People v.

Prieto
G.R. No. L-399 | January 29, 1948
Plaintiff
: People of the Philippines
Defendant
: Eduardo Prieto (Eddie Valencia)
Ponente
: Tuason,
J.
FACTS
:-Prieto was prosecuted in the People’s Court for 7 counts of treason.
Initially, he pleaded notguilty to every charge. Later on, he entered a plea of guilty to
counts 1, 2, 3 and 7, andmaintained his original plea to counts 4, 5 and 6.
-l
The prosecutor only presented evidence to count 4 as he admitted insufficiency
of evidence asto counts 5 and 6. The court found him guilty to all counts except 5 and 6
of “treasoncomplexed by murder and physical injuries.”
ISSUE
: What is the criminal liability of Prieto?
DECISION
(Not guilty of count 4, guilty of treason in counts 1, 2, 3 and 7):-Prieto is acquitted
in count 4 as the of two-witness principle requirement was not
satisfied. They failed to corroborate each other:
o
Juanito Albano testified that the accused and other Filipino undercovers and
Japaneseofficers caught an American aviator and had him carried to town on a sled
pulled by acarabao. That on the way, Prieto walked behind the sled and the American
was takento the Kempetai headquarters.
o
Valentin Cuison testified that he saw the accused following the American whose
handswere tied while walking and that he struck the flier with a rope. There was no
mentionof a sled and nor did he see Juanito Albano.-There is no crime of treason
complexed with other felonies because these were not separate offenses from
treason.
o
When a deed is charged as an element of treason, it becomes identified with it
andcannot be subject of a separate punishment, or used in combination with treason
toincrease the penalty.
o
Murder or physical injuries are charged as overt acts of treason and cannot beregarded
separately under their general denomination.
o
But the brutality which accompanied the killing and the physical injuries are taken
asaggravating circumstances since it augmented the sufferings of the offended
partiesunnecessarily to the attainment of the criminal objectives.
o
But there is a mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty, hence, the punishment shouldbe
reclusion perpetua.- O t h e r i s s u e :
o
There is a presumption in favour of legality and regularity of the proceedings
and thepresumption that the accused was not denied of his rights.
o
The fact that the attorney appointed to defend Prieto is reluctant to accept
thedesignation is not sufficient to overcome the presumption. The present
counsel“sincerely believes that the said Attorney Carin did his best, although it was not
thebest of a willing worker.”

People vs. SiyohL- 57292FACTS>

Julaide Siyoh and Omarkyam Kiram, together with Namli Indanan and Andaw Jamahali
were accused of qualified piracy with triple murder and frustrated murder > On July 10,
1979, Antonio de Guzman together with his friends who were also travelling merchants
likehim (Danilo Hiolen. Rodolfo de Castro and Anastacio de Guzman) were on their way
to Pilas Island,Province of Basilan, to sell goods they received from Alberto Aurea.>
They left for Pilas Island at 2:00 p.m. of July 10, 1979 on a pumpboat. They took their
dinner and slept thatnight in the house of Omar-kayam Kiram at Pilas Island. Who also
helped them from selling their goods todifferent Islands near Pilas.> Before the incident
happened, Antonio, the lone survivor saw that Kiram was talking with another
twopersons that he can only recognize in their faces somewhere near the house where
they were selling thegoods> On July 14, 1979, When they were heading back to Pilas
Island from Baluk-Baluk Island through riding apumpboat where Siyoh positioned
himself at the front while Kiram operated the engine.> On the way to Pilas Island,
Antonio de Guzman saw another pumpboat painted red and green about 200meters
away from their pumpboat Shortly after" Kiram turned off the engine of their pumpboat.
Thereafter two shots were fired from the other pumpboat as it moved towards them>
There were two persons on the other pumpboat who were armed with armantes.
De Guzman recognizedthem to be the same persons he saw Kiram conversing with in a
house at Baluk-Baluk Island.> When the boat came close to them, Kiram threw a rope
to the other pumpboat which towed de Guzman'spumpboat towards Mataja Island.> On
the way to Mataja Island, Antonio de Guzman and his companions were divested of
their money andtheir goods by Kiram. Thereafter Kiram and his companions ordered the
group of de Guzman to undress.Taking fancy on the pants of Antonio de Guzman,
Kiram put it on.> With everybody undressed, Kiram said 'It was good to kill all of you'.
After that remark, Siyoh hackedDanilo Hiolen while Kiram hacked Rodolfo de
Castro. Antonio de Guzman jumped into the water. As he wasswimming away from the
pumpboat, the two companions of Kiram fired at him, injuring his back. But he wasable
to reach a mangrove where he stayed till nightfall. When he left the mangrove, he
saw the dead bodiesof Anastacio de Guzman, Danilo Hiolen and Rodolfo de Castro. He
was picked up by a fishing boat andbrought to the Philippine Army station at Maluso
where he received first aid treatment. Later he was broughtto the J.S. Alano Memorial
Hospital at Isabela, Basilan province.> On July 15, 1979, while waiting for the dead
bodies of his companions at the wharf, de Guzman saw Siyohand Kiram. He pointed
them out to the PC and the two were arrested before they could run. When
arrested,Kiram was wearing the pants he took from de Guzman and de Guzman had
to ask Pat. Bayabas at theProvincial Jail to get back his pants from KiramISSUE: WoN
the respondent-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt?CONTENTIONS OF
APPELLANTS1.Since it was contested by appellants that there guilt was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt since the prosecution did not present evidence
that the accused were also the one who killed Anastaciode Guzman because his
remains are never recovered.2.The Credibility of the W itness—since only 1
witness was presented
3.
Appellants claim (Siyoh and Kiram) that they were not the assailants but also the
victimHELD: They were said to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified piracy
with triple murder andfrustrated homicideRATIONALE
1.
Number of persons killed on the occasion of piracy, not material; Piracy, a special
complex crimepunishable by death—but the number of persons killed on the occasion
of piracy is not material. PD532 considers qualified piracy as a special complex crime
punishable by death. Therefore, the guiltof respondent were proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
2.
There was no other evidence presented on why should the lone survivor tell lies and
fabricate storyas to apprehend the accused.
3.
Appellants claim that they were not the assailants but also the victim and that the two
persons theyhave identified (Namli Indanan and Andaw Jamahali) is baseless as view
in the proven conspiracyamong the accused. The Conspiracy was established through
the testimony of the lone witnessand survivor- De Guzman

G.R. No. 111709 August 30, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

plaintiff-appellee,vs.
ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C.
INFANTE, CHEONG SAN HIONG, andJOHN DOES,
accused-appellants.In the evening of March 2, 1991, "M/T Tabangao," a cargo vessel
owned by the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation,loaded with barrels of
kerosene, regular gasoline, and diesel oil, was boarded by 7 fully armed pirates. The
pirates includingthe accused Roger P. Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, and Andres Infante Jr.
detained the crew and completely took over the vessel.The vessel was
directed to proceed to Singapore where the cargoes were unloaded transferred and
sold under the directsupervision of accused Cheong San Hiong. Thereafter, the captive
vessel returned to the Philippines.
 A series of arrests was thereafter effected and all the accused were charged
with qualified piracy or violation of PresidentialDecree No. 532 (Piracy in Philippine
Waters). They were subsequently convicted of the crime charged. Hence, this
appeal.Meanwhile accused Cheong argues that

the trial court erred in convicting and punishing him as an accomplice when theacts
allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside of Philippine waters and
territory, stripping the Philippinecourts of jurisdiction to hold him for trial, to convict, and
sentence.ISSUE:WON the Philippines is without jurisdiction to try a crime committed
outside the Philippine waters and territory?RULING:We affirm the conviction of all the
accused-appellants. Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment,
provided that piracy must be committed on the high seas byany person not a member of
its complement nor a passenger thereof. Upon its amendment by Republic Act No.
7659, thecoverage of the pertinent provision was widened to include offenses
committed "in Philippine waters." On the other hand,under Presidential Decree No. 532
(issued in 1974), the coverage of the law on piracy embraces
any person
including "apassenger or member of the complement of said vessel in Philippine
waters." Hence, passenger or not, a member of thecomplement or not, any person is
covered by the law.Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the
provisions on piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532. Thereis no contradiction
between the two laws. There is likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is no need to
construe or interpretthe law. All the presidential decree did was to widen the coverage
of the law, in keeping with the intent to protect thecitizenry as well as neighboring states
from crimes against the law of nations. As expressed in one of the "whereas" clausesof
Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is "among the highest forms of lawlessness
condemned by the penal statutes of allcountries." For this reason, piracy under the
Article 122, as amended, and piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532
existharmoniously as separate laws.
As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
person of accused-appellantHiong since the crime was committed outside
Philippine waters, suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attackon and seizure
of "M/T Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo were
committed inPhilippine waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by
the pirates to Singapore where its cargo wasoff-loaded, transferred, and sold.
And such transfer was done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct
supervision.Although Presidential Decree No. 532 requires that the attack and
seizure of the vessel and its cargo be committedin Philippine waters, the
disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed part of the
act of piracy, hence, the same need not be committed in Philippine waters.

PEOPLE V. BURGOS - 144 SCRA 1

FACTS:
Due to an information given by a person, who allegedly was being forcibly recruited by
accused to the NPA, the members of the Constabulary went to the house of accused,
asked about his firearm and documents connected to subversive activities. Accused
pointed to where his firearm was as well as his other documents allegedly.

HELD:
The right of the person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and
any deprivation of liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or
rule, which allows exceptions to the requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly
construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the situations when securing a
warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the Rule.
We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its
application
beyond the cases specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe upon
personal liberty and set back a basic right so often violated and so deserving of
full protection.

Stonehill vs. Diokno

20 SCRA 383 (GR No. L-19550)
June 19, 1967

CJ Concepcion

Facts:

Upon application of the prosecutors (respondent) several judges (respondent) issued on different
dates a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners (Stonehill et. al.) and/or corporations of
which they were officers to search the persons of the petitioner and/or premises of their officers
warehouses and/or residences and to seize and take possession of the personal property which is
the subject of the offense, stolen, or embezzled and proceeds of fruits of the offense, or used or
intended to be used or the means of committing the offense, which is described in the application
as violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code and the
Revised Penal Code.
Petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus and injunction and prayed that, pending final disposition of the case, a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued against the prosecutors, their agents and representatives from
using the effect seized or any copies thereof, in the deportation case and that thereafter, a
decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and
void. For being violative of the constitution and the Rules of court by: (1) not describing with
particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) money not mentioned in the
warrants were seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence for deportation cases filed
against the petitioner; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the
documents paper and cash money were not delivered to the issuing courts for disposal in
accordance with law.

In their answer, the prosecutors (respondent) alleged; (1) search warrants are valid and issued in
accordance with law; (2) defects of said warrants, were cured by petitioners consent; and (3) in
any event the effects are admissible regardless of the irregularity.

The Court granted the petition and issued the writ of preliminary injunction. However by a
resolution, the writ was partially lifted dissolving insofar as paper and things seized from the
offices of the corporations.

Issues:

1.) Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to assail the legality of search warrants
issued against the corporation of which they were officers.

2.) Whether or not the search warrants issued partakes the nature of a general search warrants.

3.) Whether or not the seized articles were admissible as evidence regardless of the illegality of
its seizure.
Held:

Officers of certain corporations, from which the documents, papers, things were seized by means
of search warrants, have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of
the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their
respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners,
regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations,
and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a
seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the
objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third
parties.

Officers of certain corporations can not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the
documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted
to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence
belongsexclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be
invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity.

Jose Burgos vs. Chief of Staff

G.R. No L-64261
December 26, 1984

Facts:

Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of
“Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to
have been used in subversive activities. Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that
respondents be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner.

Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two
warrants issued indicated only one and the same address. In addition, the items seized
subject to the warrant were real properties.

Issue:
Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items.

Held:
The defect in the indication of the same address in the two warrants was held by the
court as a typographical error and immaterial in view of the correct determination of the
place sought to be searched set forth in the application. The purpose and intent to
search two distinct premises was evident in the issuance of the two warrant.
As to the issue that the items seized were real properties, the court applied the
principle in the case ofDavao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, ruling “that machinery which is
movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement,
property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person
having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.” In
the case at bar, petitioners did not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on
which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question,
while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under
a search warrant.
However, the Court declared the two warrants null and void.

Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched.

The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the warrant did not
satisfy the requirement of probable cause, the statements of the witnesses having been
mere generalizations.

Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance of general warrants.

(Stanford vs. State of Texas). The description and enumeration in the warrant of the
items to be searched and seized did not indicate with specification the subversive
nature of the said items.
Juan Ponce Enrile vs Judge Salazar
Habeas Corpus
–
Right to Bail
–
Rebellion
–
SC Cannot Change Law

In February 1990, Sen Enrile was arrested. He was charged together with Mr. & Mrs.
Panlilio, andHonasan for the crime of rebellion withmurderand multiple frustrated
murder which allegedlyoccurred during their failed coup attempt. Enrile was then
brought to Camp Karingal. Enrile laterfiled for the habeas corpus alleging that the crime
being charged against him is nonexistent. That he

was charged with acriminaloffense in an information for which no complaint was

initially filed orpreliminary investigation was conducted, hence was denied due process;
denied his right to bail; andarrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued
without thejudgewho issued it first having personally determined the existence
of probable cause.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court should affirm the
Hernandez
ruling.
HELD:
Enrile filed for habeas corpus because he was denied bail although ordinarily a charge
of rebellion would entitle one for bail. The crime of rebellion charged against him
however iscomplexed with murder and multiple frustratedmurders
–
theintentionof the prosecution was tomake rebellion in its most serious form so as to
make the penalty thereof in the maximum. The SC

ruled that there is no such crime as Rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder. What Enrile et al can be charged of would be Simple Rebellion because other
crimes such as murder or allthose that may be necessary to the commission of rebellion
is absorbed hence he should be entitiledfor bail. The SC however noted that apetitionfor
habeas corpus was not the proper remedy so as toavail of bail. The properstepthat should
have been taken was for Enrile to file a petition to beadmitted for bail. He should have
exhausted all other efforts beforepetitioningfor habeas corpus.The Hernandez ruling is
still valid. All other crimes committed in carrying out rebellion are deemed

absorbed. The SC noted, however, that there may be a need to modify the rebellion law.
Consideringthat the essence of rebellion has been lost and that it is being used by a lot of
opportunists to attempt to grab power.
People vs Dasig
Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the
case cited. Xie xie!

People vs Dasig
G.R. No. 100231
April 28, 1993

Facts:

Appellants Rodrigo Dasig, Edwin Nuñez and 6 others were charged together of
shooting Redempto Manatad, a police officer, as he died while performing duties. Upon
arraignment, appellant and Edwin Nuñes entered a plea of "not guilty." However, after
the prosecution had presented its first witness, accused Nuñes changed his plea of "not
guilty" to "guilty." Hence, the lower court held in abeyance the promulgation of a
judgment against said accused until the prosecution had finished presenting its
evidence. While trial was still ongoing, Nuñez died on March 10, 1989, thereby
extinguishing his criminal liability.

At about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Pfc. Catamora noticed eight (8) persons, one of
whom he identified as Edwin Nuñez, acting suspiciously. He noticed one of them giving
instructions to two of the men to approach Pfc. Manatad. On August 16, 1987, two
teams of police officers were tasked to conduct surveillance on a suspected safehouse
of members of the sparrow unit located in Peace Valley, Cebu City. Upon reaching the
place, the group saw Rodrigo Dasig and Edwin Nuñes trying to escape. The team of
Capt. Antonio Gorre captured Nuñes and confiscated a .45 caliber revolver with 3
magazines and ammunitions, while the group of Sgt. Ronald Arnejo pursued Dasig, who
threw a grenade at his pursuers, but was shot on his left upper arm and subsequently
apprehended while a .38 caliber revolver with 17 live ammunitions were confiscated
from him. Thereafter, Dasig was brought to the hospital for treatment, while Nuñes was
turned over to the Metrodiscom for investigation. Dasig confessed that he and the group
of Edwin Nuñes killed Pfc. Manatad. He likewise admitted that he and Nuñes were
members of the sparrow unit and the their aliases were "Armand" and "Mabi,"
respectively.

The extra-judicial confession of appellant was signed by him on every page thereof with
the first page containing a certification likewise signed by him. However, Dasig contends
that the procedure by which his extra-judicial confession was taken was legally
defective, and contrary to his Constitutional rights. He further contends that assuming
he conspired in the killing of Pfc. Manatad, he should be convicted at most of simple
rebellion and not murder with direct assault. Appellant also claims that the custodial
interrogation was done while he was still very sick and consequently, he could not have
fully appreciated the wisdom of admitting such a serious offense.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellant is liable for extra-judicial killing of the deceased
and participated in the act of rebellion?

Held:

Yes. Accused Rogelio Dasig is found guilty of participating in an act of rebellion beyond
reasonable doubt and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of eight
(8) years of prision mayor, and to pay the heirs of Pfc. Redempto Manatad, P50,000.00
as civil indemnity.

As to the proper imposable penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable to
persons convicted of rebellion (Sec. 2, R.A. 4203), contrary to the insinuation of the
Solicitor General. Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision
mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00 to any person who promotes, maintains, or
heads a rebellion. However, in the case at bar, there is no evidence to prove that
appellant Dasig headed the crime committed. As a matter of fact he was not specifically
pinpointed by Pfc. Catamora as the person giving instructions to the group which
attacked Pfc. Manatad.

Appellant merely participated in committing the act, or just executed the command of an
unknown leader. Hence, he should be made to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
eight (8) years of prision mayor. For the resulting death, appellant is likewise ordered to
pay the heirs of Pfc. Manatad FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as civil
indemnity.
Case of People of the Philippines vs. Elias Lovedioro y Castro
G.R.No. 112235 29November1995 (People vs. Lovedioro 250 SCRA 389)

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Elias Lovedioro with 3 other companions fatally shot SPO3 Jesus Lucilo while Lucilo
was walking along Burgos St. away from Daraga, Albay Public Market. The victim died
on the same day from massive blood loss. On November 6, 1992, Elias Lovedioro was
then charged of the crime of murder, and subsequently found guilty. Lovedioro then
appealed the decision, contesting the verdict of murder instead of rebellion. It was
confirmed by the prosecution’s principal witness that Lovedioro was a member of the
New People’s Army.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Was the RTC correct in holding Lovedioro liable for the crime of murder, instead of
rebellion?
- Yes. Because, overt acts and purpose are essential components of the crime of
rebellion, with either of these elements wanting, the crime of rebellion does not
exist.
- Political motive should be established before a person charged with a common
crime- alleging rebellion in order to lessen the possible imposable penalty- could
benefit from the law’s relatively benign attitude towards political crimes. If no
political motive is established or proved, the accused should be convicted of the
common crime and not of rebellion.
- In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act, and mere membership in an
organization dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of itself
suffice.
- The killing of the victim, as observed by the Solicitor General, offered no
contribution to the achievement of the NPA’s subversive aims, in fact, there were no
known acts of the victim’s that can be considered as offending to the NPA.
- Evidence shows that Lovedioro’s allegation of membership to the N.P.A was
conveniently infused to mitigate the penalty imposable upon him.

HELD:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the trial court's decision dated September 14,
1993, sentencing the accused of Murder is hereby AFFIRMED, in toto.

PEOPLEVSAMADOHERNANDEZ(99PHIL515)1. What happened:

About March 15, 1945, Amado Hernandez and other appellants were accused of conspiring,
confederating and cooperating with each other, as well as with the thirty-one(31) defendants charged
in the criminal cases of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Theywere accused of being members of PKP
Community Party of the Philippines which wasactively engaged in an armed rebellion against the
government of the Philippines. With the party of HUKBALAHAP (Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa mga
Hapon), they committed thecrime of rebellion causing murder, pillage, looting plunder, etc.,
enumerated in 13 attackson government forces or civilians by HUKS.
2.CrimeCommitted:
Rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies
3. Contention of the State:
The government, headed by the Solicitor General, argued that the gravity of thecrime committed
required the denial of bail. Moreover, the complex crime charged by
theg o v e r n m e n t a g a i n s t H e r n a n d e z h a s b e e n s u c c e s s f u l l y i m p o s e d w i t h o t h
e r a r r e s t e d communist leaders and was sentenced to life imprisonment.
4.ContentionoftheAccused:
An appeal prosecuted by the defendants regarding the judgment rendered by theCFI in Manila that
rebellion cannot be a complex crime with murder, arson or robbery.
5. Ruling:
The court ruled that “murder, arson, and robbery are mere ingredient of the crime of rebellion as means “necessary”
for the perpetration of the offense. Such common offense isabsorbed or inherent of the crime of rebellion. Inasmuch
as the acts specified in Article 135constitutes, one single crime it follows that said acts offer no occasion for the
application of Article 48 which requires therefore the commission of at least two crimes.***
HERNANDEZDOCTRINE
: Rebellion cannot be complexed with commoncrimes such as killings, destruction of property,
etc., committed on the occasion and infurtherance thereof. The thinking is not anymore correct more so that
there is no legal basisfor such rule now. Rebellion constitutes ONLY ONE CRIME. ***

U.S. vs. Abad

G.R. No. L-976, October 22, 1902

Ponente: Ladd, J.

Facts:

Maximo Abad was charged with violation of oath of allegiance when he denied toan
officer of the United States Army the existence of certain rifles at the time of his
surrender in April 1901 when in fact, he was aware of the existence
and whereabouts of such rifles. Section 14 of Article 292 of the United StatesPhilippine
Commission states that: "Any person who shall have taken any oath before any military
officer under the Civil Government of the Philippine Islands, whether such official so
administering the oath was specially authorized by law soto do or not, in which oath the
affiant is substance engaged to recognize or acceptthe supreme authority of the United
States of America in these Islands or tomaintain true faith and allegiance thereto or to
obey the laws, legal orders, anddecrees promulgated by its duly constituted authorities and who
shall, after thepassage of this act, violate the terms and provisions of such oath or any of
suchterms or provisions, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousanddollars or
by imprisonment not exceeding ten years, or both."

Abad is a former insurgent officer and is entitled to the benefit of theproclamation of

amnesty if the offense is one of those to which the proclamationapplies. The denying of the
whereabouts of the rifles can be considered an act of treason, as being an act of adhering
to the enemies of the United States, givingthem aid and comfort, the offense in this particular
case might, perhaps, be heldto be covered by the amnesty as being, in substance, treason
though prosecutedunder another name.

Treason is defined in section 1 of Act No. 292 to consist in levying war against theUnited States or the
Government of the Philippine Islands, or adhering to theirenemies, giving them aid and
comfort within the Philippine Islands or elsewhere.Sedition is defined in section 5 of the same act as the
rising publicly andtumultuously in order to obtain by force or outside of legal methods
certainenumerated objects of a political character.
Issue:

Whether or not the offense of violation of oaths of allegiance fall under the category of
“treason and sedition.”

Held:
Yes.

Ratio:

The offense of violation of oaths of allegiance, being one of the political offensesdefined in
Act No. 292, is included in the general words "treason and sedition," asused in the amnesty
proclamation of July 4, 1902.

The offenses listed in Act No. 292 include: treason, misprision of treason,insurrection, conspiracy to
commit treason or insurrection, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, seditious words and
libels, the formation of secret politicalsocieties, and violation of oaths of allegiance.
When the framer of theproclamation used the words "treason and sedition" to describe the
purely political offenses covered by the amnesty, we think it was his intention,
withoutspecially enumerating the political offenses defined in Act No. 292, to include
them all under the terms “treason and sedition.”

Ruling:
The defendant is entitled to the benefits of the proclamation of amnesty, andupon filing
in the court the prescribed oath the cause will be returned to the court below with
directions that he be discharged

Espuelas vs People
Espuelas vs People
G.R. No. L-2990
December 17, 1951

Facts:

On June 9 and June 24, 1947, both dates inclusive, in the town of Tagbilaran, Bohol, Oscar
Espuelas y Mendoza had his picture taken, making it to appear as if he were hanging lifeless at
the end of a piece of rope suspended form the limb of the tree, when in truth and in fact, he was
merely standing on a barrel. After securing copies of his photograph, Espuelas sent copies of
same to Free Press, the Evening News, the Bisayas, Lamdang of general circulation and other
local periodicals in the Province of Bohol but also throughout the Philippines and abroad, for
their publication with a suicide note or letter, wherein he made to appear that it was written by a
fictitious suicide, Alberto Reveniera and addressed to the latter's supposed wife translation of
which letter or note, stating his dismay and administration of President Roxas, pointing out the
situation in Central Luzon and Leyte, and directing his wife his dear wife to write to President
Truman and Churchill of US and tell them that in the Philippines the government is infested with
many Hitlers and Mussolinis.

Issue:

Whether the accused is liable of seditious libel under Art. 142 of the RPC against the
Government of the Philippines?

Held:

Yes. The accused must therefore be found guilty as charged. And there being no question as to
the legality of the penalty imposed on him, the decision will be affirmed with costs.

Analyzed for meaning and weighed in its consequences, the article written bybthe accused,
cannot fail to impress thinking persons that it seeks to sow the seeds of sedition and strife. The
infuriating language is not a sincere effort to persuade, what with the writer's simulated suicide
and false claim to martyrdom and what with is failure to particularize. When the use irritating
language centers not on persuading the readers but on creating disturbances, the rationable of
free speech cannot apply and the speaker or writer is removed from the protection of the
constitutional guaranty.

If it be argued that the article does not discredit the entire governmental structure but only
President Roxas and his men, the reply is that article 142 punishes not only all libels against the
Government but also "libels against any of the duly constituted authorities thereof." The "Roxas
people" in the Government obviously refer of least to the President, his Cabinet and the majority
of legislators to whom the adjectives dirty, Hitlers and Mussolinis were naturally directed. On
this score alone the conviction could be upheld.

Regarding the publication, it suggests or incites rebellious conspiracies or riots and tends to stir
up people against the constituted authorities, or to provoke violence from opposition who may
seek to silence the writer. Which is the sum and substance of the offense under consideration.

The essence of seditious libel may be said to its immediate tendency to stir up general
discontent to the pitch of illegal courses; that is to say to induce people to resort to illegal
methods other than those provided by the Constitution, in order to repress the evils which press
upon their minds.