STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING IN EUROPE: SCENARIO 1

You are Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy. It’s July 1944, and numerous reports are coming to you from Europe about the
wholesale Nazi killing of Jews and other prisoners in gas chambers at the Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp. Jewish leaders
are calling on the United States to use its air force to bomb the camp and the railroads leading to it in order to halt the killing. The
camp is narrowly within range of Allied bombers, but there are significant risks. The gas chambers are dangerously close to the
prisoners’ barracks; a bombing attempt could easily destroy the very lives it was meant to save. It would also divert bombers away
from the main task of defeating the German military, which the War Department believes is the fastest and surest way to end all
Nazi persecution in Europe. On the other hand, if the gas chambers are left intact, many thousands of innocent lives could be lost
before the camps can be shut down by defeating Germany on the ground.

Do you order the US Army Air Force to make plans to bomb Auschwitz-Bireknau, accepting the risks, or do you maintain that the
best way to end the killing at Auschwitz is to defeat the Nazi German military first?

Volume 2 : The War in Europe The National WWII Museum

STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING IN EUROPE: SCENARIO 2

You are President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. It’s September 4, 1941, and you’ve just learned that a German submarine
has fired two torpedoes at an American battleship, the USS Greer, in the Atlantic Ocean. The Greer was never hit, and its captain
did not return fire. Reports suggest the German commander did not actually know the Greer was an American warship and that
a British plane started the fight by firing depth charges at the submarine. Still, you have been looking for ways to convince the
American people that the United States must get more involved in the ongoing war in Europe. If you report the incident to the
public as an unprovoked German attack on a US vessel, it might help boost support for deeper involvement in the war. On the
other hand, this announcement would also be a serious misrepresentation of the facts that could hurt you politically and
strengthen your isolationist critics.

What do you tell the public? Do you tell the truth and report the Greer incident as a simple misunderstanding on the high seas
and miss this opportunity to generate more support for a stronger American response to Nazi Germany? Or do you call the incident
a deliberate attack on the United States and call for war, accepting the risk that the truth might cause you political trouble in
the future?

Volume 2 : The War in Europe The National WWII Museum

STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING IN EUROPE: SCENARIO 3

You are Lieutenant General Omar Bradley, commander of American ground forces in France. It’s July 1944, and the Allies have
just successfully landed a large force on the beaches of Normandy. The Germans, however, are blocking the Allies from advancing
any farther into France, which threatens to turn the whole campaign into a stalemate. One option is to attack the German lines
with heavy bombers and then move ground troops in quickly to take advantage of the confusion that would follow. There are risks,
however. US Army Air Force commanders have told you that the only way they can effectively approach the German lines in this
case is over the heads of the Allied troops. Even if you move your troops back a mile away from the bombing zone, there’s still a
good chance some of the bombs will fall on them, resulting in casualties. To delay, on the other hand, might be just as harmful;
Allied casualties since the Normandy invasion have climbed to over 100,000 with very little conquered territory to show for it.

What do you do? Do you accept the risks and move forward with the plan to have Allied heavy bombers attack the German lines to
make way for a ground attack? Or do you halt further planning for the offensive until a safer approach can be planned?

Volume 2 : The War in Europe The National WWII Museum

STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING IN EUROPE: SCENARIO 4
You are General George Patton, commander of the US Seventh Army. It’s July 1943, and your troops are about to invade the island
of Sicily in the Mediterranean Sea. British cryptographers have learned by decoding German military messages through the Ultra
project that the area near the Sicilian town of Gela will be heavily defended by two German divisions. This information would be
very useful for the paratroopers of the 82nd Airborne Division, who will be the first to land at Gela, right in the firing line of these
divisions. Sharing the information will better prepare the paratroopers to face the German defenders, but it could also endanger
the Ultra project. So far, the Germans do not realize that the Allies know how to translate their secret communication codes. If the
Germans were to capture one of the invading Allied soldiers and interrogate them, they might find out about the Ultra project.

What should you do? Should you share what you have learned from the Ultra cryptographers about the two German divisions
defending Gela with the paratrooper units that will face them? Or should you withhold that information to prevent the Germans
from potentially finding out about Ultra and changing their secret communications codes?

Volume 2 : The War in Europe The National WWII Museum

STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING IN EUROPE: SCENARIO 5

You are President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. It’s February 1945, and scientists are secretly developing an atomic bomb, a weapon
of unprecedented power. The British have been in on the project since it began, but you have said nothing to the other major US
ally in Europe, the Soviet Union, even though you know Soviet spies have been reporting on the project for years. This situation
makes some of your advisors uneasy because relations between the Soviet Union and the other Allied powers have already been
very difficult, especially regarding plans for postwar Europe. If you tell the Soviets about the atomic bomb project now, you will
avoid the impression that you have been keeping secrets from them, which might make your relationship with the Soviets easier.
The Soviets might also be willing to help build some sort of international system to control atomic energy and prevent a future
nuclear war. On the other hand, if you choose to keep quiet about the atomic bomb, you may be able to use it as a bargaining chip
later when making deals with the Soviets about postwar Europe. Keeping quiet might also slow down the process of the Soviets’
creation of their own atomic bomb, although you realize this can’t be stopped forever. The downside to remaining quiet is that the
Soviets may feel betrayed and threatened by your secrecy about the new weapon once it has been used.
The next big meeting between you, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin is about to begin at
the Crimean resort town of Yalta. Should you bring up the subject of atomic weapons now in hopes of securing better cooperation
with the Soviets? Or should you keep the atomic bomb a secret to use later?
Volume 2 : The War in Europe The National WWII Museum

STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING IN EUROPE: SCENARIO 1 OUTCOME

Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy made no effort to direct the US Army Air Force to bomb Auschwitz-Birkenau or to study
the feasibility of the proposal. He based this decision on the standard War Department policy that the best way to help Nazi
prisoners of war and those in concentration camps was to defeat Nazi Germany as soon as possible. This would turn out to be one
of the most controversial American decisions of the war.

Volume 2 : The War in Europe The National WWII Museum

STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING IN EUROPE: SCENARIO 2 OUTCOME
President Roosevelt announced the Greer incident in a nationwide radio address on September 11, 1941, saying the German
submarine “fired first upon this American destroyer without warning, and with deliberate design to sink her.” Using this incident
as justification, Roosevelt also announced a new “shoot-on-sight” policy in which US naval vessels were told to fire at any German
ship or submarine caught within the US defense zone. One Gallup Poll indicated that 62 percent of Americans agreed with the
president’s policy. Even after a congressional inquiry revealed the president’s distortion of the facts in the Greer incident, neither
the public nor Congress demanded a change in policy.

Volume 2 : The War in Europe The National WWII Museum

STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING IN EUROPE: SCENARIO 3 OUTCOME

Lieutenant General Bradley ordered this plan, code-named Operation Cobra, to move forward on the night of July 24, 1944.
Thousands of bombers poured their payloads into a small section of territory near the French town of Saint-Lô, disabling half of the
German defenders and scattering the others. A number of bombs fell short of the targets and landed behind Allied lines, killing
over 100 American GIs as well as Lieutenant General Lesley McNair. Another 500 American soldiers were wounded. Bradley later
wrote in his memoirs that he accepted the risk because in his estimation any soldiers who perished were “nothing more than tools
to be used in the accomplishment of the mission.”

Volume 2 : The War in Europe The National WWII Museum

STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING IN EUROPE: SCENARIO 4 OUTCOME

Neither Patton nor any other commander informed the 82nd Airborne Division about the presence of the two German divisions
they would face when they landed at Gela. In fact, General Patton’s staff received strict orders not to share this information with
the paratroopers because of the likelihood that some of them would be captured. Ultimately, the decision does not appear to
have made a substantial difference. Other factors caused the 82nd Airborne Division to land its paratroopers in a haphazard and
confused manner all around the planned drop zone. As a result, the German and Italian defenders believed the invasion force was
much larger than it really was.

Volume 2 : The War in Europe The National WWII Museum

STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING IN EUROPE: SCENARIO 5 OUTCOME
President Roosevelt never told the Soviets anything about the US effort to develop an atomic bomb, despite warnings from multiple
advisers that keeping the bomb a secret from the Soviets would poison US-Soviet relations. As it turned out, by 1949 the Soviets
had developed their own atomic bomb without having received any open assistance from the United States.

Volume 2 : The War in Europe The National WWII Museum