A unique country

«A people so indifferent
that it ignores all responsibility, justice and truth,
a people which denies human dignity,
which rejects in entirety
free men and free thought »
A.S.Pushkin
Today’s Russia belongs to the group of countries usually referred to as “the develop
ing world” (though to apply that adjective to Putin’s Russia would be stretching the
term). Some of the "developing" countries are modernising (economically or po
litically), most are stagnating. Some of the shared characteristics typical of
developing countries include:
Authoritarian, sometimes totalitarian political systems.
A low-technology economy.
Mass poverty.
Armed conflicts and wars - both internal and external.
Modern global interdependence adds to the destabilising influence some o
f these developing states exercise on the international arena. Unsurprisingly,
Russia tops the list of international “tough customers”.
What a unique country. It claims leadership in everything, including th
e ability to destabilise. The danger of its escalating and exporting its unreso
lved conflicts keeps growing, making the world an even less predictable place.
This should not come as a surprise. The 20th century was for Russia a
period of failures and defeats. It began and ended with social, ideological and
geopolitical catastrophes; changes of political system and government; losses
of vast territories and their population.
In 1917-1918 Russia paid a high price for its collapse in WW1, in 1991 for its d
efeat in the Cold War. 1917 and 1991 saw the failure not merely of two historic
al structures of Russian authority - autocracy and communism - but the failure o
f two attempts at "autocratic modernisation": the one under the Romanovs and the
one under the Communists. 1998 saw the failure of Russia’s attempt at pursuing
the “Western liberal” model. In other words, Russia failed in the 20th century at v
irtually everything it attempted.
Russia has gone down in history as a country possessed by a uniquely persistent
desire to expand its borders. Which is actually not surprising, given that Russ
ia has always been an imperial state. But it is puzzling that while devoting so
much energy to expansion, Russia has always neglected to engage in domestic impr
ovement. To this day it is a country which strikes visitors as an ill-kempt wil
derness, leaving them feeling uncharmed, and sometimes disgusted.
What a uniquely puzzling country. How does one explain its aspirations to lead
ership? Russia has always been a country whose population is keep to leave it.
The appearance in 1920’s of numerous Russian émigrés in Paris, Berlin, Constantinople
and Harbin has created the false impression among many of our contemporaries th
at emigration from Russia has been connected with the Communist revolution in 19
17. This is far from the truth. About 4.5 million person left Russia between 18
61 and 1915. Turning to the USSR, we find that 4-5.5 million people emigrate
d between 1917 and 1938; 8-10 million in 1939-1947; 1.1 million in 1948-1990. In
1970’s emigration from the USSR did not exceed 10 to 15 thousand people annually,
sometimes rising to 30-40 thousand per annum. The crisis came in 1988. In comp
arison with 1987 when 39,000 people were allowed to emigrate, in 1988 emigration
numbers rose to 108,000. In 1989, the figures rose again - to 235,000, and in
1990, 452,000 people left the Soviet Union. The figures for movement in the opp
osite direction are ridiculously small: according to data from the Ministry of t
he Interior no more than 2,000 persons arrived annually to settle in the USSR.
Now to the data on emigration from the Russian Federation just before and follow
ing the collapse of the USSR in 1991: 674,462 Russian citizens left for Germany;
195,071 for Israel; 17,538 for Canada; 110,137 for the US; 14,843 for Finland;
in all 1,012,051 persons leaving Russia in the period of 1990-1999.
When asked recently whether Russia could be thought of as an ark, the acclaimed
film director Alexander Sokurov (whose credits include the Oscar-nominated “The Ru
ssian Ark”) replied: “Certainly not. An ark is where people seek safety. Russia is
a dangerous place - a place people prefer to flee”.
Russia’s twentieth century included two World Wars, several revolutions, a
Civil war, wars with Japan and Finland, the horrors of the Gulag, conflicts in
Afghanistan and Chechnya - the tragic list could be continued. Losing the coun
tless millions of emigrants who fled the enforced lack of freedom has resulted i
n a catastrophic reduction in the country’s human capital. The vast outflow of peo
ple in the 20th century has deprived Russia of a significant part of its intelle
ctual wealth and potential.
What a unique country. It aspires to leadership in everything, including frank
ly strange innovations. Suddenly and seemingly for no reason, as so often occur
s in Russia, despite decades of ideologically driven distaste as regards its emi
grants, Moscow has started talking of “supporting fellow-countrymen abroad”. Tho
se who remember the Orwellian pronouncements of the Soviet government will have
understood that the idea is not help migrants, but to exploit their economic an
d intellectual potential. Someone in the Kremlin has decided that there are huge
“Russian diasporas” abroad, consisting of people who are not necessarily ethnic Rus
sians, but who identify with Russian culture. The idea then got spawned of usin
g them as an instrument of expansion. Patently insincere Soviet-style verbiage
about “a prospering Motherland” being necessary to “the well-being of a migrant living
abroad” has been used to justify the scheme. Hints have been dropped that aside
from the “linguistic and cultural dimension” of the relationship between the mother
country and the migrant, there is also the “economic dimension”.
It is easy enough to understand why the Russian state would appeal for h
elp to the people who have left Russia. But instead of beginning a dialogue of
equals, the participants at the International Congress of Compatriots under the
sponsorship of Moscow’s nationalist Mayor Luzkhov, and those who took part in the
international conference pompously titled “The Intellectual Bridge between Russia
and the West” in December 2002, were told that “compatriotship is defined not by the
country of residence, nor by formal citizenship. All of us were born in a coun
try which no longer exists… The Diaspora is too a part of the nation (?!), and its
role in modern Russian life is very important”. And so, without having been cons
ulted, the emigrant communities were “honoured” to be classed as part of the Russian
state.
Simultaneously them were sternly advised that “the President is not happy
with the work of the Russian state with the Russian communities (?!) abroad, and
has decided to create an over-arching state structure which would be engaged wi
th all the problems of the Diaspora”. It seems the President forgot that citizens
of foreign countries cannot be subjected to dictates of Russia’s state bodies.
Having declared the people who fled Russia a part of the Russian state,
and magnanimously considering their sin of emigration expiated, the Russian gove
rnment has begun calling on them to return “home”. Until recently, this sort of rh
etoric was the province of such individuals as Rogozin, Zhirinovsky and Putin hi
mself.
But very few emigrants seriously consider returning to Russia. The number of th
ose who return does not exceed 2-6% of the number of those who leave. A MIGnews
Internet poll conducted in 2000 asked whether the respondents were ready to hee
d Putin’s call to return to Russia. 5% of the respondents said they could return
immediately, 10% said they could consider returning, and 5% said they could retu
rn to a Russia without Putin. The biggest number by far - 80% of the respondent
s - said “under no circumstances”.
Another recent event is the suspicious activity in nationalist circles a
round the creation of “Russki Mir” (“The Russian World”), conceived as some sort ethno-c
ulturally unity of persons who think in Russian, and who identify, consciously o
r unconsciously, with Russian culture and the basic Russian Orthodox values. Th
is enterprise bears an uncanny resemblance to the Hitlerite idea of “Germany Unity”
under the aegis of “Greater Germany”. The difference being that instead of “Deutshlan
d uber alles” we get «Russia above all». Those familiar with the history and practic
e of such movements as “Pan-Germanism”, “Pan-Islamism”, “Pan-Slavism” etc will easily see t
at Russia’s recent imperial initiatives represent an extremely retrograde form of “P
an-Russism”.
What a unique country. A country of bewildering ideas and strange con
clusions. It is a commonly held view in Russia that it is capable of surviving
the current crisis and re-creating itself as a great power. Russia’s history is t
hought to contain many examples of re-birth as a powerful state after periods of
decline. As the ship of Putinist modernisation runs aground, Russia’s elite soot
hes itself with dubious historical analogies.
As Russia becomes more distant from the international family of democra
cies, the anti-liberal outlook of its elite grows more pronounced.
One wonders to what degree the Russian elite’s professed agreement with d
emocratic ideals is sincere. And whether the principles of democracy correspond
to its broader political ideals and values. In this context it is important to
bear in mind the three common theses which have received the blessing of the st
ate media under Putin and which can be taken to exemplify the thinking of Russia’s
rulers:
1. Russia is a unique civilisation - a civilisation unlike others;
2. In Russia the state has a “natural” dominating role over society;
3. The Russian people are naturally collectivist, in line with their underl
ying collectivist Orthodox values.
Banalities of this sort are avidly consumed in Russia by the ruling elit
e, the social theorists who serve them, and even by some independent or quasi-in
dependent intellectuals. A close examination of the way in which these principl
es are formulated and applied makes plain their utility to the ruling regime: t
he interests of the state are not only declared paramount, but they are deemed t
o be in natural conflict with private or group interests, which are represented
as selfish and, therefore, harmful.
What a puzzling country. It claims leadership in everything, including
dubious experiments. Such as the one which took place in 1917 when Russia took
Bismarck’s advice and proceeded to stage a socialist experiment in a country whic
h, in Bismarck’s words, deserves no pity. Russia’s readiness to follow that disastr
ous path reveals its core beliefs and values: the primacy of the spiritual over
the material; the subjugation of the individual to the collective; justice in th
e service of abstract dogmas; the painful present as a necessary prologue to a g
lorious future. These values are still in play. Putin’s reign in the Kremlin, his
subsequent installation of Medvedev as a pliable marionette, and all that has o
ccurred in this period in Russia’s internal and foreign policy confirms that Russi
a represents:
an aggressive Soviet-type society;
Soviet-style thinking;
Soviet ideology;
Soviet propaganda;
a Soviet army with Soviet arms and Soviet military tactics;
a country which abides by no accepted rules of behaviour;
a country intent on rebuilding the Soviet Union by military means;
a real and present danger;
a country which is culturally and psychologically opposed to Western values.
What a unique country - so arrogant and feckless despite its tragic history and
all its lessons it could have but has not learnt. Russians are not even vaguely
disturbed by German sociological studies showing that Russia’s least popular poli
ticians over the last century are Yeltsin and Gorbachev, and the most popular -
Putin, Stalin and Brezhnev.
Nor is anyone paying heed to a geopolitical forecast for Russia made at
the Institute of Applied Mathematics at the Russian Academy of Sciences, which p
redicts that based on current trends, without any particular external interventi
on, by 2030 Russia will disintegrate into spheres of external influence.
Given this pronounced lack of interest in the prognosis of Russia’s own scientists
, should one be surprised at the indifference to the predictions of one of the l
eading 20th century theorists of the comparative-civilisational approach, Arnold
Joseph Toynbee, who painted a picture of civilisational collapse as a set of “soc
ial cracks” on the “body of a tired society”. The biggest of them being the gap of al
ienation separating the society at large from a narrow ruling elite unable to ri
se to the challenges of the time yet unwilling to loosen its grip on power.
Toynbee forecast the death of the Russian Empire by 2020. It is unlikel
y that he was aware of the Russian author Shmelev’s summing up of the Russian char
acter in the following words: “A nation which hates liberty and worships slavery,
loves its own chains and shackles, lives in physical and moral filth… ready at any
moment to subjugate all”.
Russia - an amazing and unique country which will be remembered by the w
orld as a bizarre civilisational accident.
Malkhaz Zhvania
06.01.2009
The more things change...
The Rose Revolution was effected by a small group of thirtysomethings. Like mos
t revolutionary leaders, they had all the typical features of the rebel: an absu
rd stubbornness bordering on the inability to compromise; an impatience borderin
g on madness and an exaggerated self-confidence.
Born out of revolutionary fervour, this maximalism revealed an irrational distru
st of the older generation. Personnel decisions based on the principle of sponta
neously accorded trust (or mistrust) were the crucial mistake. In matters of sta
tecraft, no amount of newly-acquired theoretical knowledge and political fervour
can be a substitute for real-life experience and qualifications.
The age requirement and the principle of spontaneously accorded trust-mistrust l
ed to a predictable result. A huge mass of spineless, not always overly scrupul
ous young conformists rose up around the leaders of the revolution. They became
the bureaucracy called on to push through the progressive ideas and the concret
e reform agenda of the government.
This occurred in parallel with the entrenchment of the revolution and was its lo
gical and necessary development.
And so the overloaded "reform agenda” of the government soon began to resemble a f
aulty vehicle which moves towards some exalted destination while suffering from
engine faults and running on low-quality petrol.
History teaches that the progressive aspirations of many governments are liable
to come into conflict with the indifference and insufficient training of the bur
eaucracy. Georgia did not look for or has not been able to find a fix for this p
roblem. The lack of professionalism, combined with the excessive caution and ind
ifference has led to an acute shortage of competent cadres in most fields. The
problem persists to this day.
In developed countries with a full-fledged democracy, officials and employees of
all ranks have a “Code of Conduct” deeply implanted in their professional subconsci
ous. It consists of such concepts as personal prestige, professional ethics, th
e dignity of the office etc. Those who betray or reject these values are punish
ed by losing the public’s trust and respect. This loss of public trust can be mor
e dramatic (and sometimes more damaging) even than a demotion or dismissal.
In Georgia, the situation is radically different and, thus, seriously dangerous.
Paradoxical as this may sound, all of the above is closely related to the weakn
ess and helplessness of the opposition, which cannot be called a force and consi
dered as a truly political movement.
So what do the errors in the course of reforms, the distorted personnel policy
and the pseudo-opposition have in common? The former generates the latter, as in
competence and the lack of drive, dignity and ethics among the bureaucracy creat
e a corrupting atmosphere which extends far beyond the sphere of bureaucratic ac
tion, and which results in a politics of falsity and even collaborationism.
Many leaders of the so-called Opposition were earlier expelled from the bureaucr
acy. Their actions can seem indicative of a basic lack of political intelligence
. This in turn creates confusion and destructive ideas in the wider society.
As already noted, the ruling power elite is in an internal conflict with its own
bureaucracy. These two camps are driven by different goals and objectives. Thi
s confrontation usually results in the victory of the bureaucracy, which has suc
h vital goals at stake as its own salvation and survival. The bureaucracy has
more choices than the government: it can find many ways to avoid the need to exe
rcise initiative and responsibility and to disguise its incompetence. And in ca
se of dismissal, it can join the opposition, a perfectly viable and frequently e
xercised option.
Since many of the leaders of the so-called Opposition came from the bureaucracy
, it is precisely their bureaucratic experience which pushes them to adopt the c
ounter-productive political method of attacking specific individuals, rather tha
n offering the public a professionally designed ideological platform.
Here’s how it all happens:
• The new government announces that it lacks trust in the older generation. This
opens the corridors of power to a mass of indifferent, drive-less, barely compet
ent young conformists, who proceed to take over the bureaucracy.
• The internal confrontation between the ruling elite and the bureaucracy and the
dismissal of some functionaries creates an extremely harmful style of opposition
politics, one characterised by cheap opportunism and collaborationism.
• The two mutually influencing parts of the body politic - the bureaucracy and the
opposition - act in tandem to create an unhealthy, destructive social atmospher
e.
Let us clarify what we mean by that.
Let us think of the bureaucracy and the so-called opposition as the two politica
l “poles". The two poles share the same motivation - its own social salvation. I
n parallel with the low quality of motivation, they also share such indicators a
s low professional skills and the lack of professional ethics and dignity.
Caught between these two "poles", the broader society loses its sense of citizen
ship, becomes infected with pessimism, and begins to approach politics from a ne
gative and sometimes destructive perspective.
The first problem - that of the "pole" of civil servants - is far from insoluble
. The “pole” of the pseudo-opposition can only be transformed after the solution of
the first problem.
All this is only a small fraction of the public issues currently facing Georgia.
One thing is certain: the low quality of personnel policies and the lack of a h
ealthy political opposition are the starting point for many of the crucial probl
ems besetting our country. This has been the case for some time now. As for wh
at awaits us - the future will tell.
The more things change ... Part 2
Given that the dismal personnel policies and the lack of a healthy political opp
osition are the starting point and the cause of many of the critical public issu
es facing Georgia, it is worth examining at least some of these important proble
ms.
The national bureaucracy is free or virtually free from corruption. So says the
government, and so confirm the various international expert groups. This is tr
ue if corruption is understood solely in the narrow sense of outright bribery an
d illegal lobbying, and if we set aside the battles of the monopolistic clans an
d corporate interests, which are difficult to investigate due of the lack of tra
nsparency and the prevalence of opportunism among the bureaucracy. To understan
d the essence of the "unusualness" of state and public activity, it may suffice
to take a look at a specific illness prevalent in the state apparatus. Namely,
the informal structures of family and friendly links both in government and in b
roader society. This is a particular sort of clannishness in which the “value” (the
analogue of outright bribery or other corrupt acts) is an advanced loyalty, or
an "appreciation" practiced as a sort of “good-neighbourliness”. Under this princip
le of selection and hiring of bureaucrats, and of their further rotation, it is
difficult to not to doubt the competency and diligence of such bureaucrats, not
to mention the application of the rule of competition.
This phenomenon also manifests itself in different guises in the broader society
, sometimes in the most unexpected forms.
Just as the public sector is built on informal clannishness, so the pseudo-oppos
ition also builds its pseudo-democratic and pseudo-political parties on the same
principle. As a result, the society gets tiny pseudo-democratic parties that l
ack a clear ideology and are prone to cheap populism. They tend to be run on au
thoritarian lines, without a hint of democracy in their institutions.
Business is also built on the principle of informal clan links prevalent both in
the public sector and among the self-styled opposition. Because business built
on cronyism cannot be effective, it survives by crushing all potential or emerg
ing competitors.
Therefore, the national economy suffers from several destructive tendencies: th
e clan-corporate model; the indifference and incompetence of much of the bureauc
racy; the absence of a healthy motivation and principled political direction fro
m the so-called opposition. These tendencies combine to result in social tensi
on.
What’s more, this informal clannishness in the public sector, big business and the
so-called opposition shapes the national model of behaviour, creates a psycholo
gical framework for all social life.
Do these conditions allow for the development and strengthening of a democracy?
Only if we lower the standards and broaden the definitions of democracy so dram
atically as to accept an imitation as the real thing. It can be an artful, even
a partially appealing imitation, never the original. A society in the grip of
these tendencies cannot be a society of true democratic aspirations. The common
pattern of social behaviour includes concepts of public duty and probity that a
re incompatible with meritocracy. We get a love of country with a sense of nati
onhood. The country is full of unprincipled, vociferous jingoists, but it lacks
a citizenry. This ambience nicely suits both the bureaucracy and the oppositio
n - the “two poles” of society whose motivations appear mutually antagonistic, while
sharing the same quality of opportunism.
We touched on the problem of the “two poles” in the previous chapter where we said t
hat while the "pole" of the civil service is fixable, the transformation of the
other "pole" - that of the pseudo-opposition - is possible only after the soluti
on of the first problem. When we say “fixable”, we mean merely that such changes ar
e possible if serious changes occur in the minds of the ruling elite. Something
we are not overly optimistic about. There is, of course, another way of encour
aging change in the public sector. It involves the voters, many of whom are yet
to become citizens.
Today the political situation is such that the society is waiting for the emerge
nce of a charismatic politician, and following him, a new political force. This
is a problematic option since Georgia’s newest history has not produced anyone wi
th charisma. Perhaps Merab Kostava could have developed into one, but that is j
ust a belated hypothesis.
The existence of this “bipolar” dysfunction hinders the emergence of a new politicia
n and a new political party capable of effectively communicating with the electo
rate, and negates the prerequisites for the emergence of a civil society with al
l its attendant structures.
Is the situation hopeless? To think so is to reject the laws of social developm
ent. The main positive condition present in today’s Georgia is the “emancipated” consc
iousness of the voters. The hindering influence of the “two poles” and other negati
ve factors aside, the psychological readiness for a new charismatic politician i
s there. This may be thought of as a broad socio-political expectation. Which
is why the situation is not hopeless. A widespread socio-political expectation
is rarely unfulfilled - the course of Time and History cannot be stopped.
Malkhaz Zhvania
Tbilisi
Media and politics consultant,
TV and theatre director,
Journalist.
Contact:
In Tbilisi: home - 934240, mob. - 893998115
In St Petersburg: home – 3161238, mob. - 89112352635
Email: malkhazzhvania@gmail.com
Blogs: http://thenativelandandapolicy.blogspot.com/,
http://my.opera.com/MalkhazZhvania/blog/