Where only the material possession is transferred, conversion of the property gives

rise to the crime of theft; where both material and juridical possessions are
transferred, misappropriation of the property would constitute estafa; and where in
addition to the material possession, the ownership of the property is transferred,
misappropriation would only give rise to a civil obligation (People vs. Aquino, 36
Off. Gaz., 1886).

U.S. v. De Vera, the accused, Nieves de Vera, received from Pepe, an Igorot, a
bar of gold weighing 559.7 grams for the purpose of having a silversmith examine
the same, and bank notes amounting to P200.00 to have them exchanged for
silver coins. Accused appropriated the bar of gold and bank notes. The Court ruled
that the crime committed was theft and not estafa since the delivery of the personal
property did not have the effect of transferring the juridical possession, thus such
possession remained in the owner; and the act of disposal with gainful intent and
lack of owner’s consent constituted the crime of theft.

In People v. Trinidad,25 defendant received a finger ring from the offended party
for the purpose of pledging it as security for a loan of P5.00 for the benefit of said
offended party. Instead of pledging the ring, the defendant immediately carried it
to one of her neighbors to whom she sold it for P30.00 and appropriated the money
to her own use. The Court, citing De Vera, similarly convicted defendant of theft.

In People v. Locson,26 this Court considered deposits received by a teller in

behalf of a bank as being only in the material possession of the teller. This
interpretation applies with equal force to money received by a bank teller at the
beginning of a business day for the purpose of servicing withdrawals. Such is only
material possession. Juridical possession remains with the bank. In line with the
reasoning of the Court in the above-cited cases, beginning with People v. De Vera,
if the teller appropriates the money for personal gain then the felony committed is
theft and not estafa. Further, since the teller occupies a position of confidence, and
the bank places money in the teller’s possession due to the confidence reposed
on the teller, the felony of qualified theft would be committed.

In People v. Isaac,27 this Court convicted a jeepney driver of theft and

not estafa when he did not return the jeepney to its owner since the motor vehicle
was in the juridical possession of its owner, although physically held by the driver.
The Court reasoned that the accused was not a lessee or hirer of the jeepney
because the Public Service Law and its regulations prohibit a motor vehicle
operator from entering into any kind of contract with any person if by the terms
thereof it allows the use and operation of all or any of his equipment under a fixed
rental basis. The contract with the accused being under the "boundary system,"
legally, the accused was not a lessee but only an employee of the owner. Thus,
the accused’s possession of the vehicle was only an extension of the owner’s.

Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 28 a travelling sales agent misappropriated or

failed to return to his principal the proceeds of things or goods he was
commissioned or authorized to sell. He was, however, found liable for estafa under
Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code, and not qualified theft. In
the Guzman case, we explained the distinction between possession of a bank
teller and an agent for purposes of determining criminal liability —
The case cited by the Court of Appeals (People vs. Locson. 57 Phil. 325), in
support of its theory that appellant only had the material possession of the
merchandise he was selling for his principal, or their proceeds, is not in point. In
said case the receiving teller of a bank who misappropriated money received by
him for the bank, was held guilty of qualified theft on the theory that the possession
of the teller is the possession of the bank. There is an essential distinction between
the possession by a receiving teller of funds received from third persons paid to
the bank, and an agent who receives the proceeds of sales of merchandise
delivered to him in agency by his principal. In the former case, payment by third
persons to the teller is payment to the bank itself; the teller is a mere custodian or
keeper of the funds received, and has no independent right or title to retain or
possess the same as against the bank. An agent, on the other hand, can even
assert, as against his own principal, an independent, autonomous, right to retain
money or goods received in consequence of the agency; as when the principal
fails to reimburse him for advances he has made, and indemnify him for damages
suffered without his fault (Article 1915, [N]ew Civil Code: Article 1730, old).

Delia Ringor vs People GR#198904 2013, Grave abuse of confidence, as an

element of the felony of qualified theft, must be the result of the relation because
of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance, between the appellant and the offended
party that might create a high degree of confidence between them which the
appellant abused.15 The element of grave abuse of confidence is present in this
case. Verily, the petitioner, as sales clerk/agent of PCS, is duty-bound to remit to
Ingan the payments which she collected from the customers of PCS. She would
not have been able to take the money paid by LACS if it were not for her position
in PCS. In failing to remit to Ingan the money paid by LACS, the petitioner
indubitably gravely abused the confidence reposed on her by PCS.

Sheala Matrido vs. People of the Philippines, GR. No. 179061, July 13, 2009,
Sheala was the credit and collection assistant of Empire East Land Holdings, Inc.
whose duty was to collect payments from buyers of real estate properties
developed by Empire East Land Holdings, Inc., issue receipts therefor, and remit
the payments to employer in Makati City. Sheala failed to remit payments received
from its clients, so she was charged with estafa. The Supreme Court ruled that
Sheala is liable for qualified theft, not estafa. She did not have juridical possession
over the amount involved. A sum of money received by an employee in behalf of
the employer is considered to be only in the material possession of the employee.
For there to be juridical
possession, the employer must recognize such, otherwise the crime committed
remains to be qualified theft.

Anita Miranda vs People GR# 176298 (2012) Here, the prosecution was able to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that the amount of P797,187.85 taken does not
belong to petitioner but to VCCI and that petitioner took it without VCCI’s consent
and with grave abuse of confidence by taking advantage of her position as
accountant and bookkeeper. The prosecution’s evidence proved that petitioner
was entrusted with checks payable to VCCI or Viva by virtue of her position as
accountant and bookkeeper. She deposited the said checks to the joint account
maintained by VCCI and Jefferson Tan, then withdrew a total of P797,187.85 from
said joint account using the pre-signed checks, with her as the payee. In other
words, the bank account was merely the instrument through which petitioner stole
from her employer VCCI.

People vs Bernard Mirto GR# 193479 (2011), In the instant case, it is clear how
accused-appellant, as Branch Manager of UCC who was authorized to receive
payments from UCC customers, gravely abused the trust and confidence reposed
upon him by the management of UCC. Precisely, by using that trust and
confidence, accused-appellant was able to perpetrate the theft of UCC funds to
the grave prejudice of the latter. To repeat, the resulting report of UCCs internal
audit showed that accused-appellant unlawfully took PhP 6,572,750 of UCCs
funds.