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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 Page |1
LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA, complainant,

vs.
HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, respondent.
A.M. No. 133-J

May 31, 1982
FACTS:
In 1963, Macariola and her step sister (Reyes) had a dispute over their inheritance involving parcels of
land located in Leyte. A trial ensued and Judge Macariola, after determining the legibility of the parties to inherit
rendered a decision in the civil case. Thereafter, the counsels of the parties submitted a project partition reflecting
the preference of the parties. The project partition was, however, unsigned by Macariola. But her lawyer assured
Asuncion that he is duly authorized by Macariola as counsel. The judge then approved the project partition. The
decision became final in 1963 as well.
Reyes et al sold some of their shares to Arcadio Galapon, who later sold the property to judge Asuncion in
1965. On 6 Aug 1968, Macariola filed a complaint against Judge Asuncion with “acts unbecoming a judge” on the
ground that he bought a property (formerly owned by Macariola) which was involved in a civil case decided by
him. Also, Macariola said that Asuncion’s act tainted his earlier judgment. Macariola said that the project partition
was unsigned by her and that what was given to her in the partition were insignificant portions of the parcels of
land.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Judge violated paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce when he
associated himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking
officer.
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court held that although the aforestated provision is incorporated in the Code of
Commerce which is part of the commercial laws of the Philippines, it, however, partakes of the nature of a political
law as it regulates the relationship between the government and certain public officers and employees, like
justices and judges. Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the organization
and operation of the governmental organs of the State and define the relations of the state with the inhabitants of
its territory.
It is significant to note that the present Code of Commerce is the Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885,
with some modifications made by the "Commission de Codificacion de las Provincias de Ultramar," which was
extended to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of August 6, 1888, and took effect as law in this jurisdiction on
December 1, 1888. Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United
States to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been
abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether
compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-
enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign. There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the
Univerisity of Mindanao – College of Law

“Great Lawyers are not born, they are made”
LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code of Commerce after the change of sovereignty from Spain to the
United States and then to the Republic of the Philippines. Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has
no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent, then Judge of the Court of First Instance, now
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.
In conclusion, while respondent Judge Asuncion, did not violate any law in acquiring by purchase a parcel
of land which was in litigation in his court and in engaging in business by joining a private corporation during his
incumbency as judge, he was reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activity.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
Lawyers League for a Better Philippines

vs.
President Corazon C. Aquino
G.R. No. 73748
FACTS:
President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were
taking power. Proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power
by stating that the “new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people
assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines.” Petitioners alleged that the Aquino government is
illegal because it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Aquino administration is illegal because it was not established by the 1973 constitution.
HELD:
It was held that the petition has no merit. Atty. Lozano as counsel for the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 73748
and 73972 withdrew the petitions and manifested that they would pursue the question by extra-judicial methods.
The withdrawal is functus oficio.
It is elementary that the Supreme Court assumes no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief. More
importantly, the petition amounts in effect to a suit against the incumbent President of the Republic, President
Corazon C. Aquino, and it is equally elementary that incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being
brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure. The three petitions obviously are not
impressed with merit. Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. For the
legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the
people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the
government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not
merely a de facto government but is in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations
has recognized the legitimacy of the present government. All the eleven members of this Court, as reorganized,
have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her government.
In view of the foregoing, the petitions were dismissed.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ALFREDO M. DE LEON, et. al, petitioners,

vs.
HON. BENJAMIN B. ESGUERRA, in his capacity as OIC Governor of the Province of Rizal, et. al,
respondents.
G.R. No. 78059

August 31, 1987
FACTS:
Petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain together with the other petitioners as
Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Muncipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal in a Barangay election held
under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as Barangay Election Act of 1982. On February 9, 1987,
petitioner De Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor
Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of
Barangay Dolores and the other respondents as members of Barangay Council of the same Barangay and
Municipality.
Petitoners prayed to the Supreme Court that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be declared null
and void and that respondents be prohibited by taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay
Councilmen. Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222),
their terms of office shall be six years which shall commence on June 7, 1988 and shall continue until their
successors shall have elected and shall have qualified. It was also their position that with the ratification of the
1987 Philippine Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them and to
designate their successors.
On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive officials were
abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution and not
because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the
term of office of Barangay officials to six years must be deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with
Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the one-year
period which ended on Feb 25, 1987.
RULING:
Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Gov on Feb 8, 1987 designating
respondents as Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal has no legal force
and effect.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987, therefore, the Provisional Constitution
must be deemed to have superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Gov could no longer rely on Sec

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2, Art 3, thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners. Relevantly, Sec 8, Art 1
of the 1987 Constitution further provides in part:
"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined
by law, shall be three years x x x."
Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law, therefore, the term of office of
6 years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern.

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LORENZO M. TAÑADA, et.al, petitioners,

vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, et. al, respondents.
G.R. No. L-63915

April 24, 1985
FACTS:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that
laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus
to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative
orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that
petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid and
enforceable.
HELD:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if
the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general public
adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such
notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat.
It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he
had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette…. The
word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the
constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance and validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of

due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically
informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general application which have not
been published have no force and effect.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner,

vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION
and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.
G.R. No. 122156

February 3, 1997
FACTS:
Pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, the GSIS sold in public auction its
stake in Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). Only 2 bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation,
a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong
Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares
at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court to compel the GSIS to allow it to match the bid of
Renong Berhad. It invoked the Filipino First Policy enshrined in §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, which provides that “in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy
and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.”
ISSUES: Whether Section 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision and does
not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect.
RULING:
YES, Section 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision and does not
need implementing legislation to carry it into effect. A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and
extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be
determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is
referred to the legislature for action. UNLESS it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. The
omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not
necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self exexuting – the rule is that a self-executing provision
does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the
constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available. Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII
is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But,
certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long
as the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without
impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-
executing because Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises
fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise
authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the
same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its language require any legislation in

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order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-
executing in another.
Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From
its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering
national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that - qualified
Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified
circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation
on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such
right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their
bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution
that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by the
legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and vod and
without any force and effect. Thus, since the constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the
nation, it is deemed written in every statue and contract.
In light of the foregoin the Supreme Court held that, the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation; GSIS is included in the term “State,” hence, it is mandated to
implement §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the Constitution; and ultimately GSIS should give preference to the
petitioner in the sale of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
REV. ELLY CHAVEZ PAMATONG, ESQUIRE, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. 161872

April 13, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC declared
petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not
nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency.
Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC
violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987
Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide
campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is
the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal
qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous
national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he
has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a constitutional right to run for or hold public office
RULING:
No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to
limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable
right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an
interpretation of the sort.
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of
Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and
there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the
policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but
merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to
any cause of action before the courts.
Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would
accommodate as many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be
desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the
absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of
claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as
"equal access," "opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their

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inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but
amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.
The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid
limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election
Code on "Nuisance Candidates.” As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination,
however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by
the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at
bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates
who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to
ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into
account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the
greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in
preparation for the election. The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough.
To add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually
impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to
constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the
electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless
sacrifice on the part of the State.
The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of
the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further
evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the
question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of
the Omnibus Election Code.

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TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR TROPICAL MEDICINE
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL ORTHOPEDIC WORKERS UNION, DR. JOSE R. REYES MEMORIAL HOSPITAL
EMPLOYEES UNION, SAN LAZARO HOSPITAL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, ALLIANCE OF HEALTH WORKERS, INC.,
HEALTH ALLIANCE FOR DEMOCRACY, COUNCIL FOR HEALTH DEVELOPMENT, NETWORK OPPOSED TO
PRIVATIZATION, COMMUNITY MEDICINE DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION INC., PHILIPPINE SOCIETY OF SANITARY
ENGINEERS INC., KILUSANG MAYO UNO, GABRIELA, KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS, KALIPUNAN NG
DAMAYAN NG MGA MARALITA, ELSA O. GUEVARRA, ARCADIO B. GONZALES, JOSE G. GALANG, DOMINGO P.
MANAY, TITO P. ESTEVES, EDUARDO P. GALOPE, REMEDIOS M. YSMAEL, ALFREDO BACUÑATA, EDGARDO J.
DAMICOG, REMEDIOS M. MALTU AND REMEGIO S. MERCADO, Petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, SECRETARY OF HEALTH MANUEL M.
DAYRIT, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT EMILIA T. BONCODIN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 167324

July 17, 2007
FACTS:
In 1999, the DOH launched the HSRA, a reform agenda developed by the HSRA Technical Working Group
after a series of workshops and analyses with inputs from several consultants, program managers and technical
staff possessing the adequate expertise and experience in the health sector. Petitioners questioned the first
reform agenda involving the fiscal autonomy of government hospitals, particularly the collection of socialized user
fees and the corporate restructuring of government hospitals. Petitioners alleged that the implementation of the
aforementioned reforms had resulted in making free medicine and free medical services inaccessible to
economically disadvantaged Filipinos. Thus, they alleged that the HSRA is void for being in violation of some
constitutional provisions:
Petitioners contended that a law, such as Executive Order No. 102, which effects the reorganization of the
DOH, should be enacted by Congress in the exercise of its legislative function. They argued that Executive Order
No. 102 is void, having been issued in excess of the Presidents authority.
In resolving the substantial issues of the case, the Court of Appeals ruled that the HSRA cannot be declared void for
violating Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18 of Article II; Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and
Sections 1 and 3(2) of Article XV, all of the 1987 Constitution, which directly or indirectly pertain to the duty of the
State to protect and promote the people’s right to health and well-being. It reasoned that the aforementioned
provisions of the Constitution are not self-executing; they are not judicially enforceable constitutional rights and
can only provide guidelines for legislation.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that the petitioners assertion that Executive Order No. 102 is
detrimental to the health of the people cannot be made a justiciable issue. The question of whether the HSRA will
bring about the development or disintegration of the health sector is within the realm of the political department.
ISSUE: Whether or not the the constitutional provisions protecting the health of the Filipino people are judicially
enforceable.

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HELD:
It was held that the petition had no merit. As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are
considered self-executing, and do not require future legislation for their enforcement. For if they are not treated
as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law can be easily nullified by the inaction of Congress. However,
some provisions have already been categorically declared by this Court as non self-executing.
The HSRA cannot be nullified based solely on petitioners bare allegations that it violates the general
principles expressed in the non self-executing provisions they cite herein. There are two reasons for denying a
cause of action to an alleged infringement of broad constitutional principles: basic considerations of due process
and the limitations of judicial power.
Petitioners claim that Executive Order No. 102 is void on the ground that it was issued by the President in
excess of his authority was also held to have no basis. The Supreme Court has already ruled in a number of cases
that the President may, by executive or administrative order, direct the reorganization of government entities
under the Executive Department. This is also sanctioned under the Constitution, as well as other statutes.
Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, clearly states: The president shall have control of all
executive departments, bureaus and offices. Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of Executive Order No. 292, also
known as the Administrative Code of 1987 reads:
Clearly, Executive Order No. 102 is well within the constitutional power of the President to issue. The
President did not usurp any legislative prerogative in issuing Executive Order No. 102. It is an exercise of the
Presidents constitutional power of control over the executive department, supported by the provisions of the
Administrative Code, recognized by other statutes, and consistently affirmed by this Court.
In several cases, this Court regarded reorganizations of government units or departments as valid, for so
long as they are pursued in good faith that is, for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient
(Secretary of Department of Transportation Communication vs Mabalot). On the other hand, if the reorganization
is done for the purpose of defeating security of tenure or for ill-motivated political purposes, any abolition of
position would be invalid. None of these circumstances are applicable since none of the petitioners were removed
from public service, nor did they identify any action taken by the DOH that would unquestionably result in their
dismissal. The reorganization that was pursued in the present case was made in good faith. The RSP was clearly
designed to improve the efficiency of the department and to implement the provisions of the Local Government
Code on the devolution of health services to local governments. While this Court recognizes the inconvenience
suffered by public servants in their deployment to distant areas, the executive departments finding of a need to
make health services available to these areas and to make delivery of health services more efficient and more
compelling is far from being unreasonable or arbitrary, a determination which is well within its authority. In all, this
Court finds petitioners contentions to be insufficient to invalidate Executive Order No. 102.

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ANTONIO M. SERRANO, Petitioner,

vs.
Gallant MARITIME SERVICES, INC. and MARLOW NAVIGATION CO., INC., Respondents.
G.R. No. 167614

March 24, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. (respondents)
under a Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)-approved Contract of Employment. On the date
of his departure, petitioner was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract for the position of
Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and representation of respondents that
he would be made Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.
Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief Officer. Hence, petitioner refused
to stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on May 26, 1998. Petitioner’s employment
contract was for a period of 12 months or from March 19, 1998 up to March 19, 1999, but at the time of his
repatriation on May 26, 1998, he had served only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an
unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days.
Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for constructive dismissal and
for payment of his money claims in the total amount of US$26,442.73. The LA rendered a Decision dated July 15,
1999, declaring the dismissal of petitioner illegal and awarding him monetary benefits, declaring that the dismissal
of the Serrano by the respondents was illegal and the respondents were ordered to pay the complainant, jointly
and severally, in Philippine Currency, based on the rate of exchange prevailing at the time of payment, the amount
of EIGHT THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY U.S. DOLLARS (US $8,770.00), representing the complainant’s
salary for three (3) months of the unexpired portion of the aforesaid contract of employment. Respondents
appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to question the finding of the LA that petitioner was
illegally dismissed. The NLRC modified the LA Decision and corrected the LA’s computation of the lump-sum salary
awarded to petitioner by reducing the applicable salary rate from US$2,590.00 to US$1,400.00 because R.A. No.
8042 “does not provide for the award of overtime pay, which should be proven to have been actually performed,
and for vacation leave pay. Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the
constitutionality of the subject clause. The NLRC denied the motion.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, reiterating the constitutional challenge against the
subject clause. After initially dismissing the petition on a technicality, the CA eventually gave due course to it, as
directed by this Court in its Resolution which granted the petition for certiorari,filed by petitioner. The CA affirmed
the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate; however, the CA skirted the constitutional issue
raised by petitioner. His Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the CA, petitioner brings his cause to
the Supreme Court.
ISSUES: Whether Section 10 (par 5) of RA 8042 is unconstitutional

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RULING:
Does the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18, Article II and
Section 3, Article XIII on Labor as protected sector? The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative.
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the law.
Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector, without distinction
as to place of deployment, full protection of their rights and welfare.
To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate to
economic security and parity: all monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by workers of similar category,
while all monetary obligations should be borne by them in equal degree; none should be denied the protection of
the laws which is enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed on, others in like circumstances.
Imbued with the same sense of “obligation to afford protection to labor,” the Court in the present case
also employs the standard of strict judicial scrutiny, for it perceives in the subject clause a suspect classification
prejudicial to OFWs. Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs.
However, a closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious
impact on OFWs. The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental purpose; and it is for that
precise reason that the clause violates not just petitioner’s right to equal protection, but also her right to
substantive due process under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.
Second Issue:
It is plain that prior to R.A. No. 8042, all OFWs, regardless of contract periods or the unexpired portions
thereof, were treated alike in terms of the computation of their monetary benefits in case of illegal dismissal. Their
claims were subjected to a uniform rule of computation: their basic salaries multiplied by the entire unexpired
portion of their employment contracts.
The enactment of the subject clause in R.A. No. 8042 introduced a differentiated rule of computation of
the money claims of illegally dismissed OFWs based on their employment periods, in the process singling out one
category whose contracts have an unexpired portion of one year or more and subjecting them to the peculiar
disadvantage of having their monetary awards limited to their salaries for 3 months or for the unexpired portion
thereof, whichever is less, but all the while sparing the other category from such prejudice, simply because the
latter’s unexpired contracts fall short of one year.
Prior to R.A. No. 8042, a uniform system of computation of the monetary awards of illegally dismissed
OFWs was in place. This uniform system was applicable even to local workers with fixed-term employment.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner,

vs.
THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C. MAYOR,respondents.
G.R. No. L-45081

July 15, 1936
FACTS:
Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the position
of member of the National Assembly for the 1st district of Tayabas province.
On Oct 17 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the Nat'l
Assembly for garnering the most number of votes. He then took his oath of office on Nov 15th. On Dec 3, Nat'l
Assembly passed Res. No 8 which declared with finality the victory of Angara. On Dec 8, Ynsua filed before the
Electoral Commission a motion of protest against the election of Angara, that he be declared elected member of
the Nat'l Assembly. Electoral Commission passed a resolution in Dec 9th as the last day for the filing of the protests
against the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. On Dec 20, Angara filed
before the Elec. Commission a motion to dismiss the protest that the protest in question was filed out of the
prescribed period. The Elec. Commission denied Angara's petition.
Angara prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission
taking further cognizance of Ynsua's protest. He contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction
upon the said Electoral Commissions as regards the merits of contested elections to the Nat'l Assembly and the
Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
controversy
RULING:
In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to
determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. The court has jurisdiction
over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining
the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." (Sec 4 Art.
VI 1935 Constitution). It is held, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise
of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the election protest filed by Ynsua.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
PHILIPPINE COCONUT, PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC. (COCOFED), MANUEL V. DEL ROSARIO, DOMINGO P.
ESPINA, SALVADOR P. BALLARES, JOSELITO A. MORALEDA, PAZ M. YASON, VICENTE A. CADIZ, CESARIA DE LUNA
TITULAR, and RAYMUNDO C. DE VILLA, Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent,
WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, OSCAR F. SANTOS, SURIGAO DEL SUR FEDERATION OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES
(SUFAC) and MORO FARMERS ASSOCIATION OF ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR (MOFAZS), represented by ROMEO C.
ROYANDOYAN, Intervenors.
G.R. Nos. 177857-58

January 24, 2012
Facts:
In 1971, RA 6260 created the Coconut Investment Company (CIC) to administer the Coconut Investment
Fund, a fund to be sourced from levy on the sale of copra. The copra seller was, or ought to be, issued COCOFUND
receipts. The fund was placed at the disposition of COCOFED, the national association of coconut producers having
the largest membership.
When martial law started in 1972, several presidential decrees were issued to improve the coconut
industry through the collection and use of the coconut levy fund. Then came P.D. No. 755 in July 1975, providing
under its Section 1 the policy to provide readily available credit facilities to the coconut farmers at preferential
rates. Towards achieving this, Section 2 of PD 755 authorized PCA to utilize the CCSF and the CIDF collections to
acquire a commercial bank and deposit the CCSF levy collections in said bank, interest free, the deposit
withdrawable only when the bank has attained a certain level of sufficiency in its equity capital. It also decreed
that all levies PCA is authorized to collect shall not be considered as special and/or fiduciary funds or form part of
the general funds of the government. Both P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 also provide that the CCSF shall not be
construed by any law as a special and/or trust fund, the stated intention being that actual ownership of the said
fund shall pertain to coconut farmers in their private capacities.
Shortly before the issuance of PD 755 however, PCA had already bought from Peping Cojuangco 72.2% of
the outstanding capital stock of FUB / UCPB. In that contract, it was also stipulated that Danding Cojuanco shall
receive equity in FUB amounting to 10%, or 7.22 % of the 72.2%, as consideration for PCA’s buy-out of what
Danding Conjuanco claim as his exclusive and personal option to buy the FUB shares. The PCA appropriated, out of
its own fund, an amount for the purchase of the said 72.2% equity. It later reimbursed itself from the coconut levy
fund. While the 64.98% (72.2 % – 7.22%) portion of the option shares ostensibly pertained to the farmers, the
corresponding stock certificates supposedly representing the farmers equity were in the name of and delivered to
PCA. There were, however, shares forming part of the 64.98% portion, which ended up in the hands of non-
farmers. The remaining 27.8% of the FUB capital stock were not covered by any of the agreements.
Through the years, a part of the coconut levy funds went directly or indirectly to various projects and/or
was converted into different assets or investments. Of particular relevance to this was their use to acquire the FUB
/ UCPB, and the acquisition by UCPB, through the CIIF and holding companies, of a large block of San Miguel
Corporation (SMC) shares.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
Issue:
W/N the mandate provided under PD 755, 961 and 1468 that the CCSF shall not be construed by any law
as a special and/or trust fund is valid
Held:
No. The coconut levy funds can only be used for the special purpose and the balance thereof should
revert back to the general fund. Article VI, Section 29 (3) of the Constitution provides that all money collected on
any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only, and if the
purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be
transferred to the general funds of the Government. Here, the CCSF were sourced from forced exactions with the
end-goal of developing the entire coconut industry. Therefore, the subsequent reclassification of the CCSF as a
private fund to be owned by private individuals in their private capacities under P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 is
unconstitutional. Not only is it unconstitutional, but the mandate is contrary to the purpose or policy for which the
coco levy fund was created.
Under the principle of separation of powers; neither the congress, the president, nor the judiciary may
encroach on fields allocated to the other branches of government. – The decision on whether to proceed with the
conversion or defer action thereon until final adjudication of the issue of ownership over the sequestered shares
properly pertains to the executive branch, represented by the PCGG. Just as it cannot look into the wisdom and
reasons behind the decision of the executive branch to ask for the conversion of the common shares to preferred
shares. Else, the court would be trenching on the well settled doctrine of separation of powers. The cardinal
postulate explains that the 3 branches must discharge their respective functions within the limits of authority
conferred by the Constitution.
Under the principle of separation of powers, neither Congress, the President, nor the Judiciary may
encroach on fields allocated to the other branches of government. The legislature is generally limited to the
enactment of laws, the executive to the enforcement of laws and the judiciary to their interpretation and
application to cases and controversies. Jurisprudence is well-established that the courts cannot intervene or
interfere with executive or legislative discretion exercised within constitutional limits. In JG Summit Holding, Inc. V.
CA. 450 SCRA 169 (2005), the court explained: The discretion to accept or reject a bid and award contracts is
vested in the government agencies entrusted with that function. The discretion given to the authorities on this
matter is of such wide latitude that the courts will not interfere therewith, unless it is apparent that is used as a
shield to a fraudulent award. (Jalandoni v. NARRA, 108 Phil. 486 [1960]). Xxx The exercise of this discretion is a
policy decision that necessitates prior inquiry, investigation, comparison, evaluation, and deliberation. This task
can best be discharged by the Government agencies xxx.
The role of the courts is to ascertain whether a branch or instrumentality of the government has
transgressed its constitutional boundaries. But the courts will not interfere with executive or legislative discretion
exercised within those boundaries. Otherwise, it strays into the realm of policy decision-making.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE Petitioner,

vs.
LA TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT, Respondent.
G.R. No. 166471

March 22, 2011
FACTS:
Tawang multi-purpose cooperative (TMPC) is a cooperative registered with the cooperative development
authority and organized to provide domestic water services in Barangay Tawang, La Trinidad benguet. LA Trinidad
water district is a local water utility created under PD No. 198, as amended. It is authorized to supply water for
domestic, industrial and commercial purposes within the municipality of LA Trinidad benguet. On October 9 2000,
TMPC filed with the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) an application for a certificate of public convenience
(CPC) to operate and maintain a waterworks system in Brgy. Tawang. LTWD opposed TMPC’s application. LTWD
Claimed that under section 47 of PD No. 198, as amened, its franchise is exclusive. In its Resolution, NWRB
approved TMPC’s application for a CPC. The NWRB held that LTWD’s franchise cannot be exclusive since exclusive
franchises are unconstitutional and found that TMPC is legally and financially qualified to operate and maintain a
waterworks system. NWRB stated that:
“This board has time and again ruled that “exclusive franchise’ provision under PD 198 has misled most
water districts that it likewise extends to be the waters within their territorial boundaries. Such ideological
adherence collides head on with the constitutional provision that “ALL WATERS AND NATURAL RESOURCES
BELONG TO THE STATE” (Sec 2, Art XII)”
LTWD then appealed to RTC. The RTC set aside NWRB resolution an cancelled TMPC’s CPC. The RTC held
that Section 47 is valid. TMPC filed a motion for reconsideration but the RTC denied the motion. Hence, the
present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in holding that Section 47 of PD no. 198, as amended is valid.
RULING:
The petition is meritorious. The President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly franchises for
the operation of a public utility that are exclusive in character. What the president, congress and the court cannot
do directly they cannot do indirectly. Thus the President, Congress and the court cannot create indirectly
franchises that are exclusive in character by allowing Board of Directors of a water district and the Local Water
Utilities Administration (LWUA) to create franchises that are exclusive in character. There is no reasonable and
legitimate ground to violate the constitution – the dissenting opinion state two reasonable and legitimate grounds
for the creation of exclusive franchise: 1.) protection of the governments investment and 2) avoidance of a
situation where ruinous competition could compromise the supply of public utilities in poor and remote areas”.
There is no “reasonable ground and legitimate” ground to violate the constitution. The Constitution should never
be violated by anyone. Right or wrong, the President, Congress, the Court, the BOD, and the LWUA have no choice
but to follow the Constitution. Any acts, however noble its intentions, is void if it violates the constitution. This rule
is basic. Police power does not include the power to violate the Constitution. Police power is the plenary power
vested in congress to make laws not repugnant to the Constitution. This rule is basic.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. (METROBANK), represented by ROSELLA A. SANTIAGO, Petitioner,
vs.
ANTONINO O. TOBIAS III, Respondent.
G.R. No. 177780

January 25, 2012
FACTS:
City Prosecutor of Malabon found probable cause against Tobias. Tobias appealed to the DOJ. Acting
secretary of Justice Gutierrez issued a resolution directing the withdrawal of the information filed agains Tobias.
She opined that Tobias had sufficiently established his good faith in purchasing the property. Metrobank moved to
reconsider but it was denied by the secretary of justice. Metrobank sought reconsideration from the CA but the CA
denied its motion. Metrobank maintains that what the SOJ did was to determine the innocence of the accussed,
which should not be done, during the prelimary investigation; and that the CA disregarded such lapse.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the honorable CA has decided a question of substance probably not in accord with law or
with the applicable decision of this honorable court.
HELD:
The appeal has no merit. Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right to directly
decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Executive Branch of the
Government, or to substitute their own judgments for that of the executive branch, represented in this case by the
DOJ. The settled policy is that the courts will not interfere with the executive determination of probable cause for
the purpose of filing an information, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. That abuse of discretion must be
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law or to act at all in contemplation of law, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or hostility.
In this regard we stress that a preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining the existence of
probable cause is not part of a trial. At a preliminary investigation, the investigating prosecutor or the SOJ only
determines whether the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charge.
“Probable cause refers to facts and circumstance that engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof”

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Complainant,

vs.
MERLE RAMONEDA-PITA, Clerk III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Danao City. Respondent.
A.M. No. P-08-2531

April 11, 2013
FACTS:
This administrative case arose from a letter by Director David E. Cabanag Jr. of CSC R.O. No. VII calling the
attention of the Office of court administrator to the continued employment of Merle Ramoneda-Pita as clerk III of
MTCC, Danao City. It informed the OCA that in CSC, Ramoneda-Pita was found guilty of DISHONESTY and dismissed
from service. As accessory penalties, she was perpetually barred from joining government service and her civil
service eligibility was revoked. However, Ramoneda-Pita did not declare her ineligbilit when she stated in her PDS
that she had never been involved in any administrative case and that she was CS eligible.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ramoneda-Pita should be dismissed from service because of her prior dishonesty.
RULING:
The Supreme Court dismissed Ramoneda-pita from service but emphasized that they have always
maintained that it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s administrative
compliance with all laws, rule and regulations. No other branch of government may intrude into this power
without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. However, as aptly pointed out by the OCA,
Ramoneda-Pita was afforded the full protection of the law, that is, afforded due process. She was able to file
several affidavits and pleadings before the CSC with counsel. It may also be noted that the case had been elevated
to the CA and this Court, where the resolution of the CSC was upheld in both instances.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, and
ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor children, namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE
ANTHONE, all surnamed GARCIA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 179267

June 25, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent and criminalize spousal and child abuse,
which could prevent and criminalize spousal and the child abuse, which could very well be committed by either
the husband or the wife, gender alone is not enough basis to deprive the husband/father of the remedies under
the law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Anti-VAWC law is unconstitutional.
RULING:
No. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy or expediency of a statute; by the principle
of separation of powers, it is the legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of
any law. Hence, we dare not venture into the real motivations and wisdom of the members of Congress in limiting
the protection against violence and abuse under RA 9262 to women and children only.
No proper challenge on said grounds may be entertained in this proceeding. Congress has made its choice
and it is not our prerogative to supplant this judgement. The choice may be perceived as erroneous but even then,
the remedy against it is to seek its amendment or repeal by the legislative. By the principle of separation of
powers, it is the legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law. We only
step in when there is a violation of the Constitution. However, none was sufficiently shown in this case.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan), Petitioners,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 179987

September 3, 2013
FACTS:
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration before the RTC of Cavite-
Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan
claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest
had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30)
years. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his
great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons– Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban–the fourth being
Aristedes’s grandfather. Upon Lino’s death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves.
But by 1966, Esteban’s wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the
Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them
in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It
was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued
by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was “verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land
per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656
on March 15, 1982.” On 3 December 2002, the RTC approved the application for registration.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove
that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred
in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law
for confirmation of imperfect title. On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and
dismissed the application of Malabanan.
ISSUES: Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable
RULING:
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired
ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence
to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property
since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own
evidence—the Tax Declarations they presented in particular—is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail
themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Neither can petitioners

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject property was declared as alienable or
disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the
development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the
subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of
the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
It was the Supreme Court’s view that if the Supreme Court believes that a law already has absurd effects
because of the passage of time, its role under the principle of separation of powers is not to give the law an
interpretation that is not there in order to avoid the perceived absurdity. The ponente believes that the Supreme
Court should be very careful in delineating the line between the constitutionally-allowed interpretation and the
prohibited judicial legislation, given the powers that the 1987 constitution has entrusted to this court.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ZENON R. PEREZ, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 164763

February 12, 2008
FACTS:
An audit team head by Auditor 1 Arlene R, Mandin, provincial auditor’s office, bohol, conducted a cash
examination on the account of Zenon R. Perez, who was then the acting municipal treasurer. Based on the said
audit, petitioner was supposed to have on hand the total amount of Php 94,116.00 instead of the 21,2331.79
counted in the safe of petitioner, incurring a shortage of 72,784.57.
When asked by the auditing team as to the location of the missing funds, petitioner verbally explained
that part of the money was used to pay for the loan of his late broher, another portion was spent for the food of
his family, and the rest for his medicine. As a result of the audit, Arlene R. Mandin prepared a memo
recommending the filing of the appropriate criminal case.
An administrative case was filed against petitioner. Petitioner was able to fully restitute the missing
money. Nonetheless, petitioner was still charged before the Sandiganbayan with Malversation of Public Funds,
define and penalized by article 217 of the revised penal code. Later on, the Sanndiganbayan rendered a judgement
of conviction. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied with finality. Petitioner resorted
to the instant appeal.
Petitioner argues that the penalty for the crime of malversation of public funds is cruel and therefor
unconstitutional as government has not suffered any damage.
ISSUE: Whether or not sentence imposed is cruel and therefore violates section 19 of article III (bill of rights) of the
constitution.
HELD:
The argument is specious on two grounds.
First. Payment or reimbursement is not a defense for exoneration in malversation; it may only be
considered as a mitigating circumstance. This is because damage is not an element of malversation.
Second. There is strong presumption of constitutionality accorded to statutes. It is established doctrine

that a statute should be construed whenever possible in harmony with, rather than in violation of, constitution.
The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which operates no
further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law. It is presumed that the legislature has
acted within its constitutional powers. So, it is generally accepted rule that every statute every rule, or regularly
accepted act, is, or will be, or should be, presumed to be valid and constitutional.
The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which
operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
HACIENDA LUISITA, Petitioner

vs.
PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL, Respondent
G.R. No. 171101

November 22, 2011
FACTS:
In 1988, RA 6657 or the CARP law was passed. It is a program aimed at redistributing public and private agricultural
lands to farmers and farmworkers who are landless. One of the lands covered by this law is the Hacienda Luisita, a
6,443-hectare mixed agricultural-industrial-residential expanse straddling several municipalities of Tarlac.
Hacienda Luisita was bought in 1958 from the Spanish owners by the Tarlac Development Corporation (TADECO),
which is owned and/or controlled by Jose Cojuanco Sr., Group. Back in 1980, the Martial Law administration filed
an expropriation suit against TADECO to surrender the Hacienda to the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (now
DAR) so that the land can be distributed to the farmers at cost. The RTC rendered judgment ordering TADECO to
surrender Hacienda Luisita to the MAR.
In 1988, the OSG moved to dismiss the government’s case against TADECO. The CA dismissed it, but the
dismissal was subject to the condition that TADECO shall obtain the approval of FWB (farm worker beneficiaries) to
the SDP (Stock Distribution Plan) and to ensure its implementation.
Sec 31 of the CARP Law allows either land transfer or stock transfer as two alternative modes in
distributing land ownership to the FWBs. Since the stock distribution scheme is the preferred option of TADECO, it
organized a spin-off corporation, the Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI), as vehicle to facilitate stock acquisition by the
farmers.
After conducting a follow-up referendum and revision of terms of the Stock Distribution Option
Agreement (SDOA) proposed by TADECO, the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), led by then DAR
Secretary Miriam Santiago, approved the SDP of TADECO/HLI through Resolution 89-12-2 dated Nov 21, 1989.
From 1989 to 2005, the HLI claimed to have extended those benefits to the farmworkers. Such claim was
subsequently contested by two groups representing the interests of the farmers – the HLI Supervisory Group and
the AMBALA. In 2003, each of them wrote letter petitions before the DAR asking for the renegotiation of terms
and/or revocation of the SDOA. They claimed that they haven’t actually received those benefits in full, that HLI
violated the terms, and that their lives haven’t really improved contrary to the promise and rationale of the SDOA.
The DAR created a Special Task Force to attend to the issues and to review the terms of the SDOA and the
Resolution 89-12-2. Adopting the report and the recommendations of the Task Force, the DAR Sec recommended
to the PARC (1) the revocation of Resolution 89-12-2 and (2) the acquisition of Hacienda Luisita through
compulsory acquisition scheme. Consequently, the PARC revoked the SDP of TADECO/HLI and subjected those
lands covered by the SDP to the mandated land acquisition scheme under the CARP law. These acts of the PARC
was assailed by HLI via Rule 65.
On the other hand, FARM, an intervenor, asks for the invalidation of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, insofar as it
affords the corporation, as a mode of CARP compliance, to resort to stock transfer in lieu of outright agricultural

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
land transfer. For FARM, this modality of distribution is an anomaly to be annulled for being inconsistent with the
basic concept of agrarian reform ingrained in Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the constitutionality of Sec 31 of RA
6657.
RULING:
No. First, the intervener FARM failed to challenge the constitutionality of RA 6657, Sec 31 at the earliest possible
opportunity. It should have been raised as early as Nov 21, 1989, when PARC approved the SDP of HLI or at least
within a reasonable time thereafter.
Second, the constitutionality of RA 6657 is not the very lis mota of this case. Before the SC, the lis mota of
the petitions filed by the HLI is whether or not the PARC acted with grave abuse of discretion in revoking the SDP
of HLI. With regards to the original positions of the groups representing the interests of the farmers, their very lis
mota is the non-compliance of the HLI with the SDP so that the SDP may be revoked. Such issues can be resolved
without delving into the constitutionality of RA 6657.
Hence, the essential requirements in passing upon the constitutionality of acts of the executive or
legislative departments have not been met in this case.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
DELA LLANA, petitioner

vs.
THE CHAIRPERSON, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY and THE NATIONAL TREASURER,
respondents
G. R. No. 180989
February 7, 2012
FACTS:
Petitioners, prayed for the issuance of A TRO because they want to annul and set aside COA Circular No. 89-299.
Circular No. 89-299 lifted the system of pre-audit of government financial transactions. The rationale of the circular
is to reaffirm the concept that fiscal responsibility resides in management as embodied in the Government
Auditing Code of the Philippines and to contribute to accelerating the delivery of public services and improving
government operations. As a taxpayer, Petitioner filed this petition. Petitioner alleges that the Pre-audit on the
part of the COA cannot be lifted by a mere circular, considering that the pre-audit is a constitutional mandate as
provided in section 2, Article 9-D and because of lack of pre-auditing, serious irregularities in government
transactions have been committed.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner has legal standing to file the case.
RULING:
Yes. Petitioner has legal standing to file the case. This petition has been filed as a taxpayer’s suit. A taxpayer is
deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds from taxation
have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the Law or the constitution. Thus Petitioner has a standing to file
this suit as a taxpayer, since he would be adversely affected by the illegal use of public money. However,
Petitioners allegations find no support in the aforequoted Constitutional provision. There is nothing in the said
provision that requires the COA to conduct a pre-audit of all government transactions and for all government
agencies. The only clear reference to a pre-audit requirement is found in Section 2, paragraph 1, which provides
that a post-audit is mandated for certain government or private entities with state subsidy or equity and only
when the internal control system of an audited entity is inadequate. In such a situation, the COA may adopt
measures, including a temporary or special pre-audit, to correct the deficiencies.
Hence, the conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that this Court may compel the COA to perform. This
discretion on its part is in line with the constitutional pronouncement that the COA has the exclusive authority to
define the scope of its audit and examination. When the language of the law is clear and explicit, there is no room
for interpretation, only application. Neither can the scope of the provision be unduly enlarged by this Court.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
EUSTAQUIO CANDARI, ET AL., petitioners

vs.
ROLAND DONASCO, ET AL., respondents
G.R. No. 185053

February 15, 2012
FACTS:
Respondents were members of Board of Directors of Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative
Incorporated (DARBCI). They were elected into office on July 12, 1998 and their terms should have ended on July
12, 2000. Respondents filed a civil case to enjoin petitioners from holding a special general assembly and an
election of officers on the ground that it was not in accordance with Sec. 35 of RA 6938 (Cooperative Code of the
Philippines). RTC issued a 72 hour TRO to restrain petitioners from holding the General Assembly.
Despite the TRO and without the petitioners participation, 78, 68% of the total membership of the cooperative
(5,910 members) went through with the General Assembly and elected petitioners in Absentia as new members of
the Board and two more General Assemblies were held which ratified the Amended Articles of Cooperation and
By-Laws and elected new sets of officers.
ISSUE: Whether or not the case will proceed after there has been newly elected sets of officers.
RULING:
No. the case was dismissed for lack of Cause of Action. Supervening events had rendered the case moot through
the voluntary act of the General Assembly – The Highest Policymaking body of the cooperative. It is clear from the
Omnibus Order of the RTC that it dismissed the Amended Complaint because the supervening events had rendered
the case moot through the voluntary act of the GA as the highest policy-making body of the cooperative to declare
the contested positions vacant and to elect a new set of officers. As a consequence, respondents no longer had the
personality or the cause of action to maintain the case against petitioners herein. Thus, the RTC committed no
error when it dismissed the case.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
JELBERT B. GALICTO, petitioner

vs.
H.E. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES; ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; AND FLORENCIO B.
ABAD, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, respondents
G.R. No. 193978

February 28, 2012
FACTS:
The Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises found out that the officials
and governing boards of various Government Owned and Control Corporations and Government Financial
Institutions have been granting themselves unwarranted allowances and other benefits. Senate issued Senate
Resolution No. 17 urging the President to order the immediate suspension of those allowances and benefits.
Heeding the call, President Aquino issued Executive Order No. 7 which provides a moratorium on the increases in
the salaries and other forms of compensation of all GOCCs and GFIs employees. Petitioner, as a Phil health
employee, alleged that he is affected by the Executive order No. 7 which was issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of Jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner as an employee of Philhealth, has legal standing to assail the constitutionality of
Executive Order no. 7.
RULING:
No. Petitioner has no legal standing to assail the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 7. In this case, his interest
was described as speculative and based on a mere expectancy. Petitioner has no vested rights to salary increases.
Therefore, the absence of such right deprives him of legal standing to assail Executive order No. 7. He also added
that as a lawyer and as member of the bar he has legal standing but the court describes its interest as too general
and it is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in that case. The case was also mooted by supervening events
which includes the lapse of the effectivity of the moratorium and enactment of Republic Act 10149 which amends
the provisions in the charters of GOCCs and GFIs.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY AND POVERTY (LAMP), petitioners

vs.
THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, respondents
G.R. No. 164987

April 24, 2012
FACTS:
Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP), a group of lawyers who have banded together with a
mission of dismantling all forms of political, economic or social monopoly in the country. According to LAMP, the
above provision is silent and, therefore, prohibits an automatic or direct allocation of lump sums to individual
senators and congressmen for the funding of projects. It does not empower individual Members of Congress to
propose, select and identify programs and projects to be funded out of PDAF. For LAMP, this situation runs afoul
against the principle of separation of powers because in receiving and, thereafter, spending funds for their chosen
projects; the Members of Congress in effect intrude into an executive function. Further, the authority to propose
and select projects does not pertain to legislation. “It is, in fact, a non-legislative function devoid of constitutional
sanction,”8 and, therefore, impermissible and must be considered nothing less than malfeasance.
ISSUE: Whether or not LAMP has legal standing.
RULING:
Yes. Lamp has legal standing to file the case. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions. Here, the sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation required in
taxpayers’ suits is established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds have been illegally disbursed and wasted through
the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
DENNIS A. B. FUNA, Petitioner

vs.
THE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REYNALDO A. VILLAR, Respondent
G.R. No. 192791

April 24, 2012
FACTS:
Dennis Funa challenges the Constitutionality of the Appointment of Reynaldo A. Villar as Chairman of the
Commission on Audit. Before the Court resolve this petition, Villar addressed a letter to the President Benigno S.
Aquino III that he would step down from office upon the appointment of his replacement.
President Benigno Aquino named Ma. Garcia Pulido-Tan as COA Chairman, and Villar being true to his words,
vacated his position.
ISSUE: Whether or not the development of the case has rendered the petition and the main issue moot and
academic.
RULING:
Yes. The development of the case has rendered the petition moot and academic. A case is considered
moot and academic when its purpose has become state however Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and
academic:
1. There is a grave violation of the Constitution.

2. The case involves a situation of exceptional character and is of paramount public interest.
3. The Constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench,
the bar, and the public.
4. Case is capable of repetition yet evading view.
Although deemed moot due to the intervening appointment of Chairman Tan and the resignation of Villar, We
consider the instant case as falling within the requirements for review of a moot and academic case, since it
asserts at least four exceptions to the mootness rule discussed in David, namely: there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; the case involves a situation of exceptional character and is of paramount public interest; the
constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the
public; and the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. The appointment of then Commissioner Reynaldo
A. Villar to the position of Chairman of the Commission on Audit to replace Guillermo N. Carague, whose term of
office as such chairman has expired, is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for violation of Sec. 1(2), Art. IX (D) of the
Constitution and then President Macapagal-Arroyo exercised her appointing power in a manner constituting grave
abuse of discretion.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ARCHBISHOP FERNANDO R. CAPALLA, OMAR SOLITARIO ALI and MARY ANNE L. SUSANO, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent
G.R. No. 201112

June 13, 2012
FACTS:
Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM entered into a Contract for the Provision of an Automated Election System
for the May 10, 2010 Synchronized National and Local Elections (AES Contract) which is a Contract of Lease with
Option to Purchase (OTP) the goods listed therein consisting of the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS), both
software and hardware. The parties agreed that the AES Contract shall remain effective until the release of the
performance security posted by the Comelec. The Comelec was given until December 31, 2010 within which to
exercise the option to purchase. The option was, however, not exercised within said period. The parties later
entered into an extension agreement giving the Comelec until March 31, 2012 within which to exercise it.
Herein petitioners, however, assailed the validity of such agreement on the ground that the same requires another
public bidding since it substantially amended the terms of the contract. They also averred that such extension to
exercise the option will prejudice the governments interest. In the assailed June 13, 2012 decision of the Supreme
Court, the Court upheld the validity of the transaction. Hence, the petitioners moved for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
the Comelec in issuing the assailed Resolutions and in executing the assailed Extension Agreement and Deed.
RULING:
No. A reading of the other provisions of the AES contract would show that the parties are given the right
to amend the contract which may include the period within which to exercise the option. There is, likewise, no
prohibition on the extension of the period, provided that the contract is still effective. The Comelec still retains
P50M of the amount due Smartmatic-TIM as performance security, which indicates that the AES contract is still
effective and not yet terminated. Consequently, pursuant to Article 19 of the contract, the provisions thereof may
still be amended by mutual agreement of the parties provided said amendment is in writing and signed by the
parties. Considering, however, that the AES contract is not an ordinary contract as it involves procurement by a
government agency, the rights and obligations of the parties are governed not only by the Civil Code but also by RA
9184. A winning bidder is not precluded from modifying or amending certain provisions of the contract bidded
upon. However, such changes must not constitute substantial or material amendments that would alter the basic
parameters of the contract and would constitute a denial to the other bidders of the opportunity to bid on the
same terms. The conclusions held by the Court in Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation
(PSALM) v. Pozzolanic Philippines Incorporated and Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.,
(PIATCO) cannot be applied in the present case. First, Smartmatic-TIM was not granted additional right that was
not previously available to the other bidders. The bidders were apprised that aside from the lease of goods and
purchase of services, their proposals should include an OTP the subject goods. Second, the amendment of the AES
contract is not substantial. The approved budget for the contract was P11,223,618,400.00 charged against the

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
supplemental appropriations for election modernization. Bids were, therefore, accepted provided that they did not
exceed said amount. The competitive public bidding conducted for the AES contract was sufficient. A new public
bidding would be a superfluity. Lastly, the amendment of the AES contract is more advantageous to the Comelec
and the public because the P7,191,484,739.48 rentals paid for the lease of goods and purchase of services under
the AES contract was considered part of the purchase price. For the Comelec to own the subject goods, it was
required to pay only P2,130,635,048.15. If the Comelec did not exercise the option, the rentals already paid would
just be one of the government expenses for the past election and would be of no use to future elections.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., Respondents
G.R. No. 202242

July 17, 2012
FACTS:
In 1994, instead of having only 7 members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two
representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one from the
Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and
2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each.
Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC
as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents
argued that the crux of the controversy is the phrase “a representative of Congress.” It is their theory that the two
houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory components of “Congress,”
such that the absence of either divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution.
Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective powers
in the performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution speaks of “a representative from Congress,” it should mean one representative each from both
Houses which comprise the entire Congress.
ISSUE: Whether or not the case is subject for Judicial Review.
RULING:
Yes. The Courts’ power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, namely: (a) there must be an
actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have
“standing” to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or
will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Generally,
a party will be allowed to litigate only when these conditions sine qua non are present, especially when the
constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch of government is put in issue. The Court disagrees with the
respondents’ contention that petitioner lost his standing to sue because he is not an official nominee for the post
of Chief Justice. While it is true that a “personal stake” on the case is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to
say that only official nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court and question the JBC
composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and nominates other members of the Judiciary.
Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the JBC’s duty is not at all limited to the nominations for the highest
magistrate in the land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all over the country may be affected by the
Court’s ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very process of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is
the nucleus of the controversy. The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an object
of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial
intervention for rectification of legal blunders.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
INITIATIVES FOR DIALOGUES AND EMPOWERMENT THROUGH LEGAL SERVICES (IDEALS), petitioners
Vs.
POWER SECTORS ASSET AND LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT CORPORATION (PSALM), respondent
G.R. No. 192088

October 9, 2012
FACTS:
PSALM is a GOCC created by virtue of the EPIRA law. Said law mandated PSALM to manage privatization
of NPC. When PSALM commenced the privatization an invitation to bid was published and the highest bidder K-
Water was identified. The sale to K-Water was sought to be enjoined by petitioners who contend that PSALM
gravely abused its discretion when, in the conduct of the bidding it violated the people’s right to information
without having previously released to the public critical information about the sale. The petitioner IDEALS, files as
taxpayers and as Filipino citizens asserting the Promotion and Protection of a Public right.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to file the case.
RULING:
Yes. The petitioner has legal standing. When a proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the
mere fact that the Petitioner is a citizen satisfies the requirement of Personal interest. The matter ensuring
adequate water supply for domestic use is one by the paramount importance to the public. The court reiterated
that the constitutional right to information includes official information non on-going negotiations before a final
contract. The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and should not
cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters
affecting national security and public order.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ADVOCATES FOR TRUTH IN LENDING, INC. and EDUARDO B. OLAGUER, Petitioners

vs.
BANGKO SENTRAL MONETARY BOARD, represented by its Chairman, GOVERNOR ARMANDO M. TETANGCO, JR.,
and its incumbent members: JUANITA D. AMATONG, ALFREDO C. ANTONIO, PETER FA VILA, NELLY F.
VILLAFUERTE, IGNACIO R. BUNYE and CESAR V. PURISIMA, Respondents
G.R. No. 192986

January 15, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner Advocates for Truth in lending, Inc. is a non-profit and non stock corporation organized to
engage in Pro Bono concerns and activities relating to money lending issues filed the petition as taxpayer and a
citizen. R.A. No. 265, which created the Central Bank (CB) of the Philippines on June 15, 1948, empowered the CB-
MB to, among others, set the maximum interest rates which banks may charge for all types of loans and other
credit operations, within limits prescribed by the Usury Law. CB-MB was authorized only to prescribe or set the
maximum rates of interest for a loan or renewal thereof or for the forbearance of any money, goods or credits.
Petitioners, claiming that they are raising issues of transcendental importance to the public, filed directly with this
Court this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court, seeking to declare that the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board (BSP-MB), replacing the Central Bank Monetary Board (CB-MB) by virtue of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653, has no authority to continue enforcing Central Bank Circular No. 905, issued by the
CB-MB in 1982, which "suspended" Act No. 2655, or the Usury Law of 1916.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has legal standing to file the case and has raised an issue of transcendental
importance.
RULING:
Petitioners have no locus standi/ legal standing to file the Petition. Locus standi is defined as "a right of
appearance in a court of justice on a given question." In private suits, Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest,"
who is "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit." Succinctly put, a party’s standing is based on his own right to the relief sought. Even in public
interest cases such as this petition, the Court has generally adopted the "direct injury" test that the person who
impugns the validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result." Thus, while petitioners assert a public right to assail CB Circular
No. 905 as an illegal executive action, it is nonetheless required of them to make out a sufficient interest in the
vindication of the public order and the securing of relief. It is significant that in this petition, the petitioners do not
allege that they sustained any personal injury from the issuance of CB Circular No. 905. The Petition raises no
issues of transcendental importance. It was held that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law
or governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for
judicial inquiry, namely: (a) that the question must be raised by the proper party; (b) that there must be an actual
case or controversy; (c) that the question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (d) that the
decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
DENNIS A.B. FUNA, Petitioner

vs.
CTING SECRETARY OF JUSTICE ALBERTO C. AGRA, IN HIS OFFICIAL CONCURRENT CAPACITIES AS ACTING
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND AS ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
LEANDRO R. MENDOZA, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, Respondents
G.R. No. 191644

February 19, 2013
FACTS:
Agra was then the Government Corporate Counsel when President Arroyo designated him as the Acting
Solicitor General in place of former Sol Gen Devanadera, who has been appointed as the Secretary of Justice.
Again, Agra was designated as the Acting Secretary in place of Secretary Devanadera when the latter resigned.
Agra then relinquished his position as Corporate Counsel and continued to perform the duties of an Acting Solicitor
General. Funa, a concerned citizen, questioned his appointment. Agra argued that his concurrent designations
were merely in a temporary capacity. Even assuming that he was holding multiple offices at the same time, his
designation as an Acting Sol Gen is merely akin to a hold-over, so that he never received salaries and emoluments
for being the Acting Sol Gen when he was appointed as the Acting Secretary of Justice.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition raises an issue of transcendental importance.
RULING:
Yes. The petition raises an issue of transcendental importance, since it obviously has "far-reaching
implications," and there is a need to promulgate rules that will guide the bench, bar, and the public in future
analogous cases. We, thus, assume a liberal stance and allow petitioner to institute the instant petition. The
constitutionality of the concurrent holding by Agra of the two positions in the Cabinet, albeit in acting capacities,
was an issue that comes under all the recognized exceptions. The issue involves a probable violation of the
Constitution, and relates to a situation of exceptional character and of paramount public interest by reason of its
transcendental importance to the people. The resolution of the issue will also be of the greatest value to the Bench
and the Bar in view of the broad powers wielded through said positions. The situation further calls for the review
because the situation is capable of repetition, yet evading review. In other words, many important and practical
benefits are still to be gained were the Court to proceed to the ultimate resolution of the constitutional issue
posed.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
EVELIO B. JAVIER, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR, respondents
G.R. Nos. L-68379-81

September 22, 1986
FACTS:
The petitioner and the private respondents were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the
May 1984 elections. There was tension between two parties. Petitioner questioned the Proclamation of Pacifador,
arguing that the Proclamation was void because it was made only by a division and not by the Commission on
Elections En Banc as required by the Constitution. While the case was still pending, petitioner was killed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supervening events rendered the case moot and academic.
RULING:
Yes. The abolishment of Batasang Pambansa and the death of the petitioner rendered the case moot and
academic. However the court declared the proclamation of Pacifador void as it is violative of the constitution
because for a proclamation to be valid, it must be made by the Supreme Court en Banc and not by a division only.
The court stressed that were it not for the supervening events that have legally rendered it moot and academic,
this petition would have been granted and the decision of the Commission on Elections dated July 23, 1984, set
aside as it is violative of the Constitution.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ABS- CBN, Petitioner

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), Respondent
G.R. No. 133486

January 28, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioner ABS-CBN and other groups were restrained by COMELEC from conducting an exit survey
because might conflict with the official COMELEC count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the National
Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL). It also noted that it had not authorized or deputized Petitioner ABS-CBN
to undertake the exit survey.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Petition is moot and academic because the May 11, 1998 election has already been held
and done with.
RULING:
No. the petition is not totally moot. While the assailed Resolution referred specifically to the May 11,
1998 election, its implications on the people's fundamental freedom of expression transcend the past election. The
holding of periodic elections is a basic feature of our democratic government. By its very nature, exit polling is tied
up with elections. To set aside the resolution of the issue now will only postpone a task that could well crop up
again in future elections. In any event, in Salonga v. Cruz Pano, the Court had occasion to reiterate that it "also has
the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the
symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional
[
guarantees." Since the fundamental freedoms of speech and of the press are being invoked here, we have
resolved to settle, for the guidance of posterity, whether they likewise protect the holding of exit polls and the
dissemination of data derived therefrom. The solicitor general further contends that the Petition should be
dismissed for petitioner's failure to exhaust available remedies before the issuing forum, specifically the filing of a
motion for reconsideration. This Court, however, has ruled in the past that this procedural requirement may be
glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice when the issue involves the principle of social justice or the
protection of labor, when the decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is
extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available. The instant Petition assails a
Resolution issued by the Comelec en banc on April 21, 1998, only twenty (20) days before the election itself.
Besides, the petitioner got hold of a copy thereof only on May 4, 1998. Under the circumstances, there was hardly
enough opportunity to move for a reconsideration and to obtain a swift resolution in time for the May 11, 1998
elections. Moreover, not only is time of the essence; the Petition involves transcendental constitutional issues.
Direct resort to this Court through a special civil action for certiorari is therefore justified.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
CENTRAL BANK (NOW BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS) EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS AND THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, Respondents
G.R. No. 148208

December 15, 2004
FACTS:
On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old Central Bank of
the Philippines, and created a new BSP. On June 8, 2001, almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653,
petitioner Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP and the
Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from further implementing the
last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional. Petitioner
posits that the classification is not reasonable but arbitrary and capricious, and violates the equal protection clause
of the Constitution. Petitioner also stresses: (a) that R.A. No. 7653 has a separability clause, which will allow the
declaration of the unconstitutionality of the proviso in question without affecting the other provisions; and (b) the
urgency and propriety of the petition, as some 2,994 BSP rank-and-file employees have been prejudiced since
1994 when the proviso was implemented. Petitioner concludes that: (1) since the inequitable proviso has no force
and effect of law, respondents' implementation of such amounts to lack of jurisdiction; and (2) it has no appeal nor
any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course except through this petition for prohibition,
which this Court should take cognizance of, considering the transcendental importance of the legal issue involved.
Respondent BSP, in its comment,contends that the provision does not violate the equal protection clause and can
stand the constitutional test, provided it is construed in harmony with other provisions of the same law, such as
"fiscal and administrative autonomy of BSP," and the mandate of the Monetary Board to "establish
professionalism and excellence at all levels in accordance with sound principles of management.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject clause constitutes invidious discrimination on the rank-and-file employees of the
BSP.
RULING:
Yes. The subject clause constitutes invidious discrimination on the rank-and-file employees of the BSP.
The last paragraph of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, runs afoul of the constitutional mandate that "No
person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws”. It breached the BSP’s employee’s right to equal
protection which does not demand absolute equality but requires that all people should be treated alike. Thus, the
court held that the continued operation and implementation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of
Republic Act No. 7653 is unconstitutional.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
RESTITUTO YNOT, Petitioner

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT, Respondent
G.R. No. 74457

March 20, 1987
FACTS:
On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when
the same was confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A.
A case was filed by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive order and the recovery of the
carabaos. After considering the merits of the case, the confiscation was sustained and the court declined to rule on
the constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court but it also
upheld the ruling of RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed Executive Order is Unconstitutional.
RULING:
Yes Executive Order 626-A is unconstitutional. The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police
power to justify EO 626-A amending EO 626 in basic rule prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain
conditions. The supreme court said that The reasonable connection between the means employed and the
purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing the Supreme Court do not see how the
prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering
that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the
carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there; any more than moving them to another province
will make it easier to kill them there. The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act
defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out
forthright. Due process was not properly observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by
the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and
given a supersede as bond of P12, 000.00. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without
giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying due process.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
EVELYN ONGSUCO, Petitioner

vs.
MARIANO MALONES, Respondent
G.R. No. 182065

October 27, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioners are stall holders at the Maasin Public Market. After a meeting with the stall holders,
Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin approved Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01, entitled "The Municipal Revised Revenue
Code."The Code contained a provision for increased rentals for the stalls and the imposition of goodwill fees in the
amount of P20,000.00 andP15,000.00 for stalls located on the first and second floors of the municipal public
market, respectively. The same Code authorized respondent to enter into lease contracts over the said market
stalls, and incorporated a standard contract of lease for the stall holders at the municipal public market.
Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin approved Resolution No. 68, series of 1998, moving to have the meeting declared
inoperative as a publichearing, because majority of the persons affected by the imposition of the goodwill fee
failed to agree to the said measure. However, Resolution No. 68, series of 1998, of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Maasin was vetoed by respondent on 30 September 1998. Respondent wrote a letter to petitioners informing
them that they were occupying stalls in the newly renovated municipal public market without any lease contract,
as a consequence of which, the stalls were considered vacant and open for qualified and interested applicants.
Petitioners filed a Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus, with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, against respondent. The RTC found that petitioners could not avail
themselves of the remedy of mandamus or prohibition. Because they failed to show a clear legal right to the use of
the market stalls without paying the goodwill fees and also on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a need for the exhaustion of administrative remedies.
RULING:
No. The rule on the exhaustion of administrative remedies is intended to preclude a court from arrogating unto
itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative
body of special competence. Thus, a case where the issue raised is a purely legal question, well within the
competence; and the jurisdiction of the court and not the administrative agency, would clearly constitute an
exception. There is no dispute herein that the notices sent to petitioners and other stall holders at the municipal
public market were sent out, informing them of the supposed "public hearing" to be held on 11 August 1998. Even
assuming that petitioners received their notice, the "public hearing" was already scheduled, and actually
conducted, only five days later. This contravenes Article 277 (b) (3) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
the Local Government Code which requires that the public hearing be held no less than ten days from the time the
notices were sent out, posted, or published, when the Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin sought to correct this
procedural defect through Resolution No. 68, series of 1998 vetoed the said resolution. Although the Sangguniang
Bayan may have had the power to override respondent's veto, it no longer did so. The defect in the enactment of
Municipal Ordinance No. 98 was not cured when another public hearing was held on 22 January 1999, after the

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
questioned ordinance was passed by the Sangguniang Bayan and approved by respondent on 17 August 1998.
Section 186 of the Local Government Code prescribes that the public hearing be held prior to the enactment by a
local government unit of an ordinance levying taxes, fees, and charges. Since no public hearing had been duly
conducted prior to the enactment of Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01, said ordinance is void and cannot be given
any effect. Consequently, a void and ineffective ordinance could not have conferred upon respondent the
jurisdiction to order petitioners' stalls at the municipal public market vacant.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
FRANCISCO SERRANO DE AGBAYANI, Plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK and THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF PANGASINAN, Defendants, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
BANK, Defendant-appellant
G.R. No. L-23127

April 29, 1971
FACTS:
Plaintiff obtained a loan from PNB dated July 19, 1939, maturing on July 19, 1944, secured by real estate
mortgage. On July 13 1959 or 15 years after maturity of the loan, defendant instituted extra-judicial foreclosure
proceedings for the recovery of the balance of the loan remaining unpaid. Plaintiff countered with his suit against
both alleging that the mortgage sought to be foreclosed had long prescribed, fifteen years having elapsed from the
date of maturity. PNB on the other hand claims that the defense of prescription would not be available if the
1
period from March 10, 1945, when Executive Order No. 32 was issued, to July 26, 1948, when the subsequent
2
legislative act extending the period of moratorium was declared invalid, were to be deducted from the
computation of the time during which the bank took no legal steps for the recovery of the loan. The lower court
did not find such contention persuasive and decided the suit in favor of plaintiff.
ISSUE: Whether or not the period of the effectivity of EO 32 and the Act extending the Moratorium Law before the
same were declared invalid tolled the period of prescription.
RULING:
Yes. In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: “The actual existence of a statute, prior to
such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly
be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as
to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, with respect to particular relations, individual and
corporate, and particular conduct, private and official.” The now prevailing principle is that the existence of a
statute or executive order prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal consequences are
attached. Precisely because of the judicial recognition that moratorium was a valid governmental response to the
plight of the debtors who were war sufferers, this Court has made clear its view in a series of cases impressive in
their number and unanimity that during the eight-year period that Executive Order No. 32 and Republic Act No.
342 were in force, prescription did not run. The error of the lower court in sustaining plaintiff’s suit is thus
manifest. From July 19, 1944, when her loan matured, to July 13, 1959, when extra-judicial foreclosure
proceedings were started by appellant Bank, the time consumed is six days short of fifteen years. The prescriptive
period was tolled however, from March 10, 1945, the effectivity of Executive Order No. 32, to May 18, 1953, when
the decision of Rutter v. Esteban was promulgated, covering eight years, two months and eight days. Obviously
then, when resort was had extra-judicially to the foreclosure of the mortgage obligation, there was time to spare
before prescription could be availed of as a defense.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ROBERTO A. FLORES, DANIEL Y. FIGUEROA, ROGELIO T. PALO, DOMINGO A. JADLOC, CARLITO T. CRUZ and
MANUEL P. REYES, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, Executive Secretary, and RICHARD J. GORDON, Respondents
G.R. No. 104732

June 22, 1993
FACTS:
Petitioners, as taxpayers and employees of U.S facilities at Subic, challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 13
(d) of the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 which directs the President to appoint a professional
manager as administrator of the SBMA…provided that “for the 1st year of its operations, the mayor of Olongapo
City (Richard Gordon) shall be appointed as the chairman and the CEO of the Subic Authority.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the proviso violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation
of elective officials to other government posts.
RULING:
Yes. The proviso violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective
officials to other government posts. Sec. 7 of Article IX-B of the Constitution Provides: No elective official shall be
eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. Unless
otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other
office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. The subject proviso directs the President to
appoint an elective official i.e. the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government post (as Chairman and CEO of
SBMA). This is precisely what the Constitution prohibits. It seeks to prevent a situation where a
local elective official will work for his appointment in an executive position in government, and thus neglect his
constituents.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
VIOLETA ALDOVINO, ALI ALIBASA, FELIX BALINO, DIONISIO BALLESTEROS, JOSE N. BALEIN, JR., FREDDIE
CAUTON, JANE CORROS, ROBERTO CRUZ, TRINIDAD DACUMOS, ANGELITA DIMAPILIS, ANDREA ESTONILO,
EFREN FONTANILLA, MARY PAZ FRIGILLANA, MANUEL HENSON, SAMUEL HIPOL, MERLENE IBALIO, MAGDALENA
JAMILLA, ALEXANDER JUSTINIANI, ROMULO MIRADOR, JULIO MIRAVITE, DANTE NAGTALON, CLARITA NAMUCO,
ALICIA ORBITA, ANGELITA PUCAN, MYRNA P. SALVADOR, LIBRADA TANTAY, and ARACELI J. DE
VEYRA, Petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY RAFAEL ALUNAN III, DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM and SECRETARY GUILLERMO M. CARAGUE,
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents
G.R. No. 102232

March 9, 1994
FACTS:
Petitioners and intervenors seek reinstatement and payment of back wages, citing Mandani Vs. Gonzales
and Abrogar Vs. Garrucho Jr. and Garrucho. Mandani Vs. Gonzales. Executive Order No. 120, Sec. 29 took effect
upon approval that reorganizes the Ministry of Tourism, providing that the incumbents whose positions are not
included in the new system of position structure and staffing pattern are separated from service. Then Ministry of
Tourism, after which issued office orders and memoranda vacating many positions and effecting the separation of
employees including petitioners Mandani, Abrogar and Arnaldo which made them file their cases and instant
petition. In Mandani, the office orders and memoranda issued by Ministry of Tourism were declared null and void
pursuant to Executive Order No. 120 and to immediately restore the petitioners to their positions with salaries
computed under the new position and staffing system from the dates of their invalid terminations at rates not
lower than their former salaries.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners and intervenors must be reinstated and be paid of their back wages.
RULING:
Yes the petitioners and intervenors must be reinstated and be paid of their back wages. It was the public
respondents who created the problem of petitioners and intervenors by illegally abolishing their positions and
terminating their services in outrageous disregard of the basic protection accorded civil servants, hence our
repeated pronouncement that it was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court ruled that herein petitioners are
reinstated immediately to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and with back salaries computed
under new staffing pattern from the dates of their invalid dismissal at rates not lower than their former salaries
but not to exceed a period of 5 years with several provisions. Having found out that the Executive Order is
unconstitutional, thus dismissal of the employees is also unconstitutional. The courts declared its total nullity. An
unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights, imposes no duties and affords no protection. In legal
contemplation, it is inoperative as if it had not been passed. It is therefore stricken from the statute books and
considered never to have existed at all. All persons are bound by the declaration of unconstitutionality which
means that no one may thereafter invoke it nor may the courts be permitted to apply it in subsequent cases. It is
as if the intervenors were never served their termination orders and, consequently, were never separated from
the service. Whenever the courts declared an administrative official to have acted in unlawful manner, that official

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
must undo the harmful effects of his illegal act and to accord to the aggrieved parties restoration or restitution in
good faith to make up for the deprivations which may have suffered because of his act.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
HACIENDA LUISITA, Petitioner

vs.
PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL, Respondent
G.R. No. 171101

November 22, 2011
FACTS:
On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the petition filed
by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC revoking HLI’s Stock Distribution Plan (SDP)
and placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) of the government. The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-
5, the Court noted that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot validly
ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by application of the operative fact principle,
give way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified farm workers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they
want to remain as HLI stockholders or [choose actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) to “immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the
effects, consequences and legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to
manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their thumb marks, as the
case may be, over their printed names.” The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of
the Court decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the operative fact doctrine is available in this case.
RULING:
Yes. The operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case. The Court maintained its stance that the
operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case since, contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is
not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions made by the President or the
administrative agencies that have the force and effect of laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decisions,
they may have produced acts and consequences that must be respected. It is on this score that the operative fact
doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC
Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. The majority stressed that the application of the operative fact doctrine by
the Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs because not only were they allowed to
retain the benefits and home lots they received under the stock distribution scheme, they were also given the
option to choose for themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not. The Court maintained
that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it was not
raised at the earliest opportunity and that the resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the case. Moreover, the
issue has been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes of acquisition under RA
9700. The majority clarified that in its July 5, 2011 decision; it made no ruling in favor of the constitutionality of
Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but found nonetheless that there was no apparent grave violation of the Constitution that may
justify the resolution of the issue of constitutionality.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC. (COCOFED), Petitioners

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
G.R. Nos. 177857-58

January 24, 2012
FACTS:
the largest membership. When martial law started in 1972, several presidential decrees were issued to improve
the coconut industry through the collection and use of the coconut levy fund: PD 276 established the Coconut
Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF) and declared the proceeds of the CCSF levy as trust fund, to be utilized to
subsidize the sale of coconut-based products, thus stabilizing the price of edible oil. PD 582 created the Coconut
Industry Development Fund (CIDF) to finance the operation of a hybrid coconut seed farm. In 1973, PD 232 created
the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) to accelerate the growth and development of the coconut and palm oil
industry. Then came P.D. No. 755 in July 1975, providing under its Section 1 the policy to provide readily available
credit facilities to the coconut farmers at preferential rates. Towards achieving this, Section 2 of PD 755 authorized
PCA to utilize the CCSF and the CIDF collections to acquire a commercial bank and deposit the CCSF levy collections
in said bank, interest free, the deposit withdrawable only when the bank has attained a certain level of sufficiency
in its equity capital. It also decreed that all levies PCA is authorized to collect shall not be considered as special
and/or fiduciary funds or form part of the general funds of the government. Both P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 also
provide that the CCSF shall not be construed by any law as a special and/or trust fund, the stated intention being
that actual ownership of the said fund shall pertain to coconut farmers in their private capacities. Shortly before
the issuance of PD 755 however, PCA had already bought from Peping Cojuangco 72.2% of the outstanding capital
stock of FUB / UCPB. In that contract, it was also stipulated that Danding Cojuanco shall receive equity in FUB
amounting to 10%, or 7.22 % of the 72.2%, as consideration for PCA’s buy-out of what Danding Conjuanco claim as
his exclusive and personal option to buy the FUB shares.
The PCA appropriated, out of its own fund, an amount for the purchase of the said 72.2% equity. It later
reimbursed itself from the coconut levy fund. While the 64.98% (72.2 % – 7.22%) portion of the option shares
ostensibly pertained to the farmers, the corresponding stock certificates supposedly representing the farmers’
equity were in the name of and delivered to PCA. There were, however, shares forming part of the 64.98% portion,
which ended up in the hands of non-farmers. The remaining 27.8% of the FUB capital stock were not covered by
any of the agreements. Through the years, a part of the coconut levy funds went directly or indirectly to various
projects and/or was converted into different assets or investments. Of particular relevance to this was their use to
acquire the FUB / UCPB, and the acquisition by UCPB, through the CIIF and holding companies, of a large block of
San Miguel Corporation (SMC) shares.
ISSUE: Whether or not it is unconstitutional for the farmers to own the coco levy fund in their private capacities.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
RULING:
Yes. It is unconstitutional for the farmers to own the coco levy fund in their private capacities. The coconut levy
funds are in the nature of taxes and can only be used for public purpose. They cannot be used to purchase shares
of stocks to be given for free to private individuals. Even if the money is allocated for a special purpose and raised
by special means, it is still public in character.
Accordingly, the presidential issuances which authorized the PCA to distribute, for free, the shares of stock of the
bank it acquired to the coconut farmers under such rules and regulations the PCA may promulgate is
unconstitutional.
It is unconstitutional because first, it have unduly delegated legislative power to the PCA, and second, it
allowed the use of the CCSF to benefit directly private interest by the outright and unconditional grant of absolute
ownership of the FUB/UCPB shares paid for by PCA entirely with the CCSF to the undefined “coconut farmers”,
which negated or circumvented the national policy or public purpose declared by P.D. No. 755.
Hence, the so-called Farmers’ shares do not belong to the coconut farmers in their private capacities, but to the
Government. The coconut levy funds are special public funds and any property purchased by means of the coconut
levy funds should likewise be treated as public funds or public property, subject to burdens and restrictions
attached by law to such property.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
GRECO BELGICA ET AL., Petitioners

vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO OCHOA ET AL., Respondent
G.R. No. 208566

November 19, 2013
FACTS:
Before the Court are consolidated petitions, taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail
the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System. Pork Barrel refers to an appropriation of government spending
meant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a representative's district. In the
Philippines, the “pork barrel” has been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the
Legislature, although, its usage would evolve in reference to certain funds of the President such as the Malampaya
Funds and the Presidential Social Fund. The Malampaya Funds was a special fund created under PD 910 issued by
then President Ferdinand E .Marcos for the development of indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth.
The Presidential Social Fund is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of
PAGCOR through which the President provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects not funded
under the regular budget. In 1996, an anonymous source later identified as Former Marikina City Romeo Candazo
revealed that huge sums of government money went into the pockets of legislators as kickbacks .In 2004, several
concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF for being unconstitutional. Unfortunately, for lack of
any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common
exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress, the petition was dismissed.In July 2013, NBI began its probe into
allegations that “the government has been defrauded of some P10Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate
using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various sgovernment agencies for scores of ghost projects.” The
investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation (stands
for Janet Lim Napoles) had facilitated the swindling of billions of pesos from the public coffers for “ghost projects”
using no fewer than 20 dummy non-government organizations for an entire decade. Motivated by the foregoing,
Greco Belgica and several others filed various petitions before the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality
of the pork barrel system.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Pork Barrel system is unconstitutional.
RULING:
Yes. The Pork Barrel system is unconstitutional because it violates the following principles:
a. Separation of Powers- As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds
(power of the purse). The executive, on the other hand, implements the laws – this includes the GAA to
which the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may implement the law but under the pork barrel system,
what’s happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as
to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to – a clear act of implementing the law they
enacted – a violation of the principle of separation of powers. This is also highlighted by the fact that in
realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to get the concurrence of the legislator concerned.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power- As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone.
(The Constitution does grant the people legislative power but only insofar as the processes of referendum
and initiative are concerned). That being, legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot
delegate further that which was delegated to it by the Constitution. Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) Delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local
matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified
limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates,
import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within
the framework of the national development program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to which his
PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The power to
appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the
individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the Congress can delegate the power to
the individual member of Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances- One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the
president to veto items in the GAA which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already
being undermined because of the fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify the
project to which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto the
appropriation made by the legislator if the appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA –
again, “Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given
power of the President useless.”
d. Local Autonomy- As a rule, the local governments has the power to manage their local affairs. Through
their Local Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies
concerning their localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the House of
Representatives, what’s happening is that a congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project by the
LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national government (note, a
congressman is a national officer) meddles with the affairs of the local government – and this is contrary
to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on local autonomy. It’s good if that’s all that is happening
under the pork barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part of
legislators.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
MARIA CAROLINA ARAULLO ET AL., Petitioners

vs.
PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO III ET AL., Respondent
G.R. Nos. 209287

January 3, 2015
FACTS:
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth of the
economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch”
Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP). The DAP was seen as a
remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the Executive to realign funds from slow
moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next year’s appropriation. So what happens under the
DAP was that if a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds
allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as “savings” by the
Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate
the economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as
noted by the Supreme Court). Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General
Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé claiming that he, and other Senators,
received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice
Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the
request of the Senators. This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign
funds within the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a few:
Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera People’s Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation
Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several other
concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among
their contentions was that DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that
“no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” Secretary Abad
argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and augmentation provisions thereof),
Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292
(power of the President to suspend expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively).
ISSUE: Whether or not the Disbursement Allocation Program is unconstitutional.
RULING:
No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the
Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such,
it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution. In DAP no
additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise; an appropriation made by law would have been
required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being declared as
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has
funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may cause more
harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return
what they received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative
Fact may not be applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the
appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
JUAN ANTONIO OPOSA et al, Petitioner

vs.
HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Respondents
G.R. No. 101083

July 30, 1993
FACTS:
The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The first complaint
was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court, National
capital Judicial Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural
resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn and asserted that continued deforestation have caused a distortion
and disturbance of the ecological balance and have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies. Plaintiffs prayed
that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his
behalf to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs. Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground that the complaint had no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question. The RTC
Judge sustained the motion to dismiss; further ruling that granting of the relief prayed for would result in the
impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution. Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant
special civil action for certiorari and asked the court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that
the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the court.
RULING:
Yes. The petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the Court. The case at bar is subject to
judicial review by the Court. Justice Davide, Jr. precisely identified in his opinion the requisites for a case to be
subjected for the judicial review by the Court. According to him, the subject matter of the complaint is of common
interest, making this civil case a class suit and proving the existence of an actual controversy. He strengthens this
conclusion by citing in the decision Section 1, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution. The petitioners can file a class suit
because they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. Their personality to sue in behalf of the
succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to
a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the “rhythm and
harmony of nature.” Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably
include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their
exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. Every
generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a
balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors’ assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
generations to come. The Court does not agree with the trial court’s conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege
with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the
complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. The complaint focuses on
one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our
nation’s constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. While the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of
Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter.
Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation
and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be
said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written
in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. The Court are not persuaded by
the trial court’s pronouncement. The respondent Secretary did not invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-
impairment clause. If he had done so, Justice Feliciano would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government
by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would
have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions
regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly
pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D.
No. 705) which provides that when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or
rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein. All licenses may
thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protested by the
due process clause of the Constitution. Hence, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order
of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 was set aside. The petitioners amend their
complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
BROTHER MARIANO MIKE Z. VELARDE, Petitioner

vs.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY, Respondent
G.R. No. 159357

April 28, 2004
FACTS:
On January 28, 2003, Social Justice Society (SJS) filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with theRegional Trial Court
(RTC) Manila against Mariano “Mike” Velarde, His Eminence Jaime Cardinal Sin, Executive Minister Eraño Manalo,
Bro. Eddie Villanueva and Bro. Eliseo Soriano. SJS sought the interpretation of certain constitutional provisions,
specifically concerning the separation of Church and State, as well as a petition for declaratory judgment on the
constitutionality of religious leaders endorsing certain candidates and asking members of their flock to vote for a
specific candidate. All respondents of the initial case sought for the dismissal of the petition on the common
ground that aforesaid petition by the SJS did not state a cause of action and had no justiciable controversy. They
were ordered to submit a pleading by way of advisement which was followed closely by another Order that denied
all Motions to Dismiss. Bro. Mike Velarde, Bro. Eddie Villanueva and Executive Minister Eraño Manalo moved to
reconsider the denial. His Eminence Jaime Cardinal Sin, asked for extension to file memorandum. Only Bro. Eli
Soriano complied with the first Order by submitting his Memorandum. The Motions for Reconsideration were
denied as well. After its essay on the legal issue, however, the trial court failed to include a dispositive in its
Decision. A Petition for Review was filed by respondent Velarde.
ISSUE: Whether or not the constitutional question sought to be resolved by herein respondent is ripe for judicial
determination.
RULING:
No. A justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory. The SJS Petition for Declaratory Relief fell
short of this test. It miserably failed to allege an existing controversy or dispute between the petitioner and the
named respondents therein. Further, the Petition did not sufficiently state what specific legal right of the
petitioner was violated by the respondents therein; and what particular act or acts of the latter were in breach of
its rights, the law or the Constitution. As pointed out by Brother Eliseo F. Soriano in his Comment, what exactly has
he done that merited the attention of SJS? He confesses that he does not know the answer, because the SJS
Petition (as well as the assailed Decision of the RTC) yields nothing in this respect. His Eminence, Jaime Cardinal
Sin, adds that, at the time SJS filed its Petition on January 28, 2003, the election season had not even started yet;
and that, in any event, he has not been actively involved in partisan politics. Indeed, SJS merely speculated or
anticipated without factual moorings that, as religious leaders, the petitioner and his co-respondents below had
endorsed or threatened to endorse a candidate or candidates for elective offices; and that such actual or
threatened endorsement will enable [them] to elect men to public office who [would] in turn be forever beholden
to their leaders, enabling them to control the government and posing a clear and present danger of serious erosion
of the people’s faith in the electoral process and reinforcing their belief that religious leaders determine the
ultimate result of elections, which would then be violative of the separation clause.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ISABELITA VINUYA ET AL., Petitioners

vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY PAQUITO OCHOA ET AL., Respondents
G.R. No. 162230

August 13, 2014
FACTS:
This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the Office of the Executive Secretary, the Secretary
of the DFA, the Secretary of the DOJ, and the OSG. Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock,
non-profit organization registered with the SEC, established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape
by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second World War. Petitioners claim that since 1998, they
have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim
against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the “comfort women”
stations in the Philippines. But officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took the
position that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by
Japan’s compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan. Hence, this petition where
petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and war crimes
committed against them; and (b) compel the respondents to espouse their claims for official apology and other
forms of reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international tribunals.
Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the war were dealt with in the
San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations Agreement of 1956. On January 15, 1997, the
Asian Women’s Fund and the Philippine government signed a Memorandum of Understanding for medical and
welfare support programs for former comfort women. Over the next five years, these were implemented by the
Department of Social Welfare and Development.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners’
claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.
RULING:
No. The Executive Department did not commit grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners’
claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the
Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners’ claims against
Japan. Political questions refer “to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people
in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative
or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a
particular measure.” One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-
established that “the conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the
executive and legislative–‘the political’–departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in
the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.” are delicate, complex, and involve

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
large elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people
whose welfare they advance or imperil. But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions,
and courts certainly possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements. However,
the question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign
government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution
not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is
to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of
Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question. The President, not Congress, has the
better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time
of war. He has his confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and
other officials. The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners’ cause would be inimical to
our country’s foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious
implications for stability in this region. For the to overturn the Executive Department’s determination would mean
an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that
judgment has been constitutionally committed. From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a
general principle, where such an extraordinary length of time has lapsed between the treaty’s conclusion and our
consideration – the Executive must be given ample discretion to assess the foreign policy considerations of
espousing a claim against Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners and those of the
Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and whether further steps are appropriate or
necessary. In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a claim within
the international legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on
the individual’s behalf. By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or
international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in the person
of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law. Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State
may exercise diplomatic protection by whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right
that the State is asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their rights
are not adequately protected, they have no remedy in international law. All they can do is resort to national law, if
means are available, with a view to furthering their cause or obtaining redress. All these questions remain within
the province of municipal law and do not affect the position internationally. Even the invocation of jus cogens
norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this analysis. Petitioners have not shown that the crimes
committed by the Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or
that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has attained the
status of jus cogens. The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been used as a
legal term describing obligations owed by States towards the community of states as a whole. Essential distinction
should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, and those
arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are the concern
of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their
protection; they are obligations erga omnes. The term “jus cogens” (literally, “compelling law”) refers to norms
that command peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are
considered peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified only
by general international norms of equivalent authority.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioners

vs.
ANTONIO CAMPOS RUEDA, Respondent
G.R. No. L-13250

October 29, 1971
FACTS:
Antonio Campos Rueda is the administrator of the estate of the deceased Maria Cerdeira. Cerdeira is a
Spanish national, by reason of her marriage to a Spanish citizen and was a resident of Tangier, Morocco up to her
death. At the time of her demise she left, among others, intangible personal properties in the Philippines. The CIR
then issued an assessment for state and inheritance taxes of P369, 383.96. Rueda filed an amended return stating
that intangible personal properties worth P396, 308.90 should be exempted from taxes. The CIR denied the
request on the ground that the law of Tangier is not reciprocal to Section 122 (now Section 104) of the National
Internal Revenue Code. The case was elevated to the CTA which sided with Rueda. The CTA stated that the foreign
country mentioned in Section 122 "refers to a government of that foreign power which, although not an
international person in the sense of international law, does not impose transfer or death upon intangible person
properties of our citizens not residing therein, or whose law allows a similar exemption from such taxes. It is,
therefore, not necessary that Tangier should have been recognized by our Government order to entitle the
petitioner to the exemption benefits of the proviso of Section 122 of our Tax Code."
ISSUE: Whether or not the exemption was valid.
RULING:
Yes. The exemption was valid. The controlling legal provision as noted is a proviso in Section 122 of the
National Internal Revenue Code. It reads thus: "That no tax shall be collected under this Title in respect of
intangible personal property (a) if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a foreign country which
at the time of his death did not impose a transfer tax or death tax of any character in respect of intangible person
property of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country, or (b) if the laws of the foreign country of which
the decedent was a resident at the time of his death allow a similar exemption from transfer taxes or death taxes
of every character in respect of intangible personal property owned by citizens of the Philippines not residing in
that foreign country." It does not admit of doubt that if a foreign country is to be identified with a state, it is
required in line with Pound's formulation that it be a politically organized sovereign community independent of
outside control bound by penalties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting through a
government functioning under a regime of law. A foreign country is thus a sovereign person with the people
composing it viewed as an organized corporate society under a government with the legal competence to exact
obedience to its commands. Even on the assumption then that Tangier is bereft of international personality, the
CIR has not successfully made out a case. The Court did commit itself to the doctrine that even a tiny principality,
like Liechtenstein, hardly an international personality in the sense, did fall under this exempt category.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
SUZETTE NICOLAS, Petitioner

vs.
ALBERTO ROMULO ET AL., Respondents
G.R. No. 175888

February 11, 2009
FACTS:
Lance Corporal Daniel Smith, member of the US Armed Forces, was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of rape in the RTC of Makati. The court ordered Smith detained at the Makati City Jail until further
orders. On December 19 and 22, 2006, Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo and US Ambassador
Kristie Kenney executed agreements that pursuant to the VFA, Smith be returned to the US military custody and be
detained at the first floor, Rowe Building, US Embassy Compound. Petitioner Jovito Salonga, et al. challenged the
validity of the said agreements contending that the Philippines should have custody of Smith because, first of all,
the VFA is void and unconstitutional since it violates Article XVlll, Section 25 of the constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Visiting Forcs Agreement is unconstitutional.
RULING:
No. The Visiting Forces Agreement is Constitutional. The SC ruled The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)
between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States, entered into on February 10, 1998, is
constitutional, but the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006 are DECLARED not in accordance
with the VFA. The SC ruled that “the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized
as a treaty by the United States,” and “the fact that (it) was not submitted for advice and consent of the United
States does not detract from its status as a binding international agreement or treaty recognized by the said
State.” Section 25, Article XVIII, 1987 Constitution provides that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall
not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so
requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.” The issue, the Court said, is “whether or not the presence of
the US Armed Forces in Philippine territory pursuant to the VFA is allowed ‘under a treaty duly concurred in by the
Senate and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.’” “It is,” the Court ruled. “The VFA, which is the
instrument agreed upon to provide for the joint RP-US military exercises, is simply an implementing agreement to
the main RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty,” the Court held that the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951
was signed and duly ratified with the concurrence of both the Philippine Senate and the United States
Senate. Romulo-Kenney Agreements not in accord with the VFA itself. The Court however ruled that “the Romulo-
Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006, which are agreements on the detention of the accused in the
United States Embassy, are not in accord with the VFA itself because such detention is not “by Philippine
authorities.” Article V, Section 10 of the VFA provides that “the confinement or detention by Philippine authorities
of the United States personnel shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by appropriate Philippines and United
States authorities.”

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
QUA CHEE GAN, JAMES UY, DANIEL DY alias DEE PAC, CHAN TIONG YU, CUA CHU TIAN, CHUA LIM PAO alias JOSE
CHUA and BASILIO KING, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE DEPORTATION BOARD, respondent-appellee.
G.R. No. L-10280

September 30, 1963
FACTS:
On May 12, 1952, Special Prosecutor EmilIo Galang charged petitioners before the Deportation Board,
having purchased US dollars in the sum of $130,000.00, without the necessary license from the Central Bank of the
Philippines, which was then secretly remitted to Hong Kong.
Petitioners Qua Chee Gan and Chua Lim Pao alias Jose Chua and Basilio King attempted to bribe officers of the PHL
and US governments (Antonio La forteza, Chief of the Intelligence Division of the Central Bank, Capt. A.P. Charak of
the OSI, US Air Force) to evade prosecution for the unauthorized purchase.
A warrant of arrest of petitioners was issued by the Deportation Board. They filed a surety bond of P10,000.00 and
cash bond for P10,000.00, thereby provisionally setting them at liberty.
Petitioners-appellants filed a joint motion to dismiss in the Deportation Board for the reason that the same does
not constitute legal ground for deportation of aliens, and that the Board has no jurisdiction to entertain such
charges. Motion was denied by the Board on Feb. 9, 1953.
Petitioners then filed a petition for habeas corpus and/or prohibition to the Court, but made returnable to the
Court of First Instance of Manila. After securing and filing a bond for P5,000.00 each, a writ of preliminary
injunction was issued by the lower court, restraining the DB from hearing deportation charges against petitioners
pending termination of the habeas corpus and/or prohibition proceedings.
The DB then filed its answer to the original petition, saying as an authorized agent of the President, it has
jurisdiction over the charges filed, and the authority to order their arrest. The Court upheld the validity of the
delegation by the president to the Deportation Board of his power to conduct the investigations. It also sustained
the power of the DB to issue warrant of arrest and fix bonds for the alien’s temporary release pending
investigation, pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code.
ISSUE:
1. WON the President has powers to deport aliens and, consequently,
2. WON the delegation to the DB of the ancillary power to investigate, carries with it the power to order
the arrest of the alien complained of.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
RULING:
1. Yes. As stated in Sec 69 od Act 2711 of the Revised Administrative Code
-x-
SEC. 69 Deportation of subject to foreign power. — A subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippines shall
not be deported, expelled, or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his own country by the President of the
Philippines except upon prior investigation, conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground
upon which Such action is contemplated. In such case the person concerned shall be informed of the charge or
charges against him and he shall be allowed not less than these days for the preparation of his defense. He shall
also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-examine
the opposing witnesses."
-x-
While it does not expressly confer on the President the authority to deport these aliens, the fact that such a
procedure was provided for before the President is a clear indication of such power. SC stated petitioners
committed the act of profiteering¸ which is a ground for deportation. The President may then order their
deportation if after investigation they are shown to have committed the act charged.
2. No. President Quirino’s EO 398 authorizes the DB “to issue the warrant for the arrest of the alien
complained of and to hold him under detention during the investigation unless he files a bond for his provisional
release.” The exercise of the power to order the arrest of an individual demands the exercise of discretion by the
one issuing the same. Such conditions are dependent/personal to the one upon whom the authority devolves. It is
an implied grant of power that would serve as curtailment on the fundamental right of security to life and liberty,
which equally applies to both citizens and foreigners in this country. The guarantees of human rights, then, must
not rest on such a shaky foundation.
EO 398, as it empowers the DB to issue warrant of arrest and to fix bond and prescribe the conditions for
his temporary release, is therefore declared as illegal.
Order of arrest of DB upon petitioners is declared null and void.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners,

vs.
The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X.
FORNIER, respondents.
x-----------------------------x
G.R. No. 161634 March 3, 2004
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner,
vs.
RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., respondent.
x-----------------------------x
G. R. No. 161824 March 3, 2004
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN AS FERNANDO POE
JR., respondents.
G.R. No. 161434

March 3, 2004
FACTS:
On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his certificate of
candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang
Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the 2004 national elections.
In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of
birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9 January 2004, a petition (SPA 04-003) before the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of
candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to
be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie
Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a
Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have
transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother.
Fornier based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe contracted a prior
marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if no such prior marriage had
existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of FPJ.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 for lack of merit. 3 days later, or on 26 January
2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 6 February 2004 by the COMELEC en
banc.

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On 10 February 2004, Fornier assailed the decision of the COMELEC before the Supreme Court
conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition likewise
prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay
the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with GR 161824, would include GR 161434 and GR 161634, both
challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the
1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the
case.
ISSUE: Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to run for the office of the President of the
Philippines.
RULING:
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that "No person may be elected President unless
he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age
on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such
election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." Herein, the date, month and year of
birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four
modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis – had been in vogue. Only
two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a “natural-born” citizen of the Philippines. Jus
soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the
reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become
the primary basis of citizenship by birth.
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate of
FPJ and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of
certainty from the documents would be that (1) The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; (2) FPJ was
born to them on 20 August 1939; (3) Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September,
1940; (4) The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and (5) At the time of his death on 11 September 1954,
Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ,
and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. The
documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during the proceedings before the
COMELEC. But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that FPJ is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held
guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in
relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.
Fornier has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to
the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material
misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but also
deliberate and willful. The petitions were dismissed.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
CARLOS T. GO, SR., Petitioner,

vs.
LUIS T. RAMOS, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 167570
JIMMY T. GO, Petitioner,
vs.
LUIS T. RAMOS, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 171946
HON. ALIPIO F. FERNANDEZ, JR., in his capacity as the Commissioner of the BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION; ATTY.
FAISAL HUSSIN and ANSARI M. MACAAYAN, in their capacity as Intelligence Officers of the BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION, Petitioners,
vs.
JIMMY T. GO a.k.a. JAIME T. GAISANO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 167569

September 4, 2009
FACTS:
These petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit for deportation initiated by Luis T. Ramos before
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) against Jimmy T. Go alleging that the
latter is an illegal and undesirable alien. Luis alleged that while Jimmy represents himself as a Filipino citizen,
Jimmy’s personal circumstances and other records indicate that he is not so.
To prove his contention, Luis presented the birth certificate of Jimmy, issued by the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Iloilo City, which indicated Jimmy’s citizenship as “Chinese.” Luis argued that although it appears from
Jimmy’s birth certificate that his parents, Carlos and Rosario Tan, are Filipinos, the document seems to be
tampered, because only the citizenship of Carlos appears to be handwritten while all the other entries were
typewritten. He also averred that in September 1989 or thereabout, Jimmy, through stealth, machination and
scheming managed to cover up his true citizenship, and with the use of falsified documents and untruthful
declarations, was able to procure a Philippine passport from the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Jimmy refuted the allegations in his counter-affidavit,verring that the complaint for deportation initiated
by Luis was merely a harassment case designed to oust him of his rightful share in their business dealings.
Jimmy maintained that there is no truth to the allegation that he is an alien, and insisted that he is a
natural-born Filipino. Jimmy alleged that his father Carlos, who was the son of a Chinese father and Filipina
mother, elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with Commonwealth Act 625.
In resolution dated Feb. 14, 2001, Associate Comm. Linda L. Malinab Hornilla dismissed the complaint for
deportation against Jimmy.

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On March 8, 2001, The Board of Commissioner reversed the decision. Their contention is that Carlos
election of citizenship was made out of time.
The board issued a decision dated April 17, 2002 for apprehension and deportation of Jimmy Go to China.
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in RTC but was denied by the said court. They questioned the said
decision and filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of appeals. The petition was granted. Their motion for
reconsideration was denied at Bureau of immigration.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the petition for habeas corpus should be dismissed.
RULING:
A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the
Revised Rules of Court. The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or
lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a person’s detention as of, at
the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception
[98]
illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102,
[99]
be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application.
Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention through a
petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information and/or the
warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be
released had been charged before any court. The term “court” in this context includes quasi-judicial bodies of
governmental agencies authorized to order the person’s confinement, like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of
[100]
Immigration. Likewise, the cancellation of his bail cannot be assailed via a petition for habeas corpus. When an
alien is detained by the Bureau of Immigration for deportation pursuant to an order of deportation by the
Deportation Board, the Regional Trial Courts have no power to release such alien on bail even in habeas corpus
[101]
proceedings because there is no law authorizing it.
Given that Jimmy has been duly charged before the Board, and in fact ordered arrested pending his
deportation, coupled by this Court’s pronouncement that the Board was not ousted of its jurisdiction to continue
with the deportation proceedings, the petition for habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic. This being so,
we find it unnecessary to touch on the other arguments advanced by respondents regarding the same subject.

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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL M. GONZALEZ, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION COMMISSIONER and

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS CHAIRMAN ALIPIO F. FERNANDEZ, JR., IMMIGRATION ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONERS
and BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS MEMBERS ARTHEL B. CARONONGAN, TEODORO B. DELARMENTE, JOSE D.L.
CABOCHAN, and FRANKLIN Z. LITTUA, Petitioners,
vs.
MICHAEL ALFIO PENNISI, Respondent.
G.R. No. 169958

March 5, 2010
FACTS:
Michael Alfio Pennisi (respondent) was born on 13 March 1975 in Queensland, Australia to Alfio Pennisi,
an Australian national, and Anita T. Quintos (Quintos), allegedly a Filipino citizen. In March 1999, respondent filed
a petition for recognition as Filipino citizen before the Bureau of Immigration (BI).
After submitting all the requirements necessary to prove that he is a Filipino the BI and DOJ granted his
petition to be a Filipino citizen.
On 7 August 2003, the Senate Committees on Games, Amusement and Sports and on Constitutional
[5]
Amendments (Senate Committees) jointly submitted Committee Report No. 256 (Committee Report)
recommending, among other things, that (1) the BI conduct summary deportation proceedings against several
Filipino-foreign PBA players, including respondent; and (2) the DOJ Secretary conduct an immediate review of all
orders of recognition. Respondent was included in the said list.
On the said list the inclusion of his name is anchored on the ground that the authenticity of the document
presented by him are suspicious.
His alleged mother and other relatives, specifically the parents of the former, namely: Felipe M. Quintos
and Celina G. Tomeda, who were mentioned in his application for recognition of Philippine citizenship in the BI,
are not known and have never existed in Panabingan, San Antonio, Nueva Ecija.
On 18 October 2004, the DOJ issued a resolution revoking respondent’s certificate of recognition and
directing the BI to begin summary deportation proceedings against respondent and other Filipino-foreign PBA
players.
An appeal was filed before the CA. After hearing CA affirmed the first decision of the BI and DOJ retaining
the petitioner’s status as a Filipino.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Pennisi is a Filipino citizen.

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RULING:
We agree with the court of appeals that while the affidavits of Soliman and Peralta might have cast doubt
on the validity of Quintos’ Certificate of Live Birth, such certificate remains valid unless declared invalid by the
competent authority. The rule stands that “Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.”
We further sustain the Court of Appeals that there could be reasons why the Quintoses and Tomedas
were not included in the census, such as they could have been mere transients in the place. As for their absence in
the master list of voters, they could have failed to register themselves as voters. The late registration of Quintos’
Certificate of Live Birth was made 10 years after her birth and not anytime near the filing of respondent’s petition
for recognition as Filipino citizen. As such, it could not be presumed that the certificate’s late filing was meant to
use it fraudulently. Finally, Australian Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs itself attested that as of
July 14, 1999, Quintos has not been granted Australian citizenship. Respondent submitted a certified true copy of
Quintos’ Australian Certificate of Registration of alien, indicating her nationality as Filipino. These pieces of
evidence should prevail over the affidavits submitted by Soliman and Peralta to the Senate Committees.
Wherefore, we deny the petition. We affirm the September 30, 2005 decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP NO. 87271

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IN RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR,

vs.
VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.
BAR MATTER No. 914

October 1, 1999
FACTS:
In 1998, Vicente Ching finished his law degree at the Saint Louis University in Baguio City. He eventually
passed the bar but he was advised that he needs to show proof that he is a Filipino citizen before he be allowed to
take his oath. Apparently, Ching’s father was a Chinese citizen but his mother was a Filipino citizen. His parents
were married before he was born in 1963. Under the 1935 Constitution, a legitimate child, whose one parent is a
foreigner, acquires the foreign citizenship of the foreign parent. Ching maintained that he has always considered
himself as a Filipino; that he is a certified public accountant – a profession reserved for Filipinos; that he even
served as a councilor in a municipality in La Union.
The Solicitor-General commented on the case by saying that as a legitimate child of a Chinese and a
Filipino, Ching should have elected Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; that under prevailing
jurisprudence, “upon reaching the age of majority” is construed as within 7 years after reaching the age of majority
(in his case 21 years old because he was born in 1964 while the 1935 Constitution was in place).
Ching did elect Filipino citizenship but he only did so when he was preparing for the bar in 1998 or 14
years after reaching the age of majority. Nevertheless, the Solicitor-General recommended that the rule be relaxed
due to the special circumstance of Ching.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ching should be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath.
RULING:
No. Unfortunately, he belatedly elected Filipino citizenship. The Supreme Court cannot agree with the
recommendation of the Solicitor-General. Fourteen years had lapsed and it is way beyond the allowable 7 year
period. The Supreme Court even noted that the period is originally 3 years but it was extended to 7 years. (It
seems it can’t be extended any further). Ching’s special circumstances can’t be considered. It is not enough that he
considered all his life that he is a Filipino; that he is a professional and a public officer (was) serving this country.
The rules for citizenship are in place. Further, Ching didn’t give any explanation why he belatedly chose to elect
Filipino citizenship (but I guess it’s simply because he never thought he’s Chinese not until he applied to take the
bar). The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process.
All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file
the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching’s unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot
be simply glossed over.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
CHULE Y. LIM, respondent.
G.R. No. 153883

January 13, 2004
FACTS:
Chule Y. Lim, respondent, was an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. She filed a
petition to the court for correction of four erroneous entries in her birth certificate to wit: 1) her surname “Yu”
was misspelled as “Yo” 2) her father’s name was written as “Yo Diu To” (Co Tian) when it should have been “Yu Dio
To” 3) her nationality was entered as Chinese when it should have been Filipino 4) that she was a legitimate child
when she should have been described as illegitimate considering that her parents were never married.
After the trial court conducted the appropriate proceeding, it granted the petition sought by respondent
to set the records straight and in their proper perspective. However, petitioner herein filed an appeal specifically
on the correction of her citizenship (from Chinese to Filipino) not having complied with the legal requirements for
election of citizenship. It cited Article IV, Sec 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution and Sec 1, CA No. 625 which provides
the election of citizenship of a legitimate child of a Filipino mother and alien father upon reaching the age of
maturity.
ISSUE:
1. WHETHER the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the correction of the citizenship of respondent Chule Y.
Lim from “Chinese” to “Filipino” despite the fact that respondent never demonstrated any compliance with
the legal requirements for election of citizenship.
2. WHETHER the Court of Appeals erred in allowing respondent to continue using her father’s surname
despite its finding that respondent is an illegitimate child.
RULING:
1. No. The Republic avers that respondent did not comply with the constitutional requirement of electing
Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority as mandated in Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935
Constitution and Section 1 of the Commonwealth Act No. 625. The Supreme Court held that the two above
provisions only apply to legitimate children. These do not apply in the case of the respondent who was an
illegitimate child considering that her parents never got married. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother,
respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth, and as such, there was no more need for her to validly
elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Also, she registered as a voter inside the country when
she reached 18 years old. The exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute
a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
2. No. The Republic’s submission was misleading. The Court of Appeals did not allow respondent to use
her father’s surname. What it did allow was the correction of her father’s misspelled surname which she has been
using ever since she can remember. The court held that prohibiting the respondent to use her father’s surname
would only sow confusion. Also, Sec. 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142 which regulates the use of aliases as well as
the jurisprudence state that it is allowed for a person to use a name “by which he has been known since
childhood”. Even legitimate children cannot enjoin the illegitimate children of their father from using his surname.
While judicial authority is required for a chance of name or surname, there is no such requirement for the
continued use of a surname which a person has already been using since childhood.
The doctrine that disallows such change of name as would give the false impression of family relationship
remains valid but only to the extent that the proposed change of name would in great probability cause prejudice
or future mischief to the family whose surname it is that is involved or to the community in general. In this case,
the Republic has not shown that the Yu family in China would probably be prejudiced or be the object of future
mischief.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition brought by the Republic is DENIED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
BALGAMELO CABILING MA, FELIX CABILING MA, JR., AND VALERIANO CABILING MA, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSIONER ALIPIO F. FERNANDEZ, JR., ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER ARTHEL B. CARONOÑGAN, ASSOCIATE
COMMISSIONER JOSE DL. CABOCHAN, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER TEODORO B. DELARMENTE AND ASSOCIATE
COMMISSIONER FRANKLIN Z. LITTAUA, in their capacities as Chairman and Members of the Board of
Commissioners (Bureau of Immigration), and MAT G. CATRAL, Respondents.
G.R. No. 183133

July 26, 2010
FACTS:
Balgamelo Cabiling Ma, Felix Cabiling Ma, Jr., Valeriano Cabiling Ma, Lechi Ann Ma, Arceli Ma, Nicolas Ma,
and Isidro Ma are the children of Felix Ma, a Taiwanese, and Dolores Sillona Cabiling, a Filipina. Petitioners Felix,
Jr., Balgamelo and Valeriano were all born under the 1935 Philippine Constitution.
They were all raised in the Philippines and have resided in this country for almost 60 years; they spent
their whole lives, studied and received their primary and secondary education in the country; they do not speak
nor understand the Chinese language, have not set foot in Taiwan, and do not know any relative of their father;
they have not even traveled abroad; and they have already raised their respective families in the Philippines.
During their age of minority, they secured from the Bureau of Immigration their Alien Certificates of Registration
(ACRs).
Immediately upon reaching the age of 21, they claimed Philippine citizenship in accordance with Section
1(4), Article IV, of the 1935 Constitution, which provides that “(t)hose whose mothers are citizens of the
Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship” are citizens of the Philippines.
Thus, on 15 August 1969, Felix, Jr. executed his affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and took his
oath of allegiance before then Judge Jose L. Gonzalez. Balgamelo did the same before a notary public. In 1978,
Valeriano took his oath of allegiance before then Judge Salvador C. Sering, the fact of which the latter attested to
in his Affidavit.
Having taken their oath of allegiance as Philippine citizens, petitioners, however, failed to have the
necessary documents registered in the civil registry as required under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625.
More than 30 years after they elected Philippine citizenship that Balgamelo and Felix, Jr. did so. On the
other hand, there is no showing that Valeriano complied with the registration requirement.
Individual certifications issued by the Office of the City Election Officer, COMELEC show that all of them are
registered voters of Barangay Washington, Precinct No. 0015A since June 1997, and that records on previous
registrations are no longer available because of the mandatory general registration every 10 years.
Moreover, aside from exercising their right of suffrage, Balgamelo is one of the incumbent Barangay
Kagawads in Barangay Washington, Surigao City.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
The Bureau of Immigration received the Complaint-Affidavit of a certain Mat G. Catral alleging that Felix
Ma and his 7 children are undesirable and overstaying aliens. Mr. Catral, however, did not participate in the
proceedings, and the Ma family could not but believe that the complaint against them was politically motivated
because they strongly supported a candidate in Surigao City in the 2004 National and Local Elections.
ISSUE: Should children born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father but who failed to
immediately file the documents of election with the nearest civil registry, be considered foreign nationals?
RULING:
No. Petitioners complied with the first and second requirements upon reaching the age of majority. It was
only the registration of the documents of election with the civil registry that was belatedly done.
We rule that under the facts peculiar to the petitioners, the right to elect Philippine citizenship has not
been lost and they should be allowed to complete the statutory requirements for such election.
We are not prepared to state that the mere exercise of suffrage, being elected public official, continuous
and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship can take
the place of election of citizenship. What we now say is that where, as in petitioners’ case, the election of
citizenship has in fact been done and documented within the constitutional and statutory timeframe, the
registration of the documents of election beyond the frame should be allowed if in the meanwhile positive acts of
citizenship have publicly, consistently, and continuously been done. The actual exercise of Philippine citizenship,
for over half a century by the herein petitioners, is actual notice to the Philippine public which is equivalent to
formal registration of the election of Philippine citizenship.
In a contract of partnership, we said that the purpose of registration is to give notice to third parties; that
failure to register the contract does not affect the liability of the partnership and of the partners to third persons;
and that neither does such failure affect the partnership’s juridical personality. An unregistered contract of
partnership is valid as among the partners, so long as it has the essential requisites, because the main purpose of
registration is to give notice to third parties, and it can be assumed that the members themselves knew of the
contents of their contract. The non-registration of a deed of donation does not also affect its validity. Registration is
not a requirement for the validity of the contract as between the parties, for the effect of registration serves chiefly
to bind third persons.
Likewise relevant is the pronouncement that registration is not a mode of acquiring a right. In an
analogous case involving an unrecorded deed of sale, we reiterated the settled rule that registration is not a mode
of acquiring ownership.
Registration does not confer ownership. It is not a mode of acquiring dominion, but only a means of
confirming the fact of its existence with notice to the world at large. Registration, then, is the confirmation of the
existence of a fact. In the instant case, registration is the confirmation of election as such election. It is not the
registration of the act of election, although a valid requirement under Commonwealth Act No. 625, that will confer
Philippine citizenship on the petitioners. It is only a means of confirming the fact that citizenship has been claimed.
The petitioners timely took their oath of allegiance to the Philippines. This was a serious undertaking. It
was commitment and fidelity to the state coupled with a pledge “to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance”

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
to any other state. This was unqualified acceptance of their identity as a Filipino and the complete disavowal of
any other nationality.
Petitioners have passed decades of their lives in the Philippines as Filipinos. Their present status having
been formed by their past, petitioners can no longer have any national identity except that which they chose upon
reaching the age of reason.
Having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is the basis of the right of the petitioners to elect Philippine
citizenship. Petitioners elected Philippine citizenship in form and substance. The failure to register the election in
the civil registry should not defeat the election and resultingly negate the permanent fact that they have a Filipino
mother. The lacking requirements may still be complied with subject to the imposition of appropriate
administrative penalties, if any. The documents they submitted supporting their allegations that they have already
registered with the civil registry, although belatedly, should be examined for validation purposes by the
appropriate agency, in this case, the Bureau of Immigration. Other requirements embodied in the administrative
orders and other issuances of the Bureau of Immigration and the Department of Justice shall be complied with
within a reasonable time.

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THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
NORA FE SAGUN, Respondent.
G.R. No. 187567

February 15, 2012
FACTS:
Nora Fe Sagun is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta Borromeo, a Filipino
citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City and did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority. In 1992, at the age of 33 and after getting married to Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Said document was notarized by Atty. Cristeta Leungon but was not
recorded and registered with the Local Civil Register of Baguio City.
Sometime in September 2005, respondent applied for a Philippine passport. Her application was denied
due to the citizenship of her father and there being no annotation on her birth certificate that she has elected
Philippine citizenship. Consequently, she sought a judicial declaration of her election of Philippine citizenship
averring that she was raised as a Filipino and she is a registered voter of Precinct No. 0419A of Barangay Manuel A.
Roxas in Baguio City and had voted in local and national elections as shown in the Voter Certification. She asserted
that by virtue of her positive acts, she has effectively elected Philippine citizenship and such fact should be
annotated on her record of birth so as to entitle her to the issuance of a Philippine passport.
After conducting a hearing, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision on April 3, 2009 granting the
petition and declaring respondent a Filipino citizen.
Upon payment of the required fees, the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City is hereby directed to annotate
on her birth certificate, this judicial declaration of Filipino citizenship of said petitioner.
Petitioner, through the OSG, directly filed the instant recourse via a petition for review on certiorari
before us. Petitioner points out that while respondent executed an oath of allegiance before a notary public, there
was no affidavit of her election of Philippine citizenship. Additionally, her oath of allegiance which was not
registered with the nearest local civil registry was executed when she was already 33 years old or 12 years after
she reached the age of majority.
ISSUE:
1. Is an action or proceeding for judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship procedurally and
jurisdictionally permissible?
2. Is an election of Philippine citizenship, made twelve (12) years after reaching the age of majority,
considered to have been made within a reasonable time as interpreted by jurisprudence?

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
RULING:
Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an
individual. Courts of justice exist for settlement of justiciable controversies, which imply a given right, legally
demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by
law, for said breach of right. As an incident only of the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy, the
court may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative to their status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is
beyond judicial power.
Clearly, it was erroneous for the trial court to make a specific declaration of respondents Filipino
citizenship as such pronouncement was not within the court’s competence.
As to the propriety of respondent's petition seeking a judicial declaration of election of Philippine

citizenship, it is imperative that we determine whether respondent is required under the law to make an election
and if so, whether she has complied with the procedural requirements in the election of Philippine citizenship.
When respondent was born on August 8, 1959, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution, which
declares as citizens of the Philippines those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Sec. 1, Art. IV of the 1935 Constitution reads:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine
citizenship.
Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a
Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of
majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. The right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the
1973 Constitution when it provided that [t]hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five are citizens of the Philippines. Likewise, this recognition by the
1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states that [t]hose born before January 17,
1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority are Philippine citizens.
It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine
citizenship should not be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship
for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. If the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old
charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial challenge had not been
commenced before the effectivity of the new constitution.
Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent clearly failed to comply with the procedural
requirements for a valid and effective election of Philippine citizenship. Respondent cannot assert that the exercise
of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship
since the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of citizenship by election. The mere exercise
of suffrage, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts showing exercise of
Philippine citizenship cannot take the place of election of Philippine citizenship. Hence, respondent cannot now be
allowed to seek the intervention of the court to confer upon her Philippine citizenship when clearly she has failed
to validly elect Philippine citizenship. As we held in Ching, the prescribed procedure in electing Philippine
citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an
affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Having
failed to comply with the foregoing requirements, respondents petition before the trial court must be denied.
Petition was GRANTED.

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KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION AND BANTAY KATARUNGAN FOUNDATION, petitioners,

vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA; SANDIGANBAYAN JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG,respondents.
G.R. No. 177721

July 3, 2007
FACTS:
On May 16, 2007, respondent Executive Secretary, in representation of the Office of the President,
announced an appointment in favor of respondent Gregory S. Ong as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court to fill
up the vacancy created by the retirement on April 28, 2007 of Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. The
appointment was reported the following day, May 17, 2007, by the major daily publications. .
On May 18, 2007, the major daily publications reported that the appointment was "recalled" or "held in
abeyance" by Malacañang in view of the question relating to the citizenship of respondent Gregory S. Ong. There is
no indication whatever that the appointment has been cancelled by the Office of the President.
On May 19, 2007, the major daily publications reported that respondent Executive Secretary stated that
the appointment is "still there except that the validation of the issue is being done by the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC)."
Petitioners contend that the appointment extended to respondent Ong through respondent Executive
Secretary is patently unconstitutional, arbitrary, whimsical and issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners claim that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, that this fact is plain and incontestable, and
that his own birth certificate indicates his Chinese citizenship. Petitioners attached a copy of said birth certificate as
Annex "H" to the petition. The birth certificate, petitioners add, reveals that at the time of respondent Ong’s birth
on May 25, 1953, his father was Chinese and his mother was also Chinese.
Petitioners invoke the Constitution:
Section 7 (1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "No person shall be appointed Member
of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines."
Sec. 2 of Art. IV defines "natural-born citizens as those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine Citizenship.
Petitioners maintain that even if it were granted that eleven years after respondent Ong’s birth his father
was finally granted Filipino citizenship by naturalization, that, by itself, would not make respondent Ong a natural-
born Filipino citizen.
Petitioners further argue that respondent Ong’s birth certificate speaks for itself and it states his
nationality as "Chinese" at birth. They invoke the Civil Code:
Article 410 of the Civil Code provides that "*t+he books making up the civil register and all documents relating
thereto x x x shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained." Therefore, the entry in Ong’s birth

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
certificate indicating his nationality as Chinese is prima facie evidence of the fact that Ong’s citizenship at birth is
Chinese.
Article 412 of the Civil Code also provides that "*N+o entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected
without a judicial order." Thus, as long as Ong’s birth certificate is not changed by a judicial order, the
Judicial & Bar Council, as well as the whole world, is bound by what is stated in his birth certificate.2
This birth certificate, petitioners assert, prevails over respondent Ong’s new Identification Certificate
issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated October 16, 1996, stating that he is a natural-born Filipino and
over the opinion of then Secretary of Justice Teofisto Guingona that he is a natural-born Filipino. They
maintain that the Department of Justice (DOJ) does not have the power or authority to alter entries in a
birth certificate; that respondent Ong’s old Identification Certificate did not declare that he is a natural-
born Filipino; and that respondent Ong’s remedy is an action to correct his citizenship as it appears in his
birth certificate.
Petitioners thereupon pray that a writ of certiorari be issued annulling the appointment issued to
respondent Ong as Associate Justice of this Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Ong is a natural-born Filipino citizen
RULING:
First, on the issue of standing, the petitioners have standing as the issue involved is of utmost
importance—the citizenship of a person to be appointed as a member of the Supreme Court.
Second, on the principal issue of the case, the Court took judicial notice of Ong’s petition to be admitted to the
Philippine Bar. In his petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar, respondent alleged that he is qualified to be
admitted because among others he is a Filipino citizen, and that he became a citizen because his father became a
naturalized Filipino citizen and being a minorthen, thus he too became a Filipino citizen.
As part of his evidence, he submitted his birth certificate and the naturalization papers of his father.
It was on basis of these allegations under oath and the submitted evidence of no less than Ong that the Court
allowed him to take his oath as a lawyer. It is clear therefore, that from the records of this Court, Ong is a
naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of
Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating that Ong and his mother were
naturalized along with his father. Furthermore, as the petitioner correctly submitted, no substantial change in an
entry in the civil register can be made without a judicial order. Change in the citizenship status is a substantial
change.
The long string of events that Ong alleged leading to him being a natural-born citizen, all entail factual
assertions that need to be threshed out in proper judicial proceedings.
NOTE: In this case, there has been no ouster from an appointment.
There may be approval of the appointment but it lacks other acts that will complete the appointment.
The last act in an appointment is the delivery of the commission. It is now up to the appointee—he must accept
the appointment, take an oath of office, assume office, etc. It doesn’t end here. The CSC can either reject or
approve of the appointment. When the appointee doesn’t pursue all the acts to assume office, the question is
whether or not he can be held liable. The law doesn’t provide really that there is a period to accept or reject
an appointment.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.
LI CHING CHUNG
G.R. No. 197450

March 20, 2013
FACTS:
On August 22, 2007, respondent, otherwise known as Bernabe Luna Li or Stephen Lee Keng, is a Chinese
national. He filed his Declaration of Intention to become a citizen of the Philippines before the Office of the
Solicitor General. Almost 7 months after filing his declaration of intention, respondent filed his Petition for
Naturalization before the Regional Trial Court. On April 5, 2008, respondent filed his amended petition for
naturalization, where he alleged that he was born in China, which granted the same privilege of naturalization to
Filipinos; that he came to the Philippines on March 15, 1988; that on November 19, 1989, he married Cindy Sze
Mei Ngar, a British national, with whom he had 4 children, all born in Manila; that he had been continuously and
permanently residing in the country since his arrival and is currently a resident of Manila with prior residence in
Malabon; that he could speak and write in English and Tagalog; that he was entitled to the benefit of Sec. 3 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473 reducing to 5 years the requirement under Sec. 2 of ten years of continuous
residence, because he knew English and Filipino having obtained his education in Manila; and that he had
successfully established a trading general merchandise business. He attached several documentary evidence in
support with his application.
The petition was set for initial hearing on April 3, 2009 and its notice was posted in a conspicuous place at
the Manila City Hall and was published in the Official Gazette and in the Manila Times. Thereafter, respondent filed
the Motion for Early Setting praying that the hearing be moved from April 3, 2009 to July 31, 2008 so he could
acquire real estate properties. However, OSG filed its opposition, arguing that the said motion for early setting was
a “clear violation of Sec. 1, RA 530, which provides that hearing on the petition should be held not earlier than 6
months from the date of last publication of the notice.” The last publication in the newspaper of general
circulation was on June 13, 2008, the earliest setting could only be scheduled 6 months later or on December 15,
2008.
The RTC granted respondent’s application for naturalization as a Filipino citizen, which was affirmed by
the CA. The CA held that although the petition for naturalization was filed less than 1 year from the time of the
declaration of intent before the OSG, this defect was not fatal.
The OSG argues that “the petition for naturalization should not be granted in view of its patent
jurisdictional infirmities, particularly because: 1) it was filed within the one (1) year proscribed period from the
filing of declaration of intention; 2) no certificate of arrival, which is indispensable to the validity of the Declaration
of Intention, was attached to the petition; and 3) respondent’s failure to comply with the publication and posting
requirements set under CA 473.” In particular, the OSG points out that the publication and posting requirements

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
were not strictly followed, specifically citing that: “(a) the hearing of the petition on 15 December 2008 was set
ahead of the scheduled date of hearing on 3 April 2009; (b) the order moving the date of hearing (Order dated 31
July 2008) was not published; and, (c) the petition was heard within six (6) months (15 December 2008) from the
last publication (on 14 July 2008).
ISSUE: Whether the respondent should be admitted as a Filipino Citizen despite his undisputed failure to comply
with the requirements provided for in CA No. 473 which are mandatory and jurisdictional in character.
RULING:
No. Section 5 of CA No. 473, expressly states:
Section 5. Declaration of intention. – One year prior to the filing of his petition for admission to Philippine
citizenship, the applicant for Philippine citizenship shall file with the Bureau of Justice (now Office of the Solicitor
General) a declaration under oath that it is bona fide his intention to become a citizen of the Philippines.
Such declaration shall set forth name, age, occupation, personal description, place of birth, last foreign
residence and allegiance, the date of arrival, the name of the vessel or aircraft, if any, in which he came to the
Philippines, and the place of residence in the Philippines at the time of making the declaration. No declaration shall
be valid until lawful entry for permanent residence has been established and a certificate showing the date, place,
and manner of his arrival has been issued.
The declarant must also state that he has enrolled his minor children, if any, in any of the public schools or
private schools recognized by the Office of Private Education of the Philippines, where Philippine history,
government, and civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the entire period of the
residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine
citizen. Each declarant must furnish two photographs of himself.
As held in Tan v. Republic, “the period of one year required therein is the time fixed for the State to make
inquiries as to the qualifications of the applicant. If this period of time is not given to it, the State will have no
sufficient opportunity to investigate the qualifications of the applicants and gather evidence thereon. An applicant
may then impose upon the courts, as the State would have no opportunity to gather evidence that it may present
to contradict whatever evidence that the applicant may adduce on behalf of his petition.”
The period is designed to give the government ample time to screen and examine the qualifications of an
applicant and to measure the latter’s good intention and sincerity of purpose. Stated otherwise, the waiting period
will unmask the true intentions of those who seek Philippine citizenship for selfish reasons alone, such as, but not
limited to, those who are merely interested in protecting their wealth, as distinguished from those who have truly
come to love the Philippines and its culture and who wish to become genuine partners in nation building.

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The only exception to the mandatory filing of a declaration of intention is specifically stated in Section 6 of
CA No. 473, to wit:
Section 6. Persons exempt from requirement to make a declaration of intention. – Persons born in the Philippines
and have received their primary and secondary education in public schools or those recognized by the Government
and not limited to any race or nationality, and those who have resided continuously in the Philippines for a period
of thirty years or more before filing their application, may be naturalized without having to make a declaration of
intention upon complying with the other requirements of this Act. To such requirements shall be added that which
establishes that the applicant has given primary and secondary education to all his children in the public schools or
in private schools recognized by the Government and not limited to any race or nationality. The same shall be
understood applicable with respect to the widow and minor children of an alien who has declared his intention to
become a citizen of the Philippines, and dies before he is actually naturalized.
Unquestionably, respondent does not fall into the category of such exempt individuals that would excuse
him from filing a declaration of intention one year prior to the filing of a petition for naturalization. Contrary to the
CA finding, respondent’s premature filing of his petition for naturalization before the expiration of the one-year
period is fatal.
In naturalization proceedings, the burden of proof is upon the applicant to show full and complete
compliance with the requirements of the law. The opportunity of a foreigner to become a citizen by naturalization
is a mere matter of grace, favor or privilege extended to him by the State; the applicant does not possess any
natural, inherent, existing or vested right to be admitted to Philippine citizenship. The only right that a foreigner
has, to be given the chance to become a Filipino citizen, is that which the statute confers upon him; and to acquire
such right, he must strictly comply with all the statutory conditions and requirements. The absence of one
jurisdictional requirement is fatal to the petition as this necessarily results in the dismissal or severance of the
naturalization process.

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HUBERT TAN CO and ARLENE TAN CO

vs.
THE CIVIL REGISTRY OF MANILA
G.R No. 138496

February 23, 2004
FACTS:
Hubert Tan Co was born on March 23, 1974, His sister, Arlene Tan Co, was born on May 19, 1975. In their
respective certificates of birth, it is stated that their parents Co Boon Peng and Lourdes Vihong K. Tan are Chinese
citizens. Co Boon Peng filed an application for his naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines with the Special
Committee on Naturalization under Letter of Instruction No. 270. His application was granted and he was
conferred Philippine citizenship under Presidential Decree 1055. He was issued a certificate of naturalization and
consequently took an oath as Philippine citizen on February 15, 1977.
On August 27, 1998, they filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a petition under Rules of Court for
correction of entries in the certificate of birth that was denied on the following grounds:
A. Although Commonwealth Act No. 473 and Letter of Instruction No 270 are statutes relating to the same
subject matter, they do not provide the same beneficial effects with respect to the minor children of the
applicant.
B. Section 15 – effects of naturalization on the wife and children.
C. Letter of Instruction 270 refers to qualified individuals only.
D. Section 15, CA No. 473 should not be deemed incorporated in and applied to Letter of Instruction 270;
E. Application of “pariaterial” is misplaced.
Aggrieved, the petitioners now come to this Court assailing the court a quo’s Order dismissing their
petition outright and its Order denying their motion for the reconsideration of the same.
The petitioners contend that the trial court erred in holding that their petition was insufficient. They
assert that contrary to the ruling of the trial court, they are qualified to claim the benefit of Section 15 of CA No.
473, which provides that minor children of persons naturalized thereunder who were born in the Philippines shall
likewise be considered citizens thereof.
They contend that although LOI No. 270, under which the petitioners’ father was naturalized does not
contain a provision similar to Section 15 of CA No. 473, the latter provision should be deemed incorporated

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therein. They point out that both laws have the same purpose and objective, i.e., to grant Philippine citizenship to
qualified aliens permanently residing in the Philippines.
The petitioners invoke the rule that statutes in pari materia are to be read together. They posit that CA
No. 473 and LOI No. 270 should be harmonized and reconciled since “all statutes relating to the same subject, or
having the same general purpose, should be read in connection with it, and should be construed together as they
constitute one law
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners Hubert Tan Co and Arlene Tan Co are Filipino citizens.
RULING:
Yes. Petitioners Hubert Tan Co and Arlene Tan Co are Filipino citizens.
Statues in pari material should be read and construed together because enactments of the same
legislature on the subject are supposed to form part of one uniform system. Letter of Instruction No. 270 and
Commonwealth Act No 473 are laws governing the naturalization of qualified aliens residing in the Philippines.
While they provide different procedures, Commonwealth Act No. 473 governs naturalization by judicial decree
while Letter of Instruction governs naturalization by presidential decree, both statues have the same purpose and
objective to enable aliens permanently residing in the Philippines to be integrated into the national fabric by being
granted Filipino citizenship. Thus, Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No 473, which extends the grant of Philippine
citizenship to minor children of those naturalized thereunder, should be similarly applied to the minor children of
those naturalized under Letter of Instruction No. 270.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018

vs.
KERRY LAO ONG
G.R. No. 175430

June 18, 2012
FACTS:
Respondent Kerry Lao Ong, then 38 years old, filed a petition for naturalization. Ong alleged in his petition
that he has been a businessman/business manager since 1989, earning an average annual income of P150, 000.00.
However, in his testimony where he said that he has been a businessman since he graduated from college in 1978,
did not specify or describe the nature of his business.
As a proof of his income, Ong presented four tax returns for the year 1994 to 1997. Based on the returns,
Ongs gross annual income was P60,000.00 for 1994; P118,000.00 for 1995; P118,000.00 for 1996; and P128,000.00
for 1997.On November 23, 2001, the trial court granted Ongs petition.
The Republic, through the Solicitor General, appealed to the CA. The Republic faulted the trial court for
granting Ong’s petition despite his failure to prove that he possesses a known lucrative trade, profession or lawful
occupation as required under Section 2, paragraph 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law.
The Republic posited that, contrary to the trial courts finding, respondent Ong did not prove his allegation that he
is a businessman/business manager earning an average income of P150,000.00 since 1989. His income tax returns
belie the value of his income. Moreover, he failed to present evidence on the nature of his profession or trade,
which is the source of his income. Considering that he has four minor children (all attending exclusive private
schools), he has declared no other property and/or bank deposits, and he has not declared owning a family home,
his alleged income cannot be considered lucrative. Under the circumstances, the Republic maintained that
respondent Ong is not qualified as he does not possess a definite and existing business or trade.
The appellate court dismissed the Republic’s appeal. The appellate court denied the Republic’s motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent Kerry Lao Ong has sufficiently proved that he has some known lucrative trade,
profession or lawful occupation in accordance with Section 2, paragraph 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law.

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RULING:
The courts must always be mindful that naturalization proceedings are imbued with the highest public interest.
Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the
applicant. The burden of proof rests upon the applicant to show full and complete compliance with the
requirements of law.
To recall, respondent Ong and his witnesses testified that Ong is a businessman but none of them
identified Ong’s business or described its nature. The Court finds it suspect that Ong did not even testify as to the
nature of his business, whereas his witness Carvajal did not respect to his own. The applicant provided no
documentary evidence, like business permits, registration, official receipts, or other business records to
demonstrate his proprietorship or participation in a business. After poring over the records, the Court finds that
the reason for the lack of citation is the absence of evidence to support such conclusion. Ong’s gross income might
have been sufficient to meet his family’s basic needs, but there is simply no sufficient proof that it was enough to
create an appreciable margin of income over expenses.
Clearly, therefore, respondent Ong failed to prove that he possesses the qualification of a known lucrative
trade provided in Section 2, paragraph 4, of the Revised Naturalization Law. There is even no need to present new
evidence. A careful review of the extant records suffices to hold that respondent Ong has not proven his
possession of a “known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation” to qualify for naturalization.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018

vs.
AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUIGAS
G.R. No. 183110

October 7, 2013
FACTS:
Azucena was born in Zamboanga del Sur on September 28, 1941 to Chinese parents. Her primary, secondary, and
tertiary educations were taken in Philippine schools. She then practiced her teaching profession in various schools
situated in the Philippines. In 1968, at the age of 26, Azucena married Santiago Batuigas,a natural-born Filipino
citizen with whom she have five children. On December 2, 2002, Azucena filed a petition for naturalization before
the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur.
She alleged in her petition that she believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution; that
she has conducted herself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the period of her stay in the Philippines,
as well as in her relations with the constituted Government and with the community in which she is living; that she
has mingled socially with the Filipinos and has evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace their customs,
traditions, and ideals; that she has all the qualifications required under Section 2 and none of the disqualifications
enumerated in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 (CA473); that she is not opposed to organized government
nor is affiliated with any association or group of persons that uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized
governments; that she is not defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or
assassination for the success and predominance of men’s ideas; that she is neither a polygamist nor believes in
polygamy; that the nation of which she is a subject is not at war with the Philippines; that she intends in good faith
to become a citizen of the Philippines and to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any
foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, and particularly to China; and that she will reside continuously in
the Philippines from the time of the filing of her petition up to the time of her naturalization.
However, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a motion to dimiss on the ground that Azucena failed to
allege that she is engaged in a lawful occupation or in some known lucrative trade. On January 31, 2005, the RTC
found that Azucena has amply supported the allegations in her petition and granted it. The OSG then appealed the
RTC judgment to the CA, contending that Azucena failed to comply with the income requirement under CA 473.
The OSG maintained that Azucena is not allowed under the Retail Trade Law (Republic Act No. 1180) to engage
directly or indirectly in the retail trade. The CA dismissed OSG’s appeal as it found that Azucena’s financial
condition permits her and her family to live with reasonable comfort in accordance with the prevailing standard of
living and consistent with the demands of human dignity.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for naturalization by Azucena Batuigas should be granted.

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RULING:
Yes. Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through either judicial naturalization under
Commonwealth Act 473 or administrative naturalization under Republic Act No. 9139 (the "Administrative
Naturalization Law of 2000"). A third option, called derivative naturalization, which is available to alien women
married to Filipino husbands is found under Section 15 of CA 473, which provides that:
"any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines and who might herself be
lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines."
Under this provision, foreign women who are married to Philippine citizens may be deemed ipso facto Philippine
citizens and it is neither necessary for them to prove that they possess other qualifications for naturalization at the
time of their marriage nor do they have to submit themselves to judicial naturalization. Copying from similar laws
in the United States which has since been amended, the Philippine legislature retained Section 15 of CA 473, which
then reflects its intent to confer Filipino citizenship to the alien wife through derivative naturalization.

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AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR SCHOOL TEACHERS AND ALLIED WORKERS)
MEMBER - HECTOR GUMANGAN CALILUNG
vs.
THE HONORABLE SIMEON DATUMANONG, in his official capacity as the Secretary of Justice
G.R. No. 160869

May 11, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioner AASJS filed an instant petition against respondent, then Secretary of Justice Simeon Datumanong, the
official tasked to implement laws governing citizenship. Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop
respondent from implementing Republic Act No. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine
Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As
Amended, and for Other PurposeS.” Petitioner avers that Republic. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates
Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national
interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Petitioner contends that Rep. Act No. 9225 cheapens Philippine citizenship. He avers that Sections 2 and 3 of Rep.
Act No. 9225, together, allow dual allegiance and not dual citizenship.
Section 2. Declaration of Policy - It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who
become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the
conditions of this Act.
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born
citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of
allegiance to the Republic:
Petitioner maintains that Section 2 allows all Filipinos, either natural-born or naturalized, who become foreign
citizens, to retain their Philippine citizenship without losing their foreign citizenship. Section 3 permits dual
allegiance because said law allows natural-born citizens of the Philippines to regain their Philippine citizenship by
simply taking an oath of allegiance without forfeiting their foreign allegiance. Petitioner likewise advances the
proposition that although Congress has not yet passed any law on the matter of dual allegiance, such absence of a
law should not be justification why this Court could not rule on the issue.

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ISSUES: Whether or not the court jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of dual allegiance.
RULING:
No. To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing
provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the
framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain
their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Congress was given a mandate to draft a
law that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would be
premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.
Petitioner misreads Mercado. That case did not set the parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance but merely
made a distinction between dual allegiance and dual citizenship. We cannot arrogate the duty of setting the
parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance when the Constitution itself has clearly delegated the duty of
determining what acts constitute dual allegiance for study and legislation by Congress.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
EUSEBIO EUGENIO K. LOPEZ

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and TESSIE P. VILLANUEVA
G.R. No. 182701

July 23, 2008
FACTS:
Petitioner Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez was a candidate for the position of Chairman of Barangay Bagacay, San
Dionisio, Iloilo City in the synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections held on October 29,2007. On
October 25, 2007, respondent Tessie P. Villanueva filed a petition before the Provincial Election Supervisor of the
Province of Iloilo, praying for the disqualification of petitioner on the ground that he is an American citizen, hence,
ineligible from running for any public office.
In his Answer, petitioner argued that he is a dual citizen, a Filipino and at the same time an American, by virtue of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re- acquisition Act of 2003. He
returned to the Philippines and resided in Barangay Bagacay. Thus, he said, he possessed all the qualifications to
run for Barangay Chairman. After the votes for Barangay Chairman were canvassed, petitioner emerged as the
winner. On February 6, 2008, COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution granting the petition for disqualification.
Petitioner Lopez assails the (1) Resolution and (2) Omnibus Order of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
Second Division, in disqualifying him from running as Barangay Chairman.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s filing of a certificate of candidacy operated as an effective renunciation of
foreign citizenship.
RULING:
No. R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the conditions before those who re-acquired Filipino citizenship may run
for a public office in the Philippines. Section 5 of the said law states:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities- Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this
Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under
existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
(2) “Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office
as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make

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a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.”
Petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the cited law. This new law explicitly provides that should one
seek elective public office, he should first "make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath." Petitioner failed to comply with this
requirement. We quote with approval the COMELEC observation on this point. While respondent was able to
regain his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of the Dual Citizenship Law when he took his oath of allegiance before the
Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General's Office in Los Angeles, California, the same is not enough to allow
him to run for a public office. The above-quoted provision of law mandates that a candidate with dual citizenship
must make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath. There is no evidence presented that will show that respondent complied with
the provision of R.A. No. 9225. Absent such proof we cannot allow respondent to run for Barangay Chairman of
Barangay Bagacay.
For the renunciation to be valid, it must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of law who is
authorized to administer an oath. The affiant must state in clear and unequivocal terms that he is renouncing all
foreign citizenship for it to be effective. In the instant case, respondent Lopez's failure to renounce his American
citizenship as proven by the absence of an affidavit that will prove the contrary leads this Commission to believe
that he failed to comply with the positive mandate of law. For failure of respondent to prove that he abandoned
his allegiance to the United States, this Commission holds him disqualified from running for an elective position in
the Philippines.
While it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath and began to discharge the functions of Chairman,
his victory cannot cure the defect of his candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the
election of a disqualified candidate because the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on
disqualification is not a matter of popularity.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
NESTOR A. JACOT
vs.
ROGEN T. DAL and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 179848

November 27, 2008
FACTS:
Petitioner Nestor A. Jacot assails the Resolution dated September 28, 2007 of the Commission of Elections
(COMELEC) En Banc in SPA No. 07-361, affirming the Resolution dated June 12, 2007 of the COMELEC, Second
Division disqualifying him from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, in the May 14, 2007
National and Local Elections, on the ground that he failed to make a personal renouncement of his United States
(U.S.) Citizenship.
Petitioner was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of the U.S. on
December 13, 1989.
Petitioner sought to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act 9225, otherwise known as the
“Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act.” He filed a request for administration of his Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines with the Philippine Consulate General (PCG) of Los Angeles, California. The Los
Angeles PCG issued on June 19, 2006 an Order of Approval of petitioner’s request, and on the same day, petitioner
took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Vice Consul Edward C. Yulo. On September 27,
2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued Identification Certificate No. 06-12019 recognizing petitioner as a citizen of
the Philippines.
Six months after, on March 26, 2007, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Vice-
Mayor of the Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin. In the meantime, the May 14, 2007, National and Local Elections
were held. Petitioner garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Vice-Mayor.
However, on June 12, 2007, the COMELEC, Second Division, finally issued its resolution disqualifying the
petitioner for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, for his failure to make sworn renunciation of his
U.S. citizenship.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is disqualified from running as a candidate in the May 14, 2007 local elections for
his failure to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his U.S. citizenship.

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RULING:
Yes. Contrary to the assertions made by petitioner, his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
made before the Los Angeles PCG and his Certificate of Candidacy do not substantially comply with the
requirement of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship because these are distinct requirements
to be complied with for different purposes.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who are already
naturalized citizens of a foreign country, must take the following oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines to reacquire or retain their Philippine citizenship.
By the oath dictated in the afore-quoted provision, the Filipino swears allegiance to the Philippines, but there is
nothing therein on his renunciation of foreign citizenship. Precisely, a situation might arise under Republic Act No.
9225 wherein said Filipino has dual citizenship by also reacquiring or retaining his Philippine citizenship, despite his
foreign citizenship. The afore-quoted oath of allegiance is substantially similar to the one contained in the
Certificate of Candidacy which must be executed by any person who wishes to run for public office in Philippine
elections.
The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either retained their Philippine
citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before a public officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate
of candidacy.
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens
of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance
under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to
additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized
public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in
Philippine elections.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ROSELLER DE GUZMAN
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ANGELINA DG. DELA CRUZ
G.R. No. 180048

June 19, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner De Guzman and private respondent Angelina DG. Dela Cruz were candidates for Vice-Mayor of Guimba,
Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections. On April 3, 2007, private respondent filed against petitioner a petition
for disqualification alleging that petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines, but an immigrant and resident of the
United States of America.
Petitioner admitted that he was a naturalized American. However, on January 25, 2006, he applied for dual
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the “Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act” of
2003. Upon approval of his application, he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on
September 6, 2006. He argued that, having re-acquired Philippine citizenship, he is entitled to exercise full civil and
political rights. As such, he is qualified to run as vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is disqualified from running for Vice-Mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14,
2007 elections for having failed to renounce his American Citizenship in accordance with Republic Act No. 9225.
RULING:
Yes. Petitioner is disqualified from running for public office in view of his failure to renounce his American
Citizenship. Republic Act No. 9225 was enacted to allow retention and re-acquisition of Philippine Citizenship for:
(1) Natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country
(2) Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who after the effectivity of the law, becomes a citizen of a foreign
country.
The law provides that they are not deemed to have required or retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking
Oath of Allegiance. In the case at bar, petitioner’s Oath of Allegiance and Certificate of Candidacy did not comply
with Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 which further requires those seeking elective public office in the
Philippines to make a personal sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship. Accordingly, having failed to comply with
the requirements of R.A. No. 9225, he is disqualified to run as Vice-Mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, LUIS M. BAUTISTA, ROBELITO V. PICAR and WILMA P. PAGADUAN
G.R. No. 198742

August 10, 2012
FACTS:
The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents on August 8, 1944. On
December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas
Condon. On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the Philippine
Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known as the “Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003.” The application was approved and the petitioner took her oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5,2005.
On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship
before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order
certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen. The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba,
La Union in the 2007 elections. She lost in her bid. She again sought elective office during the May 10, 2010
elections this time for the position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed
as the winning candidate. She took her oath of office. Soon thereafter, private respondents all registered voters of
Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for quo warranto questioning the petitioner’s eligibility before the RTC.
The petitions similarly sought the petitioner’s disqualification from holding her elective post on the ground that
she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a “personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath” as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since September 27, 2006, she ceased to be an
Australian citizen. She claimed that the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed in
Australia sufficiently complied with Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 and that her act of running for public office is a
clear abandonment of her Australian citizenship. Trial court held that the petitioner’s failure to comply with
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 rendered her ineligible to run and hold public office. As admitted by the petitioner
herself during trial, the personal declaration of renunciation she filed in Australia was not under oath.
The petitioner appealed to the COMELEC. The COMELEC en banc concurred with the findings
and conclusions of the RTC.
Hence, the present petition ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the COMELEC en banc.
The petitioner contends that since she ceased to be an Australian citizen on September 27, 2006, she no
longer held dual citizenship and was only a Filipino citizen when she filed her certificate of candidacy as early as

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
the 2007 elections. Hence, the “personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship” imposed by Section 5(2) of
R.A. No. 9225 to dual citizens seeking elective office does not apply to her. She further argues that a sworn
renunciation is a mere formal and not a mandatory requirement.
ISSUE: Whether or not the “sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship” in Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 mere pro-
forma requirement.
RULING:
No. R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-born citizens who have
lost their Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic. Natural-born citizens of the
Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores one’s Filipino citizenship and all civil and political
rights and obligations concomitant therewith, subject to certain conditions imposed in Section 5:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under
this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities
under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath.”
Under the provisions of the aforementioned law, the petitioner has validly re-acquired her Filipino citizenship
when she took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005. At that point, she
held dual citizenship, i.e., Australian and Philippine.
In Jacot v. Dal, the Court held that Filipinos re-acquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship under R.A. No.
9225 must explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines, thus:
before a public officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of
candidacy.
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural- born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
The intent of the legislators was not only for Filipinos reacquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship under
Republic Act No. 9225 to take their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, but also to explicitly
renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines. To qualify as a candidate
in Philippine elections, Filipinos must only have one citizenship, namely, Philippine citizenship.
The foreign citizenship must be formally rejected through an affidavit duly sworn before an officer authorized to
administer oath.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
CASAN MACODE MACQUILING

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), ROMMEL ARNADO Y CAGOCO, AND LINOG G. BALUA
G.R. No. 195649

July 2, 2013
FACTS:
Respondent Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his subsequent

naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America (USA), he lost hisFilipino citizenship. Arnado applied for
repatriation under Republic Act No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA
and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on July 10, 2008. On the same day an order of
approval of his citizenship retention and re-acquisition was issued in his favor. In 2009, Arnado again took his Oath
of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and executed an affidavit of renunciation of his foreign citizenship.
On November 30, 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao Del Norte.
Respondent Linog Balua, another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and presented a record
indicating that Arnado has been using his U.S. passport in entering and departing Philippines.
COMELEC issued an order requiring the respondent to personally file his answer. After Arnado failed to
answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default. In 2010 election, Arnado garnered the highest number
of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor. It was only after his proclamation
that Arnado filed his answer.
COMELEC first division ruled for his disqualification. Petitioner Maquiling, another candidate for Mayor of
Kauswagan, and who garnered the second highest number of votes, intervened in the case and filed before the
COMELEC En Banc a motion for reconsideration claiming that the cancellation of Arnado’s candidacy and the
nullification of his proclamation, him, as the legitimate candidate who obtained the highest lawful votes should be
proclaimed as the winner. COMELEC En Banc held that it shall continue with the trial and hearing. However, it
reversed and set aside the ruling of first division and granted Arnado’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for
public office despite his continued use of a U.S. passport and praying that he be proclaimed as the winner in the
2010 mayoralty race.
ISSUE: Whether or not the use of foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amount to undoing a
renunciation earlier made.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is
a positive and voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship. It does not divest Filipino
citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an
elective position.
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he filed his
COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier
executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American,
Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired through a positive act of
applying for naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not
required by law to take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy already carries
with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship. Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are
required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce
foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for public office. By the time he filed his certificate
of candidacy on 30November 2009.
Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship .He was qualified
to vote, but by the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, he was not
qualified to run for a local elective position.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.
HON. ROSALIO G. DE LA ROSA, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 28, MANILA and
JUAN G. FRIVALDO
G.R. No. 104654

June 6, 1994
FACTS:
On September 20, 1991, Juan Frivaldo filed a petition for naturalization under the Commonwealth Act No. 63
before the RTC Manila. On October 7, 1991, Judge dela Rosa set the petition for hearing on March 16, 1992, and
directed the publication of the said order and petition in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general
circulation, for 3 consecutive weeks, the last publication of which should be at least 6 months before the date of
the said hearing.
On January 14, 1992, Frivaldo asked the Judge to cancel the March 16 hearing and move it to January 24, 1992,
citing his intention to run for public office in the May 1992 elections. Judge granted the motion and the hearing
was moved to February 21. No publication or copy was issued about the order.
On February 21, 1992, the hearing proceeded and six days after, on February 27, 1992, Judge rendered the assailed
Decision and held that Frivaldo is readmitted as a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines by naturalization.
Republic of the Philippines filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to
R.A. No. 5440 and Section 25 of the Interim Rules, to annul the decision made on February 27, 1992 and to nullify
the oath of allegiance taken by Frivaldo on same date.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo was duly re-admitted to his citizenship as a Filipino.
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that Private respondent is declared not a citizen of the Philippines and
therefore disqualified from continuing to serve as governor of the Province of Sorsogon. He is ordered to vacate
his office and to surrender the same to the Vice-Governor of the Province of Sorsogon once this decision becomes
final and executory. The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following irregularities:

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
1.) the hearing of the petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of the order
advancing the date of hearing, and the petition itself;
2.) the petition was heard within six months from the last publication of the petition;
3.) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of the judgment; and
4.) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year waiting period.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
GERALDINE GAW GUY and GRACE GUY CHEU

vs.
ALVIN AGUSTIN T. IGNACIO
G.R. No. 167824

July 2, 2010
FACTS:
Father of petitioners Geraldine Gaw Guy and Grace Guy Cheu became a naturalized Filipino in the year
1959 when they were still minors at that time and were also recognized as Filipino. Respondent Atty. Alvin Ignacio
filed a complaint for blacklisting and deportation against petitioners Geraldine and Grace before the Bureau of
Immigration as the said two are Canadian citizens who are illegally working in the Philippines, having been issued
Canadian passports.
Special Task Force of the Bureau of Immigration Commissioner issued subpoena to the petitioners and bring with
them pertinent documents relative to their current immigration status. Petitioners filed an opposition with a
Motion to Quash the subpoena which was denied. Board of Commissioners (BoC) flied a charge sheet against
petitioners for violation of Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 when they misrepresented as Philippine citizens and
worked without appropriate permit.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with damages and a prayer for issuance of Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) and writ of Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila which granted the TRO and
sets a case for hearing on the Preliminary Injunction.
Both respondents filed their answer and supplement special and affirmative defenses to the Preliminary
Injunction. However, the RTC granted the Preliminary Injunction.
Public respondent BoC filed petition both for nullification of RTC orders which the Court of Appeals (CA) granted
and annulled the RTC orders.
Hence, a petition to the Supreme Court was made by petitioners Geraldine Gaw Guy and Grace Guy Cheu.
ISSUE: Whether or not Court of Appeals erred in holding that Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the case
since it relates to deportation proceedings.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
RULING:
Yes. The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail of
all the means afforded him by administrative processes. The issues which administrative agencies are authorized to
decide should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to a court without first giving such administrative
agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due deliberation.
Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that is,
courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the
administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services
of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.
Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the corollary doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, which are based on sound public policy and practical considerations, are not inflexible rules. There are
many accepted exceptions, such as: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b)
where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is
unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount
involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is
purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent;
(g) when its application may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due
process; (i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) when there
is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo warranto
proceedings.
The Supreme Court granted the petition and nullified the decisions of the Court of Appeals.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
IN RE: PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF WILLIE YU

vs.
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, BIENVENIDO P. ALANO, JR., MAJOR PABALAN, DELEO HERNANDEZ, BLODDY
HERNANDEZ, BENNY REYES and JUN ESPIRITU SANTO
G.R. No. L-83882

January 24, 1989
FACTS:
Petitioner Willie Yu was originally issued a Portuguese passport in 1971. On February 10, 1978, he was naturalized
as a Philippine citizen. Despite his naturalization, he applied for and was issued Portuguese Passport by the
Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo on July 21, 1981. Said Consular Office certifies that his
Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986. He also declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial
documents he signed, specifically, the Companies registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. filed in Hong Kong sometime in
April 1980.
The Criminal Investigation Department detained Yu pending his deportation case. Yu, in turn, filed a petition for
habeas corpus. An internal resolution of 7 November 1988 referred the case to the Court en banc. The Court
en banc denied the petition. When his Motion for Reconsideration was denied, petitioner filed a Motion for
Clarification.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s acts constitute renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
RULING:
Yes. Express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly
and not left to inference or implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after having
renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his prior status
as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport and represented himself as such in official
documents even after he had become a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition
of Portuguese citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citizenship.
While normally the question of whether or not a person has renounced his Philippine citizenship should be heard
before a trial court of law in adversary proceedings, this has become unnecessary as this Court, no less, upon the
insistence of petitioner, had to look into the facts and satisfy itself on whether or not petitioner's claim to
continued Philippine citizenship is meritorious. Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or
were to be displayed when required and suppressed when convenient.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
JOSE B. AZNAR (as Provincial Chairman of PDP Laban in Cebu)

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) and EMILIO MARIO RENNER OSMEÑA
G.R. No. 83820

May 25, 1990
FACTS:
On 19 November 1987, private respondent filed his certification of candidacy with the COMELEC for the
position of Governor of Cebu. Petitioner filed with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification of Osmeña on the
ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen.
On 27 January 1988, Petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a certificate issued by the then
Immigration and Deportation Commission that Osmeña is an American Citizen. According to the evidence
presented, Osmeña maintained that he is a Filipino Citizen, that he is a legitimate son of Emilio Osmeña, a Filipino
and son of the Late President Sergio Osmeña Sr., that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport
and been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and that he has been a registered voter in the
Philippines.
COMELEC dismissed the petition for Disqualification for not having been timingly filed and for lack of sufficient
proof that private respondent is not s Filipino citizen and Osmeña was proclaim of winning candidates for
obtaining the highest number of votes.
ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeña remains a Filipino and loss of his Philippine Citizenship cannot be presumed.
RULING:
Yes, Petitioner failed to present direct proof that Osmeña had lost his Filipino Citizenship by any of the modes
provided for under C.A. No. 63 these are :
1. By naturalization in foreign country;
2. By express renunciation of Citizenship; and
3. By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or Law of the foreign country.
The evidence clearly shows that Osmeña did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three (3) mentioned
hereinaboved or any other modes of losing Philippine citizenship.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
The 1987 Constitution, Article IV, Section 5 states “Dual allegiance of citizens is iniminical to the national interest
and shall be dealt with by law” has no retroactive effect.
The petition for certiorari DISMISSED and the Resolution of the COMELEC is hereby affirmed.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
RENALD F. VILANDO
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET), JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG AND HON. SPEAKER
PROSPERO NOGRALES
G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149

August 23, 2011
FACTS:
In the May 14, 2007 elections, Limkaichong filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of
the First District of Negros Oriental. She won over the other contender, Olivia Paras. On May 25, 2007, she was
proclaimed as Representative by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on the basis of Comelec Resolution issued on
May 18, 2007. On July 23, 2007, she assumed office as Member of the House of Representatives. Meanwhile,
petitions involving either the disqualification or the proclamation of Limkaichong were filed before the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) which reached the Court.
The petitions, which questioned her citizenship, were filed against Limkaichong by her detractors. On April 21,
2009 and May 27, 2009, petitioner Renald F. Vilando (Vilando),as taxpayer; and Jacinto Paras, as registered voter
of the congressional district concerned, filed separate petitions for quo warranto against Limkaichong before the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. These petitions were consolidated by the HRET as they both
challenged the eligibility of one and the same respondent. Petitioners asserted that Limkaichong was a Chinese
citizen and ineligible for the office she was elected and proclaimed. They alleged that she was born to a father
(Julio Sy), whose naturalization had not attained finality, and to a mother who acquired the Chinese citizenship of
Julio Sy from the time of her marriage to the latter. Also, they invoked the jurisdiction of the HRET for a
determination of Limkaichong’s citizenship, which necessarily included an inquiry into the validity of the
naturalization certificate of Julio Sy.
For her defense, Limkaichong maintained that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. She averred that the acquisition
of Philippine citizenship by her father was regular and in order and had already attained the status of res judicata.
Further, she claimed that the validity of such citizenship could not be assailed through a collateral attack.
On March 24, 2010, the HRET dismissed both petitions and declared Limkaichong not disqualified as Member of
the House of Representatives.
The petitioners sought reconsideration of the aforesaid decision, but it was denied by the HRET in its Resolution
dated May 17, 2010. Hence, this petition for certiorari filed by Vilando.
ISSUE: Whether or not Limkaichong is qualified to hold an office in the Republic of the Philippines.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
RULING:
Yes. Records disclose that Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City on November 9, 1959. The governing law is
the citizenship provision of the 1935 Constitution. The HRET, therefore, correctly relied on the presumption of
validity of the July 9, 1957 and September 21, 1959 Orders of the Court of First Instance (CFI) Negros Oriental,
which granted the petition and declared Julio Sy a naturalized Filipino absent any evidence to the contrary.
Respondent Limkaichong falls under the category of those persons whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(Section 1(3), Article IV, 1935 Constitution) It matters not whether the father acquired citizenship by birth or by
naturalization. Therefore, following the line of transmission through the father under the 1935 Constitution, the
respondent has satisfactorily complied with the requirement for candidacy and for holding office, as she is a
natural-born Filipino citizen.
Respondent participated in the barangay elections as a young voter in 1976, accomplished voter's affidavit as of
1984, and ran as a candidate and was elected as Mayor of La Libertad, Negros Oriental in 2004. These are positive
acts of election of Philippine citizenship. The case of In re: Florencio Mallare, elucidates how election of citizenship
is manifested in actions indubitably showing a definite choice. We note that respondent had informally
elected citizenship after January 17, 1973 during which time the 1973 Constitution considered as citizens of the
Philippines all those who elect citizenship in accordance with the 1935 Constitution.
The present petition filed by Vilando was DISMISSED. The Court affirms the March 24, 2010 Decision of the HRET
declaring that Limkaichong is not disqualified as Member of the House of Representatives representing the First
District, Negros Oriental.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, LUIS M. BAUTISTA, ROBELITO V. PICAR and WILMA P. PAGADUAN
G.R. No. 198742

August 10, 2012
FACTS:
The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents on August 8, 1944. On
December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas
Condon. On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the Philippine
Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known as the “Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003.” The application was approved and the petitioner took her oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005.
On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship
before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order
certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen. The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba,
La Union in the 2007 elections. She lost in her bid. She again sought elective office during the May 10, 2010
elections this time for the position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed
as the winning candidate. She took her oath of office. Soon thereafter, private respondents all registered voters of
Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for quo warranto questioning the petitioner’s eligibility before the RTC.
The petitions similarly sought the petitioner’s disqualification from holding her elective post on the ground that
she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a “personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath” as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since September 27, 2006, she ceased to be an
Australian citizen. She claimed that the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed in
Australia sufficiently complied with Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 and that her act of running for public office is a
clear abandonment of her Australian citizenship. Trial court held that the petitioner’s failure to comply with
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 rendered her ineligible to run and hold public office. As admitted by the petitioner
herself during trial, the personal declaration of renunciation she filed in Australia was not under oath.
The petitioner appealed to the COMELEC. The COMELEC en banc concurred with the findings
and conclusions of the RTC.
Hence, the present petition ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the COMELEC en banc.
The petitioner contends that since she ceased to be an Australian citizen on September 27, 2006, she no longer
held dual citizenship and was only a Filipino citizen when she filed her certificate of candidacy as early as the 2007
elections. Hence, the “personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship” imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
9225 to dual citizens seeking elective office does not apply to her. She further argues that a sworn renunciation is a
mere formal and not a mandatory requirement.
ISSUE: Whether or not the “sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship” in Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 mere pro-
forma requirement.
RULING:
No. R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-born citizens who have
lost their Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic. Natural-born citizens of the
Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores one’s
Filipino citizenship and all civil and political rights and obligations concomitant therewith, subject to certain
conditions imposed in Section 5:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under
this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities
under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath.”
Under the provisions of the aforementioned law, the petitioner has validly re-acquired her Filipino citizenship
when she took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005. At that point, she
held dual citizenship, i.e., Australian and Philippine.
In Jacot v. Dal, the Court held that Filipinos re-acquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship under R.A. No.
9225 must explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines, thus:
before a public officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of
candidacy.
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural- born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens
The intent of the legislators was not only for Filipinos reacquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship under
Republic Act No. 9225 to take their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, but also to explicitly

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines. To qualify as a candidate
in Philippine elections, Filipinos must only have one citizenship, namely, Philippine citizenship.
The foreign citizenship must be formally rejected through an affidavit duly sworn before an officer authorized to
administer oath.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
CASAN MACODE MACQUILING

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), ROMMEL ARNADO Y CAGOCO, AND LINOG G. BALUA
G.R. No. 195649

July 2, 2013
FACTS:
Respondent Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his subsequent

naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America (USA), he lost hisFilipino citizenship. Arnado applied for
repatriation under Republic Act No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA
and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on July 10, 2008. On the same day an order of
approval of his citizenship retention and re-acquisition was issued in his favor. In 2009, Arnado again took his Oath
of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and executed an affidavit of renunciation of his foreign citizenship.
On November 30, 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao Del Norte.
Respondent Linog Balua, another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and presented a record
indicating that Arnado has been using his U.S. passport in entering and departing Philippines.
COMELEC issued an order requiring the respondent to personally file his answer. After Arnado failed to
answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default. In 2010 election, Arnado garnered the highest number
of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor. It was only after his proclamation
that Arnado filed his answer.
COMELEC first division ruled for his disqualification. Petitioner Maquiling, another candidate for Mayor of
Kauswagan , and who garnered the second highest number of votes, intervened in the case and filed before the
COMELEC En Banc a motion for reconsideration claiming that the cancellation of Arnado’s candidacy and the
nullification of his proclamation, him, as the legitimate candidate who obtained the highest lawful votes should be
proclaimed as the winner. COMELEC En Banc held that it shall continue with the trial and hearing. However, it
reversed and set aside the ruling of first division and granted Arnado’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for
public office despite his continued use of a U.S. passport and praying that he be proclaimed as the winner in the
2010 mayoralty race.
ISSUE: Whether or not the use of foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amount to undoing a
renunciation earlier made.

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RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is
a positive and voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship. It does not divest Filipino
citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an
elective position.
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he filed his
COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier
executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American,
Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired through a positive act of
applying for naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not
required by law to take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy already carries
with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship. Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are
required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce
foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for public office. By the time he filed his certificate
of candidacy on 30 November 2009.
Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship .He was qualified
to vote, but by the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, he was not
qualified to run for a local elective position.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018

vs.
HON. ROSALIO G. DE LA ROSA, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 28, MANILA and
JUAN G. FRIVALDO
G.R. No. 104654

June 6, 1994
FACTS:
On September 20, 1991, Juan Frivaldo filed a petition for naturalization under the Commonwealth Act No.
63 before the RTC Manila.
On October 7, 1991, Judge dela Rosa set the petition for hearing on March 16, 1992, and directed the publication
of the said order and petition in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation, for 3 consecutive
weeks, the last publication of which should be at least 6 months before the date of the said hearing.
On January 14, 1992, Frivaldo asked the Judge to cancel the March 16 hearing and move it to January 24,
1992, citing his intention to run for public office in the May 1992 elections. Judge granted the motion and the
hearing was moved to February 21. No publication or copy was issued about the order. On February 21, 1992, the
hearing proceeded and six days after, on February 27, 1992, Judge rendered the assailed Decision and held that
Frivaldo is readmitted as a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines by naturalization.
Republic of the Philippines filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to
R.A. No. 5440 and Section 25 of the Interim Rules, to annul the decision made on February 27, 1992 and to nullify
the oath of allegiance taken by Frivaldo on same date.
ISSUE: Whether or not Frivaldo was duly re-admitted to his citizenship as a Filipino.
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that Private respondent is declared not a citizen of the Philippines and
therefore disqualified from continuing to serve as governor of the Province of Sorsogon. He is ordered to vacate
his office and to surrender the same to the Vice-Governor of the Province of Sorsogon once this decision becomes
final and executory. The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following irregularities:
1.) the hearing of the petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of the
order advancing the date of hearing, and the petition itself;

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
2.) the petition was heard within six months from the last publication of the petition;
3.) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of the judgment; and
4.) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year waiting period.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
CIRILO R. VALLES
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) and ROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ
G.R. No. 137000

August 9, 2000
FACTS:
In 1992, private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez ran for and was elected governor of Davao Oriental. Her
election was contested by her opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr., in a petition for quo warranto. However, finding no
sufficient proof that respondent had renounced her Philippine citizenship, the COMELEC en banc dismissed the
petition. When Lopez ran for re-election in 1995 elections, her opponent, Francisco Rabat, filed a petition for
disqualification, contesting her Filipino citizenship but the said petition was likewise dismissed by the COMELEC.
The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as an issue when she ran for re-election as governor of
Davao Oriental in the May 11, 1998 elections. Her candidacy was questioned by the petitioner Cirilo Valles.
The COMELEC, however, dismissed the petition, ruling that Lopez is a Filipino citizen and therefore, qualified to run
for a public office because (1) her father, Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino citizen, and by virtue of the principle of jus
sanguinis she was a Filipino citizen under the 1987 Philippine Constitution; (2) she was married to a Filipino,
thereby making her also a Filipino citizen ipso jure under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473; (3) and that, she
renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs
of Australia and her Australian passport was accordingly cancelled as certified to by the Australian Embassy in
Manila; and (4) furthermore, there are the COMELEC Resolutions in EPC No. 92-54 and SPA Case No. 95-066,
declaring her a Filipino citizen duly qualified to run for the elective position of Davao Oriental governor.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, maintaining that the Lopez is an Australian
citizen, placing reliance on the admitted facts that: a) In 1988, private respondent registered herself with
the Bureau of Immigration as an Australian national and was issued Alien Certificate of Registration No. 404695
dated September 19, 1988; b) On even date, she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant Certificate of Residence
(ICR), and c) She was issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on March 3, 1988.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is a Filipino.
RULING:
Yes. The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows
the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of
jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western
Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa
Marquez, an Australian. Historically, this was a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time,

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United States
governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29,
1916, also known as the Jones Law.
Under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Jones Law, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on
April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private
respondent’s father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte, a fact duly
evidenced by a certified true copy of an entry in the Registry of Births. Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and
the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the
laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo’s daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is
likewise a citizen of the Philippines.
The principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently retained
under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is
a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to
her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent
can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ANTONIO BENGZON III

vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET) and TEODORO C. CRUZ
G.R. No. 142840

May 7, 2001
FACTS:
The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement that
“no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.”
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985,
however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an
oath of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act
Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino
citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, “rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces
of a foreign country.”
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S.
citizen in 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act 2630 “An Act Providing
for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or
Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United States (1960).” He ran for and was elected as the
Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was
then running for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was
not qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI,
section 6 of the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected
Representative in the said election.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a
natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
RULING:
YES. Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner
provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a
former citizen:

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and
3. by direct act of Congress.
Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to:
1. desertion of the armed forces;

2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. political economic necessity
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that a naturalized Filipino who
lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a
natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 2630 provides:
Section 1. “Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in,
the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired
United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the
Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.”
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil
Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to have
recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino
father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before
he lost his Philippine citizenship.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
GERARDO ANGAT
vs.
G.R. No. 132244

September 14, 1999
FACTS:
Petitioner Gerardo Angat was a natural born citizen of the Philippines until he lost his citizenship by
naturalization in the United States of America. On 11 March 1996, he filed before the RTC of Marikina City, Branch
272, a petition to regain his Status as a citizen of the Philippines under Commonwealth Act No. 63, Republic Act
No. 965 and Republic Act No. 2630. The case was thereafter set for initial hearing.
On 13 June 1996, petitioner sought to be allowed to take his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
pursuant to R.A. 8171. The motion was initially denied by the trial judge but after a motion for reconsideration, it
was granted. The petitioner was ordered to take his oath of allegiance pursuant to R.A. 8171. After taking his oath
of allegiance, the trial court issued an order repatriating petitioner and declaring him as citizen of the Philippines
pursuant to Republic Act No. 8171. The Bureau of Immigration was ordered to cancel his alien certificate of
registration and issue the certificate of identification as Filipino citizen.
On 19 March 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion (virtually a motion for
reconsideration) asserting that the petition itself should have been dismissed by the court a quo for lack of
jurisdiction because the proper forum for it was the Special Committee on Naturalization consistently with
Administrative Order No. 285 (AO 285), dated 22 August 1996, issued by President Fidel V. Ramos. AO 285 had
tasked the Special Committee on Naturalization to be the implementing agency of R.A 8171. The trial court
granted the motion and dismissed the petition.
Petitioner appealed contending that the RTC seriously erred in dismissing the petition by giving retroactive effect
to Administrative Order No. 285, absent a provision on retroactive application.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court erred in dismissing the petition by giving retroactive effect to AO 285, absent a
provision on retroactive application.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
RULING:
No. Under Section 1 of Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 725, 8 dated 05 June 1975, amending
Commonwealth Act No. 63, an application for repatriation could be filed by Filipino women who lost their
Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens, as well as by natural born Filipinos who lost their Philippine citizenship,
with the Special Committee on Naturalization. The committee, chaired by the Solicitor General with the
Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency as the other
members, was created pursuant to Letter of Instruction ("LOI") No. 270, dated 11 April 1975, as amended by LOI
No. 283 and LOI No. 491 issued, respectively, on 04 June 1975 and on 29 December 1976. Although the agency was
deactivated by virtue of President Corazon C. Aquino's Memorandum of 27 March 1987, it was not however,
abrogated.
In Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 9 the Court observed that the aforedated memorandum of President
Aquino had merely directed the Special Committee on Naturalization "to cease and desist from undertaking any
and all proceedings . . . under Letter of Instruction ("LOI") 270." 10 The Court elaborated:
This memorandum dated March 27, 1987 cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics be construed as a law
sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and a repeal may
be express or implied. It is obvious that no express repeal was made because then President Aquino in her
memorandum-based on the copy furnished us by Lee-did not categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725 was
being repealed or was being rendered without any legal effect. In fact, she did not even mention it specifically by
its number or text. On the other hand, it is a basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not
favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed "unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the
two laws are clear repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist."
Indeed, the Committee was reactivated on 08 June 1995; hence, when petitioner filed his petition on 11 March
1996, the Special Committee on Naturalization constituted pursuant to LOI No. 270 under P.D. No. 725 was in
place. Administrative Order 285, promulgated on 22 August 1996 relative to R.A. No. 8171, in effect, was merely
then a confirmatory issuance.
The Office of the Solicitor General was right in maintaining that Angat's petition should have been filed with the
Committee, aforesaid, and not with the RTC which had no jurisdiction thereover. The court's order of 04 October
1996 was thereby null and void, and it did not acquire finality nor could be a source of right on the part of
petitioner.
It should also be noteworthy that the was one for repatriation, and it was thus incorrect for petitioner to initially
invoke Republic Act No. 965 and R.A. No. 2630 since these laws could only apply to persons who had lost their
citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of an allied foreign country or the
armed forces of the United States of America, a factual matter not alleged in the petition, Parenthetically, under
these statutes, the person desiring to re-acquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a petition
in court, and all that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
and to register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last resided in the
Philippines.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
CICERON P. ALTAREJOS, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JOSE ALMIE and VERNON VERSOZA, respondents.
G.R. No. 163256

November 10, 2004
FACTS:
Private respondents filed with the COMELEC to disqualify and deny due course or cancel the certificate of
candidacy of Ciceron P. Altarejos, on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and that he made a false
representation in his COC that he was not a permanent resident of the Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate, the
town he's running for as mayor in the May 10, 2004 elections. Altarejos answered that he was already issued a
Certificate of Repatriation by the Special Committee on Naturalization in December 17, 1997.
ISSUE: Whether or not the registration of petitioner’s repatriation with the proper civil registry and with the Bureau
of Immigration a prerequisite in effecting repatriation.
RULING:
Yes. The registration of certificate of repatriation with the proper local civil registry and with the Bureau
of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting repatriation. Petitioner completed all the requirements of repatriation
only after he filed his certificate of candidacy for a mayoralty position but before the elections. Petitioner’s
repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his application and was, therefore, qualified to run for a mayoralty
position in the government in the May 10, 2004 elections.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
JOEVANIE ARELLANO TABASA, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION and DEPORTATION and WILSON SOLUREN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 125793

August 29, 2006
FACTS:
In 1968, when petitioner was seven years old, his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, became a naturalized citizen of
the United States. By derivative naturalization (citizenship derived from that of another as from a person who
holds citizenship by virtue of naturalization), petitioner also acquired American citizenship. Petitioner theorizes
that he could be repatriated under RA 8171 because he is a child of a natural-born Filipino, and that he lost his
Philippine citizenship by derivative naturalization when he was still a minor.
ISSUE: Is Jeovanie Tabasa a natural-born Filipino who had lost his Philippine citizenship by reason of political or
economic necessity under RA 8171?
HELD:
He is not. The only persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are the following: a. Filipino women
who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and b. Natural-born Filipinos including their minor
children who lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. Petitioner overlooks the
fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their
citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, and to the minor children of said natural-born Filipinos.
Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to natural-born
Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, and to the minor children of said
natural-born Filipinos. The privilege under RA 8171 belongs to children who are of minor age at the time of the
filing of the petition for repatriation.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner,

vs.
EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
G.R. No. 135083

May 26, 1999
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in the
May 11, 1998 elections. Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of votes.
However, his proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto
Mercado on the ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. From the facts
presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen. The Commission on Elections declared
Manzano disqualified as candidate for said elective position. However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC
en banc, the disqualification of the respondent was reversed. Respondent was held to have renounced his US
citizenship when he attained the age of majority and registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995
and 1998. Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August 31, 1998. Thus the
present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the Philippines.
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court construed the disqualification under the Local Government Code as referring to
dual allegiance not dual citizenship.
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent
application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the
said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which
adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Private respondent
is considered as a dual citizen because he is born of Filipino parents but was born in San Francisco, USA. Such a
person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Considering the citizenship clause under Article IV of the Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of
citizens of the Philippines to posses dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers’ country such
children are citizens of that country;

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are considered citizens, unless by their
act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by
some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result
of an individual’s volition.
By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine
citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to
renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen.
By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident
or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true
faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the
laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may
have said before as a dual citizen. On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippine,
when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his
profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018

vs.
HON. GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I, THE PROVINCIAL
SHERIFF OF RIZAL, THE SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY, and THE SHERIFF OF THE CITY OF MANILA, THE CLERK OF
COURT, Court of First Instance of Cebu, P. J. KIENER CO., LTD., GAVINO UNCHUAN, AND INTERNATIONAL
CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. L-30671

November 28, 1973
FACTS:
The decision that was rendered in favor of respondents P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd, Gavino Unchuan and International
Construction Corporation was declared final and executory by Respondent Hon. Guillermo P. Villasor. Pursuant to
the said declaration, the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution was issued. And for the strength of this writ, the
provincial sheriff served notices of garnishment with several banks, specially on the 'monies due the Armed Forces
of the Philippines in the form of deposits; the Philippines Veterans Bank received the same notice of garnishment.
The funds of the AFP on deposit with the banks are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for the payment
of pensions of retireees, pay and allowances of military and civillian personnel and for maintenance and operations
of AFP.
Petitioner filed a petition against Villasor for acting in excess jurisdiction amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
granting the issuance of a Writ of Execution against the properties of AFP, hence the notices and garnishments are
null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Writ of Execution issued by respondent Judge Villasor is valid.
RULING:
No. What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution. It is a
fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the state and its
government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. A sovereign is exempt from suit not because of any
formal conception or obsolete theory but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.
Government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. Public funds cannot be the object of a
garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability
adjudged.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
PROFESSIONAL VIDEO, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
TECHNICAL EDUCATION AND SKILLS DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Respondent.
G.R. No. 155504

June 26, 2009
FACTS:
Professional Video, Inc. (PROVI) is an entity engaged in the sale of high technology equipment,
information technology products and broadcast devices. Technical Education and Skills Development Authority
(TESDA) was established under RA 7796 or TESDA Act of 1994 as an instrumentality of the government.
TESDA to fulfill its mandate, sought to issue security-printed certification and/or identification polyvinyl
(PVC) cards to trainees who have passed the certification process. TESDA’s Pre-Qualification Bids Award
Committee (PBAC) conducted two (2) public biddings but it failed. So, PBAC recommended TESDA to negotiate and
make a contract with PROVI. TESDA and PROVI signed and executed their "Contract Agreement Project: PVC ID
Card Issuance" (the Contract Agreement) for the provision of goods and services in the printing and encoding of
PVC cards which cost P39,475,000.TESDA and PROVI executed an "Addendum to the Contract Agreement Project:
PVC ID Card Issuance" (Addendum).TESDA in paid PROVI thirty percent (30%) of the total cost of the supplies
within thirty (30)days after receipt and acceptance of the contracted supplies, with the balance payable within
thirty (30) days after the initial payment. TESDA failed to pay its outstanding balance of P35,735,500 to PROVI
despite its two demand letters.
Thus, PROVI filed a petition against TESDA to the Regional Trial Court. RTC ruled in favour of PROVI and
ordered the manager of the Land Bank of the Philippines to produce TESDA’s bank statement for the garnishment
of the covered amount. TESDA filed a petition to the Court of Appeals and it set aside the RTC’s orders ruling that
TESDA’s funds are public in nature and, therefore, exempt from garnishment; and TESDA’s purchase of the PVC
cards was a necessary incident of its governmental function
ISSUE: Whether or not TESDA is covered by the principle of State Immunity?

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
RULING:
Yes. R.A. No. 7796 created the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority or TESDA under the
declared policy of the State to provide relevant, accessible, high quality and efficient technical education and skills
development in support of the development of high quality Filipino middle-level manpower responsive to and in
accordance with Philippine development goals and priorities. All these measures are undertaken pursuant to the
constitutional command that [T]he State affirms labor as a primary social economic force, and shall protect the
rights of workers and promote their welfare. Under both constitutional and statutory term, the Supreme Court
does not believe that the role and status of TESDA can seriously be contested. TESDA is an instrumentality of the
government undertaking governmental functions. TESDA, as an agency of the State, cannot be sued without its
consent.
While TESDA will charge the trainees with a fee for the PVC cards, this fee is only to recover their costs
and is not intended for profit. The PVC cards purchased by TESDA from PROVI are meant to properly identify the
trainees who passed TESDAs National Skills Certification Program the program that immediately serves TESDAs
mandated function of developing and establishing a national system of skills standardization, testing, and
certification in the country. That TESDA sells the PVC cards to its trainees for a fee does not characterize the
transaction as industrial or business; the sale, expressly authorized by the TESDA Act, cannot be considered
separately from TESDAs general governmental functions, as they are undertaken in the discharge of these
functions. Even assuming that TESDA entered into a proprietary contract with PROVI and thereby gave its implied
consent to be sued, TESDAs funds are still public in nature and, thus, cannot be the valid subject of a writ of
garnishment or attachment. Under Section 33 of the TESDA Act, the TESDA budget for the implementation of the
Act shall be included in the annual General Appropriation Act; hence, TESDA funds, being sourced from the
Treasury, are moneys belonging to the government, or any of its departments, in the hands of public officials.
Succinctly put, TESDAs funds are public in character, hence exempt from attachment or garnishment.
Even without the benefit of any immunity from suit, the attachment of TESDA funds should not have been
granted, as PROVI failed to prove that TESDA fraudulently misapplied or converted funds allocated under the
Certificate as to Availability of Funds. PROVI has not shown that it is entitled to the writ of attachment.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
THE HEIRS OF MATEO PIDACAN AND ROMANA BIGO, NAMELY: PACITA PIDACAN VDA. DE ZUBIRI AND ADELA
PIDACAN VDA. DE ROBLES, Petitioners,
vs.
AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE, represented by its Acting Director BIENVENIDO MANGA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 186192

August 25, 2010
FACTS:
Respondent Air Transportation Office (ATO) used a portion of the petitioners property as an airport. In
1974, the ATO constructed a perimeter fence and a new terminal building on the property. The ATO also
lengthened, widened, and cemented the airport's runway. Petitioners demanded from ATO the payment of the
value of the property as well as the rentals for the use thereof but ATO refused.
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of petitioners, holding that ATO's act of converting petitioners' private
property into an airport came within the purview of eminent domain and as a consequence, petitioners were
completely deprived of the beneficial use and enjoyment of their property. Supreme Court declared that justice
and fairness dictate that the appropriate reckoning point for the valuation of petitioners' property was when the
RTC made its order of expropriation in 2001. However, we deleted the RTC's award of rental payments for lack of
evidence.
Thus, on February 20, 2008, petitioners filed a Motion for Execution before the RTC. The RTC issued an
Order denying petitioners' Motion for Execution on the ground that the prosecution, enforcement, or satisfaction
of State liability must be pursued in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in Commonwealth Act
No. 327, as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445.
Respondent argues that the state may not be sued in the instant case, invoking the constitutional doctrine
of non-suability of the state, otherwise known as the royal prerogative of dishonesty.
ISSUE: Whether or not ATO may be sued.
RULING:
Yes. Under these circumstances, respondent may not validly invoke the Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty
and conveniently hide under the State's cloak of invincibility against suit, considering that this principle yields to
certain settled exceptions. True enough, the rule, in any case, is not absolute for it does not say that the state may
not be sued under any circumstance. Thus, in Amigable v. Cuenca, this Court, in effect, shred the protective shroud
which shields the State from suit, reiterating our decree in the landmark case of Ministerio v. CFI of Cebu that "the

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a
citizen." It is just as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of officialdom if the
rule of law were to be maintained. Although the Amigable and Ministerio cases generously tackled the
issue of the State's immunity from suit vis-a-vis the payment of just compensation for expropriated property, this
Court nonetheless finds the doctrine enunciated in the aforementioned cases applicable to the instant
controversy, considering that the ends of justice would be subverted if we were to uphold, in this particular
instance, the State's immunity from suit.
It is almost trite to say that execution is the fruit and the end of the suit and is the life of the law. A
judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing party. Litigation must end
sometime and somewhere. An effective and efficient administration of justice requires that, once a judgment has
become final, the winning party be not deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must, therefore, guard against
any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts
should frown upon any attempt to prolong them. Petitioners have been deprived of the beneficial use and
enjoyment of their property for a considerable length of time. Now that they prevailed before this Court, it would
be highly unjust and inequitable under the particular circumstances that payment of just compensation be
withheld from them. We, therefore, write finis to this litigation.
In light of the foregoing, the Regional Trial Court was directed to issue a Writ of Execution enforcing the
Supreme Court’s decision.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES DAVID* ELISEA RAMOS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 159402

February 23, 2011
FACTS:
Spouses David and Elisea Ramos (respondents) discovered that a portion of their land registered under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-58894 of the Baguio Cityland records with an area of 985 square meters, more or
less, was being used as part of the runway and running shoulder of the Loakan Airport being operated by
petitioner Air Transportation Office (ATO). On August 11, 1995, the respondents agreed after negotiations to
convey the affected portion by deed of sale to the ATO in consideration of the amount of P778,150.00. However,
the ATO failed to pay despite repeated verbal and written demands.
Thus, on April 29, 1998, the respondents filed an action for collection against the ATO and some of its
officials in the RTC.
In their answer, the ATO and its co-defendants invoked as an affirmative defense the issuance of
Proclamation No. 1358, whereby President Marcos had reserved certain parcels of land that included the
respondents affected portion for use of the Loakan Airport. They asserted that the RTC had no jurisdiction to
entertain the action without the States consent considering that the deed of sale had been entered into in the
performance of governmental functions. The RTC denied the ATOs motion for a preliminary hearing of the
affirmative defense.
ISSUE: Whether the ATO could be sued without the States consent.
RULING:
Yes. The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign immunity or non-
suability of the State, is expressly provided in Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.
An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own enjoys
immunity from suit because it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim for damages
against the agency cannot prosper; otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is violated. However, the need
to distinguish between an unincorporated government agency performing governmental function and one

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
performing proprietary functions has arisen. The immunity has been upheld in favor of the former because its
function is governmental or incidental to such function; it has not been upheld in favor of the latter whose
function was not in pursuit of a necessary function of government but was essentially a business.
The Supreme Court held that ATO as an agency of the Government was not performing a purely
governmental or sovereign function, but was instead involved in the management and maintenance of
the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign capacity. Hence,
the ATO had no claim to the States immunity from suit.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
CHINA NATIONAL MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT CORP. (GROUP), Petitioner,

vs.
HON. CESAR D. SANTAMARIA, in his official capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 145, et. al,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 185572

February 7, 2012
FACTS:
The Export Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank) and the Department of Finance of the Philippines (DOF)
entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (Aug 30 MOU), wherein China agreed to extend Preferential Buyers
Credit to the Philippine government to finance the Northrail Project. The Chinese government designated EXIM
Bank as the lender, while the Philippine government named the DOF as the borrower. Under the Aug 30 MOU,
EXIM Bank agreed to extend an amount not exceeding USD 400,000,000 in favor of the DOF, payable in 20 years,
with a 5-year grace period, and at the rate of 3% per annum. The Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines, Wang
Chungui (Amb. Wang), wrote a letter to DOF Secretary Jose Isidro Camacho (Sec. Camacho) informing him of
CNMEGs designation as the Prime Contractor for the Northrail Project. Northrail and CNMEG executed a Contract
Agreement for the construction of Section I, Phase I of the North Luzon Railway System from Caloocan to Malolos
on a turnkey basis (the Contract Agreement). The contract price for the Northrail Project was pegged at USD
421,050,000.
The Philippine government and EXIM Bank entered into a counterpart financial agreement Buyer Credit
Loan Agreement No. BLA 04055 (the Loan Agreement). In the Loan Agreement, EXIM Bank agreed to extend
Preferential Buyers Credit in the amount of USD 400,000,000 in favor of the Philippine government in order to
finance the construction of Phase I of the Northrail Project.
Respondents filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract and Injunction with Urgent Motion for
Summary Hearing to Determine the Existence of Facts and Circumstances Justifying the Issuance of Writs of
Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction and/or TRO against CNMEG, the Office of the Executive
Secretary, the DOF, the Department of Budget and Management, the National Economic Development Authority
and Northrail. In the Complaint, respondents alleged that the Contract Agreement and the Loan Agreement were
void for being contrary to (a) the Constitution; (b) Republic Act No. 9184 (R.A. No. 9184), otherwise known as the
Government Procurement Reform Act; (c) Presidential Decree No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government
Auditing Code; and (d) Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not CNMEG is entitled to immunity

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
RULING:
No. A thorough examination of the basic facts of the case would show that CNMEG is engaged in a
proprietary activity. Despite petitioners claim that the EXIM Bank extended financial assistance to Northrail
because the bank was mandated by the Chinese government, and not because of any motivation to do business in
the Philippines, it is clear from the foregoing provisions that the Northrail Project was a purely commercial
transaction.
Admittedly, the Loan Agreement was entered into between EXIM Bank and the Philippine government,
while the Contract Agreement was between Northrail and CNMEG. Although the Contract Agreement is silent on
the classification of the legal nature of the transaction, the foregoing provisions of the Loan Agreement, which is
an inextricable part of the entire undertaking, nonetheless reveal the intention of the parties to the Northrail
Project to classify the whole venture as commercial or proprietary in character. Thus, piecing together the content
and tenor of the Contract Agreement, the Memorandum of Understanding dated 14 September 2002, Amb. Wangs
letter dated 1 October 2003, and the Loan Agreement would reveal the desire of CNMEG to construct the Luzon
Railways in pursuit of a purely commercial activity performed in the ordinary course of its business. It is readily
apparent that CNMEG cannot claim immunity from suit, even if it contends that it performs governmental
functions. Its designation as the Primary Contractor does not automatically grant it immunity, just as the term
implementing agency has no precise definition for purposes of ascertaining whether GTZ was immune from suit.
Although CNMEG claims to be a government-owned corporation, it failed to adduce evidence that it has not
consented to be sued under Chinese law.
From all the foregoing, it is clear that CNMEG has agreed that it will not be afforded immunity from suit.
Thus, the courts have the competence and jurisdiction to ascertain the validity of the Contract Agreement.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, and MA. MARGARITA M. GALON, Petitioners,
vs.
PHIL PHARMA WEALTH, INC., Respondent.
G.R. No. 182358

February 20, 2013
FACTS:
On December 22, 1998, then Secretary of Health Alberto G. Romualdez, Jr. issued Administrative Order
(A.O.) No. 27, Series of 1998, outlining the guidelines and procedures on the accreditation of government suppliers
for pharmaceutical products.
On May 9, 2000 and May 29, 2000, respondent submitted to petitioner DOH a request for the inclusion of
additional items in its list of accredited drug products, including the antibiotic "Penicillin G Benzathine." Based on
the schedule provided by petitioner DOH, it appears that processing of and release of the result of respondent’s
request were due on September 2000, the last month of the quarter following the date of its filing.
Sometime in September 2000, petitioner DOH, through petitioner Antonio M. Lopez, chairperson of the
pre-qualifications, bids and awards committee, issued an Invitation for Bids for the procurement of 1.2 million
units vials of Penicillin G Benzathine (Penicillin G Benzathine contract).
Despite the lack of response from petitioner DOH regarding respondent’s request for inclusion of
additional items in its list of accredited products, respondent submitted its bid for the Penicillin G Benzathine
contract. When the bids were opened on October 11, 2000, only two companies participated, with respondent
submitting the lower bid at P82.24 per unit, compared to Cathay/YSS Laboratories’ (YSS) bid of P95.00 per unit. In
view, however, of the non-accreditation of respondent’s Penicillin G Benzathine product, the contract was
awarded to YSS.
Respondent thus filed a complaint for injunction, mandamus and damages. Petitioners subsequently filed
a Manifestation and Motion (motion to dismiss) praying for the outright dismissal of the complaint based on the
doctrine of state immunity. By Order of December 8, 2003, the trial court denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s Order. Hence, the instant petition for review which raises
the sole issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the denial of petitioners’ motion to dismiss.
ISSUE: Whether or not DOH is immune from suit.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
RULING:
As regards petitioner DOH, the defense of immunity from suit will not avail despite its being an
unincorporated agency of the government, for the only causes of action directed against it are preliminary
injunction and mandamus. Under Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, preliminary injunction may be directed
against a party or a court, agency or a person. Moreover, the defense of state immunity from suit does not apply in
causes of action which do not seek to impose a charge or financial liability against the State. The rule that a state
may not be sued without its consent, now embodied in Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the
generally accepted principles of international law, which we have now adopted as part of the law of the land.
While the doctrine of state immunity appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent,
it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the
discharge of their duties. The suit is regarded as one against the state where satisfaction of the judgment against
the officials will require the state itself to perform a positive act, such as the appropriation of the amount
necessary to pay the damages awarded against them.
The rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are
unauthorized or unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Neither does it apply where the public official is
clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may have
been committed while he occupied a public position.
In the present case, suing individual petitioners in their personal capacities for damages in connection
with their alleged act of "illegally” abusing their official positions to make sure that plaintiff Pharmawealth would
not be awarded the Benzathine contract which act was done in bad faith and with full knowledge of the limits and
breadth of their powers given by law" is permissible, in consonance with the foregoing principles. For an officer
who exceeds the power conferred on him by law cannot hide behind the plea of sovereign immunity and must
bear the liability personally.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
VETERANS MANPOWER AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE CHIEF OF PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY and PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY
SUPERVISORY UNIT FOR SECURITY AND INVESTIGATION AGENCIES (PC-SUSIA), Respondents.
G.R. No. 91359

September 25, 1992
FACTS:
Veterans Manpower And Protective Services, Inc., was operating as a security agency. By virtue of the
provisions of RA 5487 or the Private Security Agency Law, the then PC Chief Lt. Fidel Ramos issued Rules &
Regulations requiring “that all private security agencies/ company security forces must register as members of any
PADPAO Chapter organized within the Region where their main offices are located’.
A memorandum of Agreement was executed by PADPAO and the PC Chief, which fixed the minimum
monthly contract rate per guard for 8 hours of security service per day. Odin Security Agency filed a complaint with
APDPAO accusing VMPSI of cut-throat competition. PADPAO found VMPSI guilty and recommended its expulsion
from PADPAO and cancellation of its license to operate a security agency. The PC-SUSIA made similar findings.
When VMPSI requested the issuance of a clearance/ certificate of membership, PADPAO refused to issue
one. VMPSI wrote to the PC chief but as the latter did not reply and VMPSI’s license was expiring in March 31,
VMPSI filed a case in the RTC against the PC chief and PC-SUSIA. The RTC issued a restraining order enjoining the
defendants ”from committing acts that would result in the cancellation or non-renewal of VMPSI’s license.” The PC
Chief and PC-SUSIA moved to dismiss on the ground, inter alia, that the case is against the state which had not
given its consent thereto.
The RTC ruled in favor of VMPSI. However, the CA granted a petition for certiorari filed by the defendants,
ordering the RTC to dismiss the complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUES: Whether or not VMPSI’s complaint against the PC chief and PC_SUSIA is a suit against the State.
RULING:
Yes the suit is a suit against the state without its consent. The State may not be sued without its consent
(Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution). The PC Chief and PC-SUSIA being instrumentalities of the national
government exercising a primarily governmental function of regulating the organization and operation of private
detective, watchmen, or security guard agencies, said official (the PC Chief) and agency (PC-SUSIA) may not be

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
sued without the Government’s consent, especially in this case because VMPSI’s complaint seeks not only to
compel the public respondents to act in a certain way, but worse, because VMPSI seeks actual and compensatory
damages in the sum of P1,000,000.00, exemplary damages in the same amount, and P200,000.00 as attorney’s
fees from said public respondents. Even if its action prospers, the payment of its monetary claims may not be
enforced because the State did not consent to appropriate the necessary funds for that purpose.
The memorandum of agreement did not constitute an implied consent by the State to be sued. The
Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986 was entered into by the PC Chief in relation to the exercise of a
function sovereign in nature. The correct test for the application of state immunity is not the conclusion of a
contract by the State but the legal nature of the act. Waiver of the State’s immunity from suit, being a derogation
of sovereignty, will not be lightly inferred, but must be construed strictissimi juris.
The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority, hence, from a legislative act,
not from a mere memorandum. Without such consent, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the public
respondents.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, petitioner,

vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al., respondents.
G.R. No. 104269

November 11, 1993
FACTS:
The case is regarding money claim against Department of Agriculture (DA) as filed and requested by
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Petitioner Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency
entered into a contract for security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Pursuant
to their arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Security Agency in the various premises of the DA.
Thereafter, several guards filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform
allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay, and overtime pay, as well as for damages against the DA and
the security agency.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and severally liable with the security agency
for the payment of money claims of the complainant security guards. The DA and the security agency did not
appeal the decision. Thus, the decision became final and executory. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution to
enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the DA and the security agency. Thereafter, the City
Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of the DA.
The petitioner charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the writ of
execution. The petitioner faults the NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a money claim against the Department,
which, it claims, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. More importantly, the petitioner
asserts, the NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State.
The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner has impliedly waived its immunity
from suit by concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency.
ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in the case.
RULING:
Yes, this is a suit against the state. The basic postulate enshrined in the constitution that "(t)he State may
not be sued without its consent," reflects nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign character of the State

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction of courts. The rule, in
any case, is not really absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstances. On the
contrary, as correctly phrased, the doctrine only conveys, "the state may not be sued without its consent;" its clear
import then is that the State may at times be sued. The States' consent may be given expressly or impliedly.
Express consent may be made through a general law or a special law.
In this jurisdiction, the general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083,
where the Philippine government "consents and submits to be sued upon any money claims involving liability
arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private
parties." Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening
itself to a counterclaim or when it enters into a contract.
In this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party
and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity. This rule, relied upon by the NLRC and the private
respondents, is not, however, without qualification. Not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a
waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its
sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity.
In the instant case, the Department of Agriculture has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart
from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact,
performed any act proprietary in character. But, be that as it may, the claims of private respondents, i.e. for
underpayment of wages, holiday pay, overtime pay and similar other items, arising from the Contract for Service,
clearly constitute money claims.
Act No. 3083, aforecited, gives the consent of the State to be "sued upon any moneyed claim involving
liability arising from contract, express or implied. Pursuant, however, to Commonwealth Act ("C.A.") No. 327, as
amended by Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 1145, the money claim first be brought to the Commission on Audit.
When the state gives its consent to be sued, it does thereby necessarily consent to unrestrained
execution against it. Tersely put, when the State waives its immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give the other party
an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the State has a liability.
In light of the foregoing, the writ of execution directed against the property of the Department of
Agriculture was nullified, and the public respondents are hereby enjoined permanently from doing, issuing and
implementing any and all writs of execution issued pursuant to the decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter against
said petitioner.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
LORENZO SAYSON, as Highway Auditor, Bureau of Public Highways, Cebu First Engineering District; CORNELIO
FORNIER, as Regional Supervising Auditor, Eastern Visayas Region; ASTERIO, BUQUERON, ADVENTOR
FERNANDEZ, MANUEL S. LEPATAN, RAMON QUIRANTE, and TEODULFO REGIS, petitioners,
vs.
FELIPE SINGSON, as sole owner and proprietor of Singkier Motor Service, respondent.
G.R. No. L-30044

December 19, 1973
FACTS:
In January 1967, the Office of the District Engineer requisitioned various items of spare parts for the repair
of a D-8 bulldozer which was signed by the District Engineer, Adventor Fernandez, and the Requisitioning Officer
(civil engineer), Manuel S. Lepatan. It was approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
Antonio V. Raquiza. It is noted in the approval of the said requisition that "This is an exception to the telegram
dated Feb. 21, 1967 of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications." So a canvass or public bidding
was conducted on May 5, 1967.
The committee on award accepted the bid of the Singkier Motor Service for the sum of P43,530.00.
Subsequently, it was approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications; and on May 16,1967 the
Secretary sent a letter-order to the Singkier Motor Service, Mandaue, Cebu requesting it to immediately deliver
the items listed therein for the lot price of P43,530.00. It would appear that a purchase order signed by the District
Engineer, the Requisitioning Officer and the Procurement Officer, was addressed to the Singkier Motor Service. In
due course the Voucher No. 07806 reached the hands of Highway Auditor Sayson for pre-audit. He then made
inquiries about the reasonableness of the price.
Thus, after finding from the indorsements of the Division Engineer and the Commissioner of
Public Highways that the prices of the various spare parts are just and reasonable and that the requisition was also
approved by no less than the Secretary of Public Works and Communications with the verification of V.M. Secarro
a representative of the Bureau of Supply Coordination, Manila, he approved it for payment in the sum of
P34,824.00, with the retention of 20% equivalent to P8,706.00 to submit the voucher with the supporting papers
to the Supervising Auditor, which he did. The voucher was paid on June 9, 1967 in the amount of P34,824.00 to
Singson.
On June 10,1967, Highway Auditor Sayson received a telegram from Supervising Auditor Fornier
quoting a telegraphic message of the General Auditing Office which states: "In view of excessive prices charge for
purchase of spare parts and equipment shown by vouchers already submitted this Office direct all highway
auditors refer General Office payment similar nature for appropriate action." In the Interim it would appear that
when the voucher and the supporting papers reached the GAO, a canvass was made of the spare parts among the
suppliers in Manila, particularly, the USI(Phil.), which is the exclusive dealer of the spare parts of the caterpillar
tractors in the Philippines. Said firm thus submitted its quotations at P2,529.64 only which is P40,000.00 less than
the price of the Singkier. In view of the overpricing the GAO took up thematter with the Secretary of Public Works
in a third indorsement of July 18, 1967.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
The Secretary then circularized a telegram holding the district engineer responsible for overpricing."
What is more, charges for malversation were filed against the district engineer and the civil engineer involved. It
was the failure of the Highways Auditor, one of the petitioners before us, that led to the filing of the mandamus
suit below, with now respondent Singson as sole proprietor of Singkier Motor Service, being adjudged as entitled
to collect the balance of P8,706.00, the contract in question having been upheld. Hence this appeal by certiorari
ISSUE: What is the proper remedy to enforce collection of money claim against the Government arising from
contract? Will mandamus lie.
RULING:
Mandamus is not the remedy to enforce the collection of such claim against the state but an ordinary for
specific performance. It is apparent that respondent Singson's cause of action is a money claim against the
government, for the payment of the alleged balance of the cost of spare parts supplied by him to the Bureau of
Public Highways. Assuming momentarily the validity of such claim, although as will be shown hereunder, the claim
is void for the cause or consideration is contrary to law, morals or public policy, mandamus is not the remedy to
enforce the collection of such claim against the State but a ordinary action for specific performance. Actually, the
suit disguised as one for mandamus to compel the Auditors to approve the vouchers for payment, is a suit against
the State, which cannot prosper or be entertained by the Court except with the consent of the State.
In other words, the respondent should have filed his claim with the General Auditing Office, under the
provisions of Com. Act 327 which prescribe the conditions under which money claim against the government may
be filed “Commonwealth Act No. 327 is quite explicit. It is therein provided: "In all cases involving the settlement
of accounts or claims, other than those of accountable officers, the Auditor General shall act and decide the same
within sixty days, exclusive of Sundays and holidays, after their presentation. If said accounts or claims need
reference to other persons, office or offices, or to a party interested, the period aforesaid shall be counted from
the time the last comment necessary to a proper decision is received by him."
Thereafter, the procedure for appeal is indicated: "The party aggrieved by the final decision of the Auditor
General in the settlement of an account or claim may, within thirty days from receipt of the decision, take an
appeal in writing: (a) To the President of the United States, pending the final and complete withdrawal of her
sovereignty over the Philippines, or (b) To the President of the Philippines, or (c) To the Supreme Court of the
Philippines if the appellant is a private person or entity."
With the facts undisputed and the statute far from indefinite or ambiguous, the appealed decision defies
explanation. It would be to disregard a basic corollary of the cardinal postulate of non-suability. It is true that once
consent is secured, an action may be filed. There is nothing to prevent the State, however, in such statutory grant,
to require that certain administrative proceedings be had and be exhausted. Also, the proper forum in the judicial
hierarchy can be specified if thereafter an appeal would be taken by the party aggrieved. Here, there was no ruling
of the Auditor General. Even had there been such, the court to which the matter should have been elevated is this
Tribunal; the lower court could not legally act on the matter. What transpired was anything but that. It is quite
obvious then that it does not have the imprint of validity.

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NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, Petitioner,

vs.
HEIRS OF ISIDRO GUIVELONDO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 154411

June 19, 2003
FACTS:
NHA expropriated the land of the respondents. While the negotiation for the amount was ongoing, NHA
decided not to continue the project because of the land’s high price, rendering it impossible to implement the
socialized housing project, RTC did not agree and garnished NHA’s bank account
ISSUE: Whether or not the state can be compelled and coerced by the courts to continue with its inherent power of
eminent domain.
RULING:
Yes, NHA must continue with the expropriation; NHA’s funds can be garnished. The universal rule that
where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit
claimant’s action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power
of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized
under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public
policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The
functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the
diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.
However, if the funds belong to a public corporation or a government owned or controlled corporation
which is clothed with a personality of its own, separate and distinct from that of the government, then its funds
are not exempt from garnishment. This is so because when the government enters into commercial business, it
abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY, Petitioner,

vs.
PHILIPPINE GOLF DEVELOPMENT & EQUIPMENT, INC., Respondent.
G.R. No. 176628

March 19, 2012
FACTS:
On April 3, 1996, PTA, an agency of the Department of Tourism, whose main function is to bolster and
promote tourism, entered into a contract with Atlantic Erectors, Inc. (AEI) for the construction of the Intramuros
Golf Course Expansion Projects (PAR 60-66) for a contract price of Fifty-Seven Million Nine Hundred Fifty-Four
Thousand Six Hundred Forty-Seven and 94/100 Pesos (P57,954,647.94). On October 2, 2003, PHILGOLF filed a
collection suit against PTA amounting to Eleven Million Eight Hundred Twenty Thousand Five Hundred Fifty and
53/100 Pesos(P11,820,550.53), plus interest, for the construction of the golf course.
Despite the RTC’s liberality of granting two successive motions for extension of time, PTA failed to answer
the complaint. Hence, on April 6, 2004, the RTC rendered a judgment of default. On July 11, 2005, PTA filed a
petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. The petition for annulment of judgment
was premised on the argument that the gross negligence of PTA’s counsel prevented the presentation of evidence
before the RTC. The CA dismissed the petition for annulment of judgment for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether or not PTA, as a government entity, should be bound by the inactions or negligence of its counsel.
RULING:
Yes. PTA was acting in a proprietary character. PTA erred in invoking state immunity simply because it is a
government entity. The application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of sovereign
transactions and not in cases of commercial activities or economic affairs. The State, in entering into a business
contract, descends to the level of an individual and is deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued. Since the
Intramuros Golf Course Expansion Projects partakes of a proprietary character entered into between PTA and
PHILGOLF, PTA cannot avoid its financial liability by merely invoking immunity from suit.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, Petitioner,

vs.
UNIMEX MICRO-ELECTRONICS GmBH, Respondent.
G.R. Nos. 166309-10

March 9, 2007
FACTS:
The Petitioner BOC Commissioner was ordered to pay respondent the commercial value of the goods
based on the prevailing exchange rate at the time of their importation. The same was due to the loss of some
confiscated items in BOCs custody, pending the determination of the shipper’s compliance with the law.Petitioner
argues that a money judgment or any charge against the government requires a corresponding appropriation and
cannot be decreed by mere judicial order.
ISSUE: Whether or not BOC may be held liable to Unimex considering the political doctrine of “state immunity”
RULE:
Although it may be gainsaid that the satisfaction of respondent’s demand will ultimately fall on the
government, and that, under the political doctrine of "state immunity," it cannot be held liable for governmental
acts (jus imperii), we still hold that petitioner cannot escape its liability. The circumstances of this case warrant its
exclusion from the purview of the state immunity doctrine.
As previously discussed, the Court cannot turn a blind eye to BOC’s ineptitude and gross negligence in the
safekeeping of respondent’s goods. We are not likewise unaware of its lackadaisical attitude in failing to provide a
cogent explanation on the goods’ disappearance, considering that they were in its custody and that they were in
fact the subject of litigation. The situation does not allow us to reject respondent’s claim on the mere invocation of
the doctrine of state immunity. Succinctly, the doctrine must be fairly observed and the State should not avail itself
of this prerogative to take undue advantage of parties that may have legitimate claims against it.
In Department of Health v. C.V. Canchela & Associates, we enunciated that this Court, as the staunch
guardian of the people’s rights and welfare, cannot sanction an injustice so patent in its face, and allow itself to be
an instrument in the perpetration thereof. Over time, courts have recognized with almost pedantic adherence that
what is inconvenient and contrary to reason is not allowed in law. Justice and equity now demand that the State’s
cloak of invincibility against suit and liability be shredded.

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT

(PCGG), Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION) and ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 129406

March 6, 2006
FACTS:
Civil Case No. 0034 entitled Republic of the Philippines, plaintiff, v. Roberto S. Benedicto, et al.,
defendants, is a complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, reconstitution and damages. The case is one of
several suits involving ill-gotten or unexplained wealth that petitioner Republic, through the PCGG, filed with the
Sandiganbayan against private respondent Roberto S. Benedicto and others pursuant to Executive Order (EO) No.
14, series of 1986.
Pursuant to its mandate, the PCGG issued writs placing under sequestration all business enterprises,
entities and other properties, real and personal, owned or registered in the name of private respondent Benedicto,
or of corporations in which he appeared to have controlling or majority interest. Among the properties thus
sequestered and taken over by PCGG fiscal agents were the 227 shares in NOGCCI owned by private respondent
Benedicto and registered in his name or under the names of corporations he owned or controlled.
Subsequently, the NOGCCI Board passed a resolution, increasing the monthly membership due
from P150.00 to P250.00 for each share. As sequestrator of the 227 shares of stock in question, PCGG did not pay
the corresponding monthly membership due thereon totaling P2,959,471.00. On account thereof, the 227
sequestered shares were declared delinquent to be disposed of in an auction sale. Apprised of the above
development and evidently to prevent the projected auction sale of the same shares, PCGG filed a complaint for
injunction with the Regional Trial Court.
Petitioner Republic and private respondent Benedicto entered into a Compromise Agreement in Civil Case
No. 0034. The agreement contained a general release clause whereunder petitioner Republic agreed and bound
itself to lift the sequestration on the 227 NOGCCI shares, among other Benedicto’s properties, petitioner Republic
acknowledging that it was within private respondent Benedicto’s capacity to acquire the same shares out of his
income from business and the exercise of his profession. Implied in this undertaking is the recognition by
petitioner Republic that the subject shares of stock could not have been ill-gotten. The Sandiganbayan approved
the Compromise Agreement and accordingly rendered judgment in accordance with its terms.
Benedicto filed a "Motion for Release from Sequestration and Return of Sequestered Shares/Dividends"
praying, inter alia, that his NOGCCI shares of stock be specifically released from sequestration and returned,
delivered or paid to him as part of the parties’ Compromise Agreement in that case. Sandiganbayan granted
Benedicto’s aforementioned motion but placed the subject shares under the custody of its Clerk of Court.

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Hence, the Republic’s present recourse on the sole issue of whether or not the public respondent
Sandiganbayan, Second Division, gravely abused its discretion in holding that the PCGG is at fault for not paying the
membership dues on the 227 sequestered NOGCCI shares of stock, a failing which eventually led to the foreclosure
sale thereof.
In a last-ditch attempt to escape liability, petitioner Republic, through the PCGG, invokes state immunity
from suit. As argued, the order for it to pay the value of the delinquent shares would fix monetary liability on a
government agency, thus necessitating the appropriation of public funds to satisfy the judgment claim.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Republic is immune from suit.
RULING:
No, as private respondent Benedicto correctly countered, the PCGG fails to take stock of one of the
exceptions to the state immunity principle, i.e., when the government itself is the suitor, as in Civil Case No. 0034.
Where, as here, the State itself is no less the plaintiff in the main case, immunity from suit cannot be effectively
invoked. For, as jurisprudence teaches, when the State, through its duly authorized officers, takes the initiative in a
suit against a private party, it thereby descends to the level of a private individual and thus opens itself to
whatever counterclaims or defenses the latter may have against it. Petitioner Republic’s act of filing its complaint
in Civil Case No. 0034 constitutes a waiver of its immunity from suit. Being itself the plaintiff in that case, petitioner
Republic cannot set up its immunity against private respondent Benedicto’s prayers in the same case.
In fact, by entering into a Compromise Agreement with private respondent Benedicto, petitioner Republic
thereby stripped itself of its immunity from suit and placed itself in the same level of its adversary. When the State
enters into contract, through its officers or agents, in furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose and pursuant to
constitutional legislative authority, whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and obligations arise
therefrom, the State may be sued even without its express consent, precisely because by entering into a contract
the sovereign descends to the level of the citizen. Its consent to be sued is implied from the very act of entering
into such contract, breach of which on its part gives the corresponding right to the other party to the agreement.

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THE COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC HIGHWAYS and the AUDITOR GENERAL, petitioners,

vs.
HON. LOURDES P. SAN DIEGO as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IX, sitting in
Quezon City, respondents.
G.R. No. L-30098

February 18, 1970
FACTS:
Before WWII, the Philippine Government filed an action for the expropriation of a parcel of land owned by
Hashim for the construction of a public road. Government took possession over the property after the deposit of
the amount of 23, 413.64. Records of the case were destroyed during the WWII. After the war, Hashim filed an
action for money claims before the CFI against Bureau of Public Highways.
The parties entered into a compromise agreement wherein the Bureau shall pay almost half of the
amount claimed. The bureau failed to pay so Hashim filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution.
Respondent judge granted the motion. The sheriff served the writ with a Notice of Garnishment to PNB against the
Bureau's funds. Hashim further filed a motion for issuance of an order ordering the release of the amount. It was
granted. PNB released the amount. Petitioner filed this petition for certiorari with mandatory injunction to
reimburse the amount released.
ISSUE: What is the scope of consent when the government waives its immunity from suit?
RULING:
Although the Government, as plaintiff in expropriation proceedings, submits itself to the jurisdiction of
the Court and thereby waives its immunity from suit, the judgment that is thus rendered requiring its payment of
the award determined as just compensation for the condemned property as a condition precedent to the transfer
to the title thereto in its favor, cannot be realized upon execution. The Court there added that it is incumbent upon
the legislature to appropriate any additional amount, over and above the provisional deposit, that may be
necessary to pay the award determined in the judgment, since the Government cannot keep the land and dishonor
the judgment.
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or
special law, it may limit claimant's action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of
execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and
properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on
obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of Public funds must be covered by the corresponding
appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated
by law.
Thus, the writs of certiorari and prohibition were granted. The respondent court’s orders are declared and
null and void.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner

vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, GABRIEL V. MANANSALA and GILBERT P. LORENZO, in his official capacity as
authorized Deputy sheriff, respondents
G.R. No. L-32667

81 SCRA 214
January 31, 1978
FACTS:
A writ of execution in favor of private respondent Gabriel V. Manansala had previously been issued. He was
the counsel of the prevailing party, the United Homesite Employees and Laborers Association. The validity of the
order assailed is challenged on two grounds:
1. That the appointment of respondent Gilbert P. Lorenzo as authorized deputy sheriff to serve the writ of
execution was contrary to law and
2. That the funds subject of the garnishment “may be public in character.” In thus denying the motion to
quash, petitioner contended that there was on the part of respondent Court a failure to abide by
authoritative doctrines amounting to a grave abuse of discretion.
The Philippine National Bank (PNB) move to quash the notice of garnishment is denied for the lack of
merit. PNB is therefore ordered to comply within five days from receipt with the ‘notice of Garnishment’ dated
May 6, 1970.”
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied. Hence, this certiorari petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the order denying motion to quash a notice of garnishment can be stigmatized as a grave
abuse of discretion.
RULING:
No. Supreme Court ruled that there has not been a grave abuse of discretion. The premise that the funds
could be spoken of as public in character may be accepted in the sense that the People’s Homesite and Housing
Corporation was a government-owned entity It does not follow though that they were exempt from garnishment.
As stated in “National Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. Court of Industrial Relations”, a government
owned and controlled corporation has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government.
It may sue and be sued and may be subjected to court processes just like any other corporation.

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Justice Ozaeta held that it is well settled that when the government enters into commercial business, it
abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation. By engaging in a particular business
thru the instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests itself pro has vice of its sovereign character, so
as to render the corporation subject to the rules of law governing private corporations.
One of the coronaries of the fundamental concept of nonsuability is that governmental funds are immune
from garnishment. Since then such a principle has been followed with undeviating rigidity. It is an entirely different
matter if, the office or entity is "possessed of a separate and distinct corporate existence." Then it can sue and be
sued. Thereafter, its funds may be levied upon or garnished. That is what happened in this case.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, HON. LABOR ARBITER NIEVES V. DE CASTRO and JOSE C.
MAGNAYI, respondents.
G.R. No. 113191

September 18, 1996
FACTS:
The questions raised in the petition for certiorari are a few coincidental matters relative to the diplomatic
immunity extended to the Asian Development Bank ("ADB").
Private respondent initiated NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-01-0690-93 for his alleged illegal dismissal by ADB and
the latter's violation of the "labor-only" contracting law. Two summonses were served, one sent directly to the
ADB and the other through the Department of Foreign Affairs ("DFA"), both with a copy of the
complaint.Forthwith, the ADB and the DFA notified respondent Labor Arbiter that the ADB, as well as its President
and Officers, were covered by an immunity from legal process except for borrowings, guaranties or the sale of
securities pursuant to Article 50(1) and Article 55 of the Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank (the
"Charter") in relation to Section 5 and Section 44 of the Agreement Between The Bank And The Government Of
The Philippines Regarding The Bank's Headquarters (the "Headquarters Agreement").
The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint on the impression that the ADB had waived its
diplomatic immunity from suit. The ADB did not appeal the decision. Instead, the DFA referred the matter to the
NLRC; in its referral, the DFA sought a "formal vacation of the void judgment”. Replying to the letter, the NLRC
Chairman, wrote: The defense of immunity could have been raised before the Labor Arbiter by a special
appearance which, naturally, may not be considered as a waiver of the very defense being raised.
Dissatisfied, the DFA lodged the instant petition for certiorari. In this Court's resolution of respondents
were required to comment. Petitioner was later constrained to make an application for a restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction following the issuance, by the Labor Arbiter of a writ of execution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine on diplomatic immunity applies to ADB
RULING:
After a thorough review of the case and the records, it became convinced that ADB, indeed, was correct in
invoking its immunity from suit under the Charter and the Headquarters Agreement. The above stipulations of
both the Charter and Headquarters Agreement should be able, nay well enough, to establish that, except in the

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
specified cases of borrowing and guarantee operations, as well as the purchase, sale and underwriting of
securities, the ADB enjoys immunity from legal process of every form. The Banks officers, on their part, enjoy
immunity in respect of all acts performed by them in their official capacity. The Charter and the Headquarters
Agreement granting these immunities and privileges are treaty covenants and commitments voluntarily assumed
by the Philippine government which must be respected.
Being an international organization that has been extended a diplomatic status, the ADB is independent of
the municipal law. Contrary to private respondent's assertion, the claim of immunity is not here being raised for
the first time; it has been invoked before the forum of origin through communications sent by petitioner and the
ADB to the Labor Arbiter, as well as before the NLRC following the rendition of the questioned judgment by the
Labor Arbiter, but evidently to no avail.
Private respondent argues that, by entering into service contracts with different private companies, ADB
has descended to the level of an ordinary party to a commercial transaction giving rise to a waiver of its immunity
from suit. However, the service contracts referred to by private respondent have not been intended by the ADB for
profit or gain but are official acts over which a waiver of immunity would not attach.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Complainant

vs.
JUDGE VICENTE A. HIDALGO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 37,
Respondent
A.M. No. RTJ-05-1959

December 9, 2005
FACTS:
On 02 June 1999, Tarcila Laperal Mendoza filed an action for the annulment or declaration of nullity of the
title and deed of sale, reconveyance and/or recovery of ownership and possession of a four thousand nine
hundred twenty-four-square meter (4,924.60 sq. m. to be exact) property against the Republic of the Philippines
(in whose name the title to the property was transferred and registered) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, and was docketed as Civil Case No. 94075. The property in question is located at 1440 Arlegui Street, San
Miguel, Manila. It is also known as the Arlegui Residence which housed two (2) Philippine presidents and which
now holds the Office of the Press Secretary and the News Information Bureau.
The case was initially dismissed by the presiding Judge of the Manila RTC (Branch 35) on the ground of
state immunity. A petition for certiorari was filed with the Court of Appeals which reversed the trial court’s ruling
and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Upon the inhibition of the presiding Judge of the
Manila RTC (Branch 35), the case was re-raffled to the Manila RTC (Branch 37), with respondent Vicente A. Hidalgo
as presiding Judge.
Due to failure of Solicitor Gabriel Francisco Ramirez, the handling solicitor, to file the required Answer
within the period prayed for in his motion for extension dated 21 May 2003. The plaintiff was allowed to present
her evidence ex parte.
On 27 August 2003, Judge Hidalgo rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff Mendoza ordering the
defendant Republic of the Philippines to pay a just compensation in the sum of P143, 600, 000, plus interest at the
legal rate, until the whole amount is paid in full for the acquisition of the subject property. On 10 December 2003,
respondent issued an order directing the issuance of a writ of execution.
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by Solicitor General Alfredo L. Benipayo, with the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA), charged Judge Vicente A. Hidalgo with Gross Ignorance of the Law, Manifest
Partiality and Conduct Prejudicial to the Interest of the Service.
ISSUE: Whether or not the State necessarily consents to an unrestrained execution against it when it gives its
consent to be sued.

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RULING:
No. Tersely put, when the State waives its immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give the other party an
opportunity to prove, if it can, that the state has a liability. The Court held in Republic v. Villasor that where the
State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimants action
only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and that the power of the Courts ends
when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of
execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, which is based on obvious considerations of public policy.
Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the correspondent appropriation as required by law. The
functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of
public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
E. MERRITT, plaintiff-appellant
vs.
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-11154

March 21, 1916
FACTS:
The plaintiff, while riding on a motorcycle, was going toward the western part of Calle Padre Faura
passing along the west side thereof at a speed of ten to twelve miles an hour when upon crossing Taft Avenue, a
General Hospital ambulance turned suddenly and unexpectedly struck the plaintiff.
Merritt was hospitalized and he was severely injured beyond rehabilitation so much so that he could
never perform his job the way he used to and that he cannot even earn at least half of what he used to earn.
In order for Merritt to recover damages, he sought to sue the government which later authorized Merritt
to sue the government by virtue of Act 2457 enacted by the legislature (An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit
against the Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in
said suit). The lower court then determined the amount of damages and ordered the government to pay the same.
ISSUE: Does the Act authorize the Court to hold that the Government is legally liable for the costs?
RULING:
No. It being quite clear that Act No. 2457 does not operate to extend the Government's liability to any
cause not previously recognized, paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads:
The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should
have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the
provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.
The Supreme Court of Spain in defining the scope of this paragraph said:
“That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special
agent (and a special agent, in the sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite
and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official)
so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust
confided to him. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting
administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and
naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations."
In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a special agent nor was a government officer acting as a
special agent hence, there can be no liability from the government.

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MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION, petitioner

vs.
HON. JUDGE ROMEO N. FIRME, JUANA RIMANDO-BANIÑA, IAUREANO BANIÑA, JR., SOR MARIETA BANIÑA,
MONTANO BANIÑA, ORJA BANIÑA, AND LYDIA R. BANIÑA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-52179

April 8, 1991
FACTS:
A collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a gravel and
sand truck owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and
driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. died as
a result of the injuries they sustained and four others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.
The private respondents instituted a complaint for damages against the Estate of Macario Nieveras and
Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver, respectively, of the passenger jeepney. However, the defendants filed a Third
Party Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of a dump truck of petitioner. Petitioner filed its answer and
raised affirmative defenses such as lack of cause of action, non-suability of the State, prescription of cause of
action and the negligence of the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney as the proximate cause of the
collision.
The trial court rendered a decision ordering the petitioner and Bislig to pay the plaintiffs. The owner and
driver of the jeepney were absolved from liability. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was
dismissed for having been filed out of time.
ISSUE: Whether or not the municipality is liable for the torts committed by its employee.
RULING:
No. Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the
established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other
hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact
that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the
plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable. Anent the issue of whether or not the
municipality is liable for the torts committed by its employee, the test of liability of the municipality depends on
whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is performing governmental or proprietary
functions.
In the case at bar, the issue depends on whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is
performing governmental or proprietary functions. The driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he
was on his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal

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streets." In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty is
presumed pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court. Hence, the driver of the dump truck
was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office.
Therefore, the municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who
was then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions. Hence, the death of the passenger –– tragic and
deplorable though it may be –– imposed on the municipality no duty to pay monetary compensation.

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THE MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY, BULACAN, represented by the HON. FELIX V. OPLE, Municipal Mayor, and
FELIX V. OPLE, in his personal capacity, Petitioners
vs.
HON. SIMEON P. DUMDUM, JR., in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH
7, CEBU CITY; HON. CLERK OF COURT & EX-OFFICIO SHERIFF of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT of CEBU CITY; HON.
CLERK OF COURT & EX-OFFICIO SHERIFF of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT of BULACAN and his DEPUTIES; and
EMILY ROSE GO KO LIM CHAO, doing business under the name and style KD SURPLUS, Respondents
G.R. No. 168289

March 22, 2010
FACTS:
Respondent Emily Rose Go Ko Lim Chao had entered into an agreement with petitioner municipality
through Ople for the delivery of motor vehicles, which supposedly were needed to carry out certain
developmental undertakings in the municipality. Respondent claimed that because of Ople’s earnest
representation that funds had already been allocated for the project, she agreed to deliver from her principal place
of business in Cebu City twenty-one motor vehicles whose value totaled ₱5,820,000.00. To prove this, she
attached to the complaint copies of the bills of lading showing that the items were consigned, delivered to and
received by petitioner municipality on different dates. However, despite having made several deliveries, Ople
allegedly did not heed respondent’s claim for payment.
She filed a complaint against herein petitioners, the Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan and its chief
executive, Felix V. Ople (Ople) for collection of a sum of money and damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners’ motion to discharge the writ of preliminary attachment valid.
RULING:
Yes. The general rule spelled out in Section 3, Article XVI of the Constitution is that the state and its
political subdivisions may not be sued without their consent. Otherwise put, they are open to suit but only when
they consent to it. Consent is implied when the government enters into a business contract, as it then descends to
the level of the other contracting party; or it may be embodied in a general or special law such as that found in
Book I, Title I, Chapter 2, Section 22 of the Local Government Code of 1991, which vests local government units
with certain corporate powers —one of them is the power to sue and be sued.
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or
special law, it may limit claimant’s action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of
execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and
properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on
obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
appropriations as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be
paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects.
In the case at bar, the writ of attachment would only prove to be useless and unnecessary under the
premises, since the property of the municipality may not, in the event that respondent’s claim is validated, be
subjected to writs of execution and garnishment — unless, of course, there has been a corresponding
appropriation provided by law.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
MEYNARDO SABILI, Petitioner

Vs
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FLORENCIO LIBREA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 193261

April 24, 2012
FACTS:
Meynardo Sabili filed his COC for mayor of Lipa City for the 2010 elections, he stated therein that he had
been a resident of the city for two (2) years and eight (8) months. Prior to the 2010 elections, he had been twice
elected (in 1995 and in 1998) as Provincial Board Member representing the 4th District of Batangas. The 4th
District of Batangas includes Lipa City. Subsequently, Florencio Librea filed a "Petition to Deny Due Course and to
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing Some Grounds for Disqualification"
nd
against him before the COMELEC. COMELEC (2 division) declared petitioner as disqualified from seeking the
mayoralty post in Lipa City, and canceled his Certificate of Candidacy. Sabili moved for reconsideration, during the
pendency of which the local elections were held. The next day, he was proclaimed the duly elected mayor of Lipa
City.
In the present case, the parties are in agreement that the domicile of Sabili was Brgy. Sico, San Juan,
Batangas. He claims that he abandoned his domicile of origin and established his domicile of choice in Brgy.
Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City, thereby making him qualified to run for Lipa City mayor. On the other hand, respondent
Comelec held that no such change in domicile or residence took place and, hence the entry in his Certificate of
Candidacy showing that he was a resident of Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City constituted a misrepresentation that
disqualified him from running for Lipa City mayor.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner Sabili had complied with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials.
RULING:
Yes. The Constitution and the law requires residence as a qualification for seeking and holding elective
public office, in order to give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with the needs, difficulties, aspirations,
potentials for growth and all matters vital to the welfare of their constituencies; likewise, it enables the electorate
to evaluate the office seekers’ qualifications and fitness for the job they aspire for.
It is clear that while separately, each evidence presented by petitioner might fail to convincingly show the
fact of his residence at Pinagtong-ulan since 2007, collectively, these pieces of evidence tend to sufficiently
establish the said fact. To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be couple with
conduct indicative of the intention to make it one’s fixed and permanent place of abode. Whatever the nature of
the transaction might be, this point is immaterial for the purpose of ascertaining petitioner’s residence. The
Supreme Court have long held that It is not required that a candidate should have his own house in order to
establish his residence or domicile in a place. It is enough that he should live in the locality, even in a rented house
or that of a friend or relative. What is of central concern then is that petitioner identified and established a place in

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
Lipa City where he intended to live in and return to for an indefinite time period. The existence of a house and lot
apparently owned by petitioner’s common-law wife, with whom he has been living for over two decades, makes
plausible petitioner’s allegation of bodily presence and intent to reside in the area. There is nothing “wrong in an
individual changing residences so he could run for an elective post, for as long as he is able to prove with
reasonable certainty that he has effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the period require by
law”.
Hence, it was held that petitioner has been able to adduce substantial evidence to demonstrate
compliance with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials under the law.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
SIMON B. ALDOVINO, JR., DANILO B. FALLER AND FERDINAND N. TALABONG, Petitioners,

Vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND WILFREDO F. ASILO,
G.R. No. 184836

December 23, 2009
FACTS:
Lucena City councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected to the said office for three consecutive terms: 1998-
2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. In September 2005, during his third term of office, the Sandiganbayan issued an
order of 90-day preventive suspension against him in relation to a criminal case. The said suspension order was
subsequently lifted by the Court, and Asilo resumed the performance of the functions of his office.
Asilo then filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position in 2007. His disqualification was sought
by herein petitioners on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three consecutive terms, in
violation of the three-term Constitutional limit.
ISSUE: Whether Asilos preventive suspension constituted an interruption that allowed him to run for a 4th term.
RULING:
No. Section 8, Article X both by structure and substance fixes an elective officials term of office and limits
his stay in office to three consecutive terms as an inflexible rule that is stressed, no less, by citing voluntary
renunciation as an example of a circumvention. The interruption of a term exempting an elective official from the
three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to office.
In preventive suspension, while a temporary incapacity in the exercise of power results, no position is
vacated when a public official is preventively suspended. This was what exactly happened to Asilo. Strict adherence
to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension should not be considered an
interruption that allows an elective officials stay in office beyond three terms because the suspended official
continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within
the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended officials continuity in office is the absence of
a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists. Preventive
suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of a term and should therefore not be a reason
to avoid the three-term limitation.
Hence, Asilos 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the Sandiganbayan-imposed preventive suspension
in 2005, as preventive suspension does not interrupt an elective officials term. Thus, the COMELEC refused to
apply the legal command of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution when it granted due course to Asilos certificate
of candidacy for a prohibited fourth term. By so refusing, the COMELEC effectively committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; its action was a refusal to perform a positive duty required
by no less than the Constitution and was one undertaken outside the contemplation of law.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
MAYOR BARBARA RUBY C. TALAGA, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RODERICK A. ALCALA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 196804

October 9, 2012
FACTS:
Ramon Talaga and Philip M. Castillo respectively filed their COC for mayor position in Lucena city. Ramon,
declared in his COC that he was eligible for the office he was seeking to be elected to. Castillo filed with the
COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. as mayor for
having already served three (3) consecutive. Ramon countered that that the Sandiganbayan had preventively
nd rd
suspended during his 2 and 3 terms. After the Aldovino vs Comelec ruling was proclaimed, the COMELEC (first
division) disqualified Ramon. Later on, he filed an Ex-parte Manifestation of Withdrawal of the Pending Motion for
Reconsideration. On the same date, Barbara Ruby Talaga filed her own CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in
substitution of Ramon. Comelec en banc included Barbara Ruby in the list of candidates. Consequently, the City
Board of Canvassers proclaimed Barbara Ruby as the newly-elected Mayor of Lucena City.
Castillo filed a petition for annulment of proclamation with Comelec. COMELEC En Banc concluded that
Ruby could not have properly substituted Ramon but had simply become an additional candidate who had filed her
COC out of time; and held that Vice Mayor Alcala should succeed to the position pursuant to Section 44 of the
Local Government Code. Acting on Castillo and Alcala’s respective MOR.
ISSUE: Whether or not the substitution by Barbara Ruby as candidate for the position of Mayor of Lucena City in
lieu of Ramon, her husband, was valid.
RULING:
No. The existence of a valid CoC is a condition sine qua non for a valid substitution, it logically follows that
the Declaration of Ramon’s disqualification rendered his CoC invalid; hence, he was not a valid candidate to be
properly substituted.
The COMELEC En Banc properly disqualified Barbara Ruby from assuming the position of Mayor of Lucena
City. To begin with, there was no valid candidate for her to substitute due to Ramon’s ineligibility. Also, Ramon did
not voluntarily withdraw his CoC before the elections in accordance with Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Lastly, she was not an additional candidate for the position of Mayor of Lucena City because her filing of her CoC
on May 4, 2010 was beyond the period fixed by law. Indeed, she was not, in law and in fact, a candidate. A
permanent vacancy in the office of Mayor of Lucena City thus resulted, and such vacancy should be filled pursuant
to the law on succession defined in Section 44 of the LGC.
Hence, the Elected Vice Mayor must succeed and assume the position of Mayor due to a permanent
vacancy in the office. Castillo could not assume the office for he was only a second placer.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., Petitioners,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 189698

December 1, 2009
FACTS:
This controversy stems from the law authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated election system (AES).
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and
Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and
Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy:
a) Any person holding a public appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position.
SEC. 5. Period for filing Certificate of Candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall be filed on regular days,
from November 20 to 30, 2009, during office hours, except on the last day, which shall be until midnight.
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file their CoCs,
petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the government and
who intend to run in the coming elections, filed the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the
declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 13 of R.A. No, 9369 is unconstitutional.
RULING:
Yes. In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the
constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be
complied with, namely: (1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions; (2) It must be germane to the purposes
of the law; (3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It must apply equally to all members of
the class.
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of persons
holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote ones
candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate.
There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones. The
classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of the law. The measure
encapsulated in the second proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the
OEC violates the equal protection clause.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., Petitioners,

vs.
G.R. No. 189698

February 22, 2010
FACTS:
Upon a careful review of the case at bar, the Supreme Court resolved to grant the respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) motion for reconsideration, and the movants-intervenors motions for
reconsideration-in-intervention, of this Courts December 1, 2009 Decision (Decision).
The assailed Decision granted the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Eleazar P. Quinto and
Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. and declared as unconstitutional the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of
]
Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No.
8678, mainly on the ground that they violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution and suffer from
overbreadth. The assailed Decision thus paved the way for public appointive officials to continue discharging the
powers, prerogatives and functions of their office notwithstanding their entry into the political arena.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a compelling need to reverse the assailed Decision, as public safety and interest
demand such reversal.
RULING:
Yes. Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution and the implementing statutes apply only to civil
servants holding apolitical offices. This is because elected public officials, by the very nature of their office, engage
in partisan political activities almost all year round, even outside of the campaign period. Political partisanship is
the inevitable essence of a political office, elective positions included.
The assailed decision was said to have such a myopic view which obviously fails to consider a different, yet
equally plausible, threat to the government posed by the partisan potential of a large and growing bureaucracy:
the danger of systematic abuse perpetuated by a powerful political machine that has amassed the scattered
powers of government workers so as to give itself and its incumbent workers an unbreakable grasp on the reins of
power. In the case at bar, the probable harm to society in permitting incumbent appointive officials to remain in
office, even as they actively pursue elective posts, far outweighs the less likely evil of having arguably protected
candidacies blocked by the possible inhibitory effect of a potentially overly broad statute. In this light, the
conceivably impermissible applications of the challenged statutes which are, at best, bold predictions cannot
justify invalidating these statutes in toto and prohibiting the State from enforcing them against conduct that is, and
has for more than 100 years been, unquestionably within its power and interest to proscribe. Instead, the more
prudent approach would be to deal with these conceivably impermissible applications through case-by-case
adjudication rather than through a total invalidation of the statute itself.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ANTONIO V. GONZALES and ORLANDO R. BALBON, JR., Respondents.
G.R. No. 191938

October 19, 2010
FACTS:
When his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan was declared cancelled, Mitra was the incumbent
Representative of the Second District of Palawan. This district then included, among other territories,
the Municipality of Aborlan and Puerto Princesa City. He was elected Representative as a domiciliary of Puerto
Princesa City, and represented the legislative district for three (3) terms immediately before the elections of 2010.
Before the end of Mitras second term as Representative, Puerto Princesa City was reclassified as a highly
urbanized city and thus ceased to be a component city of the Province of Palawan. The direct legal consequence of
this new status was the ineligibility of Puerto Princesa City residents from voting for candidates for elective
provincial officials. With the intention of running for the position of Governor, Mitra applied for the transfer of his
Voters Registration Record from Precinct No. 03720 of Brgy. Sta. Monica, Puerto Princesa City,to Sitio Maligaya,
Brgy.Isaub, Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan. He subsequently filed his COC for the position of
Governor of Palawan as a resident of Aborlan.
Soon thereafter, respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. (the respondents) filed
a petition to deny due course or to cancel Mitras COC. They essentially argued that Mitra remains a resident
of Puerto Princesa City who has not yet established residence in Aborlan, and is therefore not qualified to run for
Governor of Palawan. First Division of Comelec granted the respondents petition to cancel Mitras COC. Comelec En
Banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration
ISSUE: Whether or not Mitra is qualified to run for governor.
Ruling:
Yes. To acquire a domicile of choice, jurisprudence, which the comelec correctly invoked, requires the
following: 1.) Residence or bodily presence in a new locality; 2.) An intention to remain there; and 3.) an intention
to abandon the old domicile. Where a dwelling qualifies as a residence – i.e., the dwelling where a person
permanently intends to return to and to remain – his or her capacity or inclination to decorate the place, or the
lack of it, is immaterial.
The COMELECs reasoning is not only intensely subjective but also flimsy, to the point of grave abuse of
discretion. Specifically, it was lost on the COMELEC majority (but not on the Dissent) that Mitra made definite,
although incremental transfer moves, as shown by the undisputed business interests he has established in Aborlan
in 2008; by the lease of a dwelling where he established his base; by the purchase of a lot for his permanent home;
by his transfer of registration as a voter in March 2009; and by the construction of a house all viewed against the
backdrop of a bachelor Representative who spent most of his working hours in Manila, who had a whole

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
congressional district to take care of, and who was establishing at the same time his significant presence in the
whole Province of Palawan.From these perspectives, we cannot but conclude that the COMELECs approach i.e.,
the application of subjective non-legal standards and the gross misappreciation of the evidence is tainted with
grave abuse of discretion.
With the conclusion that Mitra did not commit any material misrepresentation in his COC, we see no
reason in this case to appeal to the primacy of the electorates will. We cannot deny, however, that the people
of Palawan have spoken in an election where residency qualification had been squarely raised and their voice has
erased any doubt about their verdict. Mitra has been proclaimed winner in the electoral contest and has therefore
the mandate of the electorate to serve.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
LUIS A. ASISTIO, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. THELMA CANLAS TRINIDAD-PE AGUIRRE, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City, Branch 129;
HON. ARTHUR O. MALABAGUIO, Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Caloocan City, Branch 52; ENRICO R.
ECHIVERRI, Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct 1811A, Barangay 15, Caloocan City; and the CITY ELECTION
OFFICER, Caloocan City, Respondents.
G.R. No. 191124

April 27, 2010
FACTS:
Private respondent (Echiverri) filed against petitioner Luis A. Asistio a Petition for Exclusion of Voter from
the Permanent List of Voters of Caloocan City. Public respondent Judge Arthur O. Malabaguio presides over. In his
petition, he alleged that Asistio is not a resident of Caloocan City, specifically not of 123 Interior P. Zamora
St., Barangay 15, Caloocan City, the address stated in his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Mayor. The voters duly
registered in the 2009 CVL using the address No. 123 P. Zamora St., Barangay 17, Caloocan City did not include
Asistio.
Asistio alleged that he is a resident of No. 116, P. Zamora St., Caloocan City, and a registered voter of
Precinct No. 1811A because he mistakenly relied on the address stated in the contract of lease with Angelina dela
Torre Tengco (Tengco), which was 123 Interior P. Zamora St., Barangay 15, Caloocan City.
METC directed to remove the name of LUIS AQUINO ASISTIO from the list of permanent voters
of Caloocan City. Echiverri filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal, arguing that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over
the Appeal on the ground of failure to file the required appeal fees.
This appeal to the RTC assails the February 5, 2010 MeTC Order directing Asistios name to be removed
from the permanent list of voters [in Precinct 1811A] of Caloocan City. The Order, if implemented, would deprive
Asistio of his right to vote.
ISSUE: Whether Asistio should be excluded from the permanent list of voters of [Precinct 1811A]
of Caloocan City for failure to comply with the residency required by law.
RULING:
No. The residency requirement of a voter is at least one (1) year residence in the Philippines and at least
six (6) months in the place where the person proposes or intends to vote.
Asistio has always been a resident of Caloocan City since his birth or for more than 72 years. His family is
known to be among the prominent political families in Caloocan City. In fact, Asistio served in public office as
Caloocan City Second District representative in the House of Representatives, having been elected as such in the
1992, 1995, 1998, and 2004 elections. In 2007, he also sought election as City Mayor. In all of these occasions,

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
Asistio cast his vote in the same city. Taking these circumstances into consideration, gauged in the light of the
doctrines above enunciated, it cannot be denied that Asistio has qualified, and continues to qualify, as a voter
of Caloocan City. There is no showing that he has established domicile elsewhere, or that he had consciously and
voluntarily abandoned his residence in Caloocan City. He should, therefore, remain in the list of permanent
registered voters of Precinct No. 1811A, Barangay 15, Caloocan City. That Asistio allegedly indicated in his
Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor, both for the 2007 and 2010 elections, a non-existent or false address, or that
he could not be physically found in the address he indicated when he registered as a voter, should not operate to
exclude him as a voter of Caloocan City.
These purported misrepresentations in Asistios COC, if true, might serve as basis for an election offense
under the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), or an action to deny due course to the COC. But to our mind, they do not
serve as proof that Asistio has abandoned his domicile in Caloocan City, or that he has established residence
outside of Caloocan City.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
BAI SANDRA S. A. SEMA, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 177597

July 16, 2008
FACTS:
The 1987 Constitution apportioned two legislative districts for the Province of Maguindanao.
The ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA
9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao. Thus, what was left of
Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting its second legislative district. The voters of Maguindanao
ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in a plebiscite held on 29 October 2006.
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato requested the COMELEC to clarify the status of Cotabato City in
view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province under MMA Act 201. Comelec
answered pending the enactment of the appropriate law by Congress, the status quo should be maintained
with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao (Resolution # 07-
0407) However, in preparation for May 2007 elections, COMELEC stated that Maguindanaos first legislative district
is composed ONLY OF COTABATO CITY because of the enactment of MMA Act 201. COMELEC renamed the
legislative district in question as Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (Formerly First District of
Maguindanao with Cotabato City)
ISSUE: Whether the ARMM Regional Assembly Can Create the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan province.
RULING:
No. Legislative Districts are Created or Reapportioned Only by an Act of Congress. Section 5 (1), Article VI
of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase, through a law, the allowable membership in the House
of Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion
legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress
exercises these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that regional or local
legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the House of Representatives can be increased, and new
legislative districts of Congress can be created, only through a national law passed by Congress. Nothing in Section
20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly, to create or reapportion
legislative districts for Congress.
To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office is to allow its legislative powers to
operate outside the ARMMs territorial jurisdiction. This violates Section 20, Article X of the Constitution which
expressly limits the coverage of the Regional Assemblys legislative powers [w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction. The
ARMM Regional Assembly itself, in creating Shariff Kabunsuan, recognized the exclusive nature of Congress power
to create or reapportion legislative districts by abstaining from creating a legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
Section 5 of MMA Act 201 provides that: Except as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative district,
which includes Cotabato City as a part thereof, shall remain. (Emphasis supplied) However, a province cannot
legally be created without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that each province shall have at
least one representative.
Thus, the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan without a legislative district is unconstitutional.
Clearly, the power to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot be delegated by Congress but must be
exercised by Congress itself.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
VICTORINO B. ALDABA, CARLO JOLETTE S. FAJARDO, JULIO G. MORADA, and MINERVA ALDABA
MORADA, Petitioners,
vs.
G.R No. 188078

March 15, 2010
FACTS:
On 1 May 2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos City Charter, by creating a separate legislative
district for the city. At the time the legislative bills for RA 9591 were filed in Congress in 2007, the population of
Malolos City was 223,069. The population of Malolos City on 1 May 2009 is a contested fact but there is no dispute
that House Bill No. 3693 relied on an undated certification issued by a Regional Director of the National Statistics
Office (NSO) that the projected population of the Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using
the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000.
Petitioners, taxpayers, registered voters and residents of Malolos City, filed this petition contending that
RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit
representation in Congress as provided under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution. In its Comment to the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) contended that Congress use of projected population is non-justiciable as it involves a determination on the
wisdom of the standard adopted by the legislature to determine compliance with a constitutional requirement.
ISSUES: Whether the City of Malolos is qualified to create a legislative district of its own
RULING:
No, it was held that RA 9591 was unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution requires
that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must have a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand. It
was ruled that the Certification on demographic projections can be issued only if such projections are declared
official by the National Statistics Coordination Board, Certifications based on demographic projections can
be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer and Intercensal population projections
must be as of the middle of every year.
The Certification of Regional Director Miranda does not state that the demographic projections he
certified have been declared official by the NSCB. The records of this case do not also show that the Certification of
Regional Director Miranda is based on demographic projections declared official by the NSCB. The Certification,
which states that the population of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010, violates the requirement that
intercensal demographic projections shall be as of the middle of every year. In addition, there is no showing that
Regional Director Miranda has been designated by the NSO Administrator as a certifying officer for demographic
projections in Region III. In the absence of such official designation, only the certification of the NSO Administrator

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
can be given credence by this Court. Based on a growth rate of 3.78%, the population of Malolos will grow to only
248,365 as of 1 August 2010. Even if the growth rate is compounded yearly, the population of Malolos of 223,069
as of 1 August 2007 will grow to only 249,333 as of 1 August 2010. A city that has attained a population of 250,000
is entitled to a legislative district only in the immediately following election. In short, a city must first attain the
250,000 population, and thereafter, in the immediately following election, such city shall have a district
representative. There is no showing in the present case that the City of Malolos has attained or will attain a
population of 250,000, whether actual or projected, before the 10 May 2010 elections.
Clearly, there is no official record that the population of the City of Malolos will be at least 250,000, actual
or projected, prior to the 10 May 2010 elections, the immediately following election after the supposed
attainment of such population. Thus, the City of Malolos is not qualified to have a legislative district of its own
under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA, Petitioners,

vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, representing the President of the Philippines; SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by the SENATE PRESIDENT; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, represented by the HOUSE
SPEAKER; GOVERNOR ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS, representing the Mother Province of Surigao del Norte;
GOVERNOR GERALDINE ECLEO VILLAROMAN, representing the new Province of Dinagat Islands, Respondents.
G.R. No. 180050

May 12, 2010
FACTS:
The National Statistics Office certified that Dinagat Islands’ population is 120,813. Its land area is 802.12
square kilometers and its average annual income is P82,696,433.23, as certified by the Bureau of Local
Government Finance. On October 2, 2006, the President approved into law R.A. 9355 creating the Province of
Dinagat Islands. On December 3, 2006, the COMELEC conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the
creation of the province under the LGC which yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes. With the
approval of the people from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands
(Dinagat), the President appointed the interim set of provincial officials who took their oath of office on January
26, 2007. Later, during the May 14, 2007 synchronized elections, the Dinagatnons elected their new set of
provincial officials who assumed office on July 1, 2007.
Meanwhile, on November 10, 2006, petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro and other former political leaders of
Surigao del Norte, filed before the SC a petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 175158) challenging the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355 alleging that that the creation of Dinagat as a new province, if uncorrected,
would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly deprive the people of Surigao del Norte of a large
chunk of the provincial territory, Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from the area. Is R.A. No.
9355 constitutional?
ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 9355 is constitutional
RULING:
No. The SC ruled that the population of 120,813 is below the Local Government Code (LGC) minimum
population requirement of 250,000 inhabitants. Neither did Dinagat Islands, with an approximate land area of
802.12 square kilometers meet the LGC minimum land area requirement of 2,000 square kilometers. The Court
reiterated its ruling that paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government

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Code, which exempts proposed provinces composed of one or more islands from the land area requirement, was
null and void as the said exemption is not found in Sec. 461 of the LGC. “There is no dispute that in case of
discrepancy between the basic law and the rules and regulations implementing the said law, the basic law prevails,
because the rules and regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law,” held the Court.
The Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, and Dinagat filed their respective
motions for reconsideration of the Decision. In its Resolution dated May 12, 2010, the Supreme Court denied the
said motions.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR JESSE ROBREDO, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS represented by its Chairman JOSE A.R. MELO and its Commissioners, RENE V.
SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH AND
GREGORIO LARRAZABAL, Respondents.
G.R. No. 189793

April 7, 2010
FACTS:
The said case was filed by the petitioners by way of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court. It was addressed to nullify and declared as unconstitutional, R.A. 9716 entitled “An Act
Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second Legislative Districts (2nd) in the province of
Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District from such Reapportionment.”
Said Act originated from House Bill No. 4264, and it was enacted by President Macapagal-Arroyo.
Effectuating the act, it has divided the existing four districts, and apportioned districts shall form additional district
where the new first district shall be composed of 176,383 population count.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard with a
minimum population of 250,000 for the creation of a legislative district under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. It was emphasized as well by the petitioners that if population is less than that provided by the
Constitution, it must be stricken-down for non-compliance with the minimum population requirement, unless
otherwise fixed by law.
Respondents have argued that the petitioners are guilty of two fatal technical effects: first, error in
choosing to assail R.A. 9716 via the Remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. And
second, petitioners have no locus standi to question the constitutionality of R.A. 9716.
ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act No. 9716 is unconstitutional and therefore null and void.
RULING:
It was ruled that the said Act is constitutional. The plain and clear distinction between a city and a
province was explained under the second sentence of Section 5 (3) of the Constitution. It states that a province is
entitled into a representative, with nothing was mentioned about a population. While in cities, a minimum
population of 250,000 must first be satisfied. In 2007, CamSur had a population of 1,693,821 making the province

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
entitled to two additional districts from the present of four. Based on the formulation of Ordinance, other than
population, the results of the apportionment were valid. And lastly, other factors were mentioned during the
deliberations of House Bill No. 4264.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT), Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National Board of Canvassers), Respondent.
ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS, Intervenor.
AANGAT TAYO, Intervenor.
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS),Intervenor.
G.R. No. 179271

April 21, 2009
FACTS:
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate,
questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid;
Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at
least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule
creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the
2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-
lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new computatio
ISSUE: How are party-list sits allocated.
RULING:
It was ruled that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two
percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A.
No. 7941 is unconstitutional. It makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available
party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two
percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that
20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives. However it was
stricken down only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section
11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the broadest possible representation of
party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of party-
list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the
determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress: The House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by
law, x x x. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be
more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. However, we cannot allow the continued

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existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list
representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-
list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-
list elections. Seats for party-list representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance with the procedure used in
Table 3 above.
However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political
parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. Those who voted to continue disallowing
major political parties from the party-list elections joined Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate opinion. On
the formula to allocate party-list seats, the Court is unanimous in concurring with this ponencia.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
DARYL GRACE J. ABAYON, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, PERFECTO C. LUCABAN, JR., RONYL S. DE
LA CRUZ and AGUSTIN C. DOROGA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 189466

February 11, 2010
FACTS:
Petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list organization that won a
seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007 elections.
Lucaban, Jr., Dela Cruz, and Doroga, all registered voters, filed a petition for quo warranto with HRET
against Aangat Tayo and its nominee, petitioner Abayon, in HRET Case 07-041. Respondent House of
Representative Electoral Tribunal (HRET) issued an order, dismissing the petition as against Aangat Tayo but
upholding its jurisdiction over the qualifications of petitioner Abayon.
Petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list group that won a seat in the
2007 elections for the members of the House of Representatives. Respondents Lesaca, Jr., Palabay, Reyes, Jr.,
Cadapan, Flores, and Ustarez are members of some other party-list groups. HRET issued an order dismissing the
petition against Bantay for the reason that the issue of the ineligibility or qualification of the party-list group fell
within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC pursuant to the Party-List System Act. HRET, however, defended its
jurisdiction over the question of petitioner Palparan’s qualifications.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners.
RULING:
Yes. From the Constitution’s point of view, it is the party-list representatives who are "elected" into office,
not their parties or organizations. These representatives are elected, however, through that peculiar party-list
system that the Constitution authorized and that Congress by law established where the voters cast their votes for
the organizations or parties to which such party-list representatives belong.
The right to examine the fitness of aspiring nominees and, eventually, to choose five from among them
after all belongs to the party or organization that nominates them. But where an allegation is made that the party
or organization had chosen and allowed a disqualified nominee to become its party-list representative in the lower
House and enjoy the secured tenure that goes with the position, the resolution of the dispute is taken out of its
hand. What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of
Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their
qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list
nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of

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Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the
HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
It was held that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions
for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the question
of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY represented herein by its Chair, DANTON REMOTO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Respondent.
G.R. No. 190582

April 8, 2010
FACTS:
The case has its roots in the COMELECs refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under
Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued
that the LGBT community is a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged
because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and
violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and
that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor
Party v. Commission on Elections. The COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds.
When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration, three commissioners voted to overturn the First Assailed
Resolution (Commissioners Larrazabal, Sarmiento, and Velasco), while three commissioners voted to deny Ang
Ladlads Motion for Reconsideration (Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, and Elias R.
Yusoph). The COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie and speaking for the majority in his Separate Opinion, upheld
the First Assailed Resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ang Ladlad partylist should be accredited as a party list under RA 7941.
RULING:
Yes. The enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive (to labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals). The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a
particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
The SC found that there was no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of Ang Ladlads initial petition shows
that it never claimed to exist in each province of the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT
community in the Philippines was estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and
members around the country, and 4,044 members in its electronic discussion group. Against this backdrop, SC held
that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed,
aside from COMELECs moral objection and the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the
COMELEC ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the
requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang
Ladlads morality, or lack thereof.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify
exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on
purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool
to further any substantial public interest.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., as the second nominee of CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION (CIBAC),Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.
G.R. Nos. 179431-32

June 22, 2010
FACTS:
CIBAC, through its president, Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted its nominees. Prior to the elections,
however, CIBAC, still through Villanueva, filed a certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of the list
of nominees. Whereby it withdrew the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and substituted Armi Jane R. Borje
as one of the nominees. The amended list of nominees of CIBAC thus included: (1) Villanueva, (2) Cruz-Gonzales,
and (3) Borje.
CIBAC, supposedly through its counsel, filed with the COMELEC en banc sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers a motion seeking the proclamation of Lokin as its second nominee. The right of CIBAC to a second seat
as well as the right of Lokin to be thus proclaimed were purportedly based on Party-List Canvass Report No. 26,
which showed CIBAC to have garnered a grand total of 744,674 votes. Using all relevant formulas, the motion
asserted that CIBAC was clearly entitled to a second seat and Lokin to a proclamation. The motion was opposed by
Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales.
The COMELEC en banc approved the substitution. As a result, the COMELEC en banc proclaimed Cruz-
Gonzales as the official second nominee of CIBAC.
ISSUE: Whether the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) can issue implementing rules and regulations (IRRs) that
provide a ground for the substitution of a party-list nominee not written in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941
RULING:
No. Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 enumerates only three instances in which the party-list organization can
substitute another person in place of the nominee whose name has been submitted to the COMELEC, namely: (a)
when the nominee dies; (b) when the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; and (c) when the nominee
becomes incapacitated.
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in expanding to four the three statutory grounds for substituting a
nominee. The COMELEC did not merely reword or rephrase the text of Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941, because it
established an entirely new ground not found in the text of the provision. The new ground granted to the party-list
organization the unilateral right to withdraw its nomination already submitted to the COMELEC, which Section 8 of
R.A. No. 7941 did not allow to be done. The insertion of the new ground was invalid. Considering that Section 13 of
Resolution No. 7804 to the extent that it allows the party-list organization to withdraw its nomination already
submitted to the COMELEC was invalid, CIBACs withdrawal of its nomination of Lokin and the others and its
substitution of them with new nominees were also invalid and ineffectual. It is clear enough that any substitution
of Lokin and the others could only be for any of the grounds expressly stated in Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
Resultantly, the COMELECs approval of CIBACs petition of withdrawal of the nominations and its recognition of
CIBACs substitution, both through its assailed September 14, 2007 resolution, should be struck down for lack of
legal basis.
In light of the foregoing, the Supreme Court ordered the Commission on Elections to forthwith proclaim
petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr. as a Party-List Representative representing Citizens Battle Against Corruption in the
House of Representatives.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
MILAGROS E. AMORES, Petitioner,

vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and EMMANUEL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA,Respondents.
G.R. No. 189600

June 29, 2010
FACTS:
In her petition for quo warranto, Milagros E. Amores seeks the ouster of Villanueva. She alleges that: Villanueva
assumed office without a formal proclamation issued by the Commission on Elections, he was disqualified to be a
nominee of the youth sector of CIBAC since, at the time of the filing of his certificates of nomination and
acceptance, he was already 31 years old or beyond the age limit of 30 pursuant to Section 9 of Republic Act (RA)
No. 7941, His change of affiliation from CIBAC’s youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers and their families
sector was not effected at least six months prior to the May 14, 2007 election. (March 17, 2007) HRET dismissed
the petition.
It bears noting that the term of office of party-list representatives elected in the May, 2007 elections will expire on
June 30, 2010. While the petition has, thus, become moot and academic, rendering of a decision on the merits in
this case would still be of practical value.
ISSUES: Whether Sections 9 (Age of nominee) and 15 (Change of of RA No. 7941 apply to private respondent.
RULING:
YES. As the law states in unequivocal terms that a nominee of the youth sector must at least be twenty-
five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election, so it must be that a candidate who is
more than 30 on election day is not qualified to be a youth sector nominee. Since this mandate is contained in RA
No. 7941, the Party-List System Act, it covers ALL youth sector nominees vying for party-list representative seats.
RA No. 7941 was enacted only in March, 1995. There is thus no reason to apply Section 9 thereof only to
youth sector nominees nominated during the first three congressional terms after the ratification of the
Constitution in 1987. Under this interpretation, the last elections where Section 9 applied were held in May, 1995
or two months after the law was enacted. This is certainly not sound legislative intent, and could not have been
the objective of RA No. 7941. What is clear is that the wording of Section 15 covers changes in both political party
and sectoral affiliation. And the latter may occur within the same party since multi-sectoral party-list organizations
are qualified to participate in the Philippine party-list system. Hence, a nominee who changes his sectoral
affiliation within the same party will only be eligible for nomination under the new sectoral affiliation if the change
has been effected at least six months before the elections. Again, since the statute is clear and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is the plain
meaning rule or verba legis, as expressed in the maxim index animi sermo or speech is the index of intention.
The Supreme Court held that Villanueva was not qualified to be a nominee of either the youth sector or
the overseas Filipino workers and their families sector in the May, 2007 elections. Because he was already more
than 30 years of age in May, 2007, it being stipulated that he was born in August, 1975. Moreover, he did not
change his sectoral affiliation at least six months before May, 2007, public respondent itself having found that he
shifted to CIBAC’s overseas Filipino workers and their families sector only on March 17, 2007.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot, Petitioner,
vs.
G.R. No. 203766

April 2, 2013
FACTS:
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections in the May
2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as representatives for
marginalized or underrepresented sectors. Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUES:
Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners from
participating in the coming MAY 2013, party list elections.
RULING:
No. Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution is crystal-clear that there shall be "a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." The clear intent, express wording, and party-
list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list
system is not for sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the party-list
system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-
based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a
national or regional political party must represent a "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient
that the political party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance
principles and policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens. The phrase "marginalized and
underrepresented" should refer only to the sectors in Section 5 that are, by their nature, economically
"marginalized and underrepresented." These sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other similar sectors. For these sectors, a
majority of the members of the sectoral party must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented." The
nominees of the sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or must have a track record of advocacy for the
sector represented. Belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector does not mean one must
"wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity." It is sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below the middle class.
More specifically, the economically "marginalized and underrepresented" are those who fall in the low income
group as classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board. The national or regional parties under the party-
list system are necessarily those that do not belong to major political parties. This automatically reserves the

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
national and regional parties under the party-list system to those who "lack well-defined political constituencies,"
giving them the opportunity to have members in the House of Representatives. Thus, major political parties can
participate in subsequent party-list elections, however, major political parties should participate in party-list
elections only through their sectoral wings. The participation of major political parties through their sectoral wings,
a majority of whose members are "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political
constituencies," will facilitate the entry of the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those who "lack well-
defined political constituencies" as members of the House of Representatives.
However, since the Court adopts in this Decision new parameters in the qualification of national, regional,
and sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the
COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, SC remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to
determine who are qualified to register under the party-list system, and to participate in the coming 13 May 2013
party-list elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST ABANG LINGKOD, Petitioner,

vs.
G.R. No. 206952

October 22, 2013
FACTS:
ABANG LINGKOD is a sectoral organization that represents the interests of peasant fanners and
fisherfolks, and was registered under the party-list system on December 22, 2009. On May 31, 2012, ABANG
LINGKOD manifested before the COMELEC its intent to participate in the May 2013 elections.
After due proceedings, the COMELEC En Banc in a Resolution dated November 7 2012, cancelled ABANG
LINGKOD's registration as a party list group. The COMELEC En Banc pointed out that ABANG LINGKOD failed to
establish its track record in uplifting the cause of the marginalized and underrepresented; that it merely offered
photographs of some alleged activities it conducted after the May 2010 elections. The COMELEC En Bane further
opined that ABANG LINGKOD failed to show that its nominees are themselves marginalized and underrepresented
or that they have been involved in activities aimed at improving the plight of the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors it claims to represent.
ABANG LINGKOD then filed with this Court a petition for certiorari. The COMELEC maintains its position in
the previous en banc ruling cancelling the registration of ABANG LINGKOD. ABANG LINGKOD withdrew the motion
for reconsideration it filed with the COMELEC and, instead, instituted the instant petition.
ISSUES: Whether or not a summary evidentiary hearing is required to show that they have a track record in
representing the marginalized and underrepresented to enable them to be accredited as a party-list.
RULING:
No. In Atong Paglaum the Court has modified to a great extent the jurisprudential doctrines on who may
register under the party-list system and the representation of the marginalized and underrepresented. For
purposes of registration under the party-list system, national or regional parties or organizations need not
represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector; that representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented is only required of sectoral organizations that represent the sectors stated under Section 5 of
R.A. No. 7941 that are, by their nature, economically marginalized and underrepresented. There was no mention
that sectoral organizations intending to participate in the party-list elections are still required to present a track
record.
Contrary to the COMELEC's claim, sectoral parties or organizations, such as ABANG LINGKOD, are no
longer required to adduce evidence showing their track record, i.e. proof of activities that they have undertaken to
further the cause of the sector they represent. Indeed, it is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector. There exists no reason to further require groups seeking registration
under the party-list system to submit evidence showing their track record. In the case of sectoral organizations,

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
although they are still required to represent the marginalized and underrepresented, they are likewise not
required to show a track record since there would be no reason for them to feign representation of the
marginalized and underrepresented as they can just register as a national or regional party or organization.
There is thus no basis in law and established jurisprudence to insist that groups seeking registration under
the party-list system still comply with the track record requirement. Indeed, nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is it
mandated that groups seeking registration thereunder must submit evidence to show their track record as a
group. Nevertheless, considering that track record is no longer a requirement, a group’s misrepresentation as to its
track record cannot be used as a ground to deny or cancel its registration -it is no longer material to its
qualification under the party-list system.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR., Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERNESTO R. VEGA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 201716

January 8, 2013
FACTS:
In both the 2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged and was proclaimed as the winning mayoralty candidate and
accordingly served the corresponding terms as mayor. In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the Viga municipal
board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due time, performed the
functions of the office of mayor. Abundo protested Torres’ election and proclamation. Abundo was eventually
declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way for his assumption of office starting
May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007, or for a period of a little over one year and one
month.
Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other. When
Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty seat relative to this electoral contest, Torres lost no time
in seeking the former’s disqualification to run, predicated on the three term limit rule.
ISSUE: Whether the service of a term less than the full three years by an elected official arising from his being
declared as the duly elected official upon an election protest is considered as full service of the term for purposes of
the application of the three consecutive term limit for elective local officials.
RULING:
No. To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to the aforequoted
constitutional and statutory provisions, the following requisites must concur: (1) that the official concerned has
been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local govt post; (2) that he has fully served three consecutive
terms.
The facts of the case clearly point to an involuntary interruption during the July 2004-June 2007 term.
With the enforcement of the decision of the election protest in his favor, Abundo assumed the mayoralty post only
on May 9, 2006 and served the term until June 30, 2007 or for a period of a little over one year and one month. It
cannot be said that Mayor Abundo was able to serve fully the entire 2004-2007 term to which he was otherwise
entitled. Needless to stress, the almost two-year period during which Abundo’s opponent actually served as Mayor
is and ought to be considered an involuntary interruption of Abundo’s continuity of service. An involuntary
interrupted term, cannot, in the context of the disqualification rule, be considered as one term for purposes of
counting the three-term threshold. The declaration of being the winner in an election protest grants the local
elected official the right to serve the unexpired portion of the term. Verily, while he was declared winner in the
protest for the mayoralty seat for the 2004-2007 term, Abundo’s full term has been substantially reduced by the
actual service rendered by his opponent (Torres).

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Hence, there was actual involuntary interruption in the term of Abundo and he cannot be considered to
have served the full 2004-2007 term. It cannot be overemphasized that pending the favorable resolution of his
election protest, Abundo was relegated to being an ordinary constituent (PRIVATE CITIZEN) since his opponent, as
presumptive victor in the 2004 elections, was occupying the mayoralty seat. Hence, even if declared later as having
the right to serve the elective position from July 1, 2004, such declaration would not erase the fact that prior to the
finality of the election protest, Abundo did not serve in the mayor’s office and, in fact, had no legal right to said
position.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO and ARTURO C. MOJICA, Petitioners,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENATOR RALPH G. RECTO and SENATOR GREGORIO B. HONASAN,Respondents.
G.R. No. 148334

January 21, 2004
FACTS:
PGMA nominated then Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr as Vice-President. Congress confirmed the
nomination of Senator Guingona who took his oath as Vice-President on 9 February 2001.
The Senate passed Resolution No. 84 certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the Senate. Resolution No.
84 called on COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular
elections on 14 May 2001. Twelve Senators, with a 6-year term each, were due to be elected in that
th
election. Resolution No. 84 further provided that the Senatorial candidate garnering the 13 highest number of
votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.
Petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica (petitioners), as voters and taxpayers, filed the instant
petition for prohibition, impleading only COMELEC as respondent. Petitioners sought to enjoin COMELEC from
th
proclaiming with finality the candidate for Senator receiving the 13 highest number of votes as the winner in the
special election for a single three-year term seat. Accordingly, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Resolution
No. 01-005 in so far as it makes a proclamation to such effect. Petitioners claim that if held simultaneously, a
special and a regular election must be distinguished in the documentation as well as in the canvassing of their
results.
ISSUE: Whether a special election to fill a vacant three-year term Senate seat was validly held.
RULING:
Yes. Under Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution, a special election may be called to fill any vacancy in
the Senate and the House of Representatives in the manner prescribed by law. Thus, in case a vacancy arises in
Congress at least one year before the expiration of the term, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, requires
COMELEC: (1) to call a special election by fixing the date of the special election, which shall not be earlier than sixty
(60) days nor later than ninety (90) after the occurrence of the vacancy but in case of a vacancy in the Senate, the
special election shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election; and (2) to give notice to the
voters of, among other things, the office or offices to be voted for.
In the instant case, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 itself provides that in case of vacancy in the Senate, the
special election to fill such vacancy shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular
election. Accordingly, the special election to fill the vacancy in the Senate arising from Senator Guingonas
appointment as Vice-President in February 2001 could not be held at any other time but must be held
simultaneously with the next succeeding regular elections on 14 May 2001. The law charges the voters with
knowledge of this statutory notice and COMELECs failure to give the additional notice did not negate the calling of
such special election, much less invalidate it. The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to
the failure to give notice of the special election is whether the want of notice has resulted in misleading a sufficient

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
number of voters as would change the result of the special election. If the lack of official notice misled a
substantial number of voters who wrongly believed that there was no special election to fill a vacancy, a choice by
a small percentage of voters would be void.
The COMELEC should be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will insure the
accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created- free, orderly and honest elections. The SC may not
agree fully with its choice of means, but unless there are clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of discretion, this
court should not intervene.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,

vs.
ISMAEL MATHAY and JOSE VELASCO, respondents
G.R. No. L-25554

October 4, 1966
FACTS:
The Philippine Constitution Association, a non-stock, non-profit association duly incorporated and organized
under the laws of the Philippines, and whose members are Filipino citizens and taxpayers, has filed in this Court a
suit against the former Acting Auditor General of the Philippines and Jose Velasco, Auditor of the Congress of the
Philippines, duly assigned thereto by the Auditor General as his representative, seeking to permanently enjoin the
aforesaid officials from authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries authorized by
Republic Act No. 4134 (approved June 10, 1964) to the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives
before December 30, 1969. Subsequently, Ismael Mathay, present Auditor General, was substituted for Amable M.
Aguiluz, former Acting Auditor General.
The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and members of the House of
Representatives set by RA 4134, approved just the preceding year 1964. Petitioner contends that
such implementation is violative of Article VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution.
The reason given being that the term of the 8 senators elected in 1963, and who took part in the approval
of RA 4134, would have expired only on December 30, 1969; while the term of the members of the House who
participated in the approval of said Act expired on December 30, 1965.
ISSUE: Does Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution require that not only the term of all the members of the House
but also that of all the Senators who approved the increase must have fully expired before the increase
becomes effective?
Held:
Yes, the term of all the members of the house and senate must have fully expired before the increase
becomes effective.
Article VI, Section 14, of the Constitution, as amended in 1940 provides that the Senators and the Members
of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided by law, receive an annual compensation of seven
thousand two hundred pesos each, including per diems and other emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of
traveling expenses to and from their respective districts in the case of Members of the House of Representatives,
and to and from their places of residence in the case of Senators, when attending sessions of the Congress. No
increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such, increase. Until otherwise provided by law, the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall each receive an annual
compensation of sixteen thousand pesos.

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In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased compensation for legislators
becomes fully effective, the Constitutional provision refers to “all members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives” in the same sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or separation between them. This
unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the “expiration of the full term” of the
Senators and Representatives that approved the measure, using the singular form and not the plural, thereby
rendering more evident the intent to consider both houses for the purpose as indivisible components of one single
Legislature.
The use of the word “term” in the singular, when combined with the following phrase “all the members of
the Senate and the House,” underscores that in the application of Art. VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10), the fundamental
consideration is that the terms of office of all members of the Legislature that enacted the measure must have
expired before the increase in compensation can become operative.
The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased compensation provided by RA 4134 is not operative
until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of the Senate and House that approved it will have
expired.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
BENJAMIN T. LIGOT, petitioner,

Vs.
ISMAEL MATHAY, Auditor General and JOSE V. VELASCO, Auditor, Congress of the Philippines, respondents.
G.R. No. L-34676

April 30, 1974
FACTS:
Benjamin T. Ligot served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines
for three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from December 30, 1957 to December 30, 1969.
During his second term in office (1961-1965), RA 4134 “fixing the salaries of constitutional officials and certain
other officials of the national government” was enacted into law and under section 7 thereof took effect on July 1,
1964.
The salaries of members of Congress (senators and congressman) were increased under said Act from
P7,200.00 to P32,000.00 per annum, but the Act expressly provided that said increases “shall take effect in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.”
Ligot’s term expired on December 30, 1969, so he filed a claim for retirement under Commonwealth Act
186, section 12 (c) as amended by RA 4968 which provided for retirement gratuity of any official or employee,
appointive or elective, with a total of at least twenty years of service, the last three years of which are continuous
on the basis therein provided “in case of employees based on the highest rate received and in case of elected
officials on the rates of pay as provided by law.”
HOR granted his petition however, Velasco, the then Congress Auditor refused to so issue certification.
The Auditor General then, Mathay, also disallowed the same. The thrust of Ligot’s appeal is that his claim for
retirement gratuity computed on the basis of the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum for members of
Congress (which was not applied to him during his incumbency which ended December 30, 1969, while the Court
held in Philconsa vs. Mathay that such increases would become operative only for members of Congress elected to
serve therein commencing December 30, 1969) should not have been disallowed, because at the time of his
retirement, the increased salary for members of Congress “as provided by law” (under Republic Act 4134) was
already P32,000.00 per annum.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ligot is entitled to such retirement benefit.
RULING:
No, Benjamin Ligot is not entitled to such retirement benefit.
To allow petitioner a retirement gratuity computed on the basis of P32,000.00 per annum would be a
subtle way of increasing his compensation during his term of office and of achieving indirectly what he could not
obtain directly. Ligot’s claim cannot be sustained as far as he and other members of Congress similarly situated
whose term of office ended on December 30, 1969 are concerned for the simple reason that a retirement gratuity

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
or benefit is a form of compensation within the purview of the Constitutional provision limiting their compensation
and “other emoluments” to their salary as provided by law. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress
whose terms expired on December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per
annum (which they were prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during their term of office) would be to pay
them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase the salary beyond that which they were permitted by the
Constitution to receive during their incumbency.
As stressed by the Auditor-General in his decision in the similar case of petitioner’s colleague, ex-
Congressman Singson, “(S)uch a scheme would contravene the Constitution for it would lead to the same
prohibited result by enabling administrative authorities to do indirectly what cannot be done directly.”
Thus, the Court dismissed the petition for review and thereby affirms the Auditor-General’s decision.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

Vs.
ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accused-appellant
G.R. Nos. 132875-76

February 3, 2000
FACTS:
The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now confined at the
national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six
counts is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the
duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having
been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.
ISSUE: Whether or not being a Congressman is a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant
as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law by reason of the “mandate of the
sovereign will”.
RULING:
No. While the Constitution guarantees: “x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws.”,
this simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and
responsibilities imposed. The duties imposed by the “mandate of the people” are multifarious. The Court cannot
validate badges of inequality.
The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if
thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded. Here, election to the position of
Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office
are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and
restricted in liberty of movement.
Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to
the same class. Hence, the performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been
an excuse to free a person validly in prison.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV, petitioner,

vs.
HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL, SR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT- BRANCH 148,
MAKATI CITY; GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, VICE ADM. ROGELIO I. CALUNSAG, MGEN. BENJAMIN DOLORFINO,
AND LT. COL. LUCIARDO OBEÑA, respondents.
G.R. No. 179817

June 27, 2008
FACTS:
On July 27, 2003, more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the
resignation of the President and key national officials. After a series of negotiations, military soldiers surrendered
that evening.
In the aftermath of such event dubbed as the Oakwood Incident, petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was
charged with coup d’état before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Four years later, Trillanes remained in
detention and won a seat in the Senate. Before starting his term, Trillanes filed with RTC an Omnibus Motion for
Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests.
Trillanes requested to be allowed to attend senate sessions and fulfill his functions as senator. The RTC
however denied his motion. Thus, he filed Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court to set aside orders of the
RTC.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Trillanes‘ case is different from that of the Jalosjos case
2. Whether or not Trillanes‘ election as senator provides legal justification to allow him to work and serve his
mandate as senator
3. Whether or not there are enough precedents that allows for a liberal treatment of detention prisoners who
are held without bail
RULING:
No distinction between Trillanes’ case and that of Jalosjos case.
The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to
Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are
not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in
liberty of movement.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
The Constitution provides: All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released
on recognizance as may be provided by law. The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense, or
an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt
is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action. That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup
d’état cases, both being punishable by reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by
the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral
turpitude involved in the crime charged.
In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and for release on
recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a hearing
of an application for bail or imported from a trial court's judgment of conviction, justifies the detention of an
accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the
right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal action."
Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies equally to
detention prisoners like Trillanes or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos. The Court in People v. Hon.
Maceda said that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not practice their
profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. This
is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention.
Trillanes’ election as Senator not a legislative justification to allow him to serve his mandate.
The case against Trillanes is not administrative in nature. And there is no "prior term" to speak of. In a
plethora of cases, the Court categorically held that the doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal cases.
Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioner's electoral victory
only signifies pertinently that when the voters elected him to the Senate, "they did so with full awareness of the
limitations on his freedom of action [and] x x x with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative
results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison.
It is opportune to wipe out the lingering misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the voice of the
people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the Constitution and echoed by jurisprudence.
The apparent discord may be harmonized by the overarching tenet that the mandate of the people yields to the
Constitution which the people themselves ordained to govern all under the rule of law. The performance of
legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison.
The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty
to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the
House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 membersof the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation.
Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. x x x Never has the call
of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by
law.
Trillanes’ case fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves.
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the
discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. That this discretion was gravely abused, petitioner failed to
establish. In fact, the trial court previously allowed petitioner to register as a voter in December 2006, file his
certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be proclaimed as senator-elect, and take
his oath of office on June 29, 2007. In a seeming attempt to bind or twist the hands of the trial court lest it be
accused of taking a complete turn-around, petitioner largely banks on these prior grants to him and insists on
unending concessions and blanket authorizations.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
NICANOR T. JIMENEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants,

Vs.
BARTOLOME CABANGBANG, defendant and appellee.
G.R. No. L-15905

August 3, 1966
FACTS:
Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National
Defense. On 14 Nov 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication of an open letter addressed to the Philippines. Said
letter alleged that there have been allegedly three operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP
officers, with the aid of some civilian political strategists. That such strategists have had collusions with
communists and that the Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planning a coup d’état to place him as the
president.
The “planners” allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, among others, under their guise and that Jimenez et al
may or may not be aware that they are being used as a tool to meet such an end. The letter was said to have been
published in newspapers of general circulation. Jimenez then filed a case against Cabangbang to collect a sum of
damages against Cabangbang alleging that Cabangbang’s statement is libelous. Cabangbang petitioned for the case
to be dismissed because he said that as a member of the HOR he is immune from suit and that he is covered by the
privileged communication rule and that the said letter is not even libelous.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication endowed to members of Congress.
2. Whether or not the said letter is libelous.
RULING:
Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides “The Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be privileged from arrest during
their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech
or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place.”
The publication of the said letter is not covered by said expression which refers to utterances made by
Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes
cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same
is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing
its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly
authorized to perform its functions as such at the time of the performance of the acts in question.
Congress was not in session when the letter was published and at the same time he, himself, caused the
publication of the said letter. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof. Hence,
contrary to the finding made by the lower court the said communication is not absolutely privileged.
The SC is satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support Jimenez’ action for damages.
Although the letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the persons unnamed therein alluded to as
“planners”, and that, having been handpicked by Vargas, it should be noted that defendant, likewise, added that
“it is of course possible” that plaintiffs “are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely no
knowledge”.
In other words, the very document upon which plaintiffs’ action is based explicitly indicates that they
might be absolutely unaware of the alleged operational plans, and that they may be merely unwitting tools of the
planners. The SC does not think that this statement is derogatory to Jimenez to the point of entitling them to
recover damages, considering that they are officers of our Armed Forces, that as such they are by law, under the
control of the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff, and that the letter in question seems to suggest
that the group therein described as “planners” include these two (2) high ranking officers. Petition is dismissed.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
SERGIO OSMEÑA, JR., petitioner,

Vs.
SALIPADA K. PENDATUN, LEON Z. GUINTO, JR., VICENTE L. PERALTA, FAUSTINO TOBIA, LORENZO G. TEVES,
JOPSE J. ROY, FAUSTINO DUGENIO, ANTONIO Y. DE PIO, BENJAMIN T. LIGOT, PEDRO G. TRONO, FELIPE ABRIGO,
FELIPE S. ABELEDA, TECLA SAN ANDRES ZIGA, ANGEL B. FERNADEZ, and EUGENIO S. BALTAO, in their capacity as
members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59, respondents.
G.R. No. L-17144

October 28, 1960
FACTS:
In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr. delivered a speech entitled “A Message to Garcia”. In the said
speech, he disparaged then President Carlos Garcia and his administration. Subsequently, House Resolution No. 59
was passed by the lower house in order to investigate the charges made by Osmeña during his speech and that if
his allegations were found to be baseless and malicious, he may be subjected to disciplinary actions by the lower
house.
Osmeña then questioned the validity of the said resolution before the Supreme Court. Osmeña avers that
the resolution violates his parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in Congress. Congressman Salipada
Pendatun filed an answer where he averred that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over the matter and
Congress has the power to discipline its members.
ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeña’s immunity has been violated?
HELD:
No. Osmeña has not violated the immunity. Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any
speech or debate" in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representative "shall not be questioned
in any other place." It enshrines parliamentary immunity upon members of the legislature which is a fundamental
privilege cherished in every parliament in a democratic world.
It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in
criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside the Hall of Congress.
However, it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body whenever his words and
conduct are considered disorderly or unbecoming of a member therein. Therefore, Osmeña’s petition is dismissed.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
DANTE V. LIBAN, REYNALDO M. BERNARDO and SALVADOR M. VIARI, petitioners

Vs.
RICHARD J. GORDON, respondent
G.R No. 175352

July 15, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioners Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo, and Salvador M. Viari (petitioners) filed with this Court
a Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate. Petitioners are officers of the
Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter while respondent is Chairman of the Philippine National
Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors.
During respondents incumbency as a member of the Senate of the Philippines, he was elected Chairman
of the PNRC during the 23 February 2006 meeting of the PNRC Board of Governors. Petitioners allege that by
accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has ceased to be a member of the Senate
as provided in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent holds the chairmanship of PNRC in an ex officio capacity may hold any other office
or employment in the Government.
RULING:
The office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a government-owned or controlled
corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
SEC. 13. Article VI of the constitution provides that No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without
forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments
thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.
A position held in ex officio capacity does not violate the constitutional proscription on the holding of
multiple offices.
The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the
Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified
therein without additional compensation, in an ex officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the
primary functions of said official office. The reason is that these posts do not comprise “any other office” within
the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and
functions on said officials.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
The ex officio position being actually and in legal contemplation art of the principal office, it follows that
the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said position. The
reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office.
The term ex officio means “ from office; by virtue of office.” It refers to an authority derived from official character
merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the official position.” Ex
officio likewise denotes “an act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other
appointment or authority other than that conferred by the office.” An ex officio member of a board is one who is a
member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and without further warrant or appointment.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
DANTE V. LIBAN, REYNALDO M. BERNARDO and SALVADOR M. VIARI, petitioners

Vs.
RICHARD J. GORDON, respondent
G.R No. 175352

January 18, 2011
FACTS:
Respondent filed a motion for partial recommendation on a Supreme Court decision which ruled that
being chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) did not disqualify him from being a Senator, and that
the charter creating PNRC is unconstitutional as the PNRC is a private corporation and the Congress is precluded by
the Constitution to create such. The Court then ordered the PNRC to incorporate itself with the SEC as a private
corporation. Respondent takes exception to the second part of the ruling, which addressed the constitutionality of
the statute creating the PNRC as a private corporation. Respondent avers that the issue of constitutionality was
only touched upon in the issue of locus standi. It is a rule that the constitutionality will not be touched upon if it is
not the lis mota of the case.
ISSUE: Was it proper for the Court to have ruled on the constitutionality of the PNRC statute?
RULING:
In the case at bar, the constitutionality of the PNRC statute was raised in the issue of standing. As such,
the Court should not have declared certain provisions of such as unconstitutional. On the substantive issue, the
PNRC is sui generis. It is unlike the private corporations that the Constitution wants to prevent Congress from
creating. First, the PNRC is not organized for profit. It is an organization dedicated to assist victims of war and
administer relief to those who have been devastated by calamities, among others. It is entirely devoted to public
service. It is not covered by the prohibition since the Constitution aims to eliminate abuse by the Congress, which
tend to favor personal gain. Secondly, the PNRC was created in order to participate in the mitigation of the effects
of war, as embodied in the Geneva Convention. The creation of the PNRC is compliance with international treaty
obligations.
Lastly, the PNRC is a National Society, an auxiliary of the government. It is not like government
instrumentalities and GOCC. The PNRC is regulated directly by international humanitarian law, as opposed to local
law regulating the other mentioned entities. As such, it was improper for the Court to have declared certain
portions of the PNRC statute as unconstitutional. However, it is the stand of Justice Carpio that there is no
mandate for the Government to create a National Society to this effect. He also raises the fact that the PNRC is not
sui generis in being a private corporation organized for public needs. Justice Abad is of the opinion that the PNRC is
neither private or governmental, hence it was within the power of Congress to create.
It has been consistently held in Jurisprudence that the Court should exercise judicial restraint when it
comes to issues of constitutionality where it is not the lis mota of the case.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
EUGENIO J. PUYAT, ERWIN L. CHIONGBIAN, EDGARDO P. REYES, ANTONIO G. PUYAT, JAIME R. BLANCO, RAFAEL
R. RECTO and REYNALDO L. LARDIZABAL, petitioners,
Vs.
HON. SIXTO T. J. DE GUZMAN, JR., as Associate Commissioner of the Securities & Exchange Commission,
EUSTAQUIO T. C. ACERO, R. G. VILDZIUS, ENRIQUE M. BELO, MANUEL G. ABELLO, SERVILLANO DOLINA, JUANITO
MERCADO and ESTANISLAO A. FERNANDEZ, respondents
G.R. No. L-51122

March 25, 1982
FACTS:
In May 1979, Eugenio Puyat and his group were elected as directors of the International Pipe Industries. The
election was subsequently questioned by Eustaquio Acero (Puyat’s rival) claiming that the votes were not properly
counted – hence he filed a quo warranto case before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on May 25,
1979. Prior to Acero’s filing of the case, Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa
purchased ten shares of stock of IPI from a member of Acero’s group. And during a conference held by SEC
Commissioner Sixto de Guzman, Jr. (from May 25-31, 1979) to have the parties confer with each other, Estanislao
Fernandez entered his appearance as counsel for Acero. Puyat objected as he argued that it is unconstitutional for
an assemblyman to appear as counsel (to anyone) before any administrative body (such as the SEC). This being
cleared, Fernandez inhibited himself from appearing as counsel for Acero. He instead filed an Urgent Motion for
Intervention in the said SEC case for him to intervene, not as a counsel, but as a legal owner of IPI shares and as a
person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC Commissioner granted the motion and in effect
granting Fernandez leave to intervene.
ISSUE: Whether or not Fernandez, acting as a stockholder of IPI, can appear and intervene in the SEC case without
violating the constitutional provision that an assemblyman must not appear as counsel in such courts or bodies?
RULING:
No, Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body under the guise that he is not appearing as a counsel.
Even though he is a stockholder and that he has a legal interest in the matter in litigation he is still barred from
appearing. He bought the stocks before the litigation took place. During the conference he presented himself as
counsel but because it is clearly stated that he cannot do so under the constitution he instead presented himself as
a party of interest – which is clearly a workaround and is clearly an act after the fact. A mere workaround to get
himself involved in the litigation. What could not be done directly could not likewise be done indirectly.
Under Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution: No Senator or member of the House of
Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or
quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in
any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency,
or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his
term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit
or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
Appearance of the legislator is now barred before all courts of justice, regardless of rank, composition, or
jurisdiction. The disqualification also applies to the revived Electoral Tribunal and to all administrative bodies, like
the Securities and Exchange Commission and the National Labor Relations Commission. Courts martial and military
tribunals, being administrative agencies, are included.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN
PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by
FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by
FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, Respondents.
G.R. No. 208566

November 19, 2013
Facts:
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel is
commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent several
legal designations from “Congressional Pork Barrel” to the latest “Priority Development Assistance Fund” or PDAF.
The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to – P40 million for “hard projects”
(infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for “soft projects” (scholarship grants,
medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft
projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet members may
request for the realignment of funds into their department provided that the request for realignment is approved
or concurred by the legislator concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called presidential
pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project – this has been
around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the earnings of PAGCOR – this has
been around since about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six whistle
blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system had
been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds
into about 20 bogus NGO’s (non-government organizations) which would make it appear that government funds
are being used in legit existing projects but are in fact going to “ghost” projects. An audit was then conducted by
the Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the Supreme
Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.

II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.
HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it violates
the following principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the purse). The
executive, on the other hand, implements the laws – this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the
executive may implement the law but under the pork barrel system, what’s happening was that, after the GAA,
itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should be
allocated to – a clear act of implementing the law they enacted – a violation of the principle of separation of
powers. (Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel, then called as CDF or the
Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the legislators only recommend where their pork
barrel funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to get the concurrence of
the legislator concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant the
people legislative power but only insofar as the processes of referendum and initiative are concerned). That being,
legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate further that which was delegated to it by
the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national
policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other
duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to which his PDAF money
should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The power to appropriate funds is
solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the individual members.
Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the Congress can delegate the power to the individual
member of Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items in the GAA
which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined because of the fact that once
the GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify the project to which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
system, how can the president veto the appropriation made by the legislator if the appropriation is made after the
approval of the GAA – again, “Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the
constitutionally-given power of the President useless.”
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their Local
Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies concerning their localities.
But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the house of representatives, what’s happening is
that a congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an
instance where the national government (note, a congressman is a national officer) meddles with the affairs of the
local government – and this is contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on local autonomy. It’s
good if that’s all that is happening under the pork barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal
fund on the part of legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional
because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides: "No money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya and
PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD
1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain energy-related ventures
shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy resource
development and for other purposes which the President may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCOR’s earnings shall be allocated to a
General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The
appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general
appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO and SEN. FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioners,

vs.
SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and SEN. MARCELO B. FERNAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 13457

November 18, 1998
Facts:
On July 31, 1998, Senators Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco S. Tatad instituted an original petition
for quo warranto under Rule 66, Section 5, Rules of Court, seeking the ouster of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.
as minority leader of the Senate and the declaration of Senator Tatad as the rightful minority leader.
On August 4, 1998, the Court, upon receipt of the Petition, required the respondents and the solicitor
general "to file COMMENT thereon within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from notice." On August 25,
1998, both respondents and the solicitor general submitted their respective Comments. In compliance with a
Resolution of the Court dated September 1, 1998, petitioners filed their Consolidated Reply on September 23,
1998.
Noting said pleading, this Court gave due course to the petition and deemed the controversy submitted
for decision, without need of memoranda, on September 29, 1998.
On the agenda for the day was the election of officers. Nominated by Sen. Blas F. Ople to the position of
Senate President was Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan. Sen. Francisco S. Tatad was also nominated to the same position by
8
Sen. Miriam Defenser Santiago. By a vote of 20 to 2, Senator Fernan was declared the duly elected President of
the Senate. The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and Sen. Franklin M.
Drilon as majority leader.
Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only
other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had
voted for Senator Fernan comprised the "majority," while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee,
belonged to the "minority."
Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject petition for quo warranto, alleging in the
main that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority
leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.
Issues:
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?

2. Whether or not there was an actual violation of the Constitution?
3. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the
minority leader?
Held:

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
First issue:
Yes. It is well within the power and jurisdiction the court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials
committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions and
prerogatives.
Second issue:
The term "majority" has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a certain number
36
out of a total or aggregate, it simply "means the number greater than half or more than half of any total." The
plain and unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President must
obtain the votes of more than one half of all the senators. Not by any construal does it thereby
delineate who comprise the "majority," much less the "minority," in the said body. And there is no showing that
the framers of our Constitution had in mind other than the usual meanings of these terms.
In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number
constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not
vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority," who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law
or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.
Third issue:
The all-embracing and plenary power and duty of the Court "to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government" is restricted only by the definition and confines of the term "grave abuse of discretion." By
grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.
By the above standard, we hold that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate
President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader. Let us recall that the latter belongs to one of
the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the members of this party
that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the Senate President. Such formal recognition by
Respondent Fernan came only after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally
allowed to articulate their standpoints.
Under these circumstances, we believe that the Senate President cannot be accused of "capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment" or of "an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility." Where
no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been
violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done
within their competence and authority.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
JOSE AVELINO, petitioner,

vs.
MARIANO J. CUENCO, respondent
G.R. No. L-2821

March 4, 1949
Facts:
In the session of the Senate of February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada re quested that his right to
speak on the next session day, February 21, 1949, to formulate charges against the then Senate President Jose
Avelino be reserved. His request was approved.
Although a sufficient number of senators to constitute a quorum were at the Senate session hall at the
appointed time , and the petitioner was already in his office, said petitioner delayed his appearance at the session
hall . When he finally ascended the rostrum, he did not immediately open the session, but instead requested from
the Secretary a copy of the resolution submitted by Senators Tañada and Sanidad and in the presence of the public
he read slowly and carefully said resolution, after which he called and conferred with his colleagues Senator
Francisco and Tirona.
Shortly before 12:00 noon, due to the session be opened, the petitioner finally called the meeting to
order. Except Senator Sotto who was confined in a hospital and Senator Confesor who is in the United States, all
the Senator were present.
Before and after the roll call and before and after the reading of the minutes, Senator Tañada repeatedly
stood up to claim his right to deliver his one-hour privilege speech but the petitioner, then presiding, continuosly
ignored him; and when after the reading of the minutes, Senator Tañada instead on being recognized by the Chair,
the petitioner announced that he would order the arrest of any senator who would speak without being previously
recognized by him, but all the while, tolerating the actions of his follower, Senator Tirona, who was continuously
shouting at Senator Sanidad "Out of order!" everytime the latter would ask for recognition of Senator Tañada.
Issue: Whether or not the resolutions of Nos. 68 and 67 are validly approved. Was the session of the so-called
“rump “ senate a continuation of the session validly assembled with 22 senators in the morning of Feb. 21, 1949?
Was there a quorum in the session?
Held:
There is unanimity in the view that the session under Senator Arranz was a continuation of the morning
session and that a minority of ten senators at the beginning of such session there were at least fourteen senators
including Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the absence from the country of Senator
Tomas Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twelve three senators. When the
Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a quorum, "the House: does not mean "all"
the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute "the House". (Missouri Pac. vs. Kansas, 63 Law ed. [U.
S.], p. 239). There is a difference between a majority of "the House", the latter requiring less number than

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes
constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Mr. Justice Pablo believes furthermore than
even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent
members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have
been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained.
In fine, all the four justice agree that the Court being confronted with the practical situation that of the
twenty three senators who may participate in the Senate deliberations in the days immediately after this decision,
twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it would be most
injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President of the Senate, that office being essentially one that
depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the
President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority. And at any session hereafter held with
thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here
about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned,the said twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein
involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a doubt.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEÑA, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, AND RONALDO B.
ZAMORA, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE,
AND THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents
G.R. No. 127255

August 14, 1997
Facts:
Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit against respondents Jose
de Venecia, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Deputy Speaker Raul Daza, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano,
the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Finance, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, charging violation of
the rules of the House which petitioners claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is
tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was approved on third reading
on September 12, 1996 and transmitted on September 16, 1996 to the Senate which approved it with certain
amendments on third reading on November 17, 1996. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile
the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill.
The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on November 21, 1996.
At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to
deliver his sponsorship speech, after which he was interpellate. Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was first to interpellate. He
was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected to the
motion and asked for a head count. After a roll call, the Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence of
1
a quorum. Rep. Arroyo appealed the ruling of the Chair, but his motion was defeated when put to a vote.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the
Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the
House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by
President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996
Petitioner now claims that the law was not validly enacted because its passage was railroad and certain
internal rules of the house on the enactment bills were violated.
Issue: Whether or not the law was validly enacted.
Held:
The law is valid. The internal rules of procedure are subject to modification or waiver at the pleasure of
the body adopting them. Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural.
Courts ordinary have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the
requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure. The above principle is subject, however, to this
qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative
body the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where
private rights are involved.
It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to
set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of
procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when
petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving
commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of
its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a
48
case may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or
amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or
any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather
than disrespect is due the judgment of that body. The petition is dismissed.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY,
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND
ELECTORAL REFORMS, respondents.
G.R. No. 170338 December 23, 2008
SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI, petitioners,
vs.
THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT THE HONORABLE
MANUEL VILLAR, respondents.
G.R. No. 179275

December 23, 2008
Facts:
In 2005, tapes which allegedly contained a conversation between President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and
COMELEC Commissioner Garcillano surfaced. The said conversation contained a plan to rig the elections to favor
GMA. The recordings then became subject to legislative hearings conducted separately by each House. In his
privilege speech, Sen. Escudero motioned a congressional investigation jointly conducted by the Committees on
Public Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security, Information and Communications
Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms (respondent House Committees). During the inquiry, several
versions of the wiretapped conversation emerged. Lacson’s motion for a senate inquiry was referred to the
Committee on National Defense and Security headed by Biazon. Garci subsequently filed to petitions. One to
prevent the playing of the tapes in the each house for they are alleged to be inadmi8ssible and the other to
prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped conversation.
ISSUE: Whether or not to grant the petitions of Garcillano.
HELD:
Garci’s petition to strike the tapes off the record cannot be granted. The tapes were already played in
Congress and those tapes were already highly publicized. The issue is already overtaken by these incidents hence it
has become moot and academic. The second petition must be granted however. The Senate cannot be allowed to
continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear
derogation of the constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that “*t+he Senate or the House of
Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with
its duly published rules of procedure.” The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic
requirements of due process. Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one. What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that “*l+aws

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.”
The Senate admits in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and
th
in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14 Congress, however, of which the term of half of its
members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they
first opened their session.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
SPOUSES PNP DIRECTOR ELISEO D. DELA PAZ (Ret.) and MARIA FE C. DELA PAZ, Petitioners,
vs.
SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS and the SENATE SERGEANT-AT-ARMS JOSE BALAJADIA,
JR., Respondents.
G.R. No. 184849

February 13, 2009
Facts:
In October 2008, Gen. De La Paz, a senior officer of the PNP, headed a delegation of 8 to attend an
Interpol GA. De La Paz brought with him his wife and 3 days after the scheduled GA, de la Paz is also scheduled to
retire. After the GA, De La Paz was apprehended in the departure area for he was carrying with him €105,000.00
(P6,930,000.00). He was also carrying with him €45,000.00 (P2,970,000.00). He failed to declare in writing that he
is carrying such an amount and this is in violation of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption and the
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. De La Paz and his group was later released but
the €s were confiscated by the Russians. Upon arrival to the Philippines, De La Paz was issued a subpoena by the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations for the investigation it was to conduct involving the Moscow incident. De
La Paz averred that the said committee does not have jurisdiction of the case. De La Paz argued that the
Committee is devoid of any jurisdiction to investigate the Moscow incident as the matter does not involve state to
state relations as provided in paragraph 12, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules of Procedure (Senate Rules).
They further claim that respondent Committee violated the same Senate Rules when it issued the warrant of arrest
without the required signatures of the majority of the members of respondent Committee. They likewise assail the
very same Senate Rules because the same were not published as required by the Constitution, and thus, cannot be
used as the basis of any investigation involving them relative to the Moscow incident.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said Committee has jurisdiction over the matter.
HELD:
The SC ruled against De La Paz. Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution states:”Each House
shall determine the rules of its proceedings.” This provision has been traditionally construed as a grant of full
discretionary authority to the Houses of Congress in the formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own rules.
The challenge to the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, raised by petitioner in the case at
bench, in effect, asks this Court to inquire into a matter that is within the full discretion of the Senate. The issue
partakes of the nature of a political question. Also, the signatures were properly obtained as evidenced by the
approval of the Senate president and it is shown that the gathering of the signatures is in accordance with the
Rules. It is also shown that the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation were also published in
two newspapers of general circulation.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
JOSE ALEJANDRINO, petitioner,

vs.
MANUEL L. QUEZON, ET AL., respondents
G.R. No. 2204

September 11, 1924
Facts:
On 5 January 1924, the Philippine Senate composed of respondent Senators, including Senate President
Manuel L. Quezon, issued a resolution depriving petitioner, Senator Jose Alejandrino Senator for the Twelfth
District, of all the prerogatives, privileges and emoluments of his office for the period of one year from the first of
January 1924, having found the petitioner guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant violation of the privileges of the
Senate for having treacherously assaulted Vince de Vera, Senator for the Sixth District, on the occasion of certain
phrases being uttered by the latter in the course of the debate regarding the credentials of Senator Alejandrino.
Alejandrino contests the resolution, claiming the same to be unconstitutional, praying to the Supreme
Court (1) to issue a preliminary injunction against the respondents enjoining them from executing the
resolution;(2) to declare the aforesaid resolution of the Senate null and void; and (3) as a consequence of the
foregoing, to issue a final writ of mandamus and injunction against the respondents ordering them to recognize
the rights of the petitioner to exercise his office as Senator and that he enjoy all of his prerogatives, privileges, and
emoluments, and prohibiting them from preventing the petitioner from exercising the rights of his office, and from
carrying the order of suspension into effect. Respondents, through the Attorney General, objects, claiming the
Supreme Court has no jurisdiction therein.
Issue: Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to annul the Resolution made by the Philippine Senate
against Senator Alejandrino.
Held:
NO. Neither the Philippine Legislature nor a branch thereof can be directly controlled in the exercise of
their legislative powers by any judicial process. The court accordingly lacks jurisdiction to consider the petition and
the demurrer must be sustained. As it is unlikely that the petition could be amended to state a cause of action, it
must be dismissed
The question of jurisdiction is invariably one of perplexing difficulty. On the one hand, no consideration of
policy or convenience should induce this court to exercise a power that does not belong to it. On the other hand,
no consideration of policy or convenience should induce this court to surrender a power which it is its duty to
exercise. But certainly mandamus should never issue from this court where it will not prove to be effectual and
beneficial. It should not be awarded where it will create discord and confusion. It should not be awarded where
mischievous consequences are likely to follow. Judgment should not be pronounced which might possibly lead to
unseemly conflicts or which might be disregarded with impunity. This court should offer no means by a decision
for any possible collision between it as the highest court in the Philippines and the Philippine Senate as a branch of
a coordinate department, or between the Court and the Chief Executive or the Chief Executive and the Legislature.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
SERGIO OSMEÑA, JR., petitioner,

vs.
SALIPADA K. PENDATUN, LEON Z. GUINTO, JR., VICENTE L. PERALTA, FAUSTINO TOBIA, LORENZO G. TEVES,
JOPSE J. ROY, FAUSTINO DUGENIO, ANTONIO Y. DE PIO, BENJAMIN T. LIGOT, PEDRO G. TRONO, FELIPE ABRIGO,
FELIPE S. ABELEDA, TECLA SAN ANDRES ZIGA, ANGEL B. FERNADEZ, and EUGENIO S. BALTAO, in their capacity as
members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59,respondents.
G.R. No. L-17144

October 28, 1960
FACTS:
In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr. delivered a speech entitled “A Message to Garcia”. In the
said speech, he disparaged then President Carlos Garcia and his administration. Subsequently, House Resolution
No. 59 was passed by the lower house in order to investigate the charges made by Osmeña during his speech and
that if his allegations were found to be baseless and malicious, he may be subjected to disciplinary actions by the
lower house.
Thereafter, on July 19, 1960, the respondents (with the exception of Congressmen De Pio, Abeleda, San
1
Andres Ziga, Fernandez and Balatao) filed their answer, challenged the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the
petition, defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension, upheld a House Resolution
No. 175 and then invited attention to the fact that Congress having ended its session on July 18, 1960, the
Committee—whose members are the sole respondents—had thereby ceased to exist.
There is no question that Congressman Osmeña, in a privilege speech delivered before the House, made
the serious imputations of bribery against the President which are quoted in Resolution No. 59 and that he refused
to produce before the House Committee created for the purpose, evidence to substantiate such imputations.
There is also no question that for having made the imputations and for failing to produce evidence in support
thereof, he was, by resolution of the House, suspended from office for a period of fifteen months for serious
disorderly behaviour.
Osmeña then questioned the validity of the said resolution before the Supreme Court. Osmeña avers that
the resolution violates his parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in Congress. Congressman Salipada
Pendatun filed an answer where he averred that the Supreme Court has not jurisdiction over the matter and
Congress has the power to discipline its members.
ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeña’s immunity has been violated?
HELD:
No. Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity upon members of
the legislature which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every parliament in a democratic world. It guarantees
the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions
before the courts or any other forum outside the Hall of Congress. However, it does not protect him from
responsibility before the legislative body whenever his words and conduct are considered disorderly or
unbecoming of a member therein. Therefore, Osmeña’s petition is dismissed.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, FRANCIS E. GARCHITORENA, JOSE S. BALAJADIA AND MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO, AS
PRESIDING JUSTICE AND MEMBERS OF THE FIRST DIVISION, respondents.
G.R. No. 128055

April 18, 2001
FACTS:
In October 1988, Miriam Defensor Santiago, who was the then Commissioner of the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation (CID), approved the application for legalization of the stay of about 32 aliens. Her act
was said to be illegal and was tainted with bad faith and it ran counter against Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act). The legalization of such is also a violation of Executive Order No. 324 which prohibits
the legalization of disqualified aliens. The aliens legalized by Santiago were allegedly known by her to be
disqualified. Two other criminal cases were filed against Santiago. Pursuant to this information, Francis
Garchitorena, a presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, issued a warrant of arrest against Santiago. Santiago
petitioned for provisional liberty since she was just recovering from a car accident which was approved. In 1995, a
motion was filed with the Sandiganbayan for the suspension of Santiago, who was already a senator by then. The
Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate President (Maceda) to suspend Santiago from office for 90 days.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member of the Senate without violating the
Constitution.
HELD:
Yes. it is true that the Constitution provides that each “… house may determine the rules of its
proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its
Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.”
But on the other hand, Section 13 of RA 3019 provides: "SECTION 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. — Any
incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under
Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or
property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of
participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he
shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the
meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
"In the event that such convicted officer, who may have already been separated from the service, has
already received such benefits he shall be liable to restitute the same to the Government. (As amended by BP Blg.
195, March 16, 1982)."
In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to
discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
is a punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the Lower House, as the case may be,
upon an erring member. This is quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not
a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on
petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the Senate.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore,
the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.
But Santiago committed the said act when she was still the CID commissioner, can she still be suspended
as a senator?
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be suspended
only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been charged. Thus, it has
been held that the use of the word “office” would indicate that it applies to any office which the officer charged
may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he stands accused.
Santiago has not yet been convicted of the alleged crime, can she still be suspended?
The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-suspension proceeding
before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the strength of the
evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in
office could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records another evidence
before the court could have a valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of the case. All it
secures to the accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings against
him, such as, that he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to him
do not constitute a specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of Republic
Act No. 3019, or that the information is subject to quashal on any of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of
the Revised Rules on Criminal procedure.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
RODOLFO C. FARIÑAS, MANUEL M. GARCIA, FRANCIS G. ESCUDERO, and AGAPITO A. AQUINO, AS MEMBERS OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND ALSO AS TAXPAYERS, IN THEIR OWN BEHALF AND IN REPRESENTATION
OF THE MEMBERS OF THE MINORITY IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR., SECRETARY OF
THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY OF THE SENATE, AND SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
G.R. No. 147387 December 10, 2003
CONG. GERRY A. SALAPUDDIN, petitioner,
vs.
G.R. No. 152161
FACTS:
The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar
as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1),
Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title.
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider.
They point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and Section
67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the
use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices, while Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are
holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate
of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane
to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.
The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof
which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:
SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. – Any person holding a public appointive office or
position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in
government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy.
They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By the repeal
of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is holding is no longer
considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective officials continue in
public office even as they campaign for reelection or election for another elective position. On the other hand,
Section 66 has been retained; thus, the limitation on appointive officials remains - they are still considered ipso
facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities attended its
enactment into law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof, should be declared null and void. Even Section 16 of the
law which provides that “*t+his Act shall take effect upon its approval” is a violation of the due process clause of
the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the law before it becomes effective.
Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good law; hence,
should not have been repealed. The petitioners cited the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,[13] that
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is based on the constitutional mandate on the “Accountability of Public
Officers:”
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and
lead modest lives.
Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of Representatives acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction for not considering those members of the
House who ran for a seat in the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections as ipso facto resigned therefrom, upon
the filing of their respective certificates of candidacy.
ISSUES:
a. Whether or not Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is a Rider.
b. Whether or not Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution.
HELD:
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Not a Rider
At the core of the controversy is Section 14, the repealing clause of Rep. Act No. 9006, which provides:
Sec. 14. Sections 67 and 85 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) and Sections 10 and 11 of
Republic Act No. 6646 are hereby repealed. As a consequence, the first proviso in the third paragraph of Section 11
of Republic Act No. 8436 is rendered ineffective. All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, rules and
regulations, or any part thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified or
amended accordingly.
The repealed provision, Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, quoted earlier, reads:
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective official, whether national or local, running for
any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President,
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Not Violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. The
petitioners’ contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code pertaining to elective officials
gives undue benefit to such officials as against the appointive ones and violates the equal protection clause of the
constitution, is tenuous.
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable
classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
44
may be treated and regulated differently from the other. The Court has explained the nature of the equal
protection guarantee in this manner:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as
hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited
either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute
equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within
such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and
those who do not.
In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in constitutional law is that
the courts do not involve themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute. That is the exclusive
concern of the legislative branch of the government. When the validity of a statute is challenged on constitutional
grounds, the sole function of the court is to determine whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the limits
of legislative power. No such transgression has been shown in this case. Thus, the petitions are DISMISSED.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS) OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S.
ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B. GOROSPE and EDWIN R. SANDOVAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, HON. GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his
capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, in his Capacity as
Commissioner of Bureau of Customs, respondents
G.R. No. 166715

August 14, 2008
Facts:
This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act
(RA) 9335 (Attrition Act of 2005).
RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and
employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of
3
a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials
and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.
The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their revenue targets for the
year, as determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Any incentive or reward is
taken from the fund and allocated to the BIR and the BOC in proportion to their contribution in the excess
5
collection of the targeted amount of tax revenue.
The Boards in the BIR and the BOC are composed of the Secretary of the Department of Finance (DOF) or
his/her Undersecretary, the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) or his/her
Undersecretary, the Director General of the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) or his/her Deputy
Director General, the Commissioners of the BIR and the BOC or their Deputy Commissioners, two representatives
from the rank-and-file employees and a representative from the officials nominated by their recognized
organization.
The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) were tasked to promulgate and
8
issue the implementing rules and regulations of RA 9335, to be approved by a Joint Congressional Oversight
.
Committee created for such purpose
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA
9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law
"transform[s] the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they
will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites
corruption and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the
people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid basis

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
for classification or distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials and employees of all other
government agencies.
ISSUE: Whether or not the joint committee is valid and constitutional
Held:
Clearly, RA 9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of officials and employees of the BIR and the
BOC. The guarantee of security of tenure only means that an employee cannot be dismissed from the service for
causes other than those provided by law and only after due process is accorded the employee. In the case of RA
9335, it lays down a reasonable yardstick for removal (when the revenue collection falls short of the target by at
least 7.5%) with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection. This standard is
analogous to inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties, a ground for disciplinary action
under civil service laws. The action for removal is also subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and
compliance with substantive and procedural due process.
At any rate, this Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: "public interest," "justice and
equity," "public convenience and welfare" and "simplicity, economy and welfare." In this case, the declared policy
of optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public
interest.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the purpose of approving the
implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006,
it approved the said IRR. From then on, it became functus officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged
encroachment on the executive function of implementing and enforcing the law may be considered moot and
academic.
Hence,, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Section 12 of RA 9335 creating a Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee to approve the implementing rules and regulations of the law is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and therefore NULL and VOID. The constitutionality of the remaining provisions of
RA 9335 is UPHELD. Pursuant to Section 13 of RA 9335, the rest of the provisions remain in force and effect.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JUAN PONS, defendant-appellant
G.R. No. L-11530

August 12, 1916
FACTS:
Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On April 5, 1914, the steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived in
Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said barrels of wine were delivered to Beliso. Beliso
subsequently delivered 5 barrels to Pons’ house. On the other hand, the customs authorities noticed that the said
25 barrels listed as wine on record were not delivered to any listed merchant (Beliso not being one). And so the
customs officers conducted an investigation thereby discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually contained tins
of opium. Since the act of trading and dealing opium is against Act No. 2381, Pons and Beliso were charged for
illegally and fraudulently importing and introducing such contraband material to the Philippines. Pons appealed
the sentence arguing that Act 2381 was approved while the Philippine Commission (Congress) was not in session.
He said that his witnesses claim that the said law was passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the special session
of the Commission was adjourned at 12MN on February 28, 1914. Since this is the case, Act 2381 should be null
and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine if Act 2381 was indeed made
a law on February 28, 1914.
HELD:
The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC refused to go beyond the
recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are conclusive on the Court and to inquire into the veracity of
the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as the SC have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate
both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence,
to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate
powers and functions of the Legislature. Pons’ witnesses cannot be given due weight against the conclusiveness of
the Journals which is an act of the legislature. The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on
February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to go beyond these journals. The
SC passed upon the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
HERMINIO A. ASTORGA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of Manila, petitioner,

vs.
ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, in his capacity as Mayor of Manila, THE HON., THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ABELARDO
SUBIDO, in his capacity as Commissioner of Civil Service, EDUARDO QUINTOS, in his capacity as Chief of Police of
Manila, MANUEL CUDIAMAT, in his capacity as City Treasurer of Manila, CITY OF MANILA, JOSE SEMBRANO,
FRANCISCO GATMAITAN, MARTIN ISIDRO, CESAR LUCERO, PADERES TINOCO, LEONARDO FUGOSO, FRANCIS
YUSECO, APOLONIO GENER, AMBROCIO LORENZO, JR., ALFONSO MENDOZA, JR., SERGIO LOYOLA, GERINO
TOLENTINO, MARIANO MAGSALIN, EDUARDO QUINTOS, JR., AVELINO VILLACORTA, PABLO OCAMPO,
FELICISIMO CABIGAO, JOSE BRILLANTES, JOSE VILLANUEVA and MARINA FRANCISCO, in their capacities as
members of the Municipal Board, respondents.
G.R. No. L-23475

April 30, 1974
FACTS:
In 1964, Antonio Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued circulars to the department heads and chiefs of
offices of the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of business establishments in
Manila to disregard the provisions of Republic Act No. 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to
recall five members of the city police force who had been assigned to then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga
(assigned under authority of RA 4065).
Astorga reacted against the steps carried out by Villegas. He then filed a petition for “Mandamus,
Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction” to compel Villegas et al and
the members of the municipal board to comply with the provisions of RA 4065 (filed with the SC). In his
defense, Villegas denied recognition of RA 4065 (An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor
of the City of Manila) because the said law was considered to have never been enacted. When the this said “law”
rd
passed the 3 reading in the lower house as House Bill No. 9266, it was sent to the Senate which referred it to the
Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by then Senator Roxas. Some minor
amendments were made before the bill was referred back to the Senate floor for deliberations. During such
deliberations, Sen. Tolentino made significant amendments which were subsequently approved by the Senate. The
bill was then sent back to the lower house and was thereafter approved by the latter. The bill was sent to the
President for approval and it became RA 4065. It was later found out however that the copy signed by the Senate
President, sent to the lower house for approval and sent to the President for signing was the wrong version. It was
in fact the version that had no amendments thereto. It was not the version as amended by Tolentino and as validly
approved by the Senate. Due to this fact, the Senate president and the President of the Philippines withdrew and
invalidated their signatures that they affixed on the said law.
Astorga maintains that the RA is still valid and binding and that the withdrawal of the concerned
signatures does not invalidate the statute. Astorga further maintains that the attestation of the presiding officers
of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill’s due enactment.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4065 was validly enacted.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
HELD:
No. The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution
requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other
errors, the journal can be looked upon in this case. The SC is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill
No. 9266 signed by the President was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts
and circumstances of this case, the SC can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal
discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but
were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. Note however that the SC is not
asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law but only to declare that the bill was not duly enacted
and therefore did not become law. As done by both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive, when
they withdrew their signatures therein, the SC also declares that the bill intended to be as it is supposed to be was
never made into law. To perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous
bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended
by the law-making body.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ONOFRE P. GUEVARA, Petitioner,

vs.
RAOUL M. INOCENTES, Respondent.
G.R. No. L-25577, March 15, 1966
FACTS:
Petitioner was extended an ad interim appointment as Undersecretary of Labor by the former Executive
on November 18, 1965, having taken his oath of office on November 25 of the same year, and considering that the
ad interim appointment for the same position extended to respondent by the incumbent Executive on January 23,
1966 is invalid in spite of Memorandum Circular No. 8 issued by the latter on the same date declaring all ad interim
appointments made by the former Executive as having lapsed with the adjournment of the special session of
Congress at about midnight of January 22, 1966, petitioner brought before this Court the instant petition for quo
warranto seeking to be declared the person legally entitled to said office of Undersecretary of Labor.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not petitioner remains to be the person legally entitled to said office as Undersecretary of
Labor.
RULING:
NO. Petitioner is not legally entitled to hold office as Undersecretary of Labor.
RATIONALE: ART. VII, SEC. 10 (4) of the Constitution provides:
“The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.” It would at once reveal that it is the clear intent of the framers of our Constitution
to make a recess appointment effective only;
(a) Until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments, or
(b) Until the next adjournment of Congress, and never a day longer regardless of the nature of the session
adjourned.
The above provision contemplates two modes of termination of an ad interim appointment, or of one
made during the recess of Congress, which are completely separate from, and independent of each other, contrary
to petitioner's theory that the first mode of termination consisting in the disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments should be in separately related with the clause "until the next adjournment of Congress" in the
sense that the Commission has to be first organized in order that the last mode may operate. It is true that the
provision of the Constitution we are now considering in speaking of the mode of termination epitomized in the
phrase "until the next adjournment of the Congress" does not make any reference to any specific session of the
Congress, — whether regular or special, — but such silence is of no moment, for it is a well-known maxim in
statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish we should not distinguish.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
Indeed, when the Senate adjourned at 12:00 midnight on January 22, 1966 this adjournment should be
considered as the "next adjournment of the Congress" of the special session notwithstanding the alleged
suspension of the session earlier by the House for the reason that neither the House nor the Senate can hold
session independently of the other in the same manner as neither can transact any legislative business after the
adjournment of the other.
For one thing, between January 22, 1966 at 10:55 p.m. and January 24, 1966 at 10:35 a.m. when the
House opened its regular session, there intervened January 23, 1966, which was Sunday, and as such is expressly
excluded by the Constitution as a session day of Congress. For another, it is imperative that there be a
"constructive recess" between a special and regular session, as when a regular session succeeds immediately a
special session or vice-versa, and so a special session cannot be held immediately before a regular session without
any interruption nor can both be held simultaneously together.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
REPRESENTATIVE DANILO RAMON S. FERNANDEZ, Petitioner,

versus
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND JESUS L. VICENTE, Respondents
G.R. No. 187478, December 21, 2009
FACTS:
On the May 14, 2007 elections, petitioner filed for candidacy as Representative of the First Legislative
District of the Province of Laguna. In his Certificate of Candidacy, he indicated that he is a resident of Sta. Rosa City,
Laguna. Private respondent sought the cancellation of petitioner’s COC and the latter’s disqualification as a
candidate on the ground of an alleged material misrepresentation in his COC regarding his place of residence,
because during past elections, he had declared Pagsanjan, Laguna as his address, and Pagsanjan was located in the
Fourth Legislative District of the Province of Laguna. Private respondent likewise claimed that petitioner
maintained another house in Cabuyao, Laguna, which was also outside the First District. The petition, however,
was dismissed by COMELEC for lack of merit
On June 27, 2007, petitioner was proclaimed as the duly elected Representative of the First District of
Laguna. On July 5, 2007, private respondent filed a petition for quo warranto before the HRET praying that
petitioner be declared ineligible to hold office as a Member of the House of Representatives representing the First
Legislative District of the Province of Laguna, and that petitioner’s election and proclamation be annulled and
declared null and void. Private respondents claim that petitioner lacked the one-year residency requirement
provided under Article VI, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution. In support of his petition, private respondent argued
that petitioner falsely declared under oath: (1) his alleged Sta. Rosa residence; (2) the period of his residence in the
legislative district before May 14, 2007, which he indicated as one year and two months; and (3) his eligibility for
the office where he was seeking to be elected. Private respondent also presented testimonies of several witnesses
attesting that petitioner is not a resident of Sta. Rosa.
In order to buttress his claim that he and his family actually resided in Sta. Rosa, Laguna beginning at least
in February 2006, petitioners evidence included, among others: (a) original and extended lease contracts for a
townhouse in Villa de Toledo, Barangay Balibago, Sta. Rosa, Laguna; (b) certification issued by the President of the
Villa de Toledo Homeowners Association, Inc, that petitioner has been a resident of said Subdivision since February
2006; (c) affidavits of petitioners neighbours in Villa de Toledo attesting that petitioner has been a resident of said
subdivision since February 2006; (d) certification of the barangay chairman of Barangay Balibago, Sta. Rosa, Laguna
that petitioner is a resident of Villa de Toledo within the said barangay; (e) certificates of attendance of petitioners
children in schools located in Sta. Rosa, Laguna since 2005; and (f) DTI certificates of business issued in the name of
petitioner and his wife to show that they own and operate businesses in Sta. Rosa, Laguna since 2003.HRET ruled
in favor of private respondent
ISSUE(S):
WON petitioner sufficiently complied with the one-year residency requirement to be a Member of the
House of Representatives, as provided in the 1987 Constitution.
RULING:

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
YES. The SC found the interpretation of the HRET of the residency requirement under the Constitution to
be overly restrictive and unwarranted under the factual circumstances of this case.
SC find nothing wrong if petitioner sometimes transacted business or received visitors in his Cabuyao
house, instead of the alleged Sta. Rosa residence, as there is nothing in the residency requirement for candidates
that prohibits them from owning property and exercising their rights of ownership thereto in other places aside
from the address they had indicated as their place of residence in their COC. It also stated that there is nothing in
the Constitution or our election laws which require a congressional candidate to sell a previously acquired home in
one district and buy a new one in the place where he seeks to run in order to qualify for a congressional seat in
that other district.
Neither does the SC see the fact that petitioner was only leasing a residence in Sta. Rosa at the time of his
candidacy as a barrier for him to run in that district. It stated that the Constitution does not require a congressional
candidate to be a property owner in the district where he seeks to run but only that he resides in that district for at
least a year prior to election day. To use ownership of property in the district as the determinative indicium of
permanence of domicile or residence implies that only the landed can establish compliance with the residency
requirement. This Court would be, in effect, imposing a property requirement to the right to hold public office,
which property requirement would be unconstitutional.
In the case at bar, there are real and substantial reasons for petitioner to establish Sta. Rosa as his
domicile of choice and abandon his domicile of origin and/or any other previous domicile. To begin with, petitioner
and his wife have owned and operated businesses in Sta. Rosa since 2003. Their children have attended schools in
Sta. Rosa at least since 2005. Although ownership of property should never be considered a requirement for any
candidacy, petitioner had sufficiently confirmed his intention to permanently reside in Sta. Rosa by purchasing
residential properties in that city even prior to the May 2007 election, as evidenced by certificates of title issued in
the name of petitioner and his wife.
In all, SC found that petitioner had adequately shown that his transfer of residence to Sta. Rosa was bona
fide and was not merely for complying with the residency requirement under election laws.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
JOSELITO R. MENDOZA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROBERTO M. PAGDANGANAN, Respondent.
G.R. No. 188308, October 15, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner Mendoza and respondent Pagdanganan vied for the position of Governor of the Province of
Bulacan in the May 14, 2007 elections. The petitioner was proclaimed winning candidate and assumed the office as
Governor. The respondent seasonably filed an election protest with the COMELEC. Revision of ballots involving the
protested and counter-protested precincts soon followed. The revision was conducted at COMELEC’s office in
Intamuros. Thereafter, both parties submitted their other evidences. The formal offer of evidences was approved
and COMELEC ordered the parties to submit their memoranda. Mendoza and Pagdanganan complied with the
order and the case was then submitted for resolution.
On March 2, 2009, the COMELEC transferred the Bulacan ballot boxes, including those involved in the
provincial election contest, to the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) in connection with the protest filed by Aquilino
Pimentel III against Juan Miguel Zubiri. In light of this development, the petitioner filed to dismiss further
proceedings. On April 29, 2009, the motion filed by petitioner Mendoza was dismissed by COMELEC 2nd Division.
According to the latter, “COMELEC has plenary powers to find alternative methods to facilitate the resolution of
the election protest; thus, it concluded that it would continue the proceedings after proper coordination with the
SET.”
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the case.
RULING:
Yes. After due consideration, the Supreme Court held that the petition is bereft of merit.
These are the powers of the COMELEC as mentioned by the 1987 Constitution (Section 2, Article IX(C) of
the Constitution):
(1) Enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections;
(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all
members of the National Assembly and elective provincial and city officials; and
(3) Decide, save those involving the right to vote, administrative questions affecting elections,
including the determination of the number and location of polling places, the appointment of
election officials and inspectors, and the registration of voters.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
We state at the outset that the COMELEC did not lose jurisdiction over the provincial election contest, as
the petitioner seems to imply, because of the transmittal of the provincial ballot boxes and other election
materials to the SET. The Constitution conferred upon the COMELEC jurisdiction over election protests involving
provincial officials. The COMELEC in this case has lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter, i.e., the
provincial election contest, as well as over the parties.
Since the COMELEC action, taken by its Second Division, is authorized under the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, the Second Division cannot in any sense be said to be intruding into the COMELEC en banc rule-making
prerogative when the Second Division chose to undertake ballot appreciation within the SET premises side by side
with the SET revision of ballots. To be exact, the Second Division never laid down any new rule; it merely acted
pursuant to a rule that the COMELEC en banc itself had previously enacted.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
DARYL GRACE J. ABAYON, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, PERFECTO C. LUCABAN, JR., RONYL S. DE
LA CRUZ and AGUSTIN C. DOROGA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 189466, February 11, 2010
FACTS:
Petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list organization that won a
seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007 elections. Respondents filed a petition for quo warranto with
respondent HRET against petitioner Abayon. They claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in
the House of Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors and since
she did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an incumbent
congressional district representative.
It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of Representatives, and not Abayon who was just
its nominee. All questions involving her eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns of Aangat
Tayo.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioner Abayon.
RULING:
Yes. Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization
that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives.
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, identifies who the “members” of that House are:
- Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred
and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a partylist
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since, as
pointed out above, party-list nominees are “elected members” of the House of Representatives no less than the
district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed
and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction
begins.
The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions
for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the question
of the qualifications of petitioner Abayon.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
MARIA LOURDES B. LOCSIN, Petitioner,
versus
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and MONIQUE YAZMIN MARIA Q. LAGDAMEO,

Respondents
G.R. No. 204123, March 19, 2013
FACTS:
Locsin and Lagdameo are candidates for Rep of 1st District of Makati in the 2010 elections, Lagdameo was
proclaimed winner and Locsin came in second. Locsin filed a protest before the HRET assailing the results in all
precincts. Locsin and Lagdameo designated precincts for their respective protest and counter-protest. In the
recounts, Lagdameo’s winning margin even increased but HRET still continued revisions to prove her victory. HRET
dismissed Locsin’s petition and motion for reconsideration.
Locsin filed present petition on the ground that HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed protest, denied motion for reconsideration, admitted ballots of
Lagdameo despite Locsin’s objection and denied the latter’s ballots despite bona fide grounds for admission.
ISSUE(S):
WON the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner’s election protest.
RULING:
NO. There is no grave abuse of discretion on HRET’s part when it dismissed Locsin’s election protest.
On the jurisdiction of SC on this case (despite HRET being the sole judge in election contests): SC has
jurisdiction only when it is shown that HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
HRET took pains in reviewing the validity or invalidity of each contested ballot (ballot enumeration).
Results were explained sufficiently. It applied meticulously the existing rules and rulings on ballot appreciation for
the objected and claimed ballots of the parties. THERE IS NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot, Petitioner,
versus
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents
G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013
FACTS:
These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by 52
party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for
registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list
organizations.
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9366
and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and manifested their desire to participate in the
13 May 2013 party-list elections.
In a Resolution dated 5 December 2012, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Division’s
resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida’s (PBB) registration and accreditation as a political party in the
National Capital Region. However, PBB was denied participation in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections because
PBB does not represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector; PBB failed to apply for registration as a
party-list group; and PBB failed to establish its track record as an organization that seeks to uplift the lives of the
"marginalized and underrepresented."
These 13 petitioners (ASIN, Manila Teachers, ALA-EH, 1AAAP, AKIN, AAB, AI, ALONA, ALAM, KALIKASAN,
GUARDJAN, PPP, and PBB) were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court. The COMELEC, on 7
January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604, and excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in the printing of the
official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary evidentiary
hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that filed manifestations of intent to participate in
the 13 May 2013 party-list elections have continually complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani). The COMELEC disqualified the 39 groups and
organizations from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections:
These 39 petitioners (AKB, Atong Paglaum, ARAL, ARC, UNIMAD, 1BRO-PGBI, 1GANAP/GUARDIANS, A
BLESSED Party-List, 1-CARE, APEC, AT, ARARO, AGRI, AKMA-PTM, KAP, AKO-BAHAY, BANTAY, PACYAW, PASANG
MASDA, KAKUSA, AG, ANAD, GREENFORCE, FIRM 24-K, ALIM, AAMA, SMART, ABP, BAYANI, AANI, A-IPRA,
COCOFED, ABANG LINGKOD, ABROAD, BINHI, BUTIL, 1st KABAGIS, 1-UTAK, SENIOR CITIZENS) were able to secure a
mandatory injunction from this Court, directing the COMELEC to include the names of these 39 petitioners in the
printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ISSUE(S):
1. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of
their new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by cancellation of their existing registration and
accreditation as party-list organizations.
2. Whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections49 (BANAT) should
be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
RULING:
We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions of
this Court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. However,
since the Court adopts in this Decision new parameters in the qualification of national, regional, and sectoral
parties under the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in
disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who
are qualified to register under the partylist system, and to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list
elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.
The objective of the party list system under the 1987 constitution is to democratize political power by
giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House of
Representatives.
The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation. Simply put, the party-
list system is intended to democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative
district elections a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives.50 The voter elects two representatives in
the House of Representatives: one for his or her legislative district, and another for his or her party-list group or
organization of choice.
Both sectoral and well as non-sectoral parties are included in the party list system.
Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include not only
sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but
not the entirety, of the party-list system. As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can
participate in the party-list system “*F+or as long as they field candidates who come from the different
marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.”53
Thus, in the end, the proposal to give permanent reserved seats to certain sectors was outvoted. Instead,
the reservation of seats to sectoral representatives was only allowed for the first three consecutive terms.
There can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution expressly rejected the
proposal to make the party-list system exclusively for sectoral parties only, and that they clearly intended the
party-list system to include both sectoral and non-sectoral parties.
The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they cannot expect to win in
legislative district elections but they can garner, in nationwide elections, at least the same number of votes that
winning candidates can garner in legislative district elections. The party-list system will be the entry point to
membership in the House of Representatives for both these non-traditional parties that could not compete in
legislative district elections.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or organizations; (2)
regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or
organizations are different from sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations
need not be organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector.
What is the proof that the party list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties?
Section 5(2), article VI of the 1987 constitution which mandates that, during the first three consecutive
terms of congress after the ratification of the 1987 constitution, “one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the
religious sector.”
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three
consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, “one-half of the seats allocated to
party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except
the religious sector.” This provision clearly shows again that the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral
parties for two obvious reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be open to
non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is exclusively for sectoral
parties representing the “marginalized and underrepresented.” Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list
seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first “three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution,” clearly making the party-list system fully open after the end of the first three congressional terms.
This means that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies under
the three groups constituting the party-list system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties only, but also for
non-sectoral parties.
Political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and
policies for the general conduct of government.”
A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in
section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.”
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a “party” as “either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition
of parties.” Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides
that a “political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and
policies for the general conduct of government.” On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a
“sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5
hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.” R.A. No. 7941
provides different definitions for a political and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct from
each other.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the
“marginalized and underrepresented” sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the party-list
system to represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-
based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system. How will these ideology-based and cause-oriented
parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections, participate in the electoral process if they are excluded
from the party-list system? To exclude them from the partylist system is to prevent them from joining the

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system
is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is
clearly different from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not
represent any particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political party
must represent a “marginalized and underrepresented” sector. It is sufficient that the political party consists of
citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and policies, regardless of
their economic status as citizens.
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that “the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals.”56 The sectors mentioned in Section 5 are not all necessarily “marginalized and underrepresented.”
For sure, “professionals” are not by definition “marginalized and underrepresented,” not even the elderly, women,
and the youth. However, professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth may “lack well-defined political
constituencies,” and can thus organize themselves into sectoral parties in advocacy of the special interests and
concerns of their respective sectors.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling reason for holding that the law does not require
national or regional parties, as well as certain sectoral parties in Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, to represent the
“marginalized and underrepresented.” Section 6 provides the grounds for the COMELEC to refuse or cancel the
registration of parties or organizations after due notice and hearing.
On the contrary, to even interpret that all the sectors mentioned in Section 5 are “marginalized and
underrepresented” would lead to absurdities.
The phrase marginalized and underrepresented should refer only to the sectors in section 5 that are, by
their nature, economically “marginalized and underrepresented.”
These sectors are: labor, peasant, fisher-folk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, overseas workers, and other similar sectors.
For these sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral party must belong to the “marginalized and
underrepresented.”
The nominees of the sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or must have a track record of
advocacy for the sector represented. Belonging to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector does not mean
one must “wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity.” It is sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below the
middle class. More specifically, the economically “marginalized and underrepresented” are those who fall in the
low income group as classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board.58
How about sectoral parties of professionals, the elderly, women and the youth, do they need to be
marginalized?
No. They belong to ideology-based and cause oriented parties. Allowing them to run as party list will give
give small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies” a chance to
win seats in the house of representatives.
The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of professionals, the elderly,
women and the youth, need not be “marginalized and underrepresented” will allow small ideology-based and
cause-oriented parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies” a chance to win seats in the House of
Representatives. On the other hand, limiting to the “marginalized and underrepresented” the sectoral parties for
labor, peasant, fisher-folk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers,
and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society, will give the “marginalized and

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
underrepresented” an opportunity to likewise win seats in the House of Representatives. This interpretation will
harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will give rise to a multi-party system where those
“marginalized and underrepresented,” both in economic and ideological status, will have the opportunity to send
their own members to the House of Representatives.
Political parties can participate in the party-list elections through their sectoral wings. They cannot
directly participate because they neither lack well defined political constituencies nor represent marginalized and
underepresented sectors.
The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative district elections. Major
political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections since they neither lack “well-defined political
constituencies” nor represent “marginalized and underrepresented” sectors. Thus, the national or regional parties
under the party-list system are necessarily those that do not belong to major political parties. This automatically
reserves the national and regional parties under the party-list system to those who “lack well-defined political
constituencies,” giving them the opportunity to have members in the House of Representatives.
Political parties are allowed to participate in the party list elections through their sectoral wings in order
to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the “marginalized and
underrepresented” and to those who “lack well-defined political constituencies.”
The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in party-list elections
so as to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the “marginalized and
underrepresented” and to those who “lack well-defined political constituencies.” The participation of major
political parties in party-list elections must be geared towards the entry, as members of the House of
Representatives, of the “marginalized and underrepresented” and those who “lack well-defined political
constituencies,” giving them a voice in lawmaking.
Thus, to participate in party-list elections, a major political party that fields candidates in the legislative
district elections must organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, professional, women
or youth wing, that can register under the party-list system.
The qualification of a party-list nominee:
A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he or she seeks to
represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee one must either belong to the
sector represented, or have a track record of advocacy for such sector.
THE NEW PARAMETERS TO BE FOLLOWED BY COMELEC:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2)
regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along
sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system
and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that
fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in partylist elections only through its
sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in “well-
defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest
and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized and underrepresented” include labor,
peasant, fisher-folk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas
workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies” include professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth.

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5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they represent.
Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack “well-defined political
constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack
“well-defined political constituencies,” either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a
track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees
are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
VINZONS-CHATO, Petitioner,
versus
COMELEC, Respondents
G.R. No. 172131, April 2, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioner Chato and respondent Renato J. Unico were among the candidates for the lone congressional
district of Camarines Norte during the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections.
On May 14, 2004, at 11:30 a.m., the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) proclaimed respondent Unico as
representative-elect of the lone congressional district of Camarines Norte. On July 2, 2004, the COMELEC (First
Division) ordered the suspension of the effects of the proclamation of respondent Unico. On July 23, 2004, it lifted
the said order on the ground that respondent Unico’s proclamation and taking of oath of office had not only
divested the Commission of any jurisdiction to pass upon his election, returns, and qualifications, but also
automatically conferred jurisdiction to another electoral tribunal.
Subsequently, the COMELEC (First Division) issued the Resolution dated April 13, 2005, dismissing the
petition for lack of merit. It stated preliminarily that the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) is precluded from
entertaining pre-proclamation controversies on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody,
and appreciation of the election returns or certificates of canvass involving the positions of President, Vice-
President, Senators, and Members of the House of Representatives and Party-List.
The COMELEC (First Division) also held that the MBC or PBC had no discretion on matters pertaining to
the proclamation of the winning candidates because they were simply performing a ministerial function. Absent a
lawful order from the COMELEC to suspend or annul a proclamation, the PBC of Camarines Norte, in particular,
was mandated to comply with its duties and functions including the proclamation of respondent Unico as the
winning candidate for the lone congressional district of Camarines Norte. His petition was dismissed for utter lack
of merit.
Aggrieved, petitioner Chato filed a motion for reconsideration thereof which was elevated to the
COMELEC en banc for resolution.
ISSUE(S):
Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of jurisdiction.

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RULING:
No. In the assailed Resolution dated March 17, 2006, the COMELEC en banc denied petitioner Chato’s
motion for reconsideration ruling that the Commission already lost jurisdiction over the case in view of the fact
that respondent Unico had already taken his oath as a Member of the Thirteenth (13th) Congress. It reasoned,
thus:
In Pangilinan vs. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 105278, November 18, 1993), the Supreme Court
made a categorical pronouncement that:
The Senate and the House of Representatives now have their respective Electoral Tribunals which are the
“sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members, thereby
divesting the Commission on Elections of its jurisdiction under the 1973 Constitution over election cases pertaining
to the election of the Members of the Batasang Pambansa (Congress). It follows that the COMELEC is now bereft of
jurisdiction to hear and decide the pre-proclamation controversies against members of the House of
Representatives as well as of the Senate.
The Honorable Court reiterated the afore quoted ruling in the recent case of Aggabao vs. COMELEC, et al.
(G.R. No. 163756, January 26, 2005), where it held that:
The HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns, and
qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed,
taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
Considering that private respondent Renato Unico had already taken his oath and assumed office as
member of the 13th Congress, the Commission had already lost jurisdiction over the case.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner,
versus
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSAND JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, Respondents
G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013
FACTS:
The petitioners assail through a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction resolution of the Commission on Election ordering the cancellation of the Certificate of
Candidacy of petitioner for the position of the Representative of the lone district of Marinduque.
On October 31. 2012, Joseph Socorro Tan filed with the Comelec an Amended Petition to Deny Due
Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Regina Ongsiako Reyes, the petitioner, on the ground that it
contained material representations. On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC cancelled the certificate of candidacy of the
petitioner. She filed an MR on April 8, 2013. On May 14, 2013, COMELEC en banc denied her MR.
However, on May 18, 2013, she was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 Elections. On June 5, 2013,
COMELEC declared the May 14, 2013 Resolution final and Executory. On the same day, petitioner took her oath of
office before Feliciano Belmonte, the Speaker of the House of Representatives. She has yet to assume office at that
time, as her term officially starts at noon of June 30, 2013.According to petitioner, the COMELEC was ousted of its
jurisdiction when she was duly proclaimed20 because pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
the HRET has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the “sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications” of the Members of the House of Representatives..
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petitioner who is proclaimed as winner and who has
already taken her oath of office for the position of member of the House of Representative of Marinduque.
RULING:
Yes, COMELEC retains jurisdiction because the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is
considered a Member of the House of Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
For one to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of these
requisites: (1) valid proclamation; (2) proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.
Thus the petitioner cannot be considered a member of the HR yet as she has not assumed office yet.
Also, the 2nd requirement was not validly complied with as a valid oath must be made (1) before the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, and (2) in open session. Here, although she made the oath before Speaker

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
Belmonte, there is no indication that it was made during plenary or in open session and, thus, it remains unclear
whether the required oath of office was indeed complied.
Furthermore, petition for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and proved to
exist. For an act to be struck down as having been done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion
must be patent and gross.
Here, this Court finds that petitioner failed to adequately and substantially show that grave abuse of
discretion exists

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
WIGBERTO R. TAÑADA, JR., Petitioner,
versus
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ANGELINA D. TAN, AND ALVIN JOHN S. TANADA, Respondents
G.R. Nos. 207199-200: OCTOBER 22, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner Wigberto R. Tañada, Jr., (Wigberto) and respondents Angelina D. Tan (Angelina) and Alvin John
S. Tañada (Alvin John) were contenders for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the 4th
District of Quezon Province in the just concluded May 13, 2013 National Elections. Wigberto ran under the banner
of the Liberal Party; Alvin John was the official congressional candidate of Lapiang Manggagawa; while Angelina
was fielded by the National People Coalition.
On October 10, 2012, Wigberto filed before the COMELEC two separate petitions: first, to cancel Alvin
John CoC; and, second, to declare him as a nuisance candidate.
The COMELEC First Division dismissed both petitions for lack of merit. The COMELEC En Banc upheld
COMELEC First Division ruling. However, in SPA No. 13-056 (DC), it granted the motion for reconsideration and
cancelled Alvin John's CoC for having committed false material representations concerning his residency in
accordance with Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) of the Philippines.
On May 15, 2013, Wigberto filed a 2nd Motion for Partial Reconsideration 14 of the COMELEC En Banc
ruling in SPA No. 13-057 (DC) on the ground of newly discovered evidence.He alleged that Alvin John candidacy
was not bona fide because: (a) Alvin John was merely forced by his father to file his CoC; (b) he had no election
paraphernalia posted in official COMELEC posting areas in several barangays of Gumaca, Quezon Province; (c) he
did not even vote during the May 13, 2013 National Elections; and (d) his legal representation appeared to have
been in collusion with the lawyers of Angelina. Wigberto filed with the COMELEC En Bank an Extremely Urgent
Motion to Admit Additional and Newly Discovered Evidence and to Urgently Resolve Motion for Reconsideration
and an Urgent Manifestation and Supplemental thereto. These motions, however, remained un-acted upon until
the filing of the present petition before the Court on May 27, 2013.Thus, in order to avoid charges of forum-
shopping, said motions were withdrawn by Wigberto.
Despite Alvin John CoC due to his material representations therein, his name was not deleted from and
thus, remained printed on the ballot, prompting Wigberto to file a motion with the Provincial Board of Canvassers
of Quezon Province (PBOC) asking that the votes cast in the name of Alvin John be credited to him instead. The
PBOC, however, denied Wigberto motion. Consequently, the PBOC canvassed the votes of all three contenders
separately, and thereafter, on May 16, 2013, proclaimed Angelina as the winning candidate for the position of
Member of the House of Representatives for the 4th district of Quezon Province.
Wigberto filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Annul the Proclamation of Angelina. Wigberto then filed
certiorari case against the COMELEC En Banc Resolution declaring Alvin John not a nuisance candidate.
On July 3, 2013, Wigberto filed a Manifestation informing the Court that he had caused the filing of an
Election Protest Ad Cautelam Before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ISSUE(S): Whether or not HRET has jurisdiction over the petitioned issues.
RULING:
YES. HRET has jurisdiction over the issues.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides: The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal, shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and
the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall
be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.
Case law states that the proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election divests the
COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed
representative in favor of the HRET. The phrase election, returns and qualifications refers to all matters affecting
the validity of the contestee title. In particular, the term section refers to the conduct of the polls, including the
listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes; returns refers to
the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the winners, including questions concerning the composition of
the board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns; and qualifications refers to matters that could
be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the
inadequacy of his CoC.
In the foregoing light, considering that Angelina had already been proclaimed as Member of the House of
Representatives for the 4th District of Quezon Province on May 16, 2013, as she has in fact taken her oath and
assumed office past noon time of June 30, 2013, the Court is now without jurisdiction to resolve the case at bar. As
they stand, the issues concerning the conduct of the canvass and the resulting proclamation of Angelina as herein
discussed are matters which fall under the scope of the terms lection and returns as above-stated and hence,
properly fall under the HRET sole jurisdiction.
Petition for review on certiorari is DISMISSED.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
LORENZO M. TAÑADA and DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL, Petitioner,
versus
MARIANO JESUS CUENCO, FRANCISCO A. DELGADO, ALFREDO CRUZ, CATALINA CAYETANO, MANUEL SERAPIO,
PLACIDO REYES, and FERNANDO HIPOLITO in his capacity as cashier and disbursing officer, Respondents
G.R. No. L-10520 February 28, 1957
FACTS:
On Feb. 22, 1956, the Senate on behalf of the Nacionalista Party elected respondents Cuenco & Delgado
as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal upon the nomination of Senator Primicias, an NP member. The two
seats, originally for minority party nominees, were filled with NP members to meet the Constitutional mandate
under Sec.2 Art. 6, over the objections of lone Citizen Party Senator Tañada. Consequently, the Chairman of the
Tribunal appointed the rest of the respondents as staff members of Cuenco & Delgado. Petitioner alleges that the
nomination by Sen. Primicias on behalf of the Committee on Rules for the Senate, violates Sec. 2, Art. 6 of PC, since
3 seats on the ET are reserved for minority senators duly nominated by the minority party representatives.
Furthermore, as respondents are about to decide on Electoral Case No. 4 of Senate, the case at bar is a violation
not only of Tañada's right as CP member of ET, but respondent Macapagal's right to an impartial body that will try
his election protest. Petitioners pray for a writ of preliminary injunction against respondents (cannot exercise
duties), to be made permanent after a judgment to oust respondents is passed. Respondents contend that the
Court is without jurisdiction to try the appointment of ET members, since it is a constitutional right granted to
Senate. Moreover, the petition is without cause of action since Tañada exhausted his right to nominate 2 more
senators; he is in estoppel. They contend that the present action is not the proper remedy, but an appeal to public
opinion..
ISSUE(S):
1. WON Court has jurisdiction over the matter.

2. WON Constitutional right of CP can be exercised by NP, or the Committee on Rules for the Senate.
RULING:
1. Yes. The Court has jurisdiction. RATIO: The case at bar is not an action against the Senate compelling
them to allow petitioners to exercise duties as members of ET. The ET is part of neither House, even if the Senate
elects its members. The issue is not the power of the Senate to elect or nominate, but the validity of the manner
by which power was exercised (constitutionality).The Court is concerned with the existence and extent of said
discretionary powers.
2. No. RATIO: Although respondents allege that the Constitutional mandate of 6 Senate members in the
ET must be followed, this cannot be done without violating the spirit & philosophy of Art. 6, Sec. 2, which is to
provide against partisan decisions. The respondents' practical interpretation of the law (modifying law to fit the

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
situation) cannot be accepted; although they followed mandate on number, they disobeyed mandate on
procedure. The contention that petitioner Tañada waived his rights or is in estoppel is not tenable. When interests
of public policy & morals are at issue, the power to waive is inexistent. Tañada never led Primicias to believe that
his nominations on behalf of the CP are valid. WHEREFORE: The Senate cannot elect members of the ET not
nominated by the proper party, nor can the majority party elect more than 3 members of the ET. Furthermore, the
CRS has no standing to nominate, and the election of respondents Cuenco & Delgado void ab initio. The
appointments of the staff members are valid as it is a selection of personnel - a matter under the discretion of the
Chairman. PARAS DISSENTING: The procedure or manner of nomination cannot affect Constitution mandate that
the Senate is entitled to 6 seats in the ET. The number of seats (9) must be held fixed, since the Constitution must
have consistent application. There is no rule against the minority party nominating a majority party member to the
ET. Furthermore, the Senate, and not the parties, elect on the ET members, brushing aside partisan concerns.
LABRADOR DISSENTING: The petition itself is unconstitutional under Art. 6 Sec. 2 because: (1.) 9-member ET
mandate violated; (2.) right to elect of Senate held in abeyance by refusal of minority party to nominate; (3.)
process of nomination effectively superior to power to elect (party v. Senate power); and (4.) SC arrogation of
power in determining Con Con’s proviso of <9 ET members under certain circumstances The refusal of Tañada to
nominate must be considered a waiver of privilege based on constitutionality and reason, in order to reconcile two
applications of Art. 6, Sec. 2.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
FIRDAUSI SMAIL ABBAS, HOMOBONO A. ADAZA, ALEJANDRO D. ALMENDRAS, ABUL KAHYR D. ALONTO, JUAN
PONCE ENRILE, RENE G. ESPINA, WILSON P. GAMBOA, ROILO S. GOLEZ, ROMEO G. JALOSJOS EVA R. ESTRADA-
KALAW, WENCESLAO R. LAGUMBAY, VICENTE P. MAGSAYSAY, JEREMIAS U. MONTEMAYOR, BLAS F. OPLE,
RAFAEL P. PALMARES, ZOSIMO JESUS M. PAREDES, JR., VICENTE G. PUYAT, EDITH N. RABAT, ISIDRO S.
RODRIGUEZ, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, LORENZO G. TEVES, ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, and FERNANDO R. VELOSO,
Petitioner,
versus
THE SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, Respondent
G.R. No. 83767, October 27, 1988
FACTS:
In October 1987, Firdausi Abbas et al filed before the SET an election contest against 22 candidates of the
LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11 (1987) congressional elections by the
COMELEC. The SET was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6) Senators.
Abbas later on filed for the disqualification of the 6 senator members from partaking in the said election protest on
the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case. Abbas argue that considerations of public policy and
the norms of fair play and due process imperatively require the mass disqualification sought. To accommodate the
proposed disqualification, Abbas suggested the following amendment: Tribunal’s Rules (Section 24) —- requiring
the concurrence of five (5) members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature —- is a proviso that where
more than four (4) members are disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than
three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions. Obviously
tailored to fit the situation created by the petition for disqualification, this would, in the context of that situation,
leave the resolution of the contest to the only three Members who would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose
disqualification is not sought.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not Abbas’ proposal could be given due weight.
RULING:
The most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the Constitution
itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines
its jurisdiction and powers.
“Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members.
Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court
to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The
senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.”
It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of the SC and Members of the
Senate, the Constitution intended that both those “judicial” and “legislative” components commonly share the
duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The
legislative component herein cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election
contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution. It is not to be misunderstood in saying
that no Senator-Member of the SET may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before
said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the
resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an
objective and impartial judgment. What SC is saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the SET cannot legally
function as such; absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the
three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., REPRESENTATIVES MELVYN D. EBALLE, LEONARDO Q. MONTEMAYOR,

CRESENTE C. PAEZ, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES and PATRICIA M. SARENAS, Petitioner,
versus
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, JUSTICES JOSE A.R. MELO, VICENTE V. MENDOZA and JOSE
C. VITUG, and REPRESENTATIVES ASANI S. TAMMANG, RAUL M. GONZALES, DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN, DANTON
Q. BUESER,[1] NAPOLEON R. BERATIO, SIMEON E. GARCIA and SPEAKER MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR., Respondents
G.R. No. 141489-490. November 29, 2002
FACTS:
On 3 March 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. On 11 May 1998, in accordance with the Party-
List System Act, national elections were held which included, for the first time, the election through popular vote
of party-list groups and organizations whose nominees would become members of the House. Proclaimed winners
were 14 party-list representatives from 13 organizations, including Melvyn D. Eballe, Leonardo Q. Montemayor,
Cresente C. Paez, Loretta Ann P. Rosales and Patricia M. Sarenas from party-list groups Association of Philippine
Electric Cooperatives[5] (APEC), Alyansang Bayanihan ng mga Magsasaka, Manggagawang Bukid at Mangingisda
(ABA), NATCO Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), and Abanse! Pinay
(ABANSE). Due to the votes it garnered, APEC was able to send 2 representatives to the House, while the 12 other
party-list groups had one representative each. Also elected were district representatives belonging to various
political parties. Subsequently, the House constituted its HRET and CA contingent by electing its representatives to
these two constitutional bodies. In practice, the procedure involves the nomination by the political parties of
House members who are to occupy seats in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the
Commission on Appointments (CA). From available records, it does not appear that after the 11 May 1998
elections the party-list groups in the House nominated any of their representatives to the HRET or the CA. As of the
date of filing of the present petitions for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction,
the House contingents to the HRET and the CA were composed solely of district representatives belonging to the
different political parties. On 18 January 2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters addressed to
then Senate President Blas F. Ople, as Chairman of the CA, and to Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Jose A. R.
Melo (now retired), as Chairman of the HRET. The letters requested Senate President Ople and Justice Melo to
cause the restructuring of the CA and the HRET, respectively, to include party-list representatives to conform to
Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In its meeting of 20 January 2000, the HRET resolved to
direct the Secretary of the Tribunal to refer Senator Pimentel’s letter to the Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives. On the same day, HRET Secretary Daisy B. Panga-Vega, in an Indorsement of even date, referred
the letter to House of Representatives Secretary General Roberto P. Nazareno. On 2 February 2000, Eballe, et al.
filed with this Court their Petitions for Prohibition, Mandamus and Preliminary Injunction (with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order) against the HRET, its Chairman and Members, and against the CA, its Chairman and
Members. They contend that, under the Constitution and the Party-List System Act, party-list representatives
should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET, and 2.4 seats in the CA. They charge that the HRET, CA, et al.
committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to act positively on the letter of Senator Pimentel. In its Resolution
of 8 February 2000, the Court en banc directed the consolidation of GR 141490 with GR 141489. On 11 February
2000, Eballe et al. filed in both cases a motion to amend their petitions to implead then Speaker Manuel B. Villar,
Jr. as an additional respondent, in his capacity as Speaker of the House and as one of the members of the CA. The
Court granted both motions and admitted the amended petitions. Senator Pimentel filed the present petitions on
the strength of his oath to protect, defend and uphold the Constitution and in his capacity as taxpayer ‘and as a

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
member of the CA. He was joined by 5 party-list representatives from APEC, ABA, ABANSE, AKBAYAN and COOP-
NATCCO as co-petitioners.
ISSUE(S):
[1] Whether the present composition of the House Electoral Tribunal violates the constitutional
requirement of proportional representation because there are no party-list representatives in the HRET.
[2] Whether the refusal of the HRET and the CA to reconstitute themselves to include party-list
representatives constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
RULING:
[1] NO. The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within
constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives those who may
occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly
confers on the Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their members those who would fill the 12
seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on Appointments. Under Section 17, Article
VI of the Constitution, each chamber of Congress exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined
limits, who among their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chamber’s respective electoral
tribunal. These constitutional provisions are reiterated in Rules 3 and 4 (a) of the 1998 Rules of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is
not absolute, being subject to the mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation. However, under
the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not interfere with the exercise by the House of this
constitutionally mandated duty, absent a clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Otherwise, ‘the doctrine of separation of powers calls for each branch of
government to be left alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit. Neither can the Court speculate on what action
the House may take if party-list representatives are duly nominated for membership in the HRET and the CA. The
petitions are bereft of any allegation that respondents prevented the party-list groups in the House from
participating in the election of members of the HRET and the CA. Neither does it appear that after the 11 May 1998
elections, the House barred the party-list representatives from seeking membership in the HRET or the CA. Rather,
it appears from the available facts that the party-list groups in the House at that time simply refrained from
participating in the election process. The party-list representatives did not designate their nominees even up to the
time they filed the petitions, with the predictable result that the House did not consider any party-list
representative for election to the HRET or the CA. As the primary recourse of the party-list representatives lies
with the House of Representatives, ‘the Court cannot resolve the issues presented by petitioners at this time.
[2] There is no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and the CA in response to the
letters of Senator Pimentel. Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and their internal rules,
the HRET and the CA are bereft of any power to reconstitute themselves.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
JOSE A. ANGARA, Petitioner,
versus
THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C. MAYOR, Respondents
G.R. No. L-45081 July 15 1936
FACTS:
Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the position
of member of the National Assembly for the 1st district of Tayabas province.
On Oct 17 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the Nat'l
Assembly for garnering the most number of votes. He then took his oath of office on Nov 15th. On Dec 3rd, Nat'l
Assembly passed Res. No 8 which declared with finality the victory of Angara. On Dec 8, Ynsua filed before the
Electoral Commission a motion of protest against the election of Angara, that he be declared elected member of
the Nat'l Assembly. Electoral Commission passed a resolution in Dec 9th as the last day for the filing of the protests
against the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. On Dec 20, Angara filed
before the Elec. Commission a motion to dismiss the protest that the protest in question was filed out of the
prescribed period. The Elec. Commission denied Angara's petition.
Angara prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission
taking further cognizance of Ynsua's protest. He contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction
upon the said Electoral Commissions as regards the merits of contested elections to the Nat'l Assembly and the
Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.
.
ISSUE(S):
(1) Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
controversy.
(2) Whether or not The Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.
RULING:
(1) YES
(2) NO
In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to
determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. The court has jurisdiction
over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining
the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." (Sec 4 Art.
VI 1935 Constitution). It is held, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise
of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the election protest filed by Ynsua.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
DR. EMIGDIO A. BONDOC, Petitioner,
versus
REPRESENTATIVES MARCIANO M. PINEDA, MAGDALENO M. PALACOL, COL. JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR., or any
other representative who may be appointed vice representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., and THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, Respondents
G.R. No. 97710, Sept. 26, 1991
FACTS:
In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio Bondoc of the NP were
candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner.
Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9
members, 3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the remaining 6 are members of the House of Representatives (5
members belong to the LDP and 1 member is from the NP). Thereafter, a decision had been reached in which
Bondoc won over Pineda. Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles
of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.
On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura received a letter
informing him that he was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of
Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said political party. On the day
of the promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the Tribunal that on the
basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind
the election of Congressman Camasura to the HRET..
ISSUE(S):
1. Whether or not the House of Representatives can issue a resolution compelling HRET not to
promulgate its decision.
2. Whether or not the composition of the HRET may be affected by a change in the political alliance of its
members.
RULING:
HRET is a non-political body.
The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935
Constitution underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives (Robles vs. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990). The tribunal was created to function as a

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
nonpartisan court although two-thirds of its members are politicians. It is a non-political body in a sea of
politicians. What this Court had earlier said about the Electoral Commission applies as well to the electoral
tribunals of the Senate and House of Representatives:
Electoral tribunals are independent and impartial
The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an
independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan
consideration, and to transfer to that tribunal all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters
pertaining to contested elections of its members.
The power granted to the electoral Commission to judge contests relating to the election and qualification
of members of the National Assembly is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained in the
legislature.
Electoral tribunals as sole judge of all contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members
of the legislative houses
The Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House were created by the Constitution as special tribunals
to be the sole judge of all contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members of the legislative
houses, and, as such, are independent bodies which must be permitted to select their own employees, and to
supervise and control them, without any legislative interference. (Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81
Phil. 818.)
To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal must be independent. Its
jurisdiction to hear and decide congressional election contests is not to be shared by it with the Legislature nor
with the Courts.
The Electoral Commission is a body separate from and independent of the legislature and though not a
power in the tripartite scheme of government, it is to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its
authority, an independent organ; while composed of a majority of members of the legislature it is a body separate
from and independent of the legislature.
xxx xxx xxx
The Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ created for the specific purpose of determining contests
relating to election returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly may not be interfered with by
the judiciary when and while acting within the limits of its authority, but the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over
the Electoral Commission for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional
grant to the commission as sole judge of all contests relating to the election and qualifications of the members of
the National Assembly. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139.)
Can the House of Representatives compel the HRET not to promulgate its decision?
The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so zealously guarded by the framers of our
Constitution, would, however, by a myth and its proceedings a farce if the House of Representatives, or the
majority party therein, may shuffle and manipulate the political (as distinguished from the judicial) component of
the electoral tribunal, to serve the interests of the party in power.
Removal of HRET member for disloyalty to a party impairs HRET constitutional prerogative
The resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the House
Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of the Nacionalista Party's candidate,
Bondoc, is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge
of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives in the work of the House Electoral Tribunal
would reduce the tribunal to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP) which the three
justices of the Supreme Court and the lone NP member would be powerless to stop. A minority party candidate
may as well abandon all hope at the threshold of the tribunal.
Is disloyalty to a party a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET?
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with
complete detachment, impartiality, and independence even independence from the political party to which they
belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline," are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a
member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a conscience vote" in
favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of
the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a
violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.
HRET members enjoy security of tenure
Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it
violates Congressman Camasura's right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET as "sole judge" of
congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of
tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore, membership in the House Electoral
Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member's congressional
term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal,
formal affiliation with another political party, or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by
the House of Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another
political group. As the records of this case fail to show that Congressman Camasura has become a registered
member of another political party, his expulsion from the LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause, hence,
it violated his right to security of tenure.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
MARCELINO C. LIBANAN, Petitioner,
versus
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and JOSE T. RAMIREZ, Respondents
G.R. No. 129783. December 22, 1997
FACTS:
Petitioner Marcelino Libanan and private respondent Jose Ramirez were among the candidates for the
lone congressional seat of Eastern Samar in the May 1995 elections. After the canvass of the returns was made on
13 May 1995, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Eastern Samar proclaimed respondent Ramirez to have been
duly elected Representative of the District.
Petitioner Libanan filed an election protest before the HRET claiming, among other things, that the
absence of the BEI Chairman’s signature at the back of the ballots could not but indicate that the ballots were not
those issued to the voters during the elections thus, indicating that they were spurious and invalid. He averred that
the law would require the Chairman of the BEI to authenticate or sign the ballot before issuing it to the voter.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the ballots without the BEI Chairman’s signature are valid.
RULING:
YES. A ballot without BEI chairman’s signature at the back is valid and not spurious, provided that it bears
any one of these other authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the COMELEC watermark; and (b) in those cases where the
COMELEC watermarks are blurred or not readily apparent, the presence of red and blue fibers in the ballots. What
should, instead, be given weight is the consistent rule laid down by the HRET that a ballot is considered valid and
genuine for as long as it bears any one of these authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the COMELEC watermark, or (b)
the signature or initials, or thumbprint of the Chairman of the BEI; and (c) in those cases where the COMELEC
watermarks are blurred or not readily apparent to the naked eye, the presence of red or blue fibers in the ballots.
It is only when none of these marks appears extant that the ballot can be considered spurious and subject to
rejection.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
PERLA GARCIA, PAZ CRUZ and GERALDINE PADERNAL, Petitioner,
versus
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET) and REP. HARRY ANGPING (3rd DISTRICT
MANILA), Respondents
G.R. No. 134792. August 12, 1999
FACTS:
Harry Angpin was elected as the representative for the 3rd district of Manila. However, there has been a
petition for quo warranto filed before the HRET against Congress man Harry Angping. Petitioners questioned the
eligibility of Congressman Angping to hold office in the House of Representatives claiming that the latter was not a
natural born citizen of the Philippines, which is a constitutional requirement. Upon the petitioner’s filing of their
petition, they have paid the required 5,000php filing fee.
However, HRET issued a resolution dismissing the petition for failure to pay 5,000 php as deposit. The
petitioners then filed the cash deposit and filed for a motion for reconsideration with a receipt attached. However,
it was denied..
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the HRET has committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for quo
warranto of petitioners even after the payment of deposit fee.
RULING:
No, the HRET did not commit grave abuse in dismissing the petition. The HRET has a judgment call and has
the authority to implement its rules. As long as the exercise of such discretion is based on a well-founded factual
and legal basis, as in this case, no abuse of discretion can be imputed to the Tribunal. In view of the delicate nature
of the charge against Congressman Angpin, the observance of the HRET Rules of Procedure must be taken
seriously if they are to obtain their objective. The petitioners are duty bound to know and are expected to properly
comply with the procedural requirements laid down by the tribunal without being formally orered to do so.
Imperative justice requires the proper observance of technicalities precisely designed to ensure its proper and
swift dispensation.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
CELESTINO A. MARTINEZ III, Petitioner

vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND BENHUR L. SALIMBANGON, Respondents
G.R. No. 189034 January 12, 2010
FACTS:
In the May 14, 2007 elections, petitioner Martinez and private respondent Salimbangon were among the
candidates for Representative in the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu Province. On March 29, 2007, Edilito C.
Martinez, a resident of Barangay Tambongon, Daan-Bantayan, Cebu, filed his certificate of candidacy for the same
position.
On April 3, 2007, Martinez filed a petition to declare Edilito C. Martinez a nuisance candidate. However,
the Commission on Elections Second Division issued its Resolution declaring Edilito C. Martinez a nuisance
candidate only on June 12, 2007 or almost one (1) month after the elections.
On July 9, 2007, Salimbangon was proclaimed winner in the congressional elections for the Fourth
Legislative District of Cebu on the basis of official results showing that he garnered sixty-seven thousand two
hundred seventy-seven (67,277) votes as against Martinez who garnered sixty-seven thousand one hundred
seventy-three (67,173) votes, or a difference of one hundred four (104) votes.
Martinez filed an election protest before the HRET based on the 300 ballots more or less with only
“MARTINEZ” or “C. MARTINEZ” written on the line for Representative which the Board of Election Inspectors did
not count for Martinez on the ground that there was another congressional candidate (Edilito C. Martinez) who
had the same surname. In its decision dated May 28, 2009, the HRET sustained the BEI in considering the ballots as
stray in accordance with Sec. 211 (1) of the Omnibus Election Code. Since the name of Edilito C. Martinez was still
included in the official list of candidates on election day (May 14, 2007), the HRET held that five thousand four
hundred one (5,401) ballots with "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" only written on the line for Representative were
properly denied on the ground that there was no way of determining the real intention of the voter. The HRET
dismissed the election protest, affirmed the proclamation of Salimbangon and declared him to be the duly elected
Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu, having won by a plurality margin of 453 votes. Martinez
moved for reconsideration of the Decision, but the HRET denied it by Resolution dated July 30, 2009. Hence, this
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which seeks to nullify the decision of HRET dismissing the election protest
declaring private respondent as the duly elected Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu, and the
Resolution dated July 30, 2009 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof.
ISSUE:
What is the legal effect of declaring a nuisance candidate as such in a final judgment after the elections;
does declaration of being a nuisance candidate retroact to the day of election?

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
Should ballots containing only the similar surname of two (2) candidates be considered as stray votes or
counted in favor of the bona fide candidate? Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review
decisions of the electoral tribunal?
RULING:
Yes, the prohibition retroacts to the day of election. The prohibition against nuisance candidates is aimed
precisely at preventing uncertainty and confusion in ascertaining the true will of the electorate. Thus, in certain
situations as in the case at bar, final judgments declaring a nuisance candidate should effectively cancel the
certificate of candidacy filed by such candidate as of election day. Otherwise, potential nuisance candidates will
continue to put the electoral process into mockery by filing certificates of candidacy at the last minute and
delaying resolution of any petition to declare them as nuisance candidates until elections are held and the votes
counted and canvassed.
No, Ballots indicating only the similar surname of two (2) candidates for the same position may, in
appropriate cases, be counted in favor of the bona fide candidate and not considered stray; even if the other
candidate was declared a nuisance candidate by final judgment only after the elections.
Yes, the court has jurisdiction. We held in several cases that the judgments of the Electoral Tribunals are
beyond judicial interference, unless rendered without or in excess of their jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. The power of judicial review may be invoked in exceptional cases upon a clear showing of such arbitrary
and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a clear denial of due process of law, or upon a
demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of direction that there
has to be a remedy for such abuse. Grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion or
personal hostility.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
REPRESENTATIVE ALVIN S. SANDOVAL (Lone District of Navotas-Malabon), Petitioner

vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, JOSEPHINE VERONIQUE R. LACSON-NOEL, and HON.
SPEAKER PROSPERO NOGRALES, Respondents.
G.R. No. 190067 March 9, 2010
FACTS:
The instant case is a petition for Certiorari , praying that the Decision of the House of Representatives
2
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) dated September 24, 2009 and its Resolution dated November 12, 2009 be declared null
and void ab initio. The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Alvin S. Sandoval and private respondent Josephine Veronique R. Lacson-Noel were Candidates
for the Member of the House of Representatives, the Board of Canvassers of the Legislative District of Malabon
City-Navotas during the May 14, 2007 elections. On 19 May 2007, petitioner was proclaimed the victor in the said
election with a winning margin of One Thousand One Hundred Fifty-Nine (1,159) votes. Refusing to concede
defeat, Lacson-Noel filed a Petition of Protest on 29 May 2007. During the pendency of the hearingat the House
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) there was a lot of delays due to the fact that petitioner asked for several motions to
present evidences and witnesses. On September 24, 2009, the HRET issued the assailed Decision, declaring
Josephine Veronique Lacson-Noel is the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of Malabon City-Navotas
in the election with a winning margin of Five Hundred Forty-Two (542) votes. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration, but the same was denied per Resolution dated November 12, 2009. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
by not admitting petitioner's formal offer of evidence. Whether or not petitioner was afforded the due process he
is entitled by law.
RULING:
No, HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion. It is hornbook principle that this Court's jurisdiction to
review decisions and orders of electoral tribunals is exercised only upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion
committed by the tribunal. Absent such grave abuse of discretion, this Court shall not interfere with the electoral
tribunal’s exercise of its discretion or jurisdiction.
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction; or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility. The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
Petitioner mainly assails the Tribunal's denial of his pleas for an additional period of time within which to
make his formal offer of evidence. However, a review of the proceedings will reveal that the HRET acted in
accordance with its rules of procedure and well within its jurisdiction. Pertinent rule of HRET the issue is as follows:
Rule 59. Time Limit for Presentation of Evidence. - Each party is given a period of twenty (20) working days,
preferably successive, to complete the presentation of his evidence, including the formal offer thereof. Unless
provided otherwise, this period is terminated within two (2) months, which shall begin to run from the first date
set for the presentation of the party's evidence, either before the Tribunal or before a Hearing Commissioner.
Once commenced, presentation of the evidence-in-chief shall continue every working day until completed or until
the period granted for such purpose is exhausted. Upon motion based on meritorious grounds, the Tribunal may
grant a ten-day extension of the period herein fixed.
Petitioner was accorded several dates to present his evidence which started from September up to
December, petitioner in fact was accorded more than 3 months to present his evidence, a large leeway of time was
given, contrary to the standing rules of the tribunal.
Yes, the petitioner was afforded the due process he is entitled. The essence of due process is the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence in support of one’s defense. To be heard does not mean
verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either
through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of due process. It is quite clear from the
foregoing narration of how the proceedings were conducted that petitioner was given all the opportunity to be
heard. So many hearing dates were set for his presentation of evidence, but he merely wasted a good number of
those days. He was granted an extension of time so he could file his formal offer of evidence, but he still failed to
fulfill his responsibility.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
RENALD F. VILANDO, Petitioner

vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG AND HON. SPEAKER PROSPERO
NOGRALES, Respondents
G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149 August 23, 2011
FACTS:
st
Limkaichong ran as a representative in the 1 District of Negros Oriental. Because of this, her opponent,
Paras and some other concerned citizens filed disqualification cases against Limkaichong. They alleged that
Limkaichong was not a natural born citizen of the Philippines because when she was born her father was still a
Chinese and that her mother, lost her Filipino citizenship by virtue of her marriage to Limkaichong’s father. During
the pendency of the case against Limkaichong before the COMELEC, Election day came and votes were cast.
Results came in and Limkaichong won over her rival Paras. COMELEC after due hearing declared Limkaichong as
disqualified. Few days after the counting of votes, COMELEC declared Limkaichong as a disqualified candidate. On
the following days however, notwithstanding their proclamation disqualifying Limkaichong, the COMELEC issued a
proclamation announcing Limkaichong as the winner of the recently conducted elections. This is
in compliance with Resolution No. 8062 adopting the policy-guidelines of not suspending the proclamation of
winning candidates with pending disqualification cases which shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the
hearing and resolution of the involved cases. Paras countered the proclamation and she filed a petition before the
COMELEC. Limkaichong asailed Paras’ petition arguing that since she is now the proclaimed winner, it should be
the HRET which has the jurisdiction over the matter and not the COMELEC. COMELEC agreed with Limkaichong.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the proclamation done by COMELEC is valid. Whether or not HRET already acquired
jurisdiction. Whether or not Limkaichong is qualified to hold an office in the Republic of the Philippines
RULING:
The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid. Limkaichong timely filed with the COMELEC En Banc her
motion for reconsideration as well as for the lifting of the incorporated directive suspending her
proclamation. The filing of the motion for reconsideration effectively suspended the execution of the COMELEC’s
Joint Resolution. Since the execution of the Joint Resolution was suspended, there was no impediment to the valid
proclamation of Limkaichong as the winner pursuant to Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
The HRET must exercise jurisdiction after Limkaichong’s proclamation. The SC has invariably held that
once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of
Representatives the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the proclamation of a winning
candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should now present his case in a proper proceeding before
the HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a Member of the House of
Representatives with respect to the latter’s election, returns and qualifications. The use of the word “sole” in
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 250 of the OEC underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral
Tribunals’ jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.
Records disclose that Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City on November 9, 1959. The governing law
is the citizenship provision of the 1935 Constitution. The HRET, therefore, correctly relied on the presumption of
validity of the July 9, 1957 and September 21, 1959 Orders of the Court of First Instance (CFI) Negros Oriental,
which granted the petition and declared Julio Sy a naturalized Filipino absent any evidence to the contrary.
Respondent Limkaichong falls under the category of those persons whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(Section 1(3), Article IV, 1935 Constitution) It matters not whether the father acquired citizenship by birth or by
naturalization. Therefore, following the line of transmission through the father under the 1935 Constitution, the
respondent has satisfactorily complied with the requirement for candidacy and for holding office, as she is a
natural-born Filipino citizen.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and LAKAS-NATIONAL UNION OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS (LAKAS-

NUCD), Petitioners,
vs.
NEPTALI A. GONZALES, ALBERTO ROMULO and WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, Respondents.
NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION, petitioner-in-intervention
G.R. No. 106971 March 1, 1993
FACTS:
The mathematical representation of each of the political parties represented in the Senate for the
Commission on Appointments (CA) is as follows: LDP—7.5; LP-PDP-LABAN--.5; NPC—2.5; LAKAS-NUCD—1.5. The
LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one Senator by
adding one-half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect respondent Senator Romulo. In so doing, one other party’s
fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latter’s representation in the CA to less than their
proportional representation in the Senate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a violation of Art. VI, Sec. 18 of the Constitution regarding proportionate
representation in the Commission on Appointments.
RULING:
The respondent’s claim to membership in the Commission on Appointments by nomination and election
of the LDP majority in the Senate is not in accordance with Sec. 18 of Art. VI of the Constitution and therefore
violative of the same because it is not in compliance with the requirement that 12 senators shall be elected on the
basis of proportional representation of the political parties represented therein. To disturb the resulting fractional
membership of the political parties in the CA by adding together 2 halves to make a whole is a breach of the rule
on proportional representation because it will give the LDP an added member in the CA by utilizing the
fractional membership of the minority political party, who is deprived of half a representation. The provision of
Sec. 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in character and does not leave any discretion to the majority
party in the Senate to disobey or disregard the rule on proportional representation.
The Constitution does not require that the full complement of 12 senators be elected to
the membership in the CA before it can discharge its functions and that it is not mandatory to elect 12 senators to
the CA. The overriding directive of Art. VI, Sec. 18 is that there must be a proportional representation of the
political parties in the membership of the CA and that the specification of 12 members to constitute
its membership is merely an indication of the maximum complement allowable under the Constitution. The act of
filling up the membership thereof cannot disregard the mandate of proportional representation of the parties
even if it results in fractional membership in unusual situations. Even if the composition of the CA is fixed by
the Constitution, it can perform its functions even if not fully constituted, so long as it has the required quorum.

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SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., REPRESENTATIVES MELVYN D. EBALLE, LEONARDO Q. MONTEMAYOR,

CRESENTE C. PAEZ, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES and PATRICIA M. SARENAS, Petitioners
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, JUSTICES JOSE A.R. MELO, VICENTE V. MENDOZA and JOSE
C. VITUG, and REPRESENTATIVES ASANI S. TAMMANG, RAUL M. GONZALES, DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN, DANTON
Q. BUESER, NAPOLEON R. BERATIO, SIMEON E. GARCIA and SPEAKER MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR., Respondents.
G.R. No. 141489. November 29, 2002
FACTS:
On 3 March 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. On 11 May 1998, in accordance with the Party-
List System Act, national elections were held which included, for the first time, the election through popular vote
of party-list groups and organizations whose nominees would become members of the House. Proclaimed winners
were 14 party-list representatives from 13 organizations, including Melvyn D. Eballe, Leonardo Q. Montemayor,
Cresente C. Paez, Loretta Ann P. Rosales and Patricia M. Sarenas from party-list groups Association of Philippine
Electric Cooperatives (APEC), Alyansang Bayanihan ng mga Magsasaka, Manggagawang Bukid at Mangingisda
(ABA), NATCO Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), and Abanse! Pinay
(ABANSE).
Due to the votes it garnered, APEC was able to send 2 representatives to the House, while the 12 other
party-list groups had one representative each. Also elected were district representatives belonging to various
political parties. Subsequently, the House constituted its HRET and CA contingent by electing its representatives to
these two constitutional bodies.
In practice, the procedure involves the nomination by the political parties of House members who are to
occupy seats in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Commission on Appointments (CA).
From available records, it does not appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections the party-list groups in the House
nominated any of their representatives to the HRET or the CA. As of the date of filing of the present petitions for
prohibition and mandamus with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction, the House contingents to the HRET and
the CA were composed solely of district representatives belonging to the different political parties.
On 18 January 2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters addressed to then Senate
President Blas F. Ople, as Chairman of the CA, and to Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Jose A. R. Melo (now
retired), as Chairman of the HRET. The letters requested Senate President Ople and Justice Melo to cause the
restructuring of the CA and the HRET, respectively, to include party-list representatives to conform to Sections 17
and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In its meeting of 20 January 2000, the HRET resolved to direct the
Secretary of the Tribunal to refer Senator Pimentel’s letter to the Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives. On the same day, HRET Secretary Daisy B. Panga-Vega, in an Indorsement of even date, referred
the letter to House of Representatives Secretary General Roberto P. Nazareno.
On 2 February 2000, Eballe, et al. filed with this Court their Petitions for Prohibition, Mandamus and
Preliminary Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order) against the HRET, its Chairman and
Members, and against the CA, its Chairman and Members. They contend that, under the Constitution and the
Party-List System Act, party-list representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET, and 2.4 seats in the

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
CA. They charge that the HRET, CA, et al. committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to act positively on the
letter of Senator Pimentel.
In its Resolution of 8 February 2000, the Court en banc directed the consolidation of GR 141490 with GR
141489. On 11 February 2000, Eballe et al. filed in both cases a motion to amend their petitions to implead then
Speaker Manuel B. Villar, Jr. as an additional respondent, in his capacity as Speaker of the House and as one of the
members of the CA. The Court granted both motions and admitted the amended petitions. Senator Pimentel filed
the present petitions on the strength of his oath to protect, defend and uphold the Constitution and in his capacity
as taxpayer ‘and as a member of the CA. He was joined by 5 party-list representatives from APEC, ABA, ABANSE,
AKBAYAN and COOP-NATCCO as co-petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether the present composition of the House Electoral Tribunal violates the constitutional requirement
of proportional representation because there are no party-list representatives in the HRET.
Whether the refusal of the HRET and the CA to reconstitute themselves to include party-list
representatives constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
RULING:
No, the Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within
constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives those who may
occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly
confers on the Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their members those who would fill the 12
seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on Appointments. Under Section 17, Article
VI of the Constitution, each chamber of Congress exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined
limits, who among their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chamber’s respective electoral
tribunal. These constitutional provisions are reiterated in Rules 3 and 4 (a) of the 1998 Rules of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is
not absolute, being subject to the mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation.
However, under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not interfere with the exercise by
the House of this constitutionally mandated duty, absent a clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Otherwise, the doctrine of separation of powers calls for
each branch of government to be left alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit. Neither can the Court speculate on
what action the House may take if party-list representatives are duly nominated for membership in the HRET and
the CA. The petitions are bereft of any allegation that respondents prevented the party-list groups in the House
from participating in the election of members of the HRET and the CA. Neither does it appear that after the 11 May
1998 elections, the House barred the party-list representatives from seeking membership in the HRET or the CA.
Rather, it appears from the available facts that the party-list groups in the House at that time simply refrained from
participating in the election process. The party-list representatives did not designate their nominees even up to the
time they filed the petitions, with the predictable result that the House did not consider any party-list
representative for election to the HRET or the CA. As the primary recourse of the party-list representatives lies
with the House of Representatives, ‘the Court cannot resolve the issues presented by petitioners at this time.
No, there is no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and the CA in response to the
letters of Senator Pimentel. Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and their internal rules,
the HRET and the CA are bereft of any power to reconstitute themselves.

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THE CITY OF DAVAO, CITY TREASURER and THE CITY ASSESSOR OF DAVAO CITY, Petitioners
vs.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH XII, DAVAO CITY and THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
(GSIS), Respondents.
G.R. No. 127383 August 18, 2005
FACTS:
GSIS Davao City branch office received a Notice of Public Auction, scheduling public bidding of its
properties for non-payment of realty taxes. GSIS filed a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus and/or
Declaratory Relief with the Davao City RTC. Under Sec. 234 of the LGC, exemptions from payment of real property
taxes granted to natural or juridical persons, including GOCCs, except as provided in said section, are withdrawn
upon effectivity of LGC. GSIS being a GOCC, then it necessarily follows that its exemption has been withdrawn.
However, GSIS claimed that it retained its exemption, because two conditions had been imposed by PD 1146
before its tax exemption could be repealed: (1) Express and categorical repeal by law (2) A provision be enacted to
substitute the declared policy of exemption from any and all taxes as an essential factor for the solvency of the
GSIS fund.
RTC rendered decision in favor of GSIS. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the GSIS tax exemptions can be deemed as withdrawn by the Local Government Code.
Whether or not sec. 33 of P.D. 1146 has been repealed by the Local Government Code.
RULING:
The LGC has repealed the tax exemption of GSIS. A law cannot impose conditions for its repeal. The
Supreme Court found a fundamental flaw in Sec. 33 of PD 1146, which effectively imposes restrictions on the
competency of the Congress to enact future legislation on the taxability of GSIS. This places an undue restraint on
the plenary power of the legislature to amend or repeal laws. Only the Constitution may operate to preclude or
place restrictions on the amendment or repeal laws. These conditions imposed under P.D. 1146, if honored, have
the precise effect of limiting the powers of Congress.
The Supreme Court held that they cannot render effective Sec. 33 of PD 1146, for by doing so, they would
be giving sanction to a disingenuous means employed through legislative power to bind subsequent legislators to a
subsequent mode of repeal. Thus, the two conditions under sec. 33 cannot bear relevance whether the LGC
removed the tax-exempt status of GSIS.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
BRENDA L. NAZARETH, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, REGIONAL OFFICE
NO. IX, ZAMBOANGA CITY, Petitioner
vs.
THE HON. REYNALDO A. VILLAR, HON. JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR., (COMMISSIONERS OF THE COMMISSION ON
AUDIT), and DIR. KHEM M. INOK, Respondents
G.R. No. 188635 January 29, 2013
FACTS:
Being assailed by this petition for certiorari is the decision rendered on June 4, 2009 by the Commission
on Audit (COA) in COA Case No. 2009-045 that affirmed the issuance of notices of disallowance (NDs) by the Audit
Team Leader of COA Regional Office No. IX in Zamboanga City against the payment of benefits to covered officials
and employees of the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) for calendar year (CY) 2001 out of the savings
of the DOST. The petitioner DOST Regional Director hereby seeks to declare the decision dated June 4, 2009 "null
and void," and prays for the lifting of the disallowance of the payment of the benefits for CY2001 for being within
the ambit of Republic Act No. 8439 (R.A. No. 8439), otherwise known as the Magna Carta for Scientists, Engineers,
Researchers, and other Science and Technology Personnel in the Government (Magna Carta, for short), and on the
strength of the Memorandum of Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora dated April 12, 2000 authorizing the use
of the savings for the purpose.
Under R.A. No. 8439, the funds for the payment of the Magna Carta benefits are to be appropriated by
the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of the year following its enactment on December 22, 1997. The DOST
Regional Office No. IX in Zamboanga City released the Magna Carta benefits to the covered officials and employees
commencing in CY 1998 despite the absence of specific appropriation for the purpose in the GAA. Subsequently,
following the post-audit conducted by COA State Auditor Ramon E. Vargas on April 23, 1999, October 28, 1999,
June 20, 2000, February 27, 2001, June 27, 2001, October 10, 2001 and October 17, 2001, several Notices of
Disallowance (ND) were issued disapproving the payment of the Magna Carta benefits. The disallowance by the
COA prompted then DOST Secretary Dr. Filemon Uriarte, Jr. to request the Office of the President (OP) through his
Memorandum dated April 3, 2000 (Request for Authority to Use Savings for the Payment of Magna Carta Benefits
as provided for in R.A. 8439) for the authority to utilize the DOST’s savings to pay the Magna Carta benefits.
Through the Memorandum dated April 12, 2000, then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, acting by authority of
the President, approved the request of Secretary Uriarte, Jr.
On July 28, 2003, the petitioner, in her capacity as the DOST Regional Director in Region IX, lodged an
appeal with COA Regional Cluster Director Ellen Sescon, urging the lifting of the disallowance of the Magna Carta
benefits for the period covering CY 1998 to CY 2001 amounting to P4,363,997.47. She anchored her appeal on the
April 12, 2000 Memorandum of Executive Secretary Zamora, and cited the provision in the GAA of 1998. She
argued that the April 12, 2000 Memorandum of Executive Secretary Zamora not only ratified the payment of the
Magna Carta benefits out of the savings for CY 1998 and CY 1999 and allowed the use of the savings for CY 2000,
but also operated as a continuing endorsement of the use of savings to cover the Magna Carta benefits in
succeeding calendar years.
The appeal was referred to the Regional Legal and Adjudication Director (RLAD), COA Regional Office IX in
Zamboanga City, which denied the appeal and affirmed the grounds stated in the NDs. Not satisfied with the
result, the petitioner elevated the matter to the COA Legal and Adjudication Office in Quezon City. On September

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15, 2005, respondent Director Khem N. Inok of the COA Legal and Adjudication Office rendered a decision denying
the petitioner’s appeal with the modification that only the NDs covering the Magna Carta benefits for CY 2000
were to be set aside in view of the authorization under the Memorandum of April 12, 2000 issued by Executive
Secretary Zamora as the alter ego of the President. On December 1, 2005, the petitioner filed her motion for
reconsideration in the COA Legal and Adjudication Office-National in Quezon City. By resolution dated May 12,
2006, the COA Legal and Adjudication Office-National denied the motion for reconsideration.
Thence, the petitioner filed a petition for review in the COA Head Office, insisting that the payment of
Magna Carta benefits to qualified DOST Regional Office No. IX officials and employees had been allowed under R.A.
No. 8349. On June 4, 2009, the COA rendered the assailed decision, further modifying the decision of respondent
Director Inok by also lifting and setting aside the NDs covering the Magna Carta benefits for CY 1998 and CY 1999
for the same reason applicable to the lifting of the NDs for CY 2000, but maintaining the disallowance of the
benefits for CY 2001 on the ground that they were not covered by the authorization granted by the Memorandum
of April 12, 2000 of Executive Secretary Zamora. Hence, this special civil action for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not COA acted in grave abuse of jurisdiction in affirming the disallowance of the Magna Carta
benefits for CY 2001 despite the provisions of R.A. No. 8439, and in ruling that the Memorandum of April 12, 2000
did not cover the payment of the Magna Carta benefits for CY 2001. Whether or not the payment of Magna Carta
benefits for CYs 1998, 1999 and 2001 is valid and legal.
RULING:
No, the Commission on Audit did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The COA correctly ruled on the
matter at hand. Article VI Section 29 (1) of the 1987 Constitution firmly declares that: "No money shall be paid out
of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." This constitutional edict requires that the
GAA be purposeful, deliberate, and precise in its provisions and stipulations.
As such, the requirement under Section 20 of R.A. No. 8439 that the amounts needed to fund the Magna
Carta benefits were to be appropriated by the GAA only meant that such funding must be purposefully,
deliberately, and precisely included in the GAA. The funding for the Magna Carta benefits would not materialize as
a matter of course simply by fiat of R.A. No. 8439, but must initially be proposed by the officials of the DOST as the
concerned agency for submission to and consideration by Congress. That process is what complies with the
constitutional edict. R.A. No. 8439 alone could not fund the payment of the benefits because the GAA did not
mirror every provision of law that referred to it as the source of funding. It is worthy to note that the DOST itself
acknowledged the absolute need for the appropriation in the GAA. Otherwise, Secretary Uriarte, Jr. would not
have needed to request the OP for the express authority to use the savings to pay the Magna Carta benefits.
Verily, the COA is endowed with sufficient latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow the irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It has the power to
ascertain whether public funds were utilized for the purposes for which they had been intended by law. The
"Constitution has made the COA the guardian of public funds, vesting it with broad powers over all accounts
pertaining to government revenue and expenditures and the uses of public funds and property, including the
exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination, to establish the techniques and methods for
such review, and to promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations".
No, the payment of Magna Carta benefits for CYs 1998, 1999 and 2001 is not valid and legal. In the
funding of current activities, projects, and programs, the general rule should still be that the budgetary amount

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
contained in the appropriations bill is the extent Congress will determine as sufficient for the budgetary allocation
14
for the proponent agency. The only exception is found in Section 25 (5), Article VI of the Constitution, by which
the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions are authorized to transfer appropriations to
augment any item in the GAA for their respective offices from the savings in other items of their respective
appropriations. The plain language of the constitutional restriction leaves no room for the petitioner’s posture,
which we should now dispose of as untenable.
The claim of the petitioner that the payment of the 2001 Magna Carta benefits was upon the
authorization extended by the OP through the 12 April 2000 Memorandum of Executive Secretary Zamora was
outrightly bereft of legal basis. In so saying, she inexplicably, but self-servingly, ignored the important provisions in
the 2000 GAA on the use of savings, to wit:
Sec. 54. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional Commissions under
Article IX of the Constitution, the Ombudsman and the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights are hereby
authorized to augment any item in this Act for their respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations.
Sec. 55. Meaning of Savings and Augmentation. Savings refer to portions or balances of any programmed
appropriation in this Act free of any obligation or encumbrance still available after the completion or final
discontinuance or abandonment of the work, activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized, or
arising from unpaid compensation and related costs pertaining to vacant positions and leaves of absence without
pay.
Augmentation implies the existence in this Act of an item, project, activity or purpose with an
appropriation which upon implementation or subsequent evaluation of needed resources is determined to be
deficient. In no case, therefore, shall a non-existent item, project, activity, purpose or object of expenditure be
funded by augmentation from savings or by the use of appropriations authorized otherwise in this Act.
The purpose and conditions for which funds may be transferred were specified, i.e., transfer may be
allowed for the purpose of augmenting an item and such transfer may be made only if there are savings from
another item in the appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body. Clearly and indubitably, the
prohibition against the transfer of appropriations is the general rule. Consequently, the payment of the Magna
Carta benefits for CY 2001 without a specific item or provision in the GAA and without due authority from the
President to utilize the DOST’s savings in other items for the purpose was repugnant to R.A. No. 8439, the
Constitution, and the re-enacted GAA for 2001.

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vs.
G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013
FACTS:
This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251. The so-called pork barrel system has
been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary
funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent several legal designations from “Congressional Pork Barrel” to
the latest “Priority Development Assistance Fund” or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the
annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner: a. P70 million: for each
member of the lower house; broken down to – P40 million for “hard projects” (infrastructure projects like roads,
buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for “soft projects” (scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood
programs, IT development, etc.); b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to – P100 million for hard
projects, P100 million for soft projects; c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to – P100 million for
hard projects, P100 million for soft projects.
ISSUES:

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional. Whether or not presidential pork
barrel system is constitutional.
RULING:
No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it violates the
following principles:
barrel funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to get the
concurrence of the legislator concerned.
In addition, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant the
the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are as follows (1) Delegated legislative power to local government units but this
shall involve purely local matters; (2) Authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper
to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits,
and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government.
But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the House of Representatives, what’s happening is

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid. The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential
pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which
provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya and PAGCOR and
not from any appropriation from a particular legislation.
1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit: (i) PD
910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain energy-related ventures shall
form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy resource
development and for other purposes which the President may direct; (ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof
provides that a part of PAGCOR’s earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which
shall be used in government infrastructure projects.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, CHAIRPERSON, BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN; JUDY M. TAGUIWALO,

PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES DILIMAN, CO-CHAIRPERSON, PAGBABAGO; HENRI KAHN,
CONCERNED CITIZENS MOVEMENT; REP. LUZ ILAGAN, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY REPRESENTATIVE; REP.
CARLOS ISAGANI ZARATE, BAY AN MUNA PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE; RENATO M. REYES, JR., SECRETARY
GENERAL OF BAYAN; MANUEL K. DAYRIT, CHAIRMAN, ANG KAPATIRAN PARTY; VENCER MARI E. CRISOSTOMO,
CHAIRPERSON, ANAKBAYAN; VICTOR VILLANUEVA, CONVENOR, YOUTH ACT NOW, Petitioners,
vs.
BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; AND FLORENCIO B. ABAD, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
G.R. No. 209287 July 1, 2014
FACTS:
Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP). The DAP was seen as a
remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the Executive to realign funds from slow
moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next year’s appropriation. So what happens under the
DAP was that if a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds
allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as “savings” by the
Executive and said funds will then be allotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the
economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted
by the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA. Meanwhile, in September 2013,
Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé claiming that he, and other Senators, received Php50M from the
President as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary
Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds within the
Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA
(Cordillera People’s Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M for the
Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc. This prompted Maria
Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens to file
various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions was: DAP is
unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that “no money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on
certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the
Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President
to suspend expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively).

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ISSUE:
The issues of the case are follows: Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid
out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the executive. Whether or not the
DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is
constitutional. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
RULING:
No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the
it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional
funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been required.
Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.
No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the President’s
power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment
is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national government budget deficit (which
did not happen). Nevertheless, there’s no impoundment in the case at bar because what’s involved in the DAP
was the transfer of funds.
No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and even the
heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds,
however, such transfer or realignment should only be made “within their respective offices”. Thus, no cross-border
transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the
GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate realignment of funds to an existing
project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the Executive, these projects are non-
existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some
of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were not provided for
by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary to what was being declared by the Executive. Under the
definition of “savings” in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in the
funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer
to “savings” as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not
complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at
the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain projects in the
middle of the year and then being declared as “savings” by the Executive particularly by the DBM.
No. Un-programmed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP because under the
law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the
revenue collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such certification was secured before
unprogrammed funds were used.
Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being declared
as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
has funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may cause
more harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to
return what they received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of
Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in
the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
HON. WALDO Q. FLORES, in his capacity as Senior Deputy Executive Secretary in the Office of the President, HON.
ARTHUR P. AUTEA, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Secretary in the Office of the President, and the PRESIDENTIAL
ANTI-GRAFT COMMISSION (PAGC),
Petitioners,
VS.
ATTY. ANTONIO F. MONTEMAYOR,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 170146 August 25, 2010
FACTS:
Respondent Atty. Antonio F. Montemayor was appointed by the President as Regional Director II of BIR,
Region IV, in San Fernando, Pampanga. On January 30, 2003, the Office of the President received a letter from a
concerned citizen dated January 20, 2003 relating Montemayor’s ostentatious lifestyle which is apparently
disproportionate to his income as a public official. The letter was referred the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission
(PAGC) for appropriate action, which immediately conducted a fact-finding inquiry into the matter and
issued subpoenas duces tecum to the responsible personnel of the BIR and the Land Transportation Office (LTO).
BIR submitted to the PAGC a copy of Montemayors appointment papers along with a certified true copy of the
latter’s Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SSAL) for the year 2002. Meanwhile, the LTO, furnished the PAGC
with a record of vehicles registered to Montemayor, to wit: a 2001 Ford Expedition, a 1997 Toyota Land Cruiser, and a
1983 Mitsubishi Galant.
The Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, also submitted to the PAGC copies of Montemayors SSAL
for the years 1999, 2000 and 2001. In the1999 and 2000 SSAL, the PAGC noted that Montemayor declared his
ownership over several motor vehicles, but failed to do the same in his 2001 SSAL. On the basis of the said documents,
the PAGC charged Montemayor on May 19, 2003 for his failure to declare the 2001 Ford Expedition, and 1997 Toyota
Land Cruiser in his 2001 and 2002 SSAL. The charge was docketed as PAGC-ADM-0149-03. On the same date, the PAGC
issued an Order directing Montemayor to file his counter-affidavit or verified answer to the formal charge against him
within ten (10) days from the receipt of the Order. Montemayor, however, failed to submit his counter-affidavit or
verified answer to the formal charge lodged against him.
On June 4, 2003, Montemayor, moved to defer the administrative proceedings explaining that a petition
for certiorari before the CA questioning the PAGCs jurisdiction was already filed by him. The PAGC denied
Montemayors motion for lack of merit, and instead gave him until June 9, 2003 to submit his counter-affidavit or
verified answer. Still, no answer was filed. On June 23, 2003, the CA issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
enjoining PAGC for 60 days from the investigation. On September 12, 2003, shortly after the expiration of the sixty
(60)-day TRO, the PAGC issued a Resolution finding Montemayor administratively liable as charged and
recommending to the Office of the President Montemayors dismissal from the service.
On March 23, 2004, the Office of the President, through Deputy Executive Secretary Arthur P. Autea,
issued a Decision adopting in toto the findings and recommendation of the PAGC. Montemayor sought
reconsideration of the said decision, he argued he was denied his right to due process when the PAGC proceeded
to investigate his case notwithstanding the pendency of his petition for certiorari before the CA, and its
subsequent elevation to the Supreme Court. The motion was eventually denied. Aggrieved, Montemayor brought
the matter to the CA via a petition for review. The CA in its assailed Decision dated October 19, 2005, ruled in favor
of Montemayor hence this petition.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
REVIEW CENTER ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

CPA REVIEW SCHOOL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (CPAR), PROFESSIONAL REVIEW AND TRAINING CENTER, INC.
(PRTC), ReSA REVIEW SCHOOL, INC. (ReSA), CRC-ACE REVIEW SCHOOL, INC. (CRC-ACE), Petitioners-Intervenors.
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA and COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION represented by its
Chairman ROMULO L. NERI, Respondents.
PIMSAT COLLEGES, Respondent-Intervenor.
G.R. No. 180046 April 2, 2009
FACTS:
A cheating incident during the 2006 nursing board exam occurred wherein a handwritten copy of
questions and answers were passed around by examinees of RA Gapuz Reviewing Center during the examination
period. Upon investigation, PRC confirmed that the said incident happened. The PRC’s board of Nursing were
replaced, since the copy of the leakage was traced to two members; and the examiners were asked to retake the
exam. This also prompted President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to issue Executive Order 566 which authorized CHED
to supervise the establishment and operation of all review centers and similar entities in the Philippines. CHED
issued an IRR (CHED Memorandum Order No. 30) with respect to the said EO.
The Review Center Association of the Philippines (Petitioner), asked the CHED to “amend, if not
withdraw” the IRR arguing that giving permits to operate a review center to Higher Education institutions (HEIs) or
consortia of HEIs and professional organizations will effectively abolish independent review centers. A dialogue
between the CHED Chairman Carlitio S. Puno and Review Center’s representatives. The IRR was revised. But since
some of the requests of the Petitioner were not answered by CHED (such as lowering the required registration fee
among others), petitioner was promoted to file before the CHED a petition to clarify /amend the IRR which mainly
requests for review centers to be excluded from the coverage of CHED.
It stated that “No review center or similar entities shall be established and or operate review classes
without the favorable expressed endorsement of the CHED and without the issuance of the necessary permits or
authorizations to conduct review classes.” To Exclude the review centers would be going against the EO issued. On
October 26, 2007 the petitioner filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus before the SC praying for the
annulment of the RIRR, the declaration of EO 566 as invalid and unconstitutional, and the prohibition against CHED
from the implementing RIRR.
ISSUES:
Whether or not EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive Department of legislative power
as it expands the CHED’s jurisdiction. Whether or not the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executive’s rule making
power.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
RULING:
Yes, EO 566 is an invalid exercise of legislative power by the Executive department. The powers of the
CHED include: monitoring and the performance of programs and institutions of higher learning for appropriate
incentives as well as the imposition of sanctions such as, but not limited to diminution or widrawal of subsidy,
recommendation on the downgrading or widrawal of accreditation, program termination or school closure; and
promulgate such rules and regulations and exercise such other powers and functions as may be necessary to carry
out effectively the purpose and objectives of this act.
The OSG argues that the term “programs of higher learning” is broad enough to include Review centers.
The SC does not agree, under Sec 3 of RA 7722, CHED’s coverage shall be both public and private institutions of
higher education as well as degree- granting programs in all post- secondary educational institutions, public and
private. Neither the law nor its IRR defined the term “higher education”. But the SC defined it using verbal egis, as
a tertiary education or that which grants a degree after its completion.
The EO and the RIRR clearly expanded the scope of RA 7722 when it included review centers under the
mandate of CHED. EO 566 defined review centers under the mandate of CHED. EO 566 defined review centers as
one which offers “a program or course of study that is intended to refresh and enhance the knowledge or
competencies and skills of reviewees obtained in the formal school setting in preparation for licensure
examinations.” A review center is not an institution of higher learning as contemplated by RA 7722.
Yes, the RIRR is also an invalid exercise of the CHED’s quasi legislative power. Administrative agencies
exercise their quasi-legislative or rule making power through the promulgation of rules and regulations. The CHED
may only exercise its rule making power within the confines of its jurisdiction under RA 7722. The RIRR covers
review centers and similar entities which are neither institutions of higher education nor institutions offering
degree granting programs which, as already stated, runs counter to RA 7722. Hence the IRR is also invalid.
The court ruled that there was no delegation of police power that exists under RA 7722 authorizing the
President to regulate the operations of non-degree granting review centers. Police power primarily rests with the
legislature although it may be exercised by the President and administrative boards by virtue of a valid delegation.
Another argument by the OSG is that if there was a law which was a valid delegation of the authority to
regulate review centers it would be RA 8981 (Philippine Regulation Commission Modernization Act of 2000).
However the court ruled that the PRC has the power to preserve the integrity of licensure examination but such
power refer to the conduct of the examinations. The powers of the PRC have nothing to do with the regulation of
review centers.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
VICTORIA C. GUTIERREZ, JOEL R. PEREZ, ARACELI L. YAMBOT, CORAZON F. SORIANO, LORNA P. TAMOR,
ROMEO S. CONSIGNADO, DIVINA R. SULIT, ESTRELITA F. IRESARE, ROSALINDA L. ALPAY, AUREA L. ILAGAN AND
ALL THE OTHER CONCERNED EMPLOYEES OF THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, Petitioners,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, HONORABLE SECRETARY EMILIA T. BONCODIN AND DIRECTOR
LUZ M. CANTOR, Respondents,
G.R. No. 153266 March 18, 2010
FACTS:
This case is a consolidated petitions and class suit for all government employees, excluding the employees
of government-owned or controlled corporations and government financial institutions which questioned the
inclusion of certain allowances and fringe benefits into the standardized salary rates for offices in the national
government, state universities and colleges, and local government units as required by Republic Act (R.A.) 6758 the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 and implemented through the challenged National
Compensation Circular 59 (NCC 59). Its Section 12 consolidated allowances and additional compensation already
being enjoyed by employees into their standardized salary rates. But it exempted certain additional compensations
that the employees may be receiving from such consolidation to wit:
Section 12. Consolidation of Allowances and Compensation. -- All allowances, except for
representation and transportation allowances; clothing and laundry allowances; subsistence
allowance of marine officers and crew on board government vessels and hospital personnel;
hazard pay; allowances of foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and such other additional
compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBM, shall be
deemed included in the standardized salary rates herein prescribed. Such other additional
compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being received by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989
not integrated into the standardized salary rates shall continue to be authorized.
Pursuant to the above, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued NCC 59, covering the
offices of the national government, state universities and colleges, and local government units; it enumerated the
specific allowances and additional compensations which were deemed integrated in the basic salaries and these
included the Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) and Inflation Connected Allowance (ICA).
The DBM also issued Corporate Compensation Circular (CCC) 10, covering all government-owned or
controlled corporations and government financial institutions. The DBM re-issued this circular on February 15,
1999and published it on March 16, 1999. Accordingly, the Commission on Audit (COA) disallowed the payments of
honoraria and other allowances which were deemed integrated into the standardized salary rates. Employees of
government-owned or controlled corporations questioned the validity of CCC 10 due to its non-publication.
Meanwhile, the DBM also issued Budget Circular 2001-03 dated November 12, 2001, clarifying that only
the exempt allowances under Section 12 of R.A. 6758 may continue to be granted the employees; all others were
deemed integrated in the standardized salary rates. Thus, the payment of allowances and compensation such as

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
COLA, amelioration allowance, and ICA, among others, which were already deemed integrated in the basic salary
were unauthorized.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 12 of R.A. 6758 validly delegated to DBM power to specify such other additional
compensation that can be integrated into the standardized salary rates.
RULING:
Yes, Section 12 of R.A. 6758 validly delegated to DBM power to specify such other additional
compensation that are to be integrated into the standardized salary rates. In statutory construction grant of a
power necessarily includes incidental powers. In this case, the DBM promulgated NCC 59 (and CCC 10). But,
instead of identifying some of the additional exclusions that Section 12 of R.A. 6758 permits it to make, the DBM
made a list of what allowances and benefits are deemed integrated into the standardized salary rates. The drawing
up of the list is consistent with Section 12 above. R.A. 6758 did not prohibit the DBM from identifying for the
purpose of implementation what fell into the class of all allowances.
Delegated rule-making is a practical necessity in modern governance because of the increasing complexity
and variety of public functions. Congress has endowed administrative agencies like respondent DBM with the
power to make rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies. Such power is,
however, necessarily limited to what the law provides. Implementing rules and regulations cannot extend the law
or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute belongs to the legislature. Administrative
agencies implement the broad policies laid down in a law by filling in only its details. The regulations must be
germane to the objectives and purposes of the law and must conform to the standards prescribed by law.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and the DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF THE PORT OF SUBIC,

Petitioners,
vs.
HYPERMIX FEEDS CORPORATION,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 179579 February 1, 2012
FACTS:
On November 7, 2003, petitioner Commissioner of Customs issued CMO 27- 2003 (Customs
Memorandum order). Under the memorandum, for tariff purposes wheat is classified according to: (a) Importer or
consignee, (b) Country of Origin, (c) Port of discharge. Depending on these factors wheat could be classified as
food grade or food feed. The corresponding tariff for food grade wheat was 3%, for food feed grade 7%. A month
after the issuance of CMO 27-200 respondent filed a peptition for declaratory relief with the regional trial court of
Las Pinas City.
Respondent contended that the CMO 27-2003 was issued without following the mandate of the Revised
Administrative Code on public participation, prior notice and publication or registration with the University of
Philippines Lawcenter. Respondent also alleged that the regulation summarily adjudged it to be a feed grade
supplier without the benefit of prior assessment and examination, despite having imported food grade wheat, it
would be subjected to the 7% tariff upon the arrival of the shipment, forcing to pay 13.3%. Respondent also
claimed that the equal protection clause of the Constitution was violated and asserted that the retroactive
application of the regulation was confiscatory in nature. Petitioners filed a motion to Dismiss. They alleged: (1) The
RTC did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, (2) an action for declaratory relief was improper,
(3) CMO27-2003 was internal and administrative rule and not legislative in nature, and (4) the claims of
respondent were speculative and premature because the Bureau of Customs had yet to examine respondent’s
products. The RTC held that a petition for declaratory relief was the proper remedy, and that respondent was the
proper party to file it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CMO 27- 2003 of the petitioner met the requirements for the Revised Administrative
Code? Whether or not the content of the CMO 27- 2003 is constitutional pursuant to the requirement of the equal
protection clause.
RULING:
No, the petitioners violated respondent’s right to due process in the issuance of CMO 27- 2003when they
failed to observe the requirements under the Administrative Code to wit:

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
Sec 3. Fling. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified
copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of the effectivity of this Code which are not filed
within 3 months from that date shall not thereafter be the bases of any sanction against any party of persons.
Sec 9. Public Participation. (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable,
publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views
prior to the adoption of any rule. (2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed
rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least 2 weeks before the first hearing
thereon. (3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed.
No, CMO 27- 2003 is not constitutional because it failed to meet the equal protection clause. We do not
see how the quality of wheat is affected by who imports it, where it is discharged or which country it came from.
The equal protection clause means that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of
laws enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place in like circumstances.
The guarantee of equal protection of laws is not violated when there is a reasonable classification. For
classification to be reasonable, it must be shown that: a) It rests on substantial distinction, b) it is germane to the
purpose of the law, c) it is not limited to existing conditions only, and d) it applies equally to all members of the
same class. Petitioners violated respondent’s right to equal protection of laws when they provided for
unreasonable classification in the application of the regulation. Petitioner Commissioner of Customs went beyond
his powers of delegated authority when the regulation limited the powers of the customs officers to examine and
assess imported articles.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ALFEO D. VIVAS, ON HIS BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF THE SHAREHOLDERS OF EUROCREDIT COMMUNITY
BANK, Petitioner,
vs.
THE MONETARY BOARD OF THE BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS AND THE PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION, Respondents.
G.R. No. 191424, August 7, 2013
FACTS:
In January 2006, Vivas acquired the Rural Bank of Faire, Inc. (RBFI). Upon acquisition, Vivas initiated an
internal audit of RBFI. The audit highlighted the dismal operation of RBFI. On December 8, 2006 BSP issued a
Certificate of Authority extending the corporate life of RBFI for another 50 years. The BSP also approved the
change of its name to Euro Credit Community Bank, Inc. (ECBI). RA 7653, the new Central Bank Act, required the
General examination of certain banks including ECBI. The following are the serious finding and supervisory
concerns noted during the general examination: the negative capital of P14.674M and Capital Adequacy of
negative 16.42 %, and serious supervisory concerns on activities deemed unsafe or unsound. Because of these
findings, BSP cancelled the rediscounting line of the ECBI. Moreover, BSP directed the bank to: (1) Infuse fresh
capital of P22.643M, (2) Book the amount of P28.563M representing unbooked valuation reserves on classified
loans and other risk assests on or before October 31, 2008, and (3) Take appropriate action necessary to address
the violations/ exceptions noted in the examination. Vivas claimed that the Integrated Supervision Department II
(ISD II) took the above courses of action due to the joint influence exerted by a certain hostile shareholder and a
former BSP examiner. Vivas moved for reconsideration of such resolution for being arbitrary and violative of due
process.
BSP on the contrary, said that there are several instances that there are several instances that the BSP
invited ECBI to discuss pertinent matters but Vivas kept on posting the meeting. The Monetary Board of BSP
posited that ECBI unjustly refused to allow BSP examiners from examining and inspecting its books and records, in
violation of Sections 25 and 34 of RA No. 7653. In its letter, dated May 8, 2009, the BSP informed ECBI that it was
already due for another annual examination and that the pendency of its appeal before the Monetary Board would
not prevent the BSP from conducting another one as mandated by Section 28 of RA No. 7653.
In view of ECBI’s refusal to comply with the required examination, MB issued a resolution imposing
penalty on the ECB. In a Letter- Reply of ECBI, it asked another deferment of the examination due to the pendency
of certain unresolved issues subject of tit appeal before the MB, and because Vivas was then out of the country,
The ISD II denied ECBI’s request and ordered the general examination to proceed as previously scheduled. A
complain was filed before the DOJ for Estafa Through Falsification of Commercial Documents against certain
officials and employees of the ECBI. Eventually, the Monetary Board issued a resolution as follows: (1) To prohibit
the Eurocredit Bank from doing business in the Philippines and to place its assets and affairs under receivership;
and (2) To designate the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation as Receiver of the bank. Vivas filed a petition for
prohibition before the SC, ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the MB for prohibiting ECBI from continuing its
banking business and placing it under receivership.
ISSUES: Whether or not the Monetary Board has jurisdiction over the case. Whether or not Vivas was correct in
filing a petition for prohibition before the Supreme court.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
RULING:
Yes, the Monetary Board has jurisdiction over the case, moreover the Monetary Board (MB) may forbid a
bank from doing business and place it under receivership without prior notice and hearing. This is based on the
public policy that the masses must be protected from dangerous from financial institutions that are financial risks.
No, the petition should have been filed in the Court of Appeals. Even if treated as a petition for certiorari,
the petition should have been filed with the CA. Section 4 of Rile 65 reads: Section 4. When and where petition
filed. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In
case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty day
period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to acts or omissions of a lower court or of a
corporation, board officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as
defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or
omissions of a quasi- judicial agency, unless otherwise provided law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and
cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. That the MB is a quasi judicial agency was already settled and reiterated
in the case of Bank of Commerce vs. Planters Development Bank and Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
Even in the absence of such provision, the petition is also dismissible because it is simply ignored the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts. True, that the CA and RTC have original concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. The concurrence of jurisdiction, however does not grant the party seeking
any of the extraordinary writs the absolute freedom to file a petition in any court of his choice. The petitioner has
not advanced any special or important reason which would allow a direct resort to the Supreme Court. Under the
rules of Court, a party may directly appeal to the Supreme Court only on pure questions of law. In the case at
bench, there are certainly factual issues as Vivas is questioning the findings of the investigating team.
Strict observance of the policy of judicial hierarchy demands that where the issuance of the extraordinary
writs is also within the competence of the CA or the RTC, the special action for the obtainment of such writ must
be presented to either court. As a rule, the Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired
cannot be obtained in the appropriate lower courts; or where the exceptional and compelling circumstances, such
as cases of national interest and with serious implications, justify the availment the extraordinary remedy of the
writ or certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. The judicial policy
must be observed to prevent an imposition on the precious time and attention of the Supreme Court.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEA, WIGBERTO E. TAADA, and RONALDO B.
ZAMORA, petitioners,
vs.
JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE,
AND THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.
G.R. No. 127255

June 26, 1998
FACTS:
Petitioners seek a rehearing and reconsideration of the Courts decision dismissing their petition
for certiorari and prohibition. Basically, their contention is that when the Majority Leader (Rep. Rodolfo Albano)
moved for the approval of the conference committee report on the bill that became R.A. No. 8240, leading the
Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) to ask if there was any objection to the motion, and Rep. Joker P. Arroyo asked,
What is that, Mr. Speaker?, the Chair allegedly ignored him and instead declared the report approved.
ISSUE: WON that the question What is that, Mr. Speaker? was a privileged question or a point of order which,
under the rules of the House, has precedence over other matters. So RA 8240 was passed without compliance to the
Rules of the House of Representative or that of the Conference Committee.
RULING:
No. Arroyo’s contention lacks merit. Rule XVI, 96 of the Rules of the House of Representatives provides
that when a member desires to speak, he shall rise and respectfully address the Chair Mr. Speaker. In the other
hand, the Rules of the Senate are even more emphatic. Rule XXVI, 59 says whenever a Senator wishes to speak, he
shall rise and request the President or the Presiding Officer to allow him to have the floor which consent shall be
necessary before he may proceed. Rep. Arroyo did not have the floor. Without first drawing the attention of the
Chair, he simply stood up and started talking. As a result, the Chair did not hear him and proceeded to ask if there
were objections to the Majority Leaders motion. Hearing none, he declared the report approved.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS) OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S.
ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B. GOROSPE and EDWIN R. SANDOVAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, HON. GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his
capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, in his Capacity as
Commissioner of Bureau of Customs, respondents.
G.R. No. 166715

August 14, 2008
FACTS:
Petitioners seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335. R.A.
9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to
exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards
and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA
9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law
“transforms the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters” as they will
do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites corruption
and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the people with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the
President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR
and BOC officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall short of the target by at least
7.5%, the law does not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has
been delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy for the President to fix an
unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it
violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished and
completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight committee
permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the scope of the system of rewards and incentives limitation to officials and employees of
the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.
2. Whether or not there was an unduly delegation of power to fix revenue targets to the President.
3. Whether or not the doctrine of separation of powers has been violated in the creation of a congressional
oversight committee.
RULING:
1. No. With respect to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of the revenue-generation
capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. The equal protection clause recognizes a valid
classification, that is, a classification that has a reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary.
Since the subject of the law is the revenue- generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC,
the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the said agencies.
Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common distinct primary
function of generating revenues for the national government through the collection of taxes, customs
duties, fees and charges.
2. Yes. R.A. 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets
and the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law under Sec 2 and 4 of the said Act.
Moreover, the Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: “public interest,” “justice and
equity,” “public convenience and welfare” and “simplicity, economy and welfare.” In this case, the
declared policy of optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC
is infused with public interest.
3. The court declined jurisdiction on this case. The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was
created for the purpose of approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the
DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR. From then on, it
became functus officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive
function of implementing and enforcing the law may be considered moot and academic.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as Senate President, JUAN M.
FLAVIER, in his capacity as Senate President Pro Tempore, FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN, in his capacity as Majority
Leader, AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., in his capacity as Minority Leader, SENATORS RODOLFO G. BIAZON,
"COMPANERA" PIA S. CAYETANO, JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, LUISA "LOI" EJERCITO ESTRADA, JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, RICHARD J. GORDON, PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S.LIM, M. A. MADRIGAL, SERGIO OSMENA III,
RALPH G. RECTO, and MAR ROXAS, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
and anyone acting in his stead and in behalf of the President of the Philippines, Respondents.
G.R. No. 169777

April 20, 2006
FACTS:
This case is regarding the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National
Machinery and Equipment Group as well as the Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP, and the Fertilizer scam. The
Senate Committees sent invitations to various officials of the Executive Department and AFP officials for them to
appear before Senate on Sept. 29, 2005. Before said date arrived, Executive Sec. Ermita sent a letter to Senate
President Drilon, requesting for a postponement of the hearing on Sept. 29 in order to “afford said officials ample
time and opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they may better enlighten the Senate
Committee on its investigation.” Senate refused the request. On Sept. 28, 2005, the President issued EO 464,
effective immediately, which, among others, mandated that “all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of
the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress.”
Pursuant to this Order, Executive Sec. Ermita communicated to the Senate that the executive and AFP officials
would not be able to attend the meeting since the President has not yet given her consent. Despite the lack of
consent, Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani, among all the AFP officials invited, attended the investigation. Both
faced court marshal for such attendance. Hence, these petitions.
ISSUES:
1. WON EO 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress

2. WON EO 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern
3. WON respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they implemented EO 464 prior to its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation.

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RULING:
The power of inquiry. The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Sec. 21, Art. VI. But as
early as 1950 (the 1935 Constitution did not contain a similar provision) in Arnault v. Nazareno, the Court already
recognized that the power of inquiry is inherent in the power to legislate xxx That this power of inquiry is broad
enough to cover officials of the executive branch may be deduced from the same case. The power of inquiry... is
co-extensive with the power to legislate. The matters which may be a proper subject of legislation and those which
may be a proper subject of investigation are one. It follows that the operation of government, being a legitimate
subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation. xxx the power of inquiry, “with process to enforce it,” is
grounded on the necessity of the information in the legislative process. If the information possessed by executive
officials on the operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity of reasoning,
Congress has the right to that information and the power to compel the disclosure thereof.
The power of inquiry is subject to judicial review xxx the right of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation is, in theory, no less susceptible to abuse than executive or judicial power. It may thus be subjected to
judicial review pursuant to the Court’s certiorari powers under Sec. 1, Art. VIII. For one... the inquiry itself might
not properly be in aid of legislation, and thus beyond the constitutional power of Congress. Such inquiry could not
usurp judicial functions. Parenthetically, one possible way for Congress to avoid such a result... is to indicate in its
invitations to the public officials concerned, or to any person for that matter, the possible needed statute which
prompted the need for the inquiry. Given such statement in its investigations, along with the usual indication of
the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof, there would be less room for
speculation on the part of the person invited on whether the inquiry is in aid of legislation. Sec. 21, Art. VI likewise
establishes crucial safeguards that proscribe the legislative power of inquiry. The provision requires that the
inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate or House’s duly published rules of procedure, necessarily implying
the constitutional infirmity of an inquiry conducted without duly published rules of procedure. Sec. 21 also
mandates that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected, an imposition that
obligates Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights.
Exemption to power of inquiry. Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized
exemptions to the power of inquiry, which exemptions falls under the rubric of “executive privilege.”
Executive privilege, defined. Schwartz defines executive privilege as “the power of the Government to
withhold information from the public, the courts, and the Congress.” Similarly, Rozell defines it as “the right of the
President and high-level executive branch officers to withhold information from Congress, the courts, and
ultimately the public.”
Kinds of executive privilege. One variety of the privilege...is the state secrets privilege...on the ground
that the information is of such nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial military or diplomatic objectives.
Another variety is the informer’s privilege, or the privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of
persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that law. Finally,
a generic privilege for internal deliberations has been said to attach to intragovernmental documents reflecting
advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental
decisions and policies are formulated.
That a type of information is recognized as privileged does not, however, necessarily mean that it would
be considered privileged in all instances. For in determining the validity of a claim of privilege, the question that

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must be asked is not only whether the requested information falls within one of the traditional privileges, but also
whether that privilege should be honored in a given procedural setting.
The principle of executive privilege. Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or
the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. While executive
privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to
justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are
exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the
extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive
secrecy and in favor of disclosure.
Xxx When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves
therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads.
Only one executive official may be exempted from this power – the President on whom executive power is vested,
hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the
highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is
sanctioned by a long-standing custom. By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from
this power of inquiry. Unlike the Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial body; hence, each member
thereof is exempt on the basis not only of separation of powers but also on the fiscal autonomy and the
constitutional independence of the judiciary.
Constitutionality of Sec. 1, EO 464. Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Sec. 22 of Art. VI and the
absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in its application to
appearances of department heads in the question hour contemplated in the provision of said Sec. 22, Art. VI xxx
The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the
question hour, is valid on its face. For under Sec. 22, Art. VI, the appearance of department heads in the question
hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in
inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department
head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President
herself or by the Executive Secretary.
Validity of Sec. 2 and 3, EO 464. En passant, the Court notes that Section 2(b) of EO 464 virtually states
that executive privilege actually covers persons. Such is a misuse of the doctrine. Executive privilege...is properly
invoked in relation to specific categories of information and not to categories of persons.
The claim of executive privilege must be accompanied by specific allegation of basis thereof. Certainly,
Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information privileged. It does not
suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is so, and that
the President has not overturned that determination. Such declaration leaves Congress in the dark on how the
requested information could be classified as privileged. That the message is couched in terms that, on first
impression, do not seem like a claim of privilege only makes it more pernicious. It threatens to make Congress
doubly blind to the question of why the executive branch is not providing it with the information that it has
requested.
A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation to disclose information, must,
therefore, be clearly asserted xxx Absent then a statement of the specific basis of a claim of executive privilege,
there is no way of determining whether it falls under one of the traditional privileges, or whether, given the

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circumstances in which it is made, it should be respected xxx Upon the other hand, Congress must not require the
executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information
which the privilege is meant to protect. A useful analogy in determining the requisite degree of particularity would
be the privilege against self-incrimination xxx The claim of privilege under Sec. 3, EO 464 in relation to Sec. 2(b) is
thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the
claim, it merely invokes EO 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her consent. It is
woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding of information is justified under the
circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress.
In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of EO 464 must be invalidated. EO 464 unlawfully delegated authority
to the heads of offices in Sec. 2(b) to determine certain information as privileged. Section 2(b) in relation to
Section 3 virtually provides that, once the head of office determines that a certain information is privileged, such
determination is presumed to bear the President’s authority and has the effect of prohibiting the official from
appearing before Congress, subject only to the express pronouncement of the President that it is allowing the
appearance of such official. These provisions thus allow the President to authorize claims of privilege by mere
silence.
Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to the exception nature of the privilege. Executive
privilege...is recognized with respect to information the confidential nature of which is crucial to the fulfillment of
the unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch, or in those instances where exemption from
disclosure is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities. The doctrine of executive
privilege is thus premised on the fact that certain informations (sic) must, as a matter of necessity, be kept
confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to
disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public
interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the
President the power to invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the
privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is “By order of the
President,” which means that he personally consulted with her. The privilege being an extraordinary power, it
must be wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not
authorize her subordinates to exercise such power.
How executive privilege should be applied in the case of an official xxx when an official is being
summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own judgment, might be covered by executive privilege, he must
be afforded reasonable time to inform the President or the Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking
the privilege. This is necessary in order to provide the President or the Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to
consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. If, after the lapse of that reasonable
time, neither the President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to
respect the failure of the official to appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal means
to compel his appearance.
Right to Information. There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the right of Congress to
information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information
does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the right to

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information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials. These powers belong only to
Congress and not to an individual citizen. Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the
people, it does not follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the
people are exercising their right to information.
To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public, however, any
executive assistance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations necessarily deprives
the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public
concern. The citizens are thereby denied access to information which they can use in formulating their own
opinions on the matter before Congress – opinions which they can then communicate to their representatives and
other governmental officials through various legal means allowed by their freedom of expression.
The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of EO 464 is, therefore, in the
sense explained above, just as direct as its violation of the legislature’s power of inquiry.
Implementation of EO 464 prior to its publication. While EO 464 applies only to officials of the executive
branch, it does not follow that the same is exempt from the need for publication. On the need for publishing even
those statutes that do not directly apply to people in general, Tanada v. Tuvera states: “The term ‘laws’ should
refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in
general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a
particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be
said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people.
The subject of the law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the
political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in courts of justice.
Although the above statement was made in reference to statutes, logic dictates that the challenged order
must be covered by the publication requirement. As explained above, EO 464 has a direct effect on the right of the
people to information on matters of public concern. It is, therefore, a matter of public interest which members of
the body politic may question before this Court. Due process thus requires that the people should have been
apprised of this issuance before it was implemented.

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THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE, represented by its Chairman, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL,
JR., Petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE B. MAJADUCON, Presiding Judge of Branch 23, Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, and ATTY.
NILO J. FLAVIANO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 136760

July 29, 2003
FACTS:
This case had its aegis when the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee conducted an inquiry into the alleged
mismanagement of the funds and investment of the Armed Forces Retirement and Separation Benefits System
(AFP-RSBS). During the public hearings by the Blue Ribbon Committee, it appeared that the AFP-RSBS purchased a
lot from Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano worth P10,500 per square meter. However, the deed of sale filed with the Register of
Deeds indicated that the purchase price of the lot was only P3,000 per square meter. The Committee caused the
service of a subpoena to Atty. Flaviano, directing him to appear and testify before it. Respondent refused to
appear and filed a petition for prohibition and preliminary injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order
with the RTC of General Santos City. The trial court issued a TRO directing the committee to cease and desist from
proceeding with the inquiry. The Committee filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and
failure to state a valid cause of action. The Trial Court denied the motion to dismiss. Hence, this petition for
certiorari alleging that Judge Majaducon committed grave abuse of discretion and acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction.
ISSUES: Whether or not respondent Judge Jose Majaducon committed grave abuse of discretion when he dismissed
the petition for prohibition and issued the writ of preliminary injunction.
RULING:
The assailed resolution of respondent Judge Majaducon was issued without legal basis. The principle of
separation of powers essentially means that legislation belongs to Congress, execution to the Executive, and
settlement of legal controversies to the Judiciary. Each is prevented from invading the domain of the others. When
the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee served subpoena on respondent Flaviano to appear and testify before it in
connection with its investigation of the alleged misuse and mismanagement of the AFP-RSBS funds, it did so
pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. This is clearly provided in Article 6, Section 21 of
the 1987 Constitution: The Senate of the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. Hence, the RTC of General Santos City, or any

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
court for that matter, had no authority to prohibit the Committee from requiring respondent t appear and testify
before it. Also, the ruling in Bengzon vs. Blue Ribbon Committee cited by the respondent does not apply in this
case. The factual circumstances therein are different from those in the case at bar. In Bengzon, no intended
legislation was involved and the subject matter of the inquiry was more within the province of the courts rather
than the legislature. On the other hand, there was in this case a clear legislative purpose, and this is to look into
the reported misuse and mismanagement of the AFP-RSBS funds, with the intention of enacting appropriate
legislation to protect the rights and interests of the officers and members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
Wherefore, the petition is GRANTED.

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B/GEN. (RET.) FRANCISCO V. GUDANI AND LT. COL. ALEXANDER F. BALUTAN Petitioners,
vs.
LT./GEN. GENEROSO S. SENGA CORONA, AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE CARPIO-MORALES, ARMED FORCES OF THE
CALLEJO, SR., PHILIPPINES, COL. GILBERTO AZCUNA, JOSE C. ROA AS THE PRE-TRIAL TINGA, INVESTIGATING
OFFICER, THE CHICO-NAZARIO, PROVOST MARSHALL GENERAL GARCIA, and OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND THE GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL, Respondents.
G.R. No. 170165

August 15, 2006
FACTS:
The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election fraud and the
surfacing of the “Hello Garci” tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of the executive department including
the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her consent. AFP Chief of Staff Gen.
Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from appearing before the Senate
Committee without Presidential approval. However, the two appeared before the Senate in spite the fact that a
directive has been given to them. As a result, the two were relieved of their assignments for allegedly violating the
Articles of War and the time honoured principle of the “Chain of Command.” Gen. Senga ordered them to be
subjected before the General Court Martial proceedings for willfuly violating an order of a superior officer.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the AFP preventing them
from testifying before a legislative inquiry.
RULING:
Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as
commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military
justice. At the same time, any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer
against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military
official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President
is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military
officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully
execute.
SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior consent on
executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court
recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be formally

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invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying
before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s power as commander-in-chief to
control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The President’s prerogatives as commander-in-
chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.
At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress
is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature’s functions is the conduct
of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the President’s power as
commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congress’s right to
conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway
despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that the President
has the right to require prior consent from members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.
The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of
the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with the notion of officers
appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the final
orders of the courts.

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In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of CAMILO L. SABIO v.
HON. SENATOR RICHARD J. GORDON, et al.
G.R. No. 174340 17

October 2006,
FACTS:
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced Senate Res. No. 455 “directing an
inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications
Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings
Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors.”
Pursuant to this, on May 8, 2006, Senator Richard Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo Sabio of the PCGG inviting him
to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. Chairman Sabio declined the invitation
because of prior commitment. At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 “No member or staff of the
Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding
concerning matters within its official cognizance.” Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGG’s unhampered
performance of its task. Gordon’s Subpoenae Ad Testificandum was repeatedly ignored by Sabio hence he
threatened Sabio to be cited with contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4 of EO No. 1 is constitutional.
HELD:
No. It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive
construal. The Court’s high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it
categorically ruled that “the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch.” Verily,
the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that “the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for
legislation, is a proper subject for investigation” and that “the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to
legislate”. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full
public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
Article III, Section 7 The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

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These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in the
operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to enable them to exercise
effectively their constitutional rights. Armed with the right information, citizens can participate in public
discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and their effective implementation.

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ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner,

vs.
SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON
TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, respondents.
G.R. No. 180643

March 25, 2008
FACTS:
On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract
with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National
Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The
Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China. The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the
NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and
power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA. Neri, the head of
NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was
interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in
exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the
bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to
answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that the
communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita
be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until
such time that he would appear and give his testimony.
ISSUES: Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive privilege?
RULING:
The communications are covered by executive privilege. The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive
officials and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among
others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in
any way diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings.

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The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power
textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under
our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic
powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy
greater confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications privilege:

1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.”
2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the President or
the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the
President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a
showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important evidence” and by
the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground that the
communications elicited by the three (3) questions “fall under conversation and correspondence between the
President and public officials” necessary in “her executive and policy decision-making process” and, that “the
information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s
Republic of China.” Simply put, the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on
matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3) questions
are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a “quintessential
and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other
countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the
Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are
“received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be
considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing
of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner’s claim of executive privilege violates the
constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.50 We might have
agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself available
to them during the September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he
expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those
covered by his claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III provides: The
right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and
to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research
data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.

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VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY,
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND
ELECTORAL REFORMS, respondents.
G.R. No. 170338

December 23, 2008
FACTS:
Tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between the President of the
Philippines and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. The tapes, notoriously
referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the President’s instructions to COMELEC Commissioner
Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These recordings were to
become the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of both Houses of
Congress.
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he is summoned to attend
the Senate hearings without being apprised not only of his rights therein through the publication of the Senate
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which underpins
the investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure of public
funds involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings.
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general
circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which
the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of
these rules when they first opened their session.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that
the rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to
anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web page.
ISSUES: Whether or not publication of the Rules of Procedures Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation through the
Senate’s website, satisfies the due process requirement of law.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
RULING:
The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet form available at
the Senate, is not sufficient under the Tañada v. Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that the rules "shall take
effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation," precluding any other form of
publication. Publication in accordance with Tañada is mandatory to comply with the due process requirement
because the Rules of Procedure put a person’s liberty at risk. A person who violates the Rules of Procedure could
be arrested and detained by the Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more
incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent
of a written document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in
evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents. It does not make
the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the
Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of
inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules,
because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., petitioner,

JOSE CONCEPCION, JR., JOSE DE VENECIA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, DR. JAIME Z. GALVEZ-TAN, FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, FRISCO SAN JUAN, NORBERTO M. GONZALES, HONESTO M. GUTIERREZ, ISLETA, AND JOSE A.
BERNAS, Petitioners-in-Intervention,
vs.
G.R. No. 163193

June 15, 2004
FACTS:
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8436 authorizing the COMELEC to use an
automated election system (AES) for the process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidating the
results of the national and local elections. It also required the COMELEC to acquire automated counting machines
(ACMs), computer equipment, devices and materials and adopt new electoral forms and printing materials.
The COMELEC initially intended to implement the said automation during the May 11, 1998 presidential elections,
particularly in counting the votes collected from the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). However,
the failure of the machines to correctly read a number of automated ballots discontinued its implementation.
Contributions for the establishment of the AES persisted that even President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
issued Executive Order No. 172 on January 24, 2003, allocating the sum of P2,500,000,000 to exclusively fund the
AES in time for the May 10, 2004 elections. On February 10, 2003, upon the request of the COMELEC, President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 175 authorizing the release of a further supplemental P500
million budget for the AES project of the COMELEC.
The Supreme Court resolved the COMELEC to maintain the old and manual voting and counting system
for the May 10, 2004 elections after contract negations with companies Mega Pacific Consortium (the supplier of
the computerized voting/counting machines) were discontinued. Despite this impediment, the COMELEC
nevertheless continued the electronic transmission of advanced unofficial results of the 2004 elections for
national, provincial and municipal positions, also dubbed as an "unofficial quick count."
Petitioner contends that the respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of Jurisdiction in the issuance of Resolution No. 6712. Respondent COMELEC contends that its advancement
in tabulation procedures is allowed within the statutory confines of section 52 (i) of the Omnibus Election Code
that:
Prescribe(s) the use or adoption of the latest technological and electronic devices, taking into account the situation
prevailing in the area and the funds available for the purpose. Provided, That the Commission shall notify the
authorized representatives of accredited political parties and candidates in areas affected by the use or adoption of
technological and electronic devices not less than thirty days prior to the effectivity of the use of such devices.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ISSUE: WON Resolution No. 6712 dated April 28, 2004 issued by the COMELEC in authorizing the use of election
funds in consolidating the election results for the May 10, 2004 elections should be declared VOID, as it is
unconstitutional.
RULING:
YES. For violating section 4 of Article VII. The said Resolution No. 6712 preempts the sole authority of the
Congress to canvass the votes of the election returns for the President and the Vice-President. Art. VII, Sec. 4 of
the 1987: Resolution Preempts the sole and exclusive authority vested in the Congress to canvass the votes for the
election of President and Vice-President. It is a grave error on the part of the respondent to have ignored the
misapprehensions addressed by Senate President Franklin M. Drilon to COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos
during the 2004 saying that such act would be in violation of the Constitution (section 4 of Article VII): "any quick
count to be conducted by the Commission on said positions would in effect constitute a canvass of the votes of the
President and Vice-President, which not only would be pre-emptive of the authority of Congress, but would also be
lacking of any constitutional authority."
The existence of an accredited Citizen’s arm: Under Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166, as amended by Rep.
Act No. 8173, and reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436, the accredited citizen’s arm - in this case,
NAMFREL - is exclusively authorized to use a copy of the election returns in the conduct of an "unofficial" counting
of the votes, whether for the national or the local elections. No other entity, including the respondent COMELEC
itself, is authorized to use a copy of the election returns for purposes of conducting an "unofficial" count.
In addition, the second or third copy of the election returns, while required to be delivered to the
COMELEC under the said laws, are not intended for undertaking an "unofficial" count. The said copies are archived
and unsealed only when needed by to verify election results in connection with resolving election disputes that
may be established.
Inapplicability of Section 52(i) of the Omnibus Election Code: The Court contends that Section 52(i) of the
Omnibus Election Code, which is cited by the COMELEC as the statutory basis for the assailed resolution, does not
cover the use of the latest technological and election devices for "unofficial" tabulations of votes. Moreover, the
COMELEC failed to notify the authorized representatives of accredited political parties and all candidates in areas
affected by the use or adoption of technological and electronic devices not less than thirty days prior to the
effectivity of the use of such devices, after failing to submit any document proving that it had notified all political
parties of the intended adoption of Resolution No. 6712.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan), a JUNK VFA MOVEMENT, BISHOP TOMAS MILLAMENA (Iglesia Filipina
Independiente), BISHOP ELMER BOLOCAN (United Church of Christ of the Phil.), DR. REYNALDO LEGASCA, MD,
KILUSANG MAMBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS, KILUSANG MAYO UNO, GABRIELA, PROLABOR, and the PUBLIC
INTEREST LAW CENTER, petitioners,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RONALDO ZAMORA, FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY DOMINGO SIAZON, DEFENSE
SECRETARY ORLANDO MERCADO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, SENATE PRESIDENT MARCELO FERNAN,
SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON, SENATOR BLAS OPLE, SENATOR RODOLFO BIAZON, and SENATOR FRANCISCO
TATAD, respondents.
G.R. No. 138570

October 10, 2000
FACTS:
The United States panel met with the Philippine panel to discussed, among others, the possible elements
of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This resulted to a series of conferences and negotiations which culminated
on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed
by Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard. Pres. Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA on
October 5, 1998 and on May 27, 1999, the senate approved it by (2/3) votes.
Petitioners, among others, assert that Sec. 25, Art XVIII of the 1987 constitution is applicable and not
Section 21, Article VII.
Following the argument of the petitioner, under they provision cited, the “foreign military bases, troops,
or facilities” may be allowed in the Philippines unless the following conditions are sufficiently met:
a) it must be a treaty,
b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum held for that purpose if so required by congress, and
c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that, what is requires for
such treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the senate.
ISSUE: Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution?

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
RULING:
Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops or
facilities should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense, however, the provisions of
section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining the
number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the senate.
The Constitution, makes no distinction between “transient” and “permanent.” We find nothing in section
25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines.
It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because,
under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ROLEX SUPLICO, Petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, represented by NEDA SECRETARY ROMULO L. NERI, and
the NEDA-INVESTMENT COORDINATION COMMITTEE, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC), represented by DOTC SECRETARY LEANDRO MENDOZA, including the COMMISSION
ON INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, headed by its Chairman, RAMON P. SALES, THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS OFFICE, BIDS AND AWARDS FOR INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY
(ICT), headed by DOTC ASSISTANT SECRETARY ELMER A. SONEJA as Chairman, and the TECHNICAL WORKING
GROUP FOR ICT, AND DOTC ASSISTANT SECRETARY LORENZO FORMOSO, AND ALL OTHER OPERATING UNITS OF
THE DOTC FOR INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and ZTE CORPORATION, AMSTERDAM
HOLDINGS, INC., AND ALL PERSONS ACTING IN THEIR BEHALF, Respondents.
G.R. No. 178830

July 14, 2008
FACTS:
Triple petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with application for the issuance of a TRO
and/or preliminary injunction were filed and consolidated in the SC. The prayers of the said petitions, among
others, sought the annulment of the award of the contract for the national broadband network to respondent ZTE
Corporation and to enjoin any activity in connection with the said deal.
On October 2, 2007, during a meeting, Pres. GMA, acting in her official capacity informed Pres. Hu Jintao
of China that the Philippine Government had decided not to continue with the ZTE-NBN project. Later, the Solicitor
General made a manifestation and motion stating that in an Indorsement by the Legal Division of the DOTC, it has
been informed that the Philippine Government has decided not to continue with the ZTE-NBN Project. That said,
there is no more justiciable controversy for the Court to resolve. The public respondents then prayed that the
present petitions be dismissed.
The petitioners, in their respective replies, argued that the Indorsement is self-serving and not a sufficient
basis that the deal has been permanently scrapped. Assuming arguendo that the petition has become moot, the
Court may still take cognizance thereof to educate the bench and the bar. Further, because of the transcendental
importance of the issues raised, the Court should take cognizance of this case despite its apparent mootness.
The petitioners ultimately contended the declarations made by officials belonging to the executive branch
on the Philippine Government’s decision not to continue with the ZTE-NBN Project are self-serving, hence,
inadmissible.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ISSUE: WON the Court may take judicial notice of the acts of President GMA?
RULING:
The SC dismissed the petition. It held that It has no alternative but to take judicial notice of the official act
of the President.
Under the Section 1 Rule 129, it is mandatory and the Court has no alternative but to take judicial notice
of the official acts of the President of the Philippines, who heads the executive branch of our government. It is
further provided in the said rule that the court shall take judicial notice of the foregoing facts without introduction
of evidence. Since we consider the act of cancellation by President Macapagal-Arroyo of the proposed ZTE-NBN
Project during the meeting of October 2, 2007 with the Chinese President in China as an official act of the
executive department, the Court must take judicial notice of such official act without need of evidence.
Moreover, under Section 2, paragraph (m) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the official duty of the
executive officials of informing this Court of the government’s decision not to continue with the ZTE-NBN Project is
also presumed to have been regularly performed, absent proof to the contrary. The Court finds no factual or legal
basis to disregard this disputable presumption in the present instance.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
SUZETTE NICOLAS y SOMBILON, Petitioner,

vs.
ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs; RAUL GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary
of Justice; EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary; RONALDO PUNO, in his capacity as
Secretary of the Interior and Local Government; SERGIO APOSTOL, in his capacity as Presidential Legal Counsel;
and L/CPL. DANIEL SMITH, Respondents.
G.R. No. 175888

February 11, 2009
FACTS:
st
On the 1 of November 2005, Daniel Smith committed the crime of rape against Nicole. He was convicted
of the said crime and was ordered by the court to suffer imprisonment. Smith was a US serviceman convicted of a
crime against our penal laws and the crime was committed within the country’s jurisdiction. But pursuant to the
VFA, a treaty between the US and Philippines, the US embassy was granted custody over Smith. Nicole, together
with the other petitioners appealed before the SC assailing the validity of the VFA. Their contention is that the VFA
was not ratified by the US senate in the same way our senate ratified the VFA.
ISSUE: Is the VFA void and unconstitutional & whether or not it is self-executing.
RULING:
The VFA is a self-executing Agreement because the parties intend its provisions to be enforceable,
precisely because the VFA is intended to carry out obligations and undertakings under the RP-US Mutual Defense
Treaty. As a matter of fact, the VFA has been implemented and executed, with the US faithfully complying with its
obligation to produce Smith before the court during the trial.
The VFA is covered by implementing legislation inasmuch as it is the very purpose and intent of the US
Congress that executive agreements registered under this Act within 60 days from their ratification be immediately
implemented. The SC noted that the VFA is not like other treaties that need implementing legislation such as the
Vienna Convention. As regards the implementation of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, military aid or assistance
has been given under it and this can only be done through implementing legislation. The VFA itself is another form
of implementation of its provisions.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO TAÑADA III, RONALD LLAMAS, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ
BUTUYAN, ROGER R. RAYEL, GARY S. MALLARI, ROMEL REGALADO BAGARES, CHRISTOPHER F.C.
BOLASTIG, Petitioners,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO
ERMITA, HON. AVELINO CRUZ II, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, CHIEF OF
STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents.
G.R. No. 171396

May 3, 2006
FACTS:
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle
I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation
1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress
lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all permits
issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit,
Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest.
Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they
seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya)
was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however
grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit
him in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.
In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist. David
and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot
be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a
declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are
those of natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth
because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become
moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred
that PP 1017 is within the president’s calling out power, take care power and take over power.
ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
RULING:
PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly unconstitutional.
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in fact
operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take
cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some
provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A
reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the
events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the
escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military,
particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also
the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance
between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any
contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military
aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms and do
nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the
exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing ‘on their faces’
statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily ‘freedom of speech’ cases. Also, a
plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is
actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth
doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that ‘reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining
comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Undoubtedly, lawless violence,
insurrection and rebellion are considered ‘harmful’ and ‘constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Thus, claims of
facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only ‘spoken
words’ and again, that ‘overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against
ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct.’ Here, the incontrovertible fact remains
that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the
President’s ‘calling-out’ power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that ‘this does not
prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it
was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP
1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a ‘sequence’ of graduated powers. From
the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
that ‘whenever it becomes necessary,’ the President may call the armed forces ‘to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion.’ And such criterion has been met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
nd
Pursuant to the 2 sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the
Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the
clause ‘to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction.’ The SC noted that such provision is similar to the power that granted former
President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate ‘decrees.’ Legislative power is peculiarly
within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that ‘*t+he legislative power shall be
vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.’ To be
sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify GMA’*s exercise of legislative
power by issuing decrees. The president can only “take care” of the carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact
laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the Daily
Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the
constitution is not limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the
president can declare the state of national emergency but her exercise of emergency powers does not come
automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority from Congress must be based
on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise
of the calling out power of the president by the president.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
CHIEF JUSTICE RENATO C. CORONA, Petitioner,

vs.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES sitting as an IMPEACHMENT COURT, BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PHILIPPINE
SAVINGS BANK, ARLENE "KAKA" BAG-AO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, MARILYN PRIMICIAS-AGABAS, NIEL TUPAS,
RODOLFO FARINAS, SHERWIN TUGNA, RAUL DAZA, ELPIDIO BARZAGA, REYNALDO UMALI, NERI COLMENARES
(ALSO KNOWN AS THE PROSECUTORS FROM THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES), Respondents.
G.R. No. 200242
July 17, 2012
FACTS:
The former Chief Justice of this Court, Renato C. Corona, assails the impeachment case initiated by the
respondent Members of the House of Representatives (HOR) and trial being conducted by respondent Senate of
the Philippines. Petitioner received a copy of the complaint charging him with culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of public trust and graft and corruption. Petitioner concluded that the move to impeach him
was the handiwork of President Aquino’s party mates and supporters, including "hidden forces" who will be
benefited by his ouster.
Respondent Senate of the Philippines acting as an Impeachment Court, commenced trial proceedings
against the petitioner. Petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition claiming that his right to due process is being
violated in the ongoing impeachment proceedings because certain Senator-Judges have lost the cold neutrality of
impartial judges by acting as prosecutors.
The Solicitor General argues that the instant petition raises matters purely political in character which
may be decided or resolved only by the Senate and HOR, with the manifestation that the comment is being filed by
the respondents "without submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the Honorable Supreme Court and without
conceding the constitutional and exclusive power of the House to initiate all cases of impeachment and of the
Senate to try and decide all cases of impeachment."
Traversing the allegations of the petition, respondents assert that the Impeachment Court did not commit
any grave abuse of discretion; it has, in fact, been conducting the proceedings judiciously. Respondents maintain
that subjecting the ongoing impeachment trial to judicial review defeats the very essence of impeachment. They
contend that the constitutional command of public accountability to petitioner and his obligation to fully disclose
his assets, liabilities and net worth prevail over his claim of confidentiality of deposits; hence, the subpoena subject
of this case were correctly and judiciously issued. Considering that the ongoing impeachment proceedings, which
was initiated and is being conducted in accordance with the Constitution, simply aims to enforce the principle of
public accountability and ensure that the transgressions of impeachable public officials are corrected, the injury
being claimed by petitioner allegedly resulting from the impeachment trial has no factual and legal basis. It is thus
prayed that the present petition, as well as petitioner’s prayer for issuance of a TRO/preliminary injunction, be
dismissed.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ISSUE: WON the certiorari jurisdiction (power to review) of this Court may be invoked to assail matters or incidents
arising from impeachment proceedings, and to obtain injunctive relief for alleged violations of right to due process
of the person being tried by the Senate sitting as Impeachment Court.
HELD:
The present petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief/s is DISMISSED on the
ground of MOOTNESS.
The impeachment trial had been concluded with the conviction of petitioner by more than the required
majority vote of the SenatorJudges. Petitioner immediately accepted the verdict and without any protest vacated
his office. In fact, the Judicial and Bar Council is already in the process of screening applicants and nominees, and
the President of the Philippines is expected to appoint a new Chief Justice within the prescribed 90-day period
from among those candidates shortlisted by the JBC. Unarguably, the constitutional issue raised by petitioner had
been mooted by supervening events and his own acts.
Impeachment, described as "the most formidable weapon in the arsenal of democracy,"14 was foreseen
as creating divisions, partialities and enmities, or highlighting pre-existing factions with the greatest danger that
"the decision will be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties, than by the real demonstrations of
innocence or guilt."15 Given their concededly political character, the precise role of the judiciary in impeachment
cases is a matter of utmost importance to ensure the effective functioning of the separate branches while
preserving the structure of checks and balance in our government. Moreover, in this jurisdiction, the acts of any
branch or instrumentality of the government, including those traditionally entrusted to the political departments,
are proper subjects of judicial review if tainted with grave abuse or arbitrariness.
Respondents contend that the issues raised in the Supplemental Petition regarding the behavior of certain
Senator-Judges in the course of the impeachment trial are issues that do not concern, or allege any violation of,
the three express and exclusive constitutional limitations on the Senate’s sole power to try and decide
impeachment cases. They argue that unless there is a clear transgression of these constitutional limitations, this
Court may not exercise its power of expanded judicial review over the actions of Senator-Judges during the
proceedings. By the nature of the functions they discharge when sitting as an Impeachment Court, Senator-Judges
are clearly entitled to propound questions on the witnesses, prosecutors and counsel during the trial. Petitioner
thus failed to prove any semblance of partiality on the part of any Senator-Judges. But whether the Senate
Impeachment Rules were followed or not, is a political question that is not within this Court’s power of expanded
judicial review.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner,

vs.
FLORITA A. MASING and JOCELYN A. TAYACTAC, respondents.
G.R. No. 165416
January 22, 2008
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner,
vs.
FLORITA A. MASING, respondent.
G.R. No. 165584
January 22, 2008
PAUL L. CANSINO, FELICIDAD MOJICA, VENERANDO MOJICA and RICARTE L. MAMPARO, petitioners,
vs.
FLORITA A. MASING and JOCELYN A. TAYACTAC, respondents.
G.R. No. 165731

January 22, 2008
FACTS:
The case had its inception on 29 December 1999, when twenty-two officials and employees of the Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman (OMB) for the Visayas, led by its two directors, filed a formal complaint2 with the
Office of the Ombudsman requesting an investigation on the basis of allegations that then Deputy Ombudsman for
the Visayas, herein private respondent Arturo Mojica, committed the following: 1. Sexual harassment against Rayvi
Padua-Varona; 2. Mulcting money from confidential employees James Alueta and Eden Kiamco; and Page 13 of 23
#799 – Paul Jared Ng (Batch 8) 3. Oppression against all employees in not releasing the P7,200.00 benefits of OMB-
Visayas employees on the date the said amount was due for release.
Acting on the formal complaint against petitioner, the Ombudsman directed his Fact-Finding and
Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) to conduct a verification and fact-finding investigation on the matter. The FFIB, later in
its Report, found the evidence against Petitioner strong on the charges of acts of extortion, sexual harassment and
oppression. The FFIB report was referred by the Ombudsman to a constituted Committee of Peers composed of
the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, The Special Prosecutor and the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military.
The Committee of Peers initially recommended that the investigation be converted into one solely for
purposes of impeachment. However, this recommendation was denied by the Ombudsman after careful study, and
following the established stand of the Office of the Ombudsman that the Deputy Ombudsmen and The Special
Prosecutor are not removable through impeachment.
The undersigned members of the COP find sufficient cause to warrant the conduct of preliminary
investigation and administrative adjudication against Deputy Ombudsman Arturo C. Mojica for the following
criminal and administrative offenses, namely: I. CRIMINAL Violation of Section 3, paragraph[s] (b) and (e) of R.A.
3019 (AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act); Violation of R.A. 7877 (Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995), II.
ADMINISTRATIVE a. Dishonesty b. Grave Misconduct c. Oppression d. Conduct grossly prejudicial to the best
interest of the service e. Directly or indirectly having financial and material interest in any transaction requiring the
approval of his Office; (Section 22, paragraphs (A), (C), (N), (T) and (U), Rule XIV of Executive Order No. 292,

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
otherwise known as the "Administrative Code of 1987".) The criminal case as well as the administrative case
against the petitioner was set aside and declared null and void.
ISSUE: WON the Deputy Ombudsman is an impeachable officer under Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution
HELD:
The 1987 Constitution, the deliberations thereon, and the opinions of constitutional law experts all
indicate that the Deputy Ombudsman is not an impeachable officer.
Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, states that: Sec. 2. The President, the Vice-President, the
members of the Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be
removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees
may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
Moreover, this Court has likewise taken into account the commentaries of the leading legal luminaries on
the Constitution as to their opinion on whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman is impeachable. All of them agree
in unison that the impeachable officers enumerated in Section 2, Article XI of the 1986 Constitution is exclusive. In
their belief, only the Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable. Foremost among them is the erudite Justice
Isagani A. Cruz (ret.), who opined:
The impeachable officers are the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President, the members of the
Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman. (see Art. XI, Sec. 2) The list
is exclusive and may not be increased or reduced by legislative enactment. The power to impeach is essentially a
non-legislative prerogative and can be exercised by the Congress only within the limits of the authority conferred
upon it by the Constitution. This authority may not be expanded by the grantee itself even if motivated by the
desire to strengthen the security of tenure of other officials of the government. ***As to whether or not the
private respondent, then Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, may be held criminally and/or administratively
liable, we likewise resolve the issue in favor of the petitioner.
The rule that an impeachable officer cannot be criminally prosecuted for the same offenses which
constitute grounds for impeachment presupposes his continuance in office.34 Hence, the moment he is no longer
in office because of his removal, resignation, or permanent disability, there can be no bar to his criminal
prosecution in the courts. Nor does retirement bar an administrative investigation from proceeding against the
private respondent, given that, as pointed out by the petitioner, the former’s retirement benefits have been
placed on hold in view of the provisions of Sections 1236 and 1337 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
WHEREFORE, the Order of the Court of Appeals dated 18 December 2000 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The complaints in Criminal Case No. OMB-0-00-0615 and Administrative Case No. OMB-ADM-0-00-0316 are
hereby REINSTATED and the Office of the Ombudsman is ordered to proceed with the investigation relative to the
above cases.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
EMILIO A. GONZALES III, Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, ACTING THROUGH AND REPRESENTED BY EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., SENIOR DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY JOSE AMOR M. AMORANDO,
OFFICER-IN-CHARGE - OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS, ATTY. RONALDO A.
GERON, DIR. ROWENA TURINGAN-SANCHEZ, AND ATTY. CARLITO D. CATAYONG, Respondents.
G.R. No. 196231
January 28, 2014
WENDELL BARRERAS-SULIT Petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., IN HIS CAP A CITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ATTY.
DENNIS F. ORTIZ, ATTY. CARLO D. SULAY AND ATTY. FROILAN D. MONTALBAN, JR., IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS
CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF OFFICE OF MALACANANG LEGAL AFFAIRS,Respondents.
G.R. No. 196232
Facts:
These two petitions have been because they raise a common thread of issues relating to the President's
exercise of the power to remove from office herein petitioners who claim the protective cloak of independence of
the constitutionally-created office to which they belong – the Office of the Ombudsman.
The cases, G.R. No. 196231 and G.R. No. 196232 primarily seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section
8(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989,which gives the President
the power to dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman of the Office of the Ombudsman. FACTS: G.R. No. 196231:
A formal charge for Grave Misconduct (robbery, grave threats, robbery extortion and physical injuries)
was filed before PNP-NCR against Manila Police District Senior Inspector (P/S Insp.) Rolando Mendoza and four
others. Private complainant, Christian M. Kalaw, before the Office of the City Prosecutor, filed a similar charge.
While said cases were still pending, the Office of the Regional Director of the National Police Commission (NPC)
turned over, upon the request of petitioner Gonzales III, all relevant documents and evidence in relation to said
case to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for appropriate administrative adjudication. Subsequently a case for
Grave Misconduct was lodged against P/S Page 14 of 23 #799 – Paul Jared Ng (Batch 8) Insp. Rolando Mendoza and
his fellow police officers in the Office of the Ombudsman.
Meanwhile, the case filed before the Office of the city Prosecutor was dismissed upon a finding that the
material allegations made by the complainant had not been substantiated "by any evidence at all to warrant the
indictment of respondents of the offenses charged." Similarly, the Internal Affairs Service of the PNP issued a
Resolution recommending the dismissal without prejudice of the administrative case against the same police
officers, for failure of the complainant to appear in three (3) consecutive hearings despite due notice. However,
upon the recommendation of petitioner Gonzales III, a Decision finding P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow
police officers guilty of Grave Misconduct was approved by the Ombudsman. Mendoza and his colleagues filed for
a motion for reconsideration which was forwarded to Ombudsman Gutierrez for final approval, in whose office it
remained pending for final review and action when P/S Insp. Mendoza hijacked a bus-load of foreign tourists on
that fateful day of August 23, 2010 in a desperate attempt to have himself reinstated in the police service.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, which ended in the tragic murder of eight HongKong
Chinese nationals, the injury of seven others and the death of P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza, a public outcry against
the blundering of government officials prompted the creation of the Incident Investigation and Review Committee
(IIRC). It was tasked to determine accountability for the incident through the conduct of public hearings and
executive sessions.
The IIRC found Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable negligence and gross
violation of their own rules of procedure by allowing Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to languish for more
than nine (9) months without any justification, in violation of the Ombudsman prescribed rules to resolve motions
for reconsideration in administrative disciplinary cases within five (5) days from submission. The inaction is gross,
considering there is no opposition thereto. The prolonged inaction precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-
taking. Petitioner was dismissed from service. Hence the petition. G.R. No. 196232:
Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman charged Major General Carlos F.
Garcia, his wife Clarita D. Garcia, their sons Ian Carl Garcia, Juan Paulo Garcia and Timothy Mark Garcia and several
unknown persons with Plunder and Money Laundering before the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan denied
Major General Garcia's urgent petition for bail holding that strong prosecution evidence militated against the grant
of bail. However, the government, represented by petitioner, Special Prosecutor Barreras-Sulit and sought the
Sandiganbayan's approval of a Plea Bargaining Agreement ("PLEBARA") entered into with the accused. The
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding the change of plea warranted and the PLEBARA compliant with
jurisprudential guidelines.
Outraged by the backroom deal that could allow Major General Garcia to get off the hook with nothing
but a slap on the hand notwithstanding the prosecution's apparently strong evidence of his culpability for serious
public offenses, the House of Representatives' Committee on Justice conducted public hearings on the PLEBARA.
At the conclusion of thesepublic hearings, the Committee on Justice passed and adopted Committee Resolution
No. 3,recommending to the President the dismissal of petitioner Barreras-Sulit from the service and the filing of
appropriate charges against her Deputies and Assistants before the appropriate government office for having
committed acts and/or omissions tantamount to culpable violations of the Constitution and betrayal of public
trust, which are violations under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and grounds for removal from office
under the Ombudsman Act. Hence the petition.
ISSUE: Whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary power over a
Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally-created Office of the Ombudsman
HELD:
YES. The Ombudsman's administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor is not exclusive. While the Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively is extensive and covers
all government officials, whether appointive or elective, with the exception only of those officials removable by
impeachment such authority is by no means exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist that they should be solely and
directly subject to the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. For, while Section 21 of R.A. 6770 declares the
Ombudsman's disciplinary authority over all government officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the
President express power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. A harmonious
construction of these two apparently conflicting provisions in R.A. No.6770 leads to the inevitable conclusion that
Congress had intended the Ombudsman and the President to exercise concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction over

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
petitioners as Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, respectively. Indubitably, the manifest intent of
Congress in enacting both provisions - Section 8(2) and Section 21 - in the same Organic Act was to provide for an
external authority, through the person of the President, that would exercise the power of administrative discipline
over the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in the least diminishing the constitutional and
plenary authority of the Ombudsman over all government officials and employees. Such legislative design is simply
a measure of "check and balance" intended to address the lawmakers' real and valid concern that the Ombudsman
and his Deputy may try to protect one another from administrative liabilities.
By granting express statutory power to the President to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special
Prosecutor, Congress merely filled an obvious gap in the law. The Power of the President to Remove a Deputy
Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor is implied from his Power to Appoint. Granting the President the Power to
Remove a Deputy Ombudsman does not diminish the Independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Petitioner Gonzales may not be removed from office where the questioned acts, falling short of
constitutional standards, do not constitute betrayal of public trust. The Office of the President is vested with
statutory authority to proceed administratively against petitioner Barreras-Sulit to determine the existence of any
of the grounds for her removal from office as provided for under the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act.
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 19623, the decision of the Office of the President in OP Case No. 10-J-460 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE . Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III is ordered REINSTATED with payment of backwages
corresponding to the period of suspension effective immediately, even as the Office of the Ombudsman is directed
to proceed with the investigation in connection with the above case against petitioner. In G.R. No. 196232, We
AFFIRM the continuation of OP-DC Case No. 11-B-003 against Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit for alleged
acts and omissions tantamount to culpable violation of the Constitution and a betrayal of public trust, in
accordance with Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act is hereby DENIED.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,

NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND
MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED
BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
G.R. No. 160261

November 10, 2003
Facts:
On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the
11th Congress.
On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice
“to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment
complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for
“culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.” The complaint was
endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in
accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October
2003 that the first impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,” but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October
2003 for being insufficient in substance.
The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary
General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged
results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment
complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least 1/3 of all the
Members of the House of Representatives.
Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the
House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment
complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that “*n+o
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.”

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
Issues:
1. Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable
offenses under the Constitution.
2. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress
are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.
3. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Rulings:
1. This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of the judicial power of the
Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
1. Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a determination of what constitutes
an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the
Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
2. Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis
mota or crux of the controversy.
2. The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is unconstitutional.
1. Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on
impeachment is limited by the phrase “to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.”
Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were
intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other
specific limitations on its power to make rules.
2. It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as
alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary implication have
the power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.
3. It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the
meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been
initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one
year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
2. Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2,
2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition
against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a
one-year period.
Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved
by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ Petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, RISA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, DANILO D. LIM,
FELIPE PESTAÑO, EVELYN PESTAÑO, RENATO M. REYES, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAGONG ALYANSANG
MAKABAYAN (BAYAN); MOTHER MARY JOHN MANANZAN, CO-CHAIRPERSON OF PAGBABAGO; DANILO RAMOS,
SECRETARY-GENERAL OF KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP); ATTY. EDRE OLALIA, ACTING SECRETARY
GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLE'S LAWYERS (NUPL); FERDINAND R. GAITE, CHAIRPERSON,
CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE);
and JAMES TERRY RIDON OF THE LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS), Respondents.
FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., Respondent-Intervenor.
G.R. No. 193459

February 15, 2011
Doctrine: x x x We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere. As pointed
out in Francisco, the impeachment proceeding is not initiated “when the House deliberates on the resolution
passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has already been done.
The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather,
the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice
for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.”
Facts:
On July 22, 2010, private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, et.al. (Baraquel group) filed an
impeachment complaint against petitioner. On August 3, 2010, private respondents Renato Reyes et.al. (Reyes
group) filed another impeachment complaint. Both impeachment complaints were endorsed by different Party-List
Representatives.
On August 10, 2010, House Majority Leader Neptali Gonzales II, as chairperson of the Committee on
Rules, instructed the Deputy Secretary General for Operations to include the two complaints in the Order of
Business, which was complied with by their inclusion in the Order of Business for the following day.
On August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m., during its plenary session, the House of Representatives simultaneously
referred both complaints to public respondent. After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 1,
2010, found both complaints sufficient in form, which complaints it considered to have been referred to it at
exactly the same time.
Meanwhile, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress was published on
September 2, 2010. On September 6, 2010, petitioner tried to file a motion to reconsider the September 1, 2010
Resolution of public respondent. Public respondent refused to accept the motion, however, for prematurity;
instead, it advised petitioner to await the notice for her to file an answer to the complaints, drawing petitioner to
furnish copies of her motion to each of the 55 members of public respondent.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 7, 2010, found the two complaints, which
both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust, sufficient in substance. The
determination of the sufficiency of substance of the complaints by public respondent, which assumed
hypothetically the truth of their allegations, hinged on the issue of whether valid judgment to impeach could be
rendered thereon. Petitioner was served also on September 7, 2010 a notice directing her to file an answer to the
complaints within 10 days.
Issue: Does the present impeachment complaint violate the one-year bar rule under the Constitution?
Ruling:
The one-year bar rule. Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: “No impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.” Petitioner
reckons the start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first impeachment complaint against her on July 22,
2010 or four days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits that within one year from
July 22, 2010, no second impeachment complaint may be accepted and referred to public respondent.
Following petitioner’s line of reasoning, the verification of the complaint or the endorsement by a
member of the House – steps done prior to the filing – would already initiate the impeachment proceedings.
Contrary to petitioner’s emphasis on impeachment complaint, what the Constitution mentions is impeachment
“proceedings.” Her reliance on the singular tense of the word “complaint” to denote the limit prescribed by the
Constitution goes against the basic rule of statutory construction that a word covers its enlarged and plural sense.
The Court, of course, does not downplay the importance of an impeachment complaint, for it is the
matchstick that kindles the candle of impeachment proceedings. The filing of an impeachment complaint is like the
lighting of a matchstick. Lighting the matchstick alone, however, cannot light up the candle, unless the lighted
matchstick reaches or torches the candle wick. Referring the complaint to the proper committee ignites the
impeachment proceeding. With a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed, more than one lighted
matchsticks light the candle at the same time. What is important is that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is
kindled in a year, such that once the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the
candle. Under the Rules of the House, a motion to refer is not among those motions that shall be decided without
debate, but any debate thereon is only made subject to the five-minute rule.
Moreover, it is common parliamentary practice that a motion to refer a matter or question to a

committee may be debated upon, not as to the merits thereof, but only as to the propriety of the referral. With
respect to complaints for impeachment, the House has the discretion not to refer a subsequent impeachment
complaint to the Committee on Justice where official records and further debate show that an impeachment
complaint filed against the same impeachable officer has already been referred to the said committee and the one
year period has not yet expired, lest it becomes instrumental in perpetrating a constitutionally prohibited second
impeachment proceeding.
Far from being mechanical, before the referral stage, a period of deliberation is afforded the House, as
the Constitution, in fact, grants a maximum of three session days within which to make the proper referral. As
mentioned, one limitation imposed on the House in initiating an impeachment proceeding deals with deadlines.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
The Constitution states that “*a+ verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the
House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall
be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three
session days thereafter.” x x x We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere. As
pointed out in Francisco, the impeachment proceeding is not initiated “when the House deliberates on the
resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The action of
the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is
initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is
the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.”
Allowing an expansive construction of the term “initiate” beyond the act of referral allows the
unmitigated influx of successive complaints, each having their own respective 60-session-day period of disposition
from referral. Worse, the Committee shall conduct overlapping hearings until and unless the disposition of one of
the complaints ends with the affirmance of a resolution for impeachment or the overriding[ of a contrary
resolution (as espoused by public respondent), or the House transmits the Articles of Impeachment (as advocated
by the Reyes group), or the Committee on Justice concludes its first report to the House plenary regardless of the
recommendation (as posited by respondentintervenor). Each of these scenarios runs roughshod the very purpose
behind the constitutionally imposed one-year bar. Opening the floodgates too loosely would disrupt the series of
steps operating in unison under one proceeding.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner,

vs.
ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND
CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO
CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., respondent.
G.R. No. 146710-15

March 2, 2001
Policy: Art. XI Sec. 3(7) – Judgement in cases in impeachment shall not extend further than removal from
office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall
nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.
FACTS:
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo was elected VicePresident. From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by
problems that slowly eroded his popularity. On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singson, a longtime
friend of the petitioner, accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng
lords. The expose’ immediately ignited reactions of rage. On November 13, 2000, House Speaker Villar transmitted
the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of
Representatives to the Senate. On November 20, 2000, the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the
petitioner. On January 16, 2001, by a vote of 11- 10, the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second
envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account
under the name “Jose Velarde.” The ruling was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets of the
metropolis. Thereafter, the Armed Forces and the PNP withdrew their support to the Estrada government. Some
Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries and bureau chiefs resigned from their posts.
On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo
as President of the Philippines. On the same day, petitioner issued a press statement that he was leaving
Malacanang Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. It also appeared
that on the same day, he signed a letter stating that he was transmitting a declaration that he was unable to
exercise the powers and duties of his office and that by operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President
shall be the Acting President.
A copy of the letter was sent to Speaker Fuentebella and Senate President Pimentel on the same day.
After his fall from the power, the petitioner’s legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed
against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President.

(2) Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as President.
RULING:
Resignation is a factual question. In order to have a valid resignation, Page 17 of 23 #799 – Paul Jared Ng
(Batch 8) there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity
of a resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be
express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. In the cases at bar, the
facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before leaving Malacanang Palace.
Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before, during
and after Jan. 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial
evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. The Court had an authoritative window on the state of mind of
the petitioner provided by the diary of Executive Sec. Angara serialized in the Phil. Daily Inquirer. During the first
stage of negotiation between Estrada and the opposition, the topic was already about a peaceful and orderly
transfer of power. The resignation of the petitioner was implied. During the second round of negotiation, the
resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the
measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after the transition period. The Court held that the
resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacanang. In the press release
containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the
Republic, but with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the
presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. He did not say he was
leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to reassume the presidency as soon as the
disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them; (4) he assured
that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of the country; and (5) he
called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity.
The Court also tackled the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to perform
the powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is a President on leave. The inability claim is contained in the
Jan. 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent to Senate Pres. Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella. Despite said letter, the
House of Representatives passed a resolution supporting the assumption into office by Arroyo as President. The
Senate also passed a resolution confirming the nomination of Guingona as Vice-President. Both houses of Congress
have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the
inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner’s claim of inability.
The Court cannot pass upon petitioner’s claim of inability to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency.
The question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue which
cannot be decided by the Court without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.

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THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, duly rep. by its President, BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS, Vice-President for
Legal Affairs, MARIANO M. UMALI, Director for Pasig, Makati, and Pasay, Metro Manila, ALFREDO C. FLORES,
and Chairman of the Committee on Legal Aid, JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, Presiding Judges of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 85, Quezon City and Branches 160, 167 and 166, Pasig, Metro Manila, respectively: the NATIONAL
CONFEDERATION OF THE JUDGES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, composed of the METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURT JUDGES ASSOCIATION rep. by its President. REINATO QUILALA of the MUNICIPAL TRIAL CIRCUIT COURT,
Manila; THE MUNICIPAL JUDGES LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES rep. by its President, TOMAS G. TALAVERA; by
themselves and in behalf of all the Judges of the Regional Trial and Shari'a Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and
Municipal Courts throughout the Country, petitioners,
vs.
HON. PETE PRADO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications,
JORGE V. SARMIENTO, in his capacity as Postmaster General, and the PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORP., respondents.
G.R. No. 105371

November 11, 1993
FACTS:
Republic Act 7354 was passed into law stirring commotions from the Judiciary. Under its Section 35 as
implemented by Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No.92-28, the franking privilege of the Supreme
Court, COA, RTCs, MTC and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other
government offices were withdrawn.
The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges will be
prejudiced by the above-named measures. The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 and the
methods adopted prior it becoming a law.
Their grounds are as follows: 1. violative of Art VI Sec 26(1) which says '"Every bill passed by the Congress
shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." Its title embraces more than one
subject and does not express its purposes; 2. Violative of Art VI Sec 26(2) which says 'No bill passed by either
House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its
final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies
to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a
bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the
yeas and nays entered in the Journal. It did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed
copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before its passage; 3. Violative of the
Equal protection clause. It is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7354 is unconstitutional.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
HELD:
The Supreme Court sustained as to the violation of Art VI Sec 26(1) ruling further that its adoption is
within the terms prescribed by law saying that the title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the
act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly
indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead
the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. In the case at bar,
the repealing clause which includes the withdrawal of franking privileges is merely the effect and not the subject of
the statute; and it is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is required to be briefly expressed in its title.
While a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences between the Senate and
the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. It may propose an entirely new provision. The court
also added that said the bill in question was duly approved by the Senate and the House of Representatives. It was
enrolled with its certification by Senate President and Speaker of the House of Representatives. It was then
presented to and approved by the President. Under the doctrine of separation powers, the Court may not inquire
beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. An enrolled bill is
conclusive upon the Judiciary. The Page 18 of 23 #799 – Paul Jared Ng (Batch 8) court therefore declined to look
into the petitioners' charges. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly
enacted. The court is bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of the government.
Further, Section 35 was ruled out to be in violation of the equal protection clause. The distinction made
by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary
and the grantees of the franking privilege. The clause denies the Judiciary the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based
on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking
privilege (Pres, VP, Senators etc.). If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking
privilege, the remedy, it seems to us, is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of government. The problem is
not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial
distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it.
Therefore, RA 7354 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
AGRIPINO A. DE GUZMAN, JR., et. al., petitioners,

vs.
G.R. No. 129118

July 19, 2000
FACTS:
RA 8189 was enacted on June 10, 1996 and approved by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11, 1996.
Section 44 thereof provides: "SEC. 44. Reassignment of Election Officers. - No Election Officer shall hold office in a
particular city or municipality for more than four (4) years. Any election officer who, either at the time of the
approval of this Act or subsequent thereto, has served for at least four (4) years in a particular city or municipality
shall automatically be reassigned by the Commission to a new station outside the original congressional district."
By virtue of the aforequoted provision of law, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) promulgated
Resolution Nos. 97-0002 and 97- 0610 for the implementation thereof. Thereafter, the COMELEC issued several
directives reassigning the petitioners, who are either City or Municipal Election Officers, to different stations.
Aggrieved by the issuance of the aforesaid directives and resolutions, petitioners found their way to this
Court via the present petition assailing the validity of Section 44 of RA 8189, contending, among others, that the
provision contravenes the basic constitutional precept [Article VI, Section 26(1), Phil. Constitution] that every bill
passed by congress shall embrace only one subject which must be expressed in the title thereof.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 44 of R.A. 8189 is unconstitutional.
HELD:
Petitioners’ contention that Section 44 has an isolated and different subject from that of RA 8189 and that
the same is not expressed in the title of the law, is equally untenable.
The objectives of Section 26(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, that "[e]very bill passed by the
Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof", are: 1. To prevent hodge-
podge or log-rolling legislation; 2. To prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills
of which the titles gave no information, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and
unintentionally adopted; and 3. To fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as
is usually made, of the subjects of legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of
being heard thereon by petition or otherwise if they shall so desire.
Section 26(1) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is sufficiently complied with where, as in this case, the
title is comprehensive enough to embrace the general objective it seeks to achieve, and if all the parts of the

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
statute are related and germane to the subject matter embodied in the title or so long as the same are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title.
Section 44 of RA 8189 is not isolated considering that it is related and germane to the subject matter
stated in the title of the law. The title of RA 8189 is "The Voter’s Registration Act of 1996" with a subject matter
enunciated in the explanatory note as "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS, ADOPTING
A SYSTEM OF CONTINUING REGISTRATION, PRESCRIBING THE PROCEDURES THEREOF AND AUTHORIZING THE
APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS THEREFOR." Section 44, which provides for the reassignment of election officers, is
relevant to the subject matter of registration as it seeks to ensure the integrity of the registration process by
providing a guideline for the COMELEC to follow in the reassignment of election officers. It is not an alien provision
but one which is related to the conduct and procedure of continuing registration of voters. In this regard, it bears
stressing that the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such
precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue, all the contents and the minute details therein.
In determining the constitutionality of a statute dubbed as defectively titled, the presumption is in favor
of its validity. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED; and the constitutionality and validity of Section 44 of RA
8189 UPHELD.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
VICENTE DE LA CRUZ, RENATO ALIPIO, JOSE TORRES III, LEONCIO CORPUZ, TERESITA CALOT, ROSALIA
FERNANDEZ, ELIZABETH VELASCO, NANETTE VILLANUEVA, HONORATO BUENAVENTURA, RUBEN DE CASTRO,
VICENTE ROXAS, RICARDO DAMIAN, DOMDINO ROMDINA, ANGELINA OBLIGACION, CONRADO GREGORIO,
TEODORO REYES, LYDIA ATRACTIVO, NAPOLEON MENDOZA, PERFECTO GUMATAY, ANDRES SABANGAN, ROSITA
DURAN, SOCORRO BERNARDEZ, and PEDRO GABRIEL, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE EDGARDO L. PARAS, MATIAS RAMIREZ as the Municipal Mayor, MARIO MENDOZA as the
Municipal Vice-Mayor, and THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF BOCAUE, BULACAN, respondents.
G.R. No. L-42571-72

July 25, 1983
FACTS:
De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of
1975 or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said Ordinance
violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance would close out their business. That the
hospitality girls they employed are healthy and are not allowed to go out with customers.
Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring that Ord
84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads “AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND
COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES
OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS”. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a
valid exercise of police power to promote general welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they were deprived
of due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the
operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses pursuant to Order
84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938.
HELD:
The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the
assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the general
powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It
cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term
reasonable.
The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that
does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The
purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute
prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue should and can only regulate not prohibit the business
of cabarets.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner,

vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
FINANCE, respondents.
G.R. No. 124360

November 5, 1997
FACTS:
Considering that oil is not endemic to this country, history shows that the government has always been
finding ways to alleviate the oil industry. The government created laws accommodate these innovations in the oil
industry. One such law is the Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA 8180. This law allows that “any
person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or
domestic source, lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil
or use the same for his own requirement,” subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy. Tatad assails
the constitutionality of the law. He claims that section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 8180 violates the one title one rule of Sec
26, Art 6 of the Constitution. Section 5 (b) provides: “b) Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and starting with
the effectivity of this Act, tariff duty shall be imposed and collected on imported crude oil at the rate of three
percent (3%) and imported refined petroleum products at the rate of seven percent (7%), except fuel oil and LPG,
the rate for which shall be the same as that for imported crude oil: Provided, That beginning on January 1, 2004
the tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products shall be the same: Provided, further, That this
provision may be amended only by an Act of Congress.” The inclusion of the tariff provision in section 5(b) of R.A.
No. 8180 violates Section 26(1) Article VI of the Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which
shall be expressed in its title. Petitioner contends that the imposition of tariff rates in section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180
is foreign to the subject of the law which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8180 is constitutional.
HELD:
The SC declared the unconstitutionality of RA 8180 not because it violated the one title one subject rule
but rather because it violated Sec 19 of Art 12 of the Constitution. It violated that provision because it only
strengthens oligopoly which is contrary to free competition. The SC emphasized that the provision of Sec 5 (b) of
RA 8180 does not violate the one title one subject rule. The SC, as a policy, has adopted a liberal construction of
the one title – one subject rule. The SC also emphasized that the title need not mirror, fully index or catalogue all
contents and minute details of a law. A law having a single general subject indicated in the title may contain any
number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to
the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means
of carrying out the general subject. The SC held that section 5(b) providing for tariff differential is germane to the
subject of RA 8180 which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. The section is supposed to sway
prospective investors to put up refineries in our country and make them rely less on imported petroleum.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
RODOLFO C. FARIÑAS, MANUEL M. GARCIA, FRANCIS G. ESCUDERO, and AGAPITO A. AQUINO, AS MEMBERS OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND ALSO AS TAXPAYERS, IN THEIR OWN BEHALF AND IN REPRESENTATION
OF THE MEMBERS OF THE MINORITY IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR., SECRETARY OF
THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY OF THE SENATE, AND SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
G.R. No. 147387

December 10, 2003
FACTS:
A petition was filed seeking the Court to declare unconstitutional Section 14 of RA 9006 or “The Act to
Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections Through Fair Election Practices” as it
repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code mandating the ipso jure resignation from public office of one
who filed his certificate of candidacy, except for President and Vice-President. It is the petitioners’ contention that
the repeal of Section 67 is a rider on the said law, the same embracing more than one subject, inconsistent to what
the constitution mandates. Further, it violated the equal protection clause since the said law didn’t repeal
provision relating to appointive officials. Appointive officials would still be considered ipso jure resigned upon filing
of their respective certificates of candidacy.
ISSUE: WON Section 14 of RA 9006 is a rider.
HELD:
Section 14 is not a rider. The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which
imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the other
provisions of the contested law, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda,
doesn’t violate the “one subject- one title rule”. The Court has held that an act hatving a single general subject,
indicated in its title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they
are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and they may be considered in furtherance of such
subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.
The repeal of Section 67 is not violative of the equal protection clause. Equal protection is not absolute
especially if the classification is reasonable. There is reasonable classification between an elective official and an
appointive one. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an
office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand,
appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some
appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others
serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority. Another substantial distinction is that by law, appointed officials
are prohibited from engaging in partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
(ABAKADA Guro Party List Officer Samson S. Alcantara, et al.

vs.
The Hon. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita)
G.R. No. 168056

October 18, 2005
FACTS:
R.A. No. 9337 is a consolidation of three legislative bills namely, House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705, and
Senate Bill No. 1950. House Bill No. 35552 was introduced on first reading on January 7, 2005. The House
Committee on Ways and Means approved the bill, in substitution of House Bill No. 1468, which Representative
(Rep.) Eric D. Singson introduced on August 8, 2004. The President certified the bill on January 7, 2005 for
immediate enactment. On January 27, 2005, the House of Representatives approved the bill on second and third
reading.
House Bill No. 37053 on the other hand, substituted House Bill No. 3105 introduced by Rep. Salacnib F.
Baterina, and House Bill No. 3381 introduced by Rep. Jacinto V. Paras. Its "mother bill" is House Bill No. 3555. The
House Committee on Ways and Means approved the bill on February 2, 2005. The President also certified it as
urgent on February 8, 2005. The House of Representatives approved the bill on second and third reading on
February 28, 2005.
Meanwhile, the Senate Committee on Ways and Means approved Senate Bill No. 19504 on March 7,
2005, "in substitution of Senate Bill Nos. 1337, 1838 and 1873, taking into consideration House Bill Nos. 3555 and
3705."
The President certified the bill on March 11, 2005, and was approved by the Senate on second and third
reading on April 13, 2005.
On the same date, April 13, 2005, the Senate agreed to the request of the House of Representatives for a
committee conference on the disagreeing provisions of the proposed bills.
Before long, the Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 3555, House Bill
No. 3705, and Senate Bill No. 1950, "after having met and discussed in full free and conference," recommended
the approval of its report, which the Senate did on May 10, 2005, and with the House of Representatives agreeing
thereto the next day, May 11, 2005.
On May 23, 2005, the enrolled copy of the consolidated House and Senate version was transmitted to the
President, who signed the same into law on May 24, 2005. Thus, came R.A. No. 9337.
July 1, 2005 is the effectivity date of R.A. No. 9337.5 When said date came, the Court issued a temporary
restraining order, effective immediately and continuing until further orders, enjoining respondents from enforcing
and implementing the law.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for
prohibition on May 27, 2005. They question the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending
Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Section 4 imposes a 10%
VAT on sale of goods and properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes
a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties.
ISSUE:
Whether RA 9337 violates Article Vi, Section 24 of the Constitution
RULING:
Petitioners claim that the amendments to provisions of the NIRC (National Internal Revenue Code) did not
at all originate from the House. They aver that House Bill No. 3555 proposed amendments only regarding Sections
106, 107, 108, 110 and 114 of the NIRC, while House Bill No. 3705 proposed amendments only to Sections 106,
107,108, 109, 110 and 111 of the NIRC; thus, the other sections of the NIRC which the Senate amended but which
amendments were not found in the House bills are not intended to be amended by the House of Representatives.
Hence, they argue that since the proposed amendments did not originate from the House, such amendments are a
violation of Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution.
The argument does not hold water. Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution reads:
Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments.
In the present cases, petitioners admit that it was indeed House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705 that initiated the
move for amending provisions of the NIRC dealing mainly with the value-added tax. Upon transmittal of said House
bills to the Senate, the Senate came out with Senate Bill No. 1950 proposing amendments not only to NIRC
provisions on the value-added tax but also amendments to NIRC provisions on other kinds of taxes. Is the
introduction by the Senate of provisions not dealing directly with the value- added tax, which is the only kind of tax
being amended in the House bills, still within the purview of the constitutional provision authorizing the Senate to
propose or concur with amendments to a revenue bill that originated from the House?
The foregoing question had been squarely answered in the Tolentino case, wherein the Court held, thus:
To begin with, it is not the law – but the revenue bill – which is required by the Constitution to "originate
exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the
House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. . . . At
this point, what is important to note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To
insist that a revenue statute – and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the
enactment of the law – must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not
only to "concur with amendments" but also to "propose amendments." It would be to violate the coequality of
legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate.
…Given, then, the power of the Senate to propose amendments, the Senate can propose its own version even with
respect to bills which are required by the Constitution to originate in the House.
Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills
authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of
Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be
expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made
to bear on the enactment of such laws. (Emphasis supplied)
Since there is no question that the revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of Representatives, the
Senate was acting within its constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill when it included
provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income taxes, percentage, and excise and franchise taxes.
Verily, Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution does not contain any prohibition or limitation on the extent of the
amendments that may be introduced by the Senate to the House revenue bill.
Furthermore, the amendments introduced by the Senate to the NIRC provisions that had not been
touched in the House bills are still in furtherance of the intent of the House in initiating the subject revenue bills.
Notably therefore, the main purpose of the bills emanating from the House of Representatives is to bring
in sizeable revenues for the government to supplement our country’s serious financial problems, and improve tax
administration and control of the leakages in revenues from income taxes and value-added taxes. As these house
bills were transmitted to the Senate, the latter, approaching the measures from the point of national perspective,
can introduce amendments within the purposes of those bills.
As the Court has said, the Senate can propose amendments and in fact, the amendments made on
provisions in the tax on income of corporations are germane to the purpose of the house bills which is to raise
revenues for the government.
Likewise, the Court finds the sections referring to other percentage and excise taxes germane to the
reforms to the VAT system, as these sections would cushion the effects of VAT on consumers. Considering that
certain goods and services which were subject to percentage tax and excise tax would no longer be VAT-exempt,
the consumer would be burdened more as they would be paying the VAT in addition to these taxes.
The other sections amended by the Senate pertained to matters of tax administration which are
necessary for the implementation of the changes in the VAT system.
To reiterate, the sections introduced by the Senate are germane to the subject matter and purposes of
the house bills, which is to supplement our country’s fiscal deficit, among others. Thus, the Senate acted within its
power to propose those amendments.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018

JOSE CONCEPCION, JR., JOSE DE VENECIA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, DR. JAIME Z. GALVEZ-TAN, FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, FRISCO SAN JUAN, NORBERTO M. GONZALES, HONESTO M. GUTIERREZ, ISLETA, AND JOSE A.
BERNAS, Petitioners-in-Intervention,
vs.
G.R. No. 163193
June 15, 2004
FACTS:
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8436 authorizing the COMELEC to use an
automated election system (AES) for the process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidating the
results of the national and local elections. It also mandated the COMELEC to acquire automated counting machines
(ACMs), computer equipment, devices and materials; and to adopt new electoral forms and printing materials.
On October 29, 2002, the COMELEC adopted, in its Resolution No. 020170, a modernization program for
the 2004 elections consisting of three (3) phases, to wit:
(1) PHASE I – Computerized system of registration and voters validation or the so-called "biometrics"
system of registration;
(2) PHASE II – Computerized voting and counting of votes; and
(3) PHASE III – Electronic transmission of results.
On January 24, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 172, which allocated
the sum of P2,500,000,000 to exclusively fund the AES in time for the May 10, 2004 elections.
On January 28, 2003, the COMELEC issued an Invitation to Bid for the procurement of supplies,
equipment, materials and services needed for the complete implementation of all three phases of the AES with an
approved budget of P2,500,000,000.
On February 10, 2003, upon the request of the COMELEC, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Executive Order No. 175, authorizing the release of a supplemental P500 million budget for the AES project of the
COMELEC. The said issuance, likewise, instructed the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) to ensure
that the aforementioned additional amount be used exclusively for the AES prescribed under Rep. Act No. 8436,
particularly "the process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidation of results of the national and
local elections."
The COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 6074 awarding the contract for Phase II of the AES to Mega
Pacific Consortium and correspondingly entered into a contract with the latter to implement the project. On the
same day, the COMELEC entered into a separate contract with Philippine Multi-Media System, Inc. (PMSI)
denominated "ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION, CONSOLIDATION & DISSEMINATION OF ELECTION RESULTS PROJECT
CONTRACT. Prohibition in this Court for the nullification of Resolution No. 6074 approving the contract for Phase II
of AES to Mega Pacific Consortium. This Court promulgated its Decision nullifying COMELEC Resolution No. 6074
awarding the contract for Phase II of the AES to Mega Pacific Consortium. Also voided was the subsequent contract

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entered into by the respondent COMELEC with Mega Pacific Consortium for the purchase of computerized
voting/counting machines for the purpose of implementing the second phase of the modernization program.
Phase II of the AES was, therefore, scrapped based on the said Decision of the Court and the COMELEC
had to maintain the old manual voting and counting system for the May 10, 2004 elections. Despite the scrapping
of Phase II of the AES, the COMELEC nevertheless ventured to implement Phase III of the AES through an electronic
transmission of advanced "unofficial" results of the 2004 elections for national, provincial and municipal positions,
also dubbed as an "unofficial quick count."
On April 27, 2004, the COMELEC met en banc to update itself on and resolve whether to proceed with its
implementation of Phase III of the AES. Commissioner Tuason, Jr. stated that he had no objection as to the Phase
III of the modernization project itself, but had concerns about the budget. He opined that other funds of the
COMELEC may not be proper for realignment.
Commissioner Sadain then manifested that the consideration for the contract for Phase III had already
been almost fully paid even before the Court’s nullification of the contract for Phase II of the AES, but he was open
to the possibility of the realignment of funds of the COMELEC for the funding of the project. He added that if the
implementation of Phase III would not be allowed to continue just because Phase II was nullified, then it would be
P300,000,000 down the drain, in addition to the already allocated disbursement on Phase II of the AES.
Despite the dire and serious reservations of most of its members, the COMELEC, approved Resolution
6712 declaring that it "adopts the policy that the precinct election results of each city and municipality shall be
immediately transmitted electronically in advance to the COMELEC, Manila."
Petitioners-in-intervention point to several constitutional infractions occasioned by the assailed

resolution. They aver that there has been no appropriation by Congress for the respondent COMELEC to conduct
an "unofficial" electronic transmission of results of the May 10, 2004 elections, any expenditure for the said
purpose contravenes Article VI, Section 29 (par. 1) of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether Resolution No. 6712 is void for violating Art. VI, Sec. 29 (par. 1) of the 1987 Constitution that "no
money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
RULING:
The assailed COMELEC resolution contravenes the constitutional provision that "no money shall be paid
out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."
By its very terms, the electronic transmission and tabulation of the election results projected under
Resolution No. 6712 is "unofficial" in character, meaning "not emanating from or sanctioned or acknowledged by
the government or government body. Any disbursement of public funds to implement this project is contrary to
the provisions of the Constitution and Rep. Act No. 9206, which is the 2003 General Appropriations Act. The use of
the COMELEC of its funds appropriated for the AES for the "unofficial" quick count project may even be considered
as a felony under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Irrefragably, the implementation of the assailed resolution would entail, in due course, the hiring of
additional manpower, technical services and acquisition of equipment, including computers and software, among
others. According to the COMELEC, it needed P55,000,000 to operationalize the project, including the encoding

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process. Hence, it would necessarily involve the disbursement of public funds for which there must be the
corresponding appropriation.
The COMELEC posited during the hearing that the 2003 General Appropriations Act has appropriated the
amount needed for its "unofficial" tabulation. According to the transcript of the stenographic notes taken during
the hearing, the COMELEC, through Commissioner Sadain, admitted during the said hearing that although it had
already approved the assailed resolution, it was still looking for the P55,000,000 needed to operationalize the
project.
Earlier, during the April 27, 2004 meeting of the COMELEC En Banc, the Commissioners expressed their
serious concerns about the lack of funds for the project, the propriety of using the funds for Phase III of its
modernization, and the possibility of realigning funds to finance the project.
We have reviewed Rep. Act No. 9206, the General Appropriations Act, which took effect on April 23, 2003
and find no appropriation for the project of the COMELEC for electronic transmission of "unofficial" election
results. What is appropriated therein is the amount of P225,000,000 of the capital outlay for the modernization of
the electoral system.
Under paragraph 3 of the special provisions of Rep. Act No. 9206, the amount of P225,000,000 shall be
used primarily for the establishment of the AES prescribed under Rep. Act No. 8436. Section 52 of Rep. Act No.
9206 proscribes any change or modification in the expenditure items authorized thereunder.
Neither can the money needed for the project be taken from the COMELEC’s savings, if any, because it
would be violative of Article VI, Section 25 (5) of the 1987 Constitution.
The power to augment from savings lies dormant until authorized by law. In this case, no law has, thus, far
been enacted authorizing the respondent COMELEC to transfer savings from another item in its appropriation, if
there are any, to fund the assailed resolution. No less than the Secretary of the Senate certified that there is no law
appropriating any amount for an "unofficial" count and tabulation of the votes cast during the May 10, 2004
elections.

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NESTOR G. ATITIW v. RONALDO B. ZAMORA
GR No. 143374
September 30, 2005
FACTS:
When President Corazon Aquino assumed the presidency after the EDSA people power revolt, she was
confronted with the insurgency in the Cordilleras, a problem of long standing which dates back to the martial rule
of then President Marcos. Thus, her government initiated a series of peace talks with the Cordillera People’s
Liberation Army (CPLA) and the Cordillera Bodong Administration (CBA), both headed by Fr. Conrado Balweg. The
dialogues between the representatives of the government and the CPLA centered on the establishment of an
autonomous government in the Cordilleras and culminated in the forging of a Joint Memorandum of Agreement
whereby the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the CPLA has agreed to end hostilities.
On February 2, 1987, the Filipino people ratified the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Section 15, Article X
thereof ordains the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras while Section 18,
Article X thereof mandates the congressional enactment of the organic act for each of the autonomous regions.
Thus, by virtue of her residual legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution, President Aquino
promulgated Executive Order 220, creating the CAR, which is the interim and preparatory body tasked, among
others, to administer the affairs of the government in the Cordilleras composed of the provinces of Abra, Benguet,
Ifugao, KalingaApayao and Mountain Province and the City of Baguio.
Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6766 entitled An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera
Autonomous Region. A plebiscite was held wherein the people of the aforementioned provinces and cities cast
their votes on the ratification of the Organic Act. The plebiscite results showed, however, that the creation of an
autonomous region was approved by a majority of votes in the Ifugao province only and overwhelmingly rejected
in the rest of the region.
In said case, the Court declared EO No. 220 to be still in force and effect until properly repealed or
amended.
On February 15, 2000, President Estrada signed into law the 2000 GAA which includes the assailed Special
Provisions. President Estrada issued EO No. 270, which extended the implementations of the winding up of
operations of the CAR. He extended the period further to March 31, 2001 by virtue of EO No. 328.
ISSUE:
Whether the assailed Special Provision in RA No. 8760 (2000 GAA) is a rider and as such is unconstitutional.

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RULING:
A rider is a provision which is alien to or not germane to the subject or purpose of the bill in which it is
incorporated. There are two provisions in the 1987 Constitution which expressly prohibit riders. These provisions
are Section 25 (2) and Section 26 (1) of Article VI.
The rationale against inserting a rider in an appropriations bill under the specific appropriation clause
embodied in Section 25(2), Article VI of the Constitution is similar to that of the “one subject in the title” clause
provided in Section 26(1) also of Article VI. Which directs that every provision in a bill must be germane or has
some reasonable relations to the subject matter as expressed in the title thereof. The unity of the subject matter
of a bill is mandatory in order to prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation, to avoid surprise or fraud upon the
legislature, and to fairly appraise the people of the subjects of legislation that are being considered.
An appropriations bill, however, covers a broader range of subject matter and therefore includes more
details compared to an ordinary bill. As a matter of fact, the title of an appropriations bill cannot be any broader as
it is since it is not feasible to come out with a title that embraces all the details included in an appropriations bill.
This is not to sanction, however, the insertion of provisions or clauses which do not have any relation to
appropriations found therein. Thus, Section 25(2), Article VI lays down a germaneness standard akin to that
prescribed in Section 26(1).
The subsection simply requires that all the provisions in a general appropriations bill are either
appropriation items or non-appropriation items which relate specifically to appropriation items. Thus, provisions
or clauses that do not directly appropriate funds are deemed appurtenant in a general appropriations bill when
they specify certain conditions and restrictions in the manner by which the funds to which they relate have to be
spent.
In order that a provision or a clause in a general appropriations bill may comply with the test of
germaneness, it must be particular, unambiguous, and appropriate. A provision or clause is particular if it relates
specifically to a distinct item of appropriation in the bill and does not refer generally to the entire appropriations
bill. It is unambiguous when its application or operation is apparent on the face of the bill and it does not
necessitate reference to details or sources outside the appropriations bill. It is an appropriate provision or clause
when its subject matter does not necessarily have to be treated in a separate legislation.
The assailed paragraph 1 of the Special Provisions, insofar as it limits the spending of the appropriation for
CAR to the winding up of its activities, does not constitute a rider. It precisely follows the standard that a provision
in an appropriations bill must relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Said paragraph meets the
germaneness standard because it lays down a limitation or restriction on the use of a specific appropriation item
already provided in the 2000 GAA. Its operation is expressly confined to the budgetary allocation for the CAR. Said
provision did not have to be the subject of a separate legislation because precisely the budgetary policy of
Congress not to support the programs of the CAR was properly made a part of the 2000 GAA.
It is beyond dispute that inherent in the power of appropriation is the power to specify how money shall
be spent; and that in addition to distinct “items” of appropriation, the legislature may include in appropriation bills
qualifications, conditions, limitations or restrictions on expenditure of funds. The only limitation is that restrictions
or conditions in an appropriations bill must exhibit a connection with money items in a budgetary sense in the
schedule of expenditures.

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According to petitioners, however, paragraph 1 of the Special Provisions is foreign to the general subject
of the GAA. They argue that instead of providing a budget for the CAR, it violates the purpose (of the 2000 GAA) by
not providing for the proper and reasonable budget for the CAR.
Quite the contrary, said provision is necessarily related to the budget allocation for the CAR because it
sets forth the purposes for which the funds shall be spent, that is, for the winding up of the activities and payment
of separation and retirement benefits of all affected officials of the CAR. Clearly, the policy of Congress was to
discontinue budgetary support for the programs and activities theretofor undertaken through the CAR.
The Car was not abolished, as concluded by petitioners, with the reduction of its budgetary allocation;
what took place was only a discontinuance of its programs and activities. In fact, EO No. 328, the implementing
rule of the questioned Special Provisions, provides only for the deactivation of the CAR bodies upon the lapse of its
operational period as provided in the EO.

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vs.
G.R. No. 208566

November 19, 2013
Facts:
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel is
commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent several
legal designations from “Congressional Pork Barrel” to the latest “Priority Development Assistance Fund” or PDAF.
The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to – P40 million for “hard projects”
(infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for “soft projects” (scholarship grants,
medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft
projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for
soft projects.
Presidential Pork Barrel
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy

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ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.

II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.
HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it violates
the following principles:
a. Separation of Powers
barrel funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to get the
concurrence of the legislator concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant the
the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage
dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances

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d. Local Autonomy
But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the house of representatives, what’s happening is
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional
because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya and
PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular legislation.
1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain energy-related
ventures shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy
resource development and for other purposes which the President may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCOR’s earnings shall be allocated
to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government infrastructure projects.

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vs.
G.R. No. 209287

July 1, 2014
Facts:
Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the
Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next year’s
appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is being undertaken
slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once
withdrawn, these funds are declared as “savings” by the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other
priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in fact reported
and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court).
Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé claiming that he, and other
Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then
Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed
upon the request of the Senators.
Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several
other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP.
Among their contentions was:

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DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that “no money shall be
paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and
augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs.
38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and authority to use savings,
respectively).
Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the President’s
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and even the
heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds,
Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate realignment of funds to an existing
project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the Executive, these projects are non-
existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some
of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were not provided for
by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are “savings”

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IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP because under the
law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being declared
as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It
has funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may cause
more harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to
return what they received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of
Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in
the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.

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COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS and YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., respondents.
G.R. No. 124043

October 14, 1998
FACTS:
Private Respondent YMCA is a non-stock, non-profit institution, which conducts various programs and activities
that are beneficial to the public, especially the young people, pursuant to its religious, educational and charitable
objectives.
YMCA earned income from leasing out a portion of its premises to small shop owners, like restaurants and canteen
operators, and from parking fees collected from non-members. Petitioner issued an assessment to private
respondent for deficiency taxes. Private respondent formally protested the assessment. In reply, the CIR denied
the claims of YMCA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the income derived from rentals of real property owned by YMCA subject to
income tax.
RULING:
Yes. Income of whatever kind and character of non-stock non-profit organizations from any of
their properties, real or personal, or from any of their activities conducted for profit, regardless of the disposition
made of such income, shall be subject to the tax imposed under the NIRC.
Rental income derived by a tax-exempt organization from the lease of its properties, real or personal, is not
exempt from income taxation, even if such income is exclusively used for the accomplishment of its objectives.
Because taxes are the lifeblood of the nation, the Court has always applied the doctrine of strict in interpretation
in construing tax exemptions (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 271 SCRA 605, 613, April 18,
1997). Furthermore, a claim of statutory exemption from taxation should be manifest and unmistakable from the
language of the law on which it is based. Thus, the claimed exemption “must expressly be granted in a statute
stated in a language too clear to be mistaken”.
Verba legis non est recedendum. The law does not make a distinction. The rental income is taxable regardless of
whence such income is derived and how it is used or disposed of. Where the law does not distinguish, neither
should we.

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Private respondent also invokes Article XIV, Section 4, par. 3 of the Constitution, claiming that it “is a non-stock,
non-profit educational institution whose revenues and assets are used actually, directly and exclusively for
educational purposes so it is exempt from taxes on its properties and income.” This is without merit since the
exemption provided lies on the payment of property tax, and not on the income tax on the rentals of its property.
The bare allegation alone that one is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution is insufficient to justify its
exemption from the payment of income tax.
For the YMCA to be granted the exemption it claims under the above provision, it must prove with substantial
evidence that (1) it falls under the classification non-stock, non-profit educational institution; and (2) the income it
seeks to be exempted from taxation is used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes.
Unfortunately for respondent, the Court noted that not a scintilla of evidence was submitted to prove that it met
the said requisites.
The Court appreciates the nobility of respondent’s cause. However, the Court’s power and function are limited
merely to applying the law fairly and objectively. It cannot change the law or bend it to suit its sympathies and
appreciations. Otherwise, it would be over spilling its role and invading the realm of legislation. The Court regrets
that, given its limited constitutional authority, it cannot rule on the wisdom or propriety of legislation. That
prerogative belongs to the political departments of government.

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FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,

vs.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) and MAGTANGGOL GUNIGUNDO, (in his capacity
as chairman of the PCGG), respondents.
G.R. No. 130716.

December 9, 1998
FACTS:
PCGG and Marcos siblings agreed to General and Supplemental Agreements with regards to the ill-gotten wealth
cases against their family. The same was filed with Sandiganbayan. Chavez then filed petition with SC to enforce a
constitutional right against the PCGG and to determine whether the latter has been acting within the bounds of its
authority. SC decided the case on 09 December 1998.
However, the siblings did not file motion for reconsideration until the deadline for such lapsed. They instead filed
1) a “Motion for Leave to Intervene with Motion for Leave to File the Attached Partial Motion for Reconsideration .
. .” and (2) “Partial Motion for Reconsideration,” contending that their exclusion from the case violated their
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. Movants pray that the proceedings before the anti-graft
court be allowed to take their due course, consistent with the principle of the hierarchical administration of justice.
ISSUE: Whether or not equal protection was observed in the (principle of hierarchical) administration of justice?
RULING:
Motion denied. The movants are merely incidental parties to the instant case. Being contractors to the General
and Supplemental Agreements involving their supposed properties, they claim that their interests are affected by
the petition. However, the Agreements undeniably contain terms an condition that are clearly contrary to the
Constitution and the laws and are not subject to compromise. Such terms and conditions cannot be granted by the
PCGG to anyone.
The principle of the hierarchy of the courts generally applies to cases involving factual question. The oft-repeated
justification for invoking it is that such cases do not only impose upon the precious time of the Court but, more
important, inevitably result in their delayed adjudication. Often, such cases have to be remanded or referred to the
lower court as the proper forum or as
better equipped to resolve to the issues, since the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.
Inasmuch as the petition at bar involves only constitutional and legal questions concerning public interest, the
Court resolved to exercise primary jurisdiction on the matter.

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LUNG CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
QUEZON CITY and CONSTANTINO P. ROSAS, in his capacity as City Assessor of Quezon City, respondents.
G.R. No. 144104.

June 29, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit entity established by virtue of PD No. 1823, seeks exemption from real
property taxes when the City Assessor issued Tax Declarations for the land and the hospital building. Petitioner
predicted on its claim that it is a charitable institution.
The request was denied, and a petition hereafter filed before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals of
Quezon City (QC-LBAA) for reversal of the resolution of the City Assessor. Petitioner alleged that as a charitable
institution, is exempted from real property taxes under Sec 28(3) Art VI of the Constitution. QC-LBAA dismissed the
petition and the decision was likewise affirmed on appeal by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon
City. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the CBAA.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is exempted from real property taxes.
RULING:
No. Under PD 1823, the lung center does not enjoy any property tax exemption privileges for its
real properties as well as the building constructed thereon. The property tax exemption under Sec. 28(3), Art. VI of
the Constitution of the property taxes only. This provision was implanted by Sec.243 (b) of RA 7160.which provides
that in order to be entitled to the exemption, the lung center must be able to prove that: it is a charitable
institution and; its real properties are actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purpose. Accordingly,
the portions occupied by the hospital used for its patients are exempt from real property taxes while those leased
to private entities are not exempt from such taxes.

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HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et al.,petitioner,

vs.
SOUTHWING HEAVY INDUSTRIES, INC., et al.,respondents.
G.R. No. 164171

August 22, 2006
FACTS:
This is a petition to annul the decision of a RTC of Olongapo declaring unconstitutional the EO 156 Art. 2 Sec. 3.1.
The said executive issuance prohibits the importation into the country, inclusive of the Special Economic and
Freeport Zone or the Subic Bay Freeport (SBF or Freeport), of used motor vehicles, subject to a few exceptions. CA
upheld the ruling of the RTC on the ground of lack of any statutory basis for the President to issue the same.
It held that the prohibition on the importation of used motor vehicles is an exercise of police power vested on the
legislature and absent any enabling law, the exercise thereof by the President through an executive issuance, is
void.
The petitioners argue that EO 156 is constitutional because it was issued pursuant to EO 226, the Omnibus
Investment Code of the Philippines and that its application should be extended to the Freeport because the
guarantee of RA 7227 on the free flow of goods into the said zone is merely an exemption from customs duties and
taxes on items brought into the Freeport and not an open floodgate for all kinds of goods and materials without
restriction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the EO is valid
RULING:
Partially Yes. It is valid insofar as it is outside the Freeport zone, but void if the vehicles are within the Freeport
zone. According to the SC, Police power is inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits.
It is lodged primarily with the legislature. By virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power, it may also be
exercised by the President and administrative boards, as well as the lawmaking bodies on all municipal levels,
including the barangay.Such delegation confers upon the President quasi-legislative power which may be defined
as the authority delegated by the law-making body to the administrative body to adopt rules and regulations
intended to carry out the provisions of the law and implement legislative policy.
To be valid, an administrative issuance, such as an executive order, must comply with the following
requisites:

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(1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;

(2) It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;
(3) It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; and
(4) It must be reasonable.
First requisite:
Delegation of legislative powers to the President is permitted in Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution
through Congress’ delegation by law.
The relevant statutes to execute this provision are:
1) The Tariff and Customs Code
which authorizes the President, in the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national security, to,
inter alia , prohibit the importation of any commodity.
2) Executive Order No. 226, the Omnibus Investment Code of the Philippines that empowers the President to
approve or reject the prohibition on the importation of any equipment or raw materials or finished products
3) Republic Act No. 8800, otherwise known as the "Safeguard Measures Act" (SMA), ,"
Second requisite:
The general rule is that, the promulgation of administrative issuances requires previous notice and hearing, the
only exception being where the legislature itself requires it and mandates that the regulation shall be based on
certain facts as determined at an appropriate investigation. This exception pertains to the issuance of legislative
rules. An interpretative rule, however, give no real consequence more than what the law itself has already
prescribed; and are designed merely to provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency
is in charge of enforcing. A legislative rule, on the other hand, is in the nature ofsubordinate legislation, crafted to
implement a primary legislation.
The SC adds that when an administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or
render less cumbersome the implementation of the law and substantially increases the burden of those governed,
the agency must let those who are going to be affected be heard and informed, before the issuance is given the
force and effect of law.
In the instant case, EO 156 is obviously a legislative rule as it seeks to implement or execute primarylegislative
enactments intended to protect the domestic industry by imposing a ban on the importation of a specified
product.
Third requisite:
According to the petitioners, the purpose of the EO is for the domestic industry. EO 156, however, exceeded the
scope of its application by extending the prohibition on the importation of used cars to the Freeport, which RA
7227, considers to some extent, a foreign territory. The domestic industry which the EO seeks to protect is actually
the " customs territory " which is defined under the Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 7227
Fourth requisite:
This brings us to the fourth requisite. Rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the
end in view.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
SENATOR HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, petitioner,

vs.
HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR , respondents
G.R. No. 118303

January 31, 1996
FACTS:
On April 18, 1993, HB No. 8817, entitled “An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent
Component City to be known as the City of Santiago,” was filed in the House of Representatives. Meanwhile, a
counterpart of HB No. 8817, Senate Bill No. 1243, was filed in the Senate. On March 22, 1994, the House of
Representatives, upon being apprised of the action of the Senate, approved the amendments proposed by the
Senate.
ISSUE: Does the passing of SB No. 1243, the Senate’s own version of HB No. 8817, into Republic Act No. 7720 be
said to have originated in the House of Representatives as required?
RULING:
Yes. Although a bill of local application should originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, the claim of
petitioners that Republic Act No. 7720 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives because a bill
of the same import, SB No. 1243, was passed in the Senate, is untenable because it cannot be denied that HB No.
8817 was filed in the House of Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was filed in the Senate.
The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, does not
contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the House of
Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner,

vs.
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.
G.R. No. 115455

October 30, 1995
FACTS:
The present case involves motions seeking reconsideration of the Court’s decision dismissing
the petitions for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-
Added Tax Law. The motions, of which there are 10 in all, have been filed by the several petitioners. The Philippine
Press Institute, Inc. (PPI) contends that by removing the exemption of the press from the VAT while maintaining
those granted to others, the law discriminates against the press. At any rate, it is averred, "even nondiscriminatory
taxation of constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional”, citing in support the case of Murdock v.
Pennsylvania. Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Invc., (CREBA), on the other hand, asserts that
R.A. No. 7716 (1) impairs the obligations of contracts, (2) classifies transactions as covered or exempt without
reasonable basis and (3) violates the rule that taxes should be uniform and equitable and that Congress shall
"evolve a progressive system of taxation”. Further, the Cooperative Union of the Philippines (CUP), argues that
legislature was to adopt a definite policy of granting tax exemption to cooperatives that the present Constitution
embodies provisions on cooperatives. To subject cooperatives to the VAT would therefore be to infringe a
constitutional policy.
ISSUE: Whether or not, based on the aforementioned grounds of the petitioners, the Expanded Value-Added Tax
Law should be declared unconstitutional.
RULING:
No. With respect to the first contention, it would suffice to say that since the law granted the
press a privilege, the law could take back the privilege anytime without offense to the Constitution. The reason is
simple: by granting exemptions, the State does not forever waive the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. Indeed,
in withdrawing the exemption, the law merely subjects the press to the same tax burden to which other
businesses have long ago been subject.
The PPI asserts that it does not really matter that the law does not discriminate against the press because "even
nondiscriminatory taxation on constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional." The Court was speaking in
that case (Murdock v. Pennsylvania) of a license tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly for regulation. Its
imposition on the press is unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint on the exercise of its right.
The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a privilege, much less a
constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or properties or the sale or

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
exchange of services and the lease of properties purely for revenue purposes. To subject the press to its payment
is not to burden the exercise of its right any more than to make the press pay income tax or subject it to general
regulation is not to violate its freedom under the Constitution. Anent the first contention of CREBA, it has been
held in an early case that even though such taxation may affect particular contracts, as it may increase the debt of
one person and lessen the security of another, or may impose additional burdens upon one class and release the
burdens of another, still the tax must be paid unless prohibited by the Constitution, nor can it be said that it
impairs the obligation of any existing contract in its true legal sense. It is next pointed out that while Section 4 of
R.A. No. 7716 exempts such transactions as the sale of agricultural products, food items, petroleum, and medical
and veterinary services, it grants no exemption on the sale of real property which is equally essential.
The sale of food items, petroleum, medical and veterinary services, etc., which are essential goods and services
was already exempt under Section 103, pars. (b) (d) (1) of the NIRC before the enactment of R.A. No. 7716.
Petitioner is in error in claiming that R.A. No. 7716 granted exemption to these transactions, while subjecting those
of petitioner to the payment of the VAT. Finally, it is contended that R.A. No. 7716 also violates Art. VI, Section
28(1) which provides that "The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable.
The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation”. Nevertheless, equality and uniformity of taxation
means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power
has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation. To satisfy this
requirement it is enough that the statute or ordinance applies equally to all persons, forms and corporations
placed in similar situation. Furthermore, the Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes
which, like the VAT, are regressive. What it simply provides is that Congress shall "evolve a progressive system of
taxation." The constitutional provision has been interpreted to mean simply that "direct taxes are . . . to be
preferred [and] as much as possible, indirect taxes should be minimized." The mandate to Congress is not to
prescribe, but to evolve, a progressive tax system.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
NEPTALI A. GONZALES, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, JR, Respondents.
G.R. No. 87636

November 19, 1990.
FACTS:
Gonzales, together w/ 22 other senators, assailed the constitutionality of Cory’s veto of Section 55 of the 1989
Appropriations Bill (Sec 55 FY ’89, and subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill
(Sec 16 FY ’90). Gonzalez averred the following: (1) the President’s line-veto power as regards appropriation bills is
limited to item/s and does not cover provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her authority when she vetoed Section
55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) which are provision; (2) when the President objects to a provision of an
appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto power but should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power
does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of
the doctrine of separation of powers; and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the 1987
Constitution, has to be provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the prerogative to impose
restrictions on the exercise of that power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the Constitution. Or differently put,
has the President the power to veto `provisions’ of an Appropriations Bill.
HELD:
SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be more
properly enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate provisions inserted by it must be
treated as “item,” which can be vetoed by the President in the exercise of his item-veto power. The SC went one
step further and rules that even assuming arguendo that “provisions” are beyond the executive power to veto, and
Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) were not “provisions” in the budgetary sense of the term, they are
“inappropriate provisions” that should be treated as “items” for the purpose of the President’s veto power.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
CESAR BENGZON, QUERUBE MAKALINTAL, LINO M. PATAJO, JOSE LEUTERIO, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN N. DRILON, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as
Secretary of Department of Budget and Management, and HON. ROSALINA CAJUCOM, in her capacity as
National Treasurer, respondents.
G.R. No. 103524

April 15, 1992
FACTS:
In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e. Republic Act No. 1797) that were “repealed” during the
time of former President Ferdinand Marcos. These old laws provided certain retirement benefits to retired judges,
justices, and members of the constitutional commissions. Congress felt a need to restore these laws in order to
standardize retirement benefits among government officials. However, President Corazon Aquino vetoed the bill
(House Bill No. 16297) on the ground that the law should not give preferential treatment to certain or select
government officials.
Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition with the Supreme Court asking the court to
readjust their pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797 was never repealed (by P.D. No. 644) because the said PD
was one of those unpublished PDs which were subject of the case of Tañada v. Tuvera. Hence, the repealing law
never existed due to non publication and in effect, RA 1797 was never repealed.
The Supreme Court then readjusted their pensions. Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in the
General Appropriations Bill (GAB) for 1992, Congress allotted additional budget for pensions of retired justices.
Congress however did the allotment in the following manner: Congress made an item entitled: “General Fund
Adjustment”; included therein are allotments to unavoidable obligations in different brances of the government;
among such obligations is the allotment for the pensions of retired justices of the judiciary.
However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which provided for the pensions of the retired justices in
the judiciary in the GAB. She explained that that portion of the GAB is already deemed vetoed when she vetoed
H.B. 16297. This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired judges and justices to question the
constitutionality of the veto made by the President. The President was represented by then Executive Secretary
Franklin Drilon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill is constitutional.
RULING:
No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them in accordance
to Republic Act 1797 which was never repealed. The president has no power to set aside and override the decision
of the Supreme Court neither does the president have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws. The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is
unconstitutional since the power of the president to disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does
not grant the authority to veto part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of said item. It appears that in
the same item, the Presidents vetoed some portion of it and retained the others. This cannot be done. The rule
is: the Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all; the Executive must veto an entire line item in its
entirety or not at all. In this case, the president did not veto the entire line item of the general adjustment fund.
She merely vetoed the portion which pertained to the pensions of the justices but did not veto the other items
covering obligations to the other departments of the government.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, EXEQUIEL B. GARCIA and A. GONZALES, petitioners,

vs.
HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, as Secretary of Budget and Management; HON. VICENTE T. TAN, as National
Treasurer and COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
G.R. No. 113105

August 19, 1994
FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the validity of RA 7663 or General Appropriations Act of 1994.
GAA contains a special provision that allows any members of the Congress the REalignment of Allocation
for Operational Expenses, provided that the total of said allocation is not exceeded.
Philconsa claims that only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives are the ones
authorized under the Constitution to realign savings, not the individual members of Congress themselves.
President signed the law, but Vetoes certain provisions of the law and imposed certain provisional
conditions: that the AFP Chief of Staff is authorized to use savings to augment the pension funds under the
Retirement and Separation Benefits of the AFP.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7663 is violtive of Article VI, Section 25 (5) of 1987 Constitution.
RULING:
Yes. Only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House are allowed to approve the realignment.
Furthermore, two conditions must be met: 1) the funds to be realigned are actually savings, and 2) the transfer is
for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditures to which said transfer to be made.
As to the certain condition given to the AFP Chief of Staff, it is violative of of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of
the Article VI of the Constitution. The list of those who may be authorized to transfer funds is exclusive. the AFP
Chief of Staff may not be given authority.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST , petitioners,

vs.
HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, , respondent.
G.R. No. 166715

August 14, 2008
FACTS:
A petitioner seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335. R.A. 9335 was
enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and
the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their
revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives
Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR
and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax
reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law “transforms the
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters” as they will do their best
only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites corruption and
undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the people with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President as it
lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC officials
may be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law does
not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to
the President without sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and
unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the
doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the
enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight committee permits legislative
participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ISSUE: Whether or not there was an unduly delegation of power to fix revenue targets to the President.
RULING:
The Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. “
To determine the validity of delegation of legislative power, it needs the following: (1) the completeness
test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate’s authority,
announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,

INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his
capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director,
Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of
Printing, respondents.
G.R. No. L-63915

April 24, 1985
FACTS:
Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus in compelling respondent public officials to publish and/ or cause the
publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letter of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
The general rule in seeking writ of mandamus is that it “would be granted to a private individual only in those
cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected,
independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply
for the writ when public rights are to be subserved”.
The legal capacity of a private citizen was recognized by court to make the said petition for the reason that the
right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law
of the land.
ISSUE: Whether publication in the Official Gazette is still required considering the clause in Article 2 “unless
otherwise provided”.
RULING:
“Unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not with the publication requirement which
cannot be omitted as public needs to be notified for the law to become effective. The necessity for the
publication in the Official Gazette of all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, was
affirmed by the court on April 24, 1985. This is necessary to provide the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which regulate actions and conduct as citizens. Without this, there would be no basis for Art 3 of the
Civil Code “Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith”.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MORONG, BATAAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 111230

September 30, 1994
FACTS:
Enrique T. Garcia was elected governor of Bataan in the 1992 elections. Some mayors, vice-mayors and
members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the twelve (12) municipalities of the province constituted themselves into a
Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall election of petitioner Garcia. They issued Resolution No. 1 as
formal initiation of the recall proceedings. COMELEC scheduled the recall election for the gubernatorial position of
Bataan.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction to annul
the Resolution of the COMELEC because the PRAC failed to comply with the "substantive and procedural
requirement" laid down in Section 70 of R.A. 7160 (Local Government Code 1991). They pointed out the most fatal
defect of the proceeding followed by the PRAC in passing the Resolution: the deliberate failure to send notices of
the meeting to 65 members of the assembly.
ISSUE: Whether or not the people have the sole and exclusive right to initiate recall proceedings.
RULING:
No. There is nothing in the Constitution that will remotely suggest that the people have the "sole and exclusive
right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceeding." The Constitution did not provide for any mode, let alone
a single mode, of initiating recall elections.
The mandate given by section 3 of Article X of the Constitution is for Congress to "enact a local
government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure through
a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum . . ." By this
constitutional mandate, Congress was clearly given the power to choose the effective mechanisms of recall as its
discernment dictates.
What the Constitution simply required is that the mechanisms of recall, whether one or many, to be
chosen by Congress should be effective. Using its constitutionally granted discretion, Congress deemed it wise to
enact an alternative mode of initiating recall elections to supplement the former mode of initiation by direct action
of the people. The legislative records reveal there were two (2) principal reasons why this alternative mode of
initiating the recall process thru an assembly was adopted, viz: (a) to diminish the difficulty of initiating recall thru
the direct action of the people; and (b) to cut down on its expenses.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ENRIQUE T. GARCIA and CATALINO A. CALIMBAS, respondents.
G.R. No. 125416

September 26, 1996
FACTS:
On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA. 7227 (The Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992), which created
the Subic Economic Zone. RA 7227 likewise created SBMA to implement the declared national policy of converting
the Subic military reservation into alternative productive uses.
On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subic military reservation to the Philippines
government. Immediately, petitioner commenced the implementation of its task, particularly the preservation of
the sea-ports, airport, buildings, houses and other installations left by the American navy.
On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10 , Serye 1993 ,
expressing therein its absolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join the Subic Special
Economic Zone and submitted such to the Office of the President.
On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed a Petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang
Kapasyahan Blg.10, Serye 1993
The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify Pambayang Kapasyang Blg. 10 for Morong to join the Subic
Special Economic Zone, b) to allow Morong to join provided conditions are met.
The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong acted upon the petition by promulgating Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye
1993 , requesting Congress of the Philippines so amend certain provisions of RA 7227.
Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative under the LGC of 1991.
On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on the ground that the subject thereof was merely
a resolution and not an ordinance.
On February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation No. 532

defining the metes and bounds of the SSEZ including therein the portion of the former naval base within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Morong.
On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845 and 2848 , adopting a "Calendar of Activities for
Local referendum and providing for "the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of the referendum
On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari contesting the validity of Resolution No. 2848 alleging
that public respondent is intent on proceeding with a local initiative that proposes an amendment of a national law

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ISSUE: Whether or not the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powers of the people of Morong to
enact; whether such initiative "seeks the amendment of a national law."
RULING:
The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the municipal resolution isstill in the proposal stage and not yet an
approved law.
The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet anapproved law. Should the people reject it,
then there would be nothing tocontest and to adjudicate. It is only when the people have voted for it and ithas
become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights and obligationscan be enforced or implemented
thereunder. At this point, it is merely aproposal and the writ or prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture
orpossibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide only actualcontroversies, not hypothetical questions or
cases.In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to reviewComelec Resolution No. 2848 to
determine the commission of grave abuse of discretion. However, it does not have the same authority in regard to
theproposed initiative since it has not been promulgated or approved, or passedupon by any "branch
or instrumentality" or lower court, for that matter. TheCommission on Elections itself has made no reviewable
pronouncements about the issues brought by the pleadings. The Comelec simply includedverbatim the proposal in
its questioned Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there isreally no decision or action made by a branch, instrumentality
or court whichthis Court could take cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction over, in theexercise of its review powers

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in their capacities as
founding members of the Peoples Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA), respondents, SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK),
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), INTEGRATED
BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP) and LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.
G.R. No. 127325

March 19, 1997
FACTS:
On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a “Petition to Amend the Constitution to Lift Term Limits of
elective Officials by People’s Initiative” The COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.) set the time and dates for
signature gathering all over the country, b.) caused the necessary publication of the said petition in papers of
general circulation, and c.) instructed local election registrars to assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing
signing stations. On 18 Dec 1996, MD Santiago et al filed a special civil action for prohibition against the Delfin
Petition. Santiago argues that 1.) the constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the constitution can
only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress and no such law has yet been passed by Congress, 2.) RA
6735 indeed provides for three systems of initiative namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statues and on local
legislation. The two latter forms of initiative were specifically provided for in Subtitles II and III thereof but no
provisions were specifically made for initiatives on the Constitution. This omission indicates that the matter of
people’s initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law – as pointed out by former Senator
Arturo Tolentino.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the constitution and if so
whether the act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.
HELD:
RA 6735 is intended to include the system of initiative on amendments to the constitution but is unfortunately
inadequate to cover that system. Sec 2 of Article 17 of the Constitution provides: “Amendments to this
constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve
per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at
least there per centum of the registered voters therein.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right” This provision is obviously
not self-executory as it needs an enabling law to be passed by Congress. Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986
Con-Con stated “without implementing legislation Section 2, Art 17 cannot operate.

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Thus, although this mode of amending the constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses Congressional
action in the last analysis is still dependent on Congressional action.” Bluntly stated, the right of the people to
directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of inititative would remain entombed in the
cold niche of the constitution until Congress provides for its implementation. The people cannot exercise such
right, though constitutionally guaranteed, if Congress for whatever reason does not provide for its
implementation.

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MIRIAM DEFENSOR – SANTIAGO

vs
FIDEL RAMOS
253 SCRA 559

1996
Facts:
The protestant, Miriam Defensor-Santiago ran for presidency and lost in the May 1992 election. In her Motion on
the 16th day of August in the year 1995, reiterated in her comment of the 29th of August of the same year,
protestant Defensor-Santiago prayed that the revision in the remaining precincts of the pilot areas be dispensed
with and the revision process in the pilot areas be deemed computed.
The Court deferred action on the motion and required, instead, the protestant and protestee to submit their
respective memoranda. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the election protest filed by Defensor-Santiago is moot and academic by her election as a
Senator in the May 1995 election and her assumption of office as such on the 30th of June in the year 1995.
Held:
YES. The Court held that the election protest filed by Santiago has been abandoned or considered withdrawn as a
consequence of her election and assumption of office as Senator and her discharge of the duties and functions
thereof. The protestant abandoned her “determination to protest and pursue the public interest involved in the
matter of who is the real choice of the electorate.
Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would serve public interest as it would dissipate the aura of uncertainty as
to the results of the 1992 presidential elections, thereby enhancing the all too crucial political stability of the
nation during this period of national recovery.
Also, the PET issued a resolution ordering the protestant to inform the PET within 10 days if after the completion
of the revision of the ballots from her pilot areas, she still wishes to present evidence. Since DS has not informed
the Tribunal of any such intention, such is a manifest indication that she no longer intends to do so.

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MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners,
vs.
FORNIER, respondents.
424 SCRA 77
2004
FACTS:
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner initiated a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or
to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate
of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were
foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being
the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen,
he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien
mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe
contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no
such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.
ISSUE: WON the Supreme Court has the jurisdiction in cases questioning the qualifications of a Presidential and Vice
Presidential candidate before elections are held.
RULING:
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No. 161634, invoke the provisions of Article VII,
Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took
cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they directly
instituted before it. The Constitutional provision cited reads:
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose."
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-election scenario. Election contests consist of
either an election protest or a quo warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in
view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from office.

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The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the "President" or "VicePresident", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or
Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person who usurps,
intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. In such context, the election contest can only
contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have received either the
second or third highest number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a postelection
scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for
the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.
Accordingly, "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs. Commission on Elections et al.," and "Zoilo Antonio Velez vs.
Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

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RONALD ALLAN POE a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., protestant,

vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGALARROYO, protestee.
454 SCRA 142

2005
FACTS:
Past midnight, in the early hours of June 24, 2004, the Congress as the representatives of the sovereign people and
acting as the National Board of Canvassers, in a nearunanimous roll-call vote, proclaimed Mrs. Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo (GMA) the duly elected President of the Philippines. She obtained 12,905,808 votes, as against 11,782,232
votes for the second-placer, the movie actor Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ). She took her Oath of Office before the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court on June 30, 2004. Refusing to concede defeat, the second-placer in the elections, Mr.
FPJ, filed seasonably an election protest before this Electoral Tribunal on July 23, 2004.
On December 14, 2004, the Protestant died in the course of his medical treatment at St. Luke’s Hospital.
However, neither the Protestee’s proclamation by Congress nor the death of her main rival as a fortuitous
intervening event, appears to abate the present controversy in the public arena. Instead, notice may be taken of
periodic mass actions, demonstrations, and rallies raising an outcry for this Tribunal to decide the electoral protest
of Mr. FPJ against Mrs. GMA once and for all. The oracular function of this Tribunal, it would appear, needs to be
fully exercised to make manifest here and abroad who is the duly elected leader of the Filipino nation.
Needless to stress, this Tribunal cannot shirk its constitutional duty. Yet, neither could it go beyond its mandate
under the Constitution and the law. Further, this Tribunal is guided by its Rules, as well as the Rules of Court in a
suppletory manner. Considering the transcendental importance of the electoral contest involving the Presidency, a
rush to judgment is simply out of the question. Yet decide the matter we must, without further delay, to prevent
popular unrest and avoid further destabilization of government at the highest level.
ISSUE: May the widow substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during the pendency of the latter’s protest
case?
RULING:
It can be gleaned from the citation of this rule that movant / intervenor seeks to appear before this Tribunal as the
legal representative/substitute of the late protestant prescribed by said Section 16. However, in our application of
this rule to an election contest, we have every time ruled that a public office is personal to the public officer and

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not a property transmissible to the heirs upon death. Thus, we consistently rejected substitution by the widow or
the heirs in election contests where the protestant dies during the pendency of the protest.
This is not to say that death of the protestant necessarily abates the pending action. We have held as early as Vda.
de De Mesa (1966) that while the right to a public office is personal and exclusive to the public officer, an election
protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee such that the death of either
would oust the court of all authority to continue the protest proceedings. Hence, we have allowed substitution and
intervention but only by a real party in interest. A real party in interest is the party who would be benefited or
injured by the judgment, and the party who is entitled to the avails of the suit.
We are not unaware that a contest before election tribunals has two aspects. First, it is in pursuit of one’s right to a
public office, and second, it is imbued with public interest.
But herein movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ, has overly stressed that it is with the "paramount public interest" in mind
that she desires "to pursue the process" commenced by her late husband. She avers that she is "pursuing the
process" to determine who truly won the election, as a service to the Filipino people. We laud her noble intention
and her interest to find out the true will of the electorate. However, nobility of intention is not the point of
reference in determining whether a person may intervene in an election protest. Rule 19, Section 1 of the Rules of
Court is the applicable rule on intervention in the absence of such a rule in the PET Rules. In such intervention, the
interest which allows a person to intervene in a suit must be in the matter of litigation and of such direct and
immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the effect of the judgment. In this protest, Mrs.
FPJ will not immediately and directly benefit from the outcome should it be determined that the declared
president did not truly get the highest number of votes.

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AKBAYAN CITIZENS ACTION PARTY ("AKBAYAN"), PAMBANSANG KATIPUNAN NG MGA SAMAHAN SA

KANAYUNAN ("PKSK"), ALLIANCE OF PROGRESSIVE LABOR ("APL"), VICENTE A. FABE, ANGELITO R. MENDOZA,
MANUEL P. QUIAMBAO, ROSE BEATRIX CRUZ-ANGELES, CONG. LORENZO R. TANADA III, CONG. MARIO JOYO
AGUJA, CONG. LORETA ANN P. ROSALES, CONG. ANA THERESIA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, AND CONG.
EMMANUEL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA, Petitioners,
vs.
THOMAS G. AQUINO, in his capacity as Undersecretary of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and
Chairman and Chief Delegate of the Philippine Coordinating Committee (PCC) for the Japan-Philippines
Economic Partnership Agreement, EDSEL T. CUSTODIO, in his capacity as Undersecretary of the Department of
Foreign Affairs (DFA) and Co-Chair of the PCC for the JPEPA, EDGARDO ABON, in his capacity as Chairman of the
Tariff Commission and lead negotiator for Competition Policy and Emergency Measures of the JPEPA,
MARGARITA SONGCO, in her capacity as Assistant Director-General of the National Economic Development
Authority (NEDA) and lead negotiator for Trade in Services and Cooperation of the JPEPA, MALOU MONTERO, in
her capacity as Foreign Service Officer I, Office of the Undersecretary for International Economic Relations of the
DFA and lead negotiator for the General and Final Provisions of the JPEPA, ERLINDA ARCELLANA, in her capacity
as Director of the Board of Investments and lead negotiator for Trade in Goods (General Rules) of the JPEPA,
RAQUEL ECHAGUE, in her capacity as lead negotiator for Rules of Origin of the JPEPA, GALLANT SORIANO, in his
official capacity as Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and lead negotiator for Customs Procedures
and Paperless Trading of the JPEPA, MA. LUISA GIGETTE IMPERIAL, in her capacity as Director of the Bureau of
Local Employment of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and lead negotiator for Movement of
Natural Persons of the JPEPA, PASCUAL DE GUZMAN, in his capacity as Director of the Board of Investments and
lead negotiator for Investment of the JPEPA, JESUS MOTOOMULL, in his capacity as Director for the Bureau of
Product Standards of the DTI and lead negotiator for Mutual Recognition of the JPEPA, LOUIE CALVARIO, in his
capacity as lead negotiator for Intellectual Property of the JPEPA, ELMER H. DORADO, in his capacity as Officer-
in-Charge of the Government Procurement Policy Board Technical Support Office, the government agency that is
leading the negotiations on Government Procurement of the JPEPA, RICARDO V. PARAS, in his capacity as Chief
State Counsel of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and lead negotiator for Dispute Avoidance and Settlement of
the JPEPA, ADONIS SULIT, in his capacity as lead negotiator for the General and Final Provisions of the JPEPA,
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Secretary
of the DFA,* Respondent
G.R. No. 170516

July 16, 2008
FACTS:
Petition for mandamus and prohibition was filed by the petitioners, as congresspersons, citizens and
taxpayers, requesting respondents to submit to them the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership
Agreement (JPEPA).
Petitioner emphasize that the refusal of the government to disclose the said agreement violates there right
to information on matters of public concern and of public interest. That the non-disclosure of the same documents
undermines their right to effective and reasonable participation in all levels of social, political and economic
decision making.
Respondent herein invoke executive privilege. They relied on the ground that the matter sought involves a
diplomatic negotiation then in progress, thus constituting an exception to the right to information and the policy of

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full disclosure of matters that are of public concern like the JPEPA. Those diplomatic negotiations are covered by
the doctrine of executive privilege.
Issue:
I. Whether or not the petition has been entirely rendered moot and academic because of the
subsequent that occurred.
II. Whether the information sought by the petitioners are of public concern and are still covered by
the doctrine of executive privilege.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that t]he principal relief petitioners are praying for is the disclosure of the contents of
the JPEPA prior to its finalization between the two States parties,” public disclosure of the text of the JPEPA after
its signing by the President, during the pendency of the present petition, has been largely rendered moot and
academic.
The text of the JPEPA having then been made accessible to the public, the petition has become moot and
academic to the extent that it seeks the disclosure of the “full text” thereof.
The petition is not entirely moot, however, because petitioners seek to obtain, not merely the text of the
JPEPA, but also the Philippine and Japanese offers in the course of the negotiations.
The Supreme Court Ruled that Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this
jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations constituting no exception. It bears emphasis, however, that such privilege is
only presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type of information as privileged does not mean that
it will be considered privileged in all instances. Only after a consideration of the context in which the claim is made
may it be determined if there is a public interest that calls for the disclosure of the desired information, strong
enough to overcome its traditionally privileged status.
The court adopted also the doctrine in PMPF v. Manglapus, Wherein petitioners were seeking information
from the President’s representatives on the state of the then on-going negotiations of the RP-US Military Bases
Agreement. The Court denied the petition, stressing that “secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not
violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to
information.

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ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner,

vs.
SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON
TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, respondents.
G.R. No. 180643

September 4, 2008
FACTS:
In April April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE)
for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of
$329,481,290.00 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of
China. The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. On the other hand, Joe De Venecia issued a
statement that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval
of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one
hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to
bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed
President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when
probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, Neri refused to answer, invoking “executive
privilege“. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up
the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to
approve. He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the SBRC averring that the
communications between GMA and Neri is privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be
applied. The SBRC cited Neri for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not the three questions sought by the SBRC to be answered falls under executive privilege.
HELD:
The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is
performed in pursuit of legislation. The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the
presidential communications privilege.
First, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the
power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into
executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence.

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Second, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational
proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And
Third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege
and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

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Annotation 549 SCRA 402/588 SCRA 687

Executive Privilege
619 SCRA 669

(2010)
FACTS:
Accused, then Director General of the National Economic and Development Authority, involved himself in
the business transaction between the Philippine Government and Zhing Xing Telecommunications Equipment, Inc
of China for the implementation of the Philippine Broadband Network (PBN) Project which required the approval
of NEDA.
Offense charged: Violation of Sec. 3 (h) of RA 3019 as

amended in relation to Sec 13, Art VII of
the 1987 Constitution
Status:
Prosecution manifested that they will coordinate with the DOJ for financial support for travel to Shinshen,
China where they intend to conduct interviews with possible witnesses.
Prosecution, on 23 August 2011, received a copy of the Compliance, to one of the conditions to the Order
of the Honorable Court dated 15 July 2011 granting him permission to the travel to Hongkong from August 15,
2011 to August 17, 2011, filed by counsel of accused Neri.
Prosecution, on 18 August 2011, prayed for postponement on the ground that its witness, Mr. Madriaga
cannot be found at his given address and was informed by the Field Investigator of their office that said witness
already sold his house and lot in Paranaque. As prayed for, and without the objection of the part of counsel of the
accused Neri, continuation of presentation of evidence for the prosecution is set on October 17 and 19, 2011,
both at 8:30 in the morning.

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CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, petitioner,

vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondent.
G.R. No. 83896

February 22, 1991
FACTS:
In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which allowed members of
the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in
addition to their primary positions subject to limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO
averring that such law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the
principal submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution which provides:
“Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall
not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure.
They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business,
or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government
or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.”
CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution“, the only exceptions
against holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i)
The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the
Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.
RULING:
No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-
President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or
employment in the government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified
with respect to posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as
required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as
examples during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive officials should be
considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the constitution’s manifest intent and the people’s
understanding thereof.

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In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987
Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members,
undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2
positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or
employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting
them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

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NATIONAL AMNESTY COMMISSION, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, JUANITO G. ESPINO, Director IV, NCR, Commission on Audit, and ERNESTO C. EULALIA,
Resident Auditor, National Amnesty Commission. respondents.
G. R. No. 156982
September 8, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government agency created on March 25, 1994 by
then President Fidel V. Ramos through Proclamation No. 347. The NAC is tasked to receive, process and review
amnesty applications. It is composed of seven members: a Chairperson, three regular members appointed by the
President, and the Secretaries of Justice, National Defense and Interior and Local Government as ex
officio members.
It appears that after personally attending the initial NAC meetings, the three ex officio members turned
over said responsibility to their representatives who were paid honoraria beginning December 12, 1994. However,
on October 15, 1997, NAC resident auditor Eulalia disallowed on audit the payment of honoraria to these
representatives amounting to P255,750 for the period December 12, 1994 to June 27, 1997, pursuant to COA
Memorandum No. 97-038.
ISSUE: Whether representatives can be entitled to payment intended for ex-officio members
RULING:
The representatives in fact assumed their responsibilities not by virtue of a new appointment but by mere
designation from the ex officio members who were themselves also designated as such.
There is a considerable difference between an appointment and designation. An appointment is the

selection by the proper authority of an individual who is to exercise the powers and functions of a given office; a
designation merely connotes an imposition of additional duties, usually by law, upon a person already in the public
service by virtue of an earlier appointment.
Designation does not entail payment of additional benefits or grant upon the person so designated the
right to claim the salary attached to the position. Without an appointment, a designation does not entitle the
officer to receive the salary of the position.

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BENEDICTO ERNESTO R. BITONIO, JR., petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT and CELSO D. GANGAN, CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
G.R. No. 147392

March 12, 2004
Facts:
In 1994, petitioner Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio, Jr. was appointed Director IV of the Bureau of Labor Relations
in the Department of Labor and Employment. As representative of the Secretary of Labor to the PEZA Board, he
was receiving a per diem for every board meeting he attended during the years 1995 to 1997.
After a post audit of the PEZA’s disbursement transactions, the COA disallowed the payment of per diems
to Mr. Bitonio pursuant to the Supreme Court ruling declaring unconstitutional the holding of other offices by the
cabinet members, their deputies and assistants in addition to their primary office and the receipt of compensation
therefore, and, to COA Memorandum No. 97-038 dated September 19, 1997, implementing Senate Committee
Reports No. 509.
In his motion for reconsideration to the COA, he contended that the Supreme Court modified its earlier
ruling in the Civil Liberties Union case which limits the prohibition to Cabinet Secretaries, Undersecretaries and
their Assistants. Officials given the rank equivalent to a Secretary, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary and other
appointive officials below the rank of Assistant Secretary are not covered by the prohibition.
He further stated that the PEZA Charter (RA 7916), enacted four years after the Civil Liberties Union case
became final, authorized the payment of per diems; in expressly authorizing per diems, Congress should be
conclusively presumed to have been aware of the parameters of the constitutional prohibition as interpreted in
the Civil Liberties Union case.
COA rendered the assailed decision denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Issue: Whether COA correctly disallowed the per diems received by the petitioner for his attendance in the PEZA
Board of Directors’ meetings as representative of the Secretary of Labor.
Ruling:
The assailed decision of the COA is affirmed.
The petitioner is, indeed, not entitled to receive per diem for his board meetings sitting as representative
of the Secretary of Labor in the Board of Directors of the PEZA.
The petitioner’s presence in the PEZA Board meetings is solely by virtue of his capacity as representative
of the Secretary of Labor. Since the Secretary of Labor is prohibited from receiving compensation for his additional

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
office or employment, such prohibition likewise applies to the petitioner who sat in the Board only in behalf of the
Secretary of Labor. The Supreme Court cannot allow the petitioner who sat as representative of the Secretary of
Labor in the PEZA Board to have a better right than his principal.
Moreover, it is a basic tenet that any legislative enactment must not be repugnant to the Constitution. No
law can render it nugatory because the Constitution is more superior to a statute. The framers of R.A. No. 7916
must have realized the flaw in the law which is the reason why the law was later amended by R.A. No. 8748 to cure
such defect. The option of designating representative to the Board by the different Cabinet Secretaries was
deleted. Likewise, the paragraph as to payment of per diems to the members of the Board of Directors was also
deleted, considering that such stipulation was clearly in conflict with the proscription set by the Constitution.

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PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., LAUREANO T. ANGELES and JOCELYN P. CELESTINO, Petitioners,
vs.
MAGDANGAL B. ELMA, as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel and as Chairman of the Presidential Commission on
Good Government, and RONALDO ZAMORA, as Executive Secretary, Accused-Appellant
G.R. No. 138965

March 5, 2007
FACTS:
Respondent Magdangal Elma was appointed as Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government(PCGG) on October 30,1988. During his tenure as PCGG chairman he was appointed as Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel. He accepted the second appointment but waived any renumeration that he may
received as CPLC.Petitioners sought to have both appointments declared as unconstitutional and therefore null
and void.
For consideration is the omnibus motion dated on august 14,2006. Where respondent Elma sought:
(1) The reconsideration of the decision in the case of public Interest Center Inc.,et al vs Magdangal B. Elma
promulgated on June 30,2006;
(2) The clarification of the dispositive part of the decision ;
(3) The elevation of the case to the court en banc.
The Solicitor general in behalf of the respondent filed an Omnibus motion dated august 11,2006 with
substantially the same allegations.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent’s concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC are
unconstitutional.
RULING:
Yes. It is unconstitutional. He cannot hold both offices. The persons affected by the prohibition under
Section 13,Article VII are only Secretaries undersecretaries and assistant secretaries, excluding the public officers
who merely have the rank of secretary undersecretary or assistant secretary.
While the strict prohibition under Section 13,article VII of the 1987 Constitution is not applicable to the
PCGG Chairman nor the CPLC as neither of them is a secretary undersecretary nor an assistant secretary even if the
former may have the same rank as the latter positions it must be emphasized that despite the non-applicability of
section 13 Article VII of the 1987 constitution to the respondent Elma he remains covered by the general
prohibition under Section 7,article IX-B and his appointments must still comply with standard compatibility of
officers laid down therein failing which his appointments are hereby pronounced in violation of the constitution.
Granting the prohibition under Section 13,Article VII of the 1987 constitution is applicable to the present
case the defect in Elma’s concurrent appointments to the incompatible offices of the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC
would even be magnified when seen through the more stringent requirements imposed by the said constitutional
provision.

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The court allowed only two exceptions to the rule against multiple offices:
1) Those provided for under the Constitution such as section 3,article VII authorizing the Vice President to
become a member of the cabinet
2) Posts occupied by the Executive officials specified in Section 13,Article VII without additional
compensation in an ex officio capacity as provided by law as required by the primary functions of the said
officials’ office.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner,

vs.
ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND
CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO
CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., respondent.
G.R. No. 146710-15

March 2, 2001
Facts:
On October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal gambling, and other
forms of corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. On November 13,
2000, Estrada was impeached by the Hor and, on December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun in the
Senate during which more serious allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada were made and were only
stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the President, succeeded in suppressing damaging
evidence against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the entire prosecution
panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel resigned after casting his vote against Estrada.
On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA
Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with congressional and local
elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election. On January 20, SC declared that the seat
of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. At noon, Arroyo took her oath of
office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family later left Malacañang
Palace. Erap, after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent
Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as president
ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic
of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office.
Issue:
I. Whether or not Joseph Estrada resigned as President.

II. Whether or not Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo is only an acting President.
Rulling :
Yes, The supreme court held that the resignation was valid.Elements of valid resignation: (a) an intent to
resign and (b) acts of relinquishment. Both were present when President Estrada left the Palace.SC declared that
the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by his leaving Malacañan Palace. In the
press release containing his final statement:

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;

2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process (he did
not say that he was leaving due to any kind of disability and that he was going to reassume the Presidency as soon
as the disability disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as President (without doubt
referring to the past opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the same service of the country;
5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity.
Intent to resign—must be accompanied by act of relinquishment—act or omission before, during and after January
20, 2001 making the resignation of estrada valid.
On the second issue, Arroyo is only an acting President.
The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
as President of the Republic of the Philippines and subsequently passed H.R. 178 confirms the nomination of
Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As Vice President. Senate passed HR No. 83 declaring the Impeachment Courts as Functius
Officio and has been terminated. It is clear is that both houses of Congress recognized Arroyo as the President.
Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as the
Congress has clearly rejected his claim of inability.
The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature and addressed solely to
Congress by constitutional fiat. In fine, even if Estrada can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully
claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has
been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of
government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
SUCCESSION OF MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
353 SCRA 587

(2001)
RULING:
Estrada did not submitted a formal letter of resignation but using the events that transpired including the
entries in the diary of Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara,the Supreme Court ruled that the state of mind of
Estrada he had indeed resigned. The judicial review can be a weapon of political action and reaction and the
Supreme court become an active participant in the struggle for political power.Supreme court used the power of
judicial review as a political weapon in legitimizing the assumption of gloria macapagal-Arroyo.
Article VII sec 7 states that the president and Vice President elect shall assume office at the beginning of
their terms.
If the president elect fails to qualify,the Vice President elect shall act as President until President elect
shall have qualified.
If at the beginning of the term of the President,the President elect shall have died or shall have become
permanently disabled,the Vice President elect shall become the President.
Where no President and vice President shall have qualified or where both shall have died or become
permanently disabled,the President of the senate or in case of his inability,the speaker of the house of
representatives shall act as President until a president or vice president shall have been chosen and qualified.
The congress shall by law provide for the manner in which one who is to act as President shall be selected
until a President or Vice president shall have qualified in case of death,permanent disability or inability of the
officials .

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
BENJAMIN U. BORJA, JR., petitioner

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE T. CAPCO, JR., respondents.
G.R. No. 133495.

September 3, 1998
Facts:
Jose Capco Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros in the 1988 election. On September 2, 1989 he became
mayor, by operation of law upon the death of the incumbent mayor. He was elected for mayor in the 1992 election
and was re-elected in the 1995 election. He filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor relative to the upcoming 1998
elections. Petitioner who was a candidate for mayor sought the disqualification of Jose Capco Jr. on the ground of
the three-term limit rule under the constitution and local government code.
Capco got the majority of votes and was proclaimed as mayor of Pateros.
Issue: Whether or not Capco Jr. is eligible to run for mayor.
Ruling:
Yes, the three-term limit for elective local official refers to the right to be elected as well as the right to
serve in the same elective position. In relation to this it is not enough that a person has served three consecutive
terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position. Therefore, the succession by
operation of law by Capco does not count as a term in counting the three-term limit rule.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS. JR., IRENE M. ARANETA, IMEE M.
MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA, PACIFICO E. MARCOS, NICANOR YÑIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented by its President, CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ, MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO,
FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Executive Secretary, Secretary
of Justice, Immigration Commissioner, Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff,
respectively, respondents.
G.R. No. 88211

October 27, 1989
Facts:
Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency, he and his family fled to Hawaii. Now in his
deathbed, petitioners are asking the court to order the respondents to issue their travel documents and enjoin the
implementation of the President’s decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners contend under the
provision of the Bill of Rights that the President is without power to impair their liberty of abode because only a
court may do so “within the limits prescribed by law.” Nor, according to the petitioners, may the President impair
their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.
Issue: Whether or not the president have the power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines
Ruling:
Yes. The President has the obligation, under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare
and advance national interest.
This case calls for the exercise of the President’s power as protector of the peace. The president is not
only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with day-to-day problems of
maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the
horizon. The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the country
bolsters the conclusion that their return at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed
against the state and instigate more chaos.
The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking preemptive actions against threats to its
existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct protection of the people is
the essence of the duty of the government.
The Supreme Court held that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining the return of the petitioners at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious
threat to national interest and welfare prohibiting their return to the Philippines. The petition is dismissed

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS. JR., IRENE M. ARANETA, IMEE M.
MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA, PACIFICO E. MARCOS, NICANOR YÑIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented by its President, CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ, MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO,
FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Executive Secretary, Secretary
of Justice, Immigration Commissioner, Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff,
respectively, respondents.
G.R. No. 88211

October 27, 1989
Facts:
In its decision dated September 15,1989, the Court dismissed the petition, after finding that the President
did not act with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family
pose a threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines. On October 2,
1989, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners, raising the following as one of their arguments, that
the President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has, she had exercised it arbitrarily.
Issue: Whether the President exercised her power arbitrarily.
Ruling:
No, the President did not exercise her power arbitrarily.
It cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive power is vested, has unstated residual
powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her
duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in
the article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding
the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President
as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific power of the
President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant
of executive power.
There is no similarity between the residual powers of the President under the 1987 Constitution and the
power of the President under the 1973 Constitution pursuant to Amendment No. 6. First of all, Amendment No. 6
refers to an express grant of power. It is not implied. Then, Amendment No. 6 refers to a grant to the President of
the specific power of legislation.
Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath of office, is
to protect and promote the interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and
subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under present circumstances is in compliance
with this bounden duty.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
BLAS F. OPLE, petitioner,

vs.
RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO, ROBERT BARBERS,
CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD OF THE NATIONAL
COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
G.R. No. 127685

July 23, 1998
Facts:
On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary
Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating
Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. Petitioner Ople prays to invalidate
Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System.”
Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and hence, beyond the power of
the President to issue.
Issue: Whether A. O No. 308 is beyond the power of the President to issue.
Ruling:
Yes, A. O No. 308 is beyond the power of the President to issue.
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the laws. The executive
power is vested in the Presidents. It is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the
power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance. As head of the Executive
Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all
laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. He has control over the executive department,
bureaus and offices. Corollary to the power of control, the President also has the duty of supervising the
enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined
by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and
check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered
by an administrative order. An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to
specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be
for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.
As said administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the
State as well as the line that separates the administrative power of the President to make rules and the legislative
power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be covered by law.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
KILUSANG MAYO UNO, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU),
JOSELITO V. USTAREZ, EMILIA P. DAPULANG, SALVADOR T. CARRANZA, MARTIN T. CUSTODIO, JR. and ROQUE
M. TAN, Petitioners,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, and THE SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET and MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
G.R. No. 167798

April 19, 2006
Facts:
This case involves two consolidated petitions seeking the nullification of Executive Order No. 420 (EO 420)
on the ground that it is unconstitutional. Under EO 420, the President directs all government agencies and
government-owned and controlled corporations to adopt a uniform data collection and format for their existing
identification (ID) systems. Petitioners allege that EO 420 is unconstitutional because it constitutes usurpation of
legislative functions by the executive branch of the government.
Issue: Whether EO 420 is a usurpation of legislative power by the President.
Ruling:
No, EO 420 is not a usurpation of legislative power by the President.
A unified ID system for all these government entities can be achieved in either of two ways. First, the
heads of these existing government entities can enter into a memorandum of agreement making their systems
uniform. Second, the President may by executive or administrative order direct the government entities under the
Executive department to adopt a uniform ID data collection and format. Section 17, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution provides that the "President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices." The
same Section also mandates the President to "ensure that the laws be faithfully executed."
Certainly, under this constitutional power of control the President can direct all government entities, in
the exercise of their functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data collection and ID format to achieve
savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and convenience to the public. The President’s constitutional power of
control is self-executing and does not need any implementing legislation.
The Constitution also mandates the President to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. There are
several laws mandating government entities to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, improve public
services. The adoption of a uniform ID data collection and format under EO 420 is designed to reduce costs,
increase efficiency, and in general, improve public services. Thus, in issuing EO 420, the President is simply
performing the constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
Clearly, EO 420 is well within the constitutional power of the President to promulgate. The President has
not usurped legislative power in issuing EO 420. EO 420 is an exercise of Executive power – the President’s
constitutional power of control over the Executive department. EO 420 is also compliance by the President of the
constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. MANUEL E. GAITE, Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, Office of the President; HON. RAUL
GONZALES, Secretary, and HON. JOVENCITO ZUÑO, Chief State Prosecutor, both of the Department of Justice
(DOJ); HON. RAMON R. GARCIA (Substituted by Hon. JOSEPH LOPEZ), City Prosecutor, ACP MARLINA N. MANUEL,
and ACP ADELIZA H. MAGNO-GUINGOYON, all of the Manila Prosecution Service; and SSP EMMANUEL VELASCO,
Department of Justice, Respondents.
G.R. No. 176596

March 23, 2011
Facts:
In June 1999, petitioner was charged of child abuse by her grandniece Maria Mercedes Vistan. The
preliminary investigation of the complaint was assigned to State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco (respondent
Velasco) of the Department of Justice (DOJ). Respondent Velasco filed a case against petitioner for 21 counts of
Child Abuse under Republic Act (RA) No. 7610. Petitioner filed a petition for review with the DOJ Secretary who
ordered the withdrawal of the Information against petitioner. Petitioner filed with the DOJ an administrative
complaint for Gross Misconduct, Gross Ignorance of the Law, Incompetence and Manifest Bad Faith against
respondent Velasco, which the DOJ subsequently dismissed. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which
the DOJ Secretary denied. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review with the Office of the President (OP) assailing
the DOJ’s Resolutions dismissing the administrative complaint she filed against respondent Velasco. The OP asked
respondent Velasco to file his comment thereto. In his comment, respondent Velasco stated matters and
information provided by unimpeachable sources from the judiciary, schoolmates and close friends of Judge
Angeles, which according to the latter is a direct attack on her character and reputation as a public servant. On the
basis of the above statements, she filed a Complaint for four counts of libel against respondent Velasco before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. Assistant City Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of petitioner’s
complaint for Libel due to insufficiency of evidence and/or lack of merit. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed with the DOJ
Secretary a Petition for Review which was dismissed by the Chief State Prosecutor. She then filed a motion for
reconsideration but was also denied by DOJ with finality. So, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review before the OP
questioning the DOJ Resolutions dismissing her petition. The OP dismissed the petition, citing MC No. 58, stating
that no appeal from or petition for review of the decision or resolution of the Secretary of Justice on preliminary
investigation of criminal cases shall be entertained by the Office of the President, except those involving offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for review assailing the OP
orders. The CA denied the petition. In denying the petition, the CA applied the doctrine laid down in Carpio v.
Executive Secretary regarding the power of control of the President over all executive branches of the government,
in relation to the doctrine of qualified political agency. Under the doctrine, the official acts of a Department
Secretary are deemed to be the acts directly of the President herself unless disapproved or reprobated by the
latter; that it was the OP’s prerogative to determine whether or not it shall consent to exercise its general
appellate jurisdiction in any given case emanating from the Chief Executive’s power of control over all executive
officers from Cabinet secretaries to the lowliest ranks. The CA then ruled that the OP, relying on MC No. 58,
dismissed petitioner's petition for review and exercised its prerogative not to disapprove or overturn the DOJ
Secretary’s resolutions, thus, approving the acts or decision of the DOJ Secretary, being her alter ego.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
Issue: Whether the doctrine of qualified political agency may apply.
Ruling:
Yes, the doctrine of qualified political agency may apply.
Under this doctrine, which primarily recognizes the establishment of a single executive, "all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department; the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is
required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act
personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and
through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive." The CA cannot be deemed to have committed any error in
upholding the Office of the President's reliance on the Memorandum Circular as it merely interpreted and applied
the law as it should be.
It is quite evident from the foregoing that the President himself set the limits of his power to review
decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice in order to expedite the disposition of cases. Petitioner's
argument that the Memorandum Circular unduly expands the power of the Secretary of Justice to the extent of
rendering even the Chief Executive helpless to rectify whatever errors or abuses the former may commit in the
exercise of his discretion is purely speculative to say the least. Petitioner cannot second-guess the President's
power and the President's own judgment to delegate whatever it is he deems necessary to delegate in order to
achieve proper and speedy administration of justice, especially that such delegation is upon a cabinet secretary -
his own alter ego.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ATTY. MA. ROSARIO MANALANG-DEMIGILLO, Petitioner,

vs.
TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (TIDCORP), and its BOARD OF
DIRECTORS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 168613

March 5, 2013
Facts:
On February 12, 1998, the Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee was renamed Trade and
Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines (TIDCORP) pursuant to Republic Act No. 8494. Republic
Act No. 8494 reorganized the structure of TIDCORP. The issuance of appointments in accordance with the
reorganization ensued. Petitioner Rosario Manalang-Demigillo (Demigillo) was appointed as Senior Vice President
with permanent status, and was assigned to the Legal and Corporate Services Department (LCSD) of TIDCORP. The
Board of Directors passed Resolution No. 1365 to approve a so-called Organizational Refinement/Restructuring
Plan to implement a new organizational structure and staffing pattern, a position classification system, and a new
set of qualification standards. During the implementation of the Organizational Refinement/Restructuring Plan, the
LCSD was abolished. According to the List of Appointed Employees under the New Organizational Structure of
TIDCORP, Demigillo, albeit retaining her position as a Senior Vice President, was assigned to head the Remedial
and Credit Management Support Sector (RCMSS). On the same date, President Valdes issued her appointment as
head of RCMSS, such appointment being in nature a reappointment under the reorganization plan. In her letter
dated December 23, 2002 that she sent to TIDCORP Chairman Jose Isidro Camacho, Demigillo challenged before
the Board of Directors the validity of Resolution No. 1365 and of her assignment to the RCMSS. Pending
determination of her challenge by the Board of Directors, Demigillo appealed to the Civil Service Commission
(CSC), raising the same issues. Later on, TIDCORP furnished to the CSC a copy of Board Decision No. 03-002
dismissing Demigillo’s appeal for its lack of merit. In the meanwhile, by letter dated April 14, 2003, President
Valdes informed Demigillo of her poor performance rating for the period from January 1, 2002 to December 31,
2002. She then appealed the poor performance rating, calling the rating a part of Valdes’ "unremitting harassment
and oppression on her. On August 19, 2003, Demigillo reported for work upon the expiration of the 90-day
preventive suspension imposed by the Board of Directors in a separate administrative case, but requested to be
allowed to reproduce documents in connection with the appeal of her performance rating. It appears that the
Board of Directors rendered Decision No. 03-003 dated August 15, 2003 unanimously dropping Demigillo from the
rolls. The CSC ruled that the 2002 Organizational Refinements or Restructuring Plan of TIDCORP had been valid for
being authorized by Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8498 which granted a continuing power to TIDCORP’s Board of
Directors to prescribe the agency’s organizational structure, staffing pattern and compensation packages. Both
Demigillo and TIDCORP appealed the decision of the CSC to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA promulgated its
decision which, albeit affirming the ruling of the CSC, rendered a legal basis different from that given by the CSC. In
numerous cases citing Section 20 and Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, the Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative that the President of the Philippines has
the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. Hence, being the
alter ego of the President of the Philippines, the Board of Directors of the private respondent-appellee is
authorized by law to have a continuous power to reorganize its agency.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
Issue: Whether the application of the doctrine of qualified political agency, contending that the acts of the Board of
Directors of TIDCORP, an attached agency of the Department of Finance whose head, the Secretary of Finance, was
an alter ego of the President.
Ruling:
No, the application of the doctrine of qualified political agency cannot apply.
The doctrine of qualified political agency essentially postulates that the heads of the various executive
departments are the alter egos of the President, and, thus, the actions taken by such heads in the performance of
their official duties are deemed the acts of the President unless the President himself should disapprove such acts.
This doctrine is in recognition of the fact that in our presidential form of government, all executive organizations
are adjuncts of a single Chief Executive; that the heads of the Executive Departments are assistants and agents of
the Chief Executive; and that the multiple executive functions of the President as the Chief Executive are
performed through the Executive Departments.
But the doctrine of qualified political agency could not be extended to the acts of the Board of Directors
of TIDCORP despite some of its members being themselves the appointees of the President to the Cabinet. Under
Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1080, as further amended by Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8494, the five ex
officio members were the Secretary of Finance, the Secretary of Trade and Industry, the Governor of the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas, the Director-General of the National Economic and Development Authority, and the Chairman
of the Philippine Overseas Construction Board, while the four other members of the Board were the three from
the private sector (at least one of whom should come from the export community), who were elected by the ex
officio members of the Board for a term of not more than two consecutive years, and the President of TIDCORP
who was concurrently the Vice-Chairman of the Board. Such Cabinet members sat on the Board of Directors of
TIDCORP ex officio, or by reason of their office or function, not because of their direct appointment to the Board
by the President. Evidently, it was the law, not the President, which sat them in the Board.
Under the circumstances, when the members of the Board of Directors effected the assailed 2002
reorganization, they were acting as the responsible members of the Board of Directors of TIDCORP constituted
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1080, as amended by Republic Act No. 8494, not as the alter egos of the
President. We cannot stretch the application of a doctrine that already delegates an enormous amount of power.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
BUKLOD NG KAWANING EIIB, CESAR POSADA, REMEDIOS G. PRINCESA, BENJAMIN KHO, BENIGNO MANGA,
LULU MENDOZA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RONALDO B. ZAMORA, HON. SECRETARY JOSE PARDO, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE,
HON. SECRETARY BENJAMIN DIOKNO, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, HON. SECRETARY
ARTEMIO TUQUERO, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, respondents.
G.R. No. 142801
July 10, 2001
Facts:
Former President Corazon C. Aquino, issued Executive Order No. 127 establishing the Economic
Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) as part of the structural organization of the Ministry of Finance. Eleven
years after, President Joseph Estrada issued Executive Order No. 191 entitled "Deactivation of the Economic
Intelligence and Investigation Bureau.” Motivated by the fact that "the designated functions of the EIIB are also
being performed by the other existing agencies of the government" and that "there is a need to constantly monitor
the overlapping of functions" among these agencies. On March 29, 2000, President Estrada issued Executive Order
No. 223 providing that all EIIB personnel occupying positions specified therein shall be deemed separated from the
service. Agonizing over the loss of their employment, petitioners invoke before the Court its power of judicial
review of Executive Order Nos. 191 and 223. Petitioners contend that the issuance of the afore-mentioned
executive orders is a usurpation of the power of Congress to decide whether or not to abolish the EIIB.
Issue: Whether the executive orders are a usurpation of the power of Congress.
Ruling:
No, the executive orders are not a usurpation of the power of Congress.
The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature.
This proceeds from the legal precept that the power to create includes the power to destroy. A public office is
either created by the Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law. Thus, except where the office was created by
the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same legislature that brought it into existence. The exception,
however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are concerned, the President's
power of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular office, or certain laws may grant him the
broad authority to carry out reorganization measures.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC), petitioner,

vs.
ROBERTO MABALOT, respondent.
G.R. No. 138200
February 27, 2002
Facts:
Then Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) Jesus B. Garcia, Jr.,
issued Memorandum Order No. 96-735 addressed to Land Transportation Franchising Regulatory Board (LTFRB)
Chairman Dante Lantina ordering the transfer of the powers and functions of the LTFRB Regional Office to a DOTC
Regional Office. Herein respondent Roberto Mabalot filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order, against petitioner and LTFRB Chairman Lantin. Thereafter,
Secretary Lagdameo issued the assailed Department Order No. 97-1025 making the DOTC-CAR Regional Office as
the Regional Office of the LTFRB and shall exercise the regional functions of the LTFRB in the CAR subject to the
direct supervision and control of LTFRB Central Office. Respondent filed a Motion for Leave to File Supplemental
Petition assailing the validity of Department Order No. 97-1025. The lower court rendered a decision declaring
Memorandum Order Nos. 96-733 and 97-1025 of the respondent DOTC Secretary null and void and without any
legal effect.
Issue: Whether Memorandum Order No. 96-735 and Department Order No. 97-1025 is unconstitutional for being
an undue exercise of legislative power.
Ruling:
No, it is not.
Accordingly, in the absence of any patent or latent constitutional or statutory infirmity attending the
issuance of the challenged orders, this Court upholds Memorandum Order No. 96-735 and Department Order No.
97-1025 as legal and valid administrative issuances by the DOTC Secretary. Contrary to the opinion of the lower
court, the President - through his duly constituted political agent and alter ego, the DOTC Secretary in the present
case - may legally and validly decree the reorganization of the Department, particularly the establishment of DOTC-
CAR as the LTFRB Regional Office at the Cordillera Administrative Region, with the concomitant transfer and
performance of public functions and responsibilities appurtenant to a regional office of the LTFRB. Emphatically
the President, through Administrative Order No. 36, did not merely authorize but directed, in no uncertain terms,
the various departments and agencies of government to immediately undertake the creation and establishment of
their regional offices in the CAR. Administrative Order No. 36 is a clear and unequivocal directive and mandate - no
less than from the Chief Executive - ordering the heads of government departments and bureaus to effect the
establishment of their respective regional offices in the CAR.
By the Chief Executive’s unequivocal act of issuing Administrative Order No. 36 ordering his alter ego - the
DOTC Secretary in the present case - to effectuate the creation of Regional Offices in the CAR, the President, in

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
effect, deemed it fit and proper under the circumstances to act and exercise his authority, albeit through the
various Department Secretaries, so as to put into place the organizational structure and set-up in the CAR and so
as not to compromise in any significant way the performance of public functions and delivery of basic government
services in the Cordillera Administrative Region.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, represented herein by its Secretary, HEHERSON T.
ALVAREZ, Petitioner,
vs.
DENR REGION 12 EMPLOYEES, represented by BAGUIDALI KARIM, Acting President of COURAGE (DENR Region
12 Chapter), Respondents.
G.R. No. 149724
August 19, 2003
Facts:
The Regional Executive Director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources for Region XII,
Israel C. Gaddi, issued a Memorandum directing the immediate transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from
Cotabato City to Koronadal (formerly Marbel), South Cotabato. Respondents, employees of the DENR Region XII
who are members of the employees association, "COURAGE", represented by their Acting President, Baguindanai
A. Karim, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato, a petition for nullity of orders with prayer for preliminary
injunction. The trial court rendered judgment ordering the respondents to cease and desist from enforcing their
Memorandum Order relative to the transfer of the DENR Regional Offices from Region 12 to Region 11 at
Koronadal, South Cotabato for being bereft of legal basis. Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in enjoining it
from causing the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices, considering that it was done pursuant to DENR
Administrative Order 99-14.
Issue: Whether the DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR.
Ruling:
Yes, the DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR.
Under the doctrine of qualified political agency, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive,
all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief
Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he
act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and
through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. Applying the doctrine of qualified political agency, the power of the
President to reorganize the National Government may validly be delegated to his cabinet members exercising
control over a particular executive department. Similarly, in the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly
reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal,
South Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the acts of
the President for the latter had not expressly repudiated the same.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
SPOUSES RENATO CONSTANTINO, JR. and LOURDES CONSTANTINO

vs
HON. JOSE B. CUISIA
G.R. No. 106064

October 13, 2005
Facts:
During the Corazon Aquino regime, her administration came up with a scheme to reduce the country’s
external debt. The solution resorted to was to incur foreign debts. Three restructuring programs were sought to
initiate the program for foreign debts – they are basically buyback programs and bond-conversion programs. The
spouses Renato Constantino, Jr. and Lourdes Constantino, as a taxpayers, and in behalf of their minor children who
are Filipino citizens, together with FFDC (Freedom From Debt Coalition) averred that the buyback and bond-
conversion schemes were onerous and they do not constitute the loan “contract” or “guarantee” contemplated in
Sec. 20, Art. VII of the Constitution. And assuming that the President has such power, unlike other powers which
may be validly delegated by the President, the power to incur foreign debts is expressly reserved by the
Constitution in the person of the President, hence, the respondents herein, Central Bank Governor Josse Cuisia et
al, cannot incur debts for the Philippines or such power can be delegated to them. Constantino argue that the
gravity by which the exercise of the power will affect the Filipino nation requires that the President alone must
exercise this power. They argue that the requirement of prior concurrence of an entity specifically named by the
Constitution–the Monetary Board–reinforces the submission that not respondents but the President “alone and
personally” can validly bind the country. Hence, they would like Cuisia et al to stop acting pursuant to the said
scheme.
Issue: Whether or not the President of the Philippines can validly delegate her debt power to the respondents.
Ruling:
Yes, the President of the Philippines can validly delegate her debt power to the respondents. There is no
question that the president has borrowing powers and that the President may contract or guarantee foreign loans
in behalf of this country with prior concurrence of the Monetary Board. It makes no distinction whatsoever and the
fact that a debt or a loan may be onerous is irrelevant. On the other hand, the President can delegate this power
to her direct subordinates. The evident exigency of having the Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the
President to execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the fact that the process of establishing and
executing a strategy for managing the government’s debt is deep within the realm of the expertise of the
Department of Finance, primed as it is to raise the required amount of funding, achieve its risk and cost objectives,
and meet any other sovereign debt management goals. If the President were to personally exercise every aspect of
the foreign borrowing power, he/she would have to pause from running the country long enough to focus on a
welter of time-consuming detailed activities–the propriety of incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and choosing
among the many methods that may be taken toward this end, meeting countless times with creditor
representatives to negotiate, obtaining the concurrence of the Monetary Board, explaining and defending the
negotiated deal to the public, and more often than not, flying to the agreed place of execution to sign the
documents. This sort of constitutional interpretation would negate the very existence of cabinet positions and the
respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ARMITA B. RUFINO, ZENAIDA R. TANTOCO, LORENZO CALMA, RAFAEL SIMPAO, JR., and FREDDIE
GARCIA, petitioners,
vs.
BALTAZAR N. ENDRIGA, MA. PAZ D. LAGDAMEO, PATRICIA C. SISON, IRMA PONCE-ENRILE POTENCIANO, and
DOREEN FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 139554

July 21, 2006
Facts:
Two groups of appointed members of the Board of Trustees of CCP are contesting each other’s
appointment. The Endriga group, sitting as current members, was appointed by then-President Ramos and is
assailing the appointment of the Rufino group, replacing all 7 members of the Endriga group, by then-President
Estrada. Endriga group avers that the appointment into the Board of the Rufino group transgressed PD 15 –
creation of Board of Trustees of CCP. As stated in PD 15, specifically Section 6, appointment into the Board shall
only be made by a majority vote of the trustees; presidential appointments can only be made when the Board is
entirely vacant to uphold the CCP’s charter of independence from pressure or politics. Meanwhile, Rufino group
stands by their appointment since the provision on appointments stated in Section 6, PD 15 is violative of Section
16, Article 7 of the Constitution. The Board cannot invoke the charter of autonomy to extend to appointment of its
members.
Issue: Whether CCP trustees have the authority to appoint and elect their fellow trustees when there is vacancy.
Ruling:
No, CCP trustees does not have the authority to appoint and elect their fellow trustees when there is
vacancy. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15, which authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to fill vacancies in the Board,
runs afoul with the President’s power of control under Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The intent
of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is to insulate the CCP from political influence and pressure, specifically from the
President. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP a self-perpetuating entity, virtually outside the control of
the President. Such a public office or board cannot legally exist under the 1987 Constitution. Section 3 of PD 15,
as amended, states that the CCP “shall enjoy autonomy of policy and operation x x x.” This provision does not free
the CCP from the President’s control, for if it does, then it would be unconstitutional. This provision may give the
CCP Board a free hand in initiating and formulating policies and undertaking activities, but ultimately these policies
and activities are all subject to the President’s power of control. The CCP is part of the Executive branch. No law
can cut off the President’s control over the CCP in the guise of insulating the CCP from the President’s influence.
By stating that the “President shall have control of all the executive x x x offices,” the 1987 Constitution empowers
the President not only to influence but even to control all offices in the Executive branch, including the CCP.
Control is far greater than, and subsumes, influence.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and BAYANI FERNANDO as Chairman of the
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, petitioners,
vs.
VIRON TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., respondent.
G.R. No. 170656

August 15, 2007
Facts:
To solve the worsening traffic congestions problem in Metro Manila the President issued Executive Order
(E.O.) 179, providing for the Establishment of Greater Manila Mass Transportation System. As determined in E.O.
179, the primary cause of traffic congestion in Metro Manila has been the numerous buses plying the streets that
impede the flow of vehicles and commuters and the inefficient connectivity of the different transport modes. To
decongest traffic, petitioner Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) came up with a
recommendation, proposing the elimination of bus terminals located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares,
and the construction of mass transport terminal facilities to provide a more convenient access to mass transport
system to the commuting public. The project provided for under this E.O. was called ―Greater Manila Transport
System‖ (Project) wherein the MMDA was designated as the implementing agency. Accordingly, the Metro Manila
Council, the governing board of the MMDA issued a resolution, expressing full support of the project. The
respondents, which are engaged in the business of public transportation with a provincial bus operation, Viron
Transport Co., Inc. and Mencorp Transportation System, Inc., assailed the constitutionality of E.O. 179. They
alleged that the MMDA is not authorized to order the closure of bus terminals.
Issue: Whether MMDA is authorized to order the closure of bus terminals.
Ruling:
No, the MMDA is not authorized to order the closure of bus terminals.
It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the DOTC, and not the
MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a project such as the one subject of the cases at bar. Thus,
the President, although authorized to establish or cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the
authority through the instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law, is the primary implementing and administrative
entity in the promotion, development and regulation of networks of transportation, and the one so authorized to
establish and implement a project such as the Project in question. By designating the MMDA as the implementing
agency of the Project, the President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering
E.O. No. 179 ultra vires. There was no grant of authority to MMDA. It was delegated only to set the policies
concerning traffic in Metro Manila, and shall coordinate and regulate the implementation of all programs and
projects concerning traffic management, specifically pertaining to enforcement, engineering and education.
In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to
implement the Project as envisioned by the E.O; hence, it could not have been validly designated by the President
to undertake the Project.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T. SANTOS, respondents.
G.R. No. 93252

August 5, 1991
Facts:
Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed against him on grounds of
misconduct and misfeasance of office. The Secretary of Local Government issued several suspension orders against
Ganzon based on the merits of the complaints filed against him hence Ganzon was facing about 600 days of
suspension. Ganzon appealed the issue to the CA and the CA affirmed the suspension order by the Secretary.
Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution does not authorize the President nor any of his alter ego to suspend
and remove local officials; this is because the 1987 Constitution supports local autonomy and strengthens the
same. What was given by the present Constitution was mere supervisory power.
Issue: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President’s alter ego, can suspend and or remove
local officials.
Held:
Yes, the Secretary of Local Government can suspend and or remove local officials.
Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers,
which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces
disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because supervision means overseeing or the power or authority
of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the
former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other
hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done
in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.” But from this
pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local
government officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service
so requires.
The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in suspending Ganzon is exercising a
valid power.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
HON. EDUARDO NONATO JOSON, in his capacity as the Governor of the Province of Nueva Ecija, petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RUBEN D. TORRES, the DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR & LOCAL GOVERNMENTS,
represented by SECRETARY ROBERT Z. BARBERS and UNDERSECRETARY MANUEL R. SANCHEZ, MR. OSCAR C.
TINIO, in his capacity as Provincial Vice-Governor of Nueva Ecija, and MR. LORETO P. PANGILINAN, MR.
CRISPULO S. ESGUERRA, MS. SOLITA C. SANTOS, MR. VICENTE C. PALILIO, and MR. NAPOLEON G. INTERIOR, in
their capacity as Provincial Board Members of Nueva Ecija, respondents.
G.R. No. 131255

May 20, 1998
Facts:
Oscar Tinio, Vice-Governor of Nueva Ecija, filed with the Office of the President a letter-complaint
charging Eduardo Joson, Governor, with grave misconduct and abuse of authority. Tinio alleged that when they
were at the session hall of the provincial capitol for a session with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP), Joson
belligerently barged in and kicked the doors and chairs of the in the hall and uttered threatening words at them
due to the refusal of the SP to approve a loan proposed by Joson. Tinio prayed for the suspension and removal of
Joson. The President instructed the DIL to take investigative actions. The DILG required the parties to submit their
position papers. Joson prayed that a formal investigation of this case be conducted pursuant to the LGC and Admin
Order No. 23. The DILG denied his request declaring that the submission of position papers substantially complies
with the requirements of procedural due process in administrative proceedings. Joson was thereafter suspended
from office.
Issue:
Whether the DILG Secretary, in his resolution, was exercising the powers of the President which are
clearly vested by law only upon the President or the Executive Secretary, and thus his action is contrary to law.
Ruling:
Yes, the DILG Secretary was exercising the powers of the President.
Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions against elective local officials is lodged in two
authorities: the Disciplining Authority and the Investigating Authority. Pursuant to these provisions, the Disciplining
Authority is the President of the Philippines, whether acting by himself or through the Executive Secretary. The
Secretary of the Interior and Local Government is the Investigating Authority, who may act by himself or constitute
an Investigating Committee. The Secretary of the DILG, however, is not the exclusive Investigating Authority. The
power of the President over administrative disciplinary cases against elective local officials is derived from his
power of general supervision over local governments. The power to discipline evidently includes the power to
investigate. As the Disciplining Authority, the President has the power derived from the Constitution itself to
investigate complaints against local government officials. A.O. No. 23, however, delegates the power to investigate
to the DILG or a Special Investigating Committee, as may be constituted by the Disciplining Authority.
This is not undue delegation, contrary to petitioner Joson's claim. The President remains the Disciplining
Authority. What is delegated is the power to investigate, snot the power to discipline.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR., petitioner,

vs.
Hon. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Hon. EMILIA BONCODIN in her capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, respondents. ROBERTO PAGDANGANAN,
G.R. No. 132988

July 19, 2000
Facts:
In 1997, President Ramos issued AO 372 which: (1) required all government departments and agencies,
including SUCs, GOCCs and LGUs to identify and implement measures in FY 1998 that will reduce total
expenditures for the year by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services items
(Section 1) and (2) ordered the withholding of 10% of the IRA to LGUs (Section 4) . On 10 December 1998,
President Estrada issued AO 43, reducing to 5% the amount of IRA to be withheld from LGU.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the president committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering all LGUS to adopt a 25%
cost reduction program in violation of the LGU'S fiscal autonomy
2. Whether Section 4 of the same issuance, which withholds 10 percent of their internal revenue
allotments, are valid exercises of the President's power of general supervision over local governments
Held:
1. Section 1 of AO 372 does not violate local fiscal autonomy. Local fiscal autonomy does not rule out any
manner of national government intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal
and otherwise, are consistent with national goals. Significantly, the President, by constitutional fiat, is the head of
the economic and planning agency of the government, primarily responsible for formulating and implementing
continuing, coordinated and integrated social and economic policies, plans and programs for the entire country.
However, under the Constitution, the formulation and the implementation of such policies and programs are
subject to "consultations with the appropriate public agencies, various private sectors, and local government
units." The President cannot do so unilaterally.
Consequently, the Local Government Code provides:
“In the event the National government incurs an unmanaged public sector deficit, the President of the
Philippines is hereby authorized, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, Secretary of the Interior
and local government and secretary of Budget and Management, and subject to consultation with the presiding
officers of both houses of Congress and the Presidents of the Liga, to make the necessary adjustments in the

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
internal revenue allotment of Local government Units but in no case shall the allotment be less than 30% of the
collection of national interest revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year.”
There are therefore several requisites before the President may interfere in local fiscal matters: (1) an
unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers of the
Senate and the House of Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; and (3) the
corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and Local Government,
and Budget and Management. Furthermore, any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than thirty
percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current one.
Petitioner points out that respondents failed to comply with these requisites before the issuance and the
implementation of AO 372. At the very least, they did not even try to show that the national government was
suffering from an unmanageable public sector deficit. Neither did they claim having conducted consultations with
the different leagues of local governments. Without these requisites, the President has no authority to adjust,
much less to reduce, unilaterally the LGU's internal revenue allotment.
AO 372, however, is merely directory and has been issued by the President consistent with his power of
supervision over local governments. It is intended only to advise all government agencies and instrumentalities to
undertake cost-reduction measures that will help maintain economic stability in the country, which is facing
economic difficulties. Besides, it does not contain any sanction in case of noncompliance. Being merely an
advisory, therefore, Section 1 of AO 372 is well within the powers of the President. Since it is not a mandatory
imposition, the directive cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power of control.
2. Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic
release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than the Constitution.
The Local Government Code specifies further that the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within
five (5) days after every quarter of the year and "shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed
by the national government for whatever purpose." As a rule, the term "shall" is a word of command that must be
given a compulsory meaning. The provision is, therefore, imperative

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
JOEL BITO ONON

Vs
HON. JUDGE NELIA YAP HERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 139813

January 31, 2001
FACTS:
Joel Bito-Onon is the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay Tacras, Narra, Palawan and is the
Municipal Liga Chapter President for the Municipality of Narra, Palawan. The private respondent, Elegio Quejano,
Jr. on the other hand, is the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay Rizal, Magsaysay, Palawan and is the
Municipal Liga Chapter President for the Municipality of Magsaysay, Palawan. Both Onon and Quejano were
candidates for the position of Executive Vice-President in the August 23, 1997 election for the Liga ng Barangay
Provincial Chapter of the province of Palawan. Onon was proclaimed the winning candidate in the said election
prompting Quejano to file a post proclamation protest with the Board of Election Supervisors (BES), which was
decided against him on August 25, 1997.
ISSUE: Whether the questioned provision in the Memorandum was issued by the DILG Secretary in excess of his
authority
RULING:
In Opinion No. 41, Series of 1995, the Department of Justice ruled that the liga ng mga barangay is a
government organization, being an association, federation, league or union created by law or by authority of law,
whose members are either appointed or elected government officials. The Local Government Code21 defines the
liga ng mga barangay as an organization of all barangays for the primary purpose of determining the
representation of the liga in the sanggunians, and for ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting
barangay government administration and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto.22 The liga
shall have chapters at the municipal, city, provincial and metropolitan political subdivision levels. The municipal
and city chapters of the liga shall be composed of the barangay representatives of the municipal and city
barangays respectively. The duly elected presidents of the component municipal and city chapters shall constitute
the provincial chapter or the metropolitan political subdivision chapter. The duly elected presidents of highly
urbanized cities, provincial chapters, the Metropolitan Manila chapter and metropolitan political subdivision
chapters shall constitute the National Liga ng mga Barangay.
We rule that Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 of the DILG insofar as it authorizes the filing a Petition for
Review of the decision of the BES with the regular courts in a post proclamation electoral protest is of doubtful
constitutionality. We agree with both the petitioner and the Solicitor General that in authorizing the filing of the
petition for review of the decision of the BES with the regular courts, the DILG Secretary in effect amended and
modified the GUIDELINES promulgated by the National Liga Board and adopted by the LIGA which provides that
the decision of the BES shall be subject to review by the National Liga Board. The amendment of the GUIDELINES is
more than an exercise of the power of supervision but is an exercise of the power of control, which the President
does not have over the LIGA. Although the DILG is given the power to prescribe rules, regulations and other
issuances, the Administrative Code limits its authority to merely "monitoring compliance" by local government

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
units of such issuances.27 To monitor means "to watch, observe or check" and is compatible with the power of
supervision of the DILG Secretary over local governments, which is limited to checking whether the local
government unit concerned or the officers thereof perform their duties as per statutory enactments.28 Besides,
any doubt as to the power of the DILG Secretary to interfere with local affairs should be resolved in favor of the
greater autonomy of the local government

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
THE NATIONAL LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY, represented by ALEX L. DAVID in his capacity as National President
and for his own Person, President ALEX L. DAVID, petitioners,
vs.
HON. VICTORIA ISABEL A. PAREDES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 124, Caloocan City, and THE
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR and LOCAL GOVERNMENT, represented the HON. SECRETARY ROBERT Z.
BARBERS and MANUEL A. RAYOS, respondents.
G.R. No. 130775.

September 27, 2004
Facts:
DILG, appointed as interim caretaker to administer and manage the affairs of the Liga ng mga Barangay in
giving remedy to alleged violations made by the incumbent officer of the Liga in the conduct of their elections,
issued 2 memorandum circulars which alter, modify, nullify or set aside the actions of the Liga.
Petitioner contends that DILG’s appointment constitutes undue interference in the internal affairs of the Liga,
since the latter is not subject to DILG control and supervision. Respondent judge contends that DILG exercises
general supervisory jurisdiction over LGUs including the different leagues based on sec. 1 of Admin. Order No. 267
providing for a broad premise of the supervisory power of the DILG.
Issue: WON DILG Secretary as alter-ego of the President has power of control over the Liga ng mga Barangay.
Held:
No. Sec. 4, Art. X of the Constitution provides that the President of the Philippines shall exercise general
supervision over local government, which exclude the power of control. As the entity exercising supervision over
the Liga, the DILG’s authority is limited to seeing to it that the rules are followed, but it cannot lay down such rules
itself nor does it have the discretion to modify or replace the same.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
JESULITO A. MANALO, petitioner,

vs.
PEDRO G. SISTOZA, REGINO ARO III, NICASIO MA. CUSTODIO, GUILLERMO DOMONDON, RAYMUNDO L. LOGAN,
WILFREDO R. REOTUTAR, FELINO C. PACHECO, JR., RUBEN J. CRUZ, GERONIMO B. VALDERRAMA, MERARDO G.
ABAYA, EVERLINO B. NARTATEZ, ENRIQUE T. BULAN, PEDRO J. NAVARRO, DOMINADOR M. MANGUBAT,
RODOLFO M. GARCIA and HONORABLE SALVADOR M. ENRIQUEZ II In His Capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, respondent
G.R. No. 107369

August 11, 1999
Facts:
On December 13, 1990, former President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Republic Act 6975, creating
the Department of Interior and Local Government. The said Act states that the PNP Chief, Chief Superintendent
and Director General shall be appointed by the President subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. Pursuant thereto, Pres. Aquino, through Executive Secretary Franklin S. Drilon, promoted 15 police
officers to permanent positions in the Philippine National Police with the rank of Chief Superintendent to Director.
The said police officers took their oath of office and assumed their respective positions. Thereafter, the
Department of Budget and Management, under the then Secretary Salvador M. Enriquez III, authorized
disbursements for their salaries and other emoluments.
Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, as a taxpayer suit, to assail the legality of subject appointments
and disbursements made therefor. He contents that: (1) RA 6975 requires confirmation of the appointments of
officers from the rank of senior superintendent and higher by the CA; (2) The PNP is akin to the Armed Forces
where the Constitution specifically requires confirmation by the CA, and (3) Respondent Secretary in allowing
and/or effecting disbursements in favor of respondent officers despite the unconstitutionality and illegality of their
appointments is acting without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
Issues:
1) Whether or not the appointment PNP officers need CA confirmation

2) Whether or not the PNP is akin to the AFP
3) Whether or not Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 are constitutional
Held:
1. Under Section 16, Article VII, of the Constitution, there are four groups of officers of the government to
be appointed by the President:

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers
of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in
him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging to the first group require the confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments. The appointments of respondent officers who are not within the first
category, need not be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. As held in the case of Tarrosa vs. Singson,
Congress cannot by law expand the power of confirmation of the Commission on Appointments and require
confirmation of appointments of other government officials not mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
2. The Philippine National Police is separate and distinct from the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
The Constitution, no less, sets forth the distinction. Under Section 4 of Article XVI of the 1987
Constitution, “The Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be composed of a citizen armed force which shall undergo
military training and service, as may be provided by law. It shall keep a regular force necessary for the security of
the State.”
On the other hand, Section 6 of the same Article of the Constitution ordains that: “The State shall
establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character to be
administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local executives over the police
units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.”
The police force is different from and independent of the armed forces and the ranks in the military are
not similar to those in the Philippine National Police. Thus, directors and chief superintendents of the PNP, such as
the herein respondent police officers, do not fall under the first category of presidential appointees requiring the
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
3. Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 which empower the Commission on Appointments to confirm
the appointments of public officials whose appointments are not required by the Constitution to be confirmed are
unconstitutional. The rest of Republic Act 6975 stands. It is well-settled that when provisions of law declared void
are severable from the main statute and the removal of the unconstitutional provisions would not affect the
validity and enforceability of the other provisions, the statute remains valid without its voided sections.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
MA. J. ANGELINA G. MATIBAG, petitioner,

vs.
ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., VELMA J. CINCO, and GIDEON C.
DE GUZMAN in his capacity as Officer-In-Charge, Finance Services Department of the Commission on
Elections, respondents.
G.R. No. 149036,

April 2, 2002
FACTS:
On February 1999, petitioner Matibag was appointed Acting Director IV of the Comelec’s.
EID by then Comelec Chairperson Harriet Demetriou in a temporary capacity. On March 2001
respondent Benipayo was appointed Comelec Chairman together withother commissioners in an ad interim appoin
tment.
While on such ad interimappointment, respondent Benipayo in his capacity as Chairman issued a

Memorandum address transferring petitioner to the Law Department.
Petitioner requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV and her reassignment to the Law
department.
She cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated April 10, 2001, reminding heads of
government offices that "transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during the election period. Benipayo
denied her request for reconsideration on April 18, 2001, citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 datedNovember 6,
2000, exempting Comelec from the coverage of the said Memo Circular. Petitioner appealed the denial of her
request for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc.
She also filed an administrative and criminal complaint with the Law Department against Benipayo,
alleging that her reassignment violated Section261 (h)of the Omnibus Election Code.
COMELEC Resolution No. 3258, Civil ServiceMemorandum Circular No. 07, s. 001, and other pertinent
administrative and civil service laws, rules and regulations. During the pendency of her complaint before the Law
Department, petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that
the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on the
independence of the COMELEC.
ISSUES: Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad interim
appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C
of the Constitution.

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RULING:
We find petitioner’s argument without merit.
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effectimmediately and can no

longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character.
The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in characted by making it effective
until disapproved by the COA or until the next adjournment of Congress.
There is no dispute that an ad interim appointee disapproved by the Commission on Appointments can no
longer be extended a new appointment. The disapproval is a final decision of the Commission on Appointments in
the exercise of its checking power on the appointing authority of the President. The disapproval is a decision on
the merits, being a refusal by the Commission on Appointments to give its consent after deliberating on the
qualifications of the appointee. Since the Constitution does not provide for any appeal from such decision, the
disapproval is final and binding on the appointee as well as on the appointing power. In this instance, the President
can no longer renew the appointment not because of the constitutional prohibition on reappointment, but
because of a final decision by the Commission on Appointments to withhold its consent to the appointment.
An ad interim appointment that is by-passed because of lack of time or failure of the Commission on
Appointments to organize is another matter. A by-passed appointment is one that has not been finally acted upon
on the merits by the Commission on Appointments at the close of the session of Congress. There is no final
decision by the Commission on Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the appointment as required by
the Constitution. Absent such decision, the President is free to renew the ad interim appointment of a by-passed
appointee. This is recognized in Section 17 of the Rules of the Commission on Appointments, which provides as
follows:
"Section 17. Unacted Nominations or Appointments Returned to the President. Nominations or appointments
submitted by the President of the Philippines which are not finally acted upon at the close of the session of
Congress shall be returned to the President and, unless new nominations or appointments are made, shall not
again be considered by the Commission." (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, under the Rules of the Commission on Appointments, a by-passed appointment can be considered
again if the President renews the appointment.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that the President can renew the ad interim appointments of by-passed
appointees. Justice Roberto Concepcion, Jr. lucidly explained in his concurring opinion in Guevara vs. Inocentes why
by-passed ad interim appointees could be extended new appointments, thus:
"In short, an ad interim appointment ceases to be effective upon disapproval by the Commission, because
the incumbent cannot continue holding office over the positive objection of the Commission. It ceases, also, upon
"the next adjournment of the Congress", simply because the President may then issue new appointments - not
because of implied disapproval of the Commission deduced from its inaction during the session of Congress, for,
under the Constitution, the Commission may affect adversely the interim appointments only by action, never by
omission. If the adjournment of Congress were an implied disapproval of ad interimappointments made prior
thereto, then the President could no longer appoint those so by-passed by the Commission. But, the fact is that the
President may reappoint them, thus clearly indicating that the reason for said termination of the ad
interim appointments is not the disapproval thereof allegedly inferred from said omission of the Commission, but
the circumstance that upon said adjournment of the Congress, the President is free to make ad interim
appointments or reappointments.

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To foreclose this interpretation, the phrase "without reappointment" appears twice in Section 1 (2),
Article IX-C of the present Constitution. The first phrase prohibits reappointment of any person previously
appointed for a term of seven years. The second phrase prohibits reappointment of any person previously
appointed for a term of five or three years pursuant to the first set of appointees under the Constitution. In either
case, it does not matter if the person previously appointed completes his term of office for the intention is to
prohibit any reappointment of any kind.
However, an ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on Appointments
does not constitute a term of office. The period from the time the ad interim appointment is made to the time it
lapses is neither a fixed term nor an unexpired term. To hold otherwise would mean that the President by his
unilateral action could start and complete the running of a term of office in the COMELEC without the consent of
the Commission on Appointments. This interpretation renders inutile the confirming power of the Commission on
Appointments.
The phrase "without reappointment" applies only to one who has been appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, whether or not such person completes his term of office. There
must be a confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the previous appointment before the prohibition
on reappointment can apply. To hold otherwise will lead to absurdities and negate the President’s power to
make ad interim appointments.
In the great majority of cases, the Commission on Appointments usually fails to act, for lack of time, on
the ad interim appointments first issued to appointees. If such ad interim appointments can no longer be renewed,
the President will certainly hesitate to make ad interim appointments because most of her appointees will
effectively be disapproved by mere inaction of the Commission on Appointments. This will nullify the
constitutional power of the President to make ad interim appointments, a power intended to avoid disruptions in
vital government services. This Court cannot subscribe to a proposition that will wreak havoc on vital government
services.

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ATTY. ELPIDIO SORIANO III

VS.
REUBEN LISTA, ET AL.
G.R. No. 153881.

March 24, 2003
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Facts:
Eight officers of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) were promoted by the President to Vice Admiral, Rear
Admiral, Commodore, Naval Captain, and they assumed office without confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments (COA). Petitioner, as a taxpayer, filed a petition with the Supreme Court questioning the
constitutionality of their assumption of office, which requires confirmation of the COA.
Issue: Whether the appointment requires confirmation of the COAP
Held:
It is clear from section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution that only appointed officers from the rank
of colonel or naval captain in the armed forces require confirmation by the COAP. The rule is that the plain clear
and unambiguous language of the Constitution should be construed as such and should not be given a construction
that changes its meaning. The enumeration of appointments subject to confirmation by the COAP under the
Constitution is exclusive. The clause “officers of the Armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain” refers
to military officers alone. This is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on the proposed
text of said Section 16, Article VII of the constitution. Since the PCG is under the DOTC and no longer part of the
Philippine Navy or the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the promotions and appointments of respondent officers
of the PCG, or any PCG officer from the rank of captain and higher for that matter, do not require confirmation by
the CA.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., EDGARDO J. ANGARA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, LUISA P. EJERCITO-ESTRADA, JINGGOY
E. ESTRADA, PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S. LIM, JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, and SERGIO R. OSMEÑA
III, Petitioners
vs.
EXEC. SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, FLORENCIO B. ABAD, AVELINO J. CRUZ, JR., MICHAEL T. DEFENSOR,
JOSEPH H. DURANO, RAUL M. GONZALEZ, ALBERTO G. ROMULO, RENE C. VILLA, and ARTHUR C.
YAP, Respondents.
G.R. No. 164978

October 13, 2005
FACTS:
While Congress was in session, due to vacancies in the cabinet, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
(GMA) appointed Arthur Yap et al as secretaries of their respective departments. They were appointed in an acting
capacity only. Senator Aquilino Pimentel together with 7 other senators filed a complaint against the appointment
of Yap et al. Pimentel averred that GMA cannot make such appointment without the consent of the Commission
on Appointment; that, in accordance with Section 10, Chapter 2, Book IV of Executive Order No. 292, only the
undersecretary of the respective departments should be designated in an acting capacity and not anyone else.
On the contrary, then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita averred that the president is empowered
by Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to issue appointments in an acting capacity to department
secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments even while Congress is in session. Further, EO
292 itself allows the president to issue temporary designation to an officer in the civil service provided that the
temporary designation shall not exceed one year.
During the pendency of said case, Congress adjourned and GMA issued ad interimappointments re-
appointing those previously appointed in acting capacity.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointments made by ex PGMA is valid.
HELD:
Yes. The argument raised by Ermita is correct. Further, EO 292 itself provided the safeguard so that such
power will not be abused hence the provision that the temporary designation shall not exceed one year. In this
case, in less than a year after the initial appointments made by GMA, and when the Congress was in recess, GMA
issued the ad interim appointments – this also proves that the president was in good faith.
It must also be noted that cabinet secretaries are the alter egos of the president. The choice is the
president’s to make and the president normally appoints those whom he/she can trust. She cannot be constrained
to choose the undersecretary. She has the option to choose. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds
a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot
impose on the President who her alter ego should be.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a department
secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the President’s
confidence. That person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may make it
expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee.
Anent the issue that GMA appointed “outsiders”, such is allowed. EO 292 also provides that the president
“may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to
perform the functions of an office in the executive branch.” Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting
capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as the President deems that person competent.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
QUINTOS-DELES, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, accused-appellants
177 SCRA 259 (1992)
FACTS:
Teresita Quintos-Deles was appointed by then President Corazon Aquino as a sectoral representative for
women in 1988. Their appointment was done while Congress was in session. They were subsequently scheduled to
take their oath of office but the Commission on Appointments (COA) filed an opposition against Deles et al alleging
that their appointment must have the concurrence of the COA.
Deles then questioned the objection of the COA. She said that her appointment does not need the
concurrence of the COA. This is in pursuant to Section 7, Article XVIII of the Constitution, which does not require
her appointment to be confirmed by the COA to qualify her to take her seat in the lower house.
ISSUE:
Whether the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral representatives to the House of
Representatives should be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
HELD:
Yes. There are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to
which we will hereafter refer from time to time, are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him
in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
Only those appointments expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII (or the first group
abovementioned) are to be reviewed by the COA, namely, ‘the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and
other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution.’ All other appointments by the President
are to be made without the participation of the Commission on Appointments.

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Sectoral representatives belong to the phrase “and other officers whose appointments are vested in him
in this Constitution“. The provision of the Constitution which provides power to the president in this regard
is Section 7, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution:
Until a law is passed, the President may fill by appointment from a list of nominees by the respective
sectors the seats reserved for sectoral representation in paragraph (1), Section 5 of Article VI of this Constitution.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
BERMUDEZ, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
TORRES, accused-appellants
311 SCRA 733 (1999)
FACTS:
Petitioner Oscar Bermudez, the First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac and Officer-in-Charge of the
Office of Provincial Prosecutor, was a recommendee of then Sec. of Justice Guingona for the position of Provincial
Prosecutor. Private respondent Atty. Conrado Quiaoit had the support of then Representative Yap of the Second
District of Tarlac.
Quiaoit was appointed by Pres. Ramos to the office. Quiaoit took his oath and assumed office. Bermudez
refused to vacate the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.
Nonetheless, Quiaoit, performed the duties and functions of the Office of Provincial Prosecutor. Petitioner
Bermudez challenged the appointment of Quiaoit primarily on the ground that the appointment lacks the
recommendation of the Sec. Of Justice prescribed under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. Section 9, Chap.
II, Title III, Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code provides that “all provincial and city prosecutors and their
assistants shall be appointed by the Pres. upon the recommendation of the Secretary.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the absence of a recommendation of the Secretary of Justice to the President can be held
fatal to the appointment of Quiaoit
HELD:
An appointment to a public office is the unequivocal act of designating or selecting by one having the
authority there for of an individual to discharge and perform the duties and functions of an office or trust.
The appointment is deemed complete once the last act required of the appointing authority has been complied
with and its acceptance thereafter by the appointee in order to render it effective.
The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing authority has the right of choice which
he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have
the necessary qualifications and eligibilities.
When the Constitution or the law clothes the Pres. with the power to appoint a subordinate officer, such
conferment must be understood as necessarily carrying with it an ample discretion of whom to appoint. The Pres.
is the head of government whose authority includes the power of control over all “executive
departments, bureaus and offices.” Control means the authority of an empowered officer to alter or modify, or
even nullify or set aside, what a subordinate officer has done in the performance of his duties, as well as to
substitute the judgment of the latter, as and when the former deems it to be appropriate. The Pres. has the power

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
to assume directly the functions of an executive department, bureau and office. It can therefore be inferred that
the Pres. can interfere in the exercise of discretion of officials under him or altogether ignore their
recommendations.
The phrase “upon recommendation of the Secretary” found in Sec. 9,Chap. II, Title III, Book IV of the
Revised Administrative Code should be interpreted to be a mere advice, exhortation or endorsement, which is
essentially persuasive in character and not binding or obligatory upon the party to whom it is made. The
recommendation is here nothing really more than advisory in nature. The Pres., being the head of the Executive
Department, could very well disregard or do away with the action of the departments, bureaus or offices even in
the exercise of discretionary authority, and in so opting, he cannot be said as having acted beyond the scope of his
authority.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
EMILIO A. GONZALES III, Petitioner

vs.
OFFICE of the PRESIDENT of the PHILIPPINES,
Represented by EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO OCHOA
G.R. No. 196231
FACTS:
On August 23, 2010, a dismissed policeman, Police Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza, hijacked a bus
parked in front of the Quirino Grandstand, which was full of Chinese tourists. During the hostage-taking, Mendoza
killed most of its passengers in a 10-hour hostage drama shown on live television. Assault forces tried to enter the
bus, some using hammers to smash windows and the door of the bus but they were met with intermittent fire
from the hostage-taker. Mendoza was shot dead by a sniper.
Mendoza claimed to have been illegally dismissed from the police service. He said he was dismissed
without due process, a hearing or a complaint against him. He was demanding the release of the final decision of
his motion for reconsideration for a criminal case lodged against him and his colleagues for Grave Misconduct
(robbery, grave threats, robbery-extortion and physical injuries). While the PNP and the Office of the Prosecutor
had already dismissed the case against him for lack of substantial evidence and lack of probable cause, Mendoza
adjudged guilty, upon recommendation of herein petitioner, Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III. He filed for a
motion for reconsideration, which was pending in the office of Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez.
Due to public outcry on a national and international scale, the Incident Investigation and Review
Committee (IIRC) was created, chaired by then Justice Secretary Leila de Lima, to determine accountability for the
incident through public hearings and executive sessions. The IIRC discovered that Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales
committed serious and inexcusable negligence of their own rules of procedure by allowing Mendoza’s motion for
reconsideration to languish for more than nine months, without any justification. The inaction was gross,
considering there was no opposition thereto. The prolonged inaction precipitated the desperate resort of
Mendoza to hostage-taking.
The IIRC recommended that its findings be referred to herein respondent, Office of the President (OP) for
further determination of possible administrative offenses and for the initiation of proper administrative
proceedings. The OP instituted a formal charge against Gonzales for Gross Neglect of Duty and/or inefficiency in
the Performance of Official Duty, pursuant to Rule XIV, Section 22 of the Omnibus Implementing Book V of E.O. No.
292 and for Misconduct in Office under Sec. 3 of the Anti-Graft and Practices Act.
Gonzales did not attend the Preliminary Clarificatory Conference relative to the charge against him
because he has heard that his case was already adjudged and to attend it would simply be a charade. The OP went
on with the proceedings without Gonzales and adjudged him guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct
constituting betrayal of public trust, and meted out the penalty of DISMISSAL from service.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
In the instant petition by Gonzales, he alleged that the Office of the President had no constitutional or
valid statutory authority to subject him to an administrative investigation, nor to remove him from office because
the Office of the Ombudsman is clothed with constitutional independence and that only they have the power to
execute disciplinary actions over a Deputy Ombudsman.
ISSUE: WON the President has the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman from his or her office?
RULING:
Yes, the President has the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman from his or her office. It is true that
under R.A. 6770 and Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman is explicitly given the power
to conduct administrative investigations with regards to corrupt and inept government employees. However, this
power is not exclusive to them, for, while Section 21 of the R.A. 6770 grants them disciplinary authority over all
government officials (except impeachable officials), Section 8 (2), on the other hand, grants the President express
power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor.
Section 8. Removal; Filling of Vacancy - (2) A Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from
office by the President for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman, and after due process.
The intent of Congress in enacting both Section 21 and Section 8 (2) is to simply maintain a measure of
“check and balance” between two offices and to address the lawmakers’ concern that the Ombudsman and his
Deputy may try to protect one another from administrative liabilities. By granting express statutory power to the
President to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor, Congress merely filled an obvious gap in the
law. Furthermore, the Power of the President to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor is implied
from his power to appoint. Under the doctrine of implication, the power to appoint carries with it the power to
remove. As a general rule, therefore, an appointed officer (such as Gonzales) is also removable by the President.
This power to remove, however, does not diminish the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.
This constitutional independence vested in the Office of the Ombudsman was intended to free them from
political considerations in pursuing their constitutional mandate. What the Constitution secures them is,
essentially, political independence and means nothing more than that their terms of office, salary, appointments
and disciplines are “reasonably insulated from the whims of politicians.”
In the case at bar, there no cause for petitioner Gonzales to complain simply because the OP proceeded
witht the administrative case against him in the rightful performance of their duties. With regards to the
allegations against Gonzales, while the evidence may show some amount of wrongdoing on the part of petitioner,
the Court seriously doubts the correctness of the OP's conclusion that the imputed acts amount to gross neglect of
duty and grave misconduct constitutive of betrayal of public trust.
The tragic hostage-taking incident was the result of a confluence of several unfortunate events including
system failure of government response. It cannot be solely attributed then to what petitioner Gonzales may have

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
negligently failed to do for the quick, fair and complete resolution of the case, or to his error of judgment in the
disposition thereof. It is not, by itself, gross neglect of duty amounting to betrayal of public trust.
Thus, the decision of the Office of the President was REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Gonzales was
REINSTATED as Deputy Ombudsman.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
In Re: Appointments of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta

As Judges of the Regional Trial Court
Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively
A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC
FACTS:
On March 30, 1998, then President Fidel V. Ramos, signed the appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela
and Hon. Placido Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of Bago City and Cabanatuan City, respectively. Their
appointments, signed by the President, was referred to the Supreme Court En Banc, in view of the serious
constitutional issue concerning thereof. Some sectors of the Judicial and Bar Council raised the question of the
constitutionality of the said appointments, especially in view of the forthcoming presidential elections about two
months thereof.
It appeared, prima facie, that the said appointments were a violation of Section 15, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, which read as follows:
Sec. 15 Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his, term, a
President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
On the other hand, however, Section 4 (1) of Article VIII seems to justify appointments to fill vacancies in
the Supreme Court during the period mentioned in the above-quoted provision. The said provision states that:
Sec. 4 (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. XXX
Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
Meanwhile, another pertinent provision allows for the President for the said appointments in Section 9,
Article VII, which read:
Sec. 9 The members of the Supreme Court and judges in lower courts shall be appointed by the President
from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for, every vacancy. Such
appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the submission
of the list.
ISSUE: WON the President can fill vacancies in the Judiciary in view of Sec. 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII, despite the
express prohibition imposed by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution?

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RULING:
Yes, the President may fill vacancies in the Judiciary during the prohibition period, provided, that it is for
reason of public interest. This was the ruling of the Court in Aytona vs. Castillo, saying: “The filling up of vacancies
in important positions, if few, and so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful
consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted.”
This means that appointments made for so many positions in one night or in very little time, are not allowed.
The prohibition of appointments provided in Sec. 15, Art. VII is directed against two types of
appointments:
1.) Those made for buying votes;

2.) Those made for partisan considerations.
The first type refers to those appointments made within the two months preceding a Presidential election
and are similar to those which are declared elections offenses in the Omnibus Election Code:
Sec. 261 Prohibited Acts — The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling

(g) Appointment of new employees, creation of new position, promotion, or giving salary increases
(1) any head, official or appointing officer of a government office X X X X who appoints or hires any new
employee X X X X except upon prior authority of the Commission. The Commission shall not grant the authority
sought unless, it is satisfied that the position to be filled is essential to the proper functioning of the office or
agency concerned, and that the position shall not be filled in a manner that may influence the election.
The second type of appointments prohibited by Sec. 15, Art. VII concerns those so-called “midnight
appointments,” which was the issue in Aytona vs. Castillo. In the said case, the Court recognized that there may
well be appointments to important positions which have to be made even after the proclamations of a new
President. Such appointments, so long as they are "few and so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate
action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications,"10 can be
made by the outgoing President.
In the case at bar, the appointments of Messrs. Valenzuela and Vallarta on March 30, 1998 (transmitted
to the Office of the Chief Justice on May 14, 998) were unquestionably made during the period of the ban.
Consequently, they come within the operation of the first prohibition relating to appointments which are
considered to be for the purpose of buying votes or influencing the election. While the filling of vacancies in the
judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify
the making of the appointments during the period of the ban. On the other hand, as already discussed, there is a
strong public policy for the prohibition against appointments made within the period of the ban.
The Court, therefore, declared VOID the appointments of Valenzuela and Placido and ordered them to
CEASE AND DESIST from discharging the office of Judge of the Courts to which they were respectively appointed.

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CONRADO L. DE RAMA, Petitioner

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (NINTH DIVISION, THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION)
G.R. No. 131136
FACTS:
Upon assuming the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, herein petitioner, Conrado de Rama, wrote a
letter to the Civil Service Commission (CSC), seeking to recall the appointments of 14 municipal employees, on the
ground that the said appointments were in violation of the prohibition on “midnight appointments” in Article VII,
Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution.
Article VII, Sec. 15 Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of
his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The CSC denied the petition, on the presumption of regularity in connection with the appointments. The
appointments, the CSC held, have been previously approved by the Head of the CSC Field Office in Lucena City. The
petitioner also failed to present evidence that would warrant a revocation of the said appointments.
ISSUE: WON the prohibition on “midnight appointments” also applies to municipal employees?
RULING:
No, the prohibition on “midnight appointments” are applicable only to a “President or Acting President.”
In fact and in truth, there is no law that prohibits appointments local elective from making appointments during
the last days of his or her term. Furthermore, it is only the CSC that has the authority to recall appointments, on
the following grounds:
(a) Non-compliance with the procedures/criteria provided in the agency’s Merit Promotion Plan;
(b) Failure to pass through the agency’s Selection/Promotion Board;
(c) Violation of the existing collective agreement between management and employees relative to
promotion;
(d) Violation of other existing civil service law, rules and regulations.

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Meanwhile, Rule V, Section 9 of the Omnibus Implementing Regulations of the Revised Administrative
Code provides that “an appointment accepted by the appointee cannot be withdrawn or revoked by the
appointing authority and shall remain in force and in effect until disapproved by the Commission.
In the case at bar, there is no showing that any of the private respondents were not qualified for the
positions they were appointed to. Moreover, their appointments were duly attested to by the Head of the CSC
field office at Lucena City. By virtue thereof, they had already assumed their appointive positions even before
petitioner himself assumed his elected position as town mayor. Consequently, their appointments took effect
immediately and cannot be unilaterally revoked or recalled by petitioner.
In view of all the foregoing facts, the Court DENIED the petition and affirmed the CSC resolutions in toto.

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ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Petitioner,

vs
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL - ARROYO, Respondents.
615 SCRA 666 (2010)

618 SCRA 639 (2010)
GR. NO. 191002
March 17, 2010
FACTS:
This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the controversy that has arisen from the
forthcoming compulsory requirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 or seven days after the presidential
election. On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the JBC, addressed a
letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to the office of the Chief Justice be commenced
immediately.
In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, the JBC passed a resolution which stated that they have
unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010
upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice.
As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or recommendation, and published
for that purpose its announcement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star.
In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing the names
of the following candidates to invite to the public to file their sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if
any, not later than February 22, 2010.
Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno in accordance
with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President its list of nominees for the position
due to the controversy in this case being unresolved.
The compiled cases which led to this case and the petitions of intervenors called for either the prohibition
of the JBC to pass the shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to pass the shortlist, or that the act of appointing the next
Chief Justice by GMA is a midnight appointment.
A precedent frequently cited by the parties is the In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon.
Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the RTC of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24,
Cabanatuan City, respectively, shortly referred to here as the Valenzuela case, by which the Court held that Section
15, Article VII prohibited the exercise by the President of the power to appoint to judicial positions during the
period therein fixed.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing?
II. Whether or not there is justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial determination?
III. Whether or not the incumbent President appoint the next Chief Justice?

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IV. Whether or not mandamus and prohibition will lie to compel the submission of the shortlist of nominees by
the JBC?
RULING:
Petitioners have legal standing because such requirement for this case was waived by the Court.
Legal standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not brought by
parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act but by concerned
citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest.” But even if, strictly speaking, the petitioners
“are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and
so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.”
There is a justiciable issue
We hold that the petitions set forth an actual case or controversy that is ripe for judicial determination.
The reality is that the JBC already commenced the proceedings for the selection of the nominees to be included in
a short list to be submitted to the President for consideration of which of them will succeed Chief Justice Puno as
the next Chief Justice. Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that the JBC began the process of
nomination pursuant to its rules and practices, although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of nominees
to the incumbent outgoing President or to the next President, makes the situation ripe for judicial determination,
because the next steps are the public interview of the candidates, the preparation of the short list of candidates,
and the “interview of constitutional experts, as may be needed.”
The resolution of the controversy will surely settle – with finality – the nagging questions that are
preventing the JBC from moving on with the process that it already began, or that are reasons persuading the JBC
to desist from the rest of the process.
PROHIBITION UNDER SECTION 15, ARTICLE VII DOES NOT APPLY TO APPOINTMENTS TO FILL A VACANCY
IN THE SUPREME COURT OR TO OTHER APPOINTMENST TO THE JUDICIARY.
Two constitutional provisions seemingly in conflict:
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides:
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states:
Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It
may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within
ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
Justification of the Supreme Court:
First. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers devoted
time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution. Such meticulousness indicates that the
organization and arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the
framers, but purposely made to reflect their intention and manifest their vision of what the Constitution should
contain.

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The Constitution consists of 18 Articles, three of which embody the allocation of the awesome powers of
government among the three great departments, the Legislative (Article VI), the Executive (Article VII), and the
Judicial Departments (Article VIII). The arrangement was a true recognition of the principle of separation
of powers that underlies the political structure
As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the powers
vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15
and 16 of the Article.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored
the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit
in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in
Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII.
Although Valenzuela came to hold that the prohibition covered even judicial appointments, it cannot be
disputed that the Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
Moreover, the usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word shall – an imperative, operating to impose a
duty that may be enforced – should not be disregarded. Thereby, Sections 4(1) imposes on the President the
imperative duty to make an appointment of a Member of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence
of the vacancy. The failure by the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to the Constitution.
The 90-day limitation fixed in Section 4(1), Article VIII for the President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme
Court was undoubtedly a special provision to establish a definite mandate for the President as the appointing
power, and cannot be defeated by mere judicial interpretation in Valenzuela to the effect that Section 15, Article
VII prevailed because it was “couched in stronger negative language.”
Second. Section 15, Article VII does not apply as well to all other appointments in the Judiciary.
There is no question that one of the reasons underlying the adoption of Section 15 as part of Article VII
was to eliminate midnight appointments from being made by an outgoing Chief Executive. Given the background
and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, we have no doubt that the Constitutional Commission
confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department. The framers did not need to extend
the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the
nomination and screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the
JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary. Indeed, the creation of the JBC
was precisely intended to de-politicize the Judiciary by doing away with the intervention of the Commission on
Appointments.
Third. As earlier stated, the non-applicability of Section 15, Article VII to appointments in the Judiciary was
confirmed by then Senior Associate Justice Regalado to the JBC itself when it met on March 9, 1998 to discuss the
question raised by some sectors about the “constitutionality of xxx appointments” to the Court of Appeals in light
of the forthcoming presidential elections. He assured that “on the basis of the (Constitutional) Commission’s
records, the election ban had no application to appointments to the Court of Appeals.” This confirmation was
accepted by the JBC, which then submitted to the President for consideration the nominations for the eight
vacancies in the Court of Appeals.
Fourth. Of the 23 sections in Article VII, three (i.e., Section 14, Section15, and Section 16) concern the
appointing powers of the President.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power
of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the

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Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This
conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the
context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general
intent of the whole enactment.
Fifth. To hold like the Court did in Valenzuela that Section 15 extends to appointments to the Judiciary
further undermines the intent of the Constitution of ensuring the independence of the Judicial Department from
the Executive and Legislative Departments. Such a holding will tie the Judiciary and the Supreme Court to the
fortunes or misfortunes of political leaders vying for the Presidency in a presidential election. Consequently, the
wisdom of having the new President, instead of the current incumbent President, appoint the next Chief Justice is
itself suspect, and cannot ensure judicial independence, because the appointee can also become beholden to the
appointing authority. In contrast, the appointment by the incumbent President does not run the same risk of
compromising judicial independence, precisely because her term will end by June 30, 2010.
Sixth. The argument has been raised to the effect that there will be no need for the incumbent President
to appoint during the prohibition period the successor of Chief Justice Puno within the context of Section 4 (1),
Article VIII, because anyway there will still be about 45 days of the 90 days mandated in Section 4(1), Article VIII
remaining.
The argument is flawed, because it is focused only on the coming vacancy occurring from Chief Justice
Puno’s retirement by May 17, 2010. It ignores the need to apply Section 4(1) to every situation of a vacancy in the
Supreme Court.
Section 4 (3), Article VII requires the regular elections to be held on the second Monday of May, letting
the elections fall on May 8, at the earliest, or May 14, at the latest. If the regular presidential elections are held on
May 8, the period of the prohibition is 115 days. If such elections are held on May 14, the period of the prohibition
is 109 days. Either period of the prohibition is longer than the full mandatory 90-day period to fill the vacancy in
the Supreme Court. The result is that there are at least 19 occasions (i.e., the difference between the shortest
possible period of the ban of 109 days and the 90-day mandatory period for appointments) in which the outgoing
President would be in no position to comply with the constitutional duty to fill up a vacancy in the Supreme Court.
It is safe to assume that the framers of the Constitution could not have intended such an absurdity.
Seventh. As a matter of fact, in an extreme case, we can even raise a doubt on whether a JBC list is
necessary at all for the President – any President – to appoint a Chief Justice if the appointee is to come from the
ranks of the sitting justices of the Supreme Court.
Sec. 9, Article VIII says:
xxx.
The Members of the Supreme Court xxx shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees
prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for any vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
xxx
The provision clearly refers to an appointee coming into the Supreme Court from the outside, that is, a non-
member of the Court aspiring to become one. It speaks of candidates for the Supreme Court, not of those who
are already members or sitting justices of the Court, all of whom have previously been vetted by the JBC.
WRIT OF MANDAMUS DOES NOT LIE AGAINST THE JBC
Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is

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proper when the act against which it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer.
Mandamus is not available to direct the exercise of a judgment or discretion in a particular way.
For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be complied with: (a) the plaintiff has a clear legal
right to the act demanded; (b) it must be the duty of the defendant to perform the act, because it is mandated by
law; (c) the defendant unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law; (d) the act to be
performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (e) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.

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MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA, petitioner,

vs.
SENATOR JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, JUDICIAL AND BAR
COUNCIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS AND HESIQUIO R. MALLILLIN, respondents.
Mary Concepcion Bautista for and in her own behalf.
Christine A.Tomas Espinosa for private respondent Hesiquio R. Mallillin
G.R. No. 86439

April 13, 1989
FACTS:
The President of the Philippines, Corazon C. Aquino, designated petitioner Mary Concepcion Bautista as
"Acting Chairman, Commission on Human Rights” to succeed the late Senator Jose W. Diokno and Justice J. B. L.
Reyes. Realizing perhaps the need for a permanent chairman and members of the Commission on Human Rights,
befitting an independent office, as mandated by the Constitution, the President of the Philippines on 17 December
1988 extended to petitioner Bautista a permanent appointment as Chairman of the Commission.
It is to be noted that by virtue of such appointment, petitioner Bautista was advised by the President that
she could qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of the office of Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights, requiring her to furnish the office of the President and the Civil Service Commission with copies of
her oath of office. Before the Chief Justice of this Court, Hon. Marcelo B. Fernan, petitioner Bautista took her oath
of office by virtue of her appointment as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights. Immediately, after taking
her oath of office as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, petitioner Bautista discharged the functions
and duties of the Office of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights which, as previously stated, she had
originally held merely in an acting capacity. Petitioner Bautista received a letter from the Secretary of the
Commission on Appointments requesting her to submit to the Commission certain information and documents as
required by its rules in connection with the confirmation of her appointment as Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights.
The Commission on Appointments' Secretary again wrote petitioner Bautista requesting her presence at a
meeting of the Commission on Appointments Committee on Justice, Judicial and Bar Council and Human Rights set
for 19 January 1989 at 9 A.M. at the Conference Room, 8th Floor, Kanlaon Tower I, Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City
that would deliberate on her appointment as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights. Petitioner Bautista
wrote to the Chairman of the Commission on Appointments stating, for the reasons therein given, why she
considered the Commission on Appointments as having no jurisdiction to review her appointment as Chairman of
the Commission on Human Rights.
On 20 January 1989, or even before the respondent Commission on Appointments had acted on her "ad
interim appointment as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights" petitioner Bautista filed with this Court the
present petition for certiorari with a prayer for the immediate issuance of a restraining order, to declare "as
unlawful and unconstitutional and without any legal force and effect any action of the Commission on
Appointments as well as of the Committee on Justice, Judicial and Bar Council and Human Rights, on the lawfully
extended appointment of the petitioner as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, on the ground that they
have no lawful and constitutional authority to confirm and to review her appointment." The prayer for temporary

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restraining order was "to enjoin the respondent Commission on Appointments not to proceed further with their
deliberation and/or proceedings on the appointment of the petitioner ... nor to enforce, implement or act on any
order, resolution, etc. issued in the course of their deliberations."
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the President's appointment is considered constitutional.

II. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is subject to CoA's confirmation.
III. Whether or not President should extend her appointment on January 14, 1989.
RULING:
Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the
heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in
the courts, or in the heads of the departments, agencies, commissions or boards. The President shall have the
power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.
The Court held that it is within the authority of the President, vested upon her by the Constitution, that
she appoint Executive officials. The second sentence of the provision Section 16, Article VII provides that the
President is authorized by law to appoint, without confirmation of CoA, several government officials. The position
of Chairman of CHR is not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art VII of the 1987
Constitution, which provides the appointments which are to be made with the confirmation of CoA. It therefore
follows that the appointment of the Chairman of CHR by the President is to be made and finalized even without
the review or participation of CoA. Bautista's appointment as the Chairman of CHR, therefore, was already a
completed act on the day she took her oath as the appointment was finalized upon her acceptance, expressly
stated in her oath.
Furthermore, the Court held that the provisions of EO 163-A is unconstitutional and thus cannot be
invoked by Mallillin. The Chairman of CHR cannot be removed at the pleasure of the President for it is
constitutionally guaranteed that they must have a term of office.
To hold, as the Court holds, that petitioner Bautista is the lawful incumbent of the office of Chairman of
the Commission on Human Rights by virtue of her appointment, as such, by the President on 17 December 1988,
and her acceptance thereof, is not to say that she cannot be removed from office before the expiration of her
seven (7) year term. She certainly can be removed but her removal must be for cause and with her right to due
process properly safeguarded.
It is to the credit of the President that, in deference to the rule of law, after petitioner Bautista had
elevated her case to this Tribunal, Her Excellency merely designated an Acting Chairman for the Commission on
Human Rights (pending decision in this case) instead of appointing another permanent Chairman. The latter course
would have added only more legal difficulties to an already difficult situation.

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Petitioner Bautista is declared to be, as she is, the duly appointed Chairman of the Commission on Human
Rights and the lawful incumbent thereof, entitled to all the benefits, privileges and emoluments of said office. The
temporary restraining order heretofore issued by the Court against respondent Mallillin enjoining him from
dismissing or terminating personnel of the Commission on Human Rights is made permanent.

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vs.
FRANCISCO SALLE, JR., Y GERCILLA and RICKY MENGOTE Y CUNTADO, accused-appellants.
G.R. No. 103567

December 4, 1995
FACTS:
In 1991, Salle and Mengote were convicted of the compound crime of murder and destructive arson
before the RTC of Quezon City. Salle and Mengote appealed their case to SC on March 24, 1993. In 1994, Salle filed
an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal. The Court required Salle's counsel, Atty. Ida May La'o of the Free Legal
Assistance Group (FLAG) to verify the voluntariness of the motion.
Atty. La'o manifested that Salle signed the motion without the assistance of counsel on his misimpression
that the motion was necessary for his early release from the New Bilibid Prison following the grant of a conditional
pardon by the President on December 9, 1993. She also stated that Mengote was also granted conditional pardon
and that he immediately left for his province without consulting her. She prayed that the Court grant Salle's
motion to withdraw his appeal.
On March 23, 1994, the Court granted Salle's motion. Mengote, however, did not file a motion to
withdraw appeal. After taking into consideration Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution which provides that the
President may, except in cases of impeachment or as otherwise provided in the Constitution, grant pardon after
conviction by final judgment, the Court required (1) the Solicitor General and the counsel for accused-appellants to
submit their memoranda on the issue of the enforceability of the conditional pardon and (2) the Presidential
Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon to inform the Court why it recommended to the President the
grant of the conditional pardon despite the pendency of the appeal.
In its Memorandum, the Office of the Solicitor General maintains that the conditional pardon granted to
appellant Mengote is unenforceable because the judgment of conviction is not yet final in view of the pendency in
this Court of his appeal.
On the other hand, the FLAG, through Atty. La’o, submits that the conditional pardon extended to
Mengote is valid and enforceable. Citing Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr., it argues that although Mengote did not file a
motion to withdraw the appeal, he was deemed to have abandoned the appeal by his acceptance of the
conditional pardon which resulted in the finality of his conviction.
ISSUE: Whether or not a pardon granted to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from a judgment of
conviction by the trial court is enforceable.

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RULING:
NO. Under Section 19, Article VII thereof reads as follows:
Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the
Congress.
Where the pardoning power is subject to the limitation of conviction, it may be exercised at any time after
conviction even if the judgment is on appeal. It is, of course, entirely different where the requirement is " final
conviction," as was mandated in the original provision of Section 14, Article IX of the 1973 Constitution, or
"conviction by final judgment," as presently prescribed in Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. In such a
case, no pardon may be extended before a judgment of conviction becomes final.
A judgment of conviction becomes final (a) when no appeal is seasonably perfected, (b) when the accused
commences to serve the sentence, (c) when the right to appeal is expressly waived in writing, except where the
death penalty was imposed by the trial court, and (d) when the accused applies for probation, thereby waiving his
right to appeal. Where the judgment of conviction is still pending appeal and has not yet therefore attained
finality, as in the instant case, executive clemency may not yet be granted to the appellant.
The "conviction by final judgment" limitation under Section 19, Article VII of the present Constitution
prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from
his conviction by the trial court. Any application therefor, if one is made, should not be acted upon or the process
toward its grant should not be begun unless the appeal is withdrawn. Accordingly, the agencies or
instrumentalities of the Government concerned must require proof from the accused that he has not appealed
from his conviction or that he has withdrawn his appeal. Such proof may be in the form of a certification issued by
the trial court or the appellate court, as the case may be.
The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the
release of an accused by virtue of a pardon, commutation of sentence, or parole before the withdrawal of an
appeal shall render those responsible therefor administratively liable. Accordingly, those in custody of the accused
must not solely rely on the pardon as a basis for the release of the accused from confinement.

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IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF WILFREDO SUMULONG TORRES,
(LYDIA DELA ROSA TORRES, Wife of Wilfredo Sumulong Torres, and daughters RAMONA ELISA R. TORRES and
MARIA CECILIA R. TORRES), petitioners,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, NEW BILIBID PRISONS, MUNTINLUPA, MM., respondents.
G.R. No. 122338

December 29, 1995
FACTS:
Torres was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila of two counts of estafa. The maximum
sentence would expire on November 2, 2000. In 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to Torres by the President
of the Philippines on condition he would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the
Philippines." Torres accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement. In 1986,
upon recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole, the President cancelled the conditional pardon
because Torres had been charged with 24 of estafa and convicted of sedition.
The wife and children of Torres filed before the SC a petition for habeas corpus praying for the immediate
release of Torres from prison on the ground that the exercise of the President's prerogative under Section 64 (i) of
the Revised Administrative Code to determine the occurrence, if any, of a breach of a condition of a pardon in
violation of pardonee's right to due process and the constitutional presumption of innocence, constitutes a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
.
ISSUE: Is a final judicial pronouncement as to the guilt of a pardonee a requirement for the President to determine
whether or not there has been a breach of the terms of a conditional pardon?
RULING:
A conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the sovereign power or the Chief Executive
and the convicted criminal to the effect that the former will release the latter subject to the condition that if he
does not comply with the terms of the pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of
the sentence or an additional one. By the pardonee's consent to the terms stipulated in this contract, the
pardonee has thereby placed himself under the supervision of the Chief Executive or his delegate who is duty-
bound to see to it that the pardonee complies with the terms and conditions of the pardon. Under Section 64 (i) of
the Revised Administrative Code, the Chief Executive is authorized to order "the arrest and re-incarceration of any
such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions of his pardon, parole, or
suspension of sentence." It is now a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that this exercise of presidential

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judgment is beyond judicial scrutiny. The determination of the violation of the conditional pardon rests exclusively
in the sound judgment of the Chief Executive, and the pardonee, having consented to place his liberty on
conditional pardon upon the judgment of the power that has granted it, cannot invoke the aid of the courts,
however erroneous the findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered.
It matters not that in the case of Torres, he has allegedly been acquitted in two of the three criminal cases
filed against him subsequent to his conditional pardon, and that the third case remains pending for thirteen (13)
years in apparent violation of his right to a speedy trial.Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a person's
liberty has been judicially adjudged as illegal or unlawful. In the instant petition, the incarceration of Torres
remains legal considering that, were it not for the grant of conditional pardon which had been revoked because of
a breach thereof, the determination of which is beyond judicial scrutiny, he would have served his final sentence
for his first conviction until November 2, 2000.
Ultimately, solely vested in the Chief Executive, who in the first place was the exclusive author of the
conditional pardon and of its revocation, is the corrollary prerogative to reinstate the pardon if in his own
judgment, the acquittal of the pardonee from the subsequent charges filed against him, warrants the same. Courts
have no authority to interefer with the grant by the President of a pardon to a convicted criminal. It has been our
fortified ruling that a final judicial pronouncement as to the guilt of a pardonee is not a requirement for the
President to determine whether or not there has been a breach of the terms of a conditional pardon. There is
likewise nil a basis for the courts to effectuate the reinstatement of a conditional pardon revoked by the President
in the exercise of powers undisputedly solely and absolutely lodged in his office

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018

vs.
WILLIAM O. CASIDO @ "MARIO," and FRANKLIN A. ALCORIN @ "ARMAN," accused-appellants.
G.R. No. 116512

March 7, 1997
FACTS:
In an effort to seek their release at the soonest possible time, accused-appellants William Casido and
Franklin Alcorin applied for pardon, as well as for amnesty before the National Amnesty Commission. They were
granted conditional pardon during the pendency of their appeal. Their applications for amnesty were also
favorably acted upon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the pardon and amnesty was valid.
RULING:
The release of accused-appellants was valid solely on the ground of the amnesty granted them and not by
the pardon.
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved
by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief
Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice.
Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may
be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes
after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he
has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does nor work the
restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by
the terms of the pardon, and it in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed
upon him by the sentence (Article 36, Revised Penal Code). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts
into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person
released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
While the pardon in this case was void for having been extended during the pendency of the appeal or
before conviction by final judgment and, therefore, in violation of the first paragraph of Sec. 19, Art. VII of the
Constitution, the grant of amnesty, for which accused-appellants voluntarily applied under Proclamation No. 347
was valid. This Proclamation was concurred in by both Houses of Congress.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018

vs.
JOSE PATRIARCA, JR., alias "KA DJANGO," CARLOS NARRA, alias "KA JESSIE"
and TEN (10) JOHN DOES, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 135457

September 29, 2000
FACTS:
Patriarca was charged with the crime of murder for the death of Alfredo Arevalo before RTC Sorsogon
docketed as Criminal Case No. 2773. He was also charged with murder for the killing of one Rudy de Borja and a
certain Elmer Cadag under Informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 2665 and 2672, respectively. The RTC
found him guilty in Criminal Case No. 2773 and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Patriarca appealed the decision to the SC.
Patriarca applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724 entitled "Granting Amnesty to Rebels,
Insurgents, and All Other Persons Who Have or May Have Committed Crimes against Public Order, Other Crimes
Committed in Furtherance of Political Ends, and Violations of the Article of War, and Creating a National Amnesty
Commission." In 1999, his application was favorably granted by the National Amnesty Board concluding that his
activities were done in pursuit of his political beliefs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the grant of amnesty has an effect to the conviction of the accused-appellant.
RULING:
Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high political offenses,
or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have offended, by some breach, the
law of nations. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks
and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the person released by amnesty stands before the law
precisely as though he had committed no offense. Under Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, it
provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all
its effects. This Court takes judicial notice of the grant of amnesty upon accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr.
Once granted, it is binding and effective. It serves to put an end to the appeal. Patriarca was acquitted of the crime
of murder in Criminal Case No. 2773 while Criminal Cases Nos. 2665 and 2672 were ordered dismissed.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
MAGDALO PARA SA PAGBABAGO, petitioner,

vs.
G.R. No. 190793

June 19, 2012
FACTS:
Petitioner Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its Petition for Registration with the COMELEC,
seeking its registration and/or accreditation as a regional political party based in the National Capital Region (NCR)
for participation in the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections. COMELEC issued its Resolution denying the
Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO where it held that Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago should be refused
registration in accordance with Art. IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution. It is common knowledge that the partys
organizer and Chairman, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV, and some members participated in the take-over of the
Oakwood Premier Apartments in Ayala Center, Makati City on July 27, 2003, wherein several innocent civilian
personnel were held hostage. This and the fact that they were in full battle gear at the time of the mutiny clearly
show their purpose in employing violence and using unlawful means to achieve their goals in the process defying
the laws of organized societies. MAGDALO filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was elevated to the COMELEC
En Banc for resolution. MAGDALO filed a Manifestation and Motion for Early Resolution dated 23 December 2009,
in which it clarified its intention to participate in the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections as a party-list group.
COMELEC En Banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by MAGDALO
ISSUES: Whether or not COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the Petition for Registration filed by
MAGDALO on the ground that the latter seeks to achieve its goals through violent or unlawful means.
RULING:
No. Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and coalitions that
"seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means" shall be denied registration. This disqualification
is reiterated in Section 61 of B.P. 881, which provides that "no political party which seeks to achieve its goal
through violence shall be entitled to accreditation."
Violence is the unjust or unwarranted exercise of force, usually with the accompaniment of vehemence,
outrage or fury. It also denotes physical force unlawfully exercised; abuse of force; that force which is employed
against common right, against the laws, and against public liberty. On the other hand, an unlawful act is one that is
contrary to law and need not be a crime, considering that the latter must still unite with evil intent for it to exist.
The power vested by Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution and Section 61 of BP 881 in the COMELEC to
register political parties and ascertain the eligibility of groups to participate in the elections is purely administrative
in character. In exercising this authority, the COMELEC only has to assess whether the party or organization
seeking registration or accreditation pursues its goals by employing acts considered as violent or unlawful, and not
necessarily criminal in nature. Although this process does not entail any determination of administrative liability,
as it is only limited to the evaluation of qualifications for registration, the ruling of this Court in Quarto v. Marcelo
is nonetheless analogously applicable.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
LORETO BARRIOQUINTO and NORBERTO JIMENEZ, petitioners,

vs.
ENRIQUE A. FERNANDEZ, ANTONIO BELMONTE and FELICISIMO OCAMPO,
as Commissioners of the Fourteenth Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, respondents
G.R. No. L-1278

January 21, 1949)
FACTS:
Petitioners Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged with the crime of murder. Jimenez was sentenced to
life imprisonment while Barrioquinto remained at large. Before the period for appeal had expired, Jimenez became
aware of the Proclamation No. 8, which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged with an act
penalized under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in
the war efforts of the enemy, and committed during the period from December 8, 1941, to the date when
particular area of the Philippines where the offense was actually committed was liberated from enemy control and
occupation. Jimenez decided to apply for amnesty. Barrioquinto, who had then been already apprehended, did the
same. The Amnesty Commission returned the cases of the petitioners to the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga,
without deciding on the case saying that since the Barrioquinto and Jimenez deny having committed the crime,
they cannot invoke the benefits of amnesty.
ISSUES: Whether or not the admission of guilt necessary in granting amnesty.
RULING:
No. Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and
proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the
Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial
notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities
who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and
sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense
of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolished or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does "nor
work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly
restored by the terms of the pardon," and it "in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil
indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence"; while amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into
oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person
released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation of September 7, 1946, it is not
necessary that he should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non, admit having committed the criminal act or

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
offense with which he is charged and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the evidence either of
the complainant or the accused, shows that the offense committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty
Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say that "invocation of the benefits of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of
confession and avoidance." Although the accused does not confess the imputation against him, he may be
declared by the courts or the Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits. For, whether or not he admits or
confesses having committed the offense with which he is charged, the Commissions should, if necessary or
requested by the interested party, conduct summary hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants and the
accused, on whether he has committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, or against
persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to the benefits of amnesty and to
be "regarded as a patriot or hero who have rendered invaluable services to the nation,," or not, in accordance with
the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation. Since the Amnesty Proclamation is a public act, the courts as well as the
Amnesty Commissions created thereby should take notice of the terms of said Proclamation and apply the benefits
granted therein to cases coming within their province or jurisdiction, whether pleaded or claimed by the person
charged with such offenses or not, if the evidence presented show that the accused is entitled to said benefits

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
MIGUEL CRISTOBAL, petitioner,

vs.
ALEJO LABRADOR, ET AL., respondents
G.R. No. L-47941- December 7, 1940
FACTS:
On March 15 1930, Teofilo Santos was convicted of estafa and sentenced to 6 months imprisonment and
the accessories, and to return the amount taken. Despite this, Santos continued to be a registered elector in
Malabon, Rizal, and between 1934 and 1937 even served as municipal president. On August 22 1938 the Election
Code was approved, which had a provision that disqualifies Santos from voting, having been declared by final
judgment guilty of a crime against property. Santos applied with the President for an absolute pardon, which was
given him on December 24 1939. The pardon said that his full civil and political rights were restored except that his
right to hold public office was limited only to positions which involved no money or property responsibility.
On November 16, 1940, Cristobal filed a petition to have Santos excluded from the voters’ list on the basis
of sec 94 of the Commonwealth Act no. 357. The court ruled that the pardon given Santos excluded him from the
disqualification created by the New Election Code. Cristobal appealed, arguing that the pardoning power does not
extend to the enjoyment of political rights, for that would allow the President to encroach on the powers of the
legislature, in effect exempting some people from the effects of the law. Cristobal said the pardoning power of the
Executive does not apply to legislative prohibitions and would amount to an unlawful exercise of the Executive of a
legislative function.
ISSUES: Whether or not respondent should be removed from the list of voters on the ground that the latter is
disqualified under paragraph (b) of section 94 of Commonwealth Act No. 357.
RULING:
Yes. The Court ruled that the Constitution imposes only two limits on the power of clemency: that it be
exercised after conviction, and that it does not extend to cases of impeachment. Subject to the limitations
imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action. Saying
that paragraph b of Section 94 of Commonwealth Act no 357 does not fall within the purview of the pardoning
power of the Chief Executive would lead to the impairment of this power.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
FLORENCIO PELOBELLO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
GREGORIO PALATINO, respondent-appellee
G.R. No. L-48100

June 20, 1941
FACTS:
In 1912, Gregorio Palatino was convicted of a crime for which he was sentenced to imprisonment for 2
years, four months and one day, disqualified from voting and being voted upon. In 1915, however, he was granted
a conditional pardon by the Governor General and on Dec 25, 1940, an absolute pardon by the President.
Pellobello instituted quo warranto proceedings questioning his right to hold office as mayor elect of
Torrijos, Marinduque province. It was based on sec 94 (a) of the Election Code.
ISSUES: Whether or not the absolute pardon granted exempted him from the disqualification incident to criminal
conviction under paragraph a of sec 94 of the Election Code, the pardon having been granted after the election but
before the date fixed by law for assuming office
RULING:
Citing the case of Cristobal v Labrador, the court held that the pardoning power is only subject to the
limitations imposed by the Constitution, and cannot be controlled or restricted by legislative action. Thereafter he
had exercised the right of suffrage, was elected councilor of Torrijos, Marinduque, for the period 1918 to 1921;
was elected municipal president of that municipality three times in succession (1922-1931); and finally elected
mayor of the municipality in the election for local officials in December, 1940.
Under these circumstances, it is evident that the purpose in granting him absolute pardon was to enable
him to assume the position in deference to the popular will; and the pardon was thus extended on the date
mentioned hereinabove and before the date fixed in section 4 of the Election Code for assuming office. We see no
reason for defeating this wholesome purpose by a restrictive judicial interpretation of the constitutional grant to
the Chief Executive. We, therefore, give efficacy to executive action and disregard what at bottom is a technical
objection

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
SALVACION A. MONSANTO, petitioner,

vs.
FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., respondent.
G.R. No. 78239

February 9, 1989
FACTS:
The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City)
of the crime of estafa through falsification of public documents. She was sentenced to jail and to indemnify the
government in the sum of P4,892.50. The SC affirmed the decision. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but
while said motion was pending, she was extended by then President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted
(at that time, the rule was that clemency could be given even before conviction). By reason of said pardon,
petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant city
treasurer since the same was still vacant. Her letter was referred to the Minister of Finance who ruled that she
may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was
extended the absolute pardon.
Petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime
which implies that her service in the government has never been interrupted and therefore the date of her
reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive suspension; that she is entitled to backpay for the
entire period of her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the proportionate share of the amount
of P4,892.50.
The Ministry referred the issue to the Office of the President. Deputy Executive Secretary Factoran denied
Monsanto’s request averring that Monsanto must first seek appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate
her former position.
ISSUES
1. Is Monsanto entitled to backpay?
2. Is a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, entitled to
reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment?
3. May petitioner be exempt from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon her by the sentence?

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RULING:
1. Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the
laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he
has committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for
whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the Court.
While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eye of the
law the offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes.
The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of
the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain. It involves
forgiveness and not forgetfulness. A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the
past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any
obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. “Since the offense has been established by judicial
proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully
done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required.” This would explain why petitioner, though
pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits.
2. The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public
employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply
and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.
3. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding
service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence.
Petitioner's civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely:
payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation
and novation

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
WILFREDO TORRES Y SUMULONG, petitioner,

vs.
HON. NEPTALI A. GONZALES, THE CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE,
and THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF PRISONS, respondents.
G.R. No. 76872

July 23, 1987
FACTS:
Wilfredo Torres was convicted of a crime in 1979 and sentenced to serve a prison term of 11 years, 10
mos and 22 days to 38 years, 9 mos and 1 day. He was given a conditional pardon on April 18 1979 on the
condition that he would not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. On May 21 1986, the Board of
Pardons and parole resolve the recommend the cancellation of the pardon, having found out that Torres has been
charged with 20 counts of estafa at the Quezon City Trial Court, convicted of sedition by the QC Trial Court on June
26 1985 and had been accused of other crimes such as swindling, grave threats, grave coercion, illegal possession
of firearms, etc. He was arrested and recommitted on October 10 1986, and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the
unexpired portion of his sentence.
ISSUES: Whether or not a conviction is necessary to revoke a conditional pardon.
RULING:
Citing Tesoro, the Court however said that the since the pardon was extended by the Executive, the
determination of whether or not it has been breached is up to the Executive, not to the Courts. This Court in effect
held that since the petitioner was a convict “who had already been seized in a constitutional way, been confronted
by his accusers and the witnesses against him -, been convicted of crime and been sentenced to punishment
therefor,” he was not constitutionally entitled to another judicial determination of whether he had breached the
condition of his parole by committing a subsequent offense. The executive clemency under it is extended upon the
conditions named in it, and he accepts it upon those conditions. One of these is that the governor may withdraw
his grace in a certain contingency, and another is that the governor shall himself determine when that contingency
has arisen. It is as if the convict, with full competency to bind himself in the premises, had expressly contracted
and agreed, that, whenever the governor should conclude that he had violated the conditions of his parole, an
executive order for his arrest and remand to prison should at once issue, and be conclusive upon him.
The status of our case law on the matter under consideration may be summed up in the following
propositions:
1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are
purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.

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2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper
consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section
64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation
of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is
necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be
recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.
Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and because the conditionally pardoned
convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which he was
conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.
The Court however noted that Torres must still be convicted by final judgment of the crimes with which
he was charged before the criminal penalty can be imposed upon him. Succinctly put, in proceeding against a
convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon,
the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code which imposes the
penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who “having been granted conditional pardon by
the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon.” Here, the President has chosen to proceed
against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the
President’s executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
RODOLFO D. LLAMAS, petitioner,

vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OSCAR ORBOS and MARIANO UN OCAMPO III, respondents.
G.R. No. 99031

October 15, 1991
FACTS:
Vice-Governor Llamas together with some other complainants filed an administrative case against
Governor Ocampo III of Tarlac for alleged acts constituting graft and corruption. After trial, the Secretary of the
then Department of Local Government found Ocampo guilty of serious neglect of duty and/or abuse of authority
for entering into a loan contract grossly/manifestly disadvantageous to Tarlac Province and meted a penalty of
suspension for 90 days. Llamas, assumed office. In not less than 30 days, however, Executive Secretary Orbos, by
authority of the President, issued a Resolution granting executive clemency to Ocampo (after finding the relative
success of Ocampo's livelihood loan program) in the sense that the latter's 90-day suspension is reduced to the
period already served. Ocampo reassumed the governorship of the province, allegedly without any notification
made to Llamas. Llamas questioned the Resolution before the SC.
Petitioner's main argument is that the President may grant executive clemency only in criminal cases, based on
Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution which reads:
Sec. 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may
grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of
the Congress.
Petitioner argued that the qualifying phrase “after conviction by final judgment” applies solely to criminal cases,
and no other law allows the grant of executive clemency or pardon to anyone who has been “convicted in an
administrative case. Respondent Governor avers that since under the Constitution discretionary authority is
granted to the President on the exercise of executive clemency, the same constitutes a political question which is
beyond judicial review.
ISSUES:
1. Is the question on the exercise of executive clemency by the president a political question?
2. May the President grant executive clemency in administrative cases?

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
3. Was petitioner's right to due process violated when he was not notified of the grant of executive
clemency?
RULING:
1. While it is true that courts cannot inquire into the manner in which the President's discretionary
powers are exercised or into the wisdom for its exercise, it is also a settled rule that the Court may exercise its
power of judicial review when the issue involved concerns the validity of such discretionary powers or whether
said powers are within the limits prescribed by the Constitution. And such review does not constitute a
modification or correction of the act of the President, nor does it constitute interference with the functions of the
President. Besides, under the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court has been conferred an "expanded jurisdiction"
to review the decisions of the other branches and agencies of the government to determine whether or not they
have acted within the bounds of the Constitution.
2. Yes. "Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguire debemos." If the law does not distinguish, so the court
must not distinguish. The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be
exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive
clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of
impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Following petitioner's
proposed interpretation, cases of impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not
necessarily involve criminal offenses. In the same vein, we do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why
the President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is our considered view that if the
President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with
much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than
criminal offenses.
If those already adjudged guilty criminally in court may be pardoned, those adjudged guilty
administratively should likewise be extended the same benefit. In criminal cases, the quantum of evidence
required to convict an individual is proof beyond reasonable doubt, but the Constitution grants to the President
the power to pardon the act done by the proved criminal and in the process exempts him from punishment
therefor. On the other hand, in administrative cases, the quantum of evidence required is mere substantial
evidence to support a decision, not to mention that as to the admissibility of evidence, administrative bodies are
not bound by the technical and rigid rules of admissibility prescribed in criminal cases. It will therefore be unjust
and unfair for those found guilty administratively of some charge if the same effects of pardon or executive
clemency cannot be extended to them, even in the sense of modifying a decision to subserve the interest of the
public.
Moreover, the President, in the exercise of her power of supervision and control over all executive
departments, may substitute her decision for that of her subordinate, most especially where the basis therefor
would be to serve the greater public interest. It is clearly within the power of the President not only to grant
"executive clemency" but also to reverse or modify a ruling issued by a subordinate against an erring public official,
where a reconsideration of the facts alleged would support the same. It is in this sense that the alleged executive
clemency was granted, after adducing reasons that subserve the public interest. — "the relative success of . . .
livelihood loan program.
However, that when we say the President can grant executive clemency in administrative cases, we refer
only to all administrative cases in the Executive branch, not in the Judicial or Legislative branches of the
government.

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3. Petitioner's argument that his constitutional rights to due process were violated is unmeritorious.
Pardon has been defined as "the private, though official, act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the
individual for whose benefit it is intended and not communicated officially to the court. ..." Thus, assuming that
petitioner was not notified of the subject pardon, it is only because said notice is unnecessary

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF TEODOSIO LANSANG

RODOLFO DEL ROSARIO, and BAYANI ALCALA, petitioners,
vs.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL EDUARDO M. GARCIA, Chief, Philippine Constabulary, respondent.
G.R. No. L-33964

December 11, 1971
FACTS:
Due to the throwing of two hand grenades in a Liberal Party caucus in 1971 causing the death of 8 people,
Marcos issued PP 889 which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Marcos urged that there is a
need to curtail the growth of Maoist groups. Subsequently, Lansang et al were invited by the PC headed by Garcia
for interrogation and investigation. Lansang et al questioned the validity of the suspension of the writ averring that
the suspension does not meet the constitutional requisites.
ISSUES: Whether or not the suspension is constitutional.
RULING:
The doctrine established in Barcelon and Montenegro was subsequently abandoned in this case where
the SC declared that it had the power to inquire into the factual basis of the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus by Marcos in Aug 1971 and to annul the same if no legal ground could be established.
Accordingly, hearings were conducted to receive evidence on this matter, including two closed-door sessions in
which relevant classified information was divulged by the government to the members of the SC and 3 selected
lawyers of the petitioners. In the end, after satisfying itself that there was actually a massive and systematic
Communist-oriented campaign to overthrow the government by force, as claimed by Marcos, the SC unanimously
decided to uphold the suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.

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JOSEFINA GARCIA-PADILLA, petitioner,

vs.
MINISTER JUAN PONCE ENRILE, GENERAL FABIAN C. VER GENERAL FIDEL V. RAMOS,
and LT. COL. MIGUEL CORONEL, respondents.
G.R. No. L-47941

December 7, 1940
FACTS:
In July 1982, Sabino Padilla, together w/ 8 others who were having a conference in a house in
Bayombong, NV, were arrested by members of the PC. The raid of the house was authorized by a search warrant
issued by Judge Sayo. Josefina, mother of Sabino, opposed the arrest averring that no warrant of arrest was issued
but rather it was just a warrant of arrest hence the arrest of her son and the others was w/o just cause. Sabino and
companions together with 4 others were later transferred to a facility only the PCs know. Josefina petitioned the
court for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the arrests done against Sabino et al is valid.
RULING:
Yes. The SC decision in the Lansang Case was reversed and the ruling in the Barcelon Case &
the Montenegro Case was again reinstated. The questioned power of the president to suspend the privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus was once again held as discretionary in the president. The SC again reiterated that the
suspension of the writ was a political question to be resolved solely by the president. It was also noted that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry with it the suspension of the right to
bail, if the government’s campaign to suppress the rebellion is to be enhanced and rendered effective. If the right
to bail may be demanded during the continuance of the rebellion, and those arrested, captured and detained in
the course thereof will be released, they would, without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby
jeopardizing the success of government efforts to bring to an end the invasion, rebellion or insurrection.

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INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, GEN. PANFILO M. LACSON, GEN. EDGAR B. AGLIPAY,
and GEN. ANGELO REYES, respondents.
G.R. No. 141284

August 15, 2000
FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President
directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and
utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President
declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a
reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to
declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is
subject to judicial review.
2. Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the
constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP.
RULING:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion,
he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such
equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s action to call out the armed forces.
The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would
have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification.
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the
President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the
lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and
the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights
and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court.
In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the
necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision
is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence
to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces.

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The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law
enforcement is “militarized” in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does
not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of
military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at
all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP.
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the
police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not
with the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no
appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols
does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
PANFILO LACSON, MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO and CESAR O. MANCAO, petitioners,

vs.
SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, P/DIRECTOR LEANDRO MENDOZA, and
P/SR. SUPT. REYNALDO BERROYA, respondents.
G.R. No. 147780

May 10, 2001
FACTS:
President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of Rebellion (Proclamation No. 38) on May 1, 2001 as well
as General Order No. 1 ordering the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion in the NCR. Warrantless arrests of
several alleged leaders and promoters of the “rebellion” were thereafter effected. Petitioner filed for prohibition,
injunction, mandamus and habeas corpus with an application for the issuance of temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners assail the declaration of Proc. No. 38 and the warrantless arrests
allegedly effected by virtue thereof. Petitioners furthermore pray that the appropriate court, wherein the
information against them were filed, would desist arraignment and trial until this instant petition is resolved. They
also contend that they are allegedly faced with impending warrantless arrests and unlawful restraint being that
hold departure orders were issued against them.
ISSUES: Whether or not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with the warrantless arrests and hold departure orders
allegedly effected by the same.
RULING:
President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc. No. 38 on May 6, 2006, accordingly the instant
petition has been rendered moot and academic. Respondents have declared that the Justice Department and the
police authorities intend to obtain regular warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts committed prior to and
until May 1, 2001. Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, authorities may only resort to warrantless
arrests of persons suspected of rebellion in suppressing the rebellion if the circumstances so warrant, thus the
warrantless arrests are not based on Proc. No. 38. Petitioner’s prayer for mandamus and prohibition is improper at
this time because an individual warrantlessly arrested has adequate remedies in law: Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court, providing for preliminary investigation, Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, providing for the period in
which a warrantlessly arrested person must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities, otherwise the officer
responsible for such may be penalized for the delay of the same. If the detention should have no legal ground, the
arresting officer can be charged with arbitrary detention, not prejudicial to claim of damages under Article 32 of
the Civil Code. Petitioners were neither assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders, nor were they
expressing any intention to leave the country in the near future. To declare the hold departure orders null and void
ab initio must be made in the proper proceedings initiated for that purpose. Petitioners’ prayer for relief regarding
their alleged impending warrantless arrests is premature being that no complaints have been filed against them for
any crime, furthermore, the writ of habeas corpus is uncalled for since its purpose is to relieve unlawful restraint
which Petitioners are not subjected to.

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SANLAKAS, represented by REP. J.V. Bautista, and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA,

represented by REP. RENATO MAGTUBO, petitioners,
vs
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, GENERAL NARCISO ABAYA,
DIR. GEN. HERMOGENES EBDANE, respondents.
G.R. No. 159085

February 3, 2004
FACTS:
During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP,
acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood Building
in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for the
government, demanding the resignation of the President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts
constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General
Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers
went back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General
Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the State of Rebellion was issued.
In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG
MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of the Constitution does
not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and that there is no factual basis for such
proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al, petitioners contending that the
proclamation is a circumvention of the report requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the
President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they
contend that the presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has
not delegated any such power to the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive
Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that there was usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section
23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. (4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of
rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of
rebellion.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional.
2.) Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit.
RULING:
The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional.
Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The President in addition to its
Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution executive powers. It is not disputed that the
President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
of such power. While the Court may examine whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a
manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their
assertion that the President acted without factual basis. The issue of the circumvention of the report is of no merit
as there was no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts or that military authorities have taken
over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation of the legislative power of the Congress is of no moment
since the President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a
wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on
the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by
Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any person may be subject to this
whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid
warrantless arrest is present.
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The
gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of Issue upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Based on the foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS
Officers/Members have no legal standing to sue. Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as
Members of Congress, have standing to challenge the subject issuances. It sustained its decision in Philippine
Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each
member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.

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SPOUSES RENATO CONSTANTINO, JR. and LOURDES CONSTANTINO and their minor children RENATO
REDENTOR, ANNA MARIKA LISSA, NINA ELISSA, and ANNA KARMINA, FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION, and
FILOMENO STA. ANA III, Petitioners
vs.
HON. JOSE B. CUISIA, in his capacity as Governor of the Central Bank, HON. RAMON DEL ROSARIO, in his capacity
as Secretary of Finance, HON. EMMANUEL V. PELAEZ, in his capacity as Philippine Debt Negotiating Chairman,
and the NATIONAL TREASURER, Respondents.
G.R. No. 106064

October 13, 2005
FACTS:
During the Corazon Aquino regime, her administration came up with a scheme to reduce the country’s
external debt. The solution resorted to was to incur foreign debts. Three restructuring programs were sought to
initiate the program for foreign debts – they are basically buyback programs and bond-conversion programs. The
spouses Renato Constantino, Jr. and Lourdes Constantino, as a taxpayers, and in behalf of their minor children who
are Filipino citizens, together with FFDC (Freedom From Debt Coalition) averred that the buyback and bond-
conversion schemes were onerous and they do not constitute the loan “contract” or “guarantee” contemplated in
Sec. 20, Art. VII of the Constitution. And assuming that the President has such power, unlike other powers which
may be validly delegated by the President, the power to incur foreign debts is expressly reserved by the
Constitution in the person of the President, hence, the respondents herein, Central Bank Governor Josse Cuisia et
al, cannot incur debts for the Philippines or such power can be delegated to them. Constantino argue that the
gravity by which the exercise of the power will affect the Filipino nation requires that the President alone must
exercise this power. They argue that the requirement of prior concurrence of an entity specifically named by the
Constitution–the Monetary Board–reinforces the submission that not respondents but the President “alone and
personally” can validly bind the country. Hence, they would like Cuisia et al to stop acting pursuant to the said
scheme.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President of the Philippines can validly delegate her debt power to the respondents.
RULING:
Yes. There is no question that the president has borrowing powers and that the President may contract or
guarantee foreign loans in behalf of this country with prior concurrence of the Monetary Board. It makes no
distinction whatsoever and the fact that a debt or a loan may be onerous is irrelevant. On the other hand, the
President can delegate this power to her direct subordinates. The evident exigency of having the Secretary of
Finance implement the decision of the President to execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the fact
that the process of establishing and executing a strategy for managing the government’s debt is deep within the
realm of the expertise of the Department of Finance, primed as it is to raise the required amount of funding,
achieve its risk and cost objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt management goals. If the President were to
personally exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing power, he/she would have to pause from running the
country long enough to focus on a welter of time-consuming detailed activities–the propriety of
incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and choosing among the many methods that may be taken toward this end,
meeting countless times with creditor representatives to negotiate, obtaining the concurrence of the Monetary

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
Board, explaining and defending the negotiated deal to the public, and more often than not, flying to the agreed
place of execution to sign the documents. This sort of constitutional interpretation would negate the very
existence of cabinet positions and the respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded and would
unduly hamper the President’s effectivity in running the government. The act of the Cuisia et al are not
unconstitutional.
Exception:
There are certain acts which, by their very nature, cannot be validated by subsequent approval or
ratification by the President. There are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the
Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate the
exercise of any of those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, in his power to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus and proclaim martial law and the exercise by him of the benign prerogative of pardon (mercy).
There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if exercised,
would involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive
prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of government. The declaration of martial law, the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power notwithstanding the judicial
determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the
President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that
the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan), a JUNK VFA MOVEMENT, BISHOP TOMAS MILLAMENA (Iglesia Filipina
Independiente), BISHOP ELMER BOLOCAN (United Church of Christ of the Phil.), DR. REYNALDO LEGASCA, MD,
KILUSANG MAMBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS, KILUSANG MAYO UNO, GABRIELA, PROLABOR, and the PUBLIC
INTEREST LAW CENTER, petitioners
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RONALDO ZAMORA, FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY DOMINGO SIAZON, DEFENSE
SECRETARY ORLANDO MERCADO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, SENATE PRESIDENT MARCELO FERNAN,
SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON, SENATOR BLAS OPLE, SENATOR RODOLFO BIAZON, and SENATOR FRANCISCO
TATAD, respondents.
G.R. No. 138570

October 10, 2000
FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an agreement called the
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine government and was
ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership of the Philippine
Senate.
The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the
guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine governments in the
matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment,
materials and supplies.
Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates §25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a
treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.”
ISSUE: Was the VFA unconstitutional?
RULING:
NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional. Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b)
the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the
votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence
handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution . . . the
provision in [in §25, Article XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum
being unnecessary since Congress has not required it.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
xxx xxx xxx
This Court is of the firm view that the phrase “recognized as a treaty” means that the other contracting
party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other contracting state, the United States
of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution,
is to accord strict meaning to the phrase.
Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them
prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in common use.
Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement
because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA
possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a
treaty.
xxx xxx xxx
The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has
stated that the United States government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as long as
the United States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with
its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.
Exception
There are certain acts which, by their very nature, cannot be validated by subsequent approval or
ratification by the President. There are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the
Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate the
exercise of any of those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, in his power to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus and proclaim martial law and the exercise by him of the benign prerogative of pardon (mercy).
There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if exercised,
would involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive
prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of government. The declaration of martial law, the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power notwithstanding the judicial
determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the
President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that
the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
SENATOR AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR., REP. ETTA ROSALES, PHILIPPINE COALITION FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, TASK FORCE DETAINEES OF THE PHILIPPINES, FAMILIES OF VICTIMS OF
INVOLUNTARY DISAPPEARANCES, BIANCA HACINTHA R. ROQUE, HARRISON JACOB R. ROQUE, AHMED
PAGLINAWAN, RON P. SALO,* LEAVIDES G. DOMINGO, EDGARDO CARLO VISTAN, NOEL VILLAROMAN, CELESTE
CEMBRANO, LIZA ABIERA, JAIME ARROYO, MARWIL LLASOS, CRISTINA ATENDIDO, ISRAFEL FAGELA, and ROMEL
BAGARES, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, and the DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
represented by HON. BLAS OPLE, Respondents.
G.R. No. 158088

July 6, 2005
FACTS:
This is a petition for mandamus filed by petitioners to compel the

Office of the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence in accordance with
Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court
which "shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international
concern xxx and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions."
Its jurisdiction covers the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of
aggression as defined in the Statute. The Philippines signed the Statute through Charge d’ Affairs Enrique A.
Manalo of the Philippine Mission to the United Nations. Its provisions, however, require that it be subject to
ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states.
It is the theory of the petitioners that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic law and international
law, is a function of the Senate. Hence, it is the duty of the executive department to transmit the signed copy of
the Rome Statute to the Senate to allow it to exercise its discretion with respect to ratification of treaties.
Moreover, petitioners submit that the Philippines has a ministerial duty to ratify the Rome Statute under treaty
law and customary international law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Exec. Secretary and the DFA have the ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy
of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine mission to the U.N. even without the signature of the
President.
RULING:
No. The President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external
relations and is the country’s sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the
President acts as the country’s mouthpiece with respect to international affairs.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
The President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution provides a
limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the validity of the
treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "no treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate."
The legislative branch in the treaty-making process was deemed essential to provide a check on the
executive in the field of foreign relations. By requiring the concurrence of the legislature in the treaties entered
into by the President, the Constitution ensures a healthy system of checks and balance necessary in the nation’s
pursuit of political maturity and growth.
The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to
the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or,
having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it.

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QUA CHEE GAN, JAMES UY, DANIEL DY alias DEE PAC, CHAN TIONG YU, CUA CHU TIAN, CHUA LIM
PAO alias JOSE CHUA and BASILIO KING, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE DEPORTATION BOARD, respondent-appellee.
G.R. No. L-10280

September 30, 1963
FACTS:
On May 12, 1952, Special Prosecutor Emilio L. Galang charged the above-named petitioners before the
Deportation Board, with having purchased U.S. dollars in the total sum of $130,000.00, without the necessary
license from the Central Bank of the Philippines, and of having clandestinely remitted the same to Hongkong and
petitioners, Qua Chee Gan, Chua Lim Pao alias Jose Chua, and Basilio King, with having attempted to bribe officers
of the Philippine and United States Governments (Antonio Laforteza, Chief of the Intelligence Division of the
Central Bank, and Capt. A. P. Charak of the OSI, U.S. Air Force) in order to evade prosecution for said unauthorized
purchase of U.S. dollars. A warrant for the arrest of said aliens was issued by the presiding member of the
Deportation Board. Upon their filing surety bond for P10,000.00 and cash bond for P10,000.00, herein petitioners-
appellants were provisionally set at liberty.
Petitioners-appellants filed a joint motion to dismiss the charges presented against them in the
Deportation Board for the reason, among others, that the same do not constitute legal ground for deportation of
aliens from this country, and that said Board has no jurisdiction to entertain such charges. This motion to dismiss
having been denied by order of the Board of February 9, 1953, petitioners-appellants filed in this Court a petition
for habeas corpus and/or prohibition, which petition was given due course in our resolution of July 7, 1953, but
made returnable to the Court of First Instance of Manila. At the instance of petitioners and upon their filing a bond
for P5,000.00 each, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the lower court, restraining the respondent
Deportation Board from hearing Deportation charges No. R-425 against petitioners, pending final termination of
the habeas corpus and/or prohibition proceedings.
The respondent Board filed its answer to the original petition, maintaining among others, that the
Deportation Board, as an agent of the President, has jurisdiction over the charges filed against petitioners and the
authority to order their arrest. The court rendered a decision, upholding the validity of the delegation by the
president to the Deportation Board of his power to conduct investigations for the purpose of determining whether
the stay of an alien in this country would be injurious to the security, welfare and interest of the State. The court,
likewise, sustained the power of the deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest and fix bonds for the alien's
temporary release pending investigation pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the President has the power to deport aliens;
2. Whether or not the delegation to the Deportation Board of the ancillary power to investigate, carries
with it the power to order the arrest of the alien.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
RULING:
1. Yes. As stated in Section 69 of Act 2711 of the Revised Administrative Code.
SEC. 69 Deportation of subject to foreign power. — A subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippines
shall not be deported, expelled, or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his own country by the President of
the Philippines except upon prior investigation, conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground
While it may really be contended that the aforequoted provision did not expressly confer on the President
the authority to deport undesirable aliens, the fact that such a procedure was provided for before the President
can deport an alien is a clear indication of the recognition, and inferentially a ratification, by the legislature of the
existence of such power in the Executive. Herein petitioners constitute in effect an act of profiteering, hoarding or
black marketing of U.S. dollars, in violation of the Central Bank regulations — an economic sabotage — which is a
ground for deportation.
The President may therefore order the deportation of these petitioners if after investigation they are
shown to have committed the act charged.
2. No. President Quirino’s Executive Order No. 398 authorizes the Deportation Board “ to issue the warrant
for the arrest of the alien complained of and to hold him under detention during the investigation unless he files a
bond for his provisional release”. The exercise of the power to order the arrest of an individual demands the
exercise of discretion by the one issuing the same. Such conditions are dependent/personal to the one upon whom
the authority devolves. It is an implied grant of power that would serve as curtailment on the fundamental right of
security to life and liberty, which equally applies to both citizens and foreigners in this country. The guarantees of
human rights, then, must not rest on such a shaky foundation.
Executive Order No. 398 as it empowers the Deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest and to fix bond
and prescribe the conditions for his temporary release, is therefore declared as illegal. Order of arrest of
Deportation Board upon petitioners is declared null and void.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
GO TEK, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
DEPORTATION BOARD, respondent-appellant.
G.R. No. L-23846

September 9, 1977
FACTS:
Go Tek was arrested by the National Bureau of Investigation after a search of an office in Sta. Cruz,
Manila. He was alleged to have with him at the time of the arrest fake dollar checks in violation of Article 168 of
the Revised Penal Court which rendered him an undesirable alien. The Chief Prosecutor of the Deportation filed a
complaint against Go Tek with a prayer that after the trial the Deportation Board recommend to the President of
the Philippines Go Tek’s immediate deportation as his presence in this country having been, and will always be a
menace to the peace, welfare, and security of the community.
Go Tek filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint was premature because there was a
pending case against him and that the Board had no jurisdiction to try the case in view of the ruling in Qua Chee
Gan vs. Deporation Board , that aliens may be deported only on the grounds specified in the law. The Board
denied the motion. They reasoned that it was not necessary for an alien to be convicted before the State can
exercise its right to deport said alien. Besides the Board is only a fact finding body whose function is to report and
recommend to the President in whom is lodged the exclusive power to deport an alien.
The Court of First Instance ruled in favor of Go Tek and issued a writ of prohibition against the Board.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Deportation Board can entertain a deportation proceeding based on the ground not
specified in Section 37 of the Immigration Law and although the alien has not yet convicted of the offense imputed
to him.
RULING:
Yes. A thorough comprehension of the President’s power to deport aliens may show the baselessness of
the instant prohibition action of Go Tek. The President’s power to deport aliens and the investigation of aliens
subject to deportation are provided for in the following provisions of the Revised Administrative Code:
SEC. 69 Deportation of subject to foreign power. — A subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippines
shall not be deported, expelled, or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his own country by the President of
the Philippines except upon prior investigation, conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground

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On the other hand, Section 37 of the Immigration Law Provides that certain aliens may be arrested upon
the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and
deported upon the Commissioner’s warrant – “after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the
existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien”.
So, under existing law; the deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected (1) by order of the
President, after due investigation, pursuant to section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code and (2) by the
Commissioner of Immigration upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners under section 37 of the
immigration Law (Qua Chee Gan vs- Deportation Board, supra).
The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens. That power may be exercise by the Chief
Executive "when he deems such action necessary for the peace and domestic tranquility of the nation”.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
COMMISSIONER ANDREA D. DOMINGO, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, Petitioner,

vs.
HERBERT MARKUS EMIL SCHEER, Respondent.
G.R. No. 154745

January 29, 2004
FACTS:
Respondent Herbert Markus Emil Scheer, a native of Ochsenfurt, Germany, was a frequent visitor of the
Philippines. On July 18, 1986, his application for permanent resident status was granted. During his sojourn in the
Philippines, the respondent married widowed Edith delos Reyes with whom he had two daughters. They had a son,
Herbert Scheer, Jr., but he passed away. They resided in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, where the respondent
established and managed the Bavaria Restaurant.
The Department of Foreign Affairs received from the German Embassy in Manila Note Verbale No. 369/95
dated July 26, 1995, informing it that the respondent was wanted by the German Federal Police; that a warrant of
arrest had been issued against him; and that the respondent will be served with an official document requesting
him to turn over his German passport to the Embassy which was invalidated on July 2, 1995. The Embassy
requested the Department of Foreign Affairs to inform the competent Philippine authorities of the matter. The
Board of Commissioners thereafter issued a Summary Deportation Order dated September 27, 1997.
The Bureau of Immigration obtained custody of Scheer for deportation proceeding. Scheer has filed a
petition for certiorari, questioning the legal standing of the Immigration Commissioner. He contends that the
Commissioner has no authority to decide whether an alien may stay or not.
The Regional Trial Court rendered a judgment annulling the summary deportation proceedings period.
Domingo, The Commissioner of the Immigration contends that the judgment is void because the Board of
Commissioners was not impleaded in the complaint filed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Respondent’s right to procedural due process was violated.
RULING:
Yes. Respondent’s right to procedural due process was therefore violated.
As gleaned from the Summary Deportation Order, the respondent was ordered deported not only
because his passport had already expired; the Board of Commissioners speculated that the respondent committed
insurance fraud and illegal activities in the Philippines and would not, thus, be issued a new passport. This, in turn,
caused the Board of Commissioners to conclude that the respondent was an undesirable alien. Section 37(c) of
Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, provides that:
No alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds for deportation or without
being given a hearing under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration.

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Under paragraphs 4 and 5 of Office Memorandum Order No. 34, an alien cannot be deported unless he is
given a chance to be heard in a full deportation hearing, with the right to adduce evidence in his behalf, thus:
4. All other cases shall be tried in full deportation hearing, with due observance of the pertinent provisions of Law
Instruction No. 39.
5. In all cases, the right of the alien to be informed of the charges against him, to be notified of the time and place
of hearing, when necessary, to examine the evidence against him, and to present evidence in his own behalf,
where appropriate, shall be observed.
The respondent was not afforded any hearing at all. The Board of Commissioners simply concluded that
the respondent committed insurance fraud and illegal activities in Palawan without any evidence. The respondent
was not afforded a chance to refute the charges.
Therefore he cannot, thus, be arrested and deported without due process of law as required by the Bill of
Rights of the Constitution.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018

vs.
G.R. No. 209287

July 1, 2014
FACTS:
Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the
Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next year’s
appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is being undertaken
slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once
withdrawn, these funds are declared as “savings” by the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other
priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in fact reported
and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court).
Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé claiming that he, and other Senators,
received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice
Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the
request of the Senators.
Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several other
concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among
their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that “no money shall be
paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”

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Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and
augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs.
38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and authority to use savings,
respectively).
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
2. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the executive.
3. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
4. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.
5. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
RULING:
1. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the
2. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the President’s
3. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and even
the heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds,
Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate realignment of funds to an existing project in
the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the Executive, these projects are non-existent
insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these
projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were not provided for by the
GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are “savings”

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
4. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP because under
the law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the
5. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being
declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the
economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, then it
may cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot
be asked to return what they received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the
Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is
so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
CESAR BENGZON, QUERUBE MAKALINTAL, LINO M. PATAJO, JOSE LEUTERIO, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN N. DRILON, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as
Secretary of Department of Budget and Management, and HON. ROSALINA CAJUCOM, in her capacity as
National Treasurer, respondents.
G.R. No. 103524

April 15, 1992
FACTS:
In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e. Republic Act No. 1797) that were “repealed”
during the time of former President Ferdinand Marcos. These old laws provided certain retirement benefits to
retired judges, justices, and members of the constitutional commissions. Congress felt a need to restore these laws
in order to standardize retirement benefits among government officials. However, President Corazon Aquino
vetoed the bill (House Bill No. 16297) on the ground that the law should not give preferential treatment to certain
or select government officials.
Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition with the Supreme Court asking the court
to readjust their pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797 was never repealed (by P.D. No. 644) because the said
PD was one of those unpublished PDs which were subject of the case of Tañada v. Tuvera. Hence, the repealing law
never existed due to non-publication and in effect, RA 1797 was never repealed. The Supreme Court then
readjusted their pensions.
Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in the General Appropriations Bill (GAB) for 1992,
Congress allotted additional budget for pensions of retired justices. Congress however did the allotment in the
following manner: Congress made an item entitled: “General Fund Adjustment”; included therein are allotments to
unavoidable obligations in different brances of the government; among such obligations is the allotment for the
pensions of retired justices of the judiciary.
However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which provided for the pensions of the retired
justices in the judiciary in the GAB. She explained that that portion of the GAB is already deemed vetoed when she
vetoed H.B. 16297.
This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired judges and justices to question the
constitutionality of the veto made by the President. The President was represented by then Executive Secretary
Franklin Drilon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill is constitutional.
RULING:

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them in accordance
to Republic Act 1797 which was never repealed. The president has no power to set aside and override the decision
of the Supreme Court neither does the president have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her
predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws.
The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is unconstitutional since the power of the president to
disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of an item and to
approve the remaining portion of said item. It appears that in the same item, the Presidents vetoed some portion
of it and retained the others. This cannot be done. The rule is: the Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at
all; the Executive must veto an entire line item in its entirety or not at all. In this case, the president did not veto
the entire line item of the general adjustment fund. She merely vetoed the portion which pertained to the
pensions of the justices but did not veto the other items covering obligations to the other departments of the
government.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE T. GARCIA (Second District of Bataan), petitioner,

vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY, THE TARIFF COMMISSION, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, and THE ENERGY REGULATORY
BOARD, respondents.
G.R. No. 101273

July 3, 1992
Facts:
In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued EO No.438 which imposed, in addition to any other
duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad
valorem tax. This additional duty was imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and
other oil products imported into the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same
year, EO 475 was passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and other oil products continued to
tax at 9%. Enrique Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional for they
violate Section 24 Article VI of the constitution which provides.
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusive in the House of Representatives, but the Senate
may propose or concur with amendments.
He contends that the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the President
may not assume such power by issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue
generating measures.
Issue: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.
Held:
Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills,
like all other bill is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does
not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as
revenue measures, are prohibited to be exercised by the President, that they must be enacted instead by the
Congress of the Philippines.
Section 28(2) of the Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as it may impose tariffs rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
wharfage dues, and other duties or imports within the framework of the national development
program of the Government.
There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President “subject to such
limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose” to fix “within specific limits” tariff rates… and other duties or
imposts…” In this case, it is the Tariff and Customs Code which authorized the President to issue said EOs.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners,

vs.
CEMENT MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE
AND INDUSTRY, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU
OF CUSTOMS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 158540

August 3, 2005
Facts:
On 22 May 2001, respondent Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) accepted an application
from Philcemcor, alleging that the importation of gray Portland cement in increased quantities has caused declines
in domestic production, capacity utilization, market share, sales and employment; as well as caused depressed
local prices. Accordingly, Philcemcor sought the imposition at first of provisional, then later, definitive safeguard
measures on the import of cement pursuant to the SMA. Philcemcor filed the application in behalf of twelve (12)
of its member-companies.
The Tariff Commission received a request from the DTI for a formal investigation to determine whether or
not to impose a definitive safeguard measure on imports of gray Portland cement, pursuant to Section 9 of the
SMA and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, which later made a recommendation that no definitive general
safeguard measure be imposed. Philcemcor applied for a TRO to enjoin the DTI and the BOC from implementing
the questioned Decision and Report, and argued that the DTI Secretary, vested as he is under the law with the
power of review, is not bound to adopt the recommendations of the Tariff Commission; and, that the Report is
void, as it is predicated on a flawed framework, inconsistent inferences and erroneous methodology. The CA
refused to annul the findings of the Tariff Commission, citing the rule that factual findings of administrative
agencies are binding upon the courts and its corollary, that courts should not interfere in matters addressed to the
sound discretion and coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies. It determined
that the legislative intent is to grant the DTI Secretary the power to make a final decision on the Tariff
Commissions recommendation.
Issue: Whether the factual determination made by the Tariff Commission is binding on the DTI Secretary.
Held:
The Court of Appeals relied upon Section 13 of the SMA in ruling that the findings of the Tariff
Commission do not necessarily constitute a final decision. Section 13 details the procedure for the adoption of a
safeguard measure, as well as the steps to be taken in case there is a negative final determination. The implication
of the Court of Appeals holding is that the DTI Secretary may adopt a definitive safeguard measure,
notwithstanding a negative determination made by the Tariff Commission. Undoubtedly, Section 13 prescribes
certain limitations and restrictions before general safeguard measures may be imposed. However, the most

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
fundamental restriction on the DTI Secretary’s power in that respect is contained in Section 5 of the SMA that
there should first be a positive final determination of the Tariff Commission which the Court of Appeals curiously
all but ignored. Section 5 reads:
Sec. 5. Conditions for the Application of General Safeguard Measures. The Secretary shall apply a general
safeguard measure upon a positive final determination of the [Tariff] Commission that a product is
being imported into the country in increased quantities, whether absolute or relative to the domestic
production, as to be a substantial cause of serious injury or threat thereof to the domestic industry;
however, in the case of non-agricultural products, the Secretary shall first establish that the application of
such safeguard measures will be in the public interest. (emphasis supplied)
The plain meaning of Section 5 shows that it is the Tariff Commission that has the power to make a
positive final determination. This power lodged in the Tariff Commission, must be distinguished from the power to
impose the general safeguard measure which is properly vested on the DTI Secretary.
All in all, there are two condition precedents that must be satisfied before the DTI Secretary may impose a
general safeguard measure on grey Portland cement. First, there must be a positive final determination by the
Tariff Commission that a product is being imported into the country in increased quantities (whether absolute or
relative to domestic production), as to be a substantial cause of serious injury or threat to the domestic industry.
Second, in the case of non-agricultural products the Secretary must establish that the application of such safeguard
measures is in the public interest. Moreover, Rule 5 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the SMA, which
interprets Section 5 of the law, likewise requires a positive final determination on the part of the Tariff Commission
before the application of the general safeguard measure.
Section 5 plainly evinces legislative intent to restrict the DTI Secretary’s power to impose a general
safeguard measure by preconditioning such imposition on a positive determination by the Tariff Commission. Such
legislative intent should be given full force and effect, as the executive power to impose definitive safeguard
measures is but a delegated power the power of taxation, by nature and by command of the fundamental law,
being a preserve of the legislature. The SMA empowered the DTI Secretary, as alter ego of the President, to impose
definitive general safeguard measures, which basically are tariff imposts of the type spoken of in the
Constitution. However, the law did not grant him full, uninhibited discretion to impose such measures. The DTI
Secretary authority is derived from the SMA; it does not flow from any inherent executive power. Thus, the
limitations imposed by Section 5 are absolute, warranted as they are by a constitutional fiat.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
HON. RICARDO T. GLORIA, in his capacity as SECRETARY, AND DIRECTOR NILO L. ROSAS in his capacity as
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND DR. BIENVENIDO A. ICASIANO, respondents.
G.R. No. 119903

August 15, 2000
Facts:
Dr. Bienvenido Icasiano wa appointed by President Aquino as Schools Division Superintendent, Division of
City Schools in Quezon City. He was reassigned as a superintendent of the Marikina Institute of Science and
Technology as recommended by DECS Sec. Ricardo Gloria on June 17, 1994. In October 1994, Director Roxas
informed Icasiano of the reassignment but Icasiano requested reconsideration of the assignment. Request was
denied and CA granted a TRO. CA found that the reassignment as violative of Icasiano’s security of tenure.
However, Sec. Gloria and Director Roxas contend that the prohibition is improper because it attacks as act of the
President in violation of the Doctrine of Presidential Immunity from suit.
Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of Doctrine of Presidential immunity from suit.
Held:
No, it is not in violation of Doctrine of Presidential immunity.
The contention is untenable for the simple reason that the petition is directed against the petitioners and
not against the President.
The questioned acts are those of the petitioners and not of the President. Furthermore, Presidential
decisions may be questioned before the courts where there is grave abuse of discretion or that the President has
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.

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IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL
RODRIGUEZ, NORIEL RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, PDG JESUS AME VERSOZA, LT. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT,
MAJ. GEN. NESTOR Z. OCHOA, P/CSUPT. AMETO G. TOLENTINO, P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, COL. REMIGIO M.
DE VERA, an officer named MATUTINA, LT. COL. MINA, CALOG, GEORGE PALACPAC under the name "HARRY,"
ANTONIO CRUZ, ALDWIN "BONG" PASICOLAN and VINCENT CALLAGAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 191805

April 16, 2013
Facts:
Petitioner Noriel Rodriguez is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a peasant
organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP). He claims that the military tagged KMP as an
enemy of the State under the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its members targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. Rodriguez was abducted by military men and was tortured repeatedly when he refused to confess
to his membership in the NPA. When released, he filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for the Writ
of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents and Personal
Properties. The petition was filed against former Pres. Arroyo, et al. The writs were granted but the CA dropped
Pres. Arroyo as party-respondent, as she may not be sued in any case during her tenure of office or actual
incumbency.
Issue:
Whether former Pres. GMA should be dropped as respondent on the basis of presidential immunity from
suit.
Held:
No. It bears stressing that since there is no determination of administrative, civil or criminal liability in
amparo and habeas data proceedings, courts can only go as far as ascertaining responsibility or accountability for
the enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing.
As was held in the case of Estrada v Desierto, a non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit,
even for acts committed during the latter’s tenure; that courts should look with disfavor upon the presidential
privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. The
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission also reveal that the intent of the framers is clear that presidential
immunity from suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not his term. (The term means the time during which the
officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall
succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds office. The tenure
may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent.) Therefore, former Pres.
GMA cannot use such immunity to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the
context of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
RODOLFO NOEL LOZADA, JR., VIOLETA LOZADA and ARTURO LOZADA, Petitioners,
vs.
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, EDUARDO ERMITA, AVELINO RAZON, ANGEL ATUTUBO and SPO4
ROGER VALEROSO, Respondents.
G.R. Nos. 184379-80

April 24, 2012
Facts:
The instant Petition stems from the alleged corruption scandal precipitated by a transaction between the
Philippine government, represented by the NBN and ZTE. These events impelled the Senate to conduct an
investigation thereon, for which it issued a subpoena directing Lozada to appear and testify on 30 January 2008.
On that date, instead of appearing, Lozada left the country for a purported official trip to London. Upon
his return, he was escorted by several men and was told by Sec. Atienza that Atienza was talking to "ES and
Ma’*a+m”, whom Lozada assumed to be ES Recto and the President. Lozada was brought to LSGH where he was
purportedly harassed and threatened by the police. His wife filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus and likewise his
brother filed a Petition for a Writ of Amparo.
The CA dismissed the Habeas Corpus case for being moot and academic, as Lozada was physically present
and was not confined or detained by any of the respondents. In its Resolution dated 5 March 2008, the CA
dropped former President Arroyo as a respondent on the ground that at the time the Petition in the Amparo case
was filed, she was still the incumbent President enjoying immunity from suit.
Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals committed an error in dropping former President Arroyo as a respondent in
the Amparo case.
Held:
Yes. It is settled in jurisprudence that the President enjoys immunity from suit during his or her tenure of
office or actual incumbency. Conversely, this presidential privilege of immunity cannot be invoked by a non-sitting
president even for acts committed during his or her tenure.
In the case at bar, the events that gave rise to the present action, as well as the filing of the original
Petition and the issuance of the CA Decision, occurred during the incumbency of former President Arroyo. In that
respect, it was proper for the court a quo to have dropped her as a respondent on account of her presidential
immunity from suit.
It must be underscored, however, that since her tenure of office has already ended, former President
Arroyo can no longer invoke the privilege of presidential immunity as a defense to evade judicial determination of
her responsibility or accountability for the alleged violation or threatened violation of the right to life, liberty and
security of Lozada.

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Nonetheless, examining the merits of the case still results in the denial of the Petition on the issue of
former President Arroyo’s alleged responsibility or accountability. A thorough examination of the allegations
postulated and the evidence adduced by petitioners reveals their failure to sufficiently establish any unlawful act
or omission on her part that violated, or threatened with violation, the right to life, liberty and security of Lozada.
Except for the bare claims that: (a) Sec. Atienza mentioned a certain "Ma’*a+m," whom Lozada speculated to have
referred to her, and (b) Sec. Defensor told Lozada that "the President was ‘hurting’ from all the media
71
frenzy," there is nothing in the records that would sufficiently establish the link of former President Arroyo to the
events that transpired on 5-6 February 2010, as well as to the subsequent threats that Lozada and his family
purportedly received.

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IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF
FRANCIS SAEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR. GEN. AVELINO RAZON, 22ND MICO, CAPT.
LAWRENCE BANAAG, SGT. CASTILLO, CAPT. ROMMEL GUTIERREZ, CAPT. JAKE OBLIGADO, CPL. ROMAN ITO
QUINT ANA, PVT. JERICO DUQUIL, CPL. ARIEL FONTANILLA, A CERTAIN CAPT. ALCA YDO, A CERTAIN FIRST
SERGEANT, PVT. ZALDY OSlO, A CERTAIN PFC. SONNY, A CERTAIN CPL. JAMES, A CERTAIN JOEL, RODERICK
CLANZA and JEFFREY GOMEZ, Respondents.
G.R. No. 183533

September 25, 2012
Facts:
On March 6, 2008, the petitioner filed with the Court a petition to be granted the privilege of the writs of
amparo and habeas data with prayers for temporary protection order, inspection of place and production of
documents. In the petition, he expressed his fear of being abducted and killed. He likewise prayed for the military
to cease from further conducting surveillance and monitoring of his activities and for his name to be excluded from
the order of battle and other government records connecting him to the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).
During the hearings, the petitioner narrated that starting April 16, 2007, he noticed that he was always
being followed by a certain "Joel," a former colleague at Bayan Muna. "Joel" pretended peddling pandesal in the
vicinity of the petitioner’s store. Three days before the petitioner was apprehended, "Joel" approached and
informed him of his marital status and current job as a baker in Calapan, Mindoro Oriental. "Joel" inquired if the
petitioner was still involved with ANAKPAWIS. When asked by the CA justices during the hearing if the petitioner
had gone home to Calapan after having filed the petition, he answered in the negative explaining that he was
afraid of Pvt. Osio who was always at the pier. The CA ruled that the petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence
to substantiate his petition for habeas data and writ of amparo. The CA likewise dropped as respondent, for Pres.
GMA on the ground of her immunity from suit. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the President should be immediately dropped as respondent on the ground of her immunity
from suit.
Held:
NO. The President cannot be automatically dropped as a respondent pursuant to the Doctrine of
command responsibility.
In Noriel Rodriguez v. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, et al., the Court stated:
a. Command responsibility of the President

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Having established the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings, it
must now be resolved whether the president, as commander-in-chief of the military, can be held responsible
or accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. We rule in the affirmatives.
To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements must obtain:
a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior and the
perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate;
b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been committed; and
c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts
or punish the perpetrators thereof.
The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses control over the
military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the command responsibility doctrine.
On the issue of knowledge, it must be pointed out that although international tribunals apply a strict
standard of knowledge, i.e., actual knowledge, such may nonetheless be established through circumstantial
evidence. In the Philippines, a more liberal view is adopted and superiors may be charged with constructive
knowledge. This view is buttressed by the enactment of Executive Order No.226, otherwise known as the
Institutionalization of the Doctrine of ‘Command Responsibility’ in all Government Offices, particularly at all Levels
of Command in the Philippine National Police and other Law Enforcement Agencies (E.O. 226). Under E.O. 226, a
government official may be held liable for neglect of duty under the doctrine of command responsibility if he has
knowledge that a crime or offense shall be committed, is being committed, or has been committed by his
subordinates, or by others within his area of responsibility and, despite such knowledge, he did not take
preventive or corrective action either before, during, or immediately after its commission. Knowledge of the
commission of irregularities, crimes or offenses is presumed when (a) the acts are widespread within the
government official’s area of jurisdiction; (b) the acts have been repeatedly or regularly committed within his area
of responsibility; or (c) members of his immediate staff or office personnel are involved.
Pursuant to the doctrine of command responsibility, the President, as the Commander-in-Chief of

the AFP, can be held liable for affront against the petitioner’s rights to life, liberty and security as long as
substantial evidence exist to show that he or she had exhibited involvement in or can be imputed with knowledge
of the violations, or had failed to exercise necessary and reasonable diligence in conducting the necessary
investigations required under the rules.

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PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., LAUREANO T. ANGELES and JOCELYN P. CELESTINO, Petitioners,
vs.
MAGDANGAL B. ELMA, as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel and as Chairman of the Presidential Commission on
Good Government, and RONALDO ZAMORA, as Executive Secretary, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 138965

March 5, 2007
Facts:
Respondent Elma was appointed as Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) on 30 October 1998. Thereafter, during his tenure as PCGG Chairman, he was appointed as Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC). He accepted the second appointment, but waived any renumeration that he
may receive as CPLC. Petitioners sought to have both appointments declared as unconstitutional and, therefore,
null and void
Issue: Whether the appointments were unconstitutional.
Held:
Yes. The concurrent appointments of the respondent as PCGG Chairman and CPLC were unconstitutional.
It ruled that the concurrent appointment to these offices is in violation of Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of
the 1987 Constitution, since these are incompatible offices.
The Court also decreed that the strict prohibition under Section 13 Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
would not apply to the present case, since neither the PCGG Chairman nor the CPLC is a secretary, undersecretary,
or assistant secretary. However, had the rule thereunder been applicable to the case, the defect of these two
incompatible offices would be made more glaring. The said section allows the concurrent holding of positions only
when the second post is required by the primary functions of the first appointment and is exercised in an ex-officio
capacity. Although respondent Elma waived receiving renumeration for the second appointment, the primary
functions of the PCGG Chairman do not require his appointment as CPLC.
There also is no merit in the respondents’ motion to refer the case to the Court en banc. What is in
question in the present case is the constitutionality of respondent Elma’s concurrent appointments, and not the
constitutionality of any treaty, law or agreement. The mere application of constitutional provisions does not
require the case to be heard and decided en banc. Contrary to the allegations of the respondent, the decision of
the Court in this case does not modify the ruling in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary. It should also be
noted that Section 3 of Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89, dated 7 February 1989 clearly provides that the Court en
banc is not an Appellate Court to which decisions or resolutions of a Division may be appealed.

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CITY GOVERNMENT OF TAGAYTAY, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay, Branch XVIII; TAGAYTAY-
TAAL TOURIST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION; PROVINCE OF BATANGAS; MUNICIPALITY OF LAUREL, BATANGAS;
and MUNICIPALITY OF TALISAY, BATANGAS, Respondents.
G.R. Nos. 140743 & 140745

September 17, 2009
Facts:
Tagaytay-Taal Tourist Development Corporation (TTTDC) is the registered owner of two parcels of land.
It incurred real estate tax liabilities on the said properties for the tax years 1976 to 1983. For failure of TTTDC to
settle its delinquent real estate tax obligations, the City Government of Tagaytay offered the properties for sale at
a public auction. Being the only bidder, a certificate of sale was executed in favor of the City of Tagaytay and was
correspondingly inscribed on the titles of the properties. The City of Tagaytay filed an unnumbered petition for
entry of new certificates of title in its favor before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite. RTC granted the
petition.
The TTTDC appealed to the CA. The subject properties were later purchased by Amuerfina Melencio-
Herrera and Emiliana Melencio-Fernando (Melencios) for the amount equivalent to the taxes and penalties due to
the same. Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case before the CA, TTTDC filed a petition for nullification of the
public auction involving the disputed properties on the ground that the properties were not within the jurisdiction
of the City of Tagaytay and thus, beyond its taxing authority. On the other hand, the City of Tagaytay averred that
based on its Charter, said properties are within its territorial jurisdiction. The RTC denied this motion.
Issue: Whether or not RTC committed judicial legislation in its interpretation of Commonwealth Act No. 338 and
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1418; and (3) the RTC acted in excess of jurisdiction in entertaining the case of TTTDC
without the deposit of the amount of the tax sale as required by Section 83 of P.D. No. 464.
Held:
In Re: Balanga v. Court of Appeals, we emphatically held: “failure of the judgment-debtor to redeem the
property sold at public auction the purchaser of the land may be granted a new certificate of title, the exercise of
such function is qualified by the provision that "at any time prior to the entry of a new certificate the registered
owner may pursue all his lawful remedies to impeach or annul proceedings under executions or to enforce liens of
any description." The right, therefore, to petition for a new certificate under said section is not absolute but
subject to the determination of any objection that may be interposed relative to the validity of the proceedings
leading to the transfer of the land subject thereof which should be threshed out in a separate appropriate action.
This is the situation that obtains herein. Teopista Balanga, the judgment-debtor, is trying to impeach or annul the
execution and sale of the properties in question by alleging that they are conjugal in nature and the house erected

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on the land has been constituted as a family home which under the law is exempt from execution. These questions
should first be determined by the court in an ordinary action before entry of a new certificate may be decreed”.
This pronouncement is also in line with the interpretation we have placed on Section 112 of the same Act
to the effect that although cadastral courts are empowered to order the cancellation of a certificate of title and
the issuance of a new one in favor of the purchaser of the land covered by it, such relief can only be granted if
there is unanimity among the parties, or no serious objection is interposed by a party in interest. As this Court has
aptly said: "While this section, (112) among other things, authorizes a person in interest to ask the court for any
erasure, alteration, or amendment of a certificate of title x x x and apparently the petition comes under its scope,
such relief can only be granted if there is unanimity among the parties, or there is no adverse claim or serious
objection on the part of any party in interest; otherwise the case becomes controversial and should be threshed
out in an ordinary case or in the case where the incident properly belongs" (Angeles v. Razon, G.R. No. L-13679,
October 26, 1959, and cases cited therein). x x x.
From the foregoing ruling, it is clear that petitions under Section 75 and Section 108 of P.D. 1529
(formerly Sec. 78 and Sec. 112 of Act 496) can be taken cognizance of by the RTC sitting as a land registration or
cadastral court. Relief under said sections can only be granted if there is unanimity among the parties, or that
there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest; otherwise, the case becomes
controversial and should be threshed out in an ordinary case or in the case where the incident properly belongs.
The foregoing ponencia is now the controlling precedent on the matters being raised anew by petitioners.
We can no longer digress from such ruling. The determination of the questions of fact and of law by this Court in
G.R. No. 106812 already attained finality, and may not now be disputed or relitigated by a reopening of the same
questions in a subsequent litigation between the same parties and their privies over the same subject matter.
Furthermore, Section 4, sub-paragraph (3), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that no
doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court en banc or its Divisions may be modified or reversed
except by the Court sitting en banc. Reasons of public policy, judicial orderliness, economy, judicial time, and
interests of litigants, as well as the peace and order of society, all require that stability be accorded the solemn and
final judgments of the courts or tribunals of competent jurisdiction. There can be no question that such reasons
apply with greater force to final judgments of the highest Court of the land.

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IN RE: VALENZUELA
Narvasa, C.J.
A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC

November 9, 1998
Facts:
On March 30, 1998, The President signed appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido
Vallarta as Judges of RTC-Bago City and Cabanatuan City, respectively. These appointments were deliberated, as it
seemed to be expressly prohibited by Art 7 Sec 15 of the Constitution:
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President
or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.”
A meeting was held on March 9, 1998 by the Judicial and Bar Council to discuss the constitutionality of
appointments to the Court of Appeals (CA) in light of the forthcoming 1998 Presidential elections. Senior Associate
Justice Florenz Regalado, Consultant of the Council and Member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, was in
the position that “election ban had no application to the CA based on the Commission’s
records”. This hypothesis was then submitted to the President for consideration together with the Council’s
nominations for 8 vacancies in the CA.
The Chief Justice (CJ) received on April 6, 1998, an official communication from the Executive Secretary
transmitting the appointments of 8 Associate Justices of CA duly signed on March 11, 1998 (day
immediately before the commencement of the ban on appointments), which implies that the President’s Office did
not agree with the hypothesis.
The President, addressed to the JBC, requested on May 4, 1998 the transmission of the “list of final
nominees” for the vacancy in view of the 90 days imposed by the Constitution (from Feb 13, date present vacancy
occurred). In behalf of the JBC, CJ sent the reply on May 6 that no session has been scheduled after the May
elections for the reason that they apparently did not share the same view (hypothesis) proposed by the JBC shown
by the uniformly dated March 11, 1998 appointments. However, it appeared that the Justice Secretary and the
other members of the Council took action without waiting for the CJ reply. This prompted CJ to call for a meeting
on May 7. On this day, CJ received a letter from the President in reply of the May 6 letter where the President
expressed his view that Article 7 Sec 15 only applied to executive appointments, the whole article being entitled
“EXECUTIVE DEPT”. He posited that appointments in the Judiciary have special and specific provisions, as follows:
Article 8 Sec 4
“The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en
banc or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety
days from the occurrence thereof.”

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Article 8 Sec 9
“The Members of the Supreme Court and judges in lower courts shall be appointed by the President from
the list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments
need no confirmation.
On May 12, CJ received from Malacañang, the appointments of the 2 Judges of the RTC
mentioned. Considering the pending proceedings and deliberations on this matter, the Court resolved by
refraining the appointees from taking their oaths. However, Judge Valenzuela took oath in May 14, 1998 claiming
he did so without knowledge on the on-going deliberations. It should be noted that the originals of the
appointments for both judges had been sent to and received by the CJ on May 12 and is still in the latter’s office
and had not been transmitted yet. According to Judge Valenzuela, he did so because of the May 7 Malacañang
copy of his appointment.
In construing Article 7 and 8: when there are no presidential elections, Art. 8 shall apply where vacancies
in SC shall be filled within 90 days otherwise prohibition in Art. 7 must be considered where the President shall not
make any appointments. According to Fr. Bernas, the reason for prohibition is in order not to tie the hands of the
incoming Pres through midnight appointments.
Issue:
whether, during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Section 15, Article VII of the,
Constitution, the President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Sections 4(1) and 9 of
Article VIII; whether he can make appointments to the judiciary during the period of the ban in the interest of
public service.
Held:
3
The provisions of the Constitution material to the inquiry at bar read as follows:
Sec. 15, Article VII:
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President
or Acting President shall not make appointments,except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
Sec. 4 (1), Article VIII :
The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en
banc or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days
from the occurrence thereof.
Sec. 9, Article VIII :
The members of the Supreme Court and judges in lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a
list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for, every vacancy. Such appointments
need no confirmation.

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For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the submission
of the list.
During the period stated in Section 15. Article VII of the Constitution — “(t)wo months immediately
before the next presidential elections and up to the end his term” — the President is neither required to make
appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII simply mean that the
President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by
Section 15 of Article VII. It is not noteworthy that the prohibition on appointments comes into effect only once
every six years.
Section 15, Article VI is directed against two types of appointments: (1) those made for buying votes and
(2) those made for partisan considerations. The first refers to those appointments made within the two months
preceding a Presidential election and are similar to those which are declared elections offenses in the Omnibus
Election Code, viz.:
Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. — The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling. — (1) Any person who gives, offer or promises money or anything of
value gives or promises any office or employment, franchise or grant, public or private, or makes or offers to make
an expenditure, directly or indirectly, or cause an expenditure to be made to any person, association, corporation,
entity, or community in order to induce anyone or the public in general to vote for or against any candidate or
withhold his vote in the election, or to vote for or against any aspirant for the nomination or choice of a candidate
in a convention or similar selection process of a political party.
(g) Appointment of new employees, creation of new position, promotion, or giving salary increases. —
During the period of forty-five days before a regular election and thirty days before a regular election and thirty
days before a special election, (1) any head, official or appointing officer of a government office, agency or
instrumentality, whether national or local, including government-owned or controlled corporations, who
appoints or hires any new employee, whether provisional, temporary, or casual, or creates and fills any new
position, except upon prior authority of the Commission. The Commission shall not grant the authority sought
unless, it is satisfied that the position to be filled is essential to the proper functioning of the office or agency
concerned, and that the position shall not be filled in a manner that may influence the election.
The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article VII consist of the so-called “midnight”
appointments. There may well be appointments to important positions which have to be made even after the
proclamations of a new President. Such appointments, so long as they are “few and so spaced as to afford some
assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee’s
c
qualifications,” an be made by the outgoing President.
Section 15 may not unreasonably be deemed to contemplate not only “midnight” appointments — those
made obviously for partisan reasons as shown by their number and the time of their making — but also
appointments of the Presidential election.
The exception in the same Section 15 of Article VII allows only the making oftemporary appointments
to executive positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. Obviously,
the article greatly restricts the appointing power of the President during the period of the ban.
Considering the respective reasons for the time frames for filling vacancies in the courts and the
restriction on the President’s power of appointments, it is the Supreme Court’s view that, as a general proposition,
in case of conflict, the former should yield to the latter. Surely, the prevention of vote-buying and similar evils
outweighs the need for avoiding delays in filling up of court vacancies or the disposition of some cases. Temporary
vacancies can abide the period of the ban which, incidentally and as earlier pointed out, comes to exist only once

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
in every six years. Moreover, those occurring in the lower courts can be filled temporarily by designation. But
prohibited appointments are long-lasting and permanent in their effects. They may, as earlier pointed out, their
making is considered an election offense.
To be sure, instances may be conceived of the imperative need for an appointment, during the period of
the ban, not only in the executive but also in the Supreme Court. This may be the case should the membership of
the Court be so reduced that it will have no quorum, or should the voting on a particularly important question
requiring expeditious resolution be evenly divided. Such a case, however, is covered by neither Section 15 of
Article VII nor Sections 4 (1) and 9 of Article VIII.

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ARTURO M. DE CASTRO
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL – ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002

March 17, 2010
FACTS:
The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the
coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory
retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1),
in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof”
from a “list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also
considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting
President from making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential elections and
up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up
the position of Chief Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the position of Chief Justice
the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate
Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.;
and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through
letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the
prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court.
It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to
Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme
Court appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the
prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and
that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the President’s power to
appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from “political vicissitudes” and its “insulation
from political pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the
specified period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the process, there
being an insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has
occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its process until the
short list is prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President
to appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate
Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.

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ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement.
HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme
Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months immediately
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall
be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of
three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the
prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the
Members of the Supreme Court.
presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the
Members of the Supreme Court.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power
of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the
Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This
conclusion is R with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e.
that every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the
whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and
Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in
respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a
similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
Re: SENIORITY AMONG FOUR APPOINTMENTS

631 SCRA 377
2010
Facts:
On March 10, 2010, the Office of the President transmitted to the Supreme Court the appointments of
Court Appeals (CA) Associate Justices Myra G. Fernandez, Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr., Ramon Paul L. Hernando and
Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela. Their respective appointment papers were attached to the transmittal letter
The respective appointment papers of Justices Fernandez, Peralta, Jr., Hernando and Antonio-Valenzuela
bore the following dates and bar code numbers:
Name of Associate Justice Date of Appointment Bar Code No.
Justice Fernandez February 16, 2010 55466
Justice Peralta, Jr. February 16, 2010 55467
Justice Hernando February 16, 2010 55468
Justice Antonio-Valenzuela February 24, 2010 55465
After some initial confusion, the four Justices were finally listed in the roster of the CA Justices in the
following order of seniority: Justice Fernandez (as most senior), Justice Peralta, Jr., Justice Hernando and Justice
Antonio-Valenzuela (as most junior). The ranking was based in a letter dated March 25, 2010 submitted by the
members of the CA Committee on Rules to CA Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr.
Issue: Whether or not the date of the commission of an appointee determines seniority
Held:
An appointment to a public office is the unequivocal act, of one who has the authority, of designating or
selecting an individual to discharge and perform the duties and functions of an office or trust. Where the power of
appointment is absolute and the appointee has been determined upon, no further consent or approval is
necessary and the formal evidence of the appointment, the commission, may issue at once. The appointment is
deemed complete once the last act required of the appointing authority has been complied with.
In Valencia v. Peralta, the Court ruled that a written memorial that can render title to public office
indubitable is required. This written memorial is known as the commission. For purposes of completion of the
appointment process, the appointment is complete when the commission is signed by the executive, and sealed if
necessary, and is ready to be delivered or transmitted to the appointee. Thus, transmittal of the commission is an
act which is done after the appointment has already been completed. It is not required to complete the
appointment but only to facilitate the effectivity of the appointment by the appointees receipt and acceptance
thereof.
For purposes of appointments to the judiciary, therefore, the date the commission has been signed by the
President (which is the date appearing on the face of such document) is the date of the appointment. Such date
will determine the seniority of the members of the Court of Appeals in connection with Section 3, Chapter I of BP
129, as amended by RA 8246. In other words, the earlier the date of the commission of an appointee, the more

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
senior he/she is over the other subsequent appointees. It is only when the appointments of two or more
appointees bear the same date that the order of issuance of the appointments by the President becomes material.
This provision of statutory law (Section 3, Chapter I of BP 129, as amended by RA 8246) controls over the
provisions of the 2009 IRCA which gives premium to the order of appointments as transmitted to this Court. Rules
implementing a particular law cannot override but must give way to the law they seek to implement.
In view of the foregoing, the CA en banc acted correctly when it adopted the view of the CA Rules
Committee insofar as the reckoning of the seniority of CA Justices Fernandez, Peralta, Jr., Hernando and Antonio-
Valenzuela is concerned but erred when it declared that the CA Rules Committees interpretation applies only to
the case of the four aforementioned Justices.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
GREGORIO PERFECTO, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BIBIANO MEER, Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-2348

February 27, 1950
FACTS:
In April, 1947 the collector of internal revenue required plaintiff-appellee to pay income tax upon his
salary as a member of this court during the year 1946. After paying the amount, he instituted this action in Manila
Court of First Instance contending that assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the reason that
imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the imposition of an income tax upon this salary in 1946 amount to a diminution thereof?
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that unless and until the Legislature approves an amendment to the Income Tax
Law expressly taxing ―that salaries of judges thereafter appointed , salaries of judges are not included in the word
―income taxed by the Income Tax Law. Two paramount circumstances may additionally indicate, to wit:
First, when the Income Tax Law was first applied to the Philippines 1913, taxable ―income did not include
salaries of judicial officers when these are affected by diminution. That was the prevailing official belief in the
United States, which must be deemed to have been transplanted here, and second, when the Philippine
Constitutional Convention approved (in 1935) the prohibition against diminution off the judges‘ compensation ,
the Federal principle was known that income tax on judicial salaries really impairs them

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO, plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
SATURNINO DAVID, as Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-6355-56

August 31, 1953
Facts:
Saturnino David, as a Collector of Internal Revenue collected income taxes from Justices Endencia and
Jugo, as Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals and Associate Justice of the Supreme Court respectively. The
lower court held that under the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil., 552, the collection of
income taxes from the salaries of Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia was a diminution of their compensation and
therefore was in violation of the Constitution of the Philippines, and so ordered the refund of said taxes.
Respondent, through the Solicitor General contended that the collection was done pursuant to Section 13 of
Republic Act 590 which Congress enacted to authorize and legalize the collection of income tax on the salaries of
judicial officers, if not to counteract the ruling on the Perfecto Case.
Issue:
Whether the Legislature may lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the salary of a public
official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided
otherwise.
Held:
The Legislature cannot lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the salary of a public official,
specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise.
The interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and
jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein
that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of
the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, specially when the interpretation sought and provided in
said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land. In
the case at bar, Section 13 of Republic Act 590 interpreted or ascertained the meaning of the phrase “which shall
not be diminished during their continuance in office,” found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring
to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is
an invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. The Legislature under
our form of government is assigned the task and the power to make and enact laws, but not to interpret them.
This is more true with regard to the interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution, which is not within the
sphere of the Legislative department. Allowing the legislature to interpret the law would bring confusion and
instability in judicial processes and court decisions.

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Further, under the Philippine system of constitutional government, the Legislative department is assigned
the power to make and enact laws. The Executive department is charged with the execution or carrying out of the
provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and application of said laws belong exclusively to the Judicial
department. And this authority to interpret and apply the laws extends to the Constitution. Before the courts can
determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and ascertain the meaning not only of
said law, but also of the pertinent portion of the Constitution in order to decide whether there is a conflict
between the two, because if there is, then the law will have to give way and has to be declared invalid and
unconstitutional. Therefore, the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer to the effect that the
collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution, is
reiterated.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision, affirming the ruling in Perferto v. Meer and holding the
interpretation and application of laws belong to the Judiciary.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
DAVID G. NITAFAN, WENCESLAO M. POLO, AND MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO, JR. , petitioners

vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE AND THE
FINANCIAL OFFICER, respondent
G.R. NO. 78780

JULY 23, 1987
FACTS:
Petitioners, David G. Nifatan, Wenceslao M. Polo, and Maximo A Savellano, Jr., are the duly appointed
and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, all with stations in Manila. They seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of
withholding taxes from their salaries. They contend that any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation
as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating that during their continuance in office, their salary shall not be
decreased.
It may be pointed out that, early on, the Court had dealt with the matter administratively. The Chief
Justice has previously issued a directive to the Fiscal Management and Budget Office to continue the deduction
of withholding taxes from salaries of the Justices of the Supreme Court and other members of the judiciary. This
was affirmed by the Supreme Court en banc on 4 December 1987. This should have resolved the issue, but with
the filing of the petition, the Court deemed it best to settle the issue through judicial pronouncement.
ISSUE: Whether or not the salary of the petitioners or the members of the Judiciary are exempt from payment of
income taxes?
HELD:
No, the salaries of the petitioners or the members of the Judiciary are not exempt from payment of income
taxes because their salaries are subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers as per the intent of
the1986 Constitutional Commission. Their intent was to delete the proposed express grant of exemption from
payment of income tax to members of the Judiciary, so as to give substance to equality among the three branches
of Government. Although such intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the
1987 Constitution, the debates, interpellations and opinions expressed by the1986 Constitutional
Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the
salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable.
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional
construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect.
The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose
of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA Presiding Judge, Branch II of the City Court of Olongapo, ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR.,
FIDELA Y. VARGAS, BENJAMIN C. ESCOLANGO, JUANITO C. ATIENZA, MANUEL REYES ROSAPAPAN, JR., VIRGILIO
E. ACIERTO, and PORFIRIO AGUILLON AGUILA, petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL ALBA, Minister of Budget, FRANCISCO TANTUICO, Chairman, Commission on Audit, and RICARDO
PUNO, Minister of Justice, Respondents.
G.R. No. L-57883

March 12, 1982
Facts:
In 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled “An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds
Therefore and for Other Purposes”, was passed. Gualberto De la Llana, a judge in Olongapo, was assailing its
validity because, first of all, he would be one of the judges that would be removed because of the reorganization
and second, he said such law would contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security of tenure
of judges of the courts. He averred that only the Supreme Court can remove judges NOT the Congress.
ISSUE: Whether or not a judge like Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the legislature by such statute (BP
129).
HELD:
Yes. The SC ruled the following way: “Moreover, this Court is empowered “to discipline judges of inferior
courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal.” Thus it possesses the competence to
remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such power.
Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There
can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there
is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of
strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of
inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and
the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In
the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of
constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and
that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord
respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If
such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two
departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue.
Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization.
That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the
tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to
preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior
courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to those
predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle
that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the
former is to be preferred.”

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IN RE FIRST INDORSEMET FROM HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ DATED 16 MARCH 1988 REQUESTING
HONORABLE JUSTICE MARCELO B. FERNAN TO COMMENT ON AN ANONYMOUS LETTER-COMPLAINT.
A.M. No. 88-4-5433

April 15, 1988
Facts:
Gonzales was the Tanodbayan or Special Prosecutor. He forwarded a letter-complaint to Justice Fernan.
The letter was said to be from concerned employees of the SC (an anonymous letter). The letter was originally
addressed to Gonzales referring to the charges for disbarment sought by Mr. Miguel Cuenco against Justice
Fernan, and asking him (Gonzales) to do something about it. The Supreme Court furnished a copy to Gonzales, the
per curiam Resolution of the SC, dismissing the charges made by Cuenco against Justice Fernan for lack of merit. In
that resolution, Cuenco was asked to show cause why he should not be held administratively liable for making
serious accusations against Fernan.
Issue: Whether or not a Supreme Court Justice can be disbarred during his term office.
Held:
A public officer (such as Justice Fernan) who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of the
Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from office only by
impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer. Further, such
public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan, or any other court,
with any offense which carries with it the penalty of removal from office.
Another reason why the complaint for disbarment should be dismissed is because under the Constitution,
members of the SC may be removed only by impeachment. The above provision proscribes removal from office by
any other method. Otherwise, to allow such public officer who may be removed solely by impeachment to be
charged criminally while holding his office with an office that carries the penalty of removal from office, would be
violative of the clear mandate of the Constitution.
The effect of impeachment is limited to the loss of position and disqualification to hold any office of
honor, trust or profit under the Republic. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal
from office and disqualification to hold any office. But the party convicted shall nevertheless be held liable and
subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law.
The court is not saying that the members and other constitution al officer are entitled
to immunity from liability. What the court is merely saying is that there is a fundamental procedural requirement
that must be observed before such liability may be determined. A member of the SC must first be removed from
office, via the constitutional route of impeachment, and then only may he be held liable either criminally or
administratively (that is, disbarment), for any wrong or misbehaviour in appropriate proceedings.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner

vs
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, respondent
G.R. No. 158791

July 22, 2005
Facts:
“Automatic release” of approved annual appropriations to Civil Service Commission,

a constitutional commission which is vested with fiscal autonomy, should thus be construed to mean that no
condition to fund releases to it may be imposed. The total funds appropriated by General Appropriations Act of
2002 (GAA) for Civil Service Commission (CSC) was P285,660,790.44. CSC complains that the total funds released
by Department of Budget and Management (DBM) was only P279,853,398.14, thereby leaving an unreleased
balance of P5,807,392.30. CSC contends that the funds were intentionally withheld by DBM on the ground of their
―no report, no release‖ policy. Hence, CSC filed a petition for mandamus seeking to compel the DBM to release
the balance of its budget for fiscal year 2002. At the same time, it seeks a determination by this Court of the extent
of the constitutional concept of fiscal autonomy.
ISSUE: Whether or not DBM‘s policy, ―no report, no release‖ is constitutional.
HELD:
DBM‘s act of withholding the subject funds from CSC due to revenue shortfall is hereby declared
unconstitutional.
The no report, no release policy may not be validly enforced against offices vested with fiscal autonomy is
not disputed. Indeed, such policy cannot be enforced against offices possessing fiscal autonomy without violating
Article IX (A), Section 5 of the Constitution, which provides that the Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy and
that their approved appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released. The Court held in the case of,
Batangas v. Romulo, ―automatic release‖ in Section 6, Article X of the Constitution is defined as ―an automatic
manner; without thought or conscious intention.‖ Being ―automatic,‖ thus, connotes something mechanical,
spontaneous and perfunctory. As such the LGUs are not required to perform any act to receive the ―just share‖
accruing to them from the national coffers. By parity of construction, ―automatic release‖ of approved annual
appropriations to petitioner, a constitutional commission which is vested with fiscal autonomy, should thus be
construed to mean that no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed. This conclusion is consistent with the
Resolution of this Court which effectively prohibited the enforcement of a ―no report, no release‖ policy against
the Judiciary which has also been granted fiscal autonomy by the Constitution. Furthermore, the
Constitution grants the enjoyment of fiscal autonomy only to the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, of
which petitioner is one, and the Ombudsman. To hold that the CSC may be subjected to withholding
or reduction of funds in the event of a revenue shortfall would, to that extent, place CSC and the other entities
vested with fiscal autonomy on equal footing with all others which are not granted the same autonomy, thereby
reducing to naught the distinction established by the Constitution.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
RE: FURTHER CLARIFYING AND STRENGTHENING THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATIVE SET-
UP OF THE PHILIPPINE JUDICIAL ACADEMY
A.M. No. 01-1-04-SC-PHILJA September 25, 2009
FACTS:
The present administrative matter arose from a letter dated June 17, 2009 of Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna, Chancellor
of the Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA), addressed to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, Chairperson of the PHILJA
Board of Trustees, requesting the Courts approval of the following amendments in the PHILJAs staffing pattern,
solely referring to the Chancellors Office. Thus:
We refer your Honor to the Court En Banc Resolution dated 23 September 2008, in Revised A.M. No. 01-1-
04-SC-PHILJA, (Further Clarifying and Strengthening the Organizational Structure and Administrative Set-
up of the Philippine Judicial Academy), which approved PHILJAs staffing pattern, hereto attached as Annex
A.
In reference to the abovementioned Resolution, may we respectfully request the Courts approval of the
following amendments solely referring to the Chancellors Office.
1) To convert the position of PHILJA Attorney VI, salary grade 27, to Judicial Staff Head with the same
salary grade 27, and change it from permanent to coterminous.
The conversion of the position will accord the Chancellor the discretion to hire a non-lawyer for the
position when necessary.
2) To revert the status of the following positions from permanent to coterminous:
SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer SG 25

Judicial Staff Officer III SG 18
Records Officer II SG 14
Judicial Staff Assistant III SG 10
Under the Revised A.M. No. 01-1-04-SC-PHILJA, the status of the above-mentioned positions were
changed from coterminous to permanent status.
In view of the nature of work required by the Chancellor for the staff under the Office of the Chancellor,
there is a need to appoint such personnel of trust and confidence of the Chancellor.
May we respectfully request that the permanent status of these positions be reverted to coterminous
status.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Supreme Court En Banc has autonomy over the organizational structure and administrative set
up of Philippine Judicial Academy.
RULING:
Yes, the Supreme Court En Banc has autonomy over the organizational structure and administrative set up of
Philippine Judicial Academy. The court resolves in reference to the, Office of the Chancellor, Office of the Vice-
Chancellor, and Office of the Executive Secretary:
To grant the request of Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna, Chancellor of the Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA), with
regard to the Office of Chancellor, as follows: (a) The change in the position title from PHILJA Attorney VI, a newly-
created item which is unfilled, to PHILJA Head Executive Assistant and maintaining the nature of the appointment
as coterminous with Salary Grade 27; (b) The reversion of the position status from permanent to coterminous with
regard to the following items in the plantilla:
SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer Salary Grade 25

Judicial Staff Officer III Salary Grade 18
Judicial Staff Assistant III Salary Grade 10
However, the request to revert the position status of Records Officer II, with Salary Grade 14, from permanent to
coterminous is DENIED and said position shall remain to be permanent to ensure the continuity of workflow and
preserve the records management in the Office of the Chancellor.
To approve and adopt the recommendation of Atty. Eden T. Candelaria, Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief
Administrative Officer, Office of Administrative Services, as to the following: (a) The reclassification of each
position in the PHILJA Offices of the Vice-Chancellor and Executive Secretary, both having the status of
coterminous: Office of the Vice-Chancellor: From PHILJA Attorney V to PHILJA Executive Assistant Supervisor, with
Salary Grade 26; unfilled. Office of the Executive Secretary: From PHILJA Attorney IV to PHILJA Executive Assistant
VI, with Salary Grade 25; unfilled
The reversion of the position status from permanent to coterminous with regard to the following designated items
in the plantilla of the PHILJA Offices of the Vice-Chancellor and Executive Secretary:
Office of the Vice-Chancellor:

a. SC Supervising Judicial Staff Officer (Salary Grade 23)
b. Judicial Staff Officer III (Salary Grade 18)
Office of the Executive Secretary:

a. Judicial Staff Officer VI (Salary Grade 22)
b. Judicial Staff Officer III (Salary Grade 18)
With the exception of the position of Clerk III (Salary Grade 6) in each office, which remains to be permanent to
ensure the continuity of workflow and preserve the records management in each office; and
To request the Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor, Executive Secretary to appoint qualified personnel to the three (3)
newly reclassified coterminous positions, namely:
Office of the Chancellor:

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PHILJA Head Executive Assistant (Salary Grade 27)
Office of the Vice-Chancellor:

PHILJA Executive Assistant Supervisor (Salary Grade 26)
Office of the Executive Secretary:

PHILJA Executive Assistant VI (Salary Grade 25)

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the Properties Purchased by the Retired
Chief/Associate Justices of the Supreme Court.
A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC July 31, 2012
FACTS:
The present administrative matter stems from the two Memoranda, dated July 14, 2011 and August 10, 2010,
submitted by Atty. Eden T. Candelaria, Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief Administrative Officer, Office of
Administrative Services, to the Office of the Chief Justice. These Memoranda essentially ask the Court to determine
the proper formula to be used in computing the appraisal value that a retired Chief Justice and several Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court have to pay to acquire the government properties they used during their tenure.
1
This issue has its roots in the June 8, 2010 Opinion issued by the Legal Services Sector, Office of the General
Counsel of the Commission on Audit (COA), which found that an underpayment amounting to P221,021.50
resulted when five (5) retired Supreme Court justices purchased from the Supreme Court the personal properties
assigned to them during their incumbency in the Court.
The COA attributed this underpayment to the use by the Property Division of the Supreme Court of the wrong
formula in computing the appraisal value of the purchased vehicles. According to the COA, the Property Division
erroneously appraised the subject motor vehicles by applying Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) Joint
Resolution No. 35 dated April 23, 1997 and its guidelines, in compliance with the Resolution of the Court En Banc
3
dated March 23, 2004 in A.M. No. 03-12-01, when it should have applied the formula found in COA Memorandum
4
No. 98-569-A dated August 5, 1998.
Recommendations of the Office of Administrative Services In her Memorandum dated August 10, 2010, Atty.
Candelaria recommended that the Court advise the COA to respect the in-house computation based on the CFAG
formula, noting that this was the first time that the COA questioned the authority of the Court in using CFAG Joint
Resolution No. 35 and its guidelines in the appraisal and disposal of government property since these were issued
in 1997. As a matter of fact, in two previous instances involving two (2) retired Court of Appeals Associate Justices,
the COA upheld the in-house appraisal of government property using the formula found in the CFAG guidelines.
More importantly, the Constitution itself grants the Judiciary fiscal autonomy in the handling of its budget and
resources. Full autonomy, among others, contemplates the guarantee of full flexibility in the allocation and
utilization of the Judiciary’s resources, based on its own determination of what it needs. The Court thus has the
recognized authority to allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided or required by law in the course of the
7
discharge of its functions. To allow the COA to substitute the Court’s policy in the disposal of its property would be
tantamount to an encroachment into this judicial prerogative.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the in-house computation of the appraisal value made by the Property Division, Office of
Administrative Services, of the properties purchased by the retired Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court, based on CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 dated April 23, 1997, as directed under the Court
Resolution dated March 23, 2004 in A.M. No. 03-12-01, is legal and valid.

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RULING:
Yes, the in-house computation of the appraisal value made by the Property Division, Office of Administrative
Services, of the properties purchased by the retired Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court,
based on CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 dated April 23, 1997, as directed under the Court Resolution dated March
23, 2004 in A.M. No. 03-12-01, is legal and valid.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express
provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance
of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that
the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely
unrestrained and independent of each other.
One of the most important aspects of judicial independence is the constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy. Just as
the Executive may not prevent a judge from discharging his or her judicial duty (for example, by physically
preventing a court from holding its hearings) and just as the Legislature may not enact laws removing all
jurisdiction from courts, the courts may not be obstructed from their freedom to use or dispose of their funds for
purposes germane to judicial functions.
As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee
of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require.
The Judiciary’s fiscal autonomy is realized through the actions of the Chief Justice, as its head, and of the Supreme
Court En Banc, in the exercise of administrative control and supervision of the courts and its personnel. As the
Court En Banc’s Resolution (dated March 23, 2004) in A.M. No. 03-12-01 reflects, the fiscal autonomy of the
Judiciary serves as the basis in allowing the sale of the Judiciary’s properties to retiring Justices of the Supreme
Court and the appellate courts.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
EVELYN ONGSUCO and ANTONIA SALAYA, Petitioners

vs.
HON. MARIANO M. MALONES, both in his private and official capacity as Mayor of the Municipality of Maasin,
Iloilo, Respondent
G.R. No. 182065, October 27, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioners are stall holders at the Maasin Public Market. After a meeting with the stall holders, Sangguniang Bayan
of Maasin approved Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 entitled "The Municipal Revised Revenue Code."The Code
contained a provision for increased rentals for the stalls and the imposition of goodwill fees in the amount
of P20,000.00 and P15,000.00 for stalls located on the first and second floors of the municipal public market,
respectively. The same Code authorized respondent to enter into lease contracts over the said market stalls, and
incorporated a standard contract of lease for the stall holders at the municipal public market. Sangguniang Bayan
of Maasin approved Resolution No. 68, series of 1998, moving to have the meeting declared inoperative as a public
hearing, because majority of the persons affected by the imposition of the goodwill fee failed to agree to the said
measure. However, Resolution No. 68, series of 1998, of the Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin was vetoed by
respondent on 30 September 1998. Respondent wrote a letter to petitioners informing them that they were
occupying stalls in the newly renovated municipal public market without any lease contract, as a consequence of
which, the stalls were considered vacant and open for qualified and interested applicants. Petitioners filed a
Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus, with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ
of Preliminary Injunction, against respondent. The RTC found that petitioners could not avail themselves of the
remedy of mandamus or prohibition. Because they failed to show a clear legal right to the use of the market stalls
without paying the goodwill fees and also on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. This
decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
1. W/N there was a need for the exhaustion of administrative remedies;

2. W/N the imposition of the goodwill fees is valid.
RULING:
1. No. The rule on the exhaustion of administrative remedies is intended to preclude a court from arrogating unto
itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative
body of special competence. Thus, a case where the issue raised is a purely legal question, well within the
competence; and the jurisdiction of the court and not the administrative agency, would clearly constitute an
exception.
2. No, it is defective due to lack of public hearings. There is no dispute herein that the notices sent to petitioners
and other stall holders at the municipal public market were sent out, informing them of the supposed

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
"public hearing" to be held on 11 August 1998. Even assuming that petitioners received their notice, the" public
hearing" was already scheduled, and actually conducted, only five days later. This contravenes Article 277 (b) (3) of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code which requires that the public hearing be
held no less than ten days from the time the notices were sent out, posted, or published. When the Sangguniang
Bayan of Maasin sought to correct this procedural defect through Resolution No. 68, series of 1998 vetoed the said
resolution. Although the Sangguniang Bayan may have had the power to override respondent's veto, it no longer
did so. The defect in the enactment of Municipal Ordinance No. 98 was not cured when another public hearing was
held on 22 January 1999, after the questioned ordinance was passed by the Sangguniang Bayan and approved by
respondent on 17 August 1998. Section 186 of the Local Government Code prescribes that the public hearing be
held prior to the enactment by a local government unit of an ordinance levying taxes, fees, and charges. Since no
public hearing had been duly conducted prior to the enactment of Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01, said ordinance
is void and cannot be given any effect. Consequently, a void and ineffective ordinance could not have conferred
upon respondent the jurisdiction to order petitioners' stalls at the municipal public market vacant.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ANTONIO L. TAN, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
YOSHITSUGU MATSUURA and CAROLINA T ANJUTCO, JULIE O. CUA, Respondent
G.R. No. 179003 and G.R. No. 195816, January 9, 2013
FACTS:
On March 31, 1998, Tan filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Makati City a Complaint-
Affidavit charging the respondents Yoshitsugu Matsuura (Matsuura), Atty. Carolina Tanjutco (Tanjutco) and Atty.
Julie Cua (Cua) of the crime of falsification under the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
The respondents filed their respective counter-affidavits.
Matsuura vehemently denied Tan's charges. He countered that the filing of the complaint was merely a scheme
resorted to by Tan following their dispute in TF Ventures, Inc., and after he had obtained a favorable resolution in a
complaint for estafa against Tan. Matsuura further explained that the transfer of the shareholdings covered by the
subject Deed of Trust was a result of Tan's offer to compromise the intra-corporate dispute. He insisted that it was
Tan who caused the notarization of the deed, as this was a condition for Matsuura's acceptance of the
compromise.
For her defense, Tanjutco argued that Tan's admission of having pre-signed the subject deed only proved that he
had willingly assigned his shares in TF Ventures, Inc. to Matsuura.
On July 13, 1998, the OCP dismissed the complaints against Matsuura, Tanjutco and Cua for lack of probable cause.
Tan's motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting him to file a petition for review with the Department of
Justice (DOJ) which DOJ denied for lack of evidence.
Undaunted, Tan filed a motion for reconsideration, which was granted by then Acting Secretary of Justice Ma.
Merceditas N. Gutierrez in a Resolution dated July 1, 2004.
The respondents moved for reconsideration. On April 4, 2005, then DOJ Undersecretary Ernesto L. Pineda, signing
on behalf of the Secretary of Justice, issued a resolution affirming the presence of probable cause against
Matsuura and Tanjutco, but ordering the exclusion of Cua from the filing of information.
Matsuura and Tanjutco filed with the CA the petition for certiorari. Cua also file a petition. The CA granted both
petitions questioning the Secretary of Justice's resolutions.
Tan's motion for reconsideration for both petitions was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in taking cognizance of the two petitions filed before it, assuming the role of a
reviewing authority of the Secretary of Justice.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
RULING:
Petitioner contends that the CA should not have taken cognizance of the petitions for certiorari filed before it
because criminal proceedings shall not be restrained once probable cause has been determined and the
corresponding information has been filed in courts. Citing jurisprudence, Tan argues that the institution of a
criminal action in court depends upon the sound discretion of the prosecutor.
The Court remains mindful of the established principle that the determination of probable cause is essentially an
executive function that is lodged with the public prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice. However, equally settled
is the rule that courts retain the power to review findings of prosecutors in preliminary investigations, although in
a mere few exceptional cases showing grave abuse of discretion.
Judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution covers the courts' power to determine whether
there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by any branch or
instrumentality of the government in the discharge of its functions. Although policy considerations call for the
widest latitude of deference to the prosecutors' findings, courts should not shirk from exercising their power,
when the circumstances warrant, determining whether the prosecutors' findings are supported by the facts or by
the law. In so doing, courts do not act as prosecutors but as organs of the judiciary that are exercising their
mandate under the Constitution, relevant statutes, and remedial rules to settle cases and controversies. Indeed,
the exercise of the courts' review power ensures that, on the one hand, probable criminals are prosecuted and, on
the other hand, the innocent are spared from baseless prosecution.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
HENRY R. GIRON, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent,
ALMARIO E. FRANCISCO, FEDERICO S. JONG JR., and RICARDO L. BAES JR., Petitioners-in-Intervention.
G.R. No. 188179, January 22, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner Henry Giron (Giron) and petitioners-in-intervention assail the constitutionality of Section 12(Substitution
of Candidates) and Section 14 (Repealing Clause) of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9006. He asserts that the insertion of
Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which
specifically requires: "Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in
the title thereof." Petitioner avers that these provisions are unrelated to the main subject of the Fair Election Act:
the lifting of the political ad ban. Section 12 refers to the treatment of the votes cast for substituted candidates
after the official ballots have been printed, while Section 14 pertains to the repeal of Section 67 (Candidates
holding elective office) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code. Section 67 of
this law concerns the ipso facto resignation of elective officials immediately after they file their respective
certificates of candidacy for an office other than that which they are currently holding in a permanent capacity.
On the other hand, respondent Jose Melo, then chairperson of the COMELEC, opposes the Petition and
argues inter alia that this Court has already resolved the matter in Fariñas v. Executive Secretary.
Almario E. Francisco, Federico S. Jong Jr., and Ricardo L. Baes Jr. filed their respective petitions-in-
[2]
intervention, which essentially reiterated the ratiocinations of Giron.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the inclusion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution, or the "one subject-one title" rule.
RULING:
It is a well-settled rule that courts are to adopt a liberal interpretation in favor of the constitutionality of
legislation, as Congress is deemed to have enacted a valid, sensible, and just law. Because of this strong
presumption, the one who asserts the invalidity of a law has to prove that there is a clear, unmistakable, and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution; otherwise, the petition must fail.
The Court finds that the present case fails to present a compelling reason that would surpass the strong
presumption of validity and constitutionality in favor of the Fair Election Act.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed
as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its
title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive
enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and
every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set
forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.
Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its
title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment
into law of matters which have not received the notice, action and study of the legislators and the public. In this
case, it cannot be claimed that the legislators were not apprised of the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code as the same was amply and comprehensively deliberated upon by the members of the House.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY, Represented by Officer-In-Charge Dr. Rodrigo L. Malunhao, Petitioner

vs.
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE CHAIRPERSON AND COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, and THE LEAD CONVENOR OF THE NATIONAL ANTI-POVERTY COMMISSION,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 184869, September 21, 2010
FACTS:
Petitioner Central Mindanao University (CMU) is a chartered educational institution owned and run by the State. In
1958, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 476, reserving 3,401 hectares of lands of the public domain in
Musuan, Bukidnon, as school site for CMU. Eventually, CMU obtained title in its name over 3,080 hectares of those
lands under Original Certificates of Title (OCTs) 0-160, 0-161, and 0-162. Meanwhile, the government distributed
more than 300 hectares of the remaining untitled lands to several tribes belonging to the areas cultural
communities.
On January 7, 2003 President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 310 that takes 670
hectares from CMUs registered lands for distribution to indigenous peoples and cultural communities in Barangay
Musuan, Maramag, Bukidnon.
On April 3, 2003, however, CMU filed a petition for prohibition against respondents Executive Secretary, Secretary
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Chairperson and Commissioner of the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), and Lead Convenor of the National Anti-Poverty Commission
(collectively, NCIP, et al) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay City (Branch 9), seeking to stop the
implementation of Presidential Proclamation 310 and have it declared unconstitutional.
The NCIP, et al moved to dismiss the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Malaybalay RTC over the
action, pointing out that since the act sought to be enjoined relates to an official act of the Executive Department
done in Manila, jurisdiction lies with the Manila RTC. The Malaybalay RTC denied the motion, however, and
proceeded to hear CMUs application for preliminary injunction. Meanwhile, respondents NCIP, et al moved for
partial reconsideration of the RTCs order denying their motion to dismiss.
On October 27, 2003, after hearing the preliminary injunction incident, the RTC issued a resolution granting
NCIP, et als motion for partial reconsideration and dismissed CMUs action for lack of jurisdiction.
CA dismissed CMUs appeal for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that CMUs recourse should have been a petition for
review on certiorari filed directly with this Court, because it raised pure questions law bearing mainly on the
constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation 310.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in not finding that the RTC erred in dismissing its action for prohibition against
NCIP, et al for lack of jurisdiction and at the same time ruling that Presidential Proclamation 310 is valid and
constitutional;
2. Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed CMUs appeal on the ground that it raised purely questions of law
that are proper for a petition for review filed directly with this Court;
RULING:
1. The RTC invoked two reasons for dismissing CMUs action. The first is that jurisdiction over the action to declare
Presidential Proclamation 310 lies with the RTC of Manila, not the RTC of Malaybalay City, given that such action
relates to official acts of the Executive done in Manila. The second reason, presumably made on the assumption
that the Malaybalay RTC had jurisdiction over the action, Presidential Proclamation 310 was valid and
constitutional since the State, as ultimate owner of the subject lands, has the right to dispose of the same for some
purpose other than CMUs use.
There is nothing essentially wrong about a court holding on the one hand that it has no jurisdiction over a case,
and on the other, based on an assumption that it has jurisdiction, deciding the case on its merits, both with the
same results, which is the dismissal of the action. At any rate, the issue of the propriety of the RTC using two
incompatible reasons for dismissing the action is academic. The CA from which the present petition was brought
dismissed CMUs appeal on some technical ground.
2. Section 9(3) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 vests in the CA appellate jurisdiction over the final
judgments or orders of the RTCs and quasi-judicial bodies. But where an appeal from the RTC raises purely
questions of law, recourse should be by a petition for review on certiorari filed directly with this Court. The
question in this case is whether or not CMUs appeal from the RTCs order of dismissal raises purely questions of
law.
As already stated, CMU raised two grounds for its appeal: 1) the RTC deprived it of its right to due process when it
dismissed the action; and 2) Presidential Proclamation 310 was constitutional. Did these grounds raise factual
issues that are proper for the CA to hear and adjudicate?
Regarding the first reason, CMUs action was one for injunction against the implementation of Presidential
Proclamation 310 that authorized the taking of lands from the university. The fact that the President issued this
proclamation in Manila and that it was being enforced in Malaybalay City where the lands were located were facts
that were not in issue. These were alleged in the complaint and presumed to be true by the motion to
dismiss. Consequently, the CMUs remedy for assailing the correctness of the dismissal, involving as it did a pure
question of law, indeed lies with this Court.
As to the second reason, the CMU claimed that the Malaybalay RTC deprived it of its right to due process when it
dismissed the case based on the ground that Presidential Proclamation 310, which it challenged, was
constitutional. CMU points out that the issue of the constitutionality of the proclamation had not yet been
properly raised and heard NCIP, et al had not yet filed an answer to join issue with CMU on that score. What
NCIP, et al filed was merely a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Malaybalay RTC over
the injunction case. Whether the RTC in fact prematurely decided the constitutionality of the proclamation,
resulting in the denial of CMUs right to be heard on the same, is a factual issue that was proper for the CA
Mindanao Station to hear and ascertain from the parties. Consequently, the CA erred in dismissing the action on
the ground that it raised pure questions of law.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
JOSEFA S. ABALOS* AND THE DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONERS,

VS.
SPS. LOMANTONG DARAPA AND SINAB DIMAKUTA, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 164693, March 23, 2011
FACTS:
On 25 June 1962, petitioner DBP, Ozamis Branch, granted a P31,000.00 loan to respondent spouses Lomantong
Darapa and Sinab Dimakuta (spouses) who executed therefore a real and chattel mortgage contract, which
covered a warehouse to house the rice and corn mill.
The equity rights, participation and interest of the mortgagors in said parcel of land are not registered under the
Spanish Mortgage Law nor under Act 496 and the parties hereto hereby agree that this instrument shall be
registered under Act 3344.
It is further the agreement of the parties that immediately after the mortgagors acquire absolute ownership of the
land above-mentioned on which the aforementioned building is erected by means of a free or sales patent or any
other title vesting them with ownership in fee simple, the Mortgagors shall execute a Real Estate Mortgage
thereon in favor of the Mortgagee, the Development Bank of the Philippines, to replace and substitute only, this
portion of the herein mortgage contract.
The assignment of the spouses' equity rights over the land covered by Tax Declaration No. A-148 in DBP's favor
was embedded in the Deed of Assignment of Rights and Interests which the spouses executed simultaneous with
the real and chattel mortgage contract.
In 1970, the spouses applied for the renewal and increase of their loan using Sinab Dimakuta's (Dimakuta) Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-1,997 as additional collateral. The DBP disapproved the loan application without
returning, however, Dimakuta's TCT.
When the spouses failed to pay their loan, DBP extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgages on 16 September 1971,
which, unknown to the spouses, included the TCT No. T-1,997. In 1984, the spouses discovered all these and they
immediately consulted a lawyer who forthwith sent a demand letter to the bank for the reconveyance of the
land. The bank assured them of the return of the land. In 1994, however, a bank officer told them that such is no
longer possible as the land has already been bought by Abalos.
On 20 August 1994, the spouses filed with the RTC of Iligan City, a Complaint for Annulment of Title, Recovery of
Possession and Damages, against DBP and Abalos.
The spouses averred that TCT No. T-1,997 was not one of the mortgaged properties, and, thus, its foreclosure by
DBP and its eventual sale to Abalos was null and void.
On the other hand, DBP countered that TCT No. T-1,997 had its roots in Tax Declaration No. A-148, which the
spouses mortgaged with the DBP in 1962 as evidenced by the Real Estate Mortgage and the Deed of Assignment.
Abalos, on her part, contended that she was an innocent purchaser for value who relied in good faith on the
cleanliness of the DBP's Title.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
The RTC, in a Decision dated 29 November 2000, annulled the DBP's foreclosure sale of the land under TCT No. T-
1,997 and its sale to Abalos; further, it declared Dimakuta as the land's lawful owner.
The DBP and Abalos assailed the RXC decision before the Court of Appeals; Abalos, however, later abandoned her
appeal.
The Court of Appeals denied the petition. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the the RTC and CA erred in finding that the DBP's foreclosure sale of the land under TCT No. T-
1,997 was null and void.
RULING:
It is fundamental procedural law that a petition for review on certiorari filed with this Court under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure shall, as a general rule, raise only questions of law.
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts - this is in
contradistinction from a question of fact which arises from doubt as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. A
question of law does not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants
or any of them and the resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of
circumstances.
The DBP's insistence that TCT No. T-1,997 is the same land covered by Tax Declaration No. A-148 is to ask the Court
to evaluate the pieces of evidence passed upon by the RTC and the Court of Appeals. To grant this petition will
entail the Court's review and determination of the weight, credence, and probative value of the evidence
presented at the trial court-matters which, without doubt, are factual and, therefore, outside the ambit of Rule 45.
Petitioners ought to remember that the Court of Appeals' factual findings, affirming that of the trial court, are final
and conclusive on this Court and may not be reviewed on appeal, except for the most compelling of reasons, such
as when: (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on
which the factual findings are based; (7) the findings of absence of facts are contradicted by the presence of
evidence on record; (8) the fin dings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (9) the Court of
Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion; (10) the findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such
findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties. None of the exceptions is present in this petition.
In any event, we have meticulously reviewed the case's records and found no reason to disturb the findings of the
RTC as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The records reveal that the land covered by TCT No. T-1,997 was not
among the properties, the spouses mortgaged with the DBP in 1962.
Needless to say, the bank utterly failed to establish, by preponderance of evidence, that TCT No. T-1,997 originated
from Tax Declaration No. A-148.Thus, we find no reversible error in the RTC and the Court of Appeals findings that
the DBP's foreclosure sale of the land under TCT No. T-1,997 was null and void.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Petitioner,
Vs.
THI THU THUY T. DE GUZMAN, Respondent.
G.R. No. 175021 June 15, 2011
FACTS:
De Guzman is the proprietress of Montaguz General Merchandise (MGM), a contractor accredited by the PNP for
the supply of office and construction materials and equipment, and for the delivery of various services.
On December 8, 1995, the PNP Engineering Services (PNPES), released a Requisition and Issue Voucher for the
acquisition of various building materials amounting to P2,288,562.60.
Respondent averred that on December 11, 1995, MGM and petitioner, represented by the PNP, through its chief,
executed a Contract of Agreement wherein MGM, for the price of P2,288,562.60, undertook to procure and deliver
to the PNP the construction materials itemized in the purchase order attached to the Contract. Respondent
claimed that after the PNP Chief approved the Contract and purchase order MGM proceeded with the delivery of
the construction materials.
On November 5, 1997, the respondent, through counsel, sent a letter dated October 20, 1997 to the PNP,
demanding the payment of P2,288,562.60 for the construction materials MGM procured for the PNP under their
December 1995 Contract.
On November 17, 1997, the PNP, through its Officer-in-Charge, replied to respondents counsel, informing her of
the payment made to MGM via Land Bank of the Philippines. Respondent responded by reiterating her demand
and denying having ever received the LBP check, personally or through an authorized person. On May 5, 1999,
respondent filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against the petitioner.The petitioner filed a Motion to Dismisson
July 5, 1999, on the ground that the claim or demand set forth in respondents complaint had already been paid or
extinguished.
After conducting hearings on the Motion to Dismiss, the RTC issued an Order on May 4, 2001, denying the
]
petitioners motion for lack of merit. The petitioner thereafter filed its Answer, wherein it restated the same
allegations in its Motion to Dismiss.
On September 3, 2002, Atty. Norman Bueno, petitioners counsel at that time ADMITS the allegation in paragraph 9
of the Complaint that [respondent] delivered to the PNP Engineering Service the construction materials. It also
ADMITS the existence of Receipt Nos. 151, 152 and 153 alleged in the same paragraph.
On September 8, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of respondent and against petitioner ordering the
latter to pay P2,226,147.26. The petitioner appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with
modification the RTCs ruling on September 27, 2006
ISSUES:

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
WON the RTC and CA erred in upholding the the validity of the contract between the petitioner and the
respondent on the strength of the documentary evidence presented.
RULING:
The Court has, on many occasions, distinguished between a question of law and a question of fact. It held that
when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, then it is a question of law; but when the
doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts, then it is a question of fact. Simply put, when there is no
dispute as to fact, the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct, is a question of law.
One test to determine if there exists a question of fact or law in a given case is whether the Court can resolve the
issue that was raised without having to review or evaluate the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law;
otherwise, it will be a question of fact. Thus, the petition must not involve the calibration of the probative value of
the evidence presented. In addition, the facts of the case must be undisputed, and the only issue that should be
left for the Court to decide is whether or not the conclusion drawn by the CA from a certain set of facts was
appropriate.
In this case, the circumstances surrounding the controversial LBP check are central to the issue before us, the
resolution of which will require a perusal of the entire records of the case including the transcribed testimonies of
the witnesses. Since this is an appeal via certiorari, questions of fact are not reviewable. As a rule, the findings of
fact of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and the Court will only review them under the following
recognized exceptions: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there
is a grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures;
(4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact
are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the
same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals
are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (10) when the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the
evidence on record.
Since the petitioner has not shown this Court that this case falls under any of the enumerated exceptions to the
rule, the court is constrained to uphold the facts as established by both the RTC and the Court of Appeals, and,
consequently, the conclusions reached in the appealed decision.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
GUILLERMO E. CUA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
G.R. No. 166847, November 16, 2011
FACTS:
On June 29, 1994, a regular audit was conducted on the cash account and accountable forms of petitioner, then a
Revenue Collection Agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) in Olongapo City.
Remedios Soto (Soto), resident Auditor of the BIR in San Fernando, Pampanga, assigned two of her staff members,
Alfredo Malonzo (Malonzo) and Virginia Santos (Santos), to examine the cash account inventory of accountable
forms, cash book and transactions of petitioner from December 2, 1993 to June 29, 1994.
The initial findings of said audit, based on the documents and cash produced by petitioner, revealed no cash
shortage on his account. The accountable forms consisting of Revenue Official Receipts and the documentary
stamps were complete and intact. Based on petitioner's cash book, all his collections were remitted to the
Philippine National Bank (PNB). The total amount of P340,950.37, for which petitioner was accountable, appeared
to have been deposited at the PNB, Olongapo City Branch, as evidenced by the deposit slips and official receipts
issued by the PNB.
As part of the examination process, however, a confirmation from the government depository bank is required to
verify the initial audit. Thus, on July 14, 1994, Soto sent a letter-request to PNB, requesting confirmation or
verification of the authenticity of the official receipts and deposit slips .In a reply dated August 24, 1994, PNB
returned the letter-request with a notation that the amounts stated in three of the official receipts did not tally
with their records, that the official receipt numbers should be specified to facilitate verification of the other
deposit slips, and that petitioner had not made any deposit from June 8 to 27, 1994.
Soto proceeded to the PNB to discuss the matter with Florida Francisco (Francisco), the State Auditor assigned at
the Olongapo City Branch, who checked and verified the official receipts and deposit slips presented by petitioner.
In his Letter-reply dated February 17, 1994, addressed to Soto, Felixberto De Guzman (De Guzman), Department
Manager of the PNB Olongapo City Branch, detailed the discrepancies in the amounts stated in the actual receipts
in the possession of the PNB and the amounts stated in the receipts.
Soto prepared a letter of demand dated August 23, 1994, which contained a summary of the discrepancies as
noted by the PNB, and disclosed that petitioner had incurred a cash shortage amounting to P291,783.00. Soto then
requested petitioner to come to her office to personally receive the demand letter.
[20]
Petitioner then wrote a reply letter dated August 23, 1994, addressed to the resident auditor, admitting his cash
shortage purportedly to get even with the BIR which failed to promote him but promised to pay the amount as
soon as possible.
Thereafter, a special arrangement was made between the BIR and petitioner, wherein the BIR would withhold the
salary of petitioner and apply the same to the shortage incurred until full payment of the accountability was made.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
Notwithstanding, the Information dated March 6, 1996, was filed against petitioner before the RTC. Upon
arraignment on August 9, 1996, petitioner pleaded not guilty.
During trial, the prosecution presented Soto, Santos, Francisco, and Dolores Robles as its witnesses. Petitioner, on
the other hand, did not take the witness stand, and opted instead to submit documentary evidence showing that
he had paid for the shortage by means of deductions from his salary in the total amount of P291,783.00.
Giving credence to the evidence of the prosecution, and finding that payment of the amount malversed was not a
defense, the RTC convicted petitioner and founded the accused Guillermo Cua guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Violation of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code for Malversation of Public Funds. of Reclusion
Temporal and to suffer perpetual special disqualification to hold public office.
On appeal to the CA, it denied the appeal with modification.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING:
Yes. At the outset, it should be stressed that in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only
questions of law may be raised. Thus, questions of fact are not reviewable. It is not the Court's function to analyze
or weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below, its jurisdiction being limited to
reviewing only errors of law that may have been committed by the lower court. As such, a question of law must
not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants. The resolution of
factual issues is the function of lower courts, whose findings on these matters are accorded respect.
A question of law exists when the doubt centers on what the law is on a certain set of facts. A question of fact
exists when the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. There is a question of law if the issue
raised is capable of being resolved without need of reviewing the probative value of the evidence. Thus, the issue
to be resolved must be limited to determining what the law is on a certain set of facts. Once the issue invites a
review of the evidence, the question posed is one of fact.
Petitioner raises the sole issue that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the
ground that the evidence shows that he did not incur a shortage of ?291,783.00. He argues that as an exception to
the rule that factual findings and conclusions of the CA are binding on this Court, the CA plainly overlooked certain
facts of substance and value which, if considered, would alter the result of the case.
The Court disagrees.
The resolution of the issue raised by petitioner necessarily requires the re-evaluation of the evidence presented by
both parties. This is precisely a question of fact proscribed under Rule 45. Petitioner has failed to establish that the
present case falls under any of the exceptionsto said rule. On the other hand, the factual findings of the RTC were
affirmed by the CA, and as such, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. On this ground
alone, the petition must be denied.
Nonetheless, even granting that the present case falls under one of the exceptions, the petition should still be
denied.
Considering that the factual findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, were supported by the evidence on record,
all the elements of the crime of malversation of public funds were thus duly proven beyond reasonable doubt.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
NANCY T. LORZANO, Petitioner,

vs.
JUAN TABAYAG, JR., Respondent
G.R. No. 189647, February 06, 2012
FACTS:
The instant case stemmed from an amended complaint for annulment of document and reconveyance filed by
Juan Tabayag, Jr. (respondent) against the petitioner. The petitioner and the respondent are two of the children of
the late Juan Tabayag (Tabayag) who died on June 2, 1992. Tabayag owned a parcel of land situated in Sto.
Domingo, Iriga City (subject property). Right after the burial of their father, the petitioner allegedly requested from
her siblings that she be allowed to take possession of and receive the income generated by the subject property
until after her eldest son could graduate from college. The petitioner’s siblings acceded to the said request.
After the petitioner’s eldest son finished college, her siblings asked her to return to them the possession of the
subject property so that they could partition it among themselves. However, the petitioner refused to relinquish
her possession of the subject property claiming that she purchased the subject property from their father as
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property executed by the latter on May 25, 199.
The respondent alleged that the petitioner purposely forged the signature of Tabayag in the said deed of sale to
deprive him and their other siblings of their share in the subject property. For her part, the petitioner maintained
she is the owner of the subject parcel of land having purchased the same from Tabayag as evidenced by the May
25, 1992 deed of sale. Further, the petitioner asserted that the respondent failed to establish that the signature of
Tabayag appearing on the said deed of sale was a forgery considering that it was not submitted for examination by
a handwriting expert. RTC rendered an amended decision declaring the supposed Deed of Sale null and void and of
no legal effect and ordering the petitioner to reconvey to the heirs of the late Juan Tabayag, Sr. the land subject
matter of this case. The CA rendered the assailed decision affirming in toto the RTC decision.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the lower courts erred in declaring the May 25, 1992 deed of sale a nullity.
RULING:
Primarily, Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court categorically states that the petition filed shall raise only
questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the
law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of
the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value
of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the
law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence
presented, the question posed is one of fact.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
That the signature of Tabayag in the May 25, 1992 deed of sale was a forgery is a conclusion derived by the RTC
and the CA on a question of fact. The same is conclusive upon this Court as it involves the truth or falsehood of an
alleged fact, which is a matter not for this Court to resolve. Where a petitioner casts doubt on the findings of the
lower court as affirmed by the CA regarding the existence of forgery is a question of fact.
In any case, the CA aptly ruled that a handwriting expert is not indispensable to prove that the signature of
Tabayag in the questioned deed of sale was indeed a forgery. It is true that the opinion of handwriting experts are
not necessarily binding upon the court, the expert's function being to place before the court data upon which the
court can form its own opinion. Resort to these experts is not mandatory or indispensable to the examination or
the comparison of handwriting. A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies of handwriting
experts, because the judge must conduct an independent examination of the questioned signature in order to
arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Petitioner,

vs.
ROSA REYES, CENANDO, REYES and CARLOS REYES, Respondents
G.R. No. 194247, June 19, 2013
FACTS:
On February 13, 2007, petitioner filed a complaint before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. DH-1136-07, seeking
to expropriate 308 square meters of a parcel of land located in Barangay San Ramon, Dinalupihan, Bataan,
registered in the name of respondent Rosa Reyes (Rosa) under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. CLOA-10265,
in view of the construction of the Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway (SCTEx). It claimed that the said property is an
irrigated riceland with a zonal value of ₱20.00 per square meter, based on the relevant zonal valuation of the
6
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). Consequently, pursuant to Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. 8974 (RA 8974),
petitioner deposited the amount of ₱6,120.00, representing 100% of the zonal value of the same.
Similar complaints for expropriation, docketed as Civil Case Nos. DH-1137-07 and DH-1138-07, were also filed over
the 156 and 384 square meter portions of certain parcels of land owned by respondents Cenando Reyes (Cenando)
and Carlos Reyes (Carlos), respectively, for which petitioner deposited the sums of ₱3,120.00 and ₱7,680.00 also in
accordance with Section 4(a) of RA 8974.
In their separate Answers, respondents uniformly alleged that while they had no objection to petitioner’s right to
expropriate, they claimed that the amount of just compensation which petitioner offered was ridiculously low
considering that the subject properties were already re-classified into residential lots as early as October 6, 2003
and as such, their zonal value ranged from ₱3,000.00 to ₱6,000.00 per square meter, as determined by the BIR.
Nevertheless, to expedite the proceedings, respondents expressed that they were amenable to be paid the rate of
₱3,000.00 per square meter, at the lowest, translating to ₱924,000.00 for Rosa, ₱468,000.00 for Cenando and
₱1,152,000.00 for Carlos.
The three (3) cases were subsequently consolidated as per the RTC’s Order dated May 23, 2007 and a writ of
possession was granted in petitioner’s favor on December 12, 2007.
19
Meanwhile, on April 27, 2007, respondents filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (motion for summary
judgment), contending that there were no genuine issues left for resolution, except for the amount of damages to
be paid as just compensation.
In opposition, petitioner argued that Rule 35 of the Rules of Court on summary judgment applies only to ordinary
civil actions for recovery of money claims and not to expropriation cases. Moreover, it claimed that the mandatory
constitution of a panel of commissioners for the purpose of ascertaining the amount of just compensation due
under Section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court precludes a summary judgment.
In turn, respondents filed a Reply, asserting that Rule 35 of the Rules of Court applies to both ordinary and special
civil actions.
On November 27, 2007, the RTC issued an Order, granting the motion for summary judgment and thereby ordered
petitioner to pay respondents just compensation at the rate of ₱3,000.00 per square meter, for a total of

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
₱924,000.00 for Rosa, ₱1,152,000.00 for Carlos and ₱468,000.00 for Cenando. On May 7, 2010, the CA rendered a
Resolution, dismissing petitioner’s appeal for being the wrong mode to assail the RTC’s summary judgment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing petitioner’s appeal.
RULING:
Jurisprudence dictates that there is a "question of law" when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is
on a certain set of facts or circumstances; on the other hand, there is a "question of fact" when the issue raised on
appeal pertains to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. The test for determining whether the supposed error
was one of "law" or "fact" is not the appellation given by the parties raising the same; rather, it is whether the
reviewing court can resolve the issues raised without evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law;
35
otherwise, it is one of fact. In other words, where there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of whether or
36
not the conclusions drawn from these facts are correct is a question of law. However, if the question posed
requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances
and their relationship to each other, the issue is factual.
Applying these principles, the Court finds that the CA did not err in dismissing petitioner’s appeal. Records show
that petitioner raised four (4) issues in its appeal before the CA:
First, whether or not summary judgment was properly rendered by the RTC; Second, whether or not there is any
evidence on record to support the conclusion that the subject lots had already been re-classified from agricultural
to residential; and if in the affirmative, whether or not the same may be considered as "interior lots" which would
necessarily affect its zonal valuation; Third, whether or not the appointment of commissioners is indispensable in
an expropriation case; and Fourth, whether or not the properties of Cenando and Rosa Reyes overlap that of the
Philippine National Bank.
At the outset, it bears to note that the second and fourth issues were not raised by petitioner in its opposition to
39
respondents’ motion for summary judgment but only in its motion for reconsideration from the RTC’s Order
dated November 27, 2007. It has been consistently held that appellate courts are precluded from entertaining
matters neither alleged nor raised during the proceedings below, but ventilated for the first time only in a motion
for reconsideration or on appeal. Thus, while these issues may be classified as questions of fact since their
resolution would require an evaluation of the evidence on record, the CA was precluded from considering the
same. Consequently, only the first and third issues were left for its determination.
Unlike the second and fourth issues, the first and third issues can be properly classified as questions of law since
their resolution would not involve an examination of the evidence but only an application of the law on a particular
set of facts.
To elucidate, the first issue regarding the propriety of the RTC’s summary judgment involves only a question of law
since one need not evaluate the evidence on record to assess if the unresolved issues in this case, i.e., the
classification of the properties expropriated, its location and valuation, constitute genuine issues. This is in line
with the rule that a summary judgment is not warranted when there are genuine issues which call for a full blown
trial. Similarly, the third issue concerning the propriety of the appointment of a panel of commissioners only
requires an application of Section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, without the need of examining the evidence on
record. Thus, given that the issues to be resolved on appeal only involve questions of law, no reversible error was
committed by the CA in dismissing petitioner’s appeal. The proper recourse should have been to file a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018

vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., Respondents
G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012
FACTS:
In 1994, instead of having only 7 members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two representatives from
Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each
having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to
allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis
Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as
representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents
argued that the crux of the controversy is the phrase “a representative of Congress.” It is their theory that the two
houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory components of “Congress,”
such that the absence of either divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution.
Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective powers
in the performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution speaks of “a representative from Congress,” it should mean one representative each from both
Houses which comprise the entire Congress.
ISSUE:
WON the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been met.
RULING:
Yes. The Courts’ power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, namely: (a) there must be an actual case
or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have “standing” to
challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Generally, a party
will be allowed to litigate only when these conditions sine qua non are present, especially when the
constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch of government is put in issue.
The Court disagrees with the respondents’ contention that petitioner lost his standing to sue because he is not an
official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a “personal stake” on the case is imperative to
have locus standi, this is not to say that only official nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court
and question the JBC composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and nominates other
members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the JBC’s duty is not at all limited to the
nominations for the highest magistrate in the land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all over the country
may be affected by the Court’s ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very process of nominations to the
positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy. The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and
unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the
right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., Petitioners,

vs.
FORNIER, respondents
G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004
FACTS:
On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his certificate of
candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang
Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the 2004 national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of
birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Victorino X. Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9
January 2004, a petition (SPA 04-003) before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny
due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in
his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his
parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish
national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a
Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of
an alien mother. On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 for lack of merit. 3 days later, or on 26
January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 6 February 2004 by the
COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, Fornier assailed the decision of the COMELEC before the Supreme Court
conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition likewise
prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay
the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions. The other petitions, later include challenging the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution,
only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.
HELD:
Petitioners invoke the provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post election scenario. Election contests consist of
either an election protest or a quo warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in
view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from office. The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the
tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally
defined as being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public
office. In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a
registered candidate who would have received either the second or third highest number of votes could file an
election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for
the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
LOREN B. LEGARDA, Protestant,

vs.
NOLI L. DE CASTRO, Protestee
P.E.T. Case No. 003, January 18, 2008
FACTS:
Loren B. Legarda filed an election protest against Noli L. de Castro before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET).
De Castro filed a motion for its outright dismissal but the PET confirmed its jurisdiction over the protest. De Castro
filed a motion for reconsideration assailing the PET resolution. He argues that where the correctness of the
number of votes is the issue, the best evidence are the ballots; that the process of correcting the manifest errors in
the certificates of canvass or election returns is a function of the canvassing bodies; that once the canvassing
bodies had done their functions, no alteration or correction of manifest errors can be made; that since the
authority of the Tribunal involves an exercise of judicial power to determine the facts based on the evidence
presented and to apply the law based on the established facts, it cannot perform the ministerial function of
canvassing election returns; that the averments contained in the protest are mere conclusions of law which are
inadequate to form a valid cause of action; and that the allegations are not supported by facts. He also contends
that the Tribunal cannot correct the manifest errors on the statements of votes (SOV) and certificates of canvass
(COC).
ISSUES:
1. Can the PET correct the manifest errors in the SOV and COC?
2. Is there a need to resort to revision of ballots?
3. Was the election protest sufficient in form and substance?
HELD:
1. The constitutional function as well as the power and the duty to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualification of the President and Vice-President is expressly vested in the PET, in Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution. Included therein is the duty to correct manifest errors in the SOVs and COCs.
2. We agree that the ballots are the best and most conclusive evidence in an election contest where the
correctness of the number of votes of each candidate is involved. However, we do not find any reason to resort to
revision in the first part of the protest, considering that the protestant concedes the correctness of the ballot
results, concerning the number of votes obtained by both protestant and protestee, and reflected in the election
returns. Protestant merely seeks the correction of manifest errors, that is, errors in the process of different levels
of transposition and addition of votes. Revision of ballots in case of manifest errors, in these circumstances, might
only cause unwarranted delay in the proceedings.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
3. In the instant protest, protestant enumerated all the provinces, municipalities and cities where she questions all
the results in all the precincts therein. The protest here is sufficient in form and substantively, serious enough on
its face to pose a challenge to protestee's title to his office. The instant protest consists of alleged ultimate facts,
not mere conclusions of law, that need to be proven in due time.
Considering that we find the protest sufficient in form and substance, we must again stress that nothing as yet has
been proved as to the veracity of the allegations. The protest is only sufficient for the Tribunal to proceed and give
the protestant the opportunity to prove her case pursuant to Rule 61 of the PET Rules. Although said rule only
pertains to revision of ballots, nothing herein prevents the Tribunal from allowing or including the correction of
manifest errors, pursuant to the Tribunals rule-making power under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, Petitioner

vs.
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, Respondent
G.R. No. 191618, June 7, 2011
FACTS:
Par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: “The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose.”
Sec. 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established
by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
The case at bar is a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the SC’s decision dismissing the former’s
petition and declaring the establishment of the respondent PET as constitutional.
Petitioner argues that PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution does not provide
for the creation of the PET, and it violates Sec 12, Art VIII of the Constitution.
The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on firm footing on the basis of the grant of
authority to the Supreme Court to be the sole judge of all election contests for the President or Vice-President
under par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PET is constitutional.
Whether or not PET exercises quasi-judicial power.
HELD:
Yes. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional Commission to a Presidential Electoral Tribunal,
with Fr. Joaquin Bernas categorically declaring that in crafting the last paragraph of Sec. 4, Art VII of the 1987
Constitution, they “constitutionalized what was statutory.” Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the
same Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed
by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and vice-presidential
elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it into effect.
No. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that
the power “shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.” The set
up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterize the resolution of electoral contests as essentially an

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
exercise of judicial power. When the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election
contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power.
The COMELEC, HRET and SET are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of law, they
are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power,
because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and
Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIWASA MANUFACTURING, INC., respondents
G.R. No. 110571, March 10, 1994
FACTS:
Petitioner assailed the conflicting provisions of B.P. 129, EO 226 (Art. 82) and a circular, 1-91 issued by the
Supreme Court which deals with the jurisdiction of courts for appeal of cases decided by quasi-judicial agencies
such as the Board of Investments (BOI).
BOI granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s application to amend its BOI certificate of registration by
changing the scope of its registered product from "glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic tiles." Oppositor Mariwasa filed a
motion for reconsideration of the said BOI decision while oppositor Fil-Hispano Ceramics, Inc. did not move to
reconsider the same nor appeal therefrom. Soon rebuffed in its bid for reconsideration, Mariwasa filed a petition
for review with CA. CA temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its decision. The TRO lapsed by its own
terms twenty (20) days after its issuance, without respondent court issuing any preliminary injunction.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and to lift the restraining order contending that CA does not have jurisdiction
over the BOI case, since the same is exclusively vested with the Supreme Court pursuant to Article 82 of the
Omnibus Investments Code of 1987. Petitioner argued that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or B.P. 129
and Circular 1-91, "Prescribing the Rules Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals from a Final Order or Decision
of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies" cannot be the basis of Mariwasa's appeal to respondent
court because the procedure for appeal laid down therein runs contrary to Article 82 of E.O. 226, which provides
that appeals from decisions or orders of the BOI shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court.
While Mariwasa maintains that whatever inconsistency there may have been between B.P. 129 and Article 82 of
E.O. 226 on the question of venue for appeal, has already been resolved by Circular 1-91 of the Supreme Court,
which was promulgated on February 27, 1991 or four (4) years after E.O. 226 was enacted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the case.
RULING:
YES. The fact that BOI is not expressly included in the list of quasi-judicial agencies found in the third sentence of
Section 1 of Circular 1-91 does not mean that said circular does not apply to appeals from final orders or decision
of the BOI. The second sentence of Section 1 thereof expressly states that "(T)hey shall also apply to appeals from
final orders or decisions of any quasi-judicial agency from which an appeal is now allowed by statute to the Court
of Appeals or the Supreme Court." E.O. 266 is one such statute. Besides, the enumeration is preceded by the
words "(A)mong these agencies are . . . ," strongly implying that there are other quasi-judicial agencies which are

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
covered by the Circular but which have not been expressly listed therein. More importantly, BOI does not fall
within the purview of the exclusions listed in Section 2 of the circular. Only the following final decisions and
interlocutory orders are expressly excluded from the circular, namely, those of: (1) the National Labor Relations
Commission; (2) the Secretary of Labor and Employment; (3) the Central Board of Assessment Appeals and (4)
other quasi-judicial agencies from which no appeal to the courts is prescribed or allowed by statute. Since in DBP
13
v. CA we upheld the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the Court of Tax Appeals despite the fact
that the same is not among the agencies reorganized by B.P. 129, on the ground that B.P. 129 is broad and
comprehensive, there is no reason why BOI should be excluded from Circular 1-91, which is but implementary of
said law. Clearly, Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the manner and
method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned. Appeals from decisions of the
BOI, which by statute was previously allowed to be filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now be brought
to the Court of Appeals.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
TERESITA G. FABIAN, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman; HON. JESUS F. GUERRERO, in his capacity as Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon; and NESTOR V. AGUSTIN, Respondents
G.R. No. 129742, November 16, 2011
FACTS:
Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation
(PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business with a certain Nestor Agustin. Agustin was the
incumbent District Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering District (FMED).
Misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between Fabian and Agustin. Fabian tried to terminate
their relationship, but Agustin refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of
harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually filed an administrative case against Agustin which eventually
led an appeal to the Ombudsman but the Ombudsman, Aniano Desierto, inhibited himself. But the case was later
referred to the deputy Ombudsman, Jesus Guerrero.
The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the decision is final and executory. Fabian appealed the case to
the Supreme Court. She averred that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) pertinently
provides that:
In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be
appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the
written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance
with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act is valid.
RULING:
No. It is invalid for it illegally expanded the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Section 27 of RA 6770
cannot validly authorize an appeal to the SC from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a
law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of the SC. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented
to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition. That constitutional provision was intended to give the SC
a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of
legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the SC.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution is clear when it states that the appellate jurisdiction of the SC
contemplated therein is to be exercised over “final judgments and orders of lower courts,” that is, the courts
composing the integrated judicial system. It does not include the quasi-judicial bodies or agencies.
But what is the proper remedy?
Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the Court of
Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial
agencies.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
JUDGE JOSE F. CAOIBES, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN and JUDGE FLORENTINO M. ALUMBRES, Respondents
G.R. No. 132177. July 19, 2001
FACTS:
On May 23, 1997, respondent Florentino M. Alumbres, Presiding Judge of Branch 255 of the Regional Trial Court of
Las Pinas City, filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, a Criminal Complaint for physical injuries, malicious
mischief for the destruction of complainant’s eyeglasses, and assault upon a person in authority. Alumbres alleged
that on May 20, 1997, at the hallway on the third floor of the Hall of Justice, Las Pinas City, he requested petitioner
Judge Caoibes (Presiding Judge of RTC 253) to return the executive table he borrowed from respondent; that
petitioner did not answer so respondent reiterated his request but before he could finish talking, petitioner
blurted "Tarantado ito ah," and boxed him at his right eyebrow and left lower jaw so that the right lens of
his eyeglasses was thrown away, rendering his eyeglasses unserviceable. He prayed that criminal charges be filed
before the Sandiganbayan against the petitioner.
On June 13, 1997, Respondent Judge lodged an administrative case with the SC praying for the dismissal of
petitioner from the judiciary on the ground of grave misconduct or conduct unbecoming a judicial officer using the
same facts as above.
On June 25, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman required petitioner to file a counter-affidavit within 10 days from
receipt thereof. Instead of filing a counter-affidavit, petitioner filed on an "Ex-Parte Motion for Referral to the
Honorable Supreme Court," praying that the Office of the Ombudsman hold its investigation of the case, and refer
the same to the SC which is already investigating the case. Petitioner contended that the SC, not the Office of the
Ombudsman, has the authority to make a preliminary determination of the respective culpability of petitioner and
respondent Judge who, both being members of the bench, are under its exclusive supervision and control.
On August 22, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman denied the motion for referral to the SC stating that
under Section 15 (1) of Republic Act No. 6770, it is within its jurisdiction to investigate on the criminal charges. It
likewise denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman should defer action on the case pending resolution of the
administrative case
RULING:
It appears that the present case involves two members of the judiciary who were entangled in a fight within court
premises over a piece of office furniture. Under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court
which is vested with exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel. Prescinding from this

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
premise, the Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge, or
court employee, involves an administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges
and court personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court for determination as to whether and
administrative aspect is involved therein. This rule should hold true regardless of whether an administrative case
based on the act subject of the complaint before the Ombudsman is already pending with the Court. For, aside
from the fact that the Ombudsman would not know of this matter unless he is informed of it, he should give due
respect for and recognition of the administrative authority of the Court, because in determining whether an
administrative matter is involved, the Court passes upon not only administrative liabilities but also other
administrative concerns, as is clearly conveyed in the case of Maceda vs. Vasquez.
The Ombudsman cannot dictate to, and bind the Court, to its findings that a case before it does or does not have
administrative implications. To do so is to deprive the Court of the exercise of its administrative prerogatives and
to arrogate unto itself a power not constitutionally sanctioned. This is a dangerous policy which impinges, as it
does, on judicial independence.
Maceda is emphatic that by virtue of its constitutional power of administrative supervision over all courts and
court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court
clerk, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and
take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of
government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Ombudsman is hereby directed to dismiss the
complaint filed by respondent Judge Florentino M. Alumbres and to refer the same to this Court for appropriate
action.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
JUDGE RENATO A. FUENTES

vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN-MINDANAO, GRAFT INVESTIGATION OFFICER II, MARIVIC A. TRABAJO-DARAY,
ANTONIO E. VALENZUELA in his capacity as the Director for Fact Finding and Intelligence of the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, and MARGARITO P. GERVACIO, JR., in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman
for Mindanao, Respondents
G.R. NO. 124295, OCTOBER 23, 2001
FACTS:
Pursuant to the government’s plan to construct its first fly-over in Davao City, the Republic of the
Philippines filed an expropriation case against the owners of the properties affected by the project. The
expropriation case was presided by Judge Renato A. Fuentes. The government won the expropriation case. DPWH
still owed the defendants-lot owners. The lower court granted Tessie Amadeo’s motion for the issuance of a writ
of execution against the DPWH to satisfy her unpaid claim. On May 3, 1994, respondent Sheriff Paralisan issued a
Notice of Levy, addressed to the Regional Director of the DPWH, Davao City, describing the properties subject of
the levy as ‘All scrap iron/junks found in the premises of the Department of Public Works and Highways depot at
Panacan, Davao City. The auction sale pushed through and Alex Bacquial emerged as the highest bidder.
Meanwhile, Alex Bacquial, together with respondent Sheriff Paralisan, attempted to withdraw the auctioned
properties on May 19, 1994. They were, however, prevented from doing so by the custodian of the subject DPWH
properties, a certain Engr. Ramon Alejo, who claimed that his office was totally unaware of the auction sale, and
informed the sheriff that many of the properties within the holding area of the depot were still serviceable and
were due for repair and rehabilitation. On the basis of letters from Congressman Manuel M. Garcia of the Second
District of Davao City and Engineer Ramon A. Alejo, the Court Administrator, Supreme Court directed Judge Renato
A. Fuentes and Sheriff Norberto Paralisan to comment on the report recommending the filing of an administrative
case against the sheriff and other persons responsible for the anomalous implementation of the writ of execution.
The Department of Public Works and Highways, through the Solicitor General, filed an administrative complaint
against Sheriff Norberto Paralisan for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao recommended that Judge Renato A. Fuentes be charged before the Sandiganbayan with
violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3 (e) and likewise be administratively charged before the Supreme
Court with acts unbecoming of a judge. Director Valenzuela filed with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Mindanao a criminal complaint charging Judge Rentao A. Fuentes with violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3
(e). Fuentes filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao a motion to dismiss complaint and/or
manifestation to forward all records to the Supreme Court. Petitioner alleged that the respondent Ombudsman-
Mindanao committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he initiated a
criminal complaint against petitioner for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Section 3 [e]. And he conducted an
investigation of said complaint against petitioner. Thus, he encroached on the power of the Supreme Court of
administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel. The Solicitor General submitted that the Ombudsman
may conduct an investigation because the Supreme Court is not in possession of any record which would verify the
propriety of the issuance of the questioned order and writ. Moreover, the Court Administrator has not filed any
administrative case against petitioner judge that would pose similar issues on the present inquiry of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ISSUE:
Whether the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation of acts of a judge in the exercise of his official functions
alleged to be in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in the absence of an administrative charge for
the same acts before the Supreme Court.
RULING:
No.
Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides:
“Sec. 15.Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions
and duties: (1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this
primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation
of such cases.” Thus, the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative complaint before
his office against petitioner judge, pursuant to his power to investigate public officers. The Ombudsman must
indorse the case to the Supreme Court, for appropriate action. Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution exclusively
vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding
Justice of the Court of Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk.
Hence, it is the Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the judges and court personnel and take the proper
administrative action against them if they commit any violation of the laws of the land. No other branch of
government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the independence of the judiciary and the
doctrine of separation of powers.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
LUZ C. ADAJAR, Complainant,

VS
Teresita O. Develos,* Clerk III, CELSA G. ELLORIN, Court Stenographer III, and CYRUS A. ELLORIN, Court
Interpreter, RTC, Br. 8, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, Respondents
A.M. NO.P-05-2056, NOVEMBER 18, 2005 (formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 02-1395-P)
FACTS:
Luz C. Adajar filed a complaint against Teresita Develos, Cyrus Ellorin and Celsa Ellorin, who are
government employees stationed at the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon.
Complainant alleged that she delivered pieces of jewelries on a consignment basis amounting to 70,000 pesos to
Mrs. Teresita Develos at her office at RTC Branch 8 Staff Room, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon with the agreement that
she will pay the said amount within Three (3) Months. Mrs. Develos made partial payments in the total amount of
Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos. However, when demanded from to pay the balance of P20,000.00 Pesos, she
refused. On February 6, 2002 complainant, again, went to RTC Branch 8 to collect the account from Mrs. Develos
when the latter, in an angry and loud voice said, “Dili ba nga gihatagan ta naman ka sa listahan sa mga nakakuha sa
alahas? Ikaw na ang maningil sa ila”, (which in English literally means “IS IT NOT THAT I HAVE ALREADY GIVEN YOU
THE LIST OF THOSE WHO GOT THE JEWELRIES? YOU COLLECT IT YOURSELF”). While having a verbal tussle, Mr.
Cyrus Ellorin who is a co-employee of Mrs. Develos, with the designation of court interpreter of Branch 8,
Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, allegedly, went near and shouted. Mr. Cyrus Ellorin violently pushed complainant of
the staff room, practically driving her out as if she was a leper. Employees of the office of the Clerk of Court
brought her to their office and gave her water and comforted her. The incident was reported to the police and
entered into the blotter. Respondents contend that the acts of respondents Celsa Ellorin and Teresita Develos
being complained of by complainant were not in relation to their functions as court employees but were in
connection with the pecuniary activity of complainant. Respondents further assert that complainant is guilty of
dishonesty for certifying that she did not commence any other action before any tribunal or body except before
this Court when in fact she also filed a complaint for misconduct with the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao.
Respondents also submitted in evidence a Joint-Affidavit executed by persons who were indebted to complainant
stating therein that respondent Develos simply facilitated the sale of jewelry made by complainant. Office of the
Ombudsman, Mindanao, acting on the complaint for misconduct filed by herein complainant, rendered a Decision
dismissing the administrative case against herein respondents as well as the counter-complaint filed by the latter
against herein complainant. The Investigating Judge adopted the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman,
Mindanao and, accordingly, recommended that the instant administrative complaint be dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman should take cognizance of this case
RULING:
No, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao should not have taken cognizance of the instant case the same being
administrative in nature. As correctly pointed out by the OCA, it has been settled as early as the case of Maceda

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
vs. Vasquez that: Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals
down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can
oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action
against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power,
without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of power. Pursuant to the above-settled rule, the Office of the
Ombudsman, Mindanao should have referred the instant complaint to this Court for appropriate action, instead of
resolving the same. Hence, we agree with the OCA that the Decision rendered by the Office of the Ombudsman,
Mindanao in OMB-M-A-02-126-E does not have any force and effect on the present administrative case before us.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
RE: REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE/CLARIFICATION ON SECTION 7, RULE III OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10154 REQUIRING
RETIRING GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES TO SECURE A CLEARANCE OF PENDENCY/NON-PENDENCY OF CASE/S
FROM THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION.
A.M. NO. 13-09-08-SC OCTOBER 1, 2013
FACTS:
Before the Court is a Memorandum dated September 18, 2013 from Atty. Eden T. Candelaria, Deputy Clerk of
Court and Chief Administrative Officer, Office of Administrative Services of the Supreme Court, requesting
guidance/clarification on the applicability to the Judiciary of Section 7, Rule III of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act No. (RA) 101541 which states:
Section 7.Notice of Pendency of Case. The retiring employee shall seek Clearance of Pendency/Non-Pendency of
Administrative Case from his/her employer agency, Civil Service Commission (CSC), Office of the Ombudsman, or in
case of presidential appointees, from the Office of the President.
Section 6,2 Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) exclusively vests in the Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel.3 As such, it oversees the court personnel’s
compliance with all laws and takes the proper administrative action against them for any violation thereof.4 As an
adjunct thereto, it keeps in its custody records pertaining to the administrative cases of retiring court personnel.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 7, Rule III of the IRR of R.A. No. 101541 applicable to retiring court personnel.
RULING:
No, In view of the foregoing, the Court rules that the subject provision – which requires retiring
government employees to secure a prior clearance of pendency/non-pendency of administrative case/s from,
among others, the CSC – should not be made to apply to employees of the Judiciary. To deem it otherwise would
disregard the Court’s constitutionally-enshrined power of administrative supervision over its personnel. Besides,
retiring court personnel are already required to secure a prior clearance of the pendency/non-pendency of
administrative case/s from the Court which makes the CSC clearance a superfluous and non-expeditious
requirement contrary to the declared state policy of RA 10154.5
To further clarify the matter, the same principles dictate that a prior clearance of pendency/non-pendency of
administrative case/s from the Office of the President (albeit some court personnel are presidential appointees,
e.g., Supreme Court Justices) or the Office of the Ombudsman should not equally apply to retiring court personnel.
Verily, the administrative supervision of court personnel and all affairs related thereto fall within the exclusive
province of the Judiciary.
It must, however, be noted that since the Constitution only accords the Judiciary administrative supervision over
its personnel, a different treatment of the clearance requirement obtains with respect to criminal cases. As such, a
clearance requirement which pertains to criminal cases may be imposed by the appropriate government agency,
i.e., the Office of the Ombudsman, on retiring court personnel as it is a matter beyond the ambit of the Judiciary’s
power of administrative supervision.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
WHEREFORE, the requirement of seeking a Clearance of Pendency/Non-Pendency of Administrative Case from the
Civil Service Commission embodied in Section 7, Rule III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic
Act No. 10154 is declared INAPPLICABLE to retiring employees of the Judiciary.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Complainant,

VS
MERLE RAMONEDA-PITA, Clerk III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Danao City. Respondent
AM No. P-08-2531, April 11, 2013
FACTS:
On March 23, 1998, an anonymous letter informed the CSC of an alleged irregularity in the civil service eligibility of
Ramoneda-Pita. The letter stated that the irregularity concerned Ramoneda-Pita's taking of the Career Service
Sub-Professional Examination held in Cebu City on July 26, 1987.The CSC retrieved the records for the July 26, 1987
examinations and compared the pictures and signatures of Ramoneda-Pita as they appeared in the Picture Seat
Plan (PSP) for the exam and her PDS dated October 17, 1990. As the pictures and signatures did not match, the
CSC required Ramoneda-Pita to explain why it seemed that another person took the civil service examination on
her behalf.Ramoneda-Pita denied that someone else took the civil service examinations in her stead. She averred
that she took the civil service examinations on July 30, 1986 and not July 26, 1987. She explained that there were
dissimilarities in the pictures in the PSP and the PDS because these were not taken on the same year and might
have deteriorated in quality over the years. On the other hand, she accounted for the difference in her signatures
to her low educational attainment leading to her non-development and non-maintenance of a usual signature.In
its Investigation Report dated May 3, 1999, the CSC made the following observations and recommendation:The
person who actually took the Career Service Subprofessional Examination on July 26, 1987 in Cebu City, was the
"Merle C. Ramoneda" whose picture and signature were affixed in the Admission Slip/Notice of Admission and in
the Picture Seat Plan, is NOT the "Merle C. Ramoneda" whose picture and signature appear in the Personal Data
Sheet dated October 17, 1990 of the real Merle C. Ramoneda.In view of the foregoing, considering that the
evidence presented [is] substantial, it is recommended that respondent Merle C. Ramoneda be adjudged guilty of
the charges and meted the penalty of dismissal with all its accessories.Ramoneda-Pita moved for reconsideration
but the CSC denied it in Resolution No. 010880 dated May 3, 2001.Ramoneda-Pita appealed CSC Resolution Nos.
010263 and 010880 to the Court of Appeals and, subsequently, to this Court. In both instances, her appeal was
denied. On January 14, 2005, Ramoneda-Pita wrote to then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appealing for
clemency stating that she accepted her fate and turned a new leaf with a solemn commitment to do good for the
rest of her life. The Office of the President referred the matter to Director David Cabanag, Jr. of the CSC Regional
Office No. VII for validation, verification and investigation.While the appeal for clemency was pending and in the
course of the CSC's investigation, the CSC discovered that, again, Ramoneda-Pita had been declaring in her PDS,
particularly the PDS dated June 14, 2005 submitted to the Supreme Court, that she had not been found guilty in
any administrative case and that she was civil service eligible. Thus, on MAy 11, 2006, the CSC, in its Investigation
Report pursuant to the Office of the President's referral, found that Ramoneda-Pita had not sufficiently established
moral reformation which is crucial in the grant of executive clemency. It recommended that the plea for executive
clemency be denied.On June 23, 2006, Director Cabanag, Jr. wrote a letter to the OCA informing it of the continued
employment of Ramoneda-Pita as Clerk III of the MTCC, Danao City despite the finality of CSC Resolution No.
010263.In its Report dated July 4, 2008, the OCA recommended, among others, that the case be docketed as a
regular administrative matter and that this Court conduct its own investigation on the matter.This Court noted and
adopted the recommendation of the OCA in a Resolution dated August 6, 2008 where it directed the OCA to
conduct its own investigation on the matter and submit a report and recommendation thereon.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the CSC has jurisdiction over the case of the accused with respect to her employment in the
Judiciary.
RULING:
Yes, the CSC has acquired jurisdiction over the case of the accused when he filed his affidavits and pleading with
his counsel during the course of the trial. Supreme Court has always maintained that it is only the Supreme Court
that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's administrative compliance with all laws, rules and regulations.
No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation
of powers. However, as aptly pointed out by the OCA, Ramoneda-Pita was afforded the full protection of the law,
that is, afforded due process. She was able to file several affidavits and pleadings before the CSC with counsel. It
may also be noted that the case had been elevated to the Court of Appeals and this Court, where the Resolution of
the CSC was upheld in both instances.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,

vs
HON. EUSTAQUIO Z. GACOTT, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 47, Puerto Princesa City, ARNE STROM and
GRACE REYES, Respondents
G.R. No. 116049, July 13, 1995
FACTS:
For failure to check the citations of the prosecution, the order of respondent RTC Judge Eustaquio Gacott, Jr.
dismissing a criminal case was annulled by the SC. The respondent judge was also sanctioned with a reprimand and
a fine of P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law. The judgment was made by the Second Division of the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Second Division of the SC has the competence to administratively discipline respondent judge
RULING:
To support the Court’s ruling, Justice Regalado relied on his recollection of a conversation with former Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion who was the Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission of which Regalado was also a member.The very text of the present Sec. 11, Art. VIII of the Constitution
clearly shows that there are actually two situations envisaged therein. The first clause which states that “the SC en
banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts,” is a declaration of the grant of that disciplinary
power to, and the determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof by, the Court en banc. It was not therein
intended that all administrative disciplinary cases should be heard and decided by the whole Court since it would
result in an absurdity. The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated therein and is
intentionally separated from the first by a comma, declares on the other hand that the Court en banc can “order
their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in
the case and voted therein.” In this instance, the administrative case must be deliberated upon and decided by the
full Court itself. Pursuant to the first clause which confers administrative disciplinary power to the Court en banc, a
decision en banc is needed only where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of
the Judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period of more than 1 year or a
fine exceeding P10, 000.00 or both.
Indeed, to require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all administrative matters or cases
regardless of the sanctions, imposable or imposed, would result in a congested docket and undue delay in the
adjudication of cases in the Court, especially in administrative matters, since even cases involving the penalty of
reprimand would require action by the Court en banc.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
FE A. YLAYA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. GLENN CARLOS GACOTT, Respondent
Adm. Case No. 6475, January 30, 2013
Facts:
Fe Ylaya filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Gacott. According to her, Atty. Gacott deceived her
and her late husband, Laurentino, into signing a preparatory deed of sale which they thought would be used in the
sale of the properties to the City Government of Puerto Prinsesa because at that time the said properties were
subject to expropriation proceedings. But to their dismay, according to her, it was converted into a deed of
absolute sale in favor of Atty. Gacott’s uncle Reynolds So. Atty. Gacott denied these and claimed that Laurentino
and Reynold had originally purchased the properties, that they were co owners and that Laurentino subsequently
sold his share to Reynold under the deed of absolute sale. He also argued that it was clear from the document that
the intended buyer was a natural person, not juridical because there were spaces for the buyer’s legal age, marital
status, and citizenship. Also, he claimed that he was even constrained to file a subsequent motion to intervene on
behalf of Reynold because the complainant maliciously retained the TCTs to the subject properties after borrowing
them from his office. Then, after some time, Fe Ylaya submitted a motion to withdraw and executed an affidavit
affirming and confirming the existence, genuineness, and due execution of the deed of aabsolute sale.The IBP
governor resolved to suspend Atty. Gacott to 2 years, finding him guilty of violation of Rule 1.01 and canon 16 of
the code of professional responsibility.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Gacott indeed deceived the spouses and should be suspended.
Whether or not the motion to withdraw and affidavit affirming and confirming the existence, genuiness,
and due execution will affect the disbarment proceedings.
RULING:
Yes, but not because of violation of Rule 1.01. Atty. Gacott’s failure to prove the existence of co
ownership does not lead to the conclusion that the deed of absolute sale is spurious and he was responsible for
creating the spurious documents. However, he is liable for violating canon 16, rule 15.03, and rule 18.03. Canon 16,
he was remiss in his obligation to hold in trust his client’s properties. he lost certificates of land titles that were
entrusted to his care by Reynold. Rule 15.03, he admitted to be a acting as legal counsel for the former owner of
the subject properties, spouses Ylaya, and Reynold So. There was no written consent from any of the parties
involved. Rule 18.03, he neglected legal matters entrusted to him. Records show that he never filed motion for
leave to intervene on behalf of the spouses in the expropriation proceedings, contrary to what he claimed.
No. While Fe Ylaya submitted the motion to withdraw the verified complaint and the affidavit appear to
exonerate Atty. Gacott, complete exoneration is not the necessary legal effect as they are immaterial for purposes

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
of the disbarment proceedings. According to Sec 5 Rule 139-B of the rules of Court, “no investigation shall be
interrupted or terminated by reason of desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of charges or
failure of the complainant to prosecute the same”.
Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievances. They are
undertaken and prosecute solely for the public welfare.
Atty. Gacott was suspended from practice of law for one year.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
LEO ECHEGARAY, Petitioner

vs.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., Respondents
G.R. NO. 132601, JANUARY 19, 1999
FACTS:
On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on
that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of
the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to
grant reprieve.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on the
execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has already been rendered… that by granting
the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function.
RULING:
No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the source of power of the President to grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. The
provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their
decisions after their finality. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a
death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life.
For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused
after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our
government.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
IN RE: DESIGNATION OF JUDGE RODOLFO U. MANZANO AS MEMBER OF THE ILOCOS NORTE PROVINCIAL
COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE
A.M. No. 88-7-1861-RTC, October 5, 1988
FACTS:
Judge Rodolfo Manzano sent a letter to the Supreme Court requesting to allow him to accept
appointment as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice create pursuant to Presidential
Executive Order No. 856 as amended by EO No. 326.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Manzano can accept appointment as a member of INPCJ.
RULING:
No. The committee was created by the executive branch of the government where its members discharge
administrative functions. Though it may be quasi-judicial, it is still administrative in nature. Judge Manzano is not a
subordinate of an executive or legislative official, however eminent. His integrity in the adjudication of cases
contribute to the solidity of such structure. RTC Judges may only render assistance to the aforesaid committees
when such assistance are reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial functions.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018

vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., Respondents.
G.R. No. 202242 July 17, 2012
FACTS:
The case is in relation to the process of selecting the nominees for the vacant seat of Supreme Court Chief
Justice following Renato Corona’s departure. Originally, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the
need to create a separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the President. Thus, it
conceived of a body representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process and called it the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). In particular, Paragraph 1 Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution states that “(1) A
Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief
Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members,
a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.” In compliance therewith, Congress, from the moment of the creation of the
JBC, designated one representative from the Congress to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex officio members. In
1994 however, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only seven (7) members, an
eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one
from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. During the
existence of the case, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents)
simultaneously sat in JBC as representatives of the legislature.
It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.
The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established, the framers originally envisioned a
unicameral legislative body, thereby allocating “a representative of the National Assembly” to the JBC. The phrase,
however, was not modified to aptly jive with the change to bicameralism which was adopted by the Constitutional
Commission on July 21, 1986. The respondents also contend that if the Commissioners were made aware of the
consequence of having a bicameral legislature instead of a unicameral one, they would have made the
corresponding adjustment in the representation of Congress in the JBC; that if only one house of Congress gets to
be a member of JBC would deprive the other house of representation, defeating the principle of balance.
The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2) representatives of Congress to be members of the JBC
does not render JBC’s purpose of providing balance nugatory; that the presence of two (2) members from
Congress will most likely provide balance as against the other six (6) members who are undeniably presidential
appointees.
Supreme Court held that it has the power of review the case herein as it is an object of concern, not just
for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all the citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for
rectification of legal blunders.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ISSUE:
Whether the practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are
members of Congress, defeats the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.
RULING:
Yes. The current practice of JBC in admitting two members of the Congress to perform the functions of
the JBC is violative of the 1987 Constitution. As such, it is unconstitutional.
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear,
plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As such, it can be clearly and
unambiguously discerned from Paragraph 1, Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution that in the phrase, “a
representative of Congress,” the use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is
unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the
Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC.
Had it been the intention that more than one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the
Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.
Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is
equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the
company of words in which it is founded or with which it is associated. Every meaning to be given to each word or
phrase must be ascertained from the context of the body of the statute since a word or phrase in a statute is
always used in association with other words or phrases and its meaning may be modified or restricted by the
latter. Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word “Congress” used in Article
VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on
whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular
representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC
It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members
only. Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether with one whole vote or half (1/2) of it, goes against that
mandate. Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, providing Congress with an equal voice with other members
of the JBC in recommending appointees to the Judiciary is explicit. Any circumvention of the constitutional
mandate should not be countenanced for the Constitution is the supreme law of the land. The Constitution is the
basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest
officials of the land, must defer. Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter what may be the tides
of time. It cannot be simply made to sway and accommodate the call of situations and much more tailor itself to
the whims and caprices of the government and the people who run it.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF
ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S.
SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREÑAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, PROVINCE OF LEYTE; MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO,
PROVINCE OF CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN, PROVINCE OF WESTERN SAMAR; MUNICIPALITY OF
TANDAG, PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN, PROVINCE OF EASTERN SAMAR; and
MUNICIPALITY OF TAYABAS, PROVINCE OF QUEZON, Respondents
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY
OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF
GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF
TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN,
CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM, petitioners-in-
intervention.
G.R. No. 176951, November 18, 2008 (Leading Case)
FACT:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities.
However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect
on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income
requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the
amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, “the mad rush” of municipalities to convert
into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable
of fiscal independence. After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress
adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009
the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress
ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29. During the 13th Congress, the House of
Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for
approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator
Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16
cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income
requirements in RA 9009. On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The
Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June
2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the
President’s signature. The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters
in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city. Petitioners filed the
present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale
conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment
because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the
Local Government Code.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ISSUE:
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:

1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
RULINGS:
We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.
First, applying the P100 million income requirements in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not
a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five
years later.
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in
the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and
just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for
converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory
construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of
RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic
aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
DATU SAMAD MANGELEN, Petitioner,

VS.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO HABALAYUS AND HABALAYUS ENTERPRISES, INC., Respondents
G.R. NO. 88954, OCTOBER 29, 1992
FACTS:
Mangelen filed a case for breach of contract against Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. and Pedro Habaluyas. The
Defendants were declared in default for their failure to file an answer within the reglementary period. The trial
court rendered a Decision in favor of plaintiff awarding him exemplary damages which was not included in his
prayer.
ISSUE:
Was the award of exemplary damages proper?
RULING:
No. Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court provides that judgment entered against a party in default shall
not exceed the amount or be different in kind from that prayed for. Consequently, an award of exemplary
damages should not have been made since it was not even prayed for. Besides, the complaint is for breach of
contract. Exemplary damages may only be awarded therein if private respondents acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. There is no finding whatsoever on the matter. There is a difference
between a judgment against a defendant based on evidence presented ex-parte pursuant to a default order and
one based on evidence presented ex-parte and against a defendant who had filed an answer but who failed to
appear at the hearing. In the former, section 5 of Rule 18 provides that the judgment against the defendant should
not exceed the amount or to be different in kind from that prayed for. In the latter, however, the award may
exceed the amount or be different in kind from the prayed for.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
GERMAN MACHINERIES CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
EDDIE D. ENDAYA, Respondent
G.R. NO. 156810, NOVEMBER 25, 2004
FACTS:
Complainant [Eddie Endaya] alleged that he was employed by respondent company on January 18, 1993,
[as a] car painter with a salary of P8,000.00 a month for work performed from 7:30 A.M. to 5:15 P.M., Monday to
Friday; that before March 1, 1999, he requested management that his SSS premiums already deducted from his
salary be remitted to the SSS but management did not pay attention to his request; that on March 29, 1999, he
filed a complaint with the Social Security System against respondent company for failure to remit his SSS
premiums; that when management learned about his complaint, he was reprimanded and became the object of
harassment; that he was shouted at and belittled; that on August 27, 1999, he at first refused to paint the trusses
of the newly-constructed building, an extension of office of respondent company because his position is that of a
car painter, not that of a construction worker and besides he finds difficulty working in high places as he was not
trained for the purpose; but, later, he consented to do the painting job; that at about 11:00 A.M., he felt thirsty, so
he went down to drink; but when he was about to go back to work, Mr. Andy Junginger who asked him where he
came from got irked when told that he (complainant) went down to drink and, immediately, told complainant to
get his separation pay from the Cashier and go home as he was already terminated. Complainant also alleged that
on September 6, 1999, he reported for work but he was surprised that Mr. Joseph Baclig handed him letters of
suspension, dated August 27, 1999 and September 6, 1999 and he was told to go home; that he reported for work
several times thereafter but he was told to stop reporting for work since his services were already terminated as of
August 27, 1999. Complainant, thus, contends that he was illegally dismissed. Respondents contend that
complainant was never dismissed. On January 8, 2001, the Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of herein
respondent. Aggrieved by the Labor Arbiter's decision, herein petitioner filed an appeal with the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC). In a decision promulgated on February 28, 2002, the NLRC affirmed, with
modification, the Labor Arbiter's decision. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied
by the NLRC in a resolution promulgated on April 19, 2002. On July 3, 2002, herein petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals.
The petition is DISMISSED for LACK OF MERIT and that the questions raised are too UNSUBSTANTIAL to require
consideration. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the appellate court denied the same in a resolution
issued on January 16, 2003. n March 7, 2003, petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari with
prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction. On September 24, 2003, this
Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the enforcement of the disputed resolutions of the Court of
Appeals, as well as the writ of execution dated October 21, 2002, issued by Labor Arbiter Aliman D. Mangandog in
connection with the decision dated February 28, 2002 and resolution dated April 18, 2002, issued by the NLRC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court of appeals has violated the constitutional provision that no decision shall be
rendered by any court without expressing clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
RULING:
Supreme Court is not persuaded.
The assailed resolution is not the "decision" contemplated under Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution. The mandate embodied in this constitutional provision is applicable only in "cases submitted for
decision" i.e., given due course and after the filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not where a
resolution is issued denying due course to a petition and stating the legal basis thereof. Thus, when the court, after
deliberating on a petition and subsequent pleadings, decides to deny due course to the petition and states that the
questions raised are factual or there is no reversible error in the respondent court's decision, there is sufficient
compliance with the constitutional requirement. In the present case, the Court of Appeals denied due course and
outrightly dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by herein petitioner on the grounds that the factual issues had
already been passed upon by the NLRC, and since its factual findings are in agreement with the findings of the
labor arbiter, the same are binding and conclusive upon the Court of Appeals; and that the questions raised are
too unsubstantial to require consideration. We find these legal bases in conformity with the requirements of the
Constitution.
The writ of certiorari dealt with in Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a prerogative writ, never demandable as
a matter of right, never issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion.[16] Moreover, the second paragraph of
Section 8, Rule 65[17] of the Rules of Court provides that the court may dismiss a petition for certiorari if it finds
the same to be patently without merit, prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein are
too unsubstantial to require consideration.
Furthermore, a reading of the petition filed with the Court of Appeals shows that the main issue raised is
factual as it questions the finding of the NLRC that respondent Endaya was illegally dismissed from his
employment. Petitioner brought up issues the resolution of which necessarily involves a review of the evidence
presented by both parties. It is settled that resort to a judicial review of the decisions of the NLRC in a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court is confined only to issues of want or excess of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the rendering tribunal, board or office.[18] It does not include an inquiry as
to the correctness of the evaluation of evidence which was the basis of the labor official or officer in determining
his conclusion.[19] It is not for the appellate court to reexamine conflicting evidence, reevaluate the credibility of
witnesses nor substitute the findings of fact of an administrative tribunal which has gained expertise in its
specialized field. Considering that the findings of fact of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are supported by evidence
on record, the same must be accorded due respect and finality

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR COURT

VS
JUDGE FERNANDO G. FUENTES III Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, Tagbilaran City
A.M. No. RTJ-13-2342, March 6, 2013
(Formerly: A.M. No. 11-8-152-RTC Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted at the Regional Trial Court, Branch
49, Tagbilaran City, Bohol)
FACTS:
SECOND DIVISION [A.M. No. RTJ-13-2342. March 6, 2013.] [Formerly: A.M. No. 11-8-152-RTC Re: Report
on the Judicial Audit Conducted at the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, Tagbilaran City, Bohol] OFFICE OF THE
COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. JUDGE FERNANDO G. FUENTES III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, Tagbilaran City
[A.M. No. RTJ-12-2318. March 6, 2013.] [Formerly: OCA IPI No. 11-3755-RTJ] PAULINO BUTAL, SR., complainant, vs.
JUDGE FERNANDO G. FUENTES III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, Tagbilaran City, respondent. FACTS: Â· A judicial
audit was conducted at the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 49, Tagbilaran City, Bohol, presided over by Judge
Fernando G. Fuentes III (Judge Fuentes III). Â· The judicial audit report of the team from the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) revealed that as of 13 June 2011, the aforementioned court had 272 (138 criminal and 134
civil) pending cases in its docket. Of these cases, 83 (24 criminal and 59 civil) were deemed submitted for decision.
The report also revealed that of the cases submitted for decision, 70 were already beyond the reglementary period
to decide, with some cases submitted for decision as far back as 2003. Further, 31 of these 70 cases were appealed
from the first level courts, with two criminal cases involving detention prisoners. Â· The Court now direct Presiding
Judge Fuentes III CEASE and DESIST from hearing cases in his court and devote his time in deciding cases and
resolving pending incidents/motions. Â· In his defense, Judge Fuentes III explained that he is offering no
justification for the adverse findings of the audit team. He alleged that the cases submitted for decision have
always been reflected in the monthly reports of cases he is submitting to the Court. He averred that he is not a
resident of Bohol but of Ozamis City. Thus, he had to go home from time to time upon proper leave to visit his
family which process has affected his health and has greatly hampered his case disposition. Â· Judge Fuentes III
partially complied by submitting copies of his decisions/orders however, circumstances came up and he asked the
Court for extensions for a couple of times. Â· The OCA received a verified complaint from Paulino Butal, Sr.
(complainant), charging Judge Fuentes III with delay in rendering a decision in Civil Case No. 7028, entitled
"Spouses Paulino Pombo Butal, Jr., et al. v. China Road and Bridge Corporation, et al." for damages and attorney's
fees. Â· The plaintiffs filed a Manifestation and Motion to Render Decision alleging therein that it had been 17
months since the case was submitted for decision. Â· The OCA recommended that Judge Fuentes III be: a) found
guilty of gross inefficiency for his failure to decide 70 cases within the reglementary period, which includes Civil
Case No. 7028 subject of A.M. No. RTJ-12-2318, and resolve 27 incidents submitted for resolution; b) fined in the
amount of P50, 000.00 to be deducted from his salaries; and c) sternly warned that the commission of a similar
offense will be dealt with more severely.
ISSUE:
WON Judge Fuentes III is guilty of gross inefficiency.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
RULING:
The Court held that trial judges are mandated to decide and resolve cases within 90 days from submission
for decision or resolution. Corollary to this constitutional mandate, Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to perform all judicial duties efficiently, fairly, and with
reasonable promptness. The mandate to promptly dispose of cases or matters also applies to motions or
interlocutory matters or incidents pending before the magistrate. Unreasonable delay of a judge in resolving a
pending incident is a violation of the norms of judicial conduct and constitutes gross inefficiency that warrants the
imposition of an administrative sanction against the defaulting magistrate. Â· Judge Fuentes III concedes that there
is no valid justification for the delay in resolving the cases pending in his court. Indeed, his frequent travels to his
residence in Ozamis City, which led to travel fatigue and poor health, will not absolve him from liability. Â· An
inexcusable failure to decide a case within the prescribed 90-day period constitutes gross inefficiency, warranting
the imposition of administrative sanctions such as suspension from office without pay or fine on the defaulting
judge.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
RE: FAILURE OF FORMER JUDGE ANTONIO A. CARBONELL TO DECIDE CASES SUBMITTED FOR DECISION AND TO
RESOLVE PENDING MOTIONS IN THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 27, SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION.
A.M. No. 08-5-305-RTC, July 09, 2013
FACTS:
On March 3 and 4, 2008, The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) conducted a judicial audit in the
Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, La Union, Branch 27, in view of the disability retirement of Presiding Judge
Antonio A. Carbonell on December 31, 2007. According to the Audit Team's Report, Branch 27 had a total caseload
of 231 cases, consisting of 147 criminal cases and 84 civil cases, and Judge Carbonell failed to decide 41 criminal
cases (one inherited) and 22 civil cases (four inherited). Judge Carbonell was also reported to have failed to resolve
pending motions or incidents in four criminal cases and 12 civil cases, to wit: Criminal Case Nos. 7559, 6409, 7787,
and 7788; and Civil Case Nos. 4793, LRC 1308, 7064, 4973, SP 2901, SP 2952, AC 1797, 7100, 7152, 7060, SP 2986,
and SP 2987. In a Memorandum dated May 15, 2008, the OCA recommended to the Court that a fine of
P50,000.00 be imposed upon Judge Carbonell for gross inefficiency for failing to promptly decide the cases and to
resolve pending motions and incidents. On June 17, 2008, the Court directed the Clerk of Court to furnish Judge
Carbonell with a copy of the Audit Team's Report, and ordered him to submit his comment on the report within
ten days from notice. Not having received the comment from Judge Carbonell despite the lapse of the time given,
the Court resolved on September 21, 2010 to require him to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt
with or held in contempt. Judge Carbonell replied, stating that he had incorporated his comment/compliance to
the June 17, 2008 resolution in the letter dated July 17, 2008 (Re: Very Urgent Request for Release of Disability
Retirement Benefits and Money Value of Accrued Leave Credits) he had sent to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. He
remarked that the Court had actually granted his request for the payment of his disability retirement benefits
subject to the retention of P200,000.00 pending resolution of the pending administrative cases against him. In his
July 17, 2008 letter to Chief Justice Puno, Judge Carbonell surmised that the Audit Team might have overlooked
the fact that he had inherited some of the undecided cases from the predecessor judge; that said cases had no
transcripts of stenographic notes, because of which he was impelled to require the parties to submit their
respective memoranda; that the cases would only be considered submitted for decision after the parties would
have filed their respective memoranda; and that he had undergone a quadruple heart bypass operation in 2005
that had adversely affected his pace in deciding the cases. On November 23, 2010, the Court referred Judge
Carbonell's letter to the OCA for evaluation, report, and recommendation. In its Memorandum dated February 2,
2011,[10] the OCA reiterated its recommendation to impose a fine of P50,000.00 on Judge Carbonell, noting that
he had failed to render any valid reason for his delay in deciding the cases submitted for decision and in resolving
the pending motions or incidents in other cases.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Carbonel is guilty of gross inefficiency for failure to decide on cases within the
reglementary period without justifiable and credible reason warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
RULING:
Judge Carbonell's failure to decide several cases within the reglementary period, without justifiable and
credible reasons, constituted gross inefficiency, warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions, like fines.
The fines imposed have varied in each case, depending chiefly on the number of cases not decided within the
reglementary period and other factors, including the presence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances like the
damage suffered by the parties from the delay, the health condition and age of the judge, etc. Thus, in one case,
the Court mitigated the liability of a Judge who had been suffering from illnesses and who had later retired due to
disability, and imposed upon him a fine of P20,000.00 for failure to decide 31 cases.
Considering that Judge Carbonell similarly retired due to disability, the Court believes that his poor health
condition greatly contributed to his inability to efficiently perform his duties as a trial judge. That mitigated his
administrative liability, for which reason the Court reduces the recommended penalty of fine from P50,000.00 to
P20,000.00.
WHEREFORE, Retired Judge Antonio A. Carbonell is ORDERED to pay a fine of P20,000.00 to be deducted
from the P200,000.00 that was withheld from his retirement benefits, and the balance to be immediately released
to him.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
RE: SENIORITY AMONG THE FOUR (4) MOST RECENT APPOINTMENTS TO THE POSITION OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICES
OF THE COURT OF APPEALS.
A.M. No. 10-4-22-SC, September 28, 2010
FACTS:
On March 10, 2010, the Office of the President transmitted to the Supreme Court the appointments of
Court Appeals (CA) Associate Justices Myra G. Fernandez, Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr., Ramon Paul L. Hernando and
Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela. Their respective appointment papers were attached to the transmittal letter. All four
newly appointed CA Justices took their oath before then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice, Renato C. Corona on
March 10, 2010.
After some initial confusion, the four Justices were finally listed in the roster of the CA Justices in the
following order of seniority: Justice Fernandez (as most senior), Justice Peralta, Jr., Justice Hernando and Justice
Antonio-Valenzuela (as most junior). The ranking was based in a letter dated March 25, 2010 submitted by the
members of the CA Committee on Rules to CA Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr.
The respective appointment papers of Justices Fernandez, Peralta, Jr., Hernando and Antonio-Valenzuela bore the
following dates and bar code numbers:
Name of Associate Justice Date of Appointment Bar Code No.
Justice Fernandez February 16, 2010 55466
Justice Peralta, Jr. February 16, 2010 55467
Justice Hernando February 16, 2010 55468

Justice Antonio-Valenzuela February 24, 2010 55465
According to the CA Committee on Rules, there appears to be a conflict between certain provisions of the
2009 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (2009 IRCA). In particular, Section 1, Rule I thereof provides:
RULE I
THE COURT, ITS ORGANIZATION AND OFFICIALS
Section 1. Composition of the Court of Appeals. -- Unless otherwiseprovided by law, the Court of Appeals
is composed of a Presiding Justice and sixty-eight (68) Associate Justices. It sits en banc, or in twenty-three (23)
Divisions of three (3) Justices each. The members of the Court are classified into three groups according to the
order of their seniority. The date and sequence of the appointment of the Justices determine their seniority
courtwide.
When a senior member is designated to act as Chairperson of a Division, he/she shall be designated as an
"Acting Chairperson". In like manner, a junior member designated to act as senior member of a Division shall be an
"Acting Senior Member".
On the other hand, Section 1, Rule II thereof states:

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
RULE II
RULE ON PRECEDENCE AND PROTOCOL
Section 1. Concept. -- The Presiding Justice enjoys precedence over all the other members of the Court in
all official functions. The Associate Justices shall have precedence according to the order of their appointments as
officially transmitted to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
How would the seniority among the four (4) most recent appointments to the position of associate
justices of the court of appeals be determined.
RULINGS:
As evident from the foregoing provision is a clear legislative intent to determine the order of precedence
seniority of this Court's Justices "according to the dates of their respective appointments." In addition to the
general rule of construction that applicable legal provisions should, as far as practicable, always be harmonized
with each other, the spirit and intent behind Republic Act No. 8246 should be given precedence if only because it is
the enabling law to which the IRCA should conform. Moreover, given its clarity, it also goes without saying that
Section 1 of the law should be applied according to its literal tenor, without equivocation and further need of
extended ratiocination from the Committee.
Applying Section 1, Rule I and Section I, Rule II of the IRCA vis-a-vis Section 1 of Republic Act No. 8246, the
order of precedence/seniority among Justices Fernandez, Peralta, Jr. and Hernando should be determined
according to the chronological order indicated in the March 10, 2010 letter of transmittal from Hon. Executive
secretary Leandro R. Mendoza and the barcodes accompanying their respective appointment papers. On the
other hand, having been appointed on February 16, 2010, it logically follows that said Justices collectively have
precedence/seniority over Justice Valenzuela who, despite the placement of her name in said transmittal letter
before the names of the other three new justices of the Court of Appeals and the lower bar code number
accompanying her appointment, was appointed only on February 24, 2010.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA Presiding Judge, Branch II of the City Court of Olongapo, ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR.,
FIDELA Y. VARGAS, BENJAMIN C. ESCOLANGO, JUANITO C. ATIENZA, MANUEL REYES ROSAPAPAN, JR., VIRGILIO
E. ACIERTO, and PORFIRIO AGUILLON AGUILA, Petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL ALBA, Minister of Budget, FRANCISCO TANTUICO, Chairman, Commission on Audit, and RICARDO
PUNO, Minister of Justice, Respondents
GR No. L-57883, March 12, 1982
FACTS:
In 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled “An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds
Therefor and for Other Purposes”, was passed. Gualberto De la Llana, a judge in Olongapo, was assailing its validity
because, first of all, he would be one of the judges that would be removed because of the reorganization and
second, he said such law would contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security of tenure of
judges of the courts. He averred that only the Supreme Court can remove judges NOT the Congress.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a judge like Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the legislature by such statute
(BP 129).
RULING:
Yes. The SC ruled the following way: “Moreover, this Court is empowered “to discipline judges of inferior
courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal.” Thus it possesses the competence to
remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such power. Removal is, of
course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a
non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an
occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the
question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts
abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition
of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the
implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of
constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and
that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord
respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If
such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two
departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue.
Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization.
That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to
preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior
courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The
challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to those
predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle
that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the
former is to be preferred.”

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,

vs
HON. EUSTAQUIO Z. GACOTT, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 47, Puerto Princesa City, ARNE STROM and
GRACE REYES, Respondents
G.R. No. 116049, July 13, 1995
FACTS:
For failure to check the citations of the prosecution, the order of respondent RTC Judge Eustaquio Gacott,
Jr. dismissing a criminal case was annulled by the SC. The respondent judge was also sanctioned with a reprimand
and a fine of P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law. The judgment was made by the Second Division of the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Second Division of the SC has the competence to administratively discipline
respondent judge
RULING:
To support the Court’s ruling, Justice Regalado relied on his recollection of a conversation with former
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion who was the Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary of the 1986
Constitutional Commission of which Regalado was also a member.The very text of the present Sec. 11, Art. VIII of
the Constitution clearly shows that there are actually two situations envisaged therein. The first clause which
states that “the SC en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts,” is a declaration of the grant
of that disciplinary power to, and the determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof by, the Court en
banc. It was not therein intended that all administrative disciplinary cases should be heard and decided by the
whole Court since it would result in an absurdity. The second clause, which refers to the second situation
contemplated therein and is intentionally separated from the first by a comma, declares on the other hand that
the Court en banc can “order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted therein.” In this instance, the administrative case must be
deliberated upon and decided by the full Court itself. Pursuant to the first clause which confers administrative
disciplinary power to the Court en banc, a decision en banc is needed only where the penalty to be imposed is the
dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the Judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of
them for a period of more than 1 year or a fine exceeding P10, 000.00 or both.
Indeed, to require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all administrative matters or
cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or imposed, would result in a congested docket and undue delay in
the adjudication of cases in the Court, especially in administrative matters, since even cases involving the penalty
of reprimand would require action by the Court en banc.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
EUGENIO S. CAPABLANCA, Petitioner

VS
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondent
G.R. No. 179370, November 19, 2009
FACTS:
On October 3, 1996, the PNP-Regional Office 10 appointed petitioner Eugenio S. Capablanca into the PNP service with
the rank of Police Officer 1 (PO1) with a temporary status and was assigned at the PNP Station in Butuan City. On November 29,
1998, petitioner took the PNP Entrance Examination conducted by the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) and passed the
same. On July 28, 2000, he took the Career Service Professional Examination-Computer Assisted Test (CSP-CAT) given by the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) and likewise passed the same. Thereafter, or on October 3, 2000, the Regional Director of Police
Regional Office XIII conferred upon petitioner the permanent status as PO1.
On October 15, 2001, the CSC Caraga Regional Office XIII (CSC Caraga) through its Regional Director Lourdes Clavite-Vidal
informed PO1 Capablanca about certain alleged irregularities relative to the CSP-CAT which he took on July 28, 2000. According to
the CSC, the person in the picture pasted in the Picture Seat Plan (PS-P) is different from the person whose picture is attached in
the Personal Data Sheet (PDS) and that the signature appearing in the PS-P was different from the signature affixed to the PDS. The
CSC further informed petitioner that such findings of alleged examination irregularities constituted the offense of dishonesty if
prima facie evidence was established.
A Preliminary Investigation was scheduled on November 16, 2001; petitioner failed to appear but was represented by
counsel who moved to dismiss the proceedings. He argued that it is the NAPOLCOM which has sole authority to conduct entrance
and promotional examinations for police officers to the exclusion of the CSC, pursuant to Civil Service Commission v. Court of
Appeals. Thus, the CSP-CAT conducted on July 28, 2000 was void. Moreover, he alleged that the administrative discipline over
police officers falls under the jurisdiction of the PNP and/or NAPOLCOM.
To prevent the CSC Caraga from further proceeding with the conduct of the administrative investigation, PO1
Capablanca filed on January 16, 2002 a Petition for prohibition and injunction with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Butuan. The said court issued a 20-day
temporary restraining order and set the case for summary hearing on February 8, 2002 to resolve the application for preliminary
injunction.
Instead of filing its Answer, the CSC Caraga moved to dismiss the case, arguing inter alia that: a) PO1 Capablanca failed to
exhaust administrative remedies by appealing before the CSC Central Office instead of filing a petition before the trial court; b) PO1
Capablanca’s reliance on Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals was misplaced because what he took was a career service
professional examination and not a police entrance examination; and c) the CSC was not stripped of its original disciplinary
jurisdiction over all cases involving civil service examination anomalies.
In its March 8, 2002 Resolution, the trial court denied CSCs Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit. It held that the CSC had
no jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation, much less to prosecute PO1 Capablanca.
Its Motion for Reconsideration unheeded, the CSC Caraga filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals praying for the
nullification of the Resolution of the trial court, and at the same time insisting on its jurisdictional power to prosecute the
administrative case involving dishonesty and that PO1 Capablanca failed to exhaust administrative remedies.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
On March 22, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision granting CSCs petition. The Court of Appeals found that
PO1 Capablanca prematurely resorted to court intervention when the remedy of appeal to the CSC Central Office was
available. Upholding the jurisdiction of the CSC Caraga, the appellate court declared that the subject of the latter’s preliminary
investigation was not with respect to PO1 Capablancas acts in the conduct of his duties as a police officer, but with respect to the
authenticity of the documents he submitted before the CSC Caraga in support of his application for permanent status as well as the
veracity of its contents. It held that pursuant to the CSC's constitutional duty to protect the integrity of the civil service system, it
acted within its authority to investigate irregularities or anomalies involving civil service examinations, and to ascertain whether a
prospective civil service appointee is qualified in accordance with all the legal requirements.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CSC Caraga has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation of a possible administrative case
of dishonesty against PO1 Capablanca for alleged CSP-CAT examination irregularity.
RULING:
Yes, CSC Caraga has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation of a possible administrative case of dishonesty
against PO1 Capablanca for alleged CSP examination irregularity.
The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the Government, is mandated to establish a career service, to strengthen
the merit and rewards system, and to adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency and integrity in the civil service. The civil
service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters. Specifically, Section 91 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6975 (1990) or the Department of
Interior and Local Government Act of 1990 provides that the Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations shall
apply to all personnel of the Department, to which herein petitioner belongs. It has already been settled in Cruz v. Civil Service
Commission that the appellate power of the CSC will only apply when the subject of the administrative cases filed against erring
employees is in connection with the duties and functions of their office, and not in cases where the acts of complainant arose
from cheating in the civil service examinations.
The Court of Appeals found in favor of the NAPOLCOM and held that the CSC, by issuing Item 3 of CSC Resolution No. 96-
5487 encroached on the exclusive power of NAPOLCOM under RA 6975 to administer promotional examinations for policemen
and to impose qualification standards for promotion of PNP personnel to the ranks of PO2 up to Senior Police Officers 1-4.
The Court of Appeals thus ordered the CSC to desist from conducting any promotional examination for Police Officers and Senior
Police Officers.
In a Minute Resolution dated September 25, 2001 in G.R. No. 141732, we affirmed the Court of Appeals thereby
sustaining the authority of the NAPOLCOM to administer promotional examinations for policemen.
It must be stressed however that the subject matter in the above cited case was the conduct of promotional
examination for policemen. On the contrary, the issue in the instant case is the jurisdiction of the CSC with regard to anomalies or
irregularities in the CSP-CAT, which is a totally different matter.
In fine, we find that CSC Caraga acted within its powers when it instituted the conduct of a preliminary investigation
against herein petitioner. In view of the foregoing, we need not anymore attend to the issue of the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
RESTITUTO YNOT, Petitioner

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC
NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY,
Respondent
G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987
FACTS:
Petitioners' 6 carabaos were confiscated by the police for having b een transported from Masbate to Iloilo
in violation of EO 626-A. He brought an action for replevin, challenging the consitutionality of the EO. The trial
court sustained the confiscation of the animals and declined to rule on the validity of the law on the ground that it
lacked authority to do so. Its decision was affirmed by the IAC. Hence this petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction in ruling the case.
RULING:
Yes. RTC has jurisdiction in ruling the case.
Under the provision granting the SC jurisdiction to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or
certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide final judgments of lower courts" in all cases involving the
constitutionality of certain measures, lower courts can pass upon the validity of a statute in the first instance.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
EDESIO ADAO, Complainant

vs
JUDGE CELSO F. LORENZO, Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Borongan, Eastern Samar, Respondent
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1496, October 13, 1999
FACTS:
This is a complaint filed against Judge Celso F. Lorenzo of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, of Borongan,
Eastern Samar in connection with the issuance by him of a temporary restraining order in Civil Case No. 3391,
entitled Nerio B. Naputo v. Edesio Adao and the Municipal Local Government Officer of Taft, Eastern Samar.
The administrative complaint charges that, in issuing the TRO, respondent acted with gross inexcusable
negligence, manifest partiality, and evident bad faith.
Complainant Edesio Adao was elected barangay captain of Mabuhay, Taft, Eastern Samar. It is alleged that
after his proclamation as barangay captain, the losing candidate, Nerio Naputo, filed against him an election
protest, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 56-97 in the Municipal Trial Court of Taft, Eastern Samar; that on
June 13, 1997, Naputos lawyers, Attys. Edwin B. Docena and Rodolfo Joji A. Acol, Jr., also filed a complaint for
injunction (Civil Case No. 3391) to prevent complainant from being elected president in the elections held on June
14, 1997 for officers of the Association of Barangay Captains of the Municipality of Taft, Eastern Samar; that on the
same day the said complaint was filed (June 13, 1997), respondent judge issued a temporary restraining order; that
on June 23, 1997, after successfully preventing complainant from participating in the elections, Naputos lawyer,
Atty. Edwin Docena, filed a notice of dismissal of Civil Case No. 3391; that complainant objected; that until now
complainants objection to the dismissal of the case remains unacted upon; that respondent judge acted in
violation of Supreme Court Administrative Circular 20-95, as the temporary restraining order was issued by him
without notice to complainant and a summary hearing and in the absence of urgency for the issuance of the same;
that respondent judge was politically motivated in issuing the TRO because he was promoted to RTC judge through
the efforts of former Rep. Jose Ramirez, one of whose supporters is Nerio Naputos lawyer, Atty. Edwin Docena;
and that respondent judge is guilty of violation of 3, par. 2 (Dishonesty and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act); 3, par. 3 (Violation of the Code of Judicial conduct); and 3, par. 9 of Rule 140 (Gross ignorance of the
law and procedure) and the following provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent acted with gross inexcusable negligence, manifest partiality, and evident
bad faith in issuing TRO.
RULING:
Respondents excuse is unjustifiable. The fact that respondent judge presides over four branches of the
RTC is not a valid excuse for his inaction. As we stated in Request of Judge Irma Zita V. Masamayor, RTC-Branch 52,
Talibon, Bohol for Extension of Time to Decide Criminal Case No. 96-185, “A heavy caseload may excuse a judges

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
failure to decide cases within the reglementary period, but not his/her failure to request an extension of time
within which to decide the case on time”. Nor can respondent use as an excuse the administrative and criminal
complaints filed against him by complainant as the complaints were filed only in May, 1999, more than a year after
complainant filed his memorandum in opposition to the notice of dismissal on September, 1997. Under Article VIII,
15(1) of the Constitution, judges of lower courts are required to decide cases or resolve matters within three
months from the date of their submission for resolution. In at least two cases, we considered the failure of judges
to decide even a single case within the 90-day period gross inefficiency.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Petitioner

vs
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, Respondent
G.R. No. 191002, MARCH 17, 2010
FACTS:
In the consolidated petitions, the petitioners De Castro, with the exception of Soriano, Tolentino and
Inting, submit that the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement
on May 17, 2010, on the ground that the prohibition against presidential appointments under Section 15, Article
VII does not extend to appointments in the Judiciary. In support thereof, the OSG contends that the incumbent
President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the
Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether Section 15, Article VII applies to appointments to the Judiciary (specifically in this case the
upcoming Chief Justice position).
RULING:
NO. We reverse Valenzuela. As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and,
among others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of
appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article VIII is dedicated to the Judicial Department and
defines the duties and qualifications of Members of the Supreme Court, among others. Section 4(1) and Section 9
of this Article are the provisions specifically providing for the appointment of Supreme Court Justices. In particular,
Section 9 states that the appointment of Supreme Court Justices can only be made by the President upon the
submission of a list of at least three nominees by the JBC; Section 4(1) of the Article mandates the President to fill
the vacancy within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the Members
of the Supreme Court.
Although Valenzuela came to hold that the prohibition covered even judicial appointments, it cannot be
disputed that the Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
Thereby, the confirmation made to the JBC by then Senior Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado of this Court, a

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
former member of the Constitutional Commission, about the prohibition not being intended to apply to the
appointments to the Judiciary, which confirmation Valenzuela even expressly mentioned, should prevail.
Moreover, the usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word shall an imperative, operating to impose a
duty that may be enforced should not be disregarded. Thereby, Sections 4(1) imposes on the President the
imperative duty to make an appointment of a Member of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence
of the vacancy. The failure by the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to the Constitution.
The 90-day limitation fixed in Section 4(1), Article VIII for the President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme
Court was undoubtedly a special provision to establish a definite mandate for the President as the appointing
power, and cannot be defeated by mere judicial interpretation in Valenzuela to the effect that Section 15, Article
VII prevailed because it was couched in stronger negative language. Such interpretation even turned out to be
conjectural, in light of the records of the Constitutional Commissions deliberations on Section 4 (1), Article VIII.
Consequently, prohibiting the incumbent President from appointing a Chief Justice on the premise that
Section 15, Article VII extends to appointments in the Judiciary cannot be sustained. A misinterpretation like
Valenzuela should not be allowed to last after its false premises have been exposed. It will not do to merely
distinguish Valenzuela from these cases, for the result to be reached herein is entirely incompatible with what
Valenzuela decreed. Consequently, Valenzuela now deserves to be quickly sent to the dustbin of the unworthy and
forgettable.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ATTY. AMADOR Z. TOLENTINO JR and ATTY. ROLAND B. INTING, Petitioners

vs
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC), Respondent
G. R. No. 191342, April 20, 2010

(Enactment of the DE CASTRO v. JBC case)
FACTS:
This is a consolidated case which assails the constitutionality of the action of former President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo by appointing a Chief Justice 7 days after the Presidential election in 2010.
After the compulsory retirement of former Chief Justice Reynato Puno, the position of Chief Justice was
left vacant. Section 4 (1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution states that, "vacancy shall be filled
within ninety days from occurrence thereof," from a, "List of nominees prepared by the Judicial Bar Council for
every vacancy" furthermore, Section 15, Article VII was also taken into consideration which prohibits the President
or the Acting President from making appointments within two (2) months immediately before the next Presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The JBC agreed that the vacant position must be filled and there were five (5) candidates for the position
from the most senior of the Associates of the court and one of them is Associate Justice Reynato C. Corona who
was chosen by the President and was appointed for the position of Chief Justice.
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief
Justice since the Constitution do not apply to the Supreme Court. If the framers of the Constitution intended the
prohibition to apply in the Supreme Court then it should have expressly stated it in the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President can appoint the successor of the Chief Justice.
RULING:
Yes, the President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice as the prohibitions in the Constitution.
If the framers of the Constitution intend that the prohibition shall apply to the appointment of Chief
Justice, then they should have expressly stated it in the Constitution under Section 15 (THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT), Article VII and Section 4 (1), Article VIII (JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT).
Section 14, Section 15 and Section 16 refers only to the appointments made in the Executive Department.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner

vs.
JUDICIALAND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., Respondent
G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012
FACTS:
Pursuant to Sec. 8(1), Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Congress, from the moment of the creation of
the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), designated one representative to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex officio
members. Perhaps in order to give equal opportunity to both houses to sit in the exclusive body, the House of
Representatives and the Senate would send alternate representatives to the JBC. In other words, Congress had
only one representative. In 1994, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only
seven members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in
the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half of a vote.
Then, in 2001, the JBC En Banc decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each. At present, Senator Escudero and Congressman Tupas simultaneously sit in the
JBC as representatives of the legislature. Thus, arising from the unexpected departure of Chief Justice Renato
Corona, former Solicitor General Francisco Chavez was nominated and questioned this practice in the JBC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not this practice of the JBC is violative of the 1987 Constitution.
RULING:
YES. First, Sec. 8(1), Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution uses the singular letter "a" preceding "representative
of Congress" which is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of the intention of
the Constitutional Commission that Congress may designate only one representative to the JBC.
Second, the purpose of the seven-member composition of the JBC is to provide a solution should there be
a stalemate in voting. This reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided into half,
between two representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter. This
practice can possibly cause disorder and eventually muddle the JBC’s voting process. The purpose would then be
rendered illusory, defeating the precise mechanism which the Constitution itself created.
Lastly, the paramount justification of the Court is that "Congress," in the context of JBC representation,
should be considered as one body. It is evident that the definition of "Congress" as a bicameral body refers to its
primary function in government – to legislate.In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of
the role of each house in the process and in its non-legislative powers. An inter-play between the two houses is
necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount.
Verily, each house is constitutionally granted with powers and functions peculiar to its nature and with keen
consideration to 1) its relationship with the other chamber; and 2) in consonance with the principle of checks and

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
balances, to the other branches of government. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation
because no mechanism is required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening and
nomination of judicial officers. Hence, the term "Congress" must be taken to mean the entirelegislative
department. Therefore, the practice of having more than one representative from the Congress in the JBC negates
the principle of equality among the three branches of government which is enshrined in the Constitution.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018

vs.
JUDICIALAND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., Respondents
G.R. No. 202242, April 16, 2013
FACTS:
In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two
representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one from the
Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and
2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each.
Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC
as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. it should
mean one representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress. Respondent contends that
the phrase “ a representative of congress” refers that both houses of congress should have one representative
each, and that these two houses are permanent and mandatory components of “congress” as part of the
bicameral system of legislature. Both houses have their respective powers in performance of their duties. Art VIII
Sec 8 of the constitution provides for the component of the JBC to be 7 members only with only one
representative from congress.
ISSUE:
Whether the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the House of Representatives making
8 instead of 7 sitting members to be unconstitutional as provided in Art VIII Sec 8 of the constitution.
RULING:
Yes. The practice is unconstitutional; the court held that the phrase “a representative of congress” should
be construed as to having only one representative that would come from either house, not both. That the framers
of the constitution only intended for one seat of the JBC to be allotted for the legislative.
It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in
government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each
house in the process. The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-play between the two
houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply
discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two
houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative
department. The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs
HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 104 of Quezon City, and
ALEXANDER DIONISIO Y MANIO, respondents. HON. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, Ombudsman, intervenor-
Respondent
G.R. No. L-108208, March 11, 1994
FACTS:
On 31 July 1991, private respondent Alexander Dionisio y Manio, a member of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) assigned to the Central Police District Command Station 2 in Novaliches, Quezon City, was dispatched
by his Commanding Officer to Dumalay Street in Novaliches to respond to a complaint that a person was creating
trouble there. Dionisio proceeded to that place, where he subsequently shot to death T/Sgt. Romeo Sadang. Office
of the City Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City an Information charging Dionisio
with the crime of homicide. The respondent Judge dismissed said Criminal Case for re-filing with the
Sandiganbayan" on the ground that it is the Sandiganbayan and not the Regional Trial Court, has the jurisdiction
over the case. This is in view with the SC decision in the case of Deloso vs. Domingo, quoted that “ The
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over offenses committed by public officials when penalty prescribed by law for the
offense is higher than prision correccional”, the offense charged in the herein case carries penalty of reclusion
temporal maximum to death” thus cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction
to investigate it.
Petitioner opposed the RTC dismissal of the case due to Court’s jurisdiction. He asserted that crimes
committed by PNP members are not cognizable by the Sandiganbayan because they fall within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the regular courts" as provided in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 and the Sandiganbayan is not a regular
court but a special court."
ISSUES:
1. Whether the term “regular courts” includes the Sandiganbayan.
2. Whether all offenses committed by public officer or employee with penalty higher than prision
correctional would automatically be cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
RULING:
1. Yes, Sandiganbayan is a regular Court.
Regular courts are those within the judicial department of the government, namely, the Supreme Court
and such lower courts which as established by law, under Section 16, Chapter 4, Book II of the Administrative Code
of 1987, includes the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals, Regional Trial Courts, Shari'a District

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, and Shari'a Circuit Courts.
Accordingly, the term regular courts in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 means civil courts. This is in line with the
purpose of the law to remove the jurisdiction of Court- Martial over criminal cases involving PNP members due to
reorganization and turning PNP into civilian in character which in return mandates the transfer of criminal cases
against members of the PNP to the civilian courts.
2. No, If the allegation in the information of the offense of any public officer is not related to his function
in his public office then RTC has the exclusive jurisdiction over the case.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
RENATO CAYETANO, Petitioner

vs
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO
CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, Respondent
G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991,
FACTS:
Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the
COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Renato
Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years as required under Section 1 (1), Article IX-C of the 1987
Constitution. Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC
and he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC. Renato Cayetano
challenged the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination and filed
the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment
of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether there was a valid nomination and confirmation of appointment of Monsod as he satisfied the
ten year practice of law requirement.
RULING:
YES. Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which
are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which
device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the
Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-
entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor —
verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
THE NACIONALISTA PARTY ET AL., Petitioners

vs
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. No. L-3521, December 13, 1949
FACTS:
Petitioner Nacionalista Party alleges that it is organized and registered under the laws of the Philippines,
brought this action praying that a writ of prohibition issue commanding the respondent Solicitor General to desist
forever from acting as acting member of the Commission on Elections under the designation rendered to him by
President Quirino, unless he is legally appointed as regular member of the said Commission on Elections.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner, a political party is entitled to bring an action in the courts of justice.
RULING:
It may be organized and registered as a political party in or with the Commission on Elections for the
purposes of the Revised Election Code (Republic Act No. 180), but for the purpose of bringing an action in the
courts of justice such organization and registration are not sufficient. It has to be incorporated under Act 1459 for
only natural or juridical persons may be parties in a civil action, but this technical defect may be cured by allowing
the substitution of the real parties in interest for the petitioner.
The petitioner is granted five days within which to amend its petition so as to substitute the real parties in
interest for it (the petitioner) or to show that it is a juridical person entitled to institute these proceedings.
Otherwise, or if the petitioner does not amend its petition or does not show that it is a juridical entity, the petition
will be dismissed. After the amendment or showing referred to shall have been made, the writ prayed for will
issue.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018

vs
HAYDEE B. YORAC, in her capacity as ACTING CHAIRPERSON of the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent
G.R. No. 93867, December 18, 1990
FACTS:
In December 1989, a coup attempt occurred prompting the president to create a fact finding commission
which would be chaired by Hilario Davide. Consequently he has to vacate his chairmanship over the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC). Haydee Yorac, an associate commissioner in the COMELEC, was appointed by then
President Corazon Aquino as a temporary substitute, in short, she was appointed in an acting capacity. Sixto
Brillantes, Jr. then questioned such appointment urging that under Art 10-C of the Constitution “in no case shall
any member of the COMELEC be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity”. Brillantes further
argued that the choice of the acting chairman should not come from the President for such is an internal matter
that should be resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the president violates the
independence of the COMELEC as a constitutional commission.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the designation made by the president violates the constitutional independence of the
COMELEC.
RULING:
Yes. Yorac’s designation as acting chairman is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court ruled that although all
constitutional commissions are essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the president in
the discharge of their functions. The designation made by the president has dubious justification as it was merely
grounded on the quote “administrative expediency” to present the functions of the COMELEC. Aside from such
justification, it found no basis on existing rules on statutes. It is the members of the COMELEC who should choose
whom to sit temporarily as acting chairman in the absence of Davide (they normally do that by choosing the most
senior member).
But even though the president’s appointment of Yorac as acting president is void, the members of
COMELEC can choose to reinstate Yorac as their acting chairman – the point here is that, it is the members who
should elect their acting chairman pursuant to the principle that constitutional commissions are independent
bodies.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
THE NACIONALISTA PARTY, MARCELO ADDURU, DOMOCAO ALONTO, PEDRO C. HERNAEZ, TRINIDAD F.
LEGARDA, ALEJO MABANAG, CLARO M. RECTO, JOSE O. VERA, and JOSE VELOSO, Petitioners
vs
VICENTE DE VERA, as Chairman of the Commission on Elections, Respondent
G.R. No. L-3474, December 7, 1949
FACTS:
This is an action brought by the Nacionalista Party against De Vera on the ground that his appointment as
Chairman of the COMELEC is a violation of the Constitution particularly Art. X, Sec. 1 of the 1935 Constitution
which provides that the members of the COMELEC shall hold office for nine years without reappointment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not De Vera’s appointment as COMELEC is unconstitutional.
RULING:
The prohibition against reappointment comes as a continuation of the requirement that the Commission
shall hold office for a term of nine years. Reappointment is not prohibited provided his term will not exceed
nine years in all. In July 1945, three Commissioners were appointed.
De Vefra was appointed for three years. If he were to succeed himself, he cannot be reappointed to do so
because that would preclude the appointment of a new member after 3 years and would furthermore increase his
term to 12 years since upon the expiration of his term, his successor must be appointed for nine years. But in this
case, de Vera's appointment was by virtue of the death of the Chairman in 1947 and he was
promoted to occupy the chairmanship of the Commission for the unexpired term only.
Thus, this is not offensive to the Constitution because it does not increase de Vera's term of office to
more than nine years nor does it preclude the appointment of a new member upon the expiration of the first term
of three years.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018

vs.
HONORABLE DOMINGO IMPERIAL and HONORABLE RODRIGO D. PEREZ, respondents.
G.R. No. L-8684, March 31, 1955
FACTS:
This is a quo warranto proceeding to test the legality of the continuance in office of Imperial as chairman
and Perez as member of the COMELEC. When Chairman De Vera died in August 1951, before the expiration of the
maximum term of nine years of the Chairman of the Commission, Imperial was appointed Chairman to succeed de
Vera. His appointment provided for a term expiring July 12, 1960. The SG contented that the term for which he will
legally serve as Chairman legally expired on July 12, 1954, the expiration of the 9 year term for which the first
Chairman was appointed COMELEC member Perez on the other hand, was appointed for a term of 9 years expiring
on 24 November 1958. The SG contented that his term legally expired on July 12, 1951, the expiration of the term
of 6 years for which Commissioner Enage, his predecessor was appointed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the continuance in office of Imperial as chairman and Perez as member of the COMELEC is
legal.
RULING:
The terms cannot begin from the first appointments made in July 12, 1945 but from the date of the
organization of the COMELEC under CA 657 on June 21, 1941. Thus, the term of office of the first Chairman, Lopez
Vito began on June 21, 1941 and ended June 20, 1950. That of member Enage began on June 21, 1941 to
June 20, 1944 (but this was not filled). Since the first 3 year term had already expired in 1944, the appointment of
De Vera on June 12, 1945 must be for the full term of nine years (June 1944 to June 1953). The first vacancy
occurred by the expiration of the term of Enage. His successor, Perez, was named for a full 9 year term which
shall have started on June 1947 to June 1956. The second vacancy happened upon the death of Lopez Vito on May
1947. To succeed him, de Vera appointed and lasted only up to June 1950, the unexpired period of Lopez Vito's
term. Thus, on June 1950, a vacancy occurred which De Vera could no longer fill because his appointment was
expressly prohibited by the Constitution. Thus, the next Chairman was respondent Imperial whose term of 9 years
must be deemed to have begun on June 21, 1990 to expire on June 20, 1959.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
THELMA P. GAMINDE, Petitioner

vs
COMMISSION ON AUDIT and/or Hon. CELSO D. GANGAN, Hon. RAUL C. FLORES and EMMANUEL M. DALMAN,
Respondent
G.R. No. 140335, December 13, 2000
FACTS:
On June 11, 1993, the President appointed Thelma Gaminde (Gaminde) herein petitioner as ad interim
Commissioner of the Civil Service Commission (CSC). Verily, her appointment letter provides that her term would
expire on February 2, 1999 pursuant to provisions of existing law. Come February 24, 1998, Gaminde sought
clarification from the President as to the date of the end of her term in office. The Chief Presidential Legal Counsel
opined that Gaminde’s term of office would expire on February 2, 2000 and not on February 2, 1999. Thereafter,
Gaminde remained in office after February 2, 1999. Subsequently, the Commission on Audit (COA) questioned the
extension of Gaminde’s term. Since as per her appointment letter, Gaminde’s term of office should have been only
until February 2, 1999.
ISSUE:
Whether the term of Gaminde expired on February 2, 1999 as per her letter of appointment.
RULING:
YES. The term of office of Gaminde expired on February 2, 1999. The term of office of the Chairman and
members of the Civil Service Commission is prescribed in the 1987 Constitution, as follows:
"Section 1 (2). The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those
first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, a Commissioner for five years, and
another Commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be
only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity."
In a string of cases, we said that "the operation of the rotational plan requires two conditions, both
indispensable to its workability: (1) that the terms of the first three (3) Commissioners should start on a common
date, and, (2) that any vacancy due to death, resignation or disability before the expiration of the term should only
be filled only for the unexpired balance of the term."
Consequently, the terms of the first Chairmen and Commissioners of the Constitutional Commissions under
the 1987 Constitution must start on a common date, irrespective of the variations in the dates of appointments
and qualifications of the appointees, in order that the expiration of the first terms of seven, five and three years
should lead to the regular recurrence of the two-year interval between the expiration of the terms.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
On June 11, 1993, the President appointed Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde Commissioner, Civil Service Commission,
for a term expiring February 02, 1999. This terminal date is specified in her appointment paper. On September 07,
1993, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the appointment. She accepted the appointment and assumed
office on June 22, 1993. She is bound by the term of the appointment she accepted, expiring February 02, 1999. In
this connection, the letter dated April 07, 1998, of Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona clarifying that her
term would expire on February 02, 2000, was in error. What was submitted to the Commission on Appointments
was a nomination for a term expiring on February 02, 1999. Thus, the term of her successor must be deemed to
start on February 02, 1999, and expire on February 02, 2006.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
BENJAMIN C. JUCO, Petitioner,

Vs
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION, Respondents
G.R. No. 98107, AUGUST 18, 1997
FACTS:
Benjamin C. Juco was hired as a project engineer of National Housing Corporation(NHC) from November
16, 1970 to May 14, 1975. On May 14, 1975, he was separated from the service for having been implicated in a
crime of theft and/or malversation of public funds. On March 25, 1977, Juco filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
against the NHC with the Department of Labor. On September 17, 1977, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision
dismissing the complaint on the ground that the NLRC had jurisdiction over the case. Juco then elevated the case
to the NLRC which rendered a decision onDecember 28, 1982, reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter. NHC
then appealed the NLRC decision before the Supreme Court and on January 17, 1985 which petition the Court
granted thereby setting aside the NLRC decision and reinstating the labor arbiter’s decision of dismissing the case.
On January 6, 1989, Juco filed with the Civil Service Commission a complaint for illegal dismissal, with preliminary
mandatory injunction. OnFebruary6,1989,NHC moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the
Civil ServiceCommission has no jurisdiction over the case. CSC granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction.On April 28, 1989, Juco filed with NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal withpreliminary mandatory
injunction against NHC. NLRC find NHC guilty of illegal dismissal. On June 1, 1990, NHC filed its appeal before the
NLRC and on March 14, 1991, the NLRC promulgated a decision which reversed the decision of Labor Arbiter
Manuel R. Caday on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is not governed
by the Labor Code
RULING:
Yes. Under the laws then in force, employees of government-owned and/or controlled corporations were
governed by the Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code. Although in National Housing Corporation v Juco, it
was held that employees of government-owned and/or controlled corporations, whether created by special law or
formed as subsidiaries under the general Corporation Law, are governed by the Civil Service Law and not by the
Labor Code, this ruling has been supplanted by the 1987Constitution which states that the civil service embraces
all branches subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government owned or
controlled corporations with original charter. In National Service Corporation (NASECO) v National Labor Relations
Commission, it was held that the NLRC has jurisdiction over the employees of NASECO on the ground that it is
the1987 Constitution that governs because it is the Constitution in place at the time of the decision. It was further

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
held that the new phrase "with original charter" means that government-owned and controlled corporations refer
to corporations chartered by special law as distinguished from corporations organized under the Corporation
Code.
Thus, NASECO which had been organized under the general incorporation statute and a subsidiary of the
National Investment Development Corporation, which in turn was a subsidiary of the Philippine National Bank, is
excluded from the purview of the Civil Service Commission. The above doctrine applies in this case. In the case at
bench, the National Housing Corporation is a government owned corporation organized in 1959 in accordance
with Executive Order No. 399, otherwise known as the Uniform Charter of Government Corporation, dated January
1, 1959. Its shares of stock are and have been one hundred percent (100%) owned by the Government from its
incorporation under Act 1459, the former corporation law. The government entities that own its shares of stock
are the Government Service Insurance System, the Social Security System, the Development Bank of the
Philippines, the National Investment and Development Corporation and the People's Home site and Housing
Corporation. Considering the fact that the NHA had been incorporated under Act1459, the former corporation law,
it is but correct to say that it is a government-owned or controlled corporation whose employees are subject to the
provisions of the Labor Code. This observation is reiterated in the recent case of Trade Union of the Philippines and
Allied Services (TUPAS) v National Housing Corporation, where the SC held that the NHA is now withinthe
jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and Employment, it being a government-owned and/or controlled
corporation without an original charter. Furthermore, the Court previously ruled that the workers or employees of
the NHC (now NHA) undoubtedly have the right to form unions or employee's organization and that there is no
impediment to the holding of a certification election among them as they are covered by the Labor Code.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent
G.R. No. 142297, June 15, 2004
FACTS:
22 Nov. 1990: RA 6971, “An Act to Encourage Productivity and Maintain Industrial Peace by Providing
Incentives to Both Labor and Capital,” was approved and took effect on 9 Dec. 1990. The Secretary of Labor and
Employment and the Secretary of Finance promulgated the Rules Implementing RA 6971. Pursuant to Sec. 1
Coverage the Rules shall apply to: a. All business enterprises with or without existing duly recognized or certified
labor organization, including GOCC performing proprietary functions; b. All employees and workers including
casual, regular, rank-and-file, supervisory and managerial employees. 21 Nov. 1991: HDMF granted Productivity
Incentive Bonus equivalent to one month salary plus allowance to all its personnel pursuant to RA 6971 and its
Implementing Rules. The HDMF granted said bonus despite the advice of Undersecretary Salvador Enriquez of
Dept. Of Budget and Management (DBM) to all GOCCs and governmental financial institutions (GFIs) with original
charters performing proprietary functions to defer payment of the productivity incentive bonus to their
employees, pending the issuance of a definite ruling by the Office of the President.27 Dec. 1991: DOLE and Dept.
Of Finance issued Supplemental Rules Implementing RA 6971Section 1.—Paragraph (a) Section 1, Rule II of the
Rules Implementing RA6971, shall be amended to read as follows: Coverage. These Rules shall apply to:(a)All
business enterprises with or without existing duly certified labor organizations including government-owned and
controlled corporations performing proprietary functions which are established solely for business or profit or gain
and accordingly excluding those created, maintained or acquired in pursuance of a policy of the state, enunciated
in the Constitution or by law, and those whose officers and employees are covered by the Civil Service. 29 Nov.
1996: the grant of productivity incentive bonus to the HDMF personnel was disallowed in audit under Notice of
Disallowance. The disallowance was based on COA Decision No. 96-288, stating that RA 6971 does not apply to
GOCCs or to GFIs with original charters performing proprietary functions, such as the HDMF.28 May 1997: HDMF,
through its President and CEO Zorayda Alonzo, requested for the lifting of the disallowance arguing that RA 6971
applies to HDMF employees since coverage of the law includes GOCCs performing proprietary functions, and the
supplemental rules excluding it from coverage was issued after the HDMF had already granted the productivity
incentive bonus to its employees.16 June 1998: COA affirmed the audit disallowance in its Decision No. 98-245
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Supplemental Rules are valid? If so, whether or not it may be given retroactive effect?
RULING:
HDMF is a GOCC performing proprietary functions with original charter or created by special law, PD 1752
amending PD 1530. As such, HDMF is covered by the Civil Service pursuant to Article IX, Section 2(1) of the 1987
Constitution, and therefore, excluded from the coverage of RA 6971.Since RA 6971 intended to cover only GOCCs
incorporated under the general corporation law, the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
implementation of the statute is necessarily limited to what is intended and provided for in the legislative
enactment. Hence, the Supplemental Rules clarified that GOCCs performing proprietary functions which are
“created, maintained or acquired in pursuance of a policy of the state, enunciated in the constitution or by law,
and those whose officers and employees are covered by the Civil Service” are excluded from the coverage of RA
6971.Therefore, even if petitioner HDMF granted the Productivity Incentive Bonus before the Supplemental Rules
were issued clarifying that petitioner was excluded from the coverage of RA. 6971, the employees of HDMF did not
acquire a vested right over said bonus because they were not entitled to it under RA 6971.Moreover, the DBM
advised HDMF, on August 26, 1991, to defer payment of the productivity incentive bonus to their employees,
pending the issuance of a definite ruling by the Office of the President on the matter. Despite said advice, the
Board of Trustees of HDMF opted to grant the said bonus on a voluntary basis as stated in its Resolution No. 91-
549, Series of 1991. It expressed its “concern over the welfare of the officers and employees of the Fund rather
than adhering to the stringent technicality of the law.” The Board, therefore, was aware that possibly HDMF may
not be covered by RA 6971. It should have exercised prudence by awaiting the definite ruling on the coverage to
prevent legal problems. Anent the validity of the Supplemental Rules Implementing RA 6971, the SC held that said
rules issued by the Secretary of DOLE and Secretary of Finance were in accord with the intendment and provisions
of RA 6971.
In view of the foregoing, COA did not commit GADALEJ in affirming the audit disallowance. The petition was
dismissed and COA’s Resolution and Decision were affirmed

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner,

vs.
CAYETANO A. TEJANO, JR., Respondent
G.R. No. 173615, October 16, 2009
FACTS:
The case stems from a number of alleged irregular and fraudulent transactions made by respondent
Cayetano A. Tejano, Jr. supposedly with the participation of eight (8) other employees of petitioner Philippine
National Bank (PNB) in its branch in Cebu City namely Ma. Teresa Chan, Marcelino Magdadaro, Douglasia Canuel,
Novel Fortich, Jacinto Ouano, Quirubin Blanco, Manuel Manzanares and Pedrito Ranile. Respondent, together with
the other employees, allegedly committed grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, conduct grossly prejudicial to
the best interest of the service and acts violative of Republic Act No. 3019, relative to the corporate accounts of
and transactions with Pat International Trading Corporation (PITC), Khun Tong International Trading Corporation
(KITC), Pat Garments International Corporation (PGIC), Aqua Solar Trading Corporation, Dacebu Traders and
Exporters, Mancao Mercantile Co., Inc. and V&G Better Homes Subdivision. All of these transactions transpired at
the time that PNB was still a government-owned and controlled corporation. Respondent, who was then the Vice-
President and Manager of the bank, and the eight other employees were administratively charged before the PNB
Management Hearing Committee on February 24 and March 17, 1994. At the close of the hearing on the merits,
the Committee found that with respect to respondent, he was guilty of gross misconduct in misappropriating the
funds of V&G and of gross neglect in extending unwarranted credit accommodations to PITC, PGIC and KITC which
must serve as an aggravating circumstance. The Committee then recommended that respondent be meted the
penalty of forced resignation without forfeiture of benefits. The PNB Board of Directors differed. In its Resolution
No. 88[5] dated June 21, 1995, it found that respondents gross neglect in giving unwarranted credit to PITC, PGIC
and KITC must serve as an aggravating circumstance in relation to the offense of grave misconduct consisting of
misappropriation of V&G funds and must serve the penalty of forced resignation with forfeiture of benefits. In the
meantime, on May 27, 1996, the PNB had ceased to be a government-owned and controlled corporation, and in
view of its conversion into a private banking institution by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 80. Despite this
development, the CSC, on April 14 1998, issued Resolution No. 980716 dismissing respondents appeal for being
filed out of time.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration on which the CSC required petitioner to comment. In its Comment,
petitioner theorized that even granting respondents appeal was filed on time, the same must, nevertheless, be
dismissed on account of the privatization of PNB which thereby removed the case from the jurisdiction of the CSC.
The CSC found this argument meritorious and, subsequently, in its Resolution No. 983099 dated December 7,
1998, it denied respondents reconsideration on that ground.
Respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals on petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 50084.
The Court of Appeals found merit in respondents appeal. On January 3, 2006, it issued the assailed
Decision reversing the twin resolutions of the CSC. The appellate court pointed out that respondents appeal before
the CSC had been filed on time and that the said commission had not lost jurisdiction over it despite the
supervening privatization of PNB.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, it filed the instant petition for review bearing
the same issue as that raised previously.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ISSUE:
Whether or not CSC lost its jurisdiction over the case after the PNB was privatized.
RULING:
No, CSC has not lost its jurisdiction over the case even after its privatization.
In a language too plain to be mistaken, the quoted portion of the law only states no more than the
natural, logical and legal consequences of opening to private ownership the majority of the banks voting equity.
This is very evident in the title of the section called Change in Ownership of the Majority of the Voting Equity of the
Bank. Certainly, the transfer of the majority of the banks voting equity from public to private hands is an inevitable
effect of privatization or, conversely, the privatization of the bank would necessitate the opening of the voting
equity thereof to private ownership. And as the bank ceases to be government depository, it would, accordingly be
coming under the operation of the definite set of laws and rules applicable to all other private corporations
incorporated under the general incorporation law. Perhaps the aspect of more importance in the present case is
that the bank, upon its privatization, would no longer be subject to the coverage of government service-wide
agencies such as the CSC and the Commission on Audit (COA).
By no stretch of intelligent and reasonable construction can the provisions in Section 6 of E.O. No. 80 be
interpreted in such a way as to divest the CSC of jurisdiction over pending disciplinary cases involving acts
committed by an employee of the PNB at the time that the bank was still a government-owned and controlled
corporation. Stated otherwise, no amount of reasonable inference may be derived from the terms of the said
Section to the effect that it intends to modify the jurisdiction of the CSC in disciplinary cases involving employees
of the government. While there is no denying that upon its privatization, the bank would consequently be subject
to laws, rules and regulations applicable to private corporations which is to say that disciplinary cases involving its
employees would then be placed under the operation of the Labor Code of the Philippines still, we cannot validate
petitioners own interpretation of Section 6 of E.O. No. 80 that the same must be applied to respondents pending
appeal with the CSC and that, resultantly, the CSC must abdicate its appellate jurisdiction without having to resolve
the case to finality.
It is binding rule, conformably with Article 4 of the Civil Code, that, generally, laws shall have only a
prospective effect and must not be applied retroactively in such a way as to apply to pending disputes and cases.
This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit (the law looks forward and not backward.)
The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive: the retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that
have already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and, hence, is unconstitutional. Although the
rule admits of certain well-defined exceptions such as, for instance, where the law itself expressly provides for
retroactivity, we find that not one of such exceptions that would otherwise lend credence to petitioners argument
obtains in this case. Hence, in other words, the fact that Section 6 of E.O. No. 80 states that PNB would be
removed from the coverage of the CSC must be taken to govern acts committed by the banks employees after
privatization.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
CARMELINDA C. BARRO, Petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (FIRST DIVISION); HON. DELIA P. NOEL-BERTULFO, in her capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Municipal Trial Court, Palompon, Leyte; and ELPEDIO P. CONTINEDAS, JR., Respondents
G.R. No. 186201, October 9, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner Carmelinda C. Barro and private respondent Elpedio P. Continedas, Jr. were candidates
for Punong Barangay of Barangay Plaridel, Palompon, Leyte during the October 29,
2007 synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections. Petitioner garnered 150 votes, while
respondent garnered 149 votes. The Barangay Board of Canvassers proclaimed petitioner as the duly elected Pu
nong Barangay, winning by a margin of only one vote.On November 5, 2007, private respondent filed an election
protest before the Municipal Trial Court of Palompon, Leyte (trial court), impugning the result of the canvass in
two precincts of the barangay. After the revision of ballots, the trial court found that petitioner and respondent
[6]
both garnered 151 votes On May 13, 2008, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal with the trial court and she stated
in her petition that she also paid the appeal fee required under Section 9, Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure in
Election Contests Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials (A.M. No. 07-4-15-
[7]
SC). Thereafter, the records of the case were forwarded to the COMELEC. On November 25, 2008, the First
Division of the COMELEC issued an Order dismissing petitioners appeal for failure to pay the appeal fee.
[9]
On December 15, 2008, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated November 25, 2008. On
the same date, she also posted Postal Money Order Nos. A0820039317; B0810040373 and J1350301774 in the
total sum of P3,200.00 payable to the Cash Division of the COMELEC to cover the appeal fee. Petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration was denied by the First Division of the COMELEC in its Order dated January 9, 2009.
ISSUE:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE [FIRST DIVISION OF THE COMELEC] COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DISMISSING THE APPEAL.
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING THE MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED BY PETITIONER.
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ACTING ON THE MOTION
[11]
FOR RECONSIDERATION WITHOUT ELEVATING THE SAME TO THE COMELECEN BANC.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
RULING:
The first issue is whether or not the First Division of the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
dismissing petitioners appeal. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction or an arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion or
personal hostility. The grave abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law.
The Court notes that in petitioners Notice of Appeal, she manifested payment of the appeal fees and
other lawful fees required for the appeal per Official Receipt Nos. 7719538 and 7719488. However, the receipts
were not attached to the record of the case. In her Petition, petitioner stated that when she filed her Notice of
Appeal on May 13, 2008, she also paid the appeal fee required under Section 9, Rule 14 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC. In
her Reply, petitioner also stated that she relied on the provision of Sections 8 and 9, Rule 14 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-
SC, which took effect on May 15, 2007, and that she believed in good faith that the said new Rules of Procedure
repealed the COMELEC Rules. Be that as it may, the Court still finds that the COMELEC First Division gravely abused
its discretion in issuing the order dismissing petitioner's appeal. The Court notes that the notice of appeal and
the P1,000.00 appeal fee were, respectively, filed and paid with the MTC of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte on April
21, 2008. On that date, the petitioner's appeal was deemed perfected. COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8486
clarifying the rule on the payment of appeal fees only onJuly 15, 2008, or almost three months after the appeal
was perfected. Yet, on July 31, 2008, or barely two weeks after the issuance of Resolution No. 8486, the COMELEC
First Division dismissed petitioner's appeal for non-payment to the COMELEC Cash Division of the
additional P3,200.00 appeal fee.
Considering that petitioner filed his appeal months before the clarificatory resolution on appeal fees,
petitioner's appeal should not be unjustly prejudiced by COMELEC Resolution No. 8486. Fairness and prudence
dictate that the COMELEC First Division should have first directed petitioner to pay the additional appeal fee in
accordance with the clarificatory resolution, and if the latter should refuse to comply, then, and only then, dismiss
the appeal. Instead, the COMELEC First Division hastily dismissed the appeal on the strength of the recently
promulgated clarificatory resolution which had taken effect only a few days earlier. This unseemly haste is an
invitation to outrage.
In this case, the appeal to the COMELEC was perfected when petitioner filed her Notice of Appeal and
paid the appeal fee of P1,000.00 on May 13, 2008, which was two months before the COMELEC issued Resolution
No. 8486, clarifying the rule on the payment of appeal fees. As stated in Aguilar, fairness and prudence dictate that
the First Division of the COMELEC should have first directed petitioner to pay the additional appeal fee ofP3,200.00
in accordance with the clarificatory resolution; and if petitioner refused to comply, only then should the appeal be
dismissed. The First Division of the COMELEC should have been more cautious in dismissing petitioners appeal on
the mere technicality of non-payment of the additional appeal fee of P3,200.00 given the public interest involved
in election cases.
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that the First Division of the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in issuing the Order dated November 25, 2008, dismissing petitioners appeal. The case is remanded to
the First Division of the COMELEC for disposition of the appeal in accordance with this decision, subject to the
presentation by petitioner of the receipt evidencing payment of the appeal fee of P1,000.00 as required under
Section 9, Rule 14 of A. M. No. 07-4-15-SC.
The second and third issues shall be discussed jointly.
The contention is meritorious.
It is settled that under Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution, what may be brought to this Court
on certiorari is the decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC en banc. However, this rule should not apply when a

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
division of the COMELEC arrogates unto itself and deprives the en banc of the authority to rule on a motion for
reconsideration, like in this case.
Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution provides for the procedure for the resolution of election cases
by the COMELEC, thus:
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate
its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in
division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the
Commission en banc.
The constitutional provision is reflected in Sections 5 and 6, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
as follows:
Sec. 5. How Motion for Reconsideration Disposed of. Upon the filing of a motion to
reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division, the Clerk of Court concerned shall,
within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing thereof, notify the Presiding Commissioner. The
latter shall within two (2) days thereafter certify the case to the Commission en banc.
Sec. 6. Duty of Clerk of Court of Commission to Calendar Motion for Reconsideration.

The Clerk of Court concerned shall calendar the motion for reconsideration for the resolution of
the Commission en banc within ten (10) days from the certification thereof.
In this case, the First Division of the COMELEC violated the cited provisions of the Constitution and the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure when it resolved petitioner's motion for reconsideration of its final Order
dated November 25, 2008, which dismissed petitioners appeal. By arrogating unto itself a power constitutionally
lodged in the Commission en banc, the First Division of the COMELEC exercised judgment in excess of, or without,
jurisdiction. Hence, the Order issued by the First Division of the COMELEC dated January 9, 2009, denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration, is null and void.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated November 25, 2008 and January 9, 2009 by the
First Division of the COMELEC, and the Entry of Judgment issued on April 1, 2009 by the Electoral Contests
Adjudication Department are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the First Division of the
Commission on Elections for disposition in accordance with this Decision.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, Petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, AND CLAUDE P. BAUTISTA, Respondents
G.R. No. 194139, JANUARY 24, 2012
FACTS:
The petitioner and respondent Claude P. Bautista (Bautista) contested the position of Governor of the
Province of Davao del Sur in the May 10, 2010 automated national and local elections. Results led to the
completion by May 14, 2010 of the canvassing of votes cast for Governor of Davao del Sur, and the petitioner was
proclaimed the winner.
Alleging fraud, anomalies, irregularities, vote-buying and violations of election laws, rules and resolutions,
Bautista filed an electoral protest on May 24, 2010 (EPC No. 2010-42). In his answer submitted on June 22, 2010,
the petitioner averred as his special affirmative defenses that Bautista did not make the requisite cash deposit on
time; and that Bautista did not render a detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of. COMELEC
First Division issued the first assailed order denying the special affirmative defenses of the petitioner. The
petitioner moved to reconsider on the ground that the order did not discuss whether the protest specified the
alleged irregularities in the conduct of the elections. He prayed that the matter be certified to the COMELEC en
banc. Bautista countered that the assailed orders, being merely interlocutory, could not be elevated to the
COMELEC en banc pursuant to the ruling in Panlilio v. COMELEC.
COMELEC First Division issued its second assailed order, denying the petitioners motion for
reconsideration for failing to show that the first order was contrary to law. Not satisfied, the petitioner
commenced this special civil action directly in this Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss the protest for insufficiency
in form and content.
RULING:
No. Petition Denied Political Law- SC cannot review a decision of a COMELEC Division
The governing provision is Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter
brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief,
or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless
otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within
thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. This provision, although it confers on the Court the
power to review any decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC, limits such power to a final decision
or resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and does not extend to an interlocutory order issued by a
Division of the COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review on certiorari an
interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC. The mode by
which a decision, order or ruling of the Comelec en banc may be elevated to the Supreme Court is
by the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, now
expressly provided in Rule 64, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Rule 65, Section 1, 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, requires that there be no appeal, or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A motion for reconsideration is a plain and
adequate remedy provided by law. Failure to abide by this procedural requirement constitutes a
ground for dismissal of the petition.
In like manner, a decision, order or resolution of a division of the Comelec must be reviewed by the
Comelec en banc via a motion for reconsideration before the final en banc decision may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari. The pre-requisite filing of a motion for reconsideration is mandatory. There is no
question, therefore, that the Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition forcertiorari assailing the
denial by the COMELEC First Division of the special affirmative defenses of the petitioner. The proper remedy is for
the petitioner to wait for the COMELEC First Division to first decide the protest on its merits, and if the result
should aggrieve him, to appeal the denial of his special affirmative defenses to the COMELEC en banc along with
the other errors committed by the Division upon the merits. Political Law- no final decision, resolution or order has
yet been made which will necessitate the elevation of the case and its records to the Commission en banc.
In the instant case, it does not appear that the subject controversy is one of the cases specifically provided
under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure in which the Commission may sit en banc. Neither is it shown that the
present controversy a case where a division is not authorized to act nor a situation wherein the members of the
First Division unanimously voted to refer the subject case to the Commission en banc. Clearly, the Commission en
banc, under the circumstances shown above, cannot be the proper forum which the matter concerning the
assailed interlocutory orders can be referred to. In a situation such as this where the Commission in division
committed grave abuse of discretion or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing interlocutory orders
relative to an action pending before it and the controversy did not fall under any of the instances mentioned in
Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the remedy of the aggrieved party is not to refer the
controversy to the Commission en banc as this is not permissible under its present rules but to elevate it to this
Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
PETITION DENIED.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ROMMEL APOLINARIO JALOSJOS, Petitioner
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSand DAN ERASMO, SR., Respondents
G.R. No. 191970, April 24, 2012
FACTS:
Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He Migrated to Australia and acquired Australian
citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age 35, he returned to the Philippines and lived with his brother in Barangay
Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Upon his return, he took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and was issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. He then renounced his Australian
citizenship in September 2009. He acquired residential property where he lived and applied for registration as
voter in the Municipality of Ipil. His application was opposed by the Barangay Captain of Veterans Village, Dan
Erasmo, sr. but was eventually granted by the ERB.
A petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos' name in the voter's list was then filed by Erasmo before the MCTC.
Said petition was denied. It was then appealed to the RTC who also affirmed the lower court's decision. On
November 8, 2009, Jalosjos filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay Province. Erasmo
filed a petition to deny or cancel said COC on the ground of failure to comply with R.A. 9225 and the one year
residency requirement of the local government code. COMELEC ruled that Jalosjos failed to comply with the
residency requirement of a gubernatorial candidate and failed to show ample proof of a bona fide intention to
establish his domicile in Ipil. COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in
Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
RULING:
The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial governor to be a
resident of the province for at least one year before the election. For purposes of the election laws, the
requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile, meaning that a person must not only intend to reside in a
particular place but must also have personal presence in such place coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention. The question of residence is a question of intention. Jurisprudence has laid down the following
guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile
remains until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time. It is inevitable under
these guidelines and the precedents applying them that Jalosjos has met the residency requirement for provincial

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
governor of Zamboanga Sibugay. Quezon City was Jalosjos’ domicile of origin, the place of his birth. It may be
taken for granted that he effectively changed his domicile from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there
at the age of eight, acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years. Australia became his
domicile by operation of law and by choice. When he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his
brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for good. He left
Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition, he
reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his
being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts,
Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has
since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile
in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by
operation of law (Australia) would violate the settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or residence
somewhere. The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since he has merely
been staying at his brother’s house. But this circumstance alone cannot support such conclusion. Indeed, the Court
has repeatedly held that a candidate is not required to have a house in a community to establish his residence or
domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a rented house or in the house
of a friend or relative. To insist that the candidate own the house where he lives would make property a
qualification for public office. What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil
and an intention of making it his domicile.
Further, it is not disputed that Jalosjos bought a residential lot in the same village where he lived and a
fish pond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He showed correspondences with political leaders, including
local and national party-mates, from where he lived. Moreover, Jalosjos is a registered voter of Ipil by final
judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga Sibugay. While the Court ordinarily respects the factual
findings of administrative bodies like the COMELEC, this does not prevent it from exercising its review powers to
correct palpable misappreciation of evidence or wrong or irrelevant considerations. The evidence Jalosjos
presented is sufficient to establish Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, as his domicile. The COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in holding otherwise. Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 gubernatorial race for
Zamboanga Sibugay. The Court will respect the decision of the people of that province and resolve all doubts
regarding his qualification in his favor to breathe life to their manifest will.
Court GRANTED the petition and SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., as the second nominee of CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION (CIBAC), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents
G.R. Nos. 179431-32, June 22, 2010
FACTS:
Respondent CIBAC party-list is a multi-sector party registered under Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7941,
otherwise known as the Party- List System Act. As stated in its constitution and bylaws, the platform of CIBAC is to
fight graft and corruption and to promote ethical conduct in the country’s public service. Under the leadership of
the National Council, its highest policymaking and governing body, the party participated in the 2001, 2004, and
2007 elections. On 20 November 2009, two different entities, both purporting to represent CIBAC, submitted to
the COMELEC a Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party-List System of Representation in the May 10,
2010 Elections. The first Manifestation was signed by a certain Pia B. Derla, who claimed to be the partys acting
secretary-general. At 1:30 p.m. of the same day, another Manifestation6 was submitted by herein respondents
Cinchona Cruz-Gonzales and Virginia Jose as the partys vice-president and secretary-general, respectively. On 15
January 2010, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 87447 giving due course to CIBACs Manifestation, WITHOUT
PREJUDICE the determination which of the two factions of the registered party-list/coalitions/sectoral
organizations which filed two (2) manifestations of intent to participate is the official representative of said party-
list/coalitions/sectoral organizations. On 19 January 2010, respondents, led by President and Chairperson
Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted the Certificate of Nomination of CIBAC to the COMELEC Law Department.
The nomination was certified by Villanueva and Virginia S. Jose. On 26 March 2010, Pia Derla submitted a second
Certificate of Nomination, which included petitioners Luis Lokin and Teresita Planas as party-list nominees. Derla
affixed to the certification her signature as acting secretary-general of CIBAC. Claiming that the nomination of
petitioners Lokin, Jr. and Planas was unauthorized, respondents filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Expunge
From The Records And/Or For Disqualification, seeking to nullify the Certificate filed by Derla. Respondents
contended that Derla had misrepresented herself as acting secretary-general, when she was not even a member of
CIBAC; that the Certificate of Nomination and other documents she submitted were unauthorized by the party and
therefore invalid; and that it was Villanueva who was duly authorized to file the Certificate of Nomination on its
behalf. In the Resolution dated 5 July 2010, the COMELEC First Division granted the Petition, ordered the
Certificate filed by Derla to be expunged from the records, and declared respondents faction as the true nominees
of CIBAC. Upon Motion for Reconsideration separately filed by the adverse parties, the COMELEC en banc affirmed
the Divisions findings. Petitioners now seek recourse with this Court in accordance with Rules 64 and 65 of the
Rules of Court.
ISSUES:
1) Whether the authority of Secretary General Virginia Jose to file the partys Certificate of Nomination is
an intra-corporate matter, exclusively cognizable by special commercial courts, and over which the COMELEC has
no jurisdiction; and
2) Whether the COMELEC erred in granting the Petition for Disqualification and recognizing respondents as
the properly authorized nominees of CIBAC party-list.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
RULING:
As earlier stated, this Court denies the petition for being filed outside the requisite period. The review by
this Court of judgments and final orders of the COMELEC is governed specifically by Rule 64 of the Rules of Court,
which states:
REMEDIAL LAW: review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the COA.
Sec. 1. Scope. This rule shall govern the review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit.
Sec. 2. Mode of review. A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on Elections and the
Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under
Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided. The exception referred to in Section 2 of this Rule refers precisely
to the immediately succeeding provision, Section 3 thereof, which provides for the allowable period
within which to file petitions for certiorari from judgments of both the COMELEC and the Commission on
Audit. Thus, while Rule 64 refers to the same remedy of certiorari as the general rule in Rule 65, they
cannot be equated, as they provide for different reglementary periods. Rule 65 provides for a period of 60
days from notice of judgment sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court, while Section 3 expressly
provides for only 30 days.
SEC. 3. Time to file petition. The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment
or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration
of said judgment or final order or resolution, if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission
concerned, shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the
petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned
from notice of denial. Petitioner received a copy of the first assailed Resolution on 12 July 2010. Upon the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners on 15 July 2010, the COMELEC en banc issued the second
assailed Resolution on 31 August 2010. This per curiam Resolution was received by petitioners on 1
September 2010.16 Thus, pursuant to Section 3 above, deducting the three days it took petitioners to file
the Motion for Reconsideration, they had a remaining period of 27 days or until 28 September 2010
within which to file the Petition for Certiorari with this Court. However, petitioners filed the present
Petition only on 1 October 2010, clearly outside the required period.
POLITICAL LAW: COMELEC’s jurisdiction over intra-party disputes.
In the 2010 case Atienza v. Commission on Elections, it was expressly settled that the COMELEC possessed
the authority to resolve intra-party disputes as a necessary tributary of its constitutionally mandated power to
enforce election laws and register political parties. The Court therein cited Kalaw v. Commission on Elections and
Palmares v. Commission on Elections, which uniformly upheld the COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party disputes:
The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes has already been settled by the Court. The Court
ruled in Kalaw v. Commission on Elections that the COMELECs powers and functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of
the Constitution, include the ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its legitimate officers
responsible for its acts. The Court also declared in another case that the COMELECs power to register political
parties necessarily involved the determination of the persons who must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may
resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an incident of its power to register
political parties.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ELECTION LAW: party-list system law.
Furthermore, matters regarding the nomination of party-list representatives, as well as their individual
qualifications, are outlined in the Party-List System Law. Sections 8 and 9 thereof state:
Sec. 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives. Each registered party, organization or coalition shall
submit to the COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less than five (5),
from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes. A person
may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing may be named in the
list. The list shall not include any candidate for any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an elective
office in the immediately preceding election. No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be
allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or
withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee
shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are
nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered resigned.
Sec. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative

unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of
not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide
member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of
the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election. By virtue of the aforesaid
mandate of the Party-List Law vesting the COMELEC with jurisdiction over the nomination of party-list
representatives and prescribing the qualifications of each nominee, the COMELEC promulgated its Rules on
Disqualification Cases Against Nominees of Party-List Groups/ Organizations Participating in the 10 May 2010
Automated National and Local Elections. Adopting the same qualifications of party-list nominees listed above,
Section 6 of these Rules also required that: The party-list group and the nominees must submit documentary
evidence in consonance with the Constitution, R.A. 7941 and other laws to duly prove that the nominees truly
belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, the sectoral party, organization, political party or
coalition they seek to represent, which may include but not limited to the following:
a. Track record of the party-list group/organization showing active participation of the nominee/s in the
undertakings of the party-list group/organization for the advancement of the marginalized and underrepresented
sector/s, the sectoral party, organization, political party or coalition they seek to represent;
b. Proofs that the nominee/s truly adheres to the advocacies of the party-list group/organizations (prior
declarations, speeches, written articles, and such other positive actions on the part of the nominee/sshowing
his/her adherence to the advocacies of the party-list group/organizations);
c. Certification that the nominee/s is/are a bona fide member of the party-list group/ organization for at
least ninety (90) days prior to the election; and
d. In case of a party-list group/organization seeking representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented sector/s, proof that the nominee/s is not only an advocate of the party-list/organization but
is/are also a bona fide member/s of said marginalized and underrepresented sector.
The Law Department shall require party-list group and nominees to submit the foregoing documentary
evidence if not complied with prior to the effectivity of this resolution not later than three (3) days from the last
day of filing of the list of nominees. Contrary to petitioners stance, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to
the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC en banc. The tribunal correctly found that Pia Derlas alleged
authority as acting secretary-general was an unsubstantiated allegation devoid of any supporting evidence.
Petitioners did not submit any documentary evidence that Derla was a member of CIBAC, let alone the
representative authorized by the party to submit its Certificate of Nomination.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in issuing the assailed
Resolutions, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. This Court AFFIRMS the judgment of the COMELEC expunging from
its records the Certificate of Nomination filed on 26 March 2010 by Pia B. Derla.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
MAMERTO T. SEVILLA, JR. Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RENATO R. SO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 203833, March 19, 2013
FACTS:
Sevilla and So were candidates for the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay Sucat, Muntinlupa City
during the October 25, 2010 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections. On October 26, 2010, the Board of
Election Tellers proclaimed Sevilla as the winner with a total of 7,354 votes or a winning margin of 628 votes over
So’s 6,726 total votes. On November 4, 2010, So filed an election protest with the MeTC on the ground that Sevilla
committed electoral fraud, anomalies and irregularities in all the protested precincts. So pinpointed twenty
percent (20%) of the total number of the protested precincts. He also prayed for a manual revision of the ballots.
Following the recount of the ballots in the pilot protested precincts, the MeTC issued an Order dated May
4, 2011 dismissing the election protest. On May 9, 2011, So filed a motion for reconsideration from the dismissal
order instead of a notice of appeal; he also failed to pay the appeal fee within the reglementary period. On May
17, 2011, the MeTC denied the motion for reconsideration on the ground that it was a prohibited pleading
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 6 of A.M. No. 07-04-15-SC.
In response, So filed a petition for certiorari on May 31, 2011 with the COMELEC, alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the MeTC Judge. So faults the MeTC for its non-observance of the rule that in the
appreciation of ballots, there should be a clear and distinct presentation of the specific details of how and why a
certain group of ballots should be considered as having been written by one or two persons.
On its May 14, 2012 Resolution, the COMELEC Second Division granted So’s petition. The COMELEC
Second Division held that certiorari can be granted despite the availability of appeals when the questioned order
amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority, as in the case before it. It also ruled that the assailed Order
was fraught with infirmities and irregularities in the appreciation of the ballots, and was couched in general terms:
"these are not written by one person observing the different strokes, slant, spacing, size and indentation of
handwriting and the variance in writing."
The COMELEC en banc, by a vote of 3-3, affirmed the COMELEC Second Division’s ruling in its October 6,
2012 Resolution whose dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
Respondent judge is directed to conduct another revision of the contested ballots in Election Protest Case No. SP-
6719 with dispatch.
It ruled that where the dismissal was capricious, certiorari lies as the petition challenges not the
correctness but the validity of the order of dismissal. The COMELEC en banc emphasized that procedural
technicalities should be disregarded for the immediate and final resolution of election cases inasmuch as ballots
should be read and appreciated with utmost liberality so that the will of the electorate in the choice of public
officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities. Hence the petition.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ISSUE:
WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.
RULING:
The court dismissed the petition for having been prematurely filed, and remand the case to the COMELEC
for its appropriate action.
The October 6, 2012 COMELEC en banc’s Resolution lacks legal effect as it is not a majority decision
required by the Constitution and by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution
requires that "each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members, any case or matter brought
before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. Pursuant to this Constitutional
mandate, the COMELEC provided in Section 5(a), Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure the votes required for
the pronouncement of a decision, resolution, order or ruling when the COMELEC sits en banc, viz.:
Section 5. Quorum; Votes Required. (a) When sitting en banc, four (4) Members of the Commission
shall constitute a quorum for the purpose of transacting business. The concurrence of a majority of
the Members of the Commission shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a decision,
resolution, order or ruling. [italics supplied; emphasis ours]
Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure specifically states that if the opinion of the
Comelec En Banc is equally divided, the case shall be reheard. The Court notes, however, that the
Order of the Comelec En Banc dated February 10, 2005 clearly stated that what was conducted was
a mere "re-consultation."
The Comelec, despite the obvious inclination of three commissioners to affirm the Resolution of the First
Division, cannot do away with a rehearing since its Rules clearly provide for such a proceeding for the body to have
a solicitous review of the controversy before it. A rehearing clearly presupposes the participation of the opposing
parties for the purpose of presenting additional evidence, if any, and further clarifying and amplifying their
arguments.
In the present case, it appears from the records that the Comelec en banc did not issue an Order for a
rehearing of the case in view of the filing in the interim of the present petition for certiorari by Sevilla. In both the
cases of Juliano and Marcoleta, cited above, we remanded the cases to the Comelec en banc for the conduct of the
required rehearing pursuant to the Comelec Rules of Procedure. Based on these considerations, we thus find that a
remand of this case is necessary for the Comelec en banc to comply with the rehearing requirement of Section 6,
Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
LUCITA Q. GARCES, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SALVADOR EMPEYNADO and CLAUDIO CONCEPCION, Respondents
G.R. No. 114795, July 17, 1996
FACTS:
Lucita Garces was appointed Election Registrar of Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte on July 27, 1986. She
was to replace respondent Election Registrar Claudio Concepcion, who, in turn, was transferred to Liloy,
Zamboanga del Norte.
Both appointments were to take effect upon assumption of office. Concepcion, however, refused to
transfer post as he did not request for it. Garces was directed by the Office of Assistant Director for Operations to
assume the Gutalac post. But she was not able to do so because of a Memorandum issued by respondent
Provincial Election Supervisor Salvador Empeynado that prohibited her from assuming office as the same is not
vacant.
Garces received a letter from the Acting Manager, Finance Service Department, with an enclosed check to
cover for the expenses on construction of polling booths. It was addressed “Mrs. Lucita Garces E.R. Gutalac,
Zamboanga del Norte” which Garces interpreted to mean as superseding the deferment order. Meanwhile, since
Concepcion continued occupying the Gutalac office, the COMELEC en banc cancelled his appointment to Liloy.
Garces filed before the RTC a petition for mandamus with preliminary prohibitory and mandatory
injunction and damages against Empeynado and Concepcion. Meantime, the COMELEC en banc resolved to
recognize respondent Concepcion as the Election Registrar of Gutalac and ordered that the appointments of
Garces be cancelled.
Empeynado moved to dismiss the petition for mandamus alleging that the same was rendered moot and
academic by the said COMELEC Resolution, and that the case is cognizable only by the COMELEC under Sec. 7 Art.
IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. Empeynado argues that the matter should be raised only on certiorari before the
Supreme Court and not before the RTC, else the latter court becomes a reviewer of an en banc COMELEC
resolution contrary to Sec. 7, Art. IX-A.
RTC dismissed the petition for mandamus on two grounds, viz., (1) that quo warranto is the proper
remedy, and (2) that the “cases” or “matters” referred under the constitution pertain only to those involving the
conduct of elections.
CA affirmed the RTC’s dismissal of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case is cognizable by the Supreme Court

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
RULING:
No. The case is cognizable in the RTC.
Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution provides:

“Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought
before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is
deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum
required by the rules of the commission or by the commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this
constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each commission may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.”
This provision is inapplicable as there was no case or matter filed before the COMELEC. On the contrary,
it was the COMELEC’s resolution that triggered this Controversy. The “case” or “matter” referred to by the
constitution must be something within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC, i.e., it must pertain to an election
dispute. The settled rule is that “decision, rulings, order” of the COMELEC that may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A are those that relate to the COMELEC’s exercise of its adjudicatory or
quasi-judicial powers involving “elective regional, provincial and city officials.”
In this case, what is being assailed is the COMELEC’s choice of an appointee to occupy the Gutalac Post
which is an administrative duty done for the operational set-up of an agency. The controversy involves an
appointive, not an elective, official. Hardly can this matter call for the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
To rule otherwise would surely burden the Court with trivial administrative questions that are best
ventilated before the RTC, a court which the law vests with the power to exercise original jurisdiction over “all
cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions.”
Petition denied.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
LUCIANO VELOSO, ABRAHAM CABOCHAN, JOCELYN DAWIS-ASUNCION AND MARLON M. LACSON, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 193677, SEPTEMBER 06, 2011
FACTS:
On December 7, 2000, the City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8040 entitled An Ordinance
Authorizing the Conferment of Exemplary Public Service Award to Elective Local Officials of Manila Who Have Been
Elected for Three (3) Consecutive Terms in the Same Position. Section 2 thereof provides:
SEC. 2. The EPSA shall consist of a Plaque of Appreciation, retirement and gratuity pay remuneration
equivalent to the actual time served in the position for three (3) consecutive terms, subject to the availability of
funds as certified by the City Treasurer. ….xxx…..
Pursuant to the ordinance, the City made partial payments to some former city councilors including herein
petitioners the total amount of P9,923,257.00.
The Director, Legal and Adjudication Office (LAO)-Local of the COA issued ND No. 06-010-100-05 dated
May 24, 2006.
The COA sustained the Notice of Disallowance
ISSUE:
Whether the COA has the authority to disallow the disbursement of local government funds
Whether the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the disallowance of P9,923,257.00
covering the EPSA of former three-term councilors of the City of Manila authorized by Ordinance No. 8040.
RULING:
Under the 1987 Constitution, however, the COA is vested with the authority to determine whether
government entities, including LGUs, comply with laws and regulations in disbursing government funds, and to
disallow illegal or irregular disbursements of these funds.
Thus, LGUs, though granted local fiscal autonomy, are still within the audit jurisdiction of the COA.
However, in line with existing jurisprudence, we need not require the refund of the disallowed amount because all
the parties acted in good faith

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
MANOLITO AGRA, et al., Petitioner

vs.
G.R. No. 167807, December 6, 2011
FACTS:
On July 1, 1989, Republic Act No. 6758 (the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989) took
effect, Section 12 of which provides:
Sec. 12. Consolidation of Allowances and Compensation. — All allowances, except for representation and
transportation allowances; clothing and laundry allowances; subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew on
board government vessels and hospital personnel; hazard pay; allowances of foreign service personnel stationed
abroad; and such other additional compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the
DBM, shall be deemed included in the standardized salary rates herein prescribed. Such other additional
compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being received by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into
the standardized salary rates shall continue to be authorized.
Existing additional compensation of any national government official or employee paid from local funds of
a local government unit shall be absorbed into the basic salary of said official or employee and shall be paid by the
National Government.
NEA employees who were hired after October 31, 1989 claimed that they did not receive meal, rice, and
children’s allowances. Thus, on July 23, 1999, they filed a special civil action for mandamus against NEA and its
Board of Administrators. On December 15, 1999, the RTC rendered its Decision in their favor NEA questioned
before the Court of Appeals the Orders of the lower court, and the case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 62919. On
July 4, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision declaring null and void the December 11, 2000 Resolution as
well as the January 8, 2001 Order of the RTC, and ordering the implementation of a writ of execution against the
funds of NEA. Thus, NEA filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari, On July 24, 2007, Supreme Court reversed and set
aside the Court of Appeals decision.
ISSUE:
WON the immutability of final decision doctrine must prevail over the exclusive jurisdiction of [the COA]
to audit and settle disbursements of funds
RULING:
Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Section 26 of P.D. No. 1445, it is the COA which has
primary jurisdiction to examine, audit and settle "all debts and claims of any sort" due from or owing the
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries. With respect to money claims arising from the implementation of R.A. No.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
6758, their allowance or disallowance is for COA to decide, subject only to the remedy of appeal by petition for
certiorari to this Court.
All told, the RTC acted prudently in halting implementation of the writ of execution to allow the parties
recourse to the processes of the COA. It may be that the tenor of the March 23, 2000 Indorsement issued by COA
already spells doom for respondents’ claims; but it is not for this Court to preempt the action of the COA on the
post-audit to be conducted by it per its Indorsement dated March 23, 2000.
In fine, it was grave error for the CA to reverse the RTC and direct immediate implementation of the writ
of execution through garnishment of the funds of petitioners,
The immutability rule applies only when the decision is promulgated by a court possessed of jurisdiction
to hear and decide the case. Undoubtedly, the petition in the guise of a case for mandamus is a money claim falling
within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of this Commission. Noting the propensity of the lower courts in
taking cognizance of cases filed by claimants in violation of such primary jurisdiction, the Supreme Court issued
Administrative Circular 10-2000 dated October 23, 2000 enjoining judges of lower courts to exercise caution in
order to prevent "possible circumvention of the rules and procedures of the Commission on Audit" and reiterating
the basic rule that: "All money claims against the Government must be filed with the Commission on Audit which
shall act upon it within sixty days. Rejection of the claim will authorize the claimant to elevate the matter to the
Supreme Court on certiorari and in effect sue the State thereby."
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, when an administrative body is clothed with original and
exclusive jurisdiction, courts are utterly without power and authority to exercise concurrently such jurisdiction.
Accordingly, all the proceedings of the court in violation of that doctrine and all orders and decisions reached
thereby are null and void. It will be noted in the cited Supreme Court Circular that money claims are cognizable by
the COA and its decision is appealable only to the Supreme Court. The lower courts have nothing to do with such
genus of transactions.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC. (COCOFED), MANUEL V. DEL ROSARIO, DOMINGO P.
ESPINA, SALVADOR P. BALLARES, JOSELITO A. MORALEDA, PAZ M. YASON, VICENTE A. CADIZ, CESARIA DE LUNA
TITULAR, and RAYMUNDO C. DE VILLA, Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
WIGBERTO E. TAADA, OSCAR F. SANTOS, SURIGAO DEL SUR FEDERATION OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES
(SUFAC) and MORO FARMERS ASSOCIATION OF ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR (MOFAZS), represented by ROMEO C.
ROYANDOYAN, Intervenors
G.R. Nos. 177857-58 September 4, 2012
FACTS:
the largest membership.
When martial law started in 1972, several presidential decrees were issued to improve the coconut
industry through the collection and use of the coconut levy fund:
PD 276 established the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF) and declared the proceeds of the
CCSF levy as trust fund, to be utilized to subsidize the sale of coconut-based products, thus stabilizing the price of
edible oil.
PD 582 created the Coconut Industry Development Fund (CIDF) to finance the operation of a hybrid
coconut seed farm.
In 1973, PD 232 created the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) to accelerate the growth and
development of the coconut and palm oil industry.
Then came P.D. No. 755 in July 1975, providing under its Section 1 the policy to provide readily available
credit facilities to the coconut farmers at preferential rates. Towards achieving this, Section 2 of PD 755 authorized
PCA to utilize the CCSF and the CIDF collections to acquire a commercial bank and deposit the CCSF levy collections
in said bank, interest free, the deposit withdrawable only when the bank has attained a certain level of sufficiency
in its equity capital. It also decreed that all levies PCA is authorized to collect shall not be considered as special
and/or fiduciary funds or form part of the general funds of the government.
Both P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 also provide that the CCSF shall not be construed by any law as a special
and/or trust fund, the stated intention being that actual ownership of the said fund shall pertain to coconut
farmers in their private capacities.
Shortly before the issuance of PD 755 however, PCA had already bought from Peping Cojuangco 72.2% of
the outstanding capital stock of FUB / UCPB. In that contract, it was also stipulated that Danding Cojuanco shall
receive equity in FUB amounting to 10%, or 7.22 % of the 72.2%, as consideration for PCA’s buy-out of what
Danding Conjuanco claim as his exclusive and personal option to buy the FUB shares.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
The PCA appropriated, out of its own fund, an amount for the purchase of the said 72.2% equity. It later
reimbursed itself from the coconut levy fund.
While the 64.98% (72.2 % – 7.22%) portion of the option shares ostensibly pertained to the farmers, the
corresponding stock certificates supposedly representing the farmers equity were in the name of and delivered to
PCA. There were, however, shares forming part of the 64.98% portion, which ended up in the hands of non-
farmers. The remaining 27.8% of the FUB capital stock were not covered by any of the agreements.
Through the years, a part of the coconut levy funds went directly or indirectly to various projects and/or
was converted into different assets or investments. Of particular relevance to this was their use to acquire the FUB
/ UCPB, and the acquisition by UCPB, through the CIIF and holding companies, of a large block of San Miguel
Corporation (SMC) shares.
ISSUE:
WON the coco levy fund may be owned by the coconut farmers in their private capacities.
RULING:
No. The coconut levy funds are in the nature of taxes and can only be used for public purpose. They
cannot be used to purchase shares of stocks to be given for free to private individuals. Even if the money is
allocated for a special purpose and raised by special means, it is still public in character.
Accordingly, the presidential issuances which authorized the PCA to distribute, for free, the shares of stock
of the bank it acquired to the coconut farmers under such rules and regulations the PCA may promulgate is
unconstitutional.
It is unconstitutional because first, it have unduly delegated legislative power to the PCA, and second, it
allowed the use of the CCSF to benefit directly private interest by the outright and unconditional grant of absolute
ownership of the FUB/UCPB shares paid for by PCA entirely with the CCSF to the undefined “coconut farmers”,
which negated or circumvented the national policy or public purpose declared by P.D. No. 755.
Hence, the so-called Farmers’ shares do not belong to the coconut farmers in their private capacities, but
to the Government. The coconut levy funds are special public funds and any property purchased by means of the
coconut levy funds should likewise be treated as public funds or public property, subject to burdens and
restrictions attached by law to such property.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
Candelario L. Versoza, Jr. (in his former capacity as Executive Director of the Cooperative Development
Authority), Petitioners,
vs.
Guillermo N. Carague (in his official capacity as Chairperson of the Commission on Audit), Raul C. Flores, Celso D.
Gangan, Sofronio B. Ursal, and the Commission on Audit, Respondent.
G.R. No. 157838, February 7, 2012
FACTS:
Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) conducted a public bidding for the supply of computer
equipment and peripherals. COA through the TSO, tested the reasonableness of the prices of the purchased
computers. TSO found that the purchased computers were overpriced/excessive which resulted to the Resident
Auditor issuing a Notice of Disallowance for the overpricing. CDA however contends that COA gravely abused its
discretion in the manner of the determination of the overpricing was inadequate and thus evidence was not
substantial to prove the overpricing of the computers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contention of the CDA correct.
RULING:
NO. The general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one
which is constitutionally-created, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their
presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. Findings of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the COA,
which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not
only respect but at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence, and the decision and
order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion. Thus, in this
case, there being no grave abuse of discretion in the findings and conclusions of the COA in this case, the Court
finds no cogent reason to deviate from these long-settled rules.
How do you determine overpricing?
Price is considered “excessive” if it is more than the 10% allowable pric evariance between the price paid
for the item bought and the price of the same item per canvass of the auditor. In determining whether or not the
price is excessive, the following factors may be considered: (a) supply and demand forces in the market; (b)
government price quotations; (c) warranty of products or special features; (d) brand of products.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
FILOMENA G. DELOS SANTOS, JOSEFA A. BACALTOS, NELANIE A. ANTONI, AND MAUREEN A. BIEN, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REPRESENTED BY ITS COMMISSIONERS, Respondent
G.R. No. 198457, August 13, 2013
FACTS:
Sometime in October 2001, then Congressman Antonio V. Cuenco of the Second District of Cebu City
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement 5 (MOA) with the Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center (VSMMC or
hospital), represented by Dr. Eusebio M. Alquizalas, Medical Center Chief, appropriating to the hospital the
amount of P1,500,000.00 from his Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) to cover the medical assistance of
indigent patients under the Tony N' Tommy (TNT) Health Program (TNT Program). It was agreed, inter alia, that: (a)
Cuenco shall identify and recommend the indigent patients who may avail of the benefits of the TNT Program for
an amount not exceeding P5,000.00 per patient, except those with major illnesses for whom a separate limit may
be specified; (b) an indigent patient who has been a beneficiary will be subsequently disqualified from seeking
further medical assistance; and (c) the hospital shall purchase medicines intended for the indigent patients from
out side sources if the same are not available in its pharmacy, subject to reimbursement when such expenses are
supported by official receipts and other documents. In line with this, Ma. Isabel Cuenco, Project Director of the
TNT Program, wrote petitioner Nelanie Antoni, Pharmacist V of VSMMC, requesting the latter to purchase needed
medicines not available at the hospital pharmacy from Sacred Heart Pharmacy or Dell Pharmacy which were
supposedly accredited suppliers of the Department of Health. The said request was approved. Several years after
the enforcement of the MOA, allegations of forgery and falsification of prescriptions and referrals for the
availment of medicines under the TNT Program surfaced. On December 14, 2004, petitioner Filomena G. Delos
Santos, who succeeded Dr. Alquizalas, created, through Hospital Order No. 1112, a fact-finding committee to
investigate the matter. Meanwhile, the fact-finding committee created by Delos Santos submitted its Report dated
January 18, 2005 essentially affirming the "unseen and unnoticeable" irregularities attendant to the availment of
the TNT Program but pointing out, however, that: (a) VSMMC was made an "unwilling tool to perpetuate a scandal
involving government funds X X X. In the initial investigation conducted by the CoA, the results of which were
reflected in AOM No. 2005-001 dated October 26, 2005, it was found that: (a) 133 prescriptions for vaccines, drugs
and medicines for anti-rabies allegedly dispensed by Dell Pharmacy costing P3,407,108.40, and already ypaid by
VSMMC from the PDAF of Cuenco appeared to be falsified; (b) 46 prescriptions for other drugs and medicines
allegedly dispensed by Dell Pharmacy costing P705,750.50, and already paid by VSMMC from the PDAF of Cuenco
likewise appeared to be falsified; and (c) 25 prescriptions for drugs and medicines allegedly issued by Dell
Pharmacy costing P602,063.50 were also ascertained to be falsified and have not been paid by VSMMC.
Examination by the SAT of the records and interviews with the personnel involved showed that the purported
patients-beneficiaries of the TNT Program were mostly non-existent and there was no actual procedure followed
except for the mere preparation of payment documents which were found to be falsified. Subsequently, COA
issued an order disallowing the amount of P3,386,697.10 for the payment of drugs and medicines for anti-rabies
with falsified prescription and documents, and holding petitioners, together with other VSMMC officials, solidarily
liable therefor. Petitioners appealed to the SC.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CoA committed grave abuse of discretion in holding petitioners solidarily liable for the
disallowed amount of P3,386,697.10.
RULING:
NO. At the outset, it must be emphasized that the CoA is endowed with enough latitude to determine,
prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of
government funds. It is tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the government's,
and ultimately the people's, property. The exercise of its general audit power is among the constitutional
mechanisms that gives life to the check and balance system inherent in our form of government. The CoA correctly
pointed out that VSMMC, through its officials, should have been deeply involved in the implementation of the TNT
Program as the hospital is a party to the MOA and, as such, has acted as custodian and disbursing agency of
Cuenco's PDAF. Further, under the MOA executed between VSMMC and Cuenco, the hospital represented itself as
"willing to cooperate/coordinate and monitor the implementation of a Medical Indigent Support Program." More
importantly, it undertook to ascertain that "[a]ll payments and releases under [the] program . . .shall be made in
accordance with existing government accounting and auditing rules and regulations." It is a standing rule that
public officers who are custodians of government funds shall be liable for their failure to ensure that such funds
are safely guarded against loss or damage, and that they are expended, utilized, disposed of or transferred in
accordance with the law and existing regulations, and on the basis of prescribed documents and necessary
records. However, as pointed out by the SAT, provisions of the National Budget Circular No. (NBC) 476 dated
September 20, 2001 prescribing the guidelines on the release of funds for a congressman's PDAF authorized under
Republic Act No. 8760 were not followed in the implementation of the TNT Program, as well as other existing
auditing laws, rules and regulations governing the procurement of medicines. Jurisprudence holds that, absent any
showing of bad faith and malice, there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties.
However, this presumption must fail in the presence of an explicit rule that was violated. Evidently, petitioners'
neglect to properly monitor the disbursement of Cuenco's PDAF facilitated the validation and eventual payment of
133 falsified prescriptions and fictitious claims for anti-rabies vaccines supplied by both the VSMMC and Dell
Pharmacy, despite the patent irregularities borne out by the referral slips and prescriptions related thereto. Had
there been an internal control system installed by

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
DENNIS A. B. FUNA, Petitioner

VS
THE CHAIRMAN, COA, REYNALDO A. VILLAR, Respondent
G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012
FACTS:
Funa challenges the constitutionality of the appointment of Reynaldo A. Villar as Chairman of the COA.
Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth year of Villar as COA
Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008.
Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar was nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA. Shortly thereafter,
on June 11, 2008, the Commission on Appointments confirmed his appointment. He was to serve as Chairman of
COA, as expressly indicated in the appointment papers, until the expiration of the original term of his office as COA
Commissioner or on February 2, 2011. Challenged in this recourse, Villar, in an obvious bid to lend color of title to
his hold on the chairmanship, insists that his appointment as COA Chairman accorded him a fresh term of 7 years
which is yet to lapse. He would argue, in fine, that his term of office, as such chairman, is up to February 2, 2015,
or 7 years reckoned from February 2, 2008 when he was appointed to that position.
Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar, via a letter dated February 22, 2011 addressed to
President Benigno S. Aquino III, signified his intention to step down from office upon the appointment of his
replacement. True to his word, Villar vacated his position when President Benigno Simeon Aquino III named Ma.
Gracia Pulido-Tan (Chairman Tan) COA Chairman. This development has rendered this petition and the main issue
tendered therein moot and academic.
Although deemed moot due to the intervening appointment of Chairman Tan and the resignation of
Villar, We consider the instant case as falling within the requirements for review of a moot and academic case,
since it asserts at least four exceptions to the mootness rule discussed in David vs Macapagal Arroyo namely:
a. There is a grave violation of the Constitution;
b. The case involves a situation of exceptional character and is of paramount public interest;
c. The constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar and the public;
d. The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
The procedural aspect comes down to the question of whether or not the following requisites for
the exercise of judicial review of an executive act obtain in this petition, viz:
a. There must be an actual case or justiciable controversy before the court;
b. The question before it must be ripe for adjudication;
c. The person challenging the act must be a proper party; and
d. The issue of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity and must be the
very lis mota of the case.
ISSUES:
WON the petitioner has Locus Standi to bring the case to court.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
WON Villar’s appointment as COA Chairman, while sitting in that body and after having served for four (4)
years of his seven (7) year term as COA commissioner, is valid in light of the term limitations imposed
under, and the circumscribing concepts tucked in, Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution
RULING:
Issue of Locus Standi: This case before us is of transcendental importance, since it obviously has “far-
reaching implications,” and there is a need to promulgate rules that will guide the bench, bar, and the public in
future analogous cases. We, thus, assume a liberal stance and allow petitioner to institute the instant petition.
In David vs Macapagal Arroyo, the Court laid out the bare minimum norm before the so-called “non-traditional
suitors” may be extended standing to sue, thusly:
a. For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax
measure is unconstitutional;
b. For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in
question;
c. For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental
importance which must be settled early; and
d. For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes their
prerogatives as legislators.
On the substantive issue:
Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution provides that:

(2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment.
Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one commissioner for
five years, and the other commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to
any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In no case
shall any member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Petitioner now asseverates the view that Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution proscribes
reappointment of any kind within the commission, the point being that a second appointment, be it for the same
position (commissioner to another position of commissioner) or upgraded position (commissioner to chairperson)
is a prohibited reappointment and is a nullity ab initio.
The Court finds petitioner’s position bereft of merit. The flaw lies in regarding the word “reappointment”
as, in context, embracing any and all species of appointment. The rule is that if a statute or constitutional provision
is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation.
The first sentence is unequivocal enough. The COA Chairman shall be appointed by the President for a
term of seven years, and if he has served the full term, then he can no longer be reappointed or extended another
appointment. In the same vein, a Commissioner who was appointed for a term of seven years who likewise served
the full term is barred from being reappointed. In short, once the Chairman or Commissioner shall have served the
full term of seven years, then he can no longer be reappointed to either the position of Chairman or
Commissioner. The obvious intent of the framers is to prevent the president from “dominating” the Commission
by allowing him to appoint an additional or two more commissioners.
On the other hand, the provision, on its face, does not prohibit a promotional appointment from
commissioner to chairman as long as the commissioner has not served the full term of seven years, further

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
qualified by the third sentence of Sec. 1(2), Article IX (D) that “the appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor.” In addition, such promotional appointment to the position of
Chairman must conform to the rotational plan or the staggering of terms in the commission membership such that
the aggregate of the service of the Commissioner in said position and the term to which he will be appointed to
the position of Chairman must not exceed seven years so as not to disrupt the rotational system in the commission
prescribed by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
In conclusion, there is nothing in Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D) that explicitly precludes a promotional
appointment from Commissioner to Chairman, provided it is made under the aforestated circumstances or
conditions.
The Court is likewise unable to sustain Villar’s proposition that his promotional appointment as COA
Chairman gave him a completely fresh 7- year term––from February 2008 to February 2015––given his four (4)-
year tenure as COA commissioner devalues all the past pronouncements made by this Court. While there had been
divergence of opinion as to the import of the word “reappointment,” there has been unanimity on the dictum that
in no case can one be a COA member, either as chairman or commissioner, or a mix of both positions, for an
aggregate term of more than 7 years. A contrary view would allow a circumvention of the aggregate 7-year service
limitation and would be constitutionally offensive as it would wreak havoc to the spirit of the rotational system of
succession.
In net effect, then President Macapagal-Arroyo could not have had, under any circumstance, validly
appointed Villar as COA Chairman, for a full 7- year appointment, as the Constitution decrees, was not legally
feasible in light of the 7-year aggregate rule. Villar had already served 4 years of his 7-year term as COA
Commissioner. A shorter term, however, to comply with said rule would also be invalid as the corresponding
appointment would effectively breach the clear purpose of the Constitution of giving to every appointee so
appointed subsequent to the first set of commissioners, a fixed term of office of 7 years. To recapitulate, a COA
commissioner like respondent Villar who serves for a period less than seven (7) years cannot be appointed as
chairman when such position became vacant as a result of the expiration of the 7-year term of the predecessor
(Carague). Such appointment to a full term is not valid and constitutional, as the appointee will be allowed to serve
more than seven (7) years under the constitutional ban.
To sum up, the Court restates its ruling on Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution, viz:
1. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional commissions, after the expiration
of the uneven terms of office of the first set of commissioners, shall always be for a fixed term of
seven (7) years; an appointment for a lesser period is void and unconstitutional. The appointing
authority cannot validly shorten the full term of seven (7) years in case of the expiration of the
term as this will result in the distortion of the rotational system prescribed by the Constitution;
2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death, resignation, disability or
impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor, but such
appointments cannot be less than the unexpired portion as this will likewise disrupt the
staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D);
3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC, who were appointed for a full term of
seven years and who served the entire period, are barred from reappointment to any position in
the Commission. Corollarily, the first appointees in the Commission under the Constitution are
also covered by the prohibition against reappointment;
4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years is eligible
for an appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of the
departing chairman. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment, provided
that the aggregate period of the length of service as commissioner and the unexpired period of
the term of the predecessor will not exceed seven (7) years and provided further that the
vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal by
impeachment. The Court clarifies that “reappointment” found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a
movement to one and the same office (Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
Chairman). On the other hand, an appointment involving a movement to a different position or

office (Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a new appointment and, hence, not, in the
strict legal sense, a reappointment barred under the Constitution.
5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
JOSEPH H. REYES, Petitioner.

vs.
G.R. No. 125129

March 29, 1999
FACTS:
Petitioner Joseph H. Reyes, a member of the TLRC Fund Board of Trustees, filed this petition with the
Supreme Court on June 17, 1996, as an appeal by certiorari under Rule 44 of the Revised Rules of Court, assailing
the decision of the Commission on Audit (COA) disallowing the refund of the government share in the fund to the
employee-members, and the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the said decision. The TLRC Executive
Committee created a Provident Fund the primary purpose of which was to augment the retirement benefits of the
officers and employees of TLRC by Resolution No. 89-003. But on June 3, 1993, Corporate Auditor Adelaida S.
Flores suspended the transfer of funds from TLRC to the Provident Fund for the years 1990-1991, amounting to
[7]
P11,065,715.84, per Notice of Suspension No. 93-006 . Auditor Flores held that under Par. 5.4 of Corporate
Compensation Circular No. 10, Rules and Regulations issued under R.A. 6758,fringe benefits were allowed provided
that statutory authority covered such grant of benefits. In this case, there is no law authorizing the grant of fringe
benefits to TLRC officers and employees. Furthermore, all Provident Funds are covered by R.A. 4537, to which TLRC
may not qualify. Petitioner Joseph H. Reyes, a member of the TLRC Board of Trustees, appealed the disallowance
to the Commission on Audit.
On October 12, 1995, the Commission on Audit denied the appeal per Decision No. 95-571.The
Commission ruled that the governments share in the Provident Fund must be reverted to the TLRC and not be
given to the employees. It held that since the primary purpose of the Provident Fund was not realized or attained
due to its discontinuance and dissolution, then the employees were not entitled to the governments share in the
Fund.
On December 7, 1995, petitioner wrote the Commission on Audit seeking a reversal of COA Decision No.
95-571. On May 2, 1996, the Commission on Audit denied the motion for reconsideration per Decision No. 96-236.
Petitioner contends that the dissolution of the Provident Fund does not render illegal the distribution of
governments share to the members. He avers that when TLRC made its contributions to the Provident Fund, it had
divested itself of the ownership of whatever contributions it gave. Furthermore, the money contributed to the
fund became a trust fund for the benefit of the members. Upon the dissolution of the Fund, the legal and
equitable titles were merged in the members, as beneficiaries. He asserts that the members have a vested right,
not only on their own contributions, but to the government share as well. He claims that since the Fund's
pretermination or dissolution was not due to the members' fault, then it would be unfair and greatly prejudicial to
deprive them of the government share to which they are entitled.
However, setting aside the procedural error pro hac vice, and treating the petition as one for certiorari
under Rule 65, we find that the Commission on Audit did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the
distribution of the government share in the aborted TLRC Provident Fund to its members. As correctly pointed out
[18]
by the COA in its decision, the government contributions were made on the condition that the same would be
used to augment the retirement and other benefits of the TLRC employees. Since the purpose was not attained
due to the question on the validity of the Fund, then the employees are not entitled to claim the government

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
share disbursed as its counterpart contribution to the Fund. Otherwise, it would be tantamount to the use
of public funds outside the specific purpose for which the funds were appropriated.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a merit for the members for a Provident Fund.
RULING:
No, there is no merit to petitioner's claim that the members of the Provident Fund acquired a vested right
over the government contributions. "A vested right is one which is absolute, complete and unconditional, to the
exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a
[19]
contingency," As previously stated, the government contributions were subject to the condition that the funds
would be used to augment the retirement and other fringe benefits of TLRC employees.
Provident Fund was dissolved due to lack of statutory basis. Thus, contributions made were
unauthorized, if not unlawful. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the
Commission on Audit.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ROBERTO B. REBLORA, Petitioner

vs.
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
G.R. No. 195842

June 18, 2013
FACTS:
This is an appeal via a Petition for Review on Certiorari, assailing the Decision of the Commission on Audit
(COA), which denied the petitioner’s claim for additional retirement benefit. Petitioner is a retired Captain of the
Philippine Navy born on May 22, 1944. Prior to entering military service, he rendered civilian government service
as a Barrio Development Worker at the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) from 6 January
1969 to 20 July 1974. He entered military service as a Probationary Ensign in the Philippine Navy and was called to
active duty effective August 26, 1974.
On 1996, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) officially confirmed the incorporation of petitioner’s
civilian government service at the DILG with his length of active service in the military pursuant to Section 3 of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 16389 as amended by PD No. 1650 which provides:
But on 2003, at the age of 59 and after a total of thirty-four (34) years of active service, the petitioner was
compulsorily retired from the military. He was, at that time, already ranked as a Commander in the Philippine
Navy. Petitioner chose to avail of the monthly retirement pay with the option to receive in advance and in lump
sum an amount equivalent to three (3) years worth thereof for the first three years after his retirement.
Meanwhile, the AFP granted petitioner’s claim of retirement benefits and immediately paid the latter the sum of
P722,297.16 as advance lump, however, the AFP did not include petitioner’s civilian government service at the
DILG. The AFP only considered petitioner’s actual military service i.e., covering the period between May 21, 1973
up to May 22, 2003 or a period of only thirty (30) years.
Petitioner disagreed and insisted that the computation of his retirement benefit should include the period
of his civilian government service at the DILG immediately before he entered military service
for a total of four (4) years and five (5) months. It is argued that the computation of the AFP does not reflect the
true length of his military service of thirty-four (34) years and that it is, in fact, a full four (4) years short. Petitioner
thus claims that he is entitled to P135, 991.81 in additional retirement benefit.
After an unsuccessful bid to obtain a favorable legal opinion from the AFP Judge Advocate General, the
petitioner requested assistance from the COA for the collection of his claimed additional retirement benefit. The
COA rendered a Decision denying petitioner’s claim. COA agreed with the petitioner that his civilian service at the
DILG should and ought to be included as part of his active service in the military for purposes of computing his
retirement benefits under PD No. 1638. However, since his civilian service should be included as part of his active
service in the military, the COA opined that petitioner should also have been considered as compulsorily retired on
22 May 2000 and not on 22 May 2003.
The COA explained that as of 22 May 2000, petitioner has already reached the age of fifty-six (56) with a
total of thirty-one (31) years in active service, inclusive of his four years in the DILG, which fulfilled the conditions
for compulsory retirement under Section 5(a) of PD No. 1638, as amended. Verily, the COA found that, applying
the provisions of PD No. 1638 as amended, petitioner was not actually underpaid but was rather overpaid his

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
retirement benefit in the amount of P77,807.16. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the COA
remained steadfast on their resolution. Aggrieved, petitioner questioned the Decision and Resolution of the COA
via the present Rule 45 petition before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
I. WON the COA’s decision/judgment be reviewed by Supreme Court via Rule 45.
II. WON COA’s computation of retirement benefit is correct?
HELD:
The Court dismissed the instant petition on account of it being the wrong remedy. Decisions and
resolutions of the COA are reviewable by Supreme Court, not via an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, as is the
present petition, but thru a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. Section 2 of Rule 64, which implements the mandate of Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution,19 is
clear on this:
Section 2. Mode of Review.—A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on Elections and
the Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule
65, except as hereinafter provided.
The Constitution and the Rules of Court precisely limits the permissible scope of inquiry in such cases only
to errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. Hence, unless tainted with grave abuse of discretion, simple
errors of judgment committed by the COA cannot be reviewed by Supreme Court.
The Court finds that the computation of COA is the one that is supported by PD No. 1638. Sections 5 and 7
of PD No. 1638, as amended, identifies the instances of compulsory retirement in the military service:
Section 5 (a). Upon attaining fifty-six (56) years of age or upon accumulation of thirty (30) years of
satisfactory active service, whichever is later, an officer or enlisted man shall be compulsorily retired; Provided,
That such officer or enlisted-man who shall have attained fifty-six (56) years of age with at least twenty (20)
years of active service shall be allowed to complete thirty (30) years of service but not beyond his sixtieth (60th)
birthday;
xxxx
This Court discerns that the COA was correct in holding that petitioner should be considered as
compulsorily retired on May 2000 for purposes of computing his retirement benefits under the same law. COA
correctly held that for purposes of computing his retirement benefits under PD No 1638, as amended, petitioner
should have been considered compulsorily retired as of 22 May 2000 per Section 5(a) of the same law.20 This is so
because it was on 22 May 2000 that petitioner reached the age of fifty-six (56) after a total of thirty-one (31) years
in active service—fulfilling thereby the conditions for compulsory retirement under the said section.21 In coming
up with such a conclusion, COA most certainly reckoned the beginning of petitioner’s active service in the military
from his stint as civilian worker at the DILG.
The inclusion of petitioner’s civilian government service at the DILG in the computation of his length of
active service in the military, on the other hand, is only but proper in light of Section 3 of PD No. 1638, as
amended.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
RAMON A. GONZALES, Petitioner

vs.
COMELEC, Respondent
G.R. No. L-28196

November 9, 1967
FACTS:
In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed. This law provided for the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite for
the proposed amendments to the Constitution. It was provided in the said law that the plebiscite shall be held on
the same day that the general national elections shall be held (November 14, 1967). This was questioned by
Ramon Gonzales and other concerned groups as they argued that this was unlawful as there would be no proper
submission of the proposals to the people who would be more interested in the issues involved in the general
election rather than in the issues involving the plebiscite.
Gonzales also questioned the validity of the procedure adopted by Congress when they came up with
their proposals to amend the Constitution (RA 4913). In this regard, the COMELEC and other respondents
interposed the defense that said act of Congress cannot be reviewed by the courts because it is a political
question.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the act of Congress in proposing amendments is a political question.
II. Whether or not a plebiscite may be held simultaneously with a general election.
HELD:
No in answer to the first issue. The issue is a justiciable question. It must be noted that the power to
amend as well as the power to propose amendments to the Constitution is not included in the general grant of
legislative powers to Congress. Such powers are not constitutionally granted to Congress. On the contrary, such
powers are inherent to the people as repository of sovereignty in a republican state. That being, when Congress
makes amendments or proposes amendments, it is not actually doing so as Congress; but rather, it is sitting as
a constituent assembly. Such act is not a legislative act. Since it is not a legislative act, it is reviewable by the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has the final say whether or not such act of the constituent assembly is within
constitutional limitations.
Yes in the second issue. There is no prohibition to the effect that a plebiscite must only be held on a
special election. SC held that there is nothing in this provision of the [1935] Constitution to indicate that the
election therein referred to is a special, not a general election. The circumstance that the previous amendment to
the Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress
deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit
proposed amendments for ratification in general elections.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
MERIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, Petitioner

vs.
COMELEC, Respondent
G.R. No. 127325

March 19, 1997
FACTS:
In this case Atty. Jesus Delfin (private respondent ) , the president of People’s Initiative for Reforms,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to lift the term limits
of elective officials, through People’s Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987
Constitution, which provides for the right of the people to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to
the Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and of the
notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-
IpagtanggolangKonstitusyon, Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as
intervenors-oppositors. Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is
cognizable by the COMELEC.
The petitioners herein Senator Meriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin filed this
civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and the Delfin petition rising the
several arguments, such as the following: (1) The constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the
constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; (2) The
people’s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting of the term limits
constitutes a revision, therefore it is outside the power of people’s initiative. The Supreme Court granted the
Motions for Intervention.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
II. Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments
to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the
conduct of such initiative.
III. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision or an
amendment of the Constitution.
HELD:
Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory, thus, without implementing legislation the same
cannot operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the right, the people cannot exercise it if
Congress does not provide for its implementation.
The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is void. It has been an established rule that what has been delegated

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
cannot be delegated (potestasdelegata non delegaripotest). The delegation of the power to the COMELEC being
invalid, the latter cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right to
people’s initiative.
The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a revision, as it would affect other provisions of the
Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the constitutional guarantee of equal access to opportunities
for public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative. However, considering
the Court’s decision in the above Issue, the issue of whether or not the petition is a revision or amendment has
become academic.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, Petitioner

vs.
COMELEC, Respondent
41 SCRA 701
(1971)
FACTS:
The 1971 Constitutional Convention came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the Congress
approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the purpose of calling a convention to propose
amendments to the Constitution. After election of delegates held on November 10, 1970, the Convention held its
inaugural session on June 1, 1971. In the morning of September 28, 1970, the Convention approved Organic
Resolution No. 1 which is entitled as, "A RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION 1 OF ARTICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION
SO AS TO LOWER THE VOTING AGE TO 18." On September 30, 1971, the COMELEC "resolved" to follow the
mandate of the Convention, that it will hold the said plebiscite together with the senatorial elections on November
8, 1971 .
Petitioner, Arturo Tolentino, filed a petition for prohibition, its main thrust being that Organic Resolution
No. 1 and the necessary implementing resolutions subsequently approved have no force and effect as laws in so
far as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite co-incident with the senatorial elections, on the ground that the
calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a power lodged exclusively in Congress as a
legislative body and may not be exercised by the Convention, and that, under Article XV Section 1 of the 1935
Constitution, the proposed amendment in question cannot be presented to the people for ratification separately
from each and all other amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Organic Resolution No. 1 of the 1971 Constitutional Convention violative to the
Constitution.
RULING:
All the amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must be submitted to the people in a single
"election" or plebiscite. In order that a plebiscite for the ratification of a Constitutional amendment may be validly
held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of
the amendment per se but as well as its relation to the other parts of the Constitution with which it has to form a
harmonious whole. In the present context, where the Convention has hardly started considering the merits, if not
thousands, of proposals to amend the existing Constitution, to present to the people any single proposal or a few
of them cannot comply with this requirement.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
RAMON A. GONZALES, Petitioner

vs.
COMELEC, Respondent
G.R. No. L-28196

November 9, 1967
FACTS:
In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed. This law provided for the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite for
the proposed amendments to the Constitution. It was provided in the said law that the plebiscite shall be held on
the same day that the general national elections shall be held (November 14, 1967). This was questioned by
Ramon Gonzales and other concerned groups as they argued that this was unlawful as there would be no proper
submission of the proposals to the people who would be more interested in the issues involved in the general
election rather than in the issues involving the plebiscite.
Gonzales also questioned the validity of the procedure adopted by Congress when they came up with
their proposals to amend the Constitution (RA 4913). In this regard, the COMELEC and other respondents
interposed the defense that said act of Congress cannot be reviewed by the courts because it is a political
question.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the act of Congress in proposing amendments is a political question.
II. Whether or not a plebiscite may be held simultaneously with a general election.
HELD:
No. In answer to the first issue. The issue is a justiciable question. It must be noted that the power to
amend as well as the power to propose amendments to the Constitution is not included in the general grant of
legislative powers to Congress. Such powers are not constitutionally granted to Congress. On the contrary, such
powers are inherent to the people as repository of sovereignty in a republican state. That being, when Congress
makes amendments or proposes amendments, it is not actually doing so as Congress; but rather, it is sitting as
a constituent assembly. Such act is not a legislative act. Since it is not a legislative act, it is reviewable by the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has the final say whether or not such act of the constituent assembly is within
constitutional limitations.
Yes in the second issue. There is no prohibition to the effect that a plebiscite must only be held on a
special election. SC held that there is nothing in this provision of the [1935] Constitution to indicate that the
election therein referred to is a special, not a general election. The circumstance that the previous amendment to
the Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress
deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit
proposed amendments for ratification in general elections.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner

vs.
COMELEC, respondent
41 SCRA 702
(1967)
FACTS:
On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed resolutions No. 1, 2 and 3 i.e. to increase the seats of
the Lower House from 120 to 180; to convoke a Constitutional Convention of 1971; and to amend the Constitution (Section 16,
Article VI) so they can become delegates themselves to the Convention.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June 17, 1967,became Republic Act No.
4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in therefore mentioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted,
for approval by the people, at the general elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967.
Two cases were filed against this act of Congress: One an is original action for prohibition, with preliminary
injunction by Ramon A. Gonzales, in L-28196, a Filipino citizen, a taxpayer, and a voter. He claims to have instituted case L-28196 as
a class unit, for and in behalf of all citizens, taxpayers and voters similarly situated. Another one is by PHILCONSA, in L-28224,
a corporation dulyorganized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, and a civic, non-profit and non-partisan organization
the objective of which is to uphold the rule of law in the Philippines and to defend its Constitution against erosions or onslaughts
from whatever source.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not a Resolution of Congress acting as a constituent assembly violates the Constitution?
II. May Constitutional Amendments Be Submitted for Ratification in a General Election?
HELD:
The issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress acting as a constituent assembly Violates the Constitution
essentially justifiable, not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review. In the cases at bar, notwithstanding that the R.
B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 have been approved by a vote of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives voting separately, said resolutions are null and void because Members of Congress, which approved the proposed
amendments, as well as the resolution calling a convention to propose amendments, are at best de facto Congressmen (based
upon Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution, no apportionment has been made been made by Congress within three (3) years
since 1960.Thereafter, the Congress of the Philippines and/or the election of its Members became illegal; that Congress and its
Members, likewise, became ade facto Congress and/or de facto congressmen);However, As a consequence, the title of a de
facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
JOSUE JAVELLANA , Petitioner

vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY , Respondent
50 SCRA 30 (1972)
FACTS :
The Plebiscite Case : A Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines was
approved on August 24, 1970 and began to perform its functions on June 1, 1971. On September 21, 1972, the
President issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law.
On November 29, 1972, the 1971 Constitutional Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines. The next day, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 73, “submitting to the
Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds therefor,” as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification
or rejection of the Proposed Constitution on January 15, 1973.
On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a case against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of
the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said “respondents or their agents from implementing
Presidential Decree No. 73, in any manner, until further orders of the Court,” upon the grounds, inter alia, that said
Presidential Decree “has no force and effect as law because the calling of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines
for the conduct of the same, the prescription of the ballots to be used and the question to be answered by the
voters, and the appropriation of public funds for the purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in
Congress “ and “there is no proper submission to the people of said Proposed Constitution set for January 15,
1973, there being no freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the
people of the contents thereof.”
On December 23, the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or
rejection of the Proposed Constitution and temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081 for
purposes of free and open debate on the proposed Constitution.” The Court deemed it fit to refrain, for the time
being, from deciding the aforementioned cases, for neither the date nor the conditions under which said plebiscite
would be held were known or announced officially.
“In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in Case G.R. No.  L-35948 filed an “urgent motion,”
praying that said case be decided “as soon as possible, preferably not later than January 15, 1973.” The Court
issued a resolution requiring the respondents in said three (3) cases to comment on said “urgent motion” and
“manifestation,” “not later than Tuesday noon, January 16, 1973 and set the motion for hearing “on January 17,
1973, at 9:30 a.m.” While the case was being heard, the President issued Proclamation No. 1102.
“ANNOUNCING THE RATIFICATION BY THE FILIPINO PEOPLE OF THE CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE 1971
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION”, Citizens Assemblies were created in barrios, in municipalities and in
districts/wards in chartered cities. The said Citizens Assemblies were established to broaden the base of citizen
participation in the democratic process and to afford ample opportunity for the citizenry to express their views on
important national issues.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
The Ratification Case: On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed Case G.R. No. L-36142, as a “Filipino
citizen, and a qualified and registered voter” and as “a class suit, for himself, and in behalf of all citizens and voters
similarly situated against the Executive Secretary and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice and Finance, to
restrain said respondents “and their subordinates or agents from implementing any of the provisions of the
propose Constitution not found in the present Constitution” referring to that of 1935. Javellana alleged that the
President ordered “the immediate implementation of the New Constitution, thru his Cabinet, and that the latter
are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed Constitution. He construed that
the President is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies; to approve the proposed Constitution;
proclaim the ratification; and that the election held to ratify the proposed Constitution was not a free election,
hence null and void.
ISSUE:
I. Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable, or political and therefore non-justiciable,
question?
II. Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified validly (with
substantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to the applicable constitutional and statutory
provisions?
III. Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the
people? (Acquiesced – “permission” given by silence or passiveness. Acceptance or agreement by keeping
quiet or by not making objections.)
IV. Are petitioners entitled to relief?
V. Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in force?
RULING:
The court was severely divided on the issues raised in the petition but when the crucial question of
whether the petitioners are entitled to relief, six members of the court (Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo,
Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra) voted to dismiss the petition. Concepcion, together Justices Zaldivar, Fernando
and Teehankee, voted to grant the relief being sought, thus upholding the 1973 Constitution.
1. The Court held that the issue is political and “beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry.
2. Court held that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified
in accordance with Article XV, section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, which provides only one way for
ratification, i.e., “in an election or plebiscite held in accordance with law and participated in only by
qualified and duly registered voters. However, it is conceded that the doctrine stated in some American
decisions to the effect that independently of the validity of the ratification, a new Constitution once
accepted acquiesced in by the people must be accorded recognition by the Court.”
3. On the fourth question, 6 justices voted to DISMISS the petition. Justice Makalintal and Castro so voted on
the strength of their view that “The effectivity of the said Constitution, in the final analysis, is the basic
and ultimate question posed by these cases to resolve which considerations other than judicial, and
therefore beyond the competence of this Court, are relevant and unavoidable.
4. On the fifth question of whether the new Constitution of 1973 is in force:
ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar,
Antonio and Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting votes of the Chief Justice and Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and
Teehankee, all the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. This being the vote of the majority, there is no
further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect.

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018
The Dissenting Opinion: Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that “As to whether or not the 1973
Constitution has been validly ratified pursuant to Article XV, I still maintain that in the light of traditional concepts
regarding the meaning and intent of said Article, the referendum in the Citizens’ Assemblies, especially in the
manner the votes therein were cast, reported and canvassed, falls short of the requirements thereof.
However, the fact that there was voting and that the majority of the votes were for considering as approved
the 1973 Constitution without the necessity of the usual form of plebiscite followed in past ratifications, the
people may be deemed to have cast their favorable votes in the belief that in doing so they did the part required of
them by Article XV, hence, it may be said that in its political aspect, which is what counts most, after all, said Article
has been substantially complied with, and, in effect, the 1973 Constitution has been constitutionally ratified.”


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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 Page |1

LE 108 – SY: 2017 – 2018

BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA, complainant,

A.M. No. 133-J

Univerisity of Mindanao – College of Law

Univerisity of Mindanao – College of Law

Lawyers League for a Better Philippines

G.R. No. 73748

In view of the foregoing, the petitions were dismissed.

Univerisity of Mindanao – College of Law

ALFREDO M. DE LEON, et. al, petitioners,

G.R. No. 78059

Univerisity of Mindanao – College of Law

Univerisity of Mindanao – College of Law

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, et.al, petitioners,

G.R. No. L-63915

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of

Univerisity of Mindanao – College of Law

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner,

G.R. No. 122156

Univerisity of Mindanao – College of Law

Univerisity of Mindanao – College of Law

REV. ELLY CHAVEZ PAMATONG, ESQUIRE, petitioner,

G.R. No. 161872

Univerisity of Mindanao – College of Law

Univerisity of Mindanao – College of Law

G.R. No. 167324

Univerisity of Mindanao – College of Law

Univerisity of Mindanao – College of Law

ANTONIO M. SERRANO, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 167614

ISSUES: Whether Section 10 (par 5) of RA 8042 is unconstitutional

Univerisity of Mindanao – College of Law

Univerisity of Mindanao – College of Law

JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner,

G.R. No. L-45081

Univerisity of Mindanao – College of Law

G.R. Nos. 177857-58

Univerisity of Mindanao – College of Law

Univerisity of Mindanao – College of Law

TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE Petitioner,

G.R. No. 166471

Univerisity of Mindanao – College of Law

G.R. No. 177780

Univerisity of Mindanao – College of Law

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Complainant,

A.M. No. P-08-2531

Univerisity of Mindanao – College of Law

JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 179267

ISSUE: Whether or not Anti-VAWC law is unconstitutional.

Univerisity of Mindanao – College of Law

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan), Petitioners,

G.R. No. 179987

Univerisity of Mindanao – College of Law

Univerisity of Mindanao – College of Law

ZENON R. PEREZ, petitioner,

G.R. No. 164763

The argument is specious on two grounds.

Second. There is strong presumption of constitutionality accorded to statutes. It is established doctrine

Univerisity of Mindanao – College of Law

HACIENDA LUISITA, Petitioner

G.R. No. 171101