PLAINTIFF: GERONIMO CAGUIAT, RUFINA CAGUIAT, FELICIDAD CAGUIAT, FABIAN There can be no question that the trial court

n that the trial court has jurisdiction to direct, in its discretion,

CAGUIAT, and APOLONIA CAGUIAT
DEFENDANT: THE HONORABLE GUILLERMO E. TORRES and FRANCISCO CAGUIAT
DATE: October 31, 1969
PONENTE: BARREDO, J.
TOPIC: RULE 23
Facts:
Petitioners are plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 8050 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch VIII, presided over by respondent Judge, while respondent Francisco Caguiat
is the defendant therein
After defendant had filed his answer with counterclaim, and the plaintiffs, their reply to
defendant's answer the herein petitioners served on respondent Caguiat a notice to
take his deposition. On August 26, 1964 respondent Caguiat filed with the lower court
an urgent motion to prevent the taking of the deposition or to restrict its scope which
urgent motion the petitioners opposed. On the 29th of the same month the
respondent Judge issued an order to hold in abeyance the resolution of his co-
respondent's urgent motion until after the pre-trial. The parties however failed to arrive
at an amicable settlement.
that a deposition shall not be taken, if there are valid reasons for so ruling.
(Cojuangco v. Caluag, L-7952, July 30, 1955, unreported) That the right of a party to
take depositions as means of discovery is not exactly absolute is implicit in the
provisions of the Rules of Court cited by appellants themselves, sections 16 and 18 of
Rule 24, which are precisely designed to protect parties and their witnesses,
whenever in the opinion of the trial court, the move to take their depositions under the
guise of discovery is actually intended to only annoy, embarrass or oppress them. In
such instances, these provisions expressly authorize the court to either prevent the
taking of a deposition or stop one that is already being taken.
In the case at bar, aside from having practically disclosed all his evidence at the pre-
trial, appellee expressed willingness to enter into a stipulation of facts, which offer,
appellants rejected. Moreover, according to Court of Appeals, the parties herein filed
a joint motion for hearing on the merits even before the orders in question were
issued. Under these circumstances, it is inevitable to conclude that there was indeed
no further need for the deposition desired by appellants. It could have served no
useful purpose, for there was nothing anymore to discover. Appellants have not
shown any real concrete reason for such deposition.

On October 3, 1964 herein petitioners again served on respondent Caguiat a second

notice for the taking of his deposition upon oral examination to prevent which, the
latter filed an urgent motion on the 14th of the same month. Petitioners opposed
respondent Caguiat's urgent motion. Resolving the urgent motion and the opposition
thereto, the respondent Judge, on the 17th, granted his co- respondent's urgent
motion and ordered the petitioners to refrain from taking the contemplated deposition.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied.

The petitioners' avowed purpose in securing the deposition of respondent Caguiat is

to get the latter to lay his cards on the table and/or to simplify or abbreviate the
proceedings. Respondent Caguiat, on the other hand, affirms that he has already
revealed practically his entire defense, even to the extent of naming his witnesses,
during the pre-trial, so that the necessity of a deposition has been obviated. In fact,
according to respondent Caguiat, he had expressed willingness to enter into a
stipulation of facts, but apparently the petitioners did not want to. According to CA, the
fact that the controverted orders were issued only after the pre-trial supports that
Respondent Caguiat has revealed his defenses during the trial and that the judge was
satisfied of such revelation therefore no need for deposition. CA also claimed that the
petitioners were satisfied of such defense for they filed a joint motion for hearing on
the merits even before the orders in question were issued.

Issue: Is there still a need for deposition of respondent?

Held: No.

Appellants contend that the disclosure by appellee of practically all his evidence at the
pre-trial and the danger of heightening the animosities between the parties during the
proposed taking of the deposition of appellee are not enough to warrant the trial
court's order preventing completely the taking of said deposition. Such contention is
untenable.
PLAINTIFF: ALFREDO P. ROSETE, OSCAR P. MAPALO and CHITO P. ROSETE
DEFENDANT: JULIANO LIM and LILIA LIM
DATE: June 8, 2006
PONENTE: CHICO-NAZARIO, J
TOPIC: RULE 24-28
FACTS:
 Respondents, Juliano Lim and Lilia Lim, filed a case for annulment, specific
performance with damages against AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits
System (AFP-RSBS), Espreme Realty and Development Corporation
(Espreme Realty), Alfredo P. Rosete, Maj. Oscar Mapalo, Chito P. Rosete,
Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), and Register of Deeds of the Province
of Mindoro Occidental
 It asked, among other things, that the Deed of Sale executed by AFP-RSBS
covering certain parcels of lands in favor of Espreme Realty and the titles
thereof under the name of the latter be annulled and be ordered to restore
ownership and title of said lands to respondents.
 Petitioners filed a MTD on the grounds that the court has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the action or suit and that venue has been improperly
laid
 A supplemental MTD was separately filed by Rosete, AFP-RSBS, Espreme
Realty, and, BPI which Respondents opposed
 All the MTDs were denied by the court; BPI filed its Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim and Cross-claim; Respondents also filed a Motion to Serve
Supplemental Allegation against BPI and petitioner Chito Rosete which the
trial court granted
 Petitioners filed a certiorari in CA contending the denial of their MTDs
 They likewise informed the trial court that they filed an Ex-Parte Motion to
Admit Answers Ex Abudanti Cautela
 Rosete filed his Supplemental Answer (Ex Abudanti Cautela)
 Respondents filed a Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination
giving notice that on June 18 and 20, 1997 at 9:00 a.m., they will cause the
deposition of petitioners Oscar Mapalo and Chito Rosete
 Petitioners filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion and Objection to Take
Deposition Upon Oral Examination. They argued that the deposition may not
be taken without leave of court as no answer has yet been served and the
issues have not yet been joined since their Answer was filed ex abudanti
cautela, pending resolution of the Petition for Certiorari challenging the
orders dated 12 March 1996 and 24 May 1996 that denied their Motions to
Dismiss and for Reconsideration, respectively.
 Moreover, they contend that since there are two criminal cases pending
before the City Prosecutors of Mandaluyong and Pasig City involving the
same set of facts as in the present case wherein respondent Juliano Lim is
the private complainant and petitioners are the respondents, to permit the
taking of the deposition would be violative of their right against self-
incrimination because by means of the oral deposition, respondents would
seek to establish the allegations of fact in the complaint which are also the
allegations of fact in the complaint-affidavits in the said criminal cases.
 Lower court denied petitioners motion to take deposition upon oral
examination, and scheduled the taking thereof
 Respondents filed an Omnibus Motion: (1) To Strike Out Answer of
Defendants Mapalo and Chito Rosete; (2) to Declare Defendants Mapalo
and Chito Rosete In Default; and (3) For Reception of Plaintiffs Evidence Ex-
parte
 Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition
 The lower court: (1) ordered the striking out from the record of the Answer ex
abudanti cautela filed by petitioners Mapalo and Chito Rosete for their
continued unjustified refusal to be sworn pursuant to Rule 29 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) declared defendants Mapalo and Chito Rosete
in default; and I allowed plaintiffs to present their evidence ex-parte as
regards the latter.
 Petitioners filed an Urgent Ex-parte Omnibus Motion (1) For
Reconsideration; (2) To Lift Order of Default; and (3) To Hold In Abeyance
Presentation of Plaintiffs Evidence Ex-parte. The day after, petitioners filed
an Amended Omnibus Motion
 Petitioner’s Omnibus motion was denied thus filed a Certiorari case in the
CA but was also denied
ISSUE:
WON the taking of their oral depositions should not be allowed without leave of court
as no answer has yet been served and the issues have not yet been joined because
their answers were filed ex abudanti cautela
HELD: NO.
Section 1 of Rule 24 of the ROC, it is evident that once an answer has been served,
the testimony of a person, whether a party or not, may be taken by deposition upon
oral examination or written interrogatories. In the case before us, petitioners contend
they have not yet served an answer to respondents because the answers that they
have filed with the trial court were made ex abudanti cautela. In other words, they do
not consider the answers they filed in court and served on respondents as answers
contemplated by the Rules of Court on the ground that same were filed ex abudanti
cautela.
We find petitioners contention to be untenable. Ex abudanti cautela means out of
abundant caution or to be on the safe side. An answer ex abudanti cautela does not
make their answer less of an answer. A cursory look at the answers filed by
petitioners shows that they contain their respective defenses. An answer is a pleading
in which a defending party sets forth his defenses and the failure to file one within the
time allowed herefore may cause a defending party to be declared in default. Thus,
petitioners, knowing fully well the effect of the non-filing of an answer, filed their
answers despite the pendency of their appeal with the Court of Appeals on the denial
of their motion to dismiss.
Petitioners argument that the issues of the case have not yet been joined must
necessarily fail in light of our ruling that petitioners have filed their answers although
the same were made ex abudanti cautela. Issues are joined when all the parties have
pleaded their respective theories and the terms of the dispute are plain before the
court. In the present case, the issues have, indeed, been joined when petitioners, as
well as the other defendants, filed their answers. The respective claims and defenses
of the parties have been defined and the issues to be decided by the trial court have
been laid down.
We cannot also sustain petitioners contention that the lower court erred when it said
that the joinder of issues is not required in order that Section 1, Rule 23 of the ROC
may be availed of. Under said section, a deposition pending action may be availed
of: (1) with leave of court when an answer has not yet been filed but after jurisdiction
has been obtained over any defendant or property subject of the action, or (2) without
leave of court after an answer to the complaint has been served. In the instant case,
the taking of the deposition may be availed of even without leave of court because
petitioners have already served their answers to the complaint.

NOT RELATED TO CIVPRO

It is clear, therefore, that only an accused in a criminal case can refuse to take the
witness stand. The right to refuse to take the stand does not generally apply to parties
in administrative cases or proceedings. The parties thereto can only refuse to answer
if incriminating questions are propounded. This Court applied the exception a party
who is not an accused in a criminal case is allowed not to take the witness stand in
administrative cases/proceedings that partook of the nature of a criminal proceeding
or analogous to a criminal proceeding. It is likewise the opinion of the Court that said
exception applies to parties in civil actions which are criminal in nature. As long as the
suit is criminal in nature, the party thereto can altogether decline to take the witness
stand. It is not the character of the suit involved but the nature of the proceedings that
controls.

In the present controversy, the case is civil it being a suit for Annulment, Specific
Performance with Damages. In order for petitioners to exercise the right to refuse to
take the witness stand and to give their depositions, the case must partake of the
nature of a criminal proceeding. The case on hand certainly cannot be categorized as
such. The fact that there are two criminal cases pending which are allegedly based on
the same set of facts as that of the civil case will not give them the right to refuse to
take the witness stand and to give their depositions. They are not facing criminal
charges in the civil case. Like an ordinary witness, they can invoke the right against
self-incrimination only when the incriminating question is actually asked of them. Only
if and when incriminating questions are thrown their way can they refuse to answer on
the ground of their right against self-incrimination.
PLAINTIFF: LOURDES CAMUS DE LOPEZ, on her behalf and as guardian ad litem of the
minors, SALVADOR C. LOPEZ, JR., and LUIS CARLOS LOPEZ
DEFENDANT: HON. CIRILO G. MACEREN, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao,
MARIA N. VDA. DE LOPEZ, ENRIQUE LOPEZ, SALVADOR LOPEZ, JR., LEOPOLDO
LOPEZ, RODOLFO LOPEZ and the guardian ad litem for the minor FLORDELIZ LOPEZ,
DATE: August 31, 1954
PONENTE: CONCEPCION, J
TOPIC: RULE 29
FACTS
 Petitioner Lourdes Camus de Lopez, on her behalf and as guardian ad litem of
her minor children, Salvador C. Lopez, Jr., and Luis Carlos Lopez filed a case
before the CFI against Respondents Maria N. Vda. de Lopez, Enrique Lopez,
Salvador Lopez, Jr., Leopoldo Lopez, Rodolfo Lopez and Flordeliz Lopez to
secure delivery of some property of the deceased Salvador Lopez, Sr., as
alleged share of the petitioner, who claims to be his widow.
 She contends that, although his previous marriage with respondent Maria N. de
Lopez, which was unknown to petitioner, had not been dissolved and was still
subsisting, and acting in bad faith, and without advising petitioner of such first
marriage, Salvador Lopez, Sr., wedded the latter and thereafter, lived as
husband and wife with her; and that, as a consequence of said union, Salvador
C. Lopez, Jr., and Luis Carlos Lopez were born in Manila and then christened as
legitimate children of Salvador Lopez, Sr. and the petitioner, as set forth in their
respective birth and baptismal certificates.
 After filing an answer of the defendants, petitioner through her counsel filed a
"notice for the taking" of her deposition and that of one Pilar Cristobal, at Room
202 of the Vasquez Building, 1865 Azcarraga Street, Manila, on January 16,
1954, at 2:00 p.m.
 Acting, however, upon an urgent motion of the defendants in said Civil Case,
respondent Hon. Cirilo C. Maceren, as Judge of First Instance of Davao, issued
an order prohibiting the taking of said deposition. Accordingly, petitioner instituted
the present case for the purpose of annulling said order and of having no
restraint to the taking of the aforementioned deposition.
 Petitioner maintains that respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of
discretion in forbidding the taking of said deposition, she being entitled thereto as
a matter of right, without leave of court, after the filing of the answer of the
defendants under section 1 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court
 On the other hand, respondents invoke, in their favor, section 16 of the same rule
which explicitly vests in the court the power to "order that the deposition shall not
be taken" and, this grant connotes the authority to exercise discretion in
connection therewith
ISSUE: WON petitioners is correct? - YES.
HELD: It is well-settled, however, that the discretion conferred by law is not unlimited;
that it must be exercised, not arbitrarily, capriciously or oppressively, but in a
reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of the law, to the end that its
purpose may be attained. Referring to the objective of section 16 of Rule 18 of the
Rules of Court, former Chief Justice Moran has the following to say:
The advisory committee of the United States Supreme Court said that this provision is
intended to be one of the safeguards for the protection of the parties and deponents
on account of the unrestricted right to discovery given by section 1 and 2 of this Rule.
A party may taken the deposition of a witness who knows nothing about the case,
with the only purpose of annoying him or wasting the time of the other parties. In such
case, the court may, on motion, order that the deposition shall not be taken. Or, a
party may designate a distinct place for the taking of a deposition, and the adverse
party may not have sufficient means to reach that place, because of poverty or
otherwise, in which case the court, on motion, may order that the deposition be taken
at another place, or that it be taken by written interrogatories. The party serving the
notice may wish to inquire into matters the disclosure of which may oppressive or
embarrassing to the deponent, especially if the disclosure is to be made in the
presence of third persons, or, the party serving the notice may attempt to inquire into
matters which are absolutely private of the deponent, the disclosure of which may
affect his interests and is not absolutely essential to the determination of the issues
involved in the case. Under such circumstances, the court, on motion, may order "that
certain matter shall not be inquired into or that the scope of the examination shall be
limited to certain matters, or that the examination shall be held with no one present
except the parties to the action and their officers or counsel, or that after being sealed
the deposition shall be opened only by order of the court, or that secret processes,
developments, or research need not be disclosed, or that the parties shall
simultaneously filed specific documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes
to be opened as directed by the court." In other words, this provision affords the
adverse party, as well as the deponent, sufficient protection against abuses that may
be committed by a party in the exercise of his unlimited right to discovery. As a writer
said "Any discovery involves a prying into another person's affairs — a prying that is
quite justified if it is to be a legitimate aid to litigation, but not justified if it is not to be
such an aid." For this reason, courts are given ample powers to forbid discovery
which is intended not as an aid to litigation, but merely to annoy, embarrass or
oppress either the deponent or the adverse party, or both
It is not claimed that the order complained of sought to avert any of the evils which
said section 16 was meant to prevent or arrest. Moreover, petitioner was permitted to
institute and maintain Civil Case as a pauper. As such, she cannot afford to meet the
expenses to make, with her witnesses, the trip or trips from Manila to Davao, and to
stay in said province for the time necessary for the hearing of the case, which might
not take place on the first date set therefor. Hence, the order in question tended, in
effect, to deprive her, not only of her right, under section 1 of Rule 18, to take the
deposition in question, but also, of the opportunity to prove her claim and,
consequently, of the due process guaranteed by the Constitution. Upon the other
hand, the records indicate that the defendants in Civil case No. 1035 — who are the
widow of Salvador Lopez, Sr. and their legitimate children — must be well-off
financially, for the estate of the deceased Salvador Lopez, Sr., which has already
been partitioned among them, appears to be worth approximately half a million pesos.
The main reason given in support of the contested order is that, if the deposition were
taken, the court could not observe the behaviour of the deponents. The insufficiency
of this circumstance to justify the interdiction of the taking of a deposition becomes
apparent when we consider that, otherwise, no deposition could ever be taken, said
objection or handicap being common to all depositions alike. In other words, the order
of respondent Judge cannot be sustained without nullifying the right to take
depositions, and, therefore, without, in effect repealing section 1 of Rule 18 of the
Rules of Court, which, clearly, was not intended by the framers of section 16 of the
same rule.
It is, consequently, clear that a grave abuse of discretion was committed by
respondent Judge in issuing the aforesaid order for which reason the same should be,
as it is hereby annulled and set aside, with cost against the respondents, except the
Hon. Cirilo C. Maceren.
PLAINTIFF: WALTER ASCONA LEE, ESPIRITU TAN, BENITO CHIONGBIAN and HENRY
CHIONGBIAN
DEFENDANT: HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Branch 37; CITY SHERIFF OF PASAY CITY and LEONCIO C. MENDIORO,
DATE: May 28, 1988
PONENTE: GUTTIERREZ, JR., J
TOPIC: RULE 30
FACTS:
May 6, 1975 – private respondent filed a complaint for accounting with damages
docketed as a civil case in the CFI of Rizal at Pasay City, based on a contract for
arrastre services at Pier 14, North Harbor, Manila executed between Mendioro and
William Lines, Inc., represented by Benito Chiongbian, in the Memorandum
Agreement dated July 28, 1973.
Substantial allegations in the complaint:
(1) In 1973 August 1 to November 30, Mendioro conducted arrastre operations at Pier
14 as per contract with William Lines, Inc.;
(2) All the income from the arrastre operations during the said period were received
and held in trust for Mendioro by defendants Lee, Tan and Chiongbian who were also
tasked with the disbursement of the said income for operational expenses;
(3) Defendants Lee, Tan and Chiongbian were duty-bound to turn over to plaintiff
Mendioro the income they held in trust for him; and
(4) They failed to do so despite Mendioro's repeated demands.
June 16, 1975 – the defendants Lee, etc. filed a motion to dismiss of complaint. MTD
denied. They filed an answer July 28, 1975.
January 28, 1977 – the trial court granted the motion to include Jose (3) Millares
Cesar Almario and Henry Chiongbian as indispensable parties. Millares did not file an
answer. Almario voluntarily appeared and manifested that he was joining Mendioro as
co-plaintiff.
April 15, 1977 – Henry Chiongbian filed his answer with counterclaim
December 12, 1977 – At the pre-trial stage of the proceedings, parties filed partial
stipulation of facts:
(1) plaintiff Mendioro operated the arrastre services from August 1, 1973 to November
30,1973 at Pier 14 under a contract which he had with Wilham Lines, Inc;
(2) from said operations, a total gross income of P l,620,985.47 was derived and
realized;
(3) defendants Lee, Tan and Benito Chiongbian were in-charge of collecting said
income;
(4) after November 30,1973, P-14 Arrastre Services, Inc., a corporation registered on
August 15, 1973 of which Mendioro was one of its incorporators, took over the
operations at Pier 14, and
(5) Mendioro assigned his shareholdings in P-14 Arrastre Services, Inc., to defendant
Henry Chiongbian on December 20, 1974.
March 30, 1978 – During the hearing, Counsel for the petitioners failed to show up.
Mendioro was allowed to present evidence ex-parte.
July 20,1978 – an amended order of the trial court granted the petitioners an
opportunity to adduce their evidence. Protracted and lengthy trials were conducted
until May 22, 1981.
September 11, 1981 – RTC rendered decision against petitioners. Ordered
defendants (Lee et al) jointly and severally, to deliver to the former the amount of
P859,981.53 representing the unspent amounts for salaries and for rentals for
handling equipment after deducting the actual and legitimate expenses for both items,
with interests of 14% per annum from May 30,1974 until such time as actual delivery
of the same shall have been made by defendants to plaintiff and to pay such amounts
as equivalent to 20% of the total amount due — principal and interests at the time of
actual payment—for attorney's fees. The counterclaims of defendants are hereby
dismissed for lack of merit. Defendants are, likewise, ordered to pay costs.
October 6, 1981 – copies of RTC decision mailed to the petitioners' counsel at William
Lines Building, Pier 14, North Harbor, Manila.
October 9,19 and 22,1981 – the first, second and third notices of the registered mail
were delivered respectively to the guard-on-duty at counsel's offices but the mailed
decision remained unclaimed at the post office despite the proper notices.
November 26, 1981 – an urgent ex-parte motion for execution was granted and the
corresponding writ of execution was issued. A notice of garnishment was further
issued to certain banks.
The petitioners' subsequent motion to set aside the judgment and to quash recall the
writ of execution with prayer for a restraining order dated December 1, 1981 was
denied.
In a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction filed with the Court of Appeals, the petitioners questioned the
issuance by the respondent judge of the order dated November 26, 1981.
CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit and set aside the writ of preliminary
injunction it had earlier issued.
July 10, 1982 – the instant petition was filed with SC on October 4, 1982 - denied for
being unmeritorious.
December 20, 1982 – MR granted, parties required to submit separate memorandas.
ISSUE/S:
3. Whether or not the judgment against the petitioners was premature in the absence
of a formal accounting to be made by the petitioners.
4. Whether or not the lower court's decision was validly served on the petitioners, and
HELD:

3rd Issue:

The petitioners contend that since the complaint of the private respondent was one for
accounting with damages, the lower court could not and should not have rendered a
money judgment without first ordering them to submit a formal document captioned
"Accounting." - The trial court found the amount due to Mendioro as P859,981.53
after deducting the actual and, legitimate expenses for salaries and rentals of
handling equipment. In lieu of the document referred to by the petitioners, the trial
court relied on the evidence presented in court in a span of three years (from 1978 to
1981) during which time all the parties were afforded the chance to adduce their
evidence. The absence of said formal document and the reliance on testimonial and
documentary evidence adduced during trial are explained by the trial court as follows:
o After hearing the testimony of defendants' witness Nestor Caylo who categorically
stated that the documents, vouchers, receipt and other papers which are needed to
substantiate the accounting he made were no longer available, to order defendants to
render an accounting would be an exercise in futility. After all, plaintiff has, as already
found above, satisfactorily established the amount which remained unspent after
deducting the actual and legitimate expenses.

4th Issue:

The petitioners dispute the application of Rule 13, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of
Court to their case alleging that the public respondent gravely abused his discretion in
issuing the questioned writ of execution on a mere technicality. They further allege
that if, in any case the lower court's judgment is valid, the gross negligence and
incompetence of their counsel then in failing to claim in the mails his claim of the
decision should not be taken against them. - In the instant case, there is proof that
copies of the lower court's decision were mailed to the petitioners' counsel at the
address on record, the William Lines Building, Pier 14, North Harbor, Manila on
October 6, 1981; that first, second and third notices of said registered mail were
delivered on October 9, 19 and 22, 1981, respectively to the guard-on-duty at
counsel's offices; and that petitioners' counsel failed to claim the mailed decision at
the post office. These facts indicate a correct application of the aforequoted provision
whereby the law create a presumption of valid service once there is a failure on the
part of the addressee to claim his mail as required despite the receipt of the proper
notices. - It is a well settled rule that when a party is represented by counsel, notice
should be made upon the counsel of record at his given address appearing in the
counsel's entry of appearance, to which notices of all kinds emanating from the court
should be sent in the absence of a proper and adequate notice to the court of a
change of address (Cubar v. Mendoza, 120 SCRA 768; and Lopez v. De los Reyes,
31 SCRA 214). The court cannot be expected to take judicial notice of the new
address of a lawyer who has moved or to ascertain on its own whether or not the
counsel of record has been changed and who the new counsel could possibly be or
where he probably resides or holds office.