ADMIN LAW
Chapter III
C. Entitlement to salary
1.) Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23258 July 1, 1967
ROBERTO R. MONROY, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FELIPE DEL ROSARIO, respondent.
E. M. Fernando, E. Quisumbing-Fernando and Norberto Quisumbing for
petitioner.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna and Associates for respondents.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Petitioner Roberto Monroy was the incumbent Mayor of Navotas, Rizal,
when on September 15, 1961, his certificate of candidacy as representative of
the first district of Rizal in the forthcoming elections was filed with the
Commission on Elections. Three days later, or on September 18, 1961,
petitioner filed a letter withdrawing said certificate of candidacy. The
Commission on Elections, per resolution,1 approved the withdrawal. But on
September 21, 1961, respondent Felipe del Rosario, then the vice-mayor of
Navotas, took his oath of office as municipal mayor on the theory that
petitioner had forfeited the said office upon his filing of the certificate of
candidacy in question.
Upon these facts, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, held in the suit for
injunction instituted by petitioner against respondents that (a) the former had
ceased to be mayor of Navotas, Rizal, after his certificate of candidacy was
filed on September 15, 1961; (b) respondent del Rosario became municipal
mayor upon his having assumed office as such on September 21, 1961; (c)
petitioner must reimburse, as actual damages, the salaries to which
respondent was entitled as Mayor from September 21, 1961 up to the time he
can reassume said office; and (d) petitioner must pay respondent P1,000.00
as moral damages.1äwphï1.ñët
This judgment was, on appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals,
affirmed in toto except for the award of moral damages which was
eliminated. The same Court reaffirmed its stand upon petitioner's filing a
motion to reconsider. Hence, this petition for certiorari to review the ruling
of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner first argues that both the lower court and the Court of Appeals had
done what they had no jurisdiction to do — review a resolution of the
Commission on Elections. The submission is without merit.
The Constitution empowers the Commission on Elections to
x x x decide, save those involving the right to vote, all administrative
questions affecting elections, including the determination of the number and
location of polling places, and the appointment of election inspectors and of
other election officials x x x . 2 (Emphasis supplied)
And the decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission on these
administrative questions are reviewable only by the Supreme Court.3 Since
the powers of the Commission are limited to matters connected with the
"conduct of elections," necessarily its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers
are likewise limited to controversies connected with the "conduct of
elections." This phrase covers all the administrative process of preparing and
operating the election machinery so that the people could exercise their right
to vote at the given time.4 All questions and controversies that may arise
therefrom are to be resolved exclusively by the Commission, subject to
review only by the Supreme Court.
However, in this case there appears to be no decision, order or ruling of the
Commission on any administrative question or controversy. There was no
dispute before the Commission. Respondent never contested the filing of
petitioner's certificate of candidacy. Neither has he disputed before that body
the withdrawal thereof. And even if there was a controversy before the
Commission, the same did not and could not possibly have anything to do
with the conduct of elections. What the parties are actually controverting is
whether or not petitioner was still the municipal mayor after September 15,
1961. This purely legal dispute has absolutely no bearing or effect on the
conduct of the elections for the seat of Congressman for the first district of
Rizal. The election can go on irrespective of whether petitioner is considered
resigned from his position of municipal mayor or not. The only interest and
for that matter, jurisdiction, of the Commission on Elections in this regard is
to know who are the running candidates for the forthcoming elections, for
that affects the conduct of election. So when petitioner withdrew the
certificate announcing his candidacy for Congressman, as far as the
Commission could be concerned, petitioner was no longer interested in
running for that seat. The matter of his having forfeited his present position
1
ADMIN LAW
Chapter III
C. Entitlement to salary
and the possible legal effect thereon by the withdrawal of his certificate was
completely out of the picture. Hence, that purely legal question properly fell
within the cognizance of the courts.
Now the withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy did not restore petitioner
to his former position. Sec. 27 of the Rev. Election Code providing that —
Any elective provincial, municipal or city official running for an office, other
then the one which he is actually holding, shall be considered resigned from
his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy,"
makes the forfeiture automatic and permanently effective upon the filing of
the certificate of for another office. Only the moment and act of filing are
considered. Once the certificate is filed, the seat is forfeited forever and
nothing save a new election or appointment can restore the ousted official.
Thus, as We had occasion to remark, through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, in Castro
v. Gatuslao, 98 Phil, 94, 196:
x x x The wording of the law plainly indicates that only the date of filing of
the certificate of candidacy should be taken into account. The law does not
make the forfeiture dependent upon future contingencies, unforeseen and
unforeseeable since the vacating is expressly made as of the moment of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy x x x . (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner's contention that the certificate of candidacy was filed without his
knowledge and consent and, hence, the Commission's approval of its
withdrawal invalidated such certificate for all legal purposes, is untenable. It
nowhere appears that the Commission's resolution expressly invalidated the
certificate. The withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy does not necessarily
render the certificate void ab initio. Once filed, the permanent legal effects
produced thereby remain even if the certificate itself be subsequently
withdrawn. Moreover, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals expressly
found as a fact that the certificate in question was filed with petitioner's
knowledge and consent. And since the nature of the remedy taken by
petitioner before Us would allow a discussion of purely legal questions only,
such fact is deemed conceded.5
Petitioner would next maintain that respondent Court of Appeals likewise
erred in affirming a lower court judgment requiring petitioner to pay
respondent Del Rosario by way of actual damages the salaries he was
allegedly entitled to receive from September 21, 1961, to the date of
petitioner's vacation of his office as mayor. In support of this he relies solely
upon Rodriguez v. Tan, 91 Phil. 724, holding that a senator who had been
proclaimed and had assumed office but was later on ousted in an election
protest, is a de facto officer during the time he held the office of senator, and
can retain the emoluments received even as against the successful protestant.
Petitioner's factual premise is the appellate court's finding that he was a de
facto officer when he continued occupying the office of mayor after
September 15, 1961.
However, We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Rodriguez case is not
applicable here for absence of factual and legal similarities. The Rodriguez
case involved a senator who had been proclaimed as duly elected, assumed
the office and was subsequently ousted as a result of an election contest.
These peculiar facts called for the application of an established precedent in
this jurisdiction that the candidate duly proclaimed must assume office
notwithstanding a protest filed against him and can retain the compensation
paid during his incumbency. But the case at bar does not involve
a proclaimed elective official who will be ousted because of an election
contest. The present case for injunction and quo warranto involves the
forfeiture of the office of municipal mayor by the incumbent occupant
thereof and the claim to that office by the vice-mayor because of the
operation of Sec. 27 of the Rev. Election Code. The established precedent
invoked in the Rodriguez case can not therefore be applied in this case.It is
the general rule then, i.e., "that the rightful incumbent of a public office may
recover from an officer de facto the salary received by the latter during the
time of his wrongful tenure, even though he entered into the office in good
faith and under color of title"6 that applies in the present case. The resulting
hardship occasioned by the operation of this rule to the de facto officer who
did actual work is recognized; but it is far more cogently acknowledged that
the de facto doctrine has been formulated, not for the protection of the de
facto officer principally, but rather for the protection of the public and
individuals who get involved in the official acts of persons discharging the
duties of an office without being lawful officers.7 The question of
compensation involves different principles and concepts however. Here, it is
possession of title, not of the office, that is decisive. A de facto officer, not
having good title, takes the salaries at his risk and must therefore account to
the de jure officer for whatever amount of salary he received during the
period of his wrongful retention of the public office.8Wherefore, finding no
error in the judgment appealed from, the same is, as it is hereby, affirmed in
toto. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.
2
ADMIN LAW
Chapter III
C. Entitlement to salary

2.) Republic of the Philippines On May 29, 1989, the Provincial Administrator, Tente U. Quintero inquired
SUPREME COURT from the Undersecretary of the Department of Local Government, Jacinto T.
Manila Rubillar, Jr., as to the legality of the appointment of the petitioner to act as
EN BANC the Vice-Governor of Leyte.
G.R. No. 90762 May 20, 1991
LEYTE ACTING VICE-GOVERNOR AURELIO D. In his reply letter dated June 22, 1989, Undersecretary Jacinto T. Rubillar, Jr.
MENZON, petitioner, stated that since B.P. 337 has no provision relating to succession in the
vs. Office of the Vice-Governor in case of a temporary vacancy, the appointment
LEYTE ACTING GOVERNOR, LEOPOLDO E. PETILLA in his of the petitioner as the temporary Vice- Governor is not necessary since the
capacity as Chief Executive of the Province of Leyte and Head of Vice-Governor who is temporarily performing the functions of the Governor,
SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN and Leyte Provincial Treasurer could concurrently assume the functions of both offices.
FLORENCIO LUNA, respondents.
Zozimo G. Alegre for petitioner. As a result of the foregoing communications between Tente U. Quintero and
The Provincial Attorney for respondents. Jacinto T. Rubillar, Jr., the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, in a special session
RESOLUTION held on July 7, 1989, issued Resolution No. 505 where it held invalid the
appointment of the petitioner as acting Vice-Governor of Leyte. The
pertinent portion of the resolution reads:

WHEREAS, the circumstances obtaining at present in the Office of the Vice-

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the Court dated
August 28, 1990 which initially denied the petition
for certiorari and mandamus filed by then Acting Vice-Governor of Leyte,
Aurelio D. Menzon. In the August 28 resolution, the Court stated that Mr.
Menzon cannot successfully assert the right to be recognized as Acting Vice-
Governor and, therefore, his designation was invalid. In this motion, the
primary issue is the right to emoluments while actually discharging the duties
of the office.
The facts of the case are as follows: On February 16, 1988, by virtue of the
fact that no Governor had been proclaimed in the province of Leyte, the
Secretary of Local Government Luis Santos designated the Vice-Governor,
Leopoldo E. Petilla as Acting Governor of Leyte.
On March 25, 1988 the petitioner Aurelio D. Menzon, a senior member of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was also designated by Secretary Luis Santos
to act as the Vice-Governor for the province of Leyte.
The petitioner took his oath of office before Senator Alberto Romulo on
March 29, 1988.
Governor is that there is no permanent (sic) nor a vacancy in said office. The
Honorable Leopoldo E. Petilla assumed the Office of the Vice-Governor
after he took his oath of office to said position.
WHEREAS, it is the duty of the members of the Board not only to take
cognizance of the aforesaid official communication of the Undersecretary,
Jacinto T. Rubillar, Jr., but also to uphold the law.
WHEREAS, on motion of the Honorable Macario R. Esmas, Jr., duly
seconded by the Honorable Rogelio L. Granados and the Honorable Renato
M. Rances.
RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved not to recognize Honorable Aurelio D.
Menzon as Acting Vice-Governor of Leyte. (Rollo, p. 27)
The petitioner, on July 10, 1989, through the acting LDP Regional Counsel,
Atty. Zosimo Alegre, sought clarification from Undersecretary Jacinto T.
Rubillar, Jr. regarding the June 22, 1989 opinion.
On July 12, 1989, Undersecretary Jacinto T. Rubillar replied and explained
his opinion.1âwphi1 The pertinent portion of the letter reads:

3
ADMIN LAW
Chapter III
C. Entitlement to salary
This has reference to your letter dated July 10, 1989, requesting for
clarification of our letter to Provincial Administrator Tente U. Quintero dated
June 22, 1989, which states in substance, that "there is no succession
provided for in case of temporary vacancy in the office of the vice-governor
and that the designation of a temporary vice-governor is not necessary.
We hold the view that the designation extended by the Secretary of Local
Government in favor of one of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members of
Leyte to temporarily discharge the powers and duties of the vice-governor
during the pendency of the electoral controversy in the Office of the
Governor, does not contradict the stand we have on the matter. The fact that
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan member was temporarily designated to
perform the functions of the vice-governor could not be considered that the
Sangguniang member succeeds to the office of the latter, for it is basic that
designation is merely an imposition of additional duties to be performed by
the designee in addition to the official functions attached to his office.
Furthermore, the necessity of designating an official to temporarily perform
the functions of a particular public office, would depend on the discretion of
the appointing authority and the prevailing circumstances in a given area and
by taking into consideration the best interest of public service.
On the basis of the foregoing and considering that the law is silent in case of
temporary vacancy, in the Office of the Vice-Governor, it is our view that the
peculiar situation in the Province of Leyte, where the electoral controversy in
the Office of the Governor has not yet been settled, calls for the designation
of the Sangguniang Member to act as vice-governor temporarily. (Rollo, p.
31)
In view, of the clarificatory letter of Undersecretary Rubillar, the Regional
Director of the Department of Local Government, Region 8, Resurreccion
Salvatierra, on July 17, 1989, wrote a letter addressed to the Acting-
Governor of Leyte, Leopoldo E. Petilla, requesting the latter that Resolution
No. 505 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be modified accordingly. The
letter states:
In view thereof, please correct previous actions made by your office and
those of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan which may have tended to discredit
the validity of Atty. Aurelio Menzon's designation as acting vice-governor,
including the payment of his salary as Acting Vice-Governor, if he was
deprived of such. (Rollo, p. 32)
On August 3, 1989, the Regional Director wrote another letter to Acting-
Governor Petilla, reiterating his earlier request.
Despite these several letters of request, the Acting Governor and the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, refused to correct Resolution No. 505 and
correspondingly to pay the petitioner the emoluments attached to the Office
of Vice-Governor.
Thus, on November 12, 1989, the petitioner filed before this Court a petition
for certiorari and mandamus. The petition sought the nullification of
Resolution No. 505 and for the payment of his salary for his services as the
acting Vice-Governor of Leyte.
In the meantime, however, the issue on the governorship of Leyte was settled
and Adelina Larrazabal was proclaimed the Governor of the province of
Leyte.
During the pendency of the petition, more particularly on May 16, 1990, the
provincial treasurer of Leyte, Florencio Luna allowed the payment to the
petitioner of his salary as acting Vice-Governor of Leyte in the amount of
P17,710.00, for the actual services rendered by the petitioner as acting Vice-
Governor.
On August 28, 1990, this Court dismissed the petition filed by Aurelio D.
Menzon.
On September 6, 1990, respondent Leopoldo Petilla, by virtue of the above
resolution requested Governor Larrazabal to direct the petitioner to pay back
to the province of Leyte all the emoluments and compensation which he
received while acting as the Vice-Governor of Leyte.
On September 21, 1990, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of
our resolution. The motion prayed that this Court uphold the petitioner's right
to receive the salary and emoluments attached to the office of the Vice-
Governor while he was acting as such.
The petitioner interposes the following reason for the allowance of the
motion for reconsideration:
THAT THE PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO THE EMOLUMENTS FOR
HIS SERVICES RENDERED AS DESIGNATED ACTING VICE-
4
ADMIN LAW
Chapter III
C. Entitlement to salary
GOVERNOR UNDER THE PRINCIPLES OF GOOD FAITH. SIMPLE
JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
The controversy basically revolves around two issues: 1) Whether or not
there was a vacancy?; and 2) Whether or not the Secretary of Local
Government has the authority to make temporary appointments?
The respondents argue that there exists no vacancy in the Office of the Vice-
Governor which requires the appointment of the petitioner. They further
allege that if indeed there was a need to appoint an acting Vice-Governor, the
power to appoint is net vested in the Secretary of Local Government. Absent
any provision in the Local Government Code on the mode of succession in
case of a temporary vacancy in the Office of the Vice-Governor, they claim
that this constitutes an internal problem of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
and was thus for it solely to resolve.
The arguments are of doubtful validity.
The law on Public Officers is clear on the matter. There is no vacancy
whenever the office is occupied by a legally qualified incumbent. A sensu
contrario, there is a vacancy when there is no person lawfully authorized to
assume and exercise at present the duties of the office. (see Stocking v. State,
7 Ind. 326, cited in Mechem. A Treatise on the Law on Public Offices and
Officers, at p. 61)
Applying the definition of vacancy to this case, it can be readily seen that the
office of the Vice-Governor was left vacant when the duly elected Vice-
Governor Leopoldo Petilla was appointed Acting Governor. In the eyes of
the law, the office to which he was elected was left barren of a legally
qualified person to exercise the duties of the office of the Vice-Governor.
There is no satisfactory showing that Leopoldo Petilla, notwithstanding his
succession to the Office of the Governor, continued to simultaneously
exercise the duties of the Vice-Governor. The nature of the duties of a
Provincial Governor call for a full-time occupant to discharge them. More so
when the vacancy is for an extended period. Precisely, it was Petilla's
automatic assumption to the acting Governorship that resulted in the vacancy
in the office of the Vice-Governor. The fact that the Secretary of Local
Government was prompted to appoint the petitioner shows the need to fill up
the position during the period it was vacant. The Department Secretary had
the discretion to ascertain whether or not the Provincial Governor should
devote all his time to that particular office. Moreover, it is doubtful if the
Provincial Board, unilaterally acting, may revoke an appointment made by a
higher authority.
Disposing the issue of vacancy, we come to the second issue of whether or
not the Secretary of Local Government had the authority to designate the
petitioner.
We hold in the affirmative.
The Local Government Code is silent on the mode of succession in the event
of a temporary vacancy in the Office of the Vice-Governor. However, the
silence of the law must not be understood to convey that a remedy in law is
wanting.
The circumstances of the case reveal that there is indeed a necessity for the
appointment of an acting Vice-Governor. For about two years after the
governatorial elections, there had been no de jure permanent Governor for
the province of Leyte, Governor Adelina Larrazabal, at that time, had not yet
been proclaimed due to a pending election case before the Commission on
Elections.
The two-year interregnum which would result from the respondents' view of
the law is disfavored as it would cause disruptions and delays in the delivery
of basic services to the people and in the proper management of the affairs of
the local government of Leyte. Definitely, it is incomprehensible that to leave
the situation without affording any remedy was ever intended by the Local
Government Code.
Under the circumstances of this case and considering the silence of the Local
Government Code, the Court rules that, in order to obviate the dilemma
resulting from an interregnum created by the vacancy, the President, acting
through her alter ego, the Secretary of Local Government, may remedy the
situation. We declare valid the temporary appointment extended to the
petitioner to act as the Vice-Governor. The exigencies of public service
demanded nothing less than the immediate appointment of an acting Vice-
Governor.
The records show that it was primarily for this contingency that
Undersecretary Jacinto Rubillar corrected and reconsidered his previous
position and acknowledged the need for an acting Vice-Governor.
5
ADMIN LAW
Chapter III
C. Entitlement to salary
It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, the President is empowered to make temporary
appointments in certain public offices, in case of any vacancy that may
occur. Albeit both laws deal only with the filling of vacancies in appointive
positions. However, in the absence of any contrary provision in the Local
Government Code and in the best interest of public service, we see no cogent
reason why the procedure thus outlined by the two laws may not be similarly
applied in the present case. The respondents contend that the provincial
board is the correct appointing power. This argument has no merit. As
between the President who has supervision over local governments as
provided by law and the members of the board who are junior to the vice-
governor, we have no problem ruling in favor of the President, until the law
provides otherwise.
A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no approbation under the
law for it deprives the constituents of their right of representation and
governance in their own local government.
In a republican form of government, the majority rules through their chosen
few, and if one of them is incapacitated or absent, etc., the management of
governmental affairs to that extent, may be hampered. Necessarily, there will
be a consequent delay in the delivery of basic services to the people of Leyte
if the Governor or the Vice-Governor is missing.
Whether or not the absence of a Vice-Governor would main or prejudice the
province of Leyte, is for higher officials to decide or, in proper cases, for the
judiciary to adjudicate. As shown in this case where for about two years there
was only an acting Governor steering the leadership of the province of Leyte,
the urgency of filling the vacancy in the Office of the Vice-Governor to free
the hands of the acting Governor to handle provincial problems and to serve
as the buffer in case something might happen to the acting Governor
becomes unquestionable. We do not have to dwell ourselves into the fact that
nothing happened to acting Governor Petilla during the two-year period. The
contingency of having simultaneous vacancies in both offices cannot just be
set aside. It was best for Leyte to have a full-time Governor and an acting
Vice-Governor. Service to the public is the primary concern of those in the
government. It is a continuous duty unbridled by any political considerations.
The appointment of the petitioner, moreover, is in full accord with the intent
behind the Local Government Code. There is no question that Section 49 in
connection with Section 52 of the Local Government Code shows clearly the
intent to provide for continuity in the performance of the duties of the Vice-
Governor.
The Local Government Code provides for the mode of succession in case of
a permanent vacancy, viz:
Section 49:
In case a permanent vacancy arises when a Vice-Governor assumes the
Office of the Governor, . . . refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is
removed from office, voluntary resigns or is otherwise permanently
incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office the sangguniang
panlalawigan . . . member who obtained the highest number of votes in the
election immediately preceding, . . . shall assume the office for the unexpired
term of the Vice-Governor. . . .
By virtue of the surroundings circumstance of this case, the mode of
succession provided for permanent vacancies may likewise be observed in
case of a temporary vacancy in the same office. In this case, there was a need
to fill the vacancy. The petitioner is himself the member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan who obtained the highest number of votes. The Department
Secretary acted correctly in extending the temporary appointment.
In view of the foregoing, the petitioner's right to be paid the salary attached
to the Office of the Vice Governor is indubitable. The compensation,
however, to be remunerated to the petitioner, following the example in
Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised Administrative Code, and
pursuant to the proscription against double compensation must only be such
additional compensation as, with his existing salary, shall not exceed the
salary authorized by law for the Office of the Vice-Governor.
And finally, even granting that the President, acting through the Secretary of
Local Government, possesses no power to appoint the petitioner, at the very
least, the petitioner is a de facto officer entitled to compensation.
There is no denying that the petitioner assumed the Office of the Vice-
Governor under color of a known appointment. As revealed by the records,
the petitioner was appointed by no less than the alter ego of the President, the
Secretary of Local Government, after which he took his oath of office before
6
ADMIN LAW
Chapter III
C. Entitlement to salary

Senator Alberto Romulo in the Office of Department of Local Government

Regional Director Res Salvatierra.

Concededly, the appointment has the color of validity. The respondents

themselves acknowledged the validity of the petitioner's appointment and
dealt with him as such. It was only when the controversial Resolution No.
505 was passed by the same persons who recognized him as the acting Vice-
Governor that the validity of the appointment of the petitioner was made an
issue and the recognition withdrawn.

The petitioner, for a long period of time, exercised the duties attached to the
Office of the Vice-Governor. He was acclaimed as such by the people of
Leyte. Upon the principle of public policy on which the de facto doctrine is
based and basic considerations of justice, it would be highly iniquitous to
now deny him the salary due him for the services he actually rendered as the
acting Vice-Governor of the province of Leyte. (See Cantillo v. Arrieta, 61
SCRA 55 [1974])

WHEREFORE, the COURT hereby GRANTS the motion for

reconsideration. The additional compensation which the petitioner has
received, in the amount exceeding the salary authorized by law for the
position of Senior Board Member, shall be considered as payment for the
actual services rendered as acting Vice-Governor and may be retained by
him.

SO ORDERED.

7
ADMIN LAW
Chapter III
C. Entitlement to salary
3.) EN BANC
[G.R. No. 103903. September 11, 1992.]
MELANIO D. SAMPAYAN, DIEGO L. TURLA, JR., and LEONARDO
G. TIOZON, Petitioners, v. RAUL. A. DAZA, HON. CAMILO SABIO,
as Secretary of the House of Representatives, MR. JOSE MARIA
TUAÑO, as Officer-in-Charge, Gen. Services Division of the House of
Representatives, MRS. ROSALINDA G. MEDINA, as Chief Accountant
of the House of Representatives, and the HON. COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, Respondents.
Luis H. Dado, for Petitioners.
Sevilla, Hechanova, Ballicud & Associates for respondent Raul Daza.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; HOUSE
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL; SHALL BE THE SOLE JUDGE OF ALL
CONTESTS RELATING TO THE ELECTION, RETURNS AND
QUALIFICATIONS OF ITS MEMBERS. — Under Section 17 of Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution, it is the House Electoral Tribunal which shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualification of
its members. Since petitioners challenge the qualifications of Congressman
Daza, the appropriate remedy should have been to file a petition to cancel
respondent Daza’s certificate of candidacy before the election or a quo
warranto case with the House Electoral Tribunal within ten (10) days after
Daza’s proclamation.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; WRIT OF
PROHIBITION; NOT INTENDED TO PROVIDE FOR ACTS ALREADY
CONSUMMATED. — A writ of prohibition can no longer be issued against
respondent since his term has already expired. A writ of prohibition is not
intended to provide for acts already consummated.
3. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PUBLIC OFFICERS; DE FACTO
OFFICERS; ENTITLED TO EMOLUMENT FOR ACTUAL SERVICES
RENDERED. — As a de facto public officer, respondent cannot be made to
reimburse funds disbursed during his term of office because his acts are as
valid as those of a de jure officer. Moreover, as a de facto officer, he is
entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered.
RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:
On February 18, 1992, Petitioners, residents of the second Congressional
District of Northern Samar filed the instant petition for prohibition seeking to
disqualify respondent Raul Daza, then incumbent congressman of the same
congressional district, from continuing to exercise the functions of his office,
on the ground that the latter is a greencard holder and a lawful permanent
resident of the United States since October 16, 1974.
Petitioners allege that Hr. Daza has not, by any act or declaration, renounced
his status as permanent resident, thereby violating Section 68 of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 881 (Omnibus Election Code) and Section 18, Article XI
of the 1987 Constitution.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
On February 25, 1992, we required respondents to comment. On March 13,
1992, Respondents, through the Solicitor General, filed a motion for
extension of time to file their comment for a period of thirty days or until
April 12, 1992. Reacting to the said motion, petitioners on March 30, 1992,
manifested their opposition to the 30-day extension of time stating that such
extension was excessive and prayed that respondent instead be granted only
10 days to file their comment. On May 5, 1992, the Court noted the
manifestation and opposition.
On April 7, 1992, petitioners manifested before us that on April 2, 1992, they
filed a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify respondent Daza from
running in the recent May 11, 1992 elections on the basis of Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code (SPC 92-084) and that the instant petition is
concerned with the unlawful assumption of office by respondent Daza from
June 30, 1987 until June 30, 1992. 1
On April 10, 1992, respondent Congressman Daza filed his comment
8
ADMIN LAW
Chapter III
C. Entitlement to salary

denying the fact that he is a permanent resident of the United States; that Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) which reads: 7
although he was accorded a permanent residency status on October 8, 1980
as evidenced by a letter order of the District Director, US Immigration and File No. A20 968 618
Naturalization Service, Los Angeles, U.S.A., 2 he had long waived his status
when he returned to the Philippines on August 12, 1985. 3 Date: Nov. 5, 1991

On April 13, 1992, public respondent Camilo Sabio, Secretary General of the LOS914732
House of Representatives, Mr. Jose Mari Tuaño, as OIC of the General
Services Division, Mrs. Rosalinda G. Medina, as Chief Accountant of the Geraghty, O’Loughlin and Kenney
House of Representatives and Commission on Audit, filed their comment.
They contend that if indeed Congressman Daza is a greencard holder and a Attn: David C. Hutchinson
permanent resident of the United States of America, then he should be
removed from his position as Congressman. However, they opined that only 386 N. Wasbasha Street
Congressman Daza can best explain his true and correct status as a greencard
holder. Until he files his comment to the petition, petitioners’ prayer for St. Paul, Minn. 55102-1308
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction should not
be granted. 4 SUBJECT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Eight (8) days later, respondent Daza, reacting to the petition before the Daza, Raul A.
COMELEC (SPC 92-084) and hypothesizing that the case before the
COMELEC would become moot should this Court find that his permanent Your request was received in this office on _________; please note the
resident status ceased when he was granted a US non-immigrant visa, asked paragraph(s) checked below:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
this Court to direct the COMELEC to dismiss SPC No. 92-084. 5 x x x

On May 5, 1992, petitioners filed their reply. On May 21, 1992, this Court
gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their respective
memoranda.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary 10. [XX] Other remarks:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The central issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not respondent Service File A20 968 619 relating to Raul Daza reflects: subject became a
Daza should be disqualified as a member of the House of Representatives for Lawful Permanent Resident on Oct. 16, 1974. As far as we know subject
violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. (sic) still has his greencard. No he has not applied for citizenship.

Petitioners insist that Congressman Daza should be disqualified from Sincerely, (sic)
exercising the functions of his office being a permanent resident alien of the
United States at the time when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the Sgd.
May 11, 1987 Elections. To buttress their contention, petitioners cite the
recent case of Caasi v. Court of Appeals. 6 District Director

In support of their charge that respondent Daza is a greencard holder, Form G-343 (Rev. 8-20-82)N
petitioners presented to us a letter from the United States Department of
9
ADMIN LAW
Chapter III
C. Entitlement to salary

We vote to dismiss the instant prohibition case. First, this case is already
moot and academic for it is evident from the manifestation filed by
petitioners dated April 6, 1992 8 that they seek to unseat respondent from his
position as Congressman for the duration of his term of office commencing
June 30, 1987 and ending June 30, 1992. Secondly, jurisdiction of this case
rightfully pertains to the House Electoral Tribunal. Under Section 17 of
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, it is the House Electoral Tribunal which
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualification of its members. Since petitioners challenge the qualifications of
Congressman Daza, the appropriate remedy should have been to file a
petition to cancel respondent Daza’s certificate of candidacy before the
election 9 or a quo warranto case with the House Electoral Tribunal within
ten (10) days after Daza’s proclamation. 10 Third, a writ of prohibition can
no longer be issued against respondent since his term has already expired. A
writ of prohibition is not intended to provide for acts already consummated.
11 Fourth, as a de facto public officer, 12 respondent cannot be made to
reimburse funds disbursed during his term of office because his acts are as
valid as those of a de jure officer. Moreover, as a de facto officer, he is
entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered. 13

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the instant petition for

being MOOT and ACADEMIC.

SO ORDERED.

10