Poster A Historicist Recontextualization of The Enthymeme

A Historicist Recontextualization of the Enthymeme
Author(s): Carol Poster

Source: Rhetoric Society Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Spring, 1992), pp. 1-24
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A Historicist Recontextualization of the
Enthymeme
Carol Poster
This paper examines the history of numerous mutually contradictory

meanings of the term enthymeme in classical and contemporary authors in
order to demonstrate that rhetorical terms are not so much immutable entities
with fixed and unchangeable meanings, but rather methods by which a culture
analyzes its own discursive practices, and thus must be seen not as
transcendentally bounded categories, but rather as conceptual domains whose
boundaries simultaneously define and are defined by the manner in which they
are situated within both their synchronic relations to other terms and their
historicist context.
A Historicist Recontextualization of the Enthymeme
Despite the frequency with which the enthymeme has been discussed in
contemporary rhetorical literature (see Hood's 1984 bibliography) there seems
to be no general agreement on the precise nature of what it is that is under
discussion when the term enthymeme is used.
Were this lack of agreement merely a matter of correct and erroneous
notions of the enthymeme coexisting in the contemporary literature, the
resolution of the conflict would be a matter of straightforward scholarship,
involving analysis of the appropriate classical texts, discovery of the correct
meaning, and reporting of the results of such an investigation.
Unfortunately, any but the most cursory investigation of the problem
reveals that to provide a complete account of the enthymeme it is necessary to
examine and revise certain unspoken assumptions about the nature of
meanings and the proper methodology for investigation of classical texts that
permeate much of the thinking of the rhetorical community.
The Current Situation of the Enthymeme
In most contemporary rhetorical discussions, the enthymeme is usually

described as either a syllogism with one part unstated or as a syllogism the
premises of which are probable rather than certain statements, or some variant
on these two.
A brief survey of the current state of the enthymeme is a necessary
prologue to investigating the enthymeme's history, for only by acknowledging
and foregrounding the unspoken assumptions of our current historicist
predilections is it possible to eliminate those selfsame biases from our readings
of other periods.
2 Carol Poster
To discuss the general state of knowledge, it is necessary to examine not

so much the leading edges of scholarly investigation as found in rhetorical
journals, which often reflect either idiosyncratic biases of individual writers or
one side of a disputed issue, but instead, textbooks, which by their very nature
are conservative recapitulations of the agreed upon assumptions of an
academic discipline.
I have selected examples from among the rhetorical textbooks of the past
twenty years written by distinguished and knowledgeable scholars in order to
show that these problems are issues permeating our usual methods of thinking
about the subjet rather than isolated instances of shoddy scholarship.
Textbook Examples
Corbett appears to favour the abbreviated syllogism model of the

enthymeme:
The logical link between the propositions is perhaps most apparent in (5), where
we detect an abbreviated syllogism-what the logicians call an enthymeme. (7)
In modem times, the enthymeme has come to be regarded as an abbreviated

syllogism-that is, an argumentative statement that contains a conclusion and one
of the premises, the second premise being implied. (62)
However, Corbett allows as how both models of the enthymeme coexist in

Aristotle and illustrates the possibility of both models functioning
simultaneously within the same example:
But according to what Aristotle said in Prior Analytics (Bk. 2, Ch. 27.), the
essential difference is that the syllogism leads to a necessary conclusion from
universally true premises but the enthymeme leads to a tentative conclusion from
probable premises. (62)
Here we have an enthymeme, both in the sense of a truncated syllogism and in the
sense of a deductive argument based on probable premises. (63)
On the other hand, in the majority of his examples, Corbett returns to the
missing premise model:
When we are seeking to refute someone else's enthymeme, it may be the missing
premise that we should attack.... (63)
Mackin generalizes Aristotle's use of enthymeme in passing but does not

elaborate on his obiter dicta:
The enthymeme ... might be defined as any deductive reasoning that does not adhere
to the strict rules of formal logic.... The usual definition is that enthymemes are
syllogisms with one premise surpressed. But this seems inaccurate because no one,
with the exception possibly of a logician, consciously does any suppressing of
anything whatever with engaged in deducing conclusions. (122)
Hill, in his summary of Aristotle's Rhetoric uses both the probablistic and
the missing premise notions of the enthymeme without explicitly addressing
the issue of their difference:
The enthymeme is an argument from premises which are probable principles or

from signs. (23)
A Historicist Recontextualization of the Enthymeme 3
Ordinarily enthymemes can be restated in the form of a valid syllogism with two
premises and a conclusion.... Those premises that embody the usual value structure
are usually omitted.... (27)
Maxims ... serve as conclusions or premises of enthymemes and become complete

enthymemes when a reason or conclusion is added to them. (50)
If ... one believes that scientific truth is also probable ... then the Aristotelian
definition of the enthymeme as based on probabilities loses its importance .... The
really important contribution made by Aristotle's concept of the enthyymeme is,
after all, the implied injunction to look for the unstated premise.... (54)
Horner also appears to treat the enthymeme as a syllogism, one premise of

which is not stated:
Rhetorical deduction ... is based on and uses the enthymeme, an abbreviated

syllogism based on probabilities and matters in human affairs that present us with
alternative possibilities. (10)
This kind of abbreviated syllogism, in which one premise is stated and one is
implied, is called the enthymeme.... (140)
According to Aristotle, the enthymeme, the shortened syllogism which draws a

probable conclusion, is better suited to rhetoric.... (151)
As we have discussed, in the enthymeme one of the premises is omitted. (208)
The enthymeme consists of a simple proposition and reason and omits the premise
that you can assume the reader will accept. (246)
enthymeme (EN-thi-meem): A truncated syllogism, based on probabilities, in

which one of the premises is not stated but implied. (444)
Homer seems to be a strong proponent of the notion of an enthymeme as a

truncated syllogism, although the alternative definition-that of the
enthymeme as a syllogism based on probabilities-works its way back into her
account (perhaps as an unstated premise) in a manner that appears to lead her
to an awkward equivalencing of an abbreviated syllogism with a syllogism
based on probabilities.
Bizzell and Herzberg, on the other hand, favour the model of the
enthymeme as a syllogism based on probabilities:
Another form of rational appeal is the enthymeme, which, like the syllogism used
in dialectic, deduces a conclusion from a general premise. But whereas the general
premise of a syllogism is supposed to be true and its deduction therefore necessary,
the general premise of the enthymeme is merely probable, leading to a tentative
conclusion. (5)
Logical appeals ... rely either on the enthymeme, a syllogism that takes its major
premise from received wisdom ... or the example.... (29)
The enthymeme differs from the syllogisms of logic in that it is usually based on
probable, not certain, premises. (146)
[T]he enthymeme must be developed from premises that accord with the audience's
view of the world.... (146)
4 Carol Poster
Even this brief review of selected recent textbooks provides an

embarassment of riches with respect to definition of the enthymeme. The
possibilities offered are:
(a) abbreviated syllogism (one premise omitted)

(b) syllogism of which at least one premise is probable
(c) abbreviated syllogism of which one premise is probable
(d) informal deductive reasoning
(e) syllogism of which at least one premise is a sign
(f) syllogism of which at least one term is a maxim
(g) syllogism from premises in accord with audience's world view
What is most interesting about these multiple meanings is that their

inherent contradictions are rarely adumbrated, and that a rather farfetched
conflation of such apparently disparate notions is so commonly accepted as to
be rarely worthy of comment.
Current Scholarship
If the generally accepted knowledge of the enthymeme recapitulated in

rhetorical textbooks reveals a massive degree of confusion, the discussions in
scholarly journals provide little relief. Obviously, Simonsin's "A Definitive
Note On The Enthymeme" did not prove to be as definitive as intended.
The various uses of the term enthymeme descend in almost unbroken
sequence through antiquity (Homer, Xenophon, Anaximenes, Isocrates,
Aristotle, Cicero, Dionysius of Halicamassus, Quintillian), the Christian
tradition (Boethius, Abelard), through the Renaissance to the contemporary
period. Deciding upon a starting point for modern scholarship concerning the
enthymeme requires a purely arbitrary allocation of a given work as a point de
depart. Perhaps the most important reason for such explorations of the
immediate history of the enthymeme is what Jauss calls the "inertia of
reception"-that accepted notions about a work (such as Aristotle's Rhetoric)
accumulate a vast inertia over time that determines our responses to that work
even when new evidence is unearthed that might contradict such views. Thus,
since much of contemporary neo-classical rhetoric originates in Whately's
work, his comment provides a convenient starting point for treatment of the
reception of Aristotle's enthymeme in contemporary journals:
... for everyone would allow that the same Argument may be either stated as an
enthymeme, or brought into the strict syllogistic form; and that either
categorically or hypothetically &c.; e.g. "Whatever has a beginning has a cause;
the earth had a beginning, therefore it had a cause; or, If the earth had a beginning,
it had a cause: it had a beginning." &c.; (42)
The debt to Whately is discussed by McBurney, whose essay "The Place

of the Enthymeme in Rhetorical Theory" is cited in almost all contemporary
literature on the subject.
Freese, in the glossary accompanying his 1926 Loeb translation of
Aristotle's Rhetoric, defines the enthymeme in a manner which most
traditional classicists agree to be the Aristotle's most common usage thereof:
enthymema (i.2. 8): an enthymeme (lit. thought, argument) in the Rhetoric is a

rhetorical syllogism, that is, it is drawn from probable premises and it is therefore
not a strictly demostrative proof. The use of the term for a syllogism in which one
of the premises is suppressed is due to a misunderstanding of the word ateles
"incomplete," in Anal. Priora, ii. 29. (27) 2, which refers to its logical value, not
to its form. In the same treatise Aristotle defines the enthymeme as a syllogism
from probabilities or signs. (475-76) [See R. C. Seaton in Classical Review, June
1914.]
Despite Freese and Seaton, who, in my opinion, are very strongly

supported by the textual evidence in both the Prior Analytics (70a) and
Rhetoric (1356-58), the incomplete syllogism account of Aristotle's
enthymeme remains on an equal footing with accounts derived from the nature
of the premises throughout twentieth-century scholarship.
Typical of the ongoing confusions concerning the enthymeme in scholarly
journals are two articles which appeared in the same 1959 issue of the
Quarterly Journal of Speech. In one, Charles Mudd deplores the neglect of the
enthymeme in recent rhetorical pedagogy (in a manner foreshadowing Gage):
If the rhetorical theory upon which we operate is Aristotelian, and if the

enthymeme is the heart of this rhetoric, we should expect to find the enthymeme at
the very basis of our teaching of argumentation and persuasion. Such, however, is
not the case. (409)
Mudd summarizes his definition of the enthymeme:
For him [Aristotle], the enthymeme is a logically valid syllogistic form based on
universal premises that were only probable rather than being absolutely true. (414)
In the same issue of the same journal as Mudd, Bitzer argues for a
dialogical process model of the enthymeme:
To say that the enthymeme is an "incomplete syllogism" ... means that the speaker
does not lay down his premises but lets his audience supply them out of its stock of
opinion and knowledge.... Whether or not the premises are verbalized is of no
logical importance. What is of great rhetorical importance, however, is that the
premises of the enthymeme be supplied by the audience. (407)
Those members of the rhetorical community who write about the

enthymeme (e.g. Benoit 1982) seem in general accord as to its importance (in
a manner not entirely self serving-although it is an occupational hazard of the
specialist to wax hyperbolic about the universal applications of her specialty);
however, the only universally agreed upon notion of why the enthymeme is of
any but historical importance seems to be the one embodied in the following
chain of reasoning:
(a) Aristotle's Rhetoric is/was extremely important.

(b) The enthymeme is central to Aristotle's Rhetoric.
(c) Therefore, the enthymeme is important.
Although individual articles address specific issues such as important to

whom, and why, and how, no consensus has been achieved to date.
Anderson and Belknap, for example, use the Aristotelian enthymeme as a
point to depart for an exercise in pure analytical philosophy. Deriving their
6 Carol Poster
notion of the enthymeme from Jevons' misleading etymology, they analyze it

as follows:'
Now everyone agrees that the syllogism as stated in full is valid and ... that
corresponding to this form of inference there exists a certain true proposition,
namely
If M and m, then C.
The case of the enthymematic inference and the corresponding proposition
If M, then C
may, however, occasion some doubt. (713)
Delia, in an article which grounds the persuasive force of the enthymeme

in "the natural rational tendency to harmony in the cognitive field" (146)
rather than in the abstractions of some transcendent notion of logical validity,
seems to hold to an account of the-enthymeme as any argument-regardless of
formal structure-at least one premise of which is held in common between
the rhetor and the audience (e.g.: a maxim):
A careful reading of all Aristotle's passages regarding the enthymeme reveals that
its persuasive power comes not from its following of abstract, external rules of
structure, but from the operation of the deductive form within the psychological
field of the listener. (146)
Lanigan, like Delia, summarizes the extant of conflicting interpretations of

the Aristotelian corpus before, in an almost classically Hegelian fashion,
advancing his own synthesis:
Two traditional hypotheses are customarily advanced to explain what the

Aristotelian enthymeme is. On one side, the enthymeme is posited as a syllogism
of formal validity, yet material deficiency in the use of signs or probabilities.
Contrarily, others contend that the enthymeme is a syllogism of material certainty
... that is formally deficient with unexpressed propositions. (207-8)
Yet, this bifurcation of formal and material causes is not an Aristotelian practice
Aristotle's ideas of material and formal causes are to be considered a unity of
conceptualization. In this unity, the definitive concept of the enthymeme emerges:
an incomplete syllogistic form embodying the matter of "signs and probabilities."
(209)
Although more rigorous in methodology, Lanigan's article shows the same

desire for conflation that exists in many of the rhetorical textbooks cited above.
There seems to have been little diminuition in the profusion of definitions
of the enthymeme from the seventies to the present, although in the rhetorical
literature there seems to be a slight shift of focus from logical and philological
analysis towards a rhetorical bias often privileging dialogical and process
oriented readings of Aristotle, a shift typical of the process by which rhetorical
theorists of all ages seem to reinterpret Aristotle to bring his theories into
conformance with the dominant rhetorical thinking of their period. Some
relatively recent examples include:
1 Jevons (153) assumes that the Homeric en thymos signifies "that some knowledge is held
by the mind and is supplied in the form of amn] ... understood premise." However, this projects the
forth century syllogistic model of the enthymeme back into a Homeric usage in a manner which, as
I will demonstrate later in the text, is thoroughly anachronistic.
The difference between an enthymeme and a syllogism, besides the fact that an
enthymeme addresses probable truth, is that the premises which go into making it
are derived from, or contributed by, an audience which does not already share the
conclusion. The enthymeme cannot be constructed in the absence of a dialectical
relation with an audience.... (Gage 157)
The enthymeme is like a syllogism with some differences ... the major premise of
an enthymeme may be implied rather than expressed because the audience is
presumed to know it; and ... the major premise in an enthymeme may be unproved
(or even unprovable) if the audience beleives in it. (Raymond 142)
Essentially, enthymemes may be defined as assumptions used in public

discourse.... (Raymond 144)
Aristotle's rhetor ... thus grounds his enthymemes in the audience's topics....
(Consigny 284)
The methodological imperatives of scholarship in the traditions of rhetoric,

literary criticism, and classical philology as they were practiced before the
advent of Derrida, deconstructionism, post-deconstructionism, new historicism,
and similar self-aware contemporary meta-theoretical constructs, would
demand that a writer, having provided evidence for confusion in certain notions
concerning Aristotle, resolve the confusion by advancing a hypothesis as to
some "correct" definition of the enthymeme.
However, the stringent methodological self-awareness of contemporary
theory suggests an approach that involves scrutinizing not only the question of
the enthymeme but the nature of the process by which our assumptions about
the enthymeme have evolved.
Primary and Secondary Rhetorics
If looking at definitions of enthymemes provides no consensus, perhaps

looking at individual enthymemes can do so. Harper closely examines the
examples of enthymemes offered by Aristotle in the Rhetoric and Prior
Analytics, and concludes:
Gramatically the enthymeme is a causal statement; the syllogism is a conditional

statement. Substantively, the enthymeme is an argument containing a claim and
reasons to support the claim; the syllogism is a demonstration. Formally, the
enthymeme is a psychological, empirically based inference; the syllogism is a
logical, analytically based inference. (309)
Although Harper's inductive logic is certainly credible, her views have not
been particularly influential, nor has her methodology been widely used by
subsequent authors.
The problem with inductive definition of an enthymeme is that the
enthymeme is not an object that is defined inductively and demonstrated a
posteriori. Instead, it is defined deductively and applied a priori.
We do not find "enthymemes" in orations by Demonsthenes or Lysias or
Antiphon (see Jebb 1893 for examples of speeches); instead, we find that later
rhetoricians apply the term enthymeme to selected passages from earlier
orations in accord with some notion derived a priori of what constitutes an
8 Carol Poster
enthymeme. The enthymeme, like the epicheireme or figures of speech,

belongs to secondary rather than primary rhetoric.
Kennedy's formulation of the distinction between primary and secondary
rhetoric in Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition is worth
quoting at length:
Primary rhetoric is the conception of rhetoric as held by the Greeks when the art
was, as they put it, "invented" in the fifth century B.C. Rhetoric was "primarily"
an art of persuasion; it was primarily used in civic life; it was primarily oral.
Primary rhetoric involves an act of enunciation on a specific occasion; in itself it
has no text, though subsequently an enunciation can be treated as a text....
"Secondary" rhetoric, on the other hand, is the apparatus of rhetorical techniques
clustering around discourse or art forms.... (4-5)
The enthymeme thus becomes impossible to define inductively from its

uses in primary rhetoric, or even from the examples from primary rhetoric cited
in secondary authors, due to its inherently secondary nature and a priori
derivation.
The Need for Diachronic Investigation
As shown above, definitions of the enthymeme in modern rhetorical

writing differ so widely that it is almost impossible to imagine how they can
describe the same word. Were definitions essentially binary, a necessary task
for rhetoricians concerned with consistant terminology would be to identify the
"correct" definition in a persuasive manner, thereby clearing up the confusion.
Such binary oppositions work well in such intrinsically two-valued cases
as bits in computer memory, which may assume only the values one and zero.
If a bit is not zero, it must be the opposite of zero, namely one, and vice versa.
Natural languages, however, do not possess such characteristics. Take, for
example, the Latin word "populus." Is it being used to refer to a nation or a
poplar tree? Within almost any Latin sentence, it is possible to tell whether
"populus" is being used as a nation or a tree, but out of context such a
determination is not possible. As Wittgenstein repeatedly demonstrates in his
Philosophical Investigations, it is very difficult to discuss meaning independent
of use.
If, rather than taking as a notion of meaning a reductively referentional
theory, investigation proceeds instead from the uses of the term "enthymeme"
in secondary rhetoric, then it might be possible to trace the historical forces
which have created the current situation of multiple incommensurable
accounts of the enthymeme.
The Need for an Etymology of the Enthymeme
The model of the enthymeme as a term possessed of a unique

paraphrasable meaning irrespective of context is not only problematic in light
of a general notion of how natural language functions, but also depends on a
oversimplification of its history.
The misapprehension that there is a unique and specific meaning of
"enthymeme" is a reductionist one, based on the notion that the "enthymeme"
is a Greek rhetorical term, and that the "correct" definition ... of "enthymeme"
is that which most truly reflects the Greek meaning of the term. This
chronological displacement of definition from the contemporary text to the
Greek origin, however, merely changes the nature of an imprecise formulation
of the problem, without examining its underlying fallacies.
The extant uses of the term "enthymeme" and its direct predecessors in
Greek texts cover a period of roughly 1300 years, from Homer to the Byzantine
rhetoricians, and geographically span the entire circumference of the
Mediterranean, North Africa, Spain, Italy, Greece, Turkey, and Egypt. To
speak of a unique and correct Greek use of the term "enthymeme" is to reason
based on one of the often unstated and unquestioned assumptions in classical
studies, one cast into doubt by Havelock:
A third assumption ... controlled our use of the dictionaries, our exercises in
composition, and our style of translation. It was that the Greek language ... was
constructed out of a system of interchangeable parts.... The language in short had a
common logic, finally formalized in Aristotle s canon. ... [In standard lexicons]
what seems to be conceptually the most generic meaning is cited first, quite often
from prose authors of the fourth century. Then other uses, regardless of
chronology, are listed as emanations from the basic meaning. (221-222)
This ahistorical habit is further exacerbated in the rhetorical community by

the tendency to arrange the canon around Aristotle and to treat all rhetoricians
as predecessors, contemporaries, or successors in their relations to him much
as Plotinus treated the emanations in respect to the One. Thus, while
discussions of technical uses of such terms as arete or agathon in classical
philosophy take as a point de depart that these are general terms being used in
a limited technical fashion in specific contexts, discussions of the enthymeme
usually restrict themselves to Aristotle's specifically technical use of the term,
overlooking substantial evidence of non-technical uses in other authors.
Historiographic Problems
Like Miller and Bee, though with a considerably greater degree of rigor,
Conley (1984) grounds his discussion of the enthymeme in the history of its
use. In "The Greekless Reader and Aristotle's Rhetoric" Conley states an
important methodological principle-that discussion of Aristotle must be based
on Greek texts rather than translations-and in his later article, "The
Enthymeme in Perspective," this approach proves extremely fruitful. Here,
Conley cites both Aristotelean and non-Aristotlean uses of the term
"enthymema," in order to show that the enthymeme has occupied a marginal
position in the history of rhetoric:
Indeed, nowhere outside Aristotle does any notion of the enthymeme ... play a very
important part in rhetorical theory.... [We should] conclude from the evident
ability of most rhetorical theories of Antiquity to get along quite well without the
enthymeme that the centrality of enthymematic reasoning to rhetorical theory is
questionable. (180)
Any such assertion about the centrality or marginality of a given construc

within the rhetorical tradition must be approached as reflecting not so much
absolute transcendent conditions of history, but rather the relationship of the
historical tradition to the historicist position of the writer performing the act of
10 Carol Poster
canon construction. Conley, who strongly advocates consideration of

alternatives to the enthymeme in contemporary discussions of argumentation,
when read in conjunction with such authors as Benoit and Gage, appears,
despite the emphatically rhetorical character of some of his arguments, to be
demanding a more meticulous appraisal of the position in the history of
rhetoric, rather than a complete dismissal, for as he admits in "The
Enthymeme in Perspective":
To be sure, everyone has something to say about enthymemes but the discussions
are for the most part quite perfunctory and incidental-and as we just saw, seldom
compatible with one another. (180)
Although describing classical discussions of the enthymeme as

"perfunctory and incidental" does appear to run counter to such textual
evidence as the extended treatments in Aristotle, Quintillian, and Cicero, and
the frequent (over 20) mentions of enthymema in Anaximenes, it is precisely
the lack of consensus about the enthymeme and its problematical stature in
rhetorical literature that should make an investigation of the term central to
any reappraisal of the methodological assumptions on which we base our
approaches to both rhetorical terminology and the history of rhetoric.
Earliest Forms
In Homeric, as well as later Greek, the term thymos is similar to the La

anima; it means life, soul, heart, or breath (LSJ).2 Thinking, considering
deeply, or taking to heart frequently use thymos; examples from the Odyssey
include3:
paidos gar mython pepnumenon entheto thymo

for she laid to heart the wise saying of her son (a:361)
kaka phroneous' eni thymo
with evil purpose in her heart (X:317)
In fact, the phrase kata phrena kai kata thymon (in mind and heart),
similar in use to the Latin mens animusque (LSJ), is one of the commonly
repeated phrases in Homer. Examples from the Odyssey include:
phrazesthai de epeita kata phrena kai kata thymon
thereafter take thought in mind and heart (I:294)
mermerixe d'epeita kata phrena kai kata thymon,
and debated in mind and heart. (IV:117)
Heos ho tauth' hormaine kata phrena kai kata thymon
While he pondered thus in mind and heart (V:365)
Miller and Bee, although they do not cite specific Homeric passages, use
the origin of enthymeme from thymos, and its conjunction with phren (and its
derivative, phronesis) to argue:
2 In the body of the text, I shall abbreviate references to the 9th edition of Liddell and Scott's
Greek-English Lexicon as LSJ.
3 I have retained Murray's translations for all cited Homeric passages.
the affective component inherent in the enthymeme is the essence of Aristotle's

enthymeme as practical reasoning. (201)
That the enthymeme, and the art of rhetoric itself, belong more to the
applied than to the theoretical realm is indeed self-evident, although the
textual support for Miller and Bee's siting of rhetoric in the realm of phronesis
is somewhat problematic, as Aristotle4 specifically refers to rhetoric as a
techne (art) in several places in the Rhetoric.5 However, an even more
questionable step in their argument is the direct appropriation of the meaning
of thymos for Aristotle's use of the term enthymema, which ignores several
earlier occurences of enthymema in the same form as it is found in Aristotle-
although with quite different uses.
Uses of Enthymema After Homer
LSJ cites numerous examples of forms enthymema/enthymeomai in such

authors as Homer, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Xenephon, Thucydides, and offers as
meanings "to think much or deeply of a thing," "to take to heart," "a thought,"
and "a piece of reasoning." Five uses of the term appear in the DK6 B
fragments. Nowhere in the scholarly literature are there extended debates
about either the existence of non-technical uses of the word or its general
sense in such non-rhetorical contexts as Sophocles (496-406 B.C.) Oedipus at
Colonus7.
Unfortunately, the earliest handbooks of rhetoric have not been preserved,8
so that our understanding of the appropriation of enthymema by the rhetorical
community must, due to the paucity of extant texts, be based on the work of
three authors, Isocrates (436-338 B.C.), Anaximenes (c. 380-320 B.C.), and
Aristotle (384-322 B.C.).
4 For all cited passages (except where specifically noted) from Aristotle's Rhetoric, I shall
refer to the Loeb edition and Freese's generally accurate translations due to the convenience of the
side-by-side format. For readers interested purely in quality of translation rather than availability
of Greek text, Kennedy's new translation (Oxford 1991) is substantially superior to the other three
currently available (Cooper, Freese, Roberts).
5 Both Peters (1967) and Warnick (1989: 303) comment extensively on Aristotle's treatment
of the relations among nous, episteme, sophia, techne, and phronesis.
6 Diels and Kranz (1989)-abbreviated DK in text-collect extant fragments of Pre-Socratic
philosophers. The "A" fragments are comments about the philosophers; the "B" fragments are
actual writings of the philosophers themselves. For English versions of the DK B fragments Kirk
et. al. (1983) provide Greek texts, English translations, and commentary.
7 For example (Storr's translation):
tarbein men o geraie, tanthymemata
polle st' anagke tapo sou.
The plea thou urgest, needs must give us pause.
Set forth in weighty argument (292-3)
echeis gar ouchi baia tanthumemata
ton son aderkton ommaton tetomenos.
Thou hast, alas, to prick thy memory,
Stem monitors, these ever-sightless orbs. (1200-1)
8 See Cole for an effort to reconstruct the teachings and writings of the earliest rhetoricians,
and Sprague for translations of DK fragments of the older sophists.
12 Carol Poster
Isocrates (436-338 B.C.)
Isocrates was a transitional figure in the tradition of the enthymeme; in his

work, we find the first extant uses of enthymema by a professional rhetorician.
However, as is pointed out by McBurney (1936), Kennedy (1963), and Conley
(1984), Isocrates' uses of the term ("Evagoras" 10, "Antidosis" 43, "Against
the Sophists" 16) lack the specificity of Aristotle's. Isocrates' concept of the
enthymeme appears to lie somewhere in the range of a well-turned phrase, a
well-considered thought, and an argument, as the following examples indicate:
eti de ton kairon me diamnartein, alla kai tois enthumemasi prepontos holon ton
logon katapoikilai kai tios onomasin euruthmos kai mousikos eipein ...
and also, not to miss what the occasion demands but appropriately to adorn the
whole speech with striking thoughts and to clothe it in flowing and melodious
phrase ... ("Against the Sophists" 16 in Isocrates Vol. II)
tois de peri tous logous ouden exesti ton toiouton, all' apotomos kai ton onomaton
tois politikois monon kai ton enthumematon tois peri autas tas praxeis anagkaion
esti chresthai.
Orators, on the contrary, are not permitted the use of such devices; they must
use with precision only words in current use and only such ideas [enthymemes]
as bear upon the actual facts. ('?Evagoras" 10 in Isocrates Vol. III)
Anaximenes (c. 380-320)
Anaximenes of Lampsacus, whose Rhetorica ad Alexandrum predates

Aristotle's Rhetoric, although rarely mentioned in contemporary rhetorical
literature, is the first author to use enthymema in a technical sense.
Enthymema appears over 20 times9 in this relatively short treatise. Three
passages, 1428al7 ff., 1430a23 ff., and 1431a29 ff., are critical to Anaximenes'
notion of the enthymeme.
In a section that includes his first use of the term enthymema, Anaximenes
bases his division of proofs on the type of the evidence from which they are
drawn (Rackham's translation):
ta men gar eikota kai paradeigmata kai techmeria kai enthumemata kai ai gnomai
kai ta semeja kai hoi elegchoi pisteis ex auton ton logon kai ton anthropon kai ton
pragmaton eisin, epithetoi de <doxa tou legontos>, marturiai, basanoi, horkoi.
Probabilities, examples, tokens, enthymemes, maxims, signs and refutations
are proofs drawn from actual words and persons and actions; the opinion of the
speaker, the evidence of witnesses, evidence given under torture, oaths are
supplementary. (1428al7ff)
9 The lack of contemporary acknowledgement of Anaximenes' role in the development of the

enthymeme is quite surprising in light of the frequency with which he uses the tenn. Although the
index to the Loeb edition only cites one occurence, enthymema, in fact, occurs at 1428a20,
1430a24, 1430a30 and 38, 1431a29, 34, and 36, 1431b26, 1432b27, 1434a35, 1438b35,
1439a6, 20, and 34, 1440a25, 1441a20, 1441bl and 11, 1442b36, 1443a3, and 1444al. Perhaps
Aristotle's comment (Rhetoric 1354a3) to the effect that previous writers say nothing about
enthymemes has unduely influenced the rhetorical tradition in this matter.
Since the term enthymema is introduced in the passage without any effort
at definition, we can assume that Anaximenes felt the term to be sufficiently
familiar to his audience as not to require explication.
Compare this to a similar, but far from identical, division in Aristotle's
Rhetoric:
Ton de pisteon ai men atechnoi eisin ai d'entechnoi. atechna de lego hosa me

di'hemon peporistai alla prouperchen, hoion martures basanoi suggraphai kai hosa
toiauta, entechna de hosa dia tes methodou kai di'hemon kataskeuasthenai dunaton.
As for proofs, some are inartificial, others artificial. By the former I
understand all those which have not been furnished by ourselves but were
already in existence, such as witnesses, tortures, contracts, and the like; by the
latter, all that can be constructed by system and by our own efforts. (I,ii,2)
While both Aristotle and Anaximenes make similar distinctions between

artificial and inartificial proofs, Aristotle, writing for an audience of the trained
dialecticians of Plato's Academy, grounds his artistic proofs in speaker and
theory (the nature of the techne), while Anaximenes, a historian and
rhetorician, writing for students of oratory rather than philosophy, takes a
practical approach based on subject and substance.
In a similar manner, Aristotle situates the enthymeme within the context
of logical theory and syllogism; Anaximenes treats practical issues of how to
use enthymemes in speeches and shows little interest in theoretical
ramifications.
In a passage discussing refutation, Anaximenes briefly defines the
enthymeme:
Enthumemata d'estin ou monon ta to logo kai te praxei enantioumena, alla kai tois
allois apasin.
Considerations [enthymemes] are (1) facts that run counter to the speech or
action in question, and also (2) those that run counter to anything else.
(1430a23)
This passage begins the second of a sequence of chapters each of which

starts with a specific technical term-tekmeria (IX), enthymemata (X), gnome
(XI), semeion (XII), elegchos (XIII), eikos and paradeigmatos (XIV), marturia
(XV), etc.-but is far less specific than any of the preceding or following
chapters-possibly due to the novelty and instability of enthymema as a
rhetorical term.
That Anaximenes considers an enthymeme a form of argument or
counterargument is emphasized when he tries to clarify the distinctions
between enthymemes, tekmeria (tokens), and gnomai (maxims):
kai men enthumema, tekmeriou tauten ten diaphoran eschen, hoti to men tekmerion
peri ton logon kai ten praxin enantiosis esti, to d'enthumema kai tas peri tas alias
ideas enantioseis exeilephen, e kai dioti to men tekmerion ouk eph' hemin esti
lambanein an me peri ta pragmata kai tous logous enantiosis tis huparche, to
d' enthumema pollachothen hoion to porizesthai tois legousin. gnomai
d'enthumematon diapherousin he ta men enthumemata monon ek ton enantioseon
sugkeitai kai haplos autas kai meta autas kath' hautas dunaton estin emphanizein.
Moreover, a consideration [enthymeme] possesses this difference from a token
[tekmerion], that whereas a token is a contrariety in word or deed, a
consideration [enthymeme] also selects contrarieties in regard to other forms
of things; that is to say, that whereas we cannot obtain tokens unless there
exists some contrariety in regards to deeds or words, speakers can produce a
consideration [enthymeme] from many sources. Maxims [gnomai] differ from
14 Carol Poster
considerations [enthymemes], in that, whereas considerations can only be

constructed from contrarieties, maxims can be exhibited in both connection
with contraries and simply by themselves. (1431a28)
Anaximenes does not precisely define enthymeme in the manner of a

dictionary, but instead, he examines the techniques of counterargument used
by practicing rhetoricians and inductively categorizes them by assigning them
class membership and attaching a specialized rhetorical term as a label to
each class, in direct opposition to the generally deductive and a priori
reasoning observed in Aristotle.10 Methodologically, Anaximenes is in accord
with Saussure's dictum concerning definition:
[Dians la langue il n'y a que des differences sans termes positifs. (161)
In fact, within the methodological pragmatism of Anaximenes and the

theoretical framework of Saussurean linguistics lies the key to understanding
and avoiding the confusions that have plagued discussions of the enthymeme
for the past 2400 years.
Neither enthymema-nor any other word-exists as an absolute and
independent entity, isolated from specific context within a sentence or
paragraph or author's oeuvre or isolated from its language's other terms or
isolated from its own past and future uses. The problem with trying to define
enthymema lies not only within the specific problems of the historical
confusions and lapses in scholarship that surround the enthymeme, but rather in
the adherence to an absolute notion of monological definition, rather than a
model of how words mean based on a network of synchronic and diachronic
relations among the parts of a language.
The Aristotlean Enthymeme
The self-same reductionist notion of rhetorical terms as fully explicab

the short hand of glossaries rather than by the complexities, uncertaintie
contradictions of history has radically distorted the tradition of the
Aristotlelean enthymeme.
Aristotle starts his Rhetoric with the statement:
He rhetorike estin antistrophos te dialektike.
Rhetoric is the antistrophos to dialectical (1354a)
This immediately situates rhetoric within a group of texts concerning the

nature of discourse. The Rhetoric must be read in conjunction with the
Organon; Aristotle's Rhetoric is not created ab nihilo in an absolute and self-
contained space; instead it is a dialogue-not within itself, as is the case with
Plato's Gorgias or Phaedrus-but rather it is an extended logos that enters into
a dialogical relationship with the Prior Analytics, the Topics, the Posterior
Analytics and all the other treatises on dialectic, standing in the same relation
to the Organon as the antistrophe does to the strophe in the choral ode.
10 Given that 16 of the 21 mentions of the term enthymema occur in the phrase enthymemata
kai gnomai indicates that the two should be read as a pair. The contrast often appears to be one of
length, with the enthymeme being a long or complex argument and the "maxim" a shorter saying.
11 Kennedy's translation. Freese's "counterpart" does not evoke the significant association
with the terminology of poetics.
However, this dialogue does not have only two participants; it has three.
The very term antistrophos immediately calls to mind tragedy, and thus the
Poetics:
The technique of 'saying it well' remained a partial discipline, bounded not only
from above by philosophy but laterally by other domains of discourse. One of the
fields outside rhetoric is poetics. The split between rhetoric and poetics is of
particular interest.... (Ricoeur 12)
Just as rhetoric, for Aristotle, is bounded on two sides-by logic and

poetics-so, for Aristotle, the enthymeme is bounded on two sides: by the
syllogisms of dialectic and the figures (especially metaphor) of poetry. Within
this context, it is important to note the distinction between poetic and
rhetorical metaphor. As Ricoeur continues:
Metaphor, however, has a foot in each domain. With respect to structure, it can
really consist in just one unique operation, the transfer of the meanings of words;
but with respect to function, it follows the divergent destinies of tragedy and
oratory. Metaphor will therefore have a unique structure but two functions: a
rhetorical function and a poetic function. (12)
The enthymeme viewed in relation to the syllogism-as the antistrophe of

dialectic-is a proof or demonstration of which the premises are not necessary;
instead the premises of the enthymeme are signs, probabilities, and maxims
(Rhetoric I,i,11, Ii,12, I,ii,14, I,ii,20, Prior Analytics II,xxvii e.g.). When
viewed in relation to the poetic metaphor, the enthymeme is persuasive and
argumentative as opposed to affective.
The relationship of enthymeme to syllogism is delineated clearly in
several passages in Aristotle's Rhetoric:
esti d'apodeixis rhetorike enthumema, kai esti touto hos eipein haplos kuriotaton
ton pisteon, to d'enthumema sullogismos tis
[R]hetorical demonstration is an enthymeme, which, generally speaking, is

the strongest of rhetorical proofs; and lastly, that the enthymeme is a kind of
syllogism. (I,i,1 1)
esti gar to men paradeigma epagoge, to d'enthumema sullogismos ... kalo

d'enthumema men rhetorikon sullogismon, paradeigma de epagogen rhetoriken.
[F]or the example is induction, and the enthymeme a syllogism ...
Accordingly I call an enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, and an example
rhetorical induction. (I,ii,8)
While Aristotle contrasts rhetoric with dialectic and discusses the

enthymeme in its relationship to the syllogism in the first book of the Rhetoric,
in the third book he compares rhetoric with poetic, and situates the enthymeme
with respect to simile and metaphor
he de metaphora poiei touto malista ... poiousi men oun kai ai ton poieton eikones
to auto. dioper an eu, asteion phainetai.... anagke de kai lexin kai enthumemata
taut' einai asteia, hosa poiei hemin mathesin taxeian.
It is metaphor, therefore, that above all produces this effect.... The similes of
the poets also have the same effect; wherefore, if they are well constructed, an
impression of smartness is produced.... Of necessity, therefore, all style and
enthymemes that give us rapid information are smart. (IILx,4)
Situating the enthymeme in a conceptual framework of discipline

boundaries and relations is not sufficient to stabilize the enthymeme, which
16 Carol Poster
appears to shift its domain in response to the necessities of the text within
which it is embedded.
When Aristotle discusses the premisses of the syllogism, he contrasts them
with the sort of premises used in dialectic:
Phaneron de ek ton eiremenon hoti anagke peri touton exein proton tas protaseis.
to gar tekmeria kai ta eikota kai ta seimeia protaseis eisi rhetorikai. holos men gar
sullogismos ek protaseon sesti, to d' enthumema sullogismos esti sunestekos ek
ton eirememon protaseon.
From what has been said it is evident that the orator must first have in
readiness the propositions on these three subjects. Now, necessary signs
[tekmeria], probabilities [eikota], and signs [seimeial are the propositions of
the rhetorician; for the syllogism ... consists of propositions, and the
enthymeme is a syllogism composed of the propositions above mentioned.
(I,iii,7)
However, he complicates this discussion by conflating the material nature

of the syllogism with stylistic analysis:
host' anagkaion to te enthumema einai kai to paradeigma peri ton endechomenon

hos ta polla echein kai allos, to men paradeigma epagogen to d' ewnthumema
syllogismon, kasi ex oligon te kai pollakis elattonon e ex on h protos
syllogismos. ean gar e ti touton gnorimon, oude dei legein. auto gar touto
prostithesin ho akroates.
The necessary result then is that the enthymeme and the example are concerned
with things which may, generally speaking, be other than they are, the
example being a kind of induction and the enthymeme being a kind of
syllogism, and deduced from few premises, often from fewer than the regular
syllogism; for if any one of these is well known, there is no need to mention
it, for the hearer can add it himself. (I,ii,13)
Two binary oppositions are at work within this passage-that between

necessary and probable premises and that between fully articulated and
elliptical chains of reasoning. Since both necessary premises and fully
articulated arguments stand together in the dialectical realm and probable
premises and elliptical arguments are both situated in the realm of rhetoric, the
full four-part structure of these concepts is often collapsed to produce the
notion that probabalistic arguments are necessarily articulated elliptically.
When Aristotle compares the enthymeme with the syllogism in a passage
concerning persuasive effect rather than definition, the contrast between
enthymeme and syllogism becomes situated in stylistic rather than material
considerations:
oti men oun to enthumema sullogismos tis estin, eiretai proteron, kai pos
sullogismos, kai to diapherei ton dialektikon. oute gar porrethen oute panta dei
lambanontas sunagein. to men gar asaphes dia to mekos, to de adoleschia dia to
phanera legein.
We have already said that the enthymeme is a kind of syllogism, what makes it
so, and in what it differs from the dialectic syllogisms; for the conclusion must
neither be drawn from too far back nor should it include all the steps of the
argument. In the first case its length causes obscurity, in the second, it is
simply a waste of words, because it states much that is obvious. (ll,xxii,1-3)
When Aristotle again shifts ground to discuss how best to select

enthymemes, instead of continuing to see the enthymeme in opposition to
dialectic, he parallels a bifurcation within dialectical syllogisms with one in
rhetorical enthymemes:
esti gar ton enthumematon eide duo. ta men gar deiktika estin hoti estin e ouk
estin, ta d' elegktika. kai diapherei hosper en tois dialektikois elegchos kai
sullogismos. esti de to men deiktikon enthumema to ex homologoumenon
sunagein, to de elegktikon to ta anomologoumena sunagein.
There are two kinds of enthymemes, the one demonstrative, which proves that
a thing is or is not, and the other refutative, the two differing like refutation
and syllogism in Dialectic. The demostrative enthymeme draws conclusions
from admitted premises, the refutative draws conclusions disputed by the
adversary. (II,xxii,14-16)
As the examples above would indicate, the Aristotlean enthymeme is not

a monolithic entity, but rather a term used to divide a conceptual continuum in
a manner constantly shifting in subordination to the necessity of its contextual
paradigm.
The Enthymeme After Aristotle
The enthymeme maintains a prominent place in rhetorical history

throughout classical antiquity, and is used in numerous contexts. It never
attains a single, agreed upon "definition"; instead, it acquires meaning through
its changing oppositional relation to the syllogism, the epicheireme, and other
figures of thought or speech. A brief summary of certain major writers will
suffice to fill in the gaps in a general argument of how the enthymeme arrived
at its current state.
Theophrastus (c. 370-288/5 B.C.)
According to Diogenes Laertius, Theophrastus, successor to Aristotle as

head of the Peripatos, wrote Epicheirematon (18 books). Unfortunately, neither
text nor even paraphrase of this work is extant. However, even on the basis of
this very slender evidence, it is possible to assume that the epicheireme owes
its place in rhetorical tradition to a Peripatetic tradition originating in
Theophrastus that was to become significant in authors discussed below.
Cicero (106-43 B.C.)
The contrasts introduced in Aristotle which produce meaning for his uses
of enthymema are not the only possible set of contrasts available. Cicero, for
example, in his Topica, rather than explicitly defining the enthymeme, offers
two historical models of its use:
Deinceps est locus dialecticorum proprius ex consequentibus et antecedentibus et

repugnantibus.... Ex hoc illa rhetorum ex contrariis conclusa, quae ipsi
enthymemata appellant; non quod omnis sententia proprio nomine enthymema non
dicatur, sed, ut Homerus propter excellentiam commune poetarum nomen efficit
apud Graecos suum, sic, cum omnis sententia enthymema dicatur, quia videtur ea
quae ex contrariis conficitus acutissima, sola proprie nomen commune possedit.
Next comes the topic which is the peculiar province of the logicians-
consequents, antecedents, and contradictories.... To this belong those forms
18 Carol Poster
of conclusion from contraries adopted by teachers of rhetoric, to which they

themselves have given the name enthymemata. Not that any expression of
thought is not properly called enthymema, but just as among the Greeks
Homer by his outstanding merit has made the name of poet peculiarly his own,
although it is common to all poets, so although every expression of thought
[sentential may be called enthymema, that one which is based on contraries
has, because it seems the most pointed form of argument, appropriated the
common name for its sole possession.12 (Topica 53-55)
Despite this brief historical digression, however, Cicero goes on to assert a

marked preference for Latin rather than Greek terms.13
Dionysus of Halicarnassus (fi. end of 1st century B.C.)
The first extant passages which explicitly contrast the enthymeme and the
epicheireme occur in Dionysus of Halicarnassus:
en de tois apodeiktikois diallattein an doxeien Isaios Lusiou to te me kat'

enthymema ti legein alla kat' epicheirema....
In his proofs Isaeus would appear to differ from Lysias in his use of the
epicheireme and the enthymeme.... (Vol. I: 212)
pistoutai <te> ou kat' enthymema monon, alla kai kat' epicheirema platunon.
In his proofs he not only uses the enthymeme but expiates by means of the
epicheireme. (Vol. 2: 267)
Although these do show the existence of some difference between the two
terms, and an assumption that both terms would be familiar to most readers,
they are not particularly illuminating as to the nature of the contrast.'4
Quintillian (c. 30-100 A.D.)
Quintillian begins his exposition of the problem of rhetorical termi

with characteristic common sense:15
Nunc de argumentis. Hoc enim nomine complectimur omnia, quae Graeci

enthymemata, epicheiremata, apodeixeis vocant, quanquam apud illos est aliqua
horum nomina differentia, etiamsi vis eodem fere tendit. Nam enthymema ... unum
intellectum habet, quo omnia mente concepta significat ... alterum, quo sententiam
cum ratione; tertium, quo certain quandam argumenti conclusionem vel ex
consequentibus vel ex repugnantibus, quanquam de hoc parum convenit.
I now turn to arguments, the name under which we comprise the enthymemata,
epicheiremata, and apodeixeis of the Greeks, terms which, in spite of their
difference, have much the same meaning. For the enthymeme ... has three
meanings: firstly, it means anything conceived in the mind ... secondly, it
12 Cicero uses the Greek alphabet for enthymema.

13 Cicero's discussion of the number of parts to an argument at De Inventione i.35-39
although pertinent does not use the Greek terms epicheireme (5 part argument) or enthymeme (3
part argument).
14 Dionysus' condemnations of Thucydides' overly elaborate enthymemes in the Second
Letter to Ammaeus tend to contrast enthymema with noematon, but the references are sufficiently
cursory as to obscure the significance of the pairing.
15 Quintillian uses the Greek alphabet for the first occurences of each of the three Greek tenns.
signifies a proposition with a reason, and thirdly a conclusion of an argument

drawn either from a denial of consequents or from incompatibles. (V.ix.15-x)
By Quintillian's time, multiple incommensurate uses of enthymema were

flourishing withing both the Greek and Latin traditions. He proceeds to
compare and contrast uses of the three terms within various earlier rhetorical
treatises, without ever privileging one term or definition over another, but
instead indicating that what is most important is what the audience will find
credible.
Enehymema and Periodos in Demetrius
Although there is no consensus as to the precise date of Demetrius's "On

Style," it clearly belongs to a tradition of post-Aristotelian Greek rhetoric and
belles lettres, and addresses many of the issues treated in similar works by
Longinus, Dionysus, and Plutarch.
Demetrius attempts to delineate clearly the material nature of the
enthymeme, and to disentangle it from the formal characteristics of the
periodic form in which it was frequently expressed:
Diapherei de enthumema periodou tede, hoti hn men periodos sunthesis tis esti
periegmene, aph' hes kai onomastai, to de enthumema en to dianoemati exchei ten
dunamin kai sustasin. kai estin he men periodos kuklos tou enthumematos, hoster
kai ton allon pragmaton, to d' enthumema dianoia tis etoi ek maches legomene e en
akolouthias schemati.
Semeion de. ei gar dialuseias ten sunthesin tou enthumematos, ten men periodon
ephanisas, to d' enthumema tauton menei....
The enthymeme differs from the period in that the latter is a rounded structure,
from which indeed it derives its name; while the former finds in the thought its
meaning and constitution. The period encircles the enthymeme in the same
way as other subject matter, but the enthymeme is a thought expressed either
controversially or in the form of a consequence.
A word in proof. If you break up the verbal structure of an enthymeme, you
destroy the period, but the enthymeme remains intact (I,30-31)
Demetrius then briefly contrasts the enthymeme with the syllogism as a

form of thought, and then reiterates his concerns about the relationship of the
enthymeme to the period, emphasizing a Peripatetic bifurcation between
material and formal characteristics:
Kai katholou de to men enthumema syllogismos tis esti rhetorikos, he periodos de

sullogizetai men ouden, sugkeitai dei monon. kai periodous men en panti merei tou
logou tithemen, hoion en tois prooimiois, enthumemata de ouk en panti. kai to
men hosper epilegetai, to enthumema, he periodos de autothen legetai. kai to men
hoion syllogismos estin ateles, he de oute holon ti oute ateles syllogizetai.
Sumbebeke men oun enthumemati kai periodw einai, dioti periodikos sugkeitai,
periodos d' oak estin, hosper to oikodomoumeno sumbebeke men kai leuko einai,
an leukon e, to oikodomoumenon d' oak esti leukon. Peri men de diaphoras
enthumematos kai periodou eiretai.
In general, the enthymeme is a kind of rhetorical syllogism, while the period

is not an instrument of reasoning, but simply a combination of words. Nor is
this the only point of distinction. We use periods in every part of discourse,
for example in exordiums; but we do not so use enthymemes. The one-the
20 Carol Poster
enthymeme-is as it were an addition to speech, while the period is just a form

of speech. The former may be called an imperfect syllogism, while the latter is
no syllogism, whether complete or imperfect.
It may, indeed, happen that an enthymeme is at the same time a period because
its construction is periodic. Still it is not identical with the period. A
building may be white if it so chance, but a building as such, is not necessarily
white. So much for the distinction betweem the enthymeme and the period.
(I:32-33)
Arrian (fl. 134 A.D.)
Aristotle's tendency to regard the enthymeme as inferior to the

syllogism-in much the same manner as he regarded rhetoric as inferior to
dialectic-is echoed in the writing of Arrian, who contrasts the enthymeme
with both the epicheireme and the syllogism:
Kath' hosous tropous metalambanein, esti ta isodunamounta allelois, kata

tosoutous kai ta eide ton ewpicheirematon te kai enthumematon en tois logois
ekpoiei metalambanein.... kai touto oudeni mallon prosekei e to philosopho
empeiros poiein. eiper gar ateles sullogismos esti to enthumema, delon hoti ho
peri ton teleion sullogismon gegumnasmenos houtos an hikanos eie kai peri ton
atele ouden hetton.
In as many ways as it is possible to vary the meaning of equivalent terms, in
so many ways may a man also vary the forms of his controversial arguments
[epicheiremes] and of his enthymemes in reasoning.... And no man is better
fitted to employ such variations skillfully than the philosopher. For if,
indeed, the enthymeme is an incomplete [ateles] syllogism, it is clear that he
who has been exercised in the perfect syllogism would be no less competent to
deal with the imperfect also. (I,viii,1-3)
Formally, the epicheireme is often described as a five part proof consisting

of a major premise, support for the major premise, a minor premise, support for
the minor premise, and conclusion-although close investigation of the history
of the term reveals many of the same variations found in the enthymeme.
By situating the enthymeme in relation to both the epicheireme and the
syllogism, Arrian (Epictetus) emphasizes its incompletness or imperfection
(ateles) in two ways. A two or three part enthymeme both is shorter than an
epicheireme and less logically rigorous than a syllogism.
Boethius (c. 480-524 A.D.) and the Abbreviation of the

Enthymeme
By the time of Boethius, the imperfection of the enthymeme was

commonplace:
An enthymeme is an imperfect syllogism, that is, discourse in which the

precipitous conclusion is derived without all the propositions being laid down
beforehand.... So since an enthymeme argues from universals to particulars which
are to be proved, it is, as it were, similar to a syllogism; but because it does not use
all the propositions appropriate to a syllogism, it deviates from the definition
(ratio) of a syllogism and so is called an imperfect syllogism. (1 184C)
This definition of the enthymeme as imperfectus (incomplete) compared

with the syllogism recurred frequently throughout the next ten centuries. The
apparent gloss ateles (incomplete) was probably added to manuscripts of
Aristotle's Prior Analytics in the tenth century by Byzantine rhetoricians
(McBurney, Conley 1984) to bring Aristotlean texts into accordance with the
contemporary interpretations of Aristotle-an interesting example of how a
priori theorizing forcibly reconciles textual evidence with the predominant
ideology.
Multiple versions of the enthymeme continue to coexist throughout
rhetorical history, and persist in contemporary writers (as shown in the
beginning of this article).
Methodological Conclusions
Were the confusion in the history of the enthymeme merely a case of

instances of a valid methodological approach applied less rigorously and with
less attention to detail than is ultimately desirable, it would be worth a brief
footnote, rather than the extensive literature that has grown up around it.
Instead, the case of the enthymeme serves to illustrate our need to re-examine
several of our methodological assumptions.
Ricoeur claims:
The distinction between sense and reference is a necessary and pervasive

characteristic of discourse, and collides head-on with the axiom of the immanence
of language. There is no reference problem in language: signs refer to other signs
within the same system. In the phenomenon of the sentence, language passes
outside itself; reference is the mark of the self transcendence of language.
This trait, more than others perhaps, marks the fundamental difference between
semantics and semiotics. Semiotics is aware only of intra-linguistic relationships,
whereas semantics takes up the relationship between signs and things denoted....
(74)
As ordinary language is properly both the object of semantic and semiotic
readings, an unexamined methodology conflates these two approaches.
However, the enthymeme is not part of ordinary language, it is part of
secondary rhetoric, itself a species of metadiscourse. Metadiscourse is what
Kristeva calls homogenizing language. It is not self-transcendent; it possesses
no extra-linguistic reference; and thus it is a subject exclusively appropriate to
semiotics rather than semantics.
When semantics is brought into play, an attempt is made to provide an
absolute "definition" in terms of extra-linguistic reference-which, in the case
of meta-discourse, does not exist. Thus, the confusion over the enthymeme is
not a problem of incorrect definitions but rather the problem of applying a
semantic notion of definition to a semiotic problem.
Terms like enthymeme do not have a posteriori extra-linguistic reference.
Instead, they exist within a network of synchronic and diachronic differences,
and rather than demanding definition, a term used by a rhetorician demands a
listing of relationships and boundary conditions with respect to other terms
used in the same writer, the same or other terms used in different writers of the
same period, and antecedent and subsequent uses of the term.
22 Carol Poster
The famous paradox of the village barber-a man who shaves all men who
do not shave themselves-is soluble by the simple assertion that there is no
such barber (Quine 4). In a similar fashion, it is possible to resolve the
problem of the definition of the enthymeme by asserting that there is no such
unique entity, and instead, offering, as I have attempted to do, a description of
the complex and fascinating play of synchronic and diachronic differences that
constitute the domain of use of the term.16
Carol Poster
English Department
University of Missouri
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A Historicist Recontextualization of the Enthymeme

Author(s): Carol Poster

This paper examines the history of numerous mutually contradictory

A Historicist Recontextualization of the Enthymeme

The Current Situation of the Enthymeme

In most contemporary rhetorical discussions, the enthymeme is usually

To discuss the general state of knowledge, it is necessary to examine not

Corbett appears to favour the abbreviated syllogism model of the

In modem times, the enthymeme has come to be regarded as an abbreviated

However, Corbett allows as how both models of the enthymeme coexist in

Mackin generalizes Aristotle's use of enthymeme in passing but does not

The enthymeme is an argument from premises which are probable principles or

Maxims ... serve as conclusions or premises of enthymemes and become complete

Horner also appears to treat the enthymeme as a syllogism, one premise of

Rhetorical deduction ... is based on and uses the enthymeme, an abbreviated

According to Aristotle, the enthymeme, the shortened syllogism which draws a

As we have discussed, in the enthymeme one of the premises is omitted. (208)

enthymeme (EN-thi-meem): A truncated syllogism, based on probabilities, in

Homer seems to be a strong proponent of the notion of an enthymeme as a

Even this brief review of selected recent textbooks provides an

(a) abbreviated syllogism (one premise omitted)

What is most interesting about these multiple meanings is that their

If the generally accepted knowledge of the enthymeme recapitulated in

The debt to Whately is discussed by McBurney, whose essay "The Place

enthymema (i.2. 8): an enthymeme (lit. thought, argument) in the Rhetoric is a

Despite Freese and Seaton, who, in my opinion, are very strongly

If the rhetorical theory upon which we operate is Aristotelian, and if the

Mudd summarizes his definition of the enthymeme:

Those members of the rhetorical community who write about the

(a) Aristotle's Rhetoric is/was extremely important.

Although individual articles address specific issues such as important to

notion of the enthymeme from Jevons' misleading etymology, they analyze it

The case of the enthymematic inference and the corresponding proposition

may, however, occasion some doubt. (713)

Delia, in an article which grounds the persuasive force of the enthymeme

Lanigan, like Delia, summarizes the extant of conflicting interpretations of

Two traditional hypotheses are customarily advanced to explain what the

Although more rigorous in methodology, Lanigan's article shows the same

Essentially, enthymemes may be defined as assumptions used in public

The methodological imperatives of scholarship in the traditions of rhetoric,

Primary and Secondary Rhetorics

If looking at definitions of enthymemes provides no consensus, perhaps

Gramatically the enthymeme is a causal statement; the syllogism is a conditional

enthymeme. The enthymeme, like the epicheireme or figures of speech,

The enthymeme thus becomes impossible to define inductively from its

The Need for Diachronic Investigation

As shown above, definitions of the enthymeme in modern rhetorical

The Need for an Etymology of the Enthymeme

The model of the enthymeme as a term possessed of a unique

This ahistorical habit is further exacerbated in the rhetorical community by

Any such assertion about the centrality or marginality of a given construc

canon construction. Conley, who strongly advocates consideration of

Although describing classical discussions of the enthymeme as

In Homeric, as well as later Greek, the term thymos is similar to the La

paidos gar mython pepnumenon entheto thymo

the affective component inherent in the enthymeme is the essence of Aristotle's

Uses of Enthymema After Homer

LSJ cites numerous examples of forms enthymema/enthymeomai in such

Isocrates (436-338 B.C.)

Isocrates was a transitional figure in the tradition of the enthymeme; in his

Anaximenes (c. 380-320)

Anaximenes of Lampsacus, whose Rhetorica ad Alexandrum predates

9 The lack of contemporary acknowledgement of Anaximenes' role in the development of the