Kargil: Ours must live, enemy must die!

By Bharat Verma
Issue:  Vol. 29.3 Jul-Sep 2014    | Date : 25 Jul , 2016

Even as the nation readies itself to pay homage to the extraordinary bravery displayed by the young
officers and the men of the Indian Army during the Kargil conflict, the lessons thrown up raise many
questions that reflect the political and the military leadership in poor light.

The infiltration by Pakistanis and positioning themselves on the various heights in Kargil must have
been planned by GHQ Rawalpindi for a period of at least one year. On the intelligence front it implies
that R&AW, the external intelligence agency was clueless and could not decipher the activity for
almost one year.

This amounts to a colossal intelligence failure.

…discovery of the
Similarly to position Pakistani troops on to the heights intrusions reported
would have taken considerable planning and time. Failure
to detect the ongoing movement of men, rations, and the
by a shepherd
arms and ammunition for considerable time inside our reflects that our
borders amounts to serious intelligence failure at tactical intelligence
level by Military Intelligence (MI) and the Intelligence agencies, i.e. IB and
Bureau (IB).
MI do not keep in
The chance discovery of the intrusions reported by a close contact with
shepherd reflects that our intelligence agencies, i.e. IB and the ‘locals’, who can
MI do not keep in close contact with the ‘locals’, who can provide primary
provide primary intelligence!
intelligence!
The ingress of the enemy by stealth and occupation of
heights ranging from 15,000 to 20,000 ft. was a clever move. Intruders held each major ridgeline
with up to 40 Northern Light Infantry soldiers (Pak Army) under the command of an officer. The
numbers of intruders were estimated to be approximately 1500. They were dispersed on each
ridgeline between an area of five to eight kilometers. The intruders built sangars, brought in heavy
weapons, sufficient ammunition and rations and other military stores.

The intruders were definitely in for a long haul.

Under normal principles of war, in any other country, the political leadership after permitting a small
preparatory time to the military would  order crossing of Line of Control (LoC) and to occupy Skardu
from where the support to the intruders was being provided. This would have disrupted supplies to
the intruders and their survival on those heights would have become near impossible over a period
of time, and our forces sitting in Skardu would have posed a direct challenge to the Northern Areas,
which would have put Pakistan on the back-foot.
This sane action would have drastically reduced the
number of casualties.
When an enemy
dares to occupy your
However, when the then Prime Minister asked the then Air territory, the only
Force Chief for advice, the former was told that if we sensible military
crossed the LoC, it will escalate to a full-fledged war.
response is to cut-off
This advice was neither here nor there, as it was obvious his supply lines in the
and a matter of commonsense. rear and let the
intruders starve on
When an enemy dares to occupy your territory, the only
sensible military response is to cut-off his supply lines in
such great heights
the rear and let the intruders starve on such great heights instead of taking
instead of taking huge casualties of young officers and huge casualties of
men. Why did the prime minister not question the air chief young officers and
on his advice and asked him for an alternative strategy to
recover our land.
men.

Were the prime minister and the air chief indulging in the widespread Indian culture of ‘logic of
convenience’?

The orders reportedly given by the principal secretary to the prime minister (not by the prime
minister) to the military chiefs was air-power will not be used but the army is allowed ‘hot-pursuit’ in
the area of ingress. The hot-pursuit is normally conducted from your borders into the contiguous
borders of the enemy country.

It is strange that in his ignorance, the principal secretary was asking the army to climb height
ranging from 15000 – 20000 ft. in hot-pursuit to evict the intruders! Is it possible to run-up to chase
the intruders to these heights? Is that a worthy political order to the military? Why did the prime
minister not intervene with clear directive? Was the air chief being timid in his approach? Is the air
force not supposed to come to the immediate rescue of the army? If the enemy dares to cross the
LoC and occupies your territory in the mountains, will we not cross the LoC by using air power to
neutralize his intensions, instead of young officers and men being made to climb the unusual
heights and absorbing huge number of casualties?

Due to this totally incorrect method of war-fighting, we had

to incur massive casualties and sacrifice more than five Committees do not
hundred young lives. fight wars. Military to
On the other hand, the army chief who was abroad on an
win wars cannot
official visit did not deem it necessary to return afford the luxury
immediately and take charge of the situation. The enjoyed by civil
explanation he gives is that nobody called him back. In the leadership  of
Indian Army it is customary that when the war breaks out,
the officers and men who are on leave, out of sheer
appointing
motivation and loyalty catch the next train to join the battle ‘Committees after
by reporting to their units immediately. It is also customary Committees’.
in the Indian Army for the Officers to lead from the front.
Did the Army Chief not expect those on leave to rejoin immediately and the young officers to lead
from the front?

Yet, the Chief did not hasten back to lead his Army from the front.

Another reason touted during the Kargil conflict for not crossing LoC was the fact that the Indian
armed forces were not adequately equipped. The Bofors gun had neither the spare available nor
adequate ammunition. The ammunition was imported at an extra-ordinary cost during Kargil.

Is it not the job of Ministry of Defence (MoD) to keep the armed forces well-equipped to meet all
threats to the Union’s territorial integrity 24 x 7? Are the defence minister and the prime minister
under constitutional obligations not responsible for the upkeep of its military?

Even today, the military is ill-equipped on both fronts, i.e.

China and Pakistan. Who is responsible for this shoddy The soft muddle-
state of affairs? To win any war, the integration of the headed response in
forces to optimize the military capabilities in defence of the
nation is a necessity. Why has the political leadership not
Kargil resulted in an
intervened effectively to ensure that necessary integration emboldened enemy,
of the three services headquarters with the MoD, who subsequently
appointment of Chief of Defence Staff and integration of attacked the Indian
forces does take place?
Parliament.
These were the recommendations of the Kargil Review
Committee, which was accepted by the government long time back. However, surprisingly instead
of implementing the recommendations, the present government has appointed another Task Force
(read: Committee) to study why the Kargil Review Committee recommendations has not been
implemented!

Committees do not fight wars. Military to win wars cannot afford the luxury enjoyed by the civil
leadership of appointing ‘Committees after Committees’. The soft muddle-headed response in
Kargil resulted in an emboldened enemy, who subsequently attacked the Indian Parliament.

Similarly, timid Generals cannot win wars or safeguard the borders. The timidity witnessed in some
places in the senior echelons of the military is the result of invasion of the ‘pacifist environment’
prevalent in the civil. Equipping the military with the best weapon platforms by the political
leadership will generate confidence in the mind of the military and ‘deep offensive capabilities’ on
the ground.

The best homage nation can pay to the martyrs of Kargil is to ensure that in  future military is given
the wherewithal so that our young live and the enemy dies.

This article was first published in IDR Vol. 29 (3) Jul-Sep 2014.

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