ALLIED FREE WORKERS’ UNION

VS

C. MARITIMA et al.

19 SCRA 258

[JAN.31, 1967]

NATURE

Petitions for review by certiorari of CIR decision

FACTS

-This is a consolidation of 3 cases involving both parties

-Respondent Compania Maritima (MARITIMA), a local corp. engaged in shipping

entered into a contract for lease of services with petitioner Allied Free Workers’ Union
(AFWU), a duly registered legitimate labor union. In the contract, it was stipulated that
AFWU will do and perform all the work of stevedoring and arrastre services of all vessels
or boats of MARITIMA in Iligan City; that the contract is good and valid for 1 month
starting Aug.12, 1952, but may be renewed by agreement of the parties with the
reservation that MARITIMA has the right to revoke said contract even before the
expiration of the term, if and when AFWU fails to render good service.

-Towards the end of 1953, MARITIMA complained to AFWU of unsatisfactory and

inefficient service. To remedy the situation, MARITIMA was forced to hire extra laborers
from among “stand-by” workers not affiliated to any union.

-On July 1954, AFWU sent a written proposal to MARITIMA for a CBA, but the latter did
not reply. Thereafter, AFWU instituted an action in the CIR praying that it be certified as
the sole and exclusive bargaining unit composed of all the laborers doing arrastre and
stevedoring work for MARITIMA, to which action MARITIMA answered, alleging lack of
EREE relationship. On Aug.1954, MARITIMA informed AFWU of the termination of the
contract because of the inefficient service rendered by the latter which had adversely
affected its business. The termination was to take effect as of Sept.1, 1954. MARITIMA
then contracted with the Iligan Stevedoring Union for the arrastre and stevedoring work.
The latter agreed to perform the work subject to the same terms and conditions of the
contract with AFWU. The new agreement was to be carried out on Sept.1, 1954.

-On Aug.26, 1954, AFWU charged MARITIMA of unfair labor practices (ULPs) before the
CIR. MARITIMA answered, again denying the ER-EE relationship between the parties.
On Sept.9, 1954, MARITIMA filed an action to rescind the contract, enjoin AFWU
members from doing arrastre and stevedoring work in connection with its vessels, and for
recovery of damages against AFWU and its officers. The CFI ordered the rescission of the
contract and permanently enjoined AFWU members from performing work in connection
with MARITIMA’s vessels.

AFWU was later able to secure a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the maintenance
of the status quo prior to Jan.6, 1961. Thus, after Jan.18, 1961, AFWU laborers were again
back doing the same work as before.

-On Nov.4, 1963, after almost 10 years, the CFI finally rendered its decision: In pursuance
of the provisions of Sec.12 of R.A. 875 and the Rules of this court on certification election,
the Honorable Secretary of Labor or any of his authorized representative is hereby
requested to conduct certification election among all the workers and/or stevedores
working in the wharf of Iligan City who are performing stevedoring and arrastre service
aboard Compania Maritima vessels docking at Iligan City port in order to determine their
representative for collective bargaining with the employer, whether these desire to be
represented by the petitioner Allied Free Workers Union or neither; and upon
termination of the said election, the result thereof shall forthwith be submitted to this
court for further consideration. From this ruling, both parties appealed, AFWU claiming
that it should be declared outright as the majority union while MARITIMA contends that
said court could not even have correctly ordered a certification election considering that
there was an absence of ER-EE relationship between it and said laborers.

ISSUE

WON the order of a certification election by the CIR was proper. (WON there was an ER-
EE relationship between AFWU and MARITIMA)

HELD

NO. Before a certification election can be held, there must exist an ER-EE relationship
between the ER and the petitioner union. Ratio The duty to bargain collectively exists only
between the “employer” and its “employees.” Where there is no duty to bargain
collectively, it is not proper to hold certification elections in connection therewith.
Reasoning In its findings, the CIR observed that after the rescission, the AFWU laborers
continued working in accordance with the “cabo system,” which was the prevailing
custom in the place. Under this system, the union was an independent contractor. The
CIR also made a finding that prior to the contract between MARITIMA and AFWU, the
former had an oral arrastre and stevedoring agreement with another union, the Iligan
Laborers Union (ILU), which agreement was also based on the “cabo” system. After
unsatisfactory service, MARITIMA cancelled this oral contract and entered into a new
contract with AFWU, the terms and conditions of which were similar to the oral contract
with ILU. The written contract between AFWU and MARITIMA was signed under the
assurance by AFWU that the same arrangement previously had with the former union
regarding performance and execution of arrastre and stevedoring contract be followed in
accordance with the custom of such kind of work in Iligan. Thus, petitioner union
operated as a labor contractor under the so-called “cabo” system.

-From these findings, Insofar as the working agreement was concerned, there was no real
difference between the contract and the prior oral agreement. Both were based on the
“cabo” system. Hence, since the parties observed the “cabo” system after the rescission of
the contract, and since the characteristics of said system show that the contracting union
was an independent contractor, it is reasonable to assume that AFWU continued being an
independent contractor of MARITIMA. And, being an independent contractor, it could
not qualify as an “employee”. With more reason would this be true with respect to the
laborers. Moreover, there is no evidence at all regarding the characteristics of the working
arrangement between AFWU and MARITIMA after the termination of the CONTRACT.
All we have to go on is the court a quo’s finding that the “cabo” system was observed-a
system that negatives employment relationship.

-Since the only function of a certification election is to determine, with judicial sanction,
which union shall be the official representative or spokesman of the “employees” will be,
there being no ER-EE relationship between the parties disputants, it follows that there is
neither a duty to bargain collectively. Thus, the order for certification election in question
cannot be sustained.

Disposition
Appealed decision of the CIR is AFFIRMED insofar as it dismissed the charge of ULP, but
REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as it ordered the holding of a certification election.
The petition for certification election should be DISMISSED.

REYES

VS

TRAJANO

209 SCRA 484

[June 2, 1992]

NATURE

Special civil action of certiorari

FACTS

-The officer-in-charge of the Bureau of Labor Relations (Hon. Cresenciano Trajano)

sustained the denial by the Med Arbiter of the right to vote of one hundred forty-one
(141) members of the “Iglesia ni Kristo” (INK), all employed in the same company, at a
certification election at which two (2) labor organizations were contesting the right to be
the exclusive representative of the employees in the bargaining unit.

-The certification election was authorized to be conducted by the Bureau of Labor

Relations among the employees of Tri-Union Industries Corporation on October 20,
1987. The competing unions were the Tri-Union Employees Union-Organized Labor
Association in Line Industries and Agriculture (TUEU-OLALIA), and Trade Union of the
Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS). Of the 348 workers initially deemed to be
qualified voters, only

240 actually took part in the election, conducted under the supervision of the Bureau of
Labor Relations. Among the 240 employees who cast their votes were 141 members of
the INK. The ballots provided for three (3) choices. They provided for votes to be cast, of
course, for either of the two (2) contending labor organizations, (a) TUPAS and (b)
TUEU-OLALIA; and, conformably with established rule and practice, 1 for (c) a third
choice: “NO UNION.”

The final tally of the votes showed the following results:

TUPAS 1

TUEU-OLALIA 95

NO UNION 1

SPOILED 1

CHALLENGED 141

ISSUE/S

1.

WON the members of the INC should not be allowed to vote “because they refused to
participate in the previous certification elections.”

2.

WON the NLRC was correct in saying that “if the workers who are members of the
Iglesia ni Kristo in the exercise of their religious belief opted not to join any labor
organization as a consequence of which they themselves can not have a bargainingART.
242. Rights of legitimate labor organizations. -A legitimate labor organization shall have
the right:

(a) To act as the representative of its members for the purpose of collective bargaining;

(b) To be certified as the exclusive representative of all the employees in

an appropriatebargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining;

(c) To be furnished by the employer, upon written request, with its

annual auditedfinancial statements, including the balance sheet and the profit and loss
statement, within thirty (30) calendar days from the date of receipt of the request, after
the union has been duly recognized by the employer or certified as the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative of the employees in the bargaining unit, or within sixty
(60) calendar days before the expiration of the existing collective bargaining agreement,
or during the collective bargaining negotiation;
(d) To own property, real or personal, for the use and benefit of the labor organization
and its members;

(e) To sue and be sued in its registered name; and

(f) To undertake all other activities designed to benefit the organization and its
members, including cooperative, housing, welfare and other projects not contrary to
law. Notwithstanding any provision of a general or special law to the contrary, the
income and the properties of legitimate labor organizations, including grants,
endowments, gifts, donations and contributions they may receive from fraternal and
similar organizations, local or foreign, which are actually, directly and exclusively used
for their lawful purposes, shall be free from taxes, duties and other assessments. The
exemptions provided herein may be withdrawn only by a special law expressly repealing
this provision. (As amended by Section 17, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989).

NATIONAL MINES AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION

VS

SEC. OF LABOR

227 SCRA 821

[November 16, 1993]

FACTS:

-Petitioner and respondent FFW-SMQCC are local chapters of labor federations

duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). Petitioner is the
exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank and file workers of respondent QCC, a domestic
corporation engaged in the metal industry.

-On September 27, 1991, 38 days before the expiration of the Collective
BargainingAgreement between petitioner and respondent QCC, respondent FFW-
SMQCC through Reynito de Pedro filed with the DOLE Industrial Relations Division,
National Capital Region a petition for certification election. The petition was
accompanied by a list of signatures of company employees, who signified their consent to
a certification election among the rank and file employees of QCC.

-Petitioner herein moved to dismiss the petition of respondent FFW-SMQCC on the

grounds that: (a) the required consent to the certification election of at least 25% of the
rank and file employees had not been met; (b) the petition was not verified as required by
law; and (c) Reynito de Pedro, who was also the president of petitioner, had no personality
to file the petition on behalf of FFW-SMQCC.

-On October 30, 1991, respondent FFW-SMQCC, filed a second petition for certification
election, this time signed and verified by De Pedro.

-On January 24, 1992, the Med-Arbiter granted the petition for certification election of
respondent FFW-SMQCC
-Petitioner appealed this decision to the Secretary of Labor. On June 17, 1992, the
Secretary of Labor rendered a decision, denying the appeal for lack of merit and affirming
the order of the Med-Arbiter.

ISSUE:

WON the petition for certification election was verified as required by law

HELD:

YES

Reasoning

-First, although Reynito de Pedro was the duly elected president of petitioner, he had
disaffiliated himself therefrom and joined respondent FFW-SMQCC before the petition
for certification election was filed on September 27, 1991. The eventual dismissal of De
Pedro from the company is of no moment, considering that the petition for certification
election was filed before his dismissal on August 22, 1992.

-Second, verification of a pleading is a formal, not jurisdictional requisite. Even

if verification is lacking and the pleading is formally defective, the courts may dispense
with the requirement in the interest of justice and order of correction of the pleading
accordingly. Generally, technical and rigid rules of procedure are not binding in labor
cases; and this rule is specifically applied in certification election proceedings, which are
non-litigious but merely investigative and non-adversarial in character. Nevertheless,
whatever formal defects existed in the first petition were cured and corrected in the
second petition for certification election.

-Third, attached to the original petition for certification election was a list of 141
supporting signatures out of the 300 employees belonging to the appropriate bargaining
unit to be represented by respondent FFW-SMQCC. Respondent QCC sought to delete
from the list some 36 signatures which are allegedly forged and falsified. Petitioner,
likewise, submitted a joint affidavit of 13 employees, disclaiming the validity of the
signatures therein.

-Granting that 36 signatures were falsified and that 13 was disowned, this leaves 92
undisputed signatures which is definitely more than 75 i.e., 25% of the total number of
company employees required by law to support a petition for certification election. The
disclaimer of 13 employees by their respective signatures covers only their own personal
participation and cannot in any way be extended to include the rest of those who did not
question the same.

DISPOSITIVE:

Petition dismissed

SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA PERMEX

VS

SECRETARY OF LABOR

G.R. No. 107792

 [March 2, 1998]

A certification election was conducted among employees of respondent Permex Producer

and Exporter Corporation with ‘No Union’ winning [NFL lost]. Later however, some
employees of Permex Producer formed a labor organization known as the Samahang
Manggagawa sa Permex (SMP) which they registered with the Department of
Labor and Employment and then affiliatedwith the Philippine Integrated Industries
Labor Union (PIILU). (SMP-PIILU) wrote the respondent company requesting
recognition as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of employees at the
Permex Producer and was granted. They then entered into a CBA. A year later, NFL filed
gain for a petition for certification election but was dismissed. Two arguments are put
forth in support of the petition. First, it is contended that petitioner has been recognized
by the majority of the employees at Permex Producer as their sole collective
bargainingagent. Petitioner argues that when a group of employees constituting
themselves into an organization and claiming to represent a majority of the work force
requests the employer to bargain collectively, the employer may do one of two things.

First, if the employer is satisfied with the employees’ claim the employer may voluntarily
recognize the union by merely bargaining collectively with it. The formal written
confirmation is ordinarily stated in the collective bargaining agreement.

Second, if on the other hand, the employer refuses to recognize the union voluntarily, it
may petition the Bureau of Labor Relations to conduct a certification election. If the
employer does not submit a petition for certification election, the union claiming to
represent the employees may submit the petition so that it may be directly certified as the
employees’ representative or a certification election may be held.

HELD

Challenged decision AFFIRMED. The case of Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa v. Ferrer-

Calleja is particularly apropos: “. . . Ordinarily, in an unorganized establishment like the
Calasiao Beer Region, it is the union that files a petition for a certification election if there
is no certified bargaining agent for the workers in the establishment. If a union asks the
employer to voluntarily recognize it as the bargaining agent of the employees, as the
petitioner did, it in effect asks the employer to certify it as the bargaining representative
of the employees — A CERTIFICATION WHICH THE EMPLOYER HAS
NO AUTHORITY TO GIVE, for it is the employees’ prerogative (not the employer’s) to
determine whether they want a union to represent them, and, if so, which one it should
be.” In accordance with this ruling, Permex Producer should not have given its voluntary
recognition to SMP-PIILU-TUCP when the latter asked for recognition as
exclusive collective bargaining agent of the employees of the company. The company did
not have the power to declare the union the exclusive representative of the workers for
the purpose of collective bargaining. It is not enough that a union has the support of the
majority of the employees. It is equally important that everyone in the bargaining unit be
given the opportunity to express himself.

Effect

One Union Only

CRUZVALE, INC.

VS

LAGUESMA

238 SCRA 389

 [November 25, 1994]

NATURE

Special civil action of certiorari, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order, to reverse and set aside the decision of respondent
Undersecretary (Laguesma) upholding the order of respondent Med-Arbiter (Tutay)

FACTS

-Private respondent, Union of Filipino Workers (UFW), filed with the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE), Regional Office No. IV, a petition for certification
election among the regular rank-and-file workers of petitioner.

-Petitioner filed its comment to the petition for certification election. It sought the
denial of the petition, among the grounds enumerated is that the Regional Office No. IV
of the DOLE has no jurisdiction over the petition since petitioner Company’s place
of businessis located at Cubao, Quezon City, which is outside the jurisdiction of the said
Regional Office. Consequently, it is the National Capital Region or NCR of the DOLE
which has jurisdiction over said petition.

-Med-Arbiter found petitioner’s claim unmeritorious and rendered a decision in favor of

respondent union.

ISSUE/S

1. WON petitioners correctly interpreted Section 1, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code which states: “Where to file. A petition for certification
election shall be filed with the Regional Office which has jurisdiction over the principal
office of the Employer. The petition shall be in writing and under oath.”

HELD

1. NO
Ratio The word “jurisdiction” as used in said provision refers to the venue where the
petition for certification must be filed. Unlike jurisdiction, which implies the power of
the court to decide a case, venue merely refers to the place where the action shall
be brought. Venue touches more the convenience of the parties rather than the
substance of the case. Reasoning Section 1, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code refers only to cases where the place of work of the
employees and the place of the principal office of the employer are within the same
territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Office where the petition for certification election
is filed. The said provision does not apply to the filing of petitions for certification
election where the place of work of the employees and the place of principal office of the
employer are located within the territorial jurisdictions of different regional offices. We
assume that in the drafting of the Omnibus Rules, the Secretary of Labor
and Employment took into consideration the fact that there are many companies with
factories located in places different from places where the corporate offices are located.
The worker, being the economically-disadvantaged party whether as complainant,
petitioner or respondent, as the case may be, the nearest governmental machinery to
settle a labor dispute must beplaced at hisimmediate disposal and the employer must in
no case be allowed a choice in favor of another competent agency sitting in another
place to the inconvenience of the worker. Petitioner has not shown how it will be
prejudiced by the hearing on the petition for certification election before the Regional
Office No. IV, which has its offices in Quezon City, the same city where the principal
place of business of petitioner is located. Petitioner is, therefore, being unreasonable in
demanding that the petition for certification election be filed with the National Capital
Region Office, which holds offices in Manila. Unlike in the Rules governing the
procedure before Regional Offices, the New Rules of Procedure of the National Labor
Relations Commission prescribes that all casesin which labor arbiters have jurisdiction
should be filed in the branch office which has territorial jurisdiction over the “workplace
of the complainant/petitioner” (Rule IV, Sec. 1[a]). The NLRC Rules defines the
workplace as follows: “For purposes of venue, workplace shall be understood as the
place or locality where the employee is regularly assigned whenthe cause of action arose.
It shall includethe place where the employee is supposed to report back after a
temporary detail, assignment or travel. . . “

Disposition

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the temporary restraining order is

LIFTED.

Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co., Manila

VS

Laguesma

212 SCRA 281

[Aug. 6, 1992]

Nature

Petition for Certiorari

Facts
-Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila, Inc. is engaged in the construction and
fabrication business and conducts its construction business in different construction sites
here and abroad while its fabrication operations are conducted by its Steel and Marine
Structures Group at its Batangas Marine and Fabrication Yard.

-Atlantic has adopted the practice of hiring project employees when existing fabrication
capacity cannot absorb increases in job orders for steel structures and other heavy
construction works. Said project employees are covered by the Project
Worker/Reliever Employment Agreements which indicate the specific projects to which
they are assigned and the duration of their employment. Upon the expiration of their
contracts/agreements, the employment of these employees is automatically terminated
unless the projects to which they are assigned have not yet been completed, in which case,
they are rehired for the remainder of the project. The positions occupied by the regular
rank-and-file employees and the project employees are basically similar in nature and are
directly related to the main line of petitioner’s business.

-Atlantic executed a CBA with the AG&P United Rank & File Association (“URFA”, for
brevity) which is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the regular rank-and-
fileemployees of the petitioner.

-Lakas ng Manggagawa sa AG&P-SMSG-National Federation of Labor (“LAKAS-NFL”,

for brevity) filed a Petition for Certification Election with the Med-Arbitration Unit. Med-
Arbiter Tomas F. Falconitin of the Department of Labor and Employment issued an Order
for certification election.

-Atlantic filed an appeal with the Department of Labor and Employment. Alleged project
employees sought to be represented by private respondent LAKAS-NFL were formally
issued regular employment appointments by the Atlantic. Undersecretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment Bienvenido E. Laguesma denied Atlantic’s appeal
for lack of merit. Atlantic’s project employees at its SMSG site who were not given
regular employment appointment went on strike and completely paralyzed
Atlantic’s operations in Bauan, Batangas. Strike was settled in a conciliation conference,
an Agreement was reached by the petitioner and private respondent LAKAS-NFL wherein
petitioner agreed to formally regularize all the remaining alleged project employees with
at least one year of service pending the final outcome of the certification election case.
Thereafter, 686 additional regular project employees were regularized effective
December 1, 1990 in pursuance to said Agreement.

-On December 6, 1990, Atlantic received a letter from URFA informing the former about
the admission into URFA of the membership of 410 regular project employees who were
formally regularized by the petitioner effective November 1, 1990. Atlantic filed MFR
alleging that the employees sought to be represented by the private respondent LAKAS-
NFL are regular employees of the petitioner and are deemed included in the existing
Collective Bargaining Agreement of the regular rank-and-file employees of Atlantic.
Undersecretary Laguesma denied it.

Issue

WON Laguesma was wrong in applying the CONTRACT-BAR rule and failing to consider
that the bargaining unit of the alleged regular workers has ceased to exist by virtue of the
regularization of all said workers

Held
Yes, he committed grave abuse of discretion. Section 1 of Article II of petitioner’s
Collective Bargaining Agreement with URFA defined appropriate bargaining unit as
follows: ARTICLE II :Sec. 1. Appropriate Bargaining Unit The appropriate bargaining unit
covered by this Agreement consists of those regular rank-and-file employees of the
COMPANY who have remained as such up to the date of execution of this Agreement, as
well as those who may hereafter acquire the same status. It is hereby understood and
agreed that the following are not within the appropriate bargaining unit and, therefore,
this Agreement is not applicable to them, to wit:

a. Executives, division department and section heads, staff members, managerial

employees, and executive secretaries;

b. Workers hired by the COMPANY as project employees as contemplated by existing laws

including relievers of regular employees who are sent abroad are not covered by this
Contract. Provided, however, that regular employees who are assigned as relievers shall
continue to be covered by this Contract, and provided further that relievers who are
assigned to regular positions which may become vacant shall be duly considered for such
regular positions after attaining the six months probationary period.

c. Security personnel.”

Although the aforementioned definition does not include petitioner’s regular project
employees in the coverage of the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement between
petitioner and the URFA, the regularization of all the regular project employees with at
least one year of service and the subsequent membership of said employees with the
URFA mean that the alleged regular project employees whom respondent LAKAS-NFL
seeks to represent are, in fact, regular employees by contemplation of law and included in
the appropriate bargaining unit of said Collective Bargaining Agreementconsequently,
the bargaining unit which respondent LAKAS-NFL seeks to represent has already ceased
to exist.

The Labor Code provides:

“Art. 232. Prohibition on Certification Election. The Bureau shall not entertain any
petition for certification election or any other action which may disturb the
administration of duty registered existing collective bargaining agreements affecting the
parties except under Articles 253, 253-A and 256 of this Code.” Paragraph 2 of Section 3,
Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules and Regulations likewise provides: “If a
collective bargaining agreement has been duly registered in accordance with Article 231
of the Code, a petition for certification election or a motion for intervention can only be
entertained within sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of such agreement.”

-Consequently, the existence of a duly registered Collective

Bargaining Agreementbetween the petitioner and URFA, which is the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative of all the regular rank-and-file employees of the petitioner
including the regular project employees with more than one year of service, bars any other
labor organization from filing a petition for certification election except within the 60-
dayperiod prior to the expiration of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.

-To rule otherwise would negate the legislative intent in the enactment of Article 232 of
the Labor Code which was designed to ensure industrial peace between the employer and
its employees during the existence of the collective bargaining agreement.

Disposition

Petition Granted When Applied

NATIONAL CONGRESS OF UNIONS IN THE SUGAR INDUSTRY OF THE PHILIPPINES VS CALLEJA G.R. No.
89609

Topic: Certification Election - The Union as Initiating Party - Petition Beyond Freedom Period

FACTS:

Petitioner National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the Philippines (NACUSIP-TUCP) is a
legitimate national labor organization while private respondent National Federation of Sugar Workers
(NFSW-FGT-KMU) is a labor organization

Dacongcogon Sugar and Rice Milling Co., Inc. (Dacongcogon) based in Kabankalan, Negros Occidental
employs about five hundred (500) workers during milling season and about three hundred (300) on off-
milling season.

On November 14, 1984, private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU and employer Dacongcogon entered into a
CBA.

When the CBA expired, private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU and Dacongcogon negotiated for its
renewal. The CBA was extended for another three years with reservation to negotiate for its
amendment, particularly on wage increases, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of
employment.

However, a deadlock in negotiation ensued on the matter of wage increases and optional retirement. In
order to obviate friction and tension, the parties agreed on a suspension to provide a cooling-off period
to give them time to evaluate and further study their positions. Hence, a Labor Management Council
was set up and convened, with a representative of the DOLE, acting as chairman, to resolve the issues.

Petitioner NACUSIP-TUCP filed a petition for certification election among the rank and file workers of
Dacongcogon.

Private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU moved to dismiss the petition alleging that it was filed out of time.

Med-Arbiter: denied the motion to dismiss filed by private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU and directed the
conduct of certification election among the rank and file workers of Dacongcogon

Director Calleja of BLR: rendered a resolution reversing the order of the Med-Arbiter

ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for certification election may be filed after the 60-day freedom period.

RULING: NO. A careful perusal of Rule V, Section 6, Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as
amended by the rules implementing Executive Order No. 111 provides that:

Sec. 6. Procedure — . . .

In a petition involving an organized establishment or enterprise where the majority status of the
incumbent collective bargaining union is questioned by a legitimate labor organization, the Med-Arbiter
shall immediately order the conduct of a certification election if the petition is filed during the last sixty
(60) days of the collective bargaining agreement. Any petition filed before or after the sixty-day freedom
period shall be dismissed outright.

The sixty-day freedom period based on the original collective bargaining agreement shall not be affected
by any amendment, extension or renewal of the collective bargaining agreement for purposes of
certification election.

xxx xxx xxx

The clear mandate of the aforequoted section is that the petition for certification election filed by the
petitioner NACUSIP-TUCP should be dismissed outright, having been filed outside the 60-day freedom
period or a period of more than one (1) year after the CBA expired.

It is a rule in this jurisdiction that only a certified collective bargaining agreement — i.e., an agreement
duly certified by the BLR may serve as a bar to certification elections. It is noteworthy that the Bureau of
Labor Relations duly certified the November 14, 1984 collective bargaining agreement. Hence, the
contract-bar rule as embodied in Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the rules implementing the Labor Code is
applicable.

This rule simply provides that a petition for certification election or a motion for intervention can only
be entertained within sixty days prior to the expiry date of an existing collective bargaining agreement.
Otherwise put, the rule prohibits the filing of a petition for certification election during the existence of
a collective bargaining agreement except within the freedom period, as it is called, when the said
agreement is about to expire. The purpose, obviously, is to ensure stability in the relationships of the
workers and the management by preventing frequent modifications of any collective bargaining
agreement earlier entered into by them in good faith and for the stipulated original period.

DISPOSITIVE: Private respondent won

DOCTRINE: In a petition involving an organized establishment or enterprise where the majority status of
the incumbent collective bargaining union is questioned by a legitimate labor organization, the Med-
Arbiter shall immediately order the conduct of a certification election if the petition is filed during the
last sixty (60) days of the collective bargaining agreement. Any petition filed before or after the sixty-day
freedom period shall be dismissed outright.

The sixty-day freedom period based on the original collective bargaining agreement shall not be affected
by any amendment, extension or renewal of the collective bargaining agreement for purposes of
certification election.

This rule simply provides that a petition for certification election or a motion for intervention can only
be entertained within sixty days prior to the expiry date of an existing collective bargaining agreement.
Otherwise put, the rule prohibits the filing of a petition for certification election during the existence of
a collective bargaining agreement except within the freedom period, as it is called, when the said
agreement is about to expire. The purpose, obviously, is to ensure stability in the relationships of the
workers and the management by preventing frequent modifications of any collective bargaining
agreement earlier entered into by them in good faith and for the stipulated original period.

DHL-URFA-FFW vs. BUKLOD DIGEST

DECEMBER 19, 2016 ~ VBDIAZ

TOPIC: DUTY/DUTIES OF MED-ARBITER/ ELECTION OFFICER

DHL-URFA-FFW vs. BUKLOD

G.R. No. 152094

July 22, 2004

FACTS: a certification election was conducted among the regular rank and file
employees in the main office and the regional branches of DHL Philippines
Corporation. The contending choices were petitioner and “no union.”
On the basis of the results of the certification election, with petitioner receiving 546
votes and “no union” garnering 348 votes, the election officer certified the former as
the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of the
corporation.
Thereafter, Respondent Buklod ng Manggagawa ng DHL Philippines Corporation
(BUKLOD) filed with the Industrial Relations Division of the DOLE a Petition for the
nullification of the certification election. The officers of petitioner were charged
with committing fraud and deceit in the election proceedings, particularly by
misrepresenting to the voter-employees that it was an independent union, when it was
in fact an affiliate of the Federation of Free Workers (FFW).
This misrepresentation was supposedly the basis for their selection of petitioner in the
certification election. Allegedly supporting this claim was the fact that those whom it
had misled allegedly withdrew their membership from it and subsequently formed
themselves into an independent union. The latter union, BUKLOD, was issued a
Certificate of Registration by DOLE.
ISSUE: Was the certification election valid?
HELD: NO; another election should be made
Under Section 13 of the Rules Implementing Book V (Labor Relations) of the Labor
Code, as amended, the election officer’s authority to certify the results of the election
is limited to situations in which there has been no protest filed; or if there has been
any, it has not been perfected or formalized within five days from the close of the
election proceedings.
The circumstances in the present case show that the employees did not sleep on their
rights. Hence, their failure to follow strictly the procedural technicalities regarding
the period for filing their protest should not be taken against them. Mere
technicalities should not be allowed to prevail over the welfare of the workers. What
is essential is that they be accorded an opportunity to determine freely and
intelligently which labor organization shall act on their behalf. Having been denied
this opportunity by the betrayal committed by petitioner’s officers in the present case,
the employees were prevented from making an intelligent and independent choice.
The making of false statements or misrepresentations that interfere with the free
choice of the employees is a valid ground for protest. A certification election may be
set aside for misstatements made during the campaign, where 1) a material fact has
been misrepresented in the campaign; 2) an opportunity for reply has been lacking;
and 3) the misrepresentation has had an impact on the free choice of the employees
participating in the election.
NOTES: (eto ung duties)
Section 14 of the Rules Implementing Book V (Labor Relations) of the Labor Code
provides that when a protest has been perfected, only the med-arbiter can proclaim
and certify the winner. Clearly, this rule is based on the election officer’s function,
which is merely to conduct and supervise certification elections. It is the med-arbiter
who is authorized to hear and decide representation cases. Consequently, the decision
whether to certify the results of an election or to set them aside due to incidents
occurring during the campaign is within the med-arbiter’s discretion.

PORT WORKERS UNION OF THE PHILS

VS

LAGUESMA

207 SCRA 392

[March 18, 1992]

FACTS

-The CBA between the workers of the International Container Terminal Services, Inc.
(ICTSI and Associate Port Checkers and Workers Union (APCWU) was about to expire.
Other unions were seeking to represent the laborers in the negotiation of the next CBA
and were already plotting their moves.

-Sandigan ng Manggagawa sa Daungan (SAMADA) filed a petition for certification

election. The consent signatures of at least 25% of the employees in the bargaining unit
were submitted 11 days after the petition.

-Port Workers Union of the Philippines (PWUP) filed a petition for intervention.

-Still another petition for certification election was filed by the Port Employees
Association and Labor Union (PEALU), on April 6, 1990. The consent signatures were
submitted 35 days after the filing of the petition. The petitions of SAMADA and PEALU
were consolidated for joint decision. APCWU filed a motion to dismiss them on the
ground that they did not comply with the requirement set forth in Section 6, Rule V, Book
V of the Implementing Rules, which requires that the signatures be submitted upon filing
of petition. This contention was upheld by the Med-Arbiter.

-PWUP appealed to the Secretary of Labor, arguing that Article 256 of the Labor Code did
not require the written consent to be submitted simultaneously with the petition for
certification election.

-DOLE Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma affirmed the order of the Med-Arbiter and
dismissed PWUP’s appeal.

-Thereafter, ICTSI and APCWU resumed negotiations for a new collective

bargainingagreement, which was ratified by a majority of the workers in the bargaining
unit, and subsequently registered with the DOLE.

ISSUE/S

WON respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in application of Art 256 of the
Labor Code (On Submission: WON simultaneous submission is required)
-PWUP argues that under A256, the Med-Arbiter should automatically order election by
secret ballot when the petition is supported by at least 25% of all employees in the
bargaining unit. SAMADA and PEALU substantially complied with the law when they
submitted the required consent signatures several days after filing the petition.

-PWUP complains that the dismissal of the petitions for certification election, including
its own petition for intervention, had the effect of indirectly certifying APCWU as the sole
and exclusive bargaining representative of the ICTSI employees.

HELD:

-Doctrine in Western Agusan Workers Union-Local 101 of the United Lumber and
General Workers of the Philippines vs. Trajano: “it has long been settled that the policy of
the Labor Code is indisputably partial to the holding of a certification election so as to
arrive in a manner definitive and certain concerning the choice of the labor organization
to represent the workers in a collective bargaining unit. Conformably to said basic
concept, this Court recognized that the Bureau of Labor Relations in the exercise of sound
discretion, may order a certification election notwithstanding the failure to meet the 30%
requirement”.

-SC: In line with the policy, we feel that the administrative rule requiring the simultaneous
submission of the 25% consent signatures upon the filing of petition for certification
election should not be strictly applied to frustrate thedetermination of thelegitimate
representative of the workers. Significantly, the requirement in the rule is not found in
Article 256, the law it seeks to implement. This is all the more reason why the regulation
should at best be given only a directory effect. Accordingly, we hold that the mere filing of
a petition for certification election within the freedom period is sufficient basis for the
issuance of an order for the holding of a certification election, subject to the submission
of theconsent signatures within a reasonable period from suchfiling.

ORIENTAL TIN CAN LABOR UNION VS SECRETARY OF LABOR

294 SCRA 640 [ August 28, 1998]

FACTS

-Company entered into CBA with OTCLU (Oriental Tin Can Labor Union). -248 rank
and file workers FFW to file a petition for certification election. However, this petition
was repudiated by waiver of 115 signatories who ratified the new CBA.

-OTCWU-FFW filed petition for certification election, accompanied by “authentic

signatures” of 25% of employees.

-OTCLU filed motion for dismissal of the petition for certification election. It said the
petition was not endorsed by at least 25% as some of the employees allegedly withdrew
their support.

-Company filed comment alleging that the new CBA was already ratified.

-OTCWU-FFW filed a reply, alleging that the employer has no legal personality to oppose
petition for certification election.
-DOLE issued certificate of registration of the CBA. It showed that the CBA between the
OTCLU and the company has the force and effect of law.

-OTCWU-FFW officers walked out of their jobs. The union filed notice of strike with
NCMB.grounded on alleged dismissal of union members/officers. Company directed the
officers to return to work. None of them did.

-Med-arbiter dismissed petition for certification election.

-OTCWU-FFW appealed to Sec of Labor. Pending appeal, they staged a strike. They
prevented free ingress and egress of non-striking employees, and vehicles. NLRC issued
a writ of preliminary injunction.

-Labor Usec issued resolution granting the appeal and setting aside the order of Med-
arbiter.

-After denial of their MFR, the company and OTCLU filed petitions for certiorari before
SC.

ISSUE/S

1. WON the employer can challenge petitions for certification election

2. WON the DOLE correctly granted the petition for certification election

3. WON it is proper to dismiss a petition for certification election because a new CBA has
already been ratified.

4. WON the 25% support requirement has been met in this case

HELD

1. NO

-Certification elections are exclusively the concern of employees; hence, the employer
lacks the legal personality to challenge the same.

-The only instance when an employer may concern itself with employee representation
activities is when it has to file the petition for certification election because there is no
existing CBA in the unit and it was requested to bargain collectively, pursuant to Article
258 of Labor Code. After filing the petition, the role of the employer ceases and it becomes
a mere bystander. Company’s interference in the certification election below by actively
opposing the same is manifestly uncalled-for and unduly creates a suspicion that it
intends to establish a company union.

2. YES

-Since question of right of representation as between competing labor organizations in a

bargaining unit is imbued with public interest, law governs the choice of a collective
bargaining representative which shall be the duly certified agent of the employees
concerned. An official certification becomes necessary where the bargaining agent fails to
present adequate and reasonable proof of its majority authorization and where the
employer demands it, or when the employer honestly doubts the majority representation
of several contending bargaining groups. IArticle 255 of the Labor Code allows the
majority of the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit to designate
or select the labor organization which shall be their exclusive representative for the
purpose of collective bargaining.

-The designation or selection of the bargaining representative without, however, going

through the process set out by law for the conduct of a certification election applies only
when representation is not in issue. There is no problem if a union is unanimously chosen
by a majority of the employees as their bargaining representative, but a question of
representation arising from the presence of more than one union in a bargaining unit
aspiring to be the employees’ representative, can only be resolved by holding a
certification election under the supervision of the proper government authority.

3. NO

-Petition for certification election was filed 28 days before expiration of existing CBA, well
within 60-day period provided for.

-Filing of petition for certification election during 60-day freedom period gives rise to a
representation case that must be resolved even though a new CBA has been entered into
within that period. This is clearly provided for in the aforequoted Section 4, Rule V, Book
V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. The reason behind this rule is
obvious. A petition for certification election is not necessary where the employees are one
in their choice of a representative in the bargaining process. Moreover, said provision
manifests the intent of the legislative authority to allow, if not encourage, the contending
unions in a bargaining unit to hold a certification election during the freedom period.

4. YES

-The support requirement is a mere technicality which should be employed in

determining the true will of the workers instead of frustrating the same.

-All doubts as to the number of employees actually supporting the holding of a

certification election should, therefore, be resolved by going through such procedure. It
is judicially settled that a certification election is the most effective and expeditious means
of determining which labor organization can truly represent the working force in
the appropriate bargaining unit.