IAEA BULLETIN

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

September 2008 | 50-1 | www.iaea.org/bulletin

How Long to 2020?

The Mindset of Nuclear Safety • Kenya’s Drylands • Great Expectations

 IAEA BULLETIN
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
September 2008 | 50-1 | www.iaea.org/bulletin

How Long to 2020?

The world’s nuclear order is stronger on many fronts. But is it strong enough
for the 21st century?

This year 18 highly distinguished men and women from different countries
were asked to take a long hard look at the IAEA and its future.* The timeline
took them to 2020, and a decade beyond.

The Commission of Eminent Persons, as they are known, sees a world of How Long to 2020?
rising stakes, and inter-related threats and opportunities: “A bold agenda
is required,” they emphasize. “In fact, to satisfy energy demands to mitigate
the threat of climate change — two of the 21st century’s greatest challenges
— there are major opportunities for expansion of nuclear energy…But those The Mindset of Nuclear Safety • Kenya’s Drylands • Great Expectations

opportunities also pose complex and broad-ranging safety and security

questions that must be addressed effectively.”
IAEA BULLETIN
Apart from more money (nearly double as much), the 18 men and women is produced by the
agreed that the IAEA needs additional authority, notably for nuclear Division of Public Information
safeguards, safety and security, and more targeted investment in people International Atomic Energy Agency
and technology over the next decade. Highlights of their views are featured P.O. Box 100, A-1400 Vienna, Austria
in this edition of the IAEA Bulletin. Other articles take a closer look at topics, Phone: (43-1) 2600-21270
trends and developments influencing the future global nuclear order and Fax: (43-1) 2600-29610
the IAEA’s place in it. IAEABulletin@iaea.org
www.iaea.org/bulletin
In many respects, 2020 is just around the bend.
Division of Public Information
Twenty-two years ago, a major US think-tank issued warnings about the Director: Marc Vidricaire
shaky nuclear order and what was needed to strengthen it in a cold-war Editor-in-Chief: Lothar H. Wedekind
world.** The IAEA then was regarded as a “rock” on which to build, but Managing Editor: Giovanni Verlini
one “in trouble” because of factious political, technical and financial issues Assistant Editor/Design: Ritu Kenn
confronting it. Added urgency came from the 1986 Chernobyl disaster that Editorial Intern: Vannessa Maravilla
blackened nuclear safety and shook public confidence about what the IAEA
was doing, and could do, to prevent a repeat somewhere else. Language Editions
IAEA Bulletin is also available in
Largely hidden at the time were deep-rooted future troubles of nuclear Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian and Spanish.
disarmament, clandestine proliferation, (un)sustainable development, and
global politics. They emerged more fully a decade later. States responded to IAEA BULLETIN is published twice a year and distributed
strengthen nuclear cooperation and the IAEA by the turn of the century. without charge to a limited number of readers interested
in the IAEA and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
But not enough, as the 2008 Commission reports. Real and potential 21st Written requests should be addressed to
century risks mandate more collective action on multiple nuclear fronts. The IAEABulletin@iaea.org.
report’s final six words — “Now is the time to choose.”— echo the need for Extracts from the IAEA material contained in the
urgency. IAEA Bulletin may be freely used elsewhere provided
acknowledgement of their source is made. If the
— Lothar Wedekind, Editor-in-Chief attribution indicates that the author is not an IAEA
staff member, permission to republish other than for
* ’Reinforcing the Global Order for Peace and Prosperity: The Role of the IAEA to 2020 and Beyond,’ the use of review must be sought from the author or
report prepared by an independent Commission at the request of the Director General of the originating organization.
International Atomic Energy Agency, May 2008. The report has been submitted to the IAEA Board Views expressed in any signed article appearing in the
of Governors for consideration, along with the IAEA background report 20/20, ‘Vision for the Future.’ IAEA Bulletin do not necessarily represent those of the
www.iaea.org International Atomic Energy Agency and the IAEA accepts
no responsibility for them.
** ’The International Atomic Energy Agency and World Nuclear Order,’ Lawrence Scheinman,
published by Resources for the Future, 1987. www.rff.org Cover Photo: Mark Miller/Morguefile
IAEA Bulletin is printed in Vienna, Austria.

IAEA Bulletin 49-2 | March 2008 | 1


CONTENTS
IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008
Snapshots p4
Facts, figures and images from a nuclear world.
THE ROAD AHEAD
Achieving the Vision p6
Ernesto Zedillo outlines a distinguished commission’s
vision for the IAEA to 2020 and beyond.
Sidebar: 20/20
The Next 40 Years p9
If past is prologue, new roles will remerge.
A Date to Remember p12
How the IAEA Bulletin covered the signing of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 40 years ago.
Sidebar: Leaders of the Day
Nuclear Peace p15
Robert J. Berg explains why the world needs citizen
activism to get rid of nuclear weapons.
Sidebar: Blix on the Campus Trail
“ When composing the team, the correct balance
between behavioural scientists and technical specialists is
essential for the implementation of the approach as well
as for the outcomes.
”
—Anne Kerhoas and Marin Ignatov, p47
Harvesting Times
Feed the Hungry, Today and Tomorrow p17
Qu Liang and Katherine Long highlights achievements of
the IAEA’s partnership with the UN’s Food and Agriculture
Organization.
Sidebars: A Partnership for Food Security
The UN Response to the Global Food Crisis
The Science of Plant Breeding
Nuclear Partners
Golden Wheat “Greens” Kenya’s Drylands p23
Rodolfo Quevenco reports on how the IAEA is helping
deliver hardier, healthier wheat.
No Love for Mosquitoes p26
Scientists fighting malaria zero in on the sexual lives of
mosquitoes, writes FeiFei Jiang.
The Energy File
Great Expectations p28
Projections of nuclear power around the world show an
upward trend according to Alan McDonald.
Nuclear Acceptance p32
Steve Kidd explains how the nuclear industry can achieve
a more favourable public image.
A Nuclear Divide p34
Familiarity with nuclear power can make a difference in
public opinion, the latest Eurobarometer report suggests.
Did You Say Yes? p36
Robert Knight provides an insight into the British attitude
to nuclear power.
Tackling the Global Energy Crisis p39
Mohamed ElBaradei explains why a global energy
organization is needed.
Security at the Olympics, p41
Safe and Secure
Security at the Olympics p41
Petr Pavlicek and Dana Sacchetti show how the IAEA helped the
Chinese authorities keep the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games safe and
secure.

The Mindset of Nuclear Safety p47

Anne Kerhoas and Marin Ignatov describe a new IAEA service that
looks at nuclear safety culture.

Prepare for the Worst

Earth, Wind and Fire p50
Dana Sacchetti looks at nature’s threats to nuclear power plants.
Sidebar: Steady Lessons from Shaky Events
Feed the Hungry, Today and Tomorrow, p17
43-Hour Global Drill p54
Rafael Martincic and Lisa Obrentz report on a fake nuclear
emergency testing the world’s readiness to respond.
Sidebar: Practice Makes Perfect

Progress Through Technology

Nuclear Forensics p56
Giovanni Verlini speaks with Klaus Mayer, a world expert on nuclear
forensics.
Sidebar: European Nuclear Science Lab

More than Words

Risk Communication p58
David Ropeik unveils the mechanisms of risk communication.
Golden Wheat “Greens” Kenya’s Drylands, p23
Expert Imagination p62
New trends in science communication are illustrated by Giovanni
Carrada.
Sidebar: Science y Tapas

“ Regaining control over material that has been diverted or stolen

requires significantly higher efforts. Nuclear forensics provides clues
on the history and on the origin of nuclear material.
”
—Klaus Meyer, p56

Earth, Wind and Fire, p50


75000
people die of cancer each
year in Vietnam. Through
the PACT alliance, the
IAEA aims to help save
lives.
from our image bank
4 | IAEA Bulletin 49-2 | March 2008
africa’s water
In a continent already facing water
scarcity, phenomena such as climate
change and rapid population
growth are expected to force local
populations to increase their reliance
on groundwater resources to meet
domestic, agricultural and industrial
water demands.
A conference held in Uganda this year
brought together water and climate
scientists to understand the impact
of climate and development on
groundwater resources in Africa. As a
conference sponsor, the IAEA Water
Resources Programme is promoting
isotope hydrology tools to improve
the management of groundwater
resources.
2008
Photo: IAEA
marks the 40th
anniversary of the
World’s Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty.
atomic abc Nuclear educators and experts from across Europe
came together at an IAEA workshop devoted to teach-
ing English language methodology to nuclear pro-
fessionals. The course called Making Knowledge Work — Nuclear English for University
Teachers took place at the Kaunas University of Technology in Kaunas, Lithuania in June
this year. The workshop was held as part of an IAEA technical cooperation project entitled
Strengthening Capabilities of Nuclear Knowledge Preservations. The primary audience
were university teachers working in advanced sciences whose students can speak English
well but aim to boost their comprehension of nuclear terminology.
 3000 crop varieties
from more than
170 different plant
species have been introduced since
modern plant breeding began over
80 years ago.

helping China
$10 million for Fuel Bank
The UAE has pledged $10 million towards a fuel
bank proposal originally launched by the Nuclear
Threat Initiative (NTI) in 2006. IAEA Director General
Mohamed ElBaradei receives the UAE’s fuel bank
funding letter, presented on 1 August by Mr.
Hamad Al Kaabi, UAE Special Representative for
International Nuclear Cooperation.
(Photo: D.Calma/IAEA)

The 7.9-magnitude earthquake of 12 May this year devastated China’s

mountainous Sichuan Province, killing an estimated 69,000 people
and causing extensive property damage. Among the many danger-
ous materials buried in the rubble lay a hidden enemy — stray radioac-
future trends
tive sources that could complicate relief efforts or cause contamination. Number Of Reactors
Source recovery is important to ensure safety of local populations and Under Construction Worldwide
safeguard against unintended contact with stray radioactive sources. Russia 7
China 6
India 6
In early 2007, staff from Chinese national authorities were trained by the
Rep. of Korea 3
IAEA on how to search for “lost” sources, and to then control and dispose Bulgaria 2
of them safely. In addition to this training, which was held under an IAEA Ukraine 2
Technical Cooperation Project, the IAEA contributed nearly $100,000 Argentina 1
1
worth of radiation detection and search equipment. Finland
France 1
35* nuclear plants
Iran 1 are being built
After the Sichuan earthquake, Chinese authorities were able to uti- Japan 1
in 13 countries,
lize IAEA training and donated equipment in their recovery efforts. The Pakistan 1
recovery teams used radiation detection equipment to pinpoint the USA 1 mostly in Asia.
location of 50 sources and safely recover all of them.
*The world total includes 2 reactors under construction in Taiwan, China.
Source: Power Reactor Information System (PRIS), www.iaea.org/programmes/a2/index.html
(Photo: Beijing Nuclear Safety Centre) (28 September 2008)

Pictures from an exhibition of paintings by school children from Kiev on the Chernobyl Disaster.

For more information and photos visit the IAEA website at www.iaea.org

IAEA Bulletin 49-2 | March 2008 | 5

20/ Achieving
A distinguished panel was asked to come up with recommendations
for the future of the IAEA. This is what they had to say.

T
needs.
he Commission of Eminent Persons was
asked to reflect on how the nuclear future
might evolve to 2020 and beyond, what
the world is likely to demand of the IAEA, and what
steps need to be taken to allow the IAEA to fill those

We produced a document entitled ‘Reinforcing the

Global Nuclear Order for Peace and Prosperity: The
Role of the IAEA to 2020 and Beyond’.

The national and professional backgrounds of the

Commission members are quite diverse.* This cir-
cumstance provided for a wide range of perspec-
tives on nuclear and related issues throughout our
discussions and drafting of the Report. It is remarka-
ble that notwithstanding our different, and in some
cases opposing, views on several important top-
ics tackled in our work, the Commissioners unani-
mously believe that the IAEA must be strengthened
by its member states with additional authority,
resources, personnel and technology.

We believe that a stronger IAEA is warranted by a

robust demand for those crucial services of the
Agency that in all likelihood will increase and prevail
in the foreseeable future.

Consider that the spiraling cost of fossil fuels and the

impending threat of climate change, against which
nuclear power is recognized as an important miti-
for implementing them. The Agency will also be
required to develop international nuclear safety
standards and to promote the harmonization of cer-
tification processes for new reactor models. Shared
regional nuclear plants, mechanisms for the assured
supply of nuclear fuel, including international banks
of enriched uranium, multinational management of
the entire fuel cycle, estimation of global resources
of uranium and research and development of thor-
ium fuel cycles are among the endeavors that may
result in additional responsibilities for the IAEA.

It should also be taken into account that safeguards

will continue to be a central part of the Agency’s
work. In fact, the IAEA’s safeguards responsibilities
have been expanding rapidly. From 1984 to 2007
the amount of nuclear material under safeguards
increased more than tenfold. Many are calling on
the Agency to implement the Additional Protocol
as well as to pursue a country-level, information-
driven approach to safeguards that requires the
Agency to examine a broad range of additional and
more sophisticated types of information.

The IAEA’s existing authorities should be interpreted

gating option, may make a renaissance of nuclear
energy likely in the near future.
International cooperation should be strengthened
immediately to ensure that any possible expansion
of nuclear energy will be safe and secure and will not
contribute to nuclear weapons proliferation. The
IAEA should help newcomer states put in place the
necessary infrastructure needed to develop nuclear
energy safely, securely and peacefully. It should
work with member states to coordinate research to
design reactors that are economical, safe and prolif-
eration-resistant.
It must expand its efforts to help states establish safe
and sustainable approaches to managing nuclear
waste, and to build public and international support
to give the Agency the responsibility to inspect for
indicators of nuclear weaponization activities. As has
become clear from recent events, sometimes trans-
parency going well beyond the measures called
for in the Additional Protocol is needed to provide
confidence that a state’s nuclear program is entirely
peaceful.
The IAEA should work closely with member states
developing new fuel cycle processes, so that effec-
tive safeguards, nonproliferation, and physical pro-
tection measures can be designed into such new
systems from the outset. Clearly, further increases
for safeguards work will be needed if nuclear energy
grows and other circumstances change in the
future.
Though nuclear security is fundamentally the
responsibility of individual states, the IAEA has an
important role to play in addressing the threat of
nuclear terrorism. It is the only global body with rele-
vant competence and expertise relied on by a wide
range of countries.

6 | IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008

/20
the Vision
States should negotiate binding agreements that
set effective global nuclear security standards. They
should agree to give the IAEA an important role in
developing those binding standards and assisting
in and confirming their implementation. The IAEA
should develop model legislation that will help
states fulfill their United-Nations-Security Council-
Resolution-1540 obligations to enact effective
national laws prohibiting acts related to nuclear ter-
rorism and nuclear smuggling.
The IAEA should expand its efforts to ensure effec-
tive security for the most dangerous radiological
sources worldwide and increase the priority it gives
to preventing nuclear smuggling. And it should con-
tinue its efforts to help states prepare to cope with
the consequences of a radiological dispersal.
Although nuclear safety has improved enormously
in recent decades, the risk of an accident at any given
reactor must continue to be reduced. The IAEA’s role
in persistently improving the global safety regime is
critical and must be reinforced. The Agency should
lead an international effort to establish a global
nuclear safety network, and ensure that critical
safety knowledge, experience, and lessons learned
are broadly exchanged.
Over time, with the IAEA’s involvement, states
should enter into binding agreements to adhere to
effective global safety standards and to be subject
to international nuclear safety peer reviews.
Member states and the IAEA should strengthen their
critically important efforts to ensure that countries
embarking on nuclear power programs develop
sound safety infrastructures, including effective and
independent regulatory bodies. The Agency should
expand its efforts to assist states in assessing and
strengthening the nuclear safety culture.
The IAEA’s technical assistance in developing coun-
tries for nuclear applications in health, agriculture,
industry, environment, hydrology and biological
and physical research is important both for its direct
contribution to human well-being and because it
helps to build broad support for the Agency itself
and its larger energy, safety, security, and non-prolif-
eration missions.
by Ernesto Zedillo
Consequently, the Agency’s technical coopera-
tion program needs to be expanded and diver-
sified to ensure it keeps pace with the growth in
the Agency’s other activities. Demand for techni-
cal assistance will always exceed the resources allo-
cated for it, but developing countries’ expectations
for such support from the IAEA need to be better
satisfied in the future.
The Commission believes that to enable the IAEA to
properly accomplish these and other duties, its mem-
bers should allocate it considerably larger resources.
We suggest an immediate one-time increase in the
IAEA’s budget in an amount sufficient for, at least,
refurbishing the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory
and for adequate funding of the Agency’s Incident
and Emergency Response Center.
We also propose annual increases in the regular
budget to underpin the expansion of the Agency’s
security and safety work, other activities in support
of newcomer states embarking on nuclear pro-
grams, and an expansion of work in nuclear applica-
tions and technology transfer.
In the longer time frame, the regular budget will
need to continue increasing in order to meet the
growing demands for IAEA services. A substantially
bigger regular budget – by 2020 perhaps twice as
large as the present one – would allow the needed
expansion of work on nuclear reactors and the fuel
cycle, security and safety, and support for meeting
basic human needs through nuclear applications
and technical cooperation.
The large majority of the Commissioners also believe
that progress toward disarmament, or the lack of it,
will deeply affect the success of the IAEA’s nonprolif-
eration mission. Article VI of the Treaty on the
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) legally
obligates the nuclear weapons state parties to nego-
tiate in good faith toward nuclear disarmament, and
at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, they agreed
that the treaty represented an “unequivocal under-
taking” to “accomplish the total elimination of their
nuclear arsenals.”
This commitment is an integral part of the NPT bar-
gain. The need for the NPT to become universal can-
not be stressed enough. States must recommit to
IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008 | 7
 The Road Ahead | Achieving the Vision
20/20
IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei
tasked the Agency’s Secretariat with conducting
a detailed review of the nature and scope of the
IAEA’s programme in the next decade and what Vision for the Future
resources would be needed to fund these activi-
ties. The study was given the name “20/20”, reflect-
Commission of Eminent Persons
ing the effort to look ahead to the year 2020 and
beyond with the clearest possible vision.
According to the report’s findings, the major chal-
lenges likely to face the IAEA in the 2020 timeframe Atoms for Peace
are:
• growth in the use of nuclear power, brought on by the demand for clean
energy;
• greater demand for the use of nuclear applications in health, food and the
environment;
• increased emphasis on maintaining a high level of safety;
• combating the threat of nuclear terrorism; and
• strengthening of the safeguards system to ensure its effectiveness, credibil-
ity and independence.
The “20/20 Vision for the Future” report, can be found at: www.iaea.org/
NewsCenter/News/PDF/20-20vision_220208.pdf
the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and
take firmer steps in that direction.
Needless to say, a world free of nuclear weapons will
not be achieved quickly, and will require action by
many actors in the international system, going far
beyond the mandate and capabilities of the IAEA.
What is needed is an ambitious reinvigoration of
the grand bargain that was struck 40 years ago in
the NPT. The renewed grand bargain will need to
combine steps that can be taken immediately with a
vision for the longer term, and to draw in states that
are not parties to the NPT.
New approaches to verifying compliance with
treaty obligations, to providing security for states
in the absence of nuclear weapons, and to punish-
ing states that violate the regime will certainly be
required, and new methods to control the sensi-
tive elements of the nuclear fuel cycle will likely be
needed as well.
8 | IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008
What the IAEA’s precise future role in disarmament
might be remains to be determined. But interna-
tional nuclear verification will certainly be essen-
tial as disarmament proceeds, and the IAEA’s exist-
ing capabilities and experience make it well suited
to play a central role in that endeavor. It would also
20/20 be logical for states to give the Agency a central role
in monitoring the huge stockpiles of fissile mate-
Background Report
by the
rial that would be freed from nuclear weapons pro-
Director General
for the
grams. These activities would also justify additional
resources for the Agency.
February 2008
The international community has auspicious
opportunities and significant challenges to tackle
as the world moves into its seventh nuclear dec-
ade. Expanded use of nuclear technologies offers
immense potential to meet important develop-
ment needs. But it also poses complex and broad-
ranging safety and security challenges that must be
addressed effectively. Consequently, to reduce risks
while allowing rapidly growing contributions to
human well being from nuclear technologies, our
report calls for a reinforced global nuclear order.
A stronger nuclear order will emerge as a product of
increased collective action and partnership,
expanded transparency, increasingly effective
standards for safety and security worldwide, new
nonproliferation measures, and progressive steps to
reduce and ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons. If
it can be created, this strengthened nuclear order
could ultimately produce an era of Atoms for Peace
and Prosperity, as was the hope when the IAEA was
conceived in 1953. Of course, this is a task that goes
well beyond the IAEA’s mandate and capabilities,
but reinforcing the IAEA will be one of the most cru-
cial and fundamental steps toward that goal.
Ernesto Zedillo is the Director of the Yale Center for the
Study of Globalization and former President of Mexico.
*Members of the Commission were: Ambassador
Oluyemi Adeniji (Nigeria), Lajos Bokros (Hungary),
Lakhdar Brahimi (Algeria), Dr. Rajagopala
Chidambaram and DAE-Homi Bhabha Professor
(India), Senator Lamberto Dini (Italy), Gareth
Evans (Australia), Louise Fréchette (Canada),
Anne Lauvergeon (France), Kishore Mahbubani
(Singapore), Ambassador Ronaldo Mota
Sardenberg (Brazil), Ambassador Pius Yasebasi
Ng’Wandu (Tanzania), Senator Sam Nunn (United
States), Ambassador Karl Theodor Paschke
(Germany), Dr. Wolfgang Schüssel (Austria),
Academician Evgeny Velikhov (Russia), Professor
Wang Dazhong (China), Dr. Hiroyuki Yoshikawa
(Japan), Ernesto Zedillo, Chair (Mexico).
The Next 40 Years
For four decades, the IAEA has played a crucial role
in nuclear non-proliferation. Now foundations are
being laid for the future.
F
our decades have elapsed since the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT) was opened for signature in July 1968.
Since then, the NPT has become the world’s most
adhered to multilateral nuclear non-prolifera-
tion, arms control and disarmament treaty. The
International Atomic Energy IAEA (IAEA), in which
the States Party to the NPT and all nuclear-weapon-
free zone treaties have vested the requisite verifi-
cation authority, passed its fifty-year mark in 2007.
Together, these treaties and the IAEA are the most
important components of the nuclear non-prolifer-
ation regime and serve as vital tools for the safe and
secure use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
The NPT consists of three equally important pil-
lars — nuclear non-proliferation; peaceful nuclear
cooperation; and nuclear disarmament — and the
premise that progress in any one pillar strengthens
the integrity of the whole.
The activities of the IAEA are also based on three
pillars. Through its work on nuclear verification,
nuclear safety and security, and nuclear technol-
ogy, the IAEA continues to play a key role as a cat-
alyst for sustainable development and as a corner-
stone for nuclear safety and security and verification
of nuclear non-proliferation.
Verification of Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Commitments
The 2000 NPT Review Conference Final Document
recognized that IAEA safeguards are a fundamental
pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, play
an indispensable role in the implementation of the
Treaty and help to create an environment conducive
to nuclear confidence, cooperation and disarma-
ment. The NPT Parties also reaffirmed that the IAEA
is the sole competent authority responsible for ver-
ifying and assuring, in accordance with its Statute
and the IAEA’s safeguards system, compliance with
States’ obligations under Article III.l of the Treaty.
The 2000 NPT Conference also expressed its convic-
tion that nothing should be done to undermine the
authority of the IAEA in this regard.
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements
There still remain 30 NPT States without the required
safeguards agreements in force. Out of these 30
States, 11 have already signed Comprehensive
Safeguards Agreements (CSAs) (yet to be brought
into force), five have a CSA approved by the Board
(still to be signed), and 14 States have still to initiate
negotiations with the IAEA.
Current Safeguards System
Under NPT safeguards agreements, the IAEA has the
right and the obligation to ensure that all nuclear
material in all peaceful nuclear activities of the State
is subject to safeguards.
The IAEA’s obligation is thus not limited to nuclear
material actually declared by a State; it also extends
to that which is required to be declared. However,
given the limitations of the verification tools pro-
vided to the IAEA by CSAs, in practice it is only in
respect of States which have both a CSA and an
additional protocol in force that the IAEA will be
able to provide credible assurance not only of the
non-diversion of declared nuclear material, but
also of the absence of undeclared nuclear material
and activities. As the additional protocol is a cru-
cially important tool for effective verification by the
IAEA of compliance with non-proliferation obliga-
tions, adherence by all States is essential. Since May
2007, seven States have concluded additional pro-
tocols and nine have brought additional protocols
into force — bringing the total to 125 States with
additional protocols concluded and 88 with addi-
tional protocols in force. Among these, four of the
five nuclear-weapon States have brought their addi-
tional protocols into force.
Concluding additional protocols and bringing them
into force at the earliest possible date will enable
the IAEA to discharge its safeguards responsibilities
in a more comprehensive manner. In order to facili-
tate this process, since the 2007 PrepCom, the IAEA
has organized outreach events on strengthened
safeguards in Gaborone, Geneva, Hanoi, New York,
Santo Domingo, Sydney and Vienna.
IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008 | 9
next
The Road Ahead | The Next 40 Years
Another major focus of such outreach was the
amendment of small quantities protocols (SQPs)
40
to CSAs with a view to facilitating the implemen-
tation of the IAEA Board of Governors’ September
2005 decisions on SQPs which would allow for the
application of more safeguards measures in States
with limited nuclear activities. As of August 2008,
there were 99 States with SQPs to their safeguards
agreements. Of these, 27 had accepted the revised
SQP text either by amending their existing SQP or
by signing a CSA with an SQP based on the new
standardized text. Moreover, two States have so far
rescinded their non-operational SQPs.
Financing of the safeguards system
Effective implementation of safeguards is also
dependent on the availability of the necessary
financial resources. The IAEA currently safeguards
nearly 950 facilities in more than 70 countries on a
regular safeguards budget of approximately 110 mil-
lion euros per year.
yea
It is clear that if the IAEA is to continue providing
credible verification assurances, and strengthen-
ing its safeguards system, the complexity of its ver-
ification mission must be matched by the required
resources.
Safeguards Implementation
The Secretariat’s findings and conclusions, which
are based upon an evaluation of all the information
available to the IAEA in exercising its rights and ful-
filling its obligations, are published annually in the
Safeguards Implementation Report. The report for
2007 covers 82 States that have both CSAs and addi-
tional protocols in force; 72 States with CSAs in force,
but without additional protocols; four out of five
NPT nuclear-weapon-States with voluntary offer
safeguards agreements; and three States that have
concluded item-specific safeguards agreements.
Nuclear Safety and Security
The IAEA’s activities in the field of nuclear safety
are organized in three broad programmes: nuclear
installation safety; nuclear safety coordination; and
radiation and waste safety.
Safety and security are primarily national respon-
sibilities but failure can have far reaching conse-
quences beyond national borders. In 2007, the
nuclear industry continued to demonstrate a high
level of safety and security worldwide. There was a
strong consensus on the need for maintaining con-
tinuing vigilance in both areas. With renewed inter-
est in nuclear power generation, comparable atten-
tion and commitment must be given to an equally
10 | IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008
ambitious enhancement of global safety and secu-
rity, including adequate planning for sustainable
safety infrastructure.
The threat of nuclear terrorism continues as a mat-
ter of concern to the international community. In
response, an international nuclear security frame-
work has emerged through the development and
approval of a series of legally binding and non-bind-
ing international instruments. However, progress on
entry into force of these instruments, particularly
the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material, remains slow.
New impetus to this process is expected by the
progress achieved by bringing into force the
International Convention for the Suppression of
Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in 2007.
Ensuring the Nuclear Security of Major
Public Events
The IAEA continued to assist States in ensuring
nuclear security at major public events, and estab-
lished projects with the governments of Brazil and
China for the 2007 Pan American Games and the
2008 Olympic Games, respectively. The IAEA’s coop-
eration included supplying radiation detection
equipment, providing up-to-date information, and
conducting national workshops and training pro-
grammes.
Illicit Nuclear Trafficking
In November 2007, the IAEA’s International
Conference on Illicit Nuclear Trafficking held in the
UK, reviewed the global experience in combating
illicit trafficking and considered international meas-
ures on prevention, detection and response. The
conference concluded that illicit nuclear trafficking
remained an international concern, and that efforts
must continue to establish effective systems, tech-
nical and administrative, to control movement of
nuclear and other radioactive materials, and to pre-
vent and detect their uncontrolled and unauthor-
ized movement.
Established in 1995, the IAEA Illicit Trafficking
Database programme now benefits from the vol-
untary participation of nearly 100 States. As of April
2008, ITDB Participating States had reported or oth-
erwise confirmed 1,416 incidents including 322 inci-
dents involving the seizure of nuclear material or
radioactive sources.
4th Review Meeting of the Convention on
Nuclear Safety
Nuclear safety officials from all the world’s nuclear
power countries convened in Vienna on 14 April to

review the state of nuclear safety worldwide. The
Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) aims to pro-
0ars
mote nuclear safety, safety culture, safety man-
agement and knowledge sharing among current
and future nuclear power States. As of June 2008,
there are 65 signatories to the Convention and 61
Contracting Parties. Notably, all countries with oper-
ating nuclear power plants are now parties to the
Convention.
Technical Cooperation
The 2000 Final Document called for an expanded
use of the IAEA’s technical cooperation programme.
For more than four decades, this programme devel-
ops human capacity and supports the building of
infrastructure to ensure the use of nuclear technol-
ogy in a safe, secure and peaceful manner.
The overall resources of the TC programme reached
around $100 million in 2007, for projects in 122 coun-
tries. One hundred and sixty training courses were
arranged for 2287 participants, 3546 expert mis-
sions were organized, 1661 fellows and scientific vis-
itors were trained, and $47 million worth of equip-
ment and supplies were provided.
Nuclear Technology
The IAEA’s activities in nuclear technology range
from the generation of electricity in nuclear power
plants, to the eradication of pests through irradiation,
the use of isotopic techniques in nutrition and water
development programmes and food irradiation.
To date, the use of nuclear power has been concen-
trated in industrialized countries. In terms of new
construction, however, the pattern is different; 17
of the 35 reactors now being built are in develop-
ing countries, and most of the recent expansion
has been centred in Asia and Eastern Europe. But
it is not only these two regions where we are wit-
nessing a resurgence of interest in nuclear power.
A number of countries, e.g., in the Middle East, are
seriously considering the introduction of nuclear
power programmes. And a large number of coun-
tries with existing nuclear programmes are working
to expand their nuclear generation capacity either
by new reactors or by extending the lifetime of
existing ones. It is vital that the expected increase in
the use of nuclear power is managed properly, tak-
ing into account all economic, safety, security and
non-proliferation requirements.
It is, of course, for States to decide how to respond
to the challenges posed by the growth in the use of
nuclear energy, especially the questions associated
The Road Ahead | The Next 40 Years
with the fuel cycle. So far, 12 proposals have been
made to the IAEA Secretariat on different ways
of assuring supply of nuclear fuel. The proposals
cover a broad spectrum, from establishing an
IAEA-controlled last resort reserve of low enriched
uranium to providing backup assurance of supply
and setting up international uranium enrichment
centres.
Conclusion
For fifty years the IAEA has worked to bring the ben-
efits of nuclear technology to humankind, while
minimizing its risks. It is well known that during the
past decade the cornerstone of the non-prolifera-
tion regime — the NPT — has been beset by con-
cerns about compliance with the provisions of the
Treaty and growing tension between its non-prolif-
eration and disarmament related aspects. However,
nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament are
mutually reinforcing, and the IAEA will be well posi-
tioned for the advancement of both and ready to
contribute to strengthening the regime during this
crucial time.
Although the IAEA’s primary role is the verification of
the non-proliferation commitments of States under
the NPT and nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties, its
Statute provides for a possible role in assisting States
in the verification of nuclear disarmament.
Indeed the IAEA Statute directs the IAEA to con-
duct its activities “in conformity with policies of the
United Nations furthering the establishment of safe-
guarded worldwide disarmament”.
Safety and security both require continued vigi-
lance and should always be considered as works in
progress. For example, gaps exist today in the cov-
erage of international conventions and codes of
conduct and in the development and application
of the normative infrastructure. And the number of
countries that have subscribed to the international
instruments needs to increase. These gaps need to
be filled as a matter of high priority. As the expecta-
tions and demands of States for the increased uses
of nuclear energy increase, so will the need for the
IAEA to help promote more effective and integrated
approaches towards enhancing nuclear safety and
security.
This article is taken from an official IAEA statement de-
livered at the NPT Preparatory Committee meeting held
in Geneva, Switzerland, on 28 April 2008. For a full ver-
sion of the statement, please visit www.iaea.org.
IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008 | 11
A Date to Remem
40 years ago the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) steered the IAEA
in a new direction. This is how the IAEA Bulletin covered the signing of the
treaty at the time.
In 1964 the Eighteen-Nation
Disarmament Committee (ENDC)
in Geneva took up the question
and fours years of detailed nego-
tiations culminated on 1 July 1968,
in the signing by many nations of
the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),
aimed at preventing the increase in
the number of countries possess-
ing nuclear weapons and ensuring
to non-nuclear-weapon countries
access to all peaceful uses of atomic
energy. . .
Ever since the end of World War II, var-
ious plans have been considered for
the global control of nuclear energy.
National and regional systems of
control have been created to assure
that nuclear material destined for
peaceful uses is not diverted to mili-
tary purposes. The first such controls
were national safeguards systems
developed by the major nuclear
States. In some cases safeguards
were also applied, through bilateral
agreements, when nuclear material
or equipment was exported to other
countries.
However effective some of these
national, bilateral and regional sys-
tems may be, they are limited in their
credibility for countries outside the
system. To inspire confidence in the
world community, a complete and
truly international system of verifica-
tion is required. This role was envis-
aged for the IAEA by its founders. . .
One of the principal statutory objec-
tives of the IAEA is to assure, so far as
it is able, that assistance given to pro-
mote peaceful uses of atomic energy
is not used in such a way as to further
any military purpose. The Statute
12 | IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008
also directs the IAEA to carry out its
activities in conformity with poli-
cies of the United Nations furthering
the establishment of safe-guarded
world-wide disarmament and in con-
formity with any international agree-
ments entered into pursuant to such
policies.
The IAEA has, therefore, the statutory
competence to carry out the control
functions now envisaged for it under
the NPT. It was natural, then, that the
negotiators of the NPT chose the
IAEA as the organ to verify the fulfil-
ment of the Treaty obligations.
The IAEA has had several years of
practical experience in building up
and administering a safeguards sys-
tem on an international basis. The
countries which will conclude agree-
ments with the IAEA are assured that
they will be entering into a system
which has been tried and tested and
accepted over the years . . .
It is a common belief that “safeguard-
ing” means “inspecting.” While on-
the-spot inspections are an impor-
tant element of the application of
safeguards, they are only a part of the
system. Also necessary for an effec-
tive Safeguards System are design
review and materials accounting on
the basis of records and reports which
are required on the use and location
of nuclear material and the operation
of facilities containing such material.
There are three ways in which the
IAEA assumes the responsibility to
apply safeguards in a country:
❖ When a State receives special fis-
sionable and other materials, serv-
ices, equipment or facilities, through
the IAEA.
❖ When the IAEA is requested to
safeguard any bilateral or multilateral
arrangement.
❖ When a State submits any of its
nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards.
With one recent exception, safe-
guards agreements have so far been
confined to specified installations, or
materials in given countries. Under
the terms of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty each signatory non-nuclear
weapon State is required to conclude
individually or together with other
States, a safeguard agreement with
the IAEA covering all their peace-
ful nuclear activities. Thus there may
well be an appreciable extension of
the safeguards activities of the IAEA.
..
Thirty-nine safeguards agree-
ments are now in force or have been
approved by the Board. Of these,
twenty-nine are transfer agreements
whereby the administration of bilat-
eral safeguards has been entrusted
to the IAEA. The total number of prin-
cipal nuclear facilities, research and
development facilities and other sep-
arate accountability areas covered by
these agreements is now more that
100. . .
The IAEA is closely following and fos-
tering the exchange of information
on development of techniques and
devices to improve the credibility
and facilitate the execution of safe-
guards. Several Member States are
doing research and development
work, and the IAEA itself has con-
mber
cluded research contracts. In order to carry
out efficiently the considerable increase in
work, the IAEA will take advantage of sim-
plified and mechanized procedures as they
are developed. . .
As the countries of the world are assured
that nuclear energy will not be diverted to
nuclear weapons, the exchange of infor-
mation, material, equipment and technical
aid should increase. According to Article
IV of the Treaty, “Parties to the Treaty in a
position to do so shall also co-operate in
contributing alone or together with other
States or international organizations to the
further development of the applications of
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. . .”
As the first objective set forth in the Statute
is to “seek to accelerate and enlarge the con-
tribution of atomic energy to pace, health
and prosperity throughout the world,” the
IAEA, with its international membership, is
well qualified to foster the further devel-
opment of the peaceful uses of atomic
energy. . .
In October 1967, Mr. Jan Neumann,
Chairman of the Czechoslovak Atomic
Energy Commission, who was President
of the Eleventh Session of the General
Conference, expressed the IAEA’s readi-
ness to undertake its tasks under the Non-
Proliferation Treaty and to make such
preparations as it might be necessary to
discharge the wider responsibilities which
would devolve upon it. . .
Until now, the IAEA’s role has been prima-
rily of a scientific and technological nature.
The effect of the enforcement of the Treaty
will be to give the IAEA responsibilities of
considerable political significance. “I know the stubborn, patient persistence it has required to get this far. I know the difficul-
Excerpts from “The Non-Proliferation Treaty
andtheIAEA.”IAEABulletinVol.10,Issue4.Toread
the full article, visit the IAEA Bulletin archives at:
www.iaea.org/bulletin
The Road Ahead | A Date to Remember
Leaders of the Day
On the day of the historic signing of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Treaty (NPT), the leaders of the treaty’s depositary governments commented on
the event in their own words.
Harold Wilson, Prime Minister of the UK:
“This is an historic occasion. I have no hesitation in describing this
Treaty, which is being signed today in Moscow and Washington as
well as here in London, as the most important measure of arms con-
trol and disarmament on which agreement has yet been reached.”
“Your Excellencies, this not a Treaty for which just two or three coun-
tries are responsible. It exists because it reflects and enshrines man-
kind’s universal and fundamental desire for peace and security. Harold Wilson
Every Government whose representatives supported the Treaty in
the United Nations General Assemble and who voted for the resolution can feel that it has
contributed to the Treaty we are signing today . . .”
A. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR:
“The conclusion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is a major contribution to peace. Ever since
nuclear weapons appeared the Soviet Union has firmly and consistently made efforts to
remove the nuclear threat from mankind. The Treaty is an important step towards this objec-
tive since it constitutes a barrier to the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and in doing
so decreases the danger of nuclear war breaking out.”
“The participation by a large number of States today in signing the Treaty is convincing proof
that mutually acceptable ways and means can be found by States for solving difficult inter-
national problems of vital importance for mankind as a whole.”
Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the USA:
“As the moment is reassuring, so it is, even
more, hopeful and heartening. For this Treaty
is evidence that amid the tensions, the strife,
the struggle and sorrow for these years, men
of many nations have not lost the way—or
the will—toward peace. The conclusion of this
Treaty encourages hope that other steps may
be taken toward a peaceful world.”
A. Kosygin (left) and Lyndon B. Johnson “The march of mankind is toward the summit—
not the chasm. We must not, we shall not allow
that march to be interrupted.”
ties that lie ahead. I know the fears, suspicions, and anxieties we shall have to overcome. But
I believe that the same spirit of accommodation shown in the negotiation of the present
treaty can bring us to a good result.
Man can still shape his destiny in the nuclear age—and learn to live as brothers.”
“Heads of States Welcome NPT.” IAEA Bulletin, Vol. 10, Issue 4.
IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008 | 13

are students
shaping a more
peaceful world?
by Robert J. Berg
P
eacemakers around the world have a weak
reputation. Many people in power think
of them as peaceniks, flower children just
one step removed from well-intentioned
Hare Krishnas who through chants and a vegan diet
will somehow bring about peace.
This is far from what is actually happening.
The serious front lines work on peace-making
around the world is now done by people who are
trained and experienced for the real world tasks
they face. It is these kind of people who have stud-
ied the negotiations process, who know the case
histories of how societies break down and where
the entry points are for holding back the break-
downs; who know militaries (their ranks, their pro-
tocols, their strengths as potential peacekeepers)
so that they can talk as experts with military offic-
ers. They know about post-conflict reconstruction,
what sequences are needed, how do you organize
the military for reconstruction, how to foster civil-
ian resumption of leaderships, how to draw upon
the strengths of international assistance. The best
of these peace-makers are often found in the United
Nations (UN), or as advisors to the UN, or work in col-
laboration with the UN.
I am a board member of the Alliance of Peace-
building, a coalition of 50 major academic and civil
society groups like the Carter Center, Search for
Common Ground and the Harvard Negotiations
Project. In Switzerland, there are numerous groups
like Swisspeace.
What I am saying is that making peace is now an
established profession. Those of you who want to
enter this profession can now see a path ahead on
how to do it, with whom you should study, and what
a career in making peace can be….
Nuclear disarmament discussions have been dif-
ficult, prolonged beyond human comprehension
nuc lea
r
peace
and immensely frustrating… The fact is that
over the last three decades we have far too little to
show for the efforts at global nuclear disarmament.
But there are other signs of progress.
In fact the trends in inter and intra-state violence
have declined sharply since the end of the Cold War
and this is due to three reasons.
First, a recognition that the UN and regional group-
ings of States need to be at the center of peacemak-
ing. Look at the terrific rise in the number of UN
peacekeeping missions since the end of the Cold
War.
Second, in the last two decades literally hundreds of
millions of people have entered into the emerging
middle class and above. Employment has broad-
ened significantly. This means that a much higher
proportion of humanity has a stake in stable soci-
eties.
And third, is the increasingly effective work of the
profession of peace-making and peacebuilding.
So the general trend is clearly for a more peaceful
world. If anything, nuclear disarmament has lagged
the general trend…
The World Academy of Art and Science believes that
breakthroughs are possible from other sources that
might help set a climate of pressure on the biggest
powers to get to work on disarmament more seri-
ously…
Will we have the imagination and the courage to
think about a future where inter-state military adven-
tures are a thing of the past, where multilateral secu-
rity replaces national militaries, where there is new
promise for human development because new
forces of creativity are unleashed?
The imagination for peace lives in the Academy.
IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008 | 15
 The Road Ahead | Nuclear Peace
Blix on the Campus Trail
Former IAEA Head Hans Blix Still Inspires Students
S
tudents are thinking good things for, and
about, former IAEA Director General Hans Blix.
Hundreds took part in 2008 in a global initia-
tive for peace and nuclear disarmament.
“The best way to avoid nuclear weapons is to make
governments feel that they don’t need them,”
says Dr. Blix, who launched the initiative through
Students for a Nuclear Weapons-Free World.
After leading the IAEA and UN weapons inspec-
tors for more than two decades, Dr. Blix today is
President of the World Federation of United Nations
Associations. Earlier this year, he launched a global
competition to engage students from around the
world and from a diversity of disciplines to write an
essay, design a poster or make a video to express
their ideas on how to free the world of nuclear
weapons.
The 15 winning students are from Afghanistan,
Australia, Belgium, China, Colombia, Jamaica,
Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Russia, Singapore,
Slovenia, and the United States.
Inspired and committed, students decided in July
2008 to create a mass movement of youth against
nuclear weapons. “We want to solve the problems
before we inherit them,” says Catriona Standfield, a
ear
student from Australia. The students talked about
c l
u
But it is not enough. The role of experts like those
found in the World Academy is almost by defini-
tion limited. Yes we can generate ideas. And we
can work with inner cores of activists, like the World
n
Federation of United Nations Associations, disarma-
ment non-governmental organizations, and various
levels of the UN.
But while necessary, these inner cores have not
been sufficient. I believe that the lesson of political
change is that we require citizen activism, and the
further lesson is that citizen activism is particularly
c
effective when it can mobilize unexpected friends.
e
a
Unexpected friends are the key prize in activism.
pe
What if, for example, a large number of the world’s
military leaders could be enlisted in this cause on
the basis of the obsolescence of nuclear weapons?
16 | IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008
both strategy and substance during a three-day
conference in Geneva.
The students are working on a statement that they
will send to the heads of nuclear weapons States, UN
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, and US Presidential
candidates John McCain and Barack Obama.
The student conference was backed by the UN
and governments. Mr. Sergei Ordzhonikidze, the
Director General of the UN in Geneva, and Mr. Sergio
Duarte, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament
Affairs, both sent messages to the students. The
conference programme included sessions with the
Ambassadors of Canada, Pakistan, Iraq and Sweden
and meetings with Alyn Ware from Parliamentarians
for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament,
renowned investigative journalist, Phillip Knightley,
and civil society activists, Susi Snyder and Colin
Archer. 
Students for a Nuclear Weapons-Free World has over
30 partner organizations, and is co-sponsored by the
World Academy of Art and Science. To learn more, visit
the website at www.disarmamenthub.org.
Dr. Hans Blix served as Chairman of the 2006 Weapons
of Mass Destruction Commission report. For an over-
view, see IAEA Bulletin article, “Wake Up Call”, by Manne
Wängborg at www.iaea.org/bulletin
History is on our side. Peace is prevailing over vio-
lence. There are new political figures coming on
to the scene of great promise, and leaders in most
countries are feeling the need to be more respon-
sive to their publics. Our challenge is to put the
problem of nuclear disarmament into the main-
stream moving towards a more peaceful, progress-
ing world.
Robert J. Berg is Trustee, World Academy of Art and
Science, and Senior Advisor, World Federation of United
Nations Associations. This article is based on his address
to the Conference of Students for a Nuclear Weapons
Free World, held in Geneva, Switzerland, in July 2008.
E-mail: BobBerg500@cs.com.
World Academy on the Web:
http://worldacademy.org/
 feed the hungry

©FAO/Sy Djibril
today and tomorrow by Qu Liang and Katherine Long

Through the Joint FAO/IAEA Division, nuclear technology and

related biotechnologies contributed to food security for over 40
years.
 Harvesting Times | Feed the Hungry, Today and Tomorrow

S
oaring global food prices, their effects on
the world’s economy and the widespread
social unrest that followed, have brought
to the fore the issue of poor investments
made in agriculture and food production
over the last three decades.
As a result of decreasing investments, farmers are
not only subject to rising costs of inputs, but also to
high transportation costs and poor infrastructure. At
the same time, natural resources such as soil, water
and plants are coming increasingly under pressure
from conflicting demands from agriculture, popula-
tion growth and other sectors of the economy.
Other factors contributing to the current global
food crisis include climate change, the increase in
transboundary pests and diseases (e.g., UG99, also
known as ‘wheat rust’) and the change in land use
and water distribution.
Increased demand for biofuel is also putting pres-
sure on agriculture and will continue to do so in
coming decades due to rising fossil energy prices.
Another factor related to rising food prices is the
increasing number of people moving away from
starchy foods towards meat and dairy products, a
trend that is intensifying demand for feed grains.

Dwindling food stocks combined with low crop pro-

ductivity and the increase in costs for inputs such as
fertilizer and seeds, has led to an overall decrease in
food availability and a consequent rise in prices. The
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Food Price
Index rose, on average, by an annual 12 per cent in
2006, and further accelerated to 24 per cent in 2007.
According to FAO, the price of food commodities,
currently 30 per cent above 2007 levels, will con-
tinue to increase through 2017. The impact of ris-
ing food and fuel prices is having dramatic conse-
quences, especially for those living in developing
countries where food security is already precarious.
Our Work
The IAEA has been working together with other UN
and international organizations to find solutions to
the problems set before us by the global food cri-
sis. The strategies adopted have been necessarily
divided into short, medium and long term.
In the short term, the World Food Programme (WFP)
has sought to dramatically increase food aid with
additional funding of US$755 million, while FAO has
been distributing seeds, fertilizer, animal feed and

A Partnership for Food Security

On 1 October 1964, FAO and its partner in the UN system, the IAEA created the Joint FAO/
IAEA Division of Nuclear Techniques in Food and Agriculture. The aim of setting up the
Joint Division was to use the talents and resources of both organizations for broadening coop-
eration between their Member Countries in applying nuclear technology and related biotech-
nologies for developing improved strategies for sustainable food security.*

Its uniqueness stems from the nature of the technology itself and the fact that all its activities
are conceived, planned and executed only after the scrutiny and approval of the IAEA and FAO
Governing Bodies.

The Joint Division is a successful example of inter-agency cooperation and coordination in the
UN and a precursor for UN-wide reforms being undertaken. The UN and the governments of its
Member States continually stress the need for more cooperation among UN agencies, for less
overlapping and duplication and for more harmony in their approach towards building a pros-
perous and peaceful world.

Earlier this year, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei cited plans by the FAO to end the
partnership as part of its reform process. “I believe that termination of the current arrangements
would have significantly negative consequences for developing Member States in areas such as
animal disease and insect pest eradication, land and water management, plant breeding, food
safety and trade,” Dr. ElBaradei said. He urged countries to maintain the partnership.

* Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe
©FAO/M. Roest and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.

18 | IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008


other farming tools and supplies to smallholder
farmers through its Initiative on Soaring Food
Prices (ISFP). The IAEA, through its Joint FAO/IAEA
Programme, is active with an integrated medium
and long term approach to the global food security
crisis. The sustainable intensification of agricultural
production, including enhanced food quality and
safety, and the integrated use of nuclear technolo-
gies and related biotechnologies is its field of action.
This falls under three categories: monitoring; adop-
tion of appropriate technology; and intervention.
Monitoring
Monitoring refers to the selection and assessment
of options for the prevention or mitigation of prob-
lems. In this sense, a typical monitoring effort is the
tracking of land degradation and pollutants in soil
through the use of stable isotopes that pose no
environmental threat and do not change the chem-
istry or biology of the target organism or system.
Soil monitoring through the use of isotopes
Agricultural production may be improved through
the development and use of integrated land and
water management. Isotopic and nuclear tech-
niques play an important role in identifying the
source of pollutants from different land use prac-
tices and farming activities.
Both stable isotopes and fallout radionuclides (FRN)
in soil, water or sediment samples can help to accu-
rately pinpoint the sources of these agricultural
pollutants. FRN such as caesium-137, lead-210 and
beryllium-7, airborne radioactive debris originating
from man-made activities such as nuclear weapon
testing and nuclear power plant accidents as well
as from the natural collision of cosmic rays, are
attached to soil particles and can therefore be used
as fingerprints to track their movement.
In addition, fertilizers, farmyard manure, pesticides
and animal excreta deposited by grazing animals in
an agricultural catchment carry distinct stable iso-
topic signatures — e.g., carbon-13 and nitrogen-15.
Thus specific areas within a catchment may have
distinctly different stable isotopic signatures (natu-
ral biomarkers) because of varying agricultural uses
and animal grazing patterns. The different signa-
tures offer a ‘forensic tool’ in environmental soil sci-
ence to verify the origin of a range of pollutants such
as nitrate, phosphate, and pesticides in waterways.
Soil studies using stable isotopic signatures also
assist in the understanding of climate change.
Harvesting Times | Feed the Hungry, Today and Tomorrow
The UN Response
to the Global Food Crisis
T
he timeliness of FAO’s High Level Conference on World Food
Security held in June 2008 in Rome, Italy, was widely acknowl-
edged by participants and countries alike. During the conference,
participants agreed that the issues of food, energy and climate change
are all closely linked.
While many analyses were presented, there was general agreement
on the fact that agriculture would once again play a prominent role in
the international agenda, and that increased agricultural investment
and enhanced agricultural productivity would be crucial for the future.
Short, medium and long term responses were identified.
On 28 April, 2008, the UN Secretary-General, Mr. Ban-Ki Moon, estab-
lished a Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis composed of the
heads of the UN specialized agencies, funds and programmes, Bretton
Woods institutions and relevant parts of the UN Secretariat. The Task
Force is chaired by the UN Secretary-General, with FAO Director-General
Jacques Diouf as Vice-Chairman. The primary aim of the Task Force is to
promote a unified response to the global food price challenge. The pro-
posed framework for action is to:
❶ address the current threats and opportunities resulting from
food price rises;
❷ create policy changes to avoid future food crises; and
❸ contribute to country, regional and global food and nutritional
security.
Isotopes such as carbon-13 and nitogen-15 can be
used as fingerprints to investigate how soil acts as
a sink for greenhouse gases. Changes in soil carbon
and nitrogen isotopes are expected to reflect the
shift in soil organic matter as influenced by varia-
tions in the levels of greenhouse gases in the atmos-
phere and land use activities.
Adoption of Appropriate
Technology
Appropriate technology is identified and adopted
to intensify production systems in a sustainable
manner. The development of new plant varieties
through mutation induction is one of the foremost
examples of this process.
This technology goes beyond conventional plant
breeding to address challenges such as the devel-
opment of new traits, adaptability to harsh environ-
ments, climate change and enhancement of bio-
mass productivity.
IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008 | 19
 Harvesting Times | Feed the Hungry, Today and Tomorrow

5,500Kg/ha representing a six-fold increase in pro-

ductivity of the original barley grown in 1978. Led by
Prof. Luz Gomes Pando, the socio-economic impact
of the improved barley varieties was awarded the

©FAO/Giulio Napolitano
2006 Prize of Good Governmental Practices.

Intervention
Intervention refers to products and processes
adopted to optimize efficiency, reduce vulnerability
and improve the quality and safety of food.

The Science of by Giovanni Verlini Pre- and post- harvest problems account for 30-50
per cent of crops lost due to insects and adverse

Plant Breeding storage conditions. The Joint FAO/IAEA Division has

been working to remove key constraints to agricul-
tural production, not only to increase production,
Agriculture is synonymous to plant domestication and trait selection. but also to improve food quality in relation to insect
However, scientific research applied to the screening, selection and devel- pests of plants and animals, animal diseases and
opment of plant varieties has grown immensely over the last few decades. food control measures.
But not all techniques used in this endeavor are the same.

Mutation breeding refers to the development of plant strains using Diagnosis: identify and characterize constraints
mutagens, including the irradiation of seeds. Quite simply, through this and risks
procedure the natural process of evolution of the plant’s DNA is speeded The IAEA has been actively involved in the validation
up. New varieties of crops can be chosen with characteristics tailored to a of kits to measure antibodies against non-structural
particular environment, such as grains with higher yield, better nutritional proteins of foot and mouth disease virus (FMDV).
value, tolerance to salty soil or resistance to a specific disease. The tests can distinguish between infected and vac-
cinated livestock and are of utmost importance in
Smart breeding, which makes use of marker assisted selection, refers assessing countries as free from foot and mouth dis-
to a process whereby a marker is used for indirect selection of a genetic ease (FMD). The use of such assays in well planned
trait of interest. This is a similar process to traditional breeding, although serological surveys is vital to declaring countries
it involves a far more precise knowledge, i.e., at a genetic level, of species’ or zones as free from FMD and therefore has huge
traits. trade implications.

Genetically modified plant varieties, on the other hand, have had

their genetic material altered using genetic engineering techniques. With
this technology, DNA from the original plant and other sources are com-
bined into one molecule to create a new set of genes. This DNA is then
transferred into the plant, causing it to acquire modified or novel traits.
Mutant barley varieties filling the food bowl in
the Peruvian Andes
Planted in areas above 3,000 m of altitude, where
adverse climatic conditions do not allow other crops
to be grown, barley is the main food security com-
ponent for the 3 million native Peruvians living off
subsistence agriculture in the Peruvian Andes. In an
effort initiated in the 1970s, the National Agrarian
University of La Molina, together with the Joint
Division and the Backus Foundation, developed
nine improved varieties of barley through muta-
tion induction and crosses that now cover 90% of
the barley producing area in Peru. The last released
mutant variety of barley has the potential to produce
Sterile insect technique to generate export
markets
Fruit flies cause major losses, and their presence in
a country can pose a significant barrier to trade in
fresh fruits and vegetables. The sterile insect tech-
nique (SIT) has been used in many parts of the world
against insect pests, such as the Mediterranean fruit
fly in Chile, Mexico and California, and the New World
screwworm in Libya, Central and North America.
The technique is a form of biological pest control,
an alternative to pesticides which can have serious
impacts on human health and the environment. It
involves the mass breeding of huge quantities of
target insects and the sterilization of the males by
exposing them to low doses of radiation. These ster-
ile male flies are then released by air over infested
areas where they mate with wild females. As they
produce no offspring, a gradual suppression or elim-
ination of the pest is eventually achieved.

20 | IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008


An example of this work is the eradication of
Medflies from the Patagonia region of Argentina,
which represents the culmination of ten years of
technical support provided by the IAEA and FAO.
Crucially, this achievement—which was officially
recognized by the USA—will allow Patagonia
to export fresh fruits and vegetables to the USA
without any quarantine treatments, represent-
ing annual savings of millions of dollars.
Food Safety
Food and feed products (and the water used for
their production, processing and preparation)
are likely vectors of many microbiological, (bio)
chemical and environmental hazards.
The Joint FAO/IAEA Division promotes the estab-
lishment of food control and quality assurance
systems compatible with international stand-
ards, with a focus on Codex food standards and
the reduction of the incidence of food trade
detentions and rejections from contaminants
and residue violations.
Conclusion
Nuclear and isotopic techniques can help
address the issues of food security and safety
facing the world today. They are economically
sound and highly competitive in relation to non-
nuclear technologies and can be used to achieve
a better understanding of and adaptation to new
challenges in agriculture.
The Joint FAO/IAEA Division provides an inte-
grated approach to address these challenges
throughout the food chain. At a time when
soaring food prices, combined with popula-
tion growth and continued stress on the envi-
ronment due to climate change, is becoming a
problem for millions of people in the world, it
is time to make the necessary investments that
will ensure the sustainable production of food
for generations to come, so that crisis such as the
present one will never happen again.
Qu Liang is Director of the Joint FAO/IAEA Division
of Nuclear Techniques in Food and Agriculture.
E-mail: Q.Liang@iaea.org.
Katherine Long is Programme Support Officer of
the Joint FAO/IAEA Division of Nuclear Sciences and
Applications. E-mail: k.long@iaea.org
Harvesting Times | Feed the Hungry, Today and Tomorrow
Nuclear Partners by Louise Potterton
James Butler, Deputy Director-General of the
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), talks
about the importance of nuclear techniques in
agricultural and livestock production.
Question: When we look at the global food crisis, how important is
the contribution from nuclear science?
James Butler: It is very important in the medium and long term. When
we stabilise food production and we are able to move from the immediate
needs to the next level, then we will see the impact. It could be the improved
seed, or the plant that has been developed that has genetic resistance to
insects or salt conditions. Or it could be techniques that allow animals to
be utilised in production practices in Africa, for example – the tsetse fly has
been reduced in number through sterilization technique, allowing animals
to be utilised in previously hostile areas. There are many uses of nuclear tech-
nology that will have a medium and long term impact on agriculture and
livestock production.
Q: I understand that you have applied these technologies in your
field of work. Can you tell me about this experience?
JB: I am from the US and have spent most of my career in production agri-
culture. In my youth the screw worm was very prevalent in the US, Mexico
and Central America. One of the earliest uses of technology was the steriliza-
tion of the fly. As I increased in age and went through the distribution of ster-
ile flies, the cases of screw worms we were dealing with in our own ranching
operation decreased significantly and then were removed all together.
This is a success model often cited as a proper use of technology in agricul-
ture and livestock production.
Q: According to UN Secretary General Ban-Ki Moon, to meet glo-
bal food demand production will have to increase by 50 per cent by
2030. Is this realistic?
JB: Yes it is. We have the crops; we can utilize some improved varieties,
improve yields, and reduce losses during the production phase. If we increase
production by 1-2 per cent a year we can raise production to meet this chal-
lenge.
Q: Do we need to invest more in science and technology?
JB: Yes. International financial institutions and individual country donors
have stated that they are willing to invest in agriculture and many of the
needs are medium and long term, and I do believe that this is where the col-
laboration with the IAEA applying nuclear techniques will have benefits into
the future.
Louise Potterton is a Consultant at the IAEA Division of Public Information.
E-mail: l.potterton@iaea.org
IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008 | 21
 Golden Wheat “Greens”
Kenya’s Drylands
Through IAEA partnerships, scientists and farmers
pioneer hardier, healthier wheat.
H
ot and barren, Kenya´s dry lands have long
been unfit for agriculture, at best merely
a grazing area for wild animals and live-
stock.
Today, the landscape is more picturesque and pro-
ductive, lined with golden stalks of wheat yielding
precious grain for Kenya´s farms and families. The
wheat is a new variety, one that is high yielding and
resistant to drought. As a result, small farming fam-
ilies are realizing harvests on farmlands once con-
sidered too poor to cultivate, to the country´s social
and economic benefit.
The progress is life-saving at a time when wheat
crops in Kenya and other African countries are
Rodolfo Quevenco
Rodolfo Quevenco
plagued by a virulent new strain of fungus called
“wheat rust” that threatens the region´s farmlands.
“The progress is crucial. This wheat is literally Kenya´s
bread of life,” says Martin Dyre, whose family owns
one of Kenya´s largest wheat plantations. “The diet
of this country is changing more and more towards
wheat-based products, so the demand for wheat is
growing.”
Scientists and crop researchers at Kenya´s Agri-
cultural Research Institute (KARI) developed the
new wheat seeds over the past decade. Through
a process called “mutation plant breeding”, they
applied radiation-based techniques to mod-
ify crop characteristics and traits. Kenya worked
IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008 | 23
Harvesting Times | Golden Wheat “Greens” Kenya’s Drylands
closely with the IAEA, through its technical cooper-
ation arm and a regional programme called AFRA
(African Co-operative Agreement for Research,
Development and Training related to Nuclear
Science and Technology). In August 2008, through
its Joint Division with the UN Food and Agriculture
Organization, the IAEA hosted an International
Conference on Plant Breeding to take stock of the
latest developments in Kenya and other countries.
KARIisthecountry’spremierinstitutionforagricultural
research and technology transfer. Its plant breeders
successfully released their first mutant wheat variety
in 2001. Called Njoro-BW1, it was bred to be tolerant
to drought and use limited rainfall efficiently. Key
side benefits include a moderate susceptability to
wheat rust; high yields, with grains valued for flour
production of good baking quality.
Njoro-BW1 today is cultivated on more than 10,000
hectares in Narok, Nalvasha, Katumani and Mogotio.
Its popularity among Kenyan wheat farmers is
increasing steadily, so much so that KARI’s seed unit
can barely keep up with farmer´s demand.
Professor Miriam Kinyua, now an Associate Professor
at Moi University and KARI´s former Chief Plant
Breeder and Center Director, is largely credited for
developing Kenya´s mutant wheat varieties.
“Njoro-BW1 came out as a hit variety”, she recalls.
“The farmers liked it from the start. In dry areas, they
can expect to harvest up to 20 bags an acre. It is now
our most popular wheat variety for the drylands”.
Peter Njau, KARI´s chief plant breeder, says Njoro-
BW1´s value goes beyond drylands.
“Although we developed the Njoro-BW1 variety
for dry lowlands, it is being widely adapted in other
areas”, he says. Farmers have reported successfully
growing the wheat in the highlands and even in the
acidic soils of the northern rift, where it is outper-
forming other wheat varieties developed for those
conditions.
Kenya´s plant breeders soon will release a sec-
ond mutant wheat variety, code-named DH4,
which shares most of the same good qualities of
Njoro-BW1.
“DH4 is high-yielding, and has a high grain quality.
It is also hard and red, qualities that farmers ask for
because of its high market value,” Professor Kinyua
explains. Hard red grains distinguish as some of the
world´s best wheat, high in protein and valued for
making flour used for baking high-quality breads.
24 | IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008
All Bread Does Not Bake Equal
One of KARI´s objectives is to develop good qual-
ity wheat bread for the country´s consumers, says
Mr. Njau. The institute has conducted a comparison
study of the different wheat varieties available in
Kenya for their quality of bread, including Njoro-BW1
and the new DH4 variety.
Among varieties tested, Njoro-BW1 came out on top
in flour extraction. DH4 also scored high in bread
quality overall.
“You can tell the quality of bread just by pressing it”,
Mr. Njau illustrates. “If you press good bread, it just
swells back. If it´s bad, it just sinks.”
The tests showed that mutant wheat varieties pro-
duce better bread, outperforming even the parent
strain in quality and yield.
Multiplying the Seed
With every new crop variety comes the challenge
of stocking up on seed to meet expected demand.
For KARI, the biggest issue most often is availabil-
ity of land. KARI has its own fields but they are not
large enough to meet farming needs, especially for
a high-demand variety like Njoro-BW1.
Fortunately, for Kenya´s plant breeders, the country´s
Cereal Growers Association (CGA), has provided
needed land and support particularly in the area of
seed multiplication. In the highlands of Timau, by
the northern slopes of Mount Kenya, several hec-
tares of prime wheat land are being dedicated for
field trials for future plantings of DH4.
In November 2007, DH4 was being grown on a small
scale in trials on some 40 hectares of farmland.
“These are the straw qualities wheat farmers are
looking for”, says Martin Dyre as he cuts a length of
leaf from one of the plants. His family owns the vast
Kisima Farm in Timau, Kenya; and he occupies a seat
on the CGA Board. Kisima Farms has provided land
and logistical support to Professor Kinyua and her
team at KARI, particularly in times when resources
were scarce to help ensure continuity of research
and trials.
“We are happy to continue to support plant breed-
ing activities of this kind,” he says. “Good wheat is, in
the end, good for all of us.”
Lower down the valley at the Wangu Embori
Farm, Crop Supervisor Steven Irungu points to 70
 Harvesting Times | Golden Wheat “Greens” Kenya’s Drylands

Rodolfo Quevenco
“You can tell the quality of bread just by pressing it”, Mr. Njau illustrates.
“If you press good bread, it just swells back. If it´s bad, it just sinks.”
The tests showed that mutant wheat varieties produce better bread,
outperforming even the parent strain in quality and yield.

hectares being planted with the Njoro-BW1 seeds.
He is impressed about the variety´s high yield and
plans to increase the acreage. The Wangu Embori
Farm is another farm contracted by KARI for seed
multiplication.
Wheat for Food Security
Wheat is the second most important cereal crop in
Kenya, after maize. But the country produces just
a third and has to import two-thirds of its annual
wheat demand, now at vastly higher prices. The
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) reported that as of January 2008, the global
prices of wheat were 83% higher than they were a
year ago.
Alongside market forces stands the wheat rust
plague that threatens Kenya and other countries.
New crop varieties, such as wheat that is more resist-
ant to drought conditions or to the rust fungus, are
vital for Kenya´s food security.
Professor Miriam Kinyua believes mutation tech-
niques are among the best options for Kenya to
develop better wheat varieties and other vegeta-
tively propagated crops.
Worldwide, issues of food supply and availability
are intensifying in their urgency, says IAEA Director
General Mohamed ElBaradei.
“Food security is among the most challenging prob-
lems facing poor countries,” he says. “Boosting agri-
cultural production requires enhanced crop varie-
ties, effective pest control measures, increased soil
fertility and better soil and water management.”
Under national and regional projects, the IAEA helps
local scientists and farmers with nuclear techniques
that support each of these goals, working through
channels of technical cooperation as well as scien-
tific research of the Vienna-based Joint FAO/IAEA
Division. In the past five years, in Africa alone, six
new varieties of crops have been officially released
— plants with higher yield, improved nutrition, and
more hardy characteristics for harsh environments.
This includes new varieties of sesame in Egypt, cas-
sava in Ghana, wheat in Kenya, banana in Sudan and
finger millet and cotton in Zambia.
The idea is not only to boost food production, Dr.
ElBaradei says, but also to sustain it through greener,
more productive fields.

“The fact that we can link up with the IAEA is a plus

both for Kenya and for African scientific research,” Rodolfo Quevenco, IAEA Division of Public Information.
she says. E-mail: R.Quevenco@iaea.org

IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008 | 25

 No Love
for
Mosquitoes
In the fight against malaria and other insect-borne diseases,
scientists take aim at sixteen seconds of mosquito mating.
In
steamy sites ranging from Sudan to
Tahiti, Mozambique to the United
States, researchers are studying the
sex life of the male mosquito — in
order to halt reproduction. Why? Mosquitoes can be
deadly carriers of disease, including malaria and yel-
low fever.
In July 2008 in Vienna, the world´s leading scientists
in mosquito research met to compare notes and
map strategies for thwarting the mating of mosqui-
toes in the wild. The results, down the line, stand to
be an important component in arresting the spread
of malaria and other insect-borne diseases.
Genetic Science Opens
Opportunities
The male mosquito is growing in significance as a
target of scientific research due to developments
in genetic control techniques. They include the
method known as Sterile Insect Technique (SIT),
used to control unwanted populations of insect
pests. It has been successfully applied against var-
ious insects, including the screwworm threatening
livestock and fruit flies threatening crops.
The mosquito can become a vector for diseases such
as yellow fever, dengue, and malaria — illnesses that
are fatal to over 2 million people per year worldwide.
The Anopheles mosquito, in particular, carries and
spreads the deadly malaria parasite, one of the main
foci of the IAEA scientific meeting.
Other techniques such as indoor spraying, insecti-
cide-treated bed nets, and larval treatment are all
being used in the war against these tiny harbin-
gers of disease and devastation. SIT, however, may
prove to be one of the more effective weapons in
26 | IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008
by FeiFei Jiang
the arsenal, with the potential of being able to elimi-
nate entire mosquito vectors in specific regions. The
radiation technique sterilises millions of male mos-
quitoes in the lab and releases them into the wild to
mate with female mosquitoes. The goal is to con-
trol and eventually eliminate the targeted mosquito
population.
“In a nutshell, SIT is birth control for insects,” says
Mark Benedict of the IAEA´s research laboratories in
Seibersdorf, Austria.
The researchers are conscious of the potential
human impact of their work. Scientists Jacques
Charlwood, currently working in Mozambique, and
Alexander Yawson of Ghana have both helped start
clinics to treat malaria in the regions in which they
work. Says Yawson, “Malaria is the primary cause of
death in children under five. Malaria... accounts for
45% of all our patients.”
Targeting Males
It is only the female mosquito who feeds on blood,
picks up a virus or a parasite, and spreads the dis-
ease. Why, then, the recent interest in the male mos-
quito?
Explains Bart Knols, a Dutch scientist: “The females
are responsible for passing on the pathogen
between humans... The males, however, play a very
important role because they are involved in repro-
duction and population growth in the field, so if you
can control the males... then you can define ways to
control that population.”
If scientists can successfully control the reproduc-
tive process through the males, then the entire mos-
quito population, including the female disease vec-
tors, may thus be eliminated. One female mosquito

lays hundreds of eggs in her lifetime, but what most
do not know is that all of these eggs result from a
single mating.
In Search of Sixteen
Seconds
Scientists know the basics about how mosquitoes
mate, but crucial questions remain.
Typically, the male mosquitoes emerge at sun-
set and form swarms at a specific location, usually
over a visual marker such as a bush or a small tree.
The swarm performs what looks like a complicated,
interlocked dance — much like a swarm of locusts
— but that is based on three simple mathematical
principles: keep one’s distance, maintain a constant
speed, and move towards the centre.
“The swarm is more or less like a disco,” Dr. Charlwood
describes, gesticulating animatedly. “The males are
all dancing around, as if to shout, ´Look at me! Look
at me!´”
Scientists are not sure what draws females into the
swarm. Some think that the females, when young,
act like pseudo-males, instinctively flying to cer-
tain attractive visual markers. Others believe that
the female mosquitoes are drawn to the swarm by
their sense of smell, or perhaps some kind of chem-
ical cue.
When a female enters the swarm, the males can
sense her with the aid of her wingbeat frequency,
which is lower than that of the males. Once a male
has sensed a female, his wingbeat frequency slows
to match that of the female. The male then uses his
large front claws to snatch the female by the back
legs, using the female´s legs like a trapeze bar to
swing under her abdomen. In less than one second,
the male´s terminalia attach to the female´s abdo-
men. The connected pair then slowly flies out of the
swarm while mating in mid-air. The entire mating
process takes less than 16 seconds.
Once mating is over, the female mosquito´s eggs
are fertilised; all of the eggs that the female lays in
her lifetime will result from this one mating. Thus,
if a SIT-sterilised male mates with a wild female, the
female´s unfertilised eggs will never hatch.
Plotting the Research
Still, questions remain. Is mating a selective proc-
ess? If so, what is it that makes a male attractive?
Harvesting Times | No Love for Mosquitoes
Though the even ratio of males-to-females, and the
fact that a female only mates once during her life-
time, dictate that on average, each male mates only
once a lifetime, the reality may not conform to the
math. Perhaps some male mosquitoes mate multi-
ple times, and some are left without any mates at
the end of the day.
So what is it that might make some males more suc-
cessful than others in the mating game? Researchers
are currently striving to answer this question, which
may help make the lab-grown sterile males com-
petitive as mates when released in the wild.
Mozambique´s Dr. Charlwood is working with a
grant from the IAEA to record the swarms mating
in high-definition video format in order to better
understand the process. Perhaps, he says, the larger
male mosquitoes are the most successful ones, or
maybe it is the most symmetrical mosquitoes, or
the most agile. At present, there is no consensus.
Or perhaps it is as the math suggests, and mating
is completely anonymous. These are the questions
that have inspired last week´s meeting to discuss
male mosquitoes and mating processes - and their
answers may be the key to the success of many SIT
programs.
Interestingly, says Dr. Knols, the SIT is a very “green
technology”. “You´re releasing an insect that will
specifically go out in the environment and look for
your target insects, unlike chemical pesticides, for
instance,” he explains. That helps to make it efficient
and environmentally friendly.
Much Work Still Needed
Early results from very preliminary studies of SIT on
mosquitoes show great promise. The research file
goes back as far as the 1970s in El Salvador, says the
IAEA´s Mark Benedict. They focused on one partic-
ular malaria vector. “Even though their techniques
were very crude, they eliminated an isolated popu-
lation within one season,” he says.
One target area today is an isolated region of Sudan,
where a planned SIT facility looks to be up and run-
ning by 2010.
“Hopefully, we´ll introduce a novel way for control-
ling mosquitoes that transmit disease,” Dr. Benedict
says.
FeiFei Jiang served in an internship in 2008 in the IAEA
Division of Public Information.
IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008 | 27
 Projections of nuclear power around the world
Great Expe
150
Western Europe
A Mixed Picture
GW(e) 100

200
North America 50

A Solid Base
150 0
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
GW(e)

100

50

0
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030

15
Africa
Wide Range
10
GW(e)

Latin America
5

20

Varied Landscape 0
15 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
GW(e)

10

0
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030

28 | IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008 Historical growth in regional nuclear power capacity and estimates
Projection Legend: Dark Bars= Low; Light + Dark Bars = High
pectations
show an upward trend.
by Alan McDonald,
Hans-Holger Rogner and
Andrii Gritsevskyi

120
Eastern Europe
Steady Expansion Foreseen
80
GW(e)

40

0
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030

250
Far East
Centre of Nuclear Expansion
200

150
GW(e)

100

Middle East and South Asia

50

32 0

Fast Growth Possible 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030

24
GW(e)

16

0
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030

8
South East Asia & the Pacific
Early Planning Stages
6
GW(e)

0
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030

of future growth according to the IAEA’s low and high projections (N.B.: scales vary. source: IAEA) IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008 | 29
 The Energy File | Great Expectations
In
its 2008 edition of Energy, Electricity and
Nuclear Power Estimates for the Period to
2030, the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) has again revised its pro-
jections for nuclear power upwards. At the same
time, it reports that nuclear power’s share of global
electricity generation dropped another percentage
point in 2007, to 14%. This compares to the nearly
steady share of 16 to 17% that nuclear power main-
tained for almost two decades, from 1986 through
2005.
Rising Expectations
Every year since 1981 the IAEA has published two
updated projections for the world’s nuclear power
generating capacity, a low projection and a high
projection.
The low projection is a down to earth, business-as-
usual projection. It assumes that nuclear investment
projects currently underway or firmly in the pipeline
are implemented, but not much more; that existing
plants are retired as scheduled unless license exten-
sions have been granted or applied for; and that
current policies are unchanged, such as the German
and Belgian phase-outs of nuclear power.
Fig 1. Historical growth in global nuclear power capacity (blue)
plus estimates of future growth according to the IAEA’s low
projection (dark green) and high projection (light green).
800
high
600
low
GW(e)
history
400
200
0 China and India and new policies and interest in
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
Year source:IAEA
The high projection takes into account govern-
ment and corporate announcements about longer-
term plans for nuclear investments as well as poten-
tial new national policies, e.g., to combat climate
change.
30 | IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008
The results for the 2008 projections are shown in
Figure 1. In the low projection, the projected nuclear
power capacity in 2030 in 473 GW(e), some 27%
higher than today’s 372 GW(e). In the high projec-
tion, nuclear capacity in 2030 is 748 GW(e), double
today’s capacity.
Figures 2 and 3 respectively show how the low and
high projections have changed since 2003 — the
blue bars on the left are history.
Figure 3 shows that in every year since 2003 the high
projection has been revised upwards. The low pro-
jection has also gone up, but less consistently. It has
also gone up by a smaller amount than has the high
projection, meaning the gap between the two, or
the uncertainty about nuclear power’s future that is
reflected in the two projections, has also increased.
Why have projections gone up in the last five years?
First is the current performance record. The world
now has accumulated more than 13,000 reactor-
years of experience. Performance has improved
greatly since the 1980s, and the safety record of the
types of reactors on the market today is excellent.
Second, although nuclear capacity additions since
1986 fell behind the growth of total electricity gen-
eration, nuclear power’s market share held steady
due to increases in the average load factor of the
global reactor fleet from 67% in 1990 to more than
80% since early 2000.
Third, energy demand projections keep showing
persistent long-term growth. The world is going to
need a lot more energy, so more people are think-
ing about nuclear power being an important part
of the mix.
Fourth is energy supply security. In the 1970s con-
cerns about supply security, triggered by the oil
price shocks, were a major cause of nuclear expan-
sion in Finland; France; Germany; Japan; Taiwan,
China; Sweden and other countries. Similar con-
cerns may also prove important today.
Fifth are major expansion plans in key countries like
nuclear power in countries like the UK and USA.
Sixth are new environmental constraints like entry-
into-force of the Kyoto Protocol and the European
carbon trading scheme (ETS). These mean there is
now a real financial benefit to avoiding GHG emis-
sions, which increases the attractiveness of low-car-
bon electricity generation, including nuclear power
and renewables.

Fig 2: The Evolution of the IAEA’s Low Projection
since 2003
800
Low
600
GW(e)
400
200
0 0
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Year
source:IAEA
Seventh, the costs of the dominant alternatives to
nuclear power are going up, particularly natural gas
and coal.
A Declining Share
But while projections for nuclear power’s future
rose, its share of the world’s electricity generation
today dropped from 15% in 2006 to 14% in 2007. The
reason is that while total global electricity genera-
tion rose 4.8% from 2007 to 2008, nuclear electricity
actually dropped slightly.
The main reason that nuclear generation dropped
was an earthquake in western Japan on 16 July
2007, which shut down all seven reactors at the
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power plant. The seven
units total 8.2 GW(e), almost one sixth of Japan’s
nuclear capacity. There were also several other
unusual outages and reductions in 2007, including
the relicensing and consequent outage of a reac-
tor in the Republic of Korea, the coincidence of a
number of reactor outage schedules for refueling,
and reduced generation at some German reactors
in order to extend their operating life while meet-
ing the generation limits imposed by the German
phase-out.
Finally, it appears that the increases referred to above
in the load factor for the current fleet of reactors
have plateaued. Although some future increases
can be expected as new plants with higher load
factors replace old reactors, even these increases
will eventually level off since the load factor can
The Energy File | Great Expectations
Fig 3: The Evolution of the IAEA’s High Projection
since 2003
High
800
History
2003
600
2004
GW(e)
2005 400
2006
200
2007
2008
2030 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
Year
never exceed 100%. Thus the impact of load fac-
tor improvements, which allowed past nuclear elec-
tricity production to grow at the same pace as total
electricity output, has already begun to diminish.
What does the IAEA’s 2008 update project for the
nuclear share of electricity generation in the future?
In the high projection, growth in nuclear generation
matches the 3.2% per year growth in overall gen-
eration, and nuclear power’s share therefore holds
steady at 14%. In the low projection, overall electric-
ity growth is lower, but nuclear power’s growth is
lower still, and by 2030 nuclear power’s share of glo-
bal electricity is projected to drop to about 12.5%.
Conclusion
The overall message from the IAEA’s 2008 edition of
Energy, Electricity and Nuclear Power Estimates for the
Period to 2030 is that global electricity use will grow
significantly, that nuclear power will have to expand
more rapidly than it has done recently in order to
maintain its share, and that expectations are that
nuclear power will meet the challenge.
Alan McDonald is a senior analyst at
the IAEA Department of Nuclear Energy.
E-mail: A.McDonald@iaea.org
Hans-Holger Rogner is Head of the IAEA’s Nuclear
Energy Planning and Economic Studies Section,
where Andrii Gritsevskyi is Energy Systems Analyst.
E-mails: H.H.Rogner@iaea.org; A.Gritsevskyi@iaea.org
IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008 | 31
 nuclear
acceptance by Steve Kidd
n uclear industry people often rest under
the illusion that their business is the only
one under attack by strong opponents,
engendering a feeling of isolation and supreme
defensiveness. Far from it ­— these days no industrial
sector gets an easy ride with public opinion. Under
the umbrella of corporate social responsibility (CSR),
all industrial sectors must justify their activities in
terms of their environmental and social impact. The
presumption today is essentially “guilty until proved
innocent”. But are things really so bad and the efforts
made to sway both national and international pub-
lic opinion really worthwhile? The answers are prob-
ably no.
If we look at the United States, it is clear that the
vastly improved public perception of nuclear power
has its roots in the superb operating performance
of the 104 plants in recent years. Producing large
quantities of electricity cheaply, safely and with due
regard for the environment is far more effective than
any fancy communication strategies. It is only when
things start to go wrong at the operational level that
the public becomes interested. The incidents at two
German plants and the earthquake in Japan in 2007
demonstrate the need for good management of
public opinion and “crisis management”.
Indeed until recently, the general public has shown
little interest in energy matters. It’s only when there’s
a looming crisis, such as a threat of the lights going
out or huge price escalation and queues at the
gasoline pumps, that people get highly upset and
put pressure on industry and the politicians. The
1980s and 1990s were a relatively quiet period for
energy, so most people today haven’t many strong
and well-developed opinions about particular fuels
or national strategy. Yet it’s probably the relation-
ship between energy use and the environment
which has begun to touch the general public’s con-
sciousness most deeply. Climate change and poten-
tial global warming have been a gift to the environ-
mental movement, as they present a more credible
apocalypse scenario. Most sensible people recog-
nise that the other fears they have stirred up are
largely groundless, as economic progress generally
leads to a cleaner environment.
32 | IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008
Putting nuclear power into this perspective, there
are clearly concerns in the public mind about the
weapons link, over proliferation coming from the
civil side of the industry and a general fear about
possible radiation releases from operations. We
can put much of this down to an irrational evalua-
tion of low risk but high consequence events, but
this is something the industry has to live with. The
number of people who have a hardened belief
against nuclear and are difficult to sway are fortu-
nately relatively few. That many people haven’t had
to think hard about energy matters for some time
also suggests that opinion can easily be influenced
one way or another.
Unfortunately we cannot rely on politicians to dem-
onstrate much leadership in nuclear matters. We
know from bitter experience that they prefer to “sit
on the fence” when it comes to issues which can
excite even a very small part of their electorate, as
losing these committed votes could be crucial in a
tight election. So they rely on focus groups and tend
to be led by the public rather than vice versa, argu-
ably the opposite of what they’re supposed to do.
Climate change, however, provides an ideal oppor-
tunity for nuclear to be seen in a new light by those
who have some general, but not deep-seated, con-
cerns about it. Presenting it as a green and friendly
technology is going to take time, but the message
that nuclear emits few greenhouse gases seems to
be slowly getting across.
Many of the problems the industry has with pub-
lic opinion can be blamed on the sins of the past.
Arrogant spokespeople, talking down to their audi-
ence and not being open with important informa-
tion is a legacy the industry has taken a long time to
shake off. Society itself has now changed substan-
tially and nuclear must fit in with this. The 1940s to
the late 1960s were characterised by state provision,
deference and a belief that the application of sci-
ence could bring the greatest good to the greatest
number. But from the 1970s onwards, self-reliance,
distrust of science and assertion of individual rights
irrespective of the common good have become
prominent. Nuclear power doesn’t sit easily with this,
as it relies on a degree of state involvement (at the
r very least in setting a framework for its operations in
licensing, regulation and waste management) but is
at last learning to exist within a climate of competi-
tive power markets and private ownership.
The best examples of winning over people in today’s
world come from specific examples of planning new
facilities, rather than attempts at general persua-
sion. In essence, public opinion is local and has to be
handled in that way. The siting of the waste reposi-
tory in Sweden and the 5th Finnish reactor serve to
demonstrate that careful work with local people can
bring huge dividends. The need for the new facility
must first be shown convincingly, and then the pub-
lic brought into the full process with the provision
of clear information and opportunities for consulta-
tion. Local people must be respected as the experts
in local matters and should ultimately have the final
veto on the project. The companies concerned must
be seen to be interested in more than profits and
be seen to have the interests of the local area and
the wider country at heart. Indeed, nuclear facili-
ties offer well-paid and secure jobs for many years in
the future and have widespread economic impacts
beyond the immediate capital investment.
The provision of clear and accurate information
about nuclear power has been identified as an
important weapon in winning the public over.
Whilst knowledge is clearly better than ignorance,
this approach has some limitations and cannot be
expected to achieve very much in the shorter term,
particularly in the shorter term. An obvious observa-
tion is that some of the strongest critics of the indus-
try are actually very well-informed. Indeed, the best
website on uranium mining throughout the world
is run by WISE, an anti-nuclear organisation. So there
must be a lot more to it than the facts. Beliefs and
values are arguably even more important than solid
information.
If you’ve taken in an argument by emotional
appeal (e.g. nuclear power is evil), you’re unlikely be
swayed by facts that counter that belief — indeed,
the opposite may in fact be the case. It will take a
lot of time and effort to overcome an anti-nuclear
message entrenched in minds for many years.
The messenger and the way the message is deliv-
ered are clearly also very important considerations,
hence the search for credible third party advocates.
Industries are seen as essentially self-interested by
a cynical public — “they would say that, wouldn’t
they” — but prominent environmentalists such as
James Lovelock and Patrick Moore are worth their
weight in gold when they speak up in support of
nuclear’s importance. But it’s still an uphill battle
and some people will never be persuaded. Indeed,
The Energy File | Nuclear Acceptance
nuclear power embodies all that some groups hate
about the modern world — the application of sci-
ence, big government and large organisations glo-
balising production. Their deep arrogance rather
mirrors that of some misguided early nuclear pio-
neers — they feel they alone are saving the world
for the rest of us.
Finally, it should be accepted that the use of lan-
guage is also very important. We suffer today for
some crucial errors of the past. If you ask anybody
which words they associate most with “nuclear”,
they will inevitably say “bomb”, “explosion” or “war”
and not “power”. Had nuclear power alternatively
(and more correctly) been designated as “fission
power”, the difficulties over public approval would
undoubtedly have been rather less. So it’s wise to
be take care in what you casually say, as people are
receiving messages beyond what you immediately
intend.
The other obvious example is carelessly calling eve-
rything coming out of the back of a reactor “waste”.
This ensured that there would have to be a quick
solution found as liabilities should not be passed
onto future generations. As an alternative, referring
to “used fuel” would have highlighted its potential
economic value, so the time period could poten-
tially be much-expanded (under the guise of pass-
ing on an important asset, rather than liability,
to future generations). Other nuclear terms such
as “fast breeder” are less than ideal from the pub-
lic perspective, conjuring up images of sinister Dr
Strangelove scientists at work, whereas others, such
as “pebble bed” seem more benign. It’s not neces-
sary to bring in highly-remunerated image consult-
ants, but some thought of the impact of new terms
on public opinion should ideally be taken.
In conclusion, experience has taught us that there
are a number of ways in which we can contribute
to the industry obtaining a more favourable public
image. Yet the most important remains carrying on
operating the existing nuclear power plants as well
as possible and putting this simple message across.
Beyond this, good locally-based communications
work and detailed plans for crisis management are
also essential.
Steve Kidd is Director of Strategy and Research at
the World Nuclear Association (WNA) in London.
E-mail: kidd@world-nuclear.org.
Views expressed are not necessarily those of WNA
or its member companies. His recent book, enti-
tled “Core Issues-Dissecting Nuclear Power Today,”
is published by Nuclear Engineering International.
Website: www.neimagazine.com
IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008 | 33
did you say
YES?
Opinion polls
show that Britain
is closer to public
acceptance of new
by Robert Knight

nuclear plants
than it has been
for years. Yet, this
support remains
fragile.

36 | IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008


The reputation of nuclear energy in Britain
has improved greatly in the first years
of the 21st century and now, apart from an endur-
ing hard core of opposition from a minority, there
is broad acceptance of the need for nuclear new-
build to meet the twin challenges of energy secu-
rity and climate change, provided this is presented
to the public in an appropriate way. It has been a
rocky ride for the industry, which has seen a difficult
first 50 years in many respects. It has recently been
greatly assisted by two critical factors however: the
worldwide recognition of man made global warm-
ing and the consequent need to reduce fossil fuel
use; and the transformation in the industry’s own
attitude to its communications and openness.
As one of the original nuclear
powers, Britain has a long his-
tory of nuclear weapons develop- Ipsos MORI
ment stretching back to British sci-
entists’ involvement in the WW2 Q How favourable or unfavourable are your overall opinions or
Manhattan Project. The close links
to national security through the
Cold War years were eventually to
become an obstacle to the public’s 50%
consent to the industry. In the 1950s
it was a common view that the sci- 40%
entists and the Government knew
best, and the urgency of the Soviet 30%
threat made the speed of devel-
opment essential, under a cloak of 20%
necessary secrecy. Little considera-
tion was given to the social respon- 10%
sibility of the fledgling-industry;
its safety, the disposal of waste 0%
or the inevitability of decommis-
sioning. Even the Windscale fire of
1957, in a weapons-producing reac-
tor, did not seriously dent enthusi- Base: All respondents c2,000
asm for the “white heat of technol-
ogy”. The 1960s, however, brought
a change in the public mood, particularly among
younger people. Though while this period saw
popular marches to Aldermaston to protest over
nuclear weapons, there was no serious groundswell
of opposition to nuclear energy. Instead, the indus-
try (together with successive Governments) engi-
neered its own decline in public enthusiasm by its
choice of technology for the second generation of
British reactors — the AGRs. Each was effectively a
first-of-a-kind because of its radical difference to the
others, and the consequence was overspent budg-
ets and repeatedly missed deadlines. For a decade,
the news about the AGRs was gloomy. Public inter-
est in the industry waned, then turned downright
negative after safety concerns were highlighted by
the Three Mile Island incident in the USA in 1979.
The Energy File | Did You Say Yes?
Further to this, the Chernobyl fire of 1986 marked
the nadir of the industry’s fortunes worldwide, and
it took many years to start to recover.
The 1990s saw opponents of nuclear energy as
numerous as its supporters, and often much more
vocal. The public enquiry over the construction
of the PWR at Sizewell was held up for many years
by the strength of protests and the willingness of
opposition groups to fight on every front possi-
ble. Originally intended as the first of a new gen-
eration of PWRs, Sizewell B was eventually the only
one built. Then the reputation of the British nuclear
industry suffered its heaviest blow since Chernobyl.
In 1999 its reputation was hit by the scandal over the
Favourability Towards The Nuclear Energy
Industry
Favourability towards the nuclear energy
1998-2007
industry 1998-2007
impressions of the nuclear industry/ nuclear energy?
Favourable Unfavourable
35%
26%
Feb Aug Feb Sept April Dec July Dec Dec Dec Nov'05 Nov Nov
'98 '99 '00 '01 '02 '03 '04 '06 '07
Sept
Oct
1
falsification of MOX fuel records at BNFL’s Sellafield
plant, and the subsequent rejection of the fuel deliv-
ery by the Japanese customer. Unfavourable views
of the industry peaked in July 2001 before the MOX
fuel was finally returned to Britain amid a storm of
negative press and triumphant environmental pres-
sure group activity.
But since 2001, global energy trends towards
higher prices for oil and gas, concerns about secu-
rity of energy supplies, the imminent closure of
the older nuclear power stations and above all
the paradigm change associated with the recog-
nition of the effects of man made global warm-
ing have all provided a fair wind driving the resur-
gence in acceptance of the industry. At the same
IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008 | 37
 The Energy File | Did You Say Yes?
Ipsos MORI
Support for Replacement Newbuild
2002-2007
Q To what extent would you support or oppose the building of new nuclear
power stations in Britain TO REPLACE those that are being phased out
over the next few years? This would ensure the same proportion of
nuclear energy is retained.
Support Oppose
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
5
7
2
-0
-0
-0
-0
-0
-0
ov
ov
ov
ec
ec
ec
D
N
Base: All respondents c2,000
time, with no new incidents of concern, there was a
sea change in the nuclear industry’s attitude to the
public and to the media. Freed from the old policy
of Decide Announce Defend, a new atmosphere
of openness pervaded the industry, together with
an overt acknowledgement of the need for public
consent and social responsibility. With all of these
forces working in the same direction, the result was
a recovery in the industry’s reputation, to the point
where, at Christmas 2004, favourable opinion over-
took unfavourable opinion. In the latest (2007) sur-
vey, the proportion favourable to the industry (35%)
strongly outweighs the unfavourable proportion
(26%), though a key feature of the research is the
39% who are undecided either way. This group has
held the balance of the argument for some years
and continues to do so.
Since 2002 we have also been measuring the British
public’s more specific support for replacement
nuclear newbuild. This again shows 2004 as the
pivotal year, when support overcame opposition,
before peaking in 2005 on 41%. Since 2005,
however, the volume of information and opinion
available to ordinary people about energy options
has mushroomed, and though we have plotted a
tentative rise in familiarity with the industry, the key
outcome of this has been an upsurge in confusion
about energy and specifically nuclear issues. With
so many authoritative figures openly disagreeing,
the public are less sure what to think. This has
particularly affected those whose initial gut feeling
was positive. The result has been a slight fall in
38 | IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008
support for newbuild since 2005, while
opposition remains firm, though less
numerous.
Our question has been carefully worded
to relate only to replacement newbuild,
since that was the most likely (and most
acceptable) scenario for the future.
Recent Government speeches have sug-
gested enthusiasm in Westminster for
net expansion of the nuclear compo-
36% nent. We have measured views of this
only once, in 2005, when it received a
resounding rejection by the public, at the
27%
same time as there was record support
for replacement newbuild. This is there-
fore a dangerous communications strat-
egy for the Government; probably aimed
more at demonstrating its commitment
to the industry itself than showing sensi-
tivity to fragile public acceptance.
2
The way a nuclear energy strategy is
presented can undoubtedly affect its reception by
the British public. While 35% are favourable to the
industry and 36% support replacement newbuild,
65%, an overall majority, agree with the statement
that “Britain needs a mix of energy sources to ensure
a reliable supply of electricity, including nuclear
power and renewable energy sources.” Just 10% dis-
agree. Linking nuclear energy policy to renewables
has a persuasive effect on its acceptance, as long
as it also implies that it is part of a planned national
strategy (something few have perceived Britain to
have in recent years)
We can conclude that Britain is closer to public
acceptance of nuclear newbuild than it has been
for some decades, though this support is frag-
ile and sensitive to the actual messages received.
Communicating with the British public on this issue
is notoriously difficult, particularly for the current
Government, whose credibility on nuclear issues we
recently measured as very low (2007). The nuclear
industry has done much to rehabilitate its Cold War
past, but is still held back by the British scepticism
for companies and private profit generation, par-
ticularly profits made out of public utilities, and by
the growing obsession with risk aversion in all areas
of life. Furthermore, the environmental NGOs are
united in their opposition to nuclear energy having
any role in future energy policy.
Robert Knight is Research Director at Ipsos MORI.
E-mail: robert.knight@ipsos-mori.com
Tackling the by Mohamed ElBaradei
Global Energy Crisis
The world needs a global energy organization that
would complement, not replace, bodies already
active in the energy field.

W
orld leaders need to take action on the it is actually dealt with in a fragmented, piecemeal
energy crisis that is taking shape before way. A number of institutions focus on energy, but
our eyes. Oil prices are soaring and it none with a mandate that is global and comprehen-
looks less and less likely that this is a bubble. The sive and that encompasses all energy forms. OPEC,
price of coal has doubled. Countries as far apart as for example, has just 13 members and deals exclu-
South Africa and Tajikistan are plagued by power
cuts and there have been riots in several nations
because of disruptions to electricity. Rich states, no
longer strangers to periodic blackouts, are worried
about security of energy supply. In the developing
world, 1.6 billion people — around a quarter of the
human race — have no access to electricity.

I believe that fundamental changes are underway

in the energy field whose significance we have not
yet fully grasped. Global demand for energy is ris-
ing fast as the population increases and developing
countries such as China and India undergo dramatic
economic growth. The International Energy Agency
(IEA) says the world’s energy needs could be 50%
higher in 2030 than they are today. Yet the fossil
fuels on which the world still depends are finite and
far from environmentally friendly. Serious thought
needs to be given now to creating viable alterna-
tives. The need for coordinated political action on
energy and related issues — climate change and
alleviating poverty, to name but two — has never
been more acute. Yet there is no global energy insti-
tution in which the countries of the world can agree
on joint solutions to the potentially enormous prob-
lems we see emerging.
The world’s energy needs could be
We have a World Health Organization, two global
50% higher in 2030 than they are
food agencies, the Bretton Woods financial insti- today. Yet the fossil fuels on which
tutions and organizations to deal with everything
from trade to civil aviation and maritime affairs. the world still depends are finite and
Energy, the motor of development and economic
growth, is a glaring exception. Although, like food far from environmentally friendly.
and health, it cries out for a holistic, global approach,

IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008 | 39

 The Energy File | Tackling the Global Energy Crisis
sively with oil — from the producers’ perspective.
The IEA represents the 27 OECD countries from the
consumers’ viewpoint. Only 51 countries, almost all
in Eurasia, have signed the Energy Charter Treaty,
whose focus is limited to issues such as trade, transit
and dispute settlement.
Even the pessimists believe we still have
at least a few decades before the oil
on which the world’s prosperity is built
starts to run out. Let us use that time
wisely to develop long-term solutions
to the world’s energy needs which will
benefit all humankind.
The UN coordinating mechanism, UN-Energy, is
barely four years old. It has 20 member agencies,
an indication of how fragmented the UN’s energy
activities are. UN-Energy has no budget or author-
ity and serves as a modest forum for discussion and
information sharing.
So does the world really need yet another interna-
tional organization? Frankly, yes. A global energy
organization would complement, not replace, bod-
40 | IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008
ies already active in the energy field. It would bring
a vital inter-governmental perspective to bear on
issues which cannot be left to market forces alone,
such as the development of new energy technol-
ogy, the role of nuclear power and renewables, and
innovative solutions for reducing pollution and
greenhouse gas emissions. Here are a few things a
global energy organization could do:
❖ provide authoritative assessments of global
energy demand and supply and bring under one
roof key energy data that are now dispersed and
incomplete.
❖ speed the transfer of appropriate energy tech-
nology to poor countries and give them objective
advice on an optimal energy mix that is safe, secure
and environmentally sound.
❖ develop a global mechanism to ensure energy
supplies in crises and emergencies. (The IEA already
does this for its members with oil. The International
Atomic Energy Agency is considering establishing
guarantees of nuclear fuel supplies for reactors).
❖ help countries run their energy services and even
do it for them temporarily after a war or major nat-
ural disaster.
❖ coordinate and fund R&D, both upstream and
downstream, especially for energy-poor countries,
whose needs too often get overlooked by commer-
cial R&D oriented to rich countries.
Efforts in the 1970s to establish a global energy
organization were unsuccessful. The world has
changed dramatically since then and the need for
joint action to develop long-term solutions to the
looming energy crisis is now undeniable. It is difficult
to see how this can be done without an expert mul-
tinational body, underpinned perhaps by a global
energy convention, with the authority to develop
policies and practices to benefit rich and poor coun-
tries alike, equitably and fairly. We need to act before
crisis turns into catastrophe.
Even the pessimists believe we still have at least a
few decades before the oil on which the world’s
prosperity is built starts to run out. Let us use that
time wisely to develop long-term solutions to the
world’s energy needs which will benefit all human-
kind.
Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei is Director General of the IAEA.
Security
at the Olympics
China, IAEA link up to
Bolster Security Plan
Over 10,000 athletes took part in more than 300 events during the 2008 Summer
Olympics in China. As for many global events, security was an integral component
in the planning of the Olympic Games.

During the Olympics stadiums and subways to Beijing were packed and keeping
the Games safe was foremost on the minds of Chinese authorities.
 Through advisory missions and training exercises, the IAEA helped Chinese
authorities to enhance nuclear security measures in time for the Olympics.
Participants engage in classroom time before testing skills through real-life exercises.

One of 12 newly constructed venues, the Beijing National Stadium, or ‘Bird’s Nest’
as it is colloquially known, was the site of a nuclear security training exercise in
preparation for the Games.
Meetings between IAEA experts, Chinese authorities, and other international experts
were held far in advance of the Games. International cooperative efforts are integral to
the prevention, detection and response to a nuclear security threat.

At major international events like the Olympics, radiation detection equipment is used
to sniff out any potentially nefarious activity where fans enter the Games’ venues.
 Security personnel were trained to use equipment for detecting radioactive material.
During the Games and for other large-scale international events, security staff are
deployed to help spot suspicious activity.

Beyond the China Olympics, IAEA-supported training and guidance has helped
other countries — including Greece, Brazil and Germany — keep major global
events safe and secure.
IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008 | 45
Photographs: Petr Pavlicek/IAEA ❖ Captions: Dana Sacchetti ❖ Design: Ritu Kenn
the mindset of
nuclear safety by Giovanni Verlini
Nuclear safety depends on culture as well as good
engineering practices, Anne Kerhoas and Marin Ignatov
explain.

Question: What are the origins

of the safety culture concept?
Anne Kerhoas: Engineering issues relating to safety
have received close attention from the nuclear com-
munity over many years. However, it is only in the
last two decades or so that organizational and cul-
tural issues have been identified as vital in achiev-
ing safe operation. More specifically, the concept of
safety culture originated after the 1986 Chernobyl
accident in the International Nuclear Safety Group
(INSAG).

INSAG maintained in their report that the establish-

ment of a strong safety culture within a nuclear facil-
ity is one of the fundamental management princi-
ples necessary for the safe operation of the facility.
The definition recognizes that “safety culture has
two general components. The first is the necessary Anne Kerhoas (left), a Senior Safety Specialist in
framework within an organization and is the respon-
sibility of the management hierarchy. The second is
the IAEA’s Division of Nuclear Installation Safety,
the attitude of staff at all levels in responding to and speaks with Marin Ignatov, a safety consultant.
benefiting from the framework.”
(Photo: D.Calma/IAEA)
This INSAG definition is still widely used.

Culture is a deeply-rooted, rather than superficial,

phenomenon and hence fairly stable over time. It
Q: But what is exactly safety is shared by people and relates primarily not to an
culture? individual but to a group, community or organi-
zation. Besides, it is a broad concept and covers all
Marin Ignatov: First of all, we should look at what we aspects of external and internal relationships in a
mean by the term ‘culture’. group, community or organization.

IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008 | 47

 Safe and Secure | The Mindset of Nuclear Safety
Here, José Ramón Torralbo, Plant Manager,
reviews materials with Anne Kerhoas and Marin
Ignatov. In 2008, an IAEA team reviewed safety
culture at the Santa María de Garoña nuclear
power plant in Spain. (Photo: Nuclenor)
The main differences of nuclear safety culture com-
pared with general corporate culture touch on the
concept of core hazards and the potential large
effects associated with the dispersion of radioactive
substances. It is this fact that makes nuclear power
different and that demands a set of organizational
values that place nuclear safety as the top priority of
an organization.
Q: How can we define a strong
nuclear safety culture?
MI: A strong safety culture consists in the association
of three major factors: a viable management system;
a widely shared awareness of nuclear hazards; and
widely shared behavioural norms and values.
A strong safety culture can be only expected in
cases where the Management System is imple-
mented into actual behaviour not because nega-
tive personal or group consequences (sanctions) are
feared, but as a result of profound awareness about
nuclear hazards and positive social norms, attitudes
and values of management and staff.
48 | IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008
Poor safety culture comes up in cases where the
existing Management System is in itself underdevel-
oped, insufficient or inadequate. Negative attitudes
or disruptive informal social norms become pre-
dominant. Such situations in today’s nuclear indus-
try are rare.
Q: The IAEA has launched a
new service called SCART.
What is it?
AK: SCART means Safety Culture Assessment Review
Team and is one of the safety review service of the
Agency. The difference with other services is that it
focuses on human behaviour. In other words, SCART
does not intend to assess the design or technical
operation of a nuclear power plant.
The SCART assessment is based on five characteris-
tics that are in the IAEA safety standards:
• Safety is a clearly recognized value;
• Leadership for safety is clear;
• Accountability for safety is clear;
• Safety is integrated into all activities; and
• Safety is learning-driven.
The service looks at a nuclear organization as a
whole, which means that all major functional areas
and all responsibility levels from the shop floor to
the boardroom are included in the review.
Q: Assessing safety culture
seems to be a difficult task.
How can it be done?
AK: The safety culture review process follows a sys-
tematic approach, structured in several phases. The
process seeks to integrate an initial independent
assessment of the available empirical data by the
international reviewers, followed by a discussion
within the review team and a subsequent consen-
sual decision.
The initial phase is data gathering – a review team
usually consists of 5 reviewers, a team leader, and a
deputy team leader. Each reviewer evaluates all char-
acteristics of safety culture with their corresponding
attributes (altogether 37 attributes) via interviews,

observations and documentation analysis. Usually,
there are 4 interviews per day, per reviewer.
At the end of the data gathering phase, the reviewers
analyse the data and come to conclusions concern-
ing the attributes of all 5 safety culture characteris-
tics. Their conclusions are individual and independ-
ent. This is the second step.
Afterwards, the reviewers share their individual
opinion and develop a team opinion for each of the
assessed safety culture attribute.
Finally, based on this evaluation, the team identifies
strengths and areas for improvement. Strengths are
areas where the safety culture is strong and safety
performance highly satisfactory. In areas identi-
fied for improvement, the organizational perform-
ance or attitude at the nuclear facility does not cor-
respond to what is expected according to IAEA
Safety Standards. It leads to recommendations to
the organisation assessed.
Q: What kind of expertise goes
into a SCART team?
AK: When composing the team, the correct balance
between behavioural scientists and technical spe-
cialists is essential for the implementation of the
approach as well as for the outcomes. The strong
synergy emerging from those two complementary
skills allows a reliable expert opinion to emerge and
provide credibility to the conclusions. This is one of
the important differences of SCART with the other
safety review services.
Q: What is the outcome of a
SCART mission?
AK: SCART offers a reliable evaluation of the main
characteristics of safety culture in a nuclear facil-
ity. Actually, the process of combining interviews,
observations and documentation analysis, which is
used in SCART, is a means to assess deeper values
or shared assumptions while questionnaire surveys
may only reflect the visible level of safety culture.
SCART assists a facility in the enhancement of safety
culture by identifying ways in which to continu-
ously improve the safety culture. Based on recom-
mendations and suggestions issued at the end of
the SCART process, the facility would then be able
to build its corrective action plan.
Safe and Secure | The Mindset of Nuclear Safety
SCART supports international information exchange
between the management of nuclear facilities and
reviewers on safety culture.
SCART is a sensitive tool that allows
experts to reveal early signs of a
deteriorating safety culture. It allows
a reliable expert opinion to emerge,
which is then used by the nuclear utility
to develop an enhancement plan for the
safety culture.
Q: What message on safety
culture would you like to
convey to countries operating
or planning nuclear plants?
AK: Missions have allowed us to validate the main
principles of the SCART methodology. The review
approach of SCART is the result of several years of
discussion and proactive work. We managed to win
the support and assistance of experienced and well
known international experts on safety culture.
The SCART instrument itself is a sensitive tool that
allows experts to reveal early signs of a deteriorat-
ing safety culture.
It might be concluded that SCART as a safety review
service for safety culture is a new level of support
for Member States. Being a promotion tool for
safety culture, it is also a motor of motivation for the
Member States to enhance the safety culture in their
nuclear facilities. On the other hand, SCART missions
will increasingly become opportunities to facilitate
the application of IAEA Safety Standards.
Anne Kerhoas is a Senior Safety Specialist in the
IAEA’s Division of Nuclear Installation Safety. Email:
a.kerhoas@iaea.org. Dr. Marin Ignatov is a consultant
on nuclear safety.
IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008 | 49
 by Dana Sacchetti
Earth, Wind
Preparing nuclear power plants for nature’s fury.

Nuclear power generation does not occur in a vacuum. Exposure to the outside world can bring
dangers such as hurricanes, earthquakes, fires, tsunamis and volcanoes. With safety the first
priority for nuclear plants, it is incumbent upon nuclear installation designers and builders to
prepare for the worst that nature can bring to bear.

Mount Etna seen from space. Photo: NASA

 Prepare for the Worst | Earth, Wind and Fire

and Fire S
ince the early days of nuclear power, the primary concern regard-
ing nuclear power plants has been the prospect of human error
or mechanical failure, leading to a radiological release to the
environment. The examples of Chernobyl and Three Mile Island
left the impression that the greatest risk factors came from inside a plant’s
walls.

Yet, events in recent years have raised the spectre of new threats: that
the greatest menace facing a plant’s operation lay outside its walls, not
inside. Nuclear power generation does not occur in a vacuum, and with
plants dotted around the globe exposed to the elements, the chance for
interference by natural phenomena is ubiquitous. Exposure to the out-
side world can bring dangers such as hurricanes, earthquakes, fires, tsu-
namis and volcanoes. With safety the first priority for nuclear plants, it is
incumbent upon nuclear installation designers and builders to prepare
for the worst that nature can bring to bear.

Seismic Vulnerability
One of the first external events to capture the nuclear community’s atten-
tion happened over thirty years ago, when a 1977 earthquake occurred in
Romania, affecting the Kozloduy nuclear power plant in nearby Bulgaria.
The quake’s shaking caused only superficial damage to parts of the plant
which were not safety-related, but still alerted the international commu-
nity to a possible Achilles’ heel with some of the older Soviet-designed
plants.

“The Vrancea earthquake in 1977 was a wakeup call for the Soviet-
designed plants,” explains Aybars Gürpinar, former director of the IAEA’s
Division of Nuclear Installation Safety. “It also propelled the Soviet Union
to strengthen the plant in Armenia, and caused the IAEA to begin the
first of many assistance missions to look at the designs of plants through-
out the region.”

The Chernobyl accident also triggered a lot of introspection about

nuclear safety through Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and the inter-
national nuclear community. Alongside the more general issues related
to nuclear safety, concern grew that not enough was being done to pro-
tect plants against possible external events.

Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, the IAEA dispatched several
review missions to plants in Armenia, then Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and
the Russian Federation to evaluate the Soviet-designed plants. Through
the missions, the IAEA found that first generation Water-Water Energetic
Reactor (WWER) plants, were designed without external hazards fac-
tored into their construction. The IAEA concluded its missions by rec-
ommending that certain plant equipment be reviewed, along with the
installation of additional supports and upgrading of safety equipment.

In other regions, the seismic design limits of nuclear power plants have
also come under question. Some plants in the US have exceeded the
design basis for earthquakes on occasion, though none have resulted in
any significant risk to safety.

A January 1986 earthquake of 4.9 Richter magnitude occurred close to

Perry nuclear power plant, a single unit reactor located in north-east-
ern Ohio. Ground accelerations at the site were recorded as high as 0.19

IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008 | 51

Earth
Prepare for the Worst | Earth, Wind and Fire
to 0.23g, which surpassed the 0.1g design basis for
the plant. The plant was offline at the time, though
scheduled to be loaded with fresh fuel the following
day. After the event, a team of engineers and seis-
Win
mologists was dispatched to the plant to check for
any system failure and check for aftershocks in the
days following. Small cracks in concrete and leaks
in non-critical piping were observed, though both
conditions could have existed prior to the quake.
The Perry nuclear power plant quake set off a pro-
tracted legal battle, but the plant was found to have
soundly withstood the earthquake and restarted
soon thereafter.
Fire
The largest earthquake to ever affect a nuclear
power plant occurred last year near the world’s larg-
est nuclear power facility in Japan. The strength of
the quake killed 11 people in neighbouring areas,
flattened nearly 400 structures, and disrupted auto
production plants. The Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear
plant, a seven-unit facility sited along the Sea of
Japan coastline, was walloped by the 6.6 magnitude
quake on 16 July 2007, which caused the plant to
safely shut down. Though the reactors performed
well, the quake was found to have occurred on a
fault that was unknown to plant designers, and its
force greatly exceeded the limits for which the plant
was originally designed.
Two IAEA expert visits to the site concluded that
while the design basis was exceeded, the plant was
engineered correctly and held up well, in spite of
the unexpected strength of the quake. Yet the plant
is still shutdown since the earthquake, and no time-
table has been set for restarting of operation.
As Japan is one of the most seismically active
nations in the world, it has strict sets of regulations
designed to limit the impact of quakes on nuclear
power plants. These standards call for constructing
plants on solid bedrock to reduce shaking and by
classifying all of the plant’s components into differ-
ent safety categories. As some aspects of the plant
are more vulnerable than others, the design for rug-
gedness follows suit.
Tsunamis and Flooding
With a significant number of the world’s nuclear
plants drawing from seawater for cooling pur-
poses, a second threat that nuclear power plants
face is coastal flooding and more specifically tsu-
namis. The massive Indian Ocean earthquake of 26
December 2004 generated a series of devastating
tsunamis, killing nearly a quarter of a million peo-
52 | IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008
ple and causing widespread catastrophic damage
in eleven countries.
Two power units at Kalpakkam nuclear power plant
in India were hit by the tsunami, though both weath-
ered the waves well. Even though plant designers
never planned for a tsunami to ever descend upon
the plant, they did take the similar phenomenon of
cyclone storm surges into account. Plant builders
had estimated the maximum water level that could
approach the plant in the case of a storm surge,
and had built accordingly. Two wells, one far out
at sea and one on land, were constructed to alert
operators in the event of an approaching storm
wave. Once the plant operator received the warn-
ing, the plant was immediately shut down. Even still,
the reactor buildings were encased in meter-thick
walls, so water was likely not able to enter the reac-
tor units.
So even with rising levels of water and the crushing
impact of a massive wave, the Kalpakkam plant per-
formed well under duress.
“To make such vital buildings withstand earth-
quakes, a large concrete base mat is built,” explained
L. V. Krishnan, former director of the Indira Gandhi
Centre for Atomic Research in Kalpakkam. “So if the
structure moves it will move all together without
getting cracked.”
Severe floods also affected the Le Blayais nuclear
plant in the Bordeaux region of France. During a
severe storm that struck in December 1999, high
waves crashed over a protective dyke installed at
the plant, partly submerging portions of the facil-
ity. Water affected performance of the plant, namely
units 1 and 2. Water pumps that would normally
be used to draw water away from the plant were
knocked out, forcing plant managers to take emer-
gency action to prevent a possible core meltdown.
Emergency feedwater systems were used to rem-
edy the flooding, and the plant later returned to
service.
French safety standards call for placing the plat-
form that supports safety-relevant equipment at
a level at least as high as the maximum water level
and to block any possible routes through which
external waters could reach reactor safety equip-
ment located below the level of the site platform.
As a result of the Le Blayais flooding, where both
standards failed, French nuclear safety authorities
were forced to re-examine standards with regards
to flooding.

The Way Forward
The IAEA has worked to evaluate nuclear power plants for
hazard readiness around the world since the late 1970s.
nd
Most of its early missions targeted developing countries,
with the IAEA assisting in ensuring that nuclear installations
were rugged enough to withstand certain environmental
risks. The IAEA has also long published safety standards that
set recommendations to countries seeking guidance on
improving nuclear installation safety.
Roughly eight years ago, the IAEA began to devise safety
standards that are more risk-informed and rely upon prob-
abilistic evaluations. This change in approach calls for plant
builders to integrate the likelihood of an external hazard
occurring when constructing a plant, whereas older stand-
ards prescribed a more uniform set of standards to all plants
around the world.
The IAEA also leads conferences and meetings among
nuclear power states to discuss ways in which plants can
be built and retrofitted for external events. In the past year,
the IAEA held two such conferences regarding external haz-
ards, focusing on seismic safety and threats posed by tsu-
namis.
The workload of the IAEA with respect to external hazards is
expected to increase in the coming years.
“Now a lot of new build countries are coming to us, request-
ing the IAEA to assist in site evaluation and external events
consideration,” explained Mr. Gürpinar.
Still, determining the best way to protect nuclear facilities
against mother nature’s fury continues to be a learning proc-
ess. “We´re finding that our most significant learning about
the effects of earthquakes on nuclear power plants always
occurs after strong seismic events,” said Antonio Godoy,
Acting Head of the IAEA´s Engineering Safety Section.
With continued communication and transparency among
nuclear power countries, the IAEA, and regulators world-
wide, are working to keep plants safe from all that nature
can bring to bear.
Mr. S.N. Ahmad of the Indian Department of Atomic Energy,
summed up the design of nuclear plants with respect to
natural phenomena. “Man must live with natural calami-
ties,” he stated. “Wisdom lies in effectively meeting the chal-
lenges of such situations and ensuring safety of human life
and property. In nuclear power plants the whole spectrum
of such natural calamities and highly improbable accident
conditions are factored in site selection and design.”
Dana Sacchetti, Division of Public Information, IAEA.
E-mail: d.sacchetti@iaea.org.
Prepare for the Worst | Earth, Wind and Fire
Steady Lessons
from Shaky Events
Kashiwazaki, Japan — In the wake of the significant earthquake
that struck the world’s largest nuclear power plant, the Kashiwazaki-
Kariwa nuclear power plant, last year there has been renewed inter-
national focus on the structural strength of nuclear facilities. From
19-21 June 2008, the IAEA organized a workshop with the goal of
sharing recent technical knowledge and approaches on designing
and maintaining the ruggedness of nuclear power plants to safely
withstand such severe external hazards. The meeting convened over
300 attendees from various fields of expertise, and concluded in late
June 2008 in Japan.
“We organized the workshop with the objective of sharing recent
findings and information obtained from the occurrence of strong
earthquakes that impact nuclear power plants, as well as good prac-
tices and lessons learned,” explained Antonio Godoy, Acting Head of
the IAEA’s Engineering Safety Section and leader of the workshop.
Key conclusions of the workshop included:
❶ Seismic hazard evaluation continues to be a key element of assur-
ing seismic safety of a nuclear plant;
❷ Site-specific information and a full understanding of the geologi-
cal and tectonic features of a nuclear power plant’s site are critical to
seismic safety;
❸ In light of the July 2007 earthquake at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa
plant, it is clear that design and safety regulations play a critical role in
keeping the plant robust in spite of an under-estimation on the orig-
inal seismic input from the seismological studies performed at that
time; and
❹ Learnings from the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power plant
experience is providing valuable input to the IAEA’s safety standards.
“Science is making enormous progress, but we have to remain eager
to acquire new findings and new information to ensure nuclear power
plant safety. And we also need to maintain transparency as well,” said
Mr. N. Hirawaka, of Japan’s Tohoku Electric Power Company.
The workshop was organized by the IAEA in cooperation with
the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), Nuclear Safety
Commission (NSC), and Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization
(JNES). The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency cooperated in organizing
the workshop.
A related IAEA-led workshop on the effects of tsunamis on nuclear
power plants was held on 23 June 2008 in Daejong, Korea.
IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008 | 53
by Rafael Martincic and Lisa Obrentz

Lessons were learnt from a large-scale nuclear

43-hour
international readiness.

It
is five o’clock in the morning at Laguna
Verde Nuclear Power Plant on Mexico’s East
Coast. A fire is detected in the service water
pump room driving the plant operator to decrease
power at the plant. Due to further deterioration of
the conditions at the plant the IAEA’s Incident and
Emergency Centre (IEC) receives notification from
Mexican authorities of a “site area emergency” and
the IEC begins to assess the situation.
Thankfully, on this day in July 2008, the IEC is
responding to an international emergency exer-
cise, also known as ConvEx-3 (Convention Exercise),
designed to test and evaluate the exchange of infor-
mation, coordination of assistance and harmoniza-
tion of the information for the public on an interna-
tional scale.
More messages arrive at the IEC via the offi-
cial and secure Early. Notification and Assistance
Conventions (ENAC) website. There are casualties
and signs the situation will continue to deteriorate at
Laguna Verde and the IEC moves toward full activa-
tion. IAEA staff who are part of the Agency’s Incident
and Emergency System (IES) are called in to the
Centre. Before long, almost two dozen staff mem-
bers from various divisions are hard at work analyz-
ing data, communicating with the ‘Accident State’,
Member States and relevant international organiza-
tions, and responding to press enquiries. They will
rotate and continue to work tirelessly for the next 43
hours – the duration of the exercise.
The goals of the exercise were three-fold:

The IAEA Incident and Emergency Centre (IEC) during the ConvEx-3 exercise. In total, 75 Member States and ten
international organizations participated, substantially more than in 2005 when the last ConvEx-3 took place in
Romania. The scenario was prepared by the Laguna Verde nuclear power plant, the National Nuclear Safety and
Safeguards Commission (CNSNS) and the Inter-Agency Committee for Response to Nuclear Accidents (IACRNA).
(Credit: D.Calma/IAEA)

54 | IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008

Global Drill
emergency exercise held in July that tested
❶ to test the response of Member States and rele-
vant international organizations in a severe nuclear
accident;
Practice
❷ to test and evaluate the international emer-
gency management system [e.g. current Emergency
Notification and Assistance Technical Operations
Makes Perfect
Manual (ENATOM) arrangements]; Every few years, IACRNA, whose purpose is
to coordinate the actions of relevant inter-
❸ to identify good practices as well as deficiencies national organizations in the case of a radi-
and areas requiring improvement that cannot be ological emergency, works in conjunction
identified in national exercises. with other States and organizations to test
global emergency preparedness.
The exercise scenario was based on a severe nuclear
accident with serious transnational implications: The previous such event took place in May
“actual” for few States, “potential” for some and “per- 2005 at the Cernavoda nuclear power plant
ceived” for many. In total, 75 Member States and ten in Romania and was viewed as a success.
international organizations participated, substan-
tially more than in 2005 when the last ConvEx-3 took
place in Romania. The scenario was prepared by the
Laguna Verde nuclear power plant, the National
Nuclear Safety and Safeguards Commission (CNSNS) of the world’s emerging security threats. The fre-
and the Inter-Agency Committee for Response to quency of exercises, currently held every three to
Nuclear Accidents (IACRNA) working group on coor- five years, will also increase in order to increase test-
dinated international exercise. ing and thus enhance the emergency response sys-
tems.
Prior to the exercise, many staff received special
training in response to radiation incidents or emer- The observations, evaluations, and conclusions
gencies. Members of the IES served several func- that emerge from the exercise will be included in a
tions such as: liaison officers, public information report summarizing the major findings on the simu-
officers, emergency response managers, logistics lation and providing insight into possible shortcom-
officers, technical specialists, communication spe- ings in national and international response systems.
cialists, etc. In the meantime, the IEC returns to “ready” mode,
better prepared for the worst-case scenario.
Testing preparedness and response skills is key to
gauging how ready the Agency and international
community are to face events with consequences
of “the big accident.” Exercises identify weaknesses
in the international emergency response system —
at least in regard to nuclear safety concerns and give
the opportunity to improve response prepared- Rafael Martincic is a nuclear safety consultant.
ness. The next step will be to practice responding to E-mail: R.Martincic@iaea.org.
emergencies that have a security component, such Lisa Obrentz is Action Plan Outreach Officer at the IEC.
as a terrorist attack, in light of the changing nature E-mail: L.Oberntz@iaea.org.

IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008 | 55

Nuclear Forensics
Vorsprung durch Technik
Nuclear forensic expert Klaus Mayer
talks about the new tools of atomic
investigations. by Giovanni Verlini
Question: In the past, nuclear inspectors were
considered to be “nuclear accountants”, while
as of late they are portrayed as investigators.
It is often said that this shift in public per-
ception is due to the development of nuclear
forensics. How has nuclear forensics evolved
over the past years?
Klaus Mayer: We have frequent contact with the
IAEA, with the Department of Safeguards, with
the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory and with the
Office for Nuclear Security. In the discussions and in
the technical cooperation we also experience this
shift in activities of the IAEA and of its inspectors in
particular.
Regaining control over material that has been
diverted or stolen requires significantly higher
efforts. Nuclear forensics provides clues on the
history and on the origin of nuclear material.
The driving force behind this evolution is certainly
the move from traditional safeguards (INFCIRC
153) to the Additional Protocol (INFCIRC 540) and
to Integrated Safeguards. A combination of differ-
ent technical measures provides the tool-set for
the implementation of these agreements. Nuclear
forensic science provides clues on the history and
possibly on the origin of nuclear material.
Today, we have a systematic and comprehen-
sive approach for analyzing seized nuclear mate-
rial. Parameters like isotopic composition, chemical
impurities, particle morphology or the age of the
material provide useful hints on the material under
investigation.
56 | IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008
Our laboratory, the JRC — Institute for Transuranium
Elements, experienced an increasing number of
requests for impurity measurements in certain
types of nuclear material. This is a clear indication of
the trend towards more investigative safeguards.
Q: What are the typical nuclear forensic tools
available today?
KM: The measurement techniques applied in
nuclear forensics comprise of methods that have
been traditionally used in nuclear safeguards, in iso-
tope geology or in material sciences. Investigative
radiochemistry, however, remains the backbone of
any nuclear forensic analysis.
The actual measurements, though, provide only
data which are partly self-explaining. For interpreta-
tion of the data we often need to rely on reference
information, which is obtained through model cal-
culations, through data bases or through the open
literature. All these parameters are combined to
a “nuclear fingerprint.” In any case, a good under-
standing of the nuclear fuel cycle and of nuclear
physics and radiochemistry is key for interpretation
and attribution.
Q: Looking forward, what kind of nuclear
forensic tools are being developed today for
the future?
KM: Today, we are working in several areas. On
the one hand, we investigate new, characteristic
parameters, like the isotopic composition of trace
elements. On the other hand, we are also working
on the application of classical forensic techniques
(like taking fingerprints or DNA) on radioactively
contaminated evidence. Furthermore, the applica-
tion of micro-analytical techniques enables us to
investigate individual particles of only few microm-
eters in size. Nuclear forensics is very powerful and
s
Progress Through Technology | Nuclear Forensics

significant development work is performed to fur- It is therefore an important element of sustainabil-

ther increase its effectiveness. Beyond the technical
developments, increasing emphasis is put on the
implementation of a comprehensive concept, cov-
ering the investigations from the crime scene to the
laboratory.
This “model action plan” was conceived by the
Nuclear Smuggling International Technical Working
Group (ITWG) and is being propagated also by the
IAEA.
Q: Are remote detection technologies being
developed for those cases where there is no
physical access to a facility?
KM: Remote detection technologies are being
developed. Today most of the available techniques
provide an indication on the activities being per-
formed inside a facility where the inspector has no
access.
With progressing development of such method-
ologies the nuclear forensics value will certainly
increase.
Q: How important is nuclear forensics in the
fight against nuclear trafficking, terrorism
and proliferation?
KM: The three main steps in combating illicit traf-
ficking, nuclear terrorism and proliferation are pre-
vention, detection and response. Prevention is
certainly the most effective and efficient way of
keeping nuclear material under control. Regaining
control over material that has been diverted or sto-
len requires significantly higher efforts. Nuclear
forensics provides clues on the history and on the
origin of nuclear material.
ity in combating illicit trafficking or proliferation.
Because if the place of theft or diversion can be iden-
tified, appropriate countermeasures can be taken to
avoid that such incidents are repeated in the future.
Moreover, if the source of the material can be traced
back, also the perpetrators handling the material
take a high risk of being identified. Nuclear forensics
therefore provides a strong element of deterrence.
Q: What is the relationship between the JRC-
ITU, the IAEA and other national and interna-
tional bodies involved in nuclear forensics?
KM: JRC-ITU is a research institute of the European
Commission. Nuclear forensics is one of our activ-
ities and we draw upon the rich experience in
nuclear material analysis in our laboratory. This
experience is made available to the IAEA through
the European Commission’s support programme
to the IAEA, through participation in co-ordinated
research activities and through consultant’s meet-
ings and joint activities.
In the specific area of nuclear forensics, the ITWG
takes a prominent position, as this group gathers the
key players in the area and is in continuous dialogue
with the IAEA. Exchanging experience and interna-
tional cooperation are very important for advanc-
ing nuclear forensic science and thus for sustainable
success in combating illicit nuclear trafficking, ter-
rorism and proliferation.
Klaus Mayer is leader of activities on fo-
rensic analysis and illicit trafficking at the
European Commission Joint Research Centre-
Institute for Transuranium Elements (JRC-ITU).
E-mail: Klaus.mayer@ec.europa.eu. He spoke with
Giovanni Verlini, Editor of the IAEA Bulletin, in July 2008.

Europe’s Nuclear Science Lab

T he mission of the Institute for Transuranium Elements
(ITU) is to provide the scientific foundation for the
protection of the European citizen against risks asso-
ciated with the handling and storage of highly radio-
active material. ITU’s prime objectives are to serve as a
reference centre for basic actinide research, to contrib-
ute to an effective safety and safeguards system for the
nuclear fuel cycle, and to study technological and medi-
cal applications of radionuclides/actinides.
ITU works very closely with national and international
bodies in the nuclear field, both within the EU and
beyond, as well as with the nuclear industry. In addition
to playing a key role in EU policy on nuclear waste man-
agement and the safety of nuclear installations, ITU is
also heavily involved in efforts to combat illicit traffick-
ing of nuclear materials, and in developing and oper-
ating advanced detection tools to uncover clandestine
nuclear activities. ITU provides the expertise and access
to the necessary special handling facilities for the study
of the actinide elements. This is of relevance for issues
related to nuclear power generation and radioactive
waste treatment and disposal, but also for the advance-
ment of science in general. Another key role is in the
study and production of radionuclides used in the treat-
ment of cancer.

IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008 | 57

Risk Commu
Comm
more than facts
T
he IAEA Manual for First Responders to a
Radiological Emergency states “All seri-
ous nuclear and radiological emergencies
have resulted in the public taking some
actions that were inappropriate or unwarranted,
and resulted in significant adverse psychological
and economic effects. These have been the most
severe consequences of many radiological emer-
gencies. These effects have occurred even at emer-
gencies with few or no radiological consequences
and resulted primarily because the public was not
provided with understandable and consistent infor-
mation from official sources.”
As dramatic as this statement is, it does not go far
enough. Lack of effective communication about
radiological risk can cause physical harm as well.
Chernobyl prompted unnecessary abortions. In
response to the incident in Goiânia, thousands
flooded medical facilities asking to be examined,
hampering the ability of the medical system to care
for the truly sick. Ongoing worry about nuclear radi-
ation, whether after an emergency or just because
of general apprehension, is a source of chronic
stress, which causes cardiovascular damage, weak-
ens the immune system, contributes to adult onset
diabetes, increases the likelihood of clinical depres-
sion, and interferes with memory, fertility, and bone
growth.
It is therefore incumbent on any agency that man-
ages the risks associated with radiation to recog-
nize that dealing with the bequerels and sieverts
is not enough. The risks inherent in how the pub-
lic responds to the threat of radiation must be taken
more seriously. One vital way to address these risks
is more effective risk communication as part of over-
all risk management.
To describe what risk communication is, it is help-
ful to begin with what it is not. Risk communication
58 | IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008
began in the late 1970s with efforts by the nuclear
and chemical industries in the United States to coun-
teract widespread public concern about those tech-
nologies. It was believed that clear, understandable
information was all that was needed to make peo-
ple see that the risks were lower than many feared.
To this day, many still believe risk communication is
just a matter of making information understanda-
ble. This is particularly true in fields like nuclear tech-
nology, strongly influenced by people with scien-
tific and engineering backgrounds.
For decades this approach has failed, and most
risk communication experts say it is inadequate.
The perception of risk, and the behaviors that
result, are a matter of both the facts and our feel-
ings and instincts and personal life circumstances.
Communication that offers the facts but fails to
account for the affective side of our risk perceptions
is simply incomplete.
Risk communication is also commonly thought of
as what to say under crisis circumstances. This too
is inadequate. While it is certainly true that commu-
nication in times of crises is important in managing
public response, countless examples have taught
that a great deal of the effectiveness of risk commu-
nication during a crisis is based on what was done
beforehand.
Finally, risk communication is widely thought of
as what is said, a matter of which words and mes-
sages are delivered. Again, this approach is incom-
plete. Risk communication is implicit in the actions
an agency, industry or company takes. Nowhere
could it be more true that “actions speak louder than
words” than when people are alert to anything that
might threaten their health or survival.
Here, then, is a more complete definition of risk com-
munication:
munication
and feelings
Actions, words, and other interactions that incorporate
and respect the perceptions of the information recip-
ients, intended to help people make more informed
decisions about threats to their health and safety.
This definition emphasizes that:
➠ Risk communication is a matter of what an
organization does, not just what it says.
➠ Risk communication must account for the affec-
tive component in people’s perceptions of risk.
➠ Risk communication will be more effective if it
is thought of as dialogue, not instruction. It will be
more successful if the goal is to encourage certain
behaviors, not simply to expect that the information
recipients will think and do what the communica-
tors want them to.
This approach recognizes findings in the fields of
neuroscience and psychology which have estab-
lished that the perception of risk is a dual process
of fact and feeling. We use the information we have
and a set of instincts which help us gauge how
frightening something feels. Instinctive factors that
bear on public concern about radiation include:
➠ Pain and Suffering. The greater the pain and
suffering from a risk, the greater our fear. Radiation is
associated with cancer, widely perceived as a partic-
ularly painful way to die.
➠ Unknowability. People are generally more
afraid of things they can not detect with their own
senses, like ionizing radiation
➠ Is the threat natural or human-made? A nat-
ural risk, like radon, evokes less fear than the same
type of ionizing radiation that comes from a human-
made source.
by David Ropeik
➠ Risk versus Benefit. The greater the benefit, the
less we fear the risk. Many people who willingly sub-
ject themselves to medical radiation still fear nuclear
waste.
➠ Choice. A risk taken voluntarily, such as when
communities offer to host a waste disposal facility
or nuclear power plant, is less frightening than the
same risk if it is imposed, as the people in Nevada in
the U.S.A. feel about Yucca Mountain.
➠ Control. The more we feel we can affect events
as they occur, the less afraid we will be. (This is not
a matter of whether to engage in the risk voluntar-
ily in the first place, but how much actual control we
feel over what’s happening to us.) Airborne radia-
tion from a radiological dispersal device or nuclear
plant accident feels like something we can’t do any-
thing about.
➠ Is the risk Catastrophic or Chronic? Risks that
threaten large numbers at one time evoke more fear
than statistically greater causes of injury or death
where the victims are spread out geographically
and temporally. Images of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
and Chernobyl associate safety-related events at
nuclear power plants as potentially catastrophic.
➠ Trust. We are more afraid when we don’t trust
the agencies or officials supposed to protect us,
or the industries creating the risk. Do we trust
their competence? Their honesty? Their motives?
Incompetent performance, keeping secrets, and
inconsistent information are trust-destroying hall-
marks of the way officials have behaved in many
nuclear and radiological events.
Consider this example, irradiating food to make it
safer. In many places where this process has been
approved by the government, it is not widely used
because of industry concerns about public appre-
IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008 | 59
More than Words | Risk Communication
hension. Yet studies have found that effective risk
communication can increase consumer acceptance
of food irradiation, which directly improves public
health.
The risk communication offered to prospective con-
sumers in these studies went beyond clear, under-
standable language. It included a discussion of both
risks and benefits. The communications acknowl-
edged people’s apprehensions about radiation,
rather than dismissing them by only offering infor-
mation about how irradiating food poses no risk, or
just talking about the benefits. It asked people to say
what they would choose, including offering a policy
to require labeling to identify irradiated products.
Risk communication is a tool for managing
those risks, and should be given much
greater emphasis at the most senior levels
of any organization concerned with the
peaceful applications of nuclear science.
In short, clear and understandable messages were
important, but they were not enough. Clear and
understandable information is part of any commu-
nication. Risk communication also must account for
people’s affective perceptions, and demonstrate
respect for those perceptions in actions as well as
words (the policy of labeling).
These same concepts can be applied to many risk
communication challenges connected with nuclear
issues. Here are some specific suggestions:
❶ Nations interested in starting up a nuclear power
programme need to:
• openly acknowledge risks as well as discuss ben-
efits like energy independence from a low-carbon
source, and economic growth.
• establish processes that give people choice, par-
ticularly about siting.
• offer clear, understandable information via sources
who are trusted.
• establish mechanisms for on-going public input,
or for answering questions from the public, to cre-
ate a true dialogue.
❷ Responders to emergencies — including events
perceived as emergencies by the public, regardless
of where they might rank on the INES scale — need
to:
60 | IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008
• give people a sense of control by telling them
what they can do, e.g. shelter-in-place, evacuate,
don’t go anywhere, seek medical examination, take
iodine pills.
• communicate constantly.
• honestly acknowledge uncertainty when it exists.
• avoid keeping secrets (though this is difficult in
events involving security and law-enforcement).
• highlight the risks and benefits of certain behav-
iors, e.g. evacuation, coming to contaminated areas
to rescue loved ones, coming to medical facilities
depending on likelihood of exposure.
❸ Officials responsible for long term storage of
nuclear waste should:
• respect public concerns.
• establish processes giving people choice, particu-
larly about siting.
• provide simple information from trusted sources
on the nature of the disposed material, the disposal
process and disposal facilities.
• acknowledge uncertainty about long term dis-
posal.
• note the benefits of reduced disposal of green-
house gasses — a form of waste — from fossil fuel
use, versus the potential risk from disposal of long-
live radionuclides produced by nuclear energy.
The IAEA mission statement says the agency “…pro-
motes the achievement and maintenance of high
levels of safety in applications of nuclear energy, as
well as the protection of human health and the envi-
ronment against ionizing radiation.”
This focuses only on the physical dangers of
radiation. But potential radiologiocal harms
extend far beyond the direct impacts of flying
bits of atoms. The human perception of radiation
risk can itself lead to physical, psychological,
social, and economic harm, often in excess of the
radiological harm itself. Risk communication is a
tool for managing those risks, and should be given
much greater emphasis at the most senior levels
of any organization concerned with the peaceful
applications of nuclear science.
David Ropeik is a risk communication consultant.
E-mail: dpr@dropeik.com
Expert by Giovanni Carrada
Imagination
Trust and a favourable “big picture” are
essential to good scientific communication.
Professional science communication is under-
going a period of crisis. It was born as a tool to
ease acceptance of technologies which had become
controversial, or to improve the scientific and tech-
nical literacy necessary in a modern economy. The
results, as we all know, have been poor at best.
For quite a long time, the consensus was that these
problems are due to a lack of “public understand-
ing of science”, that is, of scientific knowledge, theo-
ries and methods. If only these were translated from
specialist terminology into popular language and
widely disseminated, controversies would automat-
ically resolve themselves. The public was consid-
ered to be a homogeneous and passive audience
for the “pure” knowledge produced by scientists or
technologists.
This rather simplistic approach to the relationship
between science and society, and, therefore, to the
communication of science, has shown clear signs
of its shortcomings. Transforming citizens into “lit-
tle molecular biologists” or “little statisticians” is a
far more difficult task than can be imagined, and
for two good reasons. First, people would need to
know too much. In order to understand the possi-
ble risks of electromagnetic fields, for example, one
should become familiar with electromagnetic radi-
ation, its interactions with living cells, and heaps of
epidemiological research. How many areas of exper-
tise should a citizen have to master? The second rea-
son is the lack of sufficient motivation. How many
people are willing to invest the time and effort nec-
essary to get a good scientific education?
The idea of changing citizens into little scientists
could also turn out to be useless. If we look at sur-
vey results, we see no clear correlation between the
level of scientific literacy and attitudes and opinions
on controversial science or technology.
62 | IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008
Establishing a Relationship
After being a label for every type of initiative
launched by the scientific community for the gen-
eral public, public understanding of science is now
definitely out of fashion. Today, experts prefer to talk
about engagement, bi-directionality, public debate
and, above all, dialoguing. The communication of
science is no longer simple dissemination.
However, in order to remain an authorative voice,
science (or industry) has to keep society’s trust,
which is obtained through reciprocal understand-
ing and not simple statements of facts, no matter
how incontrovertible they are, let alone statements
of authority. Instead of asking only “what do people
need to know,” we should ask “what do people think
they need to know,” “what will be the effect on peo-
ple of what we want to say ,” “what do they know, or
think they already know.”
Dialogue is of course a good thing, because com-
munication is not about transferring information
from one party to another, but about establishing
a relationship. In fact, even more important than
the information being exchanged is the quality
(patronizing, neutral, personal, empathic, etc.) of
the exchange.
Before talking, therefore, we must listen. Not just
through opinion polls, but also through the general
press, public debates, meetings, even small talk. To
make ourselves understood, we must first under-
stand.
Listening and dialoguing are also excellent ways to
avoid the so-called “curse of knowledge”, the diffi-
culty for experts to see something as all other peo-
ple might see it and therefore to make themselves
understood.

Listening to the public is essential but not enough.
Dialogue is useful but often impractical. Maybe the
time has come for science and technology commu-
nication to take one big step further.
The Power of the Big Picture
The public understanding of science needs the sup-
port of a higher level of understanding. We may call
it the understanding of the big picture, as opposed
to the many scientific and technological facts and
details.
In fact, we all primarily understand the world in
terms of big narratives, also referred to as public rep-
resentations, framing, or metaphors. Only at a sec-
ondary level are we willing to examine the tech-
nical details. A few examples: are cloned animals
dangerous because human cloning is bad? Are sil-
icone breast implants dangerous because they are
immoral? Never mind what the truth is: in public
debates all that has consequences is real.
Before (or instead of) considering the technical
details, we often make a judgment on the basis of
the big picture we have in mind. Indeed, there is a
clear hierarchy between the two levels: the big pic-
ture prevails on the technical picture because it is
the shortcut our mind tends to take whenever we
don’t have all the necessary information and exper-
tise. And the less time and less expertise we have,
the more we rely on the big picture.
There is also a difference in literary genre between
big pictures and traditional science communica-
tion: the former are stories, the latter usually have
the form of the essay.
A story is the most natural way to absorb informa-
tion: it is engaging, it fires the imagination, it is easy
to remember and makes you act. An essay, on the
other hand, though better suited to exchange infor-
mation, is an unnatural way to communicate. It
requires an effort from the public and is often cold
and abstract.
In professional science communication we tend to
concentrate only on the second level and its asso-
ciated genre, as if the first one, i.e., the big picture,
were not “science communication”. Therefore, we
often forget to work on, update or change the big
narrative of our field, and limit ourselves to the nar-
rower, honest and apparently safer work of explain-
ing facts. The problem is that if the big picture is
negative, or just not interesting, we don’t get the
public’s attention in the first place, or we get a neg-
More than Words | Expert Imagination
ative attention, thus compromising any further
understanding.
Sharing a Future
Nuclear power has a very big “big picture”, and not
the most positive one. It’s made of the Bomb, green
movements of the 1970s, Chernobyl, technocratic
industries and behemoth public administrations. It
takes a big communication effort to change a big
picture, but a top-down communication strategy is
an illusion on both practical and political grounds
and luckily, it cannot be done in a mature demo-
cratic society. It may also easily backfire.
What you need is a new vision capable of spread-
ing itself through a bottom-up, self-sustaining proc-
ess. If you can craft a good vision, it will stimulate
other people to join your communication effort.
Just think about information technology and the
army of enthusiastic evangelista it has always effort-
lessly recruited. This is good for democratic public
debate and credibility and multiplies the communi-
cation effort. That is, after all, what public relations is
all about. It also makes traditional science commu-
nication — explaining scientific and technological
details — more effective.
Visions, however, cannot be imposed. Besides con-
sidering what the technology can deliver, a good
vision is just the right interpretation of the stake-
holders’ material, economic, social, psychological
and moral needs. That is why a good vision must
go beyond the cold idea of the future that is typical
of the technology forecaster, and should let people
understand how they can contribute to shape their
own future.
In order to craft a good vision, you need to listen and
engage in dialogue, but, first of all, you need imagi-
nation. A vision is not something that the public can
suggest, it is a vivid new story that does not exist yet
and must be invented.
In technology, a good vision must be both bold and
realistic. Science is difficult to muster, and the most
interesting and exciting visions are to be found in the
experts’ minds. That is why we need expert imagi-
nation. We should look for it in the professional com-
munity, though outside the mainstream, probably
in the younger generations. In people, who usu-
ally have little voice in big organizations. But who
knows, things may change.
Giovanni Carrada is a science writer and a communica-
tion consultant based in Rome, Italy.
E-mail: giovanni.carrada@fastwebnet.it
IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008 | 63
 More than Words | Expert Imagination
Science y Tapas
Barcelona, Spain — “Science for a better life” was the theme of
the 2008 Euroscience Open Forum (ESOF), during which the
future of nuclear power and the importance of research in the
nuclear field was also debated.
“Be it in the development of fusion as a source of energy or in
technological advances in fission, it is essential that research in
the nuclear sector carries on,” said Friedrich Wagner, President
of the European Physical Society.
Wagner’s view was echoed by Dr. David Ward, a researcher work-
ing on fusion at the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority
in Culham. He pointed to the fact that current investments
in energy research and developments (R&D) only amount to
the equivalent of less than 0.1 per cent of the energy market
value. “Without putting more resources into R&D, we will never
reduce our reliance on fossil fuels,” he commented.
ESOF 2008 attracted some 4000 participants.
(Credit: ESOF 2008)
The call for renewed investments and efforts in nuclear research
came as Sir David King, the former UK Chief Scientific Advisor
and conference keynote speaker, warned participants that
energy security will become a key factor in tackling the popu-
lation growth problem, which he described as mankind’s main
challenge for the 21st century.
“This population explosion will present a series of intercon-
nected challenges that are qualitatively different from those
facing humanity at the start of the twentieth century - ranging
from food and energy security to increased terrorism and the
impacts of climate change,” he said.
Two panel sessions organized by the UK´s Institute of Physics
looked at future prospects for fission and fusion technologies
in Europe and beyond.
64 | IAEA Bulletin 50-1 | September 2008
by Giovanni Verlini
Dr. William Nuttall, Senior Lecturer in Technology Policy at
Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, spoke of the
need for smaller nuclear plants that are cheaper and more
flexible to develop as a way to address nuclear’s weak points,
i.e., high capital costs and lengthy construction times. He noted
that Russian plans for a floating nuclear power station, and
the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor being developed in South
Africa are two examples of nuclear research going in the right
direction.
Speaking at a session entitled Fusion — Will It Always Be 40 Years
Away?, David Campbell, Assistant Deputy Director General for
Fusion Science and Technology for the ITER project, illustrated
the likely timetable for fusion power development. He said that,
according to plans, the experimental, multinational ITER facility
to be built in Caradache, France, is expected to be up and run-
ning by 2018. After an estimated 20 years of testing, a model
fusion reactor called DEMO will then be built, thus inaugurat-
ing the era of fusion power.
It might be 40 years or longer before nuclear fusion makes a sig-
nificant contribution to the world´s energy needs, but if it can
be demonstrated that nuclear fusion for power generation is
possible, safe and competitively priced it will have been worth
the wait, he said.
A conference session was also dedicated to illicit nuclear traf-
ficking and the threat of nuclear terrorism. “Illicit trafficking
of nuclear and other radioactive materials and the threat of
nuclear terrorism are reasons for serious concern,” said Gabriele
Tamborini of the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre
Institute for Transuranium Elements (JRC-ITU).
“Nuclear forensics may provide information on the history,
the intended use and possibly on the origin of nuclear mate-
rial. This scientific discipline is at the interface between physical
science, prosecution, non-proliferation and counter terrorism,”
he added. Tools and tactics that enable teams of atom detec-
tives to do their job have changed profoundly over the last few
years.
The IAEA´s Diane Fischer, a senior safeguards analyst, addressed
the tools used to detect undeclared nuclear activities, notably
environmental sampling techniques. “Today we can say that
environmental sampling is key to nuclear forensics,” she said.
The role of intelligence and international cooperation, how-
ever, was also emphasized by the experts taking part in the
panel.
ESOF 2008, Europe`s largest interdisciplinary scientific gathering at-
tracted some 4000 scientists, researchers, policy makers and jour-
nalists, in Barcelona, Spain, from 18-22 July 2008.