ASIA PACIFIC CHARTERING (PHILS.) INC.vs. MARIA LINDA R.
FAROLAN However, on even date, Petitioner terminated the employment of respondent on
FACTS:
Respondent Maria Linda R. Farolan was hired as Sales Manager of petitioner for its
passenger and cargo GSA operations for Scandinavian Airline System (SAS).
Soon after respondent assumed her post, she participated in a number of
meetings/seminars (technical aspects all geared towards improving her marketing and
sales skills)
Respondent, upon instruction of Bondoc (VP/Comptroller), submitted a report. As
reflected in respondent’s report, there was a drop in SAS’ sales revenues which to her
was attributable to market forces beyond her control.
Petitioner directed its high ranking officer Roberto Zozobrado to conduct an
investigation on the matter and identify the problem/s and implement possible
solutions.
Zozobrado thus informally took over some of respondent’s marketing and sales
responsibilities, albeit respondent retained her title as Sales Manager and continued to
receive her salary as such.
Soren Jespersen, General Manager of SAS, came to the Philippines to assess the
statistics on SAS’ sales revenues and SAS was convinced that respondent was not fit for
the job of Sales Manager; and in view of the changes introduced by Zozobrado, SAS-GSA
sales operations drew positive results.
Respondent Farolan nevertheless, received letter from Jespersen congratulating him for
exceeding sale results in April and a number of recommendations for improvement.
ground of loss of trust and confidence. Thus, respondent filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal with prayer for damages and attorney’s fees.
Respondents version: alleged that Bondoc and Zozobrado had asked her to tender her
resignation as she was not the person whom SAS was looking for to handle the position
of Sales Manager 9 but that she refused, hence, she was terminated
LA: ruled in favor of respondent;
NLRC: reversed the ruling of the LA
CA: Set aside the decision of NLRC
ISSUE: WON, APC, AS EMPLOYER, HAS THE MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE TO REPLACE A
SALES MANAGER WHOM IT HAS REASONABLE GROUNDS TO BELIEVE CANNOT
EFFECTIVELY DISCHARGE THE DUTIES DEMANDED BY SUCH POSITION.
HELD: NO.
Recent decisions of this Court distinguish the treatment of managerial employees from
that of rank and file personnel insofar as the application of the doctrine of loss of trust
and confidence is concerned
MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEES; CONDITIONS THAT MUST BE MET BEFORE ONE MAY BE
CONSIDERED A MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEE. — As enunciated in Samson v. NLRC, 330 SCRA
460, “Before one may be properly considered a managerial employee, all the following
conditions must be met: (1) Their primary duty consists of the management of the
establishment in which they are employed or of a department or subdivision thereof; (2)
They customarily and regularly direct the work of two or more employees therein; (3)
They have the authority to hire or fire other employees of lower rank; or their
suggestions and recommendations as to the hiring and firing and as to the promotion or
any other change of status of other employees are given particular weight. (Section 2(b),
Rule I, Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, italics supplied).
It is not disputed that her job description, and the terms and conditions of her
employment, with the exception of her salary and allowances, were never reduced to
writing.
By respondent’s claim, her function, as verbally explained to her by Murray, dealt mainly
with servicing of existing clientele. Bondoc, however, described respondent’s functions
and duties as critical

DISMISSAL; LOSS OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE; MUST BE BASED ON A WILLFUL BREACH

AND FOUNDED ON CLEARLY ESTABLISHED FACTS; BREACH OF DUTIES; WHEN
CONSIDERED WILLFUL; CASE AT BAR. — Even assuming, however, that respondent was
a managerial employee, the stated ground (in the letter of termination) for her
dismissal, “loss of confidence,” should have a basis and determination thereof cannot be
left entirely to the employer. Loss of trust and confidence to be a valid ground for an
employee’s dismissal must be based on a willful breach and founded on clearly
established facts. A breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly and purposely,
without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly,
heedlessly or inadvertently. Respondent’s detailed REPORT dated September 8, 1993,
relative to SAS profit and loss for 1993, which was closely examined and analyzed by the
LA contains an explanation of what brought about the decline in sales revenues. And it
contains too a number of recommended measures on improvement of sales for the
remainder of 1993 and for 1994. As did the Labor Arbiter and the Court of Appeals, this
Court finds respondent’s explanation in her Report behind the decline in sales revenues
as due to market forces beyond respondent’s control plausible. In any event, there is no
showing that the decline is reflective of any willful breach of duties by respondent.
Autobus v Bautista
458 SCRA 578 – Labor Law – Labor Standards – Service Incentive Leave Pay – Curious
Animal Doctrine
FACTS:
Antonio Bautista was employed by Auto Bus Transport Systems, Inc. in May 1995. He
was assigned to the Isabela-Manila route and he was paid by commission (7% of gross
income per travel for twice a month).
In January 2000, while he was driving his bus he bumped another bus owned by Auto
Bus. He claimed that he bumped the he accidentally bumped the bus as he was so tired
and that he has not slept for more than 24 hours because Auto Bus required him to
return to Isabela immediately after arriving at Manila. Damages were computed and
30% or P75,551.50 of it was being charged to Bautista. Bautista refused payment.
Auto Bus terminated Bautista after due hearing as part of Auto Bus’ management
prerogative. Bautista sued Auto Bus for Illegal Dismissal. The Labor Arbiter Monroe
Tabingan dismissed Bautista’s petition but ruled that Bautista is entitled to P78,117.87
13th month pay payments and P13,788.05 for his unpaid service incentive leave pay.
The case was appealed before the National Labor Relations Commission. NLRC modified
the LA’s ruling. It deleted the award for 13th Month pay. The court of Appeals affirmed
the NLRC.
Auto Bus averred that Bautista is a commissioned employee and if that is not reason
enough that Bautista is also a field personnel hence he is not entitled to a service
incentive leave. They invoke:
Art. 95. RIGHT TO SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE
(a) Every employee who has rendered at least one year of service shall be entitled to a
yearly service incentive leave of five days with pay.
Book III, Rule V: SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE
SECTION 1. Coverage. ‘ This rule shall apply to all employees except:
(d) Field personnel and other employees whose performance is unsupervised by the
employer including those who are engaged on task or contract basis, purely commission
basis, or those who are paid in a fixed amount for performing work irrespective of the
time consumed in the performance thereof; . . .
ISSUE: Whether or not Bautista is entitled to Service Incentive Leave. If he is, Whether
or not the three (3)-year prescriptive period provided under Article 291 of the Labor
Code, as amended, is applicable to respondent’s claim of service incentive leave pay.
HELD: Yes, Bautista is entitled to Service Incentive Leave. The Supreme Court
emphasized that it does not mean that just because an employee is paid on commission
basis he is already barred to receive service incentive leave pay.
The question actually boils down to whether or not Bautista is a field employee.
According to Article 82 of the Labor Code, ‘field personnel shall refer to non-agricultural
employees who regularly perform their duties away from the principal place of business
or branch office of the employer and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be
determined with reasonable certainty.
As a general rule, field personnel are those whose performance of their job/service is
not supervised by the employer or his representative, the workplace being away from
the principal office and whose hours and days of work cannot be determined with
reasonable certainty; hence, they are paid specific amount for rendering specific service
or performing specific work. If required to be at specific places at specific times,
employees including drivers cannot be said to be field personnel despite the fact that exhausted at the end of the year. In other words, an employee who has served for one
they are performing work away from the principal office of the employee. year is entitled to it. He may use it as leave days or he may collect its monetary value.

Certainly, Bautista is not a field employee. He has a specific route to traverse as a bus
driver and that is a specific place that he needs to be at work. There are inspectors hired
by Auto Bus to constantly check him. There are inspectors in bus stops who inspects the
passengers, the punched tickets, and the driver. Therefore he is definitely supervised
though he is away from the Auto Bus main office.

On the other hand, the 3 year prescriptive period ran but Bautista was able to file his
suit in time before the prescriptive period expired. It was only upon his filing of a
complaint for illegal dismissal, one month from the time of his dismissal, that Bautista
demanded from his former employer commutation of his accumulated leave credits. His
cause of action to claim the payment of his accumulated service incentive leave thus
accrued from the time when his employer dismissed him and failed to pay his
accumulated leave credits.

Therefore, the prescriptive period with respect to his claim for service incentive leave
pay only commenced from the time the employer failed to compensate his accumulated
service incentive leave pay at the time of his dismissal. Since Bautista had filed his
money claim after only one month from the time of his dismissal, necessarily, his money
claim was filed within the prescriptive period provided for by Article 291 of the Labor
Code.

Definition of Service Incentive Leave

Service incentive leave is a right which accrues to every employee who has served
within 12 months, whether continuous or broken reckoned from the date the employee
started working, including authorized absences and paid regular holidays unless the
working days in the establishment as a matter of practice or policy, or that provided in
the employment contracts, is less than 12 months, in which case said period shall be
considered as one year. It is also commutable to its money equivalent if not used or
G.R. No. L-15422 November 30, 1962
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL TEXTILE WORKERS
UNION, respondents.
FACTS: At the National Development Co., a government-owned and controlled
corporation, there were four shifts of work. One shift was from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m., while
the three other shifts were from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m; then from 2 p.m. to 10 p.m. and,
finally, from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. In each shift, there was a one-hour mealtime period, to
wit: From (1) 11 a.m. to 12 noon for those working between 6 a.m. and 2 p.m. and from
(2) 7 p.m. to 8 p.m. for those working between 2 p.m. and 10 p.m.
(Petitioner does not want to pay for the 1 hour lunch time) The records disclose that
although there was a one-hour mealtime, petitioner nevertheless credited the workers
with eight hours of work for each shift and paid them for the same number of hours.
However, since 1953, whenever workers in one shift were required to continue working
until the next shift, petitioner instead of crediting them with eight hours of overtime
work, has been paying them for six hours only, petitioner that the two hours
corresponding to the mealtime periods should not be included in computing
compensation.
CIR: Mealtime should be counted in the determination of overtime work
ISSUE: WON mealtime breaks should be considered working time
HELD: YES
The legal working day for any person employed by another shall be of not more than
eight hours daily.When the work is not continuous, the time during which the laborer is
not working and can leave his working place and can rest completely shall not be
counted. (Sec. 1, Com. Act No. 444)
It will be noted that, under the law, the idle time that an employee may spend for
resting and during which he may leave the spot or place of work though not the
premises of his employer, is not counted as working time only where the work is
broken or is not continuous.
In this case, the CIR’s finding that work in the petitioner company was continuous and
did not permit employees and laborers to rest completely is not without basis in
evidence and following our earlier rulings, shall not disturb the same.
The time cards show that the work was continuous and without interruption. There is
also the evidence adduced by the petitioner that the pertinent employees can freely
leave their working place nor rest completely. There is furthermore the aspect that
during the period covered the computation the work was on a 24-hour basis and
previously stated divided into shifts. (ang labo bakit “can freely leave their working
place norrest completely” feeling ko typo yan sa scra or ganun talaga?)
From these facts, the CIR correctly concluded that work in petitioner company was
continuous and therefore the mealtime breaks should be counted as working time for
purposes of overtime compensation.
States Marine Corp. vs. Cebu Seamen’s Assc.
GR L 12444 February 28, 1963
Facts:
On September 12, 1952, the respondent union filed with the Court of Industrial
Relations (CIR), a petition (Case No. 740-V) against the States Marine Corporation, later
amended on May 4, 1953, by including as party respondent, the petitioner Royal Line,
Inc. The Union alleged that that after the Minimum Wage Law had taken effect, the
petitioners required their employees on board their vessels, to pay the sum of P.40 for
every meal, while the masters and officers were not required to pay their meals.
The petitioners’ shipping companies, answering, averred that in enacting Rep. Act No.
602 (Minimum Wage Law), the Congress had in mind that the amount of P.40 per meal,
furnished to employees should be deducted from the daily wages.
they form part of the wage and when furnished by the employer are deductible
therefrom, since if they are not so furnished, the laborer would spend and pay for them
just the same.
Facilities may be charged to or deducted from wages. Supplements, on the other hand,
may not be so charged. Thus, when meals are freely given to crew members of a
vessel while they were on the high seas, not as part of their wages but as a necessary
matter in the maintenance of the health and efficiency of the crew personnel during the
voyage, the deductions made therefrom for the meals should be returned to them, and
the operator of the coastwise vessels affected should continue giving the same benefit.
Petition dismissed.

Issue: WON meals are deductable from wages.

Held:

It is argued that the food or meals given to the deck officers, marine engineers and
unlicensed crew members in question, were mere “facilities” which should be deducted
from wages, and not “supplements” which, according to said section 19, should not be
deducted from such wages, because it is provided therein: “Nothing in this Act shall
deprive an employee of the right to such fair wage … or in reducing supplements
furnished on the date of enactment.” In the case of Atok-Big Wedge Assn. v. Atok-Big
Wedge Co., L-7349, July 19, 1955; 51 O.G. 3432, the two terms are defined as follows —

“Supplements”, therefore, constitute extra remuneration or special privileges or

benefits given to or received by the laborers over and above their ordinary earnings or
wages. “Facilities”, on the other hand, are items of expense necessary for the laborer’s
and his family’s existence and subsistence so that by express provision of law (Sec. 2[g]),
Arica vs. NLRC
“Waiting Time”
Facts:
Petitioners Teofilo Arica et al filed a complaint against Standard Fruits Corporation
(STANFILCO)Philippines for allegedly not paying the workers for their assembly time
which takes place everywork day from 5:30am to 6am.
The assembly time consists of the following activities:
1. Roll call of the workers;
2. Getting their assignments from the foreman;
3. Filling out the Laborer’s Daily Accomplishment Report;
4. Getting tools and equipments from the stockroom; and
5. Going to the field to work.
They contended that these activities are necessarily for private respondent’s benefit.
The private respondent averred that the thirty-minute assembly time has been a long
time companypractice, thus, not considered as waiting time.
The LA dismissed the complaint. The LA agreed that the the thirty-minute assembly
time longpracticed cannot be considered waiting time or work time and, therefore,
not compensable.
The NLRC upheld the decision of the LA for the same reason.
Issue:
WON the 30-minute activity of the petitioners before the scheduled working time is
compensableunder the Labor Code.
Held:
No. The thirty minute assembly time long practiced and institutionalized by mutual
consent of theparties under Article IV, Section 3, of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement cannot be considered as ‘waiting time’ within the purview of Section 5, Rule
I, Book III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code.
The thirty (30)-minute assembly is a deeply-rooted, routinary practice of the employees,
and theproceedings attendant thereto are not infected with complexities as to deprive
the workers the timeto attend to other personal pursuits. In short, they are not subject
to the absolute control of thecompany during this period, otherwise, their failure
to report in the assembly time would justify thecompany to impose disciplinary
measures.
Furthermore, their houses are situated right on the area where the farm are located,
such that afterthe roll call, which does not necessarily require the personal presence,
they can go back to theirhouses to attend to some chores. In short, they are not subject
to the absolute control of thecompany during this period.
Aklan Electric Corp. v NLRC
FACTS:
January 22, 1991 by way of a resolution of the Board of Directors of AKELCO it allowed
the temporary holding of office at Amon Theater, Kalibo, Aklan upon the
recommendation of Atty. Leovigildo Mationg, then project supervisor, on the ground
that the office at Lezo, Aklan was dangerous and unsafe. Majority of the employees
including the herein complainants, continued to report for work at Lezo, Aklan and were
paid of their salaries. The complainants claimed that transfer of office from Lezo, Aklan
to Kalibo, Aklan was illegal because it failed to comply with the legal requirements under
P.D. 269, thus the they remained and continued to work at the Lezo Office until they
were illegally locked out therefrom by the respondents. Despite the illegal lock out
however, complainants continued to report daily to the location of the Lezo Office,
prepared to continue in the performance of their regular duties. Complainants who
continuously reported for work at Lezo, Aklan were not paid their salaries from June
1992 up to March 18, 1993.
LA dismissed the complaints. NLRC reversed and set aside the LA’s decision and RULING
that private respondents are entitled to unpaid wages.
NLRC based its conclusion on the following: (a) the letter of Leyson, Office Manager of
AKELCO addressed to AKELCO’s General Manager, Atty. Mationg, requesting for the
payment of private respondents’ unpaid wages from June 16, 1992 to March18, 1993;
(b) the memorandum of said Atty. Mationg in answer to the letter request of Leyson
where he made an assurance that he will recommend such request; (c) the private
respondents’ own computation of their unpaid wages.-
Petitioner AKELCO claims
– compensable service is best shown by timecards, payslips and other similar
documents and it was an error for public respondent to consider the computation of the
claims for wages and benefits submitted merely by private respondents as substantial
evidence
ISSUE:
WON the refusal of private respondents to work under the lawful orders of AKELCO
management are covered by the “no work, no pay” principle (thus not entitled to the
claim for unpaid wages)
RULING:
The above bases of the NLRC does not constitute substantial evidence to support the
conclusion that private respondents are entitled to the payment of wages from June 16,
1992 to March18, 1993. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. These evidences
relied upon by public respondent did not establish the fact that private respondents
actually rendered services in the Kalibo office during the stated period.
It has been established that the petitioner’s business office was transferred to Kalibo
and all its equipments, records and facilities were transferred thereat and that it
conducted its official business in Kalibo during the period in question. It was incumbent
upon private respondents to prove that they indeed rendered services for petitioner,
which they failed to do.
It would neither be fair nor just to allow private respondents to recover something they
have not earned and could not have earned because they did not render services at the
Kalibo office during the stated period
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES vs. NLRC et al
G.R. No. 132805
Feb. 2, 1999
FACTS: Private respondent Dr. Fabros was employed as flight surgeon at petitioner
company. He was assigned at the PAL Medical Clinic and was on duty from 4:00 in the
afternoon until 12:00 midnight.
On Feb.17, 1994, at around 7:00 in the evening, Dr. FAbros left the clinic to have his
dinner at his residence, which was abou t5-minute drive away. A few minutes later, the
clinic received an emergency call from the PAL Cargo Services. One of its employeeshad
suffered a heart attack. The nurse on duty, Mr. Eusebio, called private respondent at
home to inform him of the emergency. The patient arrived at the clinic at 7:50 in the
evening and Mr. Eusebio immediately rushed him to the hospital. When Dr. Fabros
reached the clinic at around 7:51 in the evening, Mr. Eusebio had already left with the
patient to the hospital. The patient died the following day.
Upon learning about the incident, PAL Medical Director ordered the Chief Flight Surgeon
to conduct an investigation. In his explanation, Dr. Fabros asserted that he was entitled
to a thirty-minute meal break; that he immediately left his residence upon being
informed by Mr. Eusebio about the emergency and he arrived at the clinic a few minutes
later; that Mr. Eusebio panicked and brought the patient to the hospital without waiting
for him.
Finding private respondent’s explanation unacceptable, the management charged
private respondent with abandonment of post while on duty. He denied that he
abandoned his post on February 17, 1994. He said that he only left the clinic to have his
dinner at home. In fact, he returned to the clinic at 7:51 in the evening upon being
informed of the emergency.
After evaluating the charge as well as the answer of private respondent, he was given a
suspension for three months effective December 16, 1994.
Private respondent filed a complaint for illegal suspension against petitioner.
On July 16, 1996, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the suspension of
private respondent illegal. It also ordered petitioner to pay private respondent the
amount equivalent to all the benefits he should have received during his period of
suspension plus P500,000.00 moral damages.
Petitioner appealed to the NLRC.
The NLRC, however, dismissed the appeal after finding that the decision of the Labor
Arbiter is supported by the facts on record and the law on the matter. The NLRC likewise
denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
1. WON the nullifying of the 3-month suspension by the NLRC erroneous.
2. WON the awarding of moral damages is proper.
HELD: The petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The portion of the assailed decision
awarding moral damages to private respondent is DELETED. All other aspects of the
decision are AFFIRMED
1. The legality of private respondent’s suspension: Dr. Fabros left the clinic that night
only to have his dinner at his house, which was only a few minutes’ drive away from the
clinic. His whereabouts were known to the nurse on duty so that he could be easily
reached in case of emergency. Upon being informed of Mr. Acosta’s condition, private perishable goods. Rest periods or coffee breaks running from five (5) to twenty (20)
respondent immediately left his home and returned to the clinic. These facts belie minutes shall be considered as compensable working time. Thus, the eight-hour work
petitioner’s claim of abandonment. Petitioner argues that being a full-time employee, period does not include the meal break. Nowhere in the law may it be inferred that
private respondent is obliged to stay in the company premises for not less than eight (8) employees must take their meals within the company premises. Employees are not
hours. Hence, he may not leave the company premises during such time, even to take prohibited from going out of the premises as long as they return to their posts on time.
his meals. We are not impressed. Art. 83 and 85 of the Labor Code read: Art. 83. Normal Private respondent’s act, therefore, of going home to take his dinner does not
hours of work. — The normal hours of work of any employee shall not exceed eight (8) constitute abandonment. 2. The award of moral damages: Not every employee who is
hours a day. Health personnel in cities and municipalities with a population of at least illegally dismissed or suspended is entitled to damages. As a rule, moral damages are
one million (1,000,000) or in hospitals and clinics with a bed capacity of at least one recoverable only where the dismissal or suspension of the employee was attended by
hundred (100) shall hold regular office hours for eight (8) hours a day, for five (5) days a bad faith or fraud, or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner
week, exclusive of time for meals, except where the exigencies of the service require contrary to morals, good customs or public policy In the case at bar, there is no showing
that such personnel work for six (6) days or forty-eight (48) hours, in which case they that the management of petitioner company was moved by some evil motive in
shall be entitled to an additional compensation of at least thirty per cent (30%) of their suspending private respondent. It suspended private respondent on an honest, albeit
regular wage for work on the sixth day. For purposes of this Article, “health personnel” erroneous, belief that private respondent’s act of leaving the company premises to take
shall include: resident physicians, nurses, nutritionists, dieticians, pharmacists, social his meal at home constituted abandonment of post which warrants the penalty of
workers, laboratory technicians, paramedical technicians, psychologists, midwives, suspension. Under the circumstances, we hold that private respondent is not entitled to
attendants and all other hospital or clinic personnel. (emphasis supplied) Art. 85. Meal moral damages.
periods. — Subject to such regulations as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe, it shall
be the duty of every employer to give his employees not less than sixty (60) minutes
time-off for their regular meals. Sec. 7, Rule I, Book III of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code further states: Sec. 7. Meal and Rest Periods. — Every
employer shall give his employees, regardless of sex, not less than one (1) hour time-off
for regular meals, except in the following cases when a meal period of not less than
twenty (20) minutes may be given by the employer provided that such shorter meal
period is credited as compensable hours worked of the employee; (a) Where the work is
non-manual work in nature or does not involve strenuous physical exertion; (b) Where
the establishment regularly operates not less than sixteen hours a day; (c) In cases of
actual or impending emergencies or there is urgent work to be performed on
machineries, equipment or installations to avoid serious loss which the employer would
otherwise suffer; and (d) Where the work is necessary to prevent serious loss of
Facts: On September 1, 1945, Herein petitioner undertook the arrastre service in some
of the piers in Manila’s Port Area at the request and under the control of the U.S. Army.
Petitioner hired some 30 men as watchmen on 12 hour shifts at a compensation of 2.) As the compensation for work done on Sundays and legal holidays, the petitioner
P3.00 per day for the day shift and P6.00 per day for the night shift. On February 1, should pay its watchmen the compensation that corresponds to the overtime (in excess
1946, the petitioner began the postwar operation of the arrastre service at the present of 8 hours) at the regular rate only.
at the request and under the control of the Bureau of Customs, by virtue of a contract
entered into with Philippine Government. The watchmen of the petitioner continued in
the service with a number of substitution and additions, their salaries having been 3.) The watchmen are not entitled to night differential pay for past service, and
raised during the month of February to P4.00 per day for the dayshift and P6.25 per day therefore the decision should be reversed.
for the nightshift.

Hence, this petition, contending that the agreement under which its police force were
Later, some of the members of the Manila Terminal Relief and Mutual Aid Association, paid certain specific wages for 12 hour shifts, included overtime compensation.
sent a letter to the Department of Labor, requesting that the overtime pay be
investigated, but nothing was done by the Department. On May 27, 1947 the petitioner
instituted the system of strict 8 – hour shifts. On July 28, 1947 Manila Aid Association Issue: Whether or not the agreement under which its police force were paid certain
filed an amended petition with the Court of Industrial Relations praying, among others, specific wages for 12 hour shifts, includes the overtime compensation?
that petitioner be ordered to pay its watchmen or police force overtime pay from the
commencement of their employment.

The case thereafter alleviated in which Judge Lanting ruled;
1.) The decision under review should be affirmed in so far it grants compensation for
overtime on regular days during the period from the date of entrance to duty to May 24,
1947, such compensation to consist of the amount that corresponds to the four hours’
overtime at the regular rate and an additional amount of 25 per cent thereof.
Held: No. The Court ruled that in times of acute employment, regardless of its terms and
conditions, their main concern in the first place being admission to some work. The
petitioner’s watchmen must have railroaded themselves into their employment for their
subsistence, although they found themselves required to work for 12 hours a day. True,
there was agreement to work, but it cannot fairly be supposed that they had the
freedom to bargain in any way, much less to insist in the observance of the 8 hour labor
law.
Also, there was no reduction was made in the salaries which its watchmen received
under the 12 hour arrangement. Although, it may be argued that the salary for the night
shift was lessened, the fact that the rate for the day shift was increased in a sense tends
to militate against the contention that the salaries given during the 12 hour shifts
included overtime compensation.

The law gives the Association the right to extra compensation. And they could not be
held to have impliedly waived such extra compensation, for the obvious reason that
could not have expressly waived it.

It is high time that all employers were warned that the public is interested in the strict
enforcement of the Eight – Hour Labor Law. This was designed not only to safeguard the
health and welfare of the laborer or employee, but in a way to minimize unemployment
by forcing employers, in cases where more than 8 – hour operation is necessary, to
utilize different shifts of laborers or employees working only for 8 hour each.

The appealed decision, in the form voted by Judge Lanting, is affirmed, it being
understood that the petitioner’s watchmen will be entitled to extra compensation only
from the dates they respectively entered the service of the petitioner.