaM  Að0; S0; 0; 0Þ. By applying the instruction
ð0; 1; 0; 1; /Þ, we also get at AaM  Að0; S0; P0; S0Þ, i.e., AaM  Að0; S0; 0; S0Þ. Thus,
nothing has happened at all, except that the time has passed. The machine will be
forever reprinting 1 on the cell 0. But the tape of the machine M is infinite, and, by
definition, M has the empty symbol 0 printed on each cell c [ 0. Thus, we have

AaM  Að0; 0; S0; 0Þ; AaM  Að0; 0; SS0; 0Þ; . . .

but also

AaM  Að0; 0; S0; S0Þ; AaM  Að0; 0; SS0; S0Þ; . . .

and so on.
This means that at each instant of time the machine has one state within its head
but it is located at an infinity quantity of cells. Turing conditions T1–T5 says that
this is impossible. Therefore, we have an absurd. h
We turn now to the second part of Theorem 4.1, which here is stated as particular
theorem.
Theorem 6.1 A class of first-order structures A corresponds to the class of Turing
computations C if, and only if, A is equivalent to the class of Turing structures M.
Proof Let A be a class of first-order structures with signature S that corresponds to C.
Take a Turing computation M a 2 C. By the Lemma 6.1, S cannot have only unary
relational symbols for each isolated sort of M. Thus, S must have, at least, relational
symbols of ariety greater than or equal to 2. Besides, S must have relational symbols
with parameters for states and symbols, otherwise, it would be impossible to represent
the computations of M. Say that S has the relational symbol Aðs1 ; s2 ; . . .; sn Þ, where s1
is a parameter for states, s2 for symbols and s3 ; . . .; sn are other parameters of A.
Among s3 ; . . .; sn some parameters must, for sure, represent cells, otherwise, it would
be impossible to determine the position of M during a computation. Let us suppose that
s3 is a parameter for cells. What about parameters for instants? Since the correspon-
dence is valid for A, it must be able to represent the time as well. Let us assume the s4 is
a parameter for instants. In this way, we have Aðs1 ; s2 ; s3 ; s4 ; . . .; sn Þ with just one
parameter for states, one for symbols, one for cells and one for instants. By
Lemma 6.2, it must exist another parameter si , 5  i  n, that represents something
else. Let us analyse what kind of thing, without lost of generality, s5 represents.
For the sake of concreteness, suppose that M has the instruction ð0; 0; 1; 1; /Þ.
Consider the computation for the input a ¼ 0. Since A corresponds to C, the initial
configuration of M a ensures that AaM  Að0; 0; 0; 0; s5 ; . . .; sn Þ. By applying the
instruction ð0; 0; 1; 1; /Þ, we have AaM  AðS0; S0; 0; S0; s5 ; . . .; sn Þ.
Could s5 be a parameter for states? Yes, it could. If s5 were a state, then, at the
instant 0, it must be that s5 ¼ 0, because the machine cannot have different states

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The Ontology of Digital Physics

within its head at a given instant of time—remember Turing conditions T1–T5. By the
same reason, at the instant 1, it must be that s5 ¼ S0. In general, if s5 is a state, s5 ¼ s1 .
Hence, to add new parameters for states does not change the logical properties of AaM ,
for it continues to be equivalent to a structure with a relation symbol of ariety 4, with
one parameter for states, one for symbols, one for cells and one for instants.
What about s5 as a parameter for symbol? If s5 is the symbol on the cell that s3
represents, then, at the instant 0, it must be that s5 ¼ 0, and at the instant 1 it must be
that s5 ¼ S0. The reason is analogous to the last case: the conditions T1–T5 forbid to
have two different symbols on the same cell. Hence, if s5 is a symbol on the cell s3 ,
s5 ¼ s2 , and we gain nothing. If s5 is the symbol on the cell that is not represented by
s3 , where is such a symbol? It must exist another parameter in the relation
Aðs1 ; . . .; sn Þ, say, s6 that represents the location of s5 . In our particular example, we
have, then, AaM  Að0; 0; 0; 0; 0; S0; s7 ; . . .; sn Þ and AaM  AðS0; S0; 0; S0; 0;
S0; s7 ; . . .; sn Þ. Except for the terms s7 ; . . .; sn , these sentences are, respectively,
equivalent to ET ð0; 0; 0Þ ^ ST ð0; 0; 0Þ ^ ST ð0; S0; 0Þ and ET ðS0; 0; S0Þ ^
ST ðS0; 0; S0Þ ^ ST ð0; S0; S0Þ from our standard Turing language. Hence, if s5 is a
parameter for symbols, our theorem is true in that case too.
Now let us think of s5 as a parameter for the space. If s5 represents the location of the
head, s5 ¼ s3 , because the machine cannot be in two different places. If s5 represents
the location of the symbol s2 , it could be that s5 ¼ s3 or not, since the same symbol
might be located at different cells; for instance, we have
AaM  Að0; 0; 0; 0; S0; s6 ; . . .; sn Þ, meaning that at the instant 0, the machine has the
symbol 0 on the cells 0 and 1. But this does not matter, as the formula ET ð0; 0; 0Þ ^
ST ð0; 0; 0Þ ^ ST ð0; S0; 0Þ from our standard Turing language is equivalent to
Að0; 0; 0; 0; S0; s6 ; . . .; sn Þ again. If s5 does not represent either the location of the head
or the location of the symbol s2 , we can even so define a formula of the standard Turing
language that expresses this fact—the argument is analogous.
To conclude, it remains to look at the case in which s5 is a parameter for the time.
This is the easiest one, for if s5 were to represent an instant of time,
Aðs1 ; s2 ; s3 ; s4 ; s5 ; . . .; sn Þ would mean that some of the terms (maybe all of them) si for
i ¼ 1; 2; 3 is the same at the instants s4 and s5 , and we gain nothing at all.
Our proof is independent of the machine M presented above—we have used it just to
make clear the argument. Therefore, since A correspond to C, for each formula / over
the signature S of A that is true over AaM 2 A, we find a formula w of the standard
Turing language that also is true with respect to the Turing structure AaM , and vice
versa.

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