I. SHORT TITLE: BSP GROUP, INC. VS.

GO
II. FULL TITLE: BSB GROUP, INC., represented by its President, Mr. RICARDO
BANGAYAN,Petitioner,-versus-SALLY GO a.k.a. SALLY GO-
BANGAYAN,Respondent.; G.R. No. 168644; February 16, 2010;
III. PONENTE: PERALTA, J.
IV. TOPIC: Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits
V. STATEMENT OF FACTS:
Petitioner, the BSB Group, Inc., is a duly organized domestic corporation presided by its herein
representative, Ricardo Bangayan (Bangayan). Respondent Sally Go, alternatively referred to as
Sally Sia Go and Sally Go-Bangayan, is Bangayans wife, who was employed in the company as
a cashier, and was engaged, among others, to receive and account for the payments made by the
various customers of the company.
In 2002, Bangayan filed with the Manila Prosecutors Office a complaint for estafa and/or
qualified theft against respondent, alleging that several checks representing the aggregate amount
of P1,534,135.50 issued by the companys customers in payment of their obligation were, instead
of being turned over to the companys coffers, indorsed by respondent who deposited the same to
her personal banking account maintained at Security Bank and Trust Company (Security Bank).
VI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Accordingly, respondent was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Respondent entered a negative plea when arraigned. The trial ensued. On the premise that
respondent had allegedly encashed the subject checks and deposited the corresponding amounts
thereof to her personal banking account, the prosecution moved for the issuance of
subpoena duces tecum /ad testificandum against the respective managers or records custodians of
Security Banks Divisoria Branch, as well as of the Asian Savings Bank (now Metropolitan Bank
& Trust Co. [Metrobank]). The trial court granted the motion and issued the corresponding
subpoena.
Respondent filed a motion to quash the subpoena, addressed to Metrobank, noting to the court
that in the complaint-affidavit filed with the prosecutor, there was no mention made of the said
bank account, to which respondent, in addition to the Security Bank account, allegedly deposited
the proceeds of the supposed checks.
Petitioner, opposing respondents move, argued for the relevancy of the Metrobank account on
the ground that the complaint-affidavit showed that there were two checks which respondent
allegedly deposited in an account with the said bank. To this, respondent filed a supplemental
motion to quash, invoking the absolutely confidential nature of the Metrobank account under the
provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1405. The trial court did not sustain respondent; hence, it
denied the motion to quash for lack of merit.
Meanwhile, the prosecution was able to present in court the testimony of Elenita Marasigan
(Marasigan), the representative of Security Bank. In a nutshell, Marasigans testimony sought to
prove that between 1988 and 1989, respondent, while engaged as cashier at the BSB Group, Inc.,
was able to run away with the checks issued to the company by its customers, endorse the same,
and credit the corresponding amounts to her personal deposit account with Security Bank. In the
course of the testimony, the subject checks were presented to Marasigan for identification and
marking as the same checks received by respondent, endorsed, and then deposited in her personal
account with Security Bank.
But before the testimony could be completed, respondent filed a Motion to Suppress, seeking the
exclusion of Marasigans testimony and accompanying documents thus far received, bearing on
the subject Security Bank account. This time respondent invokes, in addition to irrelevancy, the
privilege of confidentiality under R.A. No. 1405.
The Trial court denied said motion as well as the motion for reconsideration filed by the
respondent. CA reversed the decision and ordered that the witness’ testimony be stricken out
from the record.
In this Petition under Rule 45, petitioner averred in the main that the Court of Appeals had
seriously erred in reversing the assailed orders of the trial court, and in effect striking out
Marasigans testimony dealing with respondents deposit account with Security Bank. It asserted
that apart from the fact that the said evidence had a direct relation to the subject matter of the
case for qualified theft and, hence, brings the case under one of the exceptions to the coverage of
confidentiality under R.A. 1405.
For her part, respondent claimed that the money represented by the Security Bank account was
neither relevant nor material to the case, because nothing in the criminal information suggested
that the money therein deposited was the subject matter of the case. Thus, the checks which the
prosecution had Marasigan identify, as well as the testimony itself of Marasigan, should be
suppressed by the trial court at least for violating respondents right to due process. More in point,
respondent opined that admitting the testimony of Marasigan, as well as the evidence pertaining
to the Security Bank account, would violate the secrecy rule under R.A. No. 1405.
VII. ISSUES:
(1) WON the testimony of Marasigan and the accompanying documents are irrelevant to
the case, and whether they are also violative of the absolutely confidential nature of bank
deposits and, hence, excluded by operation of R.A. No. 1405.
VIII. RULING:
YES. The Court, after deliberative estimation, finds the subject evidence to be indeed
inadmissible.
It is conceded that while the fundamental law has not bothered with the triviality of specifically
addressing privacy rights relative to banking accounts, there, nevertheless, exists in our
jurisdiction a legitimate expectation of privacy governing such accounts. The source of this right
of expectation is statutory, and it is found in R.A. No. 1405, otherwise known as the Bank
Secrecy Act of 1955.
R.A. No. 1405 has two allied purposes. It hopes to discourage private hoarding and at the same
time encourage the people to deposit their money in banking institutions, so that it may be
utilized by way of authorized loans and thereby assist in economic development. Owing to this
piece of legislation, the confidentiality of bank deposits remains to be a basic state policy in the
Philippines.
In taking exclusion from the coverage of the confidentiality rule, petitioner in the instant case
posits that the account maintained by respondent with Security Bank contains the proceeds of the
checks that she has fraudulently appropriated to herself and, thus, falls under one of the
exceptions in Section 2 of R.A. No. 1405 that the money kept in said account is the subject
matter in litigation. To highlight this thesis, petitioner avers, citing Mathay v. Consolidated Bank
and Trust Co] that the subject matter of the action refers to the physical facts; the things real or
personal; the money, lands, chattels and the like, in relation to which the suit is prosecuted,
which in the instant case should refer to the money deposited in the Security Bank account. On
the surface, however, it seems that petitioners theory is valid to a point, yet a deeper treatment
tends to show that it has argued quite off-tangentially. This, because, while Mathay did explain
what the subject matter of an action is, it nevertheless did so only to determine whether the class
suit in that case was properly brought to the court.
What indeed constitutes the subject matter in litigation in relation to Section 2 of R.A. No. 1405
has been pointedly and amply addressed in Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, in
which the Court noted that the inquiry into bank deposits allowable under R.A. No. 1405 must be
premised on the fact that the money deposited in the account is itself the subject of the action.
In other words, it can hardly be inferred from the indictment itself that the Security Bank account
is the ostensible subject of the prosecutions inquiry. Without needlessly expanding the scope of
what is plainly alleged in the Information, the subject matter of the action in this case is the
money amounting to P1,534,135.50 alleged to have been stolen by respondent, and not the
money equivalent of the checks which are sought to be admitted in evidence. Thus, it is that,
which the prosecution is bound to prove with its evidence, and no other.
In sum, we hold that the testimony of Marasigan on the particulars of respondents supposed bank
account with Security Bank and the documentary evidence represented by the checks adduced in
support thereof, are not only incompetent for being excluded by operation of R.A. No.
1405. They are likewise irrelevant to the case, inasmuch as they do not appear to have any
logical and reasonable connection to the prosecution of respondent for qualified theft. We find
full merit in and affirm respondents objection to the evidence of the prosecution. The Court of
Appeals was, therefore, correct in reversing the assailed orders of the trial court.
IX. DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 87600 dated April 20, 2005, reversing the September 13, 2004 and November 5, 2004
Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36 in Criminal Case No. 02-202158,
is AFFIRMED.
X. PREPARED BY:
Imson, Kamille V.
I. SHORT TITLE: CHINA BANKING CORP. VS. ORTEGA
II. FULL TITLE: CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and TAN KIM LIONG, petitioners-
appellants, vs. HON. WENCESLAO ORTEGA, as Presiding Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VIII, and VICENTE G.
ACABAN, respondents-appellees.; G.R. No. L-34964; January 31, 1973;
III. PONENTE: MAKALINTAL, J.
IV. TOPIC: Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits

V. STATEMENT OF FACTS:
Vicente Acaban filed a complaint in the court a quo against Bautista Logging Co., Inc., B & B
Forest Development Corporation and Marino Bautista for the collection of a sum of money.
Upon motion of the plaintiff the trial court declared the defendants in default for failure to
answer within the reglementary period, and authorized the Branch Clerk of Court and/or Deputy
Clerk to receive the plaintiff's evidence. Judgment by default was rendered against the
defendants.
To satisfy the judgment, the plaintiff sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of the defendant
B & B Forest Development Corporation with the China Banking Corporation. Accordingly, a
notice of garnishment was issued by the Deputy Sheriff of the trial court and served on said bank
through its cashier, Tan Kim Liong. In reply, the bank' cashier invited the attention of the Deputy
Sheriff to the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 which, it was alleged, prohibit the disclosure
of any information relative to bank deposits. Thereupon the plaintiff filed a motion to cite Tan
Kim Liong for contempt of court.

VI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In an order the trial court denied the plaintiff's motion. However, Tan Kim Liong was ordered "to
inform the Court within five days from receipt of this order whether or not there is a deposit in
the China Banking Corporation of defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation, and if
there is any deposit, to hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order
from this Court." Tan Kim Liong moved to reconsider but was turned down by order of March
27, 1972. In the same order he was directed "to comply with the order of this Court dated March
4, 1972 within ten (10) days from the receipt of copy of this order, otherwise his arrest and
confinement will be ordered by the Court." Resisting the two orders, the China Banking
Corporation and Tan Kim Liong instituted the instant petition.
The petitioners argue that the disclosure of the information required by the court does not fall
within any of the four (4) exceptions enumerated in Section 2, and that if the questioned orders
are complied with Tan Kim Liong may be criminally liable under Section 5 and the bank
exposed to a possible damage suit by B & B Forest Development Corporation.

VII. ISSUES:
WON a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court process garnishing
the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking the provisions of Republic Act No.
1405.

VIII. RULING:
NO.
The lower court did not order an examination of or inquiry into the deposit of B & B Forest
Development Corporation, as contemplated in the law. It merely required Tan Kim Liong to
inform the court whether or not the defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation had a
deposit in the China Banking Corporation only for purposes of the garnishment issued by it, so
that the bank would hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order.
It will be noted from the discussion of the conference committee report on Senate Bill No. 351
and House Bill No. 3977, which later became Republic Act 1405, that it was not the intention of
the lawmakers to place bank deposits beyond the reach of execution to satisfy a final judgment.
The prohibition against examination of or inquiry into a bank deposit under Republic Act 1405
does not preclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed, there is no real
inquiry in such a case, and if the existence of the deposit is disclosed the disclosure is purely
incidental to the execution process. It is hard to conceive that it was ever within the intention of
Congress to enable debtors to evade payment of their just debts, even if ordered by the Court,
through the expedient of converting their assets into cash and depositing the same in a bank.

IX. DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the orders of the lower court dated March 4 and 27, 1972, respectively, are
hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioners-appellants.
X. PREPARED BY:
Imson, Kamille V.
I. SHORT TITLE: OÑATE VS. ABROGAR
II. FULL TITLE: EMMANUEL C. OÑATE and ECON HOLDINGS CORPORATION,
petitioners, vs. HON. ZUES C. ABROGAR, as Presiding Judge of Branch
150 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, and SUN LIFE ASSURANCE
COMPANY OF CANADA, respondents.; G.R. No. 107303; February 21,
1994
III. PONENTE: NOCON, J.:
IV. TOPIC: Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits
V. STATEMENT OF FACTS:
Respondent Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada (Sun Life, for brevity) filed a complaint for
a sum of money with a prayer for the immediate issuance of a writ of attachment against
petitioners, and Noel L. Diño. The following day, respondent Judge issued an order granting the
issuance of a writ of attachment, and the writ was actually issued on December 27, 1991.
Upon Sun Life's ex-parte motion, the trial court amended the writ of attachment to reflect the
alleged amount of the indebtedness. That same day, Deputy Sheriff, accompanied by a
representative of Sun Life, attempted to serve summons and a copy of the amended writ of
attachment upon petitioners at their known office address but was not able to do so since there
was no responsible officer to receive the same. Nonetheless, Sheriff Flores proceeded, over a
period of several days, to serve notices of garnishment upon several commercial banks and
financial institutions, and levied on attachment a condominium unit and a real property
belonging to petitioner Oñate.
VI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioners filed an "Urgent Motion to Discharge/Dissolve Writ of Attachment." That same day,
Sun Life filed an ex-parte motion to examine the books of accounts and ledgers of petitioner
Brunner Development Corporation (Brunner, for brevity) at the Urban Bank and to obtain copies
thereof, which motion was granted by respondent Judge. Petitioners filed a motion to nullify the
proceedings taken thereat since they were not present.
Petitioners and their co-defendants filed a memorandum in support of the motion to discharge
attachment. Also on that same day, Sun Life filed another motion for examination of bank
accounts, this time seeking the examination of Account with the Bank of Philippine Islands (BPI)
— which, incidentally, petitioners claim not to be owned by them — and the records of
Philippine National Bank (PNB) with regard to checks payable to Brunner. Sun Life asked the
court to order both banks to comply with the notice of garnishment.
Respondent Judge issued an order (1) denying petitioners' and the co-defendants' motion to
discharge the amended writ of attachment, (2) approving Sun Life's additional attachment, (3)
granting Sun Life's motion to examine the BPI account, and (4) denying petitioners' motion to
nullify the proceedings of January 23, 1992.
VII. ISSUES:
WON respondent Judge had acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess
of jurisdiction in allowing the examination of the bank records though no notice was given.
VIII. RULING:
NO.
Sun Life grounded its requests for the examination of the bank accounts on Section 10, Rule 57
of the Rules of Court, which provided, to wit:
Sec. 10. Examination of party whose property is attached and persons indebted to him or
controlling his property; delivery of property to officer. — Any person owing debts to the
party whose property is attached or having in his possession or under his control any
credit or other personal property belonging to such party, may be required to attend
before the court in which the action is pending, or before a commissioner appointed by
the court and be examined on oath respecting the same. The party whose property is
attached may also be required to attend for the purpose of giving information respecting
his property, and may be examined on oath. The court may, after such examination, order
personal property capable of manual delivery belonging to him, in the possession of the
person so required to attend before the court, to be delivered to the clerk or court, sheriff,
or other proper officer on such terms as may be just, having reference to any lien thereon
or claim against the same, to await the judgment in the action.
It is clear from the foregoing provision that notice need only be given to the garnishee, but the
person who is holding property or credits belonging to the defendant. The provision does not
require that notice be furnished the defendant himself, except when there is a need to examine
said defendant "for the purpose of giving information respecting his property.
Furthermore, Section 10 Rule 57 is not incompatible with Republic Act No. 1405, as amended,
"An Act Prohibiting Disclosure or Inquiry Into, Deposits With Any Banking Institution and
Providing Penalty Therefore," for Section 2 therefore provides an exception "in cases where the
money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation."
The examination of the bank records is not a fishing expedition, but rather a method by which
Sun Life could trace the proceeds of the check it paid to petitioners.
IX. DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are hereby DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order
issued on June 28, 1993 is hereby lifted.
X. PREPARED BY:
Imson, Kamille V.

I. SHORT TITLE: OÑATE VS. ABROGAR

II. FULL TITLE: EMMANUEL C. OÑATE and ECON HOLDINGS CORPORATION,
petitioners, vs. HON. ZUES C. ABROGAR, as Presiding Judge of Branch
150 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, and SUN LIFE ASSURANCE
COMPANY OF CANADA, respondents.; G.R. No. 107303; February 23,
1995;
III. PONENTE: MENDOZA, J.:
IV. TOPIC: Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits
V. STATEMENT OF FACTS:
Petitioners maintain that, in accordance with prior decisions of this Court, the attachment of their
properties was void because the trial court had not at that time acquired jurisdiction over them
and that the subsequent service of summons on them did not cure the invalidity of the levy. They
further contend that the examination of the books and ledgers of the Bank of the Philippine
Islands (BPI), the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the Urban Bank was a "fishing
expedition" which the trial court should not have authorized because petitioner Emmanuel C.
Oñate, whose accounts were examined, was not a signatory to any of the documents evidencing
the transaction between Sun Life Assurance of Canada (Sun Life) and Brunner Development
Corporation (Brunner).
On the other hand private respondent Sun Life stresses the fact that the trial court eventually
acquired jurisdiction over petitioners and contends that this cured the invalidity of the attachment
of petitioners' properties. With respect to the second contention of petitioners, private respondent
argues that the examination of petitioner Oñate's bank account was justified because it was he
who signed checks transferring huge amounts from Brunner's account in the Urban Bank to the
PNB and the BPI.

VI. ISSUES: WON respondent Judge had acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or in excess of jurisdiction in allowing the examination of the bank records though no notice
was given.
VII. RULING:
YES.
The records show that, on January 21, 1992, respondent judge ordered the examination of the
books of accounts and ledgers of Brunner at the Urban Bank, Legaspi Village branch, and on
January 30, 199 the records of account of petitioner Oñate at the BPI, even as he ordered the
PNB to produce the records regarding certain checks deposited in it.
First. Sun Life defends these court orders on the ground that the money paid by it to Brunner
was subsequently withdrawn from the Urban Bank after it had been deposited by Brunner and
then transferred to BPI and to the unnamed account in the petitioner Oñate's account in the BPI
and to the unnamed account in the PNB.
The issue before the trial court, however, concerns the nature of the transaction between
petitioner Brunner and Sun Life. In its complaint, Sun Life alleges that Oñate, in his personal
capacity and as president of Econ, offered to sell to Sun Life P46,990,000.00 worth of treasury
bills owned by Econ and Brunner at the discounted price of P39,526,500.82; that on November
27, 1991, Sun Life paid the price by means of a check payable to Brunner; that Brunner, through
its president Noel L. Diño, issued to it a receipt with undertaking to deliver the treasury bills to
Sun Life; and that on December 4, 1991, Brunner and Diño delivered instead a promissory note,
dated November 27, 1991, in which it was made to appear that the transaction was a money
placement instead of sale of treasury bills.
Thus the issue is whether the money paid to Brunner was the consideration for the sale of
treasury bills, as Sun Life claims, or whether it was money intended for placement, as petitioners
allege. Petitioners do not deny receipt of P39,526,500.82 from Sun Life. Hence, whether the
transaction is considered a sale or money placement does not make the money the "subject
matter of litigation" within the meaning of § 2 of Republic Act No. 1405 which prohibits the
disclosure or inquiry into bank deposits except "in cases where the money deposited or invested
is the subject matter of litigation." Nor will it matter whether the money was "swindled" as Sun
Life contends.
Second. The examination of bank books and records cannot be justified under Rule 57, § 10. This
provision states:
Sec. 10. Examination of party whose property is attached and persons indebted to him or
controlling his property; delivery of property to officer. — Any person owing debts to the
party whose property is attached or having in his possession or under his control any
credit or other personal property belonging to such party, may be required to attend
before the court in which the action is pending, or before a commissioner appointed by
the court, and be examined on oath respecting the same. The party whose property is
attached may also be required to attend for the purpose of giving information respecting
his property, and may be examined on oath. The court may, after such examination, order
personal property capable of manual delivery belonging to him, in the possession of the
 person so required to attend before the court, to be delivered to the clerk of the court,
sheriff, or other proper officer on such terms as may be just, having reference to any lien
thereon or claims against the same, to await the judgment in the action.
Since, as already stated, the attachment of petitioners' properties was invalid, the examination
ordered in connection with such attachment must likewise be considered invalid. Under Rule 57,
§ 10, as quoted above, such examination is only proper where the property of the person
examined has been validly attached.
VIII. DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the decision dated February 21, 1994 is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE and
another one is rendered GRANTING the petitions for certiorari and SETTING ASIDE the
orders dated February 26, 1992 and September 9, 1992, insofar as they authorize the attachment
of petitioners' properties and the examination of bank books and records pertaining to their
accounts, and ORDERING respondent Judge Zeus C. Abrogar —
(1) forthwith to issue an alias writ of attachment upon the same bond furnished by respondent
Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada;
(2) direct the sheriff to lift the levy under the original writ of attachment and simultaneously levy
on the same properties pursuant to the alias writ so issued; and
(3) take such steps as may be necessary to insure that there will be no intervening period between
the lifting of the original attachment and the subsequent levy under the alias writ.
Petitioners may file the necessary counterbond to prevent subsequent levy or to dissolve the
attachment after such levy.
IX. PREPARED BY:
Imson, Kamille V