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GO
II. PONENTE: PERALTA, J.
III. FACTS:
Petitioner, the BSB Group, Inc., is a duly organized domestic corporation presided by its
herein representative, Ricardo Bangayan (Bangayan). Respondent Sally Go is Bangayans wife,
who was employed in the company as a cashier, and was engaged to receive and account for the
payments made by the various customers of the company.
In 2002, Bangayan filed with the Manila Prosecutors Office a complaint for estafa and/or
qualified theft against respondent, alleging that several checks representing the aggregate amount
of P1,534,135.50 issued by the company’s customers in payment of their obligation were, instead
of being turned over to the company’s coffers, indorsed by respondent who deposited the same to
her personal banking account maintained at Security Bank and Trust Company (Security Bank).
Accordingly, respondent was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Respondent entered a negative plea when arraigned. The trial ensued. On the premise that
respondent had allegedly encashed the subject checks and deposited the corresponding amounts
thereof to her personal banking account, the prosecution moved for the issuance of subpoena duces
tecum /ad testificandum against the respective managers or records custodians of Security Banks
as well as of the Asian Savings Bank (now Metrobank). The trial court granted the motion and
issued the corresponding subpoena.
Respondent filed a motion to quash the subpoena, addressed to Metrobank, noting to the court that
in the complaint-affidavit filed with the prosecutor, there was no mention made of the said bank
account, to which respondent, in addition to the Security Bank account, allegedly deposited the
proceeds of the supposed checks. Interestingly, while respondent characterized the Metrobank
account as irrelevant to the case, she, in the same motion,
nevertheless waived her objection to the irrelevancy of the SecurityBank account mentioned in th
e same complaint-affidavit, inasmuch as she was admittedly willing to address the allegations with
respect thereto.
Petitioner, opposing respondents move, argued for the relevancy of the Metrobank account on the
ground that the complaint-affidavit showed that there were two checks which respondent allegedly
deposited in an account with the said bank. To this, respondent filed a supplemental motion to
quash, invoking the absolutely confidential nature of the Metrobank account under the provisions
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1405. The trial court did not sustain respondent; hence, it denied the
motion to quash for lack of merit.
Meanwhile, the prosecution was able to present in court the testimony of Elenita Marasigan
(Marasigan), the representative of Security Bank. In a nutshell, Marasigans testimony sought to
prove that between 1988 and 1989, respondent, while engaged as cashier at the BSB Group, Inc.,
was able to run away with the checks issued to the company by its customers, endorse the same,
and credit the corresponding amounts to her personal deposit account with Security Bank. In the
course of the testimony, the subject checks were presented to Marasigan for identification and
marking as the same checks received by respondent, endorsed, and then deposited in her personal
account with Security Bank.
But before the testimony could be completed, respondent filed a Motion to Suppress, seeking the
exclusion of Marasigans testimony and accompanying documents thus far received, bearing on the
subject Security Bank account. This time respondent invokes, in addition to irrelevancy, the
privilege of confidentiality under R.A. No. 1405.
The Trial court denied said motion as well as the motion for reconsideration filed by the
respondent. CA reversed the decision and ordered that the witness’ testimony be stricken out from
the record.
IV. ISSUE: W/N the pieces of evidence sought to be suppressed in this case, the testimony of
Marasigan, as well as the checks purported to have been stolen and deposited in respondents
Security Bank account, are relevant
RULING: NO.
Fundamental is the precept in all criminal prosecutions, that the constitutive acts of the offense
must be established with unwavering exactitude and moral certainty because this is the critical and
only requisite to a finding of guilt. Theft is present when a person, with intent to gain but without
violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, takes the personal property of
another without the latters consent. It is qualified when, among others, and as alleged in the instant
case, it is committed with abuse of confidence. In turn, whether these elements concur in a way
that overcomes the presumption of guiltlessness, is a question that must pass the test of relevancy
and competency in accordance with Section 3 Rule 128 of the Rules of Court.
The fact in issue appears to be that respondent has taken away cash in the amount of P1,534,135.50
from the coffers of petitioner. In support of this allegation, petitioner seeks to establish the
existence of the elemental act of taking by adducing evidence that respondent, at several times
between 1988 and 1989, deposited some of its checks to her personal account with Security
Bank. Petitioner addresses the incongruence between the allegation of theft of cash in the
Information, on the one hand, and the evidence that respondent had first stolen the checks and
deposited the same in her banking account, on the other hand, by impressing upon the Court that
there obtains no difference between cash and check for purposes of prosecuting respondent for
theft of cash. Petitioner is mistaken.
In theft, the act of unlawful taking connotes deprivation of personal property of one by another
with intent to gain, and it is immaterial that the offender is able or unable to freely dispose of the
property stolen because the deprivation relative to the offended party has already ensued from such
act of execution. The allegation of theft of money, hence, necessitates that evidence presented must
have a tendency to prove that the offender has unlawfully taken money belonging to
another. Interestingly, petitioner has taken pains in attempting to draw a connection between the
evidence subject of the instant review, and the allegation of theft in the Information by claiming
that respondent had fraudulently deposited the checks in her own name. But this line of argument
works more prejudice than favor, because it in effect, seeks to establish the commission, not of
theft, but rather of some other crime, probably estafa.
Moreover, that there is no difference between cash and check is true in other instances. In estafa by
conversion, for instance, whether the thing converted is cash or check, is immaterial in relation to
the formal allegation in an information for that offense; a check, after all, while not regarded as
legal tender, is normally accepted under commercial usage as a substitute for cash, and the credit
it represents in stated monetary value is properly capable of appropriation. And it is in this respect
that what the offender does with the check subsequent to the act of unlawfully taking it becomes
material inasmuch as this offense is a continuing one. In other words, in pursuing a case for this
offense, the prosecution may establish its cause by the presentation of the checks involved. These
checks would then constitute the best evidence to establish their contents and to prove the
elemental act of conversion in support of the proposition that the offender has indeed indorsed the
same in his own name.
Theft, however, is not of such character. Thus, for our purposes, as the Information in this case
accuses respondent of having stolen cash, proof tending to establish that respondent has actualized
her criminal intent by indorsing the checks and depositing the proceeds thereof in her personal
account, becomes not only irrelevant but also immaterial and, on that score, inadmissible in
evidence.
PREPARED BY: IMSON, Kamille V.
REPUBLIC VS. SPOUSES GIMENEZ
PONENTE: LEONEN, J.
FACTS:
The Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), instituted a
Complaint for Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting, Restitution and Damages against the
Gimenez Spouses before the Sandiganbayan. The Complaint seeks to recover . . . ill-gotten wealth
. . . acquired by the Gimenez Spouses as dummies, agents, or nominees of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda Marcos.
During trial, the Republic presented documentary evidence attesting to the positions held, business
interests, income, and pertinent transactions of the Gimenez Spouses. The Republic presented the
testimonies of Atty. Tereso Javier, Head of the Sequestered Assets Department of PCGG, and of
Danilo R.V. Daniel, Director of the Research and Development Department of PCGG. Witnesses
testified on the bank accounts and businesses owned or controlled by the Gimenez Spouses.
The Sandiganbayan denied a motion to recall Danilo R.V. Daniel's testimony. The Republic then
manifested that it was "no longer presenting further evidence." Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan
gave the Republic 30 days "to file its formal offer of evidence." The Republic moved "for an
extension of thirty (30) days within which to file its formal offer of evidence." This Motion was
granted by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution of the same date.
The Republic moved for an additional 15 days within which to file its Formal Offer of Evidence.
This Motion was granted by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution dated May 8, 2006. 18 Following
this, no additional Motion for extension was filed by the Republic.
In the first assailed Resolution, the Sandiganbayan noted that the Republic failed to file its Formal
Offer of Evidence notwithstanding repeated extensions and the lapse of 75 days from the date it
terminated its presentation of evidence. Thus, it declared that the Republic waived the filing of its
Formal Offer of Evidence.
Ignacio Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence dated May 30, 2006. He
argued that the Republic showed no right to relief as there was no evidence to support its cause of
action. Fe Roa Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss dated June 13, 2006 on the ground of failure to
prosecute. the Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration [of the first assailed Resolution] and to
Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence.
In the second assailed Resolution, the Sandiganbayan denied the Republic's Motion for
Reconsideration and granted the Gimenez Spouses' Motion to Dismiss. The Sandiganbayan also
found that the Republic failed to prosecute its case for an unreasonable length of time and to
comply with the court's rules. The court also noted that the documentary evidence presented by
the Republic consisted mostly of certified true copies. However, the persons who certified the
documents as copies of the original were not presented. Hence, the evidence lacked probative
value.The Republic filed its Petition for Review on Certiorari before this court.
ISSUE: W/N the Sandiganbayan erred in holding that petitioner Republic of the Philippines
waived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence and in granting respondents Ignacio Gimenez
and Fe Roa Gimenez's Motion to Dismiss on demurrer to evidence.
RULING: YES.
In the second assailed Resolution, the Sandiganbayan granted respondents' Motion to Dismiss
based on the lack of Formal Offer of Evidence of petitioner. At the same time, it observed that the
pieces of documentary evidence presented by petitioner were mostly certified true copies of the
original.
Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for making "a general and sweeping statement that the
evidence presented by petitioner lacked probative value for the reason that they are mainly certified
true copies which had not been testified on by the person who certified them. Thus, its right to due
process was violated when the Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner's documentary evidence in the
same Resolution which dismissed the case.
Petitioner argues that: a) respondents unqualifiedly admitted the identity and authenticity of the
documentary evidence presented by petitioner; and b) the documents it presented were public
documents, and there was no need for the identification and authentication of the original
documentary exhibits.
Petitioner claims that the following exhibits were acquired in relation to the PCGG's functions
prescribed under Executive Order No. 1, Section 3(b), and form part of the official records of the
PCGG: "Certifications as to the various positions held in Government by Fe Roa-Gimenez, her
salaries and compensation during her stint as a public officer, the BIR Income Tax Returns and
Statement of Assets and Liabilities showing the declared income of spouses Gimenezes; the
Articles of Incorporation of various corporations showing spouses Gimenezes' interests on various
corporations; and several transactions involving huge amounts of money which prove that they
acted as conduit in the disbursement of government funds."
On the other hand, respondent Ignacio Gimenez argues that petitioner's documents are not "official
issuances of the Philippine government." They are mostly notarized private
documents. Petitioner's evidence has no probative value; hence, a dismissal on demurrer to
evidence is only proper. Respondent Fe Roa Gimenez claims that the Sandiganbayan did not err in
holding that the majority of petitioner's documentary evidence has no probative value, considering
that most of these documents are only photocopies.
The evidence presented by petitioner before the Sandiganbayan deserves better treatment.
For instance, the nature and classification of the documents should have been ruled upon. Save for
certain cases, the original document must be presented during trial when the subject of the inquiry
is the contents of the document. This is the Best Evidence Rule provided under Rule 130, Section
3 of the Rules of Court In case of unavailability of the original document, secondary evidence may
be presented as provided for under Sections 5 to 7 of the same Rule.
Notably, the Sandiganbayan's evaluation of the evidence presented by petitioner was cursory. Its
main reason for granting the Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence was that there was no
evidence to consider due to petitioner's failure to file its Formal Offer of Evidence. It brushed off
the totality of evidence on which petitioner built its case.
Even assuming that no documentary evidence was properly offered, this court finds it clear from
the second assailed Resolution that the Sandiganbayan did not even consider other evidence
presented by petitioner during the 19 years of trial. The Sandiganbayan erred in ignoring
petitioner's testimonial evidence without any basis or justification. Numerous exhibits were offered
as part of the testimonies of petitioner's witnesses.
Petitioner presented both testimonial and documentary evidence that tended to establish a
presumption that respondents acquired ill-gotten wealth during respondent Fe Roa Gimenez's
incumbency as public officer and which total amount or value was manifestly out of proportion to
her and her husband's salaries and to their other lawful income or properties.
The court cannot arbitrarily disregard evidence especially when resolving a demurrer to evidence
which tests the sufficiency of the plaintiff's evidence.
The difference between the admissibility of evidence and the determination of its probative weight
is canonical.
Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or
evidence) is to [be] considered at all. On the other hand, the probative value of evidence
refers to the question of whether or not it proves an issue. Thus, a letter may be offered in
evidence and admitted as such but its evidentiary weight depends upon the observance of
the rules on evidence. Accordingly, the author of the letter should be presented as witness
to provide the other party to the litigation the opportunity to question him on the contents
of the letter. Being mere hearsay evidence, failure to present the author of the letter renders
its contents suspect. As earlier stated, hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no
probative value.
The Sandiganbayan should have considered Atienza v. Board of Medicine, et al. where this court
held that it is better to admit and consider evidence for determination of its probative value than to
outright reject it based on very rigid and technical grounds.
A liberal application of the Rules is in line with the state's policy to recover ill-gotten wealth. In
case of doubt, courts should proceed with caution in granting a motion to dismiss based on
demurrer to evidence. An order granting demurrer to evidence is a judgment on the merits. This is
because while a demurrer "is an aid or instrument for the expeditious termination of an action," it
specifically "pertains to the merits of the case." To erroneously grant a dismissal simply based on
the delay to formally offer documentary evidence essentially deprives one party of due process.
PREPARED BY: IMSON, Kamille V.
SPOUSES PARAS VS. KIMWA CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORP.
PONENTE: LEONEN, J.
FACTS:
Lucia Paras (Lucia) was a "concessionaire of a sand and gravel permit at Kabulihan, Toledo City."
Kimwa is a "construction firm that sells concrete aggregates to contractors and haulers in Cebu."
Lucia and Kimwa entered into a contract denominated "Agreement for Supply of Aggregates"
(Agreement) where 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates were "allotted" by Lucia as supplier to
Kimwa. Kimwa was to pick up the allotted aggregates at Lucia's permitted area in Toledo City.
Pursuant to the Agreement, Kimwa hauled 10,000 cubic meters of aggregates. Sometime after this,
however, Kimwa stopped hauling aggregates.Claiming that in so doing, Kimwa violated the
Agreement, Lucia filed the Complaint for breach of contract with damages that is now subject of
this Petition.
In their Complaint, Spouses Paras alleged that sometime in December 1994, Lucia was approached
by Kimwa expressing its interest to purchase gravel and sand from her. Kimwa allegedly asked
that it be "assured" of 40,000 cubic meters worth of aggregates. Lucia countered that her
concession area was due to be rechanneled on May 15, 1995, when her Special Permit
expires. Thus, she emphasized that she would be willing to enter into a contract with Kimwa
"provided the forty thousand cubic meters would be withdrawn or completely extracted and hauled
before 15 May 1995." Kimwa then assured Lucia that it would take only two to three months for
it to completely haul the 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates. Convinced of Kimwa's assurances,
Lucia and Kimwa entered into the Agreement.
Spouses Paras added that within a few days, Kimwa was able to extract and haul 10,000 cubic
meters of aggregates. However, after extracting and hauling this quantity, Kimwa allegedly
transferred to the concession area of a certain Mrs. Remedios dela Torre in violation of their
Agreement. They then addressed demand letters to Kimwa. As these went unheeded, Spouses
Paras filed their Complaint.
In its Answer, Kimwa alleged that it never committed to obtain 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates
from Lucia. It argued that the controversial quantity of 40,000 cubic meters represented only an
upper limit or the maximum quantity that it could haul. It likewise claimed that it neither made
any commitment to haul 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates before May 15, 1995 nor represented
that the hauling of this quantity could be completed in two to three months. It denied that the
hauling of 10,000 cubic meters of aggregates was completed in a matter of days and countered that
it took weeks to do so. It also denied transferring to the concession area of a certain Mrs. Remedios
dela Torre.
Kimwa asserted that the Agreement articulated the parties' true intent that 40,000 cubic meters was
a maximum limit and that May 15, 1995 was never set as a deadline. Invoking the Parol Evidence
Rule, it insisted that Spouses Paras were barred from introducing evidence which would show that
the parties had agreed differently.
On May 16, 2001, the Regional Trial Court rendered the Decision in favor of Spouses Paras. The
trial court noted that the Agreement stipulated that the allotted aggregates were set aside
exclusively for Kimwa. It reasoned that it was contrary to human experience for Kimwa to have
entered into an Agreement with Lucia without verifying the latter's authority as a
concessionaire. Considering that the Special Permit granted to Lucia clearly indicated that her
authority was good for only six (6) months from November 14, 1994, the trial court noted that
Kimwa must have been aware that the 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates allotted to it must
necessarily be hauled by May 15, 1995. As it failed to do so, it was liable to Spouses Paras for the
total sum of P720,000.00, the value of the 30,000 cubic-meters of aggregates that Kimwa did not
haul, in addition to attorney's fees and costs of suit.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the Regional Trial Court's Decision. It faulted the trial
court for basing its findings on evidence presented which were supposedly in violation of the Parol
Evidence Rule. It noted that the Agreement was clear that Kimwa was under no obligation to haul
40,000 cubic meters of aggregates by May 15, 1995.
In a subsequent Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied reconsideration to Spouses Paras. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N respondent Kimwa Construction and Development Corporation is liable to petitioners
Spouses Paras for (admittedly) failing to haul 30,000 cubic meters of aggregates from petitioner
Lucia Paras' permitted area by May 15, 1995
RULING: YES.
Rule 130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides for the Parol Evidence Rule, the
rule on admissibility of documentary evidence when the terms of an agreement have been reduced
into writing.
Per this rule, reduction to written form, regardless of the formalities observed, "forbids any
addition to, or contradiction of, the terms of a written agreement by testimony or other evidence
purporting to show that different terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport of the
written contract." This, however, is merely a general rule. Two (2) things must be established for
parol evidence to be admitted: first, that the existence of any of the four (4) exceptions has been
put in issue in a party's pleading or has not been objected to by the adverse party; and second, that
the parol evidence sought to be presented serves to form the basis of the conclusion proposed by
the presenting party.
Here, the Court of Appeals found fault in the Regional Trial Court for basing its findings "on the
basis of evidence presented in violation of the parol evidence rule." It proceeded to fault petitioners
Spouses Paras for showing "no proof of [respondent Kimwa's] obligation." Then, it stated that
"[t]he stipulations in the agreement between the parties leave no room for interpretation."