Evidentiality Revisited - Cognitive Grammar, Functional and Discourse-Pragmatic Perspectives

Evidentiality
Revisited
edi t ed by
Juana Isabel Marín Arrese
Gerda Haßler
Marta Carretero
John Benjamins Publishing Company

Evidentiality Revisited
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Volume 271
Evidentiality Revisited.
Cognitive grammar, functional and discourse-pragmatic perspectives
Edited by Juana Isabel Marín Arrese, Gerda Haßler and Marta Carretero
Evidentiality Revisited
Cognitive grammar, functional
and discourse-pragmatic perspectives
Edited by
Juana Isabel Marín Arrese
Universidad Complutense de Madrid
Gerda Haßler
Universität Potsdam
Marta Carretero
John Benjamins Publishing Company

Amsterdam / Philadelphia
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doi 10.1075/pbns.271
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Table of contents
Introduction
Evidentiality revisited 1
Juana I. Marín Arrese, Gerda Haßler and Marta Carretero
Section A. Evidentiality: Cognitive Grammar and Functional Grammar

Approaches
Chapter 1
Evidentiality in Cognitive Grammar 13
Ronald W. Langacker
Chapter 2
Evidentiality reconsidered 57
Jan Nuyts
Section B. Evidentiality in Grammar and Discourse
Chapter 3
On the evidential use of English adverbials and their equivalents in
Romance languages and Russian: A morpho-syntactic analysis 87
Verónica Böhm, Gerda Haßler and Anja Hennemann
Chapter 4
When feeling is thinking: A lexical-semantic analysis of evidential and
epistemic predicates in Spanish 105
Gijs Mulder
Chapter 5
Seem-type verbs in Dutch and German: Lijken, schijnen & scheinen 123
Tanja Mortelmans
vi Table of contents
Chapter 6
A synchronic and diachronic study of the Dutch Auxiliary “Zou(den)” 149
Ingeborg Harmes
Chapter 7
Potential vs Use: Revisiting an evidential participial construction in
Lithuanian 171
Aurelija Usonienė and Jolanta Šinkūnienė
Section C. Evidentiality and Epistemic Modality in Discourse Domains

and Genres
Chapter 8
Multifunctionality of evidential expressions in discourse domains and
genres: Evidence from cross-linguistic case studies 195
Juana I. Marín Arrese
Chapter 9
Evidential and epistemic stance strategies in scientific communication:
A corpus study of semi-formal and expert publications 225
Laura Hidalgo-Downing
Chapter 10
BE likely to and BE expected to, epistemic modality or evidentiality?
Markers of (non)commitment in newspaper discourse 249
Anne-Laure Besnard
Chapter 11
Markers of evidentiality in Lithuanian newspaper discourse: A corpus-
based study 271
Anna Ruskan
Chapter 12
Exploring evidential uses of the passive of reporting verbs through
corpus analysis 297
Ruth Breeze
Index of expressions 315

Subject index 317
Introduction
Evidentiality revisited
Juana I. Marín Arrese, Gerda Haßler and Marta Carretero

Universidad Complutense de Madrid, University of Potsdam
1. Introduction
This volume on Evidentiality Revisited focuses on semantic-pragmatic based

frameworks for the study of evidentials and evidential strategies and on discourse-
pragmatic studies, with special emphasis on their use as resources for stancetak-
ing in discourse. Stancetaking is a form of social action, involving the expression
of the speaker/writer’s (henceforth speaker) personal attitudes, beliefs, or evalua-
tions concerning events and their commitment with respect to the communicated
proposition (cf. Biber and Finegan 1989; Englebretson 2007). By the expression of
stance DuBois (2007) refers to the various overt forms and strategies of commu-
nication whereby the speaker simultaneously evaluates an object, positions him/
herself or some other subject, and expresses alignment or disalignment with other
subjects. Stancetaking allows the speaker, among other things, to assess realities
and show support or justification for the validity of the utterance, or to distance
themselves and reduce their commitment and/or responsibility for the proposi-
tional content. We hold the position that evidentiality may reflect speaker’s stance,
since the specification of the source and mode of access to knowledge may carry
an indication of the speaker’s attitude and commitment towards the validity of the
communicated information. Since epistemic modality involves speaker position-
ing regarding the epistemic status of events, we understand that this conceptual
domain directly serves the expression of the speaker’s stance. The volume offers
a collection of contributions in which evidentiality and epistemic modality are
closely related to speaker’s epistemic stance, thus aiming for a coherent explana-
tion of this notion.
In recent years, research on evidentiality and on the overlapping of this con-
ceptual domain with the domain of epistemic modality has flourished (Haßler
2010; Carretero and Zamorano-Mansilla 2013; Marín Arrese 2015; Cornillie,
Marín Arrese and Wiemer 2015). Defined narrowly, evidentiality pertains to the
sources of knowledge or evidence whereby the speaker feels entitled to make a fac-
tual claim (Anderson 1986). But evidentiality may also be conceived more broadly
doi 10.1075/pbns.271.01mar
© 2017 John Benjamins Publishing Company
2 Juana I. Marín Arrese, Gerda Haßler and Marta Carretero
as both providing epistemic justification and reflecting speaker’s attitude towards

the validity of the communicated information, and hearer’s potential acceptability
of the information, derived from the degree of reliability of the source and mode
of access to the information (Chafe 1986; Mushin 2001; Marín Arrese 2011; Boye
2012). Epistemic modality pertains to speaker’s assessments concerning the epis-
temic status of the event described; that is, the expression of different degrees of
speaker certainty regarding their conception of the reality or likelihood of the oc-
currence of the event (cf. Langacker 1991, 2009). Dendale and Tasmowski (2001:
341–2) note that three kinds of relations between these domains can be found in
the literature: “disjunction (where they are conceptually distinguished from each
other), inclusion (where one is regarded as falling within the semantic scope of the
other), and overlap (where they partly intersect)”. According to the first position,
disjunction, evidentiality is restricted to the identification of the source and mode
of access to the information available to the speaker, and is devoid of any epistemic
judgement (Anderson 1986; De Haan 1999; Aikhenvald 2004). The relation of in-
clusion differs according to which domain is considered the superordinate cat-
egory. For some, evidentiality is regarded as the superordinate category (Matlock
1989); for others, the term modality is used as a hyperonym of both evidentiality
and epistemic modality (Willett 1988; Nuyts 2001). Similarly, Palmer (2001) ar-
gues that evidentiality together with epistemic modality should be subsumed as
two subsystems within the domain of propositional modality. The position that
both domains partly intersect is held by van der Auwera and Plungian (1998), who
note that the interface between the two domains is that of inferential evidentiality
and epistemic necessity. More recently, Boye (2012) has convincingly argued that
both conceptual domains are subcategories of the same superordinate category,
namely a category of epistemicity.
Since the publication of the seminal work on evidentiality (Chafe and Nichols
1986), studies have for the most part centred on those systems of languages where
the grammatical marking of the information source is obligatory (cf. Willett 1988;
Aikhenvald 2004, inter alia). Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in the
study of the domain of evidentiality in European languages, which rely on strategies
along the lexico‐grammatical continuum (Squartini 2008; Diewald and Smirnova
2010; Wiemer 2010). We here assume a broad conception of evidentiality as a “cog-
nitive or functional substance phenomenon” (Boye and Harder 2009:6), expressed
by linguistic means that fulfil the function of indicating the source of information
for the communicated content of a certain proposition. This semantic-functional
understanding is necessary when studying evidentiality in languages which lack
a specific system of grammatical evidentiality (Lampert and Lampert 2010). The
starting point for adducing evidential meanings in a language that does not pos-
sess fully grammaticalized evidentials is to adopt a functional-onomasiological
Introduction. Evidentiality revisited 3
perspective, as has been pointed out by Wiemer (2010). This perspective is coher-
ent with the first two contributions of this volume: Langacker’s cognitive grammar
description and explanation of the domain of evidentiality, and the functional-
cognitive perspective offered by Nuyts.
The papers in this volume for the most part share the corpus-based work-
ing method, which is not only suitable to confirm or disconfirm a hypothesis by
empirical data, but it also provides further insights into a usage-based account
of linguistic reality. Most of the contributions deal with specific discursive do-
mains, genres and text types, such as different types of journalistic texts, or dif-
ferent modes of scientific publications. Among the contributions there are also
cross-linguistic studies on the expression of stance, evidentiality and modality
between various languages (Dutch, English, French, German, Italian, Lithuanian,
Portuguese, Russian and Spanish).
2. Overview of the volume
In Section A, the volume includes two theoretically oriented papers on Evidentiality

from the perspectives of Cognitive Grammar and Functional-Cognitive Grammar.
Ronald W. Langacker offers a ground-breaking study on the conceptual domain
of evidentiality and the extent to which evidential markers can be considered
grounding elements, as well as to the relevance to certain theoretical issues in
Cognitive Grammar. Langacker’s contribution discusses issues directly relevant
to the conception of speaker stance, such as the notions of speaker’s striving for
epistemic control in the discourse and speaker’s intersubjective alignment. In
this paper, he argues in favour of a unified account of evidentiality and epistemic
modality, since both evidential and modal systems together involve complemen-
tary strategies of clausal grounding. Epistemic assessment of clausal grounding
concerns the speaker’s conception of the reality status of the profiled occurrence
(an event or situation), while evidentiality provides an indication of the source and
reliability of the information. Langacker argues that both systems co-exist in dif-
ferent languages with various degrees of systemic overlap, and together contribute
to speaker’s epistemic control in discourse.
The other theoretically oriented paper, authored by Jan Nuyts, is a reconsid-
eration of the traditional concepts of modality and evidentiality from a functional
perspective. The paper starts with three preliminaries to the analysis of evidential
expressions: an overview of qualificational categories (the traditional ‘TAM mark-
ers’), a representation of these dimensions in clausal layering, and an analysis of
the modal categories which includes the proposal to add a fourth category, ‘direc-
tivity’, to the traditional epistemic, deontic and dynamic modalities. The modal
categories are approached in terms of four semantic properties, namely ascription

of a property to the speaker and/or to the addressee, speaker-orientation and sca-
larity. The different behaviour of the modalities according to these properties leads
Nuyts to propose that modality is not a coherent semantic domain. He proceeds
to describe evidentiality, including ‘classical’ evidential categories, which he sub-
divides into experienced, inferential and hearsay, as well as the two associated cat-
egories of mirativity and subjectivity. All these categories are approached in terms
of the same factors used for the analysis of the modal expressions. The results also
point against the consideration of evidentiality as a coherent semantic domain:
on the one hand, inferentiality belongs in the system of qualifications of states of
affairs, together with deontic and epistemic modality; on the other, experienced
and hearsay evidentiality, and also mirativity and subjectivity, have a very different
nature and thus cannot be positioned in the ‘normal’ qualificational system.
Section B contains five papers on different aspects of evidentiality in grammar
and discourse. The study contributed by Verónica Böhm, Gerda Haßler and Anja
Hennemann on the evidential use of adverbs in Romance languages and Russian
is an attempt at understanding the functional-semantic categories of evidentiality
and epistemic modality and how they overlap. The hypothesis is that the func-
tion and syntactic behaviour of adverbial locutions, such as Spanish al parecer,
Portuguese ao parecer, or Russian по-видимому, are motivated by their morpho-
logical composition. From this starting point, it is investigated whether the adver-
bials may be used with broad or narrow scope or as a component of a modalized
predication. It is concluded that the lexemes with the two meanings ‘visible’ and
‘apparent’ in combination with a preposition, the spatial meaning of which is a
direction, are gradually developing toward an evidential meaning. The decision
whether they represent quotative or inferential evidentiality or hearsay depends
on the context in which they appear and is not determined by the evidential mark-
ers themselves. The prototypical uses of the evidential markers are the parentheti-
cal placement at the beginning and in the middle of a sentence, and with broad
scope. Their use with narrow scope is considered to be conspicuous and therefore
simultaneously serves to mark a focus.
Gijs Mulder presents an analysis of a group of predicates united by the fact
that they do not lexicalize the act of reasoning or thinking but literally refer to
perception and spontaneous mental processes. This qualitative lexical-semantic
analysis of contemporary usage is based on data gathered mainly from Twitter. Of
about 600 Spanish verbs referring to mental states and processes, a minor subset
of more than fifty verbs is used to express evidentiality and/or epistemic modality.
Whereas only a small portion is frequently used in contemporary Spanish, some
members of this class acquire their evidential or epistemic meaning in special con-
texts. As matrix verbs with a complement clause they do not represent the central
proposition of the utterance, but rather indicate that the speaker is not completely
certain of what is asserted or mark the source of the information given. Highly
frequent verbs, especially creo, are considered semi-grammaticalized markers of
evidentiality and epistemic modality; in these cases, their precise function de-
pends on the context. Most other cognition verbs have either epistemic modality,
evidentiality or the marking of the speaker’s stance as their standard functions.
Tanja Mortelmans’ contribution addresses the German seem-type verb
scheinen and its Dutch equivalents lijken and schijnen. It is based on an analysis of
the translation patterns in an online Dutch-German parallel corpus of contempo-
rary literary texts. Seem-type verbs exhibit an interesting semantic ambivalence,
as they combine epistemic with evidential traits. Another challenge to precise se-
mantic characterization of these verbs lies in the observation that it is difficult to
pin down their exact epistemic value. The analysis shows that these verbs differ
with respect to their constructional preferences, their evidential potential and the
degree of subjectivity of the speaker, and that a correlation exists between these
three parameters. The verb schijnen favours wide-scope construction types and is
the only one in which the reportative meaning is absolutely dominant. The verb
lijken favours the copula construction and does not have a clearly developed re-
portative reading. Seem-type verbs are expected to develop wide-scope construc-
tion types over the course of time, to acquire reportative meanings and to prohibit
more objective construals on the part of the speaker.
Ingeborg Harmes provides a synchronic and diachronic study of the Dutch
auxiliary zou(den) ‘should’. She demonstrates that, from the earliest stages of the
language, the auxiliary can express nine meanings, and that its meaning has spe-
cialized to hypotheticality. The auxiliary verb zou(den) is the preterite form of
the verb zullen ‘shall’ and does not always correspond with the semantics of the
present form. The study focuses on the relevant structural features for the eviden-
tial meaning of the auxiliary and its evolution. In earlier stages of the language,
zou(den) could express modal meanings, especially dynamic modality, while in
present day Dutch it expresses hypotheticality. From this specialized meaning of
hypotheticality, its use as a hedging device has developed. The meaning catego-
ries of temporality, intention and evidentiality have a relatively fixed position in
the meaning ranges of zou(den). The context is of importance for the category of
reported evidentiality and its evolution over time. It is demonstrated that the pres-
ence of a source reference, the occurrence in a main or independent clause, the
presence of a perfective auxiliary and the grammatical person have a considerable
influence on an evidential interpretation of zou(den).
The section closes with a paper by Aurelia Usonienė and Jolanta Šinkūnienė
on the expression of evidentiality in Lithuanian by grammatical means, concretely
the participial passive construction with -ma (present) and -ta (past), which have
indirect evidentiality (inferential or reportive) as one of their meanings. The anal-

ysis is carried out with the aid of several corpora of spoken and written Lithuanian
which include texts from different types of discourse (fiction, journalistic and aca-
demic). The findings suggest that, in contemporary Lithuanian, the expression of
evidentiality with these constructions is uncommon: the evidential use of the -ta
form was only found with a few intransitive verbs like būti ‘be’, pabuvoti ‘visit’,
gyventi ‘live’, gulėti ‘lie’ or padirbėti ‘work-a-bit’, and it virtually occurred only in
written language. The -ma form was found to be even less frequent: its occurrences
were restricted to a few cases in narrative fiction and the be-verb form esama in
academic and journalistic discourse. The analysis also uncovered the use of evi-
dential -ta/-ma in specialized discourse types for expressing pragmatic functions
of author stance, often in combination with other stance markers.
Section C includes five papers on evidentiality and epistemic modality in vari-
ous discourse domains and genres. The contribution by Juana I. Marín Arrese
examines the use of evidential expressions as epistemic stance resources and their
distribution in relation to two discourse domains, unscripted conversation and
journalistic discourse, as well as the genre-related or language-related variation in
English and Spanish. The paper also addresses the issue of the multifunctionality
of some evidential expressions, and the similarities or differences observed thereof
in the two languages, and the degree to which certain evidential values are associ-
ated with particular constructions. Results point to significant similarities across
languages in both genre-related preferred types of evidential expressions, and to
certain cross-linguistic differences in the degree to which there are correlations
between evidential values and evidential constructions.
Laura Hidalgo Downing addresses the study of epistemic and evidential
stance markers in two subgenres of scientific discourse, semi-formal publications
(New Scientist) and expert publications (PubMed), adopting an onomasiological
approach to the study of these conceptual domains. The main aim of the paper is
that of revealing the underlying motivation for the variation found between the
two sets of data, and the extent to which the results reflect the nature of the two
genres of scientific discourse, their discursive conventions and preferences, which
may contribute to shed light on socio-cultural practices of speech communities
and their use of genres as forms of communication. Results indicate a significant
preference for indirect markers in the semi-formal corpus in comparison to the
expert corpus. The study thus reveals the effect of different communicative moti-
vations and discipline specific conventions in the two genres.
The paper by Anne-Laure Besnard focuses on the expression of point of view
in newspaper discourse by means of the expressions BE likely to and BE expect-
ed to. The paper argues that these expressions have both modal and evidential
values, and allow the speaker to either commit or distance themselves from the
communicated information. Drawing on Culioli’s (1990) Theory of Enunciative

Operations and his distinctions regarding the origin of the predication (S0) and
the origin of the evaluation content (S1), Besnard presents results of a corpus study
on the use of these expressions and their role in journalistic discourse as markers
of commitment or non-commitment.
Another contribution on evidentials in newspaper discourse is the paper
authored by Anna Ruskan, which focuses on the non-agreeing present passive
participles (e.g. manoma ‘thought’) and non-agreeing adjectives (e.g. akivaizdu
‘evident’) used as Complement-Taking-Predicates (CTPs) with a that-comple-
ment clause or as parentheticals and adverbs (e.g. akivaizdžiai ‘evidently’) in
two Lithuanian newspapers, one printed (Lietuvos Rytas) and the other online
(Bernardinai.lt). The paper discusses the different ways in which these evidentials
contribute to the formation of the reader’s opinion, depending on the “evidentiary
validity” determined by the mode of knowing and the source of evidence. The
evidentials were submitted to a quantitative analysis, whose results reveal distribu-
tional differences between the two newspapers: Lietuvos Rytas has more instances
of the participle-based CTP manoma ‘thought’ with a that-complement clause,
whereas Bernardinai.lt (BER) displays more occurrences of the parentheticals
žinoma ‘of course, certainly’, suprantama ‘naturally’ and aišku ‘of course’, which
appeal to shared knowledge. This quantitative difference may be due to the formal
and neutral orientation of Lietuvos Rytas, while Bernardinai.lt. is more reader-ori-
ented and tending towards persuasive argumentation.
Finally, Ruth Breeze approaches the evolution of the passive form of a number
of verbs of saying and thinking in the last two hundred years. Through the analysis
of a wealth of contemporary and historical corpus data, her study shows that the
evolution of the passive of the verbs under study does not follow a common path
for all the verbs: rather, the paths strongly depend on the individual verbs. BE
said to and BE reported to, two constructions associated with media and academic
sections of the corpora, have steadily declined, which might reflect a change in
journalists’ and academics’ style and practices, with a greater emphasis on direct
speech and named sources. Conversely, the mindsay constructions BE expected to
and BE supposed to have both seen significant increases in recent times, and this
rise is still continuing in the case of BE supposed to. Interestingly, BE expected to
seems to be shifting from deontic to evidential meanings, while BE supposed to
seems to be undergoing the opposite shift. Breeze also discusses implications for
grammaticalization of the three most frequent verbs used in these constructions,
said to, expected to and supposed to, hinting that the last construction may be clos-
est to becoming grammaticalized, particularly in informal spoken registers where
it is undergoing a process of phonological reduction and taking on a deontic role
related to participant-external obligation.
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Section A.
Evidentiality
Cognitive Grammar and Functional Grammar
Approaches
Chapter 1
Evidentiality in Cognitive Grammar
Ronald W. Langacker
University of California, San Diego
A clause serves the intersubjective function of presenting and negotiating a

proposition. It both describes an occurrence and gives some indication of its
epistemic status. The latter consists primarily in an assessment of whether the
occurrence is realized, but may also include the basis for this assessment, and
since there is no sharp distinction between the two, evidentiality constitutes a
dimension of clausal grounding. Both dimensions of grounding are organized
egocentrically in terms of immediacy to the ground and increments of distance
from it. In a broad sense, grounding is also effected by lexical and grammatical
means. These represent a higher level of functional organization concerned not
with the occurrence of events but with the validity of propositions.
Keywords: distance, egocentricity, epistemic assessment, function, grounding,

proposition
1. Issues
Evidentiality is usefully considered in relation to a variety of significant linguistic

issues. One general issue is the cognitive linguistic view of language structure as a
reflection of embodied cognition (Lakoff 1987; Johnson 1987; Pecher and Zwaan
2005; Ziemke, Zlatev, and Frank 2007). Another is the fundamental problem of
reconciling the impressive diversity of linguistic structure with the desire for a
unified characterization (cf. Langacker 2002a). The search for unity in apparent
diversity plays out in several dimensions. First, as seen in a survey like Aikhenvald
and Dixon (2003), languages differ greatly in both the structural salience of evi-
dentiality and the specific means of dealing with it. Second, evidential notions
have very different structural manifestations within a single language. A third di-
mension is language change, e.g. the evolution of grammaticized evidential ele-
ments from lexical and periphrastic sources.
Evidentials pose a number of basic descriptive issues. There is first the chal-
lenge of describing the meanings of evidential elements as well as the grammatical
doi 10.1075/pbns.271.02lan
14 Ronald W. Langacker
constructions in which they figure. These range from highly grammaticized evi-
dential systems to novel periphrastic expressions, raising the question of how they
relate to one another. From the standpoint of Cognitive Grammar (CG), a more
specific question that arises is whether evidentials should be regarded as clausal
grounding elements (Brisard 2002).
Evidentiality also proves highly relevant for the ongoing exploration in CG
of certain general theoretical notions (Langacker 2015a). One such notion is the
primacy of semantic functions, which are more fundamental and more consis-
tent than their structural implementation by lexicon and grammar. Another is the
arrangement of structures into systems representing alternate means of fulfilling
a given function. A third notion pertains to a pervasive feature of language and
cognition: organization into strata, each a substrate for the next, which draws
on additional resources affording a wider array of options (Langacker 2016). A
given stratum serves as a baseline with respect to which the next one constitutes
an elaboration.
2. Evidentiality and grounding
2.1 Semantic functions and their implementation
Lexicon and grammar effect the implementation of semantic functions – that is

their raison d’être. At the most general level, language serves the function of sym-
bolic expression for purposes of thought and communication. At the opposite ex-
treme, a lexeme serves the highly specialized function of symbolizing a particular,
culture-specific conception. Lexicon and grammar form a continuum of symbolic
assemblies comprising semantic structures, phonological structures, and sym-
bolic links between the two. Simpler structures give rise to more complex ones
through relations of symbolization, composition, and categorization. It is com-
mon for structures to cross-cut one another, the same elements being grouped in
alternate ways for different reasons.
In the last analysis, structure and function are non-distinct, just different ways
of viewing the same assembly. It makes no real difference, for example, whether
we say that a lexeme functions to symbolize a certain conception or whether we
describe that conception as a semantic structure (the lexeme’s semantic pole). The
referential function of a nominal (or “noun phrase”) can equally well be regarded
as the schematic meaning shared by nominal expressions. This is quite consistent
with the notion that structures have to be characterized not only in bottom-up
fashion, in terms of their internal composition, but also in top-down fashion, in
terms of their role in higher-level structures (Harder 2010). In the CG account,
Chapter 1. Evidentiality in Cognitive Grammar 15
linguistic units are learned in the context of larger assemblies, so their full descrip-
tion includes schematized representations of the ones they conventionally appear
in. For instance, a plural marker is not distinct from the plural construction in
which it functions, but is learned in the context of that construction and character-
ized in relation to it. To describe a construction one has to describe the component
elements and how they integrate with one another to form the resultant composite
whole. In so doing, one is ipso facto describing the function of each component
within the whole.
Semantic functions are more fundamental and more consistent than their
structural implementations. As for their being fundamental, we can plausibly
claim that structures exist because they fulfill certain functions, but it makes no
sense to say that functions exist in order to be implemented by structures. As
for consistency, we need only observe the diverse means deployed by different
languages for comparable evidential functions; to the extent that they really are
comparable, the functions represent unity in apparent structural diversity. We can
also note the great variety of structures that implement what is clearly the same
function in a single language. I would argue, for example, that all English nomi-
nals serve the function of nominal reference (briefly described below). But since
there are various strategies for achieving this, reflected in different grammatical
structures, there is no structural feature that English nominals all have in com-
mon. The following expressions, for instance, can all function as nominals (e.g. as
subject of a finite clause): Jeremy; the dog; houses; most women; those with children;
eating cucumbers; for our plan to succeed; that the US has never won the World Cup.
What unites them and makes them nominals is nothing other than their shared
semantic function.
Semantic functions inhere in the symbolic assemblies constituting language
structure, which resides in processing activity. Like any structural element, seman-
tic functions can be thought of as tasks to be performed, contributing to the global
task of symbolic expression. In the case of lexical meanings, they consist in spe-
cific conceptions to be entertained. At the opposite end of the spectrum, general
functions like nominal reference are independent of any specific conceptual con-
tent or symbolic implementation. They can nonetheless be regarded as semantic
units (these being unrestricted as to specificity) with a basic role in grammatical
structure.
2.2 Clausal grounding
Language is a basic means of achieving epistemic control and intersubjective

alignment. By epistemic control, I merely indicate knowledge of the world (both
“real” and mentally constructed). Major portions of this knowledge are provided
by other individuals. A particular expression is aimed at momentary alignment in

the interlocutors’ scope of awareness and focus of attention. In the longer term,
linguistic interaction contributes to the expansion and convergence of what they
purport to know.
Language can serve in this capacity by letting us evoke and characterize any
facet of our mental universe, comprising everything we are capable of conceiving.
Essential in this regard – hence fundamental and universal – are nominals and
clauses. Both have a referential function. For language we need a view of refer-
ence based on conception and intersubjective alignment: it consists in directing
attention to a particular entity selected from the open-ended set of entities in our
mental universe. In the case of nominals, that entity is a thing, as defined ab-
stractly in CG (Langacker 2008, 2013a); in the case of clauses, it is a process (or oc-
currence), i.e. a relationship tracked through time. The referent is the nominal or
clausal profile, the focus of attention within the conceptual content invoked. Since
the relationship profiled by a clause is conceptually dependent on its participants,
clausal reference incorporates nominal reference as a subfunction. Thus nominals
are routinely included in clauses, but not conversely.
Reference is achieved through a combination of description and deixis.
Description is characterization in terms of conceptual content, starting with the
thing or process type specified by the nominal or clausal head. Deixis is character-
ization in relation to the ground, i.e. the interlocutors and the speech event. Deixis
for referential purposes – especially via grammaticized elements with only sche-
matic descriptive content – is thus referred to as nominal and clausal grounding.
Relevant facets of the ground include the time and place of speaking, the inter-
locutors’ conception of reality, their scope of awareness, and their apprehension of
the ongoing discourse. We can say that grounding pertains to the epistemic status
of the referent (whereas description pertains to its nature).
Epistemic status plays out differently for nominals and clauses (Langacker
2009: ch. 6). For nominals, the primary epistemic concern is identification. For
clauses, on the other hand, the main concern is whether the profiled occurrence
is realized, i.e. whether it actually does occur. Realization is the clausal analog of
existence (which for things is generally presupposed). Suppose we define reality
as the totality of what has happened (the history of realized occurrences). With
clausal grounding the primary epistemic issue is then the existential status of the
profiled process – where it stands in relation to reality. This is a matter of deixis
because what counts as reality for grounding purposes is the reality conception of
the interlocutors, in particular the speaker.
Grounding reflects various kinds and degrees of epistemic control. If nominal
grounding pertains to identification, and clausal grounding to realization, it does
not follow that the grounded entity is identified or real. The grounding function
is to offer an assessment of the referent’s epistemic status, and that assessment is

not always positive. Indication that a nominal referent is unidentified, or a clausal
referent unrealized, is itself a kind of epistemic assessment representing a modi-
cum of control. The assessment may also be probabilistic rather than absolute. The
grounding quantifiers all, most, some, and no identify their referents only as some
proportion of the set of referential candidates, so the likelihood of a particular
candidate being included in the referent ranges from 1 down to 0. Analogously,
epistemic modals like will, should, and may offer probabilistic assessments of the
profiled occurrence being realized.
A crucial point is that a nominal or clausal referent is often a virtual entity, not
one which actually exists (Talmy 1996; Langacker 2005a). Despite its privileged
status, the real world is just a portion of the mental universe that we apprehend
and talk about. Virtual entities may themselves function as objects of discussion
(e.g. Snoopy sleeps on top of his doghouse). Commonly, though, they are “conjured
up” (imagined) as an indirect means of dealing with actuality. Especially notable is
their role in making generalizations. For instance, Most cats eat tuna does not refer
to any actual set of cats or instances of tuna consumption: the nominal and clausal
referents are mentally constructed to represent a normal feature of real-world cat
behavior. We can still say that most cats directs attention to a particular thing out
of all those in our mental universe; it is simply an imagined entity characterized as
a large proportion of the totality of cats (itself a fictive entity).
For linguistic purposes, we can recognize nominal and clausal referents even
in cases of negation, e.g. The guests drank no whisky. I consider the clause and the
object nominal to be referential – it is just that their referents are virtual rather
than actual. As its essential content, the sentence evokes an instance of whisky
involved in a collective instance of drinking. However the grounding quantifier no
specifies that the whisky has a magnitude of zero, so that no actual drinking took
place. But while the referents are virtual, the sentence still pertains to actuality
(guests and their behavior at a party).
2.3 Evidentials as grounding elements
It is often asked whether particular kinds of structures qualify as grounding ele-

ments. That of course depends on how the notion is defined. With a broad defini-
tion, a wide array of structures might be considered grounding elements because
they bear in some fashion on a referent’s epistemic status. My own preference is to
define the notion quite narrowly, with the understanding that particular structures
approximate it – and thus qualify as grounding elements – to different degrees. I
will follow this approach in considering the question of how evidentials relate to
clausal grounding.
My conception of grounding was first inspired by English, but hopefully it is

not unduly anglocentric. The narrow definition is based on abstractly formulated
properties plausibly taken as reflecting an aspect of nominal and clausal structure
that is highly prevalent cross-linguistically. With certain qualifications, the prop-
erties are all exemplified by English clausal grounding with tense (present vs. past)
and modals (may, can, will, shall, must; might, could, would, should). However, they
can also be instantiated by grounding systems quite different from the English one.
A narrow definition of grounding includes the following properties: (i)
Grounding elements are small in number. (ii) They are also highly grammati-
cized. (iii) Accordingly, they are quite schematic in terms of descriptive seman-
tic content. English tense and modals, for example, give no specific information
about the grounded occurrence. (iv) They are conventionally established as having
secondary status, in the sense of Boye and Harder (2009, 2012). From the CG
standpoint, we can say that they profile the grounded entity rather than the epis-
temic assessment (which remains “offstage”). (v) Grounding elements constitute
an organized system of opposing elements. (vi) They are obligatory in that one of
the systemic options (possibly a default “zero” option) must be chosen. (vii) They
are internal to the grounded structure (an integral part of the clause or nominal).
(viii) Finally, but crucially, their semantic function is to specify the referent’s epis-
temic status, as described in the previous section.
In considering whether evidentials constitute grounding elements, the key
point is obviously semantic function. Many languages have a small, grammati-
cized set of evidentials that are internal to a clause and make a required specifica-
tion. Semantically they are highly schematic, especially concerning the occurrence
whose evidential basis is being indicated. Moreover, that occurrence is clearly the
focus of attention, the evidential assessment remaining offstage and unprofiled.
The only issue, then, is whether the evidential assessment is reasonably assimi-
lated to the epistemic assessment of clausal grounding, narrowly conceived in
terms of existential status – how the occurrence relates to the speaker’s concep-
tion of reality.
Discussions of evidentiality (e.g. Cornillie 2009) tend to emphasize its dis-
tinctness from epistemic modality, the aspect of clausal grounding that it most
resembles. Evidentiality is variably described as pertaining to the source of in-
formation, the evidence on which a statement is based, its perceptual basis, reli-
ability of knowledge, or the speaker’s attitude toward the validity of information.
By contrast, modality is described as pertaining to speaker commitment, degree
of certainty, likelihood of a proposition being true, or evaluation of the pros-
pect of an occurrence being realized. It is generally agreed that these are not the
same; for example, a speaker can accept and present a statement as being true
irrespective of whether the assessment is based on direct observation, hearsay,
or inference. Of course, it is also agreed that the two are closely related. We are
more confident in the validity of a statement based on direct experience than one
based on inference.
Though I acknowledge the distinction, evidentiality and epistemic modality
prove harder to separate than is generally recognized. I view evidentiality as one
dimension of epistemic assessment, which is best treated in a unified account of
embodied experience and the striving for epistemic control. Languages vary as
to which facets of this overall scheme they make salient by means of lexical and
grammatical coding. So while evidentiality always has the potential to emerge as
a distinct or prominent feature, in a given language that potential need not be
exploited. To be sure, many indications of both evidentiality and modality fail to
qualify as grounding, as narrowly defined above, because they do not represent a
system of grammaticized elements. But that is a matter of definition and a matter
of degree. Even when expressed by lexical or periphrastic means, evidentiality and
modality constitute grounding in a broader sense of the term.
2.4 Unification
A major reason for evidentiality and modality being hard to separate is that infer-
ence has an important role in both. Evidential systems tend to be organized around
three main sources of information: (i) direct evidence (or vision); (ii) report; and
(iii) inference (everything else). An example is the tripartite evidential system de-
scribed by Floyd (1996a, 1996b) for the Wanka dialect of Quechua: (i) -mi direct;
(ii) -shi reportative; (iii) -chra conjecture. Clearly, though, epistemic modality
is also inferential. Thus in English clausal grounding, a modal indicates that the
profiled occurrence is not accepted as being real, but that the speaker – by follow-
ing an inferential path – projects its realization with greater or lesser confidence.
Hence there is no essential difference between source of information (projection/
inference) and epistemic status (projected/inferred).
Inference is thus a basic component of both evidential systems and grounding
systems with tense and modality. We can also note a connection between direct
evidence, the baseline for evidentiality, and the latter kind of system. It is gener-
ally accepted that “tense” is not just location in time but has an experiential and
epistemic aspect (Jaszczolt 2009). The present is plausibly characterized in terms
of immediate experience, in contrast to the future (which has not yet been expe-
rienced) as well as the past (no longer experienced, except by recall). I suggest that
direct evidentials and present tense have a common basis in immediate personal
experience: what the relevant conceptualizer (usually the speaker) directly experi-
ences at the current moment (as in the case of vision). Starting from this baseline,
direct evidentials put the emphasis on personal experience and can thus be used
for non-present occurrences. On the other hand, present tense retains the notion
of temporal immediacy but is not limited to the speaker’s direct experience.
Evidential systems and tense-modality systems are therefore neither sharply
distinct nor mutually exclusive. They are better seen as overlapping and comple-
mentary strategies of clausal grounding, providing an epistemic assessment con-
cerning the existential status of the profiled occurrence. Individually or jointly,
they help fulfill the referential function of a clause by way of achieving epistemic
control and intersubjective alignment. Evidential and tense-modal systems are
susceptible to unified characterization based on fundamental aspects of embodied
human experience. These amount to a general cognitive model different facets of
which are selected for coding prominence in a given language. As their common
basis, this universal conceptual substrate supports the diversity of languages and
cultures while ensuring their commensurability. The following sketch, while ad-
mittedly simplistic, is perhaps not unreasonable as a first approximation.
We inhabit a real world, which enjoys a privileged status as the foundation
for constructing our mental universe. Within this world, reality is the way things
are, out of an infinite range of possible alternatives. Reality evolves through time,
whose passage is inexorable and irreversible. Viewed in temporal perspective, re-
ality can be characterized – in cumulative fashion – as the way things have ever
been, up through the present moment; it comprises the history of realized occur-
rences (events and continuing situations). Once established, this history cannot be
changed, but at a given time its future evolution has yet to be determined.
To cope with the world, we continually engage in striving for control
(Langacker 2002b, 2009, 2013b). We do so at multiple levels: physical, perceptual,
mental, and social. At the mental level, we strive for epistemic control by building
up a conception of reality, constantly augmented and adjusted on the basis of new
experience. We realize, however, that our knowledge of reality is only partial and
imperfect. We further recognize the existence of other conceptualizers, whose
reality conceptions are never quite the same as our own. Although we have no
direct access to the minds of other individuals, we gain some appreciation of their
knowledge and experience through empathy, simulation, inference (from appear-
ance or behavior), and linguistic interaction.
In the continual striving for epistemic control, there are only a few basic
sources of information, and these correlate with reliability. First comes internal
experience, such as pain, emotion, and proprioception. This is the most reliable:
if I feel pain, I can hardly be mistaken in that regard. Almost as reliable is sen-
sory perception, experience induced by an external stimulus – we generally trust
our senses (especially vision). But while a perceptual experience per se cannot be
doubted, we may be less certain about the stimulus, given the possibility of misin-
terpretation or even hallucination. A third basic source is higher-level cognition:
thought, reasoning, generalization, inference, conceptual integration, and so on.

In terms of reliability, judgments arrived at through cognition run the gamut from
full confidence in their validity (coincidence with reality) to mere speculation.
Finally, we obtain information from other conceptualizers, whether individually
or in generalized fashion (e.g. as cultural knowledge). Here, too, reliability ranges
along the full spectrum.
Finally, we are egocentric: each of us occupies the very center of our mental
universe. As a consequence, epistemic assessment involves degrees of centrality,
with respect to several dimensions; each can be characterized in terms of imme-
diacy – direct, unmediated access to an epistemic target – and increments of dis-
tance from that center. One dimension is time, where immediacy is a matter of
what we experience at the present moment. Previous experience is less directly
accessible, being mediated by recall, while anticipated experience depends on the
more elaborate (hence less reliable) process of mental projection. Another dimen-
sion is the source of information, where internal experience – itself a facet of our
mental world – could hardly be accessible more directly. With perception the epis-
temic target is external, but we still think of it as residing in a direct connection
with external entities. Of course, since most aspects of our mental universe cannot
be perceived, they are only accessible through the mediation of higher-level cog-
nition. A third dimension is social interaction and the access it affords to other
minds. In the case of language, the speaker lies at the center, having immediate
access to her own experience. Closest to the center is an interlocutor with whom
she negotiates intersubjective alignment.
In a given language clausal grounding draws on particular facets of this uni-
versal substrate. A tense-modal system emphasizes time and reality, whereas an
evidential system highlights the source and reliability of information. These can
co-exist, with varying degrees of systemic integration. As a manifestation of ego-
centricity, the current direct experience of the speaker (immediacy in regard to
time, source, and social interaction) in each case functions as a kind of baseline.
Systems are regarded as evidential when they invoke the primary senses of vision
and hearing. They do so in different ways, e.g. as the specific values of evidential
markers, or as the basis for a more abstract notion of direct vs. indirect knowledge.
And while hearing per se is usually considered a direct source of evidence, in the
case of language it furnishes the indirect evidence marked by evidentials as hear-
say or report. This is just one illustration of how the flexibility of construal gives
rise to alternate coding systems for the same conceptual substrate. There is unity
in diversity, as it is all in the service of epistemic control.
3. Grounding systems
3.1 Systems, substrate, and strata
Grammar effects the implementation of semantic functions. The various means

available to fulfill a given function constitute a system of opposing elements
for that purpose (cf. Halliday and Matthiessen 2004). For example, the Wanka
Quechua forms -mi direct, -shi reportative, and -chra conjecture constitute
a system of alternatives for fulfilling the evidential function. While the notion of
systemic organization is anything but novel, we need to consider how it fits in the
CG framework as well as its application to clausal grounding.
Linguistic structures are never self-contained, but draw upon a substrate from
which they cannot be dissociated. For clausal grounding, the relevant substrate in-
cludes the cognitive model sketched above, reflecting universal aspects of human
experience. But that is only a starting point. In different languages (or for different
purposes), this substrate is adapted (through augmentation, selection, refinement,
etc.) to accommodate cultural interpretations and the construals imposed by lin-
guistic convention. This adapted substrate is the one invoked for the characteriza-
tion of systemic elements.
It is well known, for example, that languages make different coding distinc-
tions in regard to time and the epistemic factors associated with it (like imme-
diacy, reality, and projection). Thus English, Hopi (Kalectaca 1978), and Tariana
(Aikhenvald 2003), by imposing different construals on the universal substrate,
manifest the adapted substrates in Figure 1. For English, I have argued that pres-
ent tense really does indicate temporal immediacy, i.e. coincidence with the time
of speaking (Langacker 2009: ch. 7), whereas past tense specifies non-immediacy.
These are two facets of reality, which stands in systemic opposition to modal
projection, usually pertaining to the future. By contrast, Hopi does not distin-
guish past and present tense, so a bare verb stem like qatu translates as either ‘sits’
or ‘sat’. The basic distinction is thus between real and projected (marked by the
future suffix -ni). On the other hand, as one dimension of the Tariana system real-
ity is differentiated into present, recent past, and remote past, e.g. -naka visual/
immediate, -ka visual/recent, and -na visual/remote. The tense/evidential
system does not extend to the future.
The nested ellipses indicate degrees of centrality. The innermost ellipse rep-
resents the default or baseline situation: it is conceptually the most basic, and
is taken for granted unless there is reason not to. In the temporal dimension it
corresponds to facets of the deictic center, notably the time of speaking and the
speaker’s conception of reality. The baseline serves as point of departure for ap-
prehending other systemic options. The successive layers in Figure 1 can thus be
(a) English
like(-s) IMMEDIATE
NON-IMMED IMMED PROJECTED like-d NON-IMMEDIATE
will like PROJECTED
time
(b) Hopi
qatu ‘sits/sat’ REAL

REAL PROJECTED
qatu-ni ‘will sit’ PROJECTED
time
(c) Tariana
-naka VISUAL/IMMEDIATE
REMOTE RECENT IMMED -ka VISUAL/RECENT

-na VISUAL/REMOTE
time
Figure 1. Adapted substrates.
interpreted as increments of distance from the center. As a kind of iconicity, dis-

tance tends to correlate with extent of formal marking (Haiman 1985). Thus in
Hopi, an unmarked verb has the status real (the baseline for the adapted sub-
strate), whereas projected is marked overtly with a suffix. A complicating factor
in English is third person singular -s, which specifies person and number as well as
tense. Otherwise the system is iconic: immediate (the baseline) is unmarked, with
successive increments of distance being indicated by the suffix -d (non-immedi-
ate) and by a modal (projected) whose basic form is a separate word.
In the case of an unmarked default, linguists sometimes speak of “zero mark-
ing” or posit a “zero morpheme”. But if it looks like nothing is there, the most likely
reason is that nothing is there (not that it’s invisible). The CG alternative invokes
a ubiquitous feature of language and cognition that I refer to as B/E organiza-
tion. To a significant extent, structures are arranged in strata, each a substrate
for the next, which relies on additional resources and affords a wider range of
options. A given stratum functions as a baseline, which undergoes elaboration to

form a higher stratum supporting structures of greater complexity. In (1) I cite just
a few examples.
(1) Examples of B/E organization:
(a) A basic level category (Rosch 1978), e.g. hammer, being differentiated
into subtypes when finer distinctions are made at a higher stratum:
hammer > claw hammer, tack hammer, ball-peen hammer, sledge
hammer.
(b) Successively more elaborate syllabic structures, the baseline being a
simple vowel: (a) > ((a)y) > (((a)y)d) > (r(((a)y)d)) > (b(r(((a)y)d))).
(c) A lexical root and successive levels of morphological derivation:
(help) > ((help)ful) > (un((help)ful)) > ((un((help)ful))ly).
In a tense-modality system, the baseline epistemic status is immediacy as inter-

preted in the adapted substrate (e.g. generalized to reality in the case of Hopi).
Increments of distance from this center consist in progressively more complex
conceptions that rely on additional mental capacities (e.g. projection). An obvi-
ous and natural coding strategy is to indicate only departures from the baseline,
which – as the initial stratum along this axis – is a substrate for all the others. Thus
an unmarked form does not incorporate a zero morpheme, but is better regarded
as fundamental, representing the absence of elaboration.
3.2 A tense-modal system
Let us now consider, in more specific terms, how a grounding system is character-
ized in CG. Through a brief sketch of the core English system, I will try to indicate
what a full description would entail. A complete account is multifaceted, involving
distinct but complementary ways of viewing the same phenomena.
There is first the characterization of individual systemic elements, exempli-
fied in Figure 2 by the marking for non-immediacy (-d and its morphological
variants) and a modal such as will. Note that the diagrams presented here do not
give enough detail to distinguish will from the other core modals, which differ
in regard to modal force and degree of epistemic control (Talmy 1988; Sweetser
1990). The essential point is that highly grammaticized grounding elements profile
the grounded process, with the ground and the grounding relationship remaining
offstage (Langacker 2002c). The grounded process, only schematic in the case of
a grounding element, is represented by a bold arrow. The grounding relationship
concerns the epistemic status of the profiled occurrence: non-immediate (but
real) or projected.
(a) -d
(b) modal
Figure 2. Basic grounding elements.
Systemic elements participate in grammatical constructions that implement

the grounding function. Consisting in assemblies – any configuration of seman-
tic, phonological, and symbolic structures – constructions are conventional units
of a language, representing established patterns of expression. The assembly in
Figure 3(a) describes the grounding of a verb by the past-tense morpheme -d.
Included for sake of exposition, despite their redundancy, are indications of the
semantic functions served by the component and composite structures. In accor-
dance with its grounding function, -d evokes a schematic process as its profile.
The verb designates a specific process, whose more elaborate semantic content is
represented by a thicker arrow. Identification of the two processual profiles (dot-
ted correspondence line) produces a composite conception that fulfills the clausal
function of describing a specific grounded process.
How is this accomplished when there is no explicit grounding element, e.g. for
the “zero” variant of the English present? Given the flexibility of symbolic assem-
blies (as opposed to rigid constituency hierarchies), there is no need to posit a zero
morpheme. Though composition may be typical, not every construction involves
the integration of component structures to form a distinct composite whole. The
configuration in 3(b) can thus be recognized as a conventional unit of English
representing one implementation of the grounding function. It merely specifies
that a bare verb can itself fulfill the clausal function of grounded process, with the
epistemic status of immediacy.
Seen through the lens of composition, a construction like 3(b) is degenerate,
having a composite structure but only a single component structure. But that is so
only under the assumption that constituency is fully general, whereas CG regards
it as an emergent feature of symbolic assemblies (neither exhaustive nor essential).
From the CG standpoint, structures like 3(b) reflect the primacy of semantic func-
tion and the importance of B/E organization.
(a)
GROUNDED
PROCESS
PROCESS GROUNDING
V -d
V-d
(b)
GROUNDED PROCESS
PROCESS
V
Figure 3. Basic grounding constructions.
A full description of clausal grounding encompasses not only individual ele-

ments and constructions, but also their systemic arrangement. This is often hier-
archical, with functions decomposing into subfunctions, those into sub-subfunc-
tions, and so on, down to the level of specific implementing structures. At each
level, a function defines a system comprising alternative means of fulfilling it. The
symbolic assembly representing a grammaticized system may thus include an ar-
ray of semantic functions characterized at different levels of specificity, as well as
a family of constructions effecting their implementation. This systemic organiza-
tion is depicted in Figure 4. Each node in the hierarchy represents the grounding
function of indicating epistemic status, in either schematic or more specific terms.
At lower levels, those functions are part of implementing constructions as well as
particular forms with the status of conventional units.
This hierarchy based on schematicity is not the same as B/E organization. The
two are related, amounting to different perspectives on the same overall assem-
bly. And in each case I speak of elaboration producing structures of progressively
greater complexity. However they differ in regard to both the starting point and the
kind of elaboration it undergoes. In terms of categorization, a systemic hierarchy
GROUNDING
REAL PROJECTED
IMMEDIATE NON-IMMEDIATE IMMEDIATE NON-IMMEDIATE

V V-d PROJECTION PROJECTION
VM V M-d
... ...
may might
can
could
will
would
shall
must should
Figure 4. The basic English grounding system.
starts with a schema, elaboration consisting in the specification of finer-grained

detail (elaboration in the narrow sense). By contrast, B/E organization starts with
a category prototype with respect to which elaborations constitute extensions
with conflicting values. The baseline is non-complex in that it represents a default
invoking only a minimal array of basic conceptual resources. Rather than being
schematic for the structures at higher strata, it makes them accessible through a
series of incremental adjustments.
In Figure 5 I show the successive strata resulting from this series of adjust-
ments. The initial stratum, S0, comprises the baseline epistemic status of immedi-
acy. Each adjustment recruits an additional conceptual resource, roughly identifi-
able as recall, projection, and imagination. At S1, based on recall, the past-tense
morpheme shifts the profiled occurrence to non-immediate reality. At S2, a
basic modal – may, can, will, shall, or must – indicates its status as projected
instead of real. And at S3, an elaborated modal – might, could, would, or should
– invokes an imagined basis for modal projection, yielding the more abstract epis-
temic status of non-immediate projection. Because each stratum incorporates
the previous ones, it is conceptually more sophisticated and affords a wider range
of grounding options.
The nature of non-immediate projection is spelled out more fully in
Figure 6(a), which offers another way of showing B/E organization. Here the
adapted conceptual substrate is shown just once (rather than separately at each
level), with boxes delimiting the portions evoked at successive strata. Dashed ar-
rows represent increments of formal and conceptual elaboration, e.g. -d symbol-
izes displacement of the profiled occurrence from immediate to non-immediate
> > >
V V-d VM V M-d
S0 S1 S2 S3
Figure 5. Strata in the grounding system.
reality. The arrows can also be interpreted as epistemic paths leading from the
ground (G) to other possible locations of the referent in the epistemic landscape.
The default case (or baseline status) is the absence of such a path, i.e. the referent is
immediate to G. At S1, -d indicates a path to non-immediacy (past time, in effect),
while at S2, a basic modal marks a path effected by modal projection.
(a)
R
-d G M
S0
S1
S2
-d
R' G'
M
S3
(b) If she were rich, he would marry her.

[she is not rich] [she is rich] [he marry her]
G G'
-d will
Figure 6. Epistemic paths in the basic grounding system.
Elaborated modals merit further discussion. Might, could, would, and should,
though still related to may, can, will, and shall, have only partial morphological
and semantic analyzability, with varied and specialized meanings. Consistently,
however, they indicate greater epistemic distance than their basic counterpart. The
projection implied by might, for example, is more tenuous than the one conveyed
by may. An extreme case is counterfactuality, as in If she were rich he would marry
her (cf. If she is rich he will marry her). This greater epistemic distance is the se-
mantic contribution of the “past tense” morpheme -d. With modals, of course,
this element is neither a suffix nor a past tense marker. Morphologically, it con-
sists in the discrepancy between the basic and elaborated forms (e.g. will ––>
would). Semantically, it specifies a kind of non-immediacy with an imaginative
component.
With an elaborated modal, the speaker imagines a situation – distinct from the
actual one – from which the basic modal projection could be made. Instead of be-
ing projected from the actual ground (G), as part of reality (R), the profiled occur-
rence is projected from an imagined ground (G') within an alternate reality (R').
This is shown in 6(b) for the counterfactual would in the second clause. The actual
situation (at G) is that she is not rich. With respect to this, the speaker imagines an
altered situation (at G') in which she is. The import of the second clause, he would
marry her, is that this imagined situation allows the modal projection conveyed
by will: starting from G', the profiled event (he marry her) could be predicted.
Since the basis for modal projection (G') is distinct from G, the epistemic status is
referred to in Figure 4 as non-immediate projection.
3.3 Evidential systems
Evidentiality is an aspect of clausal grounding. To the extent of being gram-

maticized and systematic, it represents grounding even in the narrow sense.
Grammaticized evidential systems are less prevalent than tense-modality systems
and often coexist with them, which might be an indication of subsidiary status.
This is reasonable on the presumption that determining the source of information
is not an end in itself – the importance of evidentials is rather that, by bearing on
the quality of the evidence, they contribute to epistemic control in the form of an
accurate conception of reality. However, the distinction is hard to maintain given
the correlation of reliability with degree of epistemic certainty. In terms of how
people actually think and reason, the difference between confidence in the source
of information, on the one hand, and certainty about the event described, on the
other hand, is subtle and non-essential.
My limited exposure to evidential systems suggests that immediacy is more
commonly marked overtly than in a tense-modality system; if this is so, it may
(a) Substrate
INTERNAL PERCEPTION INFERENCE REPORT
(b) Wanka Quechua

-mi DIRECT
DIRECT INFERENCE REPORT -chra INFERENCE
-shi REPORT
(c) Eastern Pomo

-ya DIRECT
NON-VISUAL -ink’e NON-VIS PERCEPTION

DIRECT INFERENCE REPORT
PERCEPTION -ine INFERENCE
-:le REPORT
(d) Shipibo-Konibo
-ra DIRECT
-bira INFERENCE
DIRECT INFERENCE SPECULATION REPORT
-mein SPECULATION
-ronki REPORT
Figure 7. Some evidential systems.
reflect their subsidiary status. Evidentials are nonetheless organized egocentrically

with respect to source and reliability of information. As seen in Figure 7(a), sourc-
es representing increasing distance from the center are internal experience,
perception, inference (based on higher-level cognition), and report (contri-
butions from other conceptualizers). At best, though, this is just an approximation
to the universal substrate. For one thing, the perceptual modalities can themselves
be ranked for centrality, minimally as vision > hearing > other. Moreover, evi-
dential systems seldom (if ever) make a basic coding distinction between percep-
tion and internal experience. The tendency is rather for immediacy to be inter-
preted as direct experience, which includes them both. A final point is that
inference and report are not so clearly ordered in terms of distance; they might
instead be treated on a par as alternate sources of indirect evidence. Still, the order
given has a definite rationale from the standpoint of egocentricity, as inference
relies on one’s own mental processes, report on someone else’s.
In 7(b)–(d) I sketch the adapted substrates for several languages. Representing
a minimal adaptation, the three evidentials of Wanka Quechua constitute a base-
line system. Floyd (1996b: 63) offers the following succinct descriptions of their
prototypes. (i) -mi direct: “I know/believe P on the basis of personal experi-
ence”. (ii) -chra inference (“conjecture”): “I conclude P on the basis of other evi-
dence, but suspend commitment as to its factuality”. (iii) -shi report: “I was told
P by someone else”.
The Eastern Pomo system is more elaborate, with a four-way distinction re-
flecting a particular way of construing direct experience. McClendon (2003: 106)
describes -ya direct knowledge as indicating “that the event referred to by the
verb is actually happening or has just happened and that the speaker has direct
knowledge of it, primarily because the speaker performed or experienced” it. Note
that temporal immediacy is a factor here. It also figures in -ink’e non-visual sen-
sory, which indicates “that the speaker is experiencing, or has just experienced,
through any sense except sight, the action or state expressed by the verb” (102). Also
noteworthy – showing the flexibility of linguistic conception – is that internal feel-
ings are subsumed under non-visual sensory rather than direct knowledge.
In the Shipibo-Konibo system, a distinction is made between well-founded
inference and mere speculation (Valenzuela 2003). Inference coded by -bira is
“based on reasoning or observable evidence”, constituting “a fairly well-sustained
hypothesis” (44). By contrast, with -mein the evidence is “rather poor or maybe
even non-existent” (47).
Obviously, these few examples merely hint at the variety of evidential systems
and the complexity of their implementation. One factor is open-ended variability
in the subtle distinctions we are capable of making, and in ways of construing par-
ticular kinds of situations. For instance, established cultural knowledge (such as
myths or community history) is readily construed as either hearsay, being learned
through others, or as direct knowledge, reliable and immediately accessible to all
members of a society (Floyd 1996a: 902–903). Another factor is the polysemy of
evidential elements. In Wanka Quechua, for example, the direct evidential -mi
exhibits a range of values (Floyd 1996b): the prototype of personal experience and
the certainty it engenders; the certainty of events that have not yet transpired but
are under the speaker’s control; “imposed commitment”, where the speaker’s cer-
tainty is unsupported by direct experience; and, as a question marker, it pertains
to the hearer’s knowledge rather than the speaker’s. Such uses illustrate the partial
dissociability of source and reliability, as well as the social dimension of egocen-
tricity (speaker > hearer > other). More generally, a full account of evidentials
includes their discourse function and interaction with factors like person, tense,
negation, modality, and speech act.
An account starts with semantic descriptions of individual evidentials, based
on adapted substrates like those in Figure 7. Being a kind of grounding element, a
grammaticized evidential profiles a schematic process (bold arrow) characterized
(partially at least) in terms of a center and increments of distance from it. The ele-
ments of an evidential system can be organized in strata reflecting degrees of con-
ceptual sophistication, as shown in Figure 8 (cf. Figure 5). As a notational device,
distance from the center will be measured along the vertical axis to distinguish
evidentiality from tense and modality.
> >
DIRECT
INFERENCE
REPORT
S0 S1 S2
Figure 8. Strata in a basic evidential system.
Also essential are descriptions of evidential constructions, which – in the simplest

case – are analogous to the grounding constructions in Figure 3. Here I will go
just one step further by considering examples in which an evidential co-occurs
with another grounding element. A question which then arises is whether they
are independent specifications or whether one has the other in its semantic scope.
Lacking personal knowledge of the languages concerned, I have no definite basis
for deciding; I would only say that the analyses presented seem to be the most
plausible from the information available. In any case, the objective is simply to
raise the issue of scope and to indicate how it might be dealt with in CG.
The first example is from Wanka Quechua, where the evidentials co-occur
with tense. The question posed by (2) is whether -sh(i) report and -la past are
independent specifications, or whether report has wide scope, past being part
of the reported information. In line with the latter is the typicality of reporting on
past events. This is not the only possibility, however. It is at least conceivable, in
(2), that the actual report was contemporaneous with the event; it would then be
appropriate, at a later time, to characterize the event as both hearsay and as lying in
the past. And since the tense and evidentiality systems are formally and semanti-
cally distinct in this language, I incline to see them as making separate and parallel
specifications.
(2) Lishi-sh prista-ka-mu-la. [Wanka Quechua (Floyd 1996a: 899)]

Lishi-report borrow-refl-transloc-past
‘(I am told) Lishi borrowed it.’
On this analysis, relevant facets of (2) are as shown in Figure 9. Being grounding
elements, both -sh(i) report and -la past profile the grounded process, which
they characterize only schematically (thin bold arrow). This schematic process is
in each case identified with the specific occurrence (thick arrow) described in the
clause. In the resulting composite structure, the profiled occurrence thus has the
dual epistemic status of being reported as well as temporally non-immediate. To
be sure, this is by no means a complete account of the expression’s grammatical
organization, as it indicates neither constituency nor the internal structure of the
processual description (Lishi prista-ka-mu); the details depend on factors beyond
the scope of discussion (cf. Langacker 2015a). It is merely claimed that the corre-
spondences in Figure 9 are discernible within the symbolic assembly representing
the expression’s form and meaning.
-sh Lishi prista-ka-mu -la
Lishi-sh prista-ka-mu-la.
Figure 9. A grounding system with tense and an evidential.
The example in (3), from Shipibo-Konibo, is different in that the two grounding
elements are both members of the evidential system. Its members occur in various
combinations (though not always contiguously), and the translations supplied by
Valenzuela (2003) suggest that they participate in scope relations. The gloss for (3)
indicates that the content of some report provides the basis for the speculation
described in the clause (so that spec has report in its scope).
(3) Ani-mein-ronki iki jawen jema.[Shipibo-Konibo (Valenzuela 2003: 34)]
large-spec-report cop poss village
‘Perhaps her village is large (from what I heard).’
As I understand it, the speculation and the report pertain to different occurrences,
as shown in Figure 10. What is speculated to be the case is the onstage situation
of her village being large (the clausal profile). What is reported to be the case –
the basis for the speculation – is some other occurrence that is left implicit. As
analyzed in CG, a form like -mein speculation makes schematic reference to its
basis as an inherent aspect of its meaning; I represent this offstage occurrence with
a thin arrow enclosed in a box. The semantic scope relation is then a matter of this
unspecified occurrence being identified with the one evoked by -ronki report. So
as shown at the top, the overall expression profiles the specific situation of the vil-
lage being large. This is further characterized as being speculative, an unspecified
report providing the basis for speculation.
-ronki -mein ani iki jawen jema
Ani-mein-ronki iki jawen jema.

Figure 10. A complex evidential construction.
3.4 Combined systems
I have analyzed evidentials as grounding elements. Supporting this view are lan-
guages where evidentiality combines with tense to form a single, closely integrated
system. An example is Tariana (Aikhenvald 2003), which exhibits a basically reg-
ular paradigm of tense-evidential markers. Listed in Figure 11, these combined
forms occupy a fixed position as enclitics to the verb. (For convenience of discus-
sion, I omit two series of inferentials.)
-pida-na -pida-ka -pida REPORT
-mha-na -mha-ka -mha NON-VISUAL
-na -ka -naka VISUAL
REMOTE RECENT PRESENT

PAST PAST
Figure 11. A combined tense-evidential grounding system.
The characterization of such a system starts with the meanings of each component
element. While I have focused on egocentricity (epistemic immediacy and incre-
ments of distance from it), full semantic descriptions must further indicate the
specific conceptual import of notions like visual, report, and recent past. They
must also deal with polysemy, specifying the multiple senses of individual and
composite forms.
In examining this system the importance of egocentricity is quite apparent.
The central form -naka registers immediacy in regard to both time (present)
and source (visual). Departing from this baseline, along each axis, are concep-
tually more elaborate structures defining higher strata, as shown in Figure 12.
These dimensions of elaboration are basically orthogonal, but in the context of the
overall system they are interdependent. When they occur alone, the forms along
each axis represent the baseline for the other dimension. But they also occur in
combinations indicating departures from the baseline in both dimensions. With
this further increment of semantic and formal complexity, the composite forms
define a higher stratum with respect to which the strata in Figure 12 function
as the baseline.
> > > >
-ka -naka
-na -mha
-pida
S2 S1 S0 S0 S1 S2
Figure 12. Strata in a combined tense-evidential system.
At the lower stratum, the forms in Figure 12 constitute the system of opposing
options depicted in Figure 13(a). It decomposes into subsystems for tense and evi-
dentiality, with -naka functioning simultaneously as a member of each. However,
the full system also includes the complex forms in 13(b), each indicating departure
from the baseline along both axes. Though constructed from the simpler elements,
these composite forms amount to a third subsystem for the implementation of
clausal grounding. Relative to the tense and evidential subsystems, which function
jointly as its substrate (S0), this third subsystem constitutes a higher stratum (S1).
Their elaborative relation represents an additional level of B/E organization.
(a)
GROUNDING
TENSE EVIDENTIAL
REM PAST REC PAST IMMED NON-VIS REPORT

-na -ka -naka -mha -pida
(b)
GROUNDING
TENSE EVIDENTIAL EVIDENTIAL

TENSE
S1 S0 S0 S1
REPORT REPORT NON-VIS NON-VIS

REM PAST REC PAST REM PAST REC PAST
-pida-na -pida-ka -mha-na -mha-ka
Figure 13. Systemic organization with simple and complex forms.
The construction deriving the composite forms is exemplified in Figure 14,

where -pida report and -ka recent past combine at the lower level of constitu-
ency. Since these are grounding elements, each profiles a schematic process (thin
arrow). And since their profiles correspond, -pida-ka designates a single occur-
rence with a dual epistemic specification. Then, at a higher level of organization,
the grounding element – be it simple or complex – combines with a verb, which
profiles a specific process (thick arrow).
-pida -ka
V -pida-ka
V-pida-ka
Figure 14. A construction with a complex grounding element.
It happens that the composite forms in Figure 13(b) are morphologically transpar-

ent. But obviously, highly grammaticized elements range from full transparency to
complete opacity, at either the semantic or the phonological pole. This is unprob-
lematic in CG, which is a usage-based approach (Barlow and Kemmer 2000) and
makes no presumption of full compositionality. In the usage-based perspective,
compositional patterns are simply schematizations of specific instantiating expres-
sions, and coexist with those established as conventional linguistic units. Being an
established structure in its own right, a particular composite element is subject to

semantic and/or phonological adaptation, whereby it takes on an extended value
in addition to (or in lieu of) the expected one.
An adapted element is less than fully compositional in terms of the general
compositional pattern. That, however, is expected rather than problematic in CG,
which posits only partial compositionality. Despite the compositional metaphor,
a composite expression is merely seen as being motivated by its components, to
varying degrees, not literally constructed by combining them. Thus a form like
English might is only partially compositional and partially analyzable. To some
extent it is related to and motivated by the components, may and -d, but these
are not contained within it as clearly discernible constitutive elements. In short,
complex expressions reside in symbolic assemblies instead of strict compositional
hierarchies.
4. Means of implementation
4.1 Lexical means
Narrowly defined, the term grounding is reserved for a system of grammaticized

elements with a particular semantic function in a nominal or a clause: to specify
the epistemic status of the profiled thing or process. For clauses this assessment
pertains to realization (or existence), i.e. how the occurrence relates to the speak-
er’s conception of reality. Since they both contribute to this function, tense/modal-
ity and evidentiality are two dimensions of clausal grounding.
Clearly, though, grammaticized systems are not the only means of indicating
existential status. Also serving this function are a wide array of lexical and peri-
phrastic expressions with varying degrees of grammaticization and systematicity.
In a broader sense of the term – pertaining solely to semantic function – these too
can be considered grounding elements. They are however less closely connected
to the grounded process, being extrinsic to the clause (either external to it or an
optional elaboration). Thus they instantiate a generalized notion of grounding ef-
fected at a higher-level of organization.
Like its clause-internal counterpart, this higher-level grounding pertains to
either source of information or degree of epistemic certainty – the same two di-
mensions of epistemic control. Quite common, for example, are the periphrastic
locutions they say (source) and I think (degree of certainty). As for lexical ele-
ments, we will limit our attention to adverbs with clausal scope. Among these
reportedly and allegedly can be cited as clear-cut evidentials, whereas perhaps,
maybe, surely, clearly, and undoubtedly illustrate the more numerous cases related
to certainty. Expressions like apparently, seemingly, and evidently are plausibly

viewed in either manner.
Their analysis involves certain subtleties. First, higher-level grounding has
clause-internal grounding in its scope. In the sentence Perhaps he stole it, for ex-
ample, the assessment made by perhaps pertains not only to the profiled event (he
steal it), but also to its epistemic status (inclusion in past reality). The structure
grounded by perhaps is the proposition (P) subsuming clause-internal grounding
as well as the profiled occurrence.
Because the assessment concerns a proposition, the status it specifies pertains
to a higher level of reality. For clause-internal grounding, reality was characterized
as the history of realized occurrences, i.e. events and situations. But propositions
are more abstract (since they incorporate epistemic judgments), so per se they do
not occur. The issue is rather their validity: whether P is an accurate depiction
of the profiled occurrence and its epistemic status (where it stands in regard to
reality and its evolution). At this higher level of epistemic assessment, therefore,
what counts as reality is not the history of realized occurrences (R), but rather the
set of valid propositions (RR). By virtue of invoking additional mental capaci-
ties, this more abstract notion of reality represents a higher stratum of conceptual
organization.
In the former case marking is done in English by the absence vs. the presence
of a modal, e.g. He stole it vs. He will steal it. At the higher level, the analogous
distinction is made by the choice of grounding element. Thus surely and certainly
indicate that P is valid, hence in RR, while with perhaps and maybe P is merely pro-
jected as possibly being valid. So with higher-level grounding there are two levels
of epistemic judgment, one pertaining to the profiled occurrence and one pertain-
ing to the proposition based on it. And because the two assessments are largely
independent, we find all four combinations of real and projected, as in (4).
(4) (a) Certainly he stole it. [real [real]]
(b) Certainly he will steal it. [real [projected]]
(c) Perhaps he stole it. [projected [real]]
(d) Perhaps he will steal it. [projected [projected]]
By default, a simple statement like He stole it or He will steal it represents the epis-
temic assessment of the actual speaker. The status of the profiled occurrence as
real or projected is calculated with respect to the time of speaking and the speak-
er’s conception of reality (R), two facets of the actual ground (G), as sketched in
Figure 15(a)–(b). The effect of an adverb like perhaps or certainly is to distance this
clause-internal epistemic judgment from the actual speaker. It does so by constru-
ing the clausal content as a proposition (P) whose validity is subject to assessment,
implying that the speaker does not necessarily subscribe to the epistemic stance
conveyed by clause-internal grounding. The status of the profiled process is not

based on the actual ground and the speaker’s conception of reality, but on a virtual
ground (G') and the reality conception (R') of a virtual speaker. This is shown in
15(c), where – just as a convenient notation – the placement of the bold arrow
is meant to be neutral as to whether the profiled occurrence is real or projected
in relation to R'.
(a) He stole it.
G
R
(b) He will steal it.
G
R
(c) [ he {stole / will steal} it ]p

P
G G'
R'
Figure 15. Clause-internal grounding vs. adverbial grounding.
An adverb like perhaps functions as a kind of hedge by insulating the actual speak-
er from the stance implied by clause-internal grounding. It is roughly similar to
a non-immediate modal, in that the speaker imagines a situation (G', as part of
R') in which the epistemic stance would be appropriate. The speaker engages in
this mental simulation by way of offering a provisional assessment on the basis of
which her actual judgment can be formulated. How the two are related depends,
of course, on the meaning of the adverb. While perhaps indicates a discrepancy
between them, certainly implies their congruence.
Their meanings are sketched in Figure 16. Each concerns the validity of a
proposition (P) as assessed by the actual speaker (as part of G). They differ as to
whether P is real or projected, reality at this level being the set of valid proposi-
tions (RR). Since these are higher-level grounding elements, G itself is offstage and
remains implicit. P is the onstage focus of attention at this level, and P itself focuses
the profiled clausal process. So derivatively – as the focus within the focus – that
process is also profiled and grounded by the adverb.
(a) certainly
G'
R'
RR
G
R
(b) perhaps
G'
R'
RR
G
R
Figure 16. Alternatives for adverbial grounding.
A grounding adverb combines with a clause in a construction directly analogous

to the one for clause-internal grounding [Figure 3(a)]. This is shown in Figure 17
for the case of Perhaps he stole it. It is just a matter of the specific proposition he
stole it elaborating the schematic proposition evoked by perhaps. So while the pro-
filed event is marked as real by clause-internal grounding, in the context of the
overall expression it is merely projected since that is the status of the proposition
describing it.
G'
RR R'
G
R
G' P
R'
RR
G'
R'
G
R
perhaps he stole it
Perhaps he stole it.

Figure 17. An adverbial grounding construction.
Adverbs like perhaps and certainly pertain to degree of epistemic certainty, making
them higher-level analogs of a tense-modal grounding system. By contrast, report-
edly is clearly evidential, pertaining to the source of information. It is thus the
analog of clause-internal evidentials like Wanka Quechua -shi report, character-
ized in terms of degrees of departure from direct experience. Here, though, the as-
sessment is made in regard to a clausal proposition (not just the profiled process).
For an analysis based on egocentricity, we must first determine what to iden-
tify as the successive layers (or strata). What kinds of expressions correspond
to direct, inference, and report in a grammaticized evidential system? The
correspondences I propose are given in (5). In each case the structure subject to
higher-level grounding is the proposition he stole it, even though the interlocutors
are mainly concerned with the status of the profiled event (he steal it). Together,
clause-internal and higher-level grounding provide a wide range of elaborate op-
tions in regard to the event’s epistemic status.
(5) Higher-level analogs of the strata for clause-internal evidentials:
(a) He stole it. immediate (imm)
(b) Certainly he stole it. inference (inf)
(c) Reportedly he stole it. report (rep)
With respect to this dimension of elaboration, an unadorned clause like (5)(a)

represents the baseline, where clause-internal grounding suffices to specify the
status of the profiled event. In Figure 18(a) I use a simplified notation for baseline
grounding of this sort: it merely indicates that the profiled occurrence (bold ar-
row) is assessed by the actual speaker (as part of G), whatever its existential status
– present or past, real, or projected. The issue being source of information (rather
than epistemic certainty), the ellipse stands for immediacy (not reality).
What constitutes immediacy along this axis? It is a matter of the clause-in-
ternal grounding being the speaker’s own direct assessment, unmediated by the
view of another conceptualizer. The profiled event and the speaker’s assessment
of it implicitly define a proposition. More precisely, it functions as a proposition
when apprehended by another conceptualizer, or when the speaker “steps back”
and views it from an external perspective. But in the baseline situation, the speaker
simply views it from the inside (in G), so that only the event is onstage as an object
of conception. This latent proposition is represented by a dashed-line box.
With adverbs like perhaps and certainly, clause-internal grounding does not
reflect the speaker’s own, unmediated view. The speaker (as part of G) merely sim-
ulates the experience (in G') of viewing the profiled event in that manner, result-
ing in a proposition (P); then, at a higher level of organization, the speaker makes
an assessment concerning the validity of P (its location vis-à-vis RR). So instead
of being direct, the speaker’s view of the event and its status is mediated by the
mental processes of simulation and propositional judgment. This additional layer
of mental activity, representing higher-level cognition, is what constitutes infer-
ence along this axis.
An adverb like reportedly introduces another increment of distance by ascrib-
ing the proposition to another conceptualizer (C): the speaker in a real or imagined
speech event. Presumably C accepted P as being valid (part of RRC), and thus iden-
tified with the conceptualizer implied by clause-internal grounding. Still, the epis-
temic path from G to the profiled event is longer than with certainly, since the in-
tervening mental activity is carried out by someone other than the current speaker.
(a) He stole it.

P
G
IMM
(b) Certainly he stole it.
G G′
RR
INF
(c) Reportedly he stole it.
G C G′
RRC
REP
Figure 18. Evidential adverbial grounding.
4.2 Periphrastic means
As periphrastic means of grounding I will only consider complex sentences in

which a matrix clause indicates the existential status of a complement proposi-
tion. How closely they resemble grammaticized grounding elements is of course a
matter of degree. And as with grounding adverbs, some matrix predicates specify
source of information (e.g. see, hear, infer, say, report), others pertain to epistemic
certainty (think, suspect, know, likely, certain), while others are reasonably viewed
either way (seem, apparent, conjecture).
Here especially there is no clear dividing line between source and degree of
certainty. One reason is that the matrix clause often makes reference to a concep-
tualizer (C), typically its subject, who assesses the complement proposition (P).
Even when the judgment pertains to epistemic certainty, as in Jill is sure he stole it,
C represents a source of information regarding P. For the speaker, Jill’s epistemic
stance may be the only basis for entertaining the proposition he stole it. There is
in any case a path of access, (G)––>(C)––>[P], which the speaker follows in ap-
prehending the full expression (Achard 1998).
The conceptual organization of such expressions is not unlike the one in 18(c),
Reportedly he stole it. The main difference is that C’s assessment of P is profiled by
the matrix predicate and put onstage as the overall focus of attention, as seen in
Figure 19. In a sentence like Jill is sure he stole it, the matrix occurrence (Jill is sure)
is immediate to G both in the sense of being accepted by the speaker as real, and
also in the sense that this status – specified by clause-internal grounding – repre-
sents the speaker’s own direct assessment. On the other hand, the proposition ex-
pressed by the complement (he stole it) is ascribed to the matrix subject (C) rather
than the speaker, so it is non-immediate to the speaker in either sense.
G C G'
R'
IMM
Figure 19. Grounding via complementation.
A sentence of this sort invokes a minimum of three conceptualizers: the actual

speaker (in G), the matrix subject (C), and the conceptualizer (in G') implied by
the clause-internal grounding of the complement. In principle these are all dis-
tinct. For example, in Jill suspects he stole it, neither Jill nor the speaker is respon-
sible for the grounding assessment of the complement clause (location of the theft
in past reality): Jill merely suspects that he stole it (she does not know it), and the
speaker takes no position on the matter. In practice, however, there are often fewer
than three, as one conceptualizer not only apprehends the view of another but
subscribes to it and effectively assumes the latter’s role (Langacker 2008: §12.3.3,
2009: ch. 9).
There are several kinds of cases. With a predicate of epistemic certainty, C

identifies with G'; Jill is sure he stole it implies that Jill would be willing to say He
stole it. With a factive predicate (Kiparsky and Kiparsky 1970), the speaker identi-
fies with G'; from Jill doesn’t realize that he stole it, one can infer that the speaker
could say He stole it. And when the matrix clause is positive (Jill realizes that he
stole it), all three conceptualizers are in accord. Of course, the matrix clause can
explicitly identify its subject as the speaker, in which case their further identifica-
tion with G' depends on the predicate: I {am certain / suspect} that he stole it.
When C is the speaker and the matrix process is real, the function of the com-
plement construction is quite comparable to that of a grammaticized grounding
element. Thus I suspect he stole it can be roughly paraphrased as He may have
stolen it (projection at the levels of RR and R, respectively). By the same token, I
know he stole it resembles He stole it (without a modal) in that both imply that the
theft occurred (real at the levels of RR and R). These are also periphrastic coun-
terparts of grounding adverbials like certainly and perhaps, sketched in Figure 16.
They all pertain to degree of epistemic certainty.
With evidentials the matter is more complex. The counterpart of a reportative
marker, like Wanka Quechua -sh(i) in (2), or an adverb like reportedly, is not a ma-
trix clause with the speaker as subject, such as I say or I report. These portray the
speaker as the source of information. However, the function of reportatives is pre-
cisely to indicate that the information is secondhand: the speaker is not the source
but the recipient. Their counterpart is thus a matrix clause like they say, people say,
or it is said. Another option is I hear, involving a metonymic shift from auditory
perception to its role in the verbal transfer of information. Also metonymic are I
see and I feel, which – with finite complements – pertain to propositional judg-
ment rather than perception. They serve as periphrastic inferential markers (pre-
ferred alternatives to the formal and infrequent I infer). Other inferentials include
the quasi-perceptual it appears and it seems (to me).
In brief, a variety of matrix clauses – many based on perception predicates –
are roughly equivalent to evidential markers. But since propositions per se cannot
be directly experienced, these clauses assume the more abstract evidential values
of report or inference.
4.3 Diachrony
These kinds of matrix predicates are not just comparable to grammaticized

grounding elements but can also provide their diachronic source. I am certainly
not prepared to deal with these complex developments in any depth or detail. My
brief discussion will therefore concentrate on two major themes of this paper: ego-
centricity (degrees of centrality with respect to the speaker’s experience); and the
“secondary” status of grammatical elements (Boye and Harder 2009, 2012). Both
figure in the characterization of grounding adverbs.
Lexical adverbs like certainly and reportedly derive morphologically from
verbs or adjectives that function as matrix predicates in complement construc-
tions: She {is certain / reported} that he stole it. Shared aspects of their meaning
as matrix predicates are represented in Figure 20(a). Each profiles a relationship
(bold arrow) in which a conceptualizer (C) – often expressed as its subject – takes
a stance in regard to a proposition (P). Certain directly specifies that C accepts P
as valid, i.e. it belongs to RRC. In the case of report, C’s acceptance of P’s validity
is generally inferred.
(a) certain/report
C P
RRC
(b) certainly
P
G
RR
(c) reportedly
P
G C
RRC
Figure 20. Matrix verb vs. derived grounding adverb.
As higher-level grounding elements, certainly and reportedly differ from these

predicates in two respects. The first pertains to egocentricity: the speaker (as part
of G) becomes the primary conceptualizer. In Certainly he stole it, the one who is
certain (at least by default) is the current speaker, whose role as such and as the
deictic center makes overt mention unnecessary. The speaker is left implicit when
functioning solely in the capacity of offstage interlocutor (a tacit subject of con-
ception), whereas the grammatical subject, as an onstage participant, is salient
and explicit (an object of conception).
For the speaker and the ground to remain offstage is characteristic of ground-
ing elements. So in accordance with its higher-level grounding function, certainly
differs from certain in a second respect: the profile shifts from the speaker and her
assessment to the grounded proposition, and more specifically to its onstage focus
of attention, the grounded process. The adverb’s essential semantic content – the
speaker’s epistemic assessment – is thereby rendered non-salient in the sense of
being offstage and unprofiled. In CG terms, this defocusing of essential seman-
tic content is a main factor in the secondary status of grammatical elements. The
grounding function of adverbs like certainly can thus be seen as a step along the
path of grammaticization. (Adverbs with a lesser degree of analyzability, such as
perhaps and maybe, have moved a bit farther along it.)
In regard to the features under consideration, certainly and reportedly are
quite similar, as seen in Figure 20(b)–(c). The basic difference is that reportedly
still evokes a conceptualizer distinct from the speaker, the source of the reported
information. The presumed validity of P is ascribed to that conceptualizer, C, so P
belongs to C’s reality conception (RRC) rather than the speaker’s (RR).
Turning now to the grounding effected by matrix clauses, we find that the
same basic factors are at work. Expressions like I think, I know, and they say are
not only used for higher-level grounding but are well-entrenched in this capacity –
indeed, they are well along the path of grammaticization. For the case of epistemic
certainty (evidentials are basically analogous), let us briefly note some stages of a
potential path leading eventually to a clause-internal grounding element.
The starting point is a matrix clause which profiles the epistemic assessment of
the complement proposition (P), as shown in Figure 21. The subject is the speaker
(in G), so the assessment locates P with respect to the speaker’s own conception
(a) I know
G P
RR
(b) I think
G P
RR
Figure 21. Matrix clauses with grounding function.

of reality (RR). In the case of know the speaker accepts P as valid, hence in RR,
whereas with think its validity is merely projected.
In Figure 22(a) I sketch the basic construction combining the matrix and
complement clauses. Their integration is effected by a correspondence equating
the schematic proposition evoked by think with the specific complement proposi-
tion he stole it. A troublesome aspect of this construction has been the composite
structure profile. The traditional notion of the complement being subordinate sug-
gests that the matrix process I think should be profiled at the composite structure
level. In recent years, however, it has been observed that the complement is usually
the main focus of interest, the matrix clause having a secondary function of epis-
temic qualification (Diessel and Tomasello 2001; Thompson 2002). This suggests
that the overall profile is the complement process he stole it. Others have pointed
out that either clause can be the focus of interest, or even both (Boye and Harder
2007), which led me to propose that the composite structure profile varies accord-
ingly (Langacker 2009: ch. 11).
On the basis of later research (Langacker 2015a, 2015b), I now take a different
approach. Grammar reflects the interplay of descriptive and discursive factors.
Each involves a kind of focusing. Descriptive focusing is profiling (conceptual
reference). Its higher-level analog, discursive focusing, is an aspect of informa-
tion structure (a special case being the informational focus marked by unreduced
stress in English). In describing complementation, both levels have to be consid-
ered. Descriptively, I analyze the overall expression as having a dual focus: the
matrix and complement processes are profiled in successive windows of attention.
Superimposed on this structure is focusing motivated by discourse considerations
– a discursive overlay on either clause or both.
Descriptively, then, I posit the dual profile in 22(a) even though the comple-
ment would normally be the discursive focus of interest. But as instantiations of
the same general phenomenon, the two levels of focusing lend themselves to re-
interpretation, with both synchronic and diachronic consequences. A clear mani-
festation in English is the construction in 22(b), in which the matrix clause is
phonologically compressed, appearing as an unstressed appendage to the comple-
ment: I think he stole it. Showing that this is a distinct construction is the option of
the matrix following the complement: He stole it, I think. I analyze this phonological
compression as reflecting grammatical compression into a single-clause expres-
sion. In CG terms, it is a single clause because it has just one processual profile – at
the composite structure level it profiles only the event of stealing, not the process
of thinking. This comes about when discursive focusing of the complement is re-
interpreted as descriptive focusing, i.e. profiling.
In 22(b), this defocusing of the matrix is treated as an aspect of construction-
al meaning: in the context of this construction, the processual profile of I think
(a)
P
G
RR G' R'
G P
RR G'
R'
I think he stole it
I think he stole it.
(b)
P
G
RR G' R'
G P
RR G'
R'
I think he stole it
is suppressed at the composite structure level. However, frequent occurrence in

this construction eventually leads to expressions like I think being reananalyzed
as higher-level grounding elements. That is, instead of profiling the activity of
propositional assessment, they come to designate the process profiled by the com-
plement. The result is then a regular grounding construction where, as shown in
22(c), the schematic process profiled by a grounding element is elaborated by the
specific process profiled by its complement.
(c)
P
G
RR G' R'
P
P
G G'
RR R' G'
R'
I think he stole it
(d)
G
R
G
R
may he steal it
He may steal it.
Figure 22. Evolution from grounding via complementation to a clause-internal ground-
ing element.
We can plausibly suppose that numerous expressions (I think, I know, I sup-

pose, I’m sure, I hear, I feel, they say, it is said, etc.) have reached this stage of
grammaticization in present-day English. They comprise a system of higher-level
grounding elements. As such they are still extrinsic to the grounded clause, di-
rectly grounding the proposition it expresses; only indirectly – via the proposition
and its clause-internal grounding – do they bear on the epistemic status of the
profiled occurrence. Presumably, through further grammaticization resulting in
a greater degree of formal and conceptual integration (Langacker 2005b), they

might eventually develop into clause-internal grounding elements, as in 22(d). In
this case they directly ground the profiled clausal process. If I think in 22(c) is
comparable to maybe, its counterpart in 22(d) would be similar to the grammati-
cized modal may.
5. Conclusion
In this exploratory presentation, I have indicated ways of approaching evidentials

in CG. Their analysis relates to a number of more general issues. A fundamental
notion is that lexicon and grammar exist for the implementation of semantic func-
tions. Evidentiality – specification of the source and reliability of information – is
one such function. Alternative means of fulfilling it constitute an evidential system.
An essential semantic function is clausal grounding, pertaining to the epis-
temic status of the profiled occurrence. In a narrow sense, grounding comprises a
grammaticized system of clause-internal elements; defined more broadly, it is also
implemented by lexical means (clause-level adverbs) as well as periphrastic means
(complement constructions). Evidentials have analogous means of implementa-
tion. On the basis of both semantic and grammatical considerations, it was argued
that they are properly analyzed as grounding elements. Both evidentials and tense-
modality are in the service of epistemic control and intersubjective alignment.
Grounding manifests the inherent egocentricity of language and cognition.
Organization in terms of a center and increments of distance from it is a funda-
mental aspect of linguistic structure. At the center is the speaker, and more in-
clusively the ground, comprising the interlocutors, the speech event, and their
location in time, space, and reality. The center is characterized by immediacy –
direct, unmediated access – with respect to various dimensions. In tense-modality
grounding systems, basic distinctions include immediate vs. distant in time as
well as real vs. projected. In evidential systems, a basic distinction is direct
vs. indirect knowledge, the former including perception, and the latter both
inference (mediation by higher-level cognition) and report (information from
other individuals).
Grounding in the narrow sense, by a grammaticized system of clause-internal
elements, specifies the epistemic status of the profiled occurrence (an event or
situation). Grounding in a broader sense, at higher levels of organization, per-
tains instead to the validity of the clausal proposition (including its grounding by
clause-internal means). In either case, grammaticized grounding elements profile
the clausal occurrence, so that it – rather than the ground and grounding relation-
ship – functions as the onstage focus of attention. This defocusing of essential
semantic content is a factor in their grammaticization, being a main component

of the conventional secondary status of grammatical elements.
Despite their preliminary nature, these proposals point the way toward a uni-
fied account of (i) evidentials and grounding by tense and modality, (ii) the great
variety of grounding systems encountered cross-linguistically, and (iii) the shap-
ing of synchronic structure by ongoing diachronic processes. Hopefully they con-
tribute to the goal of seeking unity in diversity.
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Chapter 2
Evidentiality reconsidered
Jan Nuyts
University of Antwerp
This article reconsiders the semantic status of the traditional concept of eviden-
tiality, typically featuring ‘experientiality’ as the coding of directness of informa-
tion, and ‘inferentiality’ and ‘hearsay’ as the marking of two different types of
indirect information sources, as well as of two less traditional categories often as-
sociated with evidentiality, viz. ‘mirativity’ and ‘subjectivity’. It argues that these
dimensions do not constitute a semantically coherent domain. While inferential-
ity belongs in the system of ‘qualifications of SoAs’ (traditionally: ‘TAM mark-
ers’), and can be considered akin to categories such as deontic and epistemic
modality (i.e., to be ‘attitudinal’), the four other dimensions have a very different
nature, which positions them outside the ‘normal’ qualificational system.
Keywords: evidentiality, inferentiality, hearsay, experientiality, mirativity,

subjectivity, attitudes, epistemic modality, qualificational dimensions,
qualificational hierarchy
1. Introduction1
Evidentiality is currently enjoying considerable attention in the functional linguis-

tic and typological literature, and the notion has meanwhile attained the rank of
a major ‘qualificational category’, along with more classical categories such as mo-
dality, time and aspect. Correspondingly, it is also gradually finding its way into
the abbreviation commonly used as the shorthand for referring to qualificational
dimensions in general: even if this is not done systematically yet, more and more
authors use the label ‘TAME’ instead of the traditional ‘TAM’ (e.g. Dahl 2013; Post
2013; Rocci 2013; Rivero and Slavkov 2014; Muysken et al. 2015).
Concomitant with its success, the domain of evidentiality also shows a ten-
dency to expand. The standard definition (e.g. Willett 1988; Aikhenvald 2004,
1. Research for this paper was supported by a LP-BOF grant from the University of Antwerp
Research Council.
doi 10.1075/pbns.271.03nuy
58 Jan Nuyts
among many others) characterizes it in terms of the rather general concept of the
marking of the type of ‘source’ for the information about the world provided in the
utterance. In the traditional mainstream view – of which Willett’s (1988) classical
survey, even if fairly old, remains a representative summary – this covers a number
of major categories of source types, turning around the central issue of whether
the speaker has acquired the facts at stake directly (what will be called ‘experi-
enced’ here) vs. indirectly.2 The latter is further subdivided in two subcategories:
did the speaker infer the state of affairs from other witnessed or known facts (what
I will call ‘inferential’) vs. did s/he learn about it through communication with
others (to be called ‘hearsay’ here). But, gradually, other semantic dimensions have
come to be associated with evidentiality as well, even if they do not seem to have
anything to do with the issue of directness of information as such. This includes, at
least, the notion of ‘mirativity’ (e.g. DeLancey 2001; Lazard 2001), coding that the
information in the utterance is new and surprising to the speaker, and the notion
of ‘(inter)subjectivity’ (Nuyts 2001a, b), marking whether what the speaker says is
a strictly personal view vs. a view shared with others.
The question is, however, whether evidentiality really belongs in the set of
qualificational dimensions along with time, aspect, and modality. In this concep-
tual paper, I will argue that the answer is: yes and no, depending on the specific
subtype of evidentiality. And this issue actually does not just concern the distinc-
tion between the more and the less traditional notions of evidentiality: the answer
is yes for inferential, and no for mirativity and (inter)subjectivity, but probably
also for hearsay and experienced. In other words, I will argue that the notion of
evidentiality is not a coherent semantic category, not even if we confine it to the
classical subcategories, let alone if we include the less classical ones. It covers di-
mensions of a quite different nature, which need to be kept apart and deserve a
distinct status in a cognitively and functionally plausible semantic analysis. And
some of the traditional evidential categories – notably experienced and hearsay –
thereby actually share more characteristics with the less traditional ones than with
qualificational categories such as inferential or some of the modality types.
2. The label ‘speaker’ is actually not entirely accurate here. It is accurate in the default case in
which speakers talk about their own evidential – or modal, for that matter – qualifications of
states of affairs, that is, when the qualificational expression is ‘performative’. But speakers can
also report on others’ qualifications of states of affairs – in that case the qualificational expres-
sion is ‘descriptive’, and the speaker and the individual who made the qualification are different
persons. Thus, I suppose Peter has left already is performative, but John was supposing that Peter
had left already is descriptive. (See Nuyts 2001a: 72–78 on this distinction.) This distinction does
not matter in this paper, however, hence for the sake of simplicity I will keep on referring to ‘the
speaker’ in this connection.
Chapter 2. Evidentiality reconsidered 59
My analysis of the evidential categories will, not surprisingly, relate closely

to my earlier analysis of the modal categories (Nuyts 2005). On the one hand my
reasoning in the present paper will strongly remind of my argumentation against
modality as a coherent category, in the sense that it will use the same types of ele-
ments and facts, even if the distinctions to be made in the domain of evidential-
ity are entirely different in nature from those within the range of the traditional
modal categories. On the other hand, the relationship with some of the modal
categories – and epistemic modality in particular – is inevitably a crucial element
in any attempt to try to analyze and situate the evidential categories.
The essence of the position I will be adopting regarding the status of the evi-
dential categories is certainly not new, in the sense that other authors before have
differentiated between specific evidential or evidential-like categories and have
thereby at least implicitly assumed that they differ in some more or less substantial
ways (see Section 3 for references). This paper is meant to support and especially
to further nuance, substantiate and explicate (a specific version of) this position,
by offering a number of explicit arguments for why and how some of these catego-
ries are different, and by reflecting on what this means in terms of the conceptual
status of the different types.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a few preliminaries for
the discussion of the evidential categories: it sketches some essential elements of
the ‘theoretical’ perspective adopted in this paper on the analysis of qualifications
of states of affairs and their linguistic expression, and of the modal categories in
particular. Sections 3 and 4 then offer an analysis of the different evidential catego-
ries in terms of this perspective. Section 3 focuses on the three major traditional
evidential categories: experienced, inferential and hearsay; and Section 4 analyzes
the more controversial categories which have at least sometimes been labeled evi-
dential: mirativity and (inter)subjectivity. Section 5 rounds up the discussion.
2. The ‘theoretical’ background
The analysis of evidentiality in this paper is strongly inspired by the general view of
the domain of qualificational categories, and of the modal categories in particular,
as developed in among others Nuyts (2001a, b, 2005, 2009). For the sake of clar-
ity, this section presents in a nutshell the most crucial elements of this perspective
relevant for the discussion of the evidential categories in the following sections.
60 Jan Nuyts
2.1 A broad perspective on the field of expressive devices
The present analysis adopts a broad perspective on the range of expressive devices
for qualificational dimensions. There is a very distinct tendency in the literature
to focus exclusively on grammatical expressions of these categories, such as af-
fixes and auxiliaries, and to disregard other linguistic devices, such as adverbs and
full verbs. This tendency is also clearly present, even quite extremely so, in the
literature on evidentiality – it is symptomatic that major ‘classics’ on the subject
matter such as Willett (1988) and Aikhenvald (2004), for instance, only deal with
grammatical devices (and Aikhenvald 2004: 10–11 even strongly suggests that
only grammatical devices can really count as evidentials and are relevant for the
study of the notion).
There is no good reason for this limitation though. Surely, grammatical devic-
es are linguistically special (the fact that certain meanings get coded ‘in grammar’
is obviously highly significant) – but adverbial or verbal devices are linguistically
special, too, in their own way (if alone for the fact that these meanings keep on ‘us-
ing’ them as an alternative for the grammatical devices). The same meaning types
are expressed by these different expression types, hence the latter all reveal (some
of) the characteristics of the former. And we need to grasp how all of them work
together as a functionally motivated system of expressions of one semantic no-
tion (a ‘semantic paradigm’), in order to fully understand the category as such. In
general terms, none of the types of expressive devices is more privileged to help us
understand how the semantic qualification of states of affairs and its linguistic ex-
pression (in terms of any or all of the semantic categories of qualifications) works.
This is actually a reason why – even apart from the question of the felicity of
the extended label ‘TAME’ – ‘TAM’ is unfortunate as a shorthand for referring to
this semantic domain, and why the label ‘qualifications’ is to be preferred instead:
TAM traditionally stands for ‘tense-aspect-mood’, with tense and mood only refer-
ring to the grammatical devices expressing time and modality.
It is important to stress this matter because in the literature one often finds
arguments for postulating a close relationship between semantic categories on the
basis of the fact that these meanings are expressed by the same set of grammatical
forms in a language (see e.g. Lazard 2001 for an argumentation along these lines
in the range of the evidential meanings). But this is a very dangerous type of rea-
soning without a comprehensive picture of how these semantic dimensions are
expressed in the language across expressive devices, and of the functional factors
that play a role in this. There is no simple one-to-one relationship between mean-
ing and form in language, there are numerous factors which affect the mapping,
and so one cannot draw conclusions by looking at an isolated subpart of the lin-
guistic system. Thus, to give just one illustration: the presence of hearsay in the
system of the modal auxiliaries in languages such as Dutch and German, for exam-
ple, is a relevant observation, but cannot be used as an argument to treat hearsay
on a par with the modal meanings.
2.2 The qualificational hierarchy
Another important preliminary for the discussion of evidentiality is the notion

of the hierarchical or layered representation of qualificational dimensions, as a
crucial constitutive element for their analysis. This concept figures centrally in sev-
eral frameworks within functional and typological linguistics, albeit in sometimes
substantially different versions (the concept is assumed, e.g., in Role and Reference
Grammar – Foley and Van Valin 1984; Van Valin and LaPolla 1997; in Functional
(Discourse) Grammar – Dik 1997; Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2008; in the Saint
Petersburg School – Malchukov 2011; and cf. also e.g. Bybee 1985; Narrog 2009).
A fairly theory-neutral version of the hierarchy, which will be used here as a work-
ing hypothesis (see Nuyts 2001a), is represented in (1).3
(1) > evidentiality
> epistemic modality
> deontic modality
> time
> quantitative aspect / dynamic modality
> phasal aspect
> (parts of the) STATE OF AFFAIRS
In the frameworks that use it, this analytical construct is primarily meant to ac-
count for the relative extension of the semantic scope of the individual qualifica-
tional categories, and for the corresponding linguistic behavior of their expressive
devices. Specifically, the different categories are ordered from low to high in terms
of increasing scope: higher in the hierarchy means wider scope, hence categories
do have semantic scope over those below them but not over those above them.
As argued in among others Nuyts (2001a, 2009), however, this hierarchy no
doubt represents much more than just a ‘linguistic phenomenon’: it constitutes a
very basic dimension of our cognitive system for conceptualizing ‘the world’. Thus,
3. As for the definition of the category labels in the hierarchy: Evidentiality has been briefly
characterized in the introductory section and will be further specified and modified in Sections
3 and 4, and the different modal categories will be defined in Section 2.3. ‘Time’ concerns the
situation of the state of affairs on the temporal axis, ‘quantitative aspect’ involves an indication
of the frequency of the state of affairs (iterative, semelfactive, habitual, etc.), and ‘phasal aspect’
refers to the state of deployment of the state of affairs ((im)perfective, ingressive, progressive,
egressive, etc.).
62 Jan Nuyts
there appears to be a very fundamental cognitive rationale behind it, which in-
volves several conceptual dimensions, of which the for our present purpose most
relevant one is this (in strongly simplified and very abstract terms – see Nuyts
2009 for elaboration): Climbing up the hierarchy involves a gradual widening of
the perspective on the state of affairs and, correspondingly, an increasing role for
the speaker. The higher up in the hierarchy, the more the speaker has to do to
‘perform’ the qualification, in terms of drawing in information beyond the state of
affairs of concern and in interpreting the situation of the latter in that light – hence
the more room there is for creative involvement on his/her part in coming to the
qualification of the state of affairs.4 In sloganesque terms: ‘the higher up, the more
conceptual work’.
Thus, for example, to determine the state of deployment of a state of affairs
(phasal aspect), the speaker only needs the ‘percept’ of the state of affairs (or a
representation of it in memory), it requires no information beyond that. And there
is fairly little room for personal interpretation in these terms. But assessing a state
of affairs epistemically, for instance, does not involve any perception of that state
of affairs anymore (an epistemic judgment obviously concerns a hypothetical, i.e.
non-perceived, state of affairs). It is purely a matter of relating and comparing
other pieces of information about the world – concrete percepts, but also abstract
generalizations about the ‘logic’ presumably at work in the world – in order to
achieve an estimation of the likelihood of a postulated state of affairs. And there is,
in principle, an endless variability in the kinds of information that can play a role
in this reasoning process. Correspondingly, there is substantial room for interpre-
tation on the part of the speaker-qualifier.
This element of ‘work load’ and the corresponding degree of speaker presence
will be a crucial factor in the analysis of the evidential categories.
2.3 The analysis of the modal categories
A third important preliminary for the analysis of the evidential categories con-
cerns the issue of the status of what are traditionally called the ‘modal’ categories
– a matter which will also allow us to detail further some relevant aspects of the
qualificational hierarchy in (1).
The analysis of the traditional domain of modality proposed in Nuyts (2005)
features the meaning categories illustrated by means of the modal auxiliaries in (2).
4. This is also why climbing up this hierarchy can be considered to correspond to increasing
subjectivity of the meanings, in Traugott’s (1989) and Traugott and Dasher’s (2002) sense of the
notion (cf. Nuyts 2012) – but that is beyond the present concern.
(2) a. Dynamic modality:

Little John can bike to school already.
b. Deontic modality:
We cannot tolerate this kind of behavior.
c. Epistemic modality:
John might be home by now.
d. Directivity:
You can go now.
It assumes the traditional distinction between three major types of modality: ‘dy-
namic modality’, marking ability / possibility / potential or need / necessity / in-
evitability of / for the first-argument participant or the state of affairs as a whole
(with further subdivisions which do not matter here) – see (2a); ‘deontic modal-
ity’ marking the degree of moral acceptability of a state of affairs – see (2b); and
‘epistemic modality’, marking the degree of likelihood of a state of affairs – see (2c)
(Cf. Nuyts 2006, 2016 for elaboration and an overview of alternative distinctions
and how they relate to the present one.). But there is one important deviation
from the traditional view of these categories: a distinction is made between de-
ontic modality and ‘directivity’ (the traditional notion of deontic modality cov-
ers both these meanings; cf. Nuyts 2008, Nuyts et al. 2010). Directivity involves
the expression of an obligation or permission or an advice for the first argument
participant to realize the state of affairs, as in (2d) (meaning ‘you have my per-
mission’). Deontic modality on the other hand involves a pure estimation of the
degree of moral acceptability of the state of affairs, without it coding any element
of obligation or permission. When uttering (2b), for example, the speaker is not
ordering or interdicting anything, s/he is just expressing the judgment that ‘it is
morally unacceptable to tolerate it’. Pure deontic modality is a qualificational no-
tion, like epistemic and dynamic modality, and so it figures in the hierarchy in (1).
But directivity is exactly the same ‘meaning’ as expressed by the imperative, it is
in other words a speech act notion, not a qualificational category, and therefore it
does not figure in the (conceptual) hierarchy – it belongs in a completely different
realm of a language theory, namely the domain to do with communication plan-
ning (see Nuyts 2008).
In the view presented in Nuyts (2005), then, the classical concept of ‘modal-
ity’ as such – even after splitting off directivity – is not a relevant notion anymore.
Only the individual modal categories mentioned above are, as is reflected in the
fact that they have separate entries in the hierarchy in (1). And the argument for
this view is that the modal subcategories are semantically substantially different.
This is particularly true for dynamic modality on the one hand versus deontic and
epistemic modality on the other hand. The semantic difference is signaled, not
64 Jan Nuyts
only by a very different semantic scope behavior in language, as reflected in the

different hierarchical positions of these categories in the hierarchy. It is also sig-
naled by the semantic properties of the different categories summarized in Table 1.
Table 1. Semantic properties of the ‘modal’ categories

A1-related S-oriented Scalar
A1-ascr A1-addr
Dynamic Y N N N
Deontic N N Y Y
Epistemic N N Y Y
Directive Y Y Y N
Since these properties will also be crucial for the analysis of the evidential catego-
ries, let us briefly look at them in some more detail. They are illustrated by means
of the examples in (3).
Dynamic modality:
(3) a.
He can come in if he wants to, the door is unlocked.
[A1 ascribed pivotal role, no external source addressing A1;
not S-oriented (describes facts); not scalar]
b. Deontic modality:
These strikes must come to an end, they are ruining our company.
[not A1-related; S-oriented (issue of commitment); scalar (very high
degree of desirability)]
c. Epistemic modality:
John is probably in Paris now.
[not A1-related; S-oriented (issue of commitment); scalar (high degree
of likelihood)]
d. Directivity:
You have to resume work immediately, or I’ll fire you.
[A1 ascribed pivotal role, external source addressing A1; S-oriented (as
the external source); not scalar]
The (double) column ‘A1-related’ concerns the question whether the meaning cat-
egory relates to the first-argument participant – A1 – in particular, or not. This can
be the case in two different ways. The first subcolumn (‘A1-ascr’) indicates whether
A1 is ascribed a pivotal role in the realization of the state of affairs. This does ap-
ply in the dynamic modal use of the auxiliary in (3a), for example – but in (3c)
this is not at issue in the meaning of the modal adverb (although John is actually,
presumably, in control of hence pivotal to his being in Paris – but that is not what
the meaning of the adverb is about).5 The second subcolumn (‘A1-addr’) indicates
whether A1 is addressed by an external intentional source, typically the speaker,
aiming to influence A1’s execution of force or control over (hence aiming to assign
A1 a pivotal position in the realization of) the state of affairs. This is the case in
(3d), but it does not apply in (3a), for example.
The column ‘S-oriented’ indicates whether the meaning is speaker related, in
the sense that the speaker can be considered to be explicitly ‘present’ in the mean-
ing as a judging or intentional ‘source’. Of course, everything a speaker says is
in some sense speaker related – but what is meant here is whether the meaning
category at stake can be taken to explicitly code / be about the speaker’s ‘posi-
tion’. This is not the case in (3a), which simply renders an ‘objective’, observable
fact, but it is in (3b), for instance, which renders a speaker judgment (it explicitly
marks to what extent the speaker commits him/herself to what s/he says), or (3d),
which explicitly marks the speaker as an intentional source aiming to influence
the hearer’s actions.
The column ‘scalar’, finally, concerns the question whether the meaning cat-
egory involves a scale – as is the case for instance in deontic modality, which in-
volves a gradation of values ranging from complete unacceptability to high moral
necessity ((3b) marks the latter) with in between decreasing degrees of undesir-
ability, a neutral stance, and increasing degrees of desirability. If it is not scalar,
the category can have one value only, or it can be binary or n-ary yet without the
different values constituting a gradual cline. Dynamic modality for example is bi-
nary, featuring a weak value of ability / potential (as expressed in (3a) and a strong
value of need / inevitability. And directivity is n-ary (cf. (3d)): categories such as
permission, obligation and advice are distinct values which cannot be plotted on a
gradual scale (cf. Verstraete 2005).
Table 1, then, not only shows that deontic modality and directivity differ sub-
stantially in these terms – warranting their treatment as fundamentally different
categories. The table also clearly shows that deontic and epistemic modality share
the same features, but that dynamic modality differs from them in all dimensions
except the issue of A1 being addressed by an external source, which is absent in
all three. This reflects the very different cognitive status also of the latter catego-
ries, corresponding to their different position in the qualificational hierarchy. In
5. Maybe it would seem simpler to characterize this dimension in terms of ascribing ‘control’
over the state of affairs to A1. Although this would fit in many cases and is probably the pro-
totypical situation, as in (2a) and (3a) above, there are instances in which one may wonder
whether ‘ascribing control’ is really applicable. This is notably true in at least some instances of
dynamic modal need or necessity: does A1 really have control over the state of affairs in I need
to go to the toilet, or in to get into the garden you have to pass through the kitchen? Whence the
formulation in terms of ‘a pivotal role’ for A1.
66 Jan Nuyts
fact, in line with the cognitive rationale underlying the hierarchy mentioned in
Section 2.2 – in terms of increasing ‘work load’ for the speaker, and the corre-
sponding increase in speaker impact on the meanings at stake – one can subdivide
the hierarchy in a few ‘zones’ featuring groups of qualificational dimensions which
differ qualitatively in terms of what they do with regards to the state of affairs, as
shown in the modified version of the hierarchy in (4).
(4) > evidentiality
> epistemic modality
> deontic modality [attitudinal]
> time
> quantitative aspect / dynamic modality [situating]
> phasal aspect [detailing]
> (parts of the) STATE OF AFFAIRS
The categories at the bottom – involving a narrow perspective on the state of af-
fairs, hence requiring a relatively small speaker effort and allowing minimal inter-
pretational input – specify further the internal constitution of the state of affairs,
hence can be called ‘detailing’ qualifications (there are other categories of this type
next to phasal aspect but these do not matter for the present). The categories in the
middle – involving a perspective which extends beyond the state of affairs per se
hence requires more consideration on the part of the speaker – are about ‘situat-
ing’ the state of affairs as a whole in the ‘wider world’, along different dimensions,
including its frequency and its position in time (position in space would also fit in
here). In the categories at the top speaker activity hence speaker presence becomes
the absolutely dominant element: they involve different kinds of explicit speaker
reflections on the state of affairs. In other words, these qualifications are not about
situating anymore, but about reflecting and assessing, they concern different types
of ways in which the speaker can commit him/herself to the state of affairs – they
are what may be called ‘attitudinal’ categories. In these terms, then, dynamic mo-
dality figures in the range of the situating categories, but deontic and epistemic
modality are attitudinal categories.
3. The ‘classical’ evidential categories
With these preliminaries in mind, let us now turn to the analysis of the evidential
categories. And let us first consider the ‘traditional’ ones, to do with the marking
of types of information sources.
3.1 The classical evidential categories in the literature
As already indicated in the introduction, the standard view (cf. e.g. Willett 1988)
of the classical evidential categories assumes the subdivision illustrated in (5).
(5) a. [Direct:] Experienced:
A: John’s had a severe car accident today. – B: How do you know? – A:
I’ve seen it happen myself!
b. [Indirect:] Inferential:
John appears to be home. [His car is in front of the door and the lights
are on.]
c. [Indirect:] Hearsay:
I hear you’ve got a tuition waiver at Stanford, congratulations!
The main subdivision is in terms of whether the information provided in the ut-
terance has been acquired directly vs. indirectly. In the case of direct evidentials,
labeled (among others) ‘attested’ or ‘firsthand’ or ‘experienced’ (the latter term will
be used here), the speaker indicates that s/he has perceived the facts him/herself,
possibly with a further specification of the ‘channel’ of perception (visual, audi-
tory, etc.). In most Western European languages this evidential type is not very
prominent or central, at least in the sense that they do not have grammatical, or
even adverbial, expressions for it – but perception verbs can, at least in some of
their uses, arguably be considered markers of this kind of evidentiality. This is true,
for instance, for see in (5a).
‘Indirect’ evidentials are further subdivided in two major types. One type, among
others called ‘inferring’ or ‘inference(d)’ or ‘inferential’ (I will use the latter term),
involves the marking that what the speaker is talking about has not been perceived as
such, but has been inferred or deduced through logical reasoning, either from other
bits and pieces of information which s/he did perceive directly – as in (5b) – or from
general background knowledge and assumptions. Authors disagree on whether
these two types of inferential sources should be considered separate evidential cat-
egories or not: Willett (1988) includes both in the category of (what he calls) ‘infer-
ring’, but Aikhenvald (2004), for instance, does separate them more clearly. Since for
the present purpose both subtypes seem to behave in the same way, they will both be
covered under the label ‘inferential’ and not be discussed separately below.
The second major subcategory of indirect evidentials, called ‘reported’ or
‘hearsay’ (the latter term will be used here), indicates that the speaker has learned
about the facts s/he is talking about through communication with others – as in
(5c). Aikhenvald (2004), among others, distinguishes between hearsay and report-
ed as two different subtypes of this kind of evidentiality, but again the difference
68 Jan Nuyts
does not appear relevant for the present purpose, hence it will not be made in the
remainder of this paper.
Traditionally evidentiality is positioned very high, or even at the top, in the
qualificational hierarchy, above deontic and epistemic modality – this is true in
the version in (1) / (4), but also in most other proposals for such a hierarchy in the
literature.6 And so in the analysis in Nuyts (2005), in spite of some reservations
regarding some of the evidential subcategories, it is – without further discrimina-
tion – considered part of the group of attitudinal categories along with deontic and
epistemic modality.
More in general, there are many different views in the literature on how eviden-
tiality relates precisely to the modal categories – and, not surprisingly, especially
epistemic modality plays a critical role in the debates. Thus, some authors sim-
ply include evidentiality in epistemic modality, or consider it very closely related
to epistemic modality and adjoin both under one modal subcategory (e.g. Bybee
1985; Chafe 1986; Palmer 1986; Boye 2012). Others consider evidentiality and epis-
temic modality separate categories but do include evidentiality among the modal
categories (e.g. Cornillie 2009; Narrog 2005). Yet others simply exclude evidentials
from the set of modal categories (e.g. Anderson 1986; Bybee et al. 1994; Aikhenvald
2004; De Haan 2006). Some authors clearly differentiate between different subtypes
of evidentiality, however, in terms of the tightness of their link to epistemic modal-
ity and / or in terms of their inclusion in the category of modal notions. Inferential
in particular is often considered to be much more closely tied to epistemic modal-
ity than hearsay or experienced (e.g. Palmer 2001). And one extreme view, van der
Auwera and Plungian (1998), even includes inferential in epistemic modality but
excludes the other evidential categories entirely from the domain of modality.
3.2 A reanalysis
There actually appear to be good arguments in favor of a view which shares ele-
ments with several of the earlier analyses just mentioned, yet without fully cor-
responding to any of them. In particular, there are good reasons to assume that
inferential on the one hand, and hearsay and experienced on the other hand, are
really different categories, that inferential is related to even if still different from
epistemic modality, and is in any case part of the same wider semantic class as
epistemic modality, namely of what are called the attitudinal categories in (4), but
6. The mutual hierarchical ordering of evidentiality, epistemic modality and deontic modality
in the hierarchy is actually not based on observations regarding their relative scope vis-à-vis
each other, since these categories (at least when used ‘performatively’, see footnote 2) hardly
combine in one utterance. The arguments for their ordering are ‘conceptual’. See Nuyts (2009)
for elaborate discussion.
that hearsay and experienced are not members of this class. These reasons emerge
if we compare the semantic properties of the different evidential and attitudi-
nal modal categories, in terms of the dimensions already considered in Table 1.
Table 2 summarizes them.
Table 2. Semantic properties of the ‘modal’ vs. ‘evidential’ categories

A1-ascr A1-addr
Deontic N N Y Y
Epistemic N N Y Y
Inferential N N Y Y
Experienced N N N N
Hearsay N N N N
There is no difference between the individual evidential categories, or between any

of them and deontic and epistemic modality, in terms of relatedness to the first
argument participant: none of them are, in any way. But there is a clear difference
between the evidential categories in terms of the two other criteria.
First of all, inferential shares with epistemic and deontic modality that it is
scalar: it also, arguably inherently (see below), involves degrees, namely, in this
case, of the reliability of the process of inferencing in view of the strength or qual-
ity of the evidence available. In other words, it involves degrees of confidence with
which the speaker infers the hypothetical state of affairs from the evidence. And
so there are strong inferential expressions, marking high reliability, such as must,
clearly, obviously, it is clear / evident that, there are mid-scalar forms, marking
moderate reliability, including appear, presumably, it is plausible that, and there are
weak forms, marking low reliability, among others seem, seemingly, it is thinkable /
imaginable. Combined with polarity this then reflects a semantic scale of the same
type as in deontic and epistemic modality, ranging from a reliably positive conclu-
sion (cf. certainly positive in the epistemic range) to a reliably negative one (cf. cer-
tainly negative in the epistemic range), with a neutral position of inconclusiveness
of the inference (cf. uncertainty in the epistemic range) in the middle of the scale
and with degrees of increasing reliability in the positive and negative direction.
Hearsay and experienced, however, are not scalar. Hearsay is ‘monolithic’,
one-valued – one has heard something from others, and that is it (see below on
the status of any reliability suggestions that may emerge in hearsay). And in the
category of experienced languages may differentiate between the different sense
organs responsible for the experience (visual, acoustic, etc.), but that is of course
70 Jan Nuyts
not a matter of degrees of experience either: the different sense organs do not
constitute a scale.
Even more fundamentally, and no doubt causally related to the scalarity issue,7
there is a difference between inferential on the one hand, and experienced and
hearsay on the other, in terms of what ‘effort’ they involve for the speaker, and
in particular in terms of whether the speaker can be said to be present in the
meaning. Inferential requires mental effort and a real input on the speaker’s part:
s/he has to gather and process the evidence and has to draw conclusions from
this regarding a hypothetical state of affairs. And the category is actually centrally
about this deliberation process. This is very similar to the situation in epistemic
and deontic modality – there, too, the speaker has to consider other facts and draw
conclusions from them: in the epistemic case, from facts about what is real or not
in the world in order to decide on the likelihood of a hypothetical state of affairs;
in the deontic case, from facts about how the world should or should not be from
a moral perspective in order to decide on the degree of acceptability or desirabil-
ity of a real or hypothetical state of affairs. That is of course precisely what makes
deontic and epistemic modality ‘attitudinal’ categories: they concern the question
¬of the extent to which the speaker can commit him or herself to a state of affairs.
The same appears applicable for inferential evidentiality.
Hearsay and experienced, however, do not seem to require any mental effort
or deliberation on the part of the speaker at all: they simply involve registration
and signaling of the fact that information has been obtained through a certain
channel, be it the communicative utterances of another person, or be it one’s own
sense organs. That is simply a matter of rendering a little piece of meta-knowledge,
no more.
It is often suggested that hearsay implies some kind of ‘speaker evaluation’, too,
in the sense that hearsay information is often considered to be less reliable than
direct perception (e.g. Sweetser 1990). And surely, in some cases a speaker may
use a hearsay marker in a context in which it is obvious that s/he doubts the state
of affairs talked about, as in German example (6a).
(6) a. Er soll das Gemälde gestohlen haben – ich kann’s aber kaum glauben.
‘People say / rumor has it that he has stolen the painting – but I can
hardly believe it.’
b. Es soll da schön sein – da müssen wir bald mal hin.
‘People say / rumor has it that it is beautiful there – we should go there
sometime soon.’
7. Arguably, scalarity and speaker involvement are at least to some extent correlated, in the
sense that judgments of the kind involved in the attitudinal qualificational categories may typi-
cally be expected to be graded (rather than black and white).
But this element of doubt – or is it unreliability? – when present, is clearly of a very

vague and (in the technical sense of the word) ‘monotonous’ kind (cf. Aikhenvald
2004: 179ff), it can hardly be considered scalar in the sense of the clear gradation
in degrees of reliability, from strong to weak, as present in inferential markers
(Aikhenvald 2004: 179ff, at least, does not offer any clear examples of languages
with a system of hearsay – or what she calls ‘reported’ – markers coding degrees of
certainty or reliability). Even more critically, and no doubt corresponding to the
vagueness of the element of uncertainty / unreliability, the latter does not appear to
be a necessary ingredient of a hearsay marker at all, and it can easily be cancelled:
German (6b) seems equally natural as (6a), yet the same hearsay marker is used
without any suggestion of doubt or unreliability, as is reflected in the speaker’s
follow-up conclusion on the basis of the hearsay information. One can easily find
cases in which hearsay markers are entirely neutral as to elements of (un)certainty
or (un)reliability, or may even have a reassuring effect, for instance when one is re-
porting on the views of experts, in which case the hearsay marker even lends extra
credibility to the statement – and this may involve one and the same hearsay form
used on different occasions. In other words, connotations of doubt or unreliability
of hearsay markers appear to be merely contextual effects, they are not part of the
semantics of hearsay marking as such.
Experienced obviously nearly always suggests certainty /reliability (cf. also
Aikhenvald 2004). But again, this is not a matter of a scale (there does not appear
to be such a thing as graded expressions of degrees of reliability of an experience
in languages) – and it would moreover seem a nearly inevitable byproduct of the
direct perception meaning. In other words, semantically an experiential marker
expresses the meaning ‘directly perceived (through such and such sense organ)’,
not ‘I am certain / confident that’, even if the latter is more or less inevitably im-
plied by the former.
One might contend that there are languages with inferential forms which
do not imply any uncertainty / unreliability either, as reported by among others
Aikhenvald (2004: 165) or Mélac (2014: 54–55). Still, these forms appear different
from hearsay and experienced markers. On the one hand, while hearsay mark-
ers are (as argued) in principle neutral in terms of any connotations in terms of
certainty or reliability (with any effects of the latter being purely contextual by-
products), these inferential forms actually clearly mark (what these authors call)
‘certainty’ or (what might rather be) ‘very high reliability’. And on the other hand,
while any effects of certainty or high reliability may be considered automatic im-
plications of the perception meaning in experienced markers, this is not at all the
case for inference: inferences are not by default highly reliable, on the contrary.
Hence, the inferential forms at stake are arguable strong ones, comparable in
72 Jan Nuyts
meaning to English clearly, obviously etc. – and thus with the meaning of high reli-
ability as an inherent part of their semantics.8
All of this strongly suggests, then, that neither hearsay nor experienced can
be considered attitudinal categories, whereas inferential in principle is attitudinal.
3.3 The status of the different traditional evidential categories
What does all of this mean in terms of the conceptual status of these categories,
then?
Regarding the position of inferential vis-à-vis the attitudinal modal categories,
the above discussion indicates a difference between inferential and epistemic mo-
dality on the one hand, and deontic modality on the other hand, in that inferential
and epistemic modality both concern the reality status of a hypothetical state of
affairs, while deontic modality concerns the moral status of a state of affairs, no
matter whether hypothetical or real. This suggests that epistemic and inferential
are closer together than either of these is to deontic modality. Even if they are,
however, inferential nevertheless appears different from epistemic modality. Both
can be considered to be logically connected in the sense that they both involve a
reasoning process from bits and pieces of evidence which leads to a conclusion
regarding the potential of existence of a state of affairs – the process rendered in
the top line of the scheme in (7).
(7) facts [1+2+...n] REASONING hypothetical SoA
reliability of likelihood of
|| ||
inferential epistemic
But as also indicated in the scheme in (7), both denote different aspects of this pro-
cess. Epistemic modality codes the result of this reasoning process. It denotes de-
grees of likelihood of the state of affairs, and denotes nothing at all in terms of the
reasoning process leading to this assessment. It of course does suggest or imply,
8. If there really turned out to exist inferential forms in languages which are entirely neutral
in terms of the reliability of the information (like hearsay forms default appear to be) – forms
which, in other words, exclusively mark that the state of affairs talked about has been inferred –
then this type of inferential would belong to the same ‘conceptual category’ as hearsay and expe-
rienced (see below), but it would differ substantially from the category of inferentials discussed
above, and both categories would deserve a different name.
in very general terms, that there is evidence, of some kind, since one is supposed
to have background information in order to make a probability judgment – but it
does not say anything at all in terms of what this evidence involves, and whether it
is good or bad evidence. It might be sheer intuition.
Inferential, on the other hand, refers to the reasoning process as such, and
denotes its reliability in view of (the quality of) the source information. But it
strictly speaking denotes nothing in terms of the likelihood of the state of affairs.
Of course, the fact that it codes reliability means that there are very strong implica-
tions from inferential values to epistemic values, which are even hard to undo, if
that is possible at all. If a speaker, for instance, indicates high reliability of an infer-
ence from facts to some state of affairs, it is very hard not to understand this as im-
plying that s/he is also quite sure that the state of affairs applies. Still, these are im-
plications, and the two categories do denote different aspects of the process in (7).
Hence, even while acknowledging that inferential and epistemic are in a way
closer together than either is to deontic modality, they still deserve a separate place
in the qualificational hierarchy in (4), as indicated in the slightly modified version
of it in (8).
(8) > inferential evidentiality
> epistemic modality
> deontic modality [attitudinal]
> time
> quantitative aspect / dynamic modality [situating]
> phasal aspect [detailing]
> (parts of the) STATE OF AFFAIRS
Hearsay and experienced, on the other hand, appear categories of a completely

different kind, which arguably do not even belong in the qualificational hierarchy.
They of course still are elements which mark the status of the information a speak-
er provides – but, unlike all the categories in the qualificational hierarchy, in a way
they do not qualify the state of affairs talked about as such. This is most obviously
true for hearsay: it exclusively marks information source, and leaves the status of
the state of affairs as such ‘untouched’. But the discussion in Section 3.2 suggests
that the situation is not really different for experienced. This of course raises the
question what conceptual status these categories do have, then. This matter will be
taken up in Section 4.3, since a similar question emerges in the analysis of the less
traditional evidential categories, and the answer is, possibly, at least in part similar
for all of these categories.
74 Jan Nuyts
4. Mirativity and (inter)subjectivity – and hearsay and experienced again
As indicated in the introduction, next to the traditional evidential categories dis-

cussed in Section 3, there are a few more – generally less prominent – semantic
categories which some authors have covered under the label of evidentiality, in-
cluding at least ‘mirativity’ and ‘(inter)subjectivity’.
4.1 A brief characterization of mirativity and (inter)subjectivity
Mirativity (also called ‘admirativity’, but I will use the shorter label here), as the
most important of the two categories, codes that the information provided in the
utterance is new and surprising or unexpected for the speaker (there are several
other notions introduced in the literature which probably concern essentially the
same semantic category, including, among others, that of ‘(un)prepared minds’
as defined by Slobin and Aksu 1982 and Aksu-Koç and Slobin 1986 – see Nuyts
2001b for an overview). One of DeLancey’s (2001: 375) illustrations is (9), from
Hare (Athapaskan).
(9) a. Júhye sa k’ínayeda.
hereabout bear go.around
‘There was a bear walking around here.’
b. Júhye sa k’ínayeda lõ.
hereabout bear go.around MIRATIVE
‘Gee, I see there was a bear walking around here!’
(9a) is a fairly neutral statement of the speaker’s conclusion, after having noticed
tracks in the soil, that a bear has been walking around the house. (9b) on the other
hand formulates that same conclusion, but also signals surprise about it on the
part of the speaker, for example because the house is in an area where there nor-
mally are no bears. This element of surprise is coded by the mirative clause-final
particle lõ.
Lazard (2001), at least, calls mirativity an evidential category straight away.
DeLancey (1997, 2001), Plungian (2001) and Aikhenvald (2004) consider it dis-
tinct from but nevertheless closely related to evidentiality – Aikenvald for instance
gives it pride of place in her book on evidentiality, and handles it on an equal basis
with the ‘real’ evidential categories.
The notion of (inter)subjectivity, also considered evidential in nature in Nuyts
(2001a, b), marks whether what a speaker is saying is his/her strictly personal view,
or whether it is rather a rendering of common ground between the speaker and
others (cf. also Lee 1993; Choi 1995 for a comparable distinction).9 This notion
was originally introduced in order to account for the difference between epistemic
modal expressions such as (10a) and (10b), and was meant as an alternative for the
traditional distinction between subjective and objective modality, made among
others by Lyons (1977).
(10) a. Given the instability in the country it is likely that the army will
intervene.
b. In such an unstable situation I think the army will intervene.
c. The army will probably intervene.
Both (10a) and (10b) express the speaker’s estimation of the likelihood of the state
of affairs, but in (10a), due to the impersonal construction it is likely, the speaker
indicates that this is a view shared by more people, hence an intersubjective one,
while in (10b), due to the first person singular form I think, s/he signals that it is
his/her own personal opinion, hence a subjective one. (10c), with an adverbial
marker, is neutral in these terms. So the difference is here due to the syntactic pat-
tern in which the epistemic expression appears (Nuyts 2001a, b).
But in the mean time it has gotten clear that the range of the category extends
far beyond epistemic modality: it covers at least also several other attitudinal cat-
egories, including not only deontic modality but also inferential evidentiality. And
it has a much wider range of expressive devices than just the syntactic pattern
of the attitudinal marker – there are for instance also independent subjectivity
markers, as illustrated in the English expressions in (11a) and in Dutch (11b) (see
Nuyts 2012, 2014).
(11) a. In my view / If you ask me / To me / I think that’s the most stupid thing
you can do.
b. Ik vind dat een heel domme beslissing.
[literally:] ‘I find that a very stupid decision.’
While the traditional distinction between subjective and objective modality has
often been considered to be inherent in modality itself (among others by Lyons),
this alternative notion of (inter)subjectivity must certainly be assumed to have an
independent status as a semantic dimension. Several elements point in that direc-
tion: the fact that it is relevant for several different attitudinal categories; the fact
that not all expressions of these categories code the dimension and can be neutral
in its terms; and the fact that it has independent expressive devices, such as those
9. This concept of subjectivity should not be confused with Traugott’s (1989) and Traugott and
Dasher’s (2002), hence with the notion of subjectivity mentioned a few times in Section 2 (which
is Traugott’s notion). These are entirely different things (see Nuyts 2012 for a comparison).
76 Jan Nuyts
in (11). In fact, even in direct combination with an attitudinal expression, as in

(10a-b), it is in a way independent of that attitudinal expression, since it is due to
the syntactic pattern rather than the attitudinal form itself.
Mirativity and (inter)subjectivity are obviously not entirely the same.
Subjectivity does not code ‘being new and surprising’ to the speaker in any direct
sense. At best, it may imply that what the speaker says is new and potentially sur-
prising to the hearer. Nevertheless, the two notions do show semantic similarities
(Nuyts 2001a, b, 2014), and they also appear to have similar properties, as will
become clear in Section 4.2.
4.2 The semantic properties of mirativity and (inter)subjectivity
As already mentioned, mirativity and (inter)subjectivity do not fit in the direct

vs. indirect distinction at the heart of traditional evidentiality, they have nothing
to do with the matter of directness of the information. In fact, they have nothing
to do with the marking of types of sources of information regarding the state of
affairs at all. That is also why – pace Lazard (2001) – DeLancey (2001), Plungian
(2001) and Aikhenvald (2004), among others, consider mirativity to be distinct
from traditional evidentiality – and justly so. Nevertheless, they still do consider
it a category roughly of the same kind as inferential evidentiality or as the modal
categories. And given the semantic similarity, even if labeling (inter)subjectivity as
evidentiality proper may not be accurate either (pace Nuyts 2001a, b), one might
be inclined to still consider it somehow related. There are, however, reasons to
doubt that these two semantic categories belong to the set of the attitudinal catego-
ries, or even of the qualificational categories more in general.
First of all, expressions of (inter)subjectivity, at least, linguistically behave
quite differently from expressions of the other attitudinal categories. While in gen-
eral there are heavy restrictions on the co-occurrence of attitudinal categories in
a clause, such as of deontic and epistemic forms, or of epistemic and inferential
forms (for reasons discussed at length in Nuyts 2009), expressions of (inter)sub-
jectivity combine freely and frequently with any of the attitudinal categories. This
even appears to be one of their predominant ‘habitats’ – in fact, even independent
(inter)subjectivity markers as in (11) typically occur with another attitudinal or
evaluative expression elsewhere in the clause. In other words, (inter)subjectiv-
ity prototypically behaves as an ‘extra’ meaning element on top of an attitudinal
one. The literature on mirativity at least does not exclude that the same applies
for this category.
Also if we look at the semantic properties of these categories in comparison
with those of the attitudinal ones indicated in tables 1 and 2, clear differences
emerge – and one can even discern a certain relationship with the ‘evidential’ cat-
egories of hearsay and experienced. Table 3 presents the relevant facts.
Table 3. Semantic properties of the attitudinal vs. ‘other’ categories

A1-ascr A1-addr
Attitudinal N N Y1 Y
Experienced/ N N N N
hearsay
Mirativity/sub- N N Y2 N?
jectivity
There are no differences between any of these categories in their relation to the
first argument participant (none of them has one) – but they do show differences
in matters speaker orientation and scalarity. In fact, mirativity and (inter)subjec-
tivity appear quite special in these terms.
Thus, at first sight, purely ‘logically’, one might think that both mirativity and
(inter)subjectivity would be scalar: regarding the latter category, the group of peo-
ple accepting a view may be smaller or wider, and there may be different degrees
of agreement on an issue; and regarding the former category, one can be surprised
to different extents. Still, there do not seem to be any reports on the existence of
graded expressions of mirativity in the literature; and it is hard to imagine grad-
ed expressions of (inter)subjectivity – at least they do not exist in the languages
on which the analysis of (inter)subjectivity has been based so far (the Western
European ones).
Correlated with this, also the issue of speaker orientation appears special in
both mirativity and (inter)subjectivity. They differ in this regards from hearsay
and experienced in the sense that, unlike in the latter, the speaker no doubt does
play a role in them. But the way s/he plays a role seems quite different from how s/
he figures in the attitudinal categories. Consider the issue of speaker effort, which
is strongly correlated with the attitudinal character of categories such as inferen-
tial and epistemic and deontic modality. Assessing whether what one is saying is
strictly personal (subjective) or rather a shared view (intersubjective) would not
seem to require much mental effort and much deliberation – it is probably just a
matter of having knowledge about other individuals’ or the general public’s views
and opinions. Similarly for being surprised: this would appear to be no more than
a matter of registering the existence of a clash between a newly conceptualized
state of affairs and what one knows about the world. Neither of these categories
seems to require the types of reasoning processes and deliberations regarding
78 Jan Nuyts
some state of affairs on the basis of facts and background knowledge, as involved
in the attitudinal categories.
In fact, (inter)subjectivity and mirativity do not even seem to involve a reflec-
tion on the state of affairs as such at all. When coding (inter)subjectivity in what
one is saying about a state of affairs, that state of affairs, including any assessments
of it for instance in terms of its reliability or certainty or acceptability, remains
what it is. But what is affected or addressed, centrally, is the position of the speaker
in the world. This is of course with relevance to the state of affairs and its assess-
ments: these are a ‘benchmark’ for the reflection on the speaker’s position. But
nevertheless, (inter)subjectivity says more about the speaker than about the state
of affairs, or ‘focuses’ more on the former than on the latter. The situation in mira-
tivity appears the same: the state of affairs, including any assessments of it, is what
it is, but what is affected, centrally, is the position of the speaker vis-à-vis the state
of affairs and vis-à-vis the context.
And this is then what these categories share with hearsay and experienced,
in spite of the difference in terms of speaker relatedness (cf. Section 3): unlike all
the categories in the qualificational hierarchy, they do not actually ‘qualify’ the
state of affairs talked about as such. For that reason mirativity and (inter)subjectiv-
ity should probably not be considered to be part of the qualificational hierarchy
in (8) either.
The assumption in Nuyts (2001a, b) that (inter)subjectivity is an evidential
category is herewith refuted, of course.
4.3 The status of mirativity and (inter)subjectivity – and of hearsay and

experienced
The conclusion of Section 4.2 again raises the question already brought up in
Section 3.3, what status these ‘non-qualificational’ dimensions – and, thus, not
only mirativity and (inter)subjectivity, but also hearsay and experienced – actually
do have. Or, in more theoretical terms: how should these notions be integrated in
a model of conceptualization, relative to the qualificational hierarchy in (8)? The
answer is not immediately obvious. In the light of the discussion in Section 2.3
regarding the differentiation between deontic modality (as a qualificational cat-
egory) and directivity (as a non-qualificational one), one might wonder whether
these non-qualificational ‘evidential’ categories also (like directivity) belong in the
range of dimensions to do with communication planning. The answer would seem
to be negative. Unlike directivity, neither the pure information source marking
categories (experienced and hearsay) nor the categories to do with the position of
the speaker (mirativity and (inter)subjectivity) would seem to be centrally con-
cerned with or focused on the modulation of the interaction between speaker and
hearer, or with the organization of the discourse. Surely, (inter)subjectivity mark-

ing is no doubt often ‘used’ as a tool, for instance in argumentative discourse, in
the negotiation of the mutual positions of the speaker and the hearer (see Nuyts
2015). And one can easily imagine how ¬mirativity, and also hearsay marking,
might play an important role as a ‘strategic tool’ in argumentation as well (for ex-
perienced this is less obvious though). Nevertheless, this is not the ‘core business’
of these categories: they still centrally concern the coding of aspects of one’s con-
ceptualization of the world, and their role in the regulation of interaction would
appear to be ‘a byproduct’ of their properties or status as conceptual categories.
(For a comparison: directivity, concerning the coding of what kind of act a speaker
is performing towards the hearer, obviously is centrally a matter of the regulation
of the communicative interaction, and not just a byproduct of something else.)
For mirativity and (inter)subjectivity this assumption is further underscored
by the fact that they – or in any case the latter category – prototypically combine
with the attitudinal categories in the qualificational hierarchy (cf. Section 4.2).
Even if they are not part of it, this obviously suggests some kind of an ‘affilia-
tion’ of these categories with the conceptual hierarchy. Maybe we should see them
as forming a separate conceptual system surrounding or ‘sitting over’ the qualifi-
cational hierarchy. A system which does not follow the same cognitive rationale
as the hierarchy though, since the basic principle in the latter, of the widening
of the perspective on the state of affairs and the corresponding increasing ‘work
load’ and speaker involvement (cf. Section 2.2), does not apply to these categories
(cf. Section 4.2).
Maybe we can assume something comparable for experienced and hearsay,
since these categories can be conceived of as some kind of a ‘shell’ around the state
of affairs and (at least in the case of hearsay) any qualifications of it (i.e., again, the
hierarchy in (8)) which so to speak ‘encapsulates’ the latter from the speaker.10 In
fact, even beyond the absence of explicit speaker involvement in these categories
10. Experienced would seem to be inherently ‘incompatible’ with any qualifications of the state
of affairs: the perception would by necessity seem to concern the state of affairs as such. One
can, for example, not perceive ‘a state of affairs yesterday’ – if one combines a perception marker
with a time marker the latter would seem to automatically situate the perception, not the state
of affairs as such – for example, the semantic structure of I saw him walking down the street
yesterday is [yesterday I see [him walking down the street]], not [I see [him yesterday walking
down the street]]. This does not apply to hearsay: one can be told by others about a qualified
state of affairs – as in he told me that John will probably be out to a party somewhere tomorrow.
But these qualifications of the state of affairs are then inevitably the reported person’s, not the
speaker’s – hence in case of attitudinal categories, which feature the performativity vs. descrip-
tivity distinction (cf. footnote 2 in the introduction), such as epistemic probably, the expression
is automatically descriptive.
80 Jan Nuyts
as such, as marked by the ‘N’ for ‘S-oriented’ in Table 3 in section 4.2, the speaker
appears to be entirely ‘absent’ in what is in the scope of markers of these ‘evidential’
types. This is then also where the comparison with mirativity and (inter)subjectiv-
ity ends: as dimensions external to the qualificational hierarchy, they have entirely
different properties.11
Admittedly, this is a very vague characterization of the status of these different
categories, for lack of a better understanding at present. This matter is food for
much further thought.
5. Conclusion
In sum, there appear to be strong reasons to assume that – just like modality –
evidentiality is not a coherent category. Among the classical and less classical ‘evi-
dential’ categories there are a few substantially different subtypes. And these are
actually more radically different than the subtypes within the traditional domain
of modality: while both the attitudinal (deontic and epistemic) and non-attitudi-
nal (dynamic) modal categories are all qualificational, only one of the evidential
subtypes – inferential – is qualificational, and more particularly attitudinal, while
all the others are arguably non-qualificational (at least if ‘qualificational’ is inter-
preted in the narrow sense of ‘qualifying/modifying’ the state of affairs under con-
sideration, hence belonging in the hierarchy in (8)).
And so, to return to the opening paragraph of the introduction, the conclusion
of the speculative thoughts in this paper would seem to be that the label ‘TAME’ is
not a felicitous one. This is true not only for the reason mentioned in Section 2.1
that the label, at least when used in the original way, betrays an unwanted bias
towards the grammatical expression of qualificational dimensions. It is also true
because it lists categories which are not categories. Thus, the label ‘TAM’ as such
was already unfortunate since it suggests that modality is a category, on a par with
time and aspect – which it is not (cf. Section 2.3). ‘TAME’ is even more unfortu-
nate since ‘evidentiality’ does not seem to be a coherent category either, and even
more radically so than modality.
11. Maybe we should even see the hierarchy-external system of experienced and hearsay as sit-
ting beyond the system featuring mirativity and (inter)subjectivity, for the latter would seem to
be potentially within the scope of, at least, a hearsay marker: one can report on others’ surprise
over or (inter)subjective position regarding a state of affairs and its qualifications. Whether this
also applies for experienced is less obvious though – maybe this involves another difference
between these two source-marking categories, beyond that noticed in the preceding footnote.
This is matter for further investigation.
Summa summarum: the concept of ‘having to do with the marking of sources’

is apparently not suited as a basis to classify semantic categories in terms of their
conceptual status.
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Section B.
Evidentiality in Grammar and Discourse

Chapter 3
On the evidential use of English adverbials

and their equivalents in Romance languages
and Russian
A morpho-syntactic analysis
Verónica Böhm, Gerda Haßler and Anja Hennemann

Potsdam University
The present study investigates the use of equivalents of the English adverbials
seemingly and apparently with a specific morphological structure in Romance
languages and Russian, i.e. Spanish al parecer, Portuguese ao parecer and ao
que parece, French avoir l’air de, Italian all’apparenza and in apparenza as well
as Russian по-видимому. The underlying hypothesis is that the function and
syntactic behaviour of these adverbial locutions are motivated by their mor-
phological composition. It is to investigate whether the adverbials may be used
sentence-initially, parenthetically, as an adverbial with broad or narrow scope or
as a component of a modalised predication. The adverbial locutions are treated
as means of expression where evidentiality and epistemic modality represent
overlapping functional-semantic categories.
Keywords: adverbial locutions, morphological structure, scope, evidentiality,

epistemic modality
1. Introduction
The aim of the present study is to investigate the use of equivalents of the English
adverbials seemingly and apparently with a specific morphological structure in
Romance languages and Russian: the adverbial locutions in Spanish al parecer,
Portuguese ao parecer and ao que parece, French avoir l’air de, Italian all’apparenza,
in apparenza and Russian по-видимому.
In these means of expression the functional-semantic categories of eviden-
tiality and epistemic modality seem to overlap: on the one hand, they are used if
the state of affairs talked about cannot be verified, i.e., if there is still a moment
doi 10.1075/pbns.271.04boh
88 Verónica Böhm, Gerda Haßler and Anja Hennemann
of insecurity concerning the transmitted information. On the other hand, these

adverbial locutions are often used if the information being talked about comes
from an external information source, i.e., an information source which cannot be
identified as the speaker or author.
This investigation is based on the hypothesis that the function and syntactic
behaviour of the means of expression analysed here are motivated by their mor-
phological composition. The study is concerned with the scope of these adverbial
locutions, i.e. the extent of the reference range, and will analyse whether the ad-
verbials under discussion may be used sentence-initially (1), parenthetically (2), as
an adverbial with broad (3) or narrow scope (4) or as a component of a modalised
predication (5):
(1) ‘Apparently I’m a crack addict!’ Michelle Keegan jokes about snaps […].
(Daily Mail 08/07/2012)
(2a) I’m an Anglophile, it seems. Can one be an Anglophile and also a Scottish
nationalist? (The Guardian 24/02/2012)
(2b) These days, it seems, we marry the property rather than the person.
(The Guardian 20/07/2006)
(3) Apparently he saved a child from certain death, at the expense of his own.
(BNC, AN7 1775)
(4) Nicolas Sarkozy reaches out for Carla to spice up a seemingly boring meeting
on his Indian state visit. (Daily Mail 09/12/2010)
(5) ‘She apparently has not learned her lesson’: Thieving girl, 13, forced to hold ‘I
steal from my family’ sign at busy intersection. (Daily Mail 15/02/2012)
In order to obtain data from different newspapers and other texts, we used the
corpus programme GlossaNet (http://glossa.fltr.ucl.ac.be/) and the following cor-
puses: CREA (http://corpus.rae.es/creanet.html), CORDE (http://corpus.rae.es/
cordenet.html) of the Spanish Academy, Corpus do Português (http://www.cor-
pusdoportugues.org/), the Russian National Corpus (http://www.ruscorpora.ru/)
and the British National Corpus (http://www.natcorp.ox.ac.uk/).
Chapter 3. A morpho-syntactic analysis 89
2. Morphological structure and epistemic and evidential functions
2.1 Morphological structure
Although studies exist on English, Romance and Russian adverbials as means of

expressing evidentiality,1 few specifically concentrate on their morpho-syntactic
behaviour, even if adverbial evidentials are focused upon.2 Our study aims to
prove that a given structure can express evidentiality in several languages, inde-
pendently of one another. We therefore concentrate primarily on adverbials that
comprise more than one word and have the same meaning in several European
languages, but cannot be considered to have been borrowed or taken over from
other languages. We shall investigate whether their morphological structure is re-
lated to their epistemic and evidential functions and whether the same morpho-
logical structure led to evidential uses in all the languages studied.
A strikingly large number of locutions with the etymological meaning of see-
ing or visual appearance have become multiple-element adverbials in European
languages: Spanish al parecer, Portuguese ao parecer and ao que parece, French
avoir l’air de, Italian in apparenza and Russian по-видимому. These adverbial lo-
cutions do not have the same meaning and have a broad range of functions. Their
morphological structures vary, but typical for all of them is the interplay of prepo-
sitional and (in some cases deverbal) nominal components:
Span. al parecer preposition + article infinitive

Port. ao parecer preposition + article infinitive
Port. ao que parece preposition + article conjunction verb form
French: avoir l’air de verb article substantive preposition
Ital. in apparenza preposition (deverbal) substantive
Russ. по-видимому preposition substantivised deverbal adjective
1. (Cf. for instance), Alonso-Almeida and Adams 2012, Capone (2001), Celle (2009), Cornillie
(2010a), (2010b), Dendale and Van Bogaert (2007), Estellés Arguedas and Albelda Marco
(2014), Haßler (2003), (2004), (2010), Hennemann (2012), (2013), Pietrandrea (2007), Simon-
Vandenbergen and Aijmer (2007), Squartini (2008), Wiemer, Plungian (2008), Paducheva
(2011), Plungian (2011).
2. Such as in Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer (2007), Cornillie (2010b), Hennemann (2012,
2013). Some authors use the translation corpora to prove that certain adverbs have evidential
meanings. For example Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer (2007) show that obviously is ‘really’
evidential because some French translations provided proof of this analysis: the most frequent
French translations of obviously were évidemment, de toute évidence or à l’évidence – clearly
evidential expressions (cf. Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer 2007: 158) and thus confirming the
inherent evidential status of obviously.
The nominal components (el parecer, o parecer, o que parece, l’air, apparenza,
видимый) have two different meanings: ‘visible’ and ‘apparent’. The following sec-
tions investigate how the meaning components change when used evidentially in
the investigated languages.
2.2 Spanish al parecer
This ‘visible’ and ‘apparent’ polysemy of parecer can already be seen for Spanish in
examples from the 17th century:
(6) En mi conciencia, en mi conciencia, término de que él usaba siempre en
Palacio cuando daba su parecer en el Gobierno […]
(CORDE, Juan Antonio de Valencia, Diario de noticias, 1677–1678)
‘In my consciousness, in my consciousness, [an] expression he always used
in the Palace when he gave his opinion on the government […]’
(7) Crisis de criados, á quienes despedian para parecer pobres.
(CORDE, Juan Antonio de Valencia, Diario de noticias, 1677–1678)
‘A crisis for servants, whom [rich people] fired in order to appear poor.’
Whereas in example (6) parecer refers to a personal opinion, example (7) is about
the appearance of being poor that is aroused but does not correspond with the
facts. This latter meaning is dominant in the al parecer connection and can be
found in various different functions. Here, as evidential usages developed, a merg-
ing with the function of parecer which points to real sensual perceptions has
obviously occurred.
Al parecer can be found in a non-specific evidential function in texts originat-
ing from the first half of the 17th century. By non-specific evidential function the
reference to a source of knowledge is meant, whereby it remains open whether
this source is based on one’s own view or conclusion, or whether it comes from a
third party. In the following example, the contagious character of an illness is com-
municated evidentially. A degree of uncertainty as to whether the illness is in fact
contagious also resonates in the sentence:
(8) […] muchos enfermos y de enfermedad al parecer contagiosa, que comenzaba
á cundir entre gente de importancia.
(CORDE, Anónimo, Noticias de la Corte, 1659–1664)
‘[…] many sick [people] and of apparently contagious diseases, which began
to spread among important people.’
Bert Cornillie (2007a and 2007b) proposes that the quotative use of al parecer
outweighs other uses. Dorota Kotwica (2015) explains that al parecer is usual-
ly a mitigating function assigned (cf. also Kotwica 2013). This function is thus
concerned with a decrease in the speaker’s commitment to the proposition. She,

however, argues that al parecer may also acquire a strengthening function, when
the speaker refers to a largely known source or an opinion shared by the pub-
lic (Kotwica 2015). Kotwica (2013) and Hennemann (2013) show that al parecer
in journalistic discourse is an evidential particle specialised in the introduction
of indirect reported speech, but it can also introduce knowledge inferred by the
speaker. In the following examples al parecer conveys a hearsay or quotative read-
ing (cf. Hennemann 2013: 149–153):
(9) Finalmente, la mala noticia la anuncia Semana en su portada. No todo
podía ser tan bonito este verano y, al parecer, Marta Sánchez está pasando por
una delicada crisis en su matrimonio con Jesús Cabanas. (El País 07/08/2010)
‘Finally, the bad news is announced by Semana’s title page. Not everything
could be so good this summer and, apparently, Marta Sánchez is having a
delicate crisis in her marriage with Jesús Cabanas.’
(10) El sospechoso es un desconocido en la ciudad: llegó a Tortosa hace unos dos o
tres meses, señalan fuentes municipales. Al parecer, se había instalado en un
domicilio que compartía junto a otros compatriotas. (El País 07/08/2010)
‘The suspect is not known in the city: he came to Tortosa two or three
months ago, according to municipal sources. Apparently, he stayed in a house
which he shared with other compatriots.’
(11) Según informa The Guardian, al final de ese día Morlock le señaló a Holmes
que el asesinato tenía por objetivo la diversión y le amenazó si se lo decía a
alguien. La segunda víctima, Marach Agha, fue disparada y asesinada el mes
siguiente. Al parecer, Gibbs le disparó y colocó un fusil cerca del cuerpo para
justificar su muerte. (El País 12/09/2010)
‘According to The Guardian, at the end of that day Morlock pointed out to
Holmes that the motive for a crime was entertainment, and he threatened
him not to tell anybody. The second victim, Marach Agha, was shot dead the
following month. Apparently, Gibbs shot her and put a rifle near the corpse
to justify her death.’
(12) Según fuentes próximas al caso, sus testimonios han sido valiosos, y todavía
prometen serlo más los de los dos últimos (el responsable de un club y un
agente) que se acaban de ofrecer a participar. Al parecer, detrás de la decisión
de uno de ellos […] (El País 15/09/2010)
‘According to sources dealing with the case, his witnesses were valuable, and
still promise to be [valuable] more than the two last ones (the responsible of
the club and an agent) who just offered to participate. Apparently, behind the
decision of one of them […]’
(13) Sin embargo, la publicación estadounidense cita a una fuente que asegura
que se trata de una clínica al sur de California. Mientras tanto, al parecer los
choques de la actriz con la ley empiezan a afectar su carrera.
(El País 01/10/2010)
‘However, the American publication quotes a source who assures that it is a
clinic in southern California. In the meantime, the actress’ conflicts with the
law are apparently beginning to affect her career.’
(14) […] según informó a Efe un portavoz de los servicios de emergencia que
acudió al lugar del suceso. Al parecer, la explosión tuvo lugar entre la 1.30 y
las 2.00 horas de la noche y fue “bastante fuerte”, según la misma fuente, que
indicó que […] (El Mundo 27/12/2010)
‘[…] according to a speaker of the emergency services who came to the crash
scene and who informed Efe. Apparently, the explosion happened between
1:30 and 2:00 am in the night and was “quite strong”, according to the same
source, who indicated that […]’
Indeed, what these examples illustrate is that analysing al parecer + [p] without

context does not lead to a correct quotative interpretation of al parecer; it is the
context which shows this. The highlighted phrases that in each case represent
sources of [p], which all contain al parecer, illustrate that [p] can be attributed to
the source already mentioned and that al parecer is used to express that [p] belongs
to the other voice – and not to that of the journalist. It seems to be even more dif-
ficult to see that al parecer in the following example is also used to convey hearsay
readings, as it is not the ‘explicit context’ that helps to interpret the use of the ad-
verbial locution. In text passage (15) al parecer somehow ‘has to’ convey a hearsay
reading – by applying the process of elimination to the possible meanings – since
no other logical meaning remains that fits into this context. How could the jour-
nalist know that Mike Edwards ‘died instantaneously’, if not from someone else?3
(15) El músico británico Mike Edwards, fundador del grupo de rock Electric Light
Orchestra (ELO), ha muerto a los 62 años al ser arrollada por una bala
de heno de 600 kilos […]. Al parecer el músico, que tocaba el chelo en la
formación original de la banda, murió de manera instantánea.
(El País 08/09/2010)
‘The English musician Mike Edwards, founder of the rock group Electric
Light Orchestra (ELO), died at age 62 after being run over by a hay bale of
600 kilogrammes […]. Apparently, the musician, who played cello in the
original formation of the group, died instantaneously.’
3. Cf. also Hennemann (2013: 152).

In conformance with Cornillie (2007b: 123), the al parecer construction may be

based either on reported information or on an inference. The following exam-
ple contains an instance of the adverbial locution where it conveys an inferential
reading:
(16) […] se modifican cupos energéticos en renovables o se toma el peor camino
para defender -aunque sea justamente-, la protección medioambiental
de Doñana. Y Andalucía sigue sin ser noticia, porque al parecer es más
importante discutir una transferencia al País Vasco o el encaje legal del
Consejo del Poder Judicial de Cataluña, que las políticas de vivienda,
energéticas o de empleo. (El País 06/09/2010)
‘[…] energy quotas are modified into renewable energy quotas, thus
taking the worst way to defend – even though rightly – the environmental
protection of Doñana. And Andalusia is still not in the news because
apparently it is more important to discuss the transfer to the Basque Country
or the legal reserve requirements of the Judicial Council of Catalonia than
politics of housing, energy or employment.’
Example (16) contains an ironic conclusion that Andalusia is still not in the news
because – as it seems – other things are more important. There is no reason to apply
a hearsay reading to this use of al parecer. The next example is ambivalent; even the
broader context does not help to determine whether al parecer is used quotatively
or inferentially. On the one hand, one could argue that the future forms are indices
to interpret the adverbial locution as being used quotatively. On the other hand,
the synthetic future form could be used here to express inference. Following this
line of argumentation, al parecer must also be used inferentially. So two interpreta-
tions are possible, which is characteristic for an unspecific evidential meaning:4
(17) El próximo domingo, los Reyes ofrecerán en su residencia estival un almuerzo
en honor a la primera dama estadounidense, Michelle Obama, que les visitará
tras pasar cuatro días en Marbella. Quien al parecer no asistirá a la comida
será Sasha, la hija menor de los Obama, que viaja con su madre.
(El País 07/08/2010)
‘Next Sunday, the Royals are going to give a luncheon in their summer
residence in honour of the First Lady, Michelle Obama, who is going to visit
them after having spent four days in Marbella. The person who apparently
is not going to attend the luncheon is Sasha, her youngest daughter, who is
travelling with her mother.’
The following examples can also represent either quotative evidentiality, a hear-
say reading or the communication of a conclusion. As the examples are taken
4. Cf. also Hennemann (2013: 152–153).

from newspapers, the assumption can be made that unspecific evidential mean-
ings were intentionally used to create vagueness and indefiniteness with regard
to the sources:
(18) El primer ingreso de fondos se efectuó a los pocos meses de que el valdemoreño5
accediera a la vida pública tras abandonar su actividad bancaria. Al parecer,
el dinero de Granados se ocultaba en la sucursal helvética del BNP Paribas
[…] (El Mundo 19/02/2014)
‘The first deposit of funds took place a few months after the valdemoreño
acceded to public life after having abandoned his bank activity. Apparently,
de Granados’ money was hidden in the Swiss subsidiary of BNP Paribas […]’
(19) El tercer cáncer es el llamado inocuo. Ese que no progresa y que forma parte
del llamado del sobrediagnostico, que, al parecer, es uno de los peores pecados
de la mamografía. (El Mundo 19/02/2014)
‘The third cancer is harmless. That one which does not progress and which
is part of the so-called overdiagnosed [diseases], which, apparently, is one of
the worst sins of mammography.’
(20) Cuando los equipos de rescate acudieron a la vivienda encontraron
carbonizado el cadáver de un hombre de 51 años, al parecer, un conocido del
propietario, que fue hallado a la entrada de la vivienda. (ABC 11/02/2014)
‘When the rescue team came to the apartment they found the charred corpse
of a 51-year-old man, apparently an acquaintance of the owner, who was
found at the entrance to the apartment building.’
Al parecer is predominantly used parenthetically; it can be placed at the beginning

of a phrase or inserted within it. It is largely used with a broad scope, but usages
with a narrow scope are also possible, as in example (20) referring to the apposi-
tion un conocido del propietario ‘an acquaintance of the owner’, or in example (21),
where the characteristic of being unsolvable is introduced indeterminedly eviden-
tially, and simultaneously focused upon.
(21) Pero hay un problema, al parecer irresoluble, para estar seguros no ya de que
el lagarto va a volver a poblar toda la isla […]
(CREA, Miguel Delibes de Castro, Vida. La naturaleza en peligro, 2001)
‘But there is a problem, apparently unsolvable, to ensure that the lizard is not
going to repopulate the entire island […]’
5. Citizen of the Spanish city Valdemoro.

2.3 Russian по-видимому
It is astounding that the same polysemy of ‘visible’ and ‘apparent’ as with parecer
can be found in the Russian substantivised adjective видимый. When used with-
out a preposition, видимый is always used in the Russian National Corpus with
the meaning ‘visible’ (22):
(22) Астрономы в своих исследованиях использовали только видимый свет.
‘The astronomers only used visible light for their research.’
At the same time, видимый can also mean ‘visible’ in the figurative sense:
(23) Видимый результат 1992–1993 гг. в том, что насытился товарный
рынок.
‘a visible result of the years 1992–1993 was that the goods market became
saturated’
In contrast, по-видимому appears to have specialised in the evidential reading. It is

striking here that this construction comprising a preposition and a substantivised
adjective is used parenthetically and with a broad scope in the Russian National
Corpus, with few exceptions. In the exceptions, a certain phrase is marked eviden-
tially, and thus focused upon:
(24) И́щут како́го-то Васю, по-ви́димому шофёра, гро́мко выклика́я его́, […].
(В. Г. Распутин. Новая профессия, 1998)
‘They are looking for someone called Vasja, apparently a driver, and call out
his name […]’
(25) Произошёл самопроизво́льный взрыв, по-ви́димому в результа́те
нагрева́ния. (И. Грекова. На испытаниях, 1967)
‘A spontaneous explosion occurred, apparently as a result of overheating.’
These examples are taken from text passages that are characterised by simulating
speech.
The evidential marking can be placed at the beginning or inserted. There was
no use of по-ви́димому at the end of the phrase in the corpus. The expression can
be used for various types of evidentiality. Hence, in the following example, the
origin would appear to be from hearsay:
(26) Случи́лось э́то, по-ви́димому, в феврале́ и́ли ма́рте со́рок второ́го го́да;
одни́ говоря́т— зимо́й, други́е— весно́й.
(Анатолий Рыбаков. Тяжелый песок, 1975–1977)
‘It apparently occurred in February or March of the year 42; some say in
winter, others in summer.’
In example (27) the author communicates his own internal perception:

(27) По-ви́димому, я попа́л как раз на взрыв взаи́мной не́нависти.
(В. П. Катаев. Алмазный мой венец, 1975–1977)
‘Apparently I fell into the outbreak of mutual hatred.’
In the following example, the visual perception of the events is the source of
knowledge:
(28) Посети́телей мно́го, аппети́т хоро́ший, настрое́ние, по-ви́димому,
преотли́чное.
(Василий Аксенов. Круглые сутки нон-стоп // “Новый Мир”, 1976)
‘There are many visitors, their appetite is great; the mood is apparently
excellent.’
In contrast, по-видимому introduces a conclusion in sentence (29) that is then

justified with a clause:
(29) По-ви́димому, они́ делеги́рованы о́чередью, потому́ что де́йствуют
реши́тельно, как и все лю́ди, де́йствующие не от своего́ и́мени.
(Фазиль Искандер. Бедный демагог, 1969)
‘Apparently they were delegated pursuant to the ordinance because they
acted decisively, as do all people who are not acting in their own name.’
In the following example it is particularly clear that it is a conclusion, because a

visual access to the information received is explicitly negated:
(30) А́втором его́ был, по-ви́димому (в те́ксте и́мя его́ не ука́зано, и в
проло́ге пря́мо вы́ражено его́ наме́рение оста́ться анони́мным “дабы́
не вы́звать за́висти”), Гоно́рий Августодунский, церко́вный писа́тель
пе́рвой полови́ны XII в. (А. Я. Гуревич. Популярное богословие и
народная религиозность средних веков, 1976)
‘Its author was apparently Honorius Avgustodunskij, a clerical author from
the first half of the 12th century (his name is not stated in the text, and in the
prologue his intention to remain anonymous is expressed openly ‘so as not
to elicit envy’).’
However, in the cases mentioned above the type of evidentiality expressed can
only be determined through the context. По-ви́димому allows the impression of
hearsay, conclusion, own internal perception, but contributes to this only with an
unspecific evidential meaning. Where the source of knowledge cannot be clearly
determined from the context, the evidential meaning also remains unspecific and
allows more than one interpretation:
(31) То же са́мое, по-видимому, име́ет ме́сто и во Фра́нции.

(М. М. Бахтин. О полифоничности романов Достоевского, 1971)
‘Apparently exactly the same thing occurs in France.’
This indefiniteness as to the source of the communicated knowledge is often used,

especially in newspaper texts, generating vagueness:
(32) Край, пронизанный организованной преступностью и зараженный
повальной коррупцией, по-видимому, станет очагом беззакония и
терроризма. (http://www.inosmi.ru/translation/239720.html)
‘The field, which is permeated by organised crime and infected with general
corruption, is apparently becoming the centre of lawlessness and terrorism.’
(33) Другие избиратели, голосовавшие в этой школе, по-видимому, больше
интересовались дешевыми сувенирами и книгами, продававшимися на
участке для привлечения людей на выборы.
(http://www.inosmi.ru/translation/239958.html)
‘Other voters who cast their vote in this school were apparently more
interested in the cheap souvenirs and books that were being sold at the
square to lure people to the urns.’
2.4 Portuguese ao parecer / ao que parece
In the Portuguese corpus 38 occurrences of the locution ao parecer were found.

Some of them refer to the outward appearance, and it is doubted whether this is a
true reflection of the facts:
(34) A dona da casa, por certo traquejada nessas bolandinas do marido, estava
sossegada, ao menos ao parecer.
(CDP, Simões Lopes Neto, Contos Gauchescos, 1912).
‘The mistress of the house, surely experienced in these mad outbursts of her
husband, was quiet, at least apparently.’
In this connection it must also be taken into account that parecer is lexicalised in
Portuguese as a substantive with the meaning ‘view, opinion, expertise’. Ao parecer
occurs with this meaning in almost half of the examples in the corpus (17 times):
(35) Esta animava-os à prática de novos crimes, e expunha ao público descrédito a
administração menos digna de temer-se, ao parecer deles, do que o particular
que muitas vezes resistia, defendendo a sua propriedade […]
(CDP, Franklin Távora, O Cabeleira)
‘This encouraged them to commit new crimes, and exposed the
administration to public discredit, in their opinion, than an individual who
resisted various times, defending his property.’
However, it is also used with an unspecific evidential meaning. Syntactically it is

then generally used parenthetically and can have either a broad (36) or a narrow
(37) scope:
(36) De feito, vai, ao parecer, dando demasiado nas vistas esta nossa vida fácil e
perdulária, esta nossa vida à gandaia, ociosa e comodista […]
(CDP, Euclides da Cunha, Contrastes e Confrontos)
‘In fact, it seems [that] our easy and wasteful life, our roguish, lazy and
complacent life […]’
(37) […] foi um vulto escuro e, ao parecer, feminino, que […]
(CDP, Almeida Garrett, Arco de Sanct’Anna)
‘[…] it was a dark figure and, apparently, a woman, who […]’
It is probably attributable to the lexicalisation of ao parecer with the meaning ‘view,

opinion, expertise’ that the unspecific evidential meaning is largely expressed in
Portuguese with another locution: ao que parece. Ao que parece is used mostly
parenthetically. It is inserted into the sentence (38), placed at its beginning (39)
or its end (40):
(38) A lei, ao que parece, caiu em desuso. (CDP, Lima Barreto, Os Bruzundangas)
‘The law, it seems, has fallen into disuse.’
(39) Ao que parece, este doutor Carvalho nunca empregou […]
(CDP, Lima Barreto, Vida Urbana)
‘Apparently, this doctor Carvalho never employed […]’
(40) Tanto que com ela ele ousou, ao que parece.
(CDP, Bernardo Carvalho, Os Bêbados e Os Sonâmbulos, 1996)
‘So much so that with her he dared it, it seems.’
In these examples it is left open whether the imparted information comes from
a person’s own view or conclusion, or from a third-party report. The unspecific
evidentialisation simultaneously communicates a restriction of the speaker’s cer-
tainty as to whether the statement is indeed true or not. In six of 178 cases, ao que
parece is not used parenthetically, but refers with a narrow scope to an actual part
of the sentence. In sentence (41), the serious defects that had led to delays are in-
troduced unspecifically evidentially. At the same time, however, there is a focus on
the part of the sentence por graves defeitos apresentados:
(41) […] que tinham chegado com atraso, estavam sendo revisados e consertados
nas próprias gares, ao que parece por graves defeitos apresentados.
(CDP, Luiz Beltrão, A Greve dos Desempregados)
‘[…] which had arrived late, were revised and repaired in their own stations,
apparently because they showed serious defects.’
In this function, ao que parece can even be used between the components of an
analytical verb form:
(42) […] qualidades essas que eram ao que parece reforçadas pelas excelentes
posições que ocupavam […] (CDP, Euclides da Cunha, Os Sertões)
‘[…] those qualities that were apparently strengthened by the excellent
positions they occupied […]’
Finally, ao que parece may be used following an evidentially used nominal element:
(43) Seguiram os passos de um empresário americano no Brasil dos anos 40, um
magnata da indústria do papel, um amador ao que parece, um colecionador,
que adquiriu os quadros […] (CDP, Bernardo Carvalho, As Iniciais, 1999)
‘[They] followed the footsteps of an American businessman in Brazil in the
forties, a tycoon of the paper industry, an amateur apparently, a collector,
who acquired the paintings […]’
In all, ao que parece proves in Portuguese to be an element that is specialised in

expressing unspecific evidentiality and that can be used in various syntactic posi-
tions, but that clearly prefers parenthetical usage. It is used non-parenthetically
mostly in spoken or simulated spoken language.
2.5 Italian all’apparenza / in apparenza
The results for Italian all’apparenza and in apparenza are very similar, and for that
reason they are only presented briefly here. The meaning ‘by all appearances’ is ac-
centuated in the following example by adding the word solo ‘only’:
(44) Capelli lunghi, sigaretta in mano: i due, anche solo all’apparenza, sembrano
avere molte cose in comune. (http://www.gossipnews.it/paparazzate/
mischa_barton_per_le_vie_di_hollywood_con_il_nuovo_fidanzato_capelli_
lunghi_e_sigaretta_sperw.html?id=883ad042a51a47ebfd235c0b6716430f)
‘Long hair, cigarette in the hand: the two, if only by all appearances, seem to
have much in common.’
In apparenza can also refer to the external appearance that is contrary to the actual
facts:
(45) Nella vita reale, tutt’altra storia: l’attrice è una bella ragazza tranquilla, in
apparenza più giovane dei suoi 21 anni.
(http://www.repubblica.it/2006/08/sezioni/spettacoli_e_cultura/cinema/
venezia/dalia-nera/dalia-nera/dalia-nera.html)
‘In real life, [it is] a different story: the actress is a beautiful quiet girl,
appearing younger than 21 years.’
All’apparenza can, however, also denote the visual origin of the speaker’s knowl-
edge:
(46) Un tipo tosto, all’apparenza, atletico e belloccio.
(http://www.cronacaqui.it/news/apri/17202)
‘A cool guy, apparently, athletic and handsome.’
Unspecific evidentiality can also be expressed by using the combination of a prep-

osition and apparenza. In examples (47) and (49), both a conclusion and a com-
munication by a third party are possible:
(47) In apparenza, il discorso dell’amministrazione americana è persino
convincente. (http://italy.peacelink.org/pace/articles/art_12317.html)
‘Apparently, the speech of the American administration is even convincing.’
(48) Lo sconosciuto che ha abusato di lei era, in apparenza, un cliente che
pretendeva una prestazi[o]ne gratuita […] (http://www.tgcom.mediaset.it/
cronaca/articoli/articolo300657.shtml)
‘The unknown man who abused her was, apparently, a customer who wanted
a free service […]’
(49) E tutto, in apparenza, mi pare assurdo e incredibile. (http://www.
codicesorgente.it/feedsaggregator/index.php/Ho%2Bvisto%2Bcose)
‘And the whole thing, apparently, seems to me absurd and incredible.’
As these examples show, the evidential marker can be placed at the beginning of the
sentence, or inserted, then having a broad scope. But a usage with a narrow scope,
as in example (50) referring to an adjective used as an attribute, is also possible:
(50) Forse perché un tema all’apparenza triste come la solitudine […]
(http://feeds.ilsole24ore.com/c/32276/f/438669/s/51b247f/l/0L0Silsole24
ore0N0Cart0CSoleOnLine40CTempo0J20Alibero0J20Ae0J20ACultura0C
20A0A90C0A60Cpanda0Epiace0Efumetti0Bshtml0Duuid0F49c35a
0A80E50Af60E11de0Eaa610Ec9e474b9ab2e0GDocRulesView0FLibero)
‘Perhaps because [it is] a theme apparently sad like loneliness […]’
2.6 French avoir l’air de
In French, the collocation à l’apparence took on the meaning of a deceptive ap-

pearance very early, and it is not used adverbially but always refers to an appear-
ance of a certain fact or person. The following quote is designed to illustrate this
meaning of an appearance that can possibly be accurate:
(51) […] c’est celui auquel on n’a presque jamais pensé, et que l’on a toujours
été prêt à sacrifier à l’appât d’un gain sordide et à l’apparence du moindre
profit à faire sur l’étranger. Je dis à l’apparence; je ne prétends pas insinuer
par-là que ce profit soit toujours illusoire […] (Frantext, M472 – Destutt
de Tracy, Commentaire sur l’Esprit des Lois de Montesquieu, 1807, p. 341,
Livres XX, XXI)
‘[…] that’s the one from whom we hardly ever thought it, and that you were
always ready for him to abjure the lure of sordid gain and the appearance of
lesser profit to be made in the foreign countries. I say the appearance; I do
not pretend to insinuate that this profit is always illusory […]’
The meaning that was determined in the other Romance languages that comes
from the combination of a preposition and a nominal element is assumed in French
by the adverb apparemment and the verbal expression avoir l’air de. Apparemment
can be found with an unspecific evidential and modal meaning very early on, and
it can refer to both the entire proposition (52) or to parts of it (53):
(52) […] et le met si prés du principe de toute grandeur, qu’encore qu’apparemment
il n’y ait rien de plus éminent que la royauté […]
(Frantext, Q738 – Jean-Louis Guez de Balzac, Le Prince, 1631, p. 80)
‘[…] and it is put so close to the principle of all greatness so that apparently
there is nothing more prominent than royalty […]’
(53) […] chose qui se preuve par l’expérience, et bien apparemment par les
entes faicts à l’escusson […] (Frantext, S590 – Olivier de Serres, Le Théâtre
d’agriculture et mesnage des champs : t. 2, 1603, p. 225, Sixiesme lieu du
théâtre d’agriculture et mesnage des champs, des jadinages, chapitre XXVII, Le
général Gouvernement et Culture des Arbres Fruictiers)
‘[…] a thing that is proved by experience, and apparently by the entities
made by signs […]’
It must be said, however, that the verbal expression avoir l’air de is used no less
frequently, also referring to the arousal of the appearance of an act or circumstance
that can be based on varying sensory sources. But this locution refers always to a
subject and does not allow an impersonal use:
(54) La femme enceinte a l’air de plus en plus somnolente. (Frantext, R088 –

Martin Winckler, La maladie de Sachs, 1998, p. 438, Diagnostic (samedi 29
mars), 84 Dans la salle d’attente)
‘The pregnant woman looks increasingly drowsy.’
(55) […] il imagine et conçoit lui-même les plans. Il est sur le champ de bataille ;
il voit tout, il mesure tout. Il a l’air de commander aux événemens […]
(Frantext, N549 – Antoine-Léonard Thomas, Essai sur les éloges, 1773,
p. 51, chapitre 29)
‘[…] he imagines and conceives the plans himself. He is on the battlefield; he
sees all, he measures everything. He seems to command events […]’
(56) Il a l’air de marcher sur des œufs. (Frantext, R062 – Raymond Queneau,
Journaux 1914–1965, 1996, p. 617, Fragment de journoux 1944–1948)
‘He seems to walk on eggs.’
Visual perception (54) and conclusion (55) are also interfused in this expression
of evidentiality. In example (56) the perceivable image is used as a metaphor for
careful behaviour. Examples for hearsay as components of the evidential values of
avoir l’air de could not be found in the Frantext corpus.
3. Interlingual generalisation and conclusion
What can we deduce from the data discussed in this study with regard to the func-
tions and syntactic usages of the locution comprising a preposition and a nominal
element in different languages for the understanding of evidentiality?
Firstly, it can be concluded that the lexemes with the two meanings ‘visible’
and ‘apparent’ in combination with a preposition, the spatial meaning of which is a
direction, show the tendency of developing an evidential meaning. This tendency
is total in Spanish and Russian, but less defined in Italian. In Portuguese, the spe-
cial lexicalisation of parecer gives rise to the substitute construction ao que parece,
whereas in French the largely monosemantic usage of à l’apparence rules out evi-
dential usages. In Italian, all’apparenza / in apparenza occurs evidentially, but also
with the meaning ‘apparently in contradiction with the real situation’.
Secondly, the evidential value of these locutions proves to be indeterminate,
i.e. the decision whether the case represents quotative or inferential evidentiality
or hearsay depends on the context and is not determined by the evidential markers
themselves. It therefore appears to be justified to speak of an unspecific evidential
function.
Thirdly, the evidential markers can be used parenthetically and non-parenthet-
ically, with a broad or with a narrow scope. They can largely be placed as desired,
whereby a placement at the end of the sentence occurs very rarely in Spanish and
is ruled out in Russian on the basis of the corpus data. Where the usage is at the
end of a sentence or with a narrow scope, it is always in spoken language or with
the aim of depicting spoken language in a written text. The prototypical uses of
the evidential markers are hence the parenthetical placement at the beginning and
in the middle of a sentence, and the broad scope. The usage with narrow scope is
considered to be conspicuous and therefore simultaneously serves to mark a focus.
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Chapter 4
When feeling is thinking

A lexical-semantic analysis of evidential and
epistemic predicates in Spanish
Gijs Mulder
Radboud University, Nijmegen
This paper presents a survey of the predicates that are used in Spanish to express
evidentiality and epistemic modality.1 After an overview of the whole set and
the characteristics of its most frequently used members, I will focus on a subset
of predicates which share the fact that they do not lexicalize the act of reasoning
or thinking but literally refer to perception and spontaneous mental processes.
My analysis of the so-called epistemic/evidential complement-taking predicates
is qualitative and based on data gathered mainly from Twitter. It is a lexical-
semantic analysis of actual, contemporary usage, which focuses on the semantic
characteristics of the category as a whole and the individual verbs.
Keywords: Spanish, evidentiality, epistemic modality, spontaneous mental

processes, Twitter corpus
1. Introduction
About 600 Spanish verbs refer to mental states and processes, according to the
Adesse database of verbs and verbal constructions (http://adesse.uvigo.es/). A
minor subset of these is used to express evidentiality and/or epistemic modality,
especially as a matrix verb with a complement clause – meaning that they do not
represent the prime proposition of the utterance but indicate that the subject is not
completely certain of what is asserted (epistemic modality) or mark the source of
the information given (evidentiality).
This research has been inspired in part by studies of Thompson (2002) and
Rodríguez Louro and Harris (2013) of analogous verbs in English. However, unlike
1. I would like to thank my colleagues from the research group Grammar and Cognition in
Nijmegen. I am particularly grateful to Helen de Hoop and Ad Foolen.
doi 10.1075/pbns.271.05mul
106 Gijs Mulder
these I will focus on any predicate that can fulfil evidential and/or epistemic func-
tions – not just verbs of cognition. Another inspiration has been an observation
by Nuyts (2001) in his discussion of mental state predicates: “these predicates are
notoriously difficult to deal with (…), mainly because of their complex semantic
structure and their mysterious linguistic behavior” (2001:107).
2. Terminology
For a start, it might be useful to briefly discuss the names that have been assigned
to this class of verbs. The scholarly literature uses at least a dozen of different labels.
Most authors use generic terms like mental verbs, mental state predicates, psy-
chological verbs or ‘psych verbs’ for short. These are broad terms because mental
states – a notion that is not without controversy itself – include not only cognition
but also perception and emotion. This is why other authors prefer more specific
terms when treating verbs like to think: cognitive verbs, cognition predicates, or
verbs of cognitive attitude. This last notion, introduced by Cappelli (2008), can be
considered a hyponym of verbs of propositional attitude, a term from philosophy
and formal semantics that captures the fact that these verbs are used as a cogni-
tive stance towards a proposition that is expressed in a subsequent that-clause.
Sometimes verbs of this class are also referred to as doxastic verbs or predicates, a
notion that is especially frequent in the literature on mood in Romance languages
(e.g., Becker and Remberger 2010; Haverkate 2002). Within the latter approach,
doxastic predicates are one of three classes of cognition predicates, the other two
being epistemic (‘know’) and dubitative (‘doubt’) predicates. Doxastic predicates
are defined in terms of a propositional attitude in which the speaker “has rea-
sonable grounds for believing that the state of affairs expressed by the embedded
proposition corresponds with factual reality” (Haverkate 2002:68).
From the descriptive perspective adopted in this paper, however, it is con-
venient to use a term that simply captures the semantic domains involved. This
is why I follow the example of Rodríguez Louro and Harris (2013), who intro-
duce the term epistemic/evidential complement-taking predicates (E/E CTPs) for
their quantitative analysis of these verbs in Australian English. This notion cap-
tures all predicates that can be used in Spanish to express evidentiality and/or
epistemic modality.
Chapter 4. When feeling is thinking 107
3. Epistemic modality, evidentiality, subjectivity
Judging by the common definitions, epistemic modality and evidentiality seem

to be clearly distinguishable categories. There has been much discussion, how-
ever, about the exact nature of both notions and the relationship between the two.
They have been considered as separate categories (De Haan 1999; Nuyts 2001)
and as overlapping categories (Van der Auwera and Plungian 1998); evidentiality
has been viewed as part of the epistemic modal system (Palmer 1986) and both
have also been argued to be subcategories of an additional category, epistemicity
(Boye 2012). While I will not contribute to this theoretical debate, the qualitative
examination of the expressions of epistemic modality and evidentiality in Spanish
usage suggests that they are in many cases readily identifiable categories. Most E/E
CTPs encode either evidentiality or epistemic modality as their primary meaning,
while other expressions take on their evidential or epistemic meaning in context.
Traditionally (e.g., Lyons 1977) epistemic modality is defined as the expres-
sion of the speaker’s commitment towards the truth of the proposition they real-
ize. The estimation of the likelihood that the proposition is true (or false) can be
located on a scale, of which the two extremes are, on one end, complete certainty
that the proposition is true and, on the other, complete certainty that the propo-
sition is not true. Following the descriptive, applied perspective of this paper, I
will focus on the verbal expressions used in Spanish to encode different degrees
of commitment regarding the proposition expressed: (un)certainty, confidence,
likelihood, probability and possibility. Predicates that lexicalize epistemic modal-
ity are, for example, no dudo (de) ‘I don’t doubt’ and estoy seguro/a (de) ‘I’m sure’.
Evidentiality encodes the source of the information put forward, sometimes
also referred to as a justification for the information (Boye 2012) or modes of
knowing (Cornillie 2007). Direct versus indirect evidentiality is a basic distinction
followed by most scholars in the field (cf. Willet 1988; De Haan 2006). Evidence
from sensory sources is considered direct, while inferential and reported evidence
are indirect types of evidentiality. Several additional distinctions have been made
in the literature, two of which are relevant for the discussion of E/E CTPs. The first
concerns inferential evidentiality, which can be based either on perception or on
reasoning (cf. Marín Arrese 2015:212). To account for this contrast, Hengeveld
and Dall’Aglio Hattnher (2015) propose two categories of evidentiality: inference
(the information is inferred from existing and stored knowledge) and deduction
(the information is deduced from perceptual, especially visual evidence). Concluyo
‘I conclude’ and presumo ‘I presume’ are examples of verbs that refer to inferen-
tial evidence based on reasoning, compruebo ‘I realize’ and me consta ‘it is clear
to me, it is a certainty to me’ are verbs of inferential evidence based on visual or
other sensory sources. Second, Cappelli (2007:132) posits the category of affective
108 Gijs Mulder
evidentiality for evidence that comes from non-verifiable impressions encoded in

the English verb believe. Intuyo ‘I intuit, I sense’ and me da la sensación ‘it gives me
the feeling’ and other expressions that will be discussed below are verbs that mark
this type of evidentiality.
A related, no less controversial issue which is relevant for the description of
E/E verbs, is the contrast between subjectivity and objectivity. This contrast enters
the picture both in epistemic modality and evidentiality. While epistemic modality
can be objective or subjective (Lyons 1977:797), the modal evaluation expressed
by means of an E/E verb in the first person is, by definition, subjective since it
indicates the speaker’s attitude toward the proposition. As regards evidentiality,
assertions that are based on direct evidence are presented as being certain and thus
objective; assertions based on inference are less certain and thus more subjective
(cf. Willet 1988). Even more subjective are assertions that draw for their evidence
on non-verifiable sources like intuitions (see below).
While objectivity and subjectivity are inherent both to epistemic modality
and evidentiality, subjectivity is also expressed without any epistemic or evidential
meaning. Opino ‘I opine’ is an example of an ‘autonomous subjectivity marker’
(Nuyts 2015:108) and expresses an assessment or standpoint regarding an embed-
ded proposition. The use of these markers is restricted to utterances that contain
evaluative meaning elements (see also Mulder to appear).
4. E/E CTPs: definition of the category
E/E CTPs are more difficult to define and describe than, for example, E/E adverbs.
While the epistemic and evidential meanings of, respectively, por lo visto ‘appar-
ently’ and evidentemente ‘obviously’ are purely lexical, many E/E predicates take
their functions both from the semantic meaning as well as the context (see Nuyts
2001:ch. 3 for similar observations).
In compiling this inventory of E/E CTPs, I experienced at least four difficul-
ties. First, they constitute an open class which lacks clearly defined boundaries.
There is only a small set of prototypical cases. Second, some verbs encode E/E in
their primary meaning; other verbs only get their E/E meaning in context: they are
polysemic and only partially E/E. Third, highly frequent E/E verbs, notably creo,
have undergone a process of grammaticalization and have evolved into pragmatic
markers which have acquired a range of specific (pragmatic) functions. In these
verbs the explicit use of the subject pronoun (yo creo as opposed to merely creo)
can have considerable interpretive consequences. Fourth, not only cognition verbs
but also certain verbs of acquisition of knowledge and some performative verbs
can fulfill epistemic and evidential functions.
In order to achieve a coherent category of verbs, I have made the choices

specified in the remainder of this section.
In all E/E CTPs, I consider the proposition expressed in the embedded clause
to be the main one. Especially the most frequent E/E CTPs are subsidiary to the
embedded proposition, while in others the lexical meaning is more prominent.
Examples of borderline cases include verbs that are used with an evidential/epis-
temic meaning, but whose propositional meaning is – in my view – always more
prominent. That is why I have excluded me temo que ‘I am afraid that’ (although
it does not literally express the speaker’s fear), reconozco que ‘I recognize that’
and me doy cuenta de que ‘I realize that’. For the same reason, I have excluded
the factive, epistemic verb saber ‘to know’, but included estoy seguro/a (de) que ‘I
am sure that’, which expresses less than full support (cf. French sans doute, Boye
2012:141). All verbs that are exclusively used with a direct (sensory) evidential
meaning (e.g., leer ‘to read’, oír ‘to hear’ and vislumbrar ‘to discern’) were ruled out
for the same reason.
I have only included affirmative E/E CTPs. Most verbs suffer a change in their
evidential and/or epistemic meaning or even lose it when negated (no se me ocurre
que ‘it doesn’t occur to me that’). One predicate with negation loses its use as E/E
CTP when used affirmatively: no dudo (de) que ‘I don’t doubt that’.
Also, I have only included verbs in first person singular. When used in another
grammatical person, E/E CTPs usually lose their E/E meaning. Evidentiality and
epistemic modality are very much related to first person singular references in
declarative sentences, or, in interrogatives, to second person (see also De Schepper
and De Hoop 2012). The contrast between creo ‘I believe’ and cree ‘he believes’ is a
case in point: while creo is the quintessential E/E marker, cree is mainly used in its
primary meaning of ‘to believe’.
Other evidential/epistemic verbs do not occur in the first person present tense
while they can be used in other tenses. An example is experimentar ‘experience’:
ha experimentado que ‘he has experienced that’ can be evidential, but experimento
que ‘I experience that’ cannot.
I have confined the analysis to the syntactic structure first person + que. Some
otherwise normal, frequent evidential/epistemic predicates are not common when
used with this structure. Me resulta ‘it proves to me, it turns out to me’ and en-
cuentro ‘I find’ for example, typically occur with an adjective argument (me resulta
gracioso/raro que, ‘it seems funny/strange to me that’).
Paraphrases and extensions or variations of the predicates were not taken
into consideration. These include, for example, cases in which modal verbs are
used (puedo decir que ‘I can tell that’), or other tenses (diría que ‘I would say
that’) or when adverbs are added (puedo decir con toda seguridad ‘I can tell with
all certainty’)
110 Gijs Mulder
In sum, then, for the sake of coherence and clarity, I have included only predi-
cates that are used (a) affirmatively, (b) in the present tense, (c) to refer to the
speaker and (d) combine with a que-complement clause that (e) contains the
main proposition.
5. E/E CTPs in Spanish
I counted around 55 predicates that are used in Spanish as E/E CTPs, as defined as
above. All are attested in the large online corpora of the Real Academia (CREA)
and Davies (Corpus del español; 20th century) or on Twitter. Twitter is an interest-
ing additional source for spontaneous language. The average user is often eager to
tell about their personal feelings and intuitions regarding a state of affairs, which
makes Twitter a relevant source for the study of evidentiality (cf. Mulder to appear).
E/E CTPs include four classes of verbs: verbs of cognition, verbs of acquisition
of knowledge, performative verbs and opinion verbs. Most verbs can be associated
exclusively with either evidentiality or epistemic modality. The majority lexicalize
or have as their primary function (inferential) evidentiality, while a smaller num-
ber of verbs lexicalize epistemic modality.
The large majority of E/E CTPs are rather infrequent.2 Only the following
15 predicates, which are exclusively used for the expression of evidentiality and
epistemic modality, are common in contemporary Peninsular Spanish. They have
been arranged in order of their frequencies in the three corpora; since the rank-
ings did not yield substantially different results, they could be joined together.
– creo que ‘I believe that’
– me parece que ‘it seems to me that’
– pienso que ‘I think that’
– supongo que ‘I suppose that’
– me imagino que ‘I imagine that’
– considero que ‘I consider that’
– estoy seguro/a (de) que ‘I am sure that’
– me da la sensación/impresión (de) que ‘it gives me the feeling/impression that’
– me da que ‘it gives me (the feeling) that’
– estoy convencido/a (de) que ‘I am convinced that’
– tengo la sensación/impresión (de) que ‘I’ve got the feeling/impression that’
– deduzco que ‘I deduce that’
2. ‘Rather infrequent’ is, roughly, less than 20 occurrences in the 19th and 20th century in
Davies (2002), less than 10 in the oral peninsular section of CREA and less than 5 a day in all
tweets written in Spanish, October 2015.
– opino que ‘I am of the opinion that’

– sospecho que ‘I suspect that’
– apuesto (a) que ‘I bet that’
Section 5.2 will give a brief overview of cognition verbs and performative verbs.
In section 5.3 the focus will be on verbs of acquisition of knowledge, which are
divided into verbs of perception and verbs of spontaneous mental processes. Yet
first, in section 5.1, some comments are given on the three most frequent E/E
verbs, which behave somewhat differently than the other verbs.
5.1 Creo que, me parece que and pienso que
Different frequency counts (cf. Mulder to appear) confirm that creo ‘I believe’,
me parece ‘it seems to me that’ and pienso ‘I think’ are the preferred Spanish E/
ECTPs. Creo stands out as especially frequent, in European as well as in American
Spanish. Roughly, in CREA and Davies creo is about five times more frequent than
me parece and pienso.
Creo nearly always occurs with a que-complement clause and exhibits a rela-
tively high level of grammaticalization (cf. Posio, 2014). The strongest indication
for that status is the frequent use of creo as parenthetical verb. It is a prolific marker
of epistemic modality, evidentiality and related functions. Since it is unmarked for
a specific type of evidentiality or epistemic modality, the precise function of creo
depends on the context more than in the case of other E/E CTPs. Especially creo
que with a null subject pronoun suits any pragmatic function, while more speaker-
oriented, subjective functions like the expression of standpoints, are likely to be
communicated with an overt subject pronoun (yo creo que) (Mulder to appear).
Me parece has an inherently evidential meaning and is typically used as such,
but in contemporary Spanish it can as well express epistemic modality and a
standpoint, just like creo.
Contrary to recent observations (Hennemann 2013:282; Landone 2012:1813),
I argue (Mulder to appear) that especially in Peninsular Spanish pienso is not typi-
cally used as a marker of evidentiality or epistemic modality. Pienso can be used as
E/E marker, but it more often refers to the act of thinking or reasoning, its primary
meaning, or it is used for the expression of intentions or plans.
5.2 Cognition verbs, opinion verbs, performative verbs
Cognition verbs describe different mental processes or activities. While creo,

pienso and also considero ‘I consider’ are cognition verbs that refer to general pro-
cesses of thinking or believing, other cognition verbs describe them in specific
112 Gijs Mulder
terms. They denote, for example, the mental processes used to acquire knowledge
(e.g., calculo ‘I calculate’, concluyo ‘I conclude’, deduzco ‘I deduce’), the creation of a
mental image (me imagino ‘I imagine’, me figuro ‘I imagine’) and the assessment of
knowledge (opino ‘I am of the opinion’, sospechar ‘I suspect’, supongo ‘I suppose’).
Practically all cognition verbs correlate directly either to evidentiality or epis-
temic modality. Most cognition verbs literally refer to inferential evidentiality that
is based on reasoning. They are: calculo ‘I calculate’, colijo ‘I deduce’, concluyo ‘I
conclude’, conjeturo ‘I conjecture, speculate’, deduzco ‘I deduce’, entiendo ‘I un-
derstand’, infiero ‘I infer’, llego a la conclusión de ‘I come to the conclusion’, me
convenzo (de) ‘I convince myself, I believe’, me figuro ‘I imagine’, me imagino ‘I
imagine’, and supongo ‘I suppose’.
The following cognition verbs refer to inferential evidentiality based on visual
or other sensory evidence: compruebo ‘I realize’, constato ‘I verify, can see’, me
consta ‘it is clear to me, it is a certainty to me’, me entero de ‘I notify myself of, I find
out, I hear’ and me resulta ‘it proves to me, it turns out to me.’
Five cognition verbs typically express epistemic modality: recuerdo ‘I remem-
ber’, estoy convencido/a de ‘I am convinced’, estoy seguro/a (de) ‘I am sure’, no dudo
(de) ‘I don’t doubt’ and sospecho ‘I suspect.’
Opino ‘I opine, I am of the opinion’, considero ‘I consider’, encuentro ‘I find’,
estimo ‘I consider’, hallo ‘I find’ are the five verbs that are literal markers of as-
sessments or standpoints. Strictly speaking they do not express evidentiality or
epistemic modality.
Finally, a handful of performative verbs can be held to express epistemic
modality. The explicit reference to speech acts marks a strong commitment to
the truth of the proposition of the complement clause. However, only in certain
contexts can they fulfill an epistemic function. Confirmo ‘I confirm’, (te/os/le(s))
advierto ‘I warn (you)’ and digo ‘I say’ are explicit assertives, while (te/os/le(s))
apuesto (a) ‘I bet (you)’ and (te/os/le(s)) aseguro ‘I assure (you)’ are explicit com-
missives. Since they are not genuine speech acts (the speaker is not really warn-
ing or betting), these verbs could be considered as meta-speech acts, since they
function as a support of another speech act, in these cases an assertive (cf. Mulder
1998:105–109 for a similar treatment of metadirectives).
5.3 Acquisition of knowledge verbs
Within the class of E/E CTPs that refer to the acquisition of information, a dis-
tinction can be made between predicates that describe the five sensory modes of
perception and predicates that describe internal stimuli.
5.3.1 Perception verbs

The Mind-as-Body metaphor (Sweetser 1990) accounts for the semantic exten-
sion of perception verbs to cognition, which is claimed to be a language univer-
sal. Vision is the preferred source for metaphors of knowledge and thought and
in many languages the word for see has ‘understand’ as part of its meaning (cf.
Goddard 2003; but see Evans and Wilkins 2000 for Australian languages). In
Spanish, too, predicates that refer to each of the five sensory modalities (direct evi-
dentiality) are susceptible to cognitive readings (inferential evidentiality). While
examples that refer to vision usually express relatively confident assertions (1),
predicates that refer to hearing (2), smell (3) and touch (4), for example, are used
for less reliable assertions. 3
(1) Con el cansancio que tengo, veo que esta noche me duermo.4
with the tiredness rel have.1sg see.1sg comp this night 1sg.refl sleep.1sg
‘I’m so tired, it’s obvious that I’ll get to sleep tonight.’
(2) Eso me suena que ya lo tuiteó alguien.
that 1sg.dat sound.3sg comp already 3sg.acc tweet.pfv.3sg somebody
‘It sounds like somebody tweeted that already.’
(3) Me huelo que #PequeñosGigantes arrasa mañana en
1sg.refl smell.1sg comp small.giants devastate.3sg tomorrow in
audiencias.
audiences
‘I have a feeling that Small Giants will be a big audience hit tomorrow.’
(4) Me he maquillado los ojos sin alargar el delineado y
me.refl 3aux.sg make.up.ptcp the eyes without lengthen the eyeline and
siento que me estoy traicionando a mí misma.
feel.1sg comp me.refl be.1sg betray.ger prep me self.f
‘I’ve put my makeup on without lengthening my eyeline and now I feel that
I’m betraying myself.’
5.3.2 Spontaneous mental process verbs

In addition to verbs that denote one of the perceptual stimuli, verbs that refer to
internal, spontaneous stimuli are also used as E/E CTP. The list of most frequent
predicates given at the beginning of this section includes several of these verbs.
3. Taste, the fifth sense, is used metaphorically in me sabe mal que 1sg.dat taste.3sg bad comp
‘It seems wrong to me that’, ‘I’m not pleased that’, but according to the definition given above,
these cases don’t count as E/E CTP.
4. All examples in this paper were taken from Tweets written in Spain in 2014 or 2015.
114 Gijs Mulder
What follows is an inventory of the predicates describing spontaneous mental

processes (SMPPs) that are used to express evidentiality. Appearing in brackets
are impressions of these predicates’ frequency in contemporary Spanish, based
on Twitter searches in 2015 (++ frequent, common Spanish, + occasionally used,
– scarcely used).
– me da la sensación (de) que 1sg.dat give.3sg the feeling (prep) comp ‘I get
the feeling that’ (++)
– me da la impresión (de) que 1sg.dat give.3sg the impression (prep) comp ‘I
get the impression that’ (++)
– (se) me da que (impers) 1sg.dat give.3sg comp ‘I have a feeling that’; the
same use of dar ‘give’ in the expressions mentioned above, but without a noun
and sometimes with the impersonal pronoun se; dar in this context means
‘come over, seize’ and is also used (non-evidentially) with nouns that express
all sorts of physical or emotional states (++)
– se me ocurre que impers 1sg.dat happen.3sg comp ‘it occurs to me that’, ‘it
comes into my head’, or less literal: ‘it might be a good idea’; also often used
negatively, without evidential meaning: ‘I can’t think of ’, ‘I have no idea’ (++)
– tengo la sensación (de) que have.1sg the feeling (prep) comp ‘I have the feel-
ing that’ (++)
– tengo la impresión (de) que have.1sg the impression (prep) comp ‘I have the
impression that’ (++)
– intuyo que intuit.1sg comp ‘I sense that’ (++)
– se me hace que impers 1sg.dat do.3sg comp ‘I get the feeling that’; in this
context hacer ‘do’, ‘make’ means ‘cause a feeling’ (++; especially frequent in
Argentine Spanish)
– me late que 1sg.dat beat.3sg comp ‘I have the feeling that’ (++; specifically
used in Mexican Spanish and in some other Latin American varieties)
– me tinca que 1sg.dat suspect.3sg comp ‘I suspect that’, ‘I have the feeling that’
(++; specifically used in Andean Spanish)
– presiento que sense.beforehand.1sg comp ‘I sense beforehand that’, ‘I have a
premonition that’ (++)
– preveo que foresee.1sg comp ‘I foresee that’ (+)
– me da el pálpito (de) que 1sg.dat give.3sg the ticking.of.the.heart (prep)
comp; ‘I get the feeling/hunch that’ (+)
– me da el tuf(ill)o (de) que 1sg.dat give.3sg the fume(.dim) (prep) comp ‘I
suspect that’, used for negative premonitions (+)
– tengo el pálpito (de) que have.1sg the ticking.of.the.heart (prep) comp ‘I get
the feeling/hunch that’ (+)
– me da (en) la nariz que 1sg.dat give.3sg (in) the nose comp; compare English
‘I feel it in my bones that’ (+)
– tengo la/una corazonada (de) que have.1sg the/a hunch (prep) comp ‘I have
a hunch that’ (corazonada is derivative of corazón ‘heart’) (−)
– (se) me barrunta que (impers) 1sg.dat suspect.3sg comp ‘I have a feeling
that’ (−)
– barrunto que suspect.1sg comp ‘I feel that’ (−)
– se me antoja que impers 1sg.dat feel.3sg comp ‘I get the feeling that’ (−). The
evidential meaning is now outdated; in Latin America, especially in Mexico,
me antoja is often used without evidential meaning: ‘I feel like’.
– se me figura que impers 1sg.dat appear.3sg comp ‘it seems/appears to me
that’ (−). At present more or less obsolete, but attested in dialogues in classic
Spanish works as ‘La Celestina’ (1499), ‘Don Quixote’ (1605/1615) and especial-
ly in novels of 19th century authors as Pardo Bazán, Pérez Galdós and Clarín.
The list of SMPPs that are used evidentially testifies to the expressivity of this lexi-
con and its diachronic, dialectal and diaphasic variation.5 Some predicates are ob-
solete (se me figura), formal, or used with humorous intentions (barrunto), while
other expressions have a contemporary and/or colloquial flavor. For example,
the first attestations of the by now common expressions me da la sensación and
me da la impresión appear in the middle of the 20th century (according to the
CORDE corpus de la Real Academia). Other expressions are regionally bound (me
late, me tinca).
As far as the semantic structure is concerned, this inventory represents the
three different argument structures that occur in Spanish E/E verbs. Only a mi-
nority of the SMPPs (intuyo, for example) have the standard structure, common
in cognition verbs (creo, pienso): the experiencer is realized as the subject and the
stimulus as object. On the contrary, many SMPPs (and also me parece, discussed
above) are examples of experiencer-object verbs: they assign the stimulus to the
subject and the experiencer to the object, which is realized in the dative (Croft
1993, 2012). These two structures exemplify the two processes involved in enter-
ing (and changing) a mental state: “there are two directions of transmission of
force: the experiencer directs her mental attention to the stimulus, and the stimu-
lus causes a change of (mental) state in the experiencer” (Croft 2012:233). So while
experiencer-subject verbs are purely static, experiencer-object verbs are causative.
5. Regarding the expressivity of this lexicon, consider also the metaphors that are used for ‘gut
feeling’. While in Spanish expressions it is located in the nose (la nariz) and the heart (cora-
zonada), in English it is in the bones, in German in the stomach (Bauch) and according to the
Dutch expression ik voel het aan mijn water ‘I feel it in my water’ in urine or, metonymically,
in the bladder.
116 Gijs Mulder
Se me hace and se me ocurre share a third argument structure. In Spanish gram-

mar these verbs are called ‘doblemente pronominales’ (Gómez Torrego 1992:26–
27): they are verbs always headed by the impersonal pronoun se which, in turn,
is followed by a variable dative clitic (in this case, me). This se me-construction is
associated with unintentional (accidental or unplanned) actions and emphasizes
the experiencer’s lack of control over what is presented in the complement clause
(cf. Melis and Flores 2012 for the origins of this construction, and Croft 2012:35
for a similar case, se me olvida ‘I forget’).6
With regard to the semantic role labeling it should be pointed out that other
frameworks (FrameNet, for example) prefer more specified notions and use ‘cog-
nizer’ instead of ‘experiencer’ for verbs of thinking and believing. However, the use
of only one label for the whole class does not do justice to the differences between
the predicates. While the subject of verbs that refer to the general act of think-
ing (creer, pensar) is a cognizer, the subject of a verb like imaginarse is rather an
agent, since ‘to imagine’ is an intentional activity that is in control of the subject;
in SMPPs, on the other hand, the object me is a perceiver, since its referent directs
his attention to some internal stimulus (cf. De Hoop et al. to appear for a semantic
role analysis of Dutch denken ‘think’ and geloven ‘believe’).
With respect to evidentiality, SMPPs and similar expressions have been ana-
lyzed in various ways. In addition to the evidence acquired through the five senso-
ry modes of perception, Aikhenvald (2014:8) and Evans and Wilkins (2000) argue
that some languages mark as a specific type of evidentiality internal support or a
‘gut feeling’ that what is asserted must be so. Evans and Wilkins (2000:554) con-
sider an additional sensory modality, which they dub ‘proprioception’, to account
for the use of verbs that in Australian languages refer to internal feeling, as op-
posed to external feeling. Cappelli (2007:132), in her discussion of cognitive verbs
in English, posits the category of affective evidentiality for evidence that originates
in non-verifiable sources, which are typically encoded in the English verb believe.
Due to its non-verifiability, statements that are based on affective evidence are
non-reliable and thus subjective (cf. Cappelli 2007, 2008).
Me da la sensación de que can be considered as an exemplary SMPP in con-
temporary Peninsular Spanish.7 Roughly, this predicate can express three different
meanings. It is used in the literal meaning of ‘to me it has the appearance’ or ‘to me
it is as if ’, which often gives rise to a counterfactual meaning, as in (5).
6. Melis and Flores (2012) argue that the se me-construction has been introduced into Spanish
fairly recently.
7. These findings are based on instances of me da la sensación (de) que and, below, of se me
ocurre que in tweets from Spain, written in 2015.
(5) Me da la sensación que son las ocho de la tarde y

1sg.dat give.3sg the feeling comp be.3pl the eight of the afternoon and
son solo las seis y media.
be.3pl only the six and half
‘I’ve got the feeling that it’s eight o’clock in the evening but it’s only half past
six.’
Other common uses are personal observations, beliefs, (6) and (7), or premonitions
about future events (8). These are the cases in which the expression functions as
marker of (affective) evidentiality. I found a lot of cases in which me da la sensación de
que is supplemented with no sé por qué (‘I don’t know why’) as in (8). This combina-
tion emphasizes that the speaker is not able to argue the evidence for their assertion.
(6) Me da la sensación de que tal vez no he tenido el
1sg.dat give.3sg the feeling prep comp may.be neg aux.1sg have the
comportamiento adecuado.
behavior adequate
‘I’ve got the feeling that maybe I didn’t behave properly.’
(7) Me da la sensación que a Justin se la suda
1sg.dat give.3sg the feeling comp dat Justin refl 3sg.acc sweat.3sg
todo.
all
‘I’ve got the feeling that Justin [Bieber] doesn’t give a damn.’
(8) No sé por qué me da la sensación que para ese
neg know.1sg why 1sg.dat give.3sg the feeling comp around that
entonces yo ya no voy a estar en el fandom.
then I already neg go.1sg to be.inf in the fandom
‘I don’t know why I’ve got the feeling that by that time I won’t be in the
fandom anymore.’
The third group of instances mark personal judgments. The proposition of the
complement clause of (9) and (10) contains evaluative elements that refer to strong
dislike. The latter tweet includes intensifying expressions (te juro, no me equivoco)
that apparently contradict the literal meaning of me da la sensación, but that in fact
reinforce its evaluative meaning.
(9) Me da la sensación que Carlota Corredera desprende un aura
1sg.dat give.3sg the feeling comp Carlota Corredera detach.3sg an aura
de prepotencia impresionante… no me gusta nada!
of arrogance impressive… neg 1sg.dat like.3sg nothing
‘I’ve got the feeling that Carlota Corredera exudes an incredible aura of
arrogance. I don’t like it at all.’
118 Gijs Mulder
(10) Te juro que me da la sensación de que sois

2sg.dat swear comp 1sg.dat give.3sg the feeling prep comp be.2pl
todos unos falsos que flipas y sé que no me
all art.pl phoney.pl comp trip.3sg and know.1sg comp neg 1sg.refl
equivoco.
make.a.mistake
‘I swear that I’ve got the feeling that you guys are all amazingly phoney and I
know that I’m not wrong.’
The fact that me da la sensación de que is not the only SMPP that is used as marker
of an assessment or standpoint, is clear from the next examples of se me ocurre
que: (11) contains a negative evaluative expression (idiota), while the deontic read-
ing of the subjunctive in (12), together with the matrix verb, marks this example
as a suggestion.
(11) Qué decir de @iescolar, solo se me ocurre que es
what say.inf of @iescolar, only impers 1sg.dat happen.3sg comp be.3sg
IIIDIIIIOOOTAAAAA!!!
idiot
‘What can I say about Ignacio Escolar, it only comes to my mind that he’s an
IDIOT!!!’
(12) Se me ocurre que preguntes en las clínicas de fertilidad
impers 1sg.dat happen.3sg comp ask.sbjv.3sg in the clinics of fertility
como IVI.
like IVI
‘It comes to my mind that you should ask in fertility clinics like IVI.’
From the perspective of speech act theory, assertions with SMPPs are defective
speech acts.
The fact is that one of the felicity conditions for a successful realization of as-
sertions, the first preparatory condition, states: “S [The speaker] has evidence (rea-
sons, etc.) for the truth of [proposition] p” (Searle 1969:66). The fact that a speaker
in using a SMPP cannot give a justification for their statement (corroborated by
the frequent use of no sé por qué with these expressions) is especially incongruous
with situations in which the speaker is attempting to convince the addressee or is
advancing a standpoint for which they are expected to be able to give arguments,
as in discussions or debates.
The Gricean account of rational and efficient communication as well as po-
liteness theory (Brown and Levinson 1987) offer an account for this apparent in-
consistency. A standpoint expressed by means of a SMPP could be considered a
violation of the first maxim of quantity, which says “make your contribution as
informative as is required”. This generates a conversational implicature, since the

speaker is saying less than what they actually want to convey. In politeness theory,
which relies on the Gricean framework, maxim-violations are analyzed as off-
record strategies: the speaker wants to avoid the responsibility for realizing a po-
tentially face-threatening act and “leaves themselves an ‘out’ by using expressions
that can be interpreted in more than one way” (Brown and Levinson 1987:211).
Although Brown and Levinson do not mention SMPPs explicitly, speakers that
refer to spontaneous mental processes cannot be held responsible since they are
not able to influence their thoughts: ‘It’s just a feeling!’
6. Conclusion
The main conclusions of this survey of Spanish evidential and epistemic comple-
ment-taking predicates are:
– Spanish has more than fifty verbs and verbal constructions that are used as E/E
CTPs.
– Only a small portion is frequently used in contemporary Spanish.
– It is an open class with fuzzy boundaries; some members only get their eviden-
tial or epistemic meaning in specific contexts.
– Apart from cognition verbs, also performative verbs and acquisition of
knowledge verbs are used to express evidentiality and/or epistemic modality.
– Highly frequent verbs, notably creo, are semi-grammaticalized, prolific mark-
ers of evidentiality and epistemic modality. Their precise function depends on
the context more than in the case of other E/E CTPs.
– Most other cognition verbs have either epistemic modality, evidentiality or the
marking of a standpoint as their standard function.
– Acquisition of knowledge predicates include expressions that refer to per-
ceptual stimuli and to internal, spontaneous stimuli. The lexicon that refers
to spontaneous mental processes is rich, expressive and shows regional, dia-
chronic and stylistic variation.
– Predicates that describe spontaneous mental processes mark non-verifiable,
affective evidence, but they can also be used as off-record expressions of a
standpoint.
120 Gijs Mulder
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Chapter 5
Seem-type verbs in Dutch and German

Lijken, schijnen & scheinen
Tanja Mortelmans
University of Antwerp
This paper addresses the German seem-type verb scheinen and its Dutch ‘equiva-
lents’ lijken and schijnen. On the basis of an analysis of spoken corpus data, it is
shown that these verbs differ with respect to three parameters: 1) their construc-
tional preferences 2) their evidential potential and 3) the degree of subjectiv-
ity with which the speaker (or conceptualizer) is typically construed. It will be
argued that these three parameters correlate. As a result, a synchronic cline can
be presented, in which the three verbs can be arranged.
Keywords: seem-type verbs, inferentiality, hearsay, subjectivity, scope, Dutch,

German, constructional preferences, cline
1. Why seem-type verbs are interesting
Seem-type verbs have been in the focus of research for a number of reasons. First
of all, they show up an interesting semantic ambivalence, as they combine epis-
temic with evidential traits, for which Faller (2002:87) coined the term ‘epistential’.
This ambivalence is explicitly addressed in Aijmer (2009:64), according to whom
“seem straddles the boundary between perception (an evidential category) and
epistemic modality”. A similar view is held by by Langacker (this volume), López-
Couso and Méndez-Naya (2014), and Usonienė and Šinkūnienė (2013), to give a
few recent references.
[...] some matrix predicates specify source of information (see, hear, infer, report),
others pertain to epistemic certainty (think, suspect, know, likely, certain), while
others are reasonably viewed either way (seem, apparent, conjecture).
(Langacker, this volume:44)
From a semantic point of view, verbs such as appear, look, seem and sound […]
can be characterised as expressing medium modality on a scale of strength of
doi 10.1075/pbns.271.06mor
124 Tanja Mortelmans
speaker’s commitment or certainty regarding the information represented in the

embedded proposition […]. In addition to the epistemic meaning of the speaker’s
endorsement, the predicates appear, look, seem and sound also refer to the speak-
er’s source of evidence for his/her claim: perception in the case of appear, look
and sound, indeterminate, inferential or hearsay in the case of seem […]. Given
that they combine the notions of epistemicity and evidentiality, these verbs can be
characterised as epistemic/evidential predicates.
(López-Couso and Méndez-Naya 2014: 38)
Thus, the current situation regarding the status of seem-type verbs is a classic ex-
ample of their multifaceted nature, exhibiting semantic features which are charac-
teristic of evidentiality and epistemic modality.
(Usonienė and Šinkūnienė 2013: 286)
Another challenge to a precise semantic characterization of seem-type verbs lies in

the observation that it is difficult to pin down their exact epistemic and evidential
value. As to the former, Lampert and Lampert (2010:315) note that English seem
“cannot have a fixed epistemic value”, as it is compatible with epistemic adverbs
expressing probability and certainty (probably, certainly) as wel as possibility (per-
haps, maybe) (see also Diewald and Smirnova (2010:85) for a comparable claim
with respect to German scheinen).1 Other scholars maintain that seem can be
linked to “medium modality” (López-Couso and Méndez-Naya 2014: 38) or even
epistemic necessity (“in the function to express inference based on observational
evidence”, Aijmer 2009:66). As to their evidential semantics, seem-type verbs dif-
fer from one another with respect to the type of source of information they evoke.
English seem, for instance, is associated with perception, inference and hearsay
(Aijmer 2009; Fetzer 2014). German scheinen is claimed to be first and foremost an
inferential marker without reportive meaning (Diewald and Smirnova 2010:182),
whereas Spanish parecer is said to express both inferential and reportive evidenti-
ality (depending on the construction type the verb appears in) (Cornillie 2007:36).
By the same token, Dutch schijnen is said to be both inferential and reportive (e.g.
Van Bogaert and Colleman 2013), while the Dutch verb lijken, on the other hand,
is claimed to refer to both direct visual perception and inference, but not to hear-
say (Koring 2012).
Another interesting feature of seem-type verbs is their constructional vari-
ability, not only in English (see e.g. Aijmer 2009 on the different constructions
the verb seem appears in), but also in Spanish (see Cornillie (2007:25–48) on pa-
recer), Dutch (see Vliegen 2011b on lijken, blijken and schijnen) and German (see
Askedal 1998; Diewald 2000, 2001 on scheinen), to give but a few examples. One
1. This observation has led researchers like Diewald and Smirnova (2010) or Cornillie (2007) to
the claim that seem-type verbs only express evidentiality and do not involve epistemic modality.
Chapter 5. Seem-type verbs in Dutch and German 125
of the recurrent questions in this connection pertains to the relationship between

the different constructional patterns and the (epistemic/evidential) meanings that
are expressed. Some authors maintain that there is no relationship whatsoever
(Lampert and Lampert 2010:315), whereas others view a clear link between a par-
ticular construction type and the type of (source of) evidentiality or the strength
of epistemic commitment. As will become clear in the remainder of this paper, I
will defend the view that there is indeed a connection between construction type
and the meaning range of the verb.
In this paper, I will look at three seem-type verbs in two closely related lan-
guages: the German verb scheinen and its Dutch ‘equivalents’ lijken and schijnen.
On the basis of the results of a corpus analysis of spoken material, it will be claimed
that these three verbs – in spite of their common or at least semantically related
origin – take up different positions on a subjectivity cline (whereby ‘subjectivity’
– in the sense of Langacker (1991) – is understood in terms of the ground (more
in particular: the speaker/conceptualizer) being construed as maximally off-
stage) such that Dutch lijken occupies the leftmost (i.e. least subjectified) position,
German scheinen is in between and (especially Belgian) Dutch schijnen the right-
most position. This cline of subjectivity is related to syntactic properties (which
are linked to the construction types the verbs appear in) as well as the evidential
semantics of the respective verbs. The notion of (semantic and structural) scope
will play a crucial role in the paper.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the Dutch and German
seem-type verbs, thereby focusing on their semantics (2.1), constructional poten-
tial 2.2 and actual constructional preferences (2.3). Section 3 goes into a number
of factors that are traditionally regarded as relevant when discussing evidential/
epistemic verbs: the notions of scope, types of evidence and subjectivity will be
introduced. Section 4 presents the results of a new corpus analysis of spoken lan-
guage and confronts the findings with the relevant factors addressed in section 3.
In section 5, finally, the verbs are arranged in a semantic-structural cline based on
the findings of the corpus analysis.
2. The relevant verbs: German scheinen, Dutch schijnen and lijken
On the basis of an analysis of the translation patterns in an online Dutch-German

parallel corpus of contemporary literary texts compiled by M. Hüning (FU Berlin),
it appears that the most frequent Dutch counterpart of German scheinen – which
can be considered the main seem-type verb in German – is lijken: in about 72% of
all cases, scheinen is used to translate a form of lijken in the original Dutch text.
The verb schijnen comes in second position: about 17% of all cases of scheinen in
this corpus match a form of schijnen. The third category consists of a number of
miscellaneous construction types.
Table 1. Dutch equivalents of German scheinen on the basis of a Dutch-German transla-

tion corpus
scheinen Dutch original with a Dutch original with a something else
form of lijken form of schijnen
N = 188 135 33 20
(scheint, scheinen, (72%) (17%) (11%)
schien, schienen)
Table 1 thus suggests that – somewhat surprisingly – it is the Dutch verb lijken
that bears most similarity to scheinen and not its immediate formal counterpart
schijnen. Differences and similarities between schijnen, lijken and scheinen have
already been described by Vliegen (2011a), especially with regard to the con-
structional preferences of the three verbs. Before we discuss these, however, let us
elaborate on the semantics of the seem-type verbs in Dutch and German (section
2.1) and on the different constructional patterns they can appear in (section 2.2).
2.1 The (evidential) semantics of Dutch lijken and schijnen and German
scheinen
In the available literature on the Dutch and German seem-type verbs, these verbs
have been categorized as either evidential or epistemic or a combination of both. In
this paper, I take the position that epistemic modality and evidentiality belong to
conceptually distinct domains (for a thorough discussion of this topic, see Boye 2012;
Cornillie 2009). At the same time, however, I follow Boye (2012) in the assumption
that these two domains can be analysed as instantiating the more general concep-
tual domain of ‘epistemicity’ (which is defined as expressing justificatory support),
whereby epistemic modal meanings pertain to epistemic support and evidentiality is
concerned with epistemic justification. It can therefore be expected to find markers
pertaining to both domains simultaneously, and this is what seem-type verbs typi-
cally do. However, in the remainder of this paper I will concentrate on the evidential
contribution of the three verbs only, as it can be shown that the verbs clearly differ
from another as far as their conventional evidential meaning is concerned.
With respect to the domain of evidentiality, quite a number of classifica-
tions have been proposed in the literature (for an overview, see e.g. Diewald and
Smirnova 2010:40ff). In this paper, I will make use of Willett’s (1988) classic tax-
onomy based on different types of sources of information, as this suffices to cap-
ture the main evidential meanings of the Dutch and German seem-type verbs. In
Willett’s taxonomy, a first distinction is made between ‘direct’ (i.e. attested via the
senses) and ‘indirect’ sources of information. Within the indirect mode, inference
and reported (hearsay) appear as distinct subnodes. It will become clear that seem-
type verbs typically express meanings related to indirect evidentiality.
2.1.1 Giving light and resemblance: the origins of schijnen/scheinen and

lijken
The original lexical meaning of all three verbs crucially involves visual percep-
tion on the part of a viewer. In their main verb use (which is still available in both
languages), scheinen and schijnen predicate over subjects that shine, i.e. radiate or
evolve light, like the sun (example 1), the moon or gems (example 2).
(1) De zon schijnt.
‘The sun is shining’.
(2) do vant he einen edelen stein, de lecht was unde schone schein
(example taken from De Haan 2007:140)
‘there he found a precious stone that was light and shone beautifully’
In a similar vein, the original meaning of lijken is ‘resemble, being similar to’
(Phillipa et al. 2003–2009), which also crucially depends on visual perception.
This meaning – expressed by lijken in combination with a prepositional object
introduced by op – is still available in present-day Dutch, as example (3) shows:
(3) Ze lijkt op haar zus.
‘She looks like her sister.’
The development from these non-evidential meanings involving visual perception

towards inferential evidentiality can easily be accounted for. On the basis of what
she directly perceives, the speaker can infer that a particular proposition holds.
In many cases, seem-type verbs therefore allow two analyses: they can either refer
to an impression which emanates from the sentence subject and is perceived by a
particular viewer or they can be interpreted as coding an inference to which the
speaker is somehow committed. Consider the following simple sentences in (4)
containing lijken and scheinen used as copulae.
(4) Het meisje lijkt ziek.
Das Mädchen scheint krank.
‘The girl seems ill.’
On a first interpretation, lijken and scheinen can be taken to express that the im-
pression of being ill emanates from the girl, i.e. the girl looks ill. This does not
imply that the speaker necessarily believes this to be the case, she might even know
that this is not true at all.
(5) Het meisje lijkt misschien wel ziek, maar we weten allemaal dat ze doet alsof.
Das Mädchen scheint vielleicht krank, aber wir wissen alle, dass sie nur so tut,
als ob sie krank sei.
‘The girl may look ill, but we all know that she only pretends to be ill.’
However, the same sentence can also be interpreted as coding an inference with
respect to the proposition ‘the girl is ill’.
(6) Het meisje lijkt ziek, we moeten iets ondernemen.
Das Mädchen scheint krank, wir müssen etwas unternehmen.
‘The girl seems ill, we must do something.’
2.1.2 Lijken and scheinen as inferential evidentials

To the extent that the notions of appearance or similarity linked to direct percep-
tion move into the background, the inferential meaning element can become more
salient and the verb can develop into a genuine evidential marker. Note that the
inference need not be based on directly available perceptual evidence, but can be
of a more conceptual nature. Diewald and Smirnova (2010), for instance, hold
that scheinen (whose evidential potential they restrict to the use of scheinen in the
infinitival construction) can be characterized as an inferential evidential, whereby
“[t]he spectrum of types of evidence which scheinen & zu-infinitive may refer to
[…] ranges from irrefutable facts to unspecified pieces of the speaker’s subjective
knowledge” (Diewald and Smirnova 2010:182). Also “direct (visual) information”
(ibd.) can serve as the basis for the statement.
A similar analysis could be applied to Dutch lijken, although the available lit-
erature is not very consistent or clear in this respect. Vliegen (2011a) considers the
verb to be an evidential marker, his characterization of lijken’s evidential seman-
tics, however, remains quite vague: “lijken by means of an optional experiencer is
able to point to the speaker exclusively” (Vliegen 2011a:133). Nuyts (2001:338) la-
bels lijken an “inferential predicate”, Koring 2012 differentiates between the use of
lijken without an experiencer, which is said to be a non-subjective direct evidential
marker, “encoding direct, but unclear evidence” (Koring 2012:876) and subjective
lijkt me ‘seems to me’, which is used when the speaker “has indirect inferential evi-
dence for the proposition”, which can be based on either “perceptual evidence or
on mental reasoning” (Koring 2012:894).2 Koring thus seems to suggest that lijken
when used without an explicit experiencer/conceptualizer is not an inferential, but
a direct evidential marker, a position which seems untenable. An example like (7)
clearly suggests that evidential lijken without an explicit experiencer is inferential
2. Sanders and Spooren (1996) focus on lijken’s epistemic potential when writing that the verb
expresses “a lower degree of certainty” (Sanders and Spooren 1996:243).
as well, i.e. typically involves the making of an inference, which need not be based
on perceptual evidence.
(7) de notering van de euro lijkt kansen te bieden maar hoe te kiezen uit de
zesduizend beursgenoteerde ondernemingen? (CGN-NL)
‘The rate of the Euro seems to offer opportunities but how to choose from
the six thousand listed companies?’
Moreover, the explicit presence of an experiencer/conceptualizer is often inter-

preted (see e.g. Diewald and Smirnova 2010:184; Cornillie 2007:38; Aijmer 2009)
as precluding an interpretation in evidential terms. In combination with an ex-
periencer, the seem-type verb typically denotes “the perspective (often the visu-
al perspective) of an observer who is part of the described scene” (Diewald and
Smirnova 2010:184). Concerning Spanish me parece que ‘it seems to me’, Cornillie
(2007:38) writes that it “does not rely on evidence but has a subjectifier function”,
it “renders the conceptualizer’s opinion based on pure knowledge or on inference”.
In section 4.3, this topic will be dealt with in somewhat more detail.
2.1.3 Dutch schijnen as an inferential-reportive evidential

Dutch schijnen has developed into an inferential-reportive evidential, as it “can
encode various evidential meanings ranging from inference (possibly based on
direct perception) to hearsay” (Van Bogaert and Colleman 2013:484). For a num-
ber of scholars (Koring 2012; Vliegen 2011a; Van Bruggen 1980), Dutch schijnen
is reportive only, but examples like (8) and (9), both taken from the translation
corpus that was discussed above, refute this: it is clear that schijnen has inferential
meaning here, whereby the inference is based on visual perception (in 8) or more
general knowledge (in 9).
(8) De kinderen zwaaien en draaien met de hoepels, niemand schijnt hem op te
merken zoals hij daar in vervoering in de deuropening staat. (Zwagerman)
‘The children are waving and rotating with the hoops, nobody seems to
notice him as he is standing there in the doorway in ecstasy.’
(9) maar buitenstaanders schijnen niet te begrijpen dat een leraar […] iedere
halve minuut zo’n kleine beslissing moet nemen. (Zwagerman)
‘but outsiders do not seem to understand that a teacher has to take such a
small decision every half a minute.’
2.2 The constructional potential of seem-type verbs in Dutch and German
The main constructional patterns the three verbs appear in have been described
in Askedal 1998, Diewald 2000, 2001, Diewald and Smirnova 2010 for German
and Vliegen 2011a–b and Van Bogaert and Colleman 2013 for Dutch. Although
quite elaborate classifications of the various constructional patterns have been pre-
sented in the literature (see especially Askedal 1998), I will limit myself to four
main construction types, into which all patterns can be fitted: the copula con-
struction, the auxiliary construction (in combination with a to-infinitive), the use
of the seem-type verb as a matrix verb in a complement(-like) construction and
in adverbial/parenthetical constructions. I will illustrate the various construction
types using examples from the translation corpus. Note that I will not present a
quantitative analysis of the different construction types occurring in this corpus;
quantitative data will be presented in section 4 on the basis of a more carefully
composed corpus.
First, all three verbs can be used as copulae, whereby the element of visual
perception is still prevalent.
(10) Alles scheint verlassen.
Alles lijkt verlaten. (Nooteboom)
‘Everything seems desolated.’
(11) […] het enige waar dokter Fičev opgewonden over scheen was […]
‘the only thing dr. Fičev seemed excited about was […]’ (Nooteboom)
Second, all three verbs can appear as auxiliaries in combination with an infinitive
introduced by the particle zu or te.
(12) Noch immer lag Natascha in der Sonne und das alles schien sie gar nicht zu
berühren.
Nog altijd lag Natasja in de zon en alles leek langs haar heen te gaan.
(Grünberg)
‘Natasja was still lying in the sun and everything seemed to go past her.’
(13) Inzwischen ist er verheiratet und scheint jetzt viel weniger zu kotzen.
Inmiddels is hij getrouwd en nu schijnt hij veel minder te kotsen. (Grünberg)
‘In the meantime he got married and seems to puke a lot less.’
Diewald and Smirnova (2010:177) explicitly distinguish between cases in which

the infinitive is zu sein ‘to be’ and other infinitives, as the former are said to rep-
resent an intermediate stage between the (older) copular use of scheinen and full
auxiliary use of the verb. The close link between the copular use and the infinitival
to be construction is exemplified in (14), in which the German infinitival con-
struction with zu sein ‘to be’ translates copular lijken in the original Dutch version.
(14) Schmatzen schien Nathan sehr männlich zu sein.
Smakken leek Nathan heel mannelijk. (Van Dis)
‘Smacking seemed (to be) very male to Nathan.’
A third construction type that the three verbs can appear in involves an imper-
sonal use of the seem-type verb followed by a complement or another subordi-
nate construction. German es scheint ‘it seems’ can combine with the comparative
conjunction als (ob) ‘as if ’ typically marking an unreal comparison (es scheint, als
ob ‘it seems as if ’) (examples 15a-16a) or with dass ‘that’. Similarly, Dutch het lijkt
can be followed by the comparative conjunction (als)of ‘as if ’ (example 15b) or
by dat ‘that’.3 A third possibility for Dutch lijken is het lijkt erop dat ‘it looks like
it that’ (example 16b). Dutch het schijnt only combines with factive dat ‘it seems
that’ (example 17).
(15) a. Es scheint, als wäre immer Nacht, doch die Nacht ist heller als der Tag.
b. Het lijkt of het altijd nacht is, maar de nacht is helderder dan een dag.
(Nooteboom)
‘It seems as if it were always night, but the night is clearer than a day.’
(16) a. Es scheint, als könnten wir Vollkommenheit nicht mehr ertragen, nicht
einmal mehr als Idee […].
b. Het lijkt erop dat wij de volmaaktheid niet meer kunnen verdragen, zelfs
niet als idee. (Nooteboom)
‘It seems as if we can’t stand perfection anymore, not even as mere idea.’
(17) maar het scheen dat er op zulke momenten een eenheid in tegendelen ontstond.
(Nooteboom).
‘but it seemed that in such moments a unity emerged in oppositions.’
A fourth pattern is the use of the three verbs in adverbial4 and parenthetical con-
structions; examples include phrases like Dutch naar het schijnt ‘as it seems’ and
zo leek het (18b) ‘so it seemed’ and German so schien es (18a) ‘so it seemed’ and wie
mir scheint ‘as it seems to me’ (19).
(18) a. Felsbrocken fielen – so schien es – langsam auf die Straße herab.
b. […] rotsen vielen, zo leek het, langzaam over de weg. (Nooteboom)
‘Rocks fell slowly, so it seemed, on the road.’
(19) Das ist, wie mir scheint, eine Folge der rauhen Lebensbedingungen.
(Nooteboom)
‘That is, as it seems to me, a consequence of the rough living conditions.’
3. Neither for lijken nor scheinen complementation introduced by dat/dass was found in the
data discussed here.
4. Unlike parenthetical constructions, adverbial constructions provoke inversion in clause ini-
tial position. For reasons of space, I will not elaborate on this.
For reasons of simplicity, the particle use of the forms (’t) schijnt and scheint’s
(which did not occur in the translation corpus) will also be included in the latter
category (for a thorough discussion of this use, see Van Bogaert and Colleman
2013; Van Bogaert and Leuschner 2015). Inclusion seems to be justified given that
particles, just like adverbials and parentheticals, typically have wide-scope, i.e.
they most often pertain to the entire proposition, as in (20).
(20) Ellen […] heeft nen tijd in ’t ziekenhuis gelegen ’t schijnt
‘Ellen has been a while in hospital I’ve heard’ (CGN-VL)
Apart from these four main construction types, in which the seem-type verbs can
be claimed to at least potentially have evidential meaning, all three verbs still ap-
pear with lexical meaning. Both schijnen and scheinen can be used as full lexical
verbs with the meaning of ‘radiating, giving light’, whereas lijken (in combina-
tion with the preposition op) means ‘to resemble’. All three uses are present in the
translation corpus.
(21) Der Mond schien.
De maan scheen. (Abdolah)
‘The moon was shining.’
(22) […] ik keek naar de vlinder, en hoe langer ik ernaar keek, hoe meer hij begon
te lijken op een levend exemplaar. (Grünberg)
‘And I looked at the butterfly, and the longer I watched it, the more it began
to resemble a living exemplar.’
2.3 Constructional preferences: differences between scheinen, schijnen and

lijken
Although section 2.2 has shown that the constructional potential of the three
verbs is more or less identical, they clearly differ from one another with respect
to the frequency with which they actually appear in these construction types.
This is not a new observation: the differences that are discussed below, are mainly
based on findings reported in Vliegen (2011a) and Van Bogaert and Colleman
(2013).5 What is new, however, is that I will try to link these different construc-
tional preferences to the strength of the development of evidential meaning in
5. Vliegen (2011a) presents the results of a corpus analysis of Netherlandic Dutch schijnen and
lijken, on the one hand, and German scheinen, on the other, on the basis of two newspaper
corpora. Van Bogaert and Colleman (2013)’s analysis of Belgian Dutch schijnen is based on a
spoken corpus (the Belgian part of the CGN, Corpus of Spoken Dutch).
general (and reportive meaning in particular) and to the degree of subjectivity of

the conceptualizer (see section 4).
Different structural preferences can be discerned in at least three respects.
First, although all three verbs can be used as copulae, this use is found to be much
more popular with the German verb scheinen than with its Dutch counterpart
schijnen (both in Belgian and in Netherlandic Dutch). Copular use is most popular
with (Netherlandic) Dutch lijken, as can be deduced from table 2.
Table 2. Copular uses of Dutch schijnen, lijken and German scheinen

DUT schijnen ND lijken GER scheinen
copular use 6.1% (Netherlandic Dutch, Vliegen 38.3% 20.7%
2011a) (Vliegen 2011a) (Vliegen 2011a)
2.3% (Belgian Dutch, Van Bogaert &
Colleman 2013: 493)
Second, Vliegen (2011a) points out that German scheinen easily combines with
an experiencer in almost every construction type, whereas its Dutch counterpart
schijnen does not allow an experiencer in the infinitival and complement con-
struction, only “manchmal in the Kopulakonstruktion” (“sometimes in the copula
construction”, Vliegen 2011a:240). With lijken, on the other hand, “an experiencer
is always possible” (Vliegen 2011b: 133).
Table 3. Experiencers with schijnen, scheinen and lijken

ND schijnen GER scheinen ND lijken
+ experiencer “manchmal in der “höhere[r] Gebrauch “always possible”
Kopulakonstruktion” eines Experiencer” (Vliegen 2011b)
(Vliegen 2011a) (Vliegen 2011a)
A third difference pertains to the frequency of the complement and the paren-
thetical/adverbial construction types. For all three verbs, the infinitival construc-
tion is claimed to be the one with the highest frequency, at least if we consid-
er the Netherlandic Dutch newspaper sample used in Vliegen 2011a. Both the
complement and the parenthetical/adverbial construction occur infrequently in
Vliegen’s material (note that the figures for the parenthetical/adverbial type are
difficult to interpret so that the % in Table 4a presents an estimation on the basis
of Vliegen’s numbers).
Table 4a. Main construction types with schijnen, scheinen and lijken

Vliegen (2011a) ND schijnen (written) GER scheinen ND lijken
+ to-infinitive 68.7% 73.8% 45.5%
+ complement 3.8% 0.7% 0%
adverbial/parenthetical less than 5% less than 3% less than 5%
However, if we look at the results of the analysis of a Belgian Dutch spoken sample
(see Van Bogaert and Colleman 2013) a completely different picture emerges. In
Van Bogaert and Colleman’s (2013) analysis of Belgian Dutch schijnen (based on
data taken from the Belgian Dutch part of the Corpus of Spoken Dutch (CGN)),
the complement construction is the most frequent one (accounting for 33.8% of
all instances). And perhaps even more surprisingly, the adverbial-parenthetical
constructional pattern takes up second position, accounting for at least 27.8% of
all instances in the corpus. The infinitival construction is in third position, ac-
counting for 20.7% of all instances.
Table 4b. Main construction types with BD spoken schijnen

Van Bogaert & BD schijnen (spoken) GER scheinen ND lijken
Colleman (2013)
+ to-infinitive 20.7% 73.8% 45.5%
+ complement 33.8% 0.7% 0%
adverbial/parenthetical 27.8% less than 3% less than 5%
This finding thus suggests that the use of Belgian Dutch schijnen in spoken col-
loquial contexts clearly deviates from its use in the Netherlandic Dutch written
material. It also raises the question whether the behaviour of Netherlandic Dutch
schijnen and lijken and German scheinen in spoken language is similar to the one
in the newspaper corpus. This topic will be discussed in section 4.
Let us take stock: although the constructional potential of the three verbs is
similar, they differ from one another in three important respects. First, the copu-
lar use is dominant with Dutch lijken, but marginal with Dutch schijnen, whereas
German scheinen occupies a middle position. Second, lijken always allows an expe-
riencer, schijnen only allows it in the copula construction, German scheinen again
occupies a middle position. And third, complement and adverbial/parenthetical
construction types are disfavoured by scheinen and lijken, but highly popular with
Belgian Dutch schijnen, at least in the spoken material. In the following sections, I
will try to account for these observations, thereby integrating semantic consider-
ations with syntactic patterning.
3. Aspects of evidentiality: scope, types of evidence, subjectivity
As the focus of this paper is on the evidential use of seem-type verbs, I will discuss
in this section a number of factors that are traditionally regarded as relevant with
respect to the assessment of the evidential semantics of these verbs. More specifi-
cally, I will zoom in on three factors: 1) scope properties, 2) the type of evidence
involved and 3) the degree of subjectivity of the speaker/conceptualizer.
3.1 Scope
Boye (2010, 2012) argues that evidential markers semantically scope over proposi-
tions, i.e. over “meaning units with a truth value” (Boye 2010:294), i.e. they refer
to something in the actual world. Such a wide semantic scope can be iconically
reflected by a wide structural scope. This means that wide scope elements (which
take propositions in their scope, e.g. finite complement constructions) are less
ambiguous with respect to their evidential meaning than others. Boye (2012:192)
discusses the example of I heard him yell vs. I heard that he was yelling. The phrase I
heard can either describe an act of auditory perception or can function as a marker
of reportive evidentiality. In the ACI-construction I heard him yell, I heard does
not scope over a proposition, therefore it cannot function as a genuine reportive
evidential. In I heard that he was yelling, on the other hand, I heard scopes over
a proposition (evidenced by the fact that it can be evaluated epistemically, e.g. I
heard that he was probably yelling) and as such must be analyzed as a reportive or
auditiory evidential.
When we apply this to the seem-type verbs, it can be expected that obliga-
tory wide-scope constructions like finite that-complement constructions or par-
enthetical uses typically have evidential meaning, whereas seem-type verbs in non
wide-scope constructions (e.g. as copulae) tend to be less evidential, as these con-
structions more easily invite narrow-scope readings, in which the verb mainly de-
scribes a particular appearance which emanates from the subject. This is the case
in example (23), in which copular scheinen expresses that something only appears
to be traditional or conventional, but in fact isn’t.
(23) Die sind nicht konventionell, aber sie scheinen traditionell und sind es doch
nicht. (DWDS-LQ)
‘They aren’t conventional, but they seem traditional and they aren’t.’
Of course, in an appropriate context, an appearance reading can give rise to mean-

ings leading to a genuine evidential interpretation, since as a copula, scheinen “al-
ready contains an evidential meaning component, as it describes not only a visual
effect produced by a subject […] but rather an impression which is caused by
the subject referent by means of its visual (or other) appearance” (Diewald and
Smirnova 2010:178–179). The step from an impression reading towards genuine
evidential meaning is only a small one: the speaker infers on the basis of particular
signs that a proposition holds. As is argued by Whitt (2016) (on the basis of Boye
(2012:250ff.)), copular uses of scheinen can be interpreted as coercing a proposi-
tion. In (24), for instance, the speaker can be argued to infer (on the basis of par-
ticular evidence) that the proposition ‘that is urgently needed’ seems to be true.
The copula scheint thus coerces a propositional reading in this case.6
(24) Das scheint dringend nötig.
‘That seems urgently needed.’
We therefore hypothesize that a high frequency of copular uses can be indicative

of a relatively low degree of entrenchment of the evidential function of a particular
verb. Mutatis mutandis, high frequency of obligatory wide-scope constructions
can point to a high degree of entrenchment of the evidential function.
3.2 Types of evidence: from inference to reported
A cross-linguistic tendency whereby inferential markers gradually develop into

reportive ones has been observed by Wiemer (2010:115), both for modal verbs
(e.g. Dutch moeten ‘must’) and for verbs of appearance (e.g. seem). Wiemer hy-
pothesizes that the hearsay function correlates “with the least possible integration
of paradigmatically isolated verb forms into clausal syntax” (Wiemer 2010:115),
i.e. when these forms are used in parenthetical constructions or as particles. As
seem-type verbs tend to develop reportive evidentiality in a later stage, we can
expect that only verbs whose evidential potential is well developed, allow for ex-
tension into the reportive domain.
6. Also in the infinitival to be construction, “in most cases the ambiguous interpretation be-
tween more lexical copula use and more grammaticalized evidential use is possible” (Diewald
and Smirnova, 2010:187). And even in infinitival constructions, seem-type verbs do not neces-
sarily scope over propositions either. In (i), the speaker does not infer that the furniture is float-
ing in space, but describes an impression (which does not correspond to reality).
(i) De meubels lijken in de ruimte te zweven.

Die Möbel scheinen im Raum zu schweben.
‘The furniture seems to float in space’
3.3 Subjectivity
In evidential/epistemic predicates, the role of the speaker (writer, conceptualizer)

is of utmost importance. On a very basic level, it is the speaker’s epistemic support
or justification which is crucially at stake. Following Langacker (1991, 2009), epis-
temic/evidential expressions can be distinguished on the basis of the explicitness
or overtness with which the speaker/conceptualizer is portrayed. Highly subjective
evidential/epistemic markers construe the conceptualizer as maximally off-stage,
i.e. they do not explicitly refer to the conceptualizer. More objective construals, on
the other hand, typically involve the on-stage expression of a conceptualizer. In ex-
ample (25), therefore, the speaker does not portray herself as the onstage partner
of the telephone conversation, whereas in (26), the speaker voices her opinion and
brings herself on-stage.
(25) en ’t schijnt echt verschrikkelijk te zijn. dus uh dat zei ze […] weer aan de
telefoon van […] wat ie heeft gedaan (CGN-NL)
‘it really seems to be horrible, so uh she said that again on the phone, what
he has done’
(26) daar houdt het zo’n beetje mee op lijkt me (CGN-VL)
‘there it stops more or less, it seems to me’
Wrapping up, I will try to show in the remainder of this paper that the seem-type
verbs scheinen, lijken and schijnen can be arranged on a synchronic continuum
that involves (semantic/structural) scope, types of evidence and degree of sub-
jectivity of the conceptualizer. As will become clear, these aspects are intimately
related to each other.
4. A new corpus analysis: spoken Dutch and German compared
In order to compare the three seem-type verbs, I conducted a corpus analysis

based on a corpus of spoken language, for a number of reasons. First, it was spo-
ken language in which Van Bogaert and Colleman (2013) found unexpected con-
structional behaviour for Belgian Dutch schijnen. Second, and more importantly,
a number of recent studies have shown the importance of the ‘pragmatics’ of evi-
dentials, for example in discourse analytic studies (e.g. Marín Arrese 2013, 2015)
or with respect to the interactional functions of evidentials (see e.g. Nuckols and
Michael 2014; Cornillie and Gras 2015), both of which are particularly salient in
spoken environments. In other words, I expect the evidential to unfold its maximal
evidential and constructional potential in spoken (rather than written) contexts.
For Belgian and Netherlandic Dutch, the Corpus Gesproken Nederlands

(= CGN; Corpus of Spoken Dutch) was used. It consists of about nine million
words collected between 1998 and 2004 and comprises a Belgian (CGN-VL) and
a Netherlandic Dutch (CGN-NL) component. The corpus is lemmatised so that it
can easily be searched for all occurrences of schijnen and lijken in general, i.e. in
all tenses and person forms. Table 5 presents the total number of occurrences of
schijnen and lijken in the Belgian and Netherlandic Dutch part of the corpus; it is
obvious that lijken is a far more frequent item than schijnen.
Table 5. Absolute frequencies of schijnen and lijken in CGN-VL and CGN-NL

CGN schijnen lijken
CGN-NL 502 2486
CGN-VL 399 751
A number of repetitions or uninterpretable occurrences of schijnen were manually

omitted, so that the final sample consists of 321 tokens of Belgian Dutch (in the
following: BD) schijnen and 393 token of Netherlandic Dutch (in the following:
ND) schijnen. For lijken, I decided to include only occurrences of three subcorpora
of the CGN. I selected the components F, G and L that comprise interviews and
discussions that were broadcast, discussions in public meetings and personal com-
mentaries. The lijken-sample comprises 107 Belgian Dutch and 425 Netherlandic
Dutch instances of lijken.
Finding comparable corpora for spoken German proved not to be easy. The
Datenbank für gesprochenes Deutsch (DGD) provides a number of online corpora
of spoken German, most of which are either older than the Dutch material (dat-
ing from the 1960s or 1970s, like the König-corpus or the Dialogstrukturencorpus)
or contain rather specific language varieties (highly colloquial, dialectal etc.). For
this reason, I only made use of the FOLK-corpus (Forschungs- und Lehrkorpus
für gesprochenes Deutsch) containing spoken material recorded between 2005 and
2012. This corpus, however, yielded only 24 usable instances of scheinen. I there-
fore added all relevant instances of scheinen (in all mood, person and tense forms)
taken from the Korpus Gesprochene Sprache on the DWDS-website (www.dwds.
de), most of which (181 occurrences) stem from the famous German television
talk show ‘Literarisches Quartett’, which was broadcast between 1988 and 2001.
Sixteen additional tokens were taken from the subcorpus ‘Bundestagprotokolle
1998–1999’. In sum, I looked at 221 occurrences of German scheinen.
Table 6 gives an overview of the distribution of the construction types in the
respective samples. Note that the numbers for the lexical meaning were not added,
as they are not relevant for our analysis here.
Table 6. Distribution of construction types in the BD, ND and German samples

copula infinitive complement adverb/paren-
thetical/particle
BD schijnen 10 56 112 113
(n: 321) 3.1% 17.4% 34.9% 35.2%
ND schijnen 6 272 39 23
(n: 393) 1.5% 69.2% 9.9% 5.8%
GER scheinen 66 120 22 8
(n: 221) 29.9% 54.3% 9.9% 3.5%
BD lijken 70 15 10 3
(n: 107) 65.4% 14% 9.3% 2.8%
ND lijken 230 61 56 23
(n: 425) 54.1% 14.3% 13.1% 5.4%
Two things are immediately apparent. First, we find a clearly different distribu-
tion for all three verbs in the spoken material in comparison to the one Vliegen
(2011a–b) found on the basis of the newspaper corpus (with the exception of
Netherlandic Dutch schijnen, the behaviour of which in spoken language does not
differ a great deal from its behaviour in written language). And second, a first cline
emerges on the basis of the verbs’ preference for particular construction types
(note that a grey marked cell in Table 6 means that the constructional pattern has
a type frequency of at least 20% in the given sample). This will be elaborated in
greater detail in section 4.1.
4.1 Scope
As has already been suggested by Van Bogaert and Colleman (2013), BD schijnen
clearly favours obligatory wide-scope environments. It occurs most frequently in
the complement construction (34.9%) and in the adverbial/particle construction
types (35.2%). By contrast, ND schijnen clearly prefers the infinitival construc-
tion (69.2%) and hardly occurs in the complement construction, in the adverbial/
parenthetical environments or as a particle.7 The infinitival construction is the fa-
voured construction of German scheinen as well (54.3%).8 It must be noted, how-
ever, that scheinen is frequently used as a copula (in almost 30% of all occurrenc-
7. As such, the behaviour of ND schijnen in the CGN does not differ much from its behaviour
in the newspaper corpus discussed in Vliegen (2011a), in which the infinitival construction oc-
curs in 68.7% of all cases.
8. In Vliegen’s newspaper corpus, the infinitival occurrences of German scheinen dominated to
a higher extent (73.8%).
es), whereas both BD and ND schijnen seem to avoid this construction. Finally,
both BD and ND lijken is found most frequently in the copula construction,9
which suggests that its evidential potential is developed to a lesser extent than that
of the other verbs.
The following Table 7 summarizes the scope preferences. It shows that Belgian
Dutch schijnen prefers unambiguous wide-scope environments, whereas ND/BD
lijken is found much more frequently in copula constructions. German scheinen
and Netherlandic Dutch schijnen take up a middle position.
Table 7. Different scope preferences of the seem-type verbs

copula infinitive wide-scope
BD schijnen − − +++
ND schijnen − +++ −
GER scheinen + ++ −
BD lijken +++ − −
ND lijken ++ − −
4.2 Types of evidence: from inference to reported
When used evidentially (i.e. typically in the infinitival construction and in some of
the complement constructions), the verb lijken (both in Belgian and Netherlandic
Dutch) is inferential. The evidence upon which the inference is based, can be vi-
sual, as in example (27), in which the speaker bases her statement on an observa-
tion of the seals, but examples with more conceptual evidence types can be found;
see example (28), in which the speaker refers to aanwijzingen ‘indications’ or (29),
in which the inference is based on what the speaker has read.
(27) Het spektakel lijkt de robben niet echt te beroeren (CGN-VL)
‘The show does not seem to trouble the seals’
(28) alle aanwijzingen zijn inderdaad dat ’t uh ggg […]dat ’t gemiddeld genomen
op aarde lijkt ’t warmer te wor worden (CGN-VL)
‘All indications are indeed that on average the earth seems to get warmer’
(29) het lijkt nu het lijkt nu daar uh dat daar wat schot op ko in komt als je de
recente berichtgeving leest (CGN-NL)
‘It now seems that it finally goes ahead a little if you read the recent accounts’
9. Note that in Vliegen’s newspaper corpus, the infinivital occurrences of lijken are much more
frequent (45.5%).
The same holds for German scheinen. In the infinitival construction, the verb
mainly has inferential meaning, as in (30), where the speaker first mentions that
he is trying to understand (German kapieren) the game of football and then uses
scheinen to note that he has inferred that it is better to have an offensive midfield
player who is actually a striker.
(30) nee äh langsam (.) versuch ich des spiel zu kapieren (.) irgendwie scheint s gut
zu sein offensiven mittelfeldspieler zu haben der eigentlich stürmer is (FOLK)
[…] no uh slowly I am trying to understand the game (.) somehow it seems
to be good to have an offensive midfield player who is really a striker’
Note that reportive readings of German scheinen are marginal at best. Example
(31) could be a case in point, as the speaker clearly refers to the fact that her ut-
terance is based on the words of little Gabriel. It could, however, also be argued
that scheinen is still mainly inferential, whereby the inference is based on what the
speaker has heard, i.e. the inference is based on a report.10
(31) […] der gabriel erzählt in letschter zeit öfter mal wieder von […] von seinem
papa und der freundin also […] er scheint ja wohl echt jetzt irgendwie […] ne
freundin zu haben (FOLK)
‘Gabriel has been talking lately time and again about his daddy and the
girlfriend so he really seems to have a girlfriend now somehow’
Netherlandic Dutch schijnen allows both inferential and reportive readings. In the
present corpus, the majority, i.e. 194 out of 272 infinitival occurrences are report-
ive (example 32 is a case in point; the speaker has probably heard or read this
somewhere), but inferential uses can also be found (in 35 cases). Example (33)
illustrates the inferential meaning: on observing the cat, the speaker infers that it
is not in pain anymore.
(32) d’r schijnt een extreem hoog gehalte aan uh pollen in de lucht te zijn deze
maand (CGN-NL)
‘There seems to be an extremely high amount of pollen in the air this month’
(33) [talking about the cat] maar hij schijnt niet meer zo’n pijn te hebben
(CGN-NL)
‘But it doesn’t seem to be in pain that much’
Often, however, it is difficult to decide whether ND schijnen is reportive, inferen-

tial or somehow just vague between these two readings.
10. Examples of this type were found to occur only four times in the corpus. Note that purely
reportive readings are claimed to occur with the particle scheint’s (Van Bogaert and Leuschner
2015), which does not occur in my data.
Finally, in its (typically wide-scope) use as a particle, in the adverbial con-

struction naar het schijnt (example 34) and in the complement construction het
schijnt dat (example 35), which taken together account for more than 70% of all
occurrences of schijnen in Belgian Dutch, the verb mainly has reportive meaning.
(34) ik heb op m’n twaalf jaar naar ’t schijnt een angina gehad die zich op m’n
gewrichten gezet heeft (CGN-VL)
‘When I was twelve I had an angina – so it seems (i.e. as I have been told) –
which has affected to my joints’
(35) het schijnt dat er een een uh sterke griep op komst is (CGN-VL)
‘It seems that (i.e. I’ve heard/read that) a strong flu is coming’
In the infinitival construction, BD schijnen allows both reportive (example 36; the
speaker has probably read or heard this exact number; it is quite unlikely that the
speaker’s own inference is involved here) and inferential readings (example 37),
whereby the hearsay reading again prevails.
(36) in heel Vlaanderen schijnen er zich […] slechts eenentwintig studenten
tandheelkunde te hebben ingeschreven (CGN-VL)
‘in the whole of Flanders only twenty-one students seem to have enrolled in
dentistry’
(37) alleen schijnt ge dat (…) nog steeds niet te willen inzien (CGN-VL)
‘the only thing is you still don’t seem to want to realize that’
As with ND schijnen, it is sometimes difficult to decide (especially in the infinitival

construction) whether the verb is reportive or inferential or just vague.
On a final note, it should be emphasized that (B/N)Dutch lijken and German
scheinen allow for non-evidential non-factual interpretations much more fre-
quently than ND and BD schijnen. First, such readings are frequently found in the
copulae construction (which is the most frequent construction type with lijken,
see example (38)). And second, the most frequent complementizer with lijken is
the unreal comparative marker alsof ‘as if ’, which is often used when something
only appears to be the case, but in fact is not. In the complement cases, 5 out of
10 BD tokens of lijken and 34 out of 56 ND cases of lijken are construed with the
complementizer als of ‘as if ’, as in example (39).
(38) op het Beierse platteland […] lijkt de boom wel een reusachtige zuurstok of een
Indiaanse totempaal (CGN-VL)
‘in the Bavarian countryside the tree seems (i.e. looks like) a giant candy
cane or an Indian totem pole’
(39) en het leek alsof we de d’r waren aan ’t inbreken eigenlijk (CGN-VL)
‘and it seemed (i.e. looked like) as if we were breaking in there’
German scheinen can be combined with both the unreal comparative conjunction
als ob and more ‘factual’ dass ‘that’. For Dutch schijnen, on the other hand, only the
factual complementizer dat is possible.
We can conclude that on the basis of the evidence types another cline emerges,
whereby lijken and scheinen are mainly inferential, ND schijnen has both infer-
ential and reportive meaning, and BD schijnen is most strongly reportive. Fig. 1
provides an attempt to integrate both scope properties and evidential semantics.
FAVORITE COPULA INFINITIVE WIDE-SCOPE

CONSTRUCTION
EVIDENCE inferential reportive reportive

inferential
VERB BD lijken ND schijnen BD schijnen

ND lijken
GER scheinen
Figure 1. Different scope preferences, different types of evidence
4.3 Subjectivity
Finally, the corpus data show that those verbs of seeming that still frequently occur
as copulae (lijken and scheinen) easily combine with an on-stage conceptualizer,
whereas BD/ND schijnen hardly allows this option.11 As Table 8 shows, scheinen
combines with a dative conceptualizer in about 58% of all its occurrences, BD
lijken in 39% of all occurrences, ND lijken in about 47%.
Interestingly, these subjectifier uses of the seem-type verbs do not only occur
in the copula construction, but are compatible with every construction type. As
such, the verbs lijken and scheinen can be said to be compatible with both low
and high degrees of subjectivity of the conceptualizer, whereas schijnen typically
construes the conceptualizer in an implicit (and therefore highly subjective) way.
11. In the CGN, Dutch schijnen was combined with an onstage experiencer in only one out of
714 occurrences.
Table 8. Explicit conceptualizers with lijken and scheinen

+ conceptualizer copula infinitive complement adverbial/ total number
parenthetical
GER scheinen 51/66 55/120 18/22 5/8 129/221
(n: 221) (77%) (46%) (81.8%) (62.5%) (58.4%)
BD lijken 33/70 5/15 2/10 2/3 42/107
(n: 107) (47%) (33.3%) (20%) (66.7%) (39.2%)
ND lijken 160/230 9/61 10/56 19/23 198/425
(n: 425) (69.6%) (14.7%) (17.9%) (82.6%) (46.6%)
When the conceptualizer appears onstage, the seem-type verb is not genuinely
evidential anymore, it is evaluative (and seems to function more like an epistemic
marker). The following examples (in an infinitival construction in (40), in a par-
enthetical construction in (41) and in a complement construction (42)) illustrate
these subjectifier uses. Here, lijken and scheinen typically have a hedging function,
comparable with I think.
(40) Aber genau das scheint mir das Wesentliche an der Biographie zu sein, was
Herr Fuld sagt (DWDS-LQ)
‘But exactly that seems to me to be the essential thing about the biography,
that what Mr. Fuld is saying’
(41) Nein, Herr Reich-Ranicki, ich habe diesen Text irgendwie anders gelesen,
scheint mir (DWDS-LQ)
‘No, Mr. Reich-Ranicki, I have read this text somehow differently, as it seems
to me’
(42) en ’t lijkt me dat dat een evident antwoord is op de vraag (CGN-NL)
‘and it seems to me that that is an obvious answer to the question’
5. Conclusions: a three-fold cline
In this paper, I have tried to show that for the seem-type verbs lijken, schijnen and
scheinen a correlation exists between their constructionial preferences, the type of
evidentiality expressed and the degree of subjectivity with which they construe the
conceptualizer. The verb that favours wide-scope construction types (BD schijnen)
is the only one in which the reportive meaning is absolutely dominant; at the same
time, Belgian Dutch schijnen does not generally allow an on-stage conceptual-
izer. Conversely, the verb that strongly favours the copula construction (Dutch
lijken) does not have a clearly developed reportive reading and allows for an on-
stage conceptualizer to appear in about every construction type. Figure 2 tries to
capture these correlations. Although this is a synchronic cline in the first place,
seem-type verbs are expected to move (or: to have moved) from left to right, i.e. to
develop wide-scope construction types in the course of time, to acquire reportive
meanings and to ban more objective construals of the speaker. In fact, this is what
the Dutch verb schijnen has gone through, starting with the grammaticalization of
the copular construction (out of the main verb use) towards the development of
complement and infinitival construction types, whereby the verb initially could be
construed with an explicit conceptualizer in the infinitival construction (Vliegen
2011b: 126–129).
FAVORITE COPULA INFINITIVE WIDE-SCOPE

CONSTRUCTION (adverbial,
parenthetical,
particle)
EVIDENCE inferential reportive-inferential reportive

evaluative
SUBJECTIVITY subjective mainly subjective subjective

(implicit) & (implicit) construal of (implicit)
objective C construal of C
(explicit)
construal of C
VERB DUT lijken ND schijnen BD schijnen
GER scheinen
Figure 2. A three-fold cline: construction type, types of evidence and subjectivity
Finally, let me emphasize that the above cline should not be interpreted such
that a verb can only be situated in one location. For one thing, Belgian Dutch
schijnen still allows copular uses in which the conceptualizer appears on-stage,
as in example (43).
(43) de eisen […] schijnen mij trouwens onrealistisch ook en onwerkbaar.
(CGN-VL)
‘by the way the demands seem to me unrealistic and also unworkable’
For another, lijken in some of its construction types clearly moves towards the right
of the cline, in which it might even be claimed to develop reportive readings. A case
in point is the impersonal complement construction het lijkt erop dat ‘it seems like
it that’, which is incompatible with an explicit conceptualizer (unlike impersonal
het lijkt (me) dat) and has the factual complementizer dat (unlike het lijkt alsof,
which is more strongly predisposed towards non-factual readings). And indeed,
in the following sentence, het lijkt erop dat seems to acquire reportive meaning,
which is also corroborated by the use of reportive zou in the following sentence.
(44) Het lijkt erop dat Porosjenko op het laatste moment gezegd heeft dat het
akkoord voor hem ook niet aanvaardbaar is. De voorwaarden die gesteld zijn,
zouden voor Oekraïne te ver gaan.
‘It seems that P. has said at the last moment that the agreement is
inacceptable for him as well. The conditions imposed would go too far for
Ukraine.’
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Chapter 6
A synchronic and diachronic study

of the Dutch Auxiliary “Zou(den)”
Ingeborg Harmes
University of Münster/University of Antwerp
This contribution presents the results of a corpus based investigation of the

Dutch auxiliary zou(den). The synchronic and diachronic study demonstrates
that the auxiliary can express nine meanings since the oldest language stages,
and that its meaning has specialized to hypotheticality. Furthermore, the paper
focuses on the evidential function and discusses some grammatical and contex-
tual features that support an evidential interpretation. It is highly probable that
linguistic features such as a source reference and the grammatical construction
have contributed to the evolution of an evidential meaning.
Keywords: modal auxiliaries, evidentiality, semantic change, Dutch
1. Introduction
The topic of this paper is a synchronic and diachronic study of the Dutch auxil-
iary verb zou(den) ‘should’, which is the preterite form of the verb zullen ‘shall’.
The preterite form zou(den) is rather remarkable because it does not always cor-
respond with the semantics of the present form zullen. Similarly, the English cog-
nates shall and should have different uses; these modal auxiliaries have therefore
separate dictionary entries. In Present Day Dutch, the auxiliary zou(den) can only
be regarded as a semantic past of zullen in its temporal and intentional meaning.
The other meanings and uses are entirely absent in zullen, and these are so domi-
nant that zou(den) can arguably be considered an independent auxiliary, separate
from zullen.
The objective of this paper is first to give a description of the meaning cat-
egories of zou(den) in Present Day Dutch and in the older language stages, and
second, an overview of the diachronic development of these categories. The dis-
cussion will focus on the evidential meaning of zou(den) and explores the relevant
structural features for this meaning category and its evolution. The outline of the
doi 10.1075/pbns.271.07har
150 Ingeborg Harmes
paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a short background of modal auxiliaries

and the theoretical framework. Section 3 describes the methodology and section 4
presents the results of the corpus study. Section 5 discusses the evidential instances
and section 6 gives the conclusions.
2. Modal auxiliaries and the framework
Modal auxiliaries typically express modal meanings, such as epistemic, deontic and
dynamic meanings. The core modal auxiliaries in Dutch are kunnen ‘can’, moeten
‘must’, mogen ‘may’, willen ‘will’, zullen ‘shall’ and (be)hoeven ‘need’ (Haeseryn et
al. 1997). Traditionally the auxiliary zullen is considered a temporal auxiliary of
the future as well, and this claim is a main issue of discussion in the literature
on the modal auxiliary zullen (Ebeling 1962; Kirsner 1969; Janssen 1989; Verkuyl
and Broekhuis 2013; Broekhuis and Corver 2015, among others). However, the
theoretical framework of this study approaches modality and temporality from
a different perspective, and therefore it is not possible to include the discussion
mentioned above in this short contribution. The modal zou(den) is usually re-
garded as a part of the verb zullen, which can express modal meanings. It is to be
seen if the status of modal auxiliary applies for the preterite form zou(den) as well.
Many views exist on the notion of modality and, in order to clarify the def-
inition of the meaning categories, a clear theoretical framework is required. In
this study, the cognitive-functional framework proposed by Nuyts (2001; 2005;
2008) forms the basis for the analysis of the auxiliary zou(den). The framework
distinguishes between qualificational meanings and illocutionary related dimen-
sions. Qualificational meanings belong to a conceptual system, which concerns
the speaker’s world knowledge, such as his beliefs and attitudes. They include for
example the meaning categories inferential evidentiality (Nuyts, this volume), the
modal meanings epistemic, deontic and dynamic modality, and the meaning cat-
egory time. Illocutionary or action related categories concern the planning and
action of communication (Nuyts 2008:199). These dimensions, such as volition,
intention and directivity, do not qualify a state of affairs and are consequently con-
sidered non-modal. These categories need to be described in a model separate
from the qualificational categories. This distinction between qualificational and
illocutionary categories is rather common in functional theories (cf. Hengeveld
1989:128 ff., Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2008:14 ff., Verstraete 2001:1506 ff. and
Halliday and Matthiessen 2014:30 ff.). However, it is not the intention of this paper
to discuss this model extensively, instead the meaning categories of the auxiliary
zou(den) will be presented with a short description and an example.
Chapter 6. A synchronic and diachronic study of the Dutch Auxiliary “Zou(den)” 151
3. Methodology
The study of zou(den) is a qualitative analysis based on corpus research: four lan-
guage stages have been analyzed: Old Dutch (OD), the Dutch regional varieties
written between 600 and 1200, Early Middle Dutch (EMD), the varieties between
circa 1250‐1300, Early New Dutch (END), Dutch between 1550–1650 and Present
Day Dutch (PPD), from 1980 and onwards. For Present Day Dutch I have ana-
lyzed two sets, namely written language (PDDW) and spoken language (PDDS).
Although spoken and written language differ substantially in their nature – spo-
ken language is often spontaneous and more informal whereas written language
is more planned and formal –, a set of spoken language was included because we
assume that novel meanings and patterns develop especially in spoken language
(cf. Nuyts 2013:129). The two sets will be presented separately in order to under-
line these differences.
Various electronic corpora were used for the analysis: the Corpus
Oudnederlands for OD, the Corpus Gysseling for EMD, and the online library
Digitale Bibliotheek voor de Nederlandse Letteren (DBNL) for END. The corpus
ConDiv (Grondelaers et al. 2000) as well as the DBNL and some other reliable in-
ternet sources were consulted for written PDD, and finally the Corpus Gesproken
Nederlands (CGN) (Nederlandse Taalunie 2004) was chosen for spoken Present
Day Dutch. In general, the instances were selected at random but with a few con-
siderations such as a balanced regional spreading of the Dutch language spoken
in the Low Countries, a balanced distribution of text genres and a representative
proportion of number and person.
For each period, 200 instances have been analyzed, except for OD, for which
there were only 46 instances available. This means 846 instances in total. Since
the analysis is a qualitative study, every instance has been examined in terms of
their meaning or function and a range of structural and contextual features. For
instance, the type of clause, the presence of a perfective auxiliary, the presence of
other (modal) auxiliaries, negation, the type of state of affairs, the first argument
and its properties, the time reference of the state of affairs, and the presence of oth-
er modal, temporal or other functional elements. All the instances were analyzed
within a large context to allow a correct interpretation. This context was at least
10 sentences before and after the sentence containing the auxiliary, and the com-
plete text was always available if more context was required. In order to guarantee
agreement on describing the meaning categories and to establish some degree of
inter-rater reliability, a second and sometimes a third or fourth observer have ana-
lyzed the instances. Especially for instances from the older language stages and
for ambiguous or problematic cases, the semantic classification was discussed by
more than two observers.
152 Ingeborg Harmes
4. Results
This section consists of two parts: 4.1 presents the meaning categories of zou(den)
in the four language stages, and 4.2 presents the results of the semantic develop-
ment of these categories. The examples in Dutch are presented with the zou(den)
form in bold, and the language stage and the source in brackets. For the spoken
data from the Corpus Gesproken Nederlands, the source refers to the code of the
session, starting with fn (Dutch of the Netherlands) or fv (Dutch of Flanders). The
corresponding English translation serves exclusively to give an illustration of the
meaning of zou(den).
4.1 The meaning categories
The primary meaning of zou(den) is hypotheticality: the speaker refers to the un-
known status of the state of affairs with respect to its reality status. With a hypo-
thetical expression, the speaker describes an event, which may or may not be real.
The speaker does not evaluate the likelihood of the state of affairs, that is to say that
hypotheticality is not considered a modal category in Nuyts’ cognitive-functional
framework (Nuyts 2001).
(1) Dronken mensen, die vaak taxi’s nodig hebben, filmen we niet. Hun
goedkeuring voor uitzending zou toch niets waard zijn. (PDDW: ConDiv)
‘We do not film drunk people who often need taxis. Their approval for
broadcasting would be worthless.’
Several instances of hypothetical zou(den) have an additional meaning or function

besides their hypothetical meaning. This secondary function is not an inherent
meaning of zou(den), but implicated by the direct context. There are three cat-
egories of hypothetical zou(den) with a secondary label: counterfactuality, mitiga-
tion and interactionality. Hypothetical + counterfactuality (example 2) indicates
that the status of the state of affairs is not merely unknown, but that on top its
realization is beyond the bounds of possibility. In the hypothetical + mitigation
instances, the auxiliary zou(den) functions as a hedging device in order to mitigate
the utterance (example 3). The label hypothetical + interactionality occurs only in
particular hypothetical questions and expresses the wish of the speaker to discuss
the state of affairs with the addressee (example 4):
(2) Men had dus beter de binnenlandse grenzen nog 10 jaar of langer
gehandhaafd. Dit zou de controle op de trafieken van criminaliteit veel
efficiënter gemaakt hebben en ook de internationale drugstrafieken zouden veel
meer belemmering hebben ondervonden en last but not least de trafieken van
alle soorten van asielzoekers. (PDDW: www.knack.be)
‘It would have been better to have maintained the national borders for
ten years or more. This would have made the control over traffic of crime
much more efficient, and the international drug trafficking would have
encountered more obstacles, and last but not least, the trafficking of all
kinds of refugees.’
(3) Dat zou je ’ns aan iemand moeten vragen. (PDDS: CGN fn009004)
‘You should ask that to someone.’
(4) A: Zou ’t kunnen Ivoorkust? denk het.
B: Ja ja ’t zal wel zo zijn ook. ja ja ’t moet bijna zo zijn al.
(PDDS: CGN fv701324)
A: ‘Could it [be] Ivory Coast? [I] think so.’
B: ‘Yes, yes, it will be like that. Yes, yes, it must be like that.’
The second meaning is temporality: the speaker situates the state of affairs on a
time axis. The approach of situating time bases on Comrie (1985) and two types of
temporality occur in the data: the futurum praeteriti or ‘future in the past’ (example
5), and the futurum exactum praeteriti or ‘future perfect in the past’ (example 6):
(5) Enkele weken geleden verklaarde de Australische bond dat ze dat verzoek
naast zich neer zou leggen. Stephens heeft formeel nooit bekend doping te
hebben gebruikt en volgens de bond is er daarom geen reden hem te straffen.
(PDDW: ConDiv)
‘A few weeks ago the Australian association declared that it would disregard
the request. Stephens has never admitted formally to having used doping
and according to the association there is no reason to punish him.’
(6) want ik dacht dat ’t na een half jaar wel geschied zou zijn. maar ’t is niet zo.
(PDDS: CGN fn006966)
‘Because I thought that it would have happened after six months. But it is not
the case.’
The third meaning of zou(den) is reported evidentiality: the speaker refers to the
source of information about the state of affairs:
(7) Clinton zou haar via zijn vriend Vernon Jordan hebben aangezet tot meineed.
(PDDW: ConDiv)
‘Allegedly, Clinton has instigated her to make false declarations through his
friend Vernon Jordan.’
154 Ingeborg Harmes
The fourth function is mitigation. Zou(den) does not have a specific meaning but
serves as a hedging device in order to weaken the illocutionary force of the utter-
ance. It performs predominantly the function of politeness strategies.
(8) ’k zou het een beetje willen vergelijken, de vergelijking gaat niet volledig op,
met de verhouding tussen nacht en dag. (PDDS: CGN fv400044)
‘I would like to compare it a little with the relation between night and day,
though the comparison does not hold entirely.’
The fifth meaning is intention: the speaker states his goal to realize the state of af-
fairs:
(9) maer hi seide dat hi el hadde te done op dien tijt. maer hi geloefde haer seker
dat hijt namals soud doen de goede man. (EMD: Sinte Kerstine 1276–1300)
‘But he said that he had [something] to do at that time, but he promised her
truly that he would do it afterwards, the good man.’
The sixth category is volition, which marks the speaker’s wish or desire for the state
of affairs to become real:
(10) Uan danne riet aiol uerbolgen. Uierhundert kind[er e]me uolgen. Die eme
tornes uele duon. Bet stein[en en]de bet alden scuon. Wurpen si uon in allen
siden. So w[ar hi] hene solde riden. (EMD: Aiol 1220–1240)
‘From there Aiol rode enraged, four hundred children following him who
caused him a lot of grief. With stones and old shoes, they threw in all the
directions, in which he wanted to ride.’
The seventh category is directivity and expresses speech act notions such as per-
mission, instruction, advice or, with a negation, interdiction. Directive utterances
can occur performatively (example (11) or descriptively (example 12), when the
speaker is not committed to the directive but only reports it (Nuyts et al. 2010).
(11) wi selen te samen springen beide worstelen ende wringen wisselau ic ben dijn
vrient Du en sout mi biten twent al sla ic v sere jc ben ghernout v here
(EMD: Wisselau 1291–1300)
‘We shall jump with each other and both wrestle and fight Wisselau, I am
your friend, you should certainly not bite me even though I hit you hard, I
am Geernout your master.’
(12) Item op den 10 dach Juny werdt tot Antwerpen geboden op lyf en goedt, dat
niemant, die in ‘t casteel niet te doen en hadde, daer niet in-gaen en sou, noch
oock rondt om gaen kycken, dan elck syn passagie recht heyen.
(END: Haecht 1565–1571)
‘Also on the tenth day of June, it was ordered on life and property in
Antwerp that no one was to enter the castle who had nothing to do there,
nor to look about except for every one’s right of way.’
The eighth meaning is dynamic modality: the speaker marks the abilities/neces-
sities of the controlling participant, in most cases the first argument. All three
subcategories – participant-inherent, participant-imposed and situational – occur
in the sample, the latter is exemplified:
(13) Heeft Herkles, in zijn wieg, twee slangen doodgeduwt? Hoe veel te meer zou
ik? Ik ben de wieg ontwossen, Ik slaap al zonder Min, ik draag al vederbossen.
(END: Vos 1641)
‘Did Heracles strangle two snakes in his cot? How much more do I need? I
have outgrown the cradle; I already sleep without a wet nurse; I already wear
plumes.’
The ninth meaning category is deontic modality. With a deontic expression, the
speaker qualifies the moral acceptability of the state of affairs:
(14) Man mint dat man nit minnen en soide dat is dat en man al sinen wille duon
mag. (EMD: Nederrijns Moraalboek 1270–1290)
‘One desires the one, one should not desire, that is what a man can do with
his lust.’
A few instances have received the label fixed expression because zou(den) has no
differentiated meaning. These clauses have a formulaic character:
(15) Wat zou het toch. ’was bijna in mijn broek aan ’t kakken.
(PDDS: CGN fv700021)
‘So what. I was almost shitting in my pants.’
Finally, several instances have acquired the label ambiguous, which means two or
more meaning categories are equally possible interpretations in the given context.
The following example has two possible readings, one as a future in the past (tem-
porality) and one as an intention:
(16) ja nee ik had net Rien en ik had gezegd dat ik ’m om halftien zou bellen.
(PDDS: CGN fn008373)
‘Yes, no, I had just had Rien [on the telephone] and I had said that I would
call him /intended to call him at nine thirty.’
156 Ingeborg Harmes
4.2 The semantic development of zou(den)
Table 1 presents the results of the analysis; the meaning categories are for the pres-
ent ordered according to their proportional presence in PDD.
Table 1. The meaning categories of zou(den)

language stage OD EMD END PDDW PDDS
n % n % n % n % n %
hypothetical 15 32.5 101 50.5 142 71 99 49.5 126 63
+ counterfactuality – – 1 0.5 5 2.5 8 4 6 3
+ mitigation – – – – – – 3 1.5 20 10
+ interactionality – – – – 1 0,5 – – 3 1.5
temporal 13 28 43 21,5 22 11 55 27.5 9 4.5
evidential – – – – 3 1.5 22 11 3 1.5
mitigation – – – – – – 4 2 15 7.5
volition 2 4.5 4 2 – – – – – –
intention – – 12 6 10 5 4 2 6 3
directive – – 24 12 9 4.5 – – – –
dynamic 14 30.5 3 1.5 5 2.5 – – – –
deontic – – 2 1 – – – – – –
fixed expression – – – – 1 0.5 – – 2 1
ambiguous 2 4.5 10 5 2 1 5 2.5 10 5
Total 46 100 200 100 200 100 200 100 200 100
The prominent meaning in all language stages is hypotheticality. Already in the

oldest language stage, hypotheticality forms a third of the sample, and this in-
creases until END and PDD. It is remarkable that the PDDW sample has a smaller
share of hypothetical instances, namely circa 55% instead of the more than 70%
in END and PDDS. However, the sample of PDDW has a large share of temporal
and, to a lesser extent, evidential instances. These striking differences can for the
most part be explained by the fact that spoken language differs substantially from
written language. The PDDW sample includes for a great part journal articles and
non-fiction prose, such as biographies, essays about history and academic maga-
zines. One could expect a greater share of temporal and evidential markers in
these text genres. The general tendency is that zou(den) has specialized towards a
hypothetical marker.
Although the temporal meaning category has a considerable share (27.5%)
in the written sample of PDD, the overall tendency is that this meaning category
is declining throughout the language stages. The same development can be ob-
served for the smaller meaning category intention. Furthermore, Table 1 shows
that zou(den) only expresses two modal meanings in the older language stages,
predominantly dynamic modal meanings and sporadically a deontic meaning. In
PDD zou(den) only expresses non-modal meanings. A possible explanation for
the disappearance of the dynamic and deontic meanings is the evolution of the
“competing” modal moeten ‘must’. Research from Byloo and Nuyts (2014) and
Nuyts and Byloo (2015) has demonstrated that the use of moeten with dynamic
and deontic modal meanings has increased over time. Parallel to this develop-
ment is the decrease of the volitional and directive uses, which also do not occur
in the PDD sample.
The auxiliary zou(den) has acquired one new function during the four lan-
guage stages, namely its function as a hedging device to mitigate the impact of an
utterance. This function appears also in combination with a hypothetical meaning,
in most of the cases to weaken the force of a speech act. Nevertheless, zou(den) as
a hedging device can occur as an independent function (named ‘mitigation’ here)
as well. The independent use of mitigating zou(den) occurs mainly in combina-
tion with other modal auxiliaries, e.g. ze zouden dat moeten oplossen ‘they should
solve that’ or ik zou dat (graag) willen ‘I would like that’, or in combination with
verbs such as zeggen ‘say’, vragen ‘ask’ and niet weten ‘not know’ (cf. Harmes 2014:
374–375). The occurrence of the mitigating function with a hypothetical expres-
sion and of mitigating zou(den) in specific grammatical patterns strongly suggests
that this function has developed from the hypothetical meaning.
In summary, the semantic evolution of zou(den) is a process of specialization
towards a hypothetical meaning. From this meaning category zou(den) evolved
into a hedging device in order to mitigate an utterance. The dynamic and deontic
modal meanings and the categories volition and directivity have gradually disap-
peared, whereas the temporal and intentional meaning categories show a modest
decrease. The semantic evolution of evidential zou(den) will be discussed in more
detail in the section below.
5. Discussion
5.1 Zou(den) as an evidential marker
In Dutch, various linguistic forms express evidential meanings, such as the ad-
verbs blijkbaar ‘apparently’ and schijnbaar ‘seemingly’, the auxiliaries schijnen
‘seem’, lijken ‘appear’ (Mortelmans, this volume) and blijken ‘appear or prove’
and the modal auxiliaries moeten ‘must’ and zou(den). Evidentiality is a rather
158 Ingeborg Harmes
marginal category in the meaning ranges of the auxiliary zou(den). Throughout all
four language stages, only 28 instances have received an unambiguously evidential
label, which is approximately 3% of the total number (846 instances). However,
this percentage is rather overrated due to the prominent presence of evidential
expressions (22 instances) in written PDD. The sample consists of more than 50%
newspaper articles (16 instances) and 25% online magazines (5 instances), which
causes undoubtedly the relatively high amount of evidential instances (see Marín
Arrese, this volume). Apart from the 28 evidential instances, seven instances have
received an ambiguous label with evidentiality as one possible meaning and tem-
porality (2 instances), hypotheticality (3 instances) or dynamic modality (1 in-
stance) as the other possible meaning. One instance in Old Dutch has received
three possible meanings, namely dynamic modality, hypotheticality and evidenti-
ality. An example of an ambiguous instance is the following expression:
(17) An ther widervart scold er beuelhen sinen holden, thaz sie alle thie wege
besezzen wolden, of in chein kint bequemen in then wegen, thaz sie in
afnæmen thaz leben. (OD: Mittelfränkische Reimbibel 1151–1200)
‘On the return journey he was to order his servants / allegedly ordered his
servants to occupy all the roads, and if any children met them on the roads
they were to take their lives.’
Example 17 is about the Massacre of the Innocents: Herod went to Rome to obtain
advice on slaughtering the male infants in Bethlehem in order to kill Jesus. The
passage in (17), in which Herod is on his return journey, can have two possible
readings; the necessity of Herod to order his servants to slaughter (dynamic mo-
dality) or the report from another source that Herod did this (evidentiality). The
latter interpretation is supported by various source references in the context such
as sagent sie ‘they say’ and sagent sumelich ‘some people say’.
The above example from OD demonstrates that evidentiality is not a new
meaning category, despite the results in Table 1 that give the impression that evi-
dentiality occurs only from the END period onwards. However, due to its low
frequency, it is not surprising that no instances occur in the EMD sample, but
they are attested in other works belonging to this period. The historical dictionar-
ies Vroegmiddelnederlands Woordenboek (Dutch from circa 1200–1300) and the
Middelnederlands Woordenboek (Dutch from 1250–1550) attest evidential mean-
ings for all the language stages. It is interesting to note that the given examples, as
well as the examples in the Old Dutch sample, always specify the kind of source
in the near context, predominantly with the verbs lezen ‘read’, zeggen ‘say’ and
beschuldigen ‘accuse’.
All evidential instances in the data are of the category reported evidentiality.
The speaker or writer perceived the information about the state of affairs from
some source (through conversation or reading a text) and did not experience the
event personally. This type of indirect evidentiality does not belong to the mean-
ing categories in the qualificational hierarchy of Nuyts because there is no com-
mitment of the speaker and because reportative evidentiality is not scalar (Nuyts,
this volume). Because of this non-commitment, the speaker remains neutral with
respect to the truth of the utterance. Reported evidentiality is also termed hear-
say, reportative or quotative, terms, which are occasionally used synonymously
in the secondary literature. Aikhenvald (2004:25) distinguishes between hearsay
and quotative as two subcategories of reported evidentiality; hearsay concerns
reported information with no source reference and quotative concerns reported
information with source reference. Smirnova and Diewald (2013) propose a nar-
rower definition for the notions reportive and quotative when they discuss the
German Konjunktiv and the modal verb sollen as markers of reported discourse.
Quotatives involve a shift of a secondary speaker, explicitly mentioned, prototypi-
cally expressed by a communication verb in a matrix clause and an embedded
object clause. They are not regarded as evidential expressions. Reportives do not
involve a shift of speaker. The speaker just reports about another’s statement and
reportives are therefore regarded as evidential expressions.
Indirect speech and evidential markers essentially have a related semantic func-
tion (Aikhenvald 2004:135), and communication verbs like zeggen ‘say’ and vertel-
len ‘tell’ can express the function of evidentiality as well (Broekhuis and Corver
2015:888). Indirect speech in German is marked by a Konjunktiv (Mortelmans and
Vanderbiesen 2011; Smirnova and Diewald 2013), but Dutch has no special lin-
guistic devices to mark indirect speech (Roels, Mortelmans and Van der Auwera
2007). The auxiliary zou(den) can occur in reported speech, but mainly with other
meanings. To illustrate, the entire sample contains 87 instances of zou(den) in an
indirect speech construction and 6 instances in a semi-direct speech construc-
tion, but none of them has an evidential label. These zou(den) instances have pre-
dominantly temporal, hypothetical or directive meanings. However, this does not
rule out the possibility that evidential zou(den) can appear in an indirect speech
construction:
(18) Ingrid had me al verteld dat hij ziek zou zjn. Jammer dat we hem niet meer
hebben kunnen vertellen over de reünie. (cf. Mortelmans 2009:182)
‘Ingrid had already told me that he was said to be ill. What a pity that we
could not tell him about the reunion.’
Example (18) is an indirect speech construction, yet the source of information

for the state of affairs hij zou ziek zijn is not the speaker but an unknown external
source, from which the explicitly mentioned speaker Ingrid received the infor-
mation. The speaker of the complete utterance only reports this and the source
160 Ingeborg Harmes
of information stays unmentioned. Although the source of information is of im-

portance for zou(den) as an evidential marker, there is no need to make a more
differentiated distinction on basis of the presence of explicit source information.
Consequently the term reported evidentiality is sufficiently adequate to cover the
meaning category of the evidential function of zou(den).
5.2 The presence of source references
The presence of additional source references is of importance for an evidential

interpretation of zou(den), and these were listed when they appeared in the con-
text. Table 2 shows the presence of source references in instances with evidential
zou(den). The table includes the ambiguous instances with an evidential mean-
ing as one possible meaning, which makes a total of 35 instances. The distinction
between elements in the direct and in the larger context is based on whether the
position of the source reference is in the same sentence or in the surrounding pas-
sage of the instance.
Table 2. The presence of source references in evidential instances

n % n % n % n % n %
− source – – – – – – 6 24 2 50
+ source direct context 1 50 – – 3 75 5 16 2 50
+ source larger context 1 50 – – 1 25 14 56 – –
total 2 100 – – 4 100 25 100 4 100
Table 2 demonstrates that the auxiliary zou(den) can express an evidential mean-
ing independently without explicit mention of a source, as in example (19). In
five of the 28 unambiguously evidential instances (approximately 18%), there is
no reference to any source in the context. Nevertheless, the source of information
is explicitly mentioned in the majority of the evidential instances with expres-
sions such as aldus or volgens ‘according to’, het verhaal gaat ‘the story goes’, men
zei ‘it was said’, naar verluidt or geruchten deden de ronde ‘it is rumoured that’,
and er waren veel wilde verhalen ‘there were many wild stories’ (see example 20).
The majority of the references are vague indications of the source; the source is
unspecified as in men zei ‘it was said’ or naar verluidt ‘it is rumoured that’. In
only seven instances, the source of information is specified in a more concrete
way, e.g. volgens de Amerikaanse tv-zender NBC ‘according to the American televi-
sion channel NBC’ or aldus Rob Jansen ‘according to Rob Jansen’. From the four
ambiguous instances in Present Day Dutch, only one has an additional reference
to the source. These findings indicate that an unambiguous reading of evidential

zou(den) prefers an explicit reference to an information source.
(19) Hij zou voor een kleine zeventigduizend gulden aan sportkaartjes, vliegreizen
en andere giften hebben aangenomen van bedrijven.
(PDDW: ConDiv Limburger nieuws 1998)
‘Allegedly, he took for about seventy thousand guilder sport tickets, air
travels and other gifts from companies.’
(20) aan de andere kant er waren veel wilde verhalen die in eerste instantie door
de autoriteiten zijn ontkend zoals over de lading. Dat er militaire goederen in
zouden zitten. Dat er andere gevaarlijke stoffen in zouden zitten. En die later
wel degelijk de waarheid bleken te bevatten. (PDDS: CGN fn007057)
‘On the other hand, there were many wild stories that were first denied by
the authorities; that there were military goods, that there were dangerous
substances, and they turned out to be true.’
The results in Table 2 as well as the indication of the above-mentioned historical

dictionaries suggest additionally that an explicit source reference is of significance
for the development of an evidential meaning. The early evidential instances oc-
cur all with explicit source information, only in PDD does zou(den) occur without
source information.
5.3 Grammatical and semantic features of evidential zou(den)
The analysis of zou(den) includes various grammatical and semantic parameters

in order to find out if there are correlations between the evidential meaning and
certain structural features. This section discusses four different features that ap-
pear to be of importance for an evidential reading and that are discussed in the
literature on evidentials: the occurrence in a main or subordinate clause, the use of
a perfective auxiliary in the infinitive, the time reference of the state of affairs, and
the grammatical person.
The first investigated structural feature is the type of clause in which eviden-
tial zou(den) appears, namely in a main or subordinate clause. Roels, Mortelmans
and Van der Auwera (2007:191) and Wiemer (2010:80) claim that zou(den) as an
evidential marker occurs only in main clauses, but Table 3 demonstrates that this
is not a strict condition.
Table 3, which includes the ambiguous instances, shows that 80% of the evi-
dential zou(den) instances occur in a main clause; consequently, there is a strong
tendency for this claim. However, seven instances of evidential zou(den) occur
in a subordinate clause, five of them are unambiguous instances. They appear in
a relative clause (5 instances), in a nominal complement clause (2 instances) and
162 Ingeborg Harmes
Table 3. The occurrence of evidential zou(den) in main or subordinate clauses

n % n % n % n % n %
main clause 2 100 – – 2 50 22 88 2 50
subordinate clause – – – – 2 50 3 12 2 50
total 2 100 – – 4 100 25 100 4 100
in an object clause with a perception verb in the main clause (1 instance). The
Woordenboek der Nederlandsche Taal (1997) suggests that the evidential meaning
has developed from non-factual subordinate clauses, provided that the context
contains information from a third party and the speaker cannot vouch for the ac-
curacy of this information. Since the oldest ambiguous instances appear in main
clauses and there are no evidential instances in the EMD sample, it is not practica-
ble to verify this suggestion. Nevertheless, it is interesting that the source informa-
tion is rarely expressed in a prototypical indirect speech construction, but either in
prepositional phrases like naar verluidt ‘it is rumoured that’ or volgens ‘according
to’ or with other constructions in the larger context with a vague source reference.
For example, bronnen zeiden dit ‘sources told this’, and the previously mentioned
phrases het verhaal gaat, men zei and geruchten deden de ronde.
A further grammatical feature that can support an evidential reading of
zou(den) is the presence of a perfective verb in the verbal complement. Standard
examples of evidential zou(den) often contain the perfective auxiliary hebben
‘have’ or zijn ‘be’ in the verbal complement (e.g. Haeseryn et al. 1997:995; De Haan
2000:74). The complete sample contains 49 occurrences of a perfective auxiliary,
which is 5.8% of the total of instances. In general, the presence of a perfective verb
in the verbal complement is a feature that only occurs with three meaning catego-
ries of zou(den), namely a temporal, a hypothetical or hypothetical + counterfac-
tuality and an evidential meaning. From the 28 unambiguous evidential instances,
14 appear with a perfective auxiliary. This is 50% of the evidential instances. By
way of comparison, only 22 of the 483 hypothetical instances (about 4.5%) and 3
of the 134 temporal instances (about 2%) have a perfective auxiliary in the verbal
complement. This suggests that a perfective auxiliary in the infinitive does support
an evidential interpretation, although it is not necessarily required.
The appearance of a perfective auxiliary presumes a past time reference of the
state of affairs and this is indeed the case for all the 14 evidential instances with a
perfective auxiliary. Nevertheless, a perfective auxiliary is not necessary for a past
time reference of the event: the sample includes 4 instances of an unambiguously
evidential zou(den) without a perfective auxiliary but with a past time reference.
In all the cases there is an additional temporal element (e.g. vorige week ‘last week’)
to relate the event to the past.
Since a perfective auxiliary is not necessarily required to give the state of af-
fairs a past time reference, and since evidential zou(den) does not have a time
reference of its own, the time reference of the state of affairs has been analyzed.
Table 4 shows the time reference of the state of affairs in the evidential instances
(including the ambiguous instances):
Table 4. Time reference in instances with an evidential meaning

n % n % n % n % n %
past 1 50 – – 4 100 14 56 2 50
present 1 50 – – – – 8 32 1 25
future – – – – – – 1 4 1 25
ambiguous – – – – – – 2 8 – –
total 2 100 – – 4 100 25 100 4 100
The majority of the states of affairs, 21 items (60%), has a past time reference. The
results demonstrate that evidential zou(den) can relate to present and future events
as well. In this respect, zou(den) differs from its German evidential cognate sollen,
which refers exclusively to past events (Vanderbiesen 2015:27). It is however inter-
esting to note that there is an additional temporal element – mainly temporal ad-
verbs – in the direct or larger context in 29 of the 35 instances. Obviously, the time
reference in the evidential use of zou(den) needs to be expressed in a more explicit
manner. The two instances with an ambiguous time reference are evidential/tem-
poral cases, which have either a past time reference in the evidential meaning or
a future in the past time reference in a temporal meaning. These two ambiguous
instances demonstrate that a future in the past time reference is more likely to oc-
cur with temporal zou(den) than with the evidential reading.
The final discussed feature is the grammatical person. Zou(den) as an eviden-
tial expression refers commonly to third persons, all the examples given in gram-
mar books (e.g. Haeseryn et al. 1997; Broekhuis and Corver 2015) and literature
(e.g. De Haan 2000; Nuyts 2004; Mortelmans 2009; Colleman and Noël 2012) are
cases in the third person. De Haan (2000:75 ff.) proposes for grammaticalised evi-
dential expressions, such as moeten ‘must’, the criterion that the speaker cannot
show agreement with the subject of the sentence. Nevertheless, although the ma-
jority of the evidential instances occur indeed with a third person (34 of the 35
instances, including the ambiguous ones), there is one instance with a first person:
164 Ingeborg Harmes
(21) Er deden dan soms ook wel rare geruchten over mij de ronde. Zo zou ik tijdens
een wc-bezoek tijdens een tentamen eens een paar biertjes achterover hebben
geslagen, terwijl ik niet eens drink! (PDDW: www.ppsw.rug.nl)
‘Strange rumours about me circulated from time to time. Allegedly, I
knocked back a couple of beers on the toilet during an exam, and I don’t
even drink!’
Example (21) demonstrates that evidential zou(den) is not exclusively restricted

to third person subjects. Certainly the additional evidential phrase rare geruchten
deden de ronde and the presence of the perfective auxiliary hebben contribute
to this unambiguously evidential reading. It can therefore be presumed that the
occurrence of the evidential use with a first or second person1 is comparatively
rare in Dutch and needs to be supported by at least an explicit source reference
in the context.
5.4 The evolution of the evidential meaning
The small amount of evidential instances in the data and the fact that they already
appear in OD does not allow many possibilities to find out how the evidential
hearsay use has developed. Nevertheless, there are a few considerations to make
based on the – few – ambiguous instances, on comparable developments of the
modal auxiliary moeten, and on comparable developments of the West Germanic
cognate should. Ambiguous instances can give an indication of potential meaning
evolution (Traugott and Dasher 2001; Nuyts 2007), and there are seven ambigu-
ous instances with an evidential meaning. It is for two reasons unlikely that the
two evidential/temporal instances in PDD can give any insight in the evolution of
evidential zou(den). First, they occur only in PDD and not in the earlier language
stages, in which the meaning category had to establish itself. Second, temporal
zou(den) relates to events with a future in the past time reference, which is nev-
er the case with the evidential instances in the sample. It seems implausible that
evidential expressions can refer to events with a future in the past time reference,
which locates an event in the future relative to reference point in the past. Since
there is a reference point in the past, the event is generally considered as factive,
1. An example for evidential zou(den) with a second person as subject was found in the journal
Gazet van Antwerpen:
Jij zou ziek geweest zijn waardoor je de Ronde niet goed kon voorbereiden. “Dat wordt gezegd.
Maar dat is niet waar. Na Sanremo was ik kerngezond, zondag was ik doodziek.” (http://www.gva.
be/cnt/oid239968/archief-mario-cipollini-anderen-laten-werken).
‘You were said to be ill, so that you were not able to prepare for the Round. This is said. But it is
not true. After Sanremo I was perfectly healthy, Sunday I was sick as a dog.’
which is not automatically the case with a reported evidential meaning. However,
it is possible to imagine for an evidential meaning to have a future-in-the-past time
reference when the event has not finished at the moment of speaking. The reality
status could in this case be unknown. Besides, contrary to temporal zou(den), the
evidential markers zou(den) and moeten have no time reference of their own, and
the time reference of the state of affairs can be past, present or future. This leaves
the ambiguous instances with a hypothetical and dynamic meaning as the possible
source for the evidential function. Unfortunately, there are no instances with an
evidential meaning in EMD, therefore the OD instances are of particular interest
for the source of the evidential meaning. The ambiguous instances occur with a
dynamic-situational interpretation or a hypothetical/dynamic interpretation, and
they do not give new insights of the possible source. One argument against the
dynamic meaning as the source is the fact that dynamic modality in the past tense
refers to the past (cf. Nuyts and Byloo 2015:47). This is only the case in one of the
two instances with an ambiguous meaning (see Table 4).
A different approach is to look at comparable developments with other mod-
al auxiliaries. Apart from zou(den), the modal auxiliary moeten can function as
an evidential marker. De Haan (2000:78–79) suggests that the evidential use of
moeten has developed from an epistemic meaning. Since zou(den) does not ex-
press epistemic modality in any language stage, this evolution path seems rather
unlikely. Furthermore, Byloo and Nuyts (2014:110) do not attest an epistemic nor
a hypothetical meaning for moeten, and propose that evidentiality has developed
from the dynamic meaning, more specifically from dynamic situational modality.
This observation is in line with the ambiguous zou(den) instances in OD, which
have both a dynamic reading as well. The only issue is that it is the present form
of moeten expressing the evidential function, comparable with the German sollen.
Zou(den) on the other hand, is originally a preterite form, which means that there
will probably be other aspects to consider.
The West Germanic cognates demonstrate analogous uses. The English cog-
nate should could express a reportative meaning in the older language stages
(Traugott 1989:41–42; Warner 1993:188). Also the entry of shall in the Oxford
English Dictionary (1989) gives numerous examples, with the remark that this
meaning is obsolete nowadays, except for dialectal use. This use of should shows a
close resemblance with the evidential use of zou(den) in examples (20) and (21):
(22) Thys daye rennyth a tale þat the Duke off Bretayne sholde be ded. I beleeff it
nott. (cf. Oxford English Dictionary 1989)
‘That day the tale ran that the Duke of Bretagne should be dead. I do not
believe it.’
166 Ingeborg Harmes
As in the Dutch examples, there is the explicit source reference a tale rennyth (22),
but not an introduced and specified second speaker. Furthermore, the speaker of
the utterance takes no responsibility for the truth of the state of affairs. And last
but not least, it is the preterite form that functions as an evidential marker, just
like zou(den). A possible cause for the development of the evidential meanings
from the preterite forms sceolde and zou(den) could be the function of the sub-
junctive or conjunctief in the older language stages. Both in English and Dutch,
the subjunctive/conjunctief could occur in reported speech (Traugott 1992:240;
Engels 1895; Stoett 1889/1977:237) to indicate that the state of affairs is a possibil-
ity without a commitment of the speaker. Problematic for this view is that already
in the oldest language stages, it is not possible to distinguish an indicative from a
subjunctive/conjunctief on morphological grounds for the preterite forms sceolde/
should and s(c)olde/zou(den). The interpretation can only depend on functional
grounds and the structural features which come with them.
In summary, the evidential function of zou(den) has most probably evolved
from the dynamic-situational or the hypothetical use, perhaps triggered by the
function of the subjunctive/conjunctief. The contextual circumstances must have
been of crucial importance for the evolution of the evidential meaning, in par-
ticular the explicit presence of a source reference and the type of grammatical
constructions, in which the evidential use of zou(den) appears. A closer look on
EMD data should likely be useful for a more detailed description of these features.
6. Conclusions
In Present Day Dutch the auxiliary zou(den) does not express modal meanings
anymore. Only in the older language stages could zou(den) express modal mean-
ings, in particular dynamic modality. In addition, the meaning categories of voli-
tion and directivity have disappeared in PDD. The primary and specialized mean-
ing of zou(den) is hypotheticality and from this meaning a new use has developed:
zou(den) as a hedging device. Apart from hypotheticality, the meaning catego-
ries temporality, intention and evidentiality have a relatively fixed position in the
meaning ranges of zou(den).
Reported evidentiality is a small and rather old meaning category and in
Present Day Dutch, it occurs mainly in journalistic discourse. The structural re-
sults have demonstrated that zou(den) can express reported evidentiality indepen-
dently, but that the context is of importance for this category and its evolution over
time. Features such as the presence of a source reference, the occurrence in a main
or independent clause, the presence of a perfective auxiliary and the grammatical
person have a considerable influence on an evidential interpretation of zou(den).
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Chapter 7
Potential vs Use
Revisiting an evidential participial construction
in Lithuanian
Aurelija Usonienė and Jolanta Šinkūnienė

Vilnius University
The paper deals with the existing potential of the grammatical realizations of
evidentiality (so-called “passive evidentials”) in Lithuanian, which has been
described theoretically in literature; however there are no studies that would at-
test to the frequency and patterns of actual use of this construction in authentic
contemporary Lithuanian. The analysis has been carried out in the light of the
theoretical approach (Boye and Harder 2009; Boye 2012) and the template of
the database of evidential markers in European languages (Wiemer and Stathi
2010). The study employs corpus based quantitative and qualitative methodol-
ogy in order to investigate the distributional patterns of the -ma/-ta construction
in different types of discourse. Though -ma/-ta participles are very frequent in
contemporary Lithuanian, their use in the evidential construction is very rare.
Keywords: Lithuanian, corpus-based study, evidential construction, passive

participles, existential
1. Introduction
Lithuanian is one of the European languages that are considered to have gram-
matical realizations of indirect (inferential or reportive) evidentiality, which is
expressed by means of two participial constructions containing active and pas-
sive participles. They could be regarded as “evidential extensions of non-evidential
categories” (Aikhenvald 2007:209) because the evidential meaning is triggered
by the syntactic configuration and the grammatical meaning of the participle
(Gronemeyer 1997; Wiemer 2006). The two participial constructions have been ex-
tensively described theoretically in literature (Ambrazas 1996, 1997; Gronemeyer
1997; Koptjevskaja-Tamm and Wälchli 2001; Holvoet 2004, 2007; Lavine 2006,
2010; Wiemer 2006) and they could be illustrated by the following two examples,
doi 10.1075/pbns.271.08uso
172 Aurelija Usonienė and Jolanta Šinkūnienė
namely (1) a reportive evidential construction with an agreeing active participle

and (2) an inferential evidential construction with a non-agreeing past passive
(-ma/-ta) participle:
(1) Profesorius pasakė, kad mano priėmimui astronomijos katedros laborantu
prieštarauja dekanas X. Jis pavadinęs mane „nestropiu“ ir sakęs, kad aš ne
toks jau geras studentas, … (CorALit)
‘The professor said that the dean was against my appointment as an assistant
at the Department of Astronomy. Reportedly, he called (‘call’agr.pst.ap)
me “negligent” and said (‘say’agr.pst.ap) that I was not a good student …’
(2) Vyruko būta liekno - paspruko pro
guy.gen be.nagr.pst.pp slim.gen escape.pst.3 through
kaminą. (CCLL)
chimney.acc
‘The guy was obviously slim – (he) escaped through the chimney.’
Though both constructions have deserved much attention in the linguistic litera-
ture on evidentiality, there are no studies that would attest to the frequency and
patterns of use of these constructions in authentic contemporary Lithuanian.1 The
purpose of the study is to find out whether the existing potential of the grammati-
cal means of expression of evidentiality in Lithuanian is common in the actual use
of contemporary language. The focus of the present analysis is on construction 2,
in which both non-agreeing present passive -ma and past passive -ta participles
are claimed to be used. Special attention should be devoted to the fact that the
linguists who deal with this type of grammatical evidentiality in Lithuanian quote
Ambrazas’s data (1990, 1997) to support their own claims, e.g.:
(3) Ambrazas’s example (1990:207) quoted in Lavine (2010:117)
“Jo rašoma laiškas.
he:gen write:[-agr] letter:nom
‘He is evidently writing a letter.’”
(4) Ambrazas’s example (1997:282) quoted in Holvoet (2007:102)
“Šiąnakt palyta.
tonight rain:part.prt.pass.n
‘It must have been raining last night.’”
1. A certain exception is Geniušienė (2006), who bases her survey of passives in Lithuanian on
a corpus of “5 730 clauses with passive forms registered in 19 written texts (16 are fiction, and
3 popular science)” (Geniušienė 2006:59). The author does provide a useful quantitative distri-
butional information on passive constructions, which include “evidential passives” (Geniušienė
2006:54); however, no generic constraints are applied because the corpus consists mainly
of fictional texts.
Chapter 7. Potential vs Use 173
However a closer look at the data sources in Ambrazas’s studies (1990, 1996,
1997) shows that all his examples are drawn from various written sources pub-
lished in the second half of 19th and early 20th century, namely the works writ-
ten by Baranauskas (1835–1902), Jablonskis (1890–1930), Tumas-Vaižgantas
(1869–1933), Biliūnas (1879–1907), Krėvė-Mickevičius (1882–1954), Vienuolis-
Žukauskas (1882–1958), and fairy tales, e.g.:
(5) (Baranauskas in Ambrazas 1996:378)
Senų miškai mylėta <…>
elderly.gen woods.nom love.nagr.pst.pp
‘The elderly are said to/supposedly have loved woods.’
(6) (Jablonskis in Ambrazas 1996:323)
Mat ir jų laikoma arklys.
so and they.gen keep.nagr.prs.pp horse.nom
‘So they supposedly keep a horse.’
There is no doubt that these evidential constructions were in use in the 19th cen-
tury, especially in the narrative discourse; however the question is whether they
are still used in contemporary Lithuanian.
1.1 Data and method
For the purpose of finding out whether -ma/-ta participles are used in evidential
constructions, a corpus-based study was carried out to check quantitative param-
eters and distributional patterns of the evidential construction with these parti-
ciples across different types of discourse (fiction, journalistic and academic) in
authentic language use. The data have been collected from the following corpora:
(7) Corpus Academicum Lithuanicum (CorALit: B, H, P, S, T2) – http://coralit.
lt/;
Corpus of Contemporary Lithuanian Language (CCLL) – http://tekstynas.
vdu.lt/;
– Sub-corpus of news (CCLL-News);
– Sub-corpus of news from Lietuvos Rytas (CCLL-LR);
– Sub-corpus of fiction (CCLL-Fict);
– Sub-corpus of spoken Lithuanian (CCLL-Sp).
Lithuanian-English sub-corpus of the Bidirectional Parallel Corpus of English and

Lithuanian (ParaCorpLT-EN) (Usoniene and Soliene 2012);
2. Capital letters stand for the abbreviated titles of science areas (Biomedical, Humanities,
Social, Physical, Technological).
Spoken Corpus of the Vilnius area dialect3 Vilniškiai – http://www.baze.vilni-

skiai.eu/.
Some of the corpora in (7) have been used to extract participial -ma/-ta forms
of certain individual verbs, while the detailed quantitative analysis has been per-
formed on the basis of the sub-corpora shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Data sources for the quantitative analysis

Corpora Number of words
CorALit: Biomedical sub-corpus 1,638,444
CorALit: Humanities sub-corpus 2,028,906
CCLL-LR sub-corpus 2,003,431
ParaCorpLT-en 608,426
As the humanities and biomedical sciences represent two conspicuously contrast-

ing science fields in terms of soft vs hard sciences dichotomy, we selected namely
those two fields for our detailed quantitative analysis.
The CCLL-LR sub-corpus consists of randomly extracted texts from Lithuanian
daily Lietuvos Rytas (‘Lithuania’s morning’) from the time period of 2001–2002.4
1.1.1 Data selection criteria

The corpora are not annotated; therefore automatic search is possible only for cer-
tain verb forms or parts of the word forms. First, all word forms with -ma/-ta
endings were extracted, then only participial forms were manually selected and in-
dividually analysed for an evidential meaning. Eventually, the given manual analy-
sis actually meant exclusion of all cases of attributive, parenthetical, complement-
taking-predicate use, etc., e.g.:
(8) a. attributive use (jo gerai žinoma5 daina ‘his’ ‘well known’nom.f.sg
‘song’nom.f.sg)
b. parenthetical use (žinoma ‘of course/certainly’ and kaip žinoma ‘as is
known’)
c. complement-taking-predicate use (žinoma, kad S ‘[it is/was] known
that S’ and nėra žinoma, ar ‘[it] is not known whether S’)
3. We are very grateful to Vytautas Kardelis for his assistance in collecting the data from the
Spoken Corpus of the Vilnius area dialect Vilniškiai.
4. We wish to thank Andrius Utka from the Center of Computational Linguistics at Vytautas
Magnus University for making this data available for our research.
5. Word class distinction between non-agreeing or neuter adjectives and non-agreeing present
passive participles is irrelevant in the present study.
d. predicative use (X yra/buvo žinoma ‘X is/was/has been known’)

e. converb in adverbial clauses (žino-dam-a ‘know’cnb.f.sg)
The prototypical evidential construction with -ma/-ta participles as main predi-

cates is claimed to contain no finite auxiliary. The subject is casemarked genitive
(GEN) and it occurs initially while the object is most often casemarked nomina-
tive (NOM), e.g.:
(9) … pasilenkusi įvertino audimo raštą ir teištarė: –
‘[she] bended over the pattern of weaving and only uttered:
Karnočiūčių turėta nagai. (CCLL-Fict)
Karnočiūtės.gen have.nagr.pst.pp nails.nom
‘the Karnočiutės sisters (obviously/clearly) had (skilful) hands.’
The genitive subject is often considered to be an agent (Ambrazas 1997:282–283;

Geniušienė 2006:31; Lavine 2006) as well as an obligatory element in the con-
struction. However, if we keep to the point of view that agents are animate and
volitional, the role of the genitive subject NP has been sometimes found not to
meet the given criteria. What is obligatory is either an overt or covert expression
of a non-patient (cf. “most agent-like argument” in Wiemer 2010:74) in the -ma/-
ta evidential construction. The notion of a non-patient covers agents, inanimate
natural causers, i.e. all entities which can be characterized by the features “volitive,
effective, initiative, agentive” (Cruse 1973:18–21), as in the following example with
an inanimate effective role of the subject:
(10) <…> rūmų stovėta ant <…> kalvos
palace.gen stand.nagr.pst.pp on hill.gen
nutįsusios nuo Gedimino kalno <…> į vakarus. (CCLL-News)
‘The palace reportedly stood on a hill stretching from Gediminas Mount to
the west.’
Moreover, the genitive subject is not necessarily sentence initial, it can also be used
in post-position, i.e. the genitive subject NP can follow the participial predicate,
e.g.:
(11) Kambaryje <…> langas pravertas, oras grynas. Matyt, <…>
‘In the room the window is open, the air is fresh. Evidently
Būta žmogaus, vaikščiota, tvarkyta:
be.nagr.pst.pp man.gen walk.nagr.pst.pp tidy-up.nagr.pst.pp
<…> grindys pašluotos. (CCLL-Fict)
‘In the room, the window is open, the air is fresh. Evidently early in the
morning there must have been a human being, (somebody obviously) has
walked, has tidied up: the floor has been swept.’
Compare also examples with an overt realization of a non-patient in (10–11) and

a covert one with an implied genitive subject NP in (12):
(12) <…> jisi jau žinojo, jog paliks Vilnių, <…> nebestovės ant šios dirigento
pakylos.
‘He knew that he would leave Vilnius, [he] would not stand on this
conductor’s rostrum.’
O ant jos stovėta buvo daugelį kartų.
and on it Øi stand.nagr.pst.pp be.pst.3 many times
Lit. ‘It has been stood on for many times.’
Paties Kačinskoi teigimu, <…> jisi surengė apie 450 <…> koncertų <…>
(CCLL-Fict)
‘According to Kačinskas himself he had about 450 concerts’
The implication of the genitive subject in (12) is supported by the adjacent context
in the narrative discourse and the semantics of the predicate. One cannot deny
the fact that the given evidential meaning is context-dependent because the evi-
dential construction has a null subject. However, the crucial criterion in this case
is the presence of a non-passivizing verb stovėti ‘stand’, which means that there is
no position/space for the object; hence, the given case could be considered to be
ambiguous in terms of the impersonal passive and an evidential interpretation.
Likewise impersonal participles of cognitive, communication and perception
verbs that usually function as evidential complement-taking-predicates can oc-
casionally be found with genitive subject. One of the rare examples expressing
reportive evidentiality is in (13):
(13) Lietuvininkų tikėta, kad dvasregiu
Lithuanians.gen believe. nagr.pst.pp comp clairvoyant.ins
tampama
become. nagr.prs.pp
gimus ir / ar esant pakrikštytam ketvirtadienį <…>. (CorALit-H)
‘born and / or baptized on a Thursday’
‘Reportedly Lithuanians have believed that one becomes a clairvoyant when
born and/or baptized on a Thursday.’
This example is in line with the observations made in previous linguistic studies
that transitive verbs can also be found in evidential constructions. However, tran-
sitive verbs are mainly used in passive constructions, e.g.:
(14) Natrio <…> gaunama su <…> druska. (CorALit-B)
potassium.gen get.nagr.prs.pp with salt.ins
‘Potassium is consumed with salt.’
Non-agreeing participles used in prototypical evidential constructions are mainly

formed from intransitive (non-passivizing) verbs like the ones used in (10–12),
namely būti ‘be’, stovėti ‘stand’, vaikščioti ‘walk’. Other intransitive verbs like pabu-
voti ‘visit’, gyventi ‘live’, užmigti ‘fall asleep’, padirbėti ‘work-a-bit’, žūti ‘perish’
are also found in the given construction and usually in the narrative discourse.
Mention can be made of the verb pabuvoti ‘visit’, which is sometimes found in
reports of criminal cases in journalistic discourse, e.g.:
(15) <…> man susidarė įspūdis, kad kambaryje pabuvota
I had an impression, comp room.loc visit.nagr.pst.pp
pamišėlio. (CCLL-News)
madman.gen
‘I had an impression that the room was (obviously) visited by a madman.’
The evidential meaning expressed has been considered to be mainly inferential

though reportive (16) and mirative (17) are not excluded, e.g.:
(16) Juk J. Bretkūno gimtinės apylinkėse XVI a. dar
gyventa prūsų bei lietuvininkų; (CorALit-H)
live.nagr.pst.pp Prussians.gen and Lithuanians.gen
‘In 16th century, in the Bretkūnas’s birthplace area, Prussians and
Lithuanians are known to have lived there.’
(17) <…> jau vištos po kiemą goglinėja.
Vajetau, kaip užmigta! (CCLL-Fict)
goodness how fall-asleep.nagr.pst.pp
‘Hens are already loitering in the yard. Oh, goodness, how (I) happened to
fall asleep!’
Formally, main clause predication containing the auxiliary verb būti ‘be’, namely
expressions like yra/buvo/bus padaryta ‘is/are/was/were/will be done/made’ are
not regarded as evidential because they are passive constructions. However, as has
been observed by Ambrazas (1997:284) and Holvoet (2007:100), there seem to be
exceptions. The analysis has shown that predicative phrases with non-agreeing pas-
sive participles of non-passivizing verbs and the auxiliary verb būti ‘be’ can express
an indirect evidential meaning (inference based on perceptual knowledge), e.g.:
(18) <…> Emilytė ramiai miegojo, tad, matyt, buvo
‘Emilyte was peacefully sleeping, thus evidently’ be.pst.3
užmigta ir jo, nes <…>
fall-asleep.nagr.pst.pp and he.gen because
pašoko ir dairėsi <…> nesusigaudydamas, kur esąs. (CCLL-Fict)
‘Emilyte was peacefully sleeping, thus evidently he must have fallen asleep
as well because suddenly he jumped up and was (eagerly) looking around
not understanding where he was.’
Similarly, full auxiliary (a zero coded būti ‘be’ form) or auxiliariless predicative
expressions containing reflexive forms of the -ma/-ta participles like gręžiama-si
‘turn-back’nagr.prs.pp.refl, svečiuota-si ‘be-guests’nagr.pst.pp.refl are consid-
ered to be evidential (reportive), e.g.:
(19) Į šią problemą M. P. Karpio buvo gręžiamasi
to this.acc problem.acc Karpis.gen be.pst.3 turn-back.nagr.prs.pp.refl
ne kalbose, bet publicistiniame darbe, išleistame apie 1791 m. (CCLL-News)
‘This problem is said to have been addressed by Karpis not in his speeches
but in his study published approximately in 1791.’
However, in all the corpora at our disposal, only a few occurrences have been
found and exceptionally in narrative discourse.
Existential constructions with -ma/-ta forms of the verb būti ‘be’ are also used
for the coding of evidentiality:
(20) <…> baigia nustekenti <…> savo <…> mokinius mylinčius pedagogus.
‘[They] are finishing doing away with the teachers who love their pupils.’
Kad jų ten būta (ir tebesama),
comp they.gen there be.nagr.pst.pp and pref.be.nagr.prs.pp
liudija
give-evidence.prs.3
ne vien cituotas laiškelis. (CCLL-News)
‘That they must have been (and obviously are still there) is evidenced not
only by the letter quoted.’
Lithuanian impersonal null-subject auxiliariless passive constructions are not re-

garded as evidential. They are most common in the narrative discourse when the
author is giving an account of past events (descriptive passive), e.g.:
(21) Kiek čia išgerta alaus, kiek dainuota,
how much here drink.nagr.pst.pp beer.gen how much sing.nagr.pst.pp
šokta, raudota -tyliai ir garsiai. (CCLL-News)
dance.nagr.pst.pp wail.nagr.pst.pp silently and loudly
‘How much beer it has been drunk here, how much it has been sung, danced,
wailed – silently and loudly.’
This type of passive construction contains a report the focus of which is on in-
direct rendering of past activities, it is a mere listing of events. A very similar in-
terpretation is applicable to the given construction containing the -ma participle
esama ‘be’nagr.prs.pp when found in existential sentences which describe com-

mon sense or general knowledge, e.g.:
(22) Cholesterolio esama išimtinai
cholesterol.gen be.nagr.prs.pp exceptionally
gyvūniniuose produktuose. (CorALit-B)
‘There is [an amount of] cholesterol exceptionally in animal products.’
Attribution of the source of knowledge is irrelevant when stating default rules in

existential sentences. Moreover, the genitive subject cholesterolio here is not struc-
tural, it is partitive indicating an indefinite quantity and as a rule lacking verbal
agreement, which as observed by Luraghi and Kittilä (2014:32) is an obligatory
feature with existential subjects and it is common across languages. This partitive
genitive is also used with present and past tense zero-coded forms of the verb būti
‘be’, which are mere statements of fact, e.g.:
(23) Cholesterolio yra/buvo/būna gyvūniniuose produktuose.
cholesterol.gen be.prs.3/pst.3/prs.3 animals.loc products.loc
‘There is/was/happens to be [an amount of] cholesterol in animal products.’
Existential sentences of the locative-existential type in Lithuanian differ from pre-

sentative existentials (Kalėdaitė 2002:132–133) in terms of their discourse status
and functions. Presentative existential assertions are claimed to be “much more
personal, based on the speaker-type assertions <…> than the general assertion of
existence …” (Kalėdaitė 2002:133). The given difference seems to be valid for dis-
tinguishing impersonal passives from evidential constructions with the participle
forms of the verb būti ‘be’ in different types of existential assertions. For instance,
in the following presentative-būti ‘be’-type sentence, the author(s) clearly indi-
cates that the source of knowledge on the point of view asserted is other sources
(hearsay), not themselves, hence a detached and reportive stance of the author
regarding the assertion made as in the following example:
(24) Dantų prognozę blogina ir trumpos šaknys.
‘Short roots worsen the prognosis of teeth.’
Esama tos nuomonės, kad esant
be.nagr.prs.pp that.gen opinion.gen comp be.cvb
dentino displazijai dantų retencija yra neilgalaikė. (CorALit-B)
‘There is said to be a point of view that in case of dentine dysplasia denture
retention is not long lasting.’
This existential-evidential use of esama ‘be’nagr.prs.pp has been found to be

most common with so called “evidential and attitudinal nouns” (Schmid 2000:92),
namely problema ‘problem’, trūkumai ‘shortcomings’, tendencija ‘tendency’, ženklai
‘signs’, etc. in the post-verbal position followed by a kad ‘that’-complement clause.

Collins also observes that a very common “almost formulaic – type of attribu-
tive post-verbal NP” in English existential sentences is “with no + ‘modal’ noun
such as doubt, possibility, reason, way, point” (Collins 2001). These are actually
the head nouns taking complement clauses that Biber et al. (1999:648) regard as
expressing two kinds of stance information by indicating either “an assessment
of the certainty of the proposition” or “the source of the knowledge expressed in
the that-clause” which can indicate linguistic communication, cognitive reasoning
and personal belief. Thus, the semantics of the post-verbal NP plays an important
role in the existential assertion because it can be directly linked to the epistemic
qualification expressed, which means that the use of the -ma/-ta participle is not
crucial in the given construction. The contrast between the construction with the
participle esama ‘be’nagr.prs.pp and the zero-coded form yra ‘be’prs.3 shows
that the only difference concerns the stance of the author because both of them
contain an indication to the source of information. The author can be said to hold
a more tentative and detached stance in the participial construction, thus it can be
regarded as a marked member of the opposition, e.g.:
(25) ‘There is an opinion that …’
a. yrabe.prs.3 nuomonėnom, kad ‘that’ …
b. esamabe.nagr.prs.pp nuomonėsgen, kad ‘that’ …
When used in (indirect) questions or jei(gu)- ‘if ’-conditional clauses, the passive
participle forms of the verb būti ‘be’ (esama, būta) with genitive subject cannot be
regarded as evidential either, e.g.:
(26) Jei pasaulyje esama beprasmių dalykų,
if world.loc be.nagr.prs.pp meaningless.gen things.gen
tai dabar regiu vieną iš jų. (CCLL-Fict)
‘If there are meaningless things in the world, I can see one of them now.’
1.2 Indirect evidentiality – an epistemic qualification
The types of indirect evidentiality under analysis in the present paper belong to
the conceptual domain of epistemicity as defined in Boye (2012), which means
that both evidentiality and epistemic modality are regarded as its two basic sub-
domains. The given epistemic qualification of indirect evidentiality covers two
basic types of meaning, namely inferential and reportive evidentiality, which is
the coding of the author’s source of information available for them when making
an assertion. The fact that both inference and hearsay are not absolutely reliable
sources of knowledge is sufficient grounds to explain why these indirect evidential
expressions can have various epistemic overtones (Aikhenvald 2004:189–192). It

is not infrequent that the given indirect evidentials are also modified by epistemic-
evidential adverbs to emphasize author’s uncertainty regarding the propositional
content expressed, e.g.:
(27) Lėgaudo, regis, padirbėta.
Lėgaudas.gen seemingly pref.work-a-bit.nagr.pst.pp
Tą įvertini ne iš karto <…> (CCLL-News)
‘It seems there must have been worked a bit by Lėgaudas. (You) cannot
assess it at once’
The meaning of passive constructions like reportive passives in Danish (Ørsnes

2011:42) or passive matrices in English (Noël 2001) is directly linked to the evi-
dential qualification. They allow the author to remain distanced and non-respon-
sible for the assertion made. The given feature holds true for the Lithuanian evi-
dential construction with non-agreeing passive participles. The role of the author
is that of a non-involved outsider-observer who provides a mere record of events,
as in the following example:
(28) <…> tą vakarą jo pabuvota ne viename <…> bare
that.acc evening.acc he.gen visit.nagr.pst.pp neg one.loc bar.loc
ar restorane <…> (CCLL-News)
or restaurant.loc
‘That night he is reported to have been not to one bar or restaurant’
The reportive evidential meaning in this example has no epistemic overtones, it

is simply an indirect report of events which have been attested by some external
source. The author codes the source of information for the situation described as
obtained indirectly, not witnessed by themselves. In the case of inferential evi-
dentials, the utterance can contain an overt indication that the inference is based
on perceptual evidence, which means that the author can be regarded as being
responsible for the judgement made, e.g.:
(29) Bet žmogaus ten gulėta, rugiai
but man.gen there lie.nagr.pst.pp rye.nom
<…> prisiploję prie žemės. (CCLL-Fict)
Lit. ‘But there must have been lain by a person, the rye has been smashed to
the ground.’
Lithuanian impersonal passive constructions with auxiliariless null-subject

non-agreeing passive participles can be compared to the Icelandic impersonal
null-subject constructions which contain exclusively neuter singular participles
(Sigurðsson and Egerland 2009:167). The only syntactic difference is that the
Lithuanian auxiliary verb būti ‘be’ is often omitted, e.g.:
(30) Vaikystėje visi, su kuriais kartu žaista bėgiota,
childhood.loc all with whom together play.nagr.pst.pp run.nagr.pst.pp
kurie davė atsikąsti obuolio, yra draugai. (CCLL-Fict)
who has given to bite an apple are friends
Lit. ‘In childhood, everybody who has been played with, who has been run
along with, who has given you a bite of their apple are friends.’
In some cases impersonal null-subject passive construction can have an evidential

reading, which is very much context-dependent. As a rule these are reports of
criminal cases, when the author’s objective is to present the events described with-
out taking any responsibility for what is being asserted, thus information obtained
is attributed to other sources but himself/herself, e.g.:
(31) Į sprogimo vietą vedė dviejų asmenų pėdsakai,
‘There were footprints of two persons leading to the place of explosion,’
nubėgta buvo <…> didesniais žingsniais.
run-away. nagr.pst.pp be.pst.3 larger.ins steps.ins
Kaltininkų ieškos tarp mokinių. (CCLL-News)
‘(Reportedly) it had been run away in larger strides. (They) will look for the
perpetrators among the pupils.’
The following section is devoted to the findings of our corpus-based analysis of

-ma/-ta construction in academic discourse, fiction and news discourse.
2. Results and discussion
The initial search for -ma/-ta word forms has shown that these endings are very
productive. The search for -ma forms has yielded a total of nearly 50,000 words,6
whereas the search for -ta forms has resulted in about 55,000 words in all dis-
course types analysed. The manual analysis of all the occurrences of the the word
forms ending in -ma/-ta showed that 25% of all -ma word forms and 40% of all
¬-ta word forms were nouns, adjectives, pronouns, converbs, third person present
tense forms, etc. (for example, su-ma ‘sum’, diafrag-ma ‘diaphragm’, šal-ta ‘cold’,
6. Due to a very high frequency of -ma word forms, the search for all words ending in -ma was
not possible. The search for -ma forms was limited to the only three possible participial endings:
-oma, -ima, -ama.
grįž-ta ‘come-back.prs.3, etc.), i.e. all forms that were not relevant for the present
analysis. Quantitative findings are provided in tables 2 and 3.
Once the irrelevant forms were discarded this left us with as many as nearly
70, 000 cases of -ma/-ta participle use. Despite the fact that participles are general-
ly very frequent in all analysed discourse types, we can see from tables 2 and 3 that
their use in the evidential construction under analysis is actually non-existent:
with 349 evidential cases, -ma/-ta participles constitute as little as 0.5% of all parti-
ciples used in the four corpora primarily appearing in the humanities (CorALit-H
sub-corpus) and news discourse (CCLL-LR sub-corpus) discourse.
Table 2. The quantitative distribution of -ma word forms in various discourse types
-ma forms CorALit-H raw CorALit-B raw ParaCorpLT-EN CCLL-LR raw
frq frq raw frq frq
(n/1000) (n/1000) (n/1000) (n/1000)
total number 18,436 16,031 3,167 10,999
(9.09) (9.78) (5.21) (5.49)
participles 15,881 11,645 1,530 7,488
(7.83) (7.11) (2.51) (3.74)
participles in 51 5 6 19
evid-cxn (0.03) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Table 3. The quantitative distribution of -ta word forms in various discourse types
-ta forms CorALit-H raw CorALit-B raw ParaCorpLT-EN CCLL-LR raw
frq frq raw frq frq
(n/1000) (n/1000) (n/1000) (n/1000)
total number 17,925 15,077 4,310 17,379
(8.83) (9.20) (7.08) (8.67)
participles 10,392 10,360 1,256 10,718
(5.12) (6.32) (2.06) (5.35)
participles in 160 8 36 64
evid-cxn (0.08) (0.00) (0.06) (0.03)
The most frequent verb attested in the evidential -ma/-ta construction in all ana-
lysed discourse types is predominantly būti ‘be’. The -ma/-ta participles of the verb
būti ‘be’ constitute 85% of all evidential construction uses, as shown in table 4.
Table 4. Most frequent verbs in the evidential -ma/-ta construction

Verb Number of occurrences as Number of occurrences as
-ma PTCPs in evid-cxn -ta PTCPs in evid-cxn
būti ‘be’ 77 221
gyventi ‘live’ – 10
(nu)eiti (pref) ‘go’(away) – 4
padaryti pref ‘do’ – 2
parašyti pref ‘write’ – 2
pasidarbuoti
pref.refl ‘do some work’ – 2
turėti ‘have’ 1 2
There have also been single occurrences of some other, usually intransitive, verbs
such as stovėti ‘stand’, pėdinti ‘pace’, pereiti ‘pass’, susirgti ‘fall ill’ etc.
As has been noted in the introduction, one of the patterns characteristic of
evidential esama ‘be’nagr.prs.pp is its use with evidential or attitudinal nouns
followed by kad ‘that’-complement clause. This construction accounts for 16%
(12 cases) of all evidential use of esama ‘be’nagr.prs.pp and 3% (6 cases) of būta
‘be’nagr.pst.pp in our analysed corpora. The nouns that are used in this con-
structions are žinios ‘information’, prielaida ‘supposition’, požymiai ‘signs/features’,
duomenys ‘data’, įrodymai ‘proof/evidence’, požiūris ‘viewpoint’, etc., which in com-
bination with esama ‘be’nagr.prs.pp or būta ‘be’nagr.pst.pp help to create a de-
tached position of the author who attributes the proposition in the that-clause to
an external source.
Another pattern of the evidential -ma/-ta construction found in academic and
journalistic discourse is the use of esama ‘be’nagr.prs.pp in the complementa-
tion of communication verbs (32) or with evaluative and attitudinal expressions
in the context (33):
(32) Pensilvanijos senatorius respublikonas Arlenas Specteris
‘The senator of Pennsylvania, a republican Arlen Specter’
sakė, jog esama dar daug neaiškumų dėl
say.pst.3 comp be.nagr.prs.pp still many uncertainties.gen regarding
reprodukcinio klonavimo <…>. (CCLL-LR)
reproductive.gen cloning.gen
‘The senator of Pennsylvania, a republican Arlen Specter said that there are
still many uncertainties regarding reproductive cloning.’
(33) Atrodo, čia esama sąsajos su pasitikėjimu,

seem.prs.3 here be.nagr.prs.pp link.gen with trust.ins (CorALit-H)
bet neužčiuopiu, kokia ta sąsaja yra.
‘It seems there is evidently a link to trust, but I can’t identify what this link
is.’
In (32) and (33), the participle esama ‘be’ nagr.prs.pp seems to be chosen by
the author in order to avoid a straightforward statement that would result from
the use of zero-coded forms of the verb būti ‘be’. In (32), there is a clear attribu-
tion of the proposition to an external source, whereas in (33), esama makes the
inferred proposition sound less categorical, an impression even further strength-
ened by a hedgy context.
With regard to different discourse types, the academic discourse domain con-
tains the widest divide in the distribution of the evidential -ma/-ta construction
(especially with regard to the -ta participle use) with the humanities field employ-
ing most of the evidential uses of -ma/-ta participles and biomedical discourse
having virtually none of them. Studies of English research writing have shown that
scholars in the humanities and social sciences generally employ more of the prag-
matic indicators of author stance than researchers in the hard sciences. Hyland
(2005:187–188) explains this tendency suggesting that soft sciences are far more
interpretative than natural sciences, as there is “less control of variables and great-
er possibilities for diverse outcomes, so writers must spell out their evaluations”.
It seems that the same holds true for Lithuanian academic discourse. Since the
evidential construction allows for the shift of responsibility or implies that there is
evidence for the claim, it becomes one of the possible ways to express stance and
signal additional pragmatic information for the reader.
The humanities sub-corpus of CorALit includes texts from various disciplines
among which are those that are traditionally associated with interpretation and
narrative such as archaeology, ethnology, history, Lithuanian studies. Most of the
evidential -ta participle use comes from these disciplines. In (34), the author’s
inferential conclusion is based on other scholars’ data and evidence, and since this
is the only grounds for making the assertion, the author has chosen an evidential
construction which signals a certain caution towards the proposition expressed,
otherwise lost with the straightforward gyveno ‘live’pst.3:
(34) Pagal ir archeologinius, ir kalbotyrinius duomenis, ypač pagal vietovardžius,

‘Based on archeological and linguistic data, especially according to the place
names’
mūsų protėvių gyventa toli rytuose,
we.gen ancestors.gen live.nagr.pst.pp far east.loc
net už Okos, pietuose net už Pripetės jų pėdsakų aptikta. (CorALit-H)
‘Based on archeological and linguistic data, and especially on place names,
our ancestors obviously lived far in the East even beyond the Oka river, in
the South beyond the Pripyat river their traces were found.’
The fact that the evidential -ta construction is witnessed in the discourse of his-
tory and archaeology does not come as a surprise as writers in those disciplines
frequently rely on conceptual and perceptual evidence for their argumentation.
The most common examples from those science areas are thus of inferential evi-
dentiality (35) though cases of reportive evidentiality are also observed (36):
(35) Rastojo viršutinio audinio veikiausiai būta prastesnės
found.gen upper.gen fabric.gen most probably be.nagr.pst.pp worse.gen
būklės,
condition.gen
nes autorius neužsimena nei apie nyčių skaičių, nei apie raštą. (CorALit-H)
‘The upper fabric found most probably must have been in a worse condition
because the author has not mentioned anything about the number of
harnesses or about the weave.’
(36) Tuo tarpu pranešimuose „iš St. Peterburgo“, „iš Dancigo“ iš „Žemutinio Reino“
būta žinių apie
be.nagr.pst.pp news.gen about
įvykius Lenkijoje-Lietuvoje. (CorALit-H)
‘Whereas in the reports “from St. Petersburg”, “from Danzig”, from “Lower
Rhine”, there has obviously been some news about the events in Poland-
Lithuania.’
When -ta participles are used in the evidential construction there are contextual
justifications confirming the evidential nature of the construction, either because
there is an explicit proof for the proposition or other epistemological devices
showing author stance, such as markers of certainty or uncertainty:
(37) Šiandien nebeįmanoma atsekti, ar Kritiko personažas paremtas kokiu nors

konkrečiu asmeniu, tačiau
kūrybos, veiklos ar gyvenimo pobūdžio puolimo aiškiai
creative work.gen activity.gen or life.gen style.gen attack.gen clearly
būta.
be.nagr.pst.pp
Tai liudija ir nusivylimo bei priekaištų kupinos eilutės. (CorALitH)
‘Today it is not possible to trace back whether the character of the Critic was
based on some certain person, however, evidently there had clearly been
attacks on [his] creative work, activities and lifestyle. This is evidenced by
the lines full of disappointment and reproach.’
In (37), there is a marker of epistemic certainty aiškiai ‘clearly’, while in (35) above,
the author’s inferential judgment is modified by an epistemic adverbial veikiausiai
‘most probably’. Further in the context of both examples, the author provides ad-
ditional information justifying the inference, namely ‘lack of data about the weave’
in (35) and ‘lines full of disappointment’ in (37).
As the evidential meaning expressed by -ma/-ta construction in academic dis-
course is mainly inferential or reportive, it has been somewhat surprising to find
one case of mirative evidentiality in the corpus of academic discourse, because
formal writing usually is not associated with the expression of surprise elements:
(38) Pats šių tekstų autorius, leisdamas apybraižas atskira knygute, vėl jas
peržiūrėjo ir pats
stebėjosi: „Kiek daug mano tada surinkta.” (CorALit-H)
be-amazed.pst.3 how much I.gen then collect.nagr.pst.pp
‘Publishing his essays as a separate book, the author of those texts reviewed
them once again and was himself surprised: “How much [of the material] I
have collected then”’.
This example comes as a quote from the works of the priest Paulius Rabikauskas
(1920–1998) who belonged to the generation of older Lithuanians. The analysis of
the evidential construction with -ta participles in fiction shows that the age of the
author plays an important role in its use: whenever it occurs it is mainly used by
people of an older generation.
As has been mentioned in the introduction, the illustration of the eviden-
tial -ma/-ta construction in the studies on grammatical evidentiality is mainly
based on fiction dating back to the second half of 19th and early 20th century.
ParaCorpLT-EN, which was used as a data source for our analysis of fiction, is a cor-
pus of contemporary fiction (1980 and 2006). However, there is a notable excep-
tion, the novel The Forest of the Gods, written by Balys Sruoga (1896–1947) in 1945.
The 36 evidential -ta uses that have been found in the fiction sub-corpus account
for 2.9% of all participial forms in ParaCorpLT-EN (see Table 3). Just like in aca-
demic discourse, the most frequent type of evidence is either inference or hearsay.
A closer look at the sources where evidential -ta participles appear has revealed
that as many as 81% (29 occurrences) of them come from the novel The Forest
of the Gods written by Balys Sruoga in 1945, a memoir book by Juozas Kazickas
(1918–2014) and his wife, and the biographical novel Hurricane Captain written
by journalist Gražina Sviderskytė and based on historical documents about the
life of a famous aviator, Romualdas Marcinkus (1907–1944). Only the remaining 7
cases of the evidential construction with -ta participles come from contemporary
novels. This fact further confirms our observation that the evidential construction
under study is obsolete in contemporary Lithuanian.
Further evidence to support our claim that the evidential construction un-
der study is nearly extinct comes from a case study of Spoken Corpus of the
Vilnius area dialect Vilniškiai, the informants of which are more than 70 years
old. In the 103,410 words of the corpus, 8 cases of evidential -ta construction have
been found, and these examples are very much like the ones that are quoted in
Lithuanian grammars:
(39) <…> tiktai jau miego tai neturiu, miegas mano jau
only already sleep.gen prt neg.have.prs.sg.1 sleep.nom I.gen already
prarasta.
lose.nagr.pst.pp
‘I can’t sleep anymore. My sleep has been lost.’
Regarding the evidential use of the -ta construction in journalistic discourse, the
number of occurrences is surprisingly small if we consider the specific nature of
journalistic discourse, which primarily deals with reporting information from
various sources. Sourcing then becomes crucial to news discourse as it “gives us an
answer to one of the important questions that readers may ask of a news text: ‘to
whom can this be attributed?’” (Bednarek 2006:638). There were only 0.03 occur-
rences of evidential -ta construction in our analysed sub-corpus of news (CCLL-
LR). In these cases, the evidential type is mainly reportive, though occasionally
inferential cases have also been observed. Consider one of the examples in (40):
(40) Laimikio būta gausaus,
catch.gen be.nagr.pst.pp rich.gen
žvejų valtis buvo artipilnė žuvų. (CCLL-LR)
‘The catch was evidently rich, the fishermen’s boat was nearly full with fish.’
An exceptional feature characteristic of the evidential -ta participle construction

in newspaper discourse is its use in sub-headlines in news items. Even though
the news reports are fairly short, there is a tendency to break the text into small
thematic groups and give them short titles to draw focus to certain pieces of news,
as in the following example:
(41) Būta pranašingų požymių. (CCLL-LR)
be.nagr.pst.pp prophetic.gen signs.gen
‘(Reportedly) there happened to be prophetic signs.’
(42) Būta ne vien vandens. (CCLL-LR)
be.nagr.pst.pp not only water.gen
‘(Reportedly) there happened to be not only water.’
This type of sub-headlines account for 14% of all evidential -ta use in newspaper
discourse. This technique seems to be employed not only to facilitate reading but
also to grab the attention of the reader with a ‘spicy’ detail or a ‘catchy’ formulation.
Finally, the evidential construction with two non-agreeing passive participles,
namely non-agreeing participle auxiliary plus full lexical verb like būta išeita (būta
‘be’nagr.pst.pp + išeita ‘go-away’pref.nagr.pst.pp), which appears as an example
in nearly all the publications on the grammatical evidentiality in Lithuanian, has
not been found in our data.
As can be seen from the discussion above, the evidential -ma/-ta construc-
tion is actually obsolete in modern Lithuanian discourse; it is occasionally used in
specific contexts and it is nearly restricted to one verb, namely būti ‘be’. Moreover
the position of the subject in the case of existential non-agreeing passive participle
constructions with būti ‘be’ does not seem to play a crucial role in the evidential
interpretation of the construction.
3. Concluding remarks
The findings of the analysis suggest that the given type of grammatical means of
expression of evidentiality is marginal in contemporary Lithuanian and only ap-
pears as a relic of the end of the 19th – beginning of the 20th century language. The
given construction can be regarded as belonging to the potential because its actual
use is very rare. In fact it is only -ta (past passive) participle form of a few intransi-
tive verbs like būti ‘be’, pabuvoti ‘visit’, gyventi ‘live’, gulėti ‘lie’, padirbėti ‘work-a-bit’
that is still occasionally used in the evidential construction and mainly in the nar-
rative discourse (fiction, academic and journalistic discourse). On the contrary
the evidential construction with the -ma (present passive) participle can be said
to be extinct in contemporary Lithuanian with the exception of the evidential be-
verb form esama ‘be’nagr.prs.pp, which is still found in academic or journalistic
discourse. Very occasionally one can come across -ma participles of intransitive
verbs in narrative fiction as well. According to the findings of the latest studies
in realizations of epistemicity in Lithuanian (Usonienė 2013, 2015; Ruskan 2012,
Ruskan, this volume), there is a great choice of non-grammatical realizations of
evidentiality in Lithuanian.
The findings corroborate Ambrazas’s (1997) and Holvoet’s (2007) observation
that in rare cases the presence of the copular verb būti ‘be’ in the predicative phrase
with -ta participle does not discard an evidential meaning.
The given evidential construction with -ma participle is not characteristic of
spoken Lithuanian though -ta participle construction is occasionally found in the
elderly people’s speech in the Vilnius area dialect.
Position of the prototypical non-patient is not important and it can occur both
pre-verbally and post-verbally; however in existential sentences, it is the semantics
of post-verbal NPs that can play a very important role. Post-verbally used epistem-
ically- and evaluatively-charged nouns taking finite complement clauses express
reportive evidentiality. In specialised discourse types, such as academic or jour-
nalistic discourse, the evidential -ma/-ta construction can be used to express prag-
matic functions of author stance, often in combination with other stance markers.
Acknowledgements
The research has been funded by the Research Council of Lithuania within the framework of
project MIP-062/2014 (Modality and Evidentiality in the Lithuanian Language).
List of abbreviations
ap active participle nom nominative

cxn construction pp passive participle
evid evidential(ity) pref prefix
gen genitive prs present
cvb converb prt particle
ins instrumental pst past
nagr non-agreeing refl reflexive
neg negative
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Section C.
Evidentiality and Epistemic Modality in

Discourse Domains and Genres
Chapter 8
Multifunctionality of evidential expressions

in discourse domains and genres
Evidence from cross-linguistic case studies
Juana I. Marín Arrese

This paper examines the phenomenon of multifunctionality of evidential expres-

sions in unscripted oral discourse and in journalistic discourse in English and
Spanish. The paper examines the distribution of evidential expressions in rela-
tion to discourse-domain, genre-related or language-related distinctions, as well
as the similarities or differences in multifunctionality of evidential expressions in
the two languages, and the degree to which certain evidential values are associ-
ated with particular constructions. Results point to significant similarities across
languages in both genre-related preferred types of evidential expressions, and to
certain cross-linguistic differences in the degree to which there are correlations
between evidential values and evidential constructions.
Keywords: evidentiality, multifunctionality, inferential, reportative,

constructions
1. Introduction
Evidentials have been characterized as a grammatical category primarily indicat-

ing the ‘source of information’ or the ‘mode of knowing’ (cf. Chafe and Nichols
1986; Willett 1988; Aikhenvald 2004). Evidentiality is here conceived as a sub-
domain within the conceptual domain of epistemicity, in that it provides ‘epis-
temic justification’ for a proposition (Boye 2012). Within the literature there is
relative consensus regarding the main categories of evidentiality or values of the
subdomains: ‘direct’, ‘indirect inferential’, and ‘indirect reportative’ evidence (cf.
Plungian 2001; Diewald and Smirnova 2010).
This paper focuses on the extensions of meaning of evidential expressions
within the subdomain of indirect evidentiality, from the values Indirect-Inferential
evidence, which includes both perceptual-based and conceptual-based inferences,
doi 10.1075/pbns.271.09mar
196 Juana I. Marín Arrese
as well as report-based inferences, to Indirect-Reportative readings, in both

English and Spanish. It also argues for the possible role of dimensions of (inter)
subjectivity and of tense-aspect features such as non-immediacy and irrealis in
these extensions. The paper addresses the following issues:
a. whether there exist discourse-domain, genre-related or language-related dis-
tinctions in the pattern of preferences for the various resources and values of
evidentiality;
b. whether there are similarities or differences in the presence of multifunctional
evidential expressions across languages and discourse domains; and
c. the degree to which certain evidential values are associated with particular
constructions in the two languages.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 1 examines the place of evidentiality
within the conceptual domain of epistemicity. Section 2 discusses the phenom-
enon of multifunctionality in evidential expressions. Section 3 describes the meth-
odology and section 4 presents the results of the case studies. The final section is
devoted to the conclusions.
2. Evidentiality in discourse
2.1 Epistemicity and evidentiality
The conceptual domain of epistemicity, as Boye (2012:2–3) consistently argues,

comprises the “subcategories evidentiality and epistemic modality”. Boye (2012:2–
3) defines epistemicity as justificatory support for the proposition. Epistemic mo-
dality is conceived as “epistemic support”, and involves notions such as “degree
of certainty” and “degree of commitment”. The subdomain of epistemic modality
comprises full support (total certainty), partial support (probability) and neutral
support (possibility and uncertainty). Justificatory support also involves “epis-
temic justification”, which is characterized in terms of notions such as “source of
information”, “evidence” or “justification”. The subdomain of evidentiality includes
the meanings of direct and indirect justification. As Anderson (1986:274–275)
notes, “Evidentials show the kind of justification for a factual claim which is avail-
able to the person making that claim, whether direct evidence plus observation
(no inference needed), evidence plus inference, inference (evidence unspecified),
reasoned expectation from logic and other facts, and whether the evidence is audi-
tory, or visual, etc..”
Although the focus of studies on evidentiality has traditionally been on
grammatical evidentiality, that is, those systems of languages where marking the
Chapter 8. Multifunctionality of evidential expressions in discourse domains and genres 197
information source is obligatory, and where evidentiality is a grammatical category

in its own right (Aikhenvald 2004, 2007), there has been a growing interest in the
expression of evidentiality in languages which do not have a fully grammaticalized
evidential system. Germanic and Romance languages, like English or Spanish,
lack a specific system of grammatical evidentiality, and resort to various strate-
gies along the lexico‐grammatical continuum, such as sentence adverbs and lexi-
cal verbs, parentheticals, specific choices in TAM systems, and modal auxiliaries,
with which to convey the various evidential values. As Wiemer (2010:60) notes,
from a functional-onomasiological perspective, lexical evidentiality includes “all
kinds of distinct means serving to express evidential functions, especially if they
convey some specific meanings from a taxonomy of evidential functions”, with the
caveat that these linguistic devices should be sufficiently conventionalized, that is,
having “a stable, non-detachable indication” of an evidential function. As Lampert
and Lampert (2010:319) also argue, “the category of evidentiality is of use only, we
conjecture, if a radical conceptual stance is taken in order to not miss capturing al-
ternative linguistic strategies of expressing this notion. Hence, we strongly endorse
the primacy of functional criteria and suggest including all linguistic representa-
tions that serve as cues for evidentiality in context”.
2.2 Functions of evidentiality
In the literature we find various subdivisions of the domain of evidentiality on

the basis of a series of dimensions or parameters. Chafe (1986:263) identifies four
characterising features within the evidential system: (a) the source of knowledge
(language in the case of hearsay, evidence in the case of induction, hypothesis
for deduction); (b) the modes of knowing or the ways in which knowledge is ac-
quired (belief, induction, hearsay, deduction); (c) the reliability of the informa-
tion or the probability of its truth; and (d) the ways in which that knowledge is
matched against verbal resources and expectations. Plungian (2001:352ff), for
his part, distinguishes between (a) sources and forms of access to the informa-
tion (direct vs. indirect evidence) and (b) speaker’s involvement, personal access
to the evidence vs. mediated evidence, accessed through another person/means.
Squartini (2008:918) argues for the need to distinguish between: (a) “mode of
knowing or type of evidence”, that is, the process whereby the information is ac-
cessed, whether directly perceptual or indirectly through inferences or through re-
ports, and (b) “the source of evidence”, or the locus of information, which may be
internal or external to the speaker. This latter notion seems to posit some difficulty
in characterizing the indirect-inferential value, where the source may both exter-
nal (perception-based) and internal (mental processing), so that mode of knowing
and type are inextricably intertwined with source. My proposal draws mainly on
Plungian’s distinctions, and considers the interaction between the dimensions (a)
mode of access to the information, and (b) type of evidence or source of informa-
tion involved. These dimensions involve the following features characterising the
speaker/conceptualizer’s access to the evidence: (a) direct, non-mediated, access
to the information vs. indirect, cognition-mediated, mode of access vs. indirect
access, mediated by some other speaker(s)/conceptualizer(s); (b) type of informa-
tion source, that is, whether the evidence involves the perceptual, the mental level,
or the social level of communication. These dimensions and parameters may serve
as the basis for distinguishing the various subcategories of evidentiality1 (cf. Marín
Arrese 2013) (see also Cornillie, Marín Arrese and Wiemer 2015).
(i) Expressions of Direct Perceptual Evidentiality (DPE): these indicate direct,
non-mediated, access to visual or other sensoric evidence, which is external to
the speaker/conceptualizer.
(1) When, on a hot day in London, I see a woman wrapped in a black sack
tagging along beside a guy in light T-shirt, jeans and sneakers, my first
reaction is: “How bloody unfair!” (EOG)2
(ii) Expressions of Indirect-Inferential Evidentiality (IIE): these expressions in-

dicate personal indirect access to information (primary source: external to
the speaker/conceptualizer) which triggers some form of “higher-level cog-
nition: thought, reasoning, generalization, inference, conceptual integration,
and so on” (Langacker, this volume) (secondary source: internally mediated),
in the access to the evidence. The subtypes, based on the levels of experience,
include both perceptual-based and conceptual-based evidence, as well as
1. The operationalisation of the domain of evidentiality on the basis of the above-mentioned
parameters is beyond the scope of this paper. For a preliminary tentative proposal, see Marín
Arrese (2013).
2. The annotation system for the sources of the examples is the following:
ELG: English – Leading article – The Guardian

ELT: English – Leading article – The Times
EOG: English – Opinion column – The Guardian
EOT: English – Opinion column – The Times
ENG: English – News reports – The Guardian
ENT: English – News reports – The Times
SLA: Spanish – Leading article – ABC
SLP: Spanish – Leading article – El País
SOA: Spanish – Opinion column – ABC
SOP: Spanish – Opinion column – El País
SNA: Spanish – News reports – ABC
SNP: Spanish – News reports – El País
indirect-inferential meaning based on information acquired through external

communicative sources (oral and written reports), which might be termed
report-based inferential, as the following examples show.
(a) Indirect-Inferential, Perceptual-based: cognitive processes based on external
sensory evidence.
(2) For the outside world, the most powerful image of Saddam’s last day on
earth was the official footage of him being led to the gallows, where a
masked guard placed a rope around his neck – images that within hours
had reached millions on the internet and fanned protests from overseas
politicians and human rights activists. Yet for most Iraqis, the more
compelling image was a grainier, shakier one apparently <IIE> taken by a
mobile phone. Broadcast on local television, it showed a white-shrouded
body, neck twisted to one side. (ENG)
(b) Indirect-Inferential, Conceptual-based: cognitive processes based on knowl-

edge or information acquired externally.
(3) Now turn to Europe. A section of the Spanish electorate has apparently
<IIE> decided that the appropriate response to the murder of 200 of their
fellow citizens is to ask what their Government might have done to provoke
this outrage. This is a stance that smacks of weakness, not defiance. (EOT)
These conceptual-based inferences may be triggered internally through speaker’s

logical reasoning (generic inferences) on the basis of information deriving from
cultural or general world knowledge, or personal assumptions (conjectural infer-
ences) based solely on speaker reasoning on the basis of background knowledge
(Squartini 2008).
(c) Indirect-Inferential, Report-based: cognitive processes based on documen-
tary evidence, oral and written reports.
(4) One year on, the prime minister still seems <IIE> uncertain about how
to characterise the war. He started by acknowledging that it wasn’t a
humanitarian intervention to liberate the people of Iraq from tyranny, but
concluded that “we surely have a responsibility to act when a nation’s people
are subjected to a regime such as Saddam’s”. This is hardly a passing detail;
it goes to the heart of Blair’s proposals for reform of the UN and his new
“doctrine of international community”. (EOG)
(5) A juzgar por sus declaraciones, parece <IIE> que Obama, prudente
y comprometido con un sentido ético de la política, está dispuesto a
gobernar desde el estricto respeto a la Constitución, las leyes y los derechos

ciudadanos, … (SLP)
‘Judging by his declarations, it seems (parece: parecer.3SG.PRES) that Obama,
prudent and committed to an ethical sense of justice, is ready to govern with
a strict respect for the Constitution, the law and the civil rights,…’
A distinction is drawn here between cases which involve report-based infer-

ences, and have been classified together with other forms of Indirect-Inferential
Evidentiality (IIE), and those cases of Indirect Reportative Evidentiality (IRE) where
no higher-level cognitive processes are involved in the access to the information.
(iii) Expressions of Indirect-Reportative Evidentiality (IRE): indirect, medi-
ated mode of access to the information through social communication with
some external source(s) or text external voice(s), which may refer to a/some
specific conceptualizer(s), or some generalized or virtual conceptualizer.
Reportative evidentiality typically involves information originating in some
external voice(s), which includes, as Plungian (2001:352) observes, “general-
ized, second-hand information (presupposing an unknown or non-definite
‘anonymous’ author)”, and also “tradition or common knowledge (where no
personal author is invoked)”. Common markers found are auditory percep-
tion verbs (I hear that), as well as sentence adverbs (reportedly, allegedly).
Very often we find cases of multifunctionality, involving extensions from the
subdomain of indirect-inferential to the indirect-reportative domain (appear,
seem, apparently).
(6) Justice, the British section of the international commission of jurists, and
Liberty, the civil rights group, are separately challenging at the European
human rights court the order tabled by Blunkett and so meekly agreed by
parliament. They could point to the cynical opportunism by which the
government used the act – apparently <IRE> needed as matter of urgency to
save the nation – to attach a host of other measures far broader in scope than
any fight against terrorism. (EOG)
2.3 Semantic extensions in TAM systems
In addition to lexical strategies such as the above examples of evidentials, the

English modal system allows for indirect-inferential values, most notably in the
case of ‘must’, but also with the modal/future marker ‘will’, which evolved its
future-time meaning from its original modal meaning of partial epistemic sup-
port. Diachronic extensions of inferential justification have been posited for epis-
temic necessity modals, English must and Spanish deber (de) (van der Auwera and
Plungian 1998; Squartini 2004; Marín Arrese and Carretero 2014; Marín Arrese
2015b). Within the cognitive linguistics paradigm epistemic modality is conceived

in terms of the notion of force manifested at the mental level (cf. Sweetser 1982;
Talmy 1988). As Langacker (1991:274) observes, in the case of epistemic ‘must’ the
notion of potency is conceived as inherent in the conceptualizer’s mental activity,
in their assessment of the “evolutionary momentum of reality”, so that must situates
the designated process in projected ‘known reality’. Langacker (1991:274) points
out that “modal senses based on the notion of evolutionary momentum might
well engender the conception of the speaker being carried by the force of evidence
along a deductive path”. The notion of potency is thus interpreted at the mental
level as the force of evidence which leads the speaker to the most likely conclusion.
(7) <hit text=”KB7” n=”755”> She was screaming and you could hear her
crying. Then you hear, she pounded up the bloody stairs and he was after
her and I reckon well the only room with a lock As you say is the bathroom.
is the bathroom, so she <kw>must</kw> have been in there cos he’s
hammering on the door and bashing it and kicking it. Bloody hell of a row.
Or whether she opened it or whether she was in the front bedroom with
something behind the door I dunno but </hit> (BNC-Baby)
In Romance languages evidential values may also be realized through the TAM
systems (Dendale and Tasmowski 2001; Squartini 2008). In Spanish, epistemic
and indirect inferential values are often found in some uses of the future simple,
the conditional and the future perfect, while the reportative value is characteristi-
cally found with the conditional perfect (the case of perspective-switching with the
past imperfective to express free indirect speech is beyond the scope of this paper,
cf. Saussure and Morency 2012). As Cruschina and Remberger (2008:98–99) note:
The conditional as well as the other Romance evidential strategies resorting to
tense and modal specifications of the verbal system typically convey epistemic
values, in particular uncertainty and non-responsibility for the information ex-
pressed. The interpretation associated with the non-firsthand source of informa-
tion, therefore, must be considered a “semantic extension” of these forms which
frequently overlaps and coexists with a range of modal notions including prob-
ability, possibility, factuality, subjectivity, and responsibility.
It would seem that temporal distance from the deictic centre of the speech event,
that is from “S’s now and point of epistemic ‘realness’ ”, is mapped onto epistemic
distance (Chilton 2014a:166). As Langacker (1991:246) points out, modals “situate
the process at varying distances from the speaker’s position at immediate known
reality”. The ‘epistemic’ future would thus have the effect of epistemic distancing,
from ‘reality’ to ‘non-reality’. The ‘epistemic’ conditional, involving the feature
irrealis, would result in further epistemic distancing and lesser likelihood of the
process being accepted as real.
The epistemic future, or ‘putative’ future, according to Saussure and Morancy
(2012:209), “represents a future veriﬁcation of a possible state of affairs in the pres-
ent”, which bears a specific relevance to the S’s now “in the sense of inviting a par-
ticular course of action in the expectation of the future certainty of the situation
considered” (Saussure and Morancy 2012:210). They conceive the representation
of this future verification as “an imaginary allocentric point of consciousness in
the future, from which the truth of the eventuality can be veriﬁed and therefore
assessed as a fact” (Saussure and Morancy 2012:210). For Chilton (2014b:256) this
future point of view does not necessarily involve a different individual from that of
S, but rather it may be considered ‘allocentric’ in the sense that “this other point of
view is that of a cognitive avatar of S, S' ”. This interpretation would be consistent
with contexts “in which it is pragmatically manifest that the speaker herself will be
in a position to verify, in the future, a current situation” (Chilton 2014b:256). This
feature of potential verification may be a factor in paving the way for evidential
inferential values of the epistemic future, which appear to be restricted to contexts
involving some inferential calculation about a present eventuality (as in the well-
known example: [doorbell rings] That’ll be the postman.) (Saussure 2014).
The future perfect with a ‘putative’ reading still involves “verification in the
future relative to S”, but the location of the event is “in the past relative to S, i.e. at
some ti < t0” (Chilton 2014a:155). As Chilton (2014b:256) notes, “Just as ‘regular
future’ tense can, in the putative construction, refer to S’s present time, so ‘regular
future perfect’ tense forms can refer to eventualities in S’s past time”. Saussure and
Morancy (2012:216) observe that with the ‘epistemic’ future perfect “the Speaker
expresses an explanation inferred from a resultant state, true at the time of speech,
but triggered by an eventuality understood as occurring in the past”. It would thus
appear that non-immediacy with respect to the ground, potential verification and
inference play a crucial role in facilitating the extension from future perfect to
epistemic and to evidential indirect-inferential values. These extensions are not
random since they are attested in systems with grammatical evidentiality, as well as
in systems lacking a fully grammaticalized system of evidentiality such as Spanish
and other Romance languages.
(8) Y, por otra parte, está también al frente de toda la organización comercial
para la venta del cava cata español allí. Así que ustedes, que habrán <IIE>
incorporado muy probablemente todas las técnicas más sofisticadas de de
elaboración y de comercialización, etcétera, tendrán <IIE> también un hueco
bastante notable para el amor al producto, porque si lo vienen elaborando en
casa, en familia, de toda la vida, será <IIE> algo más que un producto que se
pone a la venta, ¿no?
‘And, on the other hand, you are also running all the commercial
organisation for the sales of Spanish cava-wine tasting there. So you, who
will have (habrán: fut.PERF.2PL.HON) very probably incorporated all the
most sophisticated techniques of of elaboration and of commercialisation,
etc., will (tendrán: have.fut.2pl.hon) also have considerable space for love
for the product, because if you have been elaborating it in your home firm,
in the family, all your lives, it will/must be (será: be.FUT.3SG) more than a
product one puts on the market, right?’
With respect to the use of the conditional and conditional perfect with an indi-
rect-reportative value, we find an increasing use of the latter in spoken Spanish,
especially in the context of journalistic discourse, in news reports on the radio or
on TV, as is attested in the CREA corpus. This reportative use of the conditional
perfect (habría/n) has relatively recently permeated into the written discourse, and
is found in our corpus of written journalistic discourse.
(9) El móvil de la matanza, pues, no fue la presencia de tropas españolas en
Irak decidida por el entonces presidente del Gobierno, José María Aznar, ni
la anterior misión de Afganistán, mantenida por el Ejecutivo de José Luis
Rodríguez Zapatero. Ni tampoco, por supuesto, el 11-M fue resultado de
unas oscuras tramas de policías, servicios secretos o sectores políticos que se
habrían <IRE> aliado para urdir el peor atentado de la historia de España.
Los terroristas, sólo islamistas radicales, querían arrasar nuestra democracia
para poner a nuestro país bajo el yugo de la ley islámica en su interpretación
más radical. (SNA)
‘… Nor, of course, was 11-M the result of shady plots by the police, the
secret services or political factions that would supposedly (habrían: cond.
perf.3pl) have allied to engineer the worst ever terrorist attack in the history
of Spain. …’
This semantic extension of the conditional and conditional perfect to the indirect-
reportative subdomain may be doubly motivated by conceptual distancing from
the ground, both in terms of non-immediacy or distance from known reality and
also in terms of the feature irrealis, in the sense of locating events in the realm of
the unreal, in hypothetical contexts or worlds. These features may be prompting
the extension to indirect-reportative values, which also involves distance from the
speaker, in this case in the shift from S’s now to some other point of view S2, from
personal to non-personal involvement in mediated evidentiality. It is here suggest-
ed that the feature irrealis, presenting the situation as unrealized, also contributes
to distancing the speaker from the situation and diminishes speaker’s responsibility
for the communicated information. As Givon (1989:130) notes, “Under the scope
of the IRR-assertion mode, information is weakly asserted […]. The source of the
information is thus largely irrelevant, since the speaker does not intend to defend
the information too vigorously against challenge”. Weakly justified information
shares the feature low or lack of subjective responsibility with mediated evidence,
where justification and responsibility is attributed to an external voice. Thus, in
heteroglossic discourse, these markers provide an excellent resource for the jour-
nalist to introduce the perspective of text external voices, without overtly attribut-
ing information to a specific ‘secondary voice’ or quoted source (cf. White 2012;
Marín Arrese in press).
2.4 Multifunctionality of evidential expressions
Boye (2012:137ff) observes that within the semantic map of epistemicity, which
comprises the conceptual domains of evidentiality and epistemic modality, there
are a number of expressions that are synchronically polyfunctional, and also oth-
ers undergoing diachronic movement, with respect to specific subspaces or no-
tional regions in these domains. On the basis of evidence from a sample of 50
languages of a different genetic affiliation, Boye (2012) posits the existence of cer-
tain bidirectional connecting links between those spaces, such as the following: (i)
direct justification – indirect justification (evidentiality); (ii) full support – partial
support (epistemic modality) and; (iii) partial support – neutral support (epis-
temic modality). Cross-domain connecting lines between semantic spaces within
the domain of evidentiality, as well as within the domain of epistemic modality are
also found: (iv) direct justification (evidentiality) – full support (epistemic mo-
dality); and (v) indirect justification (evidentiality) – partial support (epistemic
modality).
The link between direct justification and indirect justification (i) is evinced in
both English and Spanish in the case of predicates of visual perception (see, ver),
which may undergo extensions into the domain of indirect inferential evidence,
especially in the impersonal forms.
(10) The first is simply a return to the normal sovereignty of the nation states.
That is the default setting for Europe, as one can see <IIE> from the
condition of the single currency. If the euro fails, most of the eurozone
nations will withdraw; they will return to their original independence and
their original currencies, though … (EOT)
(11) Ese mismo sustrato de insensibilidad hace que el PSOE incumpla
descaradamente una promesa electoral sin que pase nada. Porque se
comprometieron a elaborar una ley marco de protección animal, pero el
Gobierno acaba de declarar que no la hará y que las competencias son de las
autonomías (se han presentado 1.300.000 firmas en pro de la ley, pero se ve
<IIE> que les importa un pito). (SOP)
‘That same substrate of insensibility allows the PSOE to blatantly fail
to keep an electoral promise without any consequences. Because they
promised to pass a bill on the protection of animals, but the Government
has just declared that it will not do so and that the competency belongs
to the autonomous governments (1,300,000 signatures in favour of the
law have been presented, but it seems (se ve: see.3SG.IMP) that they don’t
give a damn).’
Within the domain of epistemic modality, a connecting link (ii) is found between
full support or certainty meaning and partial support or probability, reflected for
example in the diachronic movement of French ‘sans doute’, which has now come
to express a form of mitigated full support. This process of devaluation, as Boye
(2012:141) notes, is often motivated by the fact that “overt markers of full support
tend to devalue because they are often redundant (cf. e.g. Lyons 1977:808–809)”. A
similar devaluation is found in some uses of ‘no doubt’ in English, in comparison
to the expression ‘there is no doubt’. Boye (2012:144–145) illustrates the additional
link (iii) found between partial support and neutral support or epistemic possibil-
ity, with examples from various languages, including ‘dubitatives’ like the Basque
particle ‘ote’, typically glossed as a dubitative or interrogative.
Multifunctional expressions covering direct justification and full support
or epistemic certainty (iv) are attested, for example, in some Polynesian and
Australian languages, where a single perception verb covers the meanings of ‘to
see’ and ‘to know’ (Viberg 1983) (cf. Boye 2012:146–147). Synchronically poly-
functional expressions can be found which provide evidence for the link between
indirect justification and partial support (v), such as the West Greenlandic suffix
-gunar (Boye 2012:149). Examples of diachronic movement to indirect justifica-
tion from partial support are also found, typically in the case of modal expressions,
such as English must or Spanish ‘deber (de)’. This evidential extension, as Boye
(2012:153) notes, is “not entirely uncontroversial”, since it would imply a prior
epistemic modal extension where “non-epistemic necessity extends into partial,
rather than full support”. As Boye (2012:154) observes, epistemic modal exten-
sions evolve from non-epistemic modals of comparable intensity: “expressions
of non-epistemic possibility (ability, permission) evolve extensions of epistemic
possibility; expressions of non-epistemic necessity (compulsion, strong intention,
obligation) evolve extensions of epistemic necessity”. Thus we would have a pri-
or extension from non-epistemic necessity to full support (epistemic necessity),
which leads us to posit the alternative hypothesis of an additional connecting line
between full support and indirect justification. (Boye 2012:157) argues that “the
path from full support to indirect justification – is not independently attested”, and
concludes that “it might turn out after a detailed analysis that only strong partial
support, as opposed to weak partial support, is linked to indirect justification”
(Boye 2012:158).
However, an interesting example of what constitutes an extension from full
support to indirect justification is found in Spanish, in the extension of the verb
‘conocer’ (know), from a value of full support to that of indirect justification in the
case of the indirect-inferential expression ‘se conoce’. This would seem to provide
evidence of a possible additional connecting line between full support and indi-
rect justification, unless we posit an intermediate stage of weakening from full to
strong partial support (conozco > se conoce), motivated by impersonalisation and
thus a corresponding decrease in subjective responsibility, prior to the extension
to indirect justification.
(12) A lo mejor se dejarían un grifo abierto o algo. No no no de de de te de la
terraza, que se conoce <IIE> que no la han puesto bien o no la han hecho bien
y yo qué sé, y caía goteras, y gracias puede dar gracias de que como ese piso lo
ha cogido otra vez Iviasa … (CREA-O)
‘Maybe they’d left a tap open or something. No no no in in the in the terrace,
that apparently (se conoce: know.3SG.IMP) they haven’t fixed it properly …
or they haven’t done it properly and who knows, and there was a leak,…’
Inter-subspace extensions are also attested in English and Spanish within the sub-
domain of Indirect evidentiality, typically from indirect-inferential values to the
indirect-reportative. The opposite directionality in the extension is also found,
from the indirect-reportative expression ‘se dice’ (it is said) to an indirect-inferen-
tial value in the expression ‘se diría’ (one would say), involving the feature irrealis,
as noted above in the use of the conditional form of the verb.
(13) El Gobierno presenta en el Palacio Real de Nápoles su prometida vuelta de
tuerca, un conjunto durísimo de medidas. En un 80%, se dedican a restringir
la entrada, la libre circulación y los derechos de los ciudadanos extranjeros que
residen en el país. Se diría <IIE> que la mayoría de las medidas, más que para
garantizar la seguridad, han sido diseñadas para expulsar de forma inmediata
a rumanos y gitanos. (SNP)
‘… It would seem (se diría: say.3SG.IMP.COND) that the majority of the
measures, rather than serving to guarantee security, have been designed to
expel the Rumanians and the gypsies immediately.’
This paper focuses on inter-subspace extensions within indirect justification,

that is, on multifunctional expressions involving the indirect-inferential and
indirect-reportative values. Examples of multifunctionality in our comparable

corpora are observed for a set of expressions in the two languages within the sub-
domain of indirect justification or indirect evidence. Both indirect inferential and
indirect reportative functions are found only for the following translation equiva-
lent expressions (see Appendix Tables 5 and 6):
(a) English: appear, seem, apparently;
(b) Spanish: parece, aparentemente, al parecer.
The verbs appear and seem or parecer are more frequently attested with an indirect-
inferential meaning (see Tables 2 and 3), though some instances are found with
an indirect reportative meaning. This phenomenon is common to other Germanic
and Romance languages, as Wiemer (2010:105) notes, who makes the point that
the 3SG form of the present indicative of “SEEM-verbs highlights a reportive func-
tion only when it loses its dependency relations with a host sentence, i.e., when it
becomes petrified as a particle viz. parenthetical”. However, as the following ex-
amples show, SEEM-verbs in both languages in our written corpus are regularly
found which do not comply with the above-stated condition but which neverthe-
less have a reportative value.
(14) David Kelly did not live or belong in this world. He was a quiet, intensely
focused microbiologist who had become an internationally respected expert
in biological warfare, travelling frequently to Iraq as part of the UN weapons
inspection programme. It appears <IRE> that, on an infrequent basis, he
gave journalists private briefings, but in all other respects he lived a life as far
removed as imaginable from the Westminster game. (ELG)
(15) There is some suspicion that things went wrong even before the landing
at the South Pole itself: the two probes, Scott and Amundsen, designed to
detach themselves, hurtle to the ground at 400 miles an hour and look for ice
beneath the surface, went out of the tent and have been away for some time
without any further word. It now seems <IRE> that not everything was fully
tested before the mission started. But this is surely what comes of cutting
costs. (ELT)
Spanish ‘parecer’ shows an interesting parallelism with English ‘seem’ in its ex-
tensions of meaning, from the indirect-inferential (perceptual-based, conceptual-
based, report-based), to the indirect-reportative meaning. In its indirect-inferen-
tial value, we may find both 3SG and 3PL forms indicating subject verb agreement
in the raising construction with the infinitive. However, with the reportative func-
tion, only the ‘petrified’ 3SG form or the parenthetical ‘según parece’ is found, in
accordance with Wiemer’s (2010) observation.
(16) Evidentemente, que los demás procesados suelen también descargar, o

descargan su responsabilidad, fundamentalmente el señor De la Rosa, porque
parece <IRE> que ha sido el principal beneficiario de de este de estos de
este trasvase del dinero del consorcio a cuentas corrientes de particulares.
(CREA-O)
‘…, because it seems (parece: seem.3SG.PRES) that he was the main
beneficiary of of this of these of this transfer of the money from the
consortium to the private current accounts.’
(17) Debo decir que las dos primeras veces que estuve allí no tuve en absoluto la
menor información de que existiera tal persecución, aunque, según parece
<IRE>, existía ya por lo menos de una forma solapada y más o menos
insidiosa. (CREA-O)
‘I must say that the first two times I was there I did not have the slightest
information that there was such a persecution, though, apparently (según
parece: as seem.3SG.PRES), it already existed at least in an underhand and
more or less insidious way.’
In the case of adverbial expressions, English apparently shows a relatively simi-

lar proportion of both inferential and reportative uses. However, in Spanish there
seems to be a division of labour between aparentemente and al parecer. Though
both indirect-inferential and indirect-reportative meanings are found for these
expressions, aparentemente tends to appear with an inferential meaning, whereas
al parecer is more common with the reportative meaning.
(18) According to intelligence briefings, his was the hand that cut Pearl’s throat, a
murder for which the British-born militant Omar Saeed Sheikh has already
been sentenced to death in Pakistan. The story of Sheikh’s “arrest” was also
clouded with inconsistencies. He had been involved in a string of terrorist
acts and had served time in an Indian jail. He was released in a hostage swap,
returned to Pakistan and apparently <IRE> continued his activities without
undue interference from Pakistani intelligence. (EOG)
(19) En Torrejón de Ardoz, cuando se ha hecho el censo, salen todas las cifras mal.
Y todo el que lo está haciendo lo sabe. ¿Por qué? Porque hay grupos fuertes
de polacos que están aparentemente <IRE> venidos a través de Cruz Roja,
problemas de refugiados, etcétera, que están viviendo cuarenta y la madre en
un piso y, cuando llega el investigador social o lo que sea, aquello desaparece,
allí nada más hay dos personas. (CREA)
‘ … Why? Because there are powerful groups of Poles who have apparently
come through the Red Cross, refugee problems, etc, who are all living
together in a flat and, …’
(20) Aunque muchos de los casos aún no han sido diagnosticados como legionelosis,
el brote, al parecer <IRE> originado en el centro de la ciudad, puede <EM>
haber afectado a más de cien personas. (SLA)
‘Though many of the cases have still not been diagnosed as legionnaire’s
disease, the outbreak, apparently originating in the city centre, may have
affected more than a hundred people.’
It is interesting to note that out of a total of 25 evidential expressions analysed for

English, and 27 for Spanish, only this restricted number of expressions were found
to exhibit both indirect-inferential and reportative values. Sanders and Spooren
(1996:258) observe that ‘nonsubjective modifiers’ (evidentials), which are typi-
cally associated with perceptual-based evidence such as these expressions, pre-
suppose “intersubjective, manifest evidence, observable by more persons than the
speaker”. As Langacker (2009:286) notes, these impersonal predicates “defocus the
mental activity of any particular conceptualizer”, by construing the conceptualizer
(C) generically or as only potential. He further makes the point that “evoking the
conceptualizer in generalized fashion, abstracting away from any particular indi-
vidual, gives C the status of a virtual entity”. Since these expressions present the
communicated information as part of the epistemic dominion of some virtual or
generalized conceptualizer, and ‘potentially’ accessible to the interlocutor or audi-
ence, the responsibility for the evidence is opaque, and tacitly shared with others
(Marín Arrese 2011, 2015a). It is here suggested that the feature intersubjectivity
and the construal of the conceptualizer as generalized or virtual paves the way for
the extension to reportative values, and specifically to core cases of reportative
evidentiality where the perspective of the ‘original voice’ is completely defocused,
and the external source is unspecified (Marín Arrese 2017).
2.5 Evidential functional values and constructions with ‘seem/appear’ and

‘parecer’
One of the issues explored in this paper is the degree to which certain evidential
functions may be associated with particular evidential constructions. Lampert
(2011:13–14) has argued against this hypothesis in the following terms:
In contradistinction to what the hegemonic constructional accounts claim, I hold
that none of the constructions mentioned above will yield any significant bias to-
ward one specific evidential reading. If evidence is given for the stated proposition
modified by seem at all – and this is very often not the case – it is usually found
in the wider context, not in the immediate environment of the seem-construc-
tion itself. And, likewise, the degree of certainty that may be associated with any
proposition that is modified by seem is entirely context dependent and cannot be
predicted from the construction type alone.
A series of constructional variants of English seem are commonly distinguished

in the literature (De Haan 2007; Gisborne and Holmes 2007; Lampert 2011), but
since our focus is on those variants which bear indirect evidential values, we will
disregard constructions such as the copular use of seem + adjectival predicative
complement (she seems tired), or the variants found with an explicit experiencer
(seems to me), which is a subjectified form more akin to an attitudinal marker of
stance, a cognitive attitude or belief-type of expression. Nuyts (2005) uses the term
‘subjectifier’ and considers that they do not belong within the functional category
of evidentiality.
A number of constructions have thus been factored out of the data examined.
For our case study, we have focused on the following constructions for ‘seem’ and
for ‘appear’:
a. SEEM1: Raising construction, seem + INF.
b. SEEM2: Unraised construction with an expletive subject, it seems + that.COMP.
c. SEEM3: Minor ‘comparison’ construction, seem like/as if/as though
d. SEEM4: Parenthetical seem.
e. APPEAR1: appears + INF.
f. APPEAR2: it appears + that.COMP.
g. APPEAR3: appears like/as if/as though
h. APPEAR4: Parenthetical appear
(21) Instead of tinkering around the edges with the New Deal, community
partnerships and affirmative action, they have finally embraced a bold
initiative: water cannon and teargas. Twenty years to the month after
Brixton, Handsworth and Toxteth went up in flames, it appears <IIE> as
though nothing has been learnt. (EOG)
Similar construction types have been found for ‘parecer’. Spanish ‘parece’ is a petri-
fied 3SG form of the present indicative found in all the evidential constructions:
a. PARECER1: Raising construction, parece + INF
b. PARECER2: Unraised construction, parece + que.COMP.
c. PARECER3: Minor ‘comparison’ constructions, parece + como si/que
d. PARECER4: Parenthetical, según parece, a lo que parece
e. PARECER5: Raising construction, parece + ser.INF + que.COMP
In general terms, the parenthetical construction in both languages is the most like-
ly candidate for the extension from indirect-inferential to reportative evidentiality.
The parenthetical particle ‘según parece’ would be an instance where the meaning
has become practically restricted to the reportative value. In addition, Spanish has
a construction (PARECER5) which appears to be specialized for the reportative

function.
(22) Yo últimamente oigo hablar mucho de la metadona. Parece ser <IRE> que
es un sintético opiáceo o parecido, o algo así. Y se dice que, bueno, a través
del tratamiento con metadona lo que se está produciendo, en definitiva, es
una especie de mercado negro, porque ustedes tienen un fácil acceso a a una
sobredosis… (CREA)
‘Lately I have heard a lot of talk about methadone. It seems (parece ser:
seem.3SG.PRES be.INF) that it is a synthetic opiate or similar, or something
like that. And they say that, well, through the treatment with methadone
what is taking place, in fact, is a type of black market, because you all have
easy access to to an overdose …’
In the case studies we will try to discern the degree to which there is a significant
tendency for each of these constructions toward a specific evidential value, and also
the extent to which we find multifunctionality associated with construction type.
3. The case studies
3.1 The texts
The paper presents two case studies which focus on the use of expressions of evi-
dentiality in written journalistic discourse and in unscripted oral discourse. The
data consists of naturally occurring examples of evidential expressions for the val-
ues IIE and IRE, randomly selected from the following corpora:
(i) Case study 1:
Corpus of English and Spanish Journalistic Discourse (CESJD-JMA), 2000–
2010, a comparable corpus of journalistic texts (opinion columns, leading
articles, and news reports) in the two languages (English: 342,197 words;
Spanish: 334,294 words).
(ii) Case study 2:
(a) Oral: BNC-Baby-Unscripted conversation (English); and
(b) Corpus de Referencia del Español Actual (CREA) (Subcorpus Oral-Spain)
3.2 Case studies: Research questions and hypothesis
This paper addresses the following research issues in each of the case studies:
Case Study 1: Evidentiality and multifunctionality in journalistic discourse
(a) Genre-related or language-related distinctions in the pattern of prefer-

ences for the various resources and values of evidentiality;
(b) Similarities or differences in the multifunctionality of evidential expres-
sions in the two languages;
Case study 1 is an exploratory study on the presence and patterning of multifunc-
tional expressions in the two languages within the discourse domain of journalis-
tic writing. Regarding multifunctionality, it is assumed that the written medium
is more stable and reliable and more likely to capture those extensions of eviden-
tial expressions that have become or are on their way to becoming synchronically
polyfunctional.
Case Study 2: Evidentiality, constructions and multifunctionality in journalistic
discourse and in unscripted oral discourse.
(c) Degree to which certain evidential values are associated with particular
constructions in the two discourse domains in both languages.
It is hypothesized that there will be variation across discourse domains and genres
in the values of evidentiality, due to the distinct features of oral vs. written com-
municative events, and variation across goals and roles of writers of editorials,
opinion columns, and news reports. Variation will also be found across languages
due to characteristic differences of discourse practices in argumentative and per-
suasive style across these languages and cultures.
3.3 Research objectives and procedure
The focus in this paper is on those expressions which are judged to be more pro-
totypical for each domain (introspective, top-down) and quantitatively more rel-
evant in the texts (text-driven, bottom-up). The expressions selected for both lan-
guages are listed here under the evidential values they have occurred in our data
(see Appendix, Tables 5 & 6):
(a) Evidentiality (IIE): Indirect-Inferential value, which includes perceptual-
based, conceptual-based and report-based values.
– (English) seem, appear, look, tell, see, clearly, obviously, evidently, plainly,
apparently, seemingly, visibly, on the face of it;
– (Spanish) parece, da la impresión, se ve, se conoce, se diría, se aprecia, se
observa, claramente, obviamente, evidentemente, aparentemente, visto lo
visto.
(b) Evidentiality (IRE): Indirect-Reportative, where no internal mental process-
ing or inference is involved, but rather the communicated information is ac-
cessed through external means, another person or source of information.
– (English) according to x, is said, are told, alleged, argued, claimed, seem,

appear, is believed, is supposed, is thought, apparently, allegedly, avowedly,
reportedly, plausibly, supposedly;
– (Spanish) según x, se dice, se afirma, se sostiene, se asegura, se cree, se pi-
ensa, se supone, (según) dicen, según parece, parece ser, habría/n, al parecer,
aparentemente, supuestamente, por lo visto.
4.1 Case Study 1: Results in genres of Journalistic Discourse
Studies of genres and text types (Bhatia 2004) have posited that genres, as goal-
oriented and situation-based groupings of texts, characteristically exhibit certain
linguistic features. Hidalgo-Downing (this volume) shows the existence of disci-
pline specific features of evidential and epistemic strategies in relation to expert
and non-expert scientific genres, where results in science popularization point to
a tendency to rely on indirect evidentiality, inference and report, since the authors
cannot claim first-hand knowledge of the subject matter. The use of epistemic
stance resources as discourse-pragmatic strategies in the way they index inter-
actional identity, and specific stancetaking patterns as identities, (Bucholtz and
Hall 2005; Johnstone 2007; Marín Arrese 2011, 2013, 2015a), as well as how they
contribute to shape social interaction in discursive communities (Nuckolls and
Michael 2014) has been discussed in the literature.
Within the domain of journalistic discourse, the aim of news reports is purport-
edly the presentation of ‘facts’ and representation of events, as opposed to journal-
istic commentary, which deals with ‘opinions’ and assessments of those facts and
events. The category ‘comment’ includes opinion material of various types, chief
among them are opinion columns, which specify the identity of the columnist, and
leading articles or editorials, which represent as “the paper’s voice speaking direct
to its readers” (Verstergaard 2000:155). The portrayal of news values and the lack
of objectivity in the representation of actors and events in the news have received
a great deal of attention in critical discourse studies (Richardson 2007). The pre-
sumed impartiality of news reports in ‘quality’ journalism, as White (2012:57–58)
notes, constitutes a “regime of strategic impersonalisation by which the journal-
ist’s evaluative role is backgrounded and that of the quoted source foregrounded”.
We would thus expect more presence of the viewpoints and assessments attributed
to external voices through indirect-reportative evidentials in news reports, and a
greater presence of the internal authorial voice expressed through inferential evi-
dentials in journalistic commentary (see also Besnard, this volume).
The results in Table 1 show that the figures for evidential values, indirect-infer-
ential (IIE) and indirect-reportative (IRE) in the three journalistic genres are very
consistent across the two languages. There is a clear correlation between the genres
of opinion columns and leading articles and the use of evidential expressions with
IIE values. In journalistic commentary, the expression of the author’s epistemic
justification based on internal cognitive processes is the most likely choice. Also
congruent with the type of journalistic genre is the correlation between news re-
ports and the preference for indirect reportative values of evidential expressions,
involving non-personal, external mediated forms of access to the information.
Table 1. Journalistic discourse genres (written): IIE & IRE values (raw numbers and
frequency per 1,000 words)
Genres Opinion Leading News Total
110,674 111,084 120,439 342,197
English N R N R N R N R
IIE 95 0.86 86 0.77 42 0.35 223 0.65
IRE 57 0.52 32 0.29 139 1.15 228 0.67
Total 152 1.37 118 1.06 181 1.50 451 1.32
Genres Opinion Leading News Total
105,823 107,566 120,905 334,294
Spanish N R N R N R N R
IIE 79 0.75 82 0.76 33 0.27 194 0.58
IRE 38 0.36 29 0.27 141 1.17 208 0.62
Total 117 1.11 111 1.03 174 1.45 402 1.20
Figure 1 illustrates the parallelism between the results in each genre in the two
languages. The diagram also shows the slightly higher occurrence of indirect infer-
ential markers in English. Also interesting to note is the higher use of reportative
markers in opinion columns in comparison to editorials, which is congruent with
the greater focus on the editorial voice of the newspaper, thus allowing less space
for text external voices. Editorials combine a certain backgroundedness or implic-
itness of the authorial voice with a lack of viewpoints and assessments attributed
to external voices.
120
100
OP-ENG
80 OP-SPA LD-ENG LD-SPA
60
40
N-ENG
N-SPA
20
0
IIE IRE
Figure 1. Journalistic discourse genres (written): IIE & IRE values in Opinion columns,
Leading articles and News reports (English-Spanish) (frequency per 1,000 words)
4.2 Multifunctionality and constructions with ‘seem’ and ‘parecer’
Instances of multifunctionality involving indirect-inferential and reportative

values in our English corpora are restricted to the adverbial ‘apparently’, and the
predicates ‘seem’ and ‘appear’. For Spanish we find the adverbs ‘aparentemente’
and ‘al parecer’ and the predicate ‘parecer’ (see Appendix, Tables 5 and 6). Table 2
shows results for evidential adverbials in the two languages.
Table 2. Journalistic Discourse vs. Unscripted Oral: English & Spanish adverbials
Adverbial Markers Journalistic (CESJD) BNC-Baby
English IIE IRE Total IIE IRE Total
apparently 9 16 25 8 81 89
36% 64% 100% 8.9% 91% 100%
Journalistic (CESJD) CREA
Spanish IIE IRE Total IIE IRE Total
aparentemente 7 2 9 15 6 21
77.7% 22.2% 100% 71.4% 28.6% 100%
al parecer 2 4 6 3 67 70
33.3% 66.6% 100% 4.3% 95.7% 100%
The frequencies for unscripted oral conversation seem to indicate that the reporta-
tive value for English ‘apparently’ is on the increase in comparison to the written
discourse. This, together with the marginal uses of the indirect-inferential value,
might indicate a more stable shift towards the reportative subspace. In Spanish, we
find an apparent division of labour between the two evidential adverbs exhibit-
ing multifunctionality: ‘aparentemente’ tends to appear with an inferential value,
whereas ‘al parecer’ is becoming specialised for the reportative value, showing the
same type of shift as English ‘apparently’.
One of the issues discussed in this paper is the degree to which certain eviden-
tial values are associated with particular constructions, a hypothesis that Lampert
(2011) has argued against. Table 3 shows results for English ‘appear’ and ‘seem’,
where we find that these predicates have a relatively stable indirect-inferential
value, with some marginal instances which have developed an indirect reportative
meaning. The highest frequencies for both predicates are found in the infinitive
construction. The limited number of tokens for the seem and the appear that-con-
structions found in our corpora does not allow us to reach any definite conclusion
regarding the correlation between evidential values of these predicates and con-
structional types. Nonetheless, there does appear to be a certain preference for the
reportative value in the use of the ‘appear that-construction’.3
Table 3. Journalistic Discourse vs. Unscripted Oral: English

English Journalistic (CESJD) BNC-Baby
Markers IIE IRE Total IIE IRE Total
seem +  INF 43 1 44 87 2 89
seem +  THAT 8 1 9 2 0 2
seem + LIKE/AS IF/TH 1 0 1 1 0 1
seem (PRTH) 11 0 11 1 0 1
Other 21 0 21 – – –
Total SEEM 84 2 86 91 2 93
appear + INF 35 4 39 6 0 6
appear + THAT 2 4 6 0 1 1
appear + AS IF/TH 1 0 1 0 0 0
appear (PRTH) 1 1 2 0 0 0
Other 6 0 6 – – –
Total APPEAR 45 9 54 6 1 7
In the results for Spanish in Table 4, we also find that the various constructions
with parecer (‘parecer + infinitive’, ‘parecer + que’ construction, parenthetical
3. A sample of tokens of the ‘appear that-construction’ taken from the WebCorp, and restricting
the selected tokens from a variety of discourses and genres in UK English, confirms this appar-
ent tendency towards an increase in reportative values.
expressions with ‘parece’, etc.) tend to correlate with the indirect-inferential

value. However, there is also a distinct construction, ‘parece + ser.INF + que’ (it
seems + to be + that), and the parenthetical ‘parece + ser.INF’ (it seems + to be),
which typically correlates with the reportative value. It is also interesting to note
that in the oral corpus CREA we find a considerable number of tokens of the ‘pa-
rece + que’ construction with a reportative value, where we can perceive a similar-
ity with English ‘appear + that’.
Table 4. Journalistic Discourse vs. Unscripted Oral: Spanish

Spanish Journalistic (CESJD) CREA
Markers IIE IRE Total IIE IRE Total
parece + inf 68 2 70 9 4 13
parece + que 30 1 31 81 22 103
parece + como si 1 0 1 4 0 0
parece.exp (prth) 3 0 3 3 0 3
según parece (prth) 0 2 2 0 1 1
parece ser + que 0 0 0 2 22 24
parece ser (prth) 0 0 0 0 4 4
Other 34 0 34 – – –
Total parecer 136 5 141 99 53 148
It would appear that in Spanish, there is also a division of labour in the case of con-
structions with parecer, where both ‘parece + inf’ and ‘parece + que’ are the pre-
ferred choice for inferential values, whereas ‘parecer ser que’ and the parenthetical
‘parecer ser’ are practically restricted to reportative values. These results seem to
point to significant correlations in Spanish in the PARECER constructions, con-
tra Lampert (2011). A word of caution is, however, in order to the effect that our
conclusions are perforce tentative, since we would need to expand the sample of
tokens and extend the analysis to other discourse domains and genres.
5. Conclusion
This paper has explored the presence and distribution of evidential expressions
in three genres of journalistic discourse in English and Spanish, using a compa-
rable corpus of leading articles, opinion columns and news reports from four qual-
ity newspapers. Case study 1 has revealed a significant correlation in the use of
indirect-inferential evidential expressions in the genres of opinion columns and
leading articles, and the correlation between news reports and the preference
for indirect reportative evidentials in both languages, which is coherent with the
dominant discourse type in these genres, persuasive vs. expository discourse.
The study has also revealed the presence of multifunctionality of a limited set of
evidential expressions in the two languages, involving indirect inferential and
reportative values.
An additional case study was carried out to explore the incidence of multi-
functionality of these expressions in the oral corpora, BNC-Baby unscripted con-
versation and the oral-Spain subcorpus of CREA, since the oral language is the
natural site for innovation and semantic extension. Multifunctionality in English
appears to be more restricted, with the evidential marker ‘seem’ in ‘seem + inf’
constructions as the dominant inferential choice, and a certain sensitivity to con-
struction type in ‘appear + inf’ vs. ‘appear + that’, the latter showing a growing
tendency to convey reportative values. Spanish shows a more complex and varied
system of multifunctionality, with two adverbial expressions, ‘aparentemente’ and
‘al parecer’ respectively specialising in inferential and reportative values, and the
predicate ‘parecer’, with one construction significantly associated with inferential
values, ‘parece + inf’, and the construction ‘parece ser + que’ with reportative val-
ues. The construction ‘parece + que’ seems to be undergoing a similar process to
‘appear + that’. Overall, the Spanish system seems to be more sensitive to the cor-
relation between construction type and evidential value.
Acknowledgements
Research for this paper was carried out within the framework of the project ‘The expression
of Evidentiality and Modality in English and other European Languages: Cross-linguistic per-
spectives’ (EUROEVIDMOD), (FFI2011–23181), funded by the Ministerio de Economía y
Competitividad (MINECO), Spain.
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Appendix
Table 5. List of evidential expressions in the CESJD corpus (English): IIE vs. IRE values
EVID Markers Opinion Leading News Total
110,674 111,084 120,439 342,197
English IIE IRE IIE IRE IIE IRE IIE IRE
clearly 16 0 15 0 6 0 37 0
evidently 3 0 2 0 0 0 5 0
see 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 0
look 6 0 9 0 5 0 20 0
obviously 7 0 2 0 2 0 11 0
seemingly 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
plainly 3 0 2 0 0 0 5 0
visibly 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
seem 41 1 29 1 14 0 84 2
appear 9 1 24 3 12 5 45 9
apparently 3 7 3 1 3 8 9 16
believed 0 1 0 0 0 21 0 22
thought 0 0 0 0 0 15 0 15
supposed 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
supposedly 0 5 0 2 0 2 0 9
allegedly 0 4 0 0 0 3 0 7
purportedly 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
reportedly 0 1 0 4 0 7 0 12
alleged 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 5
argued 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
claimed 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
reported 0 0 0 1 0 10 0 11
said 0 9 0 6 0 18 0 33
tell/told 2 6 0 2 0 2 2 10
according to 0 21 0 10 0 42 0 73
TOTAL 95 57 86 32 42 139 223 228
Table 6. List of evidential expressions in the CESJD corpus (Spanish): IIE vs. IRE values
EVID Markers Opinion Leading News Total
105,823 107,566 120,905 334,294
Spanish IIE IRE IIE IRE IIE IRE IIE IRE
claramente 1 0 2 0 3 0 6 0
da la impresión 2 0 5 0 0 0 7 0
evidentemente 3 0 0 0 1 0 4 0
obviamente 1 0 1 0 1 0 3 0
visto lo visto 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
se conoce 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
se diría 2 0 0 0 1 0 3 0
se ve 1 0 1 0 1 0 3 0
se aprecia 1 0 2 0 1 0 4 0
se observa 2 0 0 0 1 0 3 0
habrá/n 6 0 8 0 0 0 14 0
aparentemente 4 0 3 1 0 1 7 2
parece/n 51 0 58 1 24 2 133 3
parece.exp (prth) 2 0 1 0 0 0 3 0
parece ser 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
según parece 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2
al parecer 2 2 0 2 0 0 2 4
por lo visto 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2
habría/n 0 4 0 0 0 13 0 17
se cree 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2
se dice/dicen 0 11 0 0 0 1 0 12
se piensa 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
se supone 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
según X 0 16 0 22 0 112 0 150
supuestamente 0 1 0 2 0 9 0 12
TOTAL 79 38 82 29 33 141 194 208
Chapter 9
Evidential and epistemic stance strategies

in scientific communication
A corpus study of semi-formal and expert
publications
Laura Hidalgo-Downing
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid
The present paper presents the results of a corpus study of evidential and
epistemic strategies as stance markers in two subgenres of scientific discourse,
a sample of semi-formal publications (New Scientist) and one of expert pub-
lications (PubMed). First, an onomasiological approach to evidentiality and
epistemic stance is adopted, following Marín Arrese (2015b). Second, the
evidential and epistemic strategies performed in the context of the two genres
are discussed, following recent research which points to the need to explore
this dimension (Mushin 2012; Nuckolls and Michael 2014). Results show that
within the distinction between direct and indirect markers of evidentiality and
epistemic stance, both samples show a preference for indirect strategies. Within
the four categories of evidentiality and epistemic stance, the semi-formal corpus
shows an overall significant higher frequency of indirect markers than the expert
corpus. These differences reveal communicative discourse-pragmatic strategies
which underlie the discipline specific conventions and interactive motivations in
the two sub-genres.
Keywords: corpus study, evidential and epistemic strategies, scientific discourse,

stance
1. Introduction
The present paper addresses the study of epistemic and evidential stance mark-
ers and their discourse-pragmatic functions in two samples of scientific discourse
(Marín Arrese 2015b; Mushin 2012; Nuckolls and Michael 2014). The study of
variations across scientific genres, in particular specialised, semi-formal and
doi 10.1075/pbns.271.10hid
226 Laura Hidalgo-Downing
popularised publications, has been the object of research for some time now (see,
for example, Myers 1990, 1994; Nerlich et al. 2009; Parkinson, and Adendorff
2004; Teubert 2010; Peacock 2014, 2015; Gotti 2014; Williams 2002). Within this
field of research, there is a clear interest in exploring the relations between linguis-
tic choices and variation across genres. A crucial point is the argument that these
choices reveal, not only different discursive conventions and preferences across
genres, but also more complex discourse-pragmatic strategies which are related
to socio-cultural interactional practices of speech communities and their use of
genres as forms of communication (Mushin 2012; Nuckolls and Michael 2014).
Numerous studies have been produced over the past years on the role of modality
and hedging in scientific discourse (see, for example, Tarantino 2011; Hidalgo-
Downing 2013; Hyland 1998, 2008; Peacock 2014, 2015; Gotti 2014, among oth-
ers). However, the study of the relation between evidentiality and epistemic stance
across scientific genres has not received sufficient attention so far (for an excep-
tion, see Siau 2013). This is surprising, given the importance of how natural phe-
nomena and the results of experiments are reported, discussed and communicated
in various genres. If scientific research pursues the confirmation of hypotheses
on the functioning of natural phenomena, a study of how such hypotheses are
confirmed or refuted by appealing to types of source of knowledge and degrees
of epistemic certainty and commitment is no doubt of interest for scholars and
students of science and of linguistics.
Additionally, previous research suggests that further studies on specific scien-
tific genres are needed in order to explore in greater depth the discursive pattern-
ing of genres and the underlying communicative motivations for such variations
(Tarantino 2011; Peacock 2014, 2015; Gotti 2014). The present paper contributes
to this challenging area of study by exploring the lexical choices and discourse-
pragmatic strategies of evidential and epistemic stance markers in academic ar-
ticles published in the specialised database PubMed, which addresses an expert
audience within biomedical sciences, and in the semi-formal publication New
Scientist, which addresses a more general audience. The study collects the results
of a broader project on the nature and discourse-pragmatic functions of the lexical
and grammatical resources used by writers of different scientific genres to express
their stance towards the topic which is the object of study, namely, ‘apoptosis’, ‘pro-
grammed cell death’ or ‘cell suicide’, and to position themselves towards specific
audiences (see Du Bois’s ‘stance triangle’, 2007).
The phenomenon of cell suicide has increased exponentially since one of the
shared Nobel Prizes in Physiology or Medicine was awarded to Robert Horvitz
in 2002 for the study of this phenomenon (see Horvitz 2003). Apoptosis, or pro-
grammed cell death, was first identified by two teams of scientists working ap-
proximately at the same time in different laboratories (see Kerr, Wyllie and Currie
Chapter 9. Evidential and epistemic stance strategies in scientific communication 227
1972; Lockshin and Beaulaton 1964). The phenomenon has had enormous impli-
cations in the study of the development and functioning of the immune system,
the possible control of diseases such as viral infections, cancer and HIV, and even
ageing, among others. The term ‘apoptosis’ is an opaque metaphor which derives
from the Greek and means ‘the dropping of leaves in autumn’ or ‘the falling off of
petals in flowers’. It describes the process by which cells undergo self-destruction
at crucial moments of development and fighting against disease, among others.
The role of apoptosis has become a crucial area of study in research in biology,
immunology and biomedicine, hence the relevance of the phenomenon within
biomedical sciences.
The main objective of the present paper is to explore the differences and simi-
larities in the choice and expression of evidential and epistemic stance markers
and strategies in articles written by experts who address a specialised audience
and articles written by writers whose aim is to explain the process under study to
a broad audience in semi-formal publications.
The study is data-driven and has the following specific objectives:
(a) To calculate and compare the overall frequency of the selected markers of di-
rect and indirect evidentiality in the two corpora.
(b) To calculate and compare the frequency of the selected markers of sub-types
of indirect evidentiality and epistemic stance in the two corpora.
(c) To discuss the discourse-pragmatic functions of the different choices of evi-
dential and epistemic stance strategies in the two genres of scientific discourse.
Objective (c) has the aim of contributing to current studies in the field by explor-
ing the understudied area of research on evidential and epistemic strategies in
scientific discourse.
2. Theoretical background
The relation between the concepts of evidentiality and epistemic stance is a com-
plex one which has been the object of a long-held debate. In the present section,
a brief overview of the approaches to this relation is provided, together with
a proposal of a framework for the analysis of the data based on Marín Arrese
(2015b, present volume) and on the pragmatics of evidential and epistemic mark-
ers (Mushin 2012; Nuckolls and Michael 2014). Additionally, the relevance of the
study of these categories within scientific discourse is reviewed against the back-
drop of recent publications.
2.1 Evidentiality and epistemic stance
The study of evidentiality and epistemic modality in discourse addresses how

speakers and writers make use of different linguistic resources to express source of
knowledge, commitment to the truth of a proposition and (un)certainty, in order
to justify and legitimise scientific findings and communicate them to specific audi-
ences (Marín Arrese 2015b). While initial studies on evidentiality have focused on
the study of the morphological marking of the source of knowledge in American
Indian languages, more recent approaches to the study of evidentiality have high-
lighted the need to study this concept in languages which, like English, do not have
morphological marking of this category (see Ifantidou 2001; Marín Arrese 2013,
2015a, 2015b). Recent research has pointed out that it is particularly necessary to
go beyond semantic and grammatical classifications in order to focus on the func-
tions of evidential and epistemic stance as discourse-pragmatic strategies in social
interaction (Mushin 2012; Nuckolls and Michael 2014).
One of the key issues in the debate on the semantics of evidentiality and epis-
temic modality is the relationship between the concepts of epistemic modality
and evidentiality. While some scholars have adopted an exclusive approach, that
is, evidentiality and modality as mutually exclusive phenomena, other scholars
have adopted inclusive or even overlapping approaches. Within these frameworks,
the former, or the narrow view of evidentiality, denies its relation with epistemic
modality. Within the latter trend, there are scholars who include modality as a
sub-type of the conceptual domain of evidentiality (Chafe 1986), and, finally,
there are further scholars who include evidentiality and epistemic modality under
umbrella terms such as ‘stance’, ‘evaluation’ and ‘appraisal’ (see Biber et al. 1999;
Marín Arrese 2015a, 2015b; Hunston and Thompson 2000; Martin and White
2005). In the present study, the third approach is followed, namely, an approach to
evidentiality and epistemic modality as complementary resources for the expres-
sion of speaker/writer stance (Biber et al. 1999; Marín Arrese 2013, 2015a, 2015b;
Ifantidou 2001).
The present study argues, first, that the lack of morphological marking of evi-
dentiality in certain languages requires a functional onomasiological approach
to the study of this area of meaning in languages like English (Marín Arrese
2015b:212). Second, that a discourse-pragmatic approach is needed in order to
explore the strategies chosen by different communities of speakers/writers for dif-
ferent communicative purposes in social interaction (Mushin 2012; Nuckolls and
Michael 2014). Indeed, English has an extensive repertoire of lexical resources
which encode the expression of this concept and are used to perform evidential
and epistemic discourse-pragmatic strategies, such as verbs of sensory perception
(see, hear, smell), verbs of inferred perception (seem, appear, look like, sound like),
verbs of cognition (know, think, believe), adverbs (apparently, obviously), adjec-

tives and nouns (apparent, obvious, clear, evident). This semantic domain, on the
one hand, makes reference to the source of knowledge (evidentiality) and, on the
other, to the degree of (un)certainty (epistemic modality) of the experienced or
reported event (Boye 2012; Ifantidou 2001; Marín Arrese 2015b, this volume).
Both of these dimensions contribute to the expression of speaker/writer stance,
namely, the attitude of the speaker/writer towards the source of knowledge, his or
her commitment to the assumed degree of certainty of the proposition and his or
her positioning towards the audience addressed. As such, the expression of stance
is a fundamental strategy in spoken and written social interaction. Marín Arrese
(2015b) describes stance and its relation with epistemic modality and evidentiality
as follows:
Studies on epistemic stance primarily concern the role of beliefs, knowledge and
evidence in the expression of epistemic support or evidentiary justification for
a statement or claim (Boye, 2012). From an interactional perspective, the use of
epistemic stance expressions reflects the stance or positioning of the speaker with
respect to their assertions and their commitment to the validity of the proposition
(…). Stance expressions are also indexical of the speaker’s subjective and inter-
subjective positioning. (Marín Arrese 2015b:210–211)
In Marín Arrese’s approach, epistemic stance is ‘characteristically aimed at the

legitimisation of the assertions, through the expression of speaker/writer’s de-
gree of certainty regarding the realization of the event and/or the reference to the
sources and modes of access to that knowledge’ (2015b:211). Evidentiality and
epistemic modality complement each other within the conceptual domain of epis-
temic stance, as pointed out by Marín Arrese, following authors such as Anderson
(1986) and Boye (2012):
Evidentiality is defined as ‘epistemic justification’, in terms of notions such as
‘source of information’, ‘evidence’ or ‘justification’ (…). Epistemic modality is con-
ceived as ‘epistemic support’ and involves notions such as ‘degree of certainty’ and
‘degree of commitment’. (2015b:211)
Evidentiality makes reference to the source of information, which can be direct,

mainly through sensory perception, or indirect, by means of inferencing and de-
duction based on second-hand perceptual and inferencing claims. In the present
study, I analyse and discuss the expression of markers of evidentiality and epis-
temic stance within the domains of direct evidentiality and indirect evidentiality.
Direct evidentials are those which are based on visual sensory perception, which,
in scientific discourse, express the direct observation or evidential justification of
natural phenomena and of the results of experiments by means of direct percep-
tual sources (see and observe).
With regard to indirect evidentiality and epistemic stance, Marín Arrese

(2015b) provides the following classification, which is adopted in the present study
in order to discuss further differences in the choices of epistemic stance markers
and their corresponding functions in the two samples of scientific discourse:
(a) IIE: Indirect-inferential evidence includes markers which make reference to
‘indirect personal justification’ and ‘conceptual-based inferences’. Examples of
these markers are seem, appear, look, clearly, obviously, evidently, apparently.
(Marín Arrese 2015b:218).
(b) IRE: Indirect-reportative evidence, indicates ‘non-personal, indirect access
to information’ in such a way that no inferencing process takes place on the
part of the conceptualizer. Examples of this type of markers in English are the
following: according to x, said, told, (seem), (appear), (apparently), allegedly,
reportedly, supposedly (Marín Arrese 2015b:219).
(c) EMs: Epistemic modals and epistemic sentence adverbs express the degree of
support of a proposition. Examples in English include epistemic uses of modal
verbs and epistemic stance adverbs: must, may, might, could, certainly, surely,
probably, possibly, perhaps, maybe. (Marín Arrese 2015b:219).
(d) CGA: Verbs of mental state and cognitive attitude express ‘speakers’ beliefs
and knowledge regarding representations’ and include expressions such as I/
we know, I/we think, I/we believe, I/we suppose, it seems to me/us, I would say,
no doubt, presumably. (Marín Arrese 2015b:219).
Although Marín Arrese points out that the markers seem, appear and apparently
may be multifunctional (see Marín Arrese present volume), in the present study,
these lexical items are analysed as markers of Indirect Inferential Evidence, for
reasons of limitations of space.
2.2 Evidential and epistemic stance strategies in scientific discourse
The study of epistemic stance, modality and hedging in professional discourse is a

particularly interesting area of research within studies of academic genres, and has
given rise to numerous publications in recent years (Hyland 1998, 2008; Tarantino
2011; Peacock 2014, 2015; Gotti 2014). The semantic and discourse-pragmatic do-
main of evidentiality, however, has not received sufficient attention so far, in par-
ticular in scientific discourse (biology and biomedicine). Scholars agree that the
main criterion that determines differences across expert and non-expert genres in
scientific discourse is the audience addressed, a contextual factor (Hyland 1998,
2008; Williams 2002; Tarantino 2011; Gotti 2014). Thus, it is acknowledged that
different scientific disciplines make use of generic conventions in order to present
and discuss their research to their target audiences. In a study of academic writing
in twelve different disciplines, Peacock (2014) points out that there is a great dif-
ference in the use of modality within the hard sciences (biology, chemistry, medi-
cine) and other sciences, in particular, the humanities. There is thus a cline in the
use of modal markers across disciplines, with the hard sciences at one end and
the humanities at the other (see also Hyland 2008). The conventions for linguistic
choices are discipline specific, and rely, to a great extent, on the assumptions ex-
pert writers have of the knowledge shared with their target audience and on their
persuasive goals. To this respect, Peacock points out that, in the hard sciences
Authors discuss their methods, results and conclusions in a much more narrative
and descriptive style, normally describing their research steps and their findings
one by one, letting readers work out their claims in this way. It seems that this is
sufficient for readers, who perhaps do not need to be openly told the connections
between arguments and claims. (2014:159)
This observation regarding the relation between writer and reader of scientific dis-
course has crucial implications for the choice of evidential and epistemic stance
strategies across scientific genres. Mushin defines evidential and epistemic strate-
gies as follows:
Evidential strategies are ways of communicating source of information. Such
strategies may also express the status of knowledge deriving from evoking source
of information. Evidential strategies express aspects of a speaker’s epistemological
stance towards the information as, for example, directly experienced or otherwise
(…). They may also convey aspects of a speaker’s epistemic attitude towards infor-
mation as more or less certain, more or less valid. (2012:270)
Thus, Mushin adopts the approach which integrates evidentiality and epistemic
modality and focuses on their role in the expression of stance as a strategy in social
interaction and communication. Additionally, Mushin points out that evidential
strategies may be used by speakers in order to negotiate authority in social inter-
action, in such a way that ‘Not only may the assertion of direct visual experience
be an expression of certainty, it may also be part of a claim to a high degree of
epistemic authority over the information’ (2012:271). It may be argued that expert
writers feel they do not need to make their stance as explicit as in semi-formal and
popularised publications, which suggests that they do not need to express claims
of authority regarding source of knowledge and access to knowledge. It is assumed
that an expert writer has the right to claim authority over scientific knowledge that
is communicated in a publication. However, in non-expert discourse, rights and
claims of authority need to be made explicit by means of various indirect stance
strategies, since the writers do not have direct access to the source of knowledge.
In expert discourse, a lower frequency of evidential and epistemic stance
markers may additionally point at the assumption that expert writers share beliefs
with their target audience, while in semi-formal and popularised publications

the writer expresses his or her stance in order to guide the target audience on a
topic which is not part of the expert background knowledge of the audience. This
fact may be understood in terms of Kamio’s concept of ‘territory of information’
(1997:39). According to Kamio, speakers in a community may be situated on a cline
depending on their knowledge status with regard to a specific territory of informa-
tion. One of the factors which determines closeness on this cline is ‘Information
embodying detailed knowledge which falls into the range of the speaker/hearer’s
professional or other expertise’ (ibid.). This means that expert speakers/readers of
scientific discourse are situated at the end of closeness to accessibility to the terri-
tory of information, while non-expert speakers/readers will be situated at the dis-
tant end. The present study contributes to the analysis of evidential and epistemic
stance markers in scientific genres by exploring how the different frequencies of
these markers may reveal such patterns of assumed beliefs and generic conven-
tions in the expert publications, together with the need to express an explicit writ-
er stance in non-expert publications in order to make explicit authority claims and
to signpost stance attitudes for the potential reader. Following Mushin (2012) and
Nuckolls and Michael (2014), it may be argued that these choices constitute not
only lexico-grammatical choices but discourse-pragmatic strategies which shape
different forms of social interaction in two discursive communities.
An additional relevant feature of scientific discourse is that it is not the prod-
uct of a single individual, but of the intersubjective agreements of communities of
researchers, as pointed out by Tarantino:
Moreover, in science, the reliability of the affirmations and claims do not depend
on the judgement of one individual, but on the inter-subjective agreement of a
community of researchers sharing a number of material and conceptual tools.
These common elements are used in the same manner by the community mem-
bers in order to verify propositions, test claims, repeat experiments, improve and
expand existing knowledge. (2004:70)
When considering the relation between expert scientific writing and semi-formal
and popularised writing, it has been pointed out that this relation involves both
a process of reformulation, or using different linguistic choices, and re-contex-
tualisation, that is, adapting the discourse to the audience’s background knowl-
edge, needs and expectations (Calsamiglia and van Dijk 2004; Gotti 2014). In this
respect, differences in the preference for markers of evidentiality and epistemic
stance may shed light on the nature of expert and semi-formal scientific discourses
as genres which conform specific speech communities.
With regard to specific linguistic choices in scientific texts, it is pointed out that
rather than preferences for individual lexical items, disciplines display differing
patterns of groups of related words, which characterise the discourse conventions

of that discipline (Williams 2002; Peacock 2014). As far as markers of epistemic
stance are concerned, the modal verbs could, may and might have been the object
of particular attention. Thus, Hyland suggests that could and may are used in order
to objectify research (2008) and Tarantino argues that, in an example from expert
medical writing, may and might are not used to express necessarily uncertainty
or beliefs, but, rather ‘the two modals convey dialectical reasoning, criticism and
frustration due to the poor results obtained’ (2011:36).
A final point worth considering is Tarantino’s proposal that scientific dis-
course differs from everyday language in that it is organised in sets of three realms:
Realm 1 is the realm of the directly accessible material world of objects and
properties that can be sensed unaided.
Realm 2 is the realm of those things which can be accessed through instru-
mentation. These are initially proposed through logical reasoning.
Realm 3 is the realm of those things which are beyond sensory experience and
instrumentation but are accessed through logical reasoning alone
As argued by Tarantino:
The historic and epistemico-pragmatic evolution from realm one to the more
complex realms of observation has required time, dedication, development of
new geometrico-mathematical models, instruments, and representation patterns
by members of different cultures who belong to disciplinary communities.
(2011:24)
This process of evolution in scientific discourse can be interpreted as one which

applies to the process of reformulation and re-contextualisation of expert scientific
texts in order to be communicated to a broader audience. The more expert the
discourse, the closer it will be to directly accessible and observable phenomena,
while the more popularised the discourse, the more it will rely on second hand
evidentiality, reporting and inferencing.
3. Data and method
The data consists of two samples of articles whose topic is the phenomenon known
as cell suicide. The collection of the samples was carried out by searching articles
with the terms ‘apoptosis’, ‘programmed cell death’ or ‘cell suicide’ in the title or in
the body of the article. The reason for choosing this topic is that, as argued above,
it is a crucial phenomenon in genetics, immunology and biomedical sciences, and
it can provide a coherent thematic source for the study of comparable samples of
scientific discourse. The articles were selected randomly from 1964 to 2012. The
first corpus consists of a random selection of research articles from the database
PubMed in the fields of biology and biomedicine (68,848 words). This is an on-
line database for bio-medical and life sciences expert publications, which contains
abstracts and selected full-length articles. The present sample collects only full-
length articles. The second one is a corpus of articles from New Scientist (58,846
words), a high quality semi-formal publication which addresses a broad audience,
including scholars, students and teachers who are not necessarily experts in the
phenomenon, but may be interested, for example, in its implications for the treat-
ment of diseases and developmental genetics.
A quantitative search of selected markers of evidentiality and epistemic stance
is carried out in each of the corpora by means of a Concordancer (Monoconc).
In order to check the statistical significance of the results, a contingency table X2
statistical test was performed for each category of evidential types. The results
are presented in figures and selected concordances of representative categories
of evidentiality and epistemic stance are discussed from a qualitative discourse-
pragmatic perspective. The analysis of concordances allowed me to discard uses
of lexemes which were not relevant according to the criteria established in the
theoretical background for the classification of evidentiality and epistemic stance
types. The results are collected in figures which show frequency of evidential and
epistemic stance markers per 1,000 words in each corpus. The quantitative results
and samples of concordances are discussed in order to explore the differences in
the discourse-pragmatic strategies performed by the use of evidential and epis-
temic stance markers in the two corpora.
This section shows the quantitative results of the searches of markers of evidentiality
and epistemic stance. The results of the X2 statistical test performed for each catego-
ry shows that the differences between the frequency of categories in NS and PubMed
is extremely significant, with p > 0.0001 in each group of evidential markers. The
quantitative data are followed by a discussion of selected concordances which illus-
trate the use and discourse pragmatic functions of the analysed categories.
With regard to the difference in the frequency of markers of direct and indirect
evidentiality, Figure 1. shows that, in general terms, indirect markers of evidenti-
ality and epistemic stance are more frequent in both samples. Additionally, while
markers of direct evidentiality and epistemic stance are more frequent in PubMed
as compared to NS, markers of indirect evidentiality and epistemic stance are much
more frequent in NS as compared to PubMed. These results may be interpreted in
16 NS
14 PubMed
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
DE IE
Figure 1. Markers of Direct Evidentiality and Indirect Evidentiality in NS and PubMed
the light of Tarantino’s observation regarding the evolution of scientific discourse

from realm 1, in which natural phenomena are directly accessible for observa-
tion (in expert discourse) to realms 2 and 3, in which evidentiality and epistemic
stance rely more frequently on inferencing and second-hand access to observed
phenomena (in non-expert discourse). These differences need to be analysed in
greater detail, in order to explore the specific discourse-pragmatic strategies which
characterise each of the samples. This is discussed in the following sections.
4.1 Direct evidentiality
4.1.1 Frequency and distribution

The results in Figure 2 show that the preferred markers for direct evidence in NS
are see/seen, while in PubMed observe(d) is the preferred marker.
1.2 NS
PubMed
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
see/seen observe(d)
Figure 2. Markers of Direct Evidentiality (DE) in NS and PubMed
4.1.2 Discourse-pragmatic strategies

When selecting the concordances for the lexeme see, occurrences in which this
lexical item was not a synonym of observe were discarded. Thus, see is also used
in NS as a mental verb (‘But Miedema and his colleagues at the University of
Amsterdam [[see]] things differently’). The use of see to make reference to figures
and data (as in ‘See Figure 1.’) was also discarded, since it does not express primary
sensory evidence of the natural phenomenon. There were numerous instances of
this use in the samples, especially in PubMed. Indeed, see is only used in the par-
ticiple form seen in PubMed to indicate direct sensory perception. The difference
in preference for see(n) and observe(d) in the two corpora may be interpreted as
suggesting that two different evidential strategies are chosen in the expert and the
non-expert corpora. The use of observe(d) indicates direct first hand evidence, re-
ferring to the scientists who have performed the experiments, while see(n) is used
in the semi-formal corpus to refer to second hand evidence. This is illustrated in
examples (1) to (5) below:
(1) When they grew the osteoblasts in dishes, the researchers could [[see]] that
far fewer cells died by apoptosis in bone samples taken from the treated
mice. (NS)
(2) The findings could help to unravel some of the abnormalities [[seen]] in the
immune systems of people with HIV infection. (NS)
(3) We have observed that 5 lM resveratrol did not affect apoptosis of HEKa
cells, the effect [[seen]] in HaCaT cells. (PubMed)
(4) His colleagues were puzzled by the flood of CD4 cells rushing into the blood
that Ho and others had [[observed]] when infected people start to take
antiviral drugs. (NS)
(5) Notably, a diminution of membrane saturation index has been [[observed]]
in patients with primary and recurrent colon cancer, when compared with
control subjects. (PubMed)
4.2 Indirect evidentiality and epistemic stance
Following the classification described in the Theoretical Background section

above, the present section shows the results of indirect evidential and epistemic
stance markers.
4.2.1 IIE
4.2.1.1 Frequency and distribution

0.9 NS
0.8 PubMed
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
seem* appear* look* clearly obviously apparently
Figure 3. Markers of IIE in NS and PubMed
Figure 3. shows that in NS there is a high frequency of markers of ‘indirect per-

sonal justification’ and conceptual-based inferences, while PubMed displays an
overall significantly lower frequency of these markers. Within this category, in
NS a preference is observed for the markers seem*, appear*, look* and apparently,
as shown in Figure 3. The asterisk indicates the lexemes were searched, so as to
include variations in tense. In PubMed only the marker obviously displays a sig-
nificantly higher frequency than in NS, followed by clearly. It is worth pointing out
that look* is absent in PubMed.
4.2.1.2 Discourse-pragmatic strategies. In NS seem is used to explain aspects of

the functioning of apoptosis, as in example (6), to talk about specific treatments in
patients, as in example (7), and to talk about financing conflicts, as in example (8).
(6) Cells must, it [[seems]], be healthy and active before they can die. (NS)
(7) Remarkably, he is still alive today, his tumour gone. The treatment was not
quite as mad as it [[seems]]. (NS)
(8) The gurus who advise institutional investors on where to put their money –
agree, but can’t [[seem]] to get the message across. (NS)
In PubMed seem is used mostly to describe what is inferred from observed results
in experiments, as in example (9).
(9) Thus, it [[seems]] that K7 exerts its functions by bridging effector caspases
and Bcl-2. (PubMed)
Appear is used to provide a tentative conclusion on observed phenomena, as in

examples (10) and (11):
(10) The tools of modern molecular biology have given necrosis a new image.
Underneath the chaos there [[appears]] to be an orderly sequence of events
that recurs in most necrotic cells. (NS)
(11) As true for other DNA viruses, antiapoptotic proteins [[appear]] to be
essential for the early phases of the herpesvirus life cycle. (PubMed)
The verb look is used only in NS, and is absent in PubMed. Examples from NS are
illustrated below:
(12) Not only did the cells die, they [[looked]] like apoptotic animal cells.
(13) At first sight this [[looks]] like a paradox. The very cells that are primed to
respond to infection are also prone to suicide.
(14) “These cancers [[look]] complicated”, he says. “They expand, they make a
blood supply, they metastasise, they kill.”
The verb look, as used in the above examples, is not a synonym of appear; it may
be adventured that the semantics of this verb in NS seems to include both a sen-
sory and an inferential dimension, while seem and appear are inferential. PubMed
seems to show a preference for direct sensory perception and evidentiality by
using the verb observe, as argued above, or indirect evidence, by using the verb
appear, but not a verb which has both perceptual and inferential meanings such
as look. It may be assumed that the use of look in an expert corpus would be a
pragmatically inadequate evidential strategy because it does not show commit-
ment of the researchers to the results of observed experiments. Hence the need to
distinguish clearly between what is directly observable, for example whether a cell
is apoptotic or not, whether a form of cancer cells belong to one type or another,
and what is inferred from the results. This is an interesting evidential discourse-
pragmatic strategy which no doubt forms part of the discipline specific choices of
expert biomedical publications.
With regard to the stance adverbs clearly, obviously and apparently, since these
express inferential evidentiality, they are used in both samples to support inferred
claims on research results, as illustrated in examples (15) to (20) below:
(15) Taken together, these findings [[clearly]] suggest that HIV keeps the
immune system in a state of constant activation. (NS)
(16) [[Clearly]] more research is required before we understand all the molecular
mechanisms involved in necrosis. (NS)
(17) Our findings [[clearly]] demonstrate that GPCS functions efficiently as a

hepatocyte-targeting gene carrier in vivo. (PubMed)
(18) The present study [[clearly]] shows that 25-M emodin exerts injurious effects
on mouse blastocyst cell proliferation, and induces apoptosis. (PubMed)
(19) Compared with the control [Fig. 1A], the morphology of cells [[obviously]]
changed after treatment with 1 IM colchine. (PubMed)
(20) This resistance [[apparently]] stemmed from a genetic mutation. (NS)
4.2.2 IRE
4.2.2.1 Frequency and distribution. The results in Figure. 4 show that within IRE
markers, the most striking difference lies in the use of the reporting verb say in
NS, which is virtually absent in PubMed. The verb tell is also absent in PubMed.
The markers report*, reportedly and supposedly display similar frequencies in both
samples. In PubMed there is a higher frequency of the marker according to.
6 NS
PubMed
5
0
according to say/said tell report* reportedly supposedly
Figure 4. Markers of IRE in NS and PubMed
4.2.2.2 Discourse-pragmatic strategies. IRE markers are used in NS as quotatives

which legitimise claims by making reference to a source of authority. This may be
interpreted as an evidential strategy which is considered necessary in the semi-
formal corpus, in which the writers need to make reference to the speakers who
have direct access to the source of knowledge, the scientists who have performed
the experiments. In the expert corpus, this strategy is not necessary, since the sci-
entists themselves report on their findings and communicate them to an audience
who shares their information territory. The preference for the use of say in NS
shows that numerous quotations from researchers and scientists are reproduced
in the form of direct or indirect speech together with the reporting verb, as in ex-
amples (21) and (22):
(21) The researchers [[say]] their findings could lead to new treatments for
illnesses as diverse as insulin-dependent diabetes, multiple sclerosis,
hepatitis and heart disease. (NS)
(22) The researchers [[say]] the results are “absolutely remarkable”. (NS)
Report is used both in NS and in PubMed in the meaning of making the results of
research public, or communicating, as in examples (23) and (24):
(23) The researchers [[reported]] the finding in 2009. (NS)
(24) In summary, we [[report]] for the first time that emodin induces apoptosis
in the ICM and TE of mouse blastocysts. (PubMed)
Tell is used in NS metaphorically to refer to the way cells and proteins interact, as
in example (25), or to refer to researchers’ ability or inability to interpret a phe-
nomenon, as in example (26):
(25) Other proteins [[tell]] a healthy cell to envelop a dead neighbour. (NS)
(26) Unless we have a placebo-control trial we can’t [[tell]]. (NS)
The meaning of tell in (26) is not the communicative meaning found in (25), but
rather a mental inferencing process. However, these uses of the verb tell, of which
there are only two occurrences, have been included in the present section.
In PubMed, according to is used to refer to researchers or the results of an exper-
iment as sources of authority and reliability (examples (27) and (28)); this marker
is also used to report that the manufacturer’s instructions have been followed, as
a guarantee that the experiment has been carried out as required (example (29)).
(27) [[According to]] Malouitre et al. C&S was found to be associated with and
inhibit cyclophilin D. (PubMed)
(28) [[According to]] our findings, REST appears to be a novel gene regulated by
EGF through EGF receptor [EGFR]. (PubMed)
(29) A non-targetting control was delivered four times every 3 days with
atelocollagen [Atelogene Local use; Koken, Tokyo, Japan] [[according to]]
the manufacturer’s instructions. (PubMed)
The adverbs reportedly and supposedly are not frequently used as markers of IIE.
Examples are illustrated below.
(30) This monoclonal antibody that combats rheumatoid arthritis will be sold in
the US through an agreement with Illinois-based Abbott laboratories, which
[[reportedly]] regards Humira as its most important drug ever. (NS)
(31) Telomeres, the [[supposedly]] “dead” sections of DNA that cap the end of
chromosomes, are showing definite signs of life. (NS)
(32) Reservatrol [[reportedly]] enhances TRAIL-induced apoptosis [one of three
extrinsic pathways of cell death] in prostate, melanoma and colon cancer
cells. (PubMed)
4.2.3 EM
4.2.3.1 Frequency and distribution. The results in Figure 5. reveal that epistemic
stance markers are significantly more frequent in overall terms in NS as compared
to PubMed. The epistemic markers may, might and could are particularly frequent
in NS, especially may, which is also the most frequent marker within this category
in PubMed, followed by could and might.
2.5 NS
PubMed
2
1.5
0.5
0
must may might could certainly probably possibly perhaps &
maybe
Figure 5. Markers of EM in NS and PubMed
4.2.3.2 Discourse-pragmatic functions. These results confirm previous research

on the use of these modal verbs as discipline specific within scientific discourse,
as pointed out in the Theoretical Background above. Must expressing logical ne-
cessity based on inference is present in NS but not in PubMed; the stance adverbs
certainly, perhaps and maybe are also absent in PubMed.
May, might and could are used in NS and PubMed to set out expected develop-
ments of present research results and new developments for treatment of diseases.
Examples of the use of may are illustrated by examples (33) to (36) below:
(33) “In terms of therapeutic potential”, says Lamb, “MTS1 [[may]] be the most
important tumour-suppressor gene yet discovered.” (NS)
(34) One day it [[may]] be possible to manipulate these built-in mechanisms to
develop new cancer therapy. (NS)
(35) New findings suggest that the consequences of macrophage apoptosis
[[may]] differ from early to late artherosclerotic lesions. (PubMed)
(36) We hope that these findings [[may]] lead to improved new ideas, aspects,
investigations and interests in relation to gastric carcinoma. (PubMed)
May is used in PubMed to present conclusions of research findings, as in example

(37) below:
(37) These results point to some tumor selectivity and indicate that IAP inhibitors
[[may]] radiosensitize cancer cells while sparing normal non-transformed
cells. (PubMed)
Might and could are illustrated in examples (38) to (45) below:

(38) In future, the team hopes it [[might]] be possible to develop treatments for
cancer that interfere with the supply of IGF-1 and other growth factors that
enable cells to survive. (NS)
(39) This [[might]] explain the disappointing results of experimental treatments
meant to prevent starved neurons releasing a neurotransmitter called
glutamate, which is toxic at high doses. (NS)
(40) These data demonstrate that apamin-mediated apoptosis [[might]] be
related to its ability to reduce DNA damages. (PubMed)
(41) This suggests that additional viral (or cellular) factors [[might]] cooperate
with RID to determine its target specificity. (PubMed)
(42) This [[could]] explain why certain tumours become resistant to treatment.
(NS)
(43) The answer [[could]] be variations in specific genes. (NS)
(44) Moreover, these findings demonstrate that the use of resveratrol for
treatment of various cancers [[could]] be an alternative approach in cancer
therapeutics. (PubMed)
(45) The results were in line with ours, thereafter, we confirmed that colchicine
[[could]] induce apoptosis in L-02 cells through the mitochondrial pathway
(endogenous apoptosis). (PubMed)
Examples (37), (40) and (44) from PubMed seem to confirm the claim that
epistemic modals may, might and could are used conventionally as a discourse-
pragmatic strategy to present research claims which need further support in an
objectified form.
An interesting phenomenon is that these modal verbs tend to co-occur with
other modal verbs or other markers of evidential and epistemic stance, thus cre-
ating a semantic prosody or discursive stance strategy, not restricted to isolated
word choices. This is illustrated by example (39) above (might be possible) and by
the repetition of may in (46) below:
(46) People with HIV [[may]] hope for new types of treatment. And some of the
most cherished dogmas of a multibillion-dollar research industry [[may]] be
overturned. (NS)
Must is used in NS to express a high degree of certainty in the inferential assump-

tion made by researchers from obtained results, as illustrated in examples (47) and
(48):
(47) “Certain cells would become gut cells”, says Horvitz, “certain cells would
become muscle cells, certain cells would become nerve cells and certain cells
would die”.
Horvitz realised there [[must]] be genes that made them die. (NS)
(48) He suggested that if the cells are disappearing but not being destroyed, then
HIV [[must]] be hitting their production instead. (NS)
Epistemic stance adverbs are used less frequently, thus showing that there is a pref-
erence for the expression of epistemic modality as a discourse-pragmatic function
by means of modal verbs rather than adverbs.
(49) Raff notes that any new treatments are [[probably]] a long way off. (NS)
(50) The process remained unknown, despite many studies indicated that the
activation of caspase-3 is [[probably]] one reason. (PubMed)
(51) [[Possibly]] more important, though, CBLB502 might protect cancer
patients from the side effects of radiation therapy. (NS)
(52) Therefore, oxidative stress in mitochondria induced by resveratrol and UVA
[[possibly]] is the result of effects by both, copper and iron. (PubMed)
Perhaps and maybe are present only in NS. As illustrated by examples (53) and (54)
below, these adverbs perform a specific strategy, as they are used to express the
writer’s stance towards the phenomenon described, guiding the reader in order to
signal the relevance of findings in the field. This kind of signalling to the reader is
not considered necessary in expert publications, in which this more general back-
ground knowledge is taken for granted as shared by the community of scientists.
(53) When cell death first captured biologists’ attention in the 1980s, it was
[[perhaps]] inevitable that apoptosis would take centre stage. (NS)
(54) [[Maybe]] this is the beginning of a spectacular new technology, I can’t tell
you. (NS)
4.2.4 CGA
4.2.4.1 Frequency and distribution. The results in Figure 6. show that the cogni-
tive verbs know, think and believe co-occurring with first person pronouns are very
infrequent in PubMed. With regard to the adverb presumably, it is significantly
more frequent in PubMed than in NS.
0.25
NS
PubMed
2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0
I/we know I/we think I/we believe presumably
Figure 6. Markers of CGA in NS and PubMed
4.2.4.2 Discourse-pragmatic functions. The use of verbs of mental processing in

NS is consistent with the frequent use of the quotative verb say observed above.
Indeed, the articles in NS, unlike those in PubMed, make numerous references to
quotations from scientists and researchers by means of indirect evidentiality and
epistemic stance, reproducing their actual words, what they have said, and their
beliefs, as in examples (55) to (57) below:
(55) “We now [[know]] that cells can die by two pathways.” (NS)
(56) “We [[think]] we’ve got better efficacy than Humira, and people need take it
only once a month versus once a week.” Says Peter Allen. (NS)
(57) We [[believe]] aspirin has an anti-inflammatory effect on the component

present in tobacco smoke that causes inflammation. (NS)
Uses of the adverb presumably are illustrated in examples (58) to (60) below:
(58) “[[Presumably]] this is at least partially responsible for making cancer an
age-related disease.” (NS)
(59) Resveratrol also caused an early release of free intracellular
Ca2 + [[presumably]] from the ER. These results indicate a critical role for
mitochondria in the intrinsic death pathway. (PubMed)
(60) Although the RNAi pathway is preserved in mammals, it has [[presumably]]
been superseded in its antiviral role by the extremely potent interferon
system. (PubMed)
These examples confirm the genre-specific evidential and epistemic strategies

which characterize the two corpora of scientific discourse. While the semi-formal
corpus makes numerous references to thoughts, beliefs and knowledge of the ex-
pert scientific community as source of authority, the expert corpus uses the adverb
presumably as a strategy for objectifying the results of the research.
5. Conclusions
Turning now to the initial objectives put forward in the present study, the follow-
ing concluding remarks may be pointed out. The semantic-conceptual domain of
evidentiality and epistemic stance has a broad range of linguistic manifestations
which are used to perform relevant discourse pragmatic strategies in the scientific
texts written in English explored in this study. The results show that there are sig-
nificant differences in the preference and frequency of these markers in an expert
and a semi-formal sample of scientific discourse. With regard to the frequency
and preference for markers and strategies of direct and indirect evidential and
epistemic stance, while there is a clear preference for strategies of indirect stance
in both samples, there is also a significantly higher frequency in the use of direct
evidentiality in the expert corpus, PubMed. This has been explained because of
the need to make use of a strategy of direct evidentiality in expert discourse, since
writers are experts and address an expert audience, thus sharing the same territory
of information. This is not the case in the semi-formal discourse. Within the cat-
egory of indirect evidentiality and epistemic stance, the most significant difference
lies in the overall higher frequency of these markers in NS versus PubMed; par-
ticularly significant examples are the verbs look, of indirect sensory inference, the
quotative verbs say and tell, together with the mental verbs know, think and believe.
Most of these are virtually absent in the expert corpus. This absence is interpreted
in the light of the preference in the expert corpus for evidential strategies of first
hand direct source of knowledge. Additionally, it points at the discipline-specific
restriction of markers of second hand indirect evidence, probably due to the lack
of authority and legitimisation of source of knowledge of such markers within the
context of an expert corpus. The results of the present study confirm conclusions
from previous studies, which show that expert corpora display a lower frequency
of modal markers and strategies. Additionally, the present study also shows that
the expert sample displays a lower frequency of epistemic modal markers and
strategies, with the exception of the modal verbs may, might and could, and stance
adverbs which provide conclusions on the reported research. These results may be
interpreted as revealing discipline specific features, in particular in the expert cor-
pus. The main contribution of the present study has to do with the analysis of the
discourse-pragmatic functions of evidential and epistemic strategies in expert and
non-expert scientific genres. Expert writers in biology and biomedical sciences
do not use strategies of indirect evidential and epistemic stance frequently, first,
because they have the right to make authority claims, and, second, because they
assume the necessary background knowledge is already shared by the commu-
nity of speakers they address. In the semi-formal corpus, on the other hand, the
higher frequency of evidential and epistemic stance markers points to the need of
writers to express explicitly the source of knowledge and information in order to
legitimize claims of authority, and to mark explicitly their stance, in order to guide
their audience and signpost important and relevant information. These results
may shed light on the important role played by the expression of authority claims
and access to source of knowledge in expert and non-expert genres of scientific
discourse. These results contribute to the study of evidential and epistemic choices
in “less-restraining”, semi-formal and popularisation texts, which aim at broader
audiences that include non-specialists. In addition, insights may be gained into
how less formal scientific genres evolve and are adapted in the challenging com-
municative contexts of contemporary media.
Acknowledgements
This study has been carried out as part of the research work of two research projects, the
first one funded by the Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación (FFI-2008-01471FILO), and the
second one funded by the Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (FFI-2011-30790) to
whom I am grateful.
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Chapter 10
BE likely to and BE expected to, epistemic

modality or evidentiality?
Markers of (non)commitment in newspaper
discourse
Anne-Laure Besnard
University of Nantes
This paper deals with the contribution of BE likely to and BE expected to to the
expression of point of view in newspaper discourse. On the basis of a unified
and contextualized account of those structures’ operating modes, it is argued
that they both have modal and evidential values – a combination which, by al-
lowing the speaker to express an opinion while distancing him/herself from it,
might explain their extensive use in journalistic texts. Yet, it is also shown that
each marker has specific characteristics which, on the one hand, entail differ-
ent contextual constraints that partly explain their coexistence as well as their
diverging uses – especially when other markers of modality or reported speech
are involved – and, on the other hand, inform the speaker’s choices depending
on his/her level of commitment to the evaluation.
Keywords: BE likely/expected to, epistemic modality, evidentiality, commitment,

newspaper discourse
1. Introduction
Be likely to and be expected to are part of a broader range of structures of the

English language which have not systematically been dealt with in the literature
but are often used to convey modal or evidential meanings, especially in journal-
istic discourse, where they play an important role in the representation of point(s)
of view. Among those structures, which all revolve around an adjective or past
participle preceded by a form of be and followed by the marker to, be likely to is
generally presented as a semi-auxiliary expressing epistemic modality (Quirk et al.
1985:236), while be expected to is usually described as a passive construction of the
doi 10.1075/pbns.271.11bes
250 Anne-Laure Besnard
verb of opinion expect (Quirk et al. 1985:1033). There are indeed syntactic differ-
ences between the two structures, as we shall see later on, but there is also a strong
semantic link between them, one that is highlighted by the definition given for
likely in the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (OALD): ‘probable or expected’.
Furthermore, in a 40-million-word corpus corresponding to a complete year of
publication of The Independent (2009),1 we find roughly the same number of oc-
currences for the two structures – about 4,000 each, which is a significant figure
considering that likely and expected are both among the 450 most used words in
this corpus (out of a total of more than 200,000). Those observations raise a num-
ber of questions: what do be likely to and be expected to respectively contribute to
media discourse that would explain their extensive, concomitant use in journal-
istic texts? In other words, how exactly do these structures operate as evaluative
markers, and what kind of commitment do they imply on the part of the speaker?
2. Theoretical preliminaries
2.1 Theoretical framework
The following analysis will draw on Antoine Culioli’s Theory of Predicative and
Enunciative Operations,2 whose self-defined object is the “scientific study of lan-
guage activity apprehended through the diversity of natural languages and the
data from oral and written texts seen as arrangements of markers”. Thus,
language activity is analysed as the result of a series of operations (enunciative,
predicative and determining operations) which the linguist attempts to recon-
struct from the trace constituted by the arrangement of markers in a text.
(Chuquet et al. 2010)
One key operation here is the operation of location, which, taking place at all lev-
els, implies that “no term is isolated; [and that] all terms can only acquire a refer-
ential value if they are part of a locating system” (Chuquet et al. 2010). In this sys-
tem, the ultimate origin of locating operations is the abstract situation of uttering
Sit0, which comprises two parameters – the subjective origin, or original speaker
(S0), and the spatio-temporal origin, or moment of uttering (T0). Together, they
constitute the locator for the construction of referential values, while another situ-
ation Sit1 (S1, T1), the situation of locution, serves as locator for the representation
1. This corpus was collected in digital form by Catherine Collin (University of Nantes) as part
of a wider corpus comprised of the years 1992–2009 of The Independent.
2. Cf. Culioli 1990 for a more detailed presentation.

Chapter 10. BE likely to and BE expected to, epistemic modality or evidentiality? 251
of point(s) of view in the utterance. The two situations may coincide but their
relation with the index of events Sit2 (S2, T2) carries different implications on an
interpretative level.
Finally, this approach aims at providing a unified analysis of linguistic phe-
nomena, while requiring that they be observed in authentic corpora, which is
why The Independent (2009) was mentioned in introduction as corpus material
for this study. As far as methodology is concerned, the corpus was analysed using
the concordancer CasualConc for qualitative analysis,3 as well as the text-editor
BBEdit and a Python command-line tool for more efficient, quantitative analysis
of the data.
2.2 Key concepts
2.2.1 Point of view

In the subsequent analysis, point of view is understood as the way the speaker po-
sitions him/herself with respect to the propositional content of his/her utterance,
so that it actually describes the type of relation that obtains between the speaker
and his/her utterance. Or, in the words of Alain Rabatel (2009:79):
Point of view (POV) is defined, in an enunciative approach, in terms of the lin-
guistic means with which a subject envisages an object, and encompasses all the
meanings of the term “envisage”, whether the subject be singular or collective and
the object concrete or linguistic. The subject, who is responsible for the referential
values of the object, expresses his POV either directly, in explicit commentar-
ies, or indirectly, through the construction of referential values, in other words
through choices concerning the selection, combination, and realization of the lin-
guistic material, and does so in all circumstances, ranging from the most subjec-
tive choices to those which appear to be the most objectivizing, and from the most
explicit markers to the most implicit clues.
This means that point of view may take a variety of forms and is in fact every-
where, the absence of any visible markers being itself a manifestation of a special
kind of point of view.
2.2.2 Modality and evidentiality

According to Palmer (1990:1–2), “[m]odality is one of a number of semantic-
grammatical features” and “is concerned with the ‘opinion and attitude’ of the
speaker”. As such, modality can be considered as the expression of an explicit form
of point of view, and the definition given by Bouscaren (1993:36) in an enunciative
3. CasualConc (© 2008–2016) was developed by Yasu Imao (Osaka University) for Mac OS X
and is available at https://sites.google.com/site/casualconc/.
framework clearly signals the link between the two notions, since modality is de-
scribed as serving to indicate the speaker’s point of view on the propositional con-
tent of his/her utterance. Yet, modality can only indicate the speaker’s point of
view insofar as that point of view actually constitutes an ‘opinion or attitude’, so
that, for example, the speaker thinks that the validation of the predicative rela-
tion at stake is probable (epistemic modality), desirable (evaluative or judgemental
modality), or that the syntactic subject, or first argument, is capable of performing
the action expressed by the predicate (dynamic modality), or is under the obliga-
tion to do so (deontic modality). Assertive modality might also be added to that
list, but in any case, we can see that what modality expresses is a judgement on the
propositional content of the utterance as it is, as opposed to the underlying elabo-
ration process of that propositional content. This dimension of meaning is rather
connected to evidentiality, which “centers around the sources of information or
sources of knowledge behind assertions” according to Dendale and Tasmowski
(2001:340), or in other words relates to the speaker’s “epistemological stance”
(Mushin 2012:270). Yet evidentiality and modality are indeed very closely linked
together, and as shown by Dendale and Tasmowski (2001) but also more recently
Nuckolls and Michael (2012), there has been a great deal of debate on the relation
between the two categories, partly because in many languages including English,
evidentiality is not expressed via grammatical means. As we shall see later on,
however, it seems that they do not fulfil the same role as far as the expression of
point of view is concerned, so that they will be considered as two distinct semantic
categories from here onwards.
2.2.3 Commitment
Following Agnès Celle (2008:15), I will consider “[c]ommitment and non-com-
mitment […] as modes of enunciation depending on how the speaker treats and
possibly eliminates representations other than her own representation”. In oth-
er words, the speaker will be viewed as committed if he/she takes full respon-
sibility for the propositional content of his/her utterance, including its modal
component(s) and regardless of the strength of the assertion. Conversely, the
speaker will be characterized as non-committed if he/she does not take respon-
sibility for the propositional content of the utterance but instead relinquishes his/
her role as assertor, or source of point of view, only to remain the locator for the
construction of referential values. Thus, in reference to the theoretical model pre-
sented before, the issue of commitment appears to be linked to the value of the
relation of location existing between the subjective parameters of the situation of
uttering (S0) and the situation of locution (S1), which can either be identified, dif-
ferentiated or disconnected.
3. Syntactic and semantic description of the two structures
3.1 Classification of the structures
On the surface, the two structures under study seem rather similar but, given the na-
ture of their central components, they often receive different syntactic descriptions.
3.1.1 Be likely to and auxiliarization

As has already been mentioned, be likely to is categorized by Quirk et al. (1985:236)
as a semi-auxiliary of epistemic modality expressing “non-committed necessity”.4
It would follow that from a contextual combination of the copula be, the adjec-
tive likely and the infinitive marker to, the construction has become partly gram-
maticalized5 to fill a slot in the modal paradigm of the English language where it
functions as an indivisible whole. A degree of caution seems to be required here,
however, given the ambiguous status of such a category whose “boundaries […]
are not clear” because “[t]here is a gradience between a semi-auxiliary […] and an
occurrence of the copula be followed by an adjectival or participial construction”
(Quirk et al. 1985:143–4). Notwithstanding that qualification, it is still interesting
to notice that be expected to is not considered a member of this category by those
authors, contrary to apparently connected structures such as be obliged to, be sup-
posed to or be meant to.6 Quirk et al. (1985)’s description is obviously not the only
existing one, and grammarians like Huddleston and Pullum (2002) actually make
no mention of either structure in this respect but consider both central markers
as “lexical modals” (2002:173, 207) and catenatives (2002:1215). Yet, the emer-
gence of an intermediary category of modal markers between auxiliaries and lexi-
cal expressions has extensively been dealt with in the literature, and even though
4. The modal value of the construction will be discussed later on but for now, it is important to
note that, as it is used by Quirk et al. (1985), ‘non-committed’ is to be understood as indicative of
the degree of probability expressed by the modal – and not as referring to the absence of speaker
involvement in the modal judgement. Thus, should and ought to are also characterized as modals
expressing “non-committed necessity”, while must is said to express “committed necessity”.
5. The term “semi-auxiliary” suggests the existence of ‘semi-grammatical’ items, i.e. neither
lexical nor fully grammatical. This might be seen as an indication that such items are currently
undergoing grammaticalization, a process understood as the “change whereby lexical material
in highly constrained pragmatic and morphosyntactic contexts is assigned functional category
status” (Traugott and Dasher 2004:81), and some linguists have indeed approached structures
related to be likely to from that perspective (see for instance Aijmer 2004 on be able to).
6. Be supposed to and be meant to are described as having “homomorphic passive construc-
tions” and are thus considered to be part of the semi-auxiliary category only when they can be
glossed by ought to (Quirk et al. 1985:144–5) – which might be regarded as debatable.
be x to constructions have not received much attention, when they are actually
considered, be likely to is more often mentioned than be expected to (see Collins
2009 for example – and Krug 2000:257 for a counterexample).
3.1.2 Be expected to and passivation

This lack of visibility of the be expected to structure in the modal domain as a
partly grammaticalized expression might be due to the nature of its central ele-
ment, which, being a past participle, entails a passive reading of the construction.
This characterization deserves further comment, however, as it could certainly be
argued that there remains a degree of ambiguity as to the grammatical category of
expected, which sometimes functions as an adjective and is indeed listed as such
in dictionaries – with a negative counterpart unexpected which is fully adjectival.
Thus, if we consider example (1),7 where the main role of the marker is to express
probability, it appears that expected can indeed seem closer to an adjective such as
likely than to other past participles such as believed or thought:
(1) Sub-zero temperatures are expected [/ likely] to continue at least until the
weekend. The lowest temperature recorded on Tuesday night was −7.4C at
Charlwood, near Gatwick Airport.
To this, one might also add that given the data presented by Breeze (this volume),
the diachronic evolution of be expected to is notably different from that of most
semantically-related passives such as be thought to, the exception being be sup-
posed to, which is actually often considered as a (partly) grammaticalized con-
struction, as already suggested above. And yet, from a syntactic point of view, it is
always possible to reconstruct an active version of the utterance with be expected
to, e.g. in this case:
(1’) [Forecasters] expect sub-zero temperatures to continue at least until the
weekend.
This syntactic possibility supports the analysis of the structure as a passive con-
struction of the verb expect, and the fact that the adjective unexpected does not
occur in the be x to pattern can be considered a further argument in that direc-
tion. This goes to show that in the be x to construction, expected actually retains
its verbal properties, most notably its link with an agent as source of the expecta-
tion. This link, however, remains largely implicit – as most of the time, the agent is
not expressed; and it is in fact a specificity of the be expected to construction which
makes it quite different from its active counterpart – and arguably a lot closer to
the be likely to construction.
7. All examples are from The Independent (2009).

3.2 Semantics of the structures
3.2.1 General overview: epistemic modality and other modal values of the core
markers
We will focus for the time being on the meanings attributed to the central lexemes,
likely and expected, which are mainly responsible for the meaning of the structure
as a whole, starting from the definitions that can be found in the OALD:8
likely (adj.)
1. probable or expected
2. seeming suitable for a purpose
expect (v.)9
1. to think or believe that something will happen or that somebody will do
something
=> expected (adj.): that you think will happen
3. to demand that somebody will do something because it is their duty or re-
sponsibility
Judging from those definitions, a few remarks must be made. First, there is a de-
gree of overlap between the two markers, as has already been evoked in the intro-
duction, and as shown by the following examples where they are interchangeable:
(2) The last time Britain staged the World Cup was the loss-making competition
in 2000. The format 13 years later is likely [/ expected] to be less ambitious
and far-ranging. The Federation has also ratified the international blue-print
for the next five years, including Four Nations tournaments in the southern
hemisphere in 2010 and 2014 and in the north in 2011.
(3) Nato chief Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stated yesterday that another 4,000 troops
needed to be sent by America’s European partners for the Afghan national
elections in August. However, with other countries reluctant to commit
additional forces, most of the reinforcements, between 2,500 to 3,000, are
expected [/likely] to come from Britain.
8. Similar definitions were found in other dictionaries such as the Cambridge Advanced
Learner’s or the Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, which both also explicitly make
a link between likely and expect.
9. There are two other definitions given for expect that I choose not to mention here as they
seem to offer only slight variations compared to the other two: “2. (often used in progressive
tenses) to be waiting for somebody/something to arrive, as this has been arranged / 4. (not used
in the progressive tenses) used when you think something is probably true”.
In these two utterances, we have indeed what is probably the most common in-
terpretation of both markers and which can be characterized as their epistemic
modal value, easily paraphrased in both cases by ‘will probably’, meaning that
there are high chances for the predicative relation to be the case (at some point
in the future). Likely and expected could thus be characterized as near synonyms
in those contexts, although we must not forget that the origin of the evaluation
is always intrinsically implied by be expected to (“to think or believe”) when it
is not with likely.
The definitions given above also show that the two markers have other dis-
tinct values which either put forward the link to appearances or external evidence
(“seeming”) in the case of likely or, in the case of expect, express a form of deontic
modality with the idea that what is expected is the right thing to do. Such val-
ues are illustrated in the following examples where the two markers are not quite
so interchangeable:
(4) Hybrid teas need sterner treatment: follow each stem up from the bottom
until you come to a likely [/ *expected] looking outward-facing bud and cut
the stem off above the bud.
(5) In the second year you can specialise in things like advertising, film studies
or video making and multimedia. In the third term of your second year you
are expected [/ *likely] to do a work placement. You will write a dissertation
in the final year which counts for 30 per cent of the year.
In example (4), the reason I did not choose an occurrence of the be x to struc-
ture is that the meaning exemplified here in likely looking (“seeming suitable for
a purpose”) is never actually dominant with the be likely to construction and can
hardly even be retrieved in most cases. With be expected to, however, the deon-
tic dimension can easily be found, even when combined with the epistemic di-
mension. Indeed, in (5), pressure is definitely exerted on the grammatical subject
you for him/her to accomplish the action denoted by the predicate <do a work
placement> in the time frame given in the utterance – and a paraphrase in ‘are
required to’ would be most appropriate. And yet, there is also the underlying pre-
diction that the predicative relation will in all probability be validated for the same
time reference point, because of the requirement, so that the epistemic dimension
is there as well.
Before investigating what makes one value dominant over another in specific
contexts – which might also explain the choice of one marker over the other, we
will have a look at the markers’ respective etymology to try to understand how
those values are related from a diachronic perspective, which will allow us to draw
a few conclusions as to their present-day uses.
3.2.2 Likely and appearance

According to the Oxford English Dictionary (OED), likely is older than expect and
the two words have distinct origins as likely entered the English language from
Old Norse at the beginning of the 14th century (and already had a cognate in Old
English), while expect came from Latin in the middle of the 16th century.
Interestingly, likely is formed of the adjective like, meaning “having the same
characteristics or qualities; similar”, plus the suffix -ly, which has the same ori-
gin as like, so that “when -ly is appended to an adjective, the resulting derivative
adjective often connotes a quality related to or resembling that expressed by its
primary” (OED). Both elements stem from Germanic -lîko-, from noun *lîkom
“appearance, form, body”, which shows that what is today a secondary sense of
the term (“seeming suitable”) is deeply rooted in its history, so that the epistemic
meaning would actually derive from an evidential basis. This is emphasized by the
phrasing adopted by the OED, according to which being likely means “having an
appearance of truth or fact” – a definition which seems particularly appropriate
to example (6):10
(6) Byron Chalcraft, a forecaster at the Met Office, said: “Monday is likely to
be the coldest day of the week. It will probably get to about minus 3C or
minus 4C in inland areas of central England. // “It’s looking like this winter
as a whole will be as cold as 1995, when we had a cold easterly with similar
snow-shower events,” he said.
Indeed, we could gloss ‘judging from the current trend/our observations, it seems
that Monday will be the coldest day of the week’ – while taking notice of the use
of look like in the next sentence, which also puts the emphasis on appearances.
Moreover, if we keep focusing on the etymology of the marker, we can see
that likely implies a sort of reduplication of the notion of similarity, which bears
on itself and according to which being likely could be defined as ‘having qualities
of (having) the same characteristics (as…)’ – an expression whose incompleteness
points to the fact that a second term is missing. Thus, from this etymological defi-
nition, we may infer that likely does not modify a single item but rather links one
term (in a very broad sense) to another, while signalling that both terms share a
number of properties but remain distant from each other. This conception of the
notion /be likely/ sheds a new light on the idea of probability that it is often as-
sociated with. Indeed, it may be argued that when a speaker says the propositional
content of an utterance is likely to be true, he/she is saying in fact that the propo-
sition shares properties of the event situation Sit2 so that the predicative relation
10. Here and in following examples, double slashes are used to indicate paragraph breaks in the
original.
tends towards validation, but also that he/she is not quite certain that they share
all properties – so that, in other terms, a distance remains between the proposition
itself, as a complex notion, or lexis, and the actual validation of this proposition
in a given situation. This, in turn, is probably due to the fact that the basis for the
epistemic judgement is the speaker’s access to the surface of things only, their ap-
pearance as opposed to their essence.
To sum it all up, the epistemic semi-modal be likely to could be said to express
a probability with an evidential basis, i.e. implying the observation of the facts
at hand. In contemporary English, however, this ‘observation’ should be under-
stood in an abstract sense as it describes the way be likely to takes into account the
properties of the first argument, from which it determines that it is indeed fit to
instantiate the role of first argument (C0) in the predicative relation (PR) at stake,
this attribution of the /be likely/ property being then reinterpreted on another
level as a probability judgement. For instance in (6), be likely to qualifies the PR
<Monday – be the coldest day of the week> via the attribution of the property
/be likely/ to the C0 <Monday>, the resulting unit then being located with respect
to the predicate, as described by Rivière (1983:22) regarding the operation of mo-
dalization. Thus, a possible description of the meaning of the utterance would be
that <Monday> seems to have all the necessary properties, i.e. to be “suitable”, to
actualize the predicate <be the coldest day of the week>, which is its “purpose” – so
that in the end, it is probable that the predicative relation will be validated.
3.2.3 Expect and subjective projection

As far as expect is concerned, we also find an etymological connection to visual
perception since it comes from Latin ex- (“out”) + spectāre (“to look”), meaning
“to look out for, await” (OED). However, it entered the English language with the
sense of “to wait, defer action”, so that the link to actual perception seems more
indirect. It was nonetheless used to mean “to wait to see” in certain contexts, which
could be compared to the present-day expression ‘wait and see’, where the idea of
a prediction awaiting confirmation – which would be gained by the actual wit-
nessing of the event – is quite noticeable. Interestingly, this is echoed by uses of
be expected to in modern English which present a form of paradox in that the im-
plicit need for future confirmation is always present while the confirmation itself
is taken for granted – which is actually in keeping with the idea of “anticipation”
put forward by the OED. As a result, when this confirmation cannot take place,
the discrepancy between what was thought would happen and what actually hap-
pened is emphasized:
(7) Ministers last night pulled the plug on funding to bring the care of the
sickest babies up to the standard for adults, in a sign of the impact of the
credit crunch on the NHS. // Ministers had been expected to find the cash to
back the recommendations of a task force on neonatal care.
In utterance (7), both dimensions – epistemic and deontic – appear in the occur-
rence of had been expected to: ministers were supposed to find the cash; it was ex-
pected of them, as their duty; but it was also believed that they would succeed, i.e.
that the predicative relation would end up being validated in fulfilment of people’s
expectations. Yet, although it is not actually said in this very sentence, there is no
doubt that this is now impossible – as it is confirmed by the previous sentence.
Since the PR <ministers – find the cash…> is not negated, it means that had been
expected to has, in fact, a counterfactual value. Of course, the counterfactual in-
terpretation cannot be attributed solely to /expect/. It is rather due to the contrary
tendencies of the past perfect on the one hand, and /expect/ on the other: while the
past perfect implies accomplishment and closure, /expect/ implies a never-ending
projection towards validation, and as such a form of openness. As a consequence,
when the two markers are combined, the projection towards p is blocked and we
are left with non-p. It is worth noting that /likely/ would not carry the same impli-
cations here, as it is not oriented towards p in the same way. Indeed, the probability
judgement expressed by /likely/ is more static as it is based on apparent proper-
ties of the PR as it is and not on a dynamic projection of what those properties
should be, as is the case with /expect/. Thus, the past perfect would not have an
impact on the scope of the /likely/-evaluation because boundaries are not relevant
to its validity, so that a /likely/-judgement in the past does not say anything about
the present or the future. This is not to say that a counterfactual interpretation is
impossible with likely, but rather that the marker itself would not trigger such an
interpretation – and to this one might add that we do not actually find any occur-
rences of had been likely to in the 2009 The Independent corpus, whereas there are
81 occurrences of had been expected to.
Finally, what the etymology shows us is that expect is at heart the marker of
a subjective attitude which always implies a sort of projection. This projection,
which was visual at first, now takes place on an intellectual plane only, as it is
summed up by the OED in the definition “to look for mentally”, which is supposed
to account for all present-day uses of the marker, including “to look forward to (an
event), regard (it) as about to happen; to anticipate the occurrence of (something
good or evil)” which may be associated to “various additional notions”. In light
of such a definition, the primary, most basic type of projection appears to be of
an epistemic kind, with optional deontic values being superimposed. As far as be
expected to is concerned, this is confirmed in the Independent corpus where de-
ontic modality is sometimes dominant but never actually on its own indeed (see
example 5 above). Yet, the structure as a whole is certainly another element to be
taken into account to explain the permanence of the epistemic projection. Indeed,
the marker to is itself goal-oriented (Chuquet 1986) and thus participates in the
predictive dimension of the expression – which is also the case for be likely to.
4. Contextual constraints: modal compatibility
4.1 Syntactic distribution
Table 1 shows that there is a difference in syntactic behaviour between the two
central markers, as there are significantly fewer non-finite occurrences of be likely
to (about 1%) than of be expected to (about 10%). Expected thus appears more
flexible than likely in terms of aspectual compatibility. This is probably partly due
to the markers’ grammatical categories, as, likely being an adjective, it attributes a
primary property to the noun or proposition it modifies while expected, as a past
participle, has verbal characteristics which imply greater notional dynamism, and,
as I have already mentioned, agentive reference, so that it actually points to the
result of a process – hence a greater frequency in the -ing and -en forms.
Table 1. Frequency of the two structures depending on the form of be

Expected Likely
be * to 322 7.46% 47 1.14%
been * to 123 2.85% 2 0.05%
being * to 18 0.42% 1 0.02%
am * to 2 0.05% 2 0.05%
are * to 1068 24.74% 1225 29.77%
is * to 2333 54.04% 2391 58.10%
was * to 277 6.42% 292 7.10%
were * to 174 4.03% 155 3.77%
TOTAL BE * to 4317 100% 4115 100%
Yet, an important disparity can also be observed as far as the infinitive is con-
cerned. Given the data gathered in the corpus and represented in Table 2, this
discrepancy seems to be mostly linked to the markers’ compatibility with modal
auxiliaries. Indeed, the vast majority of infinitive occurrences of the structures –
i.e. between 97 and 99% – are found in combination with a modal. Apart from the
difference in number of infinitive occurrences between the two structures, what is
also striking is the much smaller range of combinations found with be likely to as
opposed to be expected to.
Table 2. Distribution of the structures in the infinitive according to L1 term

Be Expected To Be Likely To
will 105 32.61% 4 8.51%
would 49 15.22% 42 89.36%
can 94 29.19% – –
could 30 9.32% – –
may 1 0.31% – –
might 22 6.83% – –
must 1 0.31% – –
should 15 4.66% – –
Others 5 1.55% 1 2.13%
TOTAL be * to 322 100% 47 100%
Comparing those results to a corpus comprised of the years 1992 to 2008 of The
Independent – i.e. roughly fourteen times as big – where we only find 9 occurrenc-
es of might, 8 occurrences of may, 3 occurrences of must, 1 occurrence of could
and should, and no occurrences of can be likely to, it appears that the combinations
observed in The Independent 2009 are a well-established trend in English but also,
since we do find some occurrences of be likely to with other modals than will/
would, that they are not a matter of (a)grammaticality, or strict (un)acceptability,
but rather of most probable choices given the interpretation that would arise from
interactions between the be x to structures and specific modal auxiliaries. The
influence that modal auxiliaries have on the contextual meanings of be likely to
and be expected to is obvious when considering concrete utterances. Indeed, if we
take examples of be expected to with can and might for instance, we can see that all
likely versions are of very marginal acceptability.
4.2 Can and might: uses restricted to be expected to
There are different reasons for the lack of compatibility between be likely to and
those modal auxiliaries but it is interesting to see that in all cases the purely epis-
temic interpretation of be expected to is challenged as well.
4.2.1 Can and property attribution

(8) “The company currently has to pay £ 280 million a year towards recovering
the deficit. Without action, this number can be expected to grow significantly
and swallow any profits the company might make in the future.”
In (8), the utterance could be rephrased as ‘there are good reasons to think that
this number will grow significantly’, but definitely not as ‘*this number can prob-
ably grow significantly’, so that because of the modal can, emphasis is put on the
expectation as a process, and not on the probability value. In other words, the
epistemic value of be expected to is erased as such,11 and what remains is the gen-
eral attitude, regardless of the source of expectation. This is because can is a root
modal expressing dynamic possibility, and consequently it cannot have scope over
an epistemic judgement – which is also one of the reasons why ‘*this number can
be likely to grow significantly’ is unacceptable. Another reason is that be likely to
could not be used or interpreted in its original, property-oriented sense in such a
context because can is itself property-oriented and, therefore, saturates the rela-
tion between the first argument and the predicate.
4.2.2 Might and epistemic judgement

(9) Named in the starting line-up for this afternoon’s opening match with the
Royal XV in Rustenburg, Blair says he first picked up a rugby ball at the
age of four. It is not unusual for a future international sportsman to make
an early start – Tiger Woods was going long off the tee around the time of
his third birthday, when people still called him Eldrick – but a Scot might
reasonably be expected to try football first.
In utterance (9), the emphasis is once again on the expectation as an intellectual

act, which is made even more salient by the adverb reasonably. In this context, be
expected to takes on a normative evaluative meaning, actually close to its deontic
dimension: ‘for a Scot to try football first might be the normal thing to do’. Because
of the adverb, likely could not be used instead of expected; and yet, leaving it out,
would not completely solve the issue either: ‘?a Scot might be likely to try football
first’. This is because might, past form of may, is an epistemic modal which tenta-
tively expresses the logical possibility that the PR be validated, so that it is hardly
compatible with another epistemic judgement, such as the one often expressed by
be likely to.12 As a result, when the two markers co-occur, be likely to reverts to its
original interpretation: it loses its probability value and merely qualifies the first
argument’s properties in relation to the predicate.
11. There remains an epistemic overtone to the utterance, which could be glossed as ‘this num-
ber will probably grow significantly’, but the impossibility of maintaining can shows that it is
construed indirectly.
12. This also partly explains the very limited number of occurrences of be likely to with other
modals like should and must, their deontic value being another part of the explanation.
4.3 Will: projection into the future and redefinition of modal values
With will, where likely is found in greater numbers, there is also a foregrounding
of the attitudinal character of be expected to:
(10) Savio, who can play wide or through the middle, scored three goals in 17
games for Serie B outfit Brescia this season. // He will be expected to fill the
void created by Craig Bellamy’s transfer window switch to Manchester City.
The source of the expectation remains undetermined in this utterance and as a re-
sult, an appropriate paraphrase for (10) would be ‘it will be expected of him’ – will
having its future projection value here. In this context, expected could be replaced
with likely – ‘He will be likely to fill the void’ – but not without a clear change in the
interpretation of the utterance. In fact, be likely to would express a true probability,
stemming from the underlying meaning ‘he will [in the future] have it in him to
fill the void created…’, whereas be expected to does not actually carry the implica-
tion that the PR will most probably be validated, but only that ‘people’ will hope so
or think it likely. Interestingly, we can see that this is because of the combination
with will, which projects the expectation in the future so that it is not valid at the
time of the utterance. On the contrary, with ‘he is expected to fill the void creat-
ed…’, the implication would have been that ‘he will probably fill the void created…’.
Once again, it appears that there are important constraints on the combination of
validation-oriented markers and on their conjoint interpretation. Here, it can be
explained by the dynamic character of the be expected to evaluation which does
not attribute a stable property to the predicative relation but functions as a process
which can have a beginning and an end, both depending on the source, or agent
that is implied.
Be likely to, on the other hand, does not seem to be impacted as far as epis-
temicity is concerned:
(11) She added: Our action reflects the fact that some market participants may,
in the past, not have paid sufficient attention to their obligations in this area.
Future offenders will be likely to face significantly more severe sanctions.
This is probably because will is not like other epistemic markers such as might or
even should in that it does not imply the least bit of uncertainty, although the PR it
modifies is not validated yet. Consequently, there is no conflict with the epistemic
dimension of be likely to, which is not the trace of a projection but merely attri-
butes a probability degree to the PR by means of the attribution of a property to
the C0. When will is not present, the fact that the validation is meant to take place
in the future is thus implied by the context more than by be likely to itself – and it
would indeed be the case with ‘Future offenders are likely to face significantly more
severe sanctions’. What will does in fact – just like would in another type of context
– is signal that the future validation of the PR would result from a cause-effect re-
lation, which has yet to take place because the underlying condition has not been
fulfilled, while the bare be likely to version specifies no such thing and presents the
likelihood as a fact. It is to be noticed that expected could work instead of likely in
this utterance – ‘Future offenders will be expected to face …’ – but just as in (10), it
would have a deontic rather than epistemic value.
4.4 Summary
To conclude on what the study of be likely to and be expected to following a mod-

al auxiliary actually shows, a few remarks can be made. First, we have seen that
in all cases, being used with a modal auxiliary implies a reduction of meaning
or a foregrounding of one interpretation for both markers. Thus, with a modal
like will that inherently implies future validation, expected loses its own predic-
tive dimension, whereas it always remains underlying with other truly epistemic
modals marking a degree of probability for the validation of the PR such as may or
should. Conversely, be likely to only keeps its probabilistic dimension with modals
implying no degree of uncertainty, like will, whereas it reverts to its property-
attributing function in the few cases where it is used with epistemic modals such
as might. Those elements are helpful when attempting to isolate the core value,
or rather the operating mode, of each marker as they allow the hypotheses made
on the basis of their etymologies to be put into perspective. Thus, be likely to is
indeed deeply incorporated in the predicative relation as it modifies the relation
between the first argument and the predicate by asserting that the first argument
has properties which make it fit to serve as first argument for the predicate – hence
an interpretation in terms of probability as far as the validation of the PR is con-
cerned in most, but not all, cases. On the other hand, be expected to fundamentally
signals an attitude. Yet, the idea expressed earlier that it always marks an epistemic
kind of projection needs to be qualified. There is indeed an epistemic dimension
to a be expected to predication, as there is an orientation towards the validation of
the PR. However, because there is no clear source for the expect epistemic judge-
ment, the validation is not owned by the speaker, but merely described as being
anticipated – because it is normal or right – which is why the activation of the
probability, or predictive, value is only contingent. In the end, those descriptions
show that although they sometimes overlap in their uses, the two markers do not
represent the same kind of assessment of the predicative relation just as they do
not mark the same kind of point view. As we shall see now, those differences are
actually crucial as far as their respective contribution to commitment in newspa-
per discourse is concerned.
5. Commitment and non-commitment in newspaper discourse
The expression of probability, which belongs to the domain of uncertainty, might

seem incongruous in fact-based news reporting but analysis of those facts is part
and parcel of journalistic discourse and in this context, conjecture is to be found
often. Yet, except in some clearly identified sections of a newspaper, the expression
of conjecture and probability is submitted to a number of constraints, starting
with the obligation of neutrality or rather ‘objectivity’ in the journalistic sense (see
Richardson 2007:86–7), so that the way point of view appears is of paramount
importance, which is why constructions such as be likely to and be expected to play
an important role in newspaper discourse and deserve to be closely examined in
terms of origin of evaluation.
5.1 Be likely to and commitment
Be likely to does not in itself give any information as to the source of the evalu-
ation it marks so that, when no contextual elements can be drawn upon, the as-
sessment it expresses is to be attributed to the original speaker, as in example (2)
– already quoted. By default, the structure can thus be characterized as a marker
of commitment.
There are elements, however, which tend to lessen the subjective character of
the evaluation: namely, the way it is built into the predication which makes it ap-
pear as a property rather than a judgement; and very often, the way it is logically
linked to other elements from the context in a causal relation which provides its
justification. The following utterance is a clear illustration of this phenomenon:
(12) Professor Nicholas Crafts of Warwick University has confirmed that in the
century up to 1999 it was business failures that delivered the UK’s biggest
improvements in its relative economic performance. So there is likely to be a
sharp recovery in productivity when the economy does at last pick up again,
and that will be overlaid on the earlier improved trend.
In (12), the evaluation marked by is likely to is clearly presented as a consequence of

the previous sentence via the logical connector so. What is particularly interesting
here is that the first part of the utterance actually corresponds to indirect speech,
as shown by the reporting clause Professor Nicholas Crafts of Warwick University
has confirmed. This creates ambiguity in terms of point of view as far as be likely to
is concerned since, although it is not explicitly part of a reported speech fragment,
there is a logical link between the two sentences which puts the epistemic marker
at the junction of two subjective origins, S1 = S0 and S1 = S2 ‘professor Nicholas
Crafts’ – and there is no way of knowing whether the be likely to proposition is to
be considered as free indirect speech or as part of the main narrative. This inde-
terminacy participates in imparting a disembodied dimension verging on fact to
the epistemic evaluation, and it is worth noting that be likely to often appears in
the right context of reported speech. On the other hand, it is also very frequently
found directly embedded in direct or indirect speech where the issue of neutrality
and objectivity disappears altogether as far as the original speaker is concerned.
5.2 Be expected to and non-commitment
The relation to reported speech is quite different with be expected to which is most
often found independently from any contextual reference to reported speech or,
when there is one, preceding it. This is easily understood considering that, al-
though it does not specify its source, be expected to does express an intellectual
attitude whose source (S1) is necessarily dissociated from the original speaker
(S0) because of the passive construction. As a consequence, it can be considered
a marker of non-commitment which has a lot in common with the structures de-
scribed by C. Delesse (2006) as pertaining both to reported speech and epistemic
modality, except that its epistemic value is one of probability rather than doubt –
which has an impact on the interpretation of the origin of the evaluation. Indeed,
while the judgement is understood as being borrowed from another subjective
origin, a mode of knowledge construction and presentation that brings us back
to the notion of evidentiality, the often-predictive nature of the evaluation signals
that the opinion expressed is perceived as rather consensual and reliable. It is thus
usually either considered as referring to common knowledge, an opinion shared
by the community, or to an authoritative opinion on the issue at stake (see Breeze’s
“expert prediction” description, this volume).
(13) Britain’s banks face one of the most crucial weeks in their history with sell-
off plans for Lloyds Banking Group and Royal Bank of Scotland assets to
be finalised, just as the financial regulator begins scrutinising City bonuses.
// Alistair Darling is expected to say on Tuesday that Lloyds will not be
entering the Government’s toxic asset-protection scheme, after successfully
gaining support for a £21bn capital-raising with City investors, including a
discounted £13bn rights issue.
As an illustration, in (13), where the context is completely neutral as to the origin

of the evaluation, it is difficult to say where exactly the expectation comes from
but what is clear is that it does not emanate from the original speaker him/herself
and that there is little doubt as to the validation of the PR <Alistair Darling – say
that…>, probably because the implied source is known to be well-informed and the
announcement has already been arranged. In other cases, however, a connection

can be made between the be expected to projection and elements of the context:
(14) But those who took out the Halifax deal are due to revert to an SVR of 3.5
per cent when their tracker ends, while the 1,500 customers on the C&G
deal one will pay interest of 2.5 per cent when their deal expires. // However,
the majority of people who took out one of these loans are expected to be
able to manage the hike in repayments they will face. // Ray Boulger, senior
technical manager at John Charcol, said: “For most people it shouldn’t be a
problem. // “The rate they revert to is going to be lower than the rate they
started paying in the first place.”
Thus, in (14), we can reconstruct a link between the be expected to proposition

and the following sentences, which may be taken as a clue to the identity of the
origin of the expectation. This shows that be expected to can be used to allude
to and summarize the opinion of a reported speaker before actually presenting
it – so that there is no strict incompatibility between using be expected to and (in)
directly reporting the same propositional content at discourse level, even though
important constraints remain at sentence level if the be expected to utterance is to
be attributed to the original speaker.
6. Conclusion
In the end, the main difference between be expected to and be likely to is the rela-
tion that each marker presupposes between the origin of the predication (S0) and
the origin of the evaluation content (S1). Indeed, contrary to be likely to, be ex-
pected to allows the speaker to make a prediction without taking responsibility for
it. In other words, be likely to and be expected to can respectively be described as
markers of commitment and of non-commitment. In fact, while modalization al-
ways implies in essence the expression of a point of view, the concomitant marking
of evidentiality seems to be a way to achieve in English dissociation of this point
of view from the original speaker’s. Thus, with be expected to non-commitment is
achieved via quotative evidential marking, itself made possible by the passive turn
of the syntactic construction. With be likely to however, the perceptive and/or in-
ferential evidential dimension does not have the same impact as it does not entail
the emergence of a distinct evaluative origin, but rather provides a justification for
the point of view which is expressed by the speaker. Yet, in this as well, evidential
marking can be seen as a precious tool to uphold the ‘journalistic ideals of factual-
ity and objectivity’ (Stenvall 2008).
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Chapter 11
Markers of evidentiality in Lithuanian

newspaper discourse
A corpus-based study
Anna Ruskan
Vilnius University
The current study explores the distribution of evidential markers in Lithuanian

newspaper discourse. It focuses on the non-agreeing present passive participles
(e.g. manoma ‘thought’) and non-agreeing adjectives (e.g. akivaizdu ‘evident’)
used as Complement-Taking-Predicates (CTPs) with a that-complement clause
or parentheticals and adverbs (e.g. akivaizdžiai ‘evidently’) in two central
Lithuanian newspapers, which represent different types of media (print vs
online). The quantitative analysis of the evidential markers reveals that they are
more frequent in the online newspaper in which they are used for interactional
purposes. In both newspapers, the expressions under study function as report-
ives denoting communicative or cognitive evidence, inferentials or markers of
shared knowledge. Depending on the source of evidence and mode of knowing
available to the author, the evidential markers may express high, medium or low
“evidentiary validity”, and thus they may help the reader assess the reliability of
information and form an opinion on the issues reported.
Keywords: report, inference, shared knowledge, validity, newspaper discourse,

print newspaper, online newspaper
1. Introduction
Evidential markers are common in newspaper discourse because they function

as means of justification of the author’s knowledge of reported information. As
Bednarek (2010:31) claims, “They are used by journalists to give bases for subjec-
tive statements and to evaluate the reliability of different kinds of information.”
Knowledge underlying evidential expressions may be attributed to the author
himself/herself or to a third party (Willett 1988:57; Plungian 2001:353; Aikhenvald
2004:63–64), and it may be rated on the scale of “evidentiary validity” (Marín
doi 10.1075/pbns.271.12rus
272 Anna Ruskan
Arrese 2009:246). Depending on the source of evidence (perceptual, cognitive,

communicative) and mode of knowing (direct, indirect) accessible to the author,
evidential markers may express high, medium or low validity (Marín Arrese
2009:248–251), and thus they may add to the credibility of reports and opinions
found in news discourse.
Expressions of evidentiality in newspaper discourse have been thoroughly in-
vestigated in English, Spanish and French both intralinguistically and crossling-
uistically (Bednarek 2006, 2010; Bednarek and Caple 2012; Hidalgo 2006; Marín
2006; Martínez 2006; Celle 2009a, 2009b; Hennemann 2012). The major param-
eters of analysis have been the type of a genre (news report versus editorial), po-
litical orientation of a newspaper (conservative versus liberal) and the distribu-
tion of evidential markers within the category of author stance or evaluation. An
observation has been made on the correlation between the type of evidence and a
genre. For example, verbs presupposing strong evidence occur more frequently in
news reports, while verbs implying weak evidence are more common in editorials,
which present tentative and subjective opinions (Marín 2006:149).
The current study focuses on the distribution of evidential markers in
Lithuanian newspaper discourse, namely the non-agreeing present passive par-
ticiples manoma ‘thought’, suprantama ‘understood’, žinoma ‘known’, sakoma
‘said’, teigiama ‘stated’, the non-agreeing adjectives akivaizdu ‘evident’, aišku ‘clear’,
panašu ‘likely’ and the adverbs akivaizdžiai ‘evidently’, aiškiai ‘clearly’ and tariamai
‘allegedly’. The analysis is based on the non-agreeing present passive participles
and non-agreeing adjectives used as Complement-Taking-Predicates (CTPs) fol-
lowed by a that-complement clause (1) or parentheticals (2–4) and the adverbs
used as sentence adverbials (5), e.g.:
(1) Akivaizdu, kad mes susigrąžinome rinkėjų
evident.nagr.adj comp we.nom get back.pst.3 voter.gen.pl
pasitikėjimą. (lr)
trust.acc
‘It is evident that we have regained our voters’ trust.’
(2) Aišku, tai žurnalisto klaida. (ber)
clear.nagr.adj this.nom journalist.gen mistake.nom
‘Of course, it is the journalist’s mistake.’
(3) Vaikai, suprantama, grįžo. (ber)
child.nom.pl understand.nagr.prs.pp come.pst.3
‘The children, naturally, came back.’
Chapter 11. Markers of evidentiality in Lithuanian newspaper discourse 273
(4) Apie visą tai galima kalbėti ir banaliai,

About all this possible.n talk.inf and in a banal way
žinoma. (ber)
know.nagr.prs.pp
‘It is possible to talk about it all in a banal way, of course.’
(5) Laikraščiai akivaizdžiai darėsi vis
newspaper.nom.pl evidently become.pst.3 all the same
komerciškesni. (ber)
commercial.compr.nom.pl
‘Newspapers were evidently becoming more commercialised.’
The goal of this study is to identify the evidential functions of the markers above
in two central Lithuanian newspapers, Lietuvos Rytas (lr)1 and Bernardinai.lt
(ber), which represent different types of media. The former is a print newspaper
which covers texts from the years 2000–2002, while the latter is an online news-
paper which includes texts from the years 2005–2008. The study aims to examine
if the medium of a newspaper (print vs online) may determine the quantitative
and qualitative distribution of the markers. The focus is laid on the frequency of
the markers, the manifestations of the type of evidence (reports and inferences),
source of evidence (the author or third party) responsible for the proposition and
the author’s assessment of the validity of the proposition.
In Lithuanian, the morphosyntactic and functional features of evidential
markers have been primarily addressed intralinguistically and crosslinguisti-
cally in fiction and academic prose (Usonienė 2003, 2012, 2013; van Olmen and
Šinkūnienė 2012; Ruskan 2012). The non-agreeing present passive participles
and non-agreeing adjectives used as CTPs with a that-complement clause or par-
entheticals have been discussed by Usonienė (2012, 2013), Ruskan (2012) and
Smetona and Usonienė (2012) in the light of adverbialisation and parentheticali-
sation processes. The evidential functions of the perception-based adverbs have
been considered along the parameters of the type and source of evidence, (inter)
subjectivity and rhetorical functions (Ruskan 2013).
In newspaper discourse, only individual inferentials and reportives such as
matyt ‘evidently’, neva ‘as if ’, esą ‘they say’ and a few others have been thoroughly
investigated (Wiemer 2007, 2010a, 2010b). The main focus was on the identifica-
tion of the evidential functions of the markers, their possible epistemic mean-
ing extensions, lexicographic status and their functional and structural counter-
parts in Latvian, Estonian, Polish, Russian and other European languages. The
1. Lietuvos rytas (evidential constructions in newspaper) will henceforth be referred to as lr

and Bernardinai.lt will be marked as ber.
274 Anna Ruskan
morphosyntactic and functional semantic features of grammatical evidential

constructions in newspaper discourse have been discussed by Usonienė and
Šinkūnienė (this volume). However, none of the studies have addressed the dis-
tribution of evidential markers realised by participle-based CTPs, adjective-based
CTPs and adverbs in newspapers representing a different type of medium (print
vs online). By considering the quantitative and qualitative parameters of the evi-
dential expressions in the print and online newspapers, the current study sheds
more light on the use of evidentials in newspaper discourse and complements the
studies on evidential markers in Lithuanian fiction and academic prose.
2. Data and method
The data for the present study have been obtained from the Corpus of the
Contemporary Lithuanian Language (http://tekstynas.vdu.lt), namely from
the subcorpus of the central newspapers Lietuvos Rytas (8,695,454 words) and
Bernardinai.lt (3,115,891 words). Since the sizes of the two subcorpora differ, the
raw frequencies are normalised per 10,000 words. Both newspapers contain news
reports and opinion articles on political, economic and social issues and include
sections dealing with sport, lifestyle and entertainment. However, the distinctive
features of Bernardinai.lt (ber) are articles on religious issues, more discussion on
culture, environment and family, which contain commentaries and interviews. As
stated in the website of this newspaper, its objectives are to look for truth together
with the reader, respect differences of opinion, present reliable and exhaustive in-
formation and help the reader select and understand it.
In the first stage of qualitative analysis, relevant patterns of use of the markers
under study were selected. As shown in (1–4), the non-agreeing present passive
participles and non-agreeing adjectives were considered further when they were
used as CTPs followed by a that clause or parentheticals. The CTPs followed by a
wh-clause (6), used predicatively (7) or as a structurally independent element (8)
(Biber et al. 1999:551) were excluded, e.g.:
(6) Tiesa, labai aišku, kam ir dėl ko
truth.nom very clear.nagr.adj who.dat and for what
rašoma. (ber)
write.nagr.prs.pp
‘Really, it is very clear to whom and why they write.’
(7) Tai atrodo paprasta ir suprantama. (lr)
this.nom look.prs.3 simple and understand.nagr.prs.pp
‘This looks simple and clear.’
(8) Ar jaudiniesi eidamas į sceną? Žinoma. (ber)

Q worry.prs.2sg go.cnv.sg.m to stage.acc understand.nagr.prs.pp
‘Do you worry before going on the stage? Of course.’
In (6) and (7), the markers denote cognition, and in (8) žinoma ‘of course, cer-
tainly’ functions as a response marker. The adverbs akivaizdžiai ‘evidently’ and
aiškiai ‘clearly’ were selected from their manner uses and considered further when
they were used as sentence adverbials as shown in (5). They function as manner
adverbs when they collocate with verbs of perception (e.g. matyti ‘see’), cognition
(e.g. manyti ‘think’), communication (e.g. sakyti ‘say’), verbs denoting material
processes (e.g. statyti ‘build’) and the evidential verbs atspindėti ‘reflect’, išryškėti
‘become visible’ and atsiskleisti ‘be disclosed’, e.g.:
(9) Tai akivaizdžiai matome politinių partijų
this.acc evidently see.prs.1pl political.gen.pl party.gen.pl
kovose. (lr)
battle.loc.pl
‘We clearly see this in the battles of political parties.’
(10) (…) labai aiškiai pasakiau, kad suprantu (…). (ber)
very clearly say.pst.1sg comp understand.prs.1sg
‘I said very clearly that I understand.’
The adverbs function as evidential sentence adverbials when they collocate with
existential and relational verbs (e.g. turėti ‘have’, trūkti ‘lack’), mental verbs describ-
ing psychological states and emotions (e.g. patikti ‘like’, nuobodžiauti ‘be bored’)
and verbs denoting changes (e.g. didėti ‘increase’, blogėti ‘deteriorate’). Evidential
adverbs can be paraphrased by the corresponding adjective in the impersonal con-
struction (Carretero and Zamorano-Mansilla 2013:345), e.g.:
(11) Mašiną vairavusiam asmeniui aiškiai trūko įgūdžių. (lr)
car.acc drive.pst.ap.dat person.dat clearly lack.pst.3 skill.gen.pl
‘The person driving the car clearly lacked the skills.’
Aišku, kad mašiną vairavusiam asmeniui trūko įgūdžių.
‘It is clear (nagr.adj) that the person driving the car lacked the skills.’
(12) Akivaizdžiai praplatėjo socialinis laukas. (ber)
Evidently widen.pst.3 social.nom field.nom
‘Evidently the social spectrum has widened.’
Akivaizdu, kad socialinis laukas praplatėjo.
‘It is evident (nagr.adj) that the social spectrum has widened.’
Despite the distinction drawn between the manner and evidential meaning of the
adverbs, there are a number of cases displaying merger of the two meanings, which
276 Anna Ruskan
can be explained by their close semantic link (in an obvious manner/in a clear
manner and it is obvious that/it is clear that) (Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer
2007:166). The merger of evidential and manner meaning can be discerned in the
following contexts:
(13) Tačiau tokia diagnostika aiškiai prieštarauja moralės
However such diagnostics.nom clearly contradict.prs.3 morality.gen
principui. (ber)
principle.dat
‘However, such diagnostics clearly contradicts the principle of morality.’
(14) Vakar socialliberalai akivaizdžiai demonstravo savo
Yesterday socialliberal.nom.pl evidently demonstrate.pst.3 their
sušvelnėjusią poziciją dėl šios bendrovės pardavimo. (lr)
soften.pst.ap.acc position.acc for this.gen company.gen sale.gen
‘Yesterday the social liberals evidently demonstrated their softened position
regarding the sale of the company.’
In the examples above, the adverbs can reflect the author’s subjective reason-
ing about reality and/or modify the way things happen in reality. According to
Carretero and Zamorano-Mansilla (2013:344), the meaning of manner of the
adverbs can be compatible with their evidential meaning. In this study, the ad-
verbs displaying the merger of the two meanings have not been considered in
further analysis.
3. Frequency of the patterns of use in the newspapers: lr versus ber
The overall frequencies of the markers under study in lr and ber show that in
both newspapers the most common are non-agreeing present passive participles,
followed by non-agreeing adjectives and adverbs. The frequencies are presented
in Table 1. However, the markers in the three categories are more common in ber
than in lr, which can be explained by the online medium of the former and inter-
actional functions of the evidential markers.
Table 1. Distribution of non-agreeing present passive participles, non-agreeing adjectives

and adverbs in lr and ber
Newspaper nagr.prs.pp nagr.adj adv Total
fr/10,000 (raw fr) fr/10,000 (raw fr) fr/10,000 (raw fr)
lr 5.00 (4288) 0.86 (739) 0.46 (395) 6.32 (5422)
ber 6.58 (2051) 3.52 (1097) 0.66 (206) 10.76 (3354)
The distribution of the participle-based CTPs followed by a that-complement

clause and parenthetical CTPs shows some variation in the two newspapers. The
distribution is presented in Table 2. Participle-based CTPs with a that-comple-
ment clause occur more frequently in lr than in ber, while parenthetical CTPs are
more frequent in ber. This variation shows that lr represents formal written dis-
course, which favours patterns with the complementiser (Nuyts 2001:169), while
ber displays features of spoken discourse characterised by a variety of parentheti-
cal expressions. The most frequent CTP controlling a that-complement clause in
lr is manoma ‘thought’, which conveys the meaning of belief. Its high frequency
suggests that lr is mainly concerned with the presentation of common opinions,
which may include the author’s point of view. The importance of opinion in lr is
also signalled by the common use of the parenthetical manoma ‘thought’.
Table 2. Distribution of non-agreeing present passive participles used as CTPs + that C

and parenthetical CTPs in lr and ber
nagr.prs.pp CTP + that C Parenthetical CTP
fr/10,000 (raw fr) fr/10,000 (raw fr)
lr ber lr ber
manoma ‘thought’ 2.60 (2261) 0.36 (112) 0.29 (250) 0.07 (21)
teigiama ‘stated’ 0.76 (658) 0.43 (133) 0.08 (73) 0.13 (42)
žinoma ‘known’ 0.20 (177) 0.29 (89) 0.68 (593) 3.91 (1218)
sakoma ‘said’ 0.17 (148) 0.47 (148) 0.12 (107) 0.04 (38)
suprantama ‘understood’ 0.04 (36) 0.23 (73) 0.06 (54) 0.35 (108)
3.77 (3280) 1.78 (555) 1.23 (1008) 4.8 (1496)
The most frequently occurring CTP with a that-complement clause in ber is sa-
koma ‘said’, which implies the author’s reliance on exclusively external sources of
information. In both newspapers, the most common parenthetical is žinoma ‘of
course, certainly’ (literally ‘known’), which establishes a common ground with the
reader. However, its higher frequency in ber implies that this newspaper is much
more reader oriented than lr.
The distribution of the adjective-based CTPs followed by a that-complement
clause and used parenthetically reveals that both patterns of use are more common
in ber than in lr. The results are presented in Table 3.
The high frequency of the pattern adjective-based CTP + that C reflects the
argumentative dimension of texts found in ber. As will be shown in the following
section, the adjective-based CTPs followed by a that-clause express the author’s
reasoning and persuasive argumentation. The frequent use of the adjective-based
parentheticals in ber is indicative of their function of establishing a common
278 Anna Ruskan
Table 3. Distribution of non-agreeing adjectives used as CTPs + that C and parenthetical

CTPs in lr and ber
nagr.adj CTP + that C Parenthetical CTP
fr/10,000 (raw fr) fr/10,000 (raw fr)
lr ber lr ber
aišku ‘clear’ 0.38 (334) 0.71 (222) 0.23 (203) 1.42 (443)
akivaizdu ‘evident’ 0.23 (197) 0.95 (297) 0.01 (5) 0.03 (10)
panašu ‘likely’ 0.01 (13) 0.36 (111) – 0.04 (14)
0.62 (531) 2.02 (630) 0. 24 (208) 1.50 (467)
ground with the reader and highlighting the reader’s role in newspaper discourse.
It should be noted that in both newspapers only aišku ‘clear’ shows a tendency to
parentheticalise. The parenthetical use of akivaizdu ‘evident’ and panašu ‘likely’
is marginal, which is also confirmed by their functional distribution in academic
discourse (Ruskan 2012). The frequency of the adverbs aiškiai ‘clearly’, akivaizdžiai
‘evidently’ and tariamai ‘allegedly’ presented in Table 4 reveals that they turn out
to be least common in newspaper discourse. As shown in fiction and academic
discourse (Ruskan 2013:106), the perception-based adverbs aiškiai ‘clearly’ and
akivaizdžiai ‘evidently’ frequently function as adverbs of manner. The adverb tar-
iamai ‘allegedly’ does not denote manner, though its evidential use is rather infre-
quent either (Wiemer 2007:183).
Table 4. Distribution of adverbs (qualificational meaning) in lr and ber

adv lr ber
fr/10,000 raw fr fr/10,000 raw fr
aiškiai ‘clearly’ 0.17 147 0.2 63
tariamai ‘allegedly’ 0.16 137 0.12 38
akivaizdžiai ‘evidently’ 0.13 111 0.34 105
0.46 395 0.66 206
The perception-based adverbs akivaizdžiai ‘evidently’ and aiškiai ‘clearly’ are

more frequent in ber than in lr because the former shows the author’s greater
involvement in argumentation than the latter. The driving force of argumentation
may stem from the types of topics found in ber and its online medium. Since
this newspaper devotes more attention to topics which frequently raise debate and
controversy (religion, family), it can be expected that this newspaper will employ
more evidential markers expressing the author’s strong argumentation.
The quantitative distribution of the evidential markers under study shows

variation in the two newspapers, which is primarily explained by the medium of
the newspaper and types of topics. The overall higher frequencies of the evidential
expressions in the online newspaper are indicative of their interactional functions.
Apart from indicating the source of information, a number of CTPs function as
markers of shared knowledge which establish a relationship with the reader. The
higher frequencies of individual evidential markers may be motivated by the na-
ture of topics discussed in the online newspaper. The qualitative analysis of the
evidential expressions shows that in both newspapers they function as report-
ives indicating the acquisition of information from external sources, inferentials
or markers of shared knowledge, and they express the author’s persuasive argu-
mentation. The online medium of ber facilitates the expression of argumentation
and debate.
4. Reportive markers
Reportive markers indicate that the knowledge of the proposition comes from a
third party and the author does not show any personal commitment to the re-
ported information (Aikhenvald 2004). Wiemer (2010c:100) defines reportives
as markers which “(i) focus on the propositional content of speech (ii) uttered
previously (iii) by another speaker (other people) (iv) in the absence of the actual
speaker.” In her taxonomy of evidential values, Bednarek (2006:643) distinguishes
the author’s knowledge acquired from a third party linguistically and mentally and
refers to it as hearsay and mindsay. Marín Arrese (2009:247) subsumes the latter
values under the category of mediated evidentiality which may emphasise the cog-
nitive (“They believe”) or communicative (“They say”) aspect of “the acquisition of
the information.” Thus, knowledge acquired from external sources may represent
“different ways of referring to the opinion of others as evidence for something we
want to claim to be true. We can regard what others say as replacing a personal
judgment or base personal judgment on it” (Aijmer 1980:117). In this study, a dis-
tinction is also drawn between reportive markers expressing hearsay and mindsay.
Their functions will be discussed in greater detail in 4.1 and 4.2.
4.1 Hearsay markers
The participle-based CTPs sakoma ‘said’ and teigiama ‘stated’ and the adverb tar-
iamai ‘allegedly’ indicate the author’s acquisition of knowledge from communica-
tion. The CTPs frequently specify the original source and strengthen the reliability
of reported information as in the following examples:
280 Anna Ruskan
(15) Projekte teigiama, kad politikai turi deramai

project.loc state.nagr.prs.pp comp politician.nom.pl have.prs.3 properly
atlikti savo pareigas (…). (lr)
do.inf their duty.acc.pl
‘The project states that politicians have to do their duties properly.’
(16) Gegužės 3-osios Konstitucija priimta, kaip
May 3rd.gen constitution.nom.f accept.pst.pp.nom.f as
sakoma preambulėje, siekiant pasinaudoti tuo laikotarpiu,
say.nagr.prs.pp preamble.loc aim.prs.ap use.inf this.inst period.inst
kuriuo tada gyveno Europa. (ber)
which then live.pst.3 Europe.nom
‘The Constitution of May 3rd was signed, as the preamble says, in order to
take advantage of the period in which Europe lived at the time.’
The original source is made explicit by the phrases projekte ‘in the project’ (15) and
preambulėje ‘in the preamble’ (16), which allow for the author to distance him-
self/herself from the reported information and reinforce its credibility. As Celle
(2009a:282) claims, “In news reporting, the speaker takes precaution of presenting
information as second-hand to disclaim any responsibility. S/he thereby acts as a
mere locutor, leaving it to the reader to form opinions and judgements of his/her
own.” While the participle-based CTPs sakoma ‘said’ and teigiama ‘stated’ express
high validity, the adverb tariamai ‘allegedly’ may signal its complete lack because
it modifies false propositions, e.g.:
(17) “Teiginiai apie politikus, kuriuos tariamai pasakė
claim.nom.pl about politician.acc.pl which allegedly say.pst.3
grafienė, yra ištraukti iš konteksto,
countess.nom be.prs.3 take.pst.pp.nom.pl from context.gen
iškreipti arba neteisingi”, -sakoma pareiškime. (lr)
distort.pst.pp.nom.pl or false.nom.pl say.nagr.prs.pp report.loc
‘“The claims about politicians, allegedly made by the countess, are taken out
of context, distorted or false”, – the report says.’
(18) ”Politikos istorijoje gausu pavyzdžių, kai tariamai
politics.gen history.loc many example.gen.pl when allegedly
neginčijamos pergalės pasirodė
neg.arguable.prs.pp.nom.pl victory.nom.pl appear.pst.3
nesančios tokios jau neginčijamos”, - sakė

neg.be.prs.ap.nom.pl such already neg.arguable.prs.pp.nom.pl say.pst.3
britų premjeras. (lr)
Briton.gen.pl prime minister.nom
‘The history of politics is full of examples showing allegedly unarguable
victories not to be unarguable.’
The falsity of the proposition is marked by the lexical items iškreipti ‘distorted’
(17), neteisingi ‘false’ (17) and nesančios ‘not existing’ (18). The unreliability of
the original source implied by tariamai ‘allegedly’ is especially prominent when
the adverb occurs in an utterance made by the author who has authority. In (17),
an extract from an official document is provided, and in (18) the British Prime
Minister’s speech is quoted. In both cases, the adverb refers to rumours, which are
negated by authorities. Thus, the author shows complete disassociation from the
original sources, which turn out to be unreliable, and the propositional content
(Celle 2009a). Although the proposition within the scope of tariamai ‘allegedly’
is explicitly denied only in some contexts, its low validity is apparent almost in all
contexts of use. The adverb denotes reports on politicians’ unlawful activities or
other controversial issues and thus reinforces negative aspects of events, typically
found in newspapers (Bednarek 2010), e.g.:
(19) Speciali parlamento komisija pateikė parlamentui
special.nom parliament.gen commission.nom give.pst.3 parliament.dat
išvadas dėl dviejų finansinių skandalų, su
conclusion.acc.pl because of two.gen.pl financial.gen.pl affair.gen.pl with
kuriais prezidentas tariamai yra susijęs. (lr)
which president.nom.m allegedly be.prs.3 relate.prs.ap.nom.m
‘The special parliamentary commission provided the parliament with the
conclusions of two financial affairs, allegedly related to the president.’
(20) Ekspertai “Kursk” korpuso apatinėje dalyje rado
expert.nom.pl Kursk.nom body.gen bottom.loc part.loc find.pst.3
ertmę, tariamai atsiradusią dėl susidurimo su
cavity.acc allegedly appear.pst.ap.acc because of collision.gen with
nežinomu objektu. (lr)
unknown.prs.pp.inst object.inst
‘Experts found a cavity at the bottom of the Kursk submarine, which
allegedly appeared because of the collision with an unknown object.’
In (19), the target of allegations and rumors is the president. In (20), it is merely
a speculation that the cavity at the bottom of the submarine identified by experts
could have appeared as a result of the collision with an unknown object. The low
282 Anna Ruskan
validity of the proposition arises from the fact that even for experts it is impossible
to identify the real reason for the collision. Although in most cases the source of
information is not mentioned in the contexts of use of tariamai ‘allegedly’ be-
cause it cannot be identified or verified or it can be protected by the author (Celle
2009a:33), in some cases it is indicated, e.g.:
(21) Liudininkai pasakojo apie lėktuve prieš katastrofą tariamai
witness.nom.pl tell.pst.3 about plane.loc before catastrophe.acc allegedly
kilusį gaisrą. (lr)
arise.pst.ap.acc fire.acc
‘Witnesses told about the alleged fire on board the plane before the crash.’
(22) Penktadienį (…) korespondentas iš Pakistano pranešė, kad
Friday.acc journalist.nom from Pakistan.gen report.pst.3 comp
tariamai netoli Kandaharo slapstęsis O.bin Ladenas yra
allegedly not far Kandahar.gen hide.pst.ap.nom O.bin Laden.nom be.prs.3
vienoje šiaurinių Afganistano provincijų (…). (lr)
one.loc north.gen.pl Afghanistan.gen province.gen.pl
‘On Friday, (…) a journalist from Pakistan reported that O.bin Laden is in a
northern province of Afghanistan, allegedly hiding not far from Kandahar.’
In (21), witnesses report on the fire breaking out on board the plane before the
crash, and in (22) a journalist from Pakistan informs about the location of O. bin
Laden. In both cases, the adverb signals low validity of the proposition because
the information reported cannot be confirmed by the sources. Unlike the par-
ticiple based CTPs sakoma ‘said’ and teigiama ‘stated’ providing objective and
verified information, the adverb tariamai ‘allegedly’ occurs in contexts presenting
speculation and unconfirmed information. It may imply untrustworthy sources or
sources which cannot provide reliable information due to difficult circumstances.
The markers of low reliability “function as a defence against possible libel actions
brought against newspapers” (Bednarek 2010:33).
4.2 Mindsay markers
The non-agreeingpresent passive participles manoma ‘thought’, žinoma ‘known’

and suprantama ‘understood’ used as CTPs followed by a that-complement clause
or parentheticals denote an opinion or knowledge attributed to people in general
or to authority (Aijmer 1980:118; Bednarek and Caple 2012:91), for example some
institution, as illustrated below:
(23) Suprantama, kad šiuolaikinis veiklus žmogus

understand.nagr.prs.pp comp modern.nom active.nom person.nom
neapsieina be automobilio, kompiuterio, mobiliojo
neg.manage.prs.3 without car.gen computer.gen mobile
telefono (…). (ber)
phone.gen
‘Naturally, today an active person needs a car, a computer, a mobile phone
(…).’
(24) Napoleono kariuomenę, kuri, kaip žinoma, buvo
Napoleon.gen army.acc which as know.nagr.prs.pp be.pst.3
daugiatautė- (…). (lr)
multinational.nom
‘Napoleon’s army, which was known to be multinational (…).’
(25) Apskritai daugiausia aukų pareikalavę žemės
generally most victim.gen.pl require.pst.ap.nom.pl earth.gen
drebėjimai,(…) įvyko Kinijoje 1556 ir 1976 metais.
quake.nom.pl happen.pst.3 China.loc 1556 and 1976 year.inst.pl
Abiem atvejais, manoma, gyvybės neteko iki
both.inst.pl case.inst.pl think.nagr.prs.pp life.gen neg.be.gotten.pst.3 to
800 tūkstančių žmonių. (lr)
800 thousand.gen.pl person.gen.pl
‘In general, the earthquakes with the greatest number of victims (…)
occurred in China in 1556 and 1976. In both cases, about eight hundred
thousand people are thought to have lost their lives.’
In (23–25), the participial CTPs express general knowledge about a modern per-
son, history and disasters. In (25), there is an implicit reference to an institution,
namely the office recording the number of victims of natural disasters and re-
sponsible for the data provided. The CTPs above do not specify the actual thinker,
believer or receiver of knowledge, which makes them functionally similar to evi-
dential passive matrices in English (Nöel 2002). On the one hand, the author may
not indicate original sources because they are general or unidentified, on the other
hand, the information can be collected from a number of sources and the author
may avoid imposing responsibility on specific sources. As Vanparys (1996:173)
claims, “In news coverage, announcements (…) are often made by spokespersons,
who merely act as intermediaries for information provided by another source, and
reports (…) reach us through a network of channels, where the anchorman or
ultimate reporter constitutes only the last element.” Moreover, the evidence for an
opinion may be insufficient or lacking (Chafe 1986:266). Occasionally, the original
source may be indicated in the adjacent context, e.g.:
284 Anna Ruskan
(26) Opozicijos stovykloje manoma, kad pastarieji

opposition.gen camp.loc think.nagr.prs.pp comp latter.nom.pl
prezidento pareiškimai yra rimtas prisipažinimas. (lr)
president.gen statement.nom.pl be.prs.3 serious.nom admission.nom
‘The opposition thinks that the latest statements made by the president are
his serious admission.’
(27) anot (…) hidrologų, manoma, jog
according to scientist of hydrology.gen.pl think.nagr.prs.pp comp
kelias Rusnė-Šilutė kitą savaitę galėtų būti
road.nom.m Rusnė-Šilutė.nom next.acc week.acc can.sbjv be.inf
užtvindytas tik trumpam (…). (lr)
flood.pst.pp.nom.m only for a short time
‘According to scientists of hydrology, the road connecting Rusnė and Šilutė
could be flooded next week only for a short time.’
In (26), the opinion about the president’s declaration is attributed to the represen-
tatives of the opposition, and in (27) the prediction about a short-term flooding is
made by scientists of hydrology. The specification of the original source strength-
ens the validity of the proposition, particularly when the source is an “expert in
the relevant field” (Marín Arrese 2011:792). Since the CTPs manoma ‘thought’ and
suprantama ‘understood’ express the author’s interpretation of cognitive evidence
of external sources, they imply reduced or medium validity of the propositional
content. Diminished validity may be signalled by contextual clues as in (27), where
it is marked by the modal verb galėtų ‘may’ (galėti.sbjv). The CTP žinoma ‘known’
deriving from the semantic domain of knowledge and certainty conveys high va-
lidity. The participle-based CTPs shown in (23–27) and their correspondences in
English (Biber et al. 1999; Nöel 2002) and Spanish (Martínez 2006) are generally
defined as impersonals because they may be indeterminate with the attribution of
the propositional content either to the author or third party. However, the CTPs
manoma ‘thought’ and suprantama ‘understood’ may also occur in argumentative
contexts emphasising the author’s personal stance as illustrated below:
(28) Pagal nusikaltimų braižą bei vietą manoma,
according to crime.gen.pl mode.acc as well as place.acc think.nagr.prs.pp
kad mieste siautėja tas pats asmuo. (lr)
comp town.loc rave.prs.3 this same person.nom
‘The manner and place of the crimes suggest that the same person has been
raving in town.’
(29) Kadangi (…) jokio kito mirusiosios turto nepaveldėjo,

because no other dead.pst.ap.gen.f wealth.gen neg.inherit.pst.3
tai, suprantama, jam neapsimokėjo mokėti
therefore understand.nagr.prs.pp he.dat neg.be-worth.pst.3 pay.inf
notarui už paveldėjimo dokumentų sutvarkymą (…). (lr)
notary.dat for inheritance.gen document.gen.pl order.acc
‘Since (…) he had not inherited anything from the dead woman, thus
naturally, it did not pay off for him to cover the expenses of the inheritance
documents prepared by the notary.’
The prepositional phrase in (28) and the clause of reason in (29) do not only ex-
press the cognitive evidence of external sources but also the author’s emphasis on
this evidence. The explicit arguments aim to convince the reader about the validity
of the proposition. The author’s voice may also be highlighted when the evidential
CTPs co-occur with concessive and resultative adverbials, which make up argu-
mentative discourse patterns, e.g.:
(30) Išpuolio motyvai kol kas nežinomi, tačiau
attack.gen reason.nom.pl.m so far neg.know.prs.pp.nom.pl.m however
manoma, jog įsiverželis norėjo sukelti lėktuvo
think.nagr.prs.pp comp intruder.nom want.pst.3 cause.inf plane.gen
katastrofą. (lr)
catastrophe.acc
‘So far the reasons for the attack have been unknown, however, the intruder
is thought to have wanted to cause the plane crash.’
(31) Maža to, buvo užimtos ne visos lovos,
moreover be.pst.3 occupy.pst.pp.nom.pl.f not all bed.nom.pl.f break
sutriko finansavimas iš Ligonių kasos. Tad
down.pst.3 funding.nom from patient.gen.pl fund.gen thus
suprantama, kad administracija pradėjo
understand.nagr.prs.pp comp administration.nom start.pst.3
visokiais būdais taupyti lėšas: (…). (ber)
various.inst.pl manner.inst.pl save.inf fund.acc.pl
‘Moreover, not all beds were occupied, the funding from the National Health
Insurance Fund failed. Thus, naturally, the administration started to save in
all possible ways.’
In (30), the concessive adverbial tačiau ‘however’ emphasises the author’s align-
ment with the opinion that the person intended to cause the plane crash although
the investigation had not revealed the reasons for the attack, and in (31) the resul-
tative adverbial tad ‘therefore’ links the argument presented by the evidential CTP
with the argument in the preceding discourse context (cf. Aijmer 2013:95). The
286 Anna Ruskan
argumentative discourse patterns illustrated above suggest that evidential markers

in journalistic discourse do not only refer to external sources of information but
also imply the author’s opinion of the information reported (Ørsnes 2011:32) and
his/her attempt to make the reader share it.
5. Inferential markers
The perception-based non-agreeing adjectives akivaizdu ‘evident’, aišku ‘clear’ and

the adverbs akivaizdžiai ‘evidently’ and aiškiai ‘clearly’ mark inferences based on
perceptual or conceptual evidence. By specifying the basis of an inference, these
markers “<…> denote the speaker’s reflection of some evidence, i. e. they indicate
the relation between the described situation and some other situation, which is
treated by the speaker as evidence for the former” (Diewald and Smirnova 2010:63).
Perceptual inferences have been found in contexts depicting the author’s observa-
tions on sports events, arts reviews or some other situations as illustrated below:
(32) Rungtynių pabaigoje rezultatui tapus 2:2 Leverkuzeno
competition.gen.pl end.loc result.dat become.pst.ap 2:2 Leverkusen.gen
komanda aiškiai dominavo aikštėje. (lr)
team.nom clearly domina te.pst.3 court.loc
‘At the end of the match after the result became 2:2, Leverkusen team clearly
dominated on court.’
(33) Ir kino kūrinys aiškiai ne autobiografinis, nes
and film.gen production.nom clearly not autobiographical.nom because
scenos pakyloje pasirodęs kūrejas -jaunas
stage.gen platform.loc appear.pst.ap.nom.m creator.nom.m young.nom
žmogus. (lr)
person.nom
‘And the film is clearly not autobiographical, because the author appearing
on the platform of the stage is a young person.’
(34) Šiame spektaklyje akivaizdžiai akcentuojamas
this.loc play.loc evidently stress.prs.pp.nom.m
paprastumas (…). (ber)
simplicity.nom.m
‘This play evidently stresses simplicity (…).’
In the examples above, the adverbs aiškiai ‘clearly’ and akivaizdžiai ‘evidently’
modify propositions containing evaluative elements such as dominavo ‘was
dominant’ (32), ne autobiografinis ‘not autobiographical’ (33) and akcentuojamas
‘stressed’ (34). This evaluation is possible because of a direct witnessing of the

events (the match, the presentation of the film and the play). Reporting the ob-
servations, the author creates some vividness in the news story and justifies the
opinion expressed. Conceptual inferences reveal the author’s evaluation of the
proposition on the basis of facts, logic, previous experience or another mental
construct (Willett 1988:96), e.g.:
(35) Bet reikia turėti galvoje, kad daugelį metų
but need.prs.3 have.inf mind.loc comp many.acc year.gen.pl
bibliotekos buvo paliktos likimo valiai, ir
library.gen.pl.f be.pst.3 leave.pst.pp.nom.pl.f fate.gen will.dat and
dabar tie pinigai yra aiškiai per maži, reikėtų
now these money.nom.pl be.prs.3 clearly too small.nom.pl need.sbjv
nežinia kiek kartų daugiau. (ber)
neg.knowledge.nom.f how many times.gen.pl more
‘But it is necessary to bear in mind that for many years the libraries have
been neglected and the money is clearly not sufficient now. It is impossible
to tell how much more would be necessary.’
(36) Man teko domėtis, kokios specialiųjų
I.dat be.gotten.pst.3 be.interested.inf what special.gen.pl
tyrimų Parlamentinės kontrolės formos
investigation.gen.pl parliamentary.gen control.gen form.nom.pl
yra Vakaruose, ir galiu tvirtinti, kad mūsų šalis
be.prs.3 West.loc.pl and can.prs.1sg claim.inf comp our country.nom
akivaizdžiai atsilieka nuo kitų kraštų. (lr)
evidently be behind.prs.3 from other.gen.pl country.gen.pl
‘I had an opportunity to enquire into the practices of the parliamentary
control in the West and I can say that our country evidently does not keep
up with other countries.’
(37) Ir vis dėlto, akivaizdu, kad roko muzikos poreikis
and all the same evident.nagr.adj comp rock.gen music.gen necessity.nom
auga, nes auga žmonių besiklausančių tokios
grow.prs.3 because grow.prs.3 person.gen.pl listen.prs.ap.gen.pl such.gen
muzikos gretos (…). (ber)
music.gen rank.nom.pl
‘However, it is evident that a demand for rock music is growing because the
number of people listening to this type of music is increasing (…).’
In (35), the conclusion that the money allocated for the libraries is insufficient
is drawn from the fact that the libraries have been neglected for a long time and
they need more investment. In (36), the author forms a critical opinion of the
288 Anna Ruskan
Lithuanian practices of the parliamentary control as he compares them with the

practices in Western Europe. In (37), the claim that there is a demand for rock
music is supported by the fact that the number of people listening to this type of
music is increasing. It should be noted that the perception-based evidential ad-
verbs tend to modify propositions containing negative polarity items (per maži
‘too little’, atsilieka ‘is behind’) and they occur in argumentative contexts. In (35),
the author’s persuasive argumentation is emphasised by the verb of deontic neces-
sity reikia ‘need’; in (36) it is expressed by the predicate galiu tvirtinti ‘I can claim’
and in (37) by the adverbial vis dėl to ‘however’. The first-person verb galiu ‘I can’
and the experiencer man ‘to me’ signal the subjective dimension of the inference.
In (35–37), the source of inference is a journalist himself/herself, though he/she
may frequently report a third party’s inferences, e.g.:
(38) Vienas iš varžybų teisėjų R.Idzelevičius teigė,
one.nom from contest.gen.pl judge.gen.pl R.Idzelevičius.nom state.pst.3
kad šios poros šokis kol kas dar nėra vientisas:
comp this.gen pair.gen dance.nom so far yet neg.be.prs.3 integral.nom
“Marius aiškiai lyderiauja, o jo partnerė ne visada
Marius.nom clearly lead.prs.3 whereas he.gen partner.nom not always
spėja paskui (…).” (lr)
keep up.prs.3 after
‘One of the jury of the contest R. Idzelevičius claimed that this pair’s dance
had not been integral so far: “Marius clearly takes a leading role, while his
partner does not always keep up with him (…).’
(39) Parlamentaras šiame siūlyme įžvelgė
Member of Parliament.nom this.loc proposal.loc notice.pst.3
akivaizdų medikų grupės norą padidinti savo
evident.acc doctor.gen.pl group.gen want.acc increase.inf their
pacientų ratą ir iš valstybės biudžeto gauti
patient.gen.pl circle.acc and from state.gen budget.gen get.inf
didesnį finansavimą. “Akivaizdu, jog pediatrai
bigger funding.acc evident.nagr.adj comp pediatrician.nom.pl.m
suinteresuoti turėti kuo daugiau pacientų, būtent
be interested.pst.pp.nom.pl.m have.inf as more patient.gen.pl mainly
todėl jie ir inicijuoja tokius svarstymus”, -
therefore they.nom and initiate.prs.3 such.acc.pl consideration.acc.pl
įsitikinęs G. Dalinkevičius. (lr)
convince.pst.ap.nom.m G. Dalinkevičius.nom.m
‘In this proposal the MP noticed the doctors’ evident wish to increase the
number of their patients and to receive more funding from the government
budget. “It is evident that pediatricians are interested to have as many
patients as possible, therefore they tend to start such discussions”, – said

convincingly G. Dalinkevičius.’
In (38) the judge of the dancing contest and in (39) the MP are quoted. In both
cases, the journalist attributes an inference to a third party in order to ground
his/her comments in the preceding discourse. In (38), the comment on the pair’s
dancing technique is more convincing when followed by the words of the original
speaker who saw himself how the pair danced. In (39), the journalist’s claim that
the MP noticed the doctors’ intention to increase the number of patients is also
supported by the MP’s statements, which contain the CTP akivaizdu ‘evident’ and
the argumentative markers būtent todėl ‘mainly therefore’. The author’s personal
evaluation of the perceptual or conceptual evidence in (32–39) qualifies the infer-
ential markers high on the scale of “evidentiary validity.” However, the adjective
panašu ‘likely’, originally deriving from the semantic domain of comparison, func-
tions as an evidential marker of medium validity as illustrated below:
(40) Be to, panašu, kad Fribure gali būti
moreover likely.nagr.adj comp Fribourg.loc may.prs.3 be.inf
atgaivintas lietuvių kalbos dėstymas. (ber)
renew.pst.pp.nom.m Lithuanian.gen language.gen teaching.nom.m
‘Moreover, it is likely that in Fribourg they will perhaps renew the teaching
of Lithuanian.’
(41) Dar neturime pakankamai šio tyrimo duomenų,
yet neg.have.prs.1pl enough this.gen investigation.gen data.gen.pl
bet kol kas panašu, jog duomenys poliarizuojasi į dvi
but so far likely.nagr.adj comp data.nom.pl polarize.prs.3 to two
grupes. (ber)
group.acc.pl
‘So far we do not have enough data of this investigation, but it is likely that
the data are distributed over two groups.’
The reduced validity is triggered by contextual elements. In (40), the modal verb
gali ‘can’ diminishes the validity of the claim, while in (41) there is explicit refer-
ence to insufficient evidence to support the claim. These contexts of use bring
the CTP panašu ‘likely’ close in meaning to the verb seem followed by a that-
complement clause, which functions as “an adverbial hedge reducing the certainty
expressed in the assertion” (Aijmer 2009:76).
290 Anna Ruskan
6. Markers of shared knowledge
The participle and adjective based CTPs followed by a that-complement clause or

used parenthetically may also acquire interactional functions, which focus on the
author/reader relationship rather than evidence in discourse. These functions are
manifest in contexts of shared knowledge (Brinton 2008:17–18), where the ex-
pectations of the participants of a speech act are discussed and a common ground
between them is established, e.g.:
(42) Akivaizdu, jog protinio darbo negalime
evident.nagr.adj comp intellectual.gen work.gen neg.can.prs.1pl
standartizuoti. (ber)
standardise.inf
‘It is evident that we cannot standartise intellectual work.’
(43) Suprantama, pirmiausia mums reikia oro (…). (ber)
understand.nagr.prs.pp first of all we.dat need.prs.3 air.gen
‘Naturally, first of all, we need air (…).’
(44) Žinoma, subjektyvumo čia neišvengsi (…). (ber)
know.nagr.prs.pp subjectivity.gen here neg.avoid.prs.2sg
‘Of course, you cannot avoid here subjectivity.’
In (42–43), the first person plural form negalime ‘we cannot’ and the dative ex-
periencer mums ‘to us’ mark shared knowledge. In (44), appeal to the reader is
emphasised by the second person form neišvengsi ‘you will not avoid.’ The CTP
akivaizdu ‘evident’ is a marker of strong argumentation, while the parentheticals
suprantama ‘naturally’ and žinoma ‘of course, certainly’ are less emphatic. Direct
appeal to the reader in newspaper discourse is an important rhetorical strategy es-
tablishing familiarity with the author and shaping the reader’s opinion. The shared
knowledge evoked by the markers is also apparent in contexts with the first person
subject and dialogical exchanges involving interviews with celebrities, experts, e.g:
(45) Esu jos gerbėja, bet, aišku, koncerte
be.prs.sg1 she.gen fan.nom but clear.nagr.adj concert.loc
nedalyvavau. (ber)
neg.participate.pst.sg1
‘I am a fan of hers but of course I did not attend her concert.’
(46) Suprantama, žiūriu ne vien lietuviškus
understand.nagr.prs.pp watch.prs.sg1 not only Lithuanian.acc.pl
filmus. (ber)
film.acc.pl
‘Naturally, I do not watch only Lithuanian films.’
(47) Ką sako Kaune likusi šeima? - Aišku,

what say.prs.3 Kaunas.loc leave.pst.ap.nom family.nom clear.nagr.adj
pasiilgsta. (lr)
miss.prs.3
‘What do the rest of the family in Kaunas say? -Of course, they miss.’
(48) Tad bet kuriuo atveju santuoka vis dar suvokiama kaip
thus in any case marriage.nom.f still perceive.prs.pp.nom.f as
labai reikalingas dalykas? Taip, žinoma. (ber)
very necessary.nom thing.nom yes know.nagr.prs.pp
‘So anyway, is marriage still considered necessary? Yes, of course.’
In (45–46), the author makes claims about his/her experience (nedalyvavau ‘I did
not participate’, žiūriu ‘I watch’) and expects the reader to share this information.
In these contexts, “The speakers do not need evidence in order to make certain
claims about themselves, since they are primary knowers” (Simon-Vandenbergen
and Aijmer 2007:155). In (47–48), the parentheticals are used as response mark-
ers to the questions found in the preceding clause. Functional variation of the
markers correlates with their positional mobility and is characteristic of the par-
enthetical CTPs suprantama ‘naturally’, aišku ‘of course’ and žinoma ‘of course,
certainly.’ The parentheticals deriving from verbs of communication and the ad-
verbs akivaizdžiai ‘evidently’, aiškiai ‘clearly’ and tariamai ‘allegedly’ are not used
in contexts of shared knowledge and they do not acquire interactional functions.
Although the markers mentioned in this section express shared knowledge in both
the print and online newspaper, they are more common in the latter, which makes
greater use of dialogical exchanges and emphatic statements.
7. Concluding remarks
The range of evidential markers in Lithuanian newspaper discourse is both struc-

turally and functionally diverse. The preferred means of expression are participle-
based CTPs followed by a that-complement clause or used parenthetically. Less
common are non-agreeing adjective-based CTPs and adverbs. Functionally they
range from reportives denoting communicative or cognitive evidence, to inferen-
tials and markers of shared knowledge.
The distribution of the evidential markers under study shows variation in the
two newspapers. Lietuvos Rytas (lr) focuses on the presentation of a common
opinion realised by the participle based CTP manoma ‘thought’ with a that-com-
plement clause, whereas Bernardinai.lt (ber) frequently appeals to shared knowl-
edge expressed by the parentheticals žinoma ‘of course, certainly’, suprantama
292 Anna Ruskan
‘naturally’ and aišku ‘of course.’ The frequent use of the parentheticals in ber can
be explained by the online medium of the newspaper, which displays a reader
oriented profile and interactional functions of the evidential markers. The higher
frequency of the perception-based adverbs in ber suggests that this newspaper
gives prominence to the author’s persuasive argumentation. lr makes a moderate
use of the parentheticals and perception based adverbs, which may be indicative
of the formal and neutral orientation of the newspaper.
Evidential markers in newspaper discourse do not only express the source and
type of evidence but may also contribute to the formation of the reader’s opinion.
The value of “evidentiary validity” determined by the mode of knowing and the
source of evidence helps the reader process and select reported information. The
highest validity is expressed by the reportive CTPs teigiama ‘stated’, sakoma ‘said’
and žinoma ‘known.’ They can refer to a definite or generalised original source and
present objective and confirmed information. The perception based non-agreeing
adjectives akivaizdu ‘evident’, aišku ‘clear’ and the adverbs akivaizdžiai ‘evidently’
and aiškiai ‘clearly’ also qualify as markers of high validity because they make re-
course to reliable perceptual and conceptual evidence. They frequently express in-
ferences made by a third party and consequently support the journalist’s point of
view. The participle-based CTPs manoma ‘thought’ and suprantama ‘understood’
and the adjective-based CTP panašu ‘likely’ express medium validity because ap-
parently the author distances from the interpretation of original external sources
or perceptual and conceptual evidence available to him/her. The lowest validity is
assigned to the reportive adverb tariamai ‘allegedly’, which implies untrustworthy
sources of information and disassociation from the propositional content. In ar-
gumentative contexts, individual markers (e.g. manoma ‘thought’, akivaizdu ‘evi-
dent’) stress the author’s position and also help the reader process the information
and form an opinion.
In newspaper discourse, the reader can become a member of the same “group”
as the author through reference to shared values, norms and attitudes (Simon-
Vandenbergen and Aijmer 2007:155). Referring to shared knowledge, the markers
under study create familiarity between the author and the reader and influence
the latter’s opinion. These functions are pertinent to the parentheticals žinoma
‘of course, certainly’, suprantama ‘naturally’ and aišku ‘of course’ and display
parallels with evidential markers in Germanic and Romance languages (Simon-
Vandenbergen and Aijmer 2007; Cuenca and Marín 2012; Aijmer 2013).
Acknowledgements
The current study has been carried out within the project Modality and Evidentiality in the
Lithuanian Language (Project No MIP-062/2014) funded by the Research Council of Lithuania.
List of abbreviations
acc accusative inf infinitive

adj adjective inst instrumental
adv adverb loc locative
ap active participle lr Lietuvos Rytas
ber Bernardinai.lt m masculine
c clause n neuter
cn converb nagr non-agreeing
comp complementiser neg negative
compr comparative nom nominative
cnv converb pl plural
ctp Complement-Taking-Predicate pp passive participle
dat dative prs present
f feminine pst past
fr frequency sbjv subjunctive
gen genitive sg singular
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Studies in Language 12 (1): 51–97. doi: 10.1075/sl.12.1.04wil
Chapter 12
Exploring evidential uses of the passive

of reporting verbs through corpus analysis
Ruth Breeze
University of Navarra
One feature which has interesting evidential implications in English is the pas-
sive form of verbs of saying or thinking. Corpus evidence is used to trace the
evolution of the most frequent passive structures of this kind over the last two
hundred years, and to explore changes in their use. Diachronic developments
in frequency, and evidence for semantic and syntactic narrowing of the passive
forms of “say”, “expect” and “suppose”, are analysed in the light of claims that
these forms are becoming grammaticalised. Trends concerning the deontic and
evidential uses of “expect” and “suppose” are discussed.
Keywords: passive voice, reporting verbs, diachronic linguistics, deontic

modality, evidentiality
1. Introduction
The field of evidentiality is a current focus of research attention in many different

languages. In its narrow definition, evidentiality can be regarded as a subcategory
of a broader dimension of language which has been called epistemological posi-
tioning (Bednarek 2006a). In this view, “evidentials express the kinds of evidence
a person has for making factual claims” (Anderson 1986:273), and so evidential-
ity concerns the aspect of epistemological positioning that marks the basis of the
speaker’s/writer’s knowledge (Bednarek 2006a:637). In English, evidentiality can
be expressed either directly or indirectly. Direct evidentiality is generally conveyed
through verbs of perception indicating direct sensory evidence, such as “see”, or
“hear”. Indirect evidentiality is more complex, since the language offers a range of
resources that can be divided into two broad categories: constructions that indi-
cate some degree of inference on the part of the speaker/writer, and expressions
that are used to identify the nature of the sources of information in some way.
Inference can in turn be subdivided into deduction and assumption. The former
doi 10.1075/pbns.271.13bre
298 Ruth Breeze
is generally conveyed through verbs that reflect deduction (“look”, “sound”), and
modal constructions with “must” or “cannot” which indicate that something has
been deduced from evidence. Assumption can be conveyed with verbs or adverbs
that imply acceptance of shared information, such as “known” or “supposedly”. An
example of inference through deduction would be “She must be at home, because
the light is on”, while an example of inference through assumption would be “It is
known that she is always home by nine o’clock”. The nature of the channel of evi-
dence drawn upon is expressed by use of reporting verbs such as “say” or “report”,
adverbs formed with verbs of this type, such as “reportedly” or “allegedly”, as well
as related adjectival constructions such as “the alleged killer”.
Some previous research attention has focused on such verba dicendi, which
have a prominent role in conveying evidentiality in English (Aikhenvald 2003),
and which convey significant evaluative undertones (Hunston and Francis 1998;
Yang 2013). However, within this area, the English passive of reporting/thinking
verbs (“be said/thought to be”) is a structure that still holds considerable potential
interest (Noël 2001; Noël and van der Auwera 2009). This structure can be used
to convey “hearsay”, i.e. reported information with no reference to those it was
reported by (Aikhenvald 2004), as in the example “He was said to be very angry”,
which seems to belong to the category of indirect reported evidentiality explained
above, since the nature of the source is mentioned, albeit vaguely. Moreover, this
type of structure is also used to communicate what Bednarek (2006a:643) terms
“mindsay”, or quoted mental experience, as in the example “She is thought to live
in Algiers”, which arguably belongs to the evidential category of inferred evidenti-
ality through “assumption” or shared/general knowledge (Aikhenvald 2004), also
described above. These structures constitute interesting examples, because usually
speakers/writers either 1) take full responsibility for their own statements (non-
sourced averral, as in “She is a popular politician”), or 2) take responsibility while
basing their statements on evidence (sourced averral, as in “Yesterday’s opinion
poll shows that she is a popular politician”), or 3) attribute the propositions in
question to someone else (attribution, as in “Wolfgang Schröder says that she is
a popular politician”) (Bednarek 2006b:60–62; Hunston 2000:192). However, ex-
amples like “She is said to be popular” or “She is thought to live in Algiers”, em-
body a type of evidentiality in which the source of the averral is supposed to be
outside the self, but is not given, which means that such statements stand mid-way
between straightforward attributions and averrals (Bednarek 2006a). If anything,
they are closer to the non-sourced averral, but the type of evidence is indicated
less explicitly. Such structures have rarely formed the specific object of critical at-
tention, and the crucial difference in terms of evidentiality between mindsay and
hearsay has often been ignored.
Chapter 12. Exploring evidential uses of the passive of reporting verbs through corpus analysis 299
The observed prominence of passive structures with “say” and other hearsay or
mindsay verbs in media and academic texts, and the particular opportunities such
structures offer the writer in terms of organising information and backgrounding
sources, have led some linguists to speculate that such structures are becoming
grammaticalised, that is, that they are losing their lexical meaning and becoming
function words that serve as evidentiality markers. In Noël’s view (2001), “with-
out question the popularity of many of the BE Ved to-inf patterns, particularly in
genres like news texts and scientific discourse, can be related to the fact that these
patterns have become grammaticalized as lexicogrammatical paradigms available
in systems of evidentiality.” Noël applies Anderson’s criteria (1986) for defining
true grammaticalised evidentials to see if these structures can qualify, and brings
forward various arguments to support his view that the passive of verbs such as
“say” is indeed being grammaticalised. These include the fact that the passive is
disproportionately more frequent than the active infinitive structure with these
verbs (that is, examples such as “He is considered to be generous” are more fre-
quent than “People consider him to be generous”). Moreover, passive matrices are
more tolerant of lexical verbs in such structures (i.e. you can say “He is reported
to live in Greece”, but not “They reported him to live in Greece”). Also, the verbal
behaviour of these structures is reduced: they can only associate with a few tenses,
and they are (generally) unstressed. Rather more controversially, Noël advances
the view that verbs used in this way do not express their prototypical meaning,
namely that someone has said or thought something. He considers that the use of a
passive structure turns a simple attribution (“John said that George is hiding from
the police”) into a statement about something else that is modified by the report-
ing verb (“George is said to be hiding from the police”). Noting also that transla-
tors often represent the meaning of such structures through adverbs (equivalents
of “apparently” or “reportedly”), Noël suggests that: “The higher frequency of pas-
sive matrices could also be a concomitant of a grammaticalization process which is
turning them into a sort of function words” (2001: 129). In certain circumstances,
he maintains, this structure might ultimately end up as a kind of evidential modal.
On the other hand, Noël (2001) also commented that one argument that weak-
ens this hypothesis is that a large number of verbs can be used in and with these
constructions – that is, the structures are still productive. If it were found that one
verb comes to dominate over time, and others become less frequent, that the usage
is becoming more formulaic, or that one form is taking on a particular meaning or
fulfilling a particular special function, then a process of incipient grammaticalisa-
tion as documented above might indeed be under way. Conversely, if these verbs
are actually becoming less frequent or giving rise to more varied uses, this might
mean that prospects of grammaticalisation are receding.
300 Ruth Breeze
This study uses corpus analysis to explore developments in the use of passive
reporting verb structures over time. Its aim is twofold: first, to provide descriptive
data concerning frequency and evidential (or other) uses; and second, to address
the issue of whether these corpus data bring to light any of the features identi-
fied as suggesting grammaticalisation (high frequency, narrowing of syntatic and
semantic potential, formulaic uses, restriction to particular genres or registers).
2. Corpus and method
This study uses standard corpus data (British National Corpus (BNC), Corpus
of Contemporary American English (COCA), Corpus of Historical American
English (COHA), Google Books Corpus (Google Books), Time Magazine Corpus
(TIME)) (Davies 2007, 2008, 2010, 2011) to obtain information about the fre-
quency and usage of passive reporting verb structures, and to trace their develop-
ment over the last two hundred years. For reasons of practicality, the attention
centres particularly on the four verbs found to be most frequent in passive struc-
tures: two “hearsay” verbs (“say” and “report”) and two “mindsay” verbs (“sup-
pose” and “expect”). The study focuses on the passive of these verbs followed by
the infinitive and by the perfect infinitive. First, a synchronic analysis was per-
formed in COCA and BNC, to identify the most frequent reporting verbs used
in passive structures, and to establish their main patterns of use in contemporary
English (spoken language, fiction, newspapers, magazines and academic writing
in COCA; spoken, fiction, newspapers, magazines, academic and non-academic
writing in BNC). Then, a diachronic analysis was carried out using COHA, TIME
and Google Books, to identify long-term trends in the use of the different variants
of this structure. Sampling at different time points was used to track changing pat-
terns over time, focusing particularly on trends in frequency, erosion of syntactic
and semantic possibilities, and semantic changes, possibly accompanied by a de-
gree of bleaching, which could point to incipient grammaticalisation. The results
are then discussed in the light of claims that such structures are gradually becom-
ing grammaticalised as evidentiality markers.
3. Patterns of frequency today
In order to obtain preliminary data about the frequency of structures involving the
passive of reporting verbs, an initial study was conducted using the British National
Corpus (BNC) on the one hand, and the Corpus of Contemporary American
English (COCA) on the other. Initially, frequency counts were conducted for a
large number of verbs preceded by any form of “to be” and followed by “to”, but
it soon became clear that the verbs that most commonly appeared in these struc-
tures in both corpora were “suppose” and “expect”, which alone accounted for over
half the instances found. These were followed at some distance by “say”, “believe”,
“think” and “report”. Other potential reporting verbs were found to have much
lower frequency than these.
BE said to
BE believed to
BE supposed to
BE expected to
BE reported to
BE thought to
Graph 1. Six most frequent passive reporting verbs in BNC.
BE said to
BE believed to
BE supposed to
BE expected to
BE reported to
BE thought to
Graph 2. Six most frequent passive reporting verbs in COCA.
For this reason, it was decided to focus research attention on the passives of four
reporting verbs: the two most frequent hearsay verbs, “say” and “report”, and the
two most frequent potential mindsay verbs, “expect” and “suppose”. Table 1 shows
the normalised frequency of these “BE verb to” structures in BNC and COCA.
Table 1. Frequency of common “BE verb to” structures per million words in BNC and
COCA.
BNC COCA
BE said to 36 14
BE reported to 10 4
BE expected to 59 43
BE supposed to 33 55
302 Ruth Breeze
Regarding genre, there were some differences between the verbs. Tables 2 and 3
provide a break-down of the percentages of each “BE verb to” structure in BNC
and COCA. “BE said to” was more frequent in academic, newspaper and maga-
zine language in COCA, and in academic, newspaper and non-academic prose
in BNC. “BE said to” was less frequent in spoken language and fiction in both
these corpora. Moreover, “BE said to” collocated strongly with “to be” (and “to
have been”): in COCA, “BE said to be/have been” accounted for around 40% of
all occurrences of “BE said to”. Similar patterns were found for “BE thought to”
and “BE believed to” in both corpora, since these were also mainly found in media
language (newspapers and magazines) and in academic and non-academic prose,
and most frequently collocated with “be” (53% for “BE thought to” and 49% for
“BE believed to”).
Table 2. Percentages of each “BE verb to” structure in BNC by genre.

Spoken Fiction Magazine News Non-academic Academic Misc
BE said to 1.5 3 6.2 16.1 27.3 27.3 18.6
BE reported to 1.5 1.5 4.8 13 53.5 14.2 11.5
BE expected to 2.3 3.6 6.3 25.1 27 15.6 20.1
BE supposed to 25.6 25.1 6.4 7.2 12.1 10 13.6
Table 3. Percentages of each “BE verb to” structure in COCA by genre.

Spoken Fiction Magazine Newspaper Academic
BE said to 14.9 9 22.2 18.4 35.5
BE reported to 15.4 3 13.9 18.3 49.4
BE expected to 16.7 3.5 15 39.7 25.1
BE supposed to 30.4 28.6 15.8 18 7.2
“BE expected to” was also found most frequently in newspaper language in both
BNC and COCA, but this category was followed by academic and spoken lan-
guage in COCA, and by miscellaneous, academic and non-academic language in
BNC. “BE expected to” showed no particular pattern of collocation regarding “to
be” (14.8%). The pattern found with “BE supposed to” contrasted heavily with
these, in that “BE supposed to” was chiefly used in spoken language and fiction in
both corpora. On the other hand, “BE supposed to” collocated with “be” in around
38% of cases.
4. Diachronic developments
In this section, the striking development in the use of passive reporting verb struc-
tures over the last two hundred years is described. Then, the possible reasons for
the patterns that emerge are discussed with particular reference to the three most
frequent verbs used in these structures, namely “say”, “expect” and “suppose”.
4.1 Patterns of frequency over time
The Corpus of Historical American English (COHA) was used to investigate the
trends in the use of these passive structures over 200 years, starting from 1810. The
corpus interface allows the user to search for combinations of any form of “to be”
followed by “said to”, “thought to”, etc. Using this corpus, we can obtain normalised
frequencies per million words, which are essential for comparative purposes. As
graph 3 shows, while “BE thought to”, “BE believed to” and “BE reported to” ex-
hibited a low and fairly regular frequency over time, the other three verbs suffered
noteworthy fluctuations. “BE said to” reached it peak in 1830, and then fluctuated
until 1920, when it embarked on a fairly steady decline.
80 BE said to
70 BE reported to
BE expected to
60
BE thought to
Freq per million
50 BE believed to
40 BE supposed to
30
20
10
0
1810 1830 1850 1870 1890 1910 1930 1950 1970 1990
Years
Graph 3. Normalised frequency per million of passive reporting verbs in COHA.
“BE expected to” developed in the opposite direction, with low levels of frequency
in the nineteenth century, followed by a dramatic and sustained increase in the
early twentieth century, and then a sharp decline after 1990. “BE supposed to” was
relatively frequent over the first century, but took off around 1930, soaring to a
frequency greater than that of all the other constructions put together by the end
of the twentieth century. In short, the most striking feature of this graph is the rise
of “BE expected to” and “BE supposed to”, and the decline of “BE said to”, over the
course of the twentieth century.
304 Ruth Breeze
In order to corroborate this evidence, the Google Books corpus was consulted
in both the British and American versions (data not shown). Interestingly, in the
case of “BE said to”, these corpora both showed a steady decline from 1810 to the
present day, from around 90 per million words in 1810 to around 20 in 2010, in the
American version, and from around 120 per million words in 1810 to around 40
in 2010 in the British version. These corpora also confirmed the substantial rise in
“BE expected to”, which peaked around 1980 in the American version and 1990 in
the British version. The main contrast between COHA and Google Books was that
“BE supposed to”, which rose dramatically in COHA during the twentieth century,
actually declined during the same period in Google Books British, and remained
stable in Google Books American.
In order to account for the inconsistencies between corpora, it is useful to
consider that genre is a determining factor. As the synchronic study shows (Tables
2 and 3), these structures, more than many others, are strongly associated with
particular areas of language use. The structures involving “BE said to” and “BE
expected to” are found mainly in academic language and written media language
in contemporary English. On the other hand, “BE supposed to” is very frequent
in spoken English, particularly in the USA. The spoken nature of “BE supposed
to” would perhaps explain why it is infrequent in the Google Books corpora. To
obtain further data about these structures over time, the Time Magazine Corpus
was consulted. Since this corpus consists entirely of magazine texts, the pat-
terns that emerged shed further light on the development of these structures
in written American media English, and provide a point of comparison with
the data from COHA.
120 BE said to
BE reported to
100
BE expected to
80 BE thought to
Freq per million
BE believed to
60 BE supposed to
40
20
0
1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Years
Graph 4. Frequencies of passive reporting verbs in TIME.
Graph 4 confirms the long-term decline of “BE said to” in written media lan-
guage, and the startling rise of “BE expected to” in the later twentieth century.
Interestingly, while COHA places this rise as beginning around 1920 and remain-
ing high between the 1950s and 1980s before entering a sharp decline, TIME pres-
ents a much sharper peak (over 100 instances per million words) in the 1980s.
Finally, as graph 5 illustrates, the use of the perfect infinitive in passive report-
ing verb structures (“BE said to have” followed by a past participle) declined even
more dramatically than the use of the present infinitive in these constructions
over the two centuries represented by COHA. In the case of “BE said to have”, this
structure was relatively frequent (over 10 instances per million words) until the
mid-twentieth century, when it experienced a sharp decline. Curiously, “BE re-
ported to have” and “BE believed to have” seemed to enjoy a vogue between 1920
and 1970, but subsequently went out of fashion and dwindled away by the 1990s.
20 BE said to have PP
18 BE reported to have PP
16 BE expected to have PP
14 BE thought to have PP
Freq per million
12 BE believed to have PP
10
BE supposed to have
8
6
4
2
0
1810 1830 1850 1870 1890 1910 1930 1950 1970 1990
Years
Graph 5. Frequencies of passive reporting verbs with perfect infinitive in COHA.
“BE supposed to have” also shows a long-term downward trend, but has not
dropped as much as the others, and now has a frequency similar to that of “BE said
to have”. In the two Google Books corpora, there was a continuous decline for “BE
supposed to have” and “BE said to have” over the last two hundred years (data not
shown), and very low frequencies across the whole timespan for the other verbs
when used with perfect forms.
4.2 Changing trends in use
In order to analyse these trends further, it is first necessary to look briefly at the
reasons why a speaker or writer might prefer to use the passive of a reporting verb
to convey reported information, rather than an alternative using the active form.
Generally speaking, the passive of reporting verbs is often used when it is neces-
sary to redistribute information within the sentence. By applying this structure, it
306 Ruth Breeze
is possible to move the subject of a complement clause to sentence-initial position,

which is the unmarked position for information that is contextually “given”. This
may help to establish thematic progression within the text. Passives of reporting
verbs may also sometimes be used when the agent (the speaker or thinker) is not
known, or not important, or when the speaker/writer of the text does not wish to
reveal the identity of the speaker/thinker responsible for the reported proposition.
Finally, the passive of reporting verb offers the advantage of concision, and may
sometimes be used to avoid repetition or redundancy.
These applications make passives of reporting verbs a valuable resource for
writers, and go some way toward explaining why this structure has been espe-
cially associated with journalism. In particular, the ability to imbue a statement
with a certain degree of evidentiality, either of a reported or an assumed kind
(hearsay or mindsay), may prove very useful to journalists, since it allows them
to give more credence to their claims without actually naming their sources. As
Noël (2001:270) says, “the (be) Ved to pattern constitutes a subjective intrusion by
the speaker/writer (in the sense of Traugott 1995) to give his/her statement a sem-
blance of objectivity (…), i.e. they signal that the speaker/writer of the sentences is
not the (sole) judge of the factuality of his/her statement by calling in an unspeci-
fied source, from whose implied existence the relative factuality of the statement
can be inferred”. At the same time, the presence of the speaker/thinker is pared
down to a minimum: for example, in such structures the verb “to say” has lost its
processual dimension, and only a trace is left of the speaker. This might indicate
that it occupies a slightly different position on the evidential scale from more di-
rect forms of reported speech. However, the extent to which these structures have
evidential implications must certainly vary, since the actual verb used determines
the type of evidentiality that is engaged (for example, there may be differences in
evidentiality based on whether a hearsay or mindsay verb is used, and there may
also be differences between verbs within these categories).
On the other hand, the steady decline of some of these structures in written
language suggests that trends in writing, and even in journalism, have turned away
from this loose form of evidentiality, either because writers are becoming more
inclined to quote sources directly, or because writers increasingly avoid the use of
the passive in favour of a more direct style, or both. In view of this trend, the de-
cline in “BE said to” seems to contrast rather oddly with the twentieth century rise
in “BE expected to”, which might seem at first glance to fulfil a similar function.
The sharp and sustained rise in “BE supposed to” in the later twentieth century
also seems to call for further explanation.
For this reason, it appears necessary to look at each verb in turn in order to
find out what might have motivated the particular trend. For reasons of space,
discussion will now focus on the three most frequent reporting verbs found in the
passive (“say”, “expect” and “suppose”) in more depth, explaining their develop-
ment over time and tracing syntactic and semantic changes in their use.
4.2.1 “BE said to”

“BE said to” was the most frequent passive reporting structure at the beginning
of the period studied, and then rose to a frequency of over 40 occurrences per
million words in the first half of the nineteenth century, a position which it main-
tained for around a hundred years. Its decline began in the 1920s, and its use has
tailed off gradually ever since. Today, its frequency is around 10 instances per mil-
lion words according to COHA (Graph 3), although it is much higher in the BNC
(Table 2). We might speculate that the rise of this structure coincided with the rise
of popular journalism in the nineteenth century. Its decline, on the other hand,
may be associated more with a change in journalistic style towards a more direct,
dynamic approach to writing which favours active over passive voice and avoids
references to unspecific sources where possible. “BE said to” can easily be replaced
by an active structure indicating who said what, or by a range of loosely evidential
resources such as “reportedly”. When a statement has been made, it would seem
to be relatively easy to find out who said it, and a direct quotation is generally pre-
ferred in contemporary journalism because it is considered to have higher impact.
Regarding grammaticalisation theory, on the one hand, the relative decline of
“BE said to” appears to suggest that this structure is being discarded in favour of
other, more direct, ways of reporting speech. If frequency alone is the criterion for
grammaticalisation, the fact that “be said to” is long past its peak is an important
counter-argument. On the other hand, the fact that the forms have undergone
a process of narrowing – the perfect form (“is said to have done”) is falling into
disuse and the present tense dominates – might provide an argument in favour of
grammaticalisation. Interestingly, when co-occurrence was investigated, it turned
out that “BE said to” is most frequently found in combination with “to be”, as in
the example “he is said to be a very wealthy man”, and is also common with other
stative verbs (“live”, “have”, “like”, etc.). Moreover, “BE said to” is also mainly as-
sociated with particular genres (it is mainly found in academic, newspaper and
magazine texts, and is rare in spoken language). The comparison with the Spanish
“dizque”, thought to have been influenced by the Latin “dicitur”, would provide an
interesting historical comparison: in this case, it seems that a true verbal structure
(“They say that”) developed into a particle indicating a kind of hearsay evidential-
ity. Unfortunately, discussion of this falls beyond the scope of the present paper.
In short, the corpus evidence does not completely rule out the possibility that
“BE said to” is undergoing a very weak form of grammaticalisation – perhaps what
Lehmann (1995:13) calls “syntacticization” – and may be functioning as a kind of
evidential auxiliary denoting reliance on some form of unattributed hearsay.
308 Ruth Breeze
4.2.2 “BE expected to”

“BE expected to” has undergone a very different development from “BE said to”
over the time period studied. From a frequency of around 10 per million dur-
ing the nineteenth century, “BE expected to” suddenly shot to prominence during
the 1920s, and was very frequent (over 40 per million) during the mid-twentieth
century. In the 1980s it began to decline, but its frequency is still fairly high, par-
ticularly in journalism. The TIME corpus places its frequency at around 40 per
million still, whereas the more general COCA now suggests a frequency of around
30 per million.
In order to investigate these trends further, it is important to define what
makes “BE expected to” different from the other structures under scrutiny. Today,
“BE expected to” appears to be used as a kind of modal of probability/prediction,
which has some evidential quality related to mindsay. The idea appears to be that
someone with a certain authority in the area expects that something is going to
happen, or that a state of affairs is going to come about. When we say “inflation
is expected to rise next year”, we imply that there is some expert backing for this
opinion, but we do not suggest who exactly this expectation is to be attributed
to. Interestingly, there appears to be no adverbial in English that would suggest
exactly this quality of “expectedness”. Moreover, in contrast to “BE said to”, “BE
expected to” seems to collocate with a wide range of action verbs, and not with
stative verbs. However, a certain amount of confusion arises out of the fact that
“BE expected to” can also be used to imply a social or moral expectation: “you are
expected to work from 9 until 5” does not imply an expert prediction, but rather
an accepted condition of employment, in other words, a social expectation. In this
latter sense, “BE expected to” has deontic rather than evidential implications.
If we track these two different meanings over time, it is evident that the former
is on the increase, while the latter is declining. An analysis of 100 random concor-
dance lines in COHA for 1830 and 2000 produced the following picture: in 1830,
97% of the concordance lines with “BE expected to” implied social expectation,
and 3% prediction; by contrast, in 2000, only 7% of the concordance lines reflected
social expectation, and 93% prediction. Interestingly, “BE expected to” is currently
used in combination with a wide range of different action verbs: the commonest
collocates in the BNC were “rise”, “announce”, and “grow”, while in TIME they
were “reach”, “follow”, and “rise”, and in COCA they were “increase”, “grow”, “con-
tinue”, and “rise”. Unlike “BE said to”, “BE expected to” appears not to collocate
with stative verbs, presumably because states pervade the moment of speaking and
therefore cannot associate with “expect” (Ziegeler 2008).
In short, the development of “BE expected to” is progressing strongly in the
direction of evidential uses, and the deontic application frequent in the nine-
teenth century examples appears to be dying out. The particular usefulness of
“BE expected to” to express predictions supported by mindsay evidentiality prob-

ably accounts for its frequency in many types of reporting, as well as non-fiction
and academic prose.
4.2.3 “BE supposed to”

“BE supposed to” is the construction with the most striking growth over the pe-
riod studied. According to COHA, during the 2000s “BE supposed to” was at least
twice as frequent as any of the other passive reporting verbs. Moreover, when we
compare this evidence with the data from COCA, we can see that the importance
of “BE supposed to” is mainly due to its popularity in spoken language. The fact
that “BE supposed to” is most often used in oral language accounts for the diver-
gence of the Google Books corpora in this respect: the graphs for “BE supposed to”
in these corpora do not reflect the same dramatic rise in usage, but these corpora
by definition only provide evidence about written language. Curiously, TIME also
shows a fairly high frequency of “BE supposed to”, which might be a reflection of
the rather informal use of language in some sections of this magazine.
The patterns involving “BE supposed to” are doubtless influenced by the fact
that this combination seems to offer at least two rather diverse meanings. “BE sup-
posed to” can convey a meaning that is related to evidentiality, as in the example
“He is supposed to be a good doctor”, where a diffuse kind of mindsay is engaged.
However, it can also indicate a sense of social expectation, as in the example “You
are not supposed to do that sort of thing in the library”. Ziegeler (2008) points
out that when “BE supposed to” is combined with a stative verb or a time-stable
condition, the meaning is more likely to be related to what she terms “belief ”. If
we accept that, rather than belief, we are looking here at a form of diffuse mindsay
evidentiality, then her distinction can be applied helpfully in these cases. On the
other hand, it is fairly clear that “BE supposed to” in combination with an action
verb generally suggests that someone ought to do something, as in the example
above. The most frequent collocate of “BE supposed to” was “be” in TIME and
COCA, which might, on the strength of Ziegeler’s (2008) argument, suggest that
the evidential meaning of “BE supposed to” tends to dominate. However, one seri-
ous problem with this argument is that there are a large number of examples where
“BE supposed to” collocates with “be”, but the meaning is not stative: “You are sup-
posed to be (quiet, ready, on time, etc.)”.
In order to find out more about the development of “BE supposed to”, the
distribution of the different meanings across 100 random concordance lines was
examined, as for “BE expected to” (above). Since not all cases are clear cut, and the
expression itself contains some ambiguity (some readings of “supposed to” lie be-
tween deontics and evidentiality, such as “Politicians are supposed to declare their
income”), some of the lines were discarded as too ambiguous for classification.
310 Ruth Breeze
The results suggested that “BE supposed to” is in fact moving away from evidential
meanings and coming to fulfil a communicative need related to the expression of
social norms and expectations. In a random sample of concordance lines from the
different sections of COCA, we obtained the following results: in COCA Spoken,
we found 61 evidential and 39 deontic uses of “BE supposed to”; in COCA News,
62 evidential and 38 deontic; and in COCA Academic 80 evidential and 20 de-
ontic. When these data were compared with 100 random concordance lines from
1830, it was found that the earlier data contained 96 evidential and 4 deontic uses
of “BE supposed to”. In other words, unlike “BE expected to”, “BE supposed to”
seems to be moving away from evidential meanings and associating much more
with deontic uses, particularly in spoken language.
Ziegeler (2008) also traced the history of “BE supposed to”, finding it histori-
cally to be mainly used to convey belief. She noted that “BE supposed to” devel-
oped a sense of social obligation and expectation in the eighteenth century and
that its use to indicate what she terms “social duty normative functions” rose
over the nineteenth and twentieth century. In her words, “the grammaticalising
semi-modal was recruited into these deontic environments to help to distance
the speaker from the deontic force, since it is a generic passive and still carries
senses of the speaker-external evidentiality ascribed to its original source con-
texts” (2008:71). The present results tend to corroborate her view of the rise of
deontic uses. In Ziegeler’s view, the long term future of “BE supposed to” is as a
kind of “future-projecting modal”, and it will become grammaticalised as such,
while the other variants will probably die out. Without embarking on a detailed
discussion of how exactly her concept of the “future-projecting modal” use of “BE
supposed to” differs from the externally-sourced deontic use of this structure an-
alysed by most writers (Noël 2001; van der Auwera and Plungian 1998; Noël and
van Auwera 2009), we can generally support her view that “BE supposed to” is
moving away from evidential meanings.
This in itself is a striking finding, because as Noël and van Auwera (2009)
point out, if “BE supposed to” has developed from epistemic to deontic, then “sup-
posed” is going in the opposite direction to many other words, such as “must”
and “should” (Bybee et al. 1994). In the present study, it was found that “BE sup-
posed to” has overwhelmingly come to be used to indicate participant-external
obligation in spoken language. In academic texts, however, it still seems to func-
tion principally as an evidential. It is possible that further research, including fur-
ther phonological evidence concerning the documented reduction of “supposed
to” to “sposta” (Hopper and Traugott 2003:128), will show that the spoken variant
of “supposed to”, particularly when phonologically reduced, is indeed coming to
function as a kind of modal auxiliary conveying participant-external obligation.
5. Conclusions
This paper has shown that the passive of reporting verbs has not behaved ho-
mogeneously as a structure over the last 200 years, but that different verbs have
taken quite different paths. First, we have seen that “BE said to” was frequent in
the nineteenth century but declined considerably from the mid-twentieth cen-
tury onwards. Other hearsay constructions, such as “BE reported to”, were much
less frequent throughout the entire period, although this particular one seems to
have enjoyed a brief heyday in the mid-twentieth century. These hearsay verbs
are mainly confined to media and academic sections of the corpora, which would
indicate that they belong to a more formal, written register. Their decline might
reflect a change in journalists’ and academics’ style and practices, with a greater
emphasis on direct speech and named sources. Second, the two most frequent
mindsay constructions identified, “BE expected to” and “BE supposed to”, have
both seen significant increases in recent times, and this rise is still continuing in
the case of “BE supposed to”. But interestingly, these constructions seem almost
to have reversed their semantic roles in the course of the last two centuries. “BE
expected to” seems to be shifting from deontic to evidential meanings, the latter
being particularly frequent in media texts to indicate predictions with some expert
backing. Factors that may partially account for the popularity of “BE expected to”
include the lack of adverbs to express expectation, and the peculiar communica-
tive need of the media to provide predictions without taking full responsibility
for them, for which a mindsay construction with a future orientation is ideally
suited. “BE supposed to”, on the other hand, seems to be shifting from evidential
to deontic meanings, and is particularly common in spoken registers, where it is
used to indicate participant-external social obligation. Further research is needed
to explore the reasons that underlie this slippage between evidential and deontic
meanings, which might compare this situation with other instances, such as the
historical development of “must”.
The identification of the three reporting verbs which are most frequently used
in passive constructions in English may also have implications for discussion of
grammaticality. Since frequency is often cited as a necessary condition that pre-
cedes grammaticalisation (Traugott and Heine 1991), these results could be inter-
preted as shedding some light on whether or not such a process is taking place. On
the criterion of frequency alone, this quantitative study has suggested candidates
that might be entering a phase of grammaticalisation: “said to”, “expected to” and
“supposed to”. All of these structures are relatively frequent, and between them
they account for most of the instances of passive reporting verbs. Of these con-
structions, the one which (on the strength of this limited analysis) may be closest
to becoming grammaticalised is “BE supposed to”, particularly in informal spoken
312 Ruth Breeze
registers where it is undergoing a process of phonological reduction and taking

on a deontic role related to participant-external obligation. In the case of “BE said
to” and “BE expected to”, it has been said that high or growing frequency does
not equal grammaticalisation, but frequency is certainly a necessary condition for
such a process to occur. In the case of these two verbs, our evidence showing that
these constructions are actually now declining might serve to build a (similarly
tentative) argument that grammaticalisation is actually not taking place. On the
other hand, the erosion of the perfect forms, and the tendency for “BE said to” to
collocate with “be”, might point to a gradual reduction in syntactic and semantic
possibilities that might represent the first step on a long road towards grammati-
calisation. If this is the case, then “BE said to” might come to function as an evi-
dential modal suggesting the presence of anonymous hearsay evidence, while “BE
expected to” would function as an evidential modal indicating mindsay evidence
of a rather more reliable nature.
Acknowledgements
The research for this paper was carried out within the framework of the project “Metadiscurso
y lenguaje evaluativo: perspectivas teóricas y de análisis en el discurso periodístico”, funded by the
Spanish Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (ref. FFI2012-36309).
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Index of expressions
A believe 108, 116, 229–230, manoma 271, 272, 277, 282,

aiškiai 187, 272, 275, 278, 244, 246, 301 284, 291–292
286, 291–292 see also be believed to may 17–18, 27, 29, 38, 46,
aišku 272, 278, 286, 291–292 51–52, 230, 233, 241–243,
akivaizdu 271–272, 278, 286, C 246, 261–262
289–290, 292 can 18, 27, 29, 261–262 maybe 39, 48, 52, 124, 230,
akivaizdžiai 271, 272, 275, certainly 39, 40–44, 46–48, 241, 243, 244
278, 286, 291–292 124, 230, 241 me parece 110–111, 115, 129
al parecer 87, 89–94, clearly 38, 69, 212, 222, 230, might 18, 27, 29, 38, 230, 233,
207–208, 213, 215–216, 237–238 241–243, 246, 261–264
218, 222 considero 110–112 must 18, 27, 69, 200–201,
all’apparenza 87, 99–100, 102 could 18, 27, 29, 230, 233, 203, 205, 241, 243, 253n4,
allegedly 38, 200, 213, 222, 241–243, 246, 261 261, 262n12, 298, 310, 311
230, 298 creo 108–111, 115, 119
ao parecer 4, 87, 89, 97–98 O
ao que parece 87, 89, 97–99, D obvious 229
102 da la impresión 114–115, obviously 69, 72, 89n2, 212,
aparentemente 207, 208, 212, 223 222, 229–230, 237–238
212–213, 215–216, 218, ought to 253n4, 253n6
222 E
apparently 39, 87–88, 199– evidently 39, 212, 222, 230 P
200, 207–208, 212–213, expected 250, 254–256, 260, parece 207–208, 210–212,
215–216, 222, 229–230, 262–264 216–218, 223
237–238 see also be expected to see also me parece, según
appear 46, 69, 123–124, 200, parece
207, 209–210, 212–213, I parece ser 211, 213, 217–218
215–216, 216n3, 217–218, I think 38, 48–52, 75, 144 perhaps 39–43, 46, 48, 124,
222, 228, 230, 237–238 in apparenza 87, 89, 99–100, 230, 241, 243–244
avoir l’air de 87, 89, 101, 102 102 pienso 110–111, 115
по-видимому 87, 89, 95–97
B L
be believed to 254, 301–305 lijken 123–128, 128n2, 130– R
be expected to 249–250, 131, 131n3, 132, 132n5, reportedly 38–39, 42–48, 200,
253–254, 256, 258–267, 133–134, 136n6, 137–140, 213, 222, 230, 239–241,
301–306, 308–312 140n9, 142–145 298–299, 307
be reported to 301–305, 311 likely 44, 75, 249–250, 253,
be said to 7, 301–308, 253n5, 254–255, 255n8, S
311–312 256–262, 262n12, 263–267 sakoma 272, 277, 279–280,
be supposed to 253, 253n6, 282, 292
254, 301–306, 309–311 M scheinen 123–128, 130–131,
be thought to 254, 298, -ma/-ta participles 171–175, 131n3, 132, 132n5,
301–304 178–180, 182–185, 187, 133–136, 136n6, 137–139,
189–190
316 Index of expressions
139n8, 140–141, 141n.10, según parece 207–208, 210, think 44, 49, 106, 123,
142–145 213, 217, 223 229–230, 244, 246, 301
schijnen 123–127, 129–132, se ve 205, 212, 223 see also be thought to, I think
132n5, 133–134, 137–139, shall 18, 27, 29, 149, 165
139n7, 140–143, 143n11, should 17–18, 27, 29, 149, W
144–145, 157 164–166, 253n4, 261, will 17–18, 23–24, 27–29,
se conoce 206, 212, 223 262n12, 263–264, 310 39–40, 200, 261, 263–264
se diría 206, 212, 223 supposedly 213, 222, 230, would 18, 27–29, 261, 264
seem 44, 46, 69, 88, 123–124, 239–241, 298
136, 200, 207, 209–210, Z
212–213, 215–218, 222, T zou(den) 146, 149–166
228, 230, 237–238, 289 tariamai 272, 278–282,
seemingly 39, 69, 87–88, 291–292
212, 222
Subject index
A construction 14–15, 25–26, CTP see complement-taking

academic discourse 147, 182, 32, 34, 37, 41–42, 46–47, predicate
185, 187, 188, 278 49–50, 52, 75, 93, 95,
acquisition of knowledge 102, 105, 116, 119, 124, D
verbs 112, 119 130–136, 139–145, 149, deontic (modality) / deontics
adverbial construction 159, 162, 166, 171–173, 57, 61, 63–66, 68, 68n6,
131n4, 133, 142 175–190, 195–196, 202, 69–70, 72–73, 75–78, 80,
adverbial locution 87–89, 207, 209–212, 215–218, 118, 150, 155–157, 252,
92–93 250–253, 253n4, 253n6, 256, 259, 262, 262n12, 264,
affective evidentiality 116 254, 256, 265–267, 273n1, 288, 297, 308–312
appearance 20, 89, 90, 97, 274–275, 297–299, 303, diachronic linguistics 297
99, 101, 116, 128, 135–136, 305, 309, 311–312 diachronic analysis / study
256–258 type 125–126, 130–134, 5, 149, 300
attitude 18, 57, 106, 108, 150, 138–140, 142–145, direct evidentiality 30–32,
210, 229–232, 251–252, 209–211, 218 67, 107, 109, 113, 127–128,
259, 262, 264, 266, 292 see also adverbial 196–198, 204, 225, 227,
construction, 229, 234–238, 245, 297
C complement discourse domain 185,
cognition / cognitive verbs construction, copula 195–196, 212, 217
106, 108, 110–112, construction, grounding discourse-pragmatic function
115–116, 119, 229, 244 construction, impersonal 225–228, 234, 241,
commitment 18, 31, 64, 91, construction, indirect 243–244, 246
107, 112, 124–125, 166, speech construction, discourse-pragmatic strategy
196, 226, 228–229, 249– infinitival/infinitive 213, 225, 226, 228, 232,
250, 252, 264–265, 267 construction, 234–237, 239
see also non-commitment parenthetical distance 13, 21, 23–24,
complement construction construction, participial 29–30, 32, 35, 39, 43, 52,
46–47, 52, 133–135, / participle construction, 201–203, 249, 258, 280,
139–140, 142, 144–145 passive construction, 292, 301, 310
complement-taking-predicate verbal construction, Dutch 3, 5, 61, 75, 115n5,
174, 176, 271–274, 277– wide-scope construction 116, 123–131, 132n5,
280, 282–285, 289–292 constructional pattern 125– 133–143, 143n11, 144–145,
see also epistemic and 126, 129–130, 134, 139 149–152, 157–160, 164,
evidential complement- constructional preference 166
taking predicate (E/E 123, 125–126, 132 dynamic (modality) 61,
CTP) constructional potential 129, 63–65, 65n5, 66, 73, 80,
complementation 45, 49, 51, 132, 134, 137 150, 155–158, 165–166,
131n3, 184 copula construction 130, 252, 262
conceptual domain 126, 180, 133–134, 140, 143–145
195, 196, 204, 228–229, corpus analysis / study 125, E
245 132n5, 137, 150, 225, 300 E/E CTP see epistemic and
conditional 108, 201, 203, corpus-based analysis / study evidential complement-
206 171, 173, 182, 271 taking predicate
conditional perfect 201, 203
318 Subject index
egocentricity 13, 21, 31, 35, 74–76, 80–81, 87, 89, 272, 299–300, 302, 304,
42, 46–47, 52 93, 95–96, 99–100, 102, 307
English 15, 18–19, 22–27, 105–112, 114, 116–117, German 61, 70–71, 115n5,
38–39, 49, 51, 72, 75, 87, 119, 124, 124n1, 125–126, 123–126, 129–131, 132n5,
89, 105–106, 108, 115, 135, 144, 157–159, 133–134, 137–139, 139n8,
115n5, 116, 124, 149, 152, 165–166, 171–172, 140–143, 159, 163, 165
165–166, 173, 180–181, 178, 180, 187, 189–190, grammatical person 109,
185, 195–197, 198n2, 200, 195–198, 198n1, 202–204, 161, 163, 166
204–216, 216n3, 217–218, 210–212, 225–235, 238, grammaticalization /
222, 228, 230, 245, 249, 245, 251–252, 266–267, grammaticization 38,
252–253, 255n8, 257–258, 272, 279, 297–299, 306, 48, 51, 53, 108, 111, 145,
261, 267, 272, 283–284, 309–310 253n5, 299–300, 307,
297–298, 300, 304, 308, see also affective 311–312
311 evidentiality, direct grounding 13–22, 24–29,
epistemic and evidential evidentiality, epistemic 32–33, 35–48, 50–53
complement-taking justification, evidential construction 26, 32, 42, 50
predicate (E/E CTP) markers, indirect
105–113, 113n3, 114, 119 evidentiality, inferential
epistemic assessment 13, evidentiality, reportative H
17–21, 39, 48 / reported / reportive hearsay 18, 21, 31–32, 57–61,
epistemic future 202 evidentiality 67–72, 72n8, 73–74, 77–79,
epistemic justification 126, existential 16, 18, 20, 38, 79n10, 80n11, 91–93,
195–196, 214, 229 43–44, 171, 178–180, 95–96, 102, 123–124,
epistemic modality 18–19, 189–190, 275 127, 129, 136, 142, 159,
57, 59, 61, 63, 64–66, 68, experientiality 57 164, 179–180, 188, 197,
68n6, 69–70, 72–73, 75, 279, 298–301, 306–307,
87, 105, 106–112, 119, F 311–312
123, 124, 124n1, 126, 165, French 87, 89, 89n2, verbs 301, 311
180, 196, 201, 204–205, 101–102, 109, 205, 272 hypotheticality 5, 149, 152,
228–229, 231, 243, 249, full support 109, 196, 156, 158, 166
252, 253, 255, 266 204–206
see also epistemic function 13–16, 18, 20, I
assessment, epistemic 22, 25–26, 32, 38, 40, 43, impersonal construction 75,
future, epistemic support 46–49, 52, 87–91, 99, 131, 145, 178, 181–182,
epistemic stance 40, 45, 213, 102, 106, 108, 110–112, 275
225–236, 241, 243–246 119, 124, 129, 135–137, indirect evidentiality 6,
epistemic support 126, 137, 144, 149, 151–152, 154, 107, 127–128, 159, 180,
196, 200, 229 157, 159–160, 165–166, 195–210, 212–218, 225,
epistemicity 107, 124, 126, 179, 190, 197, 207, 209, 227, 229–230, 234–236,
180, 190, 195–196, 204, 211, 230, 264, 271, 273, 244, 245, 297
263 275–279, 282, 290–292, see also indirect justification
see also justificatory support 299, 306, 310, 312 indirect justification 196,
evidential marker 21, 35, see also discourse-pragmatic 204–207
46, 100, 102–103, 128, function indirect speech construction
135, 156–157, 159–161, functional-onomasiological 159, 162
165–166, 171, 218, 2, 197 inferential 35, 72, 72n8, 124,
222–223, 234, 271–274, 128–129, 140–143, 145,
276, 278–279, 286, 289, G 172, 177, 181, 187–188,
291–292, 300 genitive subject 175–176, 198–202, 204, 206–210,
see also inferential marker 179–180 212, 213–218, 230, 238,
evidentiality 13, 14, 18–19, genre 151, 156, 195, 243, 267, 271, 273, 279
29, 32, 35–36, 38, 52, 212–215, 216n3, 217–218, evidentiality 19, 57–59,
57–61, 61n3, 66–68, 68n6, 225–227, 230–232, 246, 67–70, 72, 72n8, 73–77,
Subject index 319
80, 93, 102, 107, 110, mediated (evidence) 189, 249, 253n6, 254,
112–113, 123–124, 197–198, 200, 203–204, 266–267, 271–274, 276–
127–128, 150, 171, 180, 214, 279 277, 282–283, 297–301,
186–188, 195, 197–198, mental state predicates 303–307, 309–312
200, 212, 230, 238 105–106, 230 construction 172n1,
marker 46, 71, 124, 136, see also spontaneous mental 176–178, 181–182, 249,
214, 286, 289, 297 process verbs (SMPP) 253n6, 254, 266, 311
inferentiality see inferential mindsay 279, 282, 298, 300, perception verb 67, 113, 162,
evidentiality 308–309, 311–312 176, 200, 205
infinitival / infinitive mindsay verbs 299, 301, perceptual 18, 20, 30, 46, 107,
construction 128, 130, 306 113, 119, 128–129, 177,
133–134, 136, 139, 139n7, mirativity 57–59, 74, 76–80, 181, 186, 195, 197–199,
140–142, 144–145, 216 80n11 207, 209, 212, 229, 238,
information source see source modal auxiliary 62, 149–150, 272, 286, 289, 292
of information 157, 164–165, 197, performative verbs 108,
(inter)subjectivity 58–59, 260–261, 264, 310 110–112, 119
74–80, 80n11, 215 mode of knowing 107, 195, point of view / viewpoint
Italian 87, 89, 99, 102 197, 271–272, 292 203, 213–214, 249, 251–
morphological structure 87, 254, 265, 267, 277, 292
J 89 Portuguese 87, 89, 97–99,
journalistic discourse 91, multifunctionality 195–196, 102
166, 177, 184, 188–190, 200, 204, 207, 211–212, prediction 258, 266–267,
195, 203, 211–217, 249, 215–216, 218 284, 308–309, 311
265, 286 probability 73, 107, 124,
see also newspaper discourse N 196–197, 201, 205, 253n4,
justificatory support 126, 196 newspaper discourse 254, 257–259, 262–266,
see also epistemicity 188–189, 249, 264–265, 308
271–274, 278, 290–292 see also partial support
L see also journalistic discourse projection 19, 21–22, 24,
language change 13 non-agreeing passive 27–29, 46, 258–260,
Lithuanian 171–172, 172n1, participles 177, 181, 189 263–264, 267
173–174, 178–179, non-commitment 159, 238, property 18, 64, 69, 76–77,
181–182, 185, 188–190, 252, 265–267, 279 80, 125, 135, 143, 151, 254,
271–274, 291 257–265
O proposition 1–2, 13, 18,
M opinion verbs 110–111 39–49, 51–52, 91, 101,
marker 15, 29, 31, 57, 67, 105–110, 112, 117, 118,
70–72, 75–76, 79n10, 80, P 124, 127–128, 132, 135,
80n11, 108–109, 111–112, parenthetical 99, 103, 111, 136, 136n6, 180, 184–186,
117–119, 126, 137, 142, 130–131, 131n4, 133–136, 195–196, 209, 228–230,
144, 156, 159, 186–187, 139, 144–145, 174, 197, 232, 257–258, 260, 265,
190, 200, 204–205, 210, 207, 210, 217, 271–274, 267, 273, 279–282,
215–217, 225–227, 277–278, 290–292 284–288, 298, 306
229–235, 237, 239–241, construction 130–131,
243–246, 249–251, 253– 131n4, 133–134, 136, Q
257, 259–260, 263–267, 144, 210 qualificational dimensions
271, 273–276, 279, 282, partial support 196, 204–206 57–58, 60–61, 66, 80
289–292 see also probability qualificational hierarchy 57,
see also evidential marker, participle / participial 61–62, 65, 68, 73, 78–80,
inferential marker, construction 171, 180, 159
reportative/reportive 188–190, 253 qualitative (analysis / study)
marker passive 171–172, 172n1, 105, 107, 151, 171, 234,
174n5, 176–179, 181–182, 251, 273–274, 279
320 Subject index
quantitative (analysis / study) 125, 132, 135–136, 136n6, stance 1, 47, 65, 106, 179–180,
106, 130, 171–174, 183, 234, 137, 139–140, 142–145, 204, 185–186, 190, 197, 210,
251, 271, 273–274, 279, 311 259, 262, 281 228–229, 231–232, 238, 243,
seem-type verbs 123–124, 246, 252, 272, 284
R 124n1, 125–127, 129–132, see also epistemic stance
reliability 18, 20–21, 29–31, 52, 135–136, 136n6, 137, 140, strategy 225, 227, 230–231
69, 71–72, 72n8, 73, 78, 197, 143–145 stratum, -a 14, 22–24, 27–28,
232, 240, 271, 279, 282 semantic change 149, 300, 307 32, 35–37, 39, 42–43
reportative / reportive 19, 22, semi-auxiliary 249, 253, subjectivity 57, 62n4, 75, 75n9,
46, 124, 129, 133, 135–136, 253n5, 253n6 76, 107–108, 123, 125, 133,
141, 141n10, 142–146, 159, semi-modal 258, 310 135, 137, 143–145, 196, 201,
165, 171–172, 176–181, shared knowledge 271, 279, 273
186–188, 190, 195–196, 290–292 see also (inter)subjectivity
200–201, 203, 206–216, spontaneous mental process subjunctive 118, 166
216n3, 217–218, 230, 271, verbs (SMPP) 113–116, system 2, 14, 18–24, 26–33,
273, 279, 291–292 118–119 35–36, 38, 42, 51–53, 57,
evidentiality / reported source of evidence 21, 124, 60–61, 71, 79, 80n11, 107,
evidentiality 124, 197, 271–273, 292 150, 196–197, 198n2,
135–136, 153, 158–160, source of information 18–19, 200–202, 218
166, 176, 180, 186, 190, 21, 29, 38, 42–46, 53, 66,
200, 209–210, 298 73, 78, 88, 123–124, 153, T
marker 46, 214, 279 159–161, 180–181, 195–198, time reference 151, 161–165,
reporting verb 239–240, 201, 212, 229, 231, 279, 282 256
297–301, 303–306, 309, 311 source reference 149, 158–162,
rhetorical strategy 290 164, 166 V
Romance (languages) 87, 89, Spanish 87–90, 94n5, 102–103, verbal construction 105, 119
101, 106, 197, 201–202, 207, 105–107, 110, 110n2, 111, verb of cognition, see cognition
292 113–115, 115n5, 116, 116n6, verb
Russian 87–89, 95, 102–103, 119, 124, 129, 195–197, verb of mental state, see mental
273 198n2, 199–218, 222–223, state predicate
272, 284, 307 viewpoint, see point of view
S speech act 32, 63, 112, 118,
scientific discourse 225–227, 154, 157, 290 W
229–235, 241, 245–246, 299 spontaneous mental process wide-scope construction
scope 32, 34, 38, 39, 61, 64, verbs (SMPPs) 113–116, 135–136, 144–145
68n6, 80, 80n11, 87–88, 94– 118–119
95, 98, 100, 102–103, 123,

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Evidentiality

John Benjamins Publishing Company

Editor Associate Editor

John Benjamins Publishing Company

the American National Standard for Information Sciences – Permanence

© 2017 – John Benjamins B.V.

Section A. Evidentiality: Cognitive Grammar and Functional Grammar

Section B. Evidentiality in Grammar and Discourse

Section C. Evidentiality and Epistemic Modality in Discourse Domains

Index of expressions 315

Juana I. Marín Arrese, Gerda Haßler and Marta Carretero

This volume on Evidentiality Revisited focuses on semantic-pragmatic based

as both providing epistemic justification and reflecting speaker’s attitude towards

2. Overview of the volume

In Section A, the volume includes two theoretically oriented papers on Evidentiality

categories are approached in terms of four semantic properties, namely ascription

indirect evidentiality (inferential or reportive) as one of their meanings. The anal-

communicated information. Drawing on Culioli’s (1990) Theory of Enunciative

Aikhenvald, Alexandra. 2004. Evidentiality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Evidentiality in Cognitive Grammar

A clause serves the intersubjective function of presenting and negotiating a

Keywords: distance, egocentricity, epistemic assessment, function, grounding,

Evidentiality is usefully considered in relation to a variety of significant linguistic

2. Evidentiality and grounding

2.1 Semantic functions and their implementation

Lexicon and grammar effect the implementation of semantic functions – that is

2.2 Clausal grounding

Language is a basic means of achieving epistemic control and intersubjective

by other individuals. A particular expression is aimed at momentary alignment in

is to offer an assessment of the referent’s epistemic status, and that assessment is

2.3 Evidentials as grounding elements

It is often asked whether particular kinds of structures qualify as grounding ele-

My conception of grounding was first inspired by English, but hopefully it is

thought, reasoning, generalization, inference, conceptual integration, and so on.

3.1 Systems, substrate, and strata

Grammar effects the implementation of semantic functions. The various means

qatu ‘sits/sat’ REAL

REMOTE RECENT IMMED -ka VISUAL/RECENT

interpreted as increments of distance from the center. As a kind of iconicity, dis-

options. A given stratum functions as a baseline, which undergoes elaboration to

In a tense-modality system, the baseline epistemic status is immediacy as inter-

3.2 A tense-modal system

Figure 2. Basic grounding elements.

Systemic elements participate in grammatical constructions that implement

Figure 3. Basic grounding constructions.

A full description of clausal grounding encompasses not only individual ele-

IMMEDIATE NON-IMMEDIATE IMMEDIATE NON-IMMEDIATE

Figure 4. The basic English grounding system.

starts with a schema, elaboration consisting in the specification of finer-grained

> > >

(b) If she were rich, he would marry her.

3.3 Evidential systems

Evidentiality is an aspect of clausal grounding. To the extent of being gram-

INTERNAL PERCEPTION INFERENCE REPORT

(b) Wanka Quechua

DIRECT INFERENCE REPORT -chra INFERENCE

(c) Eastern Pomo

NON-VISUAL -ink’e NON-VIS PERCEPTION

Figure 7. Some evidential systems.

reflect their subsidiary status. Evidentials are nonetheless organized egocentrically

Also essential are descriptions of evidential constructions, which – in the simplest

(2) Lishi-sh prista-ka-mu-la. [Wanka Quechua (Floyd 1996a: 899)]

-sh Lishi prista-ka-mu -la

-ronki -mein ani iki jawen jema

Ani-mein-ronki iki jawen jema.

3.4 Combined systems

the American National Standard for Information Sciences – Permanence

(2) Lishi-sh prista-ka-mu-la. [Wanka Quechua (Floyd 1996a: 899)]