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Diversification remain a key strategy for most real Rachel TAN +65 6682 3713 Singapore Research Team
racheltanlr@dbs.com equityresearch@dbs.com
estate companies, cheap valuations could spark M&A
The DBS Asian Insights SparX report is a deep dive look into thematic angles impacting
the longer-term investment thesis for a sector, country or the region. We view this as an
ongoing conversation rather than a one-off treatise on the topic, and invite feedback
from our readers, and in particular welcome follow-on questions worthy of closer
examination.
Table of Contents
1. Investment Summary 3
2. Peer Comparisons 5
3. Key Charts 7
Investment Summary
2017 remains a tenants' market as heightened supply 2. Developers and REITs to continue seeking overseas
completion poses a risk for most real estate sectors. It will be opportunities; en-bloc deals to pick up in 2017
another year of moderation for the Singapore property
market as we believe that most real estate subsectors will Diversification remains a key strategy but opportunities
continue to see downside in rents and/or prices on the back limited as currency volatility arises. We believe that property
of soft demand given the current economic slowdown. developers and REITs will continue their strategy to diversify
Meanwhile, heightened supply completion in 2017 means overseas for growth but expect the acquisition momentum to
that it will remain a tenants' market. taper on the back of increased currency volatility, coupled
with higher cost of funds. Countries that we believe remain
Key Themes attractive on a currency-adjusted basis are London, Australia
(Melbourne and Sydney) and selected Tier 1 cities of China
1. Luxury-end of residential market and office sectors like Shanghai.
bottoming out
Apart from acquisitions, REITs could also capitalize on the
Luxury residential and office sectors the brighter spot. increased development limits (25% cap vs 10% previously
However, among the real estate sectors, we see brighter subject to conditions) accorded by Monetary Authority of
prospects in the luxury end of the residential market and Singapore (MAS) to take on more asset enhancements to
office subsectors. We believe that luxury residential prices in rejuvenate their portfolios and boost returns.
Singapore are attractive on a relative basis compared to home
prices in the region which we expect higher investment Developers are hungry for land in Singapore, more en-bloc
transaction volumes in 2017. The office sector is projected to deals in 2017. We expect continued increased participation
see slower rental declines of (5-10%) mainly due to better- from developers in the upcoming first half 2017 government
than-projected take-up in upcoming new office buildings and land sales program (GLS) as developers look to replenish
see the sector bottoming out by end of 2017. diminishing land banks which will mean that land prices are
likely to remain firm. In addition, we expect to see more en-
However, the retail, hospitality and industrial sectors are still bloc deals for opportunities, especially in the luxury end of
expected to feel the pressure from projected negative net the market. These activities in our view, likely signal
absorption, given excess supply outlook. expectations that home prices should remain fairly stable in
the coming years.
Singapore Property Clock
3. Privatisations, mergers and acquisitions to pick up
Reasons that drive this trend could be (i) sea of capital looking
to deploy in Asian real estate, and (ii) strategic capital
partners or major shareholders looking to recalibrate their
strategies given the lacklustre capital markets and thus
capturing the upside in the medium term.
Source: DBS Bank We believe that such M&A activities highlight the attractive
valuations of listed developers, namely City Developments,
CapitaLand, Global Logistics Properties and UOL which are
trading at close to -1 standard deviation (SD) to their 5-year
historical trading range.
Balance sheet deleveraging a major wildcard; spike in bond Our picks are Ascendas REIT (A-REIT), Keppel REIT (K-REIT),
expiry in 2017-2018 a key data-point to watch. In view of the and Mapletree Commercial Trust (MCT). Among the mid-cap
uncertainty of the pace of interest rate hikes in 2017, we space, we like Croesus Retail Trust (CRT) , Keppel DC REIT
believe that the early refinancing and hedging of interest (KDC REIT) and Frasers Logistics Trust (FLT).
rates will be a key focus for developers and REITs going
forward. Of noteworthy is close to S$6.3 worth of bonds Singapore Developers – Catalysts abound to re-rate
(S$4.0bn among developers) expiring over 2017-2018 where
issuers will need to source for refinancing or alternative Potential policy relaxation and M&A could lift sentiment on
means to repay the bonds. developer stocks. Our call on the developers is mainly due to
valuations supported by an improved outlook. Firstly, we view
While we believe that refinancing for REITs are likely to be current trading levels of (P/Bk NAV of 0.75 and 0.65x
more straight forward given that credits are backed by P/RNAV) as attractive given that developers are trading at
consistent recurring cash flows, we believe that certain close to historical -1SD level. We believe that re-rating
developers, especially those in the mid-cap space which have opportunities will come from the following data-points: (i)
been more opportunistic in tapping the bond market in improved sell-through rates for existing developments on the
recent years could face more hurdles. back of improved transaction momentum, (ii) potential
relaxation of selective government policy in 2017 driving
The recent bond defaults in 2016 among the oil & gas firms higher demand for homes and investors’ sentiment, and (iii)
have cooled investors’ interest in bonds and we believe that potential privatization, M&A activities among developers or
investors will be more selective on the credit for future bond value-locking events like asset divestments which will provide
issuances. As such, the inability to refinance these expiring a lift for NAVs and thus share prices for developers. Our picks
bonds could mean that issuers (developers or REITs) might are City Developments and UOL.
seek alternative financing sources such as banks or even
issuance of equity. Risks
Projected more hawkish four FED hikes to limit upside 2. External shocks impacting on GDP outlook and
performance. We see increasing road-bumps to further unemployment rates in Singapore which will have an
outperformance for Singapore REITs (S-REITs) going into overhang on demand/supply dynamics.
2017, especially faced with a slowing DPU growth profile of
1.0% amidst a rising interest rate environment. DBS
economist projects four FED rate hikes over the course of the
year and as a result, the Singapore 10-year yield is expected
to increase another 0.7% to a normalized c.3.0%. Forward
FY17F yield spreads of 4.0% are already at historical mean
levels which indicate that valuations for REITs are fair.
2. Peer Comparison
Singapore REITs Peer Comparisons
REIT FYE Price Rec Target Mkt Total DPU (S Cts) CAGR Yield P/NAV
Price Cap Return (%)
(S$) (S$) S$'Bn (%) FY16/ FY17/ FY18F/ FY16/ FY17/ FY18F/ (x)
17F 18F 19F 17F 18F 19F
Office
CCT Dec 1.505 BUY 1.70 4.5 18% 9.0 9.3 9.2 1% 5.9% 6.1% 6.1% 0.87
FCOT Sep 1.270 BUY 1.49 1.0 25% 9.8 9.8 9.8 0% 7.8% 7.8% 7.8% 0.83
KREIT Dec 1.020 BUY 1.23 3.5 26% 6.5 6.5 6.5 0% 6.3% 6.3% 6.3% 0.74
OUECT Dec 0.695 HOLD 0.74 0.9 15% 5.3 5.2 5.0 -3% 7.7% 7.6% 7.3% 0.71
Suntec Dec 1.650 HOLD 1.71 4.3 9% 10.0 10.0 10.0 0% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 0.78
Retail - - - - 6.4% 6.3% 6.4% 0.80
CRCT Dec 1.385 BUY 1.60 1.2 22% 10.3 10.5 10.3 0% 7.4% 7.6% 7.4% 0.78
CMT Dec 1.930 BUY 2.25 6.9 21% 11.2 11.2 11.3 0% 5.8% 5.8% 5.8% 1.01
CRT Jun 0.850 BUY 0.99 0.6 26% 7.5 8.2 8.5 7% 8.8% 9.6% 10.0% 0.88
FCT Sep 1.930 BUY 2.29 1.8 23% 11.8 11.8 12.1 2% 6.0% 6.0% 6.2% 1.02
SPH REIT Aug 0.955 HOLD 1.00 2.4 9% 5.5 5.7 5.7 2% 5.8% 5.9% 5.9% 1.00
MCT Mar 1.415 BUY 1.62 4.1 19% 8.7 8.9 9.1 2% 6.0% 6.2% 6.3% 1.11
MAGIC Mar 0.945 BUY 1.11 2.7 24% 7.2 7.3 7.4 1% 7.5% 7.7% 7.8% 0.77
SGREIT Dec 0.755 BUY 0.87 1.6 21% 5.2 5.2 5.4 2% 6.8% 6.8% 7.1% 0.81
Industrial - - - - 6.3% 6.4% 6.5% 0.97
a-itrust Mar 1.010 BUY 1.13 1.0 18% 5.9 6.4 6.2 3% 5.8% 6.3% 6.1% 1.52
A-REIT Mar 2.310 BUY 2.65 6.7 19% 15.7 15.6 15.7 0% 6.7% 6.6% 6.7% 1.14
Cache Dec 0.815 HOLD 0.93 0.7 22% 7.9 7.5 7.5 -2% 9.6% 9.2% 9.2% 0.81
CREIT Dec 0.540 HOLD 0.54 0.7 6% 4.1 4.2 4.2 1% 7.5% 7.6% 7.6% 0.79
FLT Sep 0.940 BUY 1.10 1.3 23% 6.6 6.6 6.8 1% 7.0% 7.0% 7.2% 1.10
MINT Mar 1.645 BUY 1.90 2.9 23% 11.3 11.5 12.0 3% 6.9% 7.0% 7.3% 1.18
MLT Mar 1.020 BUY 1.15 2.5 19% 7.2 7.4 7.6 3% 7.0% 7.2% 7.3% 0.99
SBREIT Dec 0.655 BUY 0.75 0.7 22% 6.1 6.1 6.2 1% 9.2% 9.3% 9.4% 0.80
Hospitality - - - - 7.1% 7.1% 7.2% 1.07
ASCHT Mar 0.700 BUY 0.84 0.8 27% 5.5 5.4 5.6 1% 7.8% 7.6% 8.0% 0.81
ART Dec 1.155 BUY 1.32 1.9 21% 8.2 8.1 8.3 1% 7.1% 7.0% 7.2% 0.81
CDREIT Dec 1.360 BUY 1.59 1.3 23% 9.4 9.0 9.3 0% 6.9% 6.6% 6.8% 0.84
FEHT Dec 0.595 HOLD 0.62 1.1 10% 4.3 4.0 4.2 0% 7.1% 6.6% 7.0% 0.62
FHT Sep 0.645 BUY 0.75 1.2 15% 5.2 5.0 5.3 2% 8.0% 7.7% 8.2% 0.85
OUEHT Dec 0.685 BUY 0.72 1.2 13% 4.3 4.5 4.6 3% 6.4% 6.7% 6.8% 0.78
Healthcare - - - - 7.2% 7.1% 7.4% 0..80
P-Life Dec 2.390 BUY 2.75 1.5 20% 12.1 12.2 12.3 1% 5.1% 5.1% 5.1% 1.47
Others - - - -
IREIT Dec 0.720 HOLD 0.75 0.4 1% 6.3 6.4 6.3 0% 8.7% 8.8% 8.7% 1.16
KDCREIT Dec 1.200 BUY 1.33 1.4 -3% 6.8 7.2 7.5 5% 5.6% 5.8% 6.1% 1.33
Manulife US Jan 0.835 BUY 0.93 0.7 19% 5.6 6.0 6.1 n/a 6.7% 7.2% 7.2% 1.06
REIT
Sector Average 6.8% 6.8% 6.9% 0.95
Note: Prices used as of 04 Jan-2017
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
Developers
Capitaland Dec 13.0 3.06 4.80 -25% 3.60 17% BUY 0.64 0.77
City Dev Dec 7.5 8.39 11.90 -17% 9.90 19% BUY 0.70 0.84
Frasers Centrepoint Sep 4.4 1.60 2.86 -30% 2.00 31% BUY 0.53 0.67
Ltd
Global Logistics Mar 10.1 2.24 3.53 -30% 2.47 14% BUY 0.61 0.83
Properties
UOL Dec 4.7 6.12 10.23 -30% 7.20 23% BUY 0.57 0.59
Average 0.57 0.75
Non-Covered
Guocoland Dec 10.9 2.40 - - - - - na 0.90
UIC Dec 3.9 2.79 - - - - - na 0.66
Ho Bee Dec 1.4 2.04 - - - - - na 0.50
Wheelock Dec 1.8 1.49 - - - - - na 0.60
Wing Tai Jun 1.3 1.62 - - - - - na 0.40
Bukit Sembawang Dec 1.2 4.48 - - - - - na 0.90
United Engineers Dec 1.6 2.57 - - - - - na 0.90
Tuan Sing Dec 0.4 0.29 - - - - - na 0.39
Hiap Hoe Dec 0.3 0.72 - - - - - na 0.51
Heeton Holdings Dec 0.1 0.39 - - - - - na 0.41
Average na 0.63
Average sector 0.68
Note: Prices used as of 04 Jan-2017
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
2. Key Charts
Luxury end of the residential market bottoming out Price differential across major cities (luxury hoe prices)
Units Units Sold in Core Central Region (LHS) Rolling 4 Quarters Growth (%) US$ psf
1,800 20%
5,000
1,600 15% 4,500
1,400 10% 4,000
1,200 5% 3,500
1,000 0% 3,000
2,500
800 -5%
2,000
600 -10%
1,500
400 -15%
1,000
200 -20% 500
- -25% -
2011Q1
2011Q2
2011Q3
2011Q4
2012Q1
2012Q2
2012Q3
2012Q4
2013Q1
2013Q2
2013Q3
2013Q4
2014Q1
2014Q2
2014Q3
2014Q4
2015Q1
2015Q2
2015Q3
2015Q4
2016Q1
2016Q2
2016Q3
A tenants' market as vacancy rates spike Home prices in the suburbs to see more downside
10.0% 130.0 180 30%
(2010=100)
(%) Index Value
120.0 160 Af fordability 25%
9.0% Cur bed but
140 spread is closing
110.0 20%
8.0%
100.0 120
15%
7.0%
90.0 100
10%
6.0% 80
80.0
High Demand 5%
5.0% 70.0 60 F r om Upgraders
(P ublic to Private) 0%
4.0% 60.0 40
4Q16
Dec-04
Dec-05
Dec-06
Dec-07
Dec-08
Dec-09
Dec-10
Dec-11
Dec-12
Dec-13
Dec-14
Dec-15
Jun-04
Jun-05
Jun-06
Jun-07
Jun-08
Jun-09
Jun-10
Jun-11
Jun-12
Jun-13
Jun-14
Jun-15
Jun-16
20 -5%
0 -10%
Vacancy Rate (Non-Landed) (LHS) Rental Index (Non-Landed) (RHS) 1Q2004 3Q2005 1Q2007 3Q2008 1Q2010 3Q2011 1Q2013 3Q2014 1Q2016
Property Price index (Outside Central Area) Spread vs HDB
2.00
1.50
1.00
0.50
-
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
6.0
‐500
4.0 Spread between Premium Grade vs Grade A (RHS)
Net supply: Downtown Core (LHS)
‐1,000
Net demand: Downtown Core (LHS) 2.0 Colliers Premium Grade Raffles Place/New Downtown (LHS)
CBRE Grade A office rents (RHS)
‐1,500 ‐ CBRE Grade A Core CBD (LHS)
25.0
8% 30%
20.0
6% 20%
15.0
4%
10.0
10%
2%
5.0 0%
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016F 2017F 2018F
- 0%
2,007 2,008 2,009 2,010 2,011 2,012 2,013 2,014 2,015 2016F 2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F
-10%
Key Points subsequent FED hikes over 2017 to mean limited re-rating
Developers to continue looking for opportunities for the S-REITs.
opportunities overseas, high-end residential
space We see re-rating catalysts for Singapore Developers come
M&A and potential policy relaxation could lift 2017 on the back of (i) improved investor sentiment on
sentiment for the sector increasing expectations of a government policy easing in
Top picks: City Developments Limited (CDL), 2017 as property prices fall by as much as 12-15% from the
UOL
peak (currently 11%) (ii) potential merger and acquisition
(M&A) activities, and (iii) improved balance sheets on the back
Range bound in 2016. The Singapore Property Developers of expected asset recycling/deleveraging trend.
(measured by the FSTREH index) has fallen by close to 5%
since the start of 2016 and prices are generally c.9% below The Singapore Developers, which are trading at an average
prices from the start of 2015. The FSTREH lagged the S-REITs P/NAV of 0.7x, close to its -1SD is attractive. Current P/NAV
for the most of 2016 but caught up after the recent spike in valuations are close to multi-year lows. At a 0.7x P/NAV,
bond yields saw S-REIT prices weaken on the back of market valuations for developers are similar during past periods of
expectations of a more hawkish FED rate hike momentum in economic stress in 1997, 2003 and 2009, which we believe
2017. will not be the case going forward, especially with the
Singapore GDP projected to grow by c.1.3% in 2017
4.1 Attractive valuations with upcoming catalysts according to our DBS economists. While we continue to
expect Singapore residential prices to fall marginally in 2017,
Looking forward, we believe that the Singapore developers most negatives are priced in, in our view. We believe that we
(SG Developers) can outperform the S-REITs, especially with are closer to the trough, especially with expectations that the
expected headwinds from the uncertainty in the number of government will likely tweak policy measures to negate a
further fall in prices.
6% Index Value 900.00
Relative Performance (%)
4%
850.00
2%
800.00
0%
1/1/15 1/4/15 1/7/15 1/10/15 1/1/16 1/4/16 1/7/16 1/10/16
‐2% 750.00
‐4%
700.00
‐6%
650.00
‐8%
Relative Performance Developers
‐10% 600.00
Figure 2: Valuations attractive as developers still trade at close to past 3 market down-cycle troughs
2.50
P /N AV (x)
2.00
1.50
+1 SD: 1.30x
Figure 3: Historical developers Price-to-Bk NAV vs Figure 4: Developers trading at 45% discount to
PPI RNAVs (-1.0 standard deviation)
180.0 (x) 2.50 0%
Property Price Index Developer P/Bk NAV
Index Value 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
160.0
120.0
1.50 -20%
100.0
80.0 -30%
1.00
60.0
-40%
40.0 0.50
20.0
-50%
- -
Diversification remains a key strategy. Singapore Property properties being the main target asset class. One of the key
Developers have been acquiring and diversifying overseas over reasons was the relative attractive returns when compared to
the past few years, driven mainly by the lack of opportunities Singapore, boosted by a strong exchange rate and low cost of
in Singapore and also the attractive prospects of higher funds as funding rates remain anchored at low levels.
returns overseas. Based on our estimates, out of a sample size
of 22 listed Singapore Property Developers with total assets Figure 5: Developer exposure by geography
amounting to an aggregate S$143bn, only 44% of their
assets are in Singapore with the remaining invested overseas
in China (28%), United States (8%) and Australia (4%) as
shown in Figure 5.
This diversity in exposure has been mainly built over the past
three years post a series of cooling measures that were put in
place on purchasing residential properties in Singapore. Based
on our estimates, we saw close to S$8.1bn of capital invested
overseas, in contrast to S$7.6bn invested in Singapore over
the past few years. The trend was different prior to 2013
when a majority of capital were vested within Singapore and
Asia.
Australia, London and Japan have been the main markets of Source: Companies, DBS Bank
interest in recent years, with commercial (office/hotels)
U.K.: S$4.6bn
Europe: S$0.7bn
China: S$1.2bn
Japan: S$0.2bn
Singapore
S$7.6bn Australia: S$1.4bn
Overseas capital deployment to continue but opportunities DBS economist believes that most major currencies will
limited as currency volatility impact returns. While we believe depreciate against the US dollar over 2017, as the
that developers will continue to seek higher returns overseas, normalization of the US monetary policy and hawkish policies
the yield compression seen for prime assets over the past few from new President Trump might lead to flows from emerging
years will mean that market focus will likely change. markets back to the US. Looking forward, currency volatility
will continue to have a big impact on total returns for
According to JLL, an SGD investor total foreign currency (FX) investors diversifying into real estate outside their home
adjusted total return will diminish over 2016-2018 and is markets, and it is important to closely monitor currency
forecasted to yield in the -3% to 10% range with Shanghai, movements.
Sydney and Melbourne offering the highest returns which will
continue to feature regularly on developers’ horizon over In Singapore, developers could turn to M&A and en-bloc
time. opportunities to land bank. Developers who are looking to
replenish their property land banks in Singapore have turned
We believe that London will remain one of the key investment up in force in the government land sales program (GLS) in
markets, despite Brexit going forward and JLL expecting 2016 and have also ventured into the En-bloc market to gain
returns to moderate, mainly due to weak GBP in the medium access to land banks. Looking ahead, we believe that
term. Developers are likely to be still keen on the UK if it another avenue will be in the listed space, especially with
maintains its financial hub status in Europe. listed developers trading at 0.7x P/NAV and certain mid-cap
developers trading below that.
As developers are expected to continue targeting to grow
their recurring income base, we believe that core assets in the As pressure from additional buyer stamp duties (ABSD) on
commercial space which offer stable cash flows will be key land purchase and Qualifying Charges (QC) increase from
acquisition targets. 2017 onwards, we believe this could spark merger and
acquisition (M&A) activities going forward.
10%
5%
0%
Delhi
Delhi
Delhi
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Tokyo
Tokyo
Tokyo
Mumbai
Mumbai
Mumbai
Sydney
London
Sydney
London
Sydney
London
Hong Kong
Kuala Lumpur
Hong Kong
Kuala Lumpur
Hong Kong
Kuala Lumpur
Shanghai
Shanghai
Shanghai
Melbourne
Melbourne
Melbourne
Seoul
Seoul
Seoul
New York
New York
New York
Singapore
Singapore
Singapore
-5%
-10%
-15%
7.0%
6.0%
5.0%
1Q14
4.0%
2Q15
2Q16
3.0%
2.0%
1.0%
0.0%
Beijing Shanghai Tokyo Singapore Sydney Mebourne Brisbane
Pick-up in transactions in the luxury residential market. We stamp duties recently levied on foreign purchases by other
believe that the luxury end of the market is approaching a popular residential investment destinations such as London,
near-term bottom, judging by the increased number of Melbourne, Sydney which somewhat makes Singapore
transactions seen in the core central region. According to URA- attractive again for international investors looking for real
lodged caveats, YTD 9M16 transactions by Foreigners estate purchases. In addition, we note that (figure 1212)
(excluding Singapore permanent residents) rose by close to Singapore luxury home prices have corrected 11% over the
12% compared to the same period a year ago. We note that past few years and the gap has widened over time, when
the increase in transactions mainly come from buyers in China, compared to other residential investment destinations such as
Malaysia and Indonesia, up more than 15% y-o-y respectively. Hong Kong, London and New York, where prices have
continued to increase over the past few years (figure 13).
If transaction volumes sustain, it will imply investors’
confidence in Singapore’s fundamentals and prospects of long- Therefore, we believe that Singapore luxury home is attractive
term capital gains from current levels. from a relative pricing across countries with potential capital
upside in the medium term once the current over-supply
Attractive relative pricing compared to other popular situation normalizes.
investment destinations. According to JLL, Singapore remains
an attractive investment destination, especially with additional
Figure 10: Transactions in Core Central region growing Figure 11: Core Central Region transactions
outpacing overall total Singapore market
Units Units Sold in Core Central Region (LHS) Rolling 4 Quarters Growth (%) 25% % Change
1,800 20%
20% (Rolling 4 Quarters)
1,600 15%
15%
1,400 10%
1,200 5% 10%
1,000 0% 5%
800 -5% 0%
2011Q1
2011Q2
2011Q3
2011Q4
2012Q1
2012Q2
2012Q3
2012Q4
2013Q1
2013Q2
2013Q3
2013Q4
2014Q1
2014Q2
2014Q3
2014Q4
2015Q1
2015Q2
2015Q3
2015Q4
2016Q1
2016Q2
2016Q3
600 -10% -5%
400 -15% -10%
200 -20%
-15%
- -25%
-20%
2011Q1
2011Q2
2011Q3
2011Q4
2012Q1
2012Q2
2012Q3
2012Q4
2013Q1
2013Q2
2013Q3
2013Q4
2014Q1
2014Q2
2014Q3
2014Q4
2015Q1
2015Q2
2015Q3
2015Q4
2016Q1
2016Q2
2016Q3
-25%
Overall Transactions Core Central Region
-30%
Figure 12: % Growth in prices Figure 13: Prices of luxury residential homes
230.0
Index Value US$ psf
210.0 5,000
190.0 4,500
170.0 4,000
3,500
150.0
3,000
130.0
2,500
110.0 2,000
90.0 1,500
Q1 2010
Q2 2010
Q3 2010
Q4 2010
Q1 2011
Q2 2011
Q3 2011
Q4 2011
Q1 2012
Q2 2012
Q3 2012
Q4 2012
Q1 2013
Q2 2013
Q3 2013
Q4 2013
Q1 2014
Q2 2014
Q3 2014
Q4 2014
Q1 2015
Q2 2015
Q3 2015
Q1 2016
Q2 2016
Q3 2016
1,000
500
-
Monaco Hong London New York Los Japan Singapore Toronto
Hong Kong Korea Malaysia Singapore Taiwan Thailand Kong Angeles
Source: URA, MAS, Christie Real Estate, JLL, Knight Frank, DBS Bank
4.4 Looming ABSD deadlines not a precursor for a significant price cuts for all developments.
Strong sales in the core central region could mean firmer prices Selected impact of ABSD deadlines as most projects continue
going forward. There were close to 22,502 unsold units (both to enjoy healthy margins. Developers with projects that are
completed and uncompleted) as of 3Q16 of which 24% of subjected to deadlines on the ABSD remission on residential
5,464 units were located in the Core Central region as of sites in 2017-2018 have also done well, in our view. Based on
3Q16. The strong sales seen in recent quarters (especially for our analysis of selected projects with significant unsold
recently re-launched completed projects – Gramercy Park, OUE inventories at the start of 2016 and are likely to be under
Twin Peaks near downtown Orchard) have brought the pressure to clear stock due to looming ABSD deadlines in
number of available units for sale down by 6% q-o-q, which is 2017-2018, most have cleared a substantial portion of their
one of the fastest fall compared to homes in other regions. inventory. This is mainly coming from more aggressive
marketing activities while prices dipped slightly by 4-12%, with
Based on the current run-rate for residential transactions, we some staying steady as shown in Figure 15. This is against
estimate that total transactions in 2016 will likely come in at investors’ initial concern that developers might have to suffer
close to 15,500 (c.8,000 primary sales and 7,500 secondary deep cuts in prices in order to move unsold inventories.
sales), which implies close to 10% growth y-o-y. The increase is
mainly driven from a marked increase in both the primary and The pick-up in sales momentum, in our view, will likely give
secondary transactions. The former is mainly due to generally developers more optimism to continue marketing existing
more aggressive marketing activities and price discounts. The projects while upcoming property launches in the Central
improvement seen in the secondary market mainly came from region could also increase in order to capture the current
i) higher transactions in the Core Central region and ii) improved sentiment in that space. We believe that developers
innovative financing schemes and price discounts offered by are likely to pay the ABSD for most projects come 2017 as
developers for selected de-licensed projects which resulted in margins are expected to remain healthy (figure 16).
fairly good response from buyers (see figure 14).
Figure 14. Pipeline supply of unsold private homes (excluding executive condominiums) as of end of 3rd quarter 2016
Total Units Core Central Rest of Central Outside Remarks
Region Region Central Region
(units) (units) (units) (units)
Units Available for sale (3Q16):
Unsold uncompleted units 20,577 4,711 7,130 8,736
Unsold completed units 1,925 753 543 629
Total unsold units 22,502 5,464 7,673 9,365
% Chg Q-o-Q -3% -6% 1% -5%
Demand :
Primary Sales (YTD 9M16) 5,253 444 1,715 3,094
Secondary Sales 6,337 1568 1792 2977
Total Sales 11,590 2,012 3,507 6,071
Figure 15: ABSD payable for selected projects with high unsold inventory in 2017 / 2018
ABSD Region Project Developer Total Unsold Unsold Unsold Unsold Units Land Estimated
liability Units (Jan’16) (Nov’16) Sold in Cost ABSD
2016
(%) (%) (S$’m) (S$’m)
Figure 16: Selling prices indicate that most projects will still earn good margins after payment of ABSD
Est. Selling Selling
Est. Average Margins Margins
Project Breakeven Prices prices in % Chg
Breakeven Prices (q/o ABSD) (with ABSD)
with ABSD < 2016 2016
(S$’psf) (S$’psf) (S$’psf) (S$’psf) (%) (S$’psf) (%) (%)
Mon Jervois 1,265 1,400 1,981 1,832 -8% 1,907 51% 36%
Kingsford Hillview Peak 1,010 1,090 1,367 1,286 -6% 1,326 31% 22%
Pollen & Bleu 1,450 1,575 1,922 1,801 -6% 1,862 28% 18%
Sant Ritz 1,000 1,080 1,419 1,358 -4% 1,388 39% 29%
The Siena 1,500 1,650 2,067 1,826 -12% 1,947 30% 18%
The Glades 1,530 1,675 1,454 1,412 -3% 1,433 -6% -14%
Alex Residences 1,350 1,500 1,705 1,943 14% 1,824 35% 22%
Sophia Hills 1,450 1,650 1,995 1,916 -4% 1,955 35% 19%
Robin Suites 1,450 1,600 2,496 2,276 -9% 2,386 65% 49%
The Bently Residences 1,000 1,050 1,408 1,229 -13% 1,319 32% 26%
The Creek @ Bukit 1,180 1,400 1,589 1,656 4% 1,622 37% 16%
The Rise @ Oxley 1,525 1,685 2,335 2,283 -2% 2,309 51% 37%
Developers could turn towards the en-bloc sites or even M&A tendered out in 2016 has reached its lowest level at
to grow. The government residential land tenders have approximately 4.4m sqft, 75% below the peak in 2012.
remained competitive, driving land bid prices high, following
the dearth of land supply since the property market peaked in Unsold inventory at the lowest since 2001. With the
2013, coupled by developers having pre-sold most of their government moderating the land supply for a few years now,
inventory on their balance sheets on hand. Looking ahead, as unsold inventory of residential properties has reached its
the government continues to maintain a low supply in the lowest levels since 2001. As at 3Q2016, unsold inventory had
upcoming 1H17 land tenders, we believe that developers almost halved since its peak in 2011.
could turn towards the en-bloc market or even look to M&A
to continue land banking and to seek growth. Land prices have remained sticky. While land prices from the
government land tenders have moderated marginally in 2014
Apart from government land sales, developers have turned to to 2015 (highest land prices within the respective year fell
opportunities in the private market as evidenced by the recent c.27% to close to S$900psf ppr levels from a high of S$1,163
pick-up in en-bloc transactions. psf ppr in 2013), we saw land prices in 2016 achieve a record
high of S$1,239 psf ppr.
Smaller developers, some of which on average trade at a
50% discount to book values, could be attractive acquisition Land bids are increasingly more competitive as spreads thin.
or privatisation candidates. The spreads between the winning bid compared to the 2nd
and median bids have also narrowed from 15% back in 2013
Limited government land sales (GLS) to result in sticky (peak of 62% in 2009) to 3% in 2016. The number of bids
land bid prices has increased to an average of 12 in 2016, above the
historical average of eight bids.
Government residential land sales at its lowest level since
GFC. Since the property market peaked in 2013, the
government has been moderating the land supply into the
market. Total GFA of government residential land sales
Figure 17: Shortage of land supply from the Figure 18: Land prices remain steady as competition
government remains high
18,000 800 1,400 1,239
16,000 1,163
G ov ernment Land Sales by GFA (sqft)
14,000
600 1,000 869 849 871
12,000
Pric e (S$psf)
500
800 639 809
10,000 607
400 533 681 724 650 695
600 507
8,000 460
300 350 463 463
6,000 400 285 268 413 436 404
350 310
200
4,000
200 241 256 418 489 438 483 481
350 318 320 291
2,000 100 197 245 228 203 280
-
- -
2002
2003
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
GLS by GFA (sqft) Average Land Price (S$'psf) Min Average Max
Figure 19: Winning margin and average range of bid Figure 20: Number of bidders has increased
have narrowed
200% 18
180% winning bid margin and
average range of bid has 16
16
160% narrowed
av erage range of bid (%)
140% 14
120% 12
12 12
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Average
2
-
Highest vs Lowest Highest vs Median Highest vs 2nd
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Source: Realis, DBS Bank Source: Realis, DBS Bank
6-Dec-16 Margaret Drive Residential 99 14 MCL Land (Regency) Pte Ltd SG Listed 238.4 997.8 275
(tender closed)
1-Oct-16 Fernvale Road Residential 99 14 Sing Development (Pte) Ltd and SG Listed 287.1 517.2 575
Wee Hur Development Pte Ltd
5-Sep-16 Anchorvale Executive 99 16 Hoi Hup Realty Pte Ltd and Foreign 240.9 355.2 635
Lane Condominium Sunway Developments Pte Ltd
1-Jul-16 Martin Place Residential 99 13 First Bedok Land Pte Ltd SG Listed 595.1 1,239.4 450
(Guocoland)
30-May-16 Bukit Batok Commercial & 99 11 Qingjian Realty (BBR) Pte Ltd. Foreign 301.2 634.8 425
West Avenue 6 Residential And Qingjian Realty (BBC) Pte
Ltd
13-Apr-16 Jalan Kandis Residential 99 9 Dillenia Land Pte Ltd Foreign 51.1 481.2 110
29-Feb-16 Yio Chu Kang Executive 99 10 Hoi Hup Realty Pte Ltd Foreign 183.8 331.1 520
Road Condominium
26-Feb-16 New Upper Residential 99 8 CEL Residential Development SG Listed 419.4 760.8 570
Changi Road Pte Ltd
(Parcel B)
18-Jan-16 Siglap Road Residential 99 8 FCL Topaz Pte Ltd, Sekisui SG Listed 624.2 858.3 800
House Ltd and KH Capital Pte
Ltd
Total 2,702.8 4,085
Source: Companies, DBS Bank
Residential Sites
Increase in en-bloc transactions in 2016. From 2005-2007, we S$639m (S$557 psf ppr), ii) Raintree Gardens, Potong Pasir
saw a pick-up in en-bloc transactions when there was a second en-bloc sale of privatised former HUDC estate at
shortage of government land supply. Following the S$334m (S$593psf ppr) to UOL / UIC JV, iii) No.3 Cuscaden
implementation of property cooling measures, en-bloc Walk, Orchard at S$103.8m (S$1,826 psf ppr) to SL Capital, a
transactions have dwindled down since 2011 to no consortium led by Sustained Land, iv) No. 120 Grange Road,
transactions in 2014. In 2015, only one successful transaction Orchard at S$48.5m (S$1,841 psf ppr) to Roxy-Pacific Holdings,
(the sale of Thong Sia building) was recorded. and v) No. 8 Hullet Road, Orchard at S$38.2m (S$2,073 psf
ppr) to a consortium led by Patrick Kho of Lian Huat Group.
Nevertheless, we have seen a pick-up of en-bloc transactions in Media / news reported properties for sale including two
2016 with Harbour View Gardens being successfully transacted apartments at The Claymore, Lakeside Towers in Jurong, Villa
in August 2016 at an average price of S$1.3k psf, five en-bloc D’Este on Dalvey Road and Cairnhill Mansion on Orchard Road.
deals announced, and increasing media / news on property
owners engaging property consultants (such as JLL and CBRE) Despite the tighter rules on en-bloc sales and more tedious
to set up collective sales committee. The five en-bloc deals process to complete an en-bloc transaction, developers are
announced (excluding en-bloc sales for asset recycling now willing to undertake these properties, implying that i)
purposes or specifically to be exempted from ABSD or QC developers are hungry for land bank, and ii) developers are
charges) were i) Shunfu Ville, Bishan which was the first en- taking a more positive outlook in the medium term.
bloc sale of privatised former HUDC estate in nine years at
Figure 23: Shortage of land supply from the government Figure 24: Land prices remain high due to competitive
bids
Figure 25: Pick-up in en-bloc sales during shortage of Figure 26: Total land transactions has fallen from 2013
government land supply onwards, post the implementation of cooling measures
With the recent proposed privatisation of various property- banking. We reviewed a list of smaller-cap developers with the
related companies and news reports on potential takeovers of key summary of each of the developers below. The smaller-cap
United Engineers (UE) (please refer to our report: Another developers are trading at an average discount to NAV of 29%
Centenarian for Sale) and Global Logistic Properties (GLP), we with most trading at a range of 40-93% discount to NAV.
believe that some of the smaller-cap developers which are Companies that are in deep discounts with attractive assets
trading at deep discounts to NAV could look attractive for includes Bukit Sembawang (93% discount), Wing Tai (60%),
potential M&A as an alternative to acquire assets / land Hiap Hoe (51%), and Hobee (50%).
Figure 27: Sample list of mid-cap developers that could head the M&A route
Bukit Sembawang Wing Tai Hiap Hoe
Bloomberg / Reuters BS SP / BSES.SI WINGT SP / WTHS.SI HIAP SP / HIAP.SI
Market Cap (S$'m) 1,177 1,298 335
Shareholding Structure Lee Family 44% Cheng Family 50% Teo Family 70%
Aberdeen 11% Others 2% Others 1%
Asia Fountain Inv (Guoco 5% Free Float 48% Free float 29%
Grp)
Free float 39%
Disc / (Prem) to NAV 93% 60% 51%
Debt / Equity no debt 0.4 0.7
Net debt / Equity no debt 0.1 0.6
Cash balance (S$'m) 401 966 23
Cash % of Market Cap 34% 74% 7%
Assets by business units Development properties 99.6% Development properties 57.0% Investment properties 45%
Investment properties 0.4% Investment properties 39.0% Hotel 11%
Retail 2.0% Development properties 8%
Leisure 0%
Others 31%
Assets by countries n/a SG 47% SG 82%
HK 29% AU 18%
CH 11%
MY 13%
Key assets Paterson Collection, Orchard, SG - The Crest, SG - Resi Signature At Lewis, SG - Resi
Resi
St Thomas Walk, River Valley, SG - Le Nouvel KLCC, MY - Resi HH @ Kallang, SG - Industrial
Resi
Luxus Hill, Seletar, SG - Landed resi Winsland House, SG - comm Zhongshan Park Integrated,
Novena, SG - Mixed
Watercove, Sembawang, SG - Development in Suzhou Industrial
Landed resi Park - Comm
Lanson Place, Shanghai - hospitality
Source: DBS Bank
Figure 27: Sample list of mid-cap developers that could head the M&A route (continued)
Hobee Roxy Wheelock
Bloomberg / Reuters HOBEE SP / HBEE.SI ROXY SP / RXYP.SI WP SP / WPSL.SI
Market Cap (S$'m) 1,477 501 1,789
Shareholding Structure Chua Family 76% Teo Family 72% Wheelock and Company 76%
Limited
Others 1% Others 6% Aberdeen 6%
Free float 23% Free float 22% Free Float 18%
Disc / (Prem) to NAV 50% 45% 40%
Debt / Equity 0.5 1.9 0.0
Net debt / Equity 0.5 1.2 (0.4)
Cash balance (S$'m) 77 327 1,319
Cash % of Market Cap 5% 65% 74%
Assets by business units Commercial 63% Development properties 57% Development properties 58%
Residential 35% Hotel 11% Investment properties 35%
Industrial 1% Investment properties 16% Investments 7%
Others 17%
Assets by countries SG 55% SG 42% SG 80%
UK 29% AU 36% Other 20%
CH 12% JP 8%
AU 4% TH 4%
MY 4%
HK 5%
ID 1%
Key assets Turquoise, Seascape & Cape Hotel properties in SG, JP, AU, TH Ardmore Three, Orchard, SG - Resi
Royale, Sentosa Cove, SG & Maldives
Residential projects in Shanghai, Sunnyvale Residences, SG - Resi Scotts Square, Orchard, SG - Resi
Tangshan, Zhuhai
6 commercial buildings in London Trilive, SG - Resi / Retail Fuyang project, Hangzhou, CH
The Metropolis, Buona Vista, SG - New World Towers, South Wheelock Place, SG - Comm /
Comm / Retail Brisbane, AU - Resi Retail
HB Centre 1 & 2, SG - Ind Land banks in SG, AU, ID
Source: DBS Bank
Figure 27: Sample list of mid-cap developers that could head the M&A route (continued)
Metro UE Aspial Oxley
Bloomberg / Reuters METRO SP / MTHL.SI UEM SP / UTES.SI ASP SP / ASPA.SI OHL SP / OXHL.SI
Market Cap (S$'m) 844 1,676 525 1,282
Shareholding Structure Ong Family 36% Great Eastern 13% Koh Family 84% Ching Chiat Kwong 43%
Ngee Ann Dev Pte 10% OCBC 10% Others 6% Low See Ching (Liu 29%
Ltd Shijin)
Others 6% Lee Foundation 9% Free float 11% Tee Wee Sien 12%
(Zheng Weixian)
Free float 49% WBL Corp 3% Others 15%
MY 1% Japan 0%
TW 1% Cambodia 0%
Past transaction multiples imply that 1x P/NAV and 0.8x transacted at an average P/NAV multiple of 1.0x and P/RNAV
P/RNAV are levels at which most deals are struck. Based on of 0.8x as shown in the table below. However, we note that
selected privatisation transactions between 2010 and the there may be differences in terms of size, market
latest practicable date involving property developers listed on capitalisation, financials and portfolios that could change the
the SGX (list may not be exhaustive), the deals were potential valuations for M&A.
Jan-2015 Keppel Land Keppel Corp 4.38 2,749 25.0% 0.88x 0.66x
Apr-2014 Hotel Properties Limited Wheelock 4.05 200 33.8% 1.32x 0.79x
Apr-2014 CapitaMalls Asia CapitaLand Limited 2.35 3,025 35.8% 1.26x 0.89x
Feb-2014 Singapore Land Limited United Industrial 9.40 650 16.9% 0.72x 0.67x
Corporation Limited
Dec-2012 SC Global MYK Holdings Pte Ltd 1.80 318 57.2% 1.15x 0.8x
Developments Limited
May-2012 Wing Tai Ascend Capital Limited 1.39 1,104 14.3% 0.55x 0.62x
May-2011 Allgreen Limited Brookevale Investment 1.60 1,060 40.6% 0.99x 0.81x
Pte Ltd
Sep-2010 Soilbuild Limited Dolphin Acquisitions 0.80 113 15.6% 1.26x 1.07x
Aug-2010 MCL Hong Kong Land 2.45 189 27.3% 0.96x 0.75x
Holdings Limited
Min 14.3% 0.62x 0.62x
Average indebtedness across developers over time remain capital. Firstly, we expect the land-banking climate to remain
stable; larger-cap developers have been generally more competitive in Singapore given limited land sites available for
conservative. Property developers have generally been tender from the government, which means that most mid-
conservative in their approach towards capital management sized developers could be crowded out by their larger
and over the past few years, kept net gearing in the range of competitors or foreign developers. Secondly, increased
0.4-0.6x. Tracking the average indebtedness across developers currency volatility going forward is expected to be a drag on
over time, we found that mid-sized developers (defined as returns when deploying more capital overseas. As such, given
those with market capitalisation of up to S$2bn) have limited avenues to deploy capital and fairly strong balance
generally taken more debt in recent years and thus average sheets, we believe that a possible avenue where developers
gearing of c.0.8x in the last four years, higher than the could look to deleverage their balance sheet or if not pay
sector’s average of c.0.7x over the same period. higher dividends going forward.
On average, over the same period, the large-cap developers The recent spike in swap-offer rates (SOR) could imply higher
have an average net gearing ratio of c.0.5x. refinancing costs going forward. As such, faced with a
slowing top-line growth and increasing prospects of higher
Developers that stand out in terms of higher gearing than interest obligations, we believe that a viable strategy will be to
their peers as of the latest reported quarter are the likes of utilise proceeds that are recognised from subsequent years’
Guocoland (large-sized developer) at 1.2x and in the mid-sized pre-sales to pare down on debt obligations when they come
developer space - Oxley, Tee Land and Roxy-Pacific which all due in 2017-2018.
have net gearing in excess of 1.0x (Fig. 30). Chip Eng Seng
and Tuan Sing also have high net gearing of above 0.9x. In our interest rate analysis, we estimate impact on PATMI for
the developers from a 1% increase in interest rates result in a
Developers to deleverage as outlook remains subdued. 2017 4-40% impact on PATMI.
will turn out to be a tough year for developers to deploy
Figure 29: Gearing levels of Property Developers over Figure 30: Net gearing of Selected Mid-Cap
time have remained fairly stable Developers (Latest Quarter)
0.50 2.50
2.15
0.45
2.00
0.40
N e t Debt/Equity (x)
1.50
0.35 1.16
1.07
0.94 0.98
0.30 1.00 0.85
0.71
0.25 0.47 0.50 0.54
0.50
0.20
0.00
0.15
Fragrance
Roxy-Pacific
TEE Land
Heeton
Tuan Sing
Oxley
Hobee
OUE
0.10
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
Figure 31: Summary of Developers Financial position (As of latest quarter ended Sept-2016)
Developer Type* Market Total Total Total Cash Total Net Total Net EBITDA/I
Cap Assets Debt Equity Debt/ Debt/ Debt/ Debt/ nterest
Equity Equity EBITDA EBITDA expense
(TTM) (TTM)
(S$'bn) (S$'bn) (S$'bn) (S$'bn) (S$'bn) (x) (x) (x) (x) (x)
Capitaland Large 13.56 46.21 15.58 23.88 4.24 0.7 0.5 11 8 3.0
GLP Large 8.77 27.73 6.21 18.30 2.47 0.3 0.2 10 6 3.0
Citydev Large 7.40 19.93 6.35 11.02 3.29 0.6 0.3 5 3 11.8
UOL Large 4.52 11.60 2.57 8.51 0.27 0.3 0.3 8 7 9.8
FCL Large 4.32 24.20 9.80 11.84 2.17 0.8 0.6 12 9 5.1
UIC Large 3.86 8.62 1.31 6.98 0.08 0.2 0.2 4 4 28.9
Guocoland Large 2.21 8.15 4.05 3.47 1.13 1.2 0.8 22 16 3.9
Wheelock Mid 1.78 3.28 0.02 3.02 0.40 0.0 (0.1) 0l0 (7) 55
OUE Mid 1.57 8.09 2.97 4.59 0.21 0.6 0.6 17 14 1.5
Perennial RE Mid 1.49 6.71 2.52 3.64 0.19 0.7 0.6 221 1 1.2
Ho Bee Mid 1.44 4.29 1.39 2.79 0.08 0.5 0.5 9 8 21
Wingtai Mid 1.31 4.71 1.13 3.34 0.97 0.3 0.0 89 13 0.3
Oxley Mid 1.23 4.48 2.43 0.96 0.37 2.5 2.1 8 7 8.4
Bukit Sembawang Mid 1.16 1.42 - 1.27 0.40 - (0.3) 0.0 (4) 0.0
Fragrance Mid 1.09 2.00 0.82 1.06 0.06 0.8 0.7 93 85 1.6
Roxy-Pacific Mid 0.53 1.50 0.89 0.48 0.33 1.8 1.2 12 8 4.8
Chip Eng Seng Small 0.39 2.18 1.17 0.75 0.46 1.6 0.9 12 7 5
Tuan Sing Small 0.35 2.09 1.04 0.89 0.16 1.2 1.0 16 14 2.4
Hiap Hoe Small 0.33 1.30 0.45 0.69 0.02 0.7 0.6 8 6 4.4
SingHaiyi Small 0.30 0.95 0.30 0.47 0.12 0.6 0.4 -29 -17 -1.3
Heeton Small 0.14 0.72 0.31 0.33 0.03 0.9 0.9 -85 -77 -0.2
TEE Land Small 0.09 0.42 0.21 0.17 0.03 1.2 1.1 153 135 0.3
Total Net
Debt/ Debt/
Equity Equity
(x) (x)
Average Sector 0.6 0.4
Average Large Cap 0.6 0.4
Average Mid Cap 0.7 0.5
Average Small Cap 1.1 0.9
*Large Cap denotes Market Cap > S$2.0bn, Mid-Cap Developers refer to those with market cap > S$0.5bn to less than S$2.0bn, Small Cap
<S$0.5bn in market cap
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
Bond markets issuances have increased in recent years. With S$3.4bn worth of bonds from developers due in 2017 that
strong investor demand for yields in recent years amidst the need to be refinanced. Continued access to funding is a key
low interest rate environment, we have seen an increase in enabler to a healthy real estate development and investment
new bond issuances in Singapore. In the real estate space, we market. However, recent bond defaults in the oil & gas space
saw close to S$34bn of new issues over the past five years, has resulted in heightened risk aversion among investors in
which is more than 20% of the total amount of new bond bonds. In addition, the market for future bond issues appears
issuances over the preceding five years. to be shut for most aspiring issuers for now. If the current risk-
off sentiment remains in the medium term, it might be a
In the real estate sector, bond issuances peaked in 2011, and headwind for issuers in the real estate sector who need to
again reached new highs in 2012 and 2015. In 2015, bond refinance upcoming bond expires in 2017-2018 which total
issuances totalled S$8.7bn across the real estate sector. We S$6.3bn, out of which S$4.0bn will be from real estate
also note that mid-sized developers have also been tapping the developers.
bond markets in recent years. A total of S$3.5bn worth of
bonds will be due in 2017. We note that among the bonds due in 2017, developers like
Guocoland and OUE will need to refinance expiring bonds.
Average cost of funds has also been falling over time, hovering Developers such as OUE and Heeton’s existing cash balances
at about 3% since 2008. and receivables may not be sufficient for repayment of bonds.
Additional financing may be required in due time for bond
repayments.
Figure 32: Bond issuances by developers peaked in Figure 33: Bonds Expiry profile
2015
10,000 S $'m 4.5% S$'BN Developers REITs
9,000 4.0%
8,000 3.5%
7,000
3.0%
6,000 3.2
2.5%
5,000
2.0%
4,000
1.5%
3,000 1.3
2,000 1.0%
0.8 1.2
6.0
1,000 0.5%
1.5 1.3 3.6 2.1 1
0 0.0% 2.9 2.6 0.9
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 1.4
1.1 1.2 0.9
0.7
Total amount issued (S$m) Average cost of debt
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 >20 24
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
Deteriorating rental outlook for most real estate subsectors. While we see long-term value in the hospitality sector given
Revenues across the office, retail, industrial and hospitality that the sectors trades at 20-40% discount to book, we believe
sectors were under pressure in 2016 due to a combination of there is limited re-rating catalyst at least for 1H17 as RevPAR is
sluggish demand as well as increase in physical completions expected to remain under pressure. However, we recommend
and anticipated supply. Demand for the more cyclical sectors that investors look for opportunities to re-enter in 2H17 on the
office, hotel and industrial sectors were also negatively
back of a potential recovery in 2018 as the oversupply situation In the mid-cap space, Frasers Logistics and Industrial Trust (FLT)
in Singapore normalises. and Keppel DC REIT (KDCREIT), with inbuilt annual rental
escalations and the ability to deploy their lowly geared balance
Stocks with growth and/or trading at a discount to recent sheets, offer visible growth in DPU.
market transactions/book to outperform. With a challenging
2017 to come, we believe REITs with a clear and visible growth Growth in DPU is also evident at Croesus Retail Trust (CRT)
driver will do well. On that front in the large-cap space, which will benefit from favorable hedges, with additional
Mapletree Commercial Trust (MCT) stands out given its DPU- upside should it be taken over.
accretive acquisition of Mapletree Business City Phase I which is
under-rented as well as continued growth at its core asset Finally, our top pick for stocks that trade at a discount relative
Vivocity. to book and recent market transactions is Keppel REIT (KREIT).
The implied value for KREIT’s Singapore portfolio on a per sqft
We also believe the risk reward for Ascendas REIT (AREIT) is basis stands at S$2,250 versus recent market transactions of
favorable given its exposure to the business park space which is S$2,700 and above, and it trades at 0.76x P/BV.
supply constrained. Moreover, AREIT will be under geared
balance sheet post conversion of the outstanding convertible
bonds next year which will allow AREIT to further deepen its
presence in Australia through acquisitions.
Figure 35: Price performance of Singapore REITs vs Figure 36: S-REIT yields and yield spread chart
Singapore Developers and STI Index
1.15 +12% 14%
Sector Yield spread
1.10
12%
1.05 Sector Yield
2%
0%
With a sense of déjà vu, as we approach 2017, we are faced But expectations could be dialled back again. While the market
with the similar issues confronting investors at the start of remains focused on rate hikes, there is a possibility that 2016
2016 and 2015. These include risk of rising interest rates, could repeat again, with interest rate expectations being
slowing growth, higher cost of capital potentially constraining reduced. This could arise from the European Central Bank
the ability to raise capital to fund growth plans, and (ECB) and Bank of Japan’s (BOJ) decision to push interest rates
heightened risk of write-downs of property values given falling further into negative territory and concerns over the potential
rents. breakup of the Euro on the back of victories by nationalist
parties in several European elections next year. Furthermore,
With economic outlook now softer than at the start of 2015 the policies actually implemented by President-elect Trump may
and 2016, we believe that S-REITs with stronger relative not be as inflationary as first thought and/or concerns over
growth will command an increasing premium. In addition, S- impact on curtailment of global trade/economies weigh more
REITs which offered resiliency in the past and trade at a on long-term bond yields.
premium but are now only able to offer flattish DPU growth
might be vulnerable, given rising risks of earnings Potential return of capital to the US a headwind (Figure 38).
disappointment. Key themes in 2017 are as follows: The SGD strengthened against the USD between 2009 and
2013, when the US Federal Reserve implemented three rounds
5.1 Impact of an increase in interest rates on of quantitative easing. During this period, the carry trade was
share price, distributions prevalent with USD-based investors taking advantage of the
stronger SGD by taking positions in yield instruments including
DBS economists project interest rates to rise faster than S-REITs. This resulted in the FSTREI Index rallying c.44% to its
consensus. We believe investors’ attention is now focused on peak in May 2013. However, with the end of the quantitative
the pace of interest rates in 2017. Thus far, consensus is easing by the US Federal Reserve and the interest rate up cycle
expecting three rate hikes with the US 10-year bond yield commencing from December 2015, the FSTREI Index has
forecast to rise to 2.5-2.6%. With share prices for S-REITs become more volatile, moving in sync with changes in interest
having already corrected in anticipation of this outcome, we rate expectations and movements in the USD. Going forward,
believe S-REITs will likely deliver steady returns. In contrast, the should US interest rates continue on an aggressive path
more hawkish forecasts by our DBS economists, who anticipate upwards, in line with our DBS economists view, capital from
four rate hikes (25bps once a quarter), would take the Fed Asia would likely return back to the US, presenting a headwind
funds rate to 1.5% by end-2017, the US 10-year bond yield to to the performance of S-REITs.
3.25% and the Singapore 10-year bond yield to 3.05%. Under
our house view, the overall performance of S-REITs will likely to
capped.
Figure 37: DBS Interest Rates Forecasts Figure 38: Singapore REITs vs currency
Current 1,200 We a ker 1.80
1Q17F 2Q17F 3Q17F 4Q17F P e riod when
(8 Dec'16) S GD a
stre ngthening 1.70
1,000 pote ntial
US 10- S GD a tailwind he a dwind 1.60
2.35% 2.65% 2.85% 3.05% 3.25%
Year Bond 800
1.50
US 2-year 1.10% 1.50% 1.70% 1.90% 2.10%
bond 600 1.40
US yield 1.30
1.25% 1.15% 1.15% 1.15% 1.15% 400
Curve 1.20
SG 10 year 200
2.34% 2.65% 2.75% 2.85% 3.05% 1.10
bond
- 1.00
SG 2-year 1.17% 1.50% 1.65% 1.80% 1.95%
bond
SG Yield 1.17% 1.15% 1.10% 1.05% 1.10% FSTREI Index (LHS) USDSGD Rate (RHS)
Curve
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
Yield spread below historical averages assuming normalised REITs in general may face some volatility. However, we believe
3.05% yield. The current FY17F yield spread to the spot 10- S-REITs with clear visible growth drivers have the potential to
year bond yield stands at 4.7% which is above the historical experience a compression in yield spread, with absolute yields
average spread of 3.8% and 4.1% average since 2010. stable or even compressing. This would be similar to the
However, assuming a normalised 3.05% bond yield, the yield experience during the last interest rate up-cycle. Using Capital
spread will drop to 4.0% which will be in line with its historical Mall Trust (CMT) as an example, from 2004-2007, CMT’s yield
mean. This implies that current share prices have priced in rates spread fell from over 4% to 0.4% in mid-2007, while the US
inching back to normalised levels. Federal Reserve raised the Fed Funds Rate from 1% to a peak
of 5.25%, and CMT generated annual DPU growth in excess of
7%.
Potential for yield spreads for REITs with growth to compress
during rising interest rate environment. Assuming the long
bond yield spikes to 3.05% by end-2017, share prices of S-
Figure 39: CMT experienced a compression in interest rates during an up-cycle in interest rates
6.0% 20.0%
Increase in
interest rates 18.0%
5.0% 16.0%
4.0% 14.0%
12.0%
3.0% 10.0%
8.0%
2.0% 6.0%
1.0% 4.0%
Fall in yield
2.0%
spread
0.0% 0.0%
5.5%
+ 2 SD
5.0%
+ 1 SD
4.5%
M ean
4.0%
- 1 SD
3.5%
3.0% - 2 SD
2.5%
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
Figure 41. Historical S-REIT yield and S-REIT yield spread (2005-current)
S-REIT Yield
10 Year bond S-REIT Yields
Period Years Spreads Comments
(%) (%)
(%)
2005 2.9% 4.8% 2.1% 2006-2008 was a period of high growth
for the S-REITs where average distribution
“High Growth” 2006 3.4% 5.0% 1.6%
growth was c.13% over 2006-2008. Key
2007 2.9% 4.1% 1.2% catalysts were acquisitions
“Aberration in 2008 2.8% 7.3% 4.5% Yield spread expanded to >5.1% due to
valuations due to
2009 2.3% 9.6% 7.3% financial crisis
the GFC”
2010 2.4% 6.3% 3.9%
2011 2.2% 6.4% 4.2%
“Liquidity driven Post-global financial crisis period, the
2012 1.5% 6.5% 5.0% sector saw yield compression in 2012-
recovery”
2013 2.0% 5.8% 3.8% 2013 before the Fed hinted of rate hikes
in mid-2013
2014 2.4% 6.2% 3.8%
2015 2.4% 6.3% 3.9%
Periods
2005-cuurent 2.5% 6.2% 3.8%
2006-2008 3.0% 5.4% 2.4%
2010-current 2.1% 6.3% 4.1%
Forward
Current (FY17F) 2.3% 7.0 % 4.7%
Forward(FY17F) 3.0% 7.0% 4.0%
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P. Finance L.P, DBS Bank
Figure 42. Implied share price based on average yield spread and normalised 3.05% 10-year bond yield
Implied Yield Upside /
Avg Forward Current Current (Average Implied downside from
Yield Avg Yield Yield DPU Price Forward Yield Spread Share Price current share
Spread Yield (+1SD) (-1SD) (Scts) (S$) Yield + 3.05%) (S$) price
Office
KREIT 4.1% 6.3% 7.2% 5.4% 6.5 1.020 6.1% 7.1% 0.92 -11%
CCT 3.7% 5.8% 6.5% 5.1% 9.3 1.505 6.1% 6.7% 1.39 -9%
OUECT 5.1% 7.4% 8.1% 6.7% 5.2 0.695 7.7% 8.1% 0.64 -7%
FCOT 4.9% 7.0% 7.8% 6.2% 9.8 1.270 7.7% 7.9% 1.24 -2%
Retail
CRCT 4.6% 6.8% 7.4% 6.1% 10.5 1.385 7.6% 7.6% 1.38 -1%
CMT 3.2% 5.3% 5.7% 4.9% 11.2 1.930 5.7% 6.2% 1.81 -7%
CRT 7.1% 9.4% 10.1% 8.7% 7.5 0.850 9.0% 10.1% 0.74 -13%
FCT 3.8% 5.3% 5.7% 4.9% 11.8 1.930 6.0% 6.8% 1.74 -11%
SPH REIT 3.3% 5.6% 5.9% 5.3% 5.7 0.955 5.9% 6.3% 0.90 -7%
Commercial
MCT 3.8% 5.8% 6.4% 5.3% 8.7 1.415 6.0% 6.8% 1.28 -12%
MAGIC 4.8% 7.1% 7.7% 6.4% 7.2 0.945 7.4% 7.8% 0.92 -3%
SGREIT 4.4% 6.6% 7.1% 6.0% 5.2 0.755 6.9% 7.4% 0.70 -8%
Suntec 4.2% 6.3% 7.3% 5.3% 10 1.650 5.9% 7.2% 1.39 -16%
Hospitality
ART 5.1% 7.2% 7.9% 6.5% 8.1 1.155 7.1% 8.1% 1.00 -14%
ASCHT 5.4% 7.5% 8.4% 6.6% 5.5 0.700 7.9% 8.4% 0.65 -8%
CDREIT 4.8% 6.9% 7.8% 6.0% 8.9 1.360 6.8% 7.8% 1.14 -17%
FEHT 4.0% 6.2% 6.9% 5.5% 4 0.595 6.8% 7.0% 0.57 -5%
FHT 5.2% 7.5% 7.8% 7.1% 5 0.645 9.6% 8.2% 0.61 -6%
OUEHT 4.9% 7.2% 7.8% 6.5% 4.5 0.685 6.9% 7.9% 0.57 -16%
Industrial
AIMS 6.3% 8.5% 9.8% 7.1% 11.3 1.310 8.7% 9.3% 1.22 -7%
a-itrust 4.7% 6.8% 7.4% 6.2% 5.9 1.010 5.6% 7.7% 0.77 -25%
A-REIT 4.2% 6.3% 6.8% 5.9% 15.7 2.310 6.7% 7.2% 2.18 -7%
Cache 5.9% 8.0% 8.9% 7.2% 7.5 0.815 9.2% 8.9% 0.84 3%
CREIT 5.9% 8.0% 9.3% 6.8% 4.2 0.540 7.8% 8.9% 0.47 -14%
FLT 5.0% 6.9% 7.2% 6.7% 6.6 0.940 7.2% 8.0% 0.83 -13%
MINT 5.1% 7.2% 7.7% 6.7% 11.3 1.645 6.9% 8.1% 1.40 -15%
MLT 5.0% 7.1% 8.2% 6.0% 7.2 1.020 7.1% 8.0% 0.90 -13%
SBREIT 5.8% 8.1% 8.8% 7.5% 6.1 0.655 9.5% 8.8% 0.69 5%
Healthcare
P-Life 3.3% 5.4% 6.0% 4.9% 12.2 2.390 5.0% 6.3% 1.94 -19%
Others
IREIT 6.3% 8.6% 9.2% 7.9% 6.3 0.720 8.8% 9.3% 0.68 -6%
KDCREIT 3.9% 6.1% 6.7% 5.5% 7.2 1.200 5.8% 6.5% 1.11 -10%
MUST 4.9% 6.9% 7.2% 6.6% 6 0.835 7.3% 7.9% 0.80 -5%
Green boxes denote downside limited to <5%
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
Impact of interest rates on distributions increase in borrowing costs as they refinancing their debt.
This is due to current interest rates in Europe, Japan and
Still some breathing room as impact of interest rates will be Australia being lower than when the REITS first borrowed in
felt over time. While interest rates are anticipated to rise the respective local currencies.
next year, the majority of S-REITs have hedged 75-85% of
their borrowings and with a weighted average debt maturity Assuming a 1% lift in the cost of borrowing above our
of 2-3 years. For FY17, on average about 9% of debt is due current estimates (we have already assumed up to a 25-bp
to be refinanced, thus the full impact from higher costs of increase in cost of debt compared to FY16) and the impact
borrowings will not be felt in 2017 but over the next few only occurs when the various S-REITs refinance 9% and
years. In addition, the impact from a rise in interest rates is 21% of all loans outstanding in 2017 and 2018 respectively,
likely to be felt by the REITs which predominantly borrow in as well as only impacting the current outstanding floating
SGD. In contrast, REITs with exposure to European, Japanese rate debt, we estimate up to 2.9% and 4.9% impact on
and Australia assets with commensurate debt in EUR, JPY FY17F and FY18F overall S-REIT DPU respectively.
and Australia, may even report declining or face a slower
Figure 44. Debt Expiry Profile Figure 45. S-REIT debt by sector
Healthcare
S$bn 3%
14.0 29.7% 35.0%
Industrial
12.0 30.0% Retail 27%
24%
10.0 21.3% 20.4% 25.0%
18.6%
8.0 20.0%
6.0 15.0%
8.8%
4.0 10.0%
2.0 5.0%
1.1% Office
0.0 0.0% 33%
Hospitality
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 >2020 13%
Source: Bloomberg Finance LLP, DBS Bank Source: Bloomberg Finance LLP, DBS Bank
Figure 47: Office/Commercial REITs forecasted to Figure 48: DBSV forecasts vs consensus estimates
deliver strongest growth in DPUs
-1.3%
Hospitality
-6.7% -0.7%Hospitality
-1.3%
-0.2%
Office/ Commercial
Office/ Commercial 1.3% 1.3%
2.5% Consensus
FY17/18 1.5%
1.1% S-REITs 1.1% FY17/18
FY16/17 S-REITs 0.4%
-2.0% -1.0% 0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0%
-8.0% -6.0% -4.0% -2.0% 0.0% 2.0% 4.0%
Source: Bloomberg Finance LLP, DBS Bank Source: Bloomberg Finance LLP, DBS Bank
5.3 Potential risk to property values in the For retail space, CityVibe at Clementi was sold at a net yield of
industrial and hospitality sectors slightly above 4% while vendors for Jurong Point is seeking to
sell the mall for over S$2bn at a sub-4% net yield. The values
Capital values most resilient for office and retail sector. Cap ascribed to these transactions are in line or above the
rates have generally been compressing over the past few years valuations of the properties of the various office and retail
due to low interest rates and ample liquidity boosting REITs.
transactions velocity and value. Looking ahead, with projected
decline in rents and RevPAR for the industrial and hotels in Figure 50: Implied price per sqft of NLA for Singapore
2016, there is potential downside to the capital values for portfolio on completed basis
some industrial and hospitality REITs. REIT Price Total Implied psf
(S$) attributable SG (S$)
NLA (m sqft)
While rents for the office and retail sector are under pressure
CCT 1.505 3.1 1,850
near term, we expect capital values to remain steady, given
KREIT 1.020 2.6 2,250
abundant liquidity chasing both these asset classes. This can be
OUECT 0.695 1.0 2,320
seen by recent office transactions such as the sale of Asia
Suntec 1.650 2.4 2,050
Square Tower 1 and Straits Trading Building for approximately
*Calculated as EV less value of non Grade A office properties divided
S$2,700 and S$3,500 per sqft respectively. In addition, the
by attributed property
implied price for the Central Boulevard land tender made by IOI
Properties was over S$3,000 per sqft.
4.2%
(%) 4.1% Transaction cap rates have compressed
4.0% down to low-3.0% level as demand for
3.9%
quality offices remain high due to
3.8% foreign investors willing to price in a
3.6% 3.8%
3.6% recovery of the sector in the medium
3.6% term.
3.0%
Jun-09 Jun-10 Jun-11 Jun-12 Jun-13 Jun-14 Jun-15 Jun-16
7.4%
Cap rates for factory and warehouse
7.3% space have compressed over time to a
7.2% 7.1% peak back in 2013. Since then, it has
7.0% 6.9%
expanded slightly but remained fairly
6.8% stable since.
6.8% 6.7%
6.5%
6.6% Any downside to valuations are likely
due to unforeseen increase in vacancy
6.4%
rates from property conversions (single-
6.4% Factory
6.2% user to multi-user) properties.
Warehouse
6.0%
Mar-2009 Mar-2010 Mar-2011 Mar-2012 Mar-2013 Mar-2014 Mar-2015 Mar-2016
Source: URA, DBS Bank
5.4 Acquisitions may be difficult to execute with acquisitions worth S$861m as industrial REITs such as AREIT,
redevelopments an attractive option FLT and MLT sought freehold properties with annual rental
escalations. Suntec and FHT also bought a 25% interest in
Slowdown in acquisitions in 2016.At the end of 2015, we Southgate, Melbourne (S$289m) and Novotel Melbourne
expected the high cost of equity to potentially constrain the (S$246m) respectively. In 2016, the S-REIT sector made its
ability of S-REITs to raise equity to fund acquisitions. This maiden acquisition in Italy with KDCREIT’s purchase of a data
partially came to fruition with total announced acquisitions centre in Milan.
dropping 16% y-o-y to S$6.2bn. The most active sectors were
the Industrial (S$3.0bn), followed by Office/Commercial S-REITs increased the number of assets sold from S$306m in
(S$1.9bn) and Hospitality (S$0.8bn). Notable transactions 2015 to S$555m in 2016 as AREIT exited China and
include MCT’s purchase of Mapletree Business City Phase I redeployed its capital to Australia, while RHT sold its 51%
(S$1.8bn), CCT’s acquisition of the remaining 60% interest in economic interest in its Gurgaon property given the inability of
CapitaGreen (S$1.6bn) and CRCT’s purchase of Galleria Mall the trust to obtain the necessary regulatory approval to buy a
(S$0.3bn). direct 51% equity interest in the hospital.
In terms of country allocation, Singapore returned as the Meanwhile, the share of properties acquired from the S-REITs'
primary market (66% of total acquisitions worth S$3.8bn) for sponsors jumped to 72% in 2016 from 49% in 2015 as MCT
acquisitions. This was mainly driven by the purchase of and CCT bought from their respective sponsors. Stripping out
Mapletree Business City Phase I and 60% interest in these two transactions, the majority of acquisitions were made
CapitaGreen. Australia remains a popular destination with total from third parties.
Figure 55: Acquisition value marginally down Figure 56: Acquisitions were mainly Singapore-centric
8,000
S $' m
7,000
2015 2016
6,000 8%
Others Singapore 3% Singapore
5,000 Indonesia 3% 14%
4,000 Australia China China
Japan 36% Japan Japan
3,000 15%
China
2,000
Singapore Australia 2% Australia
38% 66%
1,000
Indonesia 5% Indonesia
0
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 6% Others Others
3%
Source: Various S-REITs, DBS Bank
Figure 57: Industrial REITs remain most active Figure 58: Sponsor remains key source of acquisitions
in 2016
100%
Total 90%
28%
80% 43%
Healthcare 49% 51%
70%
68%
Hospitality 60%
2016 50%
Industrial 2015 40%
72%
2014 30%
51% 57%
Retail 2013
49%
20%
32%
2012 10%
Office/Commercial S$m 0%
0 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Figure 63: S-REITs with development potential and/or asset recycling potential
REIT Assets with redevelopment potential Potential asset recycling opportunity
Office
CCT Golden Shoe n/a
FCOT Alexandra Techno Park if HP/Microsoft moves out n/a
KREIT n/a n/a
OUECT n/a n/a
Retail
CRCT n/a n/a
CMT Funan n/a
CRT One’s Mall and Torius Mall n/a
FCT Integration with Northpoint extension n/a
SPH REIT n/a n/a
Commercial
MCT n/a n/a
MAGIC n/a n/a
SGREIT n/a n/a
Suntec Park Mall n/a
Industrial
a-itrust n/a n/a
A-REIT Selected properties with unutilised GFA Older properties with limited medium upside
Cache n/a n/a
CREIT Selected properties with unutilised GFA Older properties with limited medium upside
MINT Selected properties with unutilised GFA Older properties with limited medium upside
MLT Selected properties with unutilised GFA Older properties with limited medium upside
SBREIT Selected properties with unutilised GFA n/a
Hospitality
ASCHT n/a
ART n/a Rental properties in Japan / Assets in lower-tier cities in Europe
CDREIT n/a n/a
FEHT n/a n/a
FHT n/a n/a
OUEHT n/a n/a
Healthcare
P-Life n/a n/a
RHT n/a n/a
Other
KDCREIT n/a n/a
IREIT n/a n/a
Key Assertions We believe the stabilisation of the market could be led by the
Luxury residential home prices (CCR) to bottom following:
out on the back of improved transaction velocity
& foreigner buying interest. 1. PPI has declined 11.4% from the peak in September 2013
Suburban home prices (OCR) to see up to a 3%- (with the inclusion of net prices in 3Q), inching closer to
5% further drop in prices impacted by higher the government’s trigger point for intervention at c.13%
mortgage rates and market vacancy rates. decline from the peak based on historical incidences.
Government could relax policy given uncertain Potential relaxation of government policies which will be
macro-outlook and pace of interest rate rise. supportive of prices.
3Q16 Property Price Index saw the sharpest drop partly due to Total transactions inch up as secondary volumes lead the way
the inclusion of net prices of de-licensed projects (Chart 1). (Charts 2 and 3). Total residential transactions rose by 11% y-
Private property prices saw the largest q-o-q decline of 1.5% in o-y and 1% q-o-q to 4,596 units. This was mainly due to a rise
3Q16 since the streak of falling prices following the September in resale transactions of 53% y-o-y to 2,615 units while
2013 peak. This was partly due to the inclusion of net prices of executive condominiums saw a 15% increase to 1,398 units.
de-licensed projects for the first time which does not present a Primary sales volumes (excluding EC) fell 18% after four
‘clean’ q-o-q price movement for this quarter. The landed quarters of improved y-o-y transactions.
private property price index (PPI landed) recorded the largest
decline of 6.9% y-o-y and a 2.3% q-o-q decrease in 3Q16. The Higher 9M16 transactions lead by EC and secondary sales.
PPI has declined 11.4% since peaking in September 2013 with Total residential transactions rose by 9.8% y-o-y to 12,000
landed PPI and non-landed PPI dropping by 15.9% and 9.8% units led by a 65% increase in EC sales and a 25% increase in
respectively. secondary sales. Primary sales volumes fell 3.1%. We believe
that signs of transactions returning to the market albeit from a
PPI has fallen 11.4% from September 2013 peak (Chart 1). lower base, implies that after a close to 10% drop in price
Following the new inclusion, PPI has declined 11.4% from the index, buyers are seeing value in the current market.
peak in September 2013 with landed properties recording the
largest decline of 15.9%, followed by RCR (-11.0%) and CCR Supply
(10.6%). Based on the past two incidences (AFC in 1998 and
dot com collapse in 2000), the government has been seen to Supply completion to start moderating from 2017 onwards.
intervene when property prices fell c.13% from the peak. If The cut in the number of sites available for tender in the
history is a good indicator, the quantum of the decline is government land sales programme and lack of collective sales
inching closer to the government’s trigger point. in recent years mean that supply growth will peak in 2016 at
51,210 units (25,000 public housing units, 21,650 private units
Central region bottoming out (Chart 1). Property prices fell in and 4,560 ECs) and moderate from 2017 onwards. The total
all three regions in Singapore partially due to the inclusion of supply under construction stands at 155,750 units (88,000
net prices with Core Central Region (CCR) recording the public housing units, 53,150 private units and 14,600 ECs).
highest decline at 1.9% q-o-q. Property prices in Rest of Given the declining completion outlook, we believe that the
Central Region (RCR) and Outside Central Region (OCR) each oversupply situation in the residential market will also start to
recorded a 1% decline q-o-q. With the inclusion of net prices, improve and normalise over the coming years. We expect
property prices in CCR and RCR recorded 10.6% and 11.0% vacancy rates to inch up from 8.9% as of 2Q16 to 9-10% over
declines from their peaks. OCR, which previously held up 2016-2017 before reversing.
better than the central region, is now inching closer at 9.8%.
Nevertheless, we believe the central region is bottoming out as
previously, property prices in the central region saw two
consecutive quarters of marginal increase in PPI of 0.3% q-o-q
in the CCR in both 1Q16 and 2Q16, while RCR saw three
consecutive quarters of flat-to-marginal increase of 0.2% q-o-q
(2Q16: +0.2% q-o-q).
Rentals
Increased supply and weak employment outlook to result in Vacancy rates improved marginally by 0.2ppt to 8.7% as at
further pressure on rental yields. The 3Q16 residential rental end of 3Q16, still above the historical average of 6.6%. The
index fell 1.2% q-o-q led by non-landed residential homes weakness in rental can be attributed to the ramp-up in supply
rental (-1.4%) while rental for landed homes was flat. The completions in recent years. Despite the marginal
residential rental index (non-landed) for residential homes improvement, we continue to expect vacancy to rise and
(non-landed) declined by 1.4% compared to a quarter ago and further downward pressure for rents but at a more muted rate.
is now more than 10.7% down from its 3Q13 peak. The q-o-q
fall is evenly spread across the various parts of the island, with The uncertainty in the employment outlook, and the ongoing
rental for residential homes in OCR leading the decline at 2.4% job rationalisation at financial institutions and tighter
followed by CCR's -1.4% and RCR's -0.6%. regulations impacting expatriates’ employment in Singapore
may add pressure on demand for some homes, especially those
in the CCR.
%yoy Chg
-3.1% -6.9% -2.0% -1.6% -0.6% -2.8% 0.1%
(3Q16)
% Chg
-11.4% -15.9% -9.8% -10.6% -11.0% -9.8% -9.4%
(Peak)
3Q16
137.9 152.4 134.9 126.9 139.2 154.9 134.7
(index)
Source: URA, HDB, DBS Bank
Private Residential Units Launched (uncompleted)
Total Direct Sales (Uncompleted)
3,000
2,000
1,000
-
1Q13 2Q13 3Q13 4Q13 1Q14 2Q14 3Q14 4Q14 1Q15 2Q15 3Q15 4Q15 1Q16 2Q16 3Q16
Source: URA, DBS Bank
Figure 69: Supply of new residential units by expected year of completion Remarks
Close to 29,000 units were
60,000 completed in 1H16.
Un its
Looking ahead, we are
50,000 looking at a more modest
rate of increase in new units
completing, due to fewer
40,000 units available for sale as a
result of the cuts in land for
tenders from the
30,000 government's land sale
program.
-
2H16 2017 2018 2019
Competed Private Residential Executive Condo Public Housing
Source: MND, DBS Bank
Figure 70: Rental index has been weakening since 4Q13, in line with property Remarks
prices
The residential rental index
15% 180.0 remains in decline, dropping
% Chg Index Value
160.0 further by 1.2% in 3Q16.
10% 140.0
Given the positive
120.0 correlation between rental
5% and prices, we expect prices
100.0
to continue moderating as
80.0 rentals weaken further.
0%
60.0
-5% 40.0
20.0
-10% -
Q0Q Chg in Rental Index PPI Index
`Source: URA, HDB, DBS Bank
Figure 71: Rental index remains weak on high vacancy rates Remarks
5.0% 70.0
4.0% 60.0
4Q16
Dec-04
Dec-05
Dec-06
Dec-07
Dec-08
Dec-09
Dec-10
Dec-11
Dec-12
Dec-13
Dec-14
Dec-15
Jun-04
Jun-05
Jun-06
Jun-07
Jun-08
Jun-09
Jun-10
Jun-11
Jun-12
Jun-13
Jun-14
Jun-15
Jun-16
Source: URA, HDB, DBS Bank
Government to tinker only if “material stress” is seen in the gains tax and property tax for land under development) were
system. The Singapore property prices have been in a given and the government opened the market to foreigners
controlled and modest decline of approximately c.5% per again by allowing them to obtain loans in SGD during the dot
annum from the peak of 3Q13. With prices now fallen by 11% com collapse.
from the peak in 3Q13 and we expect the market to remain on
a downside bias in 2017. However, we believe the scenarios that may warrant a re-look
at policies will be a marked drop in prices in a certain quarter
The government’s key focus is still the overall health of the or a potential tweak in certain policies on a selective basis. On
Singapore’s economy and its intertwining relationship with that front, we believe that “cyclical measures” such as the
property prices. With property forming close to 45% of total buyer stamp duties/seller stamp duties which have been
household wealth as of 3Q16, it is not in the government’s effective in curbing speculative demand, could be re-looked if
interest to have a rapidly declining property market. Emerging transaction volumes continue to remain tepid over 2017.
risk in the horizon stemming from increased volatility in
interest rates, coupled with a weak rental outlook due to Singapore citizen unemployment rate rising towards 4.0%. The
heightened supply completion outlook, will likely warrant the uncertain employment outlook in Singapore might be a
government to consider tweaking its macro prudential policies. dampener for prospects for price increases in 2017. As of
3Q16, it was reported that unemployment rate among
What are potential scenarios or datapoints that could lead to a Singapore citizens rose by 0.6ppt to 3.0% as of June 2016 but
policy easing? has held steady (fallen marginally to 2.9% as of September
2016) since. While not sounding any alarm bells at this point,
A marked drop in prices in a quarter or a peak-to-trough price we caution that prices tend to weaken in the event that
drop of 13-15% might point to a first round of policy unemployment rate rises to 4.0% and above (figure 74). DBS
unwinding. If history is a good indicator, the current PPI, economist believes that the unemployment outlook is likely to
having fallen close to 11% from the peak, is inching closer to remain fairly stable at the 3.0% level and not expected to
the government’s trigger point of c.13%. Historically (during deteriorate in a big way.
the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) in 1998 and the dot com
collapse in 2000), the government has been seen to intervene Sharp increase in interest rates. The recent spike in SIBOR
when property prices fell c.13% from the peak over a period rates, which a majority of home loans is a risk for prices in our
of approximately one year. Current mortgage-to-household view given that it will a rise in mortgage payments going
income ratio stands at 1.5x (mortgage-to-household income forward. The pace of increase in base rates are likely to be
ratio ranged from 1.4-1.9x from 1997-2014). closely watched by the government in order to avoid an
unwarranted fallout in property prices which might pose a risk
The government’s initial responses were: 1) suspend the seller to an already weak economic outlook.
stamp duty during the AFC; and 2) tax exemptions (capital
Figure 72: Summary of possible Scenarios that could warrant a potential policy action
Scenario Description Potential Impact on property market What has history taught us?
1. A peak-to-trough fall Usually accompanied with a weakening GDP Government had back in 1998 and 2000
in property price of 13- outlook, this will dampen homebuyer sentiment intervened when property price dropped 13%
15%. as the “loss of wealth” effect on home-owners from the peak.
could cascade to a downward spiral in prices.
2. Unemployment Rate Given the high ownership rate of c.91%, an A rise in unemployment rate to close to 4.0%
rising towards 4.0%. increase in unemployment will impact on and beyond typically results in a fall in property
households’ ability to maintain mortgage prices.
payments.
3. Sharp increase in Impact on affordability as a larger portion of No real correlation historically but likely be one of
interest rates. disposable income is channelled to mortgage the key reasons of assessing household
repayments. affordability.
Source: URA, HDB, DBS Bank
Figure 73: Measures that government tweaked during previous fall in the Singapore Property Price Index
8.00 Jun 98: deferral Feb 00: tax
Sept 02: EC Series of tightening
of buyer stamp exemption on measures
downpayment ‐ 10%
7.00 duty land dev
cash and 10% CPF
removed; DC
Dec 02: 2 yrs
6.00 rates on resi
property tax exempt
land increased
on land under dev; Jul 05: LTV raised from 80% to
30% reduction in 90%; cash payment reduced fr
5.00 May 99: 2nd stamp duty 10% to 5%; relax foreign
CPF housing
1997: Oct 01: CGT lifted; ownership rules; relaxation on
grant cut
4.00 seller foreigners can use non‐related singles joint
stamp duty SGD loans; property purchases
suspended tax exempted for Nov 05: Waived security
3.00
land under dev requirement of developers on
DPS
2.00
Dec 06: buyer Oct 07: DPS
Nov 98: 10%
Jun 00: HDB stamp duty removed
1.00 CPF housing
tightened concession
grant cut
regulations removed
‐
Dec‐95
Dec‐98
Dec‐01
Dec‐04
Dec‐07
Dec‐10
Dec‐13
Sep‐96
Sep‐99
Sep‐02
Sep‐05
Sep‐08
Sep‐11
Sep‐14
Jun‐97
Jun‐00
Jun‐03
Jun‐06
Mar‐95
Jun‐09
Mar‐98
Jun‐12
Mar‐01
Jun‐15
Mar‐04
Mar‐07
Mar‐10
Mar‐13
Blue denotes relaxation measures
Source: URA, HDB, DBS Bank
Figure 74: Unemployment spikes to close to 4% typically result in a slide in property prices
0.0% 180
Sep’97-Dec’98 Sep’07-Sep’09
( %) Unemployment Rate: 1.9% - 4.7% Unemployment Rate: 2.4% - 4.9% Index Value 160
1.0% Property Price Index: Fell by 36% Property Price Index: Fell by 25%
140
2.0%
120
3.0% 100
4.0% 80
60
5.0%
Property Price Index 40
6.0% Sep’00-Dec’01 Unemployment Rate (Inverse)
Unemployment Rate: 2.6% - 5.2% 20
Property Price Index: Fell by 17%
7.0% 0
Mar-92 Mar-94 Mar-96 Mar-98 Mar-00 Mar-02 Mar-04 Mar-06 Mar-08 Mar-10 Mar-12 Mar-14 Mar-16
URA occupancy private sector: Central Downtown Core 91.1% 90.9% 88.5% -235 -260
URA occupancy private sector: Central Fringe Area 86.7% 88.8% 89.6% 76 287
CBRE Grade A 94.8% 94.8% 95.9% 110 110
CBRE Core CBD 95.8% 95.1% 95.9% 80 10
Source: URA, Corporate Locations, CBRE, various REITs and corporate, press reports, DBS Bank
Demand Forecasts
Uncertain outlook for new office demand. Over the past three Spike in vacancy but market moves to two-tier market. On the
years, employment growth in the four key sectors driving office back of sluggish demand and jump in supply, we anticipated
demand were (1) Financial Services, (2) IT and other Private Sector Downtown Core vacancy rate to potentially spike
information services, (3) Legal, Accounting and Management from 11.5% at the end of September 2016 to 17% in 2017
Services, and (4) Insurance Services, and had been healthy. The and 18% in 2018, approaching the levels seen in 2004 and
three-year compound annual growth rate (CAGR) for those surpassing the 14% vacancy level in 2010 and 2011. While the
sectors ranged from 3-9% to end-September 2016. However, headline vacancy rate is high, the figure will be composed of
given a slowing economy, announced job losses in the financial two very different markets. One would consist of the older
services industry and businesses moving out of the CBD to buildings such as those in Shenton Way and Raffles Place
business parks/suburban locations, we believe the demand for where there will be a “structural” or persistent high vacancy
new office space will be sluggish but still positive. This is potentially in excess of 20% as these buildings are unable to
evidenced by c.13,000 sqm of net new space in Downtown compete against the new buildings currently under
Core area during the first nine months of the year. In addition, construction or recently completed due to less efficient
the number of people employed in the services sector floorplates and modern specifications. In contrast, vacancy at
continues to grow, expanding by 2% in the nine months to the newer buildings or those defined as Category 1 office
September compared to the same period last year. buildings by URA will enjoy substantially lower vacancies, closer
to the 10% level, as the “flight to quality” takes place, i.e.
Improving pre-commitment rates for key new buildings. tenants seeking better quality offices to cater to their
Compared to earlier this year where the pace of securing expansion plans or consolidate their various offices into a single
tenants for new offices was muted, the environment has since location. According to URA, Category 1 office buildings are
improved. Guoco Tower, according to press reports, has now defined as those located in core business areas in Downtown
been 80% pre-leased, while pre-commitments level has Core and Orchard Planning Area which are relatively modern
increased to 30-40% for Marina One with Duo Tower stable at or recently refurbished, command relatively high rentals, and
30%. With less urgency for Guoco Tower to secure tenants have large floor plate sizes and gross floor areas.
and Marina One potentially increasing pre-commitment levels
in the coming months, the incremental pressure on Premium Recovery from 2018 onwards. While we expect office vacancy
Grade A rents may start to ease. rates to peak in late 2017 or early 2018, with new office
supply easing from 2018 onwards, we anticipate rents to start
Supply recovering as early as the end of 2017, as both tenants and
landlords anticipate vacancies to drop due to a fall in supply.
16% jump in downtown core office supply. Approximately However, we expect a recovery in rents to largely occur in the
5.4m sqft of office net lettable area (NLA) will be completed premium spectrum of Grade A office space, as the older
within Singapore’s downtown core between 2016 and 2018; buildings at Shenton Way and Raffles Place will unlikely be able
translating into a 16% increase in existing downtown CBD to raise rents due to their still high occupancies and
stock, or at a three-year CAGR of 5%. Approximately 73% of uncompetitive products. On that front, we expect Grade A
new office supply (by NLA) will be concentrated in four assets: office rents to recover from the S$8.50 psf/mth low in 2017
(a) DUO Tower located in Bugis; (b) Guoco Tower, located in towards S$10 psf/mth in 2018, similar to the 14% rise in office
Tanjong Pagar; (c) Marina One in Marina Bay; and (d) Frasers rents experienced between mid-2013 and 2015 as we
Tower, located at Tanjong Pagar (Table 1). Based on press approached a dearth of new supply in 2015 and demand
reports, the majority of the remaining developments will likely normalises to historical average in 2019. The projected
be sub-divided and strata sold to end-users. recovery in Grade A office rents is also partially a result of the
increased proportion of premium quality office stock
commanding higher office rents.
Key Charts
Figure 78: Office supply in the Central Business District (CBD) Remarks
Office (CBD) Location Developer Estimated Property
NLA Type Estimated 5.4m sqft of office
(sqft) net lettable area (NLA) is
2016 expected to complete within
Guoco Tower Peck Seah Street Guocoland 890,000 Leasing the Downtown Core between
2016 and 2018, representing
EON Shenton Shenton Way Roxy Pacific Holdings 101,045 Strata Sale a 16% total increase in
SBF Center Robinson Road Far East 353,480 Strata Sale current Downtown Core
DUO Tower Rochor Road M+S 570,475 Leasing office stock.
GSH Plaza Cecil Street GSH/TYJ/Vibrant/DB2 282,000 Strata Sale Around 4.0m sqft of NLA will
OUE Downtown 1 Shenton Way OUE 50,000 Leasing be held for leasing purposes,
while the rest will likely be
2,247,000
strata sold.
2017
Marina One Marina Bay M+S 1,876,000 Leasing Key office projects to watch
out for are Guoco Tower
UIC Building Shenton Way UIC 278,000 Strata Sale (2016), DUO Tower (2016),
Oxley Tower Robinson Road Oxley Consortium 112,000 Strata Sale Marina One (2017) and
Crown @ Robinson Robinson Road WyWy Developments 70,000 Strata Sale Frasers Tower (2018).
2019
Funan North Bridge CapitaLand Mall Trust 204,000 Leasing
Road
204,000
2020
CPF Building Shenton Way Ascendas-Singbridge, 500,000 Leasing
Mitsui and Tokyo
Tatemono
500,000
2021
Golden Shoe Market Street CapitaLand Commercial 800,000 Leasing
Trust
Central Boulevard Marina Bay In bidding stage 1,070,000 Leasing
White Site
1,870,000
Source: URA, Corporate Locations, CBRE, various REITs and corporate, press reports, DBS Bank
Figure 79: Decentralised office supply Remarks
Office Location Developer Estimated Property
(Decentralised) NLA Type
(sqft)
2016
M18 Eastern Suburbs Mapletree 56,000 Leasing Over the next few years,
- Paya Lebar supply of decentralised
Havelock II River Valley Guthrie GTS 64,850 Strata office space will be steady.
/ Havelock Sale Given a large majority of
120,850 this new supply is being
sold as strata units
2017
potentially for smaller users
Arc 380 Eastern Suburbs Tong Eng Group 103,500 Strata and owner occupiers, they
- Jalan Besar Sale will compete directly with
Vision Exchange Western Suburbs 500,000 Strata CBD space.
- Jurong Sale
603,500 However, in 2018, Paya
2018 Lebar Central may pose
Paya Lebar Central Eastern Suburbs Lend Lease / ADIA 750,000 Leasing some form of competition
- Paya Lebar to CBD office space if Lend
750,000 Lease/ADIA is able to
2019 position the property as a
viable alternative.
Woods Square Northern Suburbs Far East Organisation 534,500 Strata
- Woodlands Sale
534,500
Source: URA, Corporate Locations, CBRE, various REITs and corporate, press reports, DBS Bank
Figure 80: Average new supply per annum over 2015-2019 in line with average from 2010- Remarks
2014
2,500 '000 sqft S$ psf pm 20.0
While the headline supply is
expected to be large from
Post GFC 18.0
2,000 2015-2019, the average
2010‐2014 average: 2015‐2019 average: supply of 1.15m sqft p.a. is
1.10m sqft 16.0 comparable to 2010-2014’s
1.15m sqft
1,500 average of 1.10m sqft p.a.
14.0
1,000 Despite the large supply in
12.0 2010-2014, central area
office rents still recorded
500 10.0 positive growth.
8.0
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
6.0
‐500
4.0
Net supply: Downtown Core (LHS)
‐1,000
Net demand: Downtown Core (LHS) 2.0
CBRE Grade A office rents (RHS)
‐1,500 ‐
Figure 81: URA rental index (central) growth vs. changes in employment for financial Remarks
institutions (1998 – present)
70% Between 1998 and 2015, there
20% was 90% correlation between
changes in the URA rental index
60% (central) and employment growth
in the financial services sector.
50% 15%
Lower correlation in rents and
40%
financial services employment
30% 10% from 2012 onwards (73%)
reflects a diversification in
20% demand for CBD office space
from other sectors such as
10% 5% technology, media and
telecommunications,
0% commodities/resources and
professional services.
‐10% 0%
Employment in the financial
‐20% institution sector will still have a
large influence on the direction
‐30% ‐5% of rents in the CBD.
URA rental inde x ‐ central (LHS) Employment ‐ Financial & Insurance Services (RHS)
Figure 83: Uncertain demand outlook for key sectors that drive CBD office demand Remarks
Ke y sectors for CBD office demand Key drivers of CBD office demand
include financial services, legal
and accounting sectors, as well as
Legal, IT and Other IT and other information services.
Accounting information
and Services, 21% Between 2012 and 2015, these
Management key sectors led CBD office
Services, 30% demand, and reported headcount
increases of between 3-9% p.a.
Financial
Insurance Services, 41%
With an uncertain economic
environment ahead, the outlook
Serivces, 8%
across these sectors has turned
more cautious. Nevertheless,
given still positive GDP growth
3‐year headcount CAGR (2012‐2015) ahead as projected by our DBS
Outlook
economists, we expect net
positive demand for space though
Total 5% at a slower pace than the more
buoyant times during 2012-2013.
Legal, Accounting and For 9M16, the amount of
8% occupied space in the Downtown
Management Services
Core area rose by 237k sqft,
according to the latest URA
Insurance Serivces 5% statistics.
Financial Services 3%
IT and Other information
7%
Services
0.0% 5.0% 10.0%
Source: Singstat, CEIC, DBS Bank
Figure 84: Office vacancies to spike on sluggish demand and increase in supply Remarks
3,000 '000 sqft S$ psf pm 20.0 We expect the soft demand
outlook to result in c.40k sqft of
2,500 18.0
net demand for space in the
Downtown core region for the
16.0
2,000 next three years.
14.0
1,500 Given the large increase in
supply, this will result in
12.0
1,000 Downtown Core vacancy rates
spiking to 17% and 18% in
10.0
2017 and 2018 respectively from
500 11.5% as at the end of
8.0
September 2016.
0
6.0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
Vacancy rates should start
-500 trending down from 2019
4.0
onwards as demand normalises
-1,000 back up to historical averages,
2.0
and supply eases.
Net Supply: Downtown Core (LHS)
-1,500 -
Net demand: Downtown Core (LHS)
CBRE Grade A office rents (RHS)
Source: URA, CBRE, DBS Bank
Key Assertions significantly below the 6% average over the past few years,
Retail sector outlook tempered by impact of e- and the lowest since 2009.
commerce and dampened consumer sentiment. Retailers have been hit by several factors: (a) declining sales
More demand in the outskirts; Orchard road efficiency (revenue per square foot) as a result of e-commerce
expect to remain weak. and leakage from residents travelling abroad; (b) a manpower
Rental reversion remain flattish to marginally shortage due to government restrictions on foreign labour; and
negative. (c) rising labour costs from minimum wage policies. Faced with
declining revenues and rising costs, retailers have, since 2014,
begun to consolidate their operations, cutting down on the
8.1 Trends, demand and supply outlook number of stores they operate while maintaining a presence in
better-performing malls. The impact of retail headwinds will
We see the next supply spike in 2018 adding more pressure in
not be felt evenly across all malls, in our view. We believe that
rental and occupancy. The years 2013 and 2014 saw
in order for a mall to outperform, it needs to be well located
Singapore’s largest influx of retail space since 2006. Recent
with a strong track record of recurring footfall and tenant
supply has been largely located outside the central region
sales, and have active asset management and advertising and
(Figure 88), an indication that the government’s push towards
promotion efforts.
a live, work and play concept in regional hubs is bearing fruit.
The recently completed Waterway Point (95% tenanted)
Supply
continues to see good demand, an indication that retailers
remain keen to tap into suburban demand for goods and
Moving to the outskirts. The retail experience for locals will be
services. Much more limited supply is expected in 2016 and
an increasingly suburban affair. The majority of shopping mall
2017, before another spike in completions in 2018, stemming
completions in the past year have been located in the suburbs:
from two key projects: Changi Jewel and Northpoint City
One KM in Tanjong Katong, Big Box in Jurong East, Paya Lebar
(Figure 89-90).
Square in Paya Lebar and Seletar Mall in Seletar, for example.
Looking ahead, new retail space will still be largely focused in
Demand
the suburbs. Waterway Point in Punggol opened in January
2016, and Northpoint City in Yishun (2018) and Changi Jewel
Tempered by retail headwinds. Despite strong take-up rates in
(2018) are largest suburban developments in the pipeline. Just
recently completed malls, net absorption has been negative
as we have seen in Jurong East, the government has been
since 2015 (Figure 92). Existing malls have, in general, been
actively encouraging the continued development of regional
under occupancy and rental pressure. As of 3Q16, shop
centres in decentralised areas as key working and leisure
occupancy rates across the country had fallen to 91.3%, from
destinations, as a means of relieving the congestion in the
a high of 95.5% in 2013. Occupancy for Frasers Centrepoint
central business district and Orchard Road. As a result, we have
Trust fell by 1ppt on-year to 94.9% (adjusted to exclude
seen many retailers that were previously only in the Orchard
Northpoint which is undergoing an asset enhancement
Road area moving into suburban shopping malls in order to
initiative); though occupancy for CapitaLand Mall Trust was
directly cater to residents living in those areas. Examples
more stable, down marginally to 98.6% from 98.8% at the
include Zara, Coach, Kate Spade and Isetan.
end of 2014, its rental reversions dropped to 1.3% for 9M16,
Figure 88: Net Additions to Shop Space Supply - suburban retail stock has been Remarks
growing at a quicker pace than that in the central region
Retail supply additions in recent years
1.40 have been mainly in the Outside Central
m' sqft Region (a.k.a. OCR; dark grey column)
1.20
and Fringe of City Centre (pink column).
1.00
In the OCR, major completions since
0.80 2013 include Westgate, JEM, Sports
0.60 Hub, One KM, Seletar Mall, Paya Lebar
Square, Capitol Piazza and Big Box.
0.40
0.20 Waterway Point, the latest mall to
obtain its temporary occupation permit
- – in 4Q2015 –added around another
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 9M16 30,000 square metres (sqm) of space to
(0.20)
the retail sector.
(0.40)
(0.60)
Figure 91: Net Absorption of retail supply and Occupancy Rate Remarks
150 96%
sqm
Net additions of shop space outpaced net
95% absorption which has turned negative since
100 2015 and has been declining further in
94% 2016 as landlords take more time to fill up
the space in recently completed malls.
50
93%
We expect net absorption to continue to
0 92% fall going forward, as retailers are
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 9M16 consolidating their operations amid
91% headwinds in the sector.
‐50
‐150 88%
70
60
Property Rental Index: Shop: Fringe Area Property Rental Index: Shop: Central Area
* We have selectively shown retail properties that are over 45,000 sqft in size in this table.
Source: URA, DBS Bank
3,000 25.0
Number of
Value S$'m
Leasing volumes in 3Q are flat q-
transactions o-q, while they appear to be
2,500 picking up in recent quarters, we
20.0 believe that it is still early to call
a bottom.
2,000
15.0
1,500
10.0
1,000
5.0
500 Transactions Value
‐ ‐
1Q10
2Q10
3Q10
4Q10
1Q11
2Q11
3Q11
4Q11
1Q12
2Q12
3Q12
4Q12
1Q13
2Q13
3Q13
4Q13
1Q14
2Q14
3Q14
4Q14
1Q15
2Q15
3Q15
4Q15
1Q16
2Q16
3Q16
Figure 96: Close to 50m sqft of new space to complete over 2016-2019 Remarks
35.0 12%
m' sqft Supply completions to spike
from 2014 and peak in
30.0
10% 2016-2017 with an average
of 25m sqft of space,
25.0
8%
thereafter it will drop
significantly to 5.3m sqft
20.0 from 2017 onwards.
6%
15.0 Supply completions to be
more than double that of
4%
10.0 the past five years.
2%
5.0
- 0%
2,007 2,008 2,009 2,010 2,011 2,012 2,013 2,014 2,015 2016F 2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F
Figure 97: We project net absorption to remain negative over 2016F-2020F with vacancy rates inching up to 11%
6 12%
m'sqft
4
10%
2
8%
‐
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016F 2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F
(2) 6%
(4)
4%
(6)
2%
(8)
(10) 0%
Net Suplus/(Net deficit) Vacancy Rate (RHS)
Figure 98: Rental reversion trend to remain negative over 2016-2018 Remarks
50%
Rental reversion trends are
expected to turn from flattish to
40% negative from 2016 onwards.
‐10%
Figure 100: Multi-user factory supply: Supply spike in 2016 to be an overhang Remarks
7.0 M illion Sqft 16%
Supply completions to spike in
6.0 14% 2016-2018; resulting in vacancy
rates increasing to more than
12% 14%.
5.0
10%
4.0 However, we see risk emerging
8% from “shadow space” arising
3.0 from the single-user factory
6% segment if end-users decide to
2.0 sub-lease part of their space
4%
(bottom chart).
1.0 2%
Rentals are expected to remain
- 0% under pressure as competition
heats up. We project a 7-10%
drop over 2016-2017 followed
by a more modest 3% fall in
Source: JTC, URA, DBS Bank Demand Supply Vacancy Rate (%) 2018.
6.0 91%
5.0 90%
4.0 89%
3.0 88%
2.0 87%
1.0 86%
- 85%
(1.0) 84%
Annual Demand (sqm) LHS Annual Supply (Sqm) LHS Occupancy Rate (%) RHS
Warehouse rents
M illion sqft (%) expected to decline 7-
12.0 95%
10% over 2016-2017.
94%
10.0
93% Occupancy rates
8.0 92% projected to dip below
90% going forward.
91%
6.0
90%
4.0 89%
2.0 88%
87%
-
86%
(2.0) 85%
Annual Demand (m'sqft) LHS Annual Supply (m'sqft) LHS
Occupancy Rate (%) RHS
Source: JTC, URA, DBS Bank
Figure 104: Majority of Business Park space has been pre-committed Remarks
'000 sqft
While the sector is expected
3.00 Global Financial Crisis (2008‐2009) 100% to see a c.14% increase in
supply, a majority has been
2.50 Eurozone Crisis (2012) 95% pre-committed with minimal
speculative built except for
2.00 certain properties –
90% Mapletree Business City
1.50 which has also seen good
85% take-up rates.
1.00
80%
0.50
- 75%
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016F 2017F 2018F 2019F
(0.50) 70%
Demand for Private Business Park Supply for Private Business Park
Occupancy (%) RHS
Source: JTC, URA, DBS Bank
Figure 105: Business parks: Rental differential currently above historical averages Remarks
20 Business Park vs. Grade A Office rents
(S$ ps f/mth) Business park rents (off-
18 central and rest of Island)
tend to be at 50% and 60%
16
discounts to Grade A offices
14 respectively.
0
4Q04 4Q05 4Q06 4Q07 4Q08 4Q09 4Q10 4Q11 4Q12 4Q13 4Q14 4Q15
Key Assertions 2017 will be another challenging year. While we expect tourist
Supply remains the key drag on RevPAR growth arrivals into Singapore to increase in 2016 by 9% to 16.6
prospects. million, largely led by a 35% jump Chinese visitors (+41% in
Corporate demand to remain soft; demand for Jan-Sep), we forecast total visitor days to rise by only 4% due to
accommodation to lag supply growth. the shorter average length of stay. In addition, while the
Hotel sector to bottom only from 2H17-2018 increase in new supply this year is now lower than earlier
onwards. expected due to delays in completion of some hotels (2,520 net
rooms to be added this year versus 3,930 previously), we remain
10.1 Trends, demand and supply outlook cautious on the outlook for revenue per available room
(RevPAR) given soft demand from the corporate sector which
Decline in 3Q16 RevPAR. Following a soft second-quarter typically offers higher yields, and excess supply. Thus, we project
where RevPAR was weak and declined 3% y-o-y to S$191, that RevPAR in 2016 will drop by 4% year-on-year (y-o-y) to
RevPAR in the third-quarter (3Q16) continued to fall, based on S$201. For 2017, we expect tourist arrivals to grow at a more
the Singapore Tourism Board (STB) statistics. The 4% fall in modest rate of 4%, but average length of stay to lengthen,
RevPAR was a result of a decrease in both occupancy (87.2% vs resulting in 5% uplift in total visitor days. However, with
88.3% in 3Q15) and average daily rate (ADR; S$244 versus corporate demand expected to remain soft and persistent
S$249 in 3Q15) as excess supply continued to weigh on the supply pressures arising from a 6% increase in room stock,
market despite an increase in tourists arrivals. However, tourist 2017 RevPAR is projected to fall 4%.
arrivals for 3Q16 was positive, up 4%, driven largely by Chinese
tourists (+20%).
Figure 106: Hospitality sector remained under pressure in 3Q16
3Q15 2Q16 3Q16 q-o-q y-o-y
Industry Occupancy 88.3% 83.2% 87.2% 4.0% -1.2%
Industry average daily rate (S$) 249 229 244 6.6% -1.9%
Industry RevPAR (S$) 220 191 212 11.2% -3.6%
Tourist* arrivals 4,096,271 4,022,046 4,248,079 5.6% 3.7%
Luxury RevPAR (S$)* 409 348 421 21.2% 3.1%
Upscale RevPAR (S$)* 242 215 233 8.4% -3.8%
Mid-Tier RevPAR (S$)* 157 144 151 5.2% -3.8%
Economy RevPAR (S$)* 90 81 84 3.7% -6.9%
Demand share, e.g. Singapore accounts for 38-39% of total Indonesian
outbound travel.
Overall increase in seat capacity to Singapore points to growth
in tourist arrivals offset by decline in average length of stay. Potential headwinds from near-term currency volatility. The
Based on data from Centre for Asia Pacific Aviation (CAPA), seat recent depreciation of regional currencies, especially the IDR
capacity between Singapore and the rest of the world is and MYR, could pose near-term headwinds to tourist arrivals
projected to increase 3% on-year in the fourth quarter of this into Singapore. Nevertheless, the number of Indonesian and
year following an increase of 3% during January-September. Malaysian visitors (third largest source market) to Singapore is
Overall seat capacity is expected to increase by a further 5% y- expected to remain on an upward trajectory as the SGD was
o-y in the first quarter of 2017. We believe this is supportive of weak against the IDR and MYR over the past six months.
a sustained recovery in Singapore arrivals and underpins our
forecast for a 9% and 3% increase in tourist arrivals in 2016 Supply
and 2017 respectively. However, given the lower “quality” of
tourists coming in such as tour groups, which typically only stay Pressure from new room supply. While new room supply in
1-2 days in Singapore, we forecast total visitor days to rise by 2016 is projected to be lower than the 4,237 rooms added in
only 3% in 2016 due to a shorter average length of stay of 3.42 2015, supply pressures should still persist with a net addition of
days, down from 3.61 days in 2015. For 2017, we expect a 2,520 rooms. This is despite a reduction from the 3,930 rooms
slight increase in the average length of stay to 3.46 days as the projected earlier this year, on account of delays in the
proportion of Chinese visitors fall, resulting in total visitor days completion of hotels. As a consequence of hotels such as
rising by 5% y-o-y. Intercontinental Robertson Quay and Sofitel at Tanjong Pagar
Centre which were originally scheduled to open in 2016 being
Recovery in Chinese tourists. Following an extremely weak 2014 shifted to 2017, supply for 2017 now stands at 3,857 rooms,
where Chinese tourist arrivals (Singapore’s second largest source up from 2,727 rooms previously. Thus, the demand and supply
market) dropped 24% on‐year to 1.7 million due to Chinese tour situation in Singapore is likely to become more balanced only in
groups avoiding Southeast Asia as a consequence of the MH370 2018, when supply pressures ease and new room inventory is
incident and the political uncertainty in Thailand, Chinese visitor projected to increase by only 2%.
arrivals recovered in 2015, rising 22% on‐year to 2.1 million. We
expect the recovery to continue in 2016. With visitor arrivals from 2016 supply mainly outside traditional areas with 2017 supply
China growing 41% y‐o‐y during January to September, the growth to come from Central Business District (CBD) and
recovery is on track to hit our 35% growth projection for this year. Orchard. The majority of new supply in 2016 is concentrated
Beyond 2016, we expect Singapore to remain an attractive outside the traditional areas of Bras Basah, CBD, Orchard and
destination for Chinese visitors, and we expect arrivals from China Singapore River, such as Changi, Joo Chiat and East Coast.
will increase by 10% and 7.5% in 2017 and 2018 respectively. These hotels account for 1,413 rooms or 45% of supply in
2016. Meanwhile, the second largest cluster of hotels opening
Recovery in Indonesian visitors. We project Indonesian tourist in 2016 are located in the Singapore River precinct (20% of
arrivals (Singapore’s largest source market) to grow by 6% this year 2016 supply). These include M Social, and The Warehouse
due to a healthy performance during January to September Hotel. Combined with the completion of refurbishment works
(arrivals up by 6%), and low base effect as overall tourist arrivals in at Swissotel Merchant Court, an estimated 507 rooms (9% of
2015 was down 10% y‐o‐y. This is despite a 2% decline in seat existing supply in the precinct) will hit the market. Beyond the
capacity between Indonesia and Singapore in 2016 based on data new supply in the Singapore River area, the rebranding of
from CAPA. For 2017 and 2018, we expect growth to normalise to Riverview Hotel as Four Points by Sheraton would also raise the
3% per annum. level of competition in this sub-market. In 2017, the majority of
supply will switch back to Orchard (1,612 rooms, equivalent to
Competition from other markets. Singapore faces increased 14% of existing Orchard inventory, from Novotel on Stevens
competition from other tourism markets through a variety of and Ascott Orchard) and the CBD area (c.748 rooms from
factors which include easier access to other countries through hotels such as JW Marriot, Sofitel Singapore Tanjong Pagar, The
the relaxation of visa restrictions, e.g. multiple entry visas for Murray Hotel and Grand Park City Hall).
Chinese visitors into Japan; devaluation of the other regional
currencies, potentially making its cheaper to visit other countries More evenly balanced across tiers in 2016 with growth in luxury
compared to Singapore, e.g. a weaker Korean won and in 2017. In 2015, the growth in supply was driven by the Mid-
Japanese yen; and Singapore already having a high market Tier segment, which represented 64% of total net new supply
in 2015 and 20% of existing Mid-Tier stock. For 2016, the new
supply of 2,520 rooms is more evenly spread across all the hotels this year, supply growth is still projected to increase by
different categories, 25% in Economy, 40% in Mid-Tier and 4%. Combined with continued weak corporate demand, which
25% in Upscale, with no hotels opened in the Luxury segment. is typically higher yielding, we project a 4% decline in RevPAR
Nevertheless, similar to 2015, we expect Mid-Tier and Economy to S$201. This will be led by a decline in ADR (down 4% to
categories to face the greatest pressure on ADR and S$236) with occupancy relatively stable at c.85%.
occupancies. For 2017, the proportion of new room supply to
Economy, Mid-Tier and Upscale hotels is expected to drop to 2017 still weak with recovery only in 2018. With the carryover
21%, 34% and 25% respectively, with Luxury hotels making a of new hotels which were originally scheduled to open in 2016
return with 21% of 2017 supply. With a larger proportion of into 2017, our earlier expectation of a more balanced market in
new rooms being added in the Upscale and Luxury segment in 2017 is likely to be delayed into 2018 where the supply of new
2017, there may be more pricing discipline compared to 2016 hotels drops off. The decline in new room supply in 2018 is due
given constraints by these upper-tier brands to cut room rates to the lack of new land released by the Singapore government
without affecting their brand status. for hotel developments over the past two years. On the back of
a 6% jump in supply in 2017 and still weak corporate demand,
Forecasts we expect ADR to remain under pressure, down 4% with
occupancy stable at 85%. This translates to a 4% decline in
Supply pressures to weigh on RevPAR in 2016. The Singapore RevPAR. Going into 2018, we expect a 3% recovery in RevPAR,
hospitality market is facing the same issues in 2016 as in 2015, as demand (+4% growth in visitor arrivals) exceeds the 2%
i.e. excess supply. While we expect a 9% bounce in tourist growth in new room supply.
arrivals, we believe this will only translate to a 4% increase in
visitor days due to a higher proportion of Chinese tour groups
which typically have a shorter average length of stay. In
addition, while there has been a delay in the opening of some
Figure 107: Number of visitors rising year-to-date but growth in visitor days still Remarks
modest and RevPAR remains soft on supply pressure
Figure 108: Uptick in overall airline capacity points to sustained recovery in tourist Remarks
arrivals
Source: Centre for Asia Pacific Aviation, Singapore Tourism Board, Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
Sep-14
Sep-15
Sep-16
May-13
May-14
May-15
May-16
Mar-13
Jul-13
Mar-14
Jul-14
Mar-15
Jul-15
Mar-16
Jul-16
Jan-13
Jan-14
Jan-15
Jan-16
Nov-13
Nov-14
Nov-15
Figure 110: Stable 2H16 seat capacity between Indonesia and Singapore with pick-up in Remarks
1Q17
Growth in Indonesian arrivals
from 4Q12 to 2Q14 on the
back of increases in seat
capacity between Indonesia
and Singapore, despite a
weaker rupiah against
Singapore dollar. The trend
reversed from 3Q14 to 4Q15
on the back of declines in
seat capacity especially in the
low cost carrier segment
Figure 111: Uptick in arrivals not translating to significant growth in visitor days Remarks
Figure 112: Increased competition from other tourism markets (9M16 inbound tourist Remarks
arrivals)
Source: CEIC, Singapore Tourism Board, Bloomberg Finance L.P, DBS Bank
Figure 113: Recent FX volatility in regional currencies a potential headwind Remarks
15%
Winners versus SGD - IDR, AUD, Avg Recent correction in regional
currencies for Singapore’s top
10% IDR five source markets a potential
headwind.
AUD
5%
However, weakening of SGD
Avg
over the last six months
0% MYR provides some buffer.
INR
-5%
CNY
-10%
Losers versus SGD - INR, CNY
-15%
Figure 115: More supply in Singapore River and CBD areas in 2016 switching to Remarks
Orchard in 2017
Number of rooms
New supply switching from
4,500 Orchard and Bras Basah in
4,000 2015 to Singapore River and
CBD areas in 2016. For
3,500
2017, the majority of supply
3,000
will come from Orchard and
2,500 CBD areas.
2,000
1,500 Growth in new supply also
1,000 coming from outside core
500 city centre areas.
0
-500 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
-1,000
Bras Basah/Bugis CBD Orchard Singapore River Others Total
Source: CDL Hospitality Trust, Singapore Tourism Board, DBS Bank
Figure 116: Majority of supply growth in 2016 coming from the Mid-Tier category Remarks
number of rooms
Majority of new supply in 2016
4,500
coming from the Mid-Tier
4,000 category.
3,500
3,000 For 2017, there is greater share
2,500
of new rooms being opened in
the luxury and upscale category
2,000 which may result in more pricing
1,500 discipline in the industry.
1,000
500
0
Economy Mid-Tier Upscale Luxury Total
2015 2016 2017 2018
Figure 117: RevPAR to remain weak in 2016 and 2017 with recovery from 2018 Remarks
11. Charts
Singapore REITs
8%
7%
6%
5%
4%
3%
2%
1%
0%
1.10
N ov ' 13 (1.04x)
1.05
0.98
0.95 F e b'14 ( 0.94 x) N ov ' 15 (0.94 x)
0.85
Ja n' 12 (0.84x)
0.80
Office REIT Sector Yield Spread Office REIT Sector Historical P/BV
1.2
9.0%
8.0%
1.1
7.0%
6.0% 1.0
5.0%
0.9
4.0%
3.0% 0.8
2.0%
0.7
1.0%
0.0% 0.6
Jan-2010 Jan-2011 Jan-2012 Jan-2013 Jan-2014 Jan-2015 Jan-2016 Jan-2017
0.5
Office REITs Yield Spread Office REITs Yield Mean Yield Jan-2010 Jan-2011 Jan-2012 Jan-2013 Jan-2014 Jan-2015 Jan-2016 Jan-20
-1 SD +1 SD CCT P/BV Mean +1 SD -1 SD
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
CapitaLand Commercial Trust Historical Yield Spread CapitaLand Commercial Trust Historical P/BV
1.2
9.0%
8.0% 1.1
7.0% 1.0
6.0%
0.9
5.0%
0.8
4.0%
0.7
3.0%
2.0% 0.6
1.0% 0.5
Jan-2010 Jan-2011 Jan-2012 Jan-2013 Jan-2014 Jan-2015 Jan-2016 Jan-2017
0.0%
Jan-2010 Jan-2011 Jan-2012 Jan-2013 Jan-2014 Jan-2015 Jan-2016
CCT Yield Spread CCT Yield Mean Yield Office REITs P/BV Mean +1 SD -1 SD
-1 SD +1 SD
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
Frasers Commercial Trust Historical Yield Spread Frasers Commercial Trust Historical P/BV
1.2
9.0%
8.0% 1.1
7.0%
1.0
6.0%
0.9
5.0%
4.0% 0.8
3.0%
0.7
2.0%
0.6
1.0%
0.0% 0.5
Jan-2010 Jan-2011 Jan-2012 Jan-2013 Jan-2014 Jan-2015 Jan-2016 Jan-2 Jan-2010 Jan-2011 Jan-2012 Jan-2013 Jan-2014 Jan-2015 Jan-2016 Jan
FCOT P/BV Mean +1 SD -1 SD
FCOT Yield Spread FCOT Yield Mean -1 SD +1 SD
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
2.0%
1.0% 1.0
0.0%
Sep-2014 Mar-2015 Sep-2015 Mar-2016 Sep-2016
IREIT Yield Spread IREIT Yield Mean -1 SD +1 SD 0.9
Sep-2014 Mar-2015 Sep-2015 Mar-2016 Sep-2016
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank IREIT P/BV Mean +1 SD -1 SD
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
7.0% 1.0
6.0% 0.9
5.0%
0.8
4.0%
0.7
3.0%
2.0% 0.6
1.0%
0.5
0.0% Jan-2010 Jan-2011 Jan-2012 Jan-2013 Jan-2014 Jan-2015 Jan-2016
Jan-2010 Jan-2011 Jan-2012 Jan-2013 Jan-2014 Jan-2015 Jan-2016 KREIT P/BV Mean +1 SD -1 SD
KREIT Yield Spread KREIT Yield Mean Yield -1 SD +1 SD
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
6.0% 1.03
5.0% 1.00
4.0%
0.98
3.0%
0.95
2.0%
1.0% 0.93
0.0%
0.90
Jun-2016 Sep-2016 Dec-2016
Jun-2016 Sep-2016 Dec-2016
MUST Yield Spread MUST Yield Mean -1 SD +1 SD MUST P/BV Mean +1 SD -1 SD
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
OUE Commercial Trust Historical Yield Spread OUE Commercial Trust Historical P/BV
1.2
9.0%
8.0% 1.1
7.0%
1.0
6.0%
5.0% 0.9
4.0% 0.8
3.0%
0.7
2.0%
1.0% 0.6
0.0%
Feb-2014 Aug-2014 Feb-2015 Aug-2015 Feb-2016 Aug-2016 0.5
OUECT Yield Spread OUECT Yield Mean -1 SD +1 Feb-2014 Aug-2014 Feb-2015 Aug-2015 Feb-2016 Aug-2016
OUECT P/BV Mean +1 SD -1 SD
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
Retail REIT Sector Yield Spread Retail REIT Sector Historical P/BV
1.50
8.0%
1.40
7.0%
1.30
6.0%
1.20
5.0%
1.10
4.0%
1.00
3.0%
0.90
2.0%
0.80
1.0%
0.70
0.0% 0.60
Jan-2010 Jan-2011 Jan-2012 Jan-2013 Jan-2014 Jan-2015 Jan-2016 Jan-2017
Jan-10 Jan-11 Jan-12 Jan-13 Jan-14 Jan-15 Jan-16 Jan-17
Retail REITs Yield Spread Retail REITs Yield Mean Yield
-1 SD +1 SD
Retail REITs P/BV Mean +1 SD -1 SD
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
CapitaLand Mall Trust Historical Yield Spread CapitaLand Mall Trust Historical P/BV
8.0% 1.5
7.0% 1.4
6.0% 1.3
5.0% 1.2
4.0%
1.1
3.0%
1.0
2.0%
0.9
1.0%
0.8
0.0%
Jan-2010 Jan-2011 Jan-2012 Jan-2013 Jan-2014 Jan-2015 Jan-2016 Jan-20 0.7
CMT Yield Spread CMT Yield Mean Yield
0.6
-1 SD +1 SD
Jan-2010 Jan-2011 Jan-2012 Jan-2013 Jan-2014 Jan-2015 Jan-2016
CMT P/BV Mean +1 SD -1 SD
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
CapitaLand Retail China Trust Historical Yield Spread CapitaLand Retail China Trust Historical P/BV
1.4
8.0%
1.3
7.0%
6.0% 1.2
5.0%
1.1
4.0%
1.0
3.0%
2.0% 0.9
1.0%
0.8
Jan-2010 Jan-2011 Jan-2012 Jan-2013 Jan-2014 Jan-2015 Jan-2016 Jan-2017
0.0%
CRCT Yield Spread CRCT Yield Mean Yield
Jan-2010 Jan-2011 Jan-2012 Jan-2013 Jan-2014 Jan-2015 Jan-2016 Jan-2017 CRCT P/BV Mean +1 SD -1 SD
-1 SD +1 SD
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
Croesus Retail Trust Historical Yield Spread Croesus Retail Trust Historical P/BV
11.0% 1.2
10.0%
9.0%
8.0% 1.1
7.0%
6.0%
1.0
5.0%
4.0%
3.0% 0.9
2.0%
1.0%
0.0% 0.8
Jun-2013 Jun-2014 Jun-2015 Jun-2016 Jun-2013 Dec-2013 Jun-2014 Dec-2014 Jun-2015 Dec-2015 Jun-2016 Dec-2016
Croesus Yield Spread Croesus Yield Mean Yield
-1 SD +1 SD Croesus P/BV Mean +1 SD -1 SD
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
Frasers Centrepoint Trust Historical Yield Spread Frasers Centrepoint Trust Historical P/BV
1.5
8.0%
1.4
7.0%
1.3
6.0%
1.2
5.0%
1.1
4.0%
1.0
3.0%
0.9
2.0%
0.8
1.0% 0.7
0.0% 0.6
Jan-2010 Jan-2011 Jan-2012 Jan-2013 Jan-2014 Jan-2015 Jan-2016 Jan-20 Jan-2010 Jan-2011 Jan-2012 Jan-2013 Jan-2014 Jan-2015 Jan-2016 Jan-201
FCT Yield Spread FCT Yield Mean Yield FCT P/BV Mean +1 SD -1 SD
-1 SD +1 SD
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
Mapletree Greater China Commercial Trust Historical Mapletree Greater China Commercial Trust Historical
Yield Spread P/BV
1.3
9.0%
8.0%
1.2
7.0%
6.0% 1.1
5.0%
1.0
4.0%
3.0%
0.9
2.0%
1.0% 0.8
0.0%
2013 2014 2015 2016 0.7
Mar-2013 Mar-2014 Mar-2015 Mar-2016
MAGIC Yield Spread MAGIC Yield Mean MAGIC P/BV Mean +1 SD -1 SD
-1 SD +1 SD
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
6.0% 1.3
1.2
5.0%
1.1
4.0% 1.0
3.0% 0.9
0.8
2.0%
0.7
1.0% 0.6
0.5
0.0%
Jul-2013 Jul-2014 Jul-2015 Jul-2016
Jul-2013 Jul-2014 Jul-2015 Jul-2016
SPH REIT Yield Spread SPH REIT Yield Mean Yield
SPH REIT P/BV Mean +1 SD -1 SD
-1 SD +1 SD
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
Starhill Global REIT Historical Yield Spread Starhill Global REIT Historical P/BV
8.0%
1.5
7.0% 1.4
1.3
6.0%
1.2
5.0% 1.1
1.0
4.0%
0.9
3.0% 0.8
0.7
2.0%
0.6
1.0% 0.5
Jan-2010 Jan-2011 Jan-2012 Jan-2013 Jan-2014 Jan-2015 Jan-2016
0.0%
Jan-2010 Jan-2011 Jan-2012 Jan-2013 Jan-2014 Jan-2015 Jan-2016 Jan SGREIT P/BV Mean +1 SD -1 SD
SGREIT Yield Spread SGREIT Yield Mean Yield
-1 SD +1 SD
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
Mixed Commercial REIT Sector Yield Spread Mixed Commercial REIT Sector Historical P/BV
9.0% 1.7
8.0%
1.5
7.0%
6.0%
1.3
5.0%
4.0% 1.1
3.0%
0.9
2.0%
1.0% 0.7
0.0%
Jan-2010 Jan-2011 Jan-2012 Jan-2013 Jan-2014 Jan-2015 Jan-2016 Jan-2017 0.5
Jan-2010 Jan-2011 Jan-2012 Jan-2013 Jan-2014 Jan-2015 Jan-2016 Jan-2017
Mixed Use REITs Yield Spread Mixed Use REITs Yield
Mixed Use REITs P/BV Mean +1 SD -1 SD
Mean Yield -1 SD
Source: Bloomberg+1Finance
SD L.P., DBS Bank
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
Mapletree Commercial Trust Historical Yield Spread Mapletree Commercial Trust Historical P/BV
9.0% 1.7
8.0%
1.5
7.0%
6.0% 1.3
5.0%
1.1
4.0%
3.0%
0.9
2.0%
1.0% 0.7
0.0%
Apr-2011 Apr-2012 Apr-2013 Apr-2014 Apr-2015 Apr-2016 0.5
MCT Yield Spread MCT Yield Mean Yield Apr-2011 Apr-2012 Apr-2013 Apr-2014 Apr-2015 Apr-2016
-1 SD +1 SD
MCT P/BV Mean +1 SD -1 SD
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
Hospitality REIT Sector Yield Spread Hospitality REIT Sector Historical P/BV
1.6
10.0%
1.5
9.0%
8.0%
1.4
7.0% 1.3
6.0% 1.2
5.0% 1.1
4.0% 1.0
3.0% 0.9
2.0% 0.8
1.0% 0.7
0.0%
0.6
Jan-2010 Jan-2011 Jan-2012 Jan-2013 Jan-2014 Jan-2015 Jan-2016 Jan-2017
Jan-2010 Jan-2011 Jan-2012 Jan-2013 Jan-2014 Jan-2015 Jan-2016 Jan-2017
Hospitality REITs Yield Spread Hospitality REITs Yield
Hospitality REITs P/BV Mean +1 SD -1 SD
Mean Yield -1 SD
+1 SD
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
Ascendas Hospitality Trust Historical Yield Spread Ascendas Hospitality Trust Historical P/BV
10.0%
9.0%
1.6
8.0%
7.0% 1.4
6.0%
1.2
5.0%
4.0% 1.0
3.0%
0.8
2.0%
1.0% 0.6
Jul-2012 Jul-2013 Jul-2014 Jul-2015 Jul-2016
0.0% ASCHT P/BV Mean +1 SD -1 SD
Jul-2012 Jul-2013 Jul-2014 Jul-2015 Jul-2016
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
Ascott Residence Trust Historical Yield Spread Ascott Residence Trust Historical P/BV
10.0% 1.6
9.0%
8.0% 1.4
7.0%
6.0%
1.2
5.0%
4.0%
1.0
3.0%
2.0%
0.8
1.0%
0.0%
Jan-2010 Jan-2011 Jan-2012 Jan-2013 Jan-2014 Jan-2015 Jan-2016 Jan-2 0.6
Ascott Yield Spread Ascott Yield Mean Yield Jan-2010 Jan-2011 Jan-2012 Jan-2013 Jan-2014 Jan-2015 Jan-2016 Jan-2
-1 SD +1 SD Ascott P/BV Mean +1 SD -1 SD
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
CDL Hospitality Trust Historical Yield Spread CDL Hospitality Trust Historical P/BV
10.0%
1.6
8.0%
1.4
6.0%
1.2
4.0% 1.0
2.0% 0.8
0.0% 0.6
Jan-2010 Jan-2011 Jan-2012 Jan-2013 Jan-2014 Jan-2015 Jan-2016 Jan-2010 Jan-2011 Jan-2012 Jan-2013 Jan-2014 Jan-2015 Jan-2016 Jan-2017
Far East Hospitality Trust Historical Yield Spread Far East Hospitality Trust Historical P/BV
10.0%
1.60
9.0%
8.0%
1.40
7.0%
6.0%
1.20
5.0%
4.0%
1.00
3.0%
2.0%
0.80
1.0%
0.0%
Aug-2012 Aug-2013 Aug-2014 Aug-2015 Aug-2016 0.60
FEHT Yield Spread FEHT Yield Mean -1 SD +1 S Aug-2012 Aug-2013 Aug-2014 Aug-2015 Aug-2016
FEHT P/BV Mean +1 SD -1 SD
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
Frasers Hospitality Trust Historical Yield Spread Frasers Hospitality Trust Historical P/BV
10.0%
1.6
9.0%
8.0%
1.4
7.0%
6.0%
1.2
5.0%
4.0%
1.0
3.0%
2.0%
0.8
1.0%
0.0%
0.6
Aug-2014 Feb-2015 Aug-2015 Feb-2016 Aug-2016
Aug-2014 Feb-2015 Aug-2015 Feb-2016 Aug-2016
FHT Yield Spread FHT Yield Mean -1 SD +1 SD FHT P/BV Mean +1 SD -1 SD
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
OUE Hospitality Trust Historical Yield Spread OUE Hospitality Trust Historical P/BV
10.0% 1.6
9.0% 1.5
8.0% 1.4
7.0% 1.3
6.0% 1.2
5.0%
1.1
4.0%
1.0
3.0%
0.9
2.0%
0.8
1.0%
0.7
0.0%
Jul-2013 Jul-2014 Jul-2015 Jul-2016 0.6
OUEHT Yield Spread OUEHT Yield Mean Yield Jul-2013 Jan-2014 Jul-2014 Jan-2015 Jul-2015 Jan-2016 Jul-2016 Jan-20
-1 SD +1 SD OUEHT P/BV Mean +1 SD -1 SD
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
Industrial REIT Sector Yield Spread Industrial REIT Sector Historical P/BV
1.8
11.0% 1.7
10.0% 1.6
9.0%
1.5
8.0%
1.4
7.0%
6.0% 1.3
5.0% 1.2
4.0% 1.1
3.0% 1.0
2.0%
0.9
1.0%
0.8
0.0%
Jan-2010 Jan-2011 Jan-2012 Jan-2013 Jan-2014 Jan-2015 Jan-2016 Jan-20 0.7
Industrial REITs Yield Spread Industrial REITs Yield
Jan-2010 Jan-2011 Jan-2012 Jan-2013 Jan-2014 Jan-2015 Jan-2016 Jan-2017
Mean +1 SD Industrial REITs P/BV Mean +1 SD -1 SD
-1 SD
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
Cambridge Industrial Trust Historical Yield Spread Cambridge Industrial Historical P/BV
1.8
11.0% 1.6
10.0% 1.4
9.0%
1.2
8.0%
7.0% 1.0
6.0%
0.8
5.0%
4.0% 0.6
3.0% 0.4
2.0%
0.2
1.0%
0.0% 0.0
Jan-2010 Jan-2011 Jan-2012 Jan-2013 Jan-2014 Jan-2015 Jan-2016 Jan-2 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
CREIT Yield Spread CREIT Yield Mean Yield CREIT P/BV Mean +1 SD -1 SD
-1 SD +1 SD
S
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
Cache Logistics Trust Historical Yield Spread Cache Logistics Trust Historical P/BV
11.0%
1.7
10.0%
9.0%
1.5
8.0%
7.0%
1.3
6.0%
5.0%
1.1
4.0%
3.0%
0.9
2.0%
1.0%
0.7
0.0%
Apr-2010 Apr-2011 Apr-2012 Apr-2013 Apr-2014 Apr-2015 Apr-2016
Apr-2010 Apr-2011 Apr-2012 Apr-2013 Apr-2014 Apr-2015 Apr-2016 Cache P/BV Mean +1 SD -1 SD
Cache Yield Spread Cache Yield Mean Yield
-1 SD +1 SD
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
Frasers Logistics & Industrial Trust Yield Spread Frasers Logistics & Industrial Trust Historical P/BV
8.0%
1.14
7.0%
6.0%
1.12
5.0% 1.10
4.0%
1.08
3.0%
1.06
2.0%
1.04
1.0%
0.0%
1.02
Jul-2016 Aug-2016 Sep-2016 Oct-2016 Nov-2016 Dec-201 Jul-2016
FLT P/BV Mean +1 SD -1 SD
FLT Yield Spread FLT Yield Mean Yield -1 SD +1 SD
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
1.0% 0.9
0.0% 0.8
Jan-2015 Jul-2015 Jan-2016 Jul-2016 0.7
KDCREIT Yield Spread KDCREIT Yield Mean -1 SD +1 S
Jan-2015 Jul-2015 Jan-2016 Jul-2016
KDCREIT P/BV Mean +1 SD -1 SD
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
Mapletree Industrial Trust Historical Yield Spread Mapletree Industrial Trust Historical P/BV
10.0% 1.5
9.0% 1.4
8.0% 1.3
7.0% 1.2
6.0% 1.1
5.0% 1.0
0.9
4.0%
0.8
3.0%
0.7
2.0%
0.6
1.0%
0.5
0.0% Oct-2010 Oct-2011 Oct-2012 Oct-2013 Oct-2014 Oct-2015 Oct-201
Apr-2011 Apr-2012 Apr-2013 Apr-2014 Apr-2015 Apr-2016 MINT P/BV Mean +1 SD -1 SD
MINT Yield Spread MINT Yield Mean Yield
-1 SD +1 SD
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
Mapletree Logistic Trust Historical Yield Spread Mapletree Logistic Trust Historical P/BV
10.0% 1.5
9.0% 1.4
8.0% 1.3
7.0% 1.2
6.0% 1.1
5.0% 1.0
4.0% 0.9
3.0% 0.8
2.0% 0.7
1.0%
0.6
0.0%
0.5
Jan-2010 Jan-2011 Jan-2012 Jan-2013 Jan-2014 Jan-2015 Jan-2016
Jan-2010 Jan-2011 Jan-2012 Jan-2013 Jan-2014 Jan-2015 Jan-2016
MLT Yield Spread MLT Yield Mean Yield -1 SD +1
MLT P/BV Mean +1 SD -1 SD
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
Soilbuild Business Space REIT Historical Yield Spread Soilbuild Business Space REIT Historical P/BV
10.0% 1.50
9.0% 1.40
8.0% 1.30
7.0% 1.20
6.0% 1.10
5.0% 1.00
4.0% 0.90
3.0% 0.80
2.0% 0.70
1.0% 0.60
0.0% 0.50
Aug-2013 Aug-2014 Aug-2015 Aug-2016 Aug-2013 Aug-2014 Aug-2015 Aug-2016
SBREIT Yield Spread SBREIT Yield Mean Yield
-1 SD +1 SD SBREIT P/BV Mean +1 SD -1 SD
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
Ascendas India Trust Historical Yield Spread Ascendas India Trust Historical P/BV
9.0% 1.7
8.0% 1.6
7.0%
1.5
6.0%
1.4
5.0%
4.0% 1.3
3.0% 1.2
2.0% 1.1
1.0%
1.0
0.0%
Jan-2010 Jan-2011 Jan-2012 Jan-2013 Jan-2014 Jan-2015 Jan-2016 Jan-20 0.9
Jan-2010 Jan-2011 Jan-2012 Jan-2013 Jan-2014 Jan-2015 Jan-2016 Jan
AIT Yield Spread AIT Yield Mean Yield -1 SD +1 SD
AIT P/BV Mean +1 SD -1 SD
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
Healthcare REIT Sector Yield Spread Healthcare REIT Sector Historical P/BV
1.5
8.0%
1.4
7.0%
6.0% 1.3
5.0% 1.2
4.0%
1.1
3.0%
1.0
2.0%
1.0% 0.9
0.0% 0.8
Jan-2010 Jan-2011 Jan-2012 Jan-2013 Jan-2014 Jan-2015 Jan-2016 Jan-20 Jan-2010 Jan-2011 Jan-2012 Jan-2013 Jan-2014 Jan-2015 Jan-2016 Jan-2
Healthcare REITs Yield Spread Healthcare REITs Yield Healthcare REITs P/BV Mean +1 SD -1 SD
Mean -1 SD
+1 SD
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
Parkway Life REIT Historical Yield Spread Parkway Life REIT Historical P/BV
10.0% 1.7
9.0%
1.5
8.0%
7.0% 1.3
6.0%
1.1
5.0%
4.0%
0.9
3.0%
2.0% 0.7
1.0%
0.5
0.0% Jan-2010 Jan-2011 Jan-2012 Jan-2013 Jan-2014 Jan-2015 Jan-2016
Jan-2010 Jan-2011 Jan-2012 Jan-2013 Jan-2014 Jan-2015 Jan-2016 PREIT P/BV Mean +1 SD -1 SD
PREIT Yield Spread PREIT Yield Mean
-1 SD +1 SD
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
Religare Health Trust Historical Yield Spread Religare Health Trust Historical P/BV
10.0%
1.7
9.0%
8.0% 1.6
7.0% 1.5
6.0%
1.4
5.0%
4.0% 1.3
3.0% 1.2
2.0%
1.1
1.0%
0.0% 1.0
Nov-12 Nov-13 Nov-14 Nov-15 Nov-1
0.9
Nov-2012 Nov-2013 Nov-2014 Nov-2015 Nov-2016
RHT Yield Spread RHT Yield Mean Yield
-1 SD +1 SD RHT P/BV Mean +1 SD -1 SD
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
Singapore Developers
2.0
2.5
1.5 2.0
1.5
1.0
1.0
0.5
0.5
0.0 0.0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
CapitaLand P/NAV Mean -1 SD +1 SD City Dev P/NAV Mean -1 SD +1 SD
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
1.2 1.0
1.0
0.8
0.8
0.6
0.6
0.4
0.4
0.2 0.2
0.0 0.0
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
GLP P/NAV Mean -1 SD +1 SD
UOL P/NAV Mean -1 SD +1 SD
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
1.0 0.8
0.6
0.5 0.4
0.2
0.0 0.0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Wheelock P/NAV Mean -1 SD +1 SD Wingtai P/NAV Mean -1 SD +1 SD
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
1.2 1.0
1.0 0.8
0.8
0.6
0.6
0.4
0.4
0.2
0.2
0.0 0.0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016
UIC P/NAV Mean -1 SD +1 SD Perennial RE P/NAV Mean -1 SD +1 SD
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
2.0
2.5
1.5 2.0
1.5
1.0
1.0
0.5
0.5
0.0 0.0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Ho Bee P/NAV Mean -1 SD +1 SD Bukit Sembawang P/NAV Mean -1 SD +1 SD
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
1.0
0.8
0.8
0.6
0.6
0.4
0.4
0.2
0.2
0.0 0.0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Tuan Sing P/NAV Mean -1 SD +1 SD
United Engineers P/NAV Mean -1 SD +1 SD
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., DBS Bank
Stock Profiles
3.9 187 Group, which offers strong income visibility in the medium term.
The operating performance of its malls will improve as the
167
3.4 147
2.9
127
107
properties reach maturity, boosted by the completion of four
2.4
87
67
Raffles City mega developments in China in the medium term.
Jan-13 Jan-14 Jan-15 Jan-16 Jan-17
Revenue (S$’m)
CRITICAL DATA POINTS TO WATCH 6,000.0
S $'m
5,000.0
Earnings Drivers:
Growing recurring revenues from retail mall portfolio and 4,000.0
In addition, Raffles City integrated developments in China will Operating PATMI (Ex Revaluations)
900.0
continue to offer stable returns (7-8% for stabilised properties S $'m
800.0
in Shanghai and Beijing, c.3% for stabilising properties in
700.0
Chengdu and Ningbo). Looking ahead, the group will be
600.0
opening four more Raffles City developments in 2016-2018, 500.0
which will boost the group’s returns and profitability when 400.0
completed. 300.0
200.0
The Ascott Limited remains on the fast track to achieve its 100.0
80,000-unit target by year 2020 and will add another 770 units -
13A 14A 15A 16F 17F 18F
by 4Q16. Ascott’s investment in China’s largest and fastest-
growing online apartment sharing platform, Tujia has yet to
bear fruit meaningfully but we continue to believe in its longer RNAV of CapitaLand S$'bn
term synergies and ability to leverage on Tujia’s platform to Value of CapitaLand Singapore 7,082.5
reach out to a wider addressable market in the medium term. Value of CapitaLand China 9,818.5
CapitaMalls Asia 17,446.0
Launch of new PE funds. Leveraging on its fund management Ascott 4,237.1
expertise, CAPL aims to launch 5-6 private equity (PE) funds
Others 855.0
with funds under management of S$8-10bn by 2020. We think
GDV of CAPL Group 39,439.2
that by tapping on third-party capital, CAPL would be able to
Less: Net Debt (11,552.3)
leverage on larger economies of scale, better capitalise on
Less: devt capex (7,548.6)
market opportunities and at the same time de-risk its property
level exposure. The group launched the US$1.5bn Raffles City RNAV of CAPL 20,458.3
China Investment Partners III (RCCIP III) aimed at prime Total Shares 4,258.6
integrated developments in gateway cities in China which will RNAV per share 4.80
likely be seeded by their properties. Discount to RNAV 25%
Target price 3.60
Source: Company, DBS Bank
bank. CAPL has been actively de-risking its Singapore residential Gross Debt to Equity (LHS) Asset Turnover (RHS)
relaxation (especially cyclical measures like the Buyers’ and Capital Expenditure (-)
Sellers’ stamp duties) may improve buyers’ market sentiment ROE (%)
and spark a revival in transactional volumes in the Singapore 7.0%
property stocks, which we believe will enable CAPL to close the 5.0%
gap between stock price and its NAV.
4.0%
3.0%
Asset recycling into listed S-REITs. CAPL will continue to
demonstrate its ability to crystallise value through strategic 2.0%
Slowdown in Asian economies. The risk to our view is a further 18.4 +1sd: 18.3x
slowdown in Asian economies which could dampen demand 16.4
Avg: 15.3x
for housing and private consumption expenditure and retail 14.4
1.0 +2sd: 1.01x
0.9 +1sd: 0.91x
0.8 Avg: 0.82x
0.7 ‐1sd: 0.72x
0.6 ‐2sd: 0.62x
0.5
Jan-13 Jan-14 Jan-15 Jan-16
Segmental Breakdown
FY Dec 2014A 2015A 2016F 2017F 2018F
Revenues (S$m)
CapitaLand Singapore 1,242 1,229 890 1,030 1,053
CapitaLand China 638 2,039 1,505 2,005 1,601
CMA 1,178 663 840 997 1,128
Ascott 683 744 725 775 794
Others 185 86.1 148 151 153
Total 3,925 4,761 4,109 4,959 4,730
Growth
Revenue Gth (%) 4.3 61.7 (48.6) 26.6 21.4
EBITDA Gth (%) (17.4) 28.6 (22.4) 29.6 (16.6)
Opg Profit Gth (%) 0.5 14.4 (19.9) 35.3 (12.5)
Net Profit Gth (Pre-ex) (%) 36.1 28.5 (11.9) 34.7 (15.8)
Margins
Gross Margins (%) 31.4 21.9 31.2 26.8 30.8
Opg Profit Margins (%) 28.6 20.3 31.5 33.7 24.3
Net Profit Margins (%) 17.9 14.2 24.4 26.0 18.0
S$
1 2 - mt h
3.37 Dat e o f Clo sin g
S. No . T arg et R at in g
Repo rt Pric e
Pric e
3.27 12 14 1: 08 J an 16 3.16 3.73 BUY
8 16
6 2: 18 J an 16 3.02 3.73 BUY
3.17
18 3: 16 F eb 16 2.90 3.73 BUY
1 7 4: 18 F eb 16 2.91 3.70 BUY
3.07 2 13 15 22
10
9 20 5: 02 Mar 16 3.07 3.70 BUY
5 11 17 6: 16 Mar 16 3.14 3.70 BUY
2.97 4 1921 7: 18 Apr 16 3.16 3.70 BUY
2.87 8: 20 Apr 16 3.17 3.70 BUY
3 9: 27 May 16 2.98 3.70 BUY
2.77 10: 31 May 16 2.99 3.70 BUY
11: 09 Jun 16 3.05 3.70 BUY
2.67 12: 05 Aug 16 3.22 3.60 BUY
Jan-16 May-16 Sep-16 Jan-17 13: 16 Se p 16 3.12 3.60 BUY
14: 30 Se p 16 3.20 3.60 BUY
No t e : Share price and Target price are adjusted for corporate actions. 15: 18 Oct 16 3.13 3.60 BUY
16: 24 Oct 16 3.17 3.60 BUY
17: 07 Nov 16 3.04 3.60 BUY
18: 10 Nov 16 3.08 3.60 BUY
19: 14 Nov 16 3.00 3.60 BUY
20: 16 Nov 16 2.99 3.60 BUY
21: 21 Nov 16 2.98 3.60 BUY
22: 25 Nov 16 3.02 3.60 BUY
Forecasts and Valuation Some light from overseas investments. CDL’s decision to
FY Dec (S$ m) 2015A 2016F 2017F 2018F
diversify into the overseas property market amid a challenging
Revenue 3,304 3,654 3,875 4,437 outlook in the Singapore property market is finally coming to
EBITDA 948 1,092 1,135 1,246
Pre-tax Profit 985 787 830 937
fruition. With most of its Singapore property projects having
Net Profit 760 548 577 653 been completed or are soon-to-be-completed, we expect
Net Pft (Pre Ex.) 436 548 577 653 international properties (UK and China) to drive property
Net Pft Gth (Pre-ex) (%) 8.6 25.7 5.3 13.2 sales/revenue recognition in 2017/2018. We believe this could
EPS (S cts) 83.6 60.2 63.5 71.8 partly offset the impact of a weak property market in Singapore.
EPS Pre Ex. (S cts) 47.9 60.2 63.5 71.8
EPS Gth Pre Ex (%) 9 26 5 13 Valuation:
Diluted EPS (S cts) 79.7 57.4 60.5 68.4
Net DPS (S cts) 16.0 11.5 12.1 13.7
We maintain our BUY call with TP to S$9.90 pegged to a 20%
BV Per Share (S cts) 989 1,034 1,085 1,145 discount to our RNAV of S$11.90. Supported by a strong
PE (X) 10.0 13.9 13.2 11.7 balance sheet and diversified earnings base, CDL should be
PE Pre Ex. (X) 17.5 13.9 13.2 11.7 able to navigate well around the current uncertain market
P/Cash Flow (X) 98.0 8.0 11.3 5.4
EV/EBITDA (X) 13.4 11.4 11.0 9.5 conditions.
Net Div Yield (%) 1.9 1.4 1.4 1.6
P/Book Value (X) 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 Key Risks to Our View:
Net Debt/Equity (X) 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 Decline in residential prices in Singapore. As a proxy to
ROAE (%) 8.7 6.0 6.0 6.4
Singapore’s residential market, a deteriorating operating
Earnings Rev (%): - - -
Consensus EPS (S cts): 62.5 63.3 69.2 environment will cap share price performance.
Other Broker Recs: B: 19 S: 1 H: 3
At A Glance
Source of all data on this page: Company, DBS Bank, Bloomberg
Issued Capital (m shrs) 909
Finance L.P
Mkt. Cap (S$m/US$m) 7,629 / 5,341
Major Shareholders (%)
Davos Investments 16.4
Hong Leong Investment 15.4
Aberdeen Asset Management 14.0
Free Float (%) 54.2
3m Avg. Daily Val (US$m) 8.9
ICB Industry : Real Estate / Real Estate
The group’s investment property division (office and retail malls Property devt
mainly in Singapore) is projected to offer steady returns. In total, 36%
0.30
Low gearing of 26%. CDL’s gearing is estimated to remain low 0.20 0.2
management’s comfortable range. This provides greater Gross Debt to Equity (LHS) Asset Turnover (RHS)
2016 and has achieved 90% sales. The group has been ROE (%)
marketing the project regionally and is understood to have 9.0%
received positive responses from investors. The successful 8.0%
launch of its ongoing project will be positive to investor 7.0%
to close the gap between its stock price and NAV. 5.0%
4.0%
3.0%
Key Risks: 2.0%
Decline in residential prices in Singapore. Seen as a proxy to 1.0%
Singapore’s residential market, a worsening of the operating 0.0%
2014A 2015A 2016F 2017F 2018F
environment is expected to cap any upside potential for the
stock. Unsold inventories are mainly in the high-end and Forward PE Band (x)
executive segments whose unsold stock typically take time to (x)
clear. 25.5
+2sd: 24.7x
23.5
Interest rate risk. A rise in interest rates will have a negative 21.5 +1sd: 21.2x
17.5 Avg: 17.6x
thus could adversely affect the group’s outlook.
15.5
13.5
‐1sd: 14.1x
Company Background 11.5
‐2sd: 10.6x
City Developments Limited (CDL) is one of the pioneers in 9.5
Jan-13 Jan-14 Jan-15 Jan-16
Singapore's property sector. It is a property and hotel
conglomerate involved in real estate development and PB Band (x)
investment, hotel ownership and management, and facility (x)
management. 1.7
1.5
+2sd: 1.45x
1.3
+1sd: 1.25x
1.1
Avg: 1.05x
0.9
‐1sd: 0.85x
0.7
‐2sd: 0.65x
0.5
Jan-13 Jan-14 Jan-15 Jan-16
Segmental Breakdown
FY Dec 2014A 2015A 2016F 2017F 2018F
Revenues (S$m)
Property devt 1,581 1,037 1,324 1,478 1,960
Rental income 385 405 394 420 428
Hotel operations 1,678 1,698 1,773 1,814 1,885
120 163 163 163 163 Recognition of locked-in
Others 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 sales
Total 3,764 3,304 3,654 3,875 4,437
S$
12- mt h
9.34 Dat e of Closing
12 S. No. T arget Rat ing
Report Pric e
6 10 14 Pric e
8.84 13 16 1: 08 J an 16 7.58 10.26 BUY
8 9 11 15 2: 18 J an 16 7.18 10.26 BUY
8.34 3: 16 F eb 16 6.93 10.26 BUY
17 4: 26 F eb 16 7.20 10.26 BUY
5: 16 Mar 16 7.58 10.26 BUY
7.84
7 6: 18 Apr 16 8.76 10.26 BUY
4 7: 12 May 16 7.97 9.60 BUY
7.34 1 2 5 8: 27 May 16 8.35 9.60 BUY
9: 09 J un 16 8.80 9.60 BUY
6.84 10: 12 Aug 16 8.80 9.90 BUY
3
11: 16 Sep 16 8.86 9.90 BUY
6.34 12: 27 Sep 16 8.99 9.90 BUY
Jan-16 May-16 Sep-16 Jan-17 13: 30 Sep 16 9.07 9.90 BUY
14: 18 Oct 16 8.77 9.90 BUY
Not e : Share price and Target price are adjusted for corporate actions. 15: 24 Oct 16 8.82 9.90 BUY
16: 10 Nov 16 8.60 9.90 BUY
17: 16 Nov 16 8.38 9.90 BUY
88
Frasers Logistics and Industrial Trust (FLT)). FY16 profit before
Jan-14 Jan-15 Jan-16
interest and tax (PBIT) from development properties fell 29%
Frasers Centrepoint Ltd (LHS) Relative STI (RHS)
while recurring income from investment properties dropped by
Forecasts and Valuation
9% (partly due absence of one-off gains). Property sales were
FY Sep (S$ m) 2016A 2017F 2018F 2019F
lower in FY16, falling 25% to 4.9k units. Management remains
Revenue 3,440 2,412 3,103 2,633
EBITDA 993 1,051 1,153 1,107 cautious and is selective in the residential sector, and continues
Pre-tax Profit 960 830 886 836 to look for opportunities to strengthen its recurring income from
Net Profit 533 387 415 378 commercial properties.
Net Pft (Pre Ex.) 368 387 415 378
Net Pft Gth (Pre-ex) (%) (23.8) 5.0 7.2 (8.8) Asset recycling into its listed S-REITs. FCL will continue to
EPS (S cts) 18.4 13.3 14.3 13.0 demonstrate its ability to crystallise value by strategically
EPS Pre Ex. (S cts) 12.7 13.3 14.3 13.0 divesting matured assets to its listed REITs. The group is thus
EPS Gth Pre Ex (%) (24) 5 7 (9)
able to free up capital, improve its balance sheet position and
Diluted EPS (S cts) 18.4 13.3 14.3 13.0
Net DPS (S cts) 8.61 8.60 8.60 8.60
recycle capital to projects with higher returns.
BV Per Share (S cts) 230 234 240 245
PE (X) 8.7 12.0 11.2 12.2 Valuation:
PE Pre Ex. (X) 12.6 12.0 11.2 12.2 We maintain our BUY rating on FCL, TP maintained at S$2.00
P/Cash Flow (X) 4.2 nm 14.4 nm (30% discount to RNAV).
EV/EBITDA (X) 17.6 18.7 17.4 19.2
Net Div Yield (%) 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 Key Risks to Our View:
P/Book Value (X) 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
Dependent on the outlook of the Australian real estate market
Net Debt/Equity (X) 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.8
ROAE (%) 8.1 5.7 6.0 5.4
and currency. The group derives an estimated 30% of PBIT
from Australia, and returns could be impacted by the
Earnings Rev (%): 0 0 0 weakening AUD/SGD exchange rate.
Consensus EPS (S cts): 17.0 19.3 19.0
Other Broker Recs: B: 8 S: 0 H: 0
At A Glance
Source of all data on this page: Company, DBS Bank, Bloomberg Issued Capital (m shrs) 2,900
Finance L.P
Mkt. Cap (S$m/US$m) 4,625 / 3,213
Major Shareholders (%)
TCC Assets Ltd 59.2
Thai Beverage 28.4
Free Float (%) 12.4
3m Avg. Daily Val (US$m) 0.24
ICB Industry : Real Estate / Real Estate Investment & Services
Revenue (FY15A-FY19F)
CRITICAL DATA POINTS TO WATCH 4,000.0
S $' m
3,500.0
Earnings Drivers:
Growing recurring revenues from its commercial and hospitality 3,000.0
from 2018 onwards, which will boost its earnings further while
PBIT breakdown by divisions (FY16)
The Centrepoint mall’s AEI has completed in Sep16. Frasers
Hospitality is also expected to see its footprint expand to 30,000
managed units by 2019. In addition, the acquisition of the
Malmaison Hotel du vin Group (MHDV), which has a portfolio F r asers
of 29 boutique lifestyle hotels and 2,082 keys within 25 P r operty
Australia De velopment
pr operties
regional cities in the UK, will further deepen its presence and 2 6%
31 %
clientele reach. We see cross-selling opportunities and synergies
between MHDV and the Frasers brand, propelling the division’s Ho spitality
1 3%
performance to greater heights. Commercial
pr operties
30 %
profile remains long at 3.0 years with an average cost of debt of 0.1
3.1%. Fixed rate percentage of its loans remains high at 81%. 0.40 0.1
0.1
0.20 0.0
Share Price Drivers: 0.0
currently has 9.3m sq ft of development space, mainly in Gross Debt to Equity (LHS) Asset Turnover (RHS)
prices will mean upside to RNAVs and could re-rate the stock. 40.0
30.0
the Singapore residential market. This is also expected to lift Capital Expenditure (-)
sentiment on property stocks, which we believe will enable FCL ROE (%)
to close the gap between its stock price and NAV.
10.0%
Gains from asset recycling into its listed S-REITs to boost share 8.0%
price. Recycling activities are perceived positively by investors as
FCL is able to free up capital by selling its matured assets to its 6.0%
listed REITs, which will improve the group’s balance sheet 4.0%
position and recycle capital to projects with higher returns.
2.0%
0.0%
2015A 2016A 2017F 2018F 2019F
Key Risks:
Small free float. The stock has a low free float with 87.9% of Forward PE Band (x)
the company held by major shareholders TCC Group and Thai (x)
Beverage, thus leading to low liquidity. 14.2
+2sd: 13.6x
13.2
Dependent on the outlook of Australia's real estate market, +1sd: 12.6x
12.2
currency outlook. The group derives an estimated 30% of Avg: 11.6x
11.2
PBIT from Australia which is dependent on the real estate
‐1sd: 10.5x
market and whose returns could be impacted by the 10.2
‐2sd: 9.5x
weakening AUD/SGD exchange rate. 9.2
8.2
Jan-14 Jan-15 Jan-16
Company Background
Frasers Centrepoint Ltd (FCL) is a one of Singapore’s main real PB Band (x)
estate companies with assets exceeding S$23bn. The group 1.1
(x)
has four key core businesses focused on residential, 1.0
+2sd: 0.94x
commercial, hospitality and industrial sectors spanning 77 cities 0.9
across Asia, Australasia, Europe and the Middle East. 0.8 +1sd: 0.8x
0.7
Avg: 0.66x
0.6
0.5 ‐1sd: 0.52x
0.4
‐2sd: 0.37x
0.3
0.2
Jan-14 Jan-15 Jan-16
Growth
Revenue Gth (%) 2.7 (35.3) 33.7 (24.0) 74.2
EBITDA Gth (%) (12.3) (17.4) 8.8 (26.7) 218.4
Opg Profit Gth (%) (57.9) 61.6 29.4 (38.0) 231.7
Net Profit Gth (Pre-ex) (%) (81.9) 204.4 13.9 (20.9) 331.4
Margins
Gross Margins (%) (13.3) 37.5 32.1 33.5 22.2
Opg Profit Margins (%) 10.6 26.5 25.7 21.0 39.9
Net Profit Margins (%) 20.5 14.7 13.7 22.6 40.5
S$
1.74 12- mt h
Dat e of Closing
S.No. T arget Rat ing
Report Pric e
Pric e
1.69 8
6 1: 08 J an 16 1.65 2.05 BUY
7 2: 18 J an 16 1.60 2.05 BUY
1.64
12 3: 04 Feb 16 1.60 2.05 BUY
4 4: 16 Feb 16 1.58 2.05 BUY
1.59
3 5: 16 Mar 16 1.58 2.05 BUY
5 12 6: 05 Apr 16 1.65 2.05 BUY
1.54
10 7: 18 Apr 16 1.69 2.05 BUY
9 8: 11 May 16 1.67 2.05 BUY
1.49
11 9: 08 Aug 16 1.53 1.90 BUY
1.44 10: 30 Sep 16 1.49 1.90 BUY
11: 18 Oct 16 1.50 1.90 BUY
1.39 12: 10 Nov 16 1.53 2.00 BUY
Jan-16 May-16 Sep-16 Jan-17
Not e : Share price and Target price are adjusted for corporate actions.
US $'mn
logistics space. Riding on the tailwinds of China’s rising 500.0
consumerism and thriving e-commerce sector, Global Logistics 400.0
Properties (GLP) remains in the front seat to take advantage of 300.0
800.0
Strong operational momentum across markets. As expected,
FY16 recorded a strong year largely led by positive effective rent
US $'mn
600.0
growth on renewal and same-property net operating income.
The group’s lease ratio remains relatively stable at 92% with 400.0
Fund management platform delivers superior returns at lower China Japan US & Brazil
53.0
boosting returns and ROEs for the group. Going forward, the
group is looking to launch a new China fund with equity capital 51.0
of c.US$3bn to increase its reach in China.
49.0
through its modern logistics space, and it has another US$5.3bn 1,200.0
1,000.0
slated for completion in FY17-19. We expect the group’s assets 800.0
to hit higher occupancies and pricier leases, if e-commerce 600.0
increases in scale (8-year CAGR was 80%) on the back of strong 400.0
ROE (%)
Realisation of value through its fund business. GLP continues to
expand through its fund platform. Looking ahead, the potential
conversion of its development funds in China and Japan into
income funds could unlock performance fees, offering upside to
the earnings that are currently not in our estimates.
Additionally, GLP continues to look for opportunities in the US
and potentially Europe to expand its fund management
business.
Key Risks:
Slowdown in Chinese economy
PB Band (x)
If a slowdown in the Chinese economy leads to a reduced
appetite for logistics warehouse space, there could be slower-
than-projected revenue growth.
Company Background
Global Logistics Properties (GLP) is a leading provider of
modern logistics facilities in China, Japan, Brazil and the US. Source: Company, DBS Bank
The group develops, owns and manages c.41m sqm GFA of
logistics properties, catering to growing domestic
consumption.
Growth
Revenue Gth (%) (0.4) 5.1 0.1 3.7 3.4
EBITDA Gth (%) (11.2) 15.2 (21.6) 38.2 5.2
Opg Profit Gth (%) (11.6) 15.9 (22.3) 43.4 5.2
Net Profit Gth (Pre-ex) (%) (89.8) nm (371.6) 93.9 nm
Margins
Gross Margins (%) 79.5 80.3 79.3 81.5 82.4
Opg Profit Margins (%) 46.7 51.5 40.0 55.2 56.2
Net Profit Margins (%) 60.2 92.6 65.9 98.2 81.0
129
rates remained stable. However, RevPAR for most of its hotels in
5.7
5.2 109 all markets were marginally lower except for hotels in Australia.
4.7 89
Jan-13 Jan-14 Jan-15 Jan-16 Jan-17
UOL Group (LHS) Relative STI (RHS) New launches in 2H16/2017. Management saw good take-up
for its recent Park Eleven project in Shangai, selling 131 out of
Forecasts and Valuation 168 units and there will be subsequent launches in phases in
FY Dec (S$ m) 2015A 2016F 2017F 2018F
2017. In addition, UOL is positioning to launch The Clement
Revenue 1,279 1,228 1,324 1,410
EBITDA 514 567 601 618
Canopy (1Q17; 505 units), and Bishopsgate, London (160
Pre-tax Profit 460 424 453 470 units). The purchase of a recent enbloc site at Potong Pasir Ave
Net Profit 391 355 372 386 1 will be finalised soon, the project is planned for launch in
Net Pft (Pre Ex.) 343 355 372 386 2018.
Net Pft Gth (Pre-ex) (%) (5.9) 3.6 4.8 3.6
EPS (S cts) 49.2 44.6 46.7 48.4 Valuation:
EPS Pre Ex. (S cts) 43.0 44.6 46.7 48.4 Maintain BUY on attractive valuations. Our TP of S$7.20 is
EPS Gth Pre Ex (%) (7) 4 5 4
Diluted EPS (S cts) 49.2 44.6 46.7 48.4 pegged to a 30% discount to our RNAV of S$10.23.
Net DPS (S cts) 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0
BV Per Share (S cts) 991 1,021 1,053 1,086 Key Risks to Our View:
PE (X) 12.5 13.7 13.1 12.6 Economic slowdown. The downside risk to our projections is if
PE Pre Ex. (X) 14.2 13.7 13.1 12.6
P/Cash Flow (X) 9.4 28.7 13.8 13.4 residential sales are slower than our projections or if
EV/EBITDA (X) 14.8 13.9 13.0 12.4 commercial properties and hotels operations are impacted by
Net Div Yield (%) 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 slower-than-projected growth in rental/room rates.
P/Book Value (X) 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
Net Debt/Equity (X) 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 At A Glance
ROAE (%) 5.0 4.4 4.5 4.5
Issued Capital (m shrs) 805
Earnings Rev (%): 0 0 0 Mkt. Cap (S$m/US$m) 4,924 / 3,448
Consensus EPS (S cts): 47.6 47.8 46.6
Other Broker Recs: B: 9 S: 0 H: 3 Major Shareholders (%)
CY Wee & Co Pte Ltd 13.9
Source of all data on this page: Company, DBS Bank, Bloomberg Wee Investment Pte Ltd 13.4
Finance L.P
United Overseas Bank 7.5
Free Float (%) 59.8
3m Avg. Daily Val (US$m) 3.7
ICB Industry : Real Estate / Real Estate
Revenue (S$’m)
CRITICAL DATA POINTS TO WATCH 1,600.0
S$'m
1,400.0
Earnings Drivers: 1,200.0
Retail and office sub-segments to offer stable returns. UOL 1,000.0
revenues from retail, office and hotel segments which should 600.0
of the CBD will result in lower volatility in rents. Thus, PATMI (S$’m)
operational performance is likely to remain stable going 400.0 S $' m
forward.
390.0
Its retail malls - United Square and Novena Square - are located 380.0
in the Novena area, close to the emerging medical hub. The 370.0
malls have formed a niche, which should result in high tenant
360.0
stickiness. This is especially so for United Square, which houses
350.0
tenants well known for providing various children’s education
programs. On the other hand, Novena Square’s tenant mix 340.0
mainly caters to necessity shopping and the needs of the 330.0
vicinity’s growth as a medical hub. 15 16F 17F 18F
0.0%
Presales for residential projects doing well amid muted FY13 FY14 FY15F FY16F FY17F
Balance sheet remains strong. Debt to equity ratio is expected 0.40 0.2
0.2
to remain stable at 0.3x to 0.4x from FY16F-FY18F. This leaves 0.35
0.2
UOL with sufficient headroom to acquire projects / new land 0.30
0.2
0.25
when such opportunities come by. 0.20
0.2
0.1
0.15
0.1
Share Price Drivers: 0.10 0.1
Replenishing land bank key to income sustainability. The Group 0.05 0.1
turns around its projects quickly and has little land bank on its 0.00
2014A 2015A 2016F 2017F 2018F
0.1
balance sheet. UOL has always been active in land tenders to Gross Debt to Equity (LHS) Asset Turnover (RHS)
bank at lower prices will mean upside to RNAVs and this could 250.0
150.0
Singapore residential market. This would also lift sentiment on Capital Expenditure (-)
property stocks, which should enable UOL to close the gap ROE (%)
between its stock price and its NAV.
9.0%
8.0%
Deep value from its hotel business. We believe that deep value 7.0%
lies in the group’s portfolio of well located hotels and serviced 6.0%
3.0%
conservative compared to potential realisable value. We 2.0%
estimate potential upside of more than S$1bn if these 1.0%
properties are valued on marked-to-market basis. 0.0%
2014A 2015A 2016F 2017F 2018F
0.9
+2sd: 0.86x
0.8
+1sd: 0.77x
0.7
Avg: 0.69x
0.4
Jan-13 Jan-14 Jan-15 Jan-16
Segmental Breakdown
FY Dec 2014A 2015A 2016F 2017F 2018F
Revenues (S$m)
Property Development 676 578 595 675 754
Property Investment 198 219 200 214 218
Hotel Operations 438 419 369 371 374
Investments 20.3 42.3 42.3 42.3 42.3 Pre-sales of residential
Others 28.8 20.2 20.8 21.4 22.0 units to add to earnings.
Total 1,361 1,279 1,228 1,324 1,410
Growth
Revenue Gth (%) 3.4 (2.7) (4.1) 10.1 8.2
EBITDA Gth (%) 7.2 (14.8) (6.3) 11.7 (4.3)
Opg Profit Gth (%) (0.4) (20.5) (12.1) 18.9 5.1
Net Profit Gth (Pre-ex) (%) 6.2 (19.4) (2.6) 23.9 (8.5)
Margins
Gross Margins (%) 38.6 35.8 34.5 34.5 33.1
Opg Profit Margins (%) 23.9 19.5 17.9 19.3 18.7
Net Profit Margins (%) 28.5 18.5 23.3 18.9 22.1
6.59
S$
12- mt h
6.39 Dat e of Closing
S.No. T arget Rat ing
Report Pric e
Pric e
6.19 1: 18 J an 16 5.54 8.47 BUY
2: 29 F eb 16 5.66 7.39 BUY
5.99
6 3: 13 May 16 5.70 7.39 BUY
10 4: 27 May 16 5.68 7.39 BUY
5.79 2 4
89 5: 09 J un 16 5.61 7.39 BUY
6: 05 Aug 16 5.83 7.20 BUY
5.59 3 11 7: 16 Sep 16 5.51 7.20 BUY
5
5.39 1 7 8: 30 Sep 16 5.61 7.20 BUY
9: 07 Oct 16 5.85 7.20 BUY
5.19 10: 18 Oct 16 5.76 7.20 BUY
11: 11 Nov 16 5.66 7.20 BUY
4.99
Jan-16 May-16 Sep-16 Jan-17
Not e : Share price and Target price are adjusted for corporate actions.
Earnings Drivers:
Australia – the largest contributor. ASCHT’s Australian portfolio
contributed c.55% of FY16 NPI. With a positive outlook for the
Australian hospitality market, driven by a combination of
continued growth in tourist arrivals (+12% y-o-y for 8M16
following 8% growth in CY15) and modest new hotel supply in
Sydney and Melbourne in the near term, we expect ASCHT’s
Australian operations to drive the REIT’s performance going
forward. Contribution from Australia should also rise in 2019 as Net Property Income and Margins (%)
ASCHT inked an agreement to acquire the serviced apartment
component at Aurora Melbourne Central for A$120m, on an
NPI yield of 7.6%. Construction of Aurora Melbourne Central is
due to be completed in 2H19. Due to uncertainty over how
ASCHT will fund the acquisition of Aurora Melbourne and
RevPAR in 2019, we have yet to include this investment in our
estimates.
Page 134
Company Guide
Ascendas Hospitality Trust
Key Risks:
Interest rate risk. As the US Fed is expected to raise interest Distribution Yield (%)
rates, ASCHT faces the challenge of higher interest costs.
Nevertheless, with c.97% of the group’s debt on fixed rates,
ASCHT is partially insulated in the near term.
Company Background
A-HTRUST is a stapled group comprising Ascendas Hospitality
Business Trust (A-HBT) and Ascendas Hospitality REIT (A-
HREIT), established to invest in a diversified portfolio of hotel
assets in Asia, Australia and New Zealand.
Page 135
Company Guide
Ascendas Hospitality Trust
Price Relative Clear growth drivers with prospects of healthy rental reversions
ahead. Over the past year, a-iTrust has announced several
developments including the construction of The V, a new 408k sqft
IT building, as well as acquisitions of CyberVale, aVance 3 & 4 and
BlueRidge Phase 2. Coupled with the potential for healthy rental
reversions ahead, of 12-20% in Chennai and up to 5% for
Hyderabad and Bangalore, provides confidence over a-iTrust’s ability
to deliver a robust 8% DPU CAGR over the next two years.
Earnings Drivers:
Leveraged on offshoring trends. a-iTrust provides exposure to
India, which remains a leading IT and offshoring hub. The
growing demand for offshoring services is underpinned by the
country's low-cost environment. According to PayScale, the
average salary for IT/software, developers or programmers in
India stands at US$5,451 p.a. which is way below that of other
competing and/or developed countries such as the US
(US$73,031), Australia (US$51,331), Hong Kong (US$23,600) Net Property Income and Margins (%)
and Malaysia (US$10,165). Combined with an abundant skilled
labour force and qualified English-speaking talent pool, based
on NASSCOM (National Association of Software and Services
Companies) estimates, IT-BPM (business process management)
revenues are forecast to grow by 10-12% in FY16/17 to
US$157-160bn.
Potential one-third increase in floor area. a-iTrust currently has a Interest Cover (x)
portfolio of properties with 9.7m sqft of space with announced
plans to take it to c.12m sqft. Beyond this, through its sponsors
and assuming a-iTrust exercises its right of first refusal (ROFR), it
could access c.2.3m sqft worth of properties. In addition, we
understand the trust is also open to the acquisition of third-
party properties. Currently, it is exploring acquisition
opportunities in Mumbai, Delhi and Gurgaon, thereby
expanding its presence beyond its current core markets of
Bangalore, Chennai, Hyderabad and Pune.
Page 140
Company Guide
Ascendas India Trust
Key Risks:
Currency risk. a-iTrust’s distributions are generated in INR but
paid in SGD. While the trust hedges each half-yearly
distribution, DPU from the trust will be negatively impacted on
a lagged basis if the INR depreciates. In addition, as 75% and
25% of the trust’s borrowings are in INR and SGD respectively,
while all its assets are in India, a depreciation of the INR would
also be negative to its NAV per share.
Company Background
Ascendas India Trust ("a-iTrust") was listed in August 2007 as
the first Indian property trust in Asia. Its principal objective is to
own income-producing real estate used primarily as business
Source: Company, DBS Bank
space in India. a-iTrust may also develop and acquire land or
uncompleted developments to be used primarily as business
space, with the objective of holding the properties upon
completion. a-iTrust is managed by Ascendas Property Fund
Trustee Pte Ltd, a subsidiary of the Ascendas Group.
Page 141
Company Guide
Ascendas India Trust
2.9
222
202
exposure to a sector (R&D) that continues to grow. The yield of
2.7
182 6.0% (all-in cost) appears low at first glance but we believe it
reflects the properties’ relatively young age (2.0 years) and long
162
2.5
142
2.3
2.1
122
102
land lease tenure. Accretion is projected to be marginal at
1.9
Jan-13 Jan-14 Jan-15 Jan-16
82
Jan-17
0.5%. We have yet to factor in the acquisition, pending EGM.
Ascendas REIT (LHS) Relative STI (RHS)
600 77.3%
Earnings Drivers: 500 75.3%
Rebound in occupancy rates to provide upside to earnings. A- 400 73.3%
REIT’s Singapore portfolio occupancy rates dipped marginally to 300 71.3%
ago. The dip was mainly due to non-renewals of leases at 40 100 67.3%
109 62%
1Q2015
2Q2015
3Q2015
4Q2015
1Q2016
2Q2016
3Q2016
4Q2016
1Q2017
2Q2017
Still positive rental reversions, but spread will likely narrow.
Rental reversionary trends are moderating and reached a low of Net Property Income Net Property Income Margin %
0.9% in 2QFY17. Looking ahead, leases representing close to
12% in Singapore and given the narrowing spread between Distribution Paid / Net Operating CF
passing and market rents, we expect rental reversionary trends 1.2 (x)
China, the manager has looked overseas for higher returns. The 6.00
Page 146
Company Guide
Ascendas REIT
4.0%
Share Price Drivers:
3.0%
Direction of 10-year long bonds impacts share price. Seen by
investors as a key S-REIT proxy, A-REIT’s share price has typically 2.0%
4.8
Key Risks:
4.3
Interest rate risk. Any increase in interest rates will result in 2013 2014 2015 2016
1.6
Economic risk. A deterioration in the economic outlook could 1.5
have a negative impact on industrial rents and occupancies as 1.4
companies cut back production and require less space, given 1.3 +2sd: 1.32x
that industrial rents have a strong correlation with GDP 1.2
+1sd: 1.24x
Avg: 1.16x
growth. 1.1 ‐1sd: 1.09x
1.0 ‐2sd: 1.01x
Company Background 0.9
Jan-13 Jan-14 Jan-15 Jan-16
A-REIT is Singapore’s first and largest listed business space and
industrial real estate investment trust. It has a diversified
portfolio comprising assets in Singapore, China and Australia. Source: Company, DBS Bank
A-REIT is managed by Ascendas Funds Management (S)
Limited, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Singapore-based
Ascendas Group.
Page 147
Company Guide
Ascendas REIT
S$
12- mt h
2.62 Dat e of Closing
S.No. T arget Rat ing
Report Pric e
Pric e
2.52 6
1: 08 J an 16 2.25 2.52 BUY
7 2: 04 Feb 16 2.34 2.52 BUY
8 10
5 12
2.42 11 14 3: 18 May 16 2.32 2.50 BUY
2 9 4: 10 J un 16 2.32 2.50 BUY
4
2.32 5: 12 J ul 16 2.48 2.55 BUY
13 6: 21 J ul 16 2.49 2.61 BUY
3
7: 22 J ul 16 2.53 2.61 BUY
2.22
1 8: 22 Aug 16 2.42 2.61 BUY
9: 29 Aug 16 2.44 2.61 BUY
2.12 10: 20 Sep 16 2.42 2.61 BUY
11: 26 Sep 16 2.46 2.61 BUY
2.02 12: 21 Oct 16 2.40 2.65 BUY
Jan-16 May-16 Sep-16 Jan-17 13: 08 Nov 16 2.34 2.65 BUY
14: 06 Dec 16 2.37 2.65 BUY
Not e : Share price and Target price are adjusted for corporate actions.
Price Relative Value from recent acquisitions/AEIs yet to be fully realised. ART
1.7
S$ Relative Index has announced c.S$1.2bn worth of acquisitions over the last
two years, increasing the value of its assets under management
216
1.6
196
1.2
136
ongoing asset enhancement initiatives (AEIs), ART should
116
200 52.4%
Earnings Drivers:
150 50.4%
Value of past acquisitions yet to be realised. ART has had an
48.4%
active two years, marking its maiden entries into Malaysia and 100
the US. In addition, ART has deepened its presence in Australia, 50 46.4%
China and Japan. All in, ART has acquired c.S$1.2bn worth of 0 44.4%
2013A 2014A 2015A 2016F 2017F
properties on an average yield of 5-8%. The benefits from these
Net Property Income Net Property Income Margin %
acquisitions should accrue over the next few years.
Asset enhancements to drive earnings. Beyond the announced Net Property Income and Margins (%)
54%
acquisitions, another growth driver for ART are the asset 59
52%
enhancement initiatives it has undertaken or in the process of 57
55
50%
completing. Refurbishments, which are initiated every 7-10 53
2Q2014
3Q2014
4Q2014
1Q2015
2Q2015
3Q2015
4Q2015
1Q2016
2Q2016
3Q2016
Barcelona, Dalian, Ho Chi Minh City, London, Manila,
Singapore, Shanghai and Tianjin. Net Property Income Net Property Income Margin %
Australia, Japan and US - key growth markets. With a timely Distribution Paid / Net Operating CF
expansion into Australia and Japan, ART is well positioned to (x)
Page 152
Company Guide
Ascott Residence Trust
properties.
range bound over the last year due to inconsistent DPU growth 4.0%
3.5%
over the last two years on account of the dilution impact from
3.0%
the rights issue in late 2013 and weakness from its Chinese 2.5%
properties. However, we believe ART will re-rate as the full 2.0%
benefits from c.S$1.2bn worth of acquisitions and 1.5%
refurbishment activities over the past two years are realised. 1.0%
0.5%
0.0%
2013A 2014A 2015A 2016F 2017F
Key Risks:
Interest rate risks. Any increase in interest rates will result in
higher interest payments and reduce the income available for Distribution Yield (%)
(%)
distribution, which will result in lower distribution per unit
8.1
(DPU) for unitholders. As at 30 September 2016, 80% of ART’s
7.6
debts are on fixed rates. +2sd: 7.5%
7.1 +1sd: 7.1%
Avg: 6.8%
Currency risk. As ART earns rental income in various 6.6
‐1sd: 6.4%
currencies, a depreciation of any foreign currency against the 6.1 ‐2sd: 6%
SGD could negatively impact DPU. Nevertheless, through the 5.6
use of currency hedges for EUR and JPY sourced income, as
5.1
well as the benefits from having a diversified portfolio, FX 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
1.1
Company Background
+2sd: 1.02x
Ascott REIT's Investment portfolio primarily comprises real 1.0
+1sd: 0.96x
estate used mainly as serviced residences or rental housing 0.9 Avg: 0.89x
‐1sd: 0.82x
properties (including investments in real estate-related assets 0.8
‐2sd: 0.75x
and/or other related value-enhancing assets or instruments). 0.7
0.6
Jan-13 Jan-14 Jan-15 Jan-16 Jan-17
Page 153
Company Guide
Ascott Residence Trust
1.25
S$
12- mt h
Dat e of Closing
S.No. T arget Rat ing
Report Pric e
1.20 Pric e
1: 26 J an 16 1.12 1.33 BUY
2: 15 Mar 16 1.08 1.33 BUY
6
1.15 3: 13 Apr 16 1.12 1.33 BUY
5
4: 18 Apr 16 1.11 1.28 BUY
4
5: 21 J ul 16 1.16 1.31 BUY
1.10 1 3 6: 21 Oct 16 1.15 1.32 BUY
2
1.05
1.00
Jan-16 May-16 Sep-16 Jan-17
Not e : Share price and Target price are adjusted for corporate actions.
Cache may need to address its gearing in the near term. A scenario
of higher gearing of 42% (vs 45% regulatory cap), which is above
the management’s comfortable level of 35-40% is likely to result in
Forecasts and Valuation an overhang in the share price of Cache in the immediate term. We
FY Dec (S$m) 2015A 2016F 2017F 2018F believe that the Manager may consider divestments or acquisitions
Gross Revenue 89.7 116 120 124 (funding through equity) to pare down its gearing. Depending on
Net Property Inc 76.2 91.1 89.1 92.5 the strategy, potential DPU dilution is possible, this has not been
Total Return (12.3) (2.5) 58.7 61.3
factored in our model yet.
Distribution Inc 67.9 70.8 67.7 68.2
EPU (S cts) 6.66 6.84 6.50 6.75
EPU Gth (%) (8) 3 (5) 4 Valuation:
DPU (S cts) 8.50 7.87 7.51 7.50 Our target price remains at S$0.93. Maintain HOLD.
DPU Gth (%) (1) (7) (5) 0
NAV per shr (S cts) 100 91.1 90.1 89.4 Key Risks to Our View:
PE (X) 12.2 11.9 12.5 12.1 Schenker’s rent dispute. The rent dispute at 51 Alps Avenue
Distribution Yield (%) 10.4 9.7 9.2 9.2 (Schenker Megahub) is pending the Court’s resolution with an
P/NAV (x) 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 uncertain timeline. If the Court rules to settle the rent significantly
Aggregate Leverage (%) 39.9 39.1 39.2 39.3 below the market price (which is also our assumption), there could
ROAE (%) 6.7 7.7 7.2 7.5 be further pressure on TP and DPU.
At A Glance
Distn. Inc Chng (%): - - -
Issued Capital (m shrs) 898
Consensus DPU (S cts): 8.10 7.80 7.90
Other Broker Recs: B: 2 S: 1 H: 7 Mkt. Cap (S$m/US$m) 732 / 504
Major Shareholders (%)
Source of all data on this page: Company, DBS Bank, Bloomberg Bank of New York Mellon Corp 4.4
Finance L.P. CWT Ltd 4.4
Capital Group Companies Inc 4.3
Free Float (%) 86.9
3m Avg. Daily Val (US$m) 1.1
ICB Industry : Real Estate / Real Estate Investment Trusts
(WALE) of 3.8 years by revenues. Cache has renewed a majority 2014A 2015A 2016F 2017F 2018F
of leases up till 2017 and is actively managing these expiries in Net Property Income Net Property Income Margin %
and Hi-Speed Logistics Centre) are fairly high and given the 21 85%
minimal new supply. Hence, demand for the space should 19 75%
remain resilient, despite the current weak operating climate, 18 70%
made worse by high supply from completions.
2Q2014
3Q2014
4Q2014
1Q2015
2Q2015
3Q2015
4Q2015
1Q2016
2Q2016
3Q2016
Net Property Income Net Property Income Margin %
The non-renewal of the master lease at Hi-Speed Logistics
Centre (40 Alps Ave) is not expected to impact earnings
Distribution Paid / Net Operating CF
significantly. We anticipate that net property income (NPI) for (x)
the property will dip by on the back of lower rents and 1.1
efficiency for the property. However, given that the property 1.0
0.7
The court case regarding the renewal of the lease at Schenker 0.6
Page 158
Company Guide
Cache Logistics Trust
0.0%
2014A 2015A 2016F 2017F 2018F
Beating market outlook. While the warehouse market is
expected to see a deluge of new supply completions over 2016-
2018, a majority of Cache’s leases are MNCs and 3PLs, and Distribution Yield (%)
(%)
hence we believe occupancy rates should remain steady. Higher 11.1
rents achieved given its quality portfolio could outperform 10.1 +2sd: 10.2%
market expectations that rents would moderate.
9.1 +1sd: 9.1%
Page 159
Company Guide
Cache Logistics Trust
S$
12- mt h
Dat e of Closing
S.No. T arget Rat ing
0.95 Report Pric e
Pric e
6 1: 26 J an 16 0.88 0.96 BUY
2: 25 Apr 16 0.89 0.93 BUY
0.90 2
4 5 3: 31 May 16 0.87 0.93 BUY
4: 21 J ul 16 0.88 0.93 BUY
5: 22 Aug 16 0.91 0.93 BUY
1
0.85 3 7 6: 28 Sep 16 0.91 0.93 HOLD
7: 24 Oct 16 0.87 0.93 HOLD
0.80
0.75
Jan-16 May-16 Sep-16 Jan-17
Not e : Share price and Target price are adjusted for corporate actions.
116
portfolio performance through strategic asset enhancement
initiatives (AEIs) and divestments to redeploy capital to higher-
0.5
96
0.5
0.4 76
Jan-13 Jan-14 Jan-15 Jan-16 Jan-17
yielding sources. While its Australia JV partner has ceased the
Cambridge Industrial Trust (LHS) Relative STI (RHS)
partnership, the Manager remains committed to its long-term
acquisition strategy in Australia and is actively exploring other
opportunities.
Forecasts and Valuation
FY Dec (S$m) 2015A 2016F 2017F 2018F Outcome of strategic review key to re-rating. The Manager is
Gross Revenue 112 110 112 113
conducting a strategic review of CREIT’s business and operations to
Net Property Inc 86.2 80.3 81.5 82.6 fulfill its strategy of maximising value for its unitholders and has
Total Return 52.5 52.2 53.2 53.1 appointed Goldman Sachs (Singapore) Pte to assist in its analysis.
Distribution Inc 61.8 53.2 54.2 54.1 The strategic review may open up a myriad of scenarios (M&A,
EPU (S cts) 4.33 4.03 4.08 4.07 trade sale or even an internalisation). Any incremental steps taken
EPU Gth (%) 3 (7) 1 0 by the Manager to drive value should be well received by investors.
DPU (S cts) 4.79 4.11 4.16 4.15
DPU Gth (%) (4) (14) 1 0 Valuation:
NAV per shr (S cts) 67.7 66.9 66.8 66.7
PE (X) 12.6 13.5 13.3 13.4 Our DCF-backed TP is S$0.54. The stock is offering a forward yield
Distribution Yield (%) 8.8 7.5 7.6 7.6 over 7.5%, which we believe will cap further downside to share
P/NAV (x) 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 price. Maintain HOLD.
Aggregate Leverage (%) 36.7 37.6 37.9 38.1
ROAE (%) 6.3 6.0 6.1 6.1
Key Risks to Our View:
Distn. Inc Chng (%): 0 0 0 Interest rate risk. Any increase in interest rates will result in higher
Consensus DPU (S cts): 4.20 4.20 4.30 interest payments which will reduce income available for
Other Broker Recs: B: 3 S: 0 H: 2
distribution and DPUs.
Source of all data on this page: Company, DBS Bank, Bloomberg
Finance L.P. At A Glance
Issued Capital (m shrs) 1,304
Mkt. Cap (S$m/US$m) 704 / 498
Major Shareholders (%)
Jinquan Tong 17.84
Chan Wai Kheong 5.39
Credit Suisse Group AG 5.00
Free Float (%) 71.77
3m Avg. Daily Val (US$m) 0.60
ICB Industry : Real Estate / Real Estate Investment Trust
CRITICAL DATA POINTS TO WATCH
Earnings Drivers:
2Q2014
3Q2014
4Q2014
1Q2015
2Q2015
3Q2015
4Q2015
1Q2016
2Q2016
3Q2016
management's comfortable range of 35-40% and is optimal, in
our view. This is likely to mean that while the Manager remains Net Property Income Net Property Income Margin %
keen to grow the portfolio via acquisitions and is looking to
venture overseas for potential opportunities, there is a cap to Distribution Paid / Net Operating CF
the number of deals it can look at. (x)
1.2
3.80
3.70
3.60
3.50
3.40
3.30
3.20
2014A 2015A 2016F 2017F 2018F
Page 164
Company Guide
Cambridge Industrial Trust
30.0%
Pro-active capital management. CREIT has refinanced most of its 25.0%
loans expiring and has no refinancing due till 2H18. In addition, 20.0%
the Manager has fixed c.88% of its interest rates over the next 15.0%
3.2 years, meaning that volatility from a hike in interest rates to
10.0%
have a marginal impact to distributions. 2014A 2015A 2016F 2017F 2018F
3.0%
0.7 ‐2sd: 0.72x
0.6
Jan-13 Jan-14 Jan-15 Jan-16
Page 165
Company Guide
Cambridge Industrial Trust
0.60 S$
12- mt h
Dat e of Closing
S.No. T arget Rat ing
Report Price
0.58 Pric e
2 1: 28 Apr 16 0.55 0.56 HOLD
0.56 4 2: 25 J ul 16 0.56 0.60 HOLD
3: 22 Aug 16 0.55 0.60 HOLD
0.54 4: 26 Oct 16 0.55 0.54 HOLD
1 3 5: 28 Nov 16 0.53 0.54 HOLD
0.52 5
0.50
0.48
0.46
Jan-16 May-16 Sep-16 Jan-17
Not e : Share price and Target price are adjusted for corporate actions.
174
Singapore Grade A office portfolio trades at an implied value of
1.7
1.6
154
134
c.S$1,900 per square foot (psf) compared to recent sales of
1.5
1.4
1.3
114 between c.S$2,700 (adjusted for 99-year leasehold for
94
CapitaLand Commercial Trust (LHS) Relative STI (RHS) unlikely to trade up to c.S$2,700 given the older profile of some
of its properties, we believe the current strength of the physical
market and 999-year leasehold status of some of its buildings,
Forecasts and Valuation
warrants CCT to trade close to its book value per unit of S$1.72
FY Dec (S$m) 2014A 2015A 2016F 2017F or an implied valuation of S$2,000 psf.
Gross Revenue 263 273 277 348
Net Property Inc 205 213 217 273 Medium term upside from redevelopment of Golden Shoe Car
Total Return 449 307 241 259 Park. CCT announced the redevelopment of its Golden Shoe Car
Distribution Inc 249 254 266 280 Park property. Subject to obtaining the necessary government
EPU (S cts) 12.6 10.4 8.15 8.62
approvals, the property will be developed into one with c.1m
EPU Gth (%) 38 (18) (22) 6
DPU (S cts) 8.46 8.62 8.98 9.31 square feet (sqft) of commercial space in terms of gross floor
DPU Gth (%) 3 2 4 4 area (GFA) and comprise an office tower of up to 280 metres
NAV per shr (S cts) 175 177 177 175 high. Upon completion in 2021, the property will provide a
PE (X) 11.9 14.4 18.5 17.5
Distribution Yield (%) 5.6 5.7 6.0 6.2 medium term uplift to CCT’s current NAV per unit of S$1.72.
P/NAV (x) 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9
Valuation:
Aggregate Leverage (%) 30.4 30.0 37.5 37.5
ROAE (%) 7.3 5.9 4.6 4.9 Our DCF-based TP of S$1.70 implies a price of c.S$2,000 psf
for CCT’s Singapore portfolio.
Distn. Inc Chng (%): - -
Consensus DPU (S cts): 8.90 9.10 Key Risks to Our View:
Other Broker Recs: B: 13 S: 4 H: 7 A key risk to our view is new office supply causing spot rents
Source of all data on this page: Company, DBS Bank, Bloomberg to fall below S$7 psf, which is likely to lead to lower-than-
Finance L.P. expected asking rents and rental income.
At A Glance
Issued Capital (m shrs) 2,963
Mkt. Cap (S$m/US$m) 4,460 / 3,075
Major Shareholders (%)
Capitaland Limited 31.1
Blackrock 6.6
CBRE Group Inc 4.9
Free Float (%) 57.4
3m Avg. Daily Val (US$m) 10.1
ICB Industry : Real Estate / Real Estate Investment Trust
150
Earnings Drivers: 80.0%
net lettable area (NLA)) should also help ensure that the
negative impact from an anticipated decline in rents over the Net Property Income and Margins (%)
80%
next two years will be gradual rather than immediate. Thus, 79%
58
CCT offers investors a measure of earnings stability and 79%
56 78%
certainty amid record office completions over the next two 78%
years. 54 77%
77%
52
76%
Defensive portfolio with >70% of office leases expiring in FY19 50 76%
75%
and beyond, coinciding with the period when Singapore faces 48 75%
no new office supply. CCT has maintained a defensive leasing
2Q2014
3Q2014
4Q2014
1Q2015
2Q2015
3Q2015
4Q2015
1Q2016
2Q2016
3Q2016
strategy amid stiff competition for larger tenants by locking in
Net Property Income Net Property Income Margin %
longer-term leases for most of its top 10 tenants. With proactive
forward renewals, more than 70% of office leases now expire
Distribution Paid / Net Operating CF
in FY19 and beyond. This fortuitously coincides with the period (x)
1.4
when the Singapore office market should be on an upturn as no 1.3
new office buildings will be completed from FY18 onwards. 1.2
1.1
Page 170
Company Guide
CapitaLand Commercial Trust
gearing has risen to c.38% from c.30% previously. While this is 30.0%
higher than CCT’s average gearing over the last few years, we 25.0%
believe this remains prudent, as it is below the 45% gearing cap 20.0%
imposed by MAS and provides some buffer in the event of any 15.0%
decline in the value of CCT’s portfolio.
10.0%
2013A 2014A 2015A 2016F 2017F
2%) which is also higher than the average S-REIT growth of 6.0%
1.7%. With a superior growth profile in a slowing growth 5.0%
environment, we believe investors will gravitate towards CCT,
4.0%
causing the stock to re-rate.
3.0%
2.0%
1.0%
Key Risks:
Risk of higher vacancies and negative rental reversions for 0.0%
2013A 2014A 2015A 2016F 2017F
FY16. In FY16-17, c.10% of CCT’s office leases will be due for
expiry, the majority of which stems from One George Street,
Six Battery Road and Raffles City, where expiring rents are Distribution Yield (%)
(%)
close to or higher than market rents. As the Manager has 7.4
c.5.3m sqft of office (NLA) will be completed within the 4.9 ‐1sd: 5%
downtown core, translating to a 15% increase in existing
4.4 ‐2sd: 4.4%
stock, or 3-year CAGR of 4.6%. Due to weaker net absorption
3.9
rates of <1m sqft in recent years, CCT could face higher 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Page 171
Company Guide
CapitaLand Commercial Trust
1.72
S$
12- mt h
Dat e of Closing
S.No. T arget Rat ing
Report Pric e
1.62 5 Pric e
6 1: 20 J an 16 1.33 1.45 BUY
4
2: 15 Apr 16 1.43 1.53 BUY
1.52 7 3: 24 May 16 1.39 1.61 BUY
4: 21 J ul 16 1.56 1.70 BUY
2 5: 05 Sep 16 1.59 1.70 BUY
1.42 6: 19 Oct 16 1.58 1.70 BUY
7: 09 Nov 16 1.56 1.70 BUY
3
1.32
1
1.22
Jan-16 May-16 Sep-16 Jan-17
Not e : Share price and Target price are adjusted for corporate actions.
159
Funan 2.0, including a cycle-through mall, two Grade A office towers,
and co-living apartment units, were largely in line with our scenario
2.1
2.0 139
1.9 119
1.8
1.7
99 study published on 1 July 2016 (Rhapsody of Funan 2.0). We are
supportive of CMT’s decision to undertake the redevelopment. Apart
1.6 79
Jan-13 Jan-14 Jan-15 Jan-16 Jan-17
250
of malls stands out in Singapore’s retail landscape due to its (a) 200
70.6%
accessibility, (b) excellent asset management track record, and 150 68.6%
100
(c) strong rewards/marketing programme. Despite recent retail 50
66.6%
Ability to deliver value through AEIs. Strategic asset Net Property Income and Margins (%)
72%
enhancement initiatives (AEIs) across its properties will result in 131
70%
increased shopper traffic in the medium term. For instance, the 126
68%
completion of AEI at IMM building in November 2015 has 121
the mall in the midst of new supply. The upcoming 106 62%
redevelopment of Funan 2.0 could also offer upside potential to 101 60%
2Q2014
3Q2014
4Q2014
1Q2015
2Q2015
3Q2015
4Q2015
1Q2016
2Q2016
3Q2016
the Trust.
Net Property Income Net Property Income Margin %
Expect rental reversions to underperform historical levels. CMT’s
rental reversion trends have been moderating (3.7% for FY15 Distribution Paid / Net Operating CF
and 1.7% for 9M16) and as retailers’ profitability continues to (x)
1.2
be squeezed by high labour costs and falling retail sales. We 1.1
believe that rental reversions are likely to fall within the 1-2% 1.0
range in the next 1-2 years, compounded by pressure from 0.9
escalating labour costs and labour shortage. 0.8
0.7
3.60
2014A 2015A 2016F 2017F 2018F
Page 176
Company Guide
CapitaLand Mall Trust
Bedok Mall in 3Q15 and assuming 100% debt financing for the 25.0%
10.0%
Cost of debt to remain stable. The average debt cost is 3.2%, 2014A 2015A 2016F 2017F 2018F
6.0%
Share Price Drivers:
5.0%
Acquisitions to drive earnings. CMT has the right of first refusal
4.0%
to acquire its Sponsor’s retail assets in Singapore. CapitaLand
3.0%
has several retail assets in its portfolio which could be injected
into the REIT, including Star Vista and the remaining 70% stake 2.0%
in Westgate. 1.0%
0.0%
2014A 2015A 2016F 2017F 2018F
Better-than-expected operational results. We believe that CMT’s
portfolio will continue to remain resilient despite headwinds.
The Trust's ability to maintain a steady growth in top line while Distribution Yield (%)
(%)
holding occupancies will be a strong testament of the 6.6
Key Risks:
Downside risk to rental reversions. A worse-than-expected PB Band (x)
slowdown in consumer sentiment and consumption outlook 1.6
(x)
may result in lower reversionary potential (vs our 2% estimate) 1.5
for leases expiring in 2016. Funan’s redevelopment could be a 1.4
near-term catalyst. Further upside risk is from interest savings. 1.3 +2sd: 1.29x
The Trust has been proactive in extending its debt profile, 1.2 +1sd: 1.21x
locking in long-tenure MTNs at lower rates than previously 1.1 Avg: 1.13x
0.8
Jan-13 Jan-14 Jan-15 Jan-16 Jan-17
The uncertainties from the implementation of Brexit following
the referendum on 24 June 2016 will continue to cause ripples
in the market. Source: Company, DBS Bank
Company Background
CapitaMall Trust is a real estate investment trust which owns
and invests in retail properties in the suburban areas and
downtown core of Singapore.
Page 177
Company Guide
CapitaLand Mall Trust
S$
12- mt h
2.27 Dat e of Closing
S.No. T arget Rat ing
Report Pric e
Pric e
3 4
1: 22 J an 16 1.97 2.10 BUY
2.17
6 2: 25 J an 16 1.97 2.10 BUY
5 7 3: 18 Apr 16 2.16 2.10 HOLD
2.07 4: 01 J ul 16 2.17 2.20 HOLD
5: 25 J ul 16 2.15 2.23 HOLD
2 6: 22 Sep 16 2.12 2.25 BUY
1.97 7: 24 Oct 16 2.15 2.25 BUY
1
1.87
1.77
Jan-16 May-16 Sep-16 Jan-17
Not e : Share price and Target price are adjusted for corporate actions.
Earnings Drivers:
Challenging near-term operating conditions in Singapore.
CDREIT’s profitability is largely dependent on earnings from its
Singapore hotels. Near term, we see headwinds to the group’s
core operations due to the growth in new hotel room supply in
Singapore (6-7% of existing supply). The more competitive
landscape is likely to lead to pressure on ADRs (average room
rates) and occupancies, which we estimate will result in a c.6%
decline in RevPAR in 2016. Nevertheless, over the medium term, Net Property Income and Margins (%)
as the Singapore government has not released any land for
hotel development over the past two years, supply pressures
should ease from 2018 onwards.
Page 182
Company Guide
CDL Hospitality Trusts
Key Risks:
Interest rate risk. Any increase in interest rates will result in
higher interest payments, which could result in lower
distribution per unit (DPU) for unitholders.
Company Background
CDL Hospitality Trusts (CDREIT) is a stapled group comprising Source: Company, DBS Bank
H-REIT and HBT. H-REIT is a real estate investment trust that
invests in a portfolio of income-producing hospitality-related
properties while HBT is a business trust.
Page 183
Company Guide
CDL Hospitality Trusts
70.0%
Earnings Drivers: 6,000
9.0% and 6.7% of leases (by NLA) in FY17, FY18 and FY19 2014A 2015A 2016A 2017F 2018F
respectively, gives CRT the opportunity to change the tenant Net Property Income Net Property Income Margin %
mix and/or drive higher rentals. This in turn provides upside to
our earnings and DPU estimates.
Net Property Income and Margins (%)
150%
Contribution from recent acquisitions and favourable hedges. 1,411 100%
4Q2014
1Q2015
2Q2015
3Q2015
4Q2015
1Q2016
2Q2016
3Q2016
4Q2016
1Q2017
NPI yield. In addition, with CRT having already hedged its FY18 -300%
5.00
Medium-term upside at One’s Mall, Torius property and Feeeal
Asahikawa. We understand there are opportunities to drive 4.00
rents higher at One’s Mall, Torius property and Feeeal
Asahikawa in the medium term. This will come primarily from 3.00
0.00
Costs savings from internalisation. We expect CRT to benefit 2014A 2015A 2016A 2017F 2018F
from its decision to bring in house its trustee-manager. This
should result in costs savings as fees paid to a third party Source: Company, DBS Bank
manager are now eliminated and replaced with lower internal
overheads. Partially offset this benefit is the higher units on
issue following the preferential offering use to help fund the
purchase of the third party trustee-manager.
Page 188
Company Guide
Croesus Retail Trust
June 2016. While this is high compared to other S-REITs, given 45.0%
35.0%
willingness of Japanese banks to extend credit to CRT and its
30.0%
business trust structure provides CRT the ability to sustain a
25.0%
gearing closer to 50% level.
20.0%
2014A 2015A 2016A 2017F 2018F
6.0%
Share Price Drivers:
Re-rating on internally managed trust. With the recent buy-out 5.0%
0.0%
2014A 2015A 2016A 2017F 2018F
Inorganic growth through acquisitions. CRT continues to look
for acquisition opportunities. Such DPU-accretive transactions
should boost CRT’s DPU and help re-rate its share price. Near Distribution Yield (%)
(%)
term it has the funding advantage to secure to pursue DPU 10.5
accretive acquisitions as CRT is able to secure cheap debt (sub 10.0
+2sd: 9.7%
1% interest rate). 9.5
9.0 +1sd: 9.2%
8.5 Avg: 8.6%
Key Risks: 8.0 ‐1sd: 8.1%
Downturn in Japanese economy. The quantitative easing (QE) 7.5 ‐2sd: 7.6%
0.9 Avg: 0.91x
Company Background ‐1sd: 0.84x
0.8
Croesus Retail Trust is a business trust that focuses on income- ‐2sd: 0.76x
generating retail assets in Japan. Its portfolio comprises seven 0.7
assets which are close to fully occupied and backed by a long 0.6
Jun-14 Dec-14 Jun-15 Dec-15 Jun-16 Dec-16
lease expiry profile.
Page 189
Company Guide
Croesus Retail Trust
0.92
S$
12- mt h
Dat e of Closing
S.No. T arget Rat ing
Report Pric e
Pric e
0.87 4 1: 11 Feb 16 0.79 0.86 HOLD
6 2: 16 May 16 0.82 0.90 BUY
5
3: 13 J un 16 0.81 0.90 BUY
2
4: 29 Aug 16 0.86 0.99 BUY
0.82
5: 08 Nov 16 0.87 0.99 BUY
6: 11 Nov 16 0.85 0.99 BUY
3
1
0.77
0.72
Jan-16 May-16 Sep-16 Jan-17
Not e : Share price and Target price are adjusted for corporate actions.
218
room supply not easing until 2018, corporate demand still soft
1.2
1.1
198
178
and FEHT’s new hotel in Sentosa only completing in 2018, we
1.0
0.9
158 expect FEHT’s DPU performance to remain muted over the
coming year.
138
0.8 118
0.7 98
0.6 78
0.5
Jan-13 Jan-14 Jan-15 Jan-16
58
Jan-17 Strong balance sheet. Even though we are cautious on FEHT’s
Far East Hospitality Trust (LHS) Relative STI (RHS) near-term earnings, there is significant upside to our forecast if
FEHT deploys its strong balance sheet well. FEHT’s gearing as at
end-September 2016 stood at approximately 32% and its
sponsor provides a clear and visible ROFR pipeline of seven
Forecasts and Valuation properties.
FY Dec (S$m) 2015A 2016F 2017F 2018F
Gross Revenue 115 111 109 114 Valuation:
Net Property Inc 104 100 97.9 103
Total Return 33.2 65.5 62.8 68.2 We maintain our DCF-based TP of S$0.62 which has
Distribution Inc 82.2 76.6 73.8 79.5 incorporated the delayed expectations of the recovery of the
EPU (S cts) 4.20 3.65 3.48 3.75 Singapore office market from 2017 to 2018.
EPU Gth (%) (5) (13) (5) 8
DPU (S cts) 4.60 4.26 3.95 4.23
DPU Gth (%) (11) (7) (7) 7 Key Risks to Our View:
NAV per shr (S cts) 93.9 93.7 93.1 92.6 Rebound in demand and acquisitions. Our cautious stance on
PE (X) 14.2 16.3 17.1 15.9 FEHT is premised on a supply imbalance in the Singapore
Distribution Yield (%) 7.7 7.2 6.6 7.1
P/NAV (x) 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
hospitality market. However, a significant rebound in demand,
Aggregate Leverage (%) 32.4 32.8 33.3 33.3 absorbing the new room supply, and FEHT utilising its strong
ROAE (%) 4.4 3.9 3.7 4.0 balance sheet, would lead to upside risks to our DPU estimates
and TP.
DPU Chng (%): - 0 -
Consensus DPU (S cts): 4.2 4.2 4.4 At A Glance
Other Broker Recs: B: 1 S: 2 H: 5 Issued Capital (m shrs) 1,801
Mkt. Cap (S$m/US$m) 1,072 / 750
Source of all data on this page: Company, DBS Bank, Bloomberg Major Shareholders (%)
Finance L.P.
Golden Development Pte Ltd 20.4
Golden Landmark Pte Ltd 10.7
Far East Organization 10.1
Free Float (%) 44.3
3m Avg. Daily Val (US$m) 0.53
ICB Industry : Real Estate / Real Estate Investment Trusts
increase in hotel room supply this year but at the same time, 60 89.4%
40
only a modest recovery in total visitors days and weak corporate 20
87.4%
2Q2014
3Q2014
4Q2014
1Q2015
2Q2015
3Q2015
4Q2015
1Q2016
2Q2016
3Q2016
help maintain FEHT’s relevance in the market place as well as
boost occupancy and ADR over the medium term. The following Net Property Income Net Property Income Margin %
are the AEIs that FEHT has completed across its portfolio: (1)
extension of outdoor refreshment area at Village Residence Distribution Paid / Net Operating CF
Robertson Quay, (2) soft refurbishment of club & suite rooms (x)
1.0
and meeting areas at Village Hotel Changi, (iii) reconfiguration
0.9
of the serviced office space to create nine additional units as
0.8
well as the upgrade of the main lobby, breakfast lounge and
0.7
pantry at Central Square (Village Residence Clarke Quay), (iv)
0.6
refurbishment of 2- and 3-bedroom units at Regency House,
0.5
and (v) upgrading of the swimming pool, function rooms, lobby
area and lobby bar. 0.4
0.3
2014A 2015A 2016F 2017F 2018F
Medium-term outlook remains bright. Despite the short-term
headwinds, the medium-term outlook for FEHT remains bright.
With no new hotel land sites being released by the Singapore Interest Cover (x)
(x)
government over the last two years, supply could be 6.00
constrained from 2018 onwards. In addition, FEHT should
5.00
benefit from the opening of the 850-room Sentosa hotel
development in 2018. 4.00
3.00
Page 194
Company Guide
Far East Hospitality Trust
FEHT’s borrowings are under fixed rates, reducing its exposure 15.0%
to volatility in interest rates.
10.0%
2014A 2015A 2016F 2017F 2018F
fall in RevPAR and DPU. While tourist arrivals are recovering, 4.0%
3.5%
new hotel supply should continue to outpace demand. Thus, we
3.0%
believe there are limited re-rating catalysts for the stock in the 2.5%
near term. 2.0%
1.5%
Interest rate risk. Any increase in interest rates will result in 0.5%
higher interest payments that the REIT has to make annually to 0.0%
2014A 2015A 2016F 2017F 2018F
service its loans. This reduces the income available for
distribution, which will result in lower distribution per unit
(DPU) for unitholders. Distribution Yield (%)
(%)
9.9
+2sd: 9%
Competitive landscape. The Singapore hospitality market has 8.9
comprising Far East H-REIT and Far East H-Business Trust. Far
East H-REIT is a Singapore-based real estate investment trust, PB Band (x)
which invests in hospitality assets including both hotels and 1.4
(x)
serviced residences. 1.3
1.2
1.1 +2sd: 1.12x
1.0
+1sd: 0.97x
0.9
0.8 Avg: 0.82x
0.7
-1sd: 0.67x
0.6
0.5 -2sd: 0.53x
0.4
Jan-13 Jan-14 Jan-15 Jan-16
Page 195
Company Guide
Far East Hospitality Trust
0.70 S$
12- mt h
Dat e of Closing
S.No. T arget Rat ing
0.68 Report Pric e
Pric e
2 1: 21 J an 16 0.64 0.63 HOLD
0.66 3 2: 13 Apr 16 0.66 0.63 HOLD
1 3: 27 Apr 16 0.67 0.63 HOLD
0.64 4
4: 01 Aug 16 0.63 0.65 HOLD
0.62 5: 05 Sep 16 0.61 0.65 HOLD
6 6: 11 Nov 16 0.60 0.62 HOLD
0.60
5
0.58
0.56
0.54
Jan-16 May-16 Sep-16 Jan-17
Not e : Share price and Target price are adjusted for corporate actions.
2.3
201
believe strong rental reversion at Causeway Point will support
earnings and cushion any pressures from any decline in
181
2.1 161
1.9
141
121
occupancy rates.
1.7
101
3Q2014
4Q2014
1Q2015
2Q2015
3Q2015
4Q2015
1Q2016
2Q2016
3Q2016
4Q2016
asset with the extension wing currently being built by the
Sponsor. With an enlarged footprint, we see Northpoint as a Net Property Income Net Property Income Margin %
key driver in accelerating growth in the medium term. We are
positive on the AEI given that (i) the northern region has the Distribution Paid / Net Operating CF
lowest retail space density in Singapore; (ii) the fast population (x)
the medium term; and (iii) relatively low occupancy costs in the 0.9
15-17% range. FCT is in a strong negotiating position with 0.8
tenants who want a presence in the north where the group has 0.7
close to 75% market share of retail malls (For detailed analysis
0.6
on Northpoint’s AEI, please refer to the Company Focus Report:
0.5
Igniting the northern start, published on 7 Mar 2016).
0.4
2014A 2015A 2016A 2017F 2018F
Acquisition growth potential from Sponsor’s pipeline. FCT is
able to purchase retail assets from its Sponsor, Frasers
Centrepoint Limited (FCL). We believe a potential target is Interest Cover (x)
(x)
Waterway Point, in which the Sponsor has a 33% stake, which 6.80
was completed in Jan 2016 and well received by shoppers and 6.60
Page 200
Company Guide
Frasers Centrepoint Trust
20.0%
Increased floating rates exposure. Percentage of borrowings on
fixed rates has been reduced to 59% from 74% in 3QFY16. 15.0%
This enables the REIT to benefit from lower cost of debt due to
10.0%
lower expectations of rate hikes for now. Its average cost of 2014A 2015A 2016A 2017F 2018F
ROE (%)
Share Price Drivers: 6.0%
Keep an eye on the risk-free rate. As a yield play, FCT’s share 5.0%
price is sensitive to fluctuations in the risk-free rate. Anticipated
hikes in the US Fed Funds rate have a negative impact on the 4.0%
1.0%
Key Risks:
Near-term fall in NPI margin. As Northpoint’s average 0.0%
2014A 2015A 2016A 2017F 2018F
occupancy drops to 76% during its AEI period (Mar 2016-Sep
2017), some narrowing in the portfolio NPI margin is expected.
While we have priced in a temporary decline in occupancy at Distribution Yield (%)
(%)
Northpoint and generally weaker occupancy rates at other
malls in the next 2 years, any unexpected sharp decline in
7.0
+2sd: 6.6%
occupancy and/or rents may drag down NPI margin and the 6.5
+1sd: 6.2%
share price. 6.0
Avg: 5.8%
5.5
-1sd: 5.4%
Interest rate risks. If expectations of rate hikes increase, the 5.0 -2sd: 5%
41% exposure to floating interest rates will amplify the 4.5
increase in the REIT’s cost of debt, putting pressure on
4.0
valuation. 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
PB Band (x)
Company Background 1.6
(x)
Frasers Centrepoint Trust (FCT) is a retail real estate investment 1.5
areas in Singapore. Its two largest assets are Causeway Point 1.3
+2sd: 1.24x
and Northpoint. 1.2
+1sd: 1.15x
1.1
Avg: 1.06x
1.0
-1sd: 0.98x
0.9 -2sd: 0.89x
0.8
0.7
Jan-13 Jan-14 Jan-15 Jan-16 Jan-17
Page 201
Company Guide
Frasers Centrepoint Trust
2.33
S$
12- mt h
Dat e of Closing
S.No. T arget Rat ing
2.23 Report Pric e
Pric e
6 1: 08 J an 16 1.83 2.04 BUY
2.13 7 8 2: 04 F eb 16 1.90 2.04 BUY
3: 07 Mar 16 1.93 2.11 BUY
4 4: 05 Apr 16 2.01 2.11 BUY
2.03
5: 25 Apr 16 2.00 2.10 BUY
9 6: 16 J ul 16 2.12 2.29 BUY
5
1.93 2 7: 18 J ul 16 2.17 2.29 BUY
3 8: 24 Oct 16 2.10 2.29 BUY
9: 07 Nov 16 2.03 2.29 BUY
1.83
1
1.73
Jan-16 May-16 Sep-16 Jan-17
Not e : Share price and Target price are adjusted for corporate actions.
1.1
207
187
Maiden distribution exceeds forecasts. FLT’s maiden distribution
(DPU ) of 1.84 Scts exceeds IPO forecasts by close to 2.8%. This
1.0
167
1.0
147
0.9
127 was mainly due to lower-than-projected interest costs at 2.8%
0.9
0.8 87
Jun-16 Sep-16 Dec-16
concentrated within major industrial markets in Australia, 2016A 2017F 2018F 2019F
including Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane. Apart from a Net Property Income Net Property Income Margin %
3Q2014
4Q2014
1Q2015
2Q2015
3Q2015
4Q2015
1Q2016
2Q2016
3Q2016
4Q2016
Net Property Income Net Property Income Margin %
In addition, FLT’s organic growth is underpinned by in-built
rental escalations. All of the leases of the initial portfolio have
Distribution Paid / Net Operating CF
fixed and/or Consumer Price Index-linked (CPI-linked) (x)
1.1
increments. The fixed rental increments, which are built into the
1.0
existing leases, range from 2.5-3.75% which translates to an 0.9
average annual rental increment of c.3.2% for the Initial 0.8
Portfolio. 0.7
0.6
Predominantly freehold and long leasehold land tenure is a 0.5
6.40
Frasers Property Australia Pty Limited (FPA) offers FLT access to a 5.80
The Sponsor has granted FLT a right of first refusal (ROFR) over
any of the completed income-producing industrial properties it
intends to divest. This currently comprises eleven existing
properties in Australia.
Page 206
Company Guide
Frasers Logistics & Industrial Trust
10.0%
Healthy financial metrics. The REIT has minimal debt expiries till 2016A 2017F 2018F 2019F
6.0%
5.0%
Share Price Drivers: 4.0%
Executing on acquisitions. FLT is looking to complete the
3.0%
planned acquisition of Martin Brower property in the coming
2.0%
quarter which will bring gearing up to the c.30-31% level.
Despite this, we believe that the portfolio remains under-geared 1.0%
portfolio is 100% concentrated in Australia. However, this risk 17.3 +1sd: 17.5x
23-Jul-
2016
2016
2016
Sep-
Jun-
Oct-
21-
25-
27-
24-
2016
Page 207
Company Guide
Frasers Logistics & Industrial Trust
S$
1.05
Closing T arget
S.No. Dat e Rat ing
Pric e Price
1.00
1 29 J ul 16 0.99 1.10 BUY
0.95
0.90
0.85
0.80
Jun-16 Jul-16 Aug-16 Sep-16 Oct-16
Not e: Share price and Target price are adjusted for corporate actions.
Earnings Drivers:
Stable cash flow profile with inflation protection. IREIT’s
portfolio of five properties has a WALE by gross rental income
of 6.2 years (as at end-September 2016), which provides
investors with significant cashflow visibility. The portfolio is also
resilient as the majority of leases contain rent adjustment
clauses which are subject to indexation to the German CPI.
Rents are adjusted by a rise or a percentage of the change in
CPI, upon the CPI crossing a prescribed hurdle rate or a
prescribed percentage hurdle. Another attractive feature of Net Property Income and Margins (%)
IREIT’s portfolio is that the properties are leased to blue chip
tenants such as Allianz, Deutsche Telekom, Deutsche
Rentenversicherung Bund and ST Microelectronics which
mitigate payment/credit risks for the REIT.
Page 212
Company Guide
IREIT Global
Company Background
IREIT is a Singapore REIT established with the investment
strategy of principally investing, directly or indirectly, in a
portfolio of income-producing real estate in Europe which is Source: Company, DBS Bank
used primarily for office purposes.
Page 213
Company Guide
IREIT Global
Earnings Drivers:
Tapping on global data storage and usage growth. As an owner
of data centres in key data gateways and financial centres
across Asia Pacific and Europe, KDC REIT is poised to ride the
wave of rising global data usage and demand for data centres.
The Trust offers investors a stable and visible earnings growth
profile, with 30% of NPI derived from long-dated master leases
with embedded rental step-ups of 2-4% p.a. With 61% of
leases by rental income due for renewal between 2015 and Net Property Income and Margins (%)
2017, earnings will be further driven by positive rental
reversions and higher occupancies at its co-location data centres
in Singapore (T25, S25), Australia (part of Gore Hill), and Ireland
(Citadel 100). As it stands, the Trust has a WALE of 2.6 years for
co-location properties, 9.9 years for fully fitted properties, and
16 years for shell & core properties.
Occupancy saw marginal improvement to 92.7% from 92.3%, Interest Cover (x)
mainly due to the take-up of half of the lease renewal (6,800
sqft in total or 6.2% of the property NLA) at Keppel DC
Singapore 1 (aka S25) that was previously committed and
announced. The remaining half is intended to be taken up in
2H17. WALE remains healthy at 8.6 years.
Expansion to Italy and the UK: The REIT had recently announced
acquisitions in two new markets, a shell and core building of a
data centre in Milan, Italy, and another one in Cardiff, UK. Both
backed by long master leases with embedded rental escalations,
the former has been fully leased to one of the world’s largest
Source: Company, DBS Bank
telecommunications companies for 12 years, whereas the latter
has been fully leased to one of the largest global cloud service
providers for 15 years.
Page 218
Company Guide
Keppel DC REIT
Key Risks:
Higher maintenance capex relative to other asset classes. Due Distribution Yield (%)
to the shorter lifespan of a datacentre’s infrastructure, it is
possible that the REIT may have to rely on borrowings to fund
maintenance capex at certain properties, which could impact
gearing.
Company Background
Keppel DC REIT (KDC REIT) is a Singapore-based real estate
investment trust (REIT), established with the principal
investment strategy of investing, directly or indirectly, in a
portfolio of income-producing real estate assets which are
used primarily for data centre purposes, with an initial focus on
Asia Pacific and Europe.
Page 219
Company Guide
Keppel DC REIT
0.8 70
Jan-13 Jan-14 Jan-15 Jan-16 Jan-17
FY17 and FY18 leases are in the low S$9’s which means if 32
78%
2Q2014
3Q2014
4Q2014
1Q2015
2Q2015
3Q2015
4Q2015
1Q2016
2Q2016
3Q2016
around S$9 per sqft, risk of negative rental reversions will be
minimised. Net Property Income Net Property Income Margin %
Long WALE offers income visibility. K-REIT has a long weighted Distribution Paid / Net Operating CF
average lease expiry (WALE) of c.6 years, with c.95% of leases (x)
5.1
due only from FY18F and beyond. Despite the increase in grade 4.6
A office supply in Singapore in 2016-2017, the Manager 4.1
3.00
Page 224
Company Guide
Keppel REIT
trade at 0.8x P/BV, and evidence that physical office asset values 2.5%
are unlikely to correct further near term based on recent market 2.0%
0.5%
the fact that c.74% of the KREIT’s debt is on fixed rates. 5.3 -2sd: 5.3%
4.8
4.3
Currency risk. As KREIT earns rental income from its Australian 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
1.2
Page 225
Company Guide
Keppel REIT
S$
1.16 12- mt h
Dat e of Closing
5 S.No. T arget Rat ing
Report Pric e
6 7 Pric e
1.11 2 8
4 1: 15 Apr 16 1.01 1.11 BUY
2: 20 J ul 16 1.08 1.26 BUY
1.06
3 3: 22 J ul 16 1.07 1.26 BUY
1.01 4: 29 Aug 16 1.07 1.26 BUY
5: 05 Sep 16 1.12 1.26 BUY
1 6: 26 Sep 16 1.10 1.26 BUY
0.96
7: 19 Oct 16 1.10 1.23 BUY
0.91 8: 08 Nov 16 1.09 1.23 BUY
0.86
0.81
Jan-16 May-16 Sep-16 Jan-17
Not e : Share price and Target price are adjusted for corporate actions.
Price Relative Increased confidence on the REIT’s ability to deliver. Our recent
visit to properties in the US and meetings with various property
brokers as well as MUST’s strong maiden results indicate that
market fundamentals remain firm. We believe that MUST's
properties in Midtown Atlanta and Downtown Los Angeles
submarkets will continue to see steadily increasing rents,
continued expansionary tenant demand, increased employment
opportunities and also a lack of competitive new supply. Apart
from upside when leases come due, 84.2% of leases (by NLA)
Forecasts and Valuation have annual rental escalations of around 3%, and 15.0% have
FY Dec (US$m) 2015P* 2016F* 2017F 2018F provisions for mid-term or period rent increases.
Gross Revenue 71.0 78.7 79.3 80.7
Net Property Inc 44.2 48.7 48.6 49.5 Acquisitions to be the next driver of growth. The manager has
Total Return 26.0 27.2 30.8 33.9 been disciplined towards acquisitions and with the recent
Distribution Inc 34.3 35.4 38.4 38.8 decline in gearing to 34.6%, MUST is well placed to execute on
EPU (US cts.) 4.15 4.32 4.84 5.29 DPU-accretive acquisitions. Apart from that, we expect any
EPU Gth (%) nm 4 12 9 acquisition to diversify the REIT’s geographic earnings base and
DPU (US cts.) 5.48 5.61 6.05 6.06 tenant concentration. Markets that are of interest are core
DPU Gth (%) nm 2 8 0 submarkets that enjoy demand from a diversified type of
NAV per shr (US cts.) 78.4 82.0 80.8 80.2
industries (i.e. manufacturing, financial, technology and law
PE (X) 20.1 19.3 17.2 15.8
firms) which imply stability across market cycles. We have not
Distribution Yield (%) 6.6 6.7 7.2 7.3
P/NAV (x) 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 priced in acquisitions in our forecasts.
Aggregate Leverage (%) 36.6 36.2 37.1 37.6
ROAE (%) 10.6 5.4 6.0 6.6 Valuation:
TP is maintained at US$0.93 based on DCF. The stock offers
attractive FY16-17F yields of 6.8-7.3%.
Distn. Inc Chng (%): - - -
Other Broker Recs: B: 4 S: 0 H: 0 Key Risks to Our View:
Lower-than-expected rental income. The key risk to our view is
* FY15 numbers are on a proforma basis while FY16 are on an
lower-than-expected rental income, arising from the non-
annualised basis
replacement/renewal of leases and/or slower-than-expected
Source of all data on this page: Company, DBS Bank, Bloomberg recovery of office rents in the US.
Finance L.P.
At A Glance
Issued Capital (m shrs) 628
Mkt. Cap (US$m) 524
Major Shareholders (%)
Manulife International 7.5
Free Float (%) 92.5
3m Avg. Daily Val (US$m) 0.98
ICB Industry : Financials / Real Estate Investment Trusts
Earnings Drivers:
Exposure to the recovery of US real estate market. According to
Colliers International (Colliers), the office market outlook for
Downtown Los Angeles, Orange County and Atlanta are
attractive given (i) rising demand due to projected falling
unemployment rates on the back of a pick-up in business
activities, and (ii) a deep pool of local talents and skilled workers
which attract companies to set up and maintain their presence
there. Net Property Income and Margins (%)
Page 230
Company Guide
Manulife US Real Estate Inv
Key Risks:
Risk of non-renewal and non-replacement of leases. MUST’s
financials, results of operations, and capital growth may be
adversely affected by bankruptcy, insolvency or downturn in Distribution Yield (%)
(%)
the businesses of one or more of the tenants, as well as the 7.2
7.1
decision by one or more of these tenants not to renew their 7.0 +2sd: 7%
lease/s at the end of a lease cycle. 6.9
+1sd: 6.9%
6.8
Avg: 6.7%
Foreign currency risks. All of the REIT’s assets are located in the
6.7
6.6
US and generate revenues in USD. Thus, investors who elect to 6.5
-1sd: 6.6%
receive distributions in SGD have exposure to volatility in the 6.4 -2sd: 6.4%
6.2
receive distributions in USD. May-16 Jun-16 Jul-16 Aug-16 Sep-16 Oct-16
Regulatory risks. MUST's tax efficiency relies in part on its PB Band (x)
Parent US REIT and Sub-US REITs being able to maintain their (x)
status as US REITs as well as qualifying for US portfolio interest 1.10
interest. Should there be any changes in tax or REIT 1.05 +1sd: 1.05x
Avg: 1.03x
regulations in either the US or Singapore which affects the
1.00 -1sd: 1.01x
current REIT structure or ability to repatriate cash in a tax- -2sd: 0.98x
efficient manner, distributions paid to MUST’s unitholders may 0.95
be adversely impacted.
0.90
May-16 Jun-16 Jul-16 Aug-16 Sep-16 Oct-16
Company Background
Manulife US REIT (MUST) is the first pure-play US office REIT
listed in Asia. Its portfolio consists of three freehold, Class A or Source: Company, DBS Bank
Trophy quality office properties in Atlanta, Los Angeles, and
Orange County with aggregate net lettable area (NLA) of
c.1.8m sqft.
Page 231
Company Guide
Manulife US Real Estate Inv
Earnings Drivers:
VivoCity a preferred destination mall in Singapore. MCT
achieved a credible 12.3% in retail rental reversions in FY16
(from 142 leases) on the back of a retention rate of 87.9%
despite the current tough operating climate. The success
continues to 1H17 where 114 leases were renewed with a
reversion rate of 13.8%. Occupancy cost for the mall was stable
at 19%, in line with its peers. While the performance growth of
the mall will gradually slowdown as it enters into a more Net Property Income and Margins (%)
matured stage, VivoCity will prove its resilience to the retail
headwinds as one of the most popular retail destinations in
Singapore.
Page 236
Company Guide
Mapletree Commercial Trust
Key Risks:
Sustained drop in CBD office rents could impact office
earnings in the medium term. Although the REIT’s office
portfolio is largely located outside the CBD and therefore less
exposed to the large office supply completing from 2016
onwards, any prolonged decline in CBD rents would have a
negative spillover effect to the city fringe, as narrowing rental
differentials could entice tenants to relocate to the CBD
instead.
PB Band (x)
Company Background
Mapletree Commercial Trust (MCT) is a real estate investment trust that
invests in income-producing office and retail properties in Singapore.
The majority of its earnings are derived from VivoCity, the largest retail
mall in Singapore, and the recent acquisition of Mapletree Business City
– Phase 1.
Page 237
Company Guide
Mapletree Commercial Trust
Page 238
Company Guide
Mapletree Commercial Trust
Page 239
Company Guide
Mapletree Commercial Trust
Price Relative
Festival Walk’s defensive positioning. The strong market positioning
S$ Relative Index
of Festival Walk makes it well placed to weather the headwinds in
1.3 220
the HK retail market. Located in Kowloon Tong’s mid to upper
residential area and next to City University of Hong Kong, it serves
1.2 200
180
1.1
1.0
160
140
the needs of the local community rather than mainland Chinese
0.9
120 tourists which have been the main reason for the fall in HK retail
sales. In addition, due to the mall’s strong track record, we
0.8 100
0.7 80
Mar-13 Mar-14 Mar-15 Mar-16
Mapletree Greater China Commercial Trust (LHS)
understand there remains a queue of potential tenants eager to be
Relative STI (RHS)
located within the mall. Combined with occupancy costs of c.19%
which is in the middle of the 16-22% range for other malls in HK,
this bodes well for rents going forward. This is evidenced by rental
reversions of 15% in 1H17.
Forecasts and Valuation
FY Mar (S$m) 2015A 2016A 2017F 2018F
Full contribution from Sandhill Plaza yet to be realised. With the
Gross Revenue 281 337 351 365 S$412m acquisition of Sandhill Plaza in Shanghai only completed in
Net Property Inc 229 277 283 295
June 2015, MAGIC’s earnings should receive a boost over the
Total Return 319 415 152 155
Distribution Inc 178 200 200 205 coming year, which should help mitigate any potential slowdown in
EPU (S cts) 4.55 6.40 5.46 5.54 HK, negative drag from higher property taxes in Beijing, and a
EPU Gth (%) 4 41 (15) 1 strengthening SGD.
DPU (S cts) 6.54 7.25 7.17 7.27
DPU Gth (%) 4 11 (1) 1 Valuation:
NAV per shr (S cts) 120 124 123 121 We maintain our DCF-based TP of S$1.11 which has incorporated
PE (X) 20.8 14.8 17.3 17.1 lower occupancy and higher taxes at Gateway Plaza partially offset
Distribution Yield (%) 6.9 7.7 7.6 7.7 by higher occupancies at Sandhill Plaza.
P/NAV (x) 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
Aggregate Leverage (%) 36.2 39.4 39.3 39.3 Key Risks to Our View:
ROAE (%) 4.0 5.3 4.4 4.5 The key risk to our view is a significant downturn in the HK and
Chinese economies, causing a decline in rents at Festival Walk,
Gateway Plaza and Sandhill Plaza.
Distn. Inc Chng (%): 0 0
Consensus DPU (S cts): 7.20 7.30
At A Glance
Other Broker Recs: B: 7 S: 0 H: 2
Issued Capital (m shrs) 2,787
Source of all data on this page: Company, DBS Bank, Bloomberg Finance Mkt. Cap (S$m/US$m) 2,633 / 1,816
L.P. Major Shareholders (%)
Mapletree Investment Pte Ltd 30.6
Norges Bank 7.7
AIA Co Ltd 6.0
Free Float (%) 55.7
3m Avg. Daily Val (US$m) 3.9
ICB Industry : Real Estate / Real Estate Investment Trusts
250 88.6%
Earnings Drivers: 86.6%
200
Festival Walk still the star. Investors have raised concerns over 84.6%
150
the slowing retail market in Hong Kong impacting MAGIC’s 82.6%
University of Hong Kong, and high transit crowd as the mall is 70 83%
82%
located next to Kowloon Tong Station which is an interchange 65 82%
between Kwun Tong Line (which serves Kowloon East) and East 81%
60
Rail Line (which connects to the Shenzhen border) and, (2) the 81%
80%
mall’s strong track record and resiliency. During the SARS 55
80%
epidemic and GFC, tenant sales were flattish. 50 79%
1Q2015
2Q2015
3Q2015
4Q2015
1Q2016
2Q2016
3Q2016
4Q2016
1Q2017
2Q2017
Full-year contribution from Sandhill Plaza. This year, MAGIC’s Net Property Income Net Property Income Margin %
earnings should receive a boost from the full year contribution
of the Sandhill Plaza acquisition which was only completed in Distribution Paid / Net Operating CF
June 2015. MAGIC should also benefit from positive rental (x)
1.0
reversions as passing rents are approximately 10% below
0.9
market rates. 0.8
0.7
Past rental reversions still provide support to Gateway Plaza’s 0.6
over the past two years. The benefits from the positive rental 0.4
headwinds in the near term due to increase in supply within the 0.2
2014A 2015A 2016A 2017F 2018F
Beijing office market and recent jump in vacancy. In the
medium/long term, Gateway Plaza should remain well placed
given the recent decision in August 2015 by the Beijing Interest Cover (x)
(x)
Municipal Commission of Development and Reform to ban new 6.00
large-scale public developments including office buildings within
5.00
the East Fifth Ring Road, West Fifth Ring Road, North Fifth Ring
Road and South Fourth Ring Road which covers the central area 4.00
2.00
Acquisition pipeline from sponsor. MAGIC’s sponsor has several
1.00
malls, office buildings and business parks in China and HK
which have yet to be stabilised or are in the process of being 0.00
2014A 2015A 2016A 2017F 2018F
constructed. Subject to the price paid, these properties could
potentially provide MAGIC with a pipeline of DPU-enhancing
Source: Company, DBS Bank
acquisitions.
Page 242
Company Guide
Mapletree Greater China Commercial Trust
15.0%
Moderate exposure to rising interest rates. Currently, 85% of
10.0%
the MAGIC’s borrowings are on fixed rates which partially 2014A 2015A 2016A 2017F 2018F
insulates the REIT against rising interest rates in the near term.
concerned over the outlook for retail rents in Hong Kong and
risk of negative rental reversions at Festival Walk. While 4.0%
lagged basis. MAGIC hedges its income to smooth out the 6.0 Avg: 6.1%
volatility from movements in FX rates.
4.0 -1sd: 4.1%
0.5
Apr-13 Apr-14 Apr-15 Apr-16
Page 243
Company Guide
Mapletree Greater China Commercial Trust
delivered strong returns to shareholders post IPO, driven mainly 100 72.8%
from the marking to market of its leases which were below 50 70.8%
With the softening of market rents due to a slowing economy, Net Property Income and Margins (%)
77%
we are forecasting rental reversions to moderate further and 65 76%
expect the Manager to be increasingly focused on maintaining 63 75%
occupancies, a strategy which we believe will result in the trust 61 74%
delivering steady dividends in an increasingly competitive 59 73%
environment. 57 72%
55 71%
1Q2015
2Q2015
3Q2015
4Q2015
1Q2016
2Q2016
3Q2016
4Q2016
1Q2017
2Q2017
REIT average. With organic growth slowing, the next thrust of
growth will come from the completion of its built-to-suit project Net Property Income Net Property Income Margin %
from HP, which emerges from the redevelopment of the Telok
Blangah cluster (expected TOP for phases 1 and 2 in 2H16 and Distribution Paid / Net Operating CF
1H17 respectively). (x)
1.0
0.9
Contribution from the new HP property will be timely just when 0.8
the REIT is facing rental pressure on its portfolio. The 0.7
restructuring of the rent free is a positive surprise. The 0.6
over the first 18 months will mean a more even distribution in 0.3
topline and costs for the REIT. This implies minimal downside 0.2
2015A 2016A 2017F 2018F 2019F
risk to DPUs in 2017 which has been a concern for investors.
Instead, we now see a steady growth profile of 2.3% over
FY17-FY19 vs industrial average of 1.2%. Interest Cover (x)
(x)
8.60
Development projects in Kallang Basin cluster to optimise 8.50
Page 247
Company Guide
Mapletree Industrial Trust
4.0%
3.0%
7.7
+2sd: 7.6%
Key Risks: 7.2 +1sd: 7.2%
Avg: 6.9%
Rising interest rates. An increase in refinancing rates will 6.7
-1sd: 6.6%
negatively impact distributions. However, MINT has minimised 6.2 -2sd: 6.2%
the impact as c.80% of its interest cost has been fixed. 5.7
5.2
Economic risk. A deterioration of the economic outlook could 2013 2014 2015 2016
1.4
Company Background
+2sd: 1.32x
Mapletree Industrial Trust (MINT) is a real estate investment
1.3
+1sd: 1.26x
trust which invests primarily in income-producing industrial 1.2 Avg: 1.19x
-1sd: 1.13x
assets located in Singapore. Its portfolio includes a diverse mix 1.1
-2sd: 1.06x
of business parks, science parks, ramp-up warehouses and 1.0
Page 248
Company Guide
Mapletree Industrial Trust
1.90
S$
12- mt h
Dat e of Closing
S.No. T arget Rat ing
2 Report Pric e
1.80 4 Pric e
1: 26 Apr 16 1.64 1.64 BUY
3 2: 12 J ul 16 1.79 1.81 HOLD
1.70 3: 27 J ul 16 1.78 1.90 BUY
4: 22 Aug 16 1.77 1.90 BUY
1.60 1
1.50
1.40
Oct-15 Feb-16 Jun-16 Oct-16
Not e : Share price and Target price are adjusted for corporate actions.
1.4 202 then, MLT has deployed close to S$161m and we see more
acquisitions in the pipeline. We believe that opportunities will
1.3 182
1.2 162
1.1
1.0
142
122
come from its Sponsor, and third parties in Australia, Korea, and
0.9
0.8
102
82
China. Acquisitions should more than compensate for
weaknesses in the various markets that MLT operates in.
Jan-13 Jan-14 Jan-15 Jan-16 Jan-17
2Q16 results in line. Top line and net property income are up
4.7% and 5.3% y-o-y to S$91.5m and S$76.8m respectively.
Forecasts and Valuation Higher revenues were mainly driven from acquisitions
FY Mar (S$m) 2016A 2017F 2018F 2019F
(portfolio expanded by six properties to 124 as of 2QFY17).
Gross Revenue 350 360 375 390
Net Property Inc 291 299 316 327 Distributable income is up by 1.0% while DPU is flat mainly
Total Return 190 172 182 187 due to higher interest incurred on the issuance of close to
Distribution Inc 183 179 185 188 S$250m worth of perpetual securities.
EPU (S cts) 7.66 6.91 7.29 7.53
EPU Gth (%) 20 (10) 5 3
DPU (S cts) 7.38 7.19 7.41 7.57 Valuation:
DPU Gth (%) (2) (3) 3 2
NAV per shr (S cts) 102 101 101 101
We upgrade our BUY call and TP at S$1.15 which has imputed
PE (X) 13.3 14.8 14.0 13.5 acquisitions in our forecasts.
Distribution Yield (%) 7.2 7.1 7.3 7.4
P/NAV (x) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 Key Risks to Our View:
Aggregate Leverage (%) 39.5 37.0 37.5 37.5
Acquisitions ramping up faster than expected. A faster-than-
ROAE (%) 7.5 6.8 7.2 7.4
projected acquisition pace or a better-than-expected outlook
for the Singapore warehouse market will translate to positive
Distn. Inc Chng (%): - - - surprises to earnings estimates, and re-rate the stock higher.
Consensus DPU (S cts): 7.30 7.50 7.80
Other Broker Recs: B: 7 S: 0 H: 9
At A Glance
Source of all data on this page: Company, DBS Bank, Bloomberg Issued Capital (m shrs) 2,500
Finance L.P. Mkt. Cap (S$m/US$m) 2,550 / 1,785
Major Shareholders (%)
Temasek Holdings Private Ltd 39.4
from a weakening rental outlook in Singapore and also Korea. 2015A 2016A 2017F 2018F 2019F
However, downside risk is expected to ease given the lower Net Property Income Net Property Income Margin %
1Q2015
2Q2015
3Q2015
4Q2015
1Q2016
2Q2016
3Q2016
4Q2016
1Q2017
2Q2017
(c.S$84.4m), and one each in Vietnam and Malaysia at yields of
Net Property Income Net Property Income Margin %
c.7.1-9.9%. The Manager remains on a lookout for acquisitions,
targeting to deploy capital from its recent perpetual issuance.
Distribution Paid / Net Operating CF
Based on a S$161m worth of deals announced year-to-date, the (x)
1.0
Manager is looking to deploy a further S$90m in opportunities.
0.9
Markets of Australia and from the Sponsor's pipeline remain key
sources of acquisition possibilities. Apart from that, the 0.8
0.4
space. 5.00
4.00
3.00
Development projects to drive value in the medium term. MLT
2.00
has completed the AEI at Mapletree Logistics Hub in Toh Guan 1.00
(GFA expanded by 2.7x to 63,500 sqm). Occupancy is estimated 0.00
to be c.92% as of 2Q16. There is another development project 2015A 2016A 2017F 2018F 2019F
Page 253
Company Guide
Mapletree Logistics Trust
10.0%
Well-staggered debt maturity profile; interest cost remains 2015A 2016A 2017F 2018F 2019F
4.0%
MLT has a long debt-to-maturity (3.76 years as at end-2QFY17)
3.0%
and proactively renews its loans ahead of time.
2.0%
optimistic on the Trust's ability to drive growth through 6.1 -1sd: 6.1%
acquisitions. After its first foray into Australia, we see the Trust 5.6
-2sd: 5.5%
4.6
the medium term. The Manager is also looking to divest low- 2013 2014 2015 2016
+2sd: 1.34x
1.3
Key Risks: +1sd: 1.23x
Rise in interest rates. The Manager has hedged the majority of 1.1 Avg: 1.11x
its debt into fixed rates but is expected to see increased cost of -1sd: 1x
0.9
funds when these loans are rolled over in the coming year. -2sd: 0.88x
0.7
Jan-13 Jan-14 Jan-15 Jan-16
Company Background
Mapletree Logistics Trust (MLT) is a real estate investment trust
which invests in logistics warehouses in the Asia Pacific region. Source: Company, DBS Bank
It currently owns warehouses in Singapore, Japan, China,
South Korea, Vietnam, Australia and Hong Kong.
Page 254
Company Guide
Mapletree Logistics Trust
S$
12- mt h
Dat e of Closing
1.11 S.No. T arget Rat ing
6 Report Pric e
Pric e
1: 08 J an 16 0.99 1.15 BUY
1.06 5 2: 04 F eb 16 0.94 1.15 BUY
3 7 3: 03 May 16 1.05 1.10 HOLD
1.01 4: 31 May 16 0.98 1.10 HOLD
4 5: 27 J ul 16 1.08 1.15 BUY
6: 22 Aug 16 1.08 1.15 BUY
0.96 1 2 7: 26 Oct 16 1.06 1.15 BUY
0.91
0.86
Jan-16 May-16 Sep-16 Jan-17
Not e : Share price and Target price are adjusted for corporate actions.
At A Glance
Distn. Inc Chng (%): 0 0 0 Issued Capital (m shrs) 1,298
Consensus DPU (S cts): 5.1 5.2 5.2 Mkt. Cap (S$m/US$m) 902 / 622
Other Broker Recs: B: 1 S: 0 H: 3 Major Shareholders (%)
Source of all data on this page: Company, DBS Bank, Bloomberg OUE Realty Pte Ltd 65.1
Finance L.P. Tong Gordon 5.9
Free Float (%) 29.0
3m Avg. Daily Val (US$m) 0.07
ICB Industry : Financials / Real Estate Investment Trusts
Earnings Drivers:
Prime office assets in the Central Business District (CBD). OUE
Commercial Trust (OUECT) comprises three Grade A commercial
assets – OUE Bayfront Property and One Raffles Place (ORP) in
downtown Central Business District in Singapore, and Lippo
Plaza Property in Shanghai, China. The REIT’s total asset under
management (AUM) is S$3.4bn, where Singapore contributes
close to c.84% of the value.
Net Property Income and Margins (%)
Better earnings diversity from the acquisition of a quality asset.
The acquisition of ORP (completed in October 2015) was a
significant milestone for OUECT as the acquisition more than
doubled OUECT’s Singapore NLA (to c.1m sqft from c.400k
presently) and portfolio size. From an operational standpoint,
we see increased flexibility for the property manager to cross-
sell and expand its addressable tenant base, as ORP is a
different office product when compared to OUE Bayfront. This
will thus improve its product offerings to existing and
prospective tenants, as well as result in a higher portfolio
retention rate.
Distribution Paid / Net Operating CF
Page 259
Company Guide
OUE Commercial REIT
Key Risks:
Concentration risk. While the acquisition of ORP will diversify
asset-specific risks, OUECT is still heavily exposed to
Singapore’s CBD office market via ORP and OUE Bayfront,
which account for >80% of earnings. Any downturn or
weakness in the Singapore office market could have a
significant negative impact on ORP, and the REIT.
Company Background
OUE Commercial REIT (OUECT) is an office REIT with a
portfolio of office assets located in prime CBD locations in Source: Company, DBS Bank
Singapore and China.
Page 260
Company Guide
OUE Commercial REIT
115
2017. This is underpinned by full year contribution of CPEX,
0.7 95 draw down of S$7.5m income support for CPEX, as well as the
increased contribution from Mandarin Gallery following the
0.6 75
Aug-13 Aug-14 Aug-15 Aug-16
2Q2014
3Q2014
4Q2014
1Q2015
2Q2015
3Q2015
4Q2015
1Q2016
2Q2016
3Q2016
Stability from fixed rentals. Besides having a more diversified
portfolio following the acquisitions of CPCA and CPEX, a Net Property Income Net Property Income Margin %
significant proportion of OUEHT’s earnings is stable and visible.
This arises from minimum S$45m rental from its Sponsor for Distribution Paid / Net Operating CF
Mandarin Orchard, and S$22.5m from Crown Plaza Changi (x)
1.2
Airport. 1.1
1.0
and the retail mall will no longer contend with the loss of 0.3
2014A 2015A 2016F 2017F 2018F
income from the fit out period for Michael Kors and Victoria
Secret.
Interest Cover (x)
(x)
Short-term headwinds at Mandarin Orchard but supply 8.00
constrained in the medium term. OUEHT’s Mandarin Orchard 7.00
(MOS) hotel faces some short-term headwinds due to the 5-6% 6.00
p.a. growth in new hotel rooms in 2016 and 2017 as well as 5.00
not releasing any new hotel sites for development over the last 2.00
two years constraining supply in the medium term, and supply 1.00
Page 265
Company Guide
OUE Hospitality Trust
30.0%
settled around the 37% level.
25.0%
20.0%
Share Price Drivers:
15.0%
Delivery of DPU. OUEHT’s share price corrected over the past
10.0%
year due to the overhang from (1) the potential capital raising 2014A 2015A 2016F 2017F 2018F
to fund the acquisition of CPEX, (2) gearing that was over 40%
and (3) weakness in the overall Singapore hospitality market.
While the Singapore market is likely to remain weak, having ROE (%)
taken the dilution associated with the rights issue and suffered
6.0%
lower occupancies and earnings at Mandarin Gallery to secure
Michael Kors and Victoria Secret as tenants in 2016, OUEHT is 5.0%
over the last two years, this will constrain supply in the medium 9.0
+1sd: 8.3%
term which should increase OUEHT’s scarcity value over time. 7.0
1.2
Competitive landscape. The Singapore hospitality market has
1.1 +2sd: 1.1x
been impacted by a decline in tourist arrivals this year. Any
1.0 +1sd: 1.01x
further deterioration in demand would pose a downside risk to
Avg: 0.93x
our earnings estimates. 0.9
-1sd: 0.84x
0.8
-2sd: 0.76x
Company Background 0.7
Page 266
Company Guide
OUE Hospitality Trust
0.78 S$
12- mt h
Dat e of Closing
0.76 S.No. T arget Rat ing
Report Pric e
Pric e
0.74 1: 06 J an 16 0.71 0.85 BUY
2: 21 J an 16 0.69 0.85 BUY
0.72
3: 09 May 16 0.67 0.75 BUY
0.70 1 2 4 4: 02 Aug 16 0.69 0.75 BUY
6
5: 05 Sep 16 0.68 0.75 BUY
0.68 6: 01 Nov 16 0.69 0.72 BUY
0.66 3
5
0.64
0.62
0.60
Jan-16 May-16 Sep-16 Jan-17
Not e : Share price and Target price are adjusted for corporate actions.
Earnings Drivers:
Page 271
Company Guide
Soilbuild Business Space Reit
Key Risks:
Higher interest rates. Any increase in refinancing rates will
negatively impact distributions. The Manager has put in place
interest rate swaps/MTNs of 1-4 years to essentially convert PB Band (x)
c.98% of its debt into fixed rates.
Company Background
Soilbuild Business Space REIT is a real estate investment trust
that invests in income-producing real estate used primarily for
business space purposes in Singapore. Its flagship asset is
Solaris, located in the one-north business park. The REIT is
backed by Soilbuild Group, a household name in the
construction and real estate business in Singapore.
Page 272
Company Guide
Soilbuild Business Space Reit
Source of all data on this page: Company, DBS Bank, Bloomberg At A Glance
Finance L.P. Issued Capital (m shrs) 2,551
Mkt. Cap (S$m/US$m) 2,436 / 1,692
Major Shareholders (%)
Singapore Press Holdings 68.7
Free Float (%) 31.3
3m Avg. Daily Val (US$m) 0.70
ICB Industry : Real Estate / Real Estate Investment Trusts
Earnings Drivers:
Maximising mall efficiency to generate higher yields. At the
Paragon, the additional 7k sqft of net lettable area (NLA) to be
generated by the chiller decanting project is progressing as
scheduled. Once completed, it is expected to generate
additional revenue of c.S$1m p.a. and ROI of >7%. This project
will be spread over three years from September 2015 to March
2018, in order to coincide with various lease expiries of tenants
in the area. Net Property Income and Margins (%)
Stable earnings profile over FY17 and FY18. SPH REIT secured
overall rental reversions 5.4% for FY16 (5.2% for Paragon;
7.8% for Clementi Mall) while maintaining a track record of
100% occupancy. As at 31 August 2016, the REIT’s portfolio
had a weighted average lease expiry (WALE) of 2.3 years and
2.2 years by NLA and gross rental income respectively. We
expect earnings to be stable over the next two years. The next
largest leasing tranche will be in FY17, when 51.6% of the
mall’s NLA will come up for renewal. Regardless of the results,
earnings next year should be stable due to the income support
Distribution Paid / Net Operating CF
from the Sponsor at Clementi Mall. However, reversion levels
are still crucial as they could set a new base for Clementi Mall
when the income support ends in 2018.
Page 277
Company Guide
SPH REIT
Key Risks:
Interest rate risk. The REIT has muted exposure to changes in
interest rates with no debt maturing until 2018 and 85.9% of
its S$850m debt facility on a fixed rate basis.
Distribution Yield (%)
(%)
Visitor traffic is trending down by 2.5% and 2.4% for FY16 6.3
registered a positive growth of 1.4%, and more traffic could 5.5 Avg: 5.5%
be drawn from the opening of the linkbridge. Decline at 5.3
-1sd: 5.2%
Clementi Mall was most likely from the unproductive traffic as 5.1
a new MRT exit at Clementi station opened early in the year 4.9 -2sd: 4.9%
4.7
provides an alternative route for the train passengers.
4.5
2013 2014 2015 2016
Page 278
Company Guide
SPH REIT
Price Relative Weak retail outlook to cap upside from asset enhancement
initiative. Assuming a typical 3-year lease cycle, tenants at phase
1 and 2 of the Suntec mall will be entering their first
reversionary cycle in 2016 and 2017. We understand that rental
reversion trends have been mixed, given the weak operating
climate. The Manager is looking to tweak the tenant mix going
forward.
Earnings Drivers:
Office portfolio faces some earnings risk. Suntec REIT currently
owns three office assets in Singapore’s CBD – Suntec Office,
One Raffles Quay (ORQ; 33%), and MBFC Towers 1 and 2
(33%). With the expected oversupply of the Singapore office
market upon the completion of several new offices at the end
of 2016 and 2017, Suntec REIT’s properties may face stiffer
competition for its tenants as well as downward pressure on
rents. Partially mitigating this is the significant forward renewals Net Property Income and Margins (%)
already completed at ORQ and MBFC Tower 2 as well as the
strong positioning of Suntec Office which has the advantage of
ample car parking spaces, connectivity to two MRT stations and
a wide choice of amenities given its location next to Suntec City
Mall.
Page 283
Company Guide
Suntec REIT
ROE (%)
Share Price Drivers:
Better-than-expected performance at Suntec City retail. Higher
occupancy rates at Suntec City retail, as well as better-than-
expected rental reversions, would present upside to our
earnings estimates.
Company Background
Suntec REIT has a portfolio of office and retail properties in
Singapore and Australia. Its most prominent asset is Suntec
City, which comprises four office towers, a retail mall, and a
convention centre, located close to the city area of Singapore.
Page 284
Company Guide
Suntec REIT
At A Glance
Distn. Inc Chng (%): 0 0 Issued Capital (m shrs) 2,181
Consensus DPU (S cts): 5.20 5.40 Mkt. Cap (S$m/US$m) 1,647 / 1,135
Other Broker Recs: B: 8 S: 0 H: 3
Major Shareholders (%)
*FY2015A contains six quarters due to rebasing of financial year. YTL Corp Bhd 35.8
AIA Group Ltd 8.0
Source of all data on this page: Company, DBS Bank, Bloomberg
Finance L.P. Free Float (%) 56.2
3m Avg. Daily Val (US$m) 1.3
ICB Industry : Real Estate / Real Estate Investment Trust
Earnings Drivers:
Strong performance from local assets. SGREIT is primarily
exposed to Ngee Ann City and Wisma Atria in Singapore, which
together account for 63% of top line and 68% of asset value.
These assets offer a mix of stability from Toshin’s master lease
at Ngee Ann City and upside potential from Wisma Atria,
whose shorter leases provide exposure to strong retailer
demand for prime Orchard Road space in Singapore.
Weaker reversions for Wisma Atria on the horizon. That said, Net Property Income and Margins (%)
we would not be surprised if reversions in upcoming quarters
turn negative, as a portion of leases expiring in the year ahead
will come from fashion tenants on the first floor, whose
performances have been generally weak. These tenants are
more reticent about committing to space given (a) lacklustre
fashion sales, and (b) uncertainty over the outcome of the newly
renovated Isetan. However, we expect earnings at Wisma to still
see good growth, driven by stronger reversions from tenants on
the basement and second floors (selling watches & jewellery).
Growing presence in Australia. The REIT acquired Myer Centre Distribution Paid / Net Operating CF
Adelaide for A$288m, located in Adelaide’s prime CBD retail
core, in May 2015. With the inclusion of the Myer Centre
acquisition, rental income contribution from Australia doubled
from 10% to 20% in FY16.
Page 289
Company Guide
YTL Starhill Global REIT
Key Risks:
Currency risk. SGREIT’s overseas properties have been affected
by forex volatility and operational headwinds. In Malaysia and
Australia, stable underlying asset performance has been
masked by the depreciation of the MYR and AUD against the
SGD, resulting in currency translation losses and weaker DPU
performance.
Company Background
Starhill Global REIT is a real estate investment trust that invests
in income-producing upscale retail and/or office assets in the Source: Company, DBS Bank
Asia Pacific region. In Singapore, it owns portions of Ngee Ann
City and Wisma Atria. It also owns assets in Malaysia, Australia,
Japan and China.
Page 290
Company Guide
YTL Starhill Global REIT
DBS Bank recommendations are based an Absolute Total Return* Rating system, defined as follows:
STRONG BUY (>20% total return over the next 3 months, with identifiable share price catalysts within this time frame)
BUY (>15% total return over the next 12 months for small caps, >10% for large caps)
HOLD (-10% to +15% total return over the next 12 months for small caps, -10% to +10% for large caps)
FULLY VALUED (negative total return i.e. > -10% over the next 12 months)
SELL (negative total return of > -20% over the next 3 months, with identifiable catalysts within this time frame)
Share price appreciation + dividends
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This report is prepared by DBS Bank Ltd. This report is solely intended for the clients of DBS Bank Ltd, DBS Vickers Securities (Singapore) Pte Ltd, its
respective connected and associated corporations and affiliates only and no part of this document may be (i) copied, photocopied or duplicated in
any form or by any means or (ii) redistributed without the prior written consent of DBS Bank Ltd.
The research set out in this report is based on information obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but we (which collectively refers to DBS
Bank Ltd, its respective connected and associated corporations, affiliates and their respective directors, officers, employees and agents (collectively,
the “DBS Group”)) do not make any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or correctness. Opinions expressed are subject to
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other banking services for these companies.
Any valuations, opinions, estimates, forecasts, ratings or risk assessments herein constitutes a judgment as of the date of this report, and there can
be no assurance that future results or events will be consistent with any such valuations, opinions, estimates, forecasts, ratings or risk assessments.
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This publication has not been reviewed or authorized by any regulatory authority in Singapore, Hong Kong or elsewhere. There is no planned
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The valuations, opinions, estimates, forecasts, ratings or risk assessments described in this report were based upon a number of estimates and
assumptions and are inherently subject to significant uncertainties and contingencies. It can be expected that one or more of the estimates on
which the valuations, opinions, estimates, forecasts, ratings or risk assessments were based will not materialize or will vary significantly from actual
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UPON as a representation and/or warranty by the DBS Group (and/or any persons associated with the aforesaid entities), that:
(a) such valuations, opinions, estimates, forecasts, ratings or risk assessments or their underlying assumptions will be achieved, and
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Please contact the primary analyst for valuation methodologies and assumptions associated with the covered companies or price targets.
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commodity referred to in this report.
DBS Vickers Securities (USA) Inc ("DBSVUSA")"), a U.S.-registered broker-dealer, does not have its own investment banking or research
department, has not participated in any public offering of securities as a manager or co-manager or in any other investment banking transaction
in the past twelve months and does not engage in market-making.
ANALYST CERTIFICATION
The research analyst(s) primarily responsible for the content of this research report, in part or in whole, certifies that the views about the companies
and their securities expressed in this report accurately reflect his/her personal views. The analyst(s) also certifies that no part of his/her
compensation was, is, or will be, directly, or indirectly, related to specific recommendations or views expressed in the report. The DBS Group has
procedures in place to eliminate, avoid and manage any potential conflicts of interests that may arise in connection with the production of research
reports. As of 6 Jan 2017, the analyst(s) and his/her spouse and/or relatives who are financially dependent on the analyst(s), do not hold interests in
the securities recommended in this report (“interest” includes direct or indirect ownership of securities). The research analyst(s) responsible for this
report operates as part of a separate and independent team to the investment banking function of the DBS Group and procedures are in place to
ensure that confidential information held by either the research or investment banking function is handled appropriately.
2. DBS Bank Ltd does not market make in equity securities of the issuer(s) or company(ies) mentioned in this Research Report.
3. DBS Bank Ltd, DBS Vickers Securities (Singapore) Pte Ltd (''DBSVS''), their subsidiaries and/or other affiliates have a net long
position exceeding 0.5% of the total issued share capital in Frasers Commercial Trust, CapitaLand Retail China Trust, Croesus
Retail Trust, Mapletree Greater China Commercial Trust, YTL Starhill Global REIT, Ascendas REIT, Frasers Logistics & Industrial
Trust, Mapletree Logistics Trust, Soilbuild Business Space Reit, Ascott Residence Trust, CDL Hospitality Trusts, Frasers Hospitality
Trust, RHT Health Trust, Keppel DC REIT, Manulife US REIT, CapitaLand recommended in this report as of 30 Nov 2016.
4. DBS Bank Ltd., DBSVS, DBSVUSA, their subsidiaries and/or other affiliates beneficially own a total of 1% of any class of common
equity securities of Frasers Commercial Trust, Croesus Retail Trust, YTL Starhill Global REIT, Frasers Logistics & Industrial Trust,
Soilbuild Business Space Reit, Ascott Residence Trust, CDL Hospitality Trusts, Frasers Hospitality Trust, Keppel DC REIT, Manulife
US REIT as of 30 Nov 2016.
5. DBS Bank Ltd., DBSVS, DBSVUSA, their subsidiaries and/or other affiliates beneficially own a total of 5% of any class of common
equity securities of Croesus Retail Trust as of 30 Nov 2016.
8. DBSVUSA does not have its own investment banking or research department, nor has it participated in any public offering of
securities as a manager or co-manager or in any other investment banking transaction in the past twelve months. Any US persons
wishing to obtain further information, including any clarification on disclosures in this disclaimer, or to effect a transaction in any
security discussed in this document should contact DBSVUSA exclusively.
Directorship/trustee interests
9. Euleen Goh Yiu Kiang, a member of DBS Group Holdings Board of Directors, is a Non-Exec Director of CapitaLand as of 1 Jan
2017.
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