A.M. NO.

02-6-02-SC Rules on Adoption

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA

G.R. NO. 148311

MARCH 31, 2005

FACTS:

Honorato B. Catindig, filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie
Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged that Stephanie’s middle name be changed to
“Garcia,” her mother’s surname, and that her surname be changed to “Catindig.” the
trial court granted the petition for adoption. Petitioner then filed for clarification and/or
reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her
biological mother as her middle name. The trial court denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration as there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the
surname of his biological mother as his middle name.

ISSUE:

Whether an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name
when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.

HELD:

There is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like
Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname. The court finds no reason
why she should not be allowed to do so.

Lahom vs. Sibulo, G.R. No. 143989, July 14, 2003

FACTS:

A childless couple adopted the wife's nephew and brought him up as their own. In
1972, the trial court granted the petition for adoption, and ordered the Civil Registrar to
change the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom. Mrs. Lahom commenced a
petition to rescind the decree of adoption, in which she averred, that, despite the her
pleas and that of her husband, their adopted son refused to use their surname Lahom
and continue to use Sibulo in all his dealing and activities. Prior to the institution of the
case, in 1998, RA No. 8552 went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the
right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption (Section 19 of Article VI).
These turn of events revealing Jose's callous indifference, ingratitude and lack of care
and concern prompted Lahom to file a petition in Court in December 1999 to rescind the
decree of adoption previously issued way back on May 5, 1972. When Lahom filed said
petition there was already a new law on adoption, specifically R.A. 8552 also known as
the Domestic Adoption Act passed on March 22,1998, wherein it was provided that:
"Adoption, being in the interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the
adopter(s). However the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in
Article 919 of the Civil Code" (Section 19).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject adoption still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the
effectivity of R.A. No. 8552, and if in the affirmative, whether or not the adopter’s action
prescribed.

RULING:

Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. The controversy should be resolved in the light of the law
governing at the time the petition was filed. In this case, it was months after the
effectivity of RA 8552 that Lahom filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption
granted in 1972. By then the new law had already abrogated and repealed the right of
the adopter under the Civil Code and the family Code to rescind a decree of adoption.
So the rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by Lahom after RA 8552
had come into force, could no longer be pursued.

Besides, even before the passage of RA8552, an action to set aside the adoption is
subject to the five year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the
adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period.
The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill
the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. Rights are considered vested
when the right to the enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional and
perfect or fixed and irrefutable. The concept of a "vested right" is a consequence of the
constitutional guarantee of due process that expresses a present fixed interest which in
right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action. While
adoption has often been referred to in the context of a "right", it is not naturally innate or
fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. It is more of a privilege that is
governed by the state's determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest
and welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the
right of the adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to State regulation.
Concomitantly, a right of action given by a statute may be taken away at any time
before it has been exercised.
But an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for
valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an
undeserving child, like denying him his legitime, and by will and testament, may
expressly exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.

LANDINGIN VS. REPUBLIC, G.R. NO. 164948, JUNE 27, 2006

FACTS:
Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a petition for the
adoption of 3 minors, natural children of Manuel Ramos, the former’s brother, and
Amelia Ramos. She alleged in her petition that when her brother died, the children were
left to their paternal grandmother for their biological mother went to Italy, re-married
there and now has 2 children by her second marriage and no longer communicates
from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption. After the paternal
grandmother passed away, the minors were being supported by the petitioner and her
children abroad and gave their written consent for their adoption.

A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending for the adoption and
narrated that Amelia, the biological mother was consulted with the adoption plan and
after weighing the benefits of adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented.

However, petitioner failed to present the said social worker as witness and offer in
evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Petitioner also failed
to present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assent to the adoption.

ISSUE:
WON a petition for adoption be granted without the written consent of the adoptee’s
biological mother.

HELD:
No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of the biological parent(s)
of the child, if known is necessary to the adoption. The written consent of the legal
guardian will suffice if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained.

The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to
protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers,
and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner
of the proposed adoption.

The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of the
decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his
consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and
re-establish in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written
consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.

Moreover, abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal
obligations of love and support. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time
undisturbed in the care of others is not such abandonment. To dispense with the
requirements of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time
of adoption.
Republic vs. Miller, 306 SCRA 183
Facts: On July 29, 1988, Spouses Miller, both American citizens, filed with the RTC,
Angeles City a verified petition to adopt a Filipino child under the provision of the Child
and Youth Welfare Code which allows aliens to adopt. The natural parents executed
affidavits giving their irrevocable consent to the adoption and the DSWD recommended
approval of the petition on the basis of its evaluation.

On August 3, 1998, the Family Code became effective, prohibiting the adoption of a
Filipino child by aliens.

The Solicitor General appealed to the granting of the petition for adoption by the RTC.

Issue: WON aliens may be allowed to adopt when the petition for adoption was filed
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code prohibiting the same.

Held: Yes. An alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which
was in force at the time of the filing of the petition, acquired a vested right which could
not be affected by the subsequent enactment of a new law disqualifying him.
Vested right include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but
also an exemption from new obligations created after the right has vested.

REPUBLIC VS. HERNANDEZ, G.R. NO. 117209, FEB. 9, 1996

FACTS:
On March 10, 1994, herein private respondent spouses, Van Munson y Navarro and
Regina Munson y Andrade, filed a petition to adopt the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome
Moran, duly alleging therein the jurisdictional facts required by Rule 99 of the Rules of
Court for adoption, their qualifications as and fitness to be adoptive parents, as well as
the circumstances under and by reason of which the adoption of the afore named minor
was sought. In the very same petition, private respondents prayed for the change of the
first name of said minor adoptee to Aaron Joseph, the same being the name with which
he was baptized in keeping with religious tradition, and by which he has been called by
his adoptive family, relatives and friends since May 6, 1993 when he arrived at private
respondents residence.

At the hearing on April 18, 1994, petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change
of name in the same petition for adoption. In its formal opposition dated May 3, 1995,
petitioner reiterated its objection to the joinder of the petition for adoption and the
petitions for change of name in a single proceeding, arguing that these petitions should
be conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings.

After considering the evidence and arguments of the contending parties, the trial court
ruled in favor of herein private respondents
A perusal of the records, according to petitioner, shows that only the laws and rules on
adoption have been observed, but not those for a petition for change of name.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the adoptive parent has the right to re-name an adoptive child.

RULING:
While the right of a natural parent to name the child is recognized, guaranteed and
protected under the law, the so-called right of an adoptive parent to re-name an adopted
child by virtue or as a consequence of adoption, even for the most noble intentions and
moving supplications, is unheard of in law and consequently cannot be favorably
considered. To repeat, the change of the surname of the adoptee as a result of the
adoption and to follow that of the adopter does not lawfully extend to or include the
proper or given name. Furthermore, factual realities and legal consequences, rather
than sentimentality and symbolisms, are what are of concern to the Court.

Finally, it is understood that this decision does not entirely foreclose and is without
prejudice to, private respondents privilege to legally change the proper or given name of
their adopted child, provided that the same is exercised, this time, via a proper petition
for change of name. Of course, the grant thereof is conditioned on strict compliance with
all jurisdictional requirements and satisfactory proof of the compelling reasons
advanced therefor.

WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the assailed order of respondent judge is

hereby MODIFIED. The legally adopted child of private respondents shall henceforth be
officially known as Kevin Earl Munson y Andrade unless a change thereof is hereafter
effected in accordance with law. In all other respects, the order is AFFIRMED.

IN RE PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE LIM AND MICHAEL JUDE LIM

GR NO. 168992-93, MAY 21, 2009

FACTS:

Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were
childless. Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were
unknown as shown by a certification of DSWD. The spouses registered the children
making it appears as if they were the parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She
then married an American Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000. Petitioner decided
to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who
simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed separate petitions for adoption of
Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was then 25 years old and already
married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle and her husband
including Michael and Olario gave their consent to the adoption executed in an affidavit.
ISSUE: WON petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.

HELD:

Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the
case at bar. In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercised parental
authority. The use of the word “shall” signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is
mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority since the
child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to
require spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit of consent given by Olario will not suffice
since there are certain requirements that he must comply as an American Citizen. He
must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552. The requirements on
residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived
pursuant to Sec 7. Parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption.
It includes caring and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and
development of their moral mental and physical character and well-being.