INTRODUCTION

According to Montesquieu:-
“Where the Legislative and executive powers are united in the same person
or in the same body or magistrate there can be no liberty. Again there is no
liberty if the judiciary power is not separated from the legislative and
executive powers. Where it is joined with the legislative power, the life and
liberty of the subjects would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge
would then be the legislature. Where it joined with the executive power the
judge might be have with violence and oppression.”

The separation of judiciary is given in Article 50 of the Constitution of India

which requires the State to take step to separate the Judiciary from the
Executive in the public services of the State. To promote the rule of law, this is
very essential.

The framers of the Indian Constitution at the time of framing of our

Constitution were concerned about the kind of Judiciary our country should
have. This concern of the members of the Constituent Assembly was responded
by Dr. B. R. Ambedkar1 in the following words,

“There can be no difference of opinion in the House that our judiciary must be
both independent of the executive and must also be competent in itself. And the
question is how these two objects can be secured.”2

In words of Prof. K. T. Shah in Constituent Assembly, “They should not, in

any way be exposed to any apprehension of being thrown out of their work by
official or executive displeasure.”3
1. Dr Bhimrao Ambedkar was appointed as Chairman of the Constitution Drafting Committee on 29 August 1947.
2. Constituent Assembly of India Debates, Vol. VIII (Pt. II 24 May 1949 Tuesday)
<http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol8p7b.htm> accessed 9 December 2013.

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During the Constituent Assembly Debates, Prof. Shibban Lal Saksena4, had
suggested that the appointment of Judges should be confirmed by 2/3rd majority
of the Parliament. This proposition was rejected by the House because it would
compromise the Independence of Judiciary and would leave the fate of the
Judges in the hands of the executives and legislators.5 This set the tone for
Independence of Judiciary in our country.

The doctrine of Separation of Powers which was brought into existence to draw
upon the boundaries for the functioning of all the three organs of the state:
Legislature, Executive and the Judiciary, provides for a responsibility to the
judiciary to act as a watchdog and to check whether the executive and the
legislature are functioning within their limits under the constitution and not
interfering in each other’s functioning. This task given to the judiciary to
supervise the doctrine of separation of powers cannot be carried on in true spirit
if the judiciary is not independent in itself. An independent judiciary supports
the base of doctrine of separation of powers to a large extent.

It is theoretically very easy to talk about the independence of the judiciary as for
which the provisions are provided for in our constitution but these provisions
introduced by the framers of our constitution can only initiate towards the
independence of the judiciary. The major task lies in creating a favourable
environment for the functioning of the judiciary in which all the other state
organs functions in cooperation so that the independence of the judiciary can be
achieved practically. The independence of the judiciary has also to be guarded
against the changing economic, political and social scenario.

3. Constituent Assembly of India Debates, Vol. VIII (Pt. I 24 May 1949 Tuesday)
<http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol8p7a.htm> accessed 9 December 2013.
4. One of the members of the Indian Constituent Assembly from United Provinces.
5. Constituent Assembly of India Debates, Vol. VIII (Pt. II 24 May 1949 Tuesday)
<http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol8p7b.htm> accessed 9 December 2013.

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Whenever there is a talk regarding the independence of the judiciary, there is
also a talk of the restrictions that must be imposed on the judiciary as an
institution and on the individual judges that forms a part of the judiciary. In
order to ensure smooth functioning of the system there must be a right blend of
the two.

Krishna Iyer J. in the case of Union of India v. Sankalchand Himatlal

Sheth6 said that:

“… fearless justice is a prominent creed of our Constitution and that the

independence of the judiciary is the fighting faith of our founding document.
Unquestionably, the fundamental principle on which these constitutional
provisions and decisions rest cannot be allowed to be violated or diluted,
directly or indirectly.”

6. AIR 1977 SC 2328 [14].

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 UNIVERSAL DECLARATION, CONVENTIONS AND
PRINCIPLES ON INDEPENDENCE OF JUDICIARY

On 13 December 1985 the United Nation General Assembly adopted, without a

dissenting vote, a set of basic principles in addition to the UDHR 7 and the
ICCPR8, set of standards known as the ‘Basic Principles on the Independence of
the Judiciary’. Also, ‘The Beijing Principles on the Independence of the
Judiciary, 1997’ was adopted at Manila by the Chief Justices of the Asia Pacific
Region to provide a vitally important set of principles for the rule of law and
administration of justice throughout the region9; and in 1988, judges of 37
countries gathered in Bangalore and formulated, what have come to be known
as, the Bangalore Principles.10

Further, ‘The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, 2002’ is one such

document needing particular mention. The essential values stated in the
Bangalore Principles are: judicial independence, both individual and
institutional, as a prerequisite to the rule of law; impartiality, not only to the
decision itself but also to the process; integrity; propriety, and the appearance of
propriety; equality of treatment to all; competence and diligence.11

Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice adopted in Montreal

in 1983 records, ‘Judges individually shall be free, and it shall be their duty, to
decide matters before them impartially, without any restrictions, influences,

7. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is a declaration adopted by the United Nations General Assembly
on 10 December 1948 at the Palais de Chaillot.
8. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is a multilateral treaty adopted by the United
Nations General Assembly on 16 December 1966.
9. <http://lawasia.asn.au/beijing-statement.htm> accessed 9 December 2013.
10. <http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/speeches/former-
justices/kirbyj/kirbyj_bang11.htm#FOOTBODY_1> accessed 9 December 2013.
11. CJI (Retd.) J S Verma, ‘Judicial Independence: Is It Threatened?’ (First S Govind Swaminadhan Memorial Lecture
Madras High Court Bar Chennai 29 January 2010) <http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?264422> accessed
9 December 2013.

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inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any
quarter or for any reason’12

In the case of Air India Statutory Corporation v United Labour Union13 the
Court held that the Article 50 of the Directive Principles of State Policy of the
Constitution of India is described as forerunners of the UNO Convention on the
Right to Development.14

Further it is to be submitted that the arrangement which now obtains for

appointment that is collegium of judges is an ideal one and, by all accounts,
amounts to a lesser evil compared to what the Constitution Amendment Act
envisages. As Justice K. T. Thomas has pointed out in his article, “The
foremost among the advantage of the present system is that the recommendation
is made through collective exercise of persons who have undoubtedly the
capacity and competence to decide on the merits of those to recommended as
judges … In fact, some of the judges of the US and Canada, when they visited
India, praised our present practice, of selecting judges.” About the inclusion of
the politicians in the National Judicial Commission, Justice Thomas observed,
‘Once this is done, the inevitable consequence would be the smudging of the
already battered image of our judicial institution.’15

12. Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice, (1983) unanimously adopted at the first plenary session of
the First World Conference on the Independence of Justice held at Montreal on 10 June 1983 (‘the Montreal
Declaration’) para 2.02.
13. AIR 1997 SC 645.
14. Adopted by UN General Assembly on 4 December 1986.
15. Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1996) 10 SCC 104.

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 ARTICLE 50 IS A PART OF BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

In the case of Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of

India16, the nine-judge bench accepted the argument made by distinguished
counsels, that Article 50 of the Constitution is a basic feature of the
Constitution within the meaning of that concept enunciated by the thirteen-
judge in Kesavananda Bharati’s judgment17.

Article 50 of our Constitution is an extremely simple Article consisting of only

one sentence. ‘The State shall take steps to separate the judiciary from the
executive in the public services of the State.’ This Article does not mean that
Judges of the Supreme Court will not socially mix with the ministers or live in
separate bungalows or in different towns. The Supreme Court rightly construed
this Article to mean that the government, which is the cause of more than half
the litigation in our courts, cannot be permitted to have any control over the
appointment of Judges, who must deal with every litigant including the
government, on the merits of their case.18 The following passage from that
judgment is its crux and rationale:

“The broad scheme of separation of powers adopted in the Constitution,

together with the directive principle of 'separation of judiciary from executive'
even at the lowest strata, provides some insight to the true meaning of the
relevant provisions in the Constitution relating to the composition of the
Judiciary”.19

16. AIR 1994 SC 268 (Second Judges case).

17. Keshvananda Bharti v. State of Kerala AIR 1973 SC 1461.
18. Ram Jethmalani, ‘Two bills that threaten democracy’ The Sunday Guardian <http://www.sunday-
guardian.com/analysis/two-bills-that-threaten-democracy> accessed 9 December 2013.
19. Ibid.

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Given the fact that the Executive is a major litigant, this fear is not an
unfounded one. It may lead to undesirable outcomes – the membership and
tenure of the Judiciary may be reduced, role of the Judiciary may be subdued
and the Executive and political class may take control of the Commission.

In Re Delhi Laws case20, it was held that separation of judiciary from the
Executive is mandated in Article 50 of the Indian Constitution, with the
Independence of Judiciary as a necessary corollary.21 Later, the doctrine of
separation of powers was elevated to the status of a basic feature of the
Constitution in Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain22.

In the galore and gamut of decisions this court has succinctly laid down in the
cases of Waman Rao v. Union of India23, S P Sampat Kumar v. Union of India24,
and in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India25 that independence of Judiciary is a
part of Basic Structure and cannot be abrogated even by constitutional
amendments.

Independence of Judiciary is part of the basic structure and there are number of
conventions and principles has already been laid down for the independence of
the Judiciary such as United Nation ‘Basic Principles on the Independence of
the Judiciary’ adopted on 13 December 1985, ‘The Beijing Principles on the
Independence of the Judiciary, 1997’ and ‘The Bangalore Principles of Judicial
Conduct, 2002’. Constituent Assembly members were also concerned about the
Judiciary which our country should have and Dr. Ambedkar said that there can

20. Re The Delhi Laws Act 1912, the Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947 and the Part C States (Laws)
Act, 1950 AIR 1951 SC 332.
21. Chandra Mohan v State of UP AIR 1966 SC 1987.
22. AIR 1975 SC 2299.
23. AIR 1981 SC 271.
24. AIR 1987 SC 271.
25. AIR 1997 SC 1125.

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be no difference of opinion in the House that our Judiciary must be both
independent of the Executive and must also be competent in itself.

Granville Austin in his revealing book, Working a Democratic Constitution,

published in 2000 by the Oxford University Press, has said, the process of
Weakening the judiciary and bringing it under the thumb of the Executive began
with the ‘grievous blow’ which the then Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi in 1973
by superseding three judges of the Supreme Court and appointing Mr A N Ray
as the Chief Justice of India by attempting to make the court obedient to her
government.26

It is to be submitted that the several provisions in the Constitution relating to the

oath of office27; fixity of tenure28; salaries and pensions being charged on
the Consolidated Fund29; restriction on discussion of their conduct in the
legislature30; power to punish for contempt31; and open hearing in courts32
are provided for the independence of the Judiciary and therefore, further
exclusion of the Executive's role in the process of appointment of Judges is
contemplated.

This concept of separation of power is now a recognized part of the basic

structure of the Constitution, and is at the core of the constitutional scheme.33

26. Ravi Kiran Jain, ‘Constitutional Amendment Bill will Curtail Judicial Independence’ PUCL Bulletin (July 2003)
<http://www.pucl.org/Topics/Law/2003/njc.htm> accessed 7 December 2013.
27. Articles 124(6) and 219 and Sch 3, the Constitution of India, 1949.
28. Article 124(2), the Constitution of India, 1949.
29. Article 146(3), the Constitution of India, 1949.
30. Article 121, the Constitution of India, 1949.
31. Articles 129 and 142, the Constitution of India, 1949.
32. Article 145(4), the Constitution of India, 1949.
33. State of Bihar v. Bal Mukund Sah AIR 2000 SC 1296.

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 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS – THE INDEPENDENCE
OF THE JUDICIARY

Many provisions are provided in our constitution to ensure the independence of

the judiciary. The constitutional provisions are discussed below:

1) Security of Tenure: The judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts
have been given the security of the tenure. Once appointed, they continue
to remain in office till they reach the age of retirement which is 65 years
in the case of judges of Supreme Court34 and 62 years in the case of
judges of the High Courts35. They cannot be removed from the office
except by an order of the President and that too on the ground of proven
misbehaviour and incapacity. A resolution has also to be accepted to that
effect by a majority of total membership of each House of Parliament and
also by a majority of no less than two third of the members of the house
present and voting. Procedure is so complicated that there has been no
case of the removal of a Judge of Supreme Court or High Court under this
provision.
2) Salaries and Allowances: The salaries and allowances of the judges is
also a factor which makes the judges independent as their salaries and
allowances are fixed and are not subject to a vote of the legislature. They
are charged on the Consolidated Fund of India in case of Supreme Court
judges and the Consolidated Fund of state in the case of High Court
judges. Their emoluments cannot be altered to their disadvantage36 except
in the event of grave financial emergency.
3) Powers and Jurisdiction of Supreme Court: Parliament can only add to
the powers and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court but cannot curtail them.

34. Article 124(2).

35. Article 217(1).
36. Article 125(2).

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 In the civil cases, Parliament may change the pecuniary limit for the
appeals to the Supreme Court. Parliament may enhance the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. It may confer the supplementary
powers on the Supreme Court to enable it work more effectively. It may
confer power to issue directions, orders or writs for any purpose other
than those mentioned in Art. 32. Powers of the Supreme Court cannot be
taken away. The point to be noted in all these provisions is that the
Parliament can exceed, but cannot curtail the jurisdiction and power of
the Supreme Court.37 Making judiciary independent.
4) No discussion on conduct of Judge in State Legislature /
Parliament: Article 211 provides that there shall be no discussion in the
legislature of the state with respect to the conduct of any judge of
Supreme Court or of a High Court in the discharge of his duties. A
similar provision is made in Article 121 which lays down that no
discussion shall take place in Parliament with respect to the conduct of
the judge of Supreme Court or High Court in the discharge of his duties
except upon a motion for presenting an address to the President praying
for the removal of the judge.
5) Power to punish for contempt: Both the Supreme Court and the High
Court have the power to punish any person for their contempt. Article
129 provides that the Supreme Court shall have the power to punish for
contempt of itself. Likewise, Article 215 lays down that every High Court
shall have the power to punish for contempt of itself. This power is very
essential for maintaining impartiality and independence of the Judiciary.
6) Separation of the Judiciary from the Executive: Article 50 contains
one of the Directive Principles of State Policy and lays down that the
state shall take steps to separate the judiciary from the executive in the
public services of the state. The object behind the Directive Principle is to

37. Article 138.

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 secure the independence of the judiciary from the executive. Article 50
says that there shall be a separate judicial service free from executive
control.
7) Judges of the Supreme Court are appointed by the Executive with
the consultation of Legal Experts: The Constitution does not leave the
appointment of the Judges of the Supreme Court to the unguided
discretion of the Executive. The Executive is required to consult Judges
of the Supreme Court and High Courts in the appointment of the Judges
of the Supreme Court.38 The independence of the Supreme Court is
emphasised by Article 229 which provides that appointment of officers
and servants shall me made by the Chief Justice or such other Judge or
officer as he may appoint.
8) Prohibition on Practice after Retirement: Article 124 (7) prohibits a
retired Judge of the Supreme Court to appear and plead in any court or
before any authority within the territory of India.

38. Article 124 (2).

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 NEED FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY

The basic need for the independence of the judiciary rests upon the following
points:

1. To check the functioning of the organs: Judiciary acts as a watchdog by

ensuring that all the organs of the state function within their respective areas
and according to the provisions of the constitution. Judiciary acts as a guardian
of the constitution and also aids in securing the doctrine of separation of
powers.

2. Interpreting the provisions of the constitution: It was well known to the

framers of the constitution that in future the ambiguity will arise with the
provisions of the constitution so they ensured that the judiciary must be
independent and self-competent to interpret the provision of the constitution in
such a way to clear the ambiguity but such an interpretation must be unbiased
i.e. free from any pressure from any organs like executive. If the judiciary is not
independent, the other organs may pressurize the judiciary to interpret the
provision of the constitution according to them. Judiciary is given the job to
interpret the constitution according to the constitutional philosophy and the
constitutional norms.

3. Disputes referred to the judiciary: It is expected of the Judiciary to deliver

judicial justice and not partial or committed justice. By committed justice we
mean to say that when a judge emphasizes on a particular aspect while giving
justice and not considering all the aspects involved in a particular situation.
Similarly judiciary must act in an unbiased manner.

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WHETHER THE JUDICIARY IS ENCROACHING UPON THE
POWERS OF THE LEGISLATURE?

The accent of the previous of the Constitution of India is towards securing all
round development of the individual and ensuring his dignity through Rule of
Law. Even the Indian Constitution does not provide for absolute Separation of
Powers. The main idea behind this concept among the framers of the
Constitution of India was that the rule of law can be maintained only when there
is no absolute concentration of powers in one single organ. The main frame of
the principle of Rule of Law excludes “arbitrariness”. Whenever there is
arbitrariness or unreasonableness, there is denial of rule of law. In Bacchan
Singh v. State of Punjab39, it was held that the Rule of Law has three basic and
fundamental assumptions. They are as follows:-

1) Law making must be essentially in the hands of a democratically elected

legislature:
2) Even in the hands of the democratically elected legislature, there should
not be unfettered legislative power; and
3) There must be independent judiciary to protect the citizens against
excesses of executive and legislative power.

Law is the manifestation of the principles of justice, equity and good

conscience.40 Law is a Social Engineering to remove the existing imbalance and
to further the progress, serving the needs of the Socialist Democratic Bharat
under the Rule of Law. The prevailing social conditions and actualities of life

39. AIR 1982 SC 1325.

40. Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. V. Union of India,(1996) 10 SCC 104

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are to be taken onto account in adjudging whether or not the impugned
legislation would sub serve the purpose of the society.41

Adjustment of law to the social needs is a continuing process. Law must always
be responsive to the social development. This continuing process requires
watchful legislature and alert judiciary.

In India, there are mainly three organs of the Government; i.e., Legislature,
Executive and Judiciary. India is a welfare state, and being a welfare state,
Government plays a very dominant role in moulding the society; or in large
perspective; the State. Directive principles laid down in Part IV of the Indian
Constitution establishes duty on the Government to seek welfare of the people.
Legislature is to legislate laws and enact laws for achieving the welfare of the
people. Executive are given the responsibility to execute the laws made by the
legislature and the Judiciary to adjudicate them. Moreover, the Supreme Court
has been made the protector and guardian of the Constitution. The Constitution
also empowered the Supreme Court and the High Courts to protect the Rights
and Freedoms granted under Part III. Any law made by the parliament or by the
legislative body would in all circumstance be considered as unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court and High Courts and they can protect them by issuing writs,
directions and orders as is considered essential to meet the requirements of a
democratic and welfare state.

The outer frame appears to be a perfect democratic state, but the inner
framework is based on a very weak foundation. India is a State, where a
considerable population are illiterate and are unaware of their rights guaranteed
under Part III of the Constitution of India. Although, there is a separation of
power, but the legislative and the executive power, both are mostly in the hands
of one. Thus, there is only Judiciary on one hand and other two organs on one
41. Ashok Kumar Gupta v. State of UP, (1997) 5 SCC 201

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hand. As a result of it, the rule of law has been put at hold in reality. As the
masses are ignorant of their rights, and the corrupt and inefficient legislature
through their executive actions are seeking to achieve their inert desire to loot
the people without paying any hindrance to protect them in reality. Moreover,
the legislature of our democratic state has been very weak. It has been lacking
both in duty and ability to enact any progressive laws for the people of
this democratic nation. As a result, the rights of the people are getting
hampered. The Indian society is filled with lots of social evil which needs to be
eliminated.

As there has been constant inaction from the legislative organ of the
government to solve the major issues which people are facing, the judiciary had
stepped into the shoes of the legislature. The legislature has mainly two
important duty to perform, i.e., to reform the laws to meet the present situation
and to enact new laws which may be necessary to remedy the future wrongs that
may arise in course of development in science and technology or due
to progress in society and criminal or wrongful intent in the minds of the
people.

As the Judiciary itself cannot suo moto initiate legal proceedings even if it has
knowledge about the wrongs, happening around it. So, it had taken steps to out
rule the locus standi formulae in cases pertaining to public domain, which made
it possible to protect the rule of law. As a result of it, the principle of Public
Interest Litigation came to play. All these are done simply to promote the
remedy which the law itself intended, i.e., to protect and uphold the interest of
each individual against any arbitrary and unreasonable action of the
Government.

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For these reasons, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has expanded Article 21
to include in its broad interpretation right to bail, the right to a speedy trial,
immunity against cruel and unusual punishment, the right to dignified treatment in
custodial institutions, the right to legal aid in criminal proceedings and above all
the right to live with basic human dignity. It has also established new doctrines,
such as, public trust doctrine, doctrine of promissory estoppel, doctrine of
absolute liability, and host of principles such as polluter’s pay principle, etc. and
offered guidelines in most important case as those relating to women, i.e.,
sexual harassment at work places, and most importantly laid down
the foundation of Public Interest Litigation.

Hence it can be deduced that the principles laid down and or laws declared by
the Judiciary in India does not at all encroach upon the powers conferred on the
Legislatures by the Constitution of India. These are merely the powers which
are being granted to the Judiciary by the Constitution and the Judiciary is
making best use of it for the betterment of the society and citizens at large.

As rightly pointed out by M.C.Chagla, former Chief Justice of India, that:

“The Courts are not a department of Government. They are an authority

coordinate with the Legislature and the Executive. Even Parliament, however
wide and vast its power, can only function under the Constitution. Even if
legislation is passed by an overwhelming majority and Parliament has expressed
its clear intention in no unequivocal terms, the legislation can be on the anvil of
judicial review and if it falls the test, Parliament must submit to the decision of
the Court. It is a mistake to call this a confrontation between Parliament and the
Judiciary. Each is discharging its duty assigned to it by the Constitution. If we
have faith in our Constitution, we should call it collaboration between two
coordinate authorities rather than confrontation.”

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 CONCLUSION

The independence of the judiciary as is clear from the above discussion hold a
prominent position as far as the institution of judiciary is concerned. It is clear
from the historical overview that judicial independence has faced many
obstacles in the past especially in relation to the appointment and the transfer of
judges. Courts have always tried to uphold the independence of judiciary and
have always said that the independence of the judiciary is a basic feature of the
Constitution. Courts have said so because the independence of judiciary is the
pre-requisite for the smooth functioning of the Constitution and for a realization
of a democratic society based on the rule of law. The interpretation in
the Judges Case giving primacy to the executive, as we have discussed has led
to the appointment of at least some Judges against the opinion of the Chief
Justice of India. The decision of the Judges Case was could never have been
intended by the framers of the Constitution as they always set the task of
keeping judiciary free from executive and making it self-competent. The
decision of the Second Judges Case and the Third Judges Case is a praiseworthy
step by the Court in this regard.

There is a saying that “‘Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts
absolutely”42

Whenever there is a mention of the independence of the judiciary, there is

always a concern about the latent dangers of the judicial independence and there
arises the importance of “Judicial Accountability”. The recent development in
this regard is the recommendation of the Law Commission for the inclusion of a
whistle-blower provision, aimed at protecting those making complaints against
judges, in a draft bill dealing with the removal of judges of the Supreme Court

42. Lord Acton.

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and High Courts. Introduction of such a bill by the Law Commission is a major
step in the direction of making changes to the rigid procedure in our constitution
for the removing of the judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts.

The final outcome of the above discussion is that the importance of the
independence of the judiciary was long ago realized by the framers of the
constitution which has been accepted by the courts by marking it as the basic
feature of the constitution. It is well known law has to change so as to meet to
the needs of the changing society. Similarly judicial independence has to be
seen with the changing dimension of the society. Judicial Accountability and
Judicial Independence have to work hand in hand to ensure the real purpose of
setting up of the institution of judiciary.

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 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Constitution of India by V. N. Shukla, 2008.

The Constitutional Law of India by Dr. J. N. Pandey, 48th Edition, 2011.
Ravi Kiran Jain, ‘Constitutional Amendment Bill will Curtail Judicial
Independence’ PUCL Bulletin (July 2003)
http://codices.coe.int
http://www.outlookindia.com/printarticle.aspx?234306
http://raijmr.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/7_27-38-Iftikhar-Hussian-
Bhat.pdf
http://sanhati.com/articles/259/
http://jac.judiciary.gov.uk/about-jac/about-jac.htm
http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/speeches/former_justices/kirbyj/ki
rbyj_bang11.htm#FOOTBODY_1

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