CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY.
BRONDIAL)
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
RULE 73-90
SAN LUIS v. SAN LUIS
G.R. No. 133743 | February 6, 2007
Rules covered: Rule 73, 78, and 79 (and Art. 26, FC)
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters
of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the
Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of
his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, we laid
down the doctrinal rule for determining the residence – as
contradistinguished from domicile – of the decedent for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence"
as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This
term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is
elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or
purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73
of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence
rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the
statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as
meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense.
Some cases make a distinction between the terms
"residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes
fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the
same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words,
"resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular
sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation
of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies
physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this
popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is,
personal residence, not legal residence or domicile.
Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant
in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in
that place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile.
No particular length of time of residence is required though;
however, the residence must be more than temporary.
(Emphasis supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is
synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are
inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases.
Needless to say, there is a distinction between "residence" for
purposes of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the
venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are
treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to
which when absent, one has the intention of returning. However, for
purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a
person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual
residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal
residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency. Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence
in one place and domicile in another. In the instant case, while
petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in
Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death.
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GARCIA-QUIAZON v. QUIAZON
G.R. No. 189121 | July 31, 2013
Rules covered: Rule 73, 78, and 79 (and Marriages, FC)
*Similar ruling as the San Luis case re: residence and interested
parties (discussed here)
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals
cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue
for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las
Piñas City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo
resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas
City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate may be
laid in the said city.
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be
benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim
against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the
phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the
decedent Is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as
distributees.
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be
benefited by the distribution of Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an
interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record
produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners’
pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of the
decedent’s estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to
reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of
Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good
grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under
the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the estate are
satisfied. Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s estate as
one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an
interested party within the purview of the law.
AGTARAP v. AGTARAP
G.R. No. 177099 | June 8, 2011
Rules covered: Rule 73, 90, and Jurisdiction of Probate Court
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a
probate or an intestate court, relates only to matters having to do
with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of
deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of
questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent
rationale for this rule is that such court merely exercises special and
limited jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a probate court or one in
charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot
adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of
the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties, not by
virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title
adverse to that of the deceased and his estate. All that the said court
could do as regards said properties is to determine whether or not
they should be included in the inventory of properties to be
administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses
no problem, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the
opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action before a court
exercising general jurisdiction for a final determination of the
conflicting claims of title.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by
expediency and convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or
a testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the
inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to the final
determination of ownership in a separate action. Second, if the
interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of
collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of
jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not
impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on
ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)
collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the
determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in
the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased
spouse.
We hold that the general rule does not apply to the instant case
considering that the parties are all heirs of Joaquin and that no rights
of third parties will be impaired by the resolution of the ownership
issue. More importantly, the determination of whether the subject
properties are conjugal is but collateral to the probate court’s
jurisdiction to settle the estate of Joaquin.
Section 2, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides that when the
marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or the wife, the
community property shall be inventoried, administered, and
liquidated, and the debts thereof paid; in the testate or intestate
proceedings of the deceased spouse, and if both spouses have died,
the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate
proceedings of either. Thus, the RTC had jurisdiction to determine
whether the properties are conjugal as it had to liquidate the conjugal
partnership to determine the estate of the decedent. In fact, should
Joseph and Teresa institute a settlement proceeding for the intestate
estate of Lucia, the same should be consolidated with the settlement
proceedings of Joaquin, being Lucia’s spouse. Accordingly, the CA
correctly distributed the estate of Lucia, with respect to the properties
covered by TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255 subject of this case, to her
compulsory heirs.
Neither can Sebastian’s claim that Joaquin’s estate could have
already been settled in 1965 after the payment of the inheritance
tax be upheld. Payment of the inheritance tax, per se, does not settle
the estate of a deceased person. As provided in Section 1, Rule 90 of
the Rules of Court—
SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue made. --
When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of
administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance
tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with
law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the
executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the
estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the
residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same,
naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which each is
entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their
respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any
other person having the same in his possession. If there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs
of the deceased person or as to the distributive share to
which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy
shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations
above mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the
distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the
court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time
as the court directs.
Thus, an estate is settled and distributed among the heirs only after
the payment of the debts of the estate, funeral charges, expenses of
administration, allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax. The
records of these cases do not show that these were complied with in
1965.
Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, as cited above,
the RTC was specifically granted jurisdiction to determine who are the
lawful heirs of Joaquin, as well as their respective shares after the
payment of the obligations of the estate, as enumerated in the said
provision. The inclusion of Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, and Gloria in
the distribution of the shares was merely a necessary consequence of
the settlement of Joaquin’s estate, they being his legal heirs.
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SUNTAY III v. COJUANGCO-SUNTAY
G.R. No. 183053 | October 10, 2012
Rules covered: Rule 78 and 82
The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of
a decedent is laid down in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted.
– If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or
executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give
bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be
granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or
next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such
person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin,
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to
serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or
next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent
or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin,
neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person
to apply for administration or to request that administration
be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one
or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing
to serve;
(c) If there is not such creditor competent and willing to
serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court
may select.
Textually, the rule lists a sequence to be observed, an order of
preference, in the appointment of an administrator. This order of
preference, which categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the
next of kin and the creditors in the appointment of an administrator,
has been reinforced in jurisprudence.
The paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator
over the estate of a decedent is the prospective administrator’s
interest in the estate. This is the same consideration which Section 6,
Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the order of preference in
the appointment of administrator for the estate. The rationale behind
the rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and
economical administration of the estate, or, in the alternative, suffer
the consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have
the highest interest and most influential motive to administer the estate
correctly. In all, given that the rule speaks of an order of preference,
the person to be appointed administrator of a decedent’s estate must
demonstrate not only an interest in the estate, but an interest therein
greater than any other candidate.
The collected teaching is that mere demonstration of interest in the
estate to be settled does not ipso facto entitle an interested person to
co-administration thereof. Neither does squabbling among the heirs
nor adverse interests necessitate the discounting of the order of
preference set forth in Section 6, Rule 78. Indeed, in the appointment
of administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal
consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to
be appointed as administrator. Given Isabel’s unassailable interest in
the estate as one of the decedent’s legitimate grandchildren and
undoubted nearest "next of kin," the appointment of Emilio III as co-
administrator of the same estate, cannot be a demandable right. It is
a matter left entirely to the sound discretion of the Court and
depends on the facts and the attendant circumstances of the case.
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)
LEE & AGGABAO v. RTC OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 85
G.R. No. 146006 | February 23, 2004
Rules covered: Rule 89 and Art. 533, NCC
An heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the property
under administration under Art. 533 of the Civil Code which provides
that possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the
heir without interruption from the moment of death of the decedent.
However, an heir can only alienate such portion of the estate that may
be allotted to him in the division of the estate by the probate or
intestate court after final adjudication, that is, after all debtors shall
have been paid or the devisees or legatees shall have been given
their shares. This means that an heir may only sell his ideal or
undivided share in the estate, not any specific property therein. In the
present case, Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez sold specific
properties of the estate (1,014 and 1,011 shares of stock in
Philinterlife) in favor of petitioner FLAG. This they could not lawfully
do pending the final adjudication of the estate by the intestate court
because of the undue prejudice it would cause the other claimants to
the estate, as what happened in the present case.
Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez sold specific properties of the
estate, without court approval. It is well-settled that court approval is
necessary for the validity of any disposition of the decedent’s estate.
In the early case of Godoy vs. Orellano, we laid down the rule that the
sale of the property of the estate by an administrator without the
order of the probate court is void and passes no title to the purchaser.
There is hardly any doubt that the probate court can declare null and
void the disposition of the property under administration, made by
private respondent, the same having been effected without authority
from said court. It is the probate court that has the power to authorize
and/or approve the sale (Section 4 and 7, Rule 89), hence, a fortiori,
it is said court that can declare it null and void for as long as the
proceedings had not been closed or terminated.
Our jurisprudence is therefore clear that (1) any disposition of estate
property by an administrator or prospective heir pending final
adjudication requires court approval and (2) any unauthorized
disposition of estate property can be annulled by the probate court,
there being no need for a separate action to annul the unauthorized
disposition.
The question now is: can the intestate or probate court execute its
order nullifying the invalid sale? We see no reason why it cannot. The
intestate court has the power to execute its order with regard to the
nullity of an unauthorized sale of estate property, otherwise its power
to annul the unauthorized or fraudulent disposition of estate property
would be meaningless. In other words, enforcement is a necessary
adjunct of the intestate or probate court’s power to annul
unauthorized or fraudulent transactions to prevent the dissipation of
estate property before final adjudication.
HEIRS OF HILARIO RUIZ v. RUIZ
G.R. No. 208828-29 | August 13, 2014
Rules covered: Rule 83, 84, and 90 (and Art. 188, NCC)
On the matter of allowance, Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised Rules
of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family. — The widow and
minor or incapacitated children of a deceased person,
during the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom
under the direction of the court, such allowance as are
provided by law.
It is settled that allowances for support under Section 3 of Rule 83
should not be limited to the "minor or incapacitated" children of the
deceased. Article 188 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the
substantive law in force at the time of the testator's death, provides
3
that during the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the deceased's
legitimate spouse and children, regardless of their age, civil status or
gainful employment, are entitled to provisional support from the funds
of the estate. The law is rooted on the fact that the right and duty to
support, especially the right to education, subsist even beyond the
age of majority.
Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional
support from the funds of the decedent's estate. The law clearly limits
the allowance to "widow and children" and does not extend it to the
deceased's grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity.
It was error, therefore, for the appellate court to sustain the probate
court's order granting an allowance to the grandchildren of the
testator pending settlement of his estate.
An order releasing titles to properties of the estate amounts to an
advance distribution of the estate which is allowed only under the
following conditions:
Sec. 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings. —
Nothwithstanding a pending controversy or appeal in
proceedings to settle the estate of a decedent, the court
may, in its discretion and upon such terms as it may deem
proper and just, permit that such part of the estate as may
not be affected by the controversy or appeal be
distributed among the heirs or legatees, upon compliance
with the conditions set forth in Rule 90 of these Rules.
And Rule 90 provides that:
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue made. —
When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of
administration the allowance to the widow, and inheritance
tax if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law,
have been paid, the court, on the application of the
executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the
estate, and after hearing upon notice shall assign the
residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same,
naming them and the proportions or parts, to which each is
entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their
respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any
other person having the same in his possession. If there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs
of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to
which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy
shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the
obligations above-mentioned has been made or provided
for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a
sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment
of said obligations within such time as the court directs.
In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate
properties can only be made: (1) after all the debts, funeral charges,
expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and estate tax
have been paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only if the
distributees or any of them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court
conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within such time as
the court directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations.
In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles
to the Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments to the
private respondents after the lapse of six months from the date of
first publication of the notice to creditors. The questioned order
speaks of "notice" to creditors, not payment of debts and obligations.
Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts when he died but the taxes on his
estate had not hitherto been paid, much less ascertained. The estate
tax is one of those obligations that must be paid before distribution
of the estate. If not yet paid, the rule requires that the distributees
post a bond or make such provisions as to meet the said tax
obligation in proportion to their respective shares in the inheritance.
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)
Notably, at the time the order was issued the properties of the estate
had not yet been inventoried and appraised.
Still and all, petitioner cannot correctly claim that the assailed order
deprived him of his right to take possession of all the real and
personal properties of the estate. The right of an executor or
administrator to the possession and management of the real and
personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be
exercised "so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and
expenses of administration," Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules
of Court explicitly provides:
Sec. 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole estate to
pay debts, and to administer estate not willed. — An
executor or administrator shall have the right to the
possession and management of the real as well as the
personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary
for the payment of the debts and expenses for
administration.
It was relevantly noted by the probate court that petitioner had
deposited with it only a portion of the one-year rental income from
the Valle Verde property. Petitioner did not deposit its succeeding
rents after renewal of the lease. Neither did he render an accounting
of such funds.
Petitioner must be reminded that his right of ownership over the
properties of his father is merely inchoate as long as the estate has
not been fully settled and partitioned. As executor, he is a mere
trustee of his father's estate. The funds of the estate in his hands are
trust funds and he is held to the duties and responsibilities of a trustee
of the highest order. He cannot unilaterally assign to himself and
possess all his parents' properties and the fruits thereof without first
submitting an inventory and appraisal of all real and personal
properties of the deceased, rendering a true account of his
administration, the expenses of administration, the amount of the
obligations and estate tax, all of which are subject to a determination
by the court as to their veracity, propriety and justness.
UNIONBANK v. SANTIBAÑEZ
G.R. No. 149926 | February 23, 2005
Rules covered: Rule 86 and Jurisdiction of Probate Court
At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the
jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the deceased, to
determine whether they should or should not be included in the
inventory or list of properties to be administered. The said court is
primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation and
distribution of the estate.
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition
among the heirs until after the will has been probated:
“In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among
the heirs until after the will has been probated. The law
enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it,
because unless a will is probated and notice thereof given
to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his
property by will may be rendered nugatory. The
authentication of a will decides no other question than such
as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the
compliance with those requirements or solemnities which the
law prescribes for the validity of a will.
This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are
the same properties embraced in the will. In the present case, the
deceased left a holographic will which contained, inter alia, the
provision which reads as follows:
“(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and
may be discovered later after my demise, shall be
distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately
4
preceding paragraph in favor of Edmund and Florence, my
children.”
[T]he above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision embracing all
the properties left by the decedent which might have escaped his
mind at that time he was making his will, and other properties he may
acquire thereafter. Included therein are the three (3) subject tractors.
This being so, any partition involving the said tractors among the heirs
is not valid. The joint agreement executed by Edmund and Florence,
partitioning the tractors among themselves, is invalid, specially so
since at the time of its execution, there was already a pending
proceeding for the probate of their late father’s holographic will
covering the said tractors.
It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already
acquired jurisdiction over all the properties of the deceased, including
the three (3) tractors. To dispose of them in any way without the
probate court’s approval is tantamount to divesting it with jurisdiction
which the Court cannot allow. Every act intended to put an end to
indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a
partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a
compromise, or any other transaction. Thus, in executing any joint
agreement which appears to be in the nature of an extra-judicial
partition, court approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest
the court of its jurisdiction over that part of the estate. Moreover, it is
within the jurisdiction of the probate court to determine the identity of
the heirs of the decedent. In the instant case, there is no showing that
the signatories in the joint agreement were the only heirs of the
decedent. When it was executed, the probate of the will was still
pending before the court and the latter had yet to determine who the
heirs of the decedent were. Thus, for Edmund and respondent
Florence S. Ariola to adjudicate unto themselves the three (3) tractors
was a premature act, and prejudicial to the other possible heirs and
creditors who may have a valid claim against the estate of the
deceased.
Perusing the joint agreement, it provides that the heirs as parties
thereto "have agreed to divide between themselves and take
possession and use the above-described chattel and each of them to
assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel taken as herein
after stated which is in favor of First Countryside Credit Corp." The
assumption of liability was conditioned upon the happening of an
event, that is, that each heir shall take possession and use of their
respective share under the agreement. It was made dependent on the
validity of the partition, and that they were to assume the
indebtedness corresponding to the chattel that they were each to
receive. The partition being invalid as earlier discussed, the heirs in
effect did not receive any such tractor. It follows then that the
assumption of liability cannot be given any force and effect.
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The
petitioner, purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim Santibañez,
should have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in
accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which provides:
Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not
filed barred; exceptions. — All claims for money against the
decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether
the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for
funeral expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and
judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed
within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are
barred forever, except that they may be set forth as
counterclaims in any action that the executor or
administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an
executor or administrator commences an action, or
prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased
in his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the
claims he has against the decedent, instead of presenting
them independently to the court as herein provided, and
mutual claims may be set off against each other in such
action; and if final judgment is rendered in favor of the
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)
defendant, the amount so determined shall be considered
the true balance against the estate, as though the claim had
been presented directly before the court in the
administration proceedings. Claims not yet due, or
contingent, may be approved at their present value.
The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the
probate court is mandatory. As we held in the vintage case of Py Eng
Chong v. Herrera:
This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate
of the deceased by informing the executor or administrator
of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each
claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which
should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule
is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and
the early delivery of the property to the distributees,
legatees, or heirs. `The law strictly requires the prompt
presentation and disposition of the claims against the
decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate
as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the
residue.
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold private
respondent Florence S. Ariola accountable for any liability incurred
by her late father. The documentary evidence presented, particularly
the promissory notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were
executed and signed only by the late Efraim Santibañez and his son
Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its money claim with the
probate court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of
the decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing
guaranty, of course, subject to any defenses Edmund may have as
against the petitioner. As the court had not acquired jurisdiction over
the person of Edmund, we find it unnecessary to delve into the matter
further.
HEIRS OF MAGLASANG v. MANILA BANKING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 171206 | September 23, 2013
Rules covered: Rule 86 and 89
Claims against deceased persons should be filed during the settlement
proceedings of their estate. Such proceedings are primarily governed
by special rules found under Rules 73 to 90 of the Rules, although
rules governing ordinary actions may, as far as practicable, apply
suppletorily. Among these special rules, Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules
(Section 7, Rule 86) provides the rule in dealing with secured claims
against the estate:
SEC. 7. Mortgage debt due from estate. – A creditor holding
a claim against the deceased secured by a mortgage or
other collateral security, may abandon the security and
prosecute his claim in the manner provided in this rule, and
share in the general distribution of the assets of the estate;
or he may foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his
security, by action in court, making the executor or
administrator a party defendant, and if there is a judgment
for a deficiency, after the sale of the mortgaged premises,
or the property pledged, in the foreclosure or other
proceeding to realize upon the security, he may claim his
deficiency judgment in the manner provided in the
preceding section; or he may rely upon his mortgage or
other security alone, and foreclose the same at any time
within the period of the statute of limitations, and in that
event he shall not be admitted as a creditor, and shall
receive no share in the distribution of the other assets of the
estate; but nothing herein contained shall prohibit the
executor or administrator from redeeming the property
mortgaged or pledged, by paying the debt for which it is
held as security, under the direction of the court, if the court
shall adjudged it to be for the best interest of the estate
that such redemption shall be made.
5
As the foregoing generally speaks of "a creditor holding a claim
against the deceased secured by a mortgage or other collateral
security" as above-highlighted, it may be reasonably concluded that
the aforementioned section covers all secured claims, whether by
mortgage or any other form of collateral, which a creditor may
enforce against the estate of the deceased debtor. On the contrary,
nowhere from its language can it be fairly deducible that the said
section would – as the CA interpreted – narrowly apply only to
mortgages made by the administrator over any property belonging
to the estate of the decedent. To note, mortgages of estate property
executed by the administrator, are also governed by Rule 89 of the
Rules, captioned as "Sales, Mortgages, and Other Encumbrances of
Property of Decedent."
[T]he CA’s reliance on Philippine National Bank v. CA was misplaced
as the said case did not, in any manner, limit the scope of Section 7,
Rule 86. It only stated that the aforesaid section equally applies to
cases where the administrator mortgages the property of the estate
to secure the loan he obtained. Clearly, the pronouncement was a
ruling of inclusion and not one which created a distinction. It cannot,
therefore, be doubted that it is Section 7, Rule 86 which remains
applicable in dealing with a creditor’s claim against the mortgaged
property of the deceased debtor, as in this case, as well as
mortgages made by the administrator, as that in the PNB case.
Jurisprudence breaks down the rule under Section 7, Rule 86 and
explains that the secured creditor has three remedies/options that he
may alternatively adopt for the satisfaction of his indebtedness. In
particular, he may choose to: (a) waive the mortgage and claim the
entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim;
(b) foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove the deficiency as an
ordinary claim; and (c) rely on the mortgage exclusively, or other
security and foreclose the same before it is barred by prescription,
without the right to file a claim for any deficiency. It must, however,
be emphasized that these remedies are distinct, independent and
mutually exclusive from each other; thus, the election of one
effectively bars the exercise of the others. With respect to real
properties, the Court in Bank of America v. American Realty
Corporation pronounced:
In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage
creditor are deemed alternative and not cumulative.
Notably, an election of one remedy operates as a waiver
of the other. For this purpose, a remedy is deemed chosen
upon the filing of the suit for collection or upon the filing of
the complaint in an action for foreclosure of mortgage,
pursuant to the provision of Rule 68 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. As to extrajudicial foreclosure, such remedy
is deemed elected by the mortgage creditor upon filing of
the petition not with any court of justice but with the Office
of the Sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made,
in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135, as
amended by Act No.4118.
PILAPIL v. HEIRS OF BRIONES
G.R. No. 150175 | February 5, 2007
Rules covered: Settlement of estate, nature; Publication
While it is true that since the CFI was not informed that Maximino still
had surviving siblings and so the court was not able to order that
these siblings be given personal notices of the intestate proceedings, it
should be borne in mind that the settlement of estate, whether testate
or intestate, is a proceeding in rem, and that the publication in the
newspapers of the filing of the application and of the date set for the
hearing of the same, in the manner prescribed by law, is a notice to
the whole world of the existence of the proceedings and of the
hearing on the date and time indicated in the publication. The
publication requirement of the notice in newspapers is precisely for
the purpose of informing all interested parties in the estate of the
deceased of the existence of the settlement proceedings, most
especially those who were not named as heirs or creditors in the
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)
petition, regardless of whether such omission was voluntarily or
involuntarily made.
This Court cannot stress enough that the CFI Order was the result of
the intestate proceedings instituted by Donata before the trial court.
As this Court pointed out in its earlier Decision, the manner by which
the CFI judge conducted the proceedings enjoys the presumption of
regularity, and encompassed in such presumption is the order of
publication of the notice of the intestate proceedings. A review of the
records fails to show any allegation or concrete proof that the CFI
also failed to order the publication in newspapers of the notice of the
intestate proceedings and to require proof from Donata of
compliance therewith. Neither can this Court find any reason or
explanation as to why Maximino’s siblings could have missed the
published notice of the intestate proceedings of their brother.
SABIDONG v. SOLAS
A.M. No. P-01-1448 | June 25, 2013
Rules covered: Art. 1491, NCC; Properties in litigation
Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibits court officers
such as clerks of court from acquiring property involved in litigation
within the jurisdiction or territory of their courts. Said provision reads:
Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by
purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in
person or through the mediation of another: x x x
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior
and inferior courts, and other officers and employees
connected with the administration of justice, the property
and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before
the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise
their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of
acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with
respect to the property and rights which may be the object
of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of
their profession.
The rationale advanced for the prohibition is that public policy
disallows the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship
involved, i.e., the relation of trust and confidence and the peculiar
control exercised by these persons. In so providing, the Code tends to
prevent fraud, or more precisely, tends not to give occasion for fraud,
which is what can and must be done.
For the prohibition to apply, the sale or assignment of the property
must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the
property. Where the property is acquired after the termination of the
case, no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code
attaches.
In the case at bar, when respondent purchased Lot 11-A on November
21, 1994, the Decision in Civil Case No. 14706 which was
promulgated on May 31, 1983 had long become final. Be that as it
may, it can not be said that the property is no longer "in litigation" at
that time considering that it was part of the Hodges Estate then under
settlement proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. 1672).
A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or
litigation over it in court, but also from the moment that it becomes
subject to the judicial action of the judge. A property forming part of
the estate under judicial settlement continues to be subject of litigation
until the probate court issues an order declaring the estate
proceedings closed and terminated. The rule is that as long as the
order for the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the
probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated. The
probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only
after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered
to the heirs entitled to receive the same. Since there is no evidence to
show that Sp. Proc. No. 1672 in the RTC of Iloilo, Branch 27, had
already been closed and terminated at the time of the execution of
6
the Deed of Sale With Mortgage dated November 21, 1994, Lot 11
is still deemed to be "in litigation" subject to the operation of Article
1491 (5) of the Civil Code.
This notwithstanding, we hold that the sale of Lot 11 in favor of
respondent did not violate the rule on disqualification to purchase
property because Sp. Proc. No. 1672 was then pending before
another court (RTC) and not MTCC where he was Clerk of Court.
ARANAS v. MERCADO
G.R. No. 156407 | January 15, 2014
Rules covered: Rule 78 and 83
*Issue on jurisdiction of probate court to pass upon issue of ownership:
See Agtarap case above discussed.
Under Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of
administration may be granted at the discretion of the court to the
surviving spouse, who is competent and willing to serve when the
person dies intestate. Upon issuing the letters of administration to the
surviving spouse, the RTC becomes duty-bound to direct the
preparation and submission of the inventory of the properties of the
estate, and the surviving spouse, as the administrator, has the duty
and responsibility to submit the inventory within three months from the
issuance of letters of administration pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules
of Court, viz:
SEC. 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within three
months. – Within three (3) months after his appointment
every executor or administrator shall return to the court a
true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal
estate of the deceased which has come into his possession
or knowledge. In the appraisement of such estate, the court
may order one or more of the inheritance tax appraisers to
give his or their assistance.
The usage of the word all in Section 1, supra, demands the inclusion
of all the real and personal properties of the decedent in the
inventory. However, the word all is qualified by the phrase which has
come into his possession or knowledge, which signifies that the
properties must be known to the administrator to belong to the
decedent or are in her possession as the administrator. Section 1
allows no exception, for the phrase true inventory implies that no
properties appearing to belong to the decedent can be excluded
from the inventory, regardless of their being in the possession of
another person or entity.
The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and
appraisal of the estate of the decedent is "to aid the court in revising
the accounts and determining the liabilities of the executor or the
administrator, and in making a final and equitable distribution
(partition) of the estate and otherwise to facilitate the administration
of the estate." Hence, the RTC that presides over the administration of
an estate is vested with wide discretion on the question of what
properties should be included in the inventory. According to Peralta v.
Peralta, the CA cannot impose its judgment in order to supplant that of
the RTC on the issue of which properties are to be included or
excluded from the inventory in the absence of "positive abuse of
discretion," for in the administration of the estates of deceased
persons, "the judges enjoy ample discretionary powers and the
appellate courts should not interfere with or attempt to replace the
action taken by them, unless it be shown that there has been a
positive abuse of discretion." As long as the RTC commits no patently
grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the
regular performance of its judicial duty.
There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate
court is special and limited. The trial court cannot adjudicate title to
properties claimed to be a part of the estate but are claimed to
belong to third parties by title adverse to that of the decedent and
the estate, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent.
All that the trial court can do regarding said properties is to
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)
determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of
properties to be administered by the administrator. Such
determination is provisional and may be still revised. As the Court
said in Agtarap v. Agtarap:
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court,
either as a probate court or an intestate court, relates only
to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or
settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not
extend to the determination of questions of ownership that
arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this
rule is that such court merely exercises special and limited
jurisdiction.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by
expediency and convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or
a testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the
inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to final
determination of ownership in a separate action. Second, if the
interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of
collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of
jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not
impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on
ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or
collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the
determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in
the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased
spouse.
SILVERIO, SR. v. SILVERIO, JR.
G.R. No. 208828-29 | August 13, 2014
Rules covered: Rule 89; Authority to nullify sale of property of estate
*Rationale and complete explanation is provided for in the Lee case
above.
At the outset, we emphasize that the probate court having jurisdiction
over properties under administration has the authority not only to
approve any disposition or conveyance, but also to annul an
unauthorized sale by the prospective heirs or administrator.
It being settled that property under administration needs the
approval of the probate court before it can be disposed of, any
unauthorized disposition does not bind the estate and is null and void.
As early as 1921 in the case of Godoy vs. Orellano, We laid down
the rule that a sale by an administrator of property of the deceased,
which is not authorized by the probate court is null and void and title
does not pass to the purchaser.
In this case, the sale of the subject properties was executed by
respondent Silverio, Jr. with prior approval of the intestate court
under its Omnibus Order dated October 31, 2006. Subsequently,
however, the sale was annulled by the said court on motion by
petitioner.
BUTIONG v. PLAZO
G.R. No. 187524 | August 5, 2015
Rules covered: Rule 74
Petitioner is mistaken. It is true that some of respondents' causes of
action pertaining to the properties left behind by the decedent Pedro,
his known heirs, and the nature and extent of their interests thereon
may fall under an action for settlement of estate. However, a
complete reading of the complaint would readily show that, based on
the nature of the suit, the allegations therein, and the relief’s prayed
for, the action, is clearly one for judicial partition with annulment of
title and recovery of possession.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides:
7
Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between
heirs. – If the decedent left no will and no debts and the
heirs are all of age5 or the minors are represented by their
judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the
purpose, the parties may without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they
see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of
the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may
do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one
heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by
means of an affidavit filled in the office of the register of
deeds. The parties to an Extrajudicial settlement, whether
by public instrument or by stipulation in a pending action
for partition, or the sole heir who adjudicates the entire
estate to himself by means of an affidavit shall file,
simultaneously with and as a condition precedent to the
filing of the public instrument, or stipulation in the action for
partition, or of the affidavit in the office of the register of
deeds, a bond with the said register of deeds, in an amount
equivalent to the value of the personal property involved
as certified to under oath by the parties concerned and
conditioned upon the payment of any just claim that may be
filed under section 4 of this rule. It shall be presumed that
the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for
letters of administration within two (2) years after the death
of the decedent.
The fact of the Extrajudicial settlement or administration
shall be Published in a newspaper of general circulation in
the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no
Extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person
who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.
It must be recalled that the general rule is that when a person dies
intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his will or the
executor o named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or fails to
furnish the bond equipped by the Rules of Court, then the decedent's
estate shall be judicially administered and the competent court shall
appoint a qualified administrator the order established in Section 6
of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. An exception to this rule, however, is
found in the aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 74 wherein the heirs of a
decedent, who left no will and no debts due from is estate, may
divide the estate either extrajudicially or in an ordinary action or
partition without submitting the same for judicial administration nor
applying for the appointment of an administrator by the court. The
reason is that where the deceased dies without pending obligations,
there is no necessity for the appointment of an administrator to
administer the estate for them and to deprive the real owners of their
possession to which they are immediately entitled.
In this case, it was expressly alleged in the complaint, and was not
disputed, that Pedro died without a will, leaving his estate without
any ending obligations. Thus, contrary to petitioner’s contention,
respondents were under no legal obligation to submit the subject
properties of the estate of a special proceeding for settlement of
intestate estate, and are, in fact, encouraged to have the same
partitioned, judicially or extrajudicially.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however,
does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration
proceedings, even if the estate has no· debts or obligations,
if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an
ordinary action for partition. While Section 1 allows the
heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may
see fit, qr. to resort to an ordinary action for partition, the
said provision does not compel them to do so if they have
good reasons to take a different course of action. It should
be noted that recourse to an administration proceeding
even if the estate has no debts is sanctioned only if the heirs
have good reasons for not resorting to an action for
partition. Where partition is possible, either in or out of
court, the estate should not be burdened with an
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)

administration proceeding without good and compelling

reasons.

Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies

without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs,
whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the property
to a judicial administration, which is always long and costly,
or to apply for the appointment of an administrator by the
Court. It has been uniformly held that in such case the
judicial administration and the appointment of an
administrator are superfluous and unnecessary proceedings.

Thus, respondents committed no error in. filing an action for judicial

partition instead of a special proceeding for the settlement of estate
as law expressly permits the same. That the complaint contained
allegations inherent in an action for settlement of estate does not
mean that there was a prohibited joined of causes of action for
questions as to the estate's properties as well as a determination of
the heirs, their status as such, and the nature and extent of their title to
the estate, may also be properly ventilated in partition proceedings
alone. In fact, a complete inventory of the estate may likewise be
done during the partition proceedings, especially since the estate has
no debts. Indeed, where the more expeditious remedy of partition is
available to the heirs, then they may not be compelled to submit to
administration proceedings, dispensing of the risks of delay and of the
properties being dissipated

8
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)

RULE 91
ALVARICO v. SOLA
G.R. No. 138953 | June 6, 2002
Rules covered: Sec. 101 of Public Land Act
Even assuming that respondent Amelita Sola acquired title to the
disputed property in bad faith, only the State can institute reversion
proceedings under Sec. 101 of the Public Land Act. Thus:
Sec. 101.—All actions for reversion to the Government of
lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be
instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his
stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of
the Philippines.
In other words, a private individual may not bring an action for
reversion or any action which would have the effect of canceling a
free patent and the corresponding certificate of title issued on the
basis thereof, such that the land covered thereby will again form part
of the public domain. Only the Solicitor General or the officer acting
in his stead may do so. Since Amelita Sola's title originated from a
grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter between the
grantor and the grantee. Clearly then, petitioner has no standing at
all to question the validity of Amelita's title. It follows that he cannot
"recover" the property because, to begin with, he has not shown that
he is the rightful owner thereof.
like what transpired in this case. Clearly, it is not within the
competence of any citizen to barter away what public
policy by law seeks to preserve.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. ), This court also discussed the
policy behind the five-year prohibitory period:
It is well-known that the homestead laws were designed to
distribute disposable agricultural lots of the State to land-
destitute citizens for their home and cultivation. Pursuant to
such benevolent intention the State prohibits the sale or
encumbrance of the homestead (Section 116 within five
years after the grant of the patent. After that five-year
period the law impliedly permits alienation of the
homestead; but in line with the primordial purpose to favor
the homesteader and his family the statute provides that
such alienation or conveyance (Section 117) shall be subject
to the right of repurchase by the homesteader, his widow or
heirs within five years. This section 117 is undoubtedly a
complement of Section 116. It aims to preserve and keep in
the family of the homesteader that portion of public land
which the State had gratuitously given to him. It would,
therefore, be in keeping with this fundamental idea to hold,
as we hold, that the right to repurchase exists not only when
the original homesteader makes the conveyance, but also
when it is made by his widow or heirs. This construction is
clearly deducible from the terms of the statute.

The effect of violating the five-year prohibitory period is provided

MALTOS v. HEIRS OF BORROMEO
G.R. No. 172720 | September 14, 2015
Rules covered: Sec. 29, 101, 118 and 124 of Public Land Act
*See Alvarico re: who may institute escheat/reversion proceedings
The five-year period prohibiting the sale of land obtained under
homestead or free patent is provided under Section 118 of the Public
Land Act, which states:
SECTION 118. Except in favor of the Government or any of
its branches, units, or institutions, or legally constituted
banking corporations, lands acquired under free patent or
homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or
alienation from the date of the approval of the application
and for a term of five years from and after the date of
issuance1 of the patent or grant, nor shall they become
liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the
expiration of said period; but the improvements or crops on
the land may be mortgaged] or pledged to qualified
persons, associations, or corporations.
The reason for prohibiting the alienation or encumbrance of
properties covered by patent or grant was explained in Metropolitan
Bank and Trust Company v. Viray.
[T]he main purpose in the grant of a freq patent of
homestead is to preserve and keep in the family of the
homesteader that portion of public land which the State has
given to him so he may have a place to live with his family
and become a happy citizen and a useful member of the
society. In Jocson v. Soriano, we held that the conservation
of a family home is the purpose of homestead laws. The
policy of the state is to foster, families as the foundation of
society, and thus promote general welfare.
. .
Section 118 of CA 141, therefore, is predicated on public
policy. Its violation gives rise to the cancellation of the grant
and the reversion of the land and its improvements to the
government at the instance of the latter. The provision that
"nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt
contracted prior to that expiration of the five-year period"
is mandatory and any sale made in violation of such
provision is void and produces no effect whatsoever, just
under Section 124 of the Public Land Act, which provides:
SECTION 124. Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation,
transfer, or other contract made or executed in violation of
any of the provisions of sections one hundred and eighteen,
one hundred and twenty, one hundred and twenty-one, one
hundred and twenty-two, and one hundred and twenty-
three of this. Act shall be unlawful and null and void from its
execution and shall produce the effect of annulling and
cancelling the grant, title, patent, or permit originally
issued, recognized or confirmed, actually or presumptively,
and cause the reversion of the property and its
improvements to the State.
In this case, Section 101 of the Public Land Act is applicable since title
already vested in Eusebio Borromeo's name. Both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals found that the sale was made within the five-
year prohibitory period. Thus, there is sufficient cause to revert the
property in favor of the state. However, this court cannot declare
reversion of the property in favor of the state in view of the limitation
imposed by Section 101 that an action for reversion must first be filed
by the Office of the Solicitor General.
Section 124 of the Public Land Act indeed provides that any
acquisition, conveyance or transfer executed in violation of any of its
provisions shall be null and void and shall produce the effect of
annulling and cancelling the grant or patent and cause the reversion
of the property to the State, and the principle of pari delicto has
been applied by this Court in a number of cases wherein the parties
to a transaction have proven to be guilty of effected the transaction
with knowledge of the cause of its invalidity. But we doubt if these
principles can now be invoked considering the philosophy and the
policy behind the approval of the Public Land Act. The principle
underlying pari delicto as known here and in the United States is not
absolute in its application. It recognizes certain exceptions one of
. them being when its enforcement or application runs counter to an
avowed fundamental policy or to public interest. As stated by us in
the Rellosa case, This doctrine is subject to one important limitation,
namely, whenever public policy is considered advanced by allowing
either party to sue for relief against the transaction.
The case under consideration comes within the exception above
adverted to. Here appellee desires to nullify a transaction which was

9
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)

done in violation of the law. Ordinarily the principle of pari delicto
would apply to her because her predecessor-in-interest has carried
out the sale with the presumed knowledge of its illegality, but
because the subject of the transaction is a piece of public land, public
policy requires that she, as heir, be not prevented from re-acquiring it
because it was given by law to her family for her home and
cultivation. This is the policy on which our homestead law is
predicated. This right cannot be waived. "It is not within the
competence of any citizen to barter away what public policy by law
seeks to preserve." We are, therefore, constrained to hold that
appellee can maintain the present action it being in furtherance of this
fundamental aim of our homestead law.
Reversion is a remedy provided under Section 101 of the Public Land
Act:
SECTION 101. All actions for the reversion to the
Government of lands of the public domain or improvements
thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor-General or the
officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name
of Commonwealth of the Philippines.
The purpose of reversion is "to restore public land fraudulently
awarded and disposed of to private individuals or corporations to the
mass of public domain."
The general rule is that reversion of lands to the state is not automatic,
and the Office of the Solicitor General is the proper party to file an
action for reversion.
[Reversion] is not automatic. The government has to take
action to cancel the patent and the certificate of title in
order that the land involved may be reverted to it.
Correspondingly, any new transaction would be subject to
whatever steps the government may take for the reversion
to it.
explained that reversion under Section 29 is self-operative, unlike
Section 101 which requires the Office of the Solicitor General to
institute reversion proceedings. Also, Section 101 applies in cases
where "title has already vested in the individual."
As a matter of fact, Section 29 of the Public Land Law
(Commonwealth Act No. 141) expressly ordains that any
sale and encumbrance made without the previous approval
of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources "shall
be null and void and shall produce the effect of annulling
the acquisition and reverting property and all rights thereto
to the State, and all payments on the purchase price
theretofore made to the Government shall be forfeited.
In fact, even if a sales application were already given due
course by the Director of Lands, the applicant is not thereby
conferred any right over the land covered by the
application. It is the award made by the Director to the
applicant (if he is the highest bidder) that confers upon him
a certain right over the land, namely, "to take possession of
the land so that he could comply with the requirements
prescribed by law." It is at this stage, when the award is
made, that the land can be considered "disposed of by the
Government," since the aforestated right of the applicant
has the effect of withdrawing the land from the public
domain that is "disposable" by the Director of Lands under
the provisions of the Public Land Act. x x x However, the
disposition is merely provisional because the applicant has
still to comply with the requirements prescribed by law
before x x x any patent is issued. After the requisites of the
law are complied with by the applicant to the satisfaction of
the Director [of] Lands, the patent is issued. It is then that the
land covered by the application may be considered
"permanently disposed of by the Government.

We clarify that the remedy of reversion is not the same as the

remedy of declaration of nullity of free patents and certificate of
title. In reversion, the "allegations in the complaint would admit State
ownership of the disputed land," while in an action for the declaration
of nullity of free patent and certificate of title, the allegations would
include "plaintiffs ownership of the contested lot prior to the issuance
of [the] free patent and certificate of title."

Since an action for reversion presupposes that the property in dispute

is owned by the state, it is proper that the action be filed by the
Office of the Solicitor General, being the real party-in-interest.

There is, however, an exception to the rule that reversion is not

automatic. Section 29 of the Public Land Act provides:

SECTION 29. After the cultivation of the land has begun, the
purchaser, with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Commerce, may convey or encumber his rights to any
person, corporation, or association legally qualified under
this Act to purchase agricultural public lands, provided such
conveyance or encumbrance does not affect any right or
interest of the Government in the land: And provided,
further, That the transferee is not delinquent in the payment
of any installment due and payable. Any sale and
encumbrance made without the previous approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce shall be null and
void and shall produce the effect of annulling the acquisition
and reverting the property and all rights to the State, and
all payments on the purchase price theretofore made to the
Government shall be forfeited. After the sale has been
approved, the vendor shall not lose his right to acquire
agricultural public lands under the provisions of this Act,
provided he has the necessary qualifications.

In Francisco v. Rodriguez, et.al, this court differentiated reversion

under Sections 29 and 101 of the Public Land Act. This court

10
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)
RULE 92-97
GOYENA v. LEDESMA-GUSTILO
G.R. No. 147148 | January 13, 2003
Rules covered: Manner of selection of guardian (judicial discretion)
In the selection of a guardian, a large discretion must be allowed the
judge who deals directly with the parties. As this Court said:
As a rule, when it appears that the judge has exercised
care and diligence in selecting the guardian, and has given
due consideration to the reasons for and against his action
which are urged by the interested parties, his action should
not be disturbed unless it is made very clear that he has
fallen into grievous error. x x x
Petitioner’s assertion that respondent’s intent in instituting the
guardianship proceedings is to take control of Julieta’s properties and
use them for her own benefit is purely speculative and finds no
support from the records.
The claim that respondent is hostile to the best interests of Julieta also
lacks merit. That respondent removed Julieta from the Makati Medical
Center where she was confined after she suffered a stroke does not
necessarily show her hostility towards Julieta, given the observation
by the trial court, cited in the present petition, that Julieta was still
placed under the care of doctors after she checked out and was
returned to the hospital when she suffered another stroke.
Finally, this Court notes two undisputed facts in the case at bar, to wit:
1) Petitioner opposed the petition for the appointment of respondent
as guardian before the trial court because, among other reasons, she
felt she was disliked by respondent, a ground which does not render
respondent unsuitable for appointment as guardian, and 2) Petitioner
concealed the deteriorating state of mind of Julieta before the trial
court, which is reflective of a lack of good faith.
CAÑIZA v. CA & SPS. ESTRADA
G.R. No. 110427 | February 24, 1997
Rules covered: Rule 96, Termination of Guardianship (in re: Rule 3)
Amparo Evangelista was appointed by a competent court the general
guardian of both the person and the estate of her aunt, Carmen
Cañiza. Her Letters of Guardianship dated December 19, 1989
clearly installed her as the “guardian over the person and properties
of the incompetent CARMEN CANIZA with full authority to take
possession of the property of said incompetent in any province or
provinces in which it may be situated and to perform all other acts
necessary for the management of her properties…” By that
appointment, it became Evangelista’s duty to care for her aunt’s
person, to attend to her physical and spiritual needs, to assure her
well-being, with right to custody of her person in preference to
relatives and friends. It also became her right and duty to get
possession of, and exercise control over, Cañiza’s property, both real
and personal, it being recognized principle that the ward has no right
to possession or control of his property during her incompetency. That
right to manage the ward’s estate carries with it the right to take
possession thereof and recover it from anyone who retains it, and
bring and defend such actions as may be needful for this purpose.
Actually, in bringing the action of desahucio, Evangelista was merely
discharging the duty to attend to “the comfortable and suitable
maintenance of the ward” explicitly imposed on her by Section 4, Rule
96 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Sec. 4. Estate to be managed frugally, and proceeds applied
to maintenance of ward. — A guardian must manage the
estate of his ward frugally and without waste, and apply
the income and profits thereof, so far as maybe necessary,
to the comfortable and suitable maintenance of the ward
and his family, if there be any; and if such income and
11
profits be insufficient for that purpose, the guardian may
sell or encumber the real estate, upon being authorized by
order to do so, and apply to such of the proceeds as may
be necessary to such maintenance.
While it is indeed well-established rule that the relationship of
guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by the death of either
the guardian or the ward, the rule affords no advantage to the
Estradas. Amparo Evangelista, as niece of Carmen Cañiza, is one of
the latter’s only two (2) surviving heirs, the other being Cañiza’s
nephew, Ramon C. Nevado. On their motion and by Resolution of this
Court of June 20, 1994, they were in fact substituted as parties in the
appeal at bar in place of the deceased, in accordance with Section
17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Sec. 18. Death of a party. — After a party dies and the
claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon
proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to
appear and be substituted for the deceased within a
period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be
granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within
said time, the court may order the opposing party to
procure the appointment of a legal representative of the
deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and
the representative shall immediately appear for and on
behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges
involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the
opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the
deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased,
without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem
for the minor heirs.
To be sure, an ejectment case survives the death of a party. Cañiza’s
demise did not extinguish the desahucio suit instituted by her through
her guardian. That action, not being a purely personal one, survived
her death; her heirs have taken her place and now represent her
interests in the appeal at bar.
NERI v. HEIRS OF UY
G.R. No. 194366 | October 10, 2012
Rules covered: Rule 93, Art. 320 and 326, NCC
*Rule 74 is discussed with regard to validity of the extrajudicial
settlement and its effect upon those who did not participate in the
partition.
With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the time of the
execution of the settlement and sale, their natural guardian and
father, Enrique, represented them in the transaction. However, on the
basis of the laws prevailing at that time, Enrique was merely clothed
with powers of administration and bereft of any authority to dispose
of their 2/16 shares in the estate of their mother, Anunciacion.
Articles 320 and 326 of the Civil Code, the laws in force at the time
of the execution of the settlement and sale, provide:
ART. 320. The father, or in his absence the mother, is the
legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child
under parental authority. If the property is worth more
than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a
bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance.
ART. 326. When the property of the child is worth more
than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall be
considered a guardian of the child’s property, subject to
the duties and obligations of guardians under the Rules of
Court.
Corollarily, Section 7, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court also provides:
SEC. 7. Parents as Guardians. – When the property of the
child under parental authority is worth two thousand pesos
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)

or less, the father or the mother, without the necessity of

court appointment, shall be his legal guardian. When the
property of the child is worth more than two thousand
pesos, the father or the mother shall be considered
guardian of the child’s property, with the duties and
obligations of guardians under these Rules, and shall file the
petition required by Section 2 hereof. For good reasons, the
court may, however, appoint another suitable persons.
Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property
and the receipt of fruits according to the natural purpose of the thing.
Any act of disposition or alienation, or any reduction in the substance
of the patrimony of child, exceeds the limits of administration. 13 Thus,
a father or mother, as the natural guardian of the minor under
parental authority, does not have the power to dispose or encumber
the property of the latter. Such power is granted by law only to a
judicial guardian of the ward’s property and even then only with
courts’ prior approval secured in accordance with the proceedings set
forth by the Rules of Court.
Consequently, the disputed sale entered into by Enrique in behalf of
his minor children without the proper judicial authority, unless ratified
by them upon reaching the age of majority, is unenforceable in
accordance with Articles 1317 and 1403(1) of the Civil Code which
provide:
ART. 1317. No one may contract in the name of another
without being authorized by the latter or unless he has by
law a right to represent him.
A contract entered into in the name of another by one who
has no authority or legal representation, or who has acted
beyond his powers, shall be unenforceable, unless it is
ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose
behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by the
other contracting party.
ART. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable,
unless they are ratified:
(1) Those entered into the name of another person by one
who has been given no authority or legal representation,
or who has acted beyond his powers; x x x
Ratification means that one under no disability voluntarily adopts and
gives sanction to some unauthorized act or defective proceeding,
which without his sanction would not be binding on him. It is this
voluntary choice, knowingly made, which amounts to a ratification of
what was theretofore unauthorized, and becomes the authorized act
of the party so making the ratification. Once ratified, expressly or
impliedly such as when the person knowingly received benefits from it,
the contract is cleansed from all its defects from the moment it was
constituted, as it has a retroactive effect.
In a guardianship proceeding, a court may appoint a
qualified guardian if the prospective ward is proven to be a
minor or an incompetent.
A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court tells us that
persons who, though of sound mind but by reason of age, disease,
weak mind or other similar causes, are incapable of taking care of
themselves and their property without outside aid are considered as
incompetents who may properly be placed under guardianship. The
full text of the said provision reads:
Sec. 2. Meaning of the word “incompetent.” – Under this
rule, the word “incompetent” includes persons suffering the
penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers,
prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read and
write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they
have lucid intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind,
but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other
similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of
themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby
an easy prey for deceit and exploitation.
We have held in the past that a “finding that a person is incompetent
should be anchored on clear, positive and definite evidence.” We
consider that evidentiary standard unchanged and, thus, must be
applied in the case at bar. x x x
In an analogous guardianship case wherein the soundness of mind of
the proposed ward was at issue, we had the occasion to rule that
“where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not
necessary [and that] the observations of the trial judge coupled with
evidence establishing the person’s state of mental sanity will suffice.”
ABAD v. BIASON
G.R. No. 191993 | December 5, 2012
Rules covered: Termination of guardianship (death of ward)
It is a well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and
ward is necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or
the ward. The supervening event of death rendered it pointless to
delve into the propriety of Biason’s appointment since the juridical tie
between him and Maura has already been dissolved. The petition,
regardless of its disposition, will not afford Abad, or anyone else for
that matter, any substantial relief.

OROPESA v. OROPESA
G.R. No. 184528 | April 25, 2012
Rules covered: Rule 92, Nature and purpose of guardianship

A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred

character, in which one person, called a “guardian” acts for
another called the “ward” whom the law regards as
incapable of managing his own affairs. A guardianship is
designed to further the ward’s well-being, not that of the
guardian. It is intended to preserve the ward’s property, as
well as to render any assistance that the ward may
personally require. It has been stated that while custody
involves immediate care and control, guardianship indicates
not only those responsibilities, but those of one in loco
parentis as well.

12
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)
RULE 98
ADVENT CAPITAL & FINANCE CORP. v. ALCANTARA
G.R. No. 183050 | January 25, 2012
Rules covered: Parties, Nature of Proceedings
The trust property is only fictitiously attributed by law to the trustee
"to the extent that the rights and powers vested in a nominal owner
shall be used by him on behalf of the real owner."
The real owner of the trust property is the trustor-beneficiary. In this
case, the trustors-beneficiaries are the Alcantaras. Thus, Advent
Capital could not dispose of the Alcantaras’ portfolio on its own. The
income and principal of the portfolio could only be withdrawn upon
the Alcantaras’ written instruction or order to Advent Capital. The
latter could not also assign or encumber the portfolio or its income
without the written consent of the Alcantaras. All these are stipulated
in the Trust Agreement.
Ultimately, the issue is what court has jurisdiction to hear and
adjudicate the conflicting claims of the parties over the dividends that
Belson held in trust for their owners. Certainly, not the rehabilitation
court which has not been given the power to resolve ownership
disputes between Advent Capital and third parties. Neither Belson nor
the Alcantaras are its debtors or creditors with interest in the
rehabilitation.
Advent Capital must file a separate action for collection to recover
the trust fees that it allegedly earned and, with the trial court’s
authorization if warranted, put the money in escrow for payment to
whoever it rightly belongs. Having failed to collect the trust fees at
the end of each calendar quarter as stated in the contract, all it had
against the Alcantaras was a claim for payment which is a proper
subject for an ordinary action for collection. It cannot enforce its
money claim by simply filing a motion in the rehabilitation case for
delivery of money belonging to the Alcantaras but in the possession of
a third party.
Rehabilitation proceedings are summary and non-adversarial in
nature, and do not contemplate adjudication of claims that must be
threshed out in ordinary court proceedings. Adversarial proceedings
similar to that in ordinary courts are inconsistent with the commercial
nature of a rehabilitation case. The latter must be resolved quickly
and expeditiously for the sake of the corporate debtor, its creditors
and other interested parties.
LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PEREZ
G.R. No. 166884| June 13, 2012
Rules covered: Trust Receipts Law (in re: Estafa under the RPC)
Section 4 of P.D. 115 defines a trust receipt transaction in this manner:
Section 4. What constitutes a trust receipt transaction. A trust
receipt transaction, within the meaning of this Decree, is any
transaction by and between a person referred to in this
Decree as the entruster, and another person referred to in
this Decree as entrustee, whereby the entruster, who owns or
holds absolute title or security interests over certain
specified goods, documents or instruments, releases the
same to the possession of the entrustee upon the latter's
execution and delivery to the entruster of a signed
document called a "trust receipt" wherein the entrustee
binds himself to hold the designated goods, documents or
instruments in trust for the entruster and to sell or otherwise
dispose of the goods, documents or instruments with the
obligation to turn over to the entruster the proceeds thereof
to the extent of the amount owing to the entruster or as
appears in the trust receipt or the goods, documents or
instruments themselves if they are unsold or not otherwise
disposed of, in accordance with the terms and conditions
13
specified in the trust receipt, or for other purposes
substantially equivalent to any of the following:
1. In the case of goods or documents, (a) to sell the goods
or procure their sale; or (b) to manufacture or process the
goods with the purpose of ultimate sale: Provided, That, in
the case of goods delivered under trust receipt for the
purpose of manufacturing or processing before its ultimate
sale, the entruster shall retain its title over the goods
whether in its original or processed form until the entrustee
has complied fully with his obligation under the trust receipt;
or (c) to load, unload, ship or tranship or otherwise deal
with them in a manner preliminary or necessary to their
sale.
There are two obligations in a trust receipt transaction. The first is
covered by the provision that refers to money under the obligation to
deliver it (entregarla) to the owner of the merchandise sold. The
second is covered by the provision referring to merchandise received
under the obligation to return it (devolvera) to the owner. Thus, under
the Trust Receipts Law, intent to defraud is presumed when (1) the
entrustee fails to turn over the proceeds of the sale of goods covered
by the trust receipt to the entruster; or (2) when the entrustee fails to
return the goods under trust, if they are not disposed of in accordance
with the terms of the trust receipts.
In all trust receipt transactions, both obligations on the part of the
trustee exist in the alternative – the return of the proceeds of the sale
or the return or recovery of the goods, whether raw or processed.
When both parties enter into an agreement knowing that the return of
the goods subject of the trust receipt is not possible even without any
fault on the part of the trustee, it is not a trust receipt transaction
penalized under Section 13 of P.D. 115; the only obligation actually
agreed upon by the parties would be the return of the proceeds of
the sale transaction. This transaction becomes a mere loan, where the
borrower is obligated to pay the bank the amount spent for the
purchase of the goods.
Article 1371 of the Civil Code provides that "[i]n order to judge the
intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and
subsequent acts shall be principally considered." Under this provision,
we can examine the contemporaneous actions of the parties rather
than rely purely on the trust receipts that they signed in order to
understand the transaction through their intent.
We note in this regard that at the onset of these transactions, LBP
knew that ACDC was in the construction business and that the
materials that it sought to buy under the letters of credit were to be
used for the following projects: the Metro Rail Transit Project and the
Clark Centennial Exposition Project. LBP had in fact authorized the
delivery of the materials on the construction sites for these projects, as
seen in the letters of credit it attached to its complaint. Clearly, they
were aware of the fact that there was no way they could recover the
buildings or constructions for which the materials subject of the
alleged trust receipts had been used. Notably, despite the allegations
in the affidavit-complaint wherein LBP sought the return of the
construction materials, its demand letter dated May 4, 1999 sought
the payment of the balance but failed to ask, as an alternative, for
the return of the construction materials or the buildings where these
materials had been used.
Based on these premises, we cannot consider the agreements between
the parties in this case to be trust receipt transactions because (1)
from the start, the parties were aware that ACDC could not possibly
be obligated to reconvey to LBP the materials or the end product for
which they were used; and (2) from the moment the materials were
used for the government projects, they became public, not LBP’s,
property. Since these transactions are not trust receipts, an action for
estafa should not be brought against the respondents, who are liable
only for a loan.
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)

The Trust Receipts Law punishes the dishonesty and abuse of

confidence in the handling of money or goods to the prejudice of
another, regardless of whether the latter is the owner or not. The law
does not singularly seek to enforce payment of the loan, as "there can
be no violation of [the] right against imprisonment for non-payment of
a debt."

In order that the respondents "may be validly prosecuted for estafa

under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, in
relation with Section 13 of the Trust Receipts Law, the following
elements must be established: (a) they received the subject goods in
trust or under the obligation to sell the same and to remit the
proceeds thereof to [the trustor], or to return the goods if not sold; (b)
they misappropriated or converted the goods and/or the proceeds of
the sale; (c) they performed such acts with abuse of confidence to the
damage and prejudice of Metrobank; and (d) demand was made on
them by [the trustor] for the remittance of the proceeds or the return
of the unsold goods."

In this case, no dishonesty or abuse of confidence existed in

the handling of the construction materials. In this case, the
misappropriation could be committed should the entrustee fail to
turn over the proceeds of the sale of the goods covered by the
trust receipt transaction or fail to return the goods themselves. The
respondents could not have failed to return the proceeds since their
allegations that the clients of ACDC had not paid for the projects it
had undertaken with them at the time the case was filed had never
been questioned or denied by LBP. What can only be attributed to
the respondents would be the failure to return the goods subject of the
trust receipts.

14
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)
ADOPTION
RULE 99-100
DOMESTIC ADOPTION ACT (R.A. 8552)
INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION ACT (R.A. 8043)
RULE ON ADOPTION (A.M. NO. 02-6-02-SC)
CANG v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 105308 | September 25, 1998
Rules covered: Consent, when necessary (in re: Art. 188, FC);
Abandonment; Physical estrangement alone, not abandonment; Effect
of legal separation; Joint parental authority
As amended by the Family Code, the statutory provision on consent
for adoption now reads:
Art. 188. The written consent of the following to the
adoption shall be necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if ten years of age or over;
(2) The parents by nature of the child, the legal guardian,
or the proper government instrumentality;
(3) The legitimate and adopted children, ten years of age
or over, of the adopting parent or parents;
(4) The illegitimate children, ten years of age or over, of the
adopting parents, if living with said parent and the latter's
spouse, if any; and
(5) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be
adopted.
Based on the foregoing, it is thus evident that notwithstanding the
amendments to the law, the written consent of the natural parent to
the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity. Notably, such
requirement is also embodied in Rule 99 of the Rules of Court as
follows:
Sec. 3. Consent to adoption. — There shall be filed with the
petition a written consent to the adoption signed by the
child, if fourteen years of age or over and not incompetent,
and by the child's spouse, if any, and by each of its known
living parents who is not insane or hopelessly intemperate or
has not abandoned the child, or if the child is in the custody
of an orphan asylum, children's home, or benevolent society
or person, by the proper officer or officers of such asylum,
home, or society, or by such persons; but if the child is
illegitimate and has not been recognized, the consent of its
father to the adoption shall not be required.
As clearly inferred from the foregoing provisions of law, the written
consent of the natural parent is indispensable for the validity of the
decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent
can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child 13 or
that such parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate." The court may
acquire jurisdiction over the case even, without the written consent of
the parents or one of the parents provided that the petition for
adoption alleges facts sufficient to warrant exemption from
compliance therewith. This is in consonance with the liberality with
which this Court treats the procedural aspect of adoption. Thus, the
Court declared:
The technical rules of pleading should not be stringently
applied to adoption proceedings, and it is deemed more
important that the petition should contain facts relating to
the child and its parents, which may give information to
those interested, than that it should be formally correct as a
pleading. Accordingly, it is generally held that a petition
will confer jurisdiction if it substantially complies with the
15
adoption statute, alleging all facts necessary to give the
court jurisdiction.
The allegations of abandonment in the petition for adoption, even
absent the written consent of petitioner, sufficiently vested the lower
court with jurisdiction since abandonment of the child by his natural
parents is one of the circumstances under which our statutes and
jurisprudence dispense with the requirement of written consent to the
adoption of their minor children.
However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily
because his consent thereto was not sought, the matter of whether he
had abandoned his child becomes a proper issue for determination.
The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a
preliminary issue that an adoption court must first confront. Only upon,
failure of the oppositor natural father to prove to the satisfaction of
the court that he did not abandon his child may the petition for
adoption be considered on its merits. x x x
In its ordinary sense, the word "abandon'' means to forsake entirely,
to forsake or renounce utterly. The dictionaries trace this word to the
root idea of "putting under a ban." The emphasis is on the finality and
publicity with which a thing or body is thus put in the control of
another, hence, the meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent never
to resume or claim one's rights or interests. In reference to
abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment
imports "any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to
forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the
child." It means "neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal
obligations of care and support which parents owe their children."
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner's conduct did not
manifest a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish
all parental claims over his children as to, constitute abandonment.
Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is
not tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was
physically absent as he was then in the United States, he was not
remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support
for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife
and children through letters and telephone. He used to send packages
by mail and catered to their whims. x x x
In a number of cases, this Court has held that parental authority
cannot be entrusted to a person simply because he could give the
child a larger measure of material comfort than his natural parent. x x
x Indeed, it would be against the spirit of the law if financial
consideration were to be the paramount consideration in deciding
whether to deprive a person of parental authority over his children.
There should be a holistic approach to the matter, taking into account
the physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual
needs of the child. x x x
The liberality with which this Court treats matters leading to adoption
insofar as it carries out the beneficent purposes of the law to ensure
the rights and privileges of the adopted child arising therefrom, ever
mindful that the paramount consideration is the overall benefit and
interest of the adopted child, should be understood in its proper
context and perspective. The Court's position, should not be
misconstrued or misinterpreted as to extend to inferences beyond the
contemplation of law and jurisprudence. The discretion to approve
adoption proceedings is not to be anchored solely on best interests of
the child but likewise, with due regard to the natural rights of the
parents over the child.
The transfer of custody over the children to Anna Marie by virtue of
the decree of legal separation did not, of necessity; deprive
petitioner of parental authority for the purpose of placing the children
up for adoption. Article 213 of the Family Code states: "in case of
legal separation of parents, parental authority shall be exercised by
the parent designated by the court." In awarding custody, the court
shall take into account "all relevant considerations, especially the
choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is
unfit."
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)
If should be noted, however, that the law only confers on the innocent
spouse the "exercise" of parental authority. Having custody of the
child, the innocent spouse shall implement the sum of parental rights
with respect to his rearing and care. The innocent spouse shall have
the right to the child's services and earnings, and the right to direct his
activities and make decisions regarding his care and control,
education, health and religion.
In a number of cases, this Court has considered parental authority,
the joint exercise of which is vested by the law upon the parents, as:
“x x x a mass of rights and obligations which the law
grants to parents for the purpose of the children's physical
preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of
their intellect and the education of their hearts and senses.
As regards parental authority, "there is no power, but a
task; no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no
sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the
minor."
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and
may not be transferred or renounced except in cases
authorized by law. The right attached to parental
authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver
of parental authority only in cases of adoption,
guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an
orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a
minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a
document, what is given is merely temporary custody and
it does not constitute a renunciation of parental
authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the
law still disallows the same.
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of
unemancipated children, are duty-bound and entitled to
keep them in their custody and company.”
As such, in instant case, petitioner may not be deemed as having been
completely deprived of parental authority, notwithstanding the award
of custody to Anna Marie in the legal separation case. To reiterate,
that award was arrived at by the lower court on the basis of the
agreement of the spouses. x x x
The law is clear that either parent may lose parental authority over
the child only for a valid reason. No such reason was established in
the legal separation case. In the instant case for adoption, the issue is
whether or not petitioner had abandoned his children as to warrant
dispensation of his consent to their adoption. Deprivation of parental
authority is one of the effects of a decree of adoption. But there
cannot be a valid decree of adoption in this case precisely because,
as this Court has demonstrated earlier, the finding of the courts below
on the issue of petitioner's abandonment of his family was based on a
misappreciation that was tantamount to non-appreciation, of facts on
record.
VDA. DE JACOB v. COUR OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 135216 | August 19, 1999
Rules covered: Burden of proof
As a rule, the factual findings of the trial court are accorded great
weight and respect by appellate courts, because it had the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and to note telltale
signs indicating the truth or the falsity of a testimony. The rule,
however, is not applicable to the present case, because it was Judge
Augusto O. Cledera, not the ponente, who heard the testimonies of the
two expert witnesses. Thus, the Court examined the records and found
that the Court of Appeals and the trial court "failed to notice certain
relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different
conclusion."
16
Central to the present question is the authenticity of Judge Moya's
signature on the questioned Order of Adoption. x x x Judge Moya's
statements contained no ambiguity.
The answer "I do not remember" did not suggest that Judge Moya
was unsure of what he was declaring. Clearly, Judge Moya could not
recall having ever issued the Order of Adoption. More importantly,
when shown the signature over his name, he positively declared that it
was not his.
Other considerations also cast doubt on the claim of respondent. The
alleged Order was purportedly made in open court. In his Deposition,
however, Judge Moya declared that he did not dictate decisions in
adoption cases. The only decisions he made in open court were
criminal cases, in which the accused pleaded guilty. Moreover, Judge
Moya insisted that the branch where he was assigned was always
indicated in his decisions and orders; yet the questioned Order did
not contain this information. Furthermore, Pilapil’s conduct gave no
indication that he recognized his own alleged adoption, as shown by
the documents that he signed and other acts that he performed
thereafter. In the same vein, no proof was presented that Dr. Jacob
had treated him as an adopted child. Likewise, both the Bureau of
Records Management in Manila and the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, issued Certifications that there
was no record that Pedro Pilapil had been adopted by Dr. Jacob.
Taken together, these circumstances inexorably negate the alleged
adoption of respondent.
The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person
claiming such relationship.50 This Respondent Pilapil failed to do.
Moreover, the evidence presented by petitioner shows that the
alleged adoption is a sham.
REPUBLIC v. HERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 117209 | February 9, 1996
Rules covered: Effects of adoption (Art. 189, FC) in re: change of
name (Rule 103, ROC); Separate and distinct proceedings; Joinder of
causes of action, when allowed (“Conceptual Unity” Rule)
Art. 189 of the Family Code enumerates in no uncertain terms the
legal effects of adoption:
(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a
legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the
reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
relationship of parent and child, including the right of the
adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
(2) The parental authority of the parents by nature over the
adopted shall terminate and be vested in the adopters,
except that if the adopter is the spouse of the parent by
nature of the adopted, parental authority over the adopted
shall be exercised jointly by both spouses; and
(3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents
and other blood relatives.
Clearly, the law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and
obligation, to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the
decree of adoption. It is the change of the adoptee's surname to
follow that of the adopter which is the natural and necessary
consequence of a grant of adoption and must specifically be
contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by
petitioner.
However, the given or proper name, also known as
the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it was
originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive
relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the
adoptee's registered Christian or first name. The automatic change
thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond
the purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)
nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor
furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot
properly be granted.
The name of the adoptee as recorded in the civil register should be
used in the adoption proceedings in order to vest the court with
jurisdiction to hear and determine the same, and shall continue to be
so used until the court orders otherwise. Changing the given or proper
name of a person as recorded in the civil register is a substantial
change in one's official or legal name and cannot be authorized
without a judicial order. The purpose of the statutory procedure
authorizing a change of name is simply to have, wherever possible, a
record of the change, and in keeping with the object of the statute, a
court to which the application is made should normally make its
decree recording such change.
The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil
register is the name appearing therein. If a change in one's name is
desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly complying with the
substantive and procedural requirements for a special proceeding for
change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the
sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and
accordingly determined. x x x
A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict
compliance with all the requirements therefor is indispensable in order
to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. It is an
independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself,
governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori, it cannot be granted by
means of any other proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or
an offshoot of another special proceeding would be to denigrate its
role and significance as the appropriate remedy available under our
remedial law system.
The Solicitor General correctly points out the glaring defects of the
subject petition insofar as it seeks the change of name of the adoptee,
all of which taken together cannot but lead to the conclusion that there
was no petition sufficient in form and substance for change of name as
would rightfully deserve an order therefor. It would be procedurally
erroneous to employ a petition for adoption to effect a change of
name in the absence of the corresponding petition for the latter relief
at law.
Neither can the allowance of the subject petition, by any stretch of
imagination and liberality, be justified under the rule allowing
permissive joinder of causes of action.
By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of
action, is meant the uniting of two or more demands or rights of action
in one action; the statement of more than one cause of action in a
declaration. It is the union of two or more civil causes of action, each
of which could be made the basis of a separate suit, in the same
complaint, declaration or petition. A plaintiff may under certain
circumstances join several distinct demands, controversies or rights of
action in one declaration, complaint or petition. x x x
While joinder of causes of action is largely left to the option of a
party litigant, Section 5, Rule 2 of our present Rules allows causes of
action to be joined in one complaint conditioned upon the following
requisites: (a) it will not violate the rules on jurisdiction, venue and
joinder of parties; and (b) the causes of action arise out of the same
contract, transaction or relation between the parties, or are for
demands for money or are of the same nature and character. x x x
Our rule on permissive joinder of causes of action, with
the proviso subjecting it to the correlative rules on jurisdiction, venue
and joinder of parties 31 and requiring a conceptual unity in the
problems presented, effectively disallows unlimited joinder.
Turning now to the present petition, while it is true that there is no
express prohibition against the joinder of a petition for adoption and
for change of name, we do not believe that there is any relation
between these two petitions, nor are they of the same nature or
character, much less do they present any common question of fact or
17
law, which conjointly would warrant their joinder. In short, these
petitions do not rightly meet the underlying test of conceptual unity
demanded to sanction their joinder under our Rules. x x x
The practically unrestricted freedom of the natural parent to select the
proper or given name of the child presupposes that no other name for
it has theretofore been entered in the civil register. Once such name is
registered, regardless of the reasons for such choice and even if it be
solely for the purpose of identification, the same constitutes the official
name. This effectively authenticates the identity of the person and
must remain unaltered save when, for the most compelling reasons
shown in an appropriate proceeding, its change may merit judicial
approval.
While the right of a natural parent to name the child is recognized,
guaranteed and protected under the law, the so-called right of an
adoptive parent to re-name an adopted child by virtue or as a
consequence of adoption, even for the most noble intentions and
moving supplications, is unheard of in law and consequently cannot be
favorably considered. To repeat, the change of the surname of the
adoptee as a result of the adoption and to follow that of the adopter
does not lawfully extend to or include the proper or given name.
Furthermore, factual realities and legal consequences, rather than
sentimentality and symbolisms, are what are of concern to the Court.
REYES v. MAURICIO
G.R. No. 175080 | November 24, 2010
Rules covered: Collateral and direct attack in re: filiation, legitimacy,
and adoption
Eugenio contended that Leonida is a mere ward of Godofredo and
Librada, thus, not a legal heir.
We are in full accord with the Court of Appeals when it ruled that
Eugenio cannot collaterally attack the status of Leonida in the instant
petition.
It is settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked.20 Well-
known civilist Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino, in his book "Civil Code of the
Philippines, Commentaries and Jurisprudence," noted that the
aforecited doctrine is rooted from the provisions of the Civil Code of
the Philippines. He explained thus:
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of
defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a
different purpose. The necessity of an independent action
directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed
in the Mexican code (article 335) which provides: "The
contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his
heirs must be made by proper complaint before the
competent court; any contest made in any other way is
void." This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles
170 and 171 of the code confirm this view, because they
refer to "the action to impugn the legitimacy." This action
can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within
the periods fixed in the present articles.
In Braza, the Court stated that legitimacy and filiation can be
questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper
party, and not through collateral attack.
The same rule is applied to adoption such that it cannot also be made
subject to a collateral attack. In Reyes v. Sotero, this Court reiterated
that adoption cannot be assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the
settlement of a decedent’s estate. Furthermore, in Austria v. Reyes, the
Court declared that the legality of the adoption by the testatrix can
be assailed only in a separate action brought for that purpose and
cannot be subject to collateral attack.
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY
ASTORGA GARCIA
G.R. No. 148311 | March 31, 2005
Rules covered: Use of surname and middle name by adopted child;
Adoption, defined; Adoption proceedings in favor of the adopted
The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper
name and (2) the surname or family name. The given or proper name
is that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to
distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family name is
that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued
from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the
parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled is
fixed by law.
Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive
rules which regulate the use of surname of an individual whatever
may be his status in life, i.e., whether he may be legitimate or
illegitimate, an adopted child, a married woman or a previously
married woman, or a widow, thus:
Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall
principally use the surname of the father.
Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the
adopter. x x x
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the
use of a middle name. Even Article 176 of the Family Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as "An Act
Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father," is
silent as to what middle name a child may use.
The middle name or the mother’s surname is only considered in Article
375(1), quoted above, in case there is identity of names and
surnames between ascendants and descendants, in which case, the
middle name or the mother’s surname shall be added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee
may use. Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides that "an
adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter." Also, Article
189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is
likewise silent on the matter, thus:
"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be
a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the
reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
relationship of parent and child, including the right of the
adopted to use the surname of the adopters; x x x"
However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the
Civil Code and Family Law Committees that drafted the Family
Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding the surname of the
child’s mother as his middle name.
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related
or not to the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a
legitimate child. It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates
between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from
legitimate paternity and filiation. The modern trend is to consider
adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity
and filiation, but also as an act which endows the child with a
legitimate status. x x x Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the
"Domestic Adoption Act of 1998," secures these rights and privileges
for the adopted.
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a
legitimate child of the adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to
Article 189 of the Family Code and Section 17 Article V of RA 8552.
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that
Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate
child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the
18
surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above. This is
consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and
Family Law Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino
custom that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately
precede the surname of the father. x x x
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary,
should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of
adoption. The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of
primary and paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and
compassionate objectives of the law. x x x
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted
by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her
mother’s surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to
do so.
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM &
MICHEAL JUDE P. LIM
G.R. No. 168992-93 | May 21, 2009
Rules covered: Who may adopt; Joint adoption by husband and wife;
It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed,
petitioner had already remarried. She filed the petitions by herself,
without being joined by her husband Olario. We have no other
recourse but to affirm the trial court’s decision denying the petitions
for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III
of RA 8552 reads:
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil
capacity and legal rights, of good moral character, has not
been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude,
emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for
children, at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee,
and who is in a position to support and care for his/her
children in keeping with the means of the family. The
requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between the
age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the
adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is the
spouse of the adoptee’s parent;
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above
stated for Filipino nationals: Provided, That his/her country
has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines,
that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least
three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the
application for adoption and maintains such residence until
the adoption decree is entered, that he/she has been
certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any
appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal
capacity to adopt in his/her country, and that his/her
government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as
his/her adopted son/daughter: Provided, further, That the
requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s
qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for
the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a
relative within the fourth (4th) degree of
consanguinity or affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate
son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and
seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a
relative within the fourth (4th) degree of
consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouses; or
xxx
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the
following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate
son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own
illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however that
the other spouse has signified his/her consent
thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from
each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse
adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint
parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that
joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in
consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child
which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to
the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses
to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having
remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must
jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by
petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court
was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions
enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are not the
legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the
children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And third,
petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his
Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements
that Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the
qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must
prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the
Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least
three continuous years prior to the filing of the application for
adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption
decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own
country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopter’s country
as the latter’s adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown
and proved during the trial.
These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s
qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section
7. The children or adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree
of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the
adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.
As to the effects of adoption, Petitioner contends that joint parental
authority is not anymore necessary since the children have been
emancipated having reached the age of majority. This is untenable.
Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic
consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral,
mental and physical character and well-being.13 The father and the
mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of
their common children. Even the remarriage of the surviving parent
shall not affect the parental authority over the children, unless the
court appoints another person to be the guardian of the person or
property of the children.
It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation — that
is, when he attains the age of majority or 18 years of age16 —
emancipation terminates parental authority over the person and
property of the child, who shall then be qualified and responsible for
all acts of civil life.17 However, parental authority is merely just one
19
of the effects of legal adoption. Article V of RA 8552 enumerates the
effects of adoption, thus:
ARTICLE V: EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
SEC. 16. Parental Authority. - Except in cases where the
biological parent is the spouse of the adopter, all legal ties
between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be
severed and the same shall then be vested on the
adopter(s).
SEC. 17. Legitimacy. - The adoptee shall be considered the
legitimate son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intents and
purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and
obligations provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters
born to them without discrimination of any kind. To this end,
the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and support in
keeping with the means of the family.
SEC. 18. Succession. - In legal and intestate succession, the
adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of
succession without distinction from legitimate filiation.
However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s)
had left a will, the law on testamentary succession shall
govern.
Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties
between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the
biological parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee
as a legitimate child of the adopter; and (3) give adopter and
adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship
of parent and child, including but not limited to: (i) the right of the
adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and (ii) the right
of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each
other. Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental authority,
the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with
all the rights of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of
the father and the mother; (2) to receive support from their parents;
and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights.
Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted
child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are
entitled such as support and successional rights.
We are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being humane and
salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of
paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes,
parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned
children and give them the protection of society and family, as well as
to allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of
parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the
adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every
reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill
these noble and compassionate objectives of the law. But, as we have
ruled in Republic v. Vergara:
We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption
statutes, which is the promotion of the welfare of the
children. Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally,
in a manner that will sustain rather than defeat said
purpose. The law must also be applied with compassion,
understanding and less severity in view of the fact that it is
intended to provide homes, love, care and education for
less fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court is not in a
position to affirm the trial court’s decision favoring adoption
in the case at bar, for the law is clear and it cannot be
modified without violating the proscription against judicial
legislation. Until such time however, that the law on the
matter is amended, we cannot sustain the respondent-
spouses’ petition for adoption.
Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were
filed, should have jointly filed the petitions with her husband. x x x
Until and unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of the
marriage between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still subsists.
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)
That being the case, joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
required. We reiterate our ruling above that since, at the time the
petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner was married to Olario,
joint adoption is mandatory.
NERY v. SAMPANA
A.C. No. 10196 | September 9, 2014
Rules covered: Adoption of aliens, qualifications; Waiver of
qualifications (as to alien adopter)
*This is a disbarment proceeding. The case involves duties of a
lawyer.
In the present case, Sampana admitted that he received "one
package fee" for both cases of annulment and adoption. Despite
receiving this fee, he unjustifiably failed to file the petition for
adoption and fell short of his duty of due diligence and candor to his
client. Sampana’s proffered excuse of waiting for the certification
before filing the petition for adoption is disingenuous and flimsy. Inhis
position paper, he suggested to Nery that if the alien adopter would
be married to her close relative, the intended adoption could be
possible. Under the Domestic Adoption Act provision, which Sampana
suggested, the alien adopter can jointly adopt a relative within the
fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of his/her Filipino spouse,
and the certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt is waived.
Having no valid reason not to file the petition for adoption, Sampana
misinformed Nery of the status of the petition. He then conceded that
the annulment case overshadowed the petition for adoption. Verily,
Sampana neglected the legal matter entrusted to him.
CASTRO v. GREGORIO
G.R. No. 188801 | October 15, 2014
Rules covered: Jurisdiction; Consent required, when vitiated (fraud);
Annulment of judgment in re: adoption proceedings
*Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is also discussed.
The policy of the law is clear. In order to maintain harmony, there must
be a showing of notice and consent. This cannot be defeated by mere
procedural devices. In all instances where it appears that a spouse
attempts to adopt a child out of wedlock, the other spouse and other
legitimate children must be personally notified through personal
service of summons. It is not enough that they be deemed notified
through constructive service. x x x
It is settled that "the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the
statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action." As
Jose filed the petition for adoption on August 1, 2000, it is Republic
Act No. 855256 which applies over the proceedings. The law on
adoption requires that the adoption by the father of a child born out
of wedlock obtain not only the consent of his wife but also the consent
of his legitimate children.
Under Article III, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8552, the husband
must first obtain the consent of his wife if he seeks to adopt his own
children born out of wedlock:
ARTICLE III: ELIGIBILITY
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. — The following may adopt: x x
x Republic Act No. 8552. Personal service of summons should have been
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the
following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate
son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate
son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse
has signified his/her consent thereto; or
20
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other x
xx
The provision is mandatory. As a general rule, the husband and wife
must file a joint petition for adoption. The rationale for this is stated
in In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim:
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision
means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint
parental authority over the child which is the ideal
situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the
level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the
spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony
between the spouses.
The law provides for several exceptions to the general
rule, as in a situation where a spouse seeks to adopt his or
her own children born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint
adoption is not necessary. However, the spouse seeking to
adopt must first obtain the consent of his or her spouse.
In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose
and Rosario remained legally married despite their de
facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and Regina,
Rosario must first signify her consent to the adoption. Jose, however,
did not validly obtain Rosario’s consent. His submission of a fraudulent
affidavit of consent in her name cannot be considered compliance of
the requisites of the law. Had Rosario been given notice by the trial
court of the proceedings, she would have had a reasonable
opportunity to contest the validity of the affidavit. Since her consent
was not obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.
The law also requires the written consent of the adopter’s children if
they are 10 years old or older. In Article III, Section 9 of Republic Act
No. 8552:
SEC. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. —
After being properly counseled and informed of his/her
right to give or withhold his/her approval of the adoption,
the written consent of the following to the adoption is
hereby required: x x x
(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10)
years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if
any;
The consent of the adopter’s other children is necessary as it ensures
harmony among the prospective siblings. It also sufficiently puts the
other children on notice that they will have to share their parent’s love
and care, as well as their future legitimes, with another person.
It is undisputed that Joanne was Jose and Rosario’s legitimate child
and that she was over 10 years old at the time of the adoption
proceedings. Her written consent, therefore, was necessary for the
adoption to be valid.
To circumvent this requirement, however, Jose manifested to the trial
court that he and Rosario were childless, thereby preventing Joanne
from being notified of the proceedings. As her written consent was
never obtained, the adoption was not valid.
For the adoption to be valid, petitioners’ consent was required by
effected on the spouse and all legitimate children to ensure that their
substantive rights are protected. It is not enough to rely on constructive
notice as in this case. Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities
cannot be privileged over substantive statutory rights.
Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and
Joanne of the proceedings, it never validly acquired jurisdiction.
There was extrinsic fraud
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)
The appellate court, in denying the petition, ruled that while fraud
may have been committed in this case, it was only intrinsic fraud,
rather than extrinsic fraud. This is erroneous.
In People v. Court of Appeals and Socorro Florece: Extrinsic fraud
refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in litigation
committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated
party is prevented from fully exhibiting his side of the case by fraud
or deception practiced on him by his opponent, such as by keeping
him away from court, by giving him a false promise of a compromise,
or where the defendant never had the knowledge of the suit, being
kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff, or where an attorney
fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat.
An action for annulment based on extrinsic fraud must be brought
within four years from discovery. Petitioners alleged that they were
made aware of the adoption only in 2005. The filing of this petition
on October 18, 2007 is within the period allowed by the rules.
The badges of fraud are present in this case.
When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent the
participation of any other interested party, as in this case, then the
fraud is extrinsic, regardless of whether the fraud was committed
through the use of forged documents or perjured testimony during the
trial.
Jose’s actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from having a
reasonable opportunity to contest the adoption. Had Rosario and
Joanne been allowed to participate, the trial court would have
hesitated to grant Jose’s petition since he failed to fulfill the necessary
requirements under the law. There can be no other conclusion than that
because of Jose’s acts, the trial court granted the decree of adoption
under fraudulent circumstances.
The law itself provides for penal sanctions for those who violate its
provisions. Under Article VII, Section 21 of Republic Act No. 8552:
ARTICLE VII: VIOLATIONS AND PENALTIES
SEC. 21. Violations and Penalties. —
(a) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years
and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and/or a fine not less
than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), but not more than
Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) at the
discretion of the court shall be imposed on any person who
shall commit any of the following acts:
(i) obtaining consent for an adoption through coercion,
undue influence, fraud, improper material inducement, or
other similar acts;
(ii) non-compliance with the procedures and safeguards
provided by the law for adoption; or
(iii)subjecting or exposing the child to be adopted to
danger, abuse, or exploitation.
(b) Any person who shall cause the fictitious registration of
the birth of a child under the name(s)of a person(s) who is
not his/her biological parents(s) shall be guilty of simulation
of birth, and shall be punished by prision mayorin its
medium period and a fine not exceeding Fifty thousand
peso (P50,000.00).
Unfortunately, Jose's death carried with it the extinguishment of any
of his criminal liabilities. Republic Act No. 8552 also fails to provide
any provision on the status of adoption decrees if the adoption is
found to have been obtained fraudulently. Petitioners also cannot
invoke Article VI, Section 19 of Republic Act No. 855279 since
rescission of adoption can only be availed of by the adoptee.
Petitioners, therefore, are left with no other remedy in law other than
the annulment of the judgment.
BARTOLOME v. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
21
G.R. No. 192531 | November 12, 2014
Rules covered: Parents by “adoption” in re: LC and ECC Rules;
Rescission, when allowed; Death of adoptee (in re: successional rights)
In the same vein, the term "parents" in the phrase "dependent parents"
in the aforequoted Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is used and
ought to be taken in its general sense and cannot be unduly limited to
"legitimate parents" as what the ECC did. The phrase "dependent
parents" should, therefore, include all parents, whether legitimate or
illegitimate and whether by nature or by adoption. When the law
does not distinguish, one should not distinguish. Plainly, "dependent
parents" are parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate, biological or
by adoption, who are in need of support or assistance. x x x
In the instant case, there is no compelling reasonable basis to
discriminate against illegitimate parents. Simply put, the above-cited
rule promulgated by the ECC that limits the claim of benefits to the
legitimate parents miserably failed the test of reasonableness since
the classification is not germane to the law being implemented. We
see no pressing government concern or interest that requires
protection so as to warrant balancing the rights of unmarried parents
on one hand and the rationale behind the law on the other. On the
contrary, the SSS can better fulfill its mandate, and the policy of PD
626 - that employees and their dependents may promptly secure
adequate benefits in the event of work-connected disability or death
- will be better served if Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is not so
narrowly interpreted.
There being no justification for limiting secondary parent beneficiaries
to the legitimate ones, there can be no other course of action to take
other than to strike down as unconstitutional the phrase "illegitimate"
as appearing in Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on
Employees’ Compensation.
Petitioner qualifies as John’s dependent parent. To begin with,
nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that "legitimate
parents" pertain to those who exercise parental authority over the
employee enrolled under the ECP. It was only in the assailed Decision
wherein such qualification was made. In addition, assuming arguendo
that the ECC did not overstep its boundaries in limiting the adverted
Labor Code provision to the deceased’s legitimate parents, and that
the commission properly equated legitimacy to parental authority,
petitioner can still qualify as John’s secondary beneficiary.
True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adopted John, then about two (2) years
old, petitioner’s parental authority over John was severed. However,
lest it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed, aside from
Cornelio’s death, was that when the adoptive parent died less than
three (3) years after the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at
about four (4) years of age.
John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor
in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should
be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents.
Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a
personal relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by
virtue of adoption, who was then left to care for the minor adopted
child if the adopter passed away?
To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor
of the biological parents is not a novel concept. Section 20 of
Republic Act No. 855222 (RA 8552), otherwise known as the Domestic
Adoption Act, provides:
Section 20. Effects of Rescission.– If the petition [for
rescission of adoption] is granted, the parental authority of
the adoptee's biological parent(s), if known, or the legal
custody of the Department shall be restored if the adoptee
is still a minor or incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and
obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other
shall be extinguished.
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)

The provision adverted to is applicable herein by analogy insofar as
the restoration of custody is concerned. The manner herein of
terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the grounds for
rescission, justifies the retention of vested rights and obligations
between the adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent
restoration of parental authority in favor of the biological parents,
simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left
to fend for himself at such a tender age.
To emphasize, We can only apply the rule by analogy, especially
since RA 8552 was enacted after Cornelio’s death. Truth be told,
there is a lacuna in the law as to which provision shall govern
contingencies in all fours with the factual milieu of the instant petition.
Nevertheless, We are guided by the catena of cases and the state
policies behind RA 855224 wherein the paramount consideration is
the best interest of the child, which We invoke to justify this disposition.
It is, after all, for the best interest of the child that someone will
remain charged for his welfare and upbringing should his or her
adopter fail or is rendered incapacitated to perform his duties as a
parent at a time the adoptee is still in his formative years, and, to Our
mind, in the absence or, as in this case, death of the adopter, no one
else could reasonably be expected to perform the role of a parent
other than the adoptee’s biological one.
Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though
parental authority is severed by virtue of adoption, the ties between
the adoptee and the biological parents are not entirely eliminated. To
demonstrate, the biological parents, in some instances, are able to
inherit from the adopted, as can be gleaned from Art. 190 of the
Family Code:
Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the
adopted shall be governed by the following rules: x x x
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the
legitimate ascendants of the adopted concur with the
adopter, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half to be
inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half,
by the adopters; x x x
(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted
survive, then the ordinary rules of legal or intestate
succession shall apply.
evidence submitted to the ECC. As it appears in the records,
petitioner, prior to John’s adoption, was a housekeeper. Her late
husband died in 1984, leaving her to care for their seven (7) children.
But since she was unable to "give a bright future to her growing
children" as a housekeeper, she consented to Cornelio’s adoption of
Johnand Elizabeth in 1985.
Following Cornelio’s death in 1987, so records reveal, both petitioner
and John repeatedly reported "Brgy. Capurictan, Solsona, Ilocos
Norte" as their residence. In fact, this very address was used in John’s
Death Certificate executed in Brazil, and in the Report of Personal
Injury or Loss of Life accomplished by the master of the vessel
boarded by John. Likewise, this is John’s known address as per the
ECC’s assailed Decision. Similarly, this same address was used by
petitioner in filing her claim before the SSS La Union branch and,
thereafter, in her appeal with the ECC. Hence, it can be assumed that
aside from having been restored parental authority over John,
petitioner indeed actually execised the same, and that they lived
together under one roof.
Moreover, John, in his SSS application, named petitioner as one of his
beneficiaries for his benefits under RA 8282, otherwise known as the
"Social Security Law." While RA 8282 does not cover compensation
for work-related deaths or injury and expressly allows the
designation of beneficiaries who are not related by blood to the
member unlike in PD 626, John’s deliberate act of indicating
petitioner as his beneficiary at least evinces that he, in a way,
considered petitioner as his dependent. Consequently, the confluence
of circumstances – from Cornelio’s death during John’s minority, the
restoration of petitioner’s parental authority, the documents showing
singularity of address, and John’s clear intention to designate
petitioner as a beneficiary - effectively made petitioner, to Our mind,
entitled to death benefit claims as a secondary beneficiary under PD
626 as a dependent parent.
All told, the Decision of the ECC dated March 17, 2010 is bereft of
legal basis. Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not
deprive petitioner of the right to receive the benefits stemming from
John’s death as a dependent parent given Cornelio’s untimely demise
during John’s minority. Since the parent by adoption already died,
then the death benefits under the Employees' Compensation Program
shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John's sole remaining
beneficiary.

Similarly, at the time of Cornelio Colcol’s death, which was prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code, the governing provision is Art. 984 of
the New Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving

no children or descendants, his parents and relatives by
consanguinity and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs.

From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain

their rights of succession to the estate of their child who was the
subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an
SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted
child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least
reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by
adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In
the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood
relation, so too should certain obligations, which, We rule, include the
exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of
their minor offspring’s adoptive parent. We cannot leave
undetermined the fate of a minor child whose second chance at a
better life under the care of the adoptive parents was snatched from
him by death’s cruel grasp. Otherwise, the adopted child’s quality of
life might have been better off not being adopted at all if he would
only find himself orphaned in the end. Thus, We hold that Cornelio’s
death at the time of John’s minority resulted in the restoration of
petitioner’s parental authority over the adopted child.

On top of this restoration of parental authority, the fact of petitioner’s

dependence on John can be established from the documentary
22
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)
CHANGE OF NAME
RULE 103 and 108
ELEOSIDA v. LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF Q.C.
G.R. No. 130277 | May 9, 2002
Rules covered: Rule 108 (Section 3, 4, 5); Adversarial proceedings
Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the procedure for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The
proceedings under said rule may either be summary or adversary in
nature. If the correction sought to be made in the civil register is
clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the
rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a
party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is
adversary. This is our ruling in Republic v. Valencia where we held that
even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the
true facts established under Rule 108 provided the parties aggrieved
by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary
proceeding. An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one
where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant
facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing
counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party's
case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and
considered. The Court further laid down the procedural requirements
to make the proceedings under Rule 108 adversary, thus:
"The pertinent sections of Rule 108 provide:
SEC. 3. Parties.—When cancellation or correction of an
entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all
persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication.—Upon the filing of the
petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place
for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice
thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition.
The court shall also cause the order to be published once in
a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition.—The civil registrar and any person
having or claiming any interest under the entry whose
cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15)
days from notice, file his opposition thereto.
Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a
proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of an
entry in the civil register are—(1) the civil registrar, and (2)
all persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes
the duty of the court to—(1) issue an order fixing the time
and place for the hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the
order for hearing to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in
the province. The following are likewise entitled to oppose
the petition: (1) the civil registrar, and (2) any person
having or claiming any interest under the entry whose
cancellation or correction is sought.
If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a
petition for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the
record of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108
of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described as
'summary'.
23
REPUBLIC v. KHO
G.R. No. 170340 | June 29, 2007
Rules covered: Rule 108 (Sec. 3-5); Adversarial proceedings;
Rule 108 as action in rem;
It cannot be gainsaid that the petition, insofar as it sought to change
the citizenship of Carlito’s mother as it appeared in his birth
certificate and delete the "married" status of Carlito’s parents in his
and his siblings’ respective birth certificates, as well as change the
date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel involves the correction of not
just clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature. Rather, the
changes entail substantial and controversial amendments.
For the change involving the nationality of Carlito’s mother as
reflected in his birth certificate is a grave and important matter that
has a bearing and effect on the citizenship and nationality not only of
the parents, but also of the offspring.
Further, the deletion of the entry that Carlito’s and his siblings’ parents
were "married" alters their filiation from "legitimate" to "illegitimate,"
with significant implications on their successional and other rights.
Clearly, the changes sought can only be granted in an adversary
proceeding. Labayo-Rowe v. Republic explains the raison d’etre:
“The philosophy behind this requirement lies in the fact that the books
making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall
be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained. If the entries in
the civil register could be corrected or changed through mere
summary proceedings and not through appropriate action wherein all
parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or
represented, the door to fraud or other mischief would be set open,
the consequence of which might be detrimental and far reaching.”
In Republic v. Valencia, however, this Court ruled, and has since
repeatedly ruled, that even substantial errors in a civil registry may
be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108.
“It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a
petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a
harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality
or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as
controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a
proceeding summary in nature. However, it is also true that
a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be
remedied as long as the appropriate remedy is used. This
Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in
a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established provided the parties aggrieved by the error
avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.
xxx
What is meant by "appropriate adversary proceeding?"
Black’s Law Dictionary defines "adversary proceeding" as
follows:
One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished
from an ex parte application, one of which the party
seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party,
and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it.
The enactment in March 2001 of Republic Act No. 9048,
otherwise known as "An Act Authorizing the City or
Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General to Correct a
Clerical or Typographical Error in an Entry and/or Change
of First Name or Nickname in the Civil Register Without
Need of Judicial Order," has been considered to lend
legislative affirmation to the judicial precedence that
substantial corrections to the civil status of persons recorded
in the civil registry may be effected through the filing of a
petition under Rule 108.”
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)
Thus, this Court in Republic v. Benemerito observed that the obvious
effect of Republic Act No. 9048 is to make possible the administrative
correction of clerical or typographical errors or change of first name
or nickname in entries in the civil register, leaving to Rule 108 the
correction of substantial changes in the civil registry in appropriate
adversarial proceedings.
When all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are
thus followed, the appropriate adversary proceeding
necessary to effect substantial corrections to the entries of
the civil register is satisfied. x x x
The essential requisite for allowing substantial corrections of
entries in the civil registry is that the true facts be
established in an appropriate adversarial proceeding. This
is embodied in Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court,
which states:
Section 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an
entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all
persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
xxx
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the
whole world to the subsequent judgment on the petition. The
sweep of the decision would cover even parties who should
have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108, but were
inadvertently left out. x x x
Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an action
against a thing and not against a person. The decision on
the petition binds not only the parties thereto but the whole
world. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through
publication. Publication is notice to the whole world that the
proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who
might be minded to make an objection of any sort against
the right sought to be established. It is the publication of
such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the
case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide
it.”
With respect to the correction in Carlito’s birth certificate of his name
from "Carlito John" to "Carlito," the same was properly granted
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. As correctly pointed out by the
CA, the cancellation or correction of entries involving changes of name
falls under letter "o" of the following provision of Section 2 of Rule
108:
Section 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. — Upon good
and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be
cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal
separation; (e) judgments of annulment of marriage; (f) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h)
adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization;
(k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m)
judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a
minor; and (o) changes of name.
Hence, while the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 103 (which
governs petitions for change of name) were not complied with,
observance of the provisions of Rule 108 suffices to effect the
correction sought for.
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR
CANCELLATION OF ENTRY, JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG
G.R. No. 159966 | March 30, 2005
Rules covered: Rationale for grant of change of name; Characteristics
of a name; RA 9255 (amending Art. 176, FC); Art. 174, 364, FC
The Court has had occasion to express the view that the State has an
interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
24
identification, and that a change of name is a privilege and not a
right, so that before a person can be authorized to change his name
given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show
proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may
justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied.
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be
‘proper and reasonable cause’ for which the change is sought. To
justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only
some proper or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be
prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the
grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a)
when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to
write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal
consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid
confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage;
(e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former
alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f)
when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that
the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the
change of name would prejudice public interest.
In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of
proper and reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of the
court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court
and not all the best evidence available. What is involved is not a
mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a
judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the
justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the consequent
results in the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for
making such determination being lodged in the courts.
The petition before us is unlike other petitions for change of name, as
it does not simply seek to change the name of the minor petitioner
and adopt another, but instead seeks to drop the middle name
altogether. Decided cases in this jurisdiction involving petitions for
change of name usually deal with requests for change of surname.
There are only a handful of cases involving requests for change of the
given name18 and none on requests for changing or dropping of the
middle name. Does the law allow one to drop the middle name from
his registered name? We have to answer in the negative.
For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the
designation by which he is known and called in the
community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined
as the word or combination of words by which a person is
distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label
or appellation which he bears for the convenience of the
world at large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing
with him. Names are used merely as one method of
indicating the identity of persons; they are descriptive of
persons for identification, since, the identity is the essential
thing and it has frequently been held that, when identity is
certain, a variance in, or misspelling of, the name is
immaterial.
The names of individuals usually have two parts: the given
name or proper name, and the surname or family name.
The given or proper name is that which is given to the
individual at birth or baptism, to distinguish him from other
individuals. The name or family name is that which identifies
the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent
to child. The given name may be freely selected by the
parents for the child; but the surname to which the child is
entitled is fixed by law.
A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is
absolute, intended to protect the individual from being
confused with others. (2) It is obligatory in certain respects,
for nobody can be without a name. (3) It is fixed,
unchangeable, or immutable, at least at the start, and may
be changed only for good cause and by judicial
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)
proceedings. (4) It is outside the commerce of man, and,
therefore, inalienable and intransmissible by act inter vivos
or mortis causa. (5) It is imprescriptible.
Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated
children shall principally use the surname of the father. The Family
Code gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the
father and the mother, while illegitimate children shall use the
surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in
which case they may bear the father’s surname.
Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not
recognized by the father bears only a given name and his mother’s
surname, and does not have a middle name. The name of the
unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is
only when the illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent
marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public
document or private handwritten instrument that he bears both his
mother’s surname as his middle name and his father’s surname as his
surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an
acknowledged illegitimate child.
Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of such
individuals requires that the middle name be indicated in the
certificate. The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and
recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given or proper name, a
middle name, and a surname. x x x
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the
dropping his middle name is convenience. However, how such change
of name would make his integration into Singaporean society easier
and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his
middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute
proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete
name.
BRAZA v. CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF HIMAMAYLAN
NEGROS OCCIDENTAL
G.R. No. 181174 | December 4, 2009
Rules covered: Rule 108 in re: Art. 412, NCC; Nullification of
marriages via correction of entries
The petition fails. In a special proceeding for correction of entry
under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original
Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and
rule on legitimacy and filiation.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil
Code charts the procedure by which an entry in the civil registry may
be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein may
generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and
other innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical error is one which
is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made
by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a
harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly
misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent.
Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in
adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are
impleaded and due process is properly observed.
The allegations of the petition filed before the trial court clearly show
that petitioners seek to nullify the marriage between Pablo and
Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous and impugn Patrick’s filiation
in connection with which they ask the court to order Patrick to be
subjected to a DNA test.
Petitioners insist, however, that the main cause of action is for the
correction of Patrick’s birth records and that the rest of the prayers
are merely incidental thereto.
Petitioners’ position does not lie. Their cause of action is actually to
seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucille’s marriage as void for being
25
bigamous and impugn Patrick’s legitimacy, which causes of action are
governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took
effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 17118 of the Family Code,
respectively, hence, the petition should be filed in a Family Court as
expressly provided in said Code.
It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well
as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral
attack such as the petition filed before the court a quo.
SILVERIO v. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 174689 | October 22, 2007
Rules covered: RA 9048 in re: Art. 376, 406-407, 412-413; Grounds
for change of name; Sex reassignment not included
A person’s first name cannot be changed on the ground of sex
reassignment. x x x
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and
entities for purposes of identification. A change of name is a
privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are controlled by
statutes. In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname
without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error
Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical
Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. – No entry in
a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a
judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors
and change of first name or nickname which can be
corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal
civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the
provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and
regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power
and authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city
or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the
law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name
is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative
officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of
first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and
108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the
Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change
of name is first filed and subsequently denied. It likewise lays down
the corresponding venue, form and procedure. In sum, the remedy
and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily
administrative in nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name
may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or
Nickname. – The petition for change of first name or
nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be
ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to
write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and
continuously used by the petitioner and he has been
publicly known by that first name or nickname in the
community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his
sex reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with
the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery.
However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or
civil status. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the
ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing
petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create
grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present
proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such
change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the
use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or
even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his
true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the
change of petitioner’s first name was not within that court’s primary
jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil
registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an
improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative,
that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong
venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no
merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him
at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed
petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his first name was
concerned.
No law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on
the ground of sex reassignment.
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate
is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. In this
connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was
amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors
are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be
made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a
judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule
108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now
applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the
civil register.
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical
error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the
following terms shall mean: x x x
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake
committed in the performance of clerical work in writing,
copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register
that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or
misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the
eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected
or changed only by reference to other existing record or
records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve
the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the
petitioner.
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change
of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial
change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and
correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided
in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:
26
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the
civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil
register: (1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal
separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7)
legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of
natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12)
recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial
determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a
minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of
the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth. However, no
reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion
that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults
or error from" while to change means "to replace something with
something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a
substitute." The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All
entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and
sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry
of certain acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate
children and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages,
naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal
separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of
marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship,
civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of
name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal
consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and
nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the
laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events
mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned
by any law, expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that
is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of
his age, nationality and his family membership.
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and
relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable
at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being
married or not. The comprehensive term status… include such matters
as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights
in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth,
legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and
sometimes even succession.
A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations.
It is a part of a person’s legal capacity and civil status. In this
connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of
civil status shall be governed by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex
reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The
declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at the
birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent
of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration
of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be
exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to
the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the
birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth
or by either parent of the newborn child.
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall
certify to the following facts: (a) date and hour of birth;
(b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and
religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of
the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place
where the infant was born; and (f) such other data as may
be required in the regulations to be issued.
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record
of the facts as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a
person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant
(the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant.
Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment,
the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her
birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their
common and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary
legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the
Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all
other laws) should therefore be understood in their common and
ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In this
connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and
function that distinguish a male from a female" or "the distinction
between male and female." Female is "the sex that produces ova or
bears young" and male is "the sex that has organs to produce
spermatozoa for fertilizing ova." Thus, the words "male" and "female"
in everyday understanding do not include persons who have
undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed
in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are
presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels
to the contrary." Since the statutory language of the Civil Register
Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it
cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used then is something
alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-operative
male-to-female transsexual to be included in the category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his
body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no
law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for
that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the
correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.
REPUBLIC v. CAGANDAHAN
G.R. No. 166676 | September 12, 2008
Rules covered: Rule 103 and 108 in re: 407-408, 412-413, NCC;
Art. 376, NCC (as amended by RA 9048); Intersex (CAH) as ground
*The court cited Rule 103 and Rule 108 in full.
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate
is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. In this
connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was
amended by Republic Act No. 9048 in so far as clerical or
typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such
matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and
without the need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048
removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the
correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial
changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving
the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a
substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court.
27
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and
correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided
in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the
civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil
register: (1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal
separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7)
legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of
natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12)
recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial
determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a
minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of
the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth.
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or
"inappropriate" appearance of male characteristics. A person, like
respondent, with this condition produces too much androgen, a male
hormone. A newborn who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH
usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with the urethral opening at the base,
an ambiguous genitalia often appearing more male than female; (2)
normal internal structures of the female reproductive tract such as the
ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some
features start to appear male, such as deepening of the voice, facial
hair, and failure to menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to
18,000 children are born with CAH.
CAH is one of many conditions that involve intersex anatomy. During
the twentieth century, medicine adopted the term "intersexuality" to
apply to human beings who cannot be classified as either male or
female. The term is now of widespread use. According to Wikipedia,
intersexuality "is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species
whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex
characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male nor
female. An organism with intersex may have biological characteristics
of both male and female sexes." x x x
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for
recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which
should not be subject to outright denial. "It has been suggested that
there is some middle ground between the sexes, a ‘no-man’s land’ for
those individuals who are neither truly ‘male’ nor truly ‘female’." The
current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person
be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not
controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally
negates such rigid classification.
In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then
there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for gender.
But if we determine, based on medical testimony and scientific
development showing the respondent to be other than female, then a
change in the subject’s birth certificate entry is in order.
Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither
consistently and categorically female nor consistently and
categorically male) composition. Respondent has female (XX)
chromosomes. However, respondent’s body system naturally produces
high levels of male hormones (androgen). As a result, respondent has
ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic features of a male.
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or
naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification
would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the
age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent
here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body
produces high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is
preponderant biological support for considering him as being male.
Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)
classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of
such persons, like respondent, is fixed.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not
taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born
with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a
male. Respondent could have undergone treatment and taken steps,
like taking lifelong medication, to force his body into the categorical
mold of a female but he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has
instead taken its due course in respondent’s development to reveal
more fully his male characteristics.
REPUBLIC v. UY
G.R. No. 198010 | August 12, 2013
Rules covered: Rule 108 in re: interested parties; Failure to implead
necessary/indispensable parties, effects
*The court cited the case of Republic v. Valencia, as cited in the cases
above. Rule 108 was cited in full. Here, only the pertinent provision
will be cited.
Hence, the present petition on the sole ground that the petition is
dismissible for failure to implead indispensable parties.
Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry is governed by
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, to wit: x x x
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. – Upon
good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil
register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b)
marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments
of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h)
adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j)
naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l)
civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n)
voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of
name.
SEC. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an
entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all
persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. – Upon the filing of the
petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place
for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice
thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition.
The court shall also cause the order to be published once a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person
having or claiming any interest under the entry whose
cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of
publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto. x x x
In this case, respondent sought the correction of entries in her birth
certificate, particularly those pertaining to her first name, surname
and citizenship. She sought the correction allegedly to reflect the
name which she has been known for since childhood, including her
legal documents such as passport and school and professional
records. She likewise relied on the birth certificates of her full blood
siblings who bear the surname "Lugsanay" instead of "Sy" and
citizenship of "Filipino" instead of "Chinese." The changes, however,
are obviously not mere clerical as they touch on respondent’s filiation
and citizenship. In changing her surname from "Sy" (which is the
surname of her father) to "Lugsanay" (which is the surname of her
mother), she, in effect, changes her status from legitimate to
illegitimate; and in changing her citizenship from Chinese to Filipino,
28
the same affects her rights and obligations in this country. Clearly, the
changes are substantial.
It has been settled in a number of cases starting with Republic v.
Valencia that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be
corrected and the true facts established provided the parties
aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceeding. x x x
In this case, it was only the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City who
was impleaded as respondent in the petition below. This,
notwithstanding, the RTC granted her petition and allowed the
correction sought by respondent, which decision was affirmed in toto
by the CA.
The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of
general circulation and notice thereof was served upon the State will
not change the nature of the proceedings taken. A reading of
Sections 4 and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court shows that the Rules
mandate two sets of notices to different potential oppositors: one
given to the persons named in the petition and another given to other
persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be
considered interested or affected parties. Summons must, therefore,
be served not for the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction but
to comply with the requirements of fair play and due process to
afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if
he so chooses.
While there may be cases where the Court held that the failure to
implead and notify the affected or interested parties may be cured
by the publication of the notice of hearing, earnest efforts were made
by petitioners in bringing to court all possible interested parties. Such
failure was likewise excused where the interested parties themselves
initiated the corrections proceedings; when there is no actual or
presumptive awareness of the existence of the interested parties; or
when a party is inadvertently left out.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that when a petition for
cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves
substantial and controversial alterations, including those on citizenship,
legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict
compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 ofthe Rules of Court is
mandated. If the entries in the civil register could be corrected or
changed through mere summary proceedings and not through
appropriate action wherein all parties who may be affected by the
entries are notified or represented, the door to fraud or other
mischief would be set open, the consequence of which might be
detrimental and far reaching.
FUJIKI v. MARINAY
G.R. No. 196049 | June 26, 2013
Rules covered: Rule 108; Interested parties
*The case also discusses recognition of foreign judgments.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of
fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides
that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a
remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the
State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are
facts of public consequence such as birth, death or marriage,66 which
the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor
General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or
right of a party or a particular fact."
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in
any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of
persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may
file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of
any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of
the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located.
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese
Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his
civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the
personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of
marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the
basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material
interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and
the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is
interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in
the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage.
The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only
to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances68) his most intimate
human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by
operation of law the moment he contracts marriage.69 These
property interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family" and preserving the
property regime of the marriage.
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the
Constitution, but a spouse’s right in a marriage extends further to
relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations
between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of
the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage. In any case,
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right
by limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the
union recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of
a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequent
marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section
2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife"—it refers
to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article
35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the
beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the
husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the
prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages
void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public
crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any
citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes. If
anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of
nullity of a bigamous marriage, there is more reason to confer
personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting
marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public interest
of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested
in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the
spouse is clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in the
judgment of the suit. Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is
clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior
marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior
spouse." Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to
sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose,
29
he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such
judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established, there should
be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage
in the civil registry. x x x
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the
civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage.
A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive
and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards
are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution
of marriage, support pendente lite of the spouses and children, the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine
collusion. A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction
of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (R.A. 8369),
as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the
corresponding civil registry is located." In other words, a Filipino
citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of
changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or
cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the recognition of a
foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine
law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A
recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a
marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the
effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which
was already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369
define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
REPUBLIC v. OLAYBAR
G.R. No. 189538 | February 10, 2014
Rules covered: Rule 108; Summary v. adversarial proceedings;
*Here, the court cited the case of Fujiki v. Marinay.
At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this
Court from the decisions and final orders of the RTC may be taken
where only questions of law are raised or involved. There is a
question of law when the doubt arises as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts, which does not call for the examination of the
probative value of the evidence of the parties. Here, the issue raised
by petitioner is whether or not the cancellation of entries in the
marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the marriage may be
undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding. Verily, petitioner raised a pure
question of law. x x x
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The
proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is
clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the
rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a
party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is
adversary. Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia in 1986, the
Court has repeatedly ruled that "even substantial errors in a civil
registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108,
with the true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the error
availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding." An
appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court
has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully
and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given
opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case, and where the
evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered.
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)
It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing
may be dispensed with, and the remedy is granted upon mere
application or motion. However, a special proceeding is not always
summary. The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary
proceeding per se. It requires publication of the petition; it mandates
the inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim interest which
would be affected by the cancellation or correction; it also requires
the civil registrar and any person in interest to file their opposition, if
any; and it states that although the court may make orders
expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall
either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the same. Thus, as
long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the
appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections
and changes in entries of the civil register.
In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of
marriage are admittedly the personal circumstances of respondent.
The latter, however, claims that her signature was forged and she was
not the one who contracted marriage with the purported husband. In
other words, she claims that no such marriage was entered into or if
there was, she was not the one who entered into such contract. It must
be recalled that when respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR from
the NSO, it appeared that she was married to a certain Ye Son Sune.
She then sought the cancellation of entries in the wife portion of the
marriage certificate.
Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was
presented to show the existence of marriage. Rather, respondent
showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into
and that she was not even aware of such existence. The testimonial
and documentary evidence clearly established that the only
"evidence" of marriage which is the marriage certificate was a
forgery. While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to
determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings
before the trial court where all the parties had been given the
opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures
were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been
admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the
nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but
the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set
forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of
the subject certificate of marriage by canceling the wife portion
thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void
as there was no marriage to speak of.
ONDE v. OFFICE OF THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR LAS PIÑAS
G.R. No. 197174 | September 10, 2014
Rules covered: R.A. 9048, as amended by R.A. 10172; Clerical and
typographical errors; Substantial errors
*The case cited Eleosida, Silverio, Cagandahan, and Uy.
On the first issue, we agree with the RTC that the first name of
petitioner and his mother as appearing in his birth certificate can be
corrected by the city civil registrar under R.A. No. 9048. We note
that petitioner no longer contested the RTC’s ruling on this
point.4 Indeed, under Section 15 of R.A. No. 9048, clerical or
typographical errors on entries in a civil register can be corrected
and changes of first name can be done by the concerned city civil
registrar without need of a judicial order. Aforesaid Section 1, as
amended by R.A. No. 10172, now reads:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical
Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. – No entry in
a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a
judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors
and change of first name or nickname, the day and month
in the date of birth or sex of a person where it is patently
clear that there was a clerical or typographical error or
mistake in the entry, which can be corrected or changed by
the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul
30
general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations.
In Silverio v. Republic, we held that under R.A. No. 9048, jurisdiction
over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged
with administrative officers. The intent and effect of said law is to
exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103
(Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in
the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an
administrative petition for change of name is first filed and
subsequently denied. The remedy and the proceedings regulating
change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not
judicial. In Republic v. Cagandahan, we said that under R.A.No. 9048,
the correction of clerical or typographical errors can now be made
through administrative proceedings and without the need for a
judicial order. The law removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court the correction of clerical or typographical errors. Thus
petitioner can avail of this administrative remedy for the correction of
his and his mother’s first name.
On the second issue, we also agree with the RTC in ruling that
correcting the entry on petitioner’s birth certificate that his parents
were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol to "not married" is a
substantial correction requiring adversarial proceedings. Said
correction is substantial as it will affect his legitimacy and convert him
from a legitimate child to an illegitimate one. In Republic v. Uy, we
held that corrections of entries in the civil register including those on
citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of
marriage,involve substantial alterations. Substantial errors in a civil
registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the
parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceedings.
On the third issue, we likewise affirm the RTC in dismissing the petition
for correction of entries. As mentioned, petitioner no longer contested
the RTC ruling that the correction he sought on his and his mother’s first
name can be done by the city civil registrar. Under the circumstances,
we are constrained to deny his prayer that the petition for correction
of entries before the RTC bereinstated since the same petition includes
the correction he sought on his and his mother’s first name.
We clarify, however, that the RTC’s dismissal is without prejudice. As
we said, petitioner can avail of the administrative remedy for the
correction of his and his mother’s first name. He can also file a new
petition before the RTC to correct the alleged erroneous entry on his
birth certificate that his parents were married on December 23, 1983
in Bicol. This substantial correction is allowed under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court. x x x
In Eleosida, we cited Section 3, and Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court, as the procedural requirements laid down by the
Court to make the proceedings under Rule 108 adversary. In Uy, we
have similarly ruled that when a petition for cancellation or correction
of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and controversial
alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or
filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the
requirements of the Rules of Court is mandated. Thus, in his new
petition, petitioner should at least implead his father and mother as
parties since the substantial correction he is seeking will also affect
them.
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)
PREROGATIVE WRITS
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
*The Writ of Habeas Corpus was discussed after Rule 103 & 108
(Change of Name), together with other prerogative writs.
ILUSORIO v. BILDNER
G.R. No. 139789 | May 12, 2000
Rules covered: When issued; Object and purpose of the writ;
Habeas corpus in re: marriage;
May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to
live with her in conjugal bliss? The answer is no. Marital rights
including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be
enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld
from the one entitled thereto.
"Habeas corpus is a writ directed to the person detaining another,
commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner at a designated
time and place, with the day and cause of his capture and detention,
to do, submit to, and receive whatsoever the court or judge awarding
the writ shall consider in that behalf."
It is a high prerogative, common-law writ, of ancient origin, the great
object of which is the liberation of those who may be imprisoned
without sufficient cause. It is issued when one is deprived of liberty or
is wrongfully prevented from exercising legal custody over another
person. x x x
As heretofore stated, a writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a
person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is available where
a person continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his
constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where
the restraints are not merely involuntary but are unnecessary, and
where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become
arbitrary. It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint, as the best and only sufficient
defense of personal freedom.
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a
person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.
To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an
illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal
restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal
or moral.
The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention
or deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio’s liberty that would
justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio
is about 86 years of age, or under medication does not necessarily
render him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge
on age or medical condition but on the capacity of the individual to
discern his actions.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to
live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a
writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other means
or process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left
to the man and woman’s free choice.
31
SERAPIO v. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION)
G.R. No. 148468 | January 28, 2003
Rules covered: Issuance of writ, when allowed/not;
Issuance in re: bail proceedings; Remedies available
Anent the issue of the propriety of the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus for petitioner, he contends that he is entitled to the issuance of
said writ because the State, through the prosecution's refusal to
present evidence and by the Sandiganbayan's refusal to grant a bail
hearing, has failed to discharge its burden of proving that as against
him, evidence of guilt for the capital offense of plunder is strong.
Petitioner contends that the prosecution launched "a seemingly endless
barrage of obstructive and dilatory moves" to prevent the conduct of
bail hearings.
However, the People insist that habeas corpus is not proper because
petitioner was arrested pursuant to the amended information which
was earlier filed in court, the warrant of arrest issued pursuant
thereto was valid, and petitioner voluntarily surrendered to the
authorities.
As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty in custody of an officer
under a process issued by the court which jurisdiction to do so. In
exceptional circumstances, habeas corpus may be granted by the
courts even when the person concerned is detained pursuant to a
valid arrest or his voluntary surrender, for this writ of liberty is
recognized as "the fundamental instrument for safeguarding
individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action" due to
"its ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural
mazes." Thus, in previous cases, we issued the writ where the
deprivation of liberty, while initially valid under the law, had later
become invalid, and even though the persons praying for its issuance
were not completely deprived of their liberty.
The Court finds no basis for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in
favor of petitioner. The general rule that habeas corpus does not lie
where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
custody of an officer under process issued by a court which had
jurisdiction to issue the same applies, because petitioner is under
detention pursuant to the order of arrest issued by the
Sandiganbayan on April 25, 2001 after the filing by the
Ombudsman of the amended information for plunder against
petitioner and his co-accused. Petitioner had in fact voluntarily
surrendered himself to the authorities on April 25, 2001 upon
learning that a warrant for his arrest had been issued.
The ruling in Moncupa vs. Enrile that habeas corpus will lie where the
deprivation of liberty which was initially valid has become arbitrary
in view of subsequent developments finds no application in the
present case because the hearing on petitioner's application for bail
has yet to commence. As stated earlier, they delay in the hearing of
petitioner's petition for bail cannot be pinned solely on the
Sandiganbayan or on the prosecution for that matter. Petitioner
himself is partly to be blamed. Moreover, a petition for habeas
corpus is not the appropriate remedy for asserting one's right to
bail. It cannot be availed of where accused is entitled to bail not as a
matter of right but on the discretion of the court and the latter has not
abused such discretion in refusing to grant bail, or has not even
exercised said discretion. The proper recourse is to file an application
for bail with the court where the criminal case is pending and to allow
hearings thereon to proceed.
The issuance of a writ of habeas corpus would not only be unjustified
but would also preempt the Sandiganbayan's resolution of the
pending application for bail of petitioner. The recourse of petitioner
is to forthwith proceed with the hearing on his application for bail.
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)
LACSON v. PEREZ
G.R. No. 147780 | May 10, 2001
Rules covered: Issuance of the writ; Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
Anent petitioners' allegations ex abundante ad cautelam in support
of their application for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, it is
manifest that the writ is not called for since its purpose is to relieve
petitioners from unlawful restraint (Ngaya-an v. Balweg), a matter
which remains speculative up to this very day.
Section 5(1), Article VIII of the Constitution limits the original
jurisdiction of the Court to cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
*The opinion of Justice Kapunan is relevant, in my opinion.
Separate Opinion: Kapunan, J.
The declaration of a "state of rebellion" is supposedly based on
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution which reads:
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all
armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of
invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he
may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within
forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the President
shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress.
The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority
of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke
such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not
be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the
President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend
such proclamation or suspension for a period to be
determined by the Congress if the invasion or rebellion shall
persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours
following such proclamation or suspension, convene in
accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension
thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within
thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of
the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil
courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the
conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies
over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor
automatically suspend the privilege of the writ. x x x
Section 18 grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, the power to
call out the armed forces in cases of (1) lawless violence, (2) rebellion
and (3) invasion. In the latter two cases, i.e., rebellion or invasion, the
President may, when public safety requires, also (a) suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or (b) place the Philippines or
any part thereof under martial law. However, in the exercise of this
calling out power as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, the
Constitution does not require the President to make a declaration of a
"state of rebellion" (or, for that matter, of lawless violence or
invasion). The term "state of rebellion" has no legal significance. It is
vague and amorphous and does not give the President more power
than what the Constitution says, i. e, whenever it becomes necessary,
he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
32
violence, invasion or rebellion. As Justice Mendoza observed during
the hearing of this case, such a declaration is "legal surplusage." But
whatever the term means, it cannot diminish or violate constitutionally-
protected rights, such as the right to due process, the rights to free
speech and peaceful assembly to petition the government for redress
of grievances, and the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures, among others.
In Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora, et al., the Court held
that:
x x x The distinction (between the calling out power, on one
hand, and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus and to declare martial law, on the other
hand) places the calling out power in a different category
from the power to declare martial law and the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply
lumped together the three powers and provided for their
revocation and review without any qualification. x x x the
"calling out" power (because it) is considered as the lesser
and more benign power compared to the power to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to
impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment
and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual
freedoms, and thus necessitating affirmation by Congress
and, in appropriate cases, review by this Court.
In an ironic sense, a "state of rebellion" declared as a subterfuge to
effect warrantless arrest and detention for an unbailable offense
places a heavier burden on the people's civil liberties than the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus the
declaration of martial law because in the latter case, built-in
safeguards are automatically set on motion: (1) The period for
martial law or suspension is limited to a period not exceeding sixty
day; (2) The President is mandated to submit a report to Congress
within forty-eight hours from the proclamation or suspension; (3) The
proclamation or suspension is subject to review by Congress, which
may revoke such proclamation or suspension. If Congress is not in
session, it shall convene in 24 hours without need for call; and (4) The
sufficiency of the factual basis thereof or its extension is subject to
review by the Supreme Court in an appropriate proceeding.
Indeed, there is nothing in Section 18 which authorizes the President
or any person acting under her direction to make unwarranted
arrests. The existence of "lawless violence, invasion or rebellion" only
authorizes the President to call out the "armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion."
Not even the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or the declaration of martial law authorizes the President to
order the arrest of any person. The only significant consequence of
the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is to divest the courts of
the power to issue the writ whereby the detention of the person is put
in issue. It does not by itself authorize the President to order the arrest
of a person. And even then, the Constitution in Section 18, Article VII
makes the following qualifications:
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only
to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any
person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged
within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
In the instant case, the President did not suspend the writ of habeas
corpus. Nor did she declare martial law. A declaration of a "state of
rebellion," at most, only gives notice to the nation that it exists, and
that the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it, as in
fact she did. Such declaration does not justify any deviation from the
Constitutional proscription against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)
SANGCA v. CITY PROSECUTOR OF CEBU CITY
G.R. No. 175864 | June 8, 2007
Rules covered: Object and purpose; When issued
Finding that Adam could not be held liable for the crime charged,
Judge Ingles issued an Order on January 26, 2007 granting the
Motion to Withdraw Information and ordering the release of the
accused, unless otherwise held for another valid ground.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention in which any person is deprived of his liberty, or in which
the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled
to it. Its essential object and purpose is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint and to relieve a person from it if such restraint is
illegal. The singular function of a petition for habeas corpus is to
protect and secure the basic freedom of physical liberty.
In the instant case, records show that Adam has been released upon
order of the trial judge on January 26, 2007. Therefore, the petition
has become moot.
MANGILA v. PANGILINAN
G.R. No. 160739 | July 17, 2013
Rules covered: Nature, not a writ of error; Issuance, when not
available (restraint lawful); Remedy available
Restraint that is lawful and pursuant to a court process cannot be
inquired into through habeas corpus. x x x
The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus has been devised as a
speedy and effective remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint. In Caballes v. Court of Appeals, the Court discoursed on the
nature of the special proceeding of habeas corpus x x x
A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special
proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
In Ex Parte Billings, it was held that habeas corpus is that of a civil
proceeding in character. It seeks the enforcement of civil rights.
Resorting to the writ is not to inquire into the criminal act of which the
complaint is made, but into the right of liberty, notwithstanding the act
and the immediate purpose to be served is relief from illegal
restraint. The rule applies even when instituted to arrest a criminal
prosecution and secure freedom. When a prisoner petitions for a writ
of habeas corpus, he thereby commences a suit and prosecutes a case
in that court.
Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as
substitute for the trial court’s function. It cannot take the place of
appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The writ cannot be used to
investigate and consider questions of error that might be raised
relating to procedure or on the merits. The inquiry in a habeas corpus
proceeding is addressed to the question of whether the proceedings
and the assailed order are, for any reason, null and void. The writ is
not ordinarily granted where the law provides for other remedies in
the regular course, and in the absence of exceptional circumstances.
Moreover, habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of trial.
The orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies
exhausted before resorting to the writ where exceptional
circumstances are extant. In another case, it was held that habeas
corpus cannot be issued as a writ of error or as a means of reviewing
errors of law and irregularities not involving the questions of
jurisdiction occurring during the course of the trial, subject to the
caveat that constitutional safeguards of human life and liberty must
be preserved, and not destroyed. It has also been held that where
restraint is under legal process, mere errors and irregularities, which
do not render the proceedings void, are not grounds for relief by
habeas corpus because in such cases, the restraint is not illegal.
Habeas corpus is a summary remedy. It is analogous to a proceeding
in rem when instituted for the sole purpose of having the person of
restraint presented before the judge in order that the cause of his
detention may be inquired into and his statements final. The writ of
33
habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but
upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be the unlawful
authority. Hence, the only parties before the court are the petitioner
(prisoner) and the person holding the petitioner in custody, and the
only question to be resolved is whether the custodian has authority to
deprive the petitioner of his liberty. The writ may be denied if the
petitioner fails to show facts that he is entitled thereto ex merito
justicias.
A writ of habeas corpus, which is regarded as a "palladium of
liberty," is a prerogative writ which does not issue as a matter of right
but in the sound discretion of the court or judge. It is, however, a writ
of right on proper formalities being made by proof. Resort to the writ
is not to inquire into the criminal act of which a complaint is made but
unto the right of liberty, notwithstanding the act, and the immediate
purpose to be served is relief from illegal restraint. The primary, if
not the only object of the writ of habeas corpus ad subjuciendum, is to
determine the legality of the restraint under which a person is held.
The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality
of the detention, and, if the detention is found to be illegal, to require
the release of the detainee. Equally well-settled however, is that the
writ will not issue where the person in whose behalf the writ is sought
is out on bail, or is in the custody of an officer under process issued by
a court or judge with jurisdiction or by virtue of a judgment or order
of a court of record.
There is no question that when the criminal complaints were lodged
against Mangila and her cohorts on June 16, 2003, Judge Pangilinan,
as the Presiding Judge of the MTCC, was empowered to conduct
preliminary investigations involving "all crimes cognizable by the
proper court in their respective territorial jurisdictions." x x x
With Mangila’s arrest and ensuing detention being by virtue of the
order lawfully issued by Judge Pangilinan, the writ of habeas corpus
was not an appropriate remedy to relieve her from the restraint on
her liberty. This is because the restraint, being lawful and pursuant to
a court process, could not be inquired into through habeas corpus. To
quote the dictum enunciated by Justice Malcolm in Quintos v. Director
of Prisons:
The writ of habeas corpus secures to a prisoner the right to
have the cause of his detention examined and determined
by a court of justice, and to have ascertained if he is held
under lawful authority. The function of habeas corpus,
where the party who has appealed to its aid is in custody
under process, does not extend beyond an inquiry into the
jurisdiction of the court by which it was issued and the
validity of the process upon its face. It is not a writ of error.
Accordingly, Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court explicitly
states:
Section 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.- If
it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his
liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued
by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of
a court of record, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or
make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the
jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person
shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or
defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything
in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person
charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines,
or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful
judgment.
Still, Mangila harps on the procedural flaws supposedly committed by
Judge Pangilinan in her attempt to convince the Court on her
entitlement to the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. She insists
that the illegality and invalidity of the warrant of arrest because of
its having been issued without an exhaustive examination of the
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)
complainants and the witnesses in writing and under oath; without a
prior finding of probable cause; and without consideration of the
necessity for its issuance in order not to frustrate the ends of justice
were enough reasons for granting the writ of habeas corpus.
Mangila fails to persuade. Judge Pangilinan issued the order of
arrest after examining Palayon, one of the complainants against
Mangila and her cohorts. If he, as the investigating judge, considered
Palayon’s evidence sufficient for finding probable cause against her
and her cohorts, which finding the Court justifiably presumes from his
act of referring the case and its records to the Office of the City
Prosecutor on the day immediately following the preliminary
investigation he conducted, her petition for habeas corpus could not
be the proper remedy by which she could assail the adequacy of the
adverse finding. Even granting that there was a failure to adhere to
the law or rule, such failure would not be the equivalent of a violation
of her constitutional rights.
TUJAN-MILITANTE v. CADA-DEAPERA
G.R. No. 210636 | July 28, 2014
Rules covered: Writ in re: Custody of Minors (A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC);
Jurisdiction in re: B.P. 129; Writ similar to summons
In the case at bar, what respondent filed was a petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-
04-04-SC and Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. As provided:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.- A verified
petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of
minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be
enforceable within its judicial region to which the Family
Court belongs.
However, the petition may be filed with the regular court in
the absence of the presiding judge of the Family Court,
provided, however, that the regular court shall refer the
case to the Family Court as soon as its presiding judge
returns to duty.
The petition may also be filed with the appropriate regular
courts in places where there are no Family Courts.
The writ issued by the Family Court or the regular court
shall be enforceable in the judicial region where they
belong.
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court,
Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so
granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the
Philippines. The writ may be made returnable to a Family
Court or to any regular court within the region where the
petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for
hearing and decision on the merits.
Upon return of the writ, the court shall decide the issue on
custody of minors. The appellate court, or the member
thereof, issuing the writ shall be furnished a copy of the
decision.
Considering that the writ is made enforceable within a judicial region,
petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, whether they
be filed under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court or pursuant to Section
20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, may therefore be filed with any of the
proper RTCs within the judicial region where enforcement thereof is
sought.
On this point, Section 13 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129),
otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, finds
relevance. Said provision, which contains the enumeration of judicial
regions in the country, states:
34
Section 13. Creation of Regional Trial Courts. – There are
hereby created thirteen Regional Trial Courts, one for each
of the following judicial regions: x x x
The National Capital Judicial Region, consisting of the cities
of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan and Mandaluyong,
and the municipalities of Navotas, Malabon, San Juan,
Makati, Pasig, Pateros, Taguig, Marikina, Parañaque, Las
Piñas, Muntinlupa, and Valenzuela.
In view of the aforequoted provision, it is indubitable that the filing of
a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus before a family
court in any of the cities enumerated is proper as long as the writ is
sought to be enforced within the National Capital Judicial Region, as
here.
In the case at bar, respondent filed the petition before the family
court of Caloocan City. Since Caloocan City and Quezon City both
belong to the same judicial region, the writ issued by the RTC-
Caloocan can still be implemented in Quezon City. Whether petitioner
resides in the former or the latter is immaterial in view of the above
rule.
Anent petitioner’s insistence on the application of Section 3 of A.M.
No. 03-04-04-SC, a plain reading of said provision reveals that the
provision invoked only applies to petitions for custody of minors, and
not to habeas corpus petitions. Thus:
Section 3. Where to file petition.- The petition for custody of
minors shall be filed with the Family Court of the province
or city where the petitioner resides or where the minor may
be found.
Lastly, as regards petitioner’s assertion that the summons was
improperly served, suffice it to state that service of summons, to begin
with, is not required in a habeas corpus petition, be it under Rule 102
of the Rules of Court or A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC. As held in Saulo v.
Cruz, a writ of habeas corpus plays a role somewhat comparable to
a summons, in ordinary civil actions, in that, by service of said writ, the
court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the respondent.
IN MATTER OF PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DATUKAN
MALANG SALIBO v. WARDEN
G.R. No. 197597 | April 8, 2015
Rules covered: Petition for issuance of the writ; Where to file, where
to appeal; Final decision on petition for issuance vs. Issuance;
Remedies (when restraint lawful)
Contrary to petitioner Salibo's claim, respondent Warden correctly
appealed before the Court of Appeals.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made through a
petition filed before this court or any of its members, the Court of
Appeals or any of its members in instances authorized by law, or the
Regional Trial Court or any of its presiding judges. The court or judge
grants the writ and requires the officer or person having custody of
the person allegedly restrained of liberty to file a return of the
writ. A hearing on the return of the writ is then conducted.
The return of the writ may be heard by a court apart from that which
issued the writ. Should the court issuing the writ designate a lower
court to which the writ is made returnable, the lower court shall
proceed to decide the petition of habeas corpus. By virtue of the
designation, the lower court "acquires the power and authority to
determine the merits of the petition for habeas corpus." Therefore, the
decision on the petition is a decision appealable to the court that has
appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the lower court. x x x
In this case, petitioner Salibo filed his Petition for Habeas Corpus
before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals issued a Writ of
Habeas Corpus, making it returnable to the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 153, Pasig City. The trial court then heard respondent
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)

Warden on his Return and decided the Petition on the merits.
Applying Saulo and Medina, we rule that the trial court "acquired the
power and authority to determine the merits" of petitioner Salibo's
Petition. The decision on the Petition for Habeas Corpus, therefore,
was the decision of the trial court, not of the Court of Appeals. Since
the Court of Appeals is the court with appellate jurisdiction over
decisions of trial courts, respondent Warden correctly filed the
appeal before the Court of Appeals. x x x
Called the "great writ of liberty," the writ of habeas corpus "was
devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient
defense of personal freedom." The remedy of habeas corpus is
extraordinary and summary in nature, consistent with the law's
"zealous regard for personal liberty."
Under Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas
corpus "shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention
by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled
thereto." The primary purpose of the writ "is to inquire into all manner
of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve
a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal." "Any restraint which will
preclude freedom of action is sufficient."
The nature of the restraint of liberty need not be related to any
offense so as to entitle a person to the efficient remedy of habeas
corpus. It may be availed of as a post-conviction remedy or when
there is an alleged violation of the liberty of abode. In other words,
habeas corpus effectively substantiates the implied autonomy of
citizens constitutionally protected in the right to liberty in Article III,
Section 1 of the Constitution. Habeas corpus being a remedy for a
constitutional right, courts must apply a conscientious and deliberate
level of scrutiny so that the substantive right to liberty will not be
further curtailed in the labyrinth of other processes. x x x
The writ of habeas corpus is different from the final decision on the
petition for the issuance of the writ. It is the writ that commands the
production of the body of the person allegedly restrained of his or
her liberty. On the other hand, it is in the final decision where a court
determines the legality of the restraint.
Between the issuance of the writ and the final decision on the petition
for its issuance, it is the issuance of the writ that is essential. The
issuance of the writ sets in motion the speedy judicial inquiry on the
legality of any deprivation of liberty. Courts shall liberally issue writs
of habeas corpus even if the petition for its issuance "on its face is
devoid of merit." Although the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
may be suspended in cases of invasion, rebellion, or when the public
safety requires it, the writ itself may not be suspended. x x x
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the
offense charged
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the
person of the accused
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no
authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to
the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a
single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has
been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute
a legal excuse or justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or
acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.
In filing a motion to quash, the accused "assails the validity of a
criminal complaint or information filed against him [or her] for
insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are
apparent in the face of the information." If the accused avails himself
or herself of a motion to quash, the accused "hypothetically admits the
facts alleged in the information." "Evidence aliunde or matters
extrinsic from the information are not to be considered."
"If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint
or information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall
order [the] amendment [of the complaint or information]." If the
motion to quash is based on the ground that the facts alleged in the
complaint or information do not constitute an offense, the trial court
shall give the prosecution "an opportunity to correct the defect by
amendment." If after amendment, the complaint or information still
suffers from the same defect, the trial court shall quash the complaint
or information.
However, Ilagan and Umil do not apply to this case. Petitioner Salibo
was not arrested by virtue of any warrant charging him of an offense.
He was not restrained under a lawful process or an order of a court.
He was illegally deprived of his liberty, and, therefore, correctly
availed himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus.

It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal

charges have been filed in the proper courts against the petitioners.
The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in
the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge,
and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or
make the order, or if such person is charged before any court, the
writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed.

In such cases, instead of availing themselves of the extraordinary

remedy of a petition for habeas corpus, persons restrained under a
lawful process or order of the court must pursue the orderly course of
trial and exhaust the usual remedies. This ordinary remedy is to file a
motion to quash the information or the warrant of arrest.

At any time before a plea is entered, the accused may file a motion
to quash complaint or information based on any of the grounds
enumerated in Rule 117, Section 3 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 3. Grounds.—The accused may move to quash the

complaint or information on any of the following grounds:

35
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)
WRIT OF AMPARO
TAPUZ v. DEL ROSARIO
G.R. No. 182484 | June 17, 2008
Rules covered: What is covered by the writ; Allegations; Writ does
not cover matters which concern purely property rights
*The Writ of Habeas Data was discussed by the Court, but the same is
herein omitted.
To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally
conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of
killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of
available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary
concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights
to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent
remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a
remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect
concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ
that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds.
Consequently, the Rule on the writ of amparo - in line with the
extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that
its issuance demands - requires that every petition for the issuance of
the writ must be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit:
"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent
responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is
unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by
an assumed appellation;
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved
party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful
act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or
violation is committed with the attendant circumstances
detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the
names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the
investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner
and conduct of the investigation, together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to
determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party
and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act
or omission; and
(f) The relief prayed for.
The petition may include a general prayer for other just
and equitable reliefs."
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima
facie existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting
affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a
threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the
aggrieved party was or is being committed.
The issuance of the writ of amparo in the present case is anchored on
the factual allegations heretofore quoted, that are essentially
repeated in paragraph 54 of the petition. These allegations are
supported by the following documents: x x x
On the whole, what is clear from these statements - both sworn and
unsworn - is the overriding involvement of property issues as the
petition traces its roots to questions of physical possession of the
property disputed by the private parties. If at all, issues relating to
the right to life or to liberty can hardly be discerned except to the
extent that the occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The
right to security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the
threats and harassments implied from the presence of "armed men
bare to the waist" and the alleged pointing and firing of
36
weapons. Notably, none of the supporting affidavits compellingly
show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of the
petitioners is imminent or is continuing. x x x
Under these legal and factual situations, we are far from satisfied
with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts that would justify
the issuance of a writ of amparo. Rather than acts of terrorism that
pose a continuing threat to the persons of the petitioners, the violent
incidents alleged appear to us to be purely property-related and
focused on the disputed land. Thus, if the petitioners wish to seek
redress and hold the alleged perpetrators criminally accountable, the
remedy may lie more in the realm of ordinary criminal prosecution
rather than on the use of the extraordinary remedy of the writ of
amparo. x x x
Separately from these considerations, we cannot fail but consider too
at this point the indicators, clear and patent to us, that the petitioners'
present recourse via the remedy of the writ of amparo is a mere
subterfuge to negate the assailed orders that the petitioners sought
and failed to nullify before the appellate court because of the use of
an improper remedial measure. We discern this from the petitioners'
misrepresentations pointed out above; from their obvious act of forum
shopping; and from the recourse itself to the extraordinary remedies
of the writs of certiorari and amparo based on grounds that are far
from forthright and sufficiently compelling. To be sure, when recourses
in the ordinary course of law fail because of deficient legal
representation or the use of improper remedial measures, neither the
writ of certiorari nor that of amparo - extraordinary though they may
be - will suffice to serve as a curative substitute. The writ of amparo,
particularly, should not issue when applied for as a substitute for the
appeal or certiorari process, or when it will inordinately interfere with
these processes - the situation obtaining in the present case.
While we say all these, we note too that the Rule on the writ of
amparo provides for rules on the institution of separate actions, for
the effect of earlier-filed criminal actions, and for the consolidation of
petitions for the issuance of a writ of amparo with a subsequently filed
criminal and civil action. These rules were adopted to promote an
orderly procedure for dealing with petitions for the issuance of the
writ of amparo when the parties resort to other parallel recourses.
Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing
directly with the possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence
and harassment, we see no point in separately and directly
intervening through a writ of amparo in the absence of any
clear prima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or security -
the personal concern that the writ is intended to protect - is
immediately in danger or threatened, or that the danger or threat is
continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an application for the
issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a pending case on
appeal or on certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions on the
co-existence of the writ with a separately filed criminal case.
CANLAS v. NAPICO HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION (I-XII), INC.
G.R. No. 182795 | June 5, 2008
Rules covered: To whom available; What is covered by the writ
The Rule on the writ of amparo provides:
Section 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a
remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty
and security is violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof.
The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment
of the court, which in this case was affirmed with finality by this Court
in G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701, 177038, is not
included among the enumeration of rights as stated in the above-
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)
quoted Section 1 for which the remedy of a writ of amparo is made
available. Their claim to their dwelling, assuming they still have any
despite the final and executory judgment adverse to them, does not
constitute right to life, liberty and security. There is, therefore, no
legal basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo.
Besides, the factual and legal basis for petitioners’ claim to the land
in question is not alleged in the petition at all. The Court can only
surmise that these rights and interest had already been threshed out
and settled in the four cases cited above. No writ of amparo may be
issued unless there is a clear allegation of the supposed factual and
legal basis of the right sought to be protected.
Under Section 6 of the same rules, the court shall issue the writ upon
the filing of the petition, only if on its face, the court ought to issue
said writ.
Section 6. Issuance of the Writ. – Upon the filing of the
petition, the court, justice or judge shall immediately order
the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The
clerk of court shall issue the writ under the seal of the court;
or in case of urgent necessity, the justice or the judge may
issue the writ under his or her own hand, and may deputize
any officer or person to serve it.
The writ shall also set the date and time for summary
hearing of the petition which shall not be later than seven
(7) days from the date of its issuance.
Considering that there is no legal basis for its issuance, as in this case,
the writ will not be issued and the petition will be dismissed outright.
This new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by this
Court is intended for the protection of the highest possible rights of
any person, which is his or her right to life, liberty and security. The
Court will not spare any time or effort on its part in order to give
priority to petitions of this nature. However, the Court will also not
waste its precious time and effort on matters not covered by the writ.
CASTILLO v. CRUZ
G.R. No. 182165 | November 25, 2009
Rules covered: To whom available; What is covered by the writ; Writ
does not cover matters which concern purely property rights
The Court is, under the Constitution, empowered to promulgate rules
for the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. In view of
the heightening prevalence of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued and took
effect on October 24, 2007 which coincided with the celebration of
United Nations Day and affirmed the Court’s commitment towards
internationalization of human rights. More than three months later or
on February 2, 2008, the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data was
promulgated.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:
Section 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a
remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty
and security is violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a
remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in
life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or
of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the
37
person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved
party.
From the above-quoted provisions, the coverage of the writs is limited
to the protection of rights to life, liberty and security. And the writs
cover not only actual but also threats of unlawful acts or omissions.
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo teaches:
As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the
intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced
disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is
confined to these two instances or to threats
thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without
due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial
proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced
disappearances" are "attended by the following
characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a
person by a government official or organized groups or
private individuals acting with the direct or indirect
acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to
disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or
a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which
places such persons outside the protection of law.
To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must
meet the threshold requirement that their right
to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful
act or omission. Evidently, the present controversy arose out of a
property dispute between the Provincial Government and
respondents. Absent any considerable nexus between the acts
complained of and its effect on respondents’ right to life, liberty and
security, the Court will not delve on the propriety of petitioners’ entry
into the property.
Apropos is the Court’s ruling in Tapuz v. Del Rosario:
What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely
property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall
issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently,
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo – in line with the
extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable
certainty that its issuance demands – requires that every
petition for the issuance of the writ must be supported by
justifying allegations of fact, to wit: x x x
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied
with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts
determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the
circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or
violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the
aggrieved party was or is being committed.
It bears emphasis that respondents’ petition did not show any actual
violation, imminent or continuing threat to their life, liberty and
security. Bare allegations that petitioners "in unison, conspiracy and in
contempt of court, there and then willfully, forcibly and feloniously
with the use of force and intimidation entered and forcibly, physically
manhandled the petitioners (respondents) and arrested the herein
petitioners (respondents)" will not suffice to prove entitlement to the
remedy of the writ of amparo. No undue confinement or detention
was present. In fact, respondents were even able to post bail for the
offenses a day after their arrest.
Although respondents’ release from confinement does not necessarily
hinder supplication for the writ of amparo, absent any evidence or
even an allegation in the petition that there is undue and continuing
restraint on their liberty, and/or that there exists threat or
intimidation that destroys the efficacy of their right to be secure in
their persons, the issuance of the writ cannot be justified.
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)
RAZON, JR. v. TAGITIS
G.R. No. 182498 | December 3, 2009
Rules covered: Section 5(c), (d), and (e); Sufficiency in form and
substance of petition; Enforced disappearances, elements;
Characteristics of the writ; Quantum of evidence required;
Totality Rule
In questioning the sufficiency in form and substance of the
respondent’s Amparo petition, the petitioners contend that the petition
violated Section 5(c), (d), and (e) of the Amparo Rule. Specifically, the
petitioners allege that the respondent failed to:
1) allege any act or omission the petitioners committed in
violation of Tagitis’ rights to life, liberty and security;
2) allege in a complete manner how Tagitis was abducted,
the persons responsible for his disappearance, and the
respondent’s source of information;
3) allege that the abduction was committed at the
petitioners’ instructions or with their consent;
4) implead the members of CIDG regional office in
Zamboanga alleged to have custody over her husband;
5) attach the affidavits of witnesses to support her
accusations;
6) allege any action or inaction attributable to the
petitioners in the performance of their duties in the
investigation of Tagitis’ disappearance; and
7) specify what legally available efforts she took to
determine the fate or whereabouts of her husband.
A petition for the Writ of Amparo shall be signed and verified and
shall allege, among others (in terms of the portions the petitioners
cite):
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved
party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful
act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or
violation is committed with the attendant circumstances
detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the
names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the
investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner
and conduct of the investigation, together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to
determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party
and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act
or omission; and x x x
The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be
complete in every detail in stating the threatened or actual violation
of a victim’s rights. As in any other initiatory pleading, the pleader
must of course state the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action,
omitting the evidentiary details. In an Amparo petition, however, this
requirement must be read in light of the nature and purpose of the
proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner
may not be able to describe with certainty how the victim exactly
disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him
or her, or where the victim is detained, because these information may
purposely be hidden or covered up by those who caused the
disappearance. In this type of situation, to require the level of
specificity, detail and precision that the petitioners apparently want
to read into the Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a token gesture of
judicial concern for violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty
and security.
38
To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing
the unique Amparo situation, the test in reading the petition should be
to determine whether it contains the details available to the petitioner
under the circumstances, while presenting a cause of action showing a
violation of the victim’s rights to life, liberty and security through State
or private party action. The petition should likewise be read in its
totality, rather than in terms of its isolated component parts, to
determine if the required elements – namely, of the disappearance,
the State or private action, and the actual or threatened violations of
the rights to life, liberty or security – are present.
In the present case, the petition amply recites in its paragraphs 4 to
11 the circumstances x x x.
These allegations, in our view, properly pleaded ultimate facts within
the pleader’s knowledge about Tagitis’ disappearance, the
participation by agents of the State in this disappearance, the failure
of the State to release Tagitis or to provide sufficient information
about his whereabouts, as well as the actual violation of his right to
liberty. Thus, the petition cannot be faulted for any failure in its
statement of a cause of action.
If a defect can at all be attributed to the petition, this defect is its
lack of supporting affidavit, as required by Section 5(c) of the
Amparo Rule. Owing to the summary nature of the proceedings for
the writ and to facilitate the resolution of the petition, the Amparo
Rule incorporated the requirement for supporting affidavits, with the
annotation that these can be used as the affiant’s direct
testimony. This requirement, however, should not be read as an
absolute one that necessarily leads to the dismissal of the petition if
not strictly followed. Where, as in this case, the petitioner has
substantially complied with the requirement by submitting a verified
petition sufficiently detailing the facts relied upon, the strict need for
the sworn statement that an affidavit represents is essentially fulfilled.
We note that the failure to attach the required affidavits was fully
cured when the respondent and her witness (Mrs. Talbin) personally
testified in the CA hearings held on January 7 and 17 and February
18, 2008 to swear to and flesh out the allegations of the petition.
Thus, even on this point, the petition cannot be faulted.
Section 5(d) of the Amparo Rule requires that prior investigation of an
alleged disappearance must have been made, specifying the manner
and results of the investigation. Effectively, this requirement seeks to
establish at the earliest opportunity the level of diligence the public
authorities undertook in relation with the reported disappearance.
These allegations, to our mind, sufficiently specify that reports have
been made to the police authorities, and that investigations should
have followed. That the petition did not state the manner and results
of the investigation that the Amparo Rule requires, but rather
generally stated the inaction of the police, their failure to perform
their duty to investigate, or at the very least, their reported failed
efforts, should not be a reflection on the completeness of the petition.
To require the respondent to elaborately specify the names, personal
circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority, as well
the manner and conduct of the investigation is an overly strict
interpretation of Section 5(d), given the respondent’s frustrations in
securing an investigation with meaningful results. Under these
circumstances, we are more than satisfied that the allegations of the
petition on the investigations undertaken are sufficiently complete for
purposes of bringing the petition forward.
Section 5(e) is in the Amparo Rule to prevent the use of a petition –
that otherwise is not supported by sufficient allegations to constitute a
proper cause of action – as a means to "fish" for evidence.81 The
petitioners contend that the respondent’s petition did not specify what
"legally available efforts were taken by the respondent," and that
there was an "undue haste" in the filing of the petition when, instead
of cooperating with authorities, the respondent immediately invoked
the Court’s intervention. x x x
Section 5(e) merely requires that the Amparo petitioner (the
respondent in the present case) allege "the actions and recourses
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)
taken to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party
and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or
omission." The following allegations of the respondent’s petition duly
outlined the actions she had taken and the frustrations she
encountered, thus compelling her to file her petition. x x x
The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the "writ shall cover
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof." We note that although the writ specifically covers "enforced
disappearances," this concept is neither defined nor penalized in this
jurisdiction. x x x
Even without the benefit of directly applicable substantive laws on
extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances, however, the
Supreme Court is not powerless to act under its own constitutional
mandate to promulgate "rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure
in all courts," since extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances,
by their nature and purpose, constitute State or private party
violation of the constitutional rights of individuals to life, liberty and
security. Although the Court’s power is strictly procedural and as such
does not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights, the legal
protection that the Court can provide can be very meaningful through
the procedures it sets in addressing extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. The Court, through its procedural rules, can set the
procedural standards and thereby directly compel the public
authorities to act on actual or threatened violations of constitutional
rights. To state the obvious, judicial intervention can make a
difference – even if only procedurally – in a situation when the very
same investigating public authorities may have had a hand in the
threatened or actual violations of constitutional rights.
Lest this Court intervention be misunderstood, we clarify once again
that we do not rule on any issue of criminal culpability for the
extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance. This is an issue that
requires criminal action before our criminal courts based on our
existing penal laws. Our intervention is in determining whether an
enforced disappearance has taken place and who is responsible or
accountable for this disappearance, and to define and impose the
appropriate remedies to address it. The burden for the public
authorities to discharge in these situations, under the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo, is twofold. The first is to ensure that all efforts at
disclosure and investigation are undertaken under pain of indirect
contempt from this Court when governmental efforts are less than
what the individual situations require. The second is to address the
disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his or
her liberty and security restored. In these senses, our orders and
directives relative to the writ are continuing efforts that are not truly
terminated until the extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance is
fully addressed by the complete determination of the fate and the
whereabouts of the victim, by the production of the disappeared
person and the restoration of his or her liberty and security, and, in
the proper case, by the commencement of criminal action against the
guilty parties. x x x
In Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, this Court, in ruling that the
right to security of persons is a guarantee of the protection of one’s
right by the government, held that:
The right to security of person in this third sense is a
corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full
respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the
1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor
of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the
rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered
ineffective if government does not afford protection to
these rights especially when they are under
threat. Protection includes conducting effective
investigations, organization of the government apparatus to
extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or
enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their
families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The
Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed the
39
importance of investigation in the Velasquez Rodriguez
Case, viz:
(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious
manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be
ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be
assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not as a step
taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative
of the victim or his family or upon their offer of proof,
without an effective search for the truth by the government.
Sections 13, 17 and 18 of the Amparo Rule define the nature of
an Amparo proceeding and the degree and burden of proof the
parties to the case carry, as follows:
Section 13. Summary Hearing. The hearing on the petition
shall be summary. However, the court, justice or judge may
call for a preliminary conference to simplify the issues and
determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations and
admissions from the parties.
Section 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence
Required. – The parties shall establish their claims
by substantial evidence.
The respondent who is a private individual must prove that
ordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules
and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent who is a public official or employee must
prove that extraordinary diligence as required by
applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the
performance of duty.
The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke
the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed or evade responsibility or liability.
Section 18. Judgment. – x x x If the allegations in the
petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court
shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may
be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall
be denied.
These characteristics – namely, of being summary and the use of
substantial evidence as the required level of proof (in contrast to the
usual preponderance of evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt
in court proceedings) – reveal the clear intent of the framers of the
Amparo Rule to have the equivalent of an administrative proceeding,
albeit judicially conducted, in addressing Amparo situations. The
standard of diligence required – the duty of public officials and
employees to observe extraordinary diligence – point, too, to the
extraordinary measures expected in the protection of constitutional
rights and in the consequent handling and investigation of extra-
judicial killings and enforced disappearance cases.
Thus, in these proceedings, the Amparo petitioner needs only to
properly comply with the substance and form requirements of a Writ
of Amparo petition, as discussed above, and prove the allegations by
substantial evidence. Once a rebuttable case has been proven, the
respondents must then respond and prove their defenses based on the
standard of diligence required. The rebuttable case, of course, must
show that an enforced disappearance took place under circumstances
showing a violation of the victim’s constitutional rights to life, liberty or
security, and the failure on the part of the investigating authorities to
appropriately respond.
The landmark case of Ang Tibay v. CIR provided the Court its first
opportunity to define the substantial evidence required to arrive at a
valid decision in administrative proceedings:
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)
support a conclusion. The statute provides that ‘the rules of evidence
prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.’ The
obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative
boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere
admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial
proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. But this
assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does
not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having
rational probative force.
In Secretary of Defense v. Manalo, which was the Court’s first petition
for a Writ of Amparo, we recognized that the full and exhaustive
proceedings that the substantial evidence standard regularly requires
do not need to apply due to the summary nature of Amparo
proceedings. We said:
The remedy of the writ of amparo provides rapid judicial
relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires
only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs
available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine
criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or
liability for damages requiring preponderance of
evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring
substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive
proceedings.
Not to be forgotten in considering the evidentiary aspects of Amparo
petitions are the unique difficulties presented by the nature of
enforced disappearances, heretofore discussed, which difficulties this
Court must frontally meet if the Amparo Rule is to be given a chance
to achieve its objectives. These evidentiary difficulties compel the
Court to adopt standards appropriate and responsive to the
circumstances, without transgressing the due process requirements that
underlie every proceeding.
The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of
evidence adduced in their totality, and to consider any evidence
otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is
consistent with the admissible evidence adduced. In other words, we
reduce our rules to the most basic test of reason – i.e., to the
relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with
all other pieces of adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence
can be admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum test.
The Convention defines enforced disappearance as "the arrest,
detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by
agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment
of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place
such a person outside the protection of the law." Under this definition,
the elements that constitute enforced disappearance are essentially
fourfold:
(a) arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation
of liberty;
(b) carried out by agents of the State or persons or groups
of persons acting with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of the State;
(c) followed by a refusal to acknowledge the detention, or
a concealment of the fate of the disappeared person; and
(d) placement of the disappeared person outside the
protection of the law.
We find no direct evidence indicating how the victim actually
disappeared. x x x
We likewise find no direct evidence showing that operatives of PNP
CIDG Zamboanga abducted or arrested Tagitis. x x x
40
Strictly speaking, we are faced here with a classic case of hearsay
evidence – i.e., evidence whose probative value is not based on the
personal knowledge of the witnesses (the respondent, Mrs. Talbin and
Col. Kasim himself) but on the knowledge of some other person not on
the witness stand (the informant).
To say that this piece of evidence is incompetent and inadmissible
evidence of what it substantively states is to acknowledge – as the
petitioners effectively suggest – that in the absence of any direct
evidence, we should simply dismiss the petition. To our mind, an
immediate dismissal for this reason is no different from a statement
that the Amparo Rule – despite its terms – is ineffective, as it cannot
allow for the special evidentiary difficulties that are unavoidably
present in Amparo situations, particularly in extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances. The Amparo Rule was not promulgated
with this intent or with the intent to make it a token gesture of concern
for constitutional rights. It was promulgated to provide effective and
timely remedies, using and profiting from local and international
experiences in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, as
the situation may require. Consequently, we have no choice but to
meet the evidentiary difficulties inherent in enforced disappearances
with the flexibility that these difficulties demand. x x x
In the present case, we should at least determine whether the Kasim
evidence before us is relevant and meaningful to the disappearance
of Tagistis and reasonably consistent with other evidence in the case.
xxx
Based on these considerations, we conclude that Col. Kasim’s
disclosure, made in an unguarded moment, unequivocally point to
some government complicity in the disappearance. The consistent but
unfounded denials and the haphazard investigations cannot but point
to this conclusion. For why would the government and its officials
engage in their chorus of concealment if the intent had not been to
deny what they already knew of the disappearance? Would not an
in-depth and thorough investigation that at least credibly determined
the fate of Tagitis be a feather in the government’s cap under the
circumstances of the disappearance? From this perspective, the
evidence and developments, particularly the Kasim evidence, already
establish a concrete case of enforced disappearance that the Amparo
Rule covers. From the prism of the UN Declaration, heretofore cited
and quoted, the evidence at hand and the developments in this case
confirm the fact of the enforced disappearance and government
complicity, under a background of consistent and unfounded
government denials and haphazard handling. The disappearance as
well effectively placed Tagitis outside the protection of the law – a
situation that will subsist unless this Court acts. x x x
[W]e believe and so hold that the government in general, through the
PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and in particular, the Chiefs of these
organizations together with Col. Kasim, should be held fully
accountable for the enforced disappearance of Tagitis.
ROXAS v. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
G.R. No. 189155 | September 7, 2010
Rules covered: Writ of Amparo in re: Command Responsibility;
Totality of Evidence Rule; Inspection orders, nature
*The Writ of Habeas Data was discussed in the case, which will be
provided in the following topic.
It must be stated at the outset that the use by the petitioner of the
doctrine of command responsibility as the justification in impleading
the public respondents in her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate, if
not incorrect. The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of
substantive law that establishes liability and, by this account, cannot
be a proper legal basis to implead a party-respondent in an amparo
petition.
The case of Rubrico v. Arroyo, which was the first to examine
command responsibility in the context of an amparo proceeding,
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)
observed that the doctrine is used to pinpoint liability. Rubrico notes
that:
The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds
its context in the development of laws of war and armed
combats. According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility,"
in its simplest terms, means the "responsibility of
commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members
of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control
in international wars or domestic conflict." In this sense,
command responsibility is properly a form of criminal
complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the
doctrine of command responsibility, foreshadowing the
present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for
the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be
remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated,
command responsibility is "an omission mode of individual
criminal liability," whereby the superior is made responsible
for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to
prevent or punish the perpetrators (as opposed to crimes he
ordered).
Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an
imputation of individual liability, it is more aptly invoked in a full-
blown criminal or administrative case rather than in a summary
amparo proceeding. The obvious reason lies in the nature of the writ
itself:
The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at
providing judicial relief consisting of the appropriate
remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by
the court, in order to address specific violations or threats
of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or
security. While the principal objective of its proceedings is
the initial determination of whether an enforced
disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof had
transpired—the writ does not, by so doing, fix liability for
such disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be
criminal, civil or administrative under the applicable
substantive law.
The rationale underpinning this peculiar nature of an amparo writ has
been, in turn, clearly set forth in the landmark case of Secretary of
National Defense v. Manalo:
The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of
a summary proceeding that requires only substantial
evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the
petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt
requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for
damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or
administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence
that will require full and exhaustive proceedings.
It must be clarified, however, that the inapplicability of the doctrine
of command responsibility in an amparo proceeding does not, by any
measure, preclude impleading military or police commanders on the
ground that the complained acts in the petition were committed with
their direct or indirect acquiescence. In which case, commanders may
be impleaded—not actually on the basis of command responsibility—
but rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least
accountability. In Razon v. Tagitis, the distinct, but interrelated
concepts of responsibility and accountability were given special and
unique significations in relation to an amparo proceeding, to wit:
Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been
established by substantial evidence to have participated in
whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced
disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court
shall craft, among them, the directive to file the
appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible
parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other
hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be
addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the
41
enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their
complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or
who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or
those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden
of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the
enforced disappearance. x x x
The totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner does not
inspire reasonable conclusion that her abductors were military or
police personnel and that she was detained at Fort Magsaysay.
First. The similarity between the circumstances attending a particular
case of abduction with those surrounding previous instances of
enforced disappearances does not, necessarily, carry sufficient weight
to prove that the government orchestrated such abduction. We opine
that insofar as the present case is concerned, the perceived similarity
cannot stand as substantial evidence of the involvement of the
government.
In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel
circumstances as evidence of military involvement depends largely on
the availability or non-availability of other pieces of evidence that
has the potential of directly proving the identity and affiliation of the
perpetrators. Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable, must be
preferred over mere circumstantial evidence based on patterns and
similarity, because the former indubitably offers greater certainty as
to the true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. An amparo
court cannot simply leave to remote and hazy inference what it could
otherwise clearly and directly ascertain. x x x
Considering the dearth of evidence concretely pointing to any military
involvement in petitioner’s ordeal, this Court finds no error on the part
of the Court of Appeals in denying an inspection of the military camp
at Fort Magsaysay. We agree with the appellate court that a
contrary stance would be equivalent to sanctioning a "fishing
expedition," which was never intended by the Amparo Rule in
providing for the interim relief of inspection order.122 Contrary to
the explicit position123 espoused by the petitioner, the Amparo Rule
does not allow a "fishing expedition" for evidence.
An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or
strengthen the claim of a petitioner in an amparo petition, in order to
aid the court before making a decision.124 A basic requirement
before an amparo court may grant an inspection order is that the
place to be inspected is reasonably determinable from the
allegations of the party seeking the order. While the Amparo Rule
does not require that the place to be inspected be identified with
clarity and precision, it is, nevertheless, a minimum for the issuance of
an inspection order that the supporting allegations of a party be
sufficient in itself, so as to make a prima facie case. This, as was
shown above, petitioner failed to do.
Since the very estimates and observations of the petitioner are not
strong enough to make out a prima facie case that she was detained
in Fort Magsaysay, an inspection of the military camp cannot be
ordered. An inspection order cannot issue on the basis of allegations
that are, in themselves, unreliable and doubtful. x x x
Ironic as it seems, but part and parcel of the reason why the
petitioner was not able to adduce substantial evidence proving her
allegations of government complicity in her abduction and torture,
may be attributed to the incomplete and one-sided investigations
conducted by the government itself. This "awkward" situation, wherein
the very persons alleged to be involved in an enforced
disappearance or extralegal killing are, at the same time, the very
ones tasked by law to investigate the matter, is a unique
characteristic of these proceedings and is the main source of the
"evidentiary difficulties" faced by any petitioner in any amparo case.
Cognizant of this situation, however, the Amparo Rule placed a potent
safeguard—requiring the "respondent who is a public official or
employee" to prove that no less than "extraordinary diligence as
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)
required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in
the performance of duty." Thus, unless and until any of the public
respondents is able to show to the satisfaction of the amparo court
that extraordinary diligence has been observed in their investigations,
they cannot shed the allegations of responsibility despite the
prevailing scarcity of evidence to that effect.
With this in mind, We note that extraordinary diligence, as required
by the Amparo Rule, was not fully observed in the conduct of the
police and military investigations in the case at bar. x x x
In light of these considerations, We agree with the Court of Appeals
that further investigation under the norm of extraordinary diligence
should be undertaken. This Court simply cannot write finis to this case,
on the basis of an incomplete investigation conducted by the police
and the military. In a very real sense, the right to security of the
petitioner is continuously put in jeopardy because of the deficient
investigation that directly contributes to the delay in bringing the real
perpetrators before the bar of justice.
BURGOS v. ESPERON, JR.
G.R. No. 178497 | February 4, 2014
Rules covered: Role of the writ; Responsibility in re: writ of amparo;
Role of courts in amparo proceedings; Satisfaction of the writ
After reviewing the newly discovered evidence submitted by the
petitioner and considering all the developments of the case, including
the March 18, 2013 CA decision that confirmed the validity of the
issuance of the Writ of Amparo in the present case, we resolve to
deny the petitioner’s Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela.
We note and conclude, based on the developments highlighted
above, that the beneficial purpose of the Writ of Amparo has been
served in the present case. As we held in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, the writ
merely embodies the Court’s directives to police agencies to
undertake specified courses of action to address the enforced
disappearance of an individual. The Writ of Amparo serves both a
preventive and a curative role. It is curative as it facilitates the
subsequent punishment of perpetrators through the investigation and
remedial action that it directs. The focus is on procedural curative
remedies rather than on the tracking of a specific criminal or the
resolution of administrative liabilities. The unique nature of Amparo
proceedings has led us to define terms or concepts specific to what
the proceedings seek to achieve. In Razon Jr., v. Tagitis, we defined
what the terms "responsibility" and "accountability" signify in an
Amparo case. We said:
Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been
established by substantial evidence to have participated in
whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced
disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court
shall craft, among them, the directive to file the
appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible
parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other
hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be
addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the
enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their
complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or
who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or
those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden
of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the
enforced disappearance.
In the present case, while Jonas remains missing, the series of
calculated directives issued by the Court outlined above and the
extraordinary diligence the CHR demonstrated in its investigations
resulted in the criminal prosecution of Lt. Baliaga. We take judicial
notice of the fact that the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch
216, has already found probable cause for arbitrary detention
against Lt. Baliaga and has ordered his arrest in connection with
Jonas’ disappearance.
42
We also emphasize that the CA in its March 18, 2013 decision
already ruled with finality on the entities responsible and accountable
(as these terms are defined in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis) for the enforced
disappearance of Jonas. In its March 18, 2013 decision, the CA
found, by substantial evidence, that Lt. Baliaga participated in the
abduction on the basis of Cabintoy’s positive identification that he
was one of the abductors of Jonas who told him not to interfere
because the latter had been under surveillance for drugs. In the same
Decision, the CA also held the AFP and the PNP accountable for
having failed to discharge the burden of extraordinary diligence in
the investigation of the enforced disappearance of Jonas. Thus, the
CA issued the following directives to address the enforced
disappearance of Jonas:
(1) DIRECT the PNP through its investigative arm, the PNP-
CIDG, to identify and locate the abductors of Jonas Burgos
who are still at large and to establish the link between the
abductors of Jonas Burgos and those involved in the ERAP 5
incident;
(2) DIRECT the incumbent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines and the Director General of the
Philippines National Police, and their successors, to ensure
the continuance of their investigation and coordination on
the enforced disappearance of Jonas Burgos until the
persons found responsible are brought before the bar of
justice;
(3) DIRECT the Commission on Human Rights to continue with
its own independent investigation on the enforced
disappearance of Jonas Burgos with the same degree of
diligence required under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;
(4) DIRECT the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine National Police to extend full assistance to the
Commission on Human Rights in the conduct of the latter’s
investigation; and
(5) DIRECT the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the
Philippines, the Director General, Philippine National Police
and the Chairman, Commission on Human Rights to submit a
quarterly report to the Court on the results of their
respective investigation.
We note that the respondents did not appeal the March 18, 2013
CA decision and the May 23, 2013 CA resolution denying their
motion for partial reconsideration.
Based on the above considerations, in particular, the final ruling of
the CA that confirmed the validity of the issuance of the Writ of
Amparo and its determination of the entities responsible for the
enforced disappearance of Jonas, we resolve to deny the petitioner’s
prayer to issue the writ of Amparo anew and to refer the case to the
CA based on the newly discovered evidence. We so conclude as the
petitioner’s request for the reissuance of the writ and for the
rehearing of the case by the CA would be redundant and superfluous
in light of: (1) the ongoing investigation being conducted by the DOJ
through the NBI; (2) the CHR investigation directed by the Court in this
Resolution; and (3) the continuing investigation directed by the CA in
its March 18, 2013 decision.
We emphasize that while the Rule on the Writ of Amparo accords the
Court a wide latitude in crafting remedies to address an enforced
disappearance, it cannot (without violating the nature of the writ of
Amparo as a summary remedy that provides rapid judicial relief)
grant remedies that would complicate and prolong rather than
expedite the investigations already ongoing. Note that the CA has
already determined with finality that Jonas was a victim of enforced
disappearance.
We clarify that by denying the petitioner’s motion, we do not thereby
rule on the admissibility or the merits of the newly discovered
evidence submitted by the petitioner. We likewise do not foreclose
any investigation by the proper investigative and prosecutory
agencies of the other entities whose identities and participation in the
enforced disappearance of Jonas may be disclosed in future
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)

investigations and proceedings. Considering that the present case has

already reached the prosecution stage, the petitioner’s motion should
have been filed with the proper investigative and prosecutory
agencies of the government. x x x

As mentioned, we take judicial notice of the ongoing investigation by

the DOJ, through the NBI, of the disappearance of Jonas.

As a final note, we emphasize that our ROLE in a writ of Amparo

proceeding is merely to determine whether an enforced
disappearance has taken place; to determine who is responsible or
accountable; and to define and impose the appropriate remedies to
address the disappearance.

As shown above, the beneficial purpose of the Writ of Amparo has

been served in the present case with the CA’s final determination of
the persons responsible and accountable for the enforced
disappearance of Jonas and the commencement of criminal action
against Lt. Baliaga. At this stage, criminal, investigation and
prosecution proceedings are already beyond the reach of the Writ of
Amparo proceeding now before us.

Based on the above developments, we now hold that the full extent of
the remedies envisioned by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo has been
served and exhausted.

43
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)
WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
CARAM v. SEGUI
G.R. No. 193652 | August 5, 2014
Rules covered: Elements of enforced disappearance; Writ of amparo,
when available
*This case should have been included in the topic of Writ of Amparo.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is
a remedy available to any person whose right to life,
liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation
by an unlawful actor omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof.
In the landmark case of Secretary of National Defense, et al. v.
Manalo, this Court held:
The Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable
problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced
disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is
confined to these two instances or to threats thereof.
"Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due
process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial
proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced
disappearances" are "attended by the following
characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a
person by a government official or organized groups or
private individuals acting with the direct or indirect
acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to
disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or
a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which
places such persons outside the protection of law.
This pronouncement on the coverage of the writ was further cemented
in the latter case of Lozada, Jr. v. Macapagal-Arroyo where this Court
explicitly declared that as it stands, the writ of amparo is confined
only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances,
or to threats thereof. As to what constitutes "enforced
disappearance," the Court in Navia v. Pardico enumerated the
elements constituting "enforced disappearances" as the term is
statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9851 to wit:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any
form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of, the State or a political
organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political
organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give information
on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the
amparo petition; and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject
person from the protection of the law for a prolonged
period of time.
In this case, Christina alleged that the respondent DSWD officers
caused her "enforced separation" from Baby Julian and that their
action amounted to an "enforced disappearance" within the context
of the Amparo rule. Contrary to her position, however, the respondent
DSWD officers never concealed Baby Julian's whereabouts. In fact,
Christina obtained a copy of the DSWD's May 28, 2010
Memorandum explicitly stating that Baby Julian was in the custody of
the Medina Spouses when she filed her petition before the RTC.
Besides, she even admitted in her petition for review on certiorari that
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the respondent DSWD officers presented Baby Julian before the RTC
during the hearing held in the afternoon of August 5, 2010. There is
therefore, no "enforced disappearance" as used in the context of the
Amparo rule as the third and fourth elements are missing.
Christina's directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her
from her child and placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly
without complying with the necessary legal requisites to qualify the
child for adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost
child but asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting
custody over him. Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what
is involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise of parental
rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally
considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly
applied.
To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of amparo is a remedy
available to victims of extra-judicial killings and enforced
disappearances or threats of a similar nature, regardless of whether
the perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a public official or
employee or a private individual. It is envisioned basically to protect
and guarantee the right to life, liberty and security of persons, free
from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of life.
VIVARES v. ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE
G.R. No. 202666 | September 29, 2014
Rules covered: Cases covered by the writ of habeas data; Actual
threat; Nexus Rule; Habeas data in re: Informational privacy and
OSN; Expectation of privacy
The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose
right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or
storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home
and correspondence of the aggrieved party. It is an independent and
summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to
provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to
informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control
information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such
information is being collected through unlawful means in order to
achieve unlawful ends.
In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an
individual’s right to informational privacy, among others. A
comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined habeas data as "a
procedure designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in
the information age." The writ, however, will not issue on the basis
merely of an alleged unauthorized access to information about a
person. Availment of the writ requires the existence of a nexus
between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life,
liberty or security on the other. Thus, the existence of a person’s right
to informational privacy and a showing, at least by substantial
evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy
in life, liberty or security of the victim are indispensable before the
privilege of the writ may be extended. x x x
The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances
Contrary to respondents’ submission, the Writ of Habeas Data was
not enacted solely for the purpose of complementing the Writ of
Amparo in cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Sec. 2. Who May File. – Any aggrieved party may file a
petition for the writ of habeas data. However, in cases of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, the
petition may be filed by:
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)
(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved
party, namely: the spouse, children and parents; or
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the
aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in
the preceding paragraph.
Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the
writ only to cases of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances,
the above underscored portion of Section 2, reflecting a variance of
habeas data situations, would not have been made.
Habeas data, to stress, was designed "to safeguard individual
freedom from abuse in the information age." As such, it is erroneous to
limit its applicability to extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances only. In fact, the annotations to the Rule prepared by
the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court, after explaining
that the Writ of Habeas Data complements the Writ of Amparo,
pointed out that:
The writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as an
independent remedy to enforce one’s right to privacy, more
specifically the right to informational privacy. The remedies
against the violation of such right can include the updating,
rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or
information or files in possession or in control of
respondents. Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Data may also be availed of in cases outside of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
What is the meaning of “engaged” in the gathering, collecting or
storing of data or information?
To be sure, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data
protection shall be available only against abuses of a person or
entity engaged in the business of gathering, storing, and collecting of
data. As provided under Section 1 of the Rule:
Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a
remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in
life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the
person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved
party.
The provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole, irresistibly
conveys the idea that habeas data is a protection against unlawful
acts or omissions of public officials and of private individuals or
entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the
aggrieved party and his or her correspondences, or about his or her
family. Such individual or entity need not be in the business of
collecting or storing data.
To "engage" in something is different from undertaking a business
endeavour. To "engage" means "to do or take part in something." It
does not necessarily mean that the activity must be done in pursuit of
a business. What matters is that the person or entity must be
gathering, collecting or storing said data or information about the
aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether such undertaking
carries the element of regularity, as when one pursues a business, and
is in the nature of a personal endeavour, for any other reason or even
for no reason at all, is immaterial and such will not prevent the writ
from getting to said person or entity.
To agree with respondents’ above argument, would mean unduly
limiting the reach of the writ to a very small group, i.e., private
persons and entities whose business is data gathering and storage,
and in the process decreasing the effectiveness of the writ as an
instrument designed to protect a right which is easily violated in view
of rapid advancements in the information and communications
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technology––a right which a great majority of the users of technology
themselves are not capable of protecting. x x x
The concept of privacy has, through time, greatly evolved, with
technological advancements having an influential part therein. This
evolution was briefly recounted in former Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno’s speech, The Common Right to Privacy, where he explained the
three strands of the right to privacy, viz: (1) locational or situational
privacy; (2) informational privacy; and (3) decisional privacy. Of the
three, what is relevant to the case at bar is the right to informational
privacy––usually defined as the right of individuals to control
information about themselves.
With the availability of numerous avenues for information gathering
and data sharing nowadays, not to mention each system’s inherent
vulnerability to attacks and intrusions, there is more reason that every
individual’s right to control said flow of information should be
protected and that each individual should have at least a reasonable
expectation of privacy in cyberspace. x x x
The question now though is up to what extent is the right to privacy
protected in OSNs? Bear in mind that informational privacy involves
personal information. At the same time, the very purpose of OSNs is
socializing––sharing a myriad of information, some of which would
have otherwise remained personal.
Briefly, the purpose of an OSN is precisely to give users the ability to
interact and to stay connected to other members of the same or
different social media platform through the sharing of statuses,
photos, videos, among others, depending on the services provided by
the site. x x x
Facebook connections are established through the process of
"friending" another user. By sending a "friend request," the user
invites another to connect their accounts so that they can view any and
all "Public" and "Friends Only" posts of the other. Once the request is
accepted, the link is established and both users are permitted to view
the other user’s "Public" or "Friends Only" posts, among others.
"Friending," therefore, allows the user to form or maintain one-to-one
relationships with other users, whereby the user gives his or her
"Facebook friend" access to his or her profile and shares certain
information to the latter.
The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users,
designed to set up barriers to broaden or limit the visibility of his or
her specific profile content, statuses, and photos, among others, from
another user’s point of view. In other words, Facebook extends its
users an avenue to make the availability of their Facebook activities
reflect their choice as to "when and to what extent to disclose facts
about [themselves] – and to put others in the position of receiving such
confidences." x x x Needless to say, as the privacy setting becomes
more limiting, fewer Facebook users can view that user’s particular
post.
STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy. It is
through the availability of said privacy tools that many OSN users
are said to have a subjective expectation that only those to whom
they grant access to their profile will view the information they post or
upload thereto.
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN
activity, it is first necessary that said user, in this case the children of
petitioners, manifest the intention to keep certain posts private,
through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to
limit its visibility. And this intention can materialize in cyberspace
through the utilization of the OSN’s privacy tools. In other words,
utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in cyber world,
of the user’s invocation of his or her right to informational privacy.
Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to
grant or deny access to his or her post or profile detail should not be
denied the informational privacy right which necessarily accompanies
said choice. Otherwise, using these privacy tools would be a feckless
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)
exercise, such that if, for instance, a user uploads a photo or any
personal information to his or her Facebook page and sets its privacy
level at "Only Me" or a custom list so that only the user or a chosen
few can view it, said photo would still be deemed public by the courts
as if the user never chose to limit the photo’s visibility and
accessibility. Such position, if adopted, will not only strip these privacy
tools of their function but it would also disregard the very intention of
the user to keep said photo or information within the confines of his or
her private space.
We must now determine the extent that the images in question were
visible to other Facebook users and whether the disclosure was
confidential in nature. In other words, did the minors limit the
disclosure of the photos such that the images were kept within their
zones of privacy? This determination is necessary in resolving the issue
of whether the minors carved out a zone of privacy when the photos
were uploaded to Facebook so that the images will be protected
against unauthorized access and disclosure. x x x
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is "Public," it
can be surmised that the photographs in question were viewable to
everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’ children
positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If such were the
case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to
informational privacy. The ensuing pronouncement in US v. Gines-
Perez is most instructive:
A person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely
intends to forsake and renounce all privacy rights to such
imagery, particularly under circumstances such as here,
where the Defendant did not employ protective measures
or devices that would have controlled access to the Web
page or the photograph itself. x x x
As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to
the sanctioned students’ Facebook friends, respondent STC can hardly
be taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion since it was the
minors’ Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol.
Respondents were mere recipients of what were posted. They did not
resort to any unlawful means of gathering the information as it was
voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate access to the
said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the minors.
Curiously enough, however, neither the minors nor their parents
imputed any violation of privacy against the students who showed the
images to Escudero.
Furthermore, petitioners failed to prove their contention that
respondents reproduced and broadcasted the photographs. In fact,
what petitioners attributed to respondents as an act of offensive
disclosure was no more than the actuality that respondents appended
said photographs in their memorandum x x x These are not
tantamount to a violation of the minor’s informational privacy rights,
contrary to petitioners’ assertion.
In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question, or to be
more precise, the photos of minor students scantily clad, are personal
in nature, likely to affect, if indiscriminately circulated, the reputation
of the minors enrolled in a conservative institution. However, the
records are bereft of any evidence, other than bare assertions that
they utilized Facebook’s privacy settings to make the photos visible
only to them or to a select few. Without proof that they placed the
photographs subject of this case within the ambit of their protected
zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that they have an expectation
of privacy with respect to the photographs in question.
Had it been proved that the access to the pictures posted were
limited to the original uploader, through the "Me Only" privacy
setting, or that the user’s contact list has been screened to limit access
to a select few, through the "Custom" setting, the result may have
been different, for in such instances, the intention to limit access to the
particular post, instead of being broadcasted to the public at large
or all the user’s friends en masse, becomes more manifest and
palpable.
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MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY v. LIM
G.R. No. 184769 | October 5, 2010
Rules covered: What is covered by the writ of amparo and habeas
data; Concerns purely property or commercial in nature, not covered;
Labor-related issues not included
Respondent’s plea that she be spared from complying with
MERALCO’s Memorandum directing her reassignment to the Alabang
Sector, under the guise of a quest for information or data allegedly in
possession of petitioners, does not fall within the province of a writ of
habeas data.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a
remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in
life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or
of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the
person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved
party.
The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of
judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor, information, and
freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a
forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy,
thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a person’s right to
life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of information
technology.
It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was
conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and available
remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings
and enforced disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or
threats to the rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy
independently from those provided under prevailing Rules.
Castillo v. Cruz underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del
Rosario that the writs of amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to
protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds
invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or
doubtful. Employment constitutes a property right under the context of
the due process clause of the Constitution. It is evident that
respondent’s reservations on the real reasons for her transfer - a
legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of one’s
employment - are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary
remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably
lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.
In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that
petitioners committed any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of
respondent’s right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or
security. To argue that petitioners’ refusal to disclose the contents of
reports allegedly received on the threats to respondent’s safety
amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at best speculative.
Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and accusations from
unknown individuals in her earlier-quoted portion of her July 10,
2008 letter as "highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if
they existed at all." And she even suspects that her transfer to another
place of work "betrays the real intent of management]" and could be
a "punitive move." Her posture unwittingly concedes that the issue is
labor-related.
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)

LEE v. ILAGAN
G.R. No. 203254 | October 8, 2014
Rules covered: Nexus Rule; Informational privacy

A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas

Data (Habeas Data Rule), was conceived as a response, given the
lack of effective and available remedies, to address the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances. It was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing
the right to privacy, most especially the right to informational
privacy of individuals, which is defined as "the right to control the
collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of data about
oneself."

As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas

data now stands as "a remedy available to any person whose right
to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or
storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home,
and correspondence of the aggrieved party." Thus, in order to
support a petition for the issuance of such writ, Section 6 of
the Habeas Data Rule essentially requires that the petition sufficiently
alleges, among others, "[t]he manner the right to privacy is violated or
threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of
the aggrieved party." In other words, the petition must adequately
show that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the one
hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Corollarily,
the allegations in the petition must be supported by substantial
evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to
privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim.[20] In this relation, it
bears pointing out that the writ of habeas data will not issue to
protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds
invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague and doubtful.

In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently
allege that his right to privacy in life, liberty or security was or would
be violated through the supposed reproduction and threatened
dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a
privacy interest in the suppression of this video which he fears would
somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for
public consumption he failed to explain the connection between such
interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty or security.
Indeed, courts cannot speculate or contrive versions of possible
transgressions. As the rules and existing jurisprudence on the matter
evoke, alleging and eventually proving the nexus between one's
privacy right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or security are crucial
in habeas data cases, so much so that a failure on either account
certainly renders a habeas data petition dismissible, as in this case.

In fact, even discounting the insufficiency of the allegations, the

petition would equally be dismissible due to the inadequacy of the
evidence presented. As the records show, all that Ilagan submitted in
support of his petition was his self-serving testimony which hardly
meets the substantial evidence requirement as prescribed by
the Habeas Data Rule. This is because nothing therein would indicate
that Lee actually proceeded to commit any overt act towards the end
of violating Ilagan's right to privacy in life, liberty or security. Nor
would anything on record even lead a reasonable mind to
conclude that Lee was going to use the subject video in order to
achieve unlawful ends say for instance, to spread it to the public so as
to ruin Ilagan's reputation. Contrastingly, Lee even made it clear in
her testimony that the only reason why she reproduced the subject
video was to legitimately utilize the same as evidence in the criminal
and administrative cases that she filed against Ilagan. Hence, due to
the insufficiency of the allegations as well as the glaring absence of
substantial evidence, the Court finds it proper to reverse the RTC
Decision and dismiss the habeas data petition.

47
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)
WRIT OF KALIKASAN
DOLOT v. PAJE
G.R. No. 199199 | August 27, 2013
Rules covered: Writ of Continuing Mandamus (specified in syllabus);
Venue for action of continuing mandamus
Venue relates only to the place of trial or the geographical location
in which an action or proceeding should be brought and does not
equate to the jurisdiction of the court. It is intended to accord
convenience to the parties, as it relates to the place of trial, and does
not restrict their access to the courts. x x x
At most, the error committed by the petitioners in filing the case with
the RTC of Sorsogon was that of improper venue. A.M. No. 09-6-8-
SC or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (Rules)
specifically states that a special civil action for continuing mandamus
shall be filed with the "[RTC] exercising jurisdiction over the territory
where the actionable neglect or omission occurred x x x." In this case,
it appears that the alleged actionable neglect or omission occurred in
the Municipality of Matnog and as such, the petition should have been
filed in the RTC of Irosin. But even then, it does not warrant the
outright dismissal of the petition by the RTC as venue may be
waived. Moreover, the action filed by the petitioners is not criminal in
nature where venue is an essential element of jurisdiction. In Gomez-
Castillo v. Commission on Elections, the Court even expressed that
what the RTC should have done under the circumstances was to
transfer the case (an election protest) to the proper branch. Similarly,
it would serve the higher interest of justice if the Court orders the
transfer of Civil Case No. 2011 8338 to the RTC of Irosin for proper
and speedy resolution, with the RTC applying the Rules in its
disposition of the case.
The concept of continuing mandamus was first introduced in
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of
Manila Bay. Now cast in stone under Rule 8 of the Rules, the writ of
continuing mandamus enjoys a distinct procedure than that of
ordinary civil actions for the enforcement/violation of environmental
laws, which are covered by Part II (Civil Procedure). Similar to the
procedure under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for special civil actions
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, Section 4, Rule 8 of the
Rules requires that the petition filed should be sufficient in form and
substance before a court may take further action; otherwise, the court
may dismiss the petition outright. Courts must be cautioned, however,
that the determination to give due course to the petition or dismiss it
outright is an exercise of discretion that must be applied in a
reasonable manner in consonance with the spirit of the law and
always with the view in mind of seeing to it that justice is served.
Sufficiency in form and substance refers to the contents of the petition
filed under Rule 8, Section 1:
When any agency or instrumentality of the government or
officer thereof unlawfully neglects the performance of an
act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust or station in connection with the
enforcement or violation of an environmental law rule or
regulation or a right therein, or unlawfully excludes another
from the use or enjoyment of such right and there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty,
attaching thereto supporting evidence, specifying that the
petition concerns an environmental law, rule or regulation,
and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent to do an act or series of acts until the judgment
is fully satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the malicious neglect to perform the
duties of the respondent, under the law, rules or regulations.
The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-
forum shopping.
48
On matters of form, the petition must be verified and must contain
supporting evidence as well as a sworn certification of non-forum
shopping. It is also necessary that the petitioner must be one who is
aggrieved by an act or omission of the government agency,
instrumentality or its officer concerned. Sufficiency of substance, on
the other hand, necessitates that the petition must contain substantive
allegations specifically constituting an actionable neglect or omission
and must establish, at the very least, a prima facie basis for the
issuance of the writ, viz: (1) an agency or instrumentality of
government or its officer unlawfully neglects the performance of an
act or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of a
right; (2) the act to be performed by the government agency,
instrumentality or its officer is specifically enjoined by law as a duty;
(3) such duty results from an office, trust or station in connection with
the enforcement or violation of an environmental law, rule or
regulation or a right therein; and (4) there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the course of law.
The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may be
availed of "to compel the performance of an act specifically enjoined
by law." The petition should mainly involve an environmental and
other related law, rule or regulation or a right therein. The RTC’s
mistaken notion on the need for a final judgment, decree or order is
apparently based on the definition of the writ of continuing
mandamus under Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules, to wit:
(c) Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an
environmental case directing any agency or instrumentality
of the government or officer thereof to perform an act or
series of acts decreed by final judgment which shall remain
effective until judgment is fully satisfied.
The final court decree, order or decision erroneously alluded to by
the RTC actually pertains to the judgment or decree that a court
would eventually render in an environmental case for continuing
mandamus and which judgment or decree shall subsequently become
final.
Under the Rules, after the court has rendered a judgment in
conformity with Rule 8, Section 7 and such judgment has become final,
the issuing court still retains jurisdiction over the case to ensure that the
government agency concerned is performing its tasks as mandated by
law and to monitor the effective performance of said tasks. It is only
upon full satisfaction of the final judgment, order or decision that a
final return of the writ shall be made to the court and if the court finds
that the judgment has been fully implemented, the satisfaction of
judgment shall be entered in the court docket. A writ of continuing
mandamus is, in essence, a command of continuing compliance with a
final judgment as it "permits the court to retain jurisdiction after
judgment in order to ensure the successful implementation of the
reliefs mandated under the court’s decision."
The Court, likewise, cannot sustain the argument that the petitioners
should have first filed a case with the Panel of Arbitrators (Panel),
which has jurisdiction over mining disputes under R.A. No. 7942.
Indeed, as pointed out by the respondents, the Panel has jurisdiction
over mining disputes. But the petition filed below does not involve a
mining dispute. What was being protested are the alleged negative
environmental impact of the small-scale mining operation being
conducted x x x. Resolution of these matters does not entail the
technical knowledge and expertise of the members of the Panel but
requires an exercise of judicial function.
Arbitration before the Panel of Arbitrators is proper only
when there is a disagreement between the parties as to
some provisions of the contract between them, which needs
the interpretation and the application of that particular
knowledge and expertise possessed by members of that
Panel. It is not proper when one of the parties repudiates
the existence or validity of such contract or agreement on
the ground of fraud or oppression as in this case. The
validity of the contract cannot be subject of arbitration
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)
proceedings. Allegations of fraud and duress in the
execution of a contract are matters within the jurisdiction of
the ordinary courts of law. These questions are legal in
nature and require the application and interpretation of
laws and jurisprudence which is necessarily a judicial
function.
Consequently, resort to the Panel would be completely useless and
unnecessary.
The Court also finds that the RTC erred in ruling that the petition is
infirm for failure to attach judicial affidavits. As previously stated,
Rule 8 requires that the petition should be verified, contain supporting
evidence and must be accompanied by a sworn certification of non-
forum shopping. There is nothing in Rule 8 that compels the inclusion of
judicial affidavits, albeit not prohibited. It is only if the evidence of
the petitioner would consist of testimony of witnesses that it would be
the time that judicial affidavits (affidavits of witnesses in the question
and answer form) must be attached to the petition/complaint.
PAJE v. CASIÑO
G.R. No. 207257 | February 3, 2015
Rules covered: Writ of Kalikasan (specified in syllabus),
in re: P.D. 1151 and 1598 (as to issuance of ECC);
Requisites for issuance of the writ; Utilization of “expert” witnesses
*The discussion on the issue of the ECC/EIS will not be discussed.
Please refer to full text.
The Rules on the Writ of Kalikasan, which is Part III of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases, was issued by the Court pursuant
to its power to promulgate rules for the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights, in particular, the individual’s right to a
balanced and healthful ecology. Section 1 of Rule 7 provides:
Section 1. Nature of the writ.- The writ is a remedy
available to a natural or juridical person, entity authorized
by law, people’s organization, nongovernmental
organization, or any public interest group accredited by or
registered with any government agency, on behalf of
persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation
by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or private individual or entity, involving
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice
the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more
cities or provinces.
The writ is categorized as a special civil action and was, thus,
conceptualized as an extraordinary remedy, which aims to provide
judicial relief from threatened or actual violation/s of the
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of a
magnitude or degree of damage that transcends political and
territorial boundaries. It is intended "to provide a stronger defense
for environmental rights through judicial efforts where institutional
arrangements of enforcement, implementation and legislation have
fallen short" and seeks "to address the potentially exponential nature
of large-scale ecological threats."
Under Section 1 of Rule 7, the following requisites must be present to
avail of this extraordinary remedy: (1) there is an actual or
threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology; (2) the actual or threatened violation arises from
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
private individual or entity; and (3) the actual or threatened violation
involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude
as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or
more cities or provinces.
Expectedly, the Rules do not define the exact nature or degree of
environmental damage but only that it must be sufficiently grave, in
terms of the territorial scope of such damage, so as to call for the
49
grant of this extraordinary remedy. The gravity of environmental
damage sufficient to grant the writ is, thus, to be decided on a case-
to-case basis.
If the petitioner successfully proves the foregoing requisites, the court
shall render judgment granting the privilege of the writ of kalikasan.
Otherwise, the petition shall be denied. If the petition is granted, the
court may grant the reliefs provided for under Section 15of Rule 7, to
wit:
Section 15. Judgment.- Within sixty (60) days from the time
the petition is submitted for decision, the court shall render
judgment granting or denying the privilege of the writ of
kalikasan.
The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:
(a) Directing respondent to permanently cease and desist
from committing acts or neglecting the performance of a
duty in violation of environmental laws resulting in
environmental destruction or damage;
(b) Directing the respondent public official, government
agency, private person or entity to protect, preserve,
rehabilitate or restore the environment;
(c) Directing the respondent public official, government
agency, private person or entity to monitor strict compliance
with the decision and orders of the court;
(d) Directing the respondent public official, government
agency, or private person or entity to make periodic
reports on the execution of the final judgment; and
(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people
to a balanced and healthful ecology or to the protection,
preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of the
environment, except the award of damages to individual
petitioners.
It must be noted, however, that the above enumerated reliefs are
non-exhaustive. The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are
broad, comprehensive and non-exclusive.
Prescinding from the above, the DENR, SBMA and RP Energy are one
in arguing that the reliefs granted by the appellate court, i.e.
invalidating the ECC and its amendments, are improper because it
had denied the Petition for Writ of Kalikasan upon a finding that the
Casiño Group failed to prove the alleged environmental damage,
actual or threatened, contemplated under the Rules.
Ordinarily, no reliefs could and should be granted. But the question
may be asked, could not the appellate court have granted the
Petition for Writ of Kalikasan on the ground of the invalidity of the
ECC for failure to comply with certain laws and rules?
This question is the starting point for setting up the framework of
analysis which should govern writ of kalikasan cases.
The power of the courts to nullify an ECC existed even prior to the
promulgation of the Rules on the Writ of Kalikasan for judicial review
of the acts of administrative agencies or bodies has long been
recognized subject, of course, to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
But the issue presented before us is not a simple case of reviewing the
acts of an administrative agency, the DENR, which issued the ECC and
its amendments. The challenge to the validity of the ECC was raised in
the context of a writ of kalikasan case. The question then is, can the
validity of an ECC be challenged via a writ of kalikasan?
We answer in the affirmative subject to certain qualifications.
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)
As earlier noted, the writ of kalikasan is principally predicated on an
actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced
and healthful ecology, which involves environmental damage of a
magnitude that transcends political and territorial boundaries. A
party, therefore, who invokes the writ based on alleged defects or
irregularities in the issuance of an ECC must not only allege and prove
such defects or irregularities, but must also provide a causal link or, at
least, a reasonable connection between the defects or irregularities in
the issuance of an ECC and the actual or threatened violation of the
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of the
magnitude contemplated under the Rules. Otherwise, the petition
should be dismissed outright and the action re-filed before the proper
forum with due regard to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. This must be so if we are to preserve the noble and
laudable purposes of the writ against those who seek to abuse it.
An example of a defect or an irregularity in the issuance of an ECC,
which could conceivably warrant the granting of the extraordinary
remedy of the writ of kalikasan, is a case where there are serious
and substantial misrepresentations or fraud in the application for the
ECC, which, if not immediately nullified, would cause actual negative
environmental impacts of the magnitude contemplated under the
Rules, because the government agencies and LGUs, with the final
authority to implement the project, may subsequently rely on such
substantially defective or fraudulent ECC in approving the
implementation of the project.
To repeat, in cases of defects or irregularities in the issuance of an
ECC, it is not sufficient to merely allege such defects or irregularities,
but to show a causal link or reasonable connection with the
environmental damage of the magnitude contemplated under the
Rules. In the case at bar, no such causal link or reasonable connection
was shown or even attempted relative to the aforesaid second set of
allegations. It is a mere listing of the perceived defects or
irregularities in the issuance of the ECC. This would have been
sufficient reason to disallow the resolution of such issues in a writ of
kalikasan case.
However, inasmuch as this is the first time that we lay down this
principle, we have liberally examined the alleged defects or
irregularities in the issuance of the ECC and find that there is only one
group of allegations, relative to the ECC, that can be reasonably
connected to an environmental damage of the magnitude
contemplated under the Rules. This is with respect to the allegation
that there was no environmental impact assessment relative to the first
and second amendments to the subject ECC. If this were true, then the
implementation of the project can conceivably actually violate or
threaten to violate the right to a healthful and balanced ecology of
the inhabitants near the vicinity of the power plant. Thus, the
resolution of such an issue could conceivably be resolved in a writ of
kalikasan case provided that the case does not violate, or is an
exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
and primary jurisdiction.
As to the claims that the issuance of the ECC violated the IPRA Law
and LGC and that the LDA, likewise, violated the IPRA Law, we find
the same not to be within the coverage of the writ of kalikasan
because, assuming there was non-compliance therewith, no
reasonable connection can be made to an actual or threatened
violation of the right to a balanced and healthful ecology of the
magnitude contemplated under the Rules.
To elaborate, the alleged lack of approval of the concerned
sanggunians over the subject project would not lead to or is not
reasonably connected with environmental damage but, rather, it is an
affront to the local autonomy of LGUs. Similarly, the alleged lack of a
certificate precondition that the project site does not overlap with an
ancestral domain would not result in or is not reasonably connected
with environmental damage but, rather, it is an impairment of the
right of Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples
(ICCs/IPs) to their ancestral domains. These alleged violations could
be the subject of appropriate remedies before the proper
administrative bodies (like the NCIP) or a separate action to compel
50
compliance before the courts, as the case may be. However, the writ
of kalikasan would not be the appropriate remedy to address and
resolve such issues. x x x
Indeed, the three witnesses presented by the Casiño Group are not
experts on the CFB technology or on environmental matters. These
witnesses even admitted on cross-examination that they are not
competent to testify on the environmental impact of the subject
project. What is wanting in their testimonies is their technical
knowledge of the project design/implementation or some other
aspects of the project, even those not requiring expert knowledge,
vis-à-vis the significant negative environmental impacts which the
Casiño Group alleged will occur. Clearly, the Casiño Group failed to
carry the onus of proving the alleged significant negative
environmental impacts of the project. In comparison, RP Energy
presented several experts to refute the allegations of the Casiño
Group. x x x
In upholding the evidence and arguments of RP Energy, relative to the
lack of proof as to the alleged significant environmental damage that
will be caused by the project, the appellate court relied mainly on the
testimonies of experts, which we find to be in accord with judicial
precedents. Thus, we ruled in one case:
Although courts are not ordinarily bound by testimonies of
experts, they may place whatever weight they choose upon
such testimonies in accordance with the facts of the case.
The relative weight and sufficiency of expert testimony is
peculiarly within the province of the trial court to decide,
considering the ability and character of the witness, his
actions upon the witness stand, the weight and process of
the reasoning by which he has supported his opinion, his
possible bias in favor of the side for whom he testifies, the
fact that he is a paid witness, the relative opportunities for
study and observation of the matters about which he
testifies, and any other matters which serve to illuminate his
statements. The opinion of the expert may not be arbitrarily
rejected; it is to be considered by the court in view of all
the facts and circumstances in the case and when common
knowledge utterly fails, the expert opinion may be given
controlling effects (20 Am. Jur., 1056-1058). The problem
of the credibility of the expert witness and the evaluation
of his testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court
whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of
an abuse of that discretion. x x x
The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases liberally provide the
courts with means and methods to obtain sufficient information in
order to adequately protect or safeguard the right to a healthful and
balanced ecology. In Section 6 (l)140 of Rule 3 (Pre-Trial), when
there is a failure to settle, the judge shall, among others, determine
the necessity of engaging the services of a qualified expert as a
friend of the court (amicus curiae). While, in Section 12141 of Rule 7
(Writ of Kalikasan), a party may avail of discovery measures: (1)
ocular inspection and (2) production or inspection of documents or
things. The liberality of the Rules in gathering and even compelling
information, specifically with regard to the Writ of Kalikasan, is
explained in this wise: The writ of kalikasan was refashioned as a tool
to bridge the gap between allegation and proof by providing a
remedy for would-be environmental litigants to compel the production
of information within the custody of the government. The writ would
effectively serve as a remedy for the enforcement of the right to
information about the environment. The scope of the fact-finding
power could be: (1) anything related to the issuance, grant of a
government permit issued or information controlled by the government
or private entity and (2) information contained in documents such as
environmental compliance certificate (ECC) and other government
records. In addition, the writ may also be employed to compel the
production of information, subject to constitutional limitations. This
function is analogous to a discovery measure, and may be availed of
upon application for the writ.
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)
Clearly, in environmental cases, the power to appoint friends of the
court in order to shed light on matters requiring special technical
expertise as well as the power to order ocular inspections and
production of documents or things evince the main thrust of, and the
spirit behind, the Rules to allow the court sufficient leeway in
acquiring the necessary information to rule on the issues presented for
its resolution, to the end that the right to a healthful and balanced
ecology may be adequately protected. To draw a parallel, in the
protection of the constitutional rights of an accused, when life or
liberty is at stake, the testimonies of witnesses may be compelled as
an attribute of the Due Process Clause.
ARIGO v. SWIFT
G.R. No. 206510 | September 16, 2014
Rules covered: Locus standi in environmental cases; Mediation and
settlement in environmental cases; “Consent Decree”
*The case discussed the concept of state immunity in re: UNCLOS and
other international agreements
Locus standi is "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question." Specifically, it is "a party's personal and substantial interest
in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result" of the act being challenged, and "calls for more than just a
generalized grievance." However, the rule on standing is a
procedural matter which this Court has relaxed for non-traditional
plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the
public interest so requires, such as when the subject matter of the
controversy is of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.
In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we recognized the
"public right" of citizens to "a balanced and healthful ecology which,
for the first time in our constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated
in the fundamental law." We declared that the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology need not be written in the Constitution for it is
assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of
Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of
transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. Such
right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment.
On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioner minors in
Oposa, this Court ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal
standing to sue for the enforcement of environmental rights, they can
do so in representation of their own and future generations. x x x
The VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States
troops and personnel visiting the Philippines to promote "common
security interests" between the US and the Philippines in the region. It
provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel,
and further defines the rights of the United States and the Philippine
government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel
and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials
and supplies. The invocation of US federal tort laws and even
common law is thus improper considering that it is the VF A which
governs disputes involving US military ships and crew navigating
Philippine waters in pursuance of the objectives of the agreement.
As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to
criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the present
petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred
from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a
person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed
separately:
SEC. 17. Institution of separate actions.-The filing of a
petition for the issuance of the writ of kalikasan shall not
preclude the filing of separate civil, criminal or
administrative actions.
51
In any case, it is our considered view that a ruling on the application
or non-application of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VF A to US
personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of the
USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a
petition for a writ of Kalikasan. We also find it unnecessary at this
point to determine whether such waiver of State immunity is indeed
absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant damages which have
resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows the
recovery of damages, including the collection of administrative fines
under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed
instituted with the criminal action charging the same violation of an
environmental law.
Section 15, Rule 7 enumerates the reliefs which may be granted in a
petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan, to wit:
SEC. 15. Judgment.-Within sixty (60) days from the time the
petition is submitted for decision, the court shall render
judgment granting or denying the privilege of the writ of
kalikasan.
The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the
following:
(a) Directing respondent to permanently cease and desist
from committing acts or neglecting the performance of a
duty in violation of environmental laws resulting in
environmental destruction or damage;
(b) Directing the respondent public official, government
agency, private person or entity to protect, preserve,
rehabilitate or restore the environment;
(c) Directing the respondent public official, government
agency, private person or entity to monitor strict compliance
with the decision and orders of the court;
(d) Directing the respondent public official, government
agency, or private person or entity to make periodic
reports on the execution of the final judgment; and
(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people
to a balanced and healthful ecology or to the protection,
preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of the
environment, except the award of damages to individual
petitioners.
We agree with respondents (Philippine officials) in asserting that this
petition has become moot in the sense that the salvage operation
sought to be enjoined or restrained had already been accomplished
when petitioners sought recourse from this Court. But insofar as the
directives to Philippine respondents to protect and rehabilitate the
coral reef structure and marine habitat adversely affected by the
grounding incident are concerned, petitioners are entitled to these
reliefs notwithstanding the completion of the removal of the USS
Guardian from the coral reef. However, we are mindful of the fact
that the US and Philippine governments both expressed readiness to
negotiate and discuss the matter of compensation for the damage
caused by the USS Guardian. The US Embassy has also declared it is
closely coordinating with local scientists and experts in assessing the
extent of the damage and appropriate methods of rehabilitation.
Exploring avenues for settlement of environmental cases is not
proscribed by the Rules. As can be gleaned from the following
provisions, mediation and settlement are available for the
consideration of the parties, and which dispute resolution methods are
encouraged by the court, to wit:
RULE 3
SEC. 3. Referral to mediation.-At the start of the pre-trial
conference, the court shall inquire from the parties if they
have settled the dispute; otherwise, the court shall
immediately refer the parties or their counsel, if authorized
by their clients, to the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC)
unit for purposes of mediation. If not available, the court
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)
shall refer the case to the clerk of court or legal researcher
for mediation.
Mediation must be conducted within a non-extendible
period of thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of referral
to mediation.
The mediation report must be submitted within ten (10) days
from the expiration of the 30-day period.
SEC. 4. Preliminary conference.-If mediation fails, the court
will schedule the continuance of the pre-trial. Before the
scheduled date of continuance, the court may refer the case
to the branch clerk of court for a preliminary conference for
the following purposes:
(a) To assist the parties in reaching a settlement; x x x
SEC. 5. Pre-trial conference; consent decree.-The judge
shall put the parties and their counsels under oath, and they
shall remain under oath in all pre-trial conferences.
The judge shall exert best efforts to persuade the parties to
arrive at a settlement of the dispute. The judge may issue a
consent decree approving the agreement between the
parties in accordance with law, morals, public order and
public policy to protect the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology. x x x
SEC. 10. Efforts to settle.- The court shall endeavor to make
the parties to agree to compromise or settle in accordance
with law at any stage of the proceedings before rendition
of judgment.
The Court takes judicial notice of a similar incident in 2009 when a
guided-missile cruiser, the USS Port Royal, ran aground about half a
mile off the Honolulu Airport Reef Runway and remained stuck for
four days. After spending $6.5 million restoring the coral reef, the US
government was reported to have paid the State of Hawaii $8.5
million in settlement over coral reef damage caused by the
grounding.
To underscore that the US government is prepared to pay
appropriate compensation for the damage caused by the USS
Guardian grounding, the US Embassy in the Philippines has announced
the formation of a US interdisciplinary scientific team which will
"initiate discussions with the Government of the Philippines to review
coral reef rehabilitation options in Tubbataha, based on assessments
by Philippine-based marine scientists." The US team intends to "help
assess damage and remediation options, in coordination with the
Tubbataha Management Office, appropriate Philippine government
entities, non-governmental organizations, and scientific experts from
Philippine universities."
A rehabilitation or restoration program to be implemented at the cost
of the violator is also a major relief that may be obtained under a
judgment rendered in a citizens' suit under the Rules, viz:
RULES
SECTION 1. Reliefs in a citizen suit.-If warranted, the court
may grant to the plaintiff proper reliefs which shall include
the protection, preservation or rehabilitation of the
environment and the payment of attorney's fees, costs of
suit and other litigation expenses. It may also require the
violator to submit a program of rehabilitation or restoration
of the environment, the costs of which shall be borne by the
violator, or to contribute to a special trust fund for that
purpose subject to the control of the court.
In the light of the foregoing, the Court defers to the Executive Branch
on the matter of compensation and rehabilitation measures through
diplomatic channels.
52
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS v. REYES, ET AL.
G.R. No. 180771 | April 21, 2015
Rules covered: Locus standi; “Stewards” as representatives
(in re: Parties-in-interest, Civil Procedure); Citizen suit
The primary reason animal rights advocates and environmentalists
seek to give animals and inanimate objects standing is due to the
need to comply with the strict requirements in bringing a suit to court.
Our own 1997 Rules of Court demand that parties to a suit be either
natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law. It further
necessitates the action to be brought in the name of the real party-in-
interest, even if filed by a representative, viz.:
Rule 3: Parties to Civil Actions
Sec. 2. Parties in interest. - A real party in interest is the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules,
every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name
of the real party in interest.
Sec. 3. Representatives as parties. - Where the action is
allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a
representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity,
the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case
and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest. A
representative may be a trustee of an express trust, a
guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party
authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his
own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal
may sue or be sued without joining the principal except
when the contract involves things belonging to the
principal.
It had been suggested by animal rights advocates and
environmentalists that not only natural and juridical persons should be
given legal standing because of the difficulty for persons, who cannot
show that they by themselves are real parties-in-interests, to bring
actions in representation of these animals or inanimate objects. For
this reason, many environmental cases have been dismissed for failure
of the petitioner to show that he/she would be directly injured or
affected by the outcome of the case. However, in our jurisdiction,
locus standi in environmental cases has been given a more liberalized
approach. x x x
Recently, the Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases, which allow for a "citizen suit," and permit any
Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for violations of our
environmental laws:
SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in representation
of others, including minors or generations yet unborn, may
file an action to enforce rights or obligations under
environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the
court shall issue an order which shall contain a brief
description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed
for, requiring all interested parties to manifest their
interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days
from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order
once in a newspaper of a general circulation in the
Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies of
said order. x x x
Explaining the rationale for this rule, the Court, in the Annotations to
the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, commented:
Citizen suit. To further encourage the protection of the
environment, the Rules enable litigants enforcing
environmental rights to file their cases as citizen suits. This
provision liberalizes standing for all cases filed enforcing
environmental laws and collapses the traditional rule on
personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)
are stewards of nature. The terminology of the text
reflects the doctrine first enunciated in Oposa v. Factoran,
insofar as it refers to minors and generations yet
unborn.53 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted.) Although
this petition was filed in 2007, years before the effectivity
of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, it has
been consistently held that rules of procedure "may be
retroactively applied to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage and will not
violate any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected, inasmuch as there is no vested rights in
rules of procedure."
Elucidating on this doctrine, the Court, in Systems Factors Corporation
v. National Labor Relations Commission held that:
Remedial statutes or statutes relating to remedies or
modes of procedure, which do not create new or take
away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the
remedy or confirmation of rights already existing, do not
come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or
the general rule against retroactive operation of statutes.
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be
construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural
laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. x x x.
Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental ·
Cases became effective, this Court had already taken a permissive
position on the issue of locus standi in environmental cases. In Oposa,
we allowed the suit to be brought in the name of generations yet
unborn "based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility
insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned." Furthermore, we said that the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology, a right that does not even need to be stated in our
Constitution as it is assumed to exist from the inception of humankind,
carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment.
In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine
Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules, which
allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to
enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting here that the
Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in
representation of the named cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos
and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be
possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident
Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal
standing to file this petition.
WEST TOWER CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION v.
FIRST PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION
G.R. No. 194239 | June 16, 2015
Rules covered: Parties-in-interest; Precautionary principle;
Special trust funds
We agree with the CA that petitioners who are affected residents of
West Tower and Barangay Bangkal have the requisite concern to be
real parties-in-interest to pursue the instant petition. x x x
As defined, a real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled
to the avails of the suit. Generally, every action must be prosecuted
or defended in the name of the real parties-in-interest. In other
words, the action must be brought by the person who, by substantive
law, possesses the right sought to be enforced. Alternatively, one who
has no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the
court as party-plaintiff-in-action for it is jurisprudentially ordained
that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party-in-interest.
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In the case at bar, there can be no quibble that the oil leak from the
WOPL affected all the condominium unit owners and residents of
West Tower as, in fact, all had to evacuate their units at the wee
hours in the morning of July 23, 2010, when the condominium's
electrical power was shut down. Until now, the unit owners and
residents of West Tower could still not return to their condominium
units. Thus, there is no gainsaying that the residents of West Tower
are real parties-in-interest.
There can also be no denying that West Tower Corp. represents the
common interest of its unit owners and residents, and has the legal
standing to file and pursue the instant petition. While a condominium
corporation has limited powers under RA 4726, otherwise known as
The Condominium Act, it is empowered to pursue actions in behalf of
its members. In the instant case, the condominium corporation .is the
management body of West Tower and deals with everything that
may affect some or all of the condominium unit owners or users.
It is of no moment that only five residents of West Tower signed their
acquiescence to the filing of the petition for the issuance of the Writ
of Kalikasan, as the merits of such petition is, as aptly put by the CA,
not measured by the number of persons who signified their assent
thereto, but on the existence of a prima facie case of a massive
environmental disaster.
As to the residents of Barangay Bangkal, they are similarly situated
with the unit owners and residents of West Tower and are real
parties-in-interest to the instant case, i.e., if they so wish to join the
petitioners.
Organizations have indicated their intention to join the petition and
submitted proof of juridical personality. x x x
This is so considering that the filing of a petition for the issuance of a
writ of kalikasan under Sec. 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases does not require that a petitioner be directly
affected by an environmental disaster. The rule clearly allows
juridical persons to file the petition on behalf of persons whose
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or
threatened with violation.
Thus, as parties to the case, they are entitled to be furnished copies of
all the submissions to the Court, including the periodic reports of FPIC
and the results of the evaluations and tests conducted on the WOPL.
Section 1, Rule 20 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or the Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases, on the Precautionary Principle, provides that
"when there is lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a causal
link between human activity and environmental effect, the court shall
apply the precautionary principle in resolving the case before it."
The precautionary principle only applies when the link between the
cause, that is the human activity sought to be inhibited, and the effect,
that is the damage to the environment, cannot be established with full
scientific certainty. Here, however, such absence of a link is not an
issue. Detecting the existence of a leak or the presence of defects in
the WOPL, which is the issue in the case at bar, is different from
determining whether the spillage of hazardous materials into the
surroundings will cause environmental damage or will harm human
health or that of other organisms. As a matter of fact, the petroleum
leak and the harm that it caused to the environment and to the
residents of the affected areas is not even questioned by FPIC.
Anent petitioners' prayer for the creation of a special trust fund, We
note that under Sec. 1, Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases, a trust fund is limited solely for the purpose of
rehabilitating or restoring the environment. Said proviso pertinently
provides:
SEC. 1. Reliefs in a citizen suit. - If warranted, the court
may grant to the plaintiff proper reliefs which shall include
the protection, preservation or rehabilitation of the
environment and the payment of attorney's fees, costs of
 CASE DOCTRINES – REMEDIAL LAW SYLLABUS (ATTY. BRONDIAL)

suit and other litigation expenses. It may also require the

violator to submit a program of rehabilitation or
restoration of the environment, the costs of which shall be
borne by the violator, or to contribute to a special trust
fund for that purpose subject to the control of the court.

Furthermore, Sec. 15(e), Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for

Environmental Cases expressly prohibits the grant of damages to
petitioners in a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan, viz:

Section 15. Judgment. - Within sixty (60) days from the

time the petition is submitted for decision, the court shall
render judgment granting or denying the privilege of the
writ of kalikasan.

The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the
following:

(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people
to a balanced and healthful ecology or to the protection,
preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of the
environment, except the award of damages to individual
petitioners.

A reading of the petition and the motion for partial reconsideration

readily reveals that the prayer is for the creation of a trust fund for
similar future contingencies. This is clearly outside the limited purpose
of a special trust fund under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases, which is to rehabilitate or restore the environment that has
presumably already suffered. Hence, the Court affirms with
concurrence the observation of the appellate court that the prayer is
but a claim for damages, which is prohibited by the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases. As such, the Court is of the
considered view that the creation of a special trust fund is misplaced.
The present ruling on petitioners' prayer for the creation of a special
trust fund in the instant recourse, however, is without prejudice to the
judgment/s that may be rendered in the civil and/or criminal cases
filed by petitioners arising from the same incident if the payment of
damages is found warranted.

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