People Vs Rodolfo Manalo (Object Evidence)
sustained gunshot wounds caused by a .45 caliber gun.
G.R. No. 9613-24 March 8, 1993
Facts:
 Two separate complaint for Murder were filed against
Respondent Rodolfo Manalo for the death or Warlito
Bonilla and Carlito Dimampo.
 When the victims Warlito Bonilla and Carlito
Dimampo were parking their motorcycle upon
accompanying Carlos Lacbay to the latter’s home, they
were invited by the accused Manalo for a drink of wine,
which they acceded.
 When the victims were about to enter the house of the
accused, The accused suddenly and without any
warning shot Diomampo on the head and then Bonilla
once the template of the distance was 3 meters from
behind with a .45 caliber pistol.
 Lacbay who was standing a meter behind the accused
was shocked that he was unable to move. The accused
told Lacbay that he shot Diamampo and Bonilla
because the former had impregnated his daughter(Dina
Manalo). Then after the accused asked Lacbay to dig
but the latter refused, from which the accused warned
him not to leave the place for he would look someone
to do the digging but Lacbay left immediately after the
accused had left him.
 The Medico Legal examination conducted by Dr. Perez,
who was the city health officer, after the bodies of the
victims were dugged up from a shallow pit under the
banggerahan of the accused’s house, revealed that both
 The Accused maintains that he was not responsible for
the said act but rather he was a unwilling witness to the
horrible event perpetuated by persons unknown to him.
 RTC finds the Accused Rodolfo Manalo guilty of two
separate counts of murder.
Issue: W/N Accused Rodolfo Manalo should be found guilty of
the crime of two counts of murder despite the absence of
physical evidence that accused fired a gun?
Ruling: Yes
 Even if he subjected himself to paraffin test and the
same yields a negative, it cannot definitely conclude
that he had not fired a gun as it is possible for one to
fire a gun and yet be negative for the presence of
nitrates as when the hands are washed before the test.
The court even considered the possibility that that there
will be no paraffin traces on his hands.
 Lacbay who was the witness of the crime had
emphatically and positively identified the accused as
the gunman from which deserves full merit and weight.
His identification of the accused as the gunman was
positive and unshakeable. He had vividly testified in
court on the time, the place and the manner how the
said killings were perpetrated by the accused.
 There was also an extrajudicial statement made by the
accused wherein he had admitted the killings but sought
 to justify his acts by alleging that one of the victims
tried to abuse his daughter.
 There were also several letters sent by the accused to
Marcelo Bonilla begging to agree to the amount 14,000
as a settlement for the death of the two victims. He even
asked for forgiveness for the offense he had committed
which was an admission that he had committed
something wrong.
 He also sent a letter to the fiscal requesting not to
charge him for murder but only for homicide for he did
not have the intention to kill the victims but was only
prompted to do so due to circumstances beyond his
control
 RTC decision affirmed. Accused is Guilty
People v. Mapan Le (G.R. No. 188976, prom. June 29, 2010)
Facts:
An Information charged accused-appellants as follows:
On or about July 27, 2004, in Pasig City and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, conspiring and
confederating together, and both of them mutually helping and
aiding one another, not being lawfully authorized by law, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver
and give away to PO1 Richard N. Noble, a police poseur-buyer,
one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet, containing two (2)
grams of white crystalline substance, which were found positive
to the test for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug, in violation of the said law.[1] Transportation of
Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a
fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00)
to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon
any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade,
administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute
dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including
any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity
and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions. The essential elements that must be established in
prosecuting a case of illegal sale of shabu are: (1) the identity of
the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor.[13] What is material is proof that the
transaction actually took place, along with the presentation in
court of the illegal substance which constitutes the corpus delicti
of the crime.[14] In the instant case, the aforementioned
elements were established by the prosecution. Le received
Php200 from poseur-buyer PO2 Noble in exchange for a plastic
sachet handed to him by Del Castillo. PO2 Noble wrote his
initials on the seized item. The plastic sachet‘s contents were
then subjected to a laboratory examination and tested positive
for shabu. The alleged inconsistencies cited by the defense do
not materially affect the credibility of the prosecution‘s
witnesses. As the OSG correctly pointed out, the inconsistencies
were too trivial to merit consideration. What is important is that
the elements of the crime were established by both the oral and
object evidence presented in court. During their arraignment,
accused-appellants both gave a negative plea. At the trial, the
prosecution presented the following witnesses: PO2 Richard
Noble (PO2 Noble) and PO1 Melvin Mendoza (PO1 Mendoza).
The defense offered the testimonies of accused-appellants and
Norhaya Mapan Le, Mapan Le‘s daughter.
Issue: WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT?
Ruling:
Accused-appellants are charged with violating Section 5 of RA
9165, which reads: Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation,
Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs
and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. - The
penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from
Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million
pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who,
unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense,
deliver, give away to another, distribute dispatch in transit or
transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of
opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or
shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. The essential
elements that must be established in prosecuting a case of illegal
sale of shabu are: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object of the sale and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of
the thing sold and the payment therefor.[13] What is material is
proof that the transaction actually took place, along with the
presentation in court of the illegal substance which constitutes
the corpus delicti of the crime.[14] In the instant case, the
aforementioned elements were established by the prosecution.
Le received Php200 from poseur-buyer PO2 Noble in exchange
for a plastic sachet handed to him by Del Castillo. PO2 Noble
wrote his initials on the seized item. The plastic sachet‘s
contents were then subjected to a laboratory examination and
tested positive for shabu. The alleged inconsistencies cited by
the defense do not materially affect the credibility of the
prosecution‘s witnesses. As the OSG correctly pointed out, the
inconsistencies were too trivial to merit consideration. What is
important is that the elements of the crime were established by
both the oral and object evidence presented in court.
Presumption of Regularity Likewise undeserving of credence is
the allegation of frame-up. Accused-appellants did not present
any evidence of extortion on the part of the buy-bust team.
Neither were they able to show any effort in correcting a wrong
supposedly committed against them by filing the appropriate
administrative and criminal charges against the police officers
who arrested them. Unless there is clear and convincing
evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired
by any improper motive or were not properly performing their
duty, their testimonies on the buy-bust operation deserve full
faith and credit.[19] We therefore uphold the presumption that
the members of the buy bust team performed their duties in a
regular manner. Their testimonies as prosecution witnesses are
entitled to full faith and credit.

Accused-appellants‘ argument on the failure to present the

marked money in court is not only without merit but baseless.
Two (2) One hundred peso (Php100) bills were presented as
evidence as the buy-bust money used and marked as Exhibits
―E‖ and ―F.‖ Moreover, the presentation of buy-bust money is
not required by law or jurisprudence. Its non-presentation is not
fatal to the case for the prosecution. The marked money used in
the buy-bust operation is not indispensable but merely
corroborative in nature.
People v. Solar
GR 181494
17 March 2009
J. Velasco
FACTS: Accused-appellant and three others were charged with
violation the Dangerous Drugs Act for selling or distributing a
regulated drug. Accused-appellant and her co-accused pleaded
not guilty to the charge. The prosecution presented in evidence
the oral testimonies of William Todavia, PO3 Reynaldo Ramos
of the PNP, and P/Sr. Inspector Lorna Tria, a forensic chemical
officer of the same regional office. The people’s version of the
incident are as follows:
On April 5, 2000, the Regional Special
Operations, based at Camp Vicente Lim in
Calamba, Laguna, received a tip from a deep
penetration agent (DPA) about a group of drug
traffickers led by Isidro Arguson operating in
Cavite. The Team led by SPO2 Pastrana, PO3
Ramos, and PO2 Balosbos arranged a buy-bust
operation to be conducted at Arguson’s rest
house in Barangay Lambingan, Tanza, Cavite.
The police officers acted as poseur-buyers and
were introduced by the DPA to Arguson. At
about 3:00 PM, in McDonald’s Pasay, Arguson
instructed the would-be-buyers to wait for
someone who will come out from the nearby
Estrella St. Later, accused-appellant emerged
from Estrella St. and approached PO3 Ramos to
check if he still had the money. After being
shown the money bundle, Arguson took from Del
Monte a black plastic bag containing shabu
packed in self-sealing transparent bags. He
handed this to the poseur-buyers. The accused-
appellant and her companions were later arrested
and brought to and booked at Camp Vicente Lim.
The black plastic bag containing the six
small self-sealing bags of white crystalline
substance was likewise taken to Camp Vicente
Lim where PO3 Ramos prepared the booking
sheets and arrest reports and the request for a
qualitative analysis of the seized items. Regional
Crime Laboratory Office IV Chief Inspector
(C/I) Mary Jean Geronimo then conducted the
standard physical and chemical examinations on
the specimen referred to her. On April 6, 2000,
C/I Geronimo prepared and completed
Chemistry Report on the crystalline substance.
Per her report, the substance tested positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
RTC rendered judgment acquitting Del Monte and
Requiz but finding accused-appellant guilty. Arguson died
during the course of the trial resulting in the dismissal of his
case.
Before the CA, accused-appellant urged her acquittal
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, particularly
stating that the forensic chemist who actually conducted the
laboratory examination on the specimens allegedly
recovered from the accused was not presented in court and
hence, there was no clear identification of the contents of the
confiscated sachets. The CA rejected and stressed that C/I
Geronimos forensic report carries the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official functions and the entries thereon
are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The CA
added the observation that absent any evidence overturning the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official
functions, the probative value and admissibility of the forensic
report prepared by C/I Geronimo, who had resigned from the
service, must be upheld even if she did not personally testify
in court.
ISSUES: Whether accused is guilty despite insufficiency of
evidence for prosecution
HELD: NOT GUILTY. PO3 Ramos categorically stated that
Del Monte was among the four who emerged with Arguson from
a street. Without hesitation, PO3 Ramos pointed to Del Monte
as the one holding the plastic bag allegedly containing the
prohibited substance until Arguson took it from him and handed
it over to PO2 Balosbalos. There is no suggestion that accused-
appellant, while at the crime scene, ever handled the
merchandise or its container. Yet, the trial court acquitted
Requiz and Del Monte, but convicted accused-appellant, stating:
Clearly, accused Monalyn Cervantes complicity with accused
Isidro Arguson in the sale of shabu has been established by the
testimony of PO3 Ramos.
Before us then is a situation where two persons:
accused-appellant, a laundry woman; and Del Monte, a car
park boy, in the company of the ostensible pusher, Arguson,
during the actual buy bustare being indicted, on the basis alone
of the testimony of a witness, with confederating with each and
several others to sell shabu. The overt acts performed by
accused-appellant, as indicia of conspiracy, consisted of
allegedly verifying whether the poseur-buyer still had the
purchase money, disappearing from the scene and then coming
back with the principal player. On the other hand, Del Monte
came accompanying Arguson carrying the drug-containing
plastic bag no less.
As between the two acts performed, carrying the bag
would relatively have the more serious implication being in
itself a punishable act of possession of regulated drugs. Both
offered the defenses of denial and instigation, each testifying
that they just happened to be near or passing by McDonalds at
about 4:30 in the afternoon of April 4, 2000 when they were
apprehended. But the trial court, in its observation that it could
have been possible that [Del Monte] was merely asked by
Arguson to carry the bag, extended to Del Monte the benefit of
the doubt, a benevolence denied to accused-appellant without so
much of an acceptable explanation.
Furthermore, we refer to the postulate that the
prosecution, having failed to positively and convincingly prove
the identity of the seized regulated substance, is deemed to have
also failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt accused-appellants
guilt. In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drug,
what is crucial is the identity of the buyer and seller, the object
and its consideration, the delivery of the thing sold, and the
payment for it. Implicit in these cases is first and foremost the
identity and existence, coupled with the presentation to the court
of the traded prohibited substance, this object evidence being
an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime of
possession or selling of regulated/prohibited drug.
There can be no such crime when nagging doubts persist
on whether the specimen submitted for examination and
presented in court was what was recovered from, or sold by, the
accused. Essential in appropriate cases is that the identity of the
prohibited drug be established with moral certainty. This means
that on top of the key elements of possession or sale, the fact that
the substance illegally possessed and sold in the first place is the
same substance offered in court as exhibit must likewise be
established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to
sustain a guilty verdict. And as we stressed in Malillin v. People,
the chain of custody requirement performs this function in
that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the
identity of the evidence are removed. So it is that in a slew of
cases the Court has considered the prosecutions failure to
adequately prove that the specimen submitted for laboratory
examination was the same one supposedly seized from the
offending seller or possessor as ground for acquittal.
As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of
custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be
preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. In
context, this would ideally include testimony about every link in
the chain, from the seizure of the prohibited drug up to the time
it is offered into evidence, in such a way that everyone who
touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was
received, where it was and what happened to it while in the
witness possession, the condition in which it was received, and
the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the
chain. An unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable
and essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive
and is not really identifiable,
The same standard obtains in case the evidence is
susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination and even
substitution and exchange. The exhibits level of susceptibility to
fungibility, alteration or tampering without regard to whether the
same is advertent or otherwise not dictates the level of strictness
in the application of the chain of custody rule.
Of the individuals who came into direct contact with or
had physical custody of the seized regulated items, only PO3
Ramos testified for the specific purpose of identifying the
evidence. In the witness box, however, he did not indicate how
he and his companions, right after the buy bust, handled the
seized plastic bag and its contents. He did not name the duty
desk officer at Camp Vicente Lim to whom he specifically
turned over the confiscated bag and sachets at least for
recording. Needless to stress, the unnamed person who delivered
the suspected shabu and the recipient of it at the laboratory were
no-show in court to testify on the circumstances under which
they handled the specimen or whether other persons had access
to the specimen before actual testing. C/I Geronimo, the
analyzing forensic chemist, was not also presented. Then, too,
no one testified on how the specimen was cared after following
the chemical analysis. These questions should be answered
satisfactorily to determine whether the integrity of the evidence
was compromised in any way. Otherwise, the prosecution
cannot maintain that it was able to prove the guilt of appellants
beyond reasonable doubt.
In this case, no physical inventory was made and no
photograph taken nor markings made on the seized articles at the
crime scene. PO3 Ramos admitted as much. Adding a negative
dimension to the prosecution’s case is the non-presentation of
C/I Geronimo and the presentation in her stead of Inspector Tria
to testify on the chemical report C/I Geronimo prepared. While
Inspector Tria can plausibly testify on the fact that C/I Geronimo
prepared the chemical report in the regular course of her duties,
she, Inspector Tria, was incompetent to state that the specimen
her former colleague analyzed was in fact shabu and was the
same specimen delivered to the laboratory for chemical analysis.
C/I Geronimo’s resignation is not a justifying factor for the
prosecution to dispense with her testimony. Accused-appellant
objected to Inspector Tria’s competency to testify on the
Geronimo chemical report. Had there been no objection, Tria’s
testimony would have sufficed.
At any rate, Inspector Tria’s testimony on, and the
presentation of, the chemistry report in question only
established, at best, the existence, due execution, and
authenticity of the results of the chemistry analysis. It does not
prove compliance with the requisite chain of custody over the
confiscated substance from the time of seizure of the evidence.
Unless the state can show by records or testimony that the
integrity of the evidence has not been compromised by
accounting for the continuous whereabouts of the object
evidence at least between the time it came into the possession of
the police officers until it was tested in the laboratory, then the
prosecution cannot maintain that it was able to prove the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In establishing the corpus
delicti, proof beyond reasonable doubt demands that unwavering
exactitude be observed, a demand which may be addressed by
hewing to the chain-of-custody rule.
Evidently, the prosecution has not proved that the
substance seized in front of the McDonalds was the same
substance adduced in evidence as an indispensable element of
corpus delicti of the crime, which failure produces a serious
doubt as to accused-appellants guilt.
20th Century Fox Film v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos.
76649-51, August 19, 1988
I. THE FACTS
Petitioner 20th Century Fox Film Corporation sought the
assistance of the NBI in conducting searches and seizures in
connection with the NBI’s anti-film piracy campaign. Petitioner
alleged that certain videotape outlets in Metro Manila are
engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted
films in violation of PD No. 49 (the old Intellectual Property
Law).
The NBI conducted surveillance and investigation of the
outlets pinpointed by the petitioner and subsequently filed three
(3) applications for search warrants against the video outlets
owned by the private respondents. The lower court issued the
desired search warrants. The NBI, accompanied by the
petitioner's agents, raided the video outlets and seized the items
described in the three warrants.
Private respondents later filed a motion to lift the search
warrants and release the seized properties, which was granted by
the lower court. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
denied by the lower court. The CA affirmed the trial court.
II. THE ISSUE
Did the judge properly lift the search warrants he issued
earlier?
III. THE RULING
[The Court DISMISSED the petition and AFFIRMED
the questioned decision and resolution of the CA.]
YES, the judge properly lifted the search warrants he
issued earlier.
The lower court lifted the three (3) questioned search
warrants in the absence of probable cause that the private
respondents violated P.D. 49. NBI agents who acted as
witnesses during the application for search warrant did not have
personal knowledge of the subject matter of their testimony,
which was the alleged commission of the offense of piracy by
the private respondents. Only the petitioner’s counsel who was
also a witness during the application stated that he had personal
knowledge that the confiscated tapes owned by the private
respondents were pirated tapes taken from master tapes
belonging to the petitioner. The lower court lifted the warrants,
declaring that the testimony of petitioner’s counsel did not have
much credence because the master tapes of the allegedly pirated
tapes were not shown to the court during the application.
The presentation of the master tapes of the
copyrighted films, from which the pirated films were
allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of search
warrants against those who have in their possession the
pirated films. The petitioner's argument to the effect that the
presentation of the master tapes at the time of application
may not be necessary as these would be merely evidentiary
in nature and not determinative of whether or not a probable
cause exists to justify the issuance of the search warrants is
not meritorious. The court cannot presume that duplicate or
copied tapes were necessarily reproduced from master tapes
that it owns.

The essence of a copyright infringement is the

similarity or at least substantial similarity of the purported
pirated works to the copyrighted work. Hence, the applicant
must present to the court the copyrighted films to compare
them with the purchased evidence of the video tapes
allegedly pirated to determine whether the latter is an
unauthorized reproduction of the former. This linkage of the
copyrighted films to the pirated films must be established to
satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Mere allegations
as to the existence of the copyrighted films cannot serve as
basis for the issuance of a search warrant.
G.R. No. 111267. September 20, 1996.
COLUMBIA PICTURES ENTERTAINMENT, INC.,
MGM ENTERTAINMENTS CO., ORION PICTURES
CORPORATION, PARAMOUNT PICTURES CORP.,
UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC., THE WALT
DISNEY COMPANY and WARNER BROTHERS, INC.,
Petitioners, v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
14TH DIVISION and JOSE B. JINGCO of SHOWTIME
ENTERPRISES, INC., Respondents.
Facts:
 Alfredo G. Ramos, intelligence officer of the Videogram
Regulatory Board (VRB), received information that
private respondent Jose B. Jinco had in his possession
pirated videotapes, posters, advertising materials and
other items used or intended to be used for the purpose
of sale, lease, distribution, circulation or public
exhibition of the said pirated videotapes. Ramos
ascertained the information to be true and filed a verified
Application for Search Warrant.
 A hearing was conducted by Judge Florentino A. Flor of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 168, wherein
Ramos and his two witnesses, Analie Jimenez and
Rebecca Benitez-Cruz testified on the need for the
issuance of search warrant.
 The prayer for the issuance of the search warrant was
granted and, on the same date, Search Warrant No. 23
was issued on July 28, 1986.
 Private respondent filed a Motion to Quash Search
Warrant No. 23 on the grounds that the Search Warrant
did not state a specific offense and that, even assuming
it stated a specific offense, it covered more than one
specific offense.
 TC denied the Motion to Quash finding that the Search
Warrant was issued for one specific offense.
 Private respondent then filed an Urgent Motion To Lift
the Search Warrant and For the Return of the Seized
Articles alleging that Search Warrant No. 23 is a
general warrant, and that it was issued without probable
cause.
 Assailed order was issued by Judge Benjamin V.
Pelayo, now presiding over Branch 168 of the Pasig
RTC, granting the Motion to Quash. The Court justified
the fact that, as the master copies were not presented to
the court in its hearing of July 28, 1986, there was no
probable cause to issue the said warrant, based on the
pronouncements in 20th Century Fox.
 Petitioners appealed to CA, which affirmed the said
Order.
Issue: Is the presentation of the master copies in such cases an
absolute requirement for a search warrant to issue?
Held: No.
 Trial Court: relied on the ruling in 20th Century Fox
Film Corporation v. Court of Appeals, Et. Al where
search warrants were later lifted by the same court on the
 ground of lack of probable cause because the master
tapes of the alleged pirated tapes were never shown to
the lower court. The Court affirmed the lifting of the
search warrants holding that the presentation of the
master tapes was necessary for the validity of the search
warrants against those who have pirated films in their
possession.
 Petitioners: questions the retroactive application of the
20th Century Fox decision which had not yet been
promulgated in 1986 when the search warrant was
issued.
Ratio:
object evidence would result in delay, inconvenience or
expenses out of proportion to its evidentiary value.
The instant case also differs from 20th Century Fox in
that what herein private respondent put in issue was the
application of the ruling in that case, not the conduct of Judge
Flor in the issuance of Search Warrant No. 23.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision and resolution of
respondent Court of Appeals, and necessarily inclusive of the
order of the trial court dated May 22, 1989, are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The order of the trial court dated
July 28, 1986 upholding the validity of Search Warrant No. 23
is hereby REINSTATED.

The Court ruled that it is evidently incorrect to suggest,

as the ruling in 20th Century fox may appear to do, that in
copyright infringement cases, the presentation of master tapes
of the copyrighted films is always necessary to meet the
requirement of probable cause and that, in the absence thereof,
there can be no finding of probable cause for the issuance of a
search warrant.
It is true that such master tapes are object evidence,
with the merit that in this class of evidence the ascertainment
of the controverted fact is made through demonstrations
involving the direct use of the senses of the presiding
magistrate.
The auxiliary procedure, however, does not rule out the
use of testimonial or documentary evidence, depositions,
admissions or other classes of evidence tending to prove the
factum probandum, especially where the production in court of
People v. Choi
G.R. No. 152950 | August 3, 2006
Corona, J.:
Nature:
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA
Facts:
1. Mario P. Nieto, Intelligence Operative of the
Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau,
Department of Finance, applied for a search warrant
against Christopher Choi for violation of Sec. 168,
par. 2 and 3 (a) and (c), in relation to Sec. 169 of
RA 8293 (IPC)
2. After examination of the applicant and his
witnesses, namely, Max Cavalera and David Lee
Sealey, the Judge issued a search warrant
3. Search warrant in part:
a. “… there are good and sufficient reasons to
believe that Christopher Choi of No. 2513
Columbia Street, Carmenville Subd.,
Angeles City has in his possession, control
and custody [r]eams and packs of fake
Marlboro Red Cigarettes, as well as
cardboard cases of fake Marlboro Red
Cigarettes (each cardboard case contains
two (2) [m]aster [c]ases of Marlboro and
each [m]aster case contains fifty (50)
reams) being distributed, kept and sold
thereat in violation of Section 168, par. 2
and 3 (a) and (c) in relation to Section 169
of R.A. 8293…”
4. Search was conducted on the same day of issuance
of the warrant
5. Choi filed a motion to quash search warrant and a
supplemental motion to quash
a. But were denied
6. Choi filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
before the CA
a. Alleged that the judge committed grave
abuse of discretion in refusing the motions
b. Probable cause was not sufficiently
established as the examination conducted
was not probing and exhaustive and the
warrant did not particularly describe the
place to be searched
c. Prayed that Atty. Bennie Nicdao be
prohibited from using as evidence the
articles seized by virtue of the search
warrant
7. CA grants
a. In determining whether there was probable
cause to believe that the cigarettes purchased
by Nieto were fake and in violation of RA
8293, Judge Gatbalite failed to ask searching
and probing questions of witness David Lee
Sealey
b. The judge committed grave abuse of
discretion when the judge relied on the
conclusion of Sealey that the cigarettes he
received from Nieto were fake
Issue:
WON Atty. Benny Nicdao can use evidence articles
seized

Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court grants the petition and
reversed the CA judgment, and declared the Search Warrant
valid.
1. A search warrant can be issued only upon a finding of
probable cause. Probable cause means such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
The determination of the existence of probable cause
requires the following: (1) the judge must examine the
complainant and his witnesses personally; (2) the
examination must be under oath and (3) the
examination must be reduced in writing in the form of
searching questions and answers.
2. The searching questions propounded to the applicant
and the witnesses depend largely on the discretion of
the judge. Although there is no hard and fast rule
governing how a judge should conduct his examination,
it is axiomatic that the examination must be probing
and exhaustive, not merely routinary, general,
peripheral, perfunctory or pro forma. The judge must
not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must
make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of
the application. The questions should not merely be
repetitious of the averments stated in the affidavits or
depositions of the applicant and the witnesses. If the
judge fails to determine probable cause by personally
examining the applicant and his witnesses in the form
of searching questions before issuing a search warrant,
grave abuse of discretion is committed.
3. The determination of probable cause does not call for
the application of rules and standards of proof that a
judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits.
As the term implies, probable cause is concerned with
probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The
standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent
man, not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full
blown trial. No law or rule states that probable cause
requires a specific kind of evidence. No formula or
fixed rule for its determination exists. Probable cause is
determined in the light of conditions obtaining in a
given situation. The entirety of the questions
propounded by the court and the answers thereto must
be considered by the judge.
4. Since probable cause is dependent largely on the
opinion and findings of the judge who conducted the
examination and who had the opportunity to question
the applicant and his witnesses, the findings of the
judge deserve great weight. The reviewing court can
overturn such findings only upon proof that the judge
disregarded the facts before him or ignored the clear
dictates of reason. We thus find no reason to disturb
Judge Gatbalite’s findings.
5. It is obvious that 20th Century Fox Film Corporation
should not be applied to the present case since this
involves the offense of unfair competition and not
copyright infringement. More importantly, as
pronounced by the Court in Columbia Pictures, Inc.,
the judge’s exercise of discretion should not be unduly
restricted by adding a requirement that is not sanctioned
by law.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
JOSE ENCARNACION MALIMIT alias MANOLO,
accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 109775. November 14, 1996
FRANCISCO, J.:
Facts:
On April 15, 1991, around 8:00 in the evening, Batin the
household boy, went to the store of his employer to inform him
that the dinner is ready. Upon entering the store Batin saw the
appellant with a bolo fleeing the store while his employer his
laying in the floor bathing in his own blood.
Rondon on the other hand was on his way to store to buy
fertilizer on his field when he saw the appellant rushing out of
the store with a blood-stained bolo.
Batin immediately went out of the store to seek help. Outside
the store, he met Rondon. Wherein they went to residence of
the victim to inform them of the tragic incident. When they
went back to the store they noticed that the store’s drawer was
opened and the victim’s wallet was stolen from his Pocket.
When the appellant was place under custody, it was discovered
that he possesses the wallet of the victim together with its
content such as Malakis residence certificate, his identification
card and a bunch of keys
As a defense, the appellant argued that such it was a violation
of his constitutional right against self-incrimination hence, the
wallet and its contents were in admissible.
The Trial Court found the appellant guilty hence, the appeal.
Issue:
Whether the wallet and its content were inadmissible as
evidence?
Ruling:
Yes. The wallet and its contents are admissible.
Ratio:
The right against self-incrimination guaranteed under our
fundamental law finds no application in this case. This right, as
put by Mr. Justice Holmes in Holt vs. United States x x x is a
prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to
extort communications from him x x x.
It is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from
the [accused]s own lips, against his will, admission of his guilt.
It does not apply to the instant case where the evidence
sought to be excluded is not an incriminating statement but
an object evidence
Infractions thereof render inadmissible only the extrajudicial
confession or admission made during custodial investigation.
The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are
relevant to the issue and is not otherwise excluded by law
or rules, is not affected even if obtained or taken in the
course of custodial investigation. Concededly, appellant was
not informed of his right to remain silent and to have his own
counsel by the investigating policemen during the custodial
investigation. Neither did he execute a written waiver of these
rights in accordance with the constitutional prescriptions.
Nevertheless, these constitutional short-cuts do not affect the
admissibility of Malakis wallet, identification card, residence
certificate and keys for the purpose of establishing other facts
relevant to the crime. Thus, the wallet is admissible to
establish the fact that it was the very wallet taken from
Malaki on the night of the robbery. The identification card,
residence certificate and keys found inside the wallet, on
the other hand, are admissible to prove that the wallet
really belongs to Malaki.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
LUCIANO JUMAMOY Y AÑORA, alias "JUNIOR",
accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 101584. April 7, 1993.
DAVIDE, JR., J
FACTS:
1. Two (2) separate informations for "Murder" and "Qualified
Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunitions (sic)" were
filed against accused Luciano Jumamoy.
2. Appellant Luciano Jumamoy and the victim Rolando Miel
were once friends and belonged to the same 'barkada' until
sometime in 1970 when the former was stabbed by the latter
on his left forearm.
3. In the evening of April 1, 1987, the victim and his younger
brother Edgar, together with three other companions, went
to the Cultural Center of Inabanga, Bohol, where a 'disco'
dance was being held. Upon reaching the Center, the victim
and his companions joined three other members of their
'barkada' watching the disco outside. All of a sudden
appellant appeared in front obliquely to the right of the
victim and fired three (3) successive shots at the latter.
However, on his way to escape, appellant passed by the
victim's brother Edgardo and a companion. When appellant
got near the two, the former poked his gun at the victim's
brother, and uttered, 'Unsa, laban ka?' ('What now, are you
taking sides?').
4. The trial court disregarded the accused's defense of alibi. The
latter testified that he had left Inabanga, Bohol for Cebu City
on 29 March 1987 to look for employment. He recounts that
he stayed in the house of a friend, Feliciano Cenita, in Pasil,
Cebu City from 1 April to 4 April 1987. In the evening of 4
April 1987, Jumamoy avers that he took a boat, the M/V
Sweet Roro, for Manila.
5. The accused did not, however, present Feliciano Cenita as a
witness despite his (accused's) repeated manifestation of his
intention to do so and the court's liberality in granting his
request for postponement for the said purpose. Instead, "out
of the blue, the accused . . . presented one Ramon Micutuan
. . . to corroborate his claim that in the evening of April 1,
1987, he was in Cebu City.
6. After trial, the court a quo promulgated its judgment finding
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
charged.
7. One of the assigned errors is: “(T)he firearm alleged to have
been used by the accused in killing the victim was not
presented in court during the trial. Its caliber and make was
(sic) never established by sufficient evidence, so that there is
no basis to convict the accused for illegal (sic) possession of
firearm."
ISSUE:
Whether or not it was indispensable for the prosecution to
introduce and offer in evidence the firearm which was used in
the killing of the victim.
HELD:
No.
Nor can We agree with the accused that it was indispensable for
the prosecution to introduce and offer in evidence the firearm
which was used in the killing of the victim. There is no law or
rule of evidence which requires the prosecution to do so; there
is also no law which prescribes that a ballistics examination be
conducted to determine the source and trajectory of the bullets.
For conviction to lie it is enough that the prosecution establishes
by proof beyond reasonable doubt that a crime was committed
and that the accused is the author thereof. The production of the
weapon used in the commission of the crime is not a condition
sine qua non for the discharge of such a burden for the weapon
may not have been recovered at all from the assailant. If the rule
were to be as proposed by the accused, many criminals would
go scot-free and much injustice would be caused to the victims
of crimes, their families and society. In the instant case, it was
established with moral certainty that the accused attacked,
assaulted and shot the victim Rolando Miel with an unlicensed
firearm, thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple gunshot
wounds which caused his death. Such proof was all that was
needed for the conviction of the accused.

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of Branch 3 of the Regional Trial

Court of Tagbilaran City in Criminal Case No. 5064 and
Criminal Case No. 5065 finding the accused LUCIANO
JUMAMOY y AÑORA, alias "JUNIOR," guilty of the crimes
charged therein, is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the
modification as to the indemnity which is increased from
P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 and the deletion of the words "life
imprisonment" from the dispositive portion thereof.
Costs against the accused.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ROSALINO FLORES, accused-appellant.
[G.R. No. 129284. March 17, 2000.]
Facts:
In an information filed before the Regional Trial Court
of Malolos, Bulacan, herein appellant was charged with the
crime of murder for unlawfully and feloniously attacking and
shooting with a handgun one Antonio Garcia, thereby inflicting
serious injuries which directly caused the death of the victim.
Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty and
thereafter, trial ensued.
Witness for the prosecution Myla Garcia, daughter of the
victim, testified in a plain and straightforward manner that she
saw accused-appellant standing 3 arms' length away from the
place where her father Antonio Garcia and his companions were
drinking; that she approached him at a distance of about one
arm's length; that she saw him pointing a gun at her father; that
as she rushed towards her father she heard a shot that hit her
father who leaned and then fell on her side; that she embraced
him and walked him towards their house; that before they
entered the house, she saw accused-appellant still there but when
she shouted, "si Jianggo, si Jianggo," he ran away.
The other witness for the prosecution, Roberto Santiago,
testified that as he was about to enter the gate of the victim's
residence to attend the latter's birthday celebration, he heard a
shot and someone shouted, "si Jianggo, si Jianggo." He passed
through the front door and went out the back door to where he
heard the shot. Thereafter, he saw accused-appellant holding a
gun and running away from the place of the incident.
Accused-appellant denied killing the victim and
proffered an alibi that on the date and time of the alleged
shooting, he was at the house of one PO3 Ernesto Martin
attending the birthday party of the latter's daughter.
Issue:
1. WON the court erred in admitting the dying declaration
of the victim. Yes.
2. WON trial court erred in convicting the accused-
appellant on the basis of circumstantial evidence. No.
Ruling:
Ratio:
1. Accused-appellant argues that the dying declaration of the
victim is inadmissible because he was an incompetent
witness and it was not made with knowledge of an impending
death. The elements for the admissibility of a dying
declaration are: (1) the declaration must concern the crime
and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (2) it
was made at a time when the declarant was under the
consciousness of an impending death; (3) the declarant would
be competent to testify; and (4) the declaration is offered in
any case in which the decedent is the victim.
We agree with accused-appellant that the dying declaration is
inadmissible for the sole reason that the declarant was not
competent to testify had he survived. Garcia was not a
competent witness because he could not have seen who shot
 him. According to Myla's testimony, the assailant was towards her father she heard a shot that hit her father who
positioned behind her father. Upon being shot, Antonio leaned and then fell on her side; that she embraced him and
Garcia stumbled and fell on his daughter. There is no showing walked him towards their house; that before they entered the
that Garcia had the opportunity to see his assailant. house, she saw accused-appellant still there but when she
Apparently, Garcia heard his daughter shout "Si Jianggo, si shouted, "si Jianggo, si Jianggo," he ran away. The other
Jianggo" and relying thereon, uttered, "Hoy, may tama ako, witness for the prosecution, Roberto Santiago, testified that
binaril ako ni Jianggo," before he expired. A dying as he was about to enter the gate of the victim's residence to
declaration of the victim identifying his assailant will not be attend the latter's birthday celebration, he heard a shot and
given probative value if the victim was not in a position to someone shouted, "si Jianggo, si Jianggo." He passed through
identify his assailant as he was shot from behind. the front door and went out the back door to where he heard
the shot. Thereafter, he saw accused-appellant holding a gun
2. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to convict provided the
and running away from the place of the incident. At the time
following requisites are present, namely: (1) there is more
Myla and Roberto saw accused-appellant they were at a
than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the
distance reasonable to make an accurate identification. Myla
inferences are derived from are proven; and (3) the
was only an arm's length away, while Roberto was 10 to 11
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
meters away from accused-appellant. Further, Myla and
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstantial
Roberto are familiar with the accused-appellant as they live
evidence must constitute an unbroken chain of events so as to
in the same place and accused-appellant is Myla's uncle. All
lead to a fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the guilt
these circumstances put together constitute an unbroken
of the accused. Although Myla and Roberto may not have
chain, consistent with each other and the theory that accused-
seen the accused-appellant in the actual act of shooting the
appellant authored the crime charged.
victim, the unrebutted testimony of the witnesses for the
prosecution point to him as the only person who may have
been responsible for the commission of the crime to the
exclusion of any other person. Witness for the prosecution
Myla Garcia, daughter of the victim, testified in a plain and
straightforward manner that she saw accused-appellant
standing 3 arms' length away from the place where her father
Antonio Garcia and his companions were drinking; that she
approached him at a distance of about one arm's length; that
she saw him pointing a gun at her father; that as she rushed
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
GONZALO PENASO @ "LULU", accused-appellant.
Facts:
That on November 16, 1989 at 9:00am at the house of the
accused Gonzalo Penaso, the complainant Basilisa Lacar who
was then fifteen years old knocked at the door of the house of
the accused Gonzalo Penaso who opened the door and upon
inquiry whether his daughter, who was a classmate of
complainant, was present which the latter told the complainant
that her (sic) daughter was in the kitchen when in fact and in
truth his daughter was out;
That the accused Gonzalo Penaso forcibly pulled the
complainant Basilisa Lacar and pushed her into the bamboo bed
and boxed the abdomen of the complainant Basilisa Lacar and
subsequently took off her panty and inserted his penis into the
vagina of the complainant Basilisa Lacar causing it to bleed;
That the accused Gonzalo Penaso warned the complainant
Basilisa Lacar not to report to her parents otherwise he would
kill her;
That the complainant reported the incident to her parents after
the accused Gonzalo Penaso escaped to avoid being arrested;
That the second, third and fourth rape incidents were committed
in the same place in the vicinity of Cogtong Elementary School;
On April 16, 1990, private complainant, assisted by her mother
Rosalina Lacar, filed a complaint for multiple rape
Following the preliminary investigation on April 25, 1990, the
municipal circuit court issued an order for the arrest of the
accused who, by then, had left Bohol for Misamis Oriental.
Meanwhile, on July 10, 1990, appellant was arrested in
Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental, for illegal possession of firearms.
Notwithstanding the warrant of arrest for rape against him, he
posted bail for the case for which he was arrested, and then he
disappeared.
On July 16, 1990, private complainant gave birth to a baby boy.
Appellant raised the defenses of denial and alibi. The defense
witnesses and the accused Gonzalo Penaso vehemently denied
the rape charges and interposed the defense that four men
impregnated the complainant Basilisa Lacar;
On April 17, 1991, appellant was arrested in Magallanes,
Agusan del Norte.
On May 5, 1991, appellant escaped from his police escort in
Cebu City while being transported from Agusan del Norte to
Bohol.
In March 1993, police operatives in Cagayan de Oro City finally
apprehended appellant.
The trial court convicted appellant in Criminal Case No. 6775
and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.
Issue:
Whether or not Penaso is guilty
Held:
Yes. Penaso is guilty.
Appellant argues that he could not have raped complainant on
November 16, 1989 at about 9:00am in the morning, since the
latter was attending classes at the Bohol School of Fisheries in
Cogtong, Candijay, Bohol, while he was in Sun-oc, Ubay, Bohol
making banana chips. Inasmuch as they were in separate places,
the rape could not have taken place. His wife and another
defense witness corroborated his testimony. The latters
testimony, was given scant consideration by the trial court, as
said witness admitted receiving one hundred pesos (P100.00)
from appellants wife before testifying. Appellant further points
to the testimony of his daughter, Jonalou Penaso, who was the
victims classmate, to the effect that the victim was attending
classes with her at the Bohol Fisheries School at the time and
date the rape took place, so it was impossible for the victim to
have been at his house at that time.
In rape cases the issue, more often than not, is the credibility of
the victim. Rape is generally unwitnessed and very often the
victim is left to testify for herself. Her testimony is most vital
and must be received with the utmost caution. When a rape
victim’s testimony is straightforward, unflawed by any material
or significant inconsistency, then it deserves full faith and credit
and cannot be discarded. Once found credible, her lone
testimony is sufficient to sustain a conviction.
In assessing the credibility of witnesses, the court is guided by
the following doctrinal principles:
(1) The reviewing court will not disturb the findings of the lower
court unless there is a showing that it had overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of
weight and substance that could affect the results of the case;
(2) The findings of the trial court respecting the credibility of
witnesses are entitled to great respect and even finality as it had
the opportunity to examine their demeanor when they testified
on the witness stand; and
(3) A witness who testified in clear, positive, and convincing
manner and remained consistent on cross-examination, is a
credible witness.
Applying these guidelines, we find no reason to disturb the trial
courts assessment of private complainants credibility. Appellant
has shown no reason whatsoever for us to doubt her testimony.
The records show that private complainant testified as to her
ravishment in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and
frank manner. She positively identified appellant as her rapist.
She was consistent in her narration of how she was dragged
inside appellants house, boxed into submission, and ravished.
Private complainant did not waiver in her account of her
harrowing experience under intense and grueling cross-
examination
We also note the finding of the trial court that:
"...in the course of the first trial of the above-
entitled Criminal Cases Nos. 6775, 6787, 6788
and 6789 the accused Gonzalo Penaso was
smiling while the complainant Basilisa Lacar
cried and was seriously and emotionally
 disturbed (as) characterized by anger as shown
on her facial expression."
We find complainants testimony credible, while appellants
defenses of alibi and denial are lacking in truth and candor.
Nothing is more settled in criminal law jurisprudence than that
alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive and categorical
testimony of the complainant.
Alibi is an inherently weak defense, which is viewed with
suspicion and received with caution because it can easily be
fabricated.
Furthermore, the question of who sired the victims child has no
bearing here, for in rape cases, the identity of the father of the
victims child is not an issue, pregnancy not being an element of
the crime.
Moreover, the records show that appellant escaped from his
police escort while being transported to face charges, and then
remained at large for two years. Flight is an implied admission
of guilt, and appellants escape betrays both his guilt and his
desire to evade responsibility.

Denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed

with strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility.

Appellant failed to present any disinterested witness to support

his claim. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough that accused show
he was elsewhere at the time the crime was committed, but there
must also be clear and convincing proof that it was impossible
for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of its commission.

With respect to the appellants claim that the victim was

attending her classes at the time she was raped, we note that
complainants explanation that it was their vacant period was not
rebutted by the defense. All told, we see no reason to depart from
the rule that positive identification of the malefactor prevails
over the defenses of alibi and denial.

Appellant insists that he did not get private complainant

pregnant. He cites the testimony of defense witness Rafael
Libres, a classmate of the victim, to the effect that complainant
admitted to him that appellant had not caused her pregnancy.
People v. Adoviso
Pablo Adoviso, and four John Does, were tried for the
MURDER of Rufino Agunos and Emeterio Vazquez. Pablo
Adoviso was positively identified by Bonifacio Agunos, the son
of one of the victims, because the former did not wear a mask in
the perpetration of the crime.
Aside from denial and alibi, the defense also offered in evidence
the testimony of Ernesto A. Lucena, Polygraph Examiner II of
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Manila, who
conducted a polygraph test on Adoviso. In Polygraph Report
No. 900175, Lucena opined that Adoviso’s “polygrams revealed
that there were no specific reactions indicative of deception to
pertinent questions relevant” to the investigation of the crimes.
The trial court found Adoviso guilty.
On the premise that the trial court rendered the judgment of
conviction on the basis of “mere conjectures and
speculations,” appellant argues that the negative result of the
polygraph test should be given weight to tilt the scales of justice
in his favor.
Issue: WON polygraph tests results may be used as evidence
A polygraph is an electromechanical instrument that
simultaneously measures and records certain physiological
changes in the human body that are believed to be
involuntarily caused by an examinee’s conscious attempt to
deceive the questioner. The theory behind a polygraph or lie
detector test is that a person who lies deliberately will have a
rising blood pressure and a subconscious block in breathing,
which will be recorded on the graph. However, American
courts almost uniformly reject the results of polygraph tests
when offered in evidence for the purpose of establishing the
guilt or innocence of one accused of a crime, whether the
accused or the prosecution seeks its introduction, for the reason
that polygraph has not as yet attained scientific acceptance as a
reliable and accurate means of ascertaining truth or
deception. The rule is no different in this jurisdiction. Thus,
in People v. Daniel, stating that much faith and credit should not
be vested upon a lie detector test as it is not
conclusive. Appellant, in this case, has not advanced any reason
why this rule should not apply to him.
Appellant was therefore correctly adjudged guilty of two counts
of Murder. Treachery qualified the killings to murder. There is
treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. In other words, there is treachery
when the attack on an unarmed victim who has not given the
slightest provocation is sudden, unexpected and without
warning. The victims in this case were totally unaware of an
impending assault – Rufino was sleeping and Emeterio was
going down the stairs when they were shot.
Diosdado Mallari vs. Court of Appeals, December 9, 1996
Facts:
There was a standing warrant of arrest against Mallari for
homicide. The police officers received information that Mallari
was seen at Sitio 14, Sta. Rita, Capas, Tarlac. The police officers
went to the said address, surrounded Mallari’s house and
arrested him. The police searched Mallari and found a home-
made gun (paltik) with live ammunition. Mallari was charged
and was found guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunition. Mallari questioned the factual
finding that there was a standing warrant of arrest against him.
He further contended that the absence of the requisite warrant is
fatal and renders the search and seizure unlawful. Corollarily,
the handgun and ammunition seized from him are inadmissible
in evidence.
Issue: Was there a valid arrest?
Held:
Yes. This is not a case of a warrantless arrest but merely an
instance of an arrest effected by the police authorities without
having the warrant in their possession at that precise moment.
Under Section 8, Rule 113: “When making an arrest by virtue of
a warrant the officer shall inform the person to be arrested of the
cause of the arrest and the fact that a warrant has been issued for
his arrest, except when he flees or forcibly resists before the
officer has opportunity so to inform him or when the giving of
such information will imperil the arrest. The officer need not
have the warrant in his possession at the time of the arrest but
after the arrest, if the person arrested so requires, the warrant
shall be shown to him as soon as practicable.”
The above quoted rule clearly allows a police officer to effect
arrest without the warrant in his possession at the time of the
arrest. Thus, appellant’s arrest being lawful, the search and
seizure made incidental thereto is likewise valid, albeit
conducted without a warrant. [10] In the case of People v Acol,
[11] where the unlicensed firearms were found when the police
team apprehended the accused for robbery and not for illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition, this Court held that the
unlicensed firearms may be seized without the necessity of
obtaining a search warrant. Expounding thereon, it stated that:
“` x x x The illegality of the search is independent from
the illegal possession of prohibited arms. The illegality of the
search did not make legal an illegal possession of firearms.
When, in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a
criminal offense, the offending police officers should happen to
discover a criminal offense being committed by any person, they
are not precluded from performing their duties as police officers
for the apprehension of the guilty and the taking of the corpus
delicti.”’
But in crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, the
prosecution has the burden of proving the elements thereof, viz:
(a) the existence of the subject firearm and (b) the fact that the
accused who owned or possessed it does not have the
corresponding license or permit to possess the same.i The latter
is a negative fact which constitutes an essential ingredient of the
offense of illegal possession, and it is the duty of the prosecution
not only to allege it but also to prove it beyond reasonable
doubt.ii In the case at bench, the testimony of a representative
of, a certification from the PNP (FEU) that petitioner was not a
licensee of the said firearm would have sufficed for the
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second
element of the crime of illegal possession.iii The absence of the
foregoing is fatal to the prosecutions case and renders petitioners
conviction erroneous.
In view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED and
the assailed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner
Diosdado Mallari is hereby ACQUITTED for insufficiency of
evidence and ordered immediately released unless there are
other legal grounds for his continued detention.
PEOPLE vs RICOLITO RUGAY
GR 113026-27 | 2 July 1998
Nature of the Case: Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing
the RTC’s conviction of Rugay.
FACTS:
 Rugay and Villalon were charged before the RTC
Palawan with the killing of Mendoza. In connection
therewith, Rugay was also charged with carrying of a
firearm without license.
 The PROSECUTION’S version is as follows:
o Madrid was utilized as an asset of PNP
NARCOM officer Guba to give information on
the drug trade. He was detained in the City Jail of
Puerto Prinsesa for dealing in marijuana. It
appears he was detained since 15 August 1991.
o He claims that Guba apparently talked with the
Jail warden to give him temporary liberty on 28
August 1991 for an operation.
o On August 28, 1991, 11:30pm, witness Madrid
and Joy Cortez were in front of a motorcycle
shop waiting for a tricycle.
o It appears a drunk Villalon was walking by. After
passing them by, Villalon suddenly turned
around, kicked Madrid, and took out a fly knife
and attempted to stab Madrid. Madrid allegedly
sustained injuries in his wrist from the attack.
o Mendoza, a friend of witness Madrid, saw the
altercation and tried to intervene.
o After seeing Mendoza, Villalon bolted and ran
towards a Mami house down the street. When
Mendoza reached the Mami house, Rugay
allegedly appeared therefrom and shot at
Mendoza, hitting him in the chest. Afterwards,
Villalon stabbed Mendoza at the chest.
o Madrid followed his friend to the Mami house,
and saw Mendoza bloodied and called for help.
With this, Villalon and Rugay allegedly ran away
from the scene.
o The prosecution tried to present the certification
from the PNP which states that “no available
information” was had regarding Rugay’s license
to possess a firearm. No other evidence was
presented to support the illegal possession case.
 The prosecution only presented one witness, Madrid, to
prove the story.
 The defense meanwhile interposed denials and alibi, and
presented a witness each to prove their respective alibis,
and two witnesses to prove other matters.
o They admitted knowing each other but claimed
they were not together during the said day.
o Allegedly, Rugay was drinking at the house of
his father-in-law with Rugay’s farmworkers until
11pm of that day in a nearby barrio, and slept
right after.
o VIllalon claimed he was staying in with his friend
and never left the house, which was also situated
in a nearby barrio.
o They further presented testimonial evidence of
PNP NARCOM officer Guba to the effect that
witness Madrid was indeed an asset of the unit.
But Guba avers that the arrangement ended when
Madrid was detained on 15 August 1991. He
categorically denies the assertion of Madrid that
Guba requested his temporary release, must less
 that he was given temporary liberty on the day in
question.
o The witness from the NBI, a Forensic Chemist,
conducted a paraffin test and the test yielded
negative results for nitrates.
 The RTC convicted the two for murder, and further
convicted Rugay for illegal possession of firearms. ON
appeal to the SC, Villalon withdrew his appeal, while
Rugay continued the same.
ISSUES:
WON Rugay is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for illegal
possession.
HELD:
NO. There are serious doubts and holes in the prosecution’s
evidence.
Appellants conviction was based mainly upon the testimony of
Jesus Madrid. The latter however admitted that he had been in
detention at the Puerto Princesa City Jail from August 15,
1991 up to and including the date of the commission of the
crime on August 28, 1991 for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Law, having been arrested for possession of marijuana.
The Court, therefore, entertains serious doubts regarding the
opportunity by which this supposed witness came to know of the
facts to which he testified. In the ordinary course of nature,
Madrid could not have possibly witnessed the events that
transpired on the night of August 28, 1991 as he was in detention
at the Puerto Princesa City Jail. His assertion that in the evening
of August 28, 1991 he was taken out of the jail and used for
surveillance purposes by SPO4 Guba was belied by the latter
who testified that after August 15, 1991, he no longer utilized
Madrid as an asset since Madrid was already in detention and
he (Guba) had no authority to place Madrid under his custody.
Despite the assertion that it happened just outside a Mami house,
no other witness was presented to at least corroborate the events
that took place, much less the presence there of Madrid.
On the charge of illegal possession, Rugay is likewise entitled to
an acquittal.
The prosecution failed to establish the first element. No firearm
was presented in evidence. Moreover, Madrid testified that
appellant used a short gun. According to Ms. Aida Viloria-
Magsipoc, the NBI Forensic Chemist, a short barreled firearm,
as approved to one with a long barrel, would deposit more
gunpowder nitrates on the subject. Logically, the use of a short-
barreled gun increases the probability that the paraffin tests
would yield positive results. Yet, the paraffin tests yielded
exactly the opposite. While a negative result on a paraffin test is
not conclusive proof that appellant did not fire a gun, such fact,
if considered with the other circumstances of this case, may be
taken as an indication of his innocence. In criminal cases, every
circumstance favoring the innocence of the accused must be
duly taken into account.
Heirs of Gabatan v. C.A (G.R No. 150206
Nature of the case: Petition for Review
Facts:
A 1.1062 hectare parcel of land situated at Calinugan,
Balulang, Cagayan de Oro Citywas declared for taxation in the
name of Juan Gabatan. In the complaint before the RTC,
Pacana alleged that she is the sole owner of it, having inherited
the same from her deceased mother, Hermogena Gabatan
Evero (Hermogena).
PACANA further claimed that her mother, Hermogena, is the
only child of Juan Gabatan and his wife, Laureana Clarito.
Respondent alleged that upon the death of Juan Gabatan, Lot
3095 C-5 was entrusted to his brother, Teofilo Gabatan
(Teofilo), and Teofilo’s wife, Rita Gabatan, for administration.
It was also claimed that prior to her death Hermogena
demanded for the return of the land but to no avail.
After Hermogena’s death, respondent also did the same but
petitioners refused to heed the numerous demands to surrender
the subject property. According to respondent, when Teofilo
and his wife died, petitioners Jesus Jabin is and Catalino
Acantilado took possession of the disputed land despite
respondent’s demands for them to vacate the same.
GABATAN denied that respondent’s mother Hermogena was
the daughter of Juan Gabatan with Laureana Clarito and that
Hermogena or respondent is the rightful heir of Juan Gabatan.
Petitioners maintained that Juan Gabatan died single in 1934
and without any issue and that Juan was survived by one
brother and two sisters, namely: Teofilo
(petitioners’predecessor-in-interest), Macaria and Justa. These
siblings and/or their heirs, inherited the subject land from Juan
Gabatan and have been in actual, physical, open,
public,adverse, continuous and uninterrupted possession
thereof in the concept of owners for more than fifty (50) years
and enjoyed the fruits of the improvements thereon, to the
exclusion of the whole world including respondent.
Petitioners filed an amended answer, additionally alleging that
the disputed land was already covered by OCT No. P-3316 in
the name of the heirs of Juan Gabatan represented by petitioner
Riorita Gabatan (Teofilo’s daughter).
RTC held in favor of PACANA, CA AFFIRMED. The
CA gave weight to the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by
Macaria Gabatan de Abrogar, Teofilo, Hermogena and heirs of
Justa Gabatan, wherein Hermogena was identified as an heir of
Juan Gabatan.
Thus, this appeal. The respondent’s main cause of action in the
court a quo is the recovery of ownership and possession of
property.
ISSUES:
Whether the lower court erred in failing to appreciate by
preponderance of evidence in favor of the defendants-appellants
(petitioners) claim that they and the heirs of Justa and Macaria
both surnamed Gabatan are the sole and surviving heirs of Juan
Gabatan and, therefore, entitled to inherit the land subject matter
 admissible under the Rules of Court of her mother’s relationship
RULING: Petition granted. to Juan Gabatan.

We find insufficient and questionable the basis of the RTC in

conferring upon respondent the status of sole heir of Juan
Gabatan.
Respondent, in asserting to be entitled to possession and
ownership of the property, pinned her claim entirely on her
alleged status as sole heir of Juan Gabatan. It was incumbent
upon her to present preponderant evidence in support of her
complaint.

Here, two conflicting birth certificates of respondent were

presented at the RTC. Respondent, during her direct testimony,
presented and identified a purported certified true copy of her
typewritten birth certificate which indicated that her mother’s
maiden name was "Hermogena Clarito Gabatan”.

RATIO:

Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other
than the original document itself.

To reiterate, to prove the relationship of respondent’s mother to

Juan Gabatan, our laws dictate that the best evidence of such
familial tie was the record of birth appearing in the Civil
Registrar, or an authentic document or a final judgment. In the
absence of these, respondent should have presented proof that
her mother enjoyed the continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child. Only in the absence of these two classes of
evidence is the respondent allowed to present other prof
Manila Mining Corporation VS. Miguel Tan
G.R. No. 171702 February 12, 2009
Facts
 Respondent Miguel Tan was doing business under the
name and style of Manila Mandarin Marketing and is
engaged in the business of selling electrical materials.
 Petitioner MMC ordered various electrical materials
from Respondent, from which the former agreed to pay
within 30 days from delivery with interest.
 MMC made partial payment but defaulted eventually.
 Respondent filed a collections suit against the petitioner
with the RTC
 MMC offered as its sole witness its accountant Rainier
Ibarrola, that absence of stamp marks on the invoices
and purchase order negated receipt of the said
document by MMC’s representatives.
 Respondent presented his sales representative to testify
that he delivered the originals of the invoices and
purchase order to MMC’s accounting department and
showed the customer’s acknowledgement receipts.
 As Alleged by the Petitioner that the Unauthenticated
Photocopies of Invoice and Purchase order did not
satisfy the Best Evidence Rule, which requires the
production of the original writing in court.
 RTC ruled in favor of the Respondent.
 CA Affirmed
Issue: W/N there was probative value of the evidence presented
by the Petitioner in relation to the unauthenticated photocopies
of Invoice and Purchase Order is a violation of the best
evidence rule?
Ruling: Yes
 Under the civil code the manner of which a contract of
sale is perfected is when there is a meeting of the mind
upon the thing which is the object of the contract and
upon the price.
 The purchase order constitute accepted offer when
respondent supplied the electrical materials to the
petitioner. Petitioner cannot evade its obligation by
claiming for lack of consent to the perfected contract of
sale. The invoices furnished the detail of the
transaction.
 The best evidence rules only applies if the contents of
the writing are directly in issue but where the existence
of the writing or its general purport is all that is the
issue, secondary evidence may be introduced as proof.
 Petitioner did not deny the contents of the invoice and
purchase order, its lone contention was that respondent
did not submit the original copies to facilitate the
payment.
 Photocopies of the documents were admissible in
evidence to prove the contract between the parties.
 Petition is Denied, Ruling of the RTC is affirmed.
Edsa Shangri-la Hotel v. BF Corp. (G.R. No. 145842, prom.
June 27, 2008)
Facts:
This is a collection case for a sum of money owed by Edsa
Shangri-la to BF Corp. for the construction of its building
roject. From May 1, 1991 to June 30, 1992, BF submitted a
total of 19 progress billings following the procedure agreed
upon. Based on Progress Billing Nos. 1 to 13, ESHRI paid BF
PhP 86,501,834.05.7 According to BF, however, ESHRI, for
Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19, did not re-measure the work
done, did not prepare the Progress Payment Certificates, let
alone remit payment for the inclusive periods covered. In this
regard, BF claimed having been misled into working
continuously on the project by ESHRI which gave the
assurance about the Progress Payment Certificates already
being processed. After several futile attempts to collect the
unpaid billings, BF filed, on July 26, 1993, before the RTC a
suit for a sum of money and damages. In its defense, ESHRI
claimed having overpaid BF for Progress Billing Nos. 1 to 13
and, by way of counterclaim with damages, asked that BF be
ordered to refund the excess payments. ESHRI also charged BF
with incurring delay and turning up with inferior work
accomplishment. Petitioners fault the CA, and necessarily the
trial court, on the matter of the admission in evidence of the
photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19 and the
complementing PMIs and the WVOs. According to petitioners,
BF, before being allowed to adduce in evidence the
photocopies adverted to, ought to have laid the basis for the
presentation of the photocopies as secondary evidence,
conformably to the best evidence rule.
Respondent BF, on the other hand, avers having complied with
the laying- the-basis requirement. Defending the action of the
courts below in admitting into evidence the photocopies of the
documents aforementioned, BF explained that it could not
present the original of the documents since they were in the
possession of ESHRI which refused to hand them over to BF
despite requests.
Issue:
Whether the admission of secondary evidence (the photocopies
of progress billings) was proper.
Held:
Yes. We agree with BF. The only actual rule that the term "best
evidence" denotes is the rule requiring that the original of
writing must, as a general proposition, be produced and
secondary evidence of its contents is not admissible except
where the original cannot be had. Rule 130, Section 3 of the
Rules of Court enunciates the best evidence rule: SEC. 3.
Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence
shall be admissible other than the original document itself,
except in the following cases: (a) When the original has been
lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad
faith on the part of the offeror; (b) When the original is in the
custody or under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice; (Emphasis added.) Complementing the
above provision is Sec. 6 of Rule 130, which reads: SEC. 6.
When original document is in adverse party's custody or
control. - If the document is in the custody or under control of
the adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it.
If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence,
he fails to produce the document, secondary evidence may be
presented as in the case of loss. Secondary evidence of the
contents of a written instrument or document refers to evidence
other than the original instrument or document itself. A party
may present secondary evidence of the contents of a writing
not only when the original is lost or destroyed, but also when it
is in the custody or under the control of the adverse party. In
either instance, however, certain explanations must be given
before a party can resort to secondary evidence. In our view,
the trial court correctly allowed the presentation of the
photocopied documents in question as secondary evidence.
Any suggestion that BF failed to lay the required basis for
presenting the photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19
instead of their originals has to be dismissed.
The stenographic notes of the following exchanges between
Atty. Andres and Atty. Autea, counsel for BF and ESHRI,
respectively, reveal that BF had complied with the
requirements:
ATTY. ANDRES: During the previous hearing of this case,
your Honor, likewise, the witness testified that certain exhibits
namely, the Progress Payment Certificates and the Progress
Billings the originals of these documents were transmitted to
ESHRI, all the originals are in the possession of ESHRI since
these are internal documents and I am referring specifically to
the Progress Payment Certificates. We requested your Honor,
that in order that plaintiff [BF] be allowed to present secondary
original, that opposing counsel first be given opportunity to
present the originals which are in their possession. May we
know if they have brought the originals and whether they will
present the originals in court, Your Honor. (Emphasis added.)
ATTY. AUTEA: We have already informed our client about
the situation, your Honor, that it has been claimed by plaintiff
that some of the originals are in their possession and our client
assured that, they will try to check. Unfortunately, we have not
heard from our client, Your Honor. Four factual premises are
readily deducible from the above exchanges, to wit: (1) the
existence of the original documents which ESHRI had
possession of; (2) a request was made on ESHRI to produce the
documents; (3) ESHRI was afforded sufficient time to produce
them; and (4) ESHRI was not inclined to produce them.
Clearly, the circumstances obtaining in this case fall under the
exception under Sec. 3(b) of Rule 130. In other words, the
conditions sine qua non for the presentation and reception of
the photocopies of the original document as secondary
evidence have been met. These are: (1) there is proof of the
original document's execution or existence; (2) there is proof of
the cause of the original document's unavailability; and (3) the
offeror is in good faith.
While perhaps not on all fours because it involved a check,
what the Court said in Magdayao v. People, is very much apt,
thus: To warrant the admissibility of secondary evidence when
the original of a writing is in the custody or control of the
adverse party, Section 6 of Rule 130 provides that the adverse
party must be given reasonable notice, that he fails or refuses to
produce the same in court and that the offeror offers
satisfactory proof of its existence.
The mere fact that the original of the writing is in the custody
or control of the party against whom it is offered does not
warrant the admission of secondary evidence. The offeror must
prove that he has done all in his power to secure the best
evidence by giving notice to the said party to produce the
document. The notice may be in the form of a motion for the
production of the original or made in open court in the
presence of the adverse party or via a subpoena duces tecum,
provided that the party in custody of the original has sufficient
time to produce the same. When such party has the original of
the writing and does not voluntarily offer to produce it or
refuses to produce it, secondary evidence may be admitted.
Borje v. Sandiganbayan
GR L-55436
25 Nov 1983
J. Guerrero
FACTS: NICASIO BORJE was charged with the crime of
FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT. The accused-
appellant pleaded not guilty. Since there is no direct proof
showing that accused-appellant, being then the Provincial Plant
Industry Officer with many subordinate employees and
personnel under him engaged in agricultural field work and
assigned in the rural areas like the complainant Rodrigo
Ducusin, had personally and actually falsified the public
documents in question which under normal office procedures
pass through numerous hands at several government offices for
typing, attestations, funding, accounting, and payment of the
check for P225.00, the legal issue thus raised merits Our careful
consideration and resolution.
The decision appealed from recites the evidence for the
government as follows:
The gist of the evidence of the prosecution,
which consist of the testimonies of Ducusin,
Edgardo Olivares, 43 years old, married,
agronomist and Provincial Plant Officer, Manuel
Varquez, 45 years old, married and Regional
Director and Remedios Lorenzo, 47 years old,
married and Cashier, all of the Bureau of Plant
Industry in San Fernando, La Union, shows that
Ducusin was employed as Plant Pest Officer with
the Bureau of Plant Industry stationed in San
Fernando, La Union from February 2, 1975 up to
his resignation on April 30, 1978.
In fairness to the accused, We are constrained to include
hereunder the more detailed statement of facts submitted by him
in his Brief:
The Province of La Union undertook as one of its
projects the program known as the Gulayan sa
Kalusugan and Masagana '99 Program, the
implementation of which became a joint program
of its Bureau of Plant Industry and its Bureau of
Agricultural Extension. Government employees
detailed as production technicians in the Gulayan
Program received incentive allowances from the
NFAC during the covered period. Their detail as
production technicians of the said program was
effected only by a special order emanating from
the Bureau of Plant Industry Door; and before the
employee received his incentive pay, he was
required to prepare his Daffy Time Record for the
particular month and submit a Certification
attesting to the fact that he was detailed to the
program.
In the case-at-bar, complainant Rodrigo Ducusin,
an employee of the Bureau of Plant Industry, was
detailed to the program from February 2,1975 up
to December 1977, his assignment of work being
contained in the NFAC Order captioned 'Detail
and Designation of Personnel to NFAC, in
connection with the Gulayan Program where his
name appeared.
 Making it appear that he was surprised to learn
that he was supposed to receive his NFAC
incentive pay for the months of January,
February and March 1977 because he was not
entitled thereto as he was not anymore connected
with the Gulayan Program; and falsely making it
appear that some person other than himself
received his incentive pay by allegedly forging
his signature on the Daily Time Records, the
Payroll and the Certification required and
submitted — complainant Rodrigo Ducusin
caused to be filled a complaint against the
petitioner, Nicasio Borje, supervising agronomist
of the Bureau of Plant Industry, before the
Tanodbayan.
Accused-appellant contends that complainant Ducusin was paid
his incentive pay for the months of January to March, 1977 in
the total sum of P225.00 as Ducusin was included in the payroll
since he has worked with the Program as shown by the Special
Order. He confirms substantially the official procedure in the
preparation of the payroll and subsequent payment of the
incentive pay to the production technicians as described by
witness Remedios Lorenzo, disbursing officer and cashier for
the BPI office in San Fernando, La Union. However, he
vigorously denies having received the payroll and the
corresponding checks from witness Lorenzo as his participation
in the preparation of the said payroll ended with his signing
thereof after which the payroll goes to the disbursing officer for
the preparation and issuance of the checks to the payees.
Accused-appellant contends that the instant case against him
was initiated by Ducusin to get even with the petitioner as the
complainant admitted in cross-examination that he believes that
Borje instigated said two criminal cases against him.
The Sandiganbayan in its decision formulated two issues
determinative of the innocence or guilt of the accused, to wit: (1)
Whether or not the a) Time Book and Payroll, b) the
certification, and c) the Daily Time Records in support of said
payroll were falsified; and (2) If they were, the liability of the
accused, if any. The accused- appellant was found guilty by
respondent court.
ISSUES: Whether the accused is guilty of falsification of public
document
HELD: NO. On the face of the above documentary evidence,
the liability of petitioner as head of the office who had signed
the certification and verification printed thereon must be limited
to the contents of said verification and certification for which he
does not necessarily incur criminal responsibility if the entries,
data or statements certified and verified turn out not to be true in
which case the employee or personnel making the entries, data
or statements as to his services and attendance is solely and
separately responsible therefor. In the instant case, since there is
the Special Order No. 172 of Executive Director Domingo
Panganiban, concurrently BPI Director, marked Exh. 6, "Detail
and Designation of BPI personnel to NFAC in connection with
the Masagana-99 Program effective January to December,
1977" listing complainant for the assignment and detail, the
inclusion of Ducusin's name in the payroll was not irregular.
Besides, the payroll is prepared by the Budget Office based on
the Special Order and not by the petitioner's office.
According to complainant Ducusin, he was no longer connected
with the Masagana Program during the period of January to
March 1977 because his assignment thereto had been
terminated. But he was asked this question by the
Sandiganbayan, thus:
Q — What evidence do you have that you were removed
in 1977 and you were no longer performing your duties as
technician?
A — It is only verbal.
The alleged verbal order is doubtful for under normal and usual
official procedure, a written special order issued by a
government office is cancelled, amended or modified only by
another written special order, not only for purposes of record on
file but also to prevent conflict and confusion in government
operations. Moreover, under the best evidence rule, Section 2,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the supposed verbal order cannot
prevail over the written Special Order.
Respondent Sandiganbayan, however, justified the conviction of
the accused on the basis of the testimony of witness Remedios
Lorenzo, Regional Disbursing Officer and Cashier, to the effect
that she delivered the payroll and checks to petitioner accused-
appellant, relying further on the presumption that as possessor
of the document, accused-appellant is presumed to have falsified
it.
But reviewing the testimony of witness Lorenzo, the records
disclose that her original testimony at the reinvestigation of the
case before the Tanodbayan was favorable to the accused, saying
that she delivered the payroll and the checks to the complainant
Ducusin, even Identifying the genuine signature of Ducusin on
the payroll.
We also reject respondent court's reliance on the presumption
that as possessor of the document, the accused is presumed to be
the author of the falsification. In the first place, the factual basis
which is the Lorenzo testimony which We have reviewed as
doubtful and variable, cannot be credited. Petitioner has denied
vigorously the testimony of Lorenzo that he received the payroll
and the checks from her. He said that his participation in the
preparation of the payroll ended with his signing thereof after
which the payroll goes to the Disbursing Officer for the
preparation and issuance of the checks to the payees at which
time the payee affix their signatures on the payroll, which is
substantially corroborated by the original testimony of the
witness Lorenzo during the reinvestigation of the case before the
Tanodbayan.
In the second place, Exhibit "A" appears to be also signed by ten
(10) other production technicians fisted in the payroll, besides
complainant Ducusin. It is initialled by three (3) personnel in the
Accounting Services Unit and further signed by the Regional
Accountant and for the Regional Director. All of these persons
were at one time or another in possession of the document, all of
them had the same opportunity impliedly imputed to the
accused, The payroll must have been carried and passed by
messengers and other employees from one office to another,
from one desk to another for purposes of typing, funding,
initialling, verification, certification, accounting, recording,
drawing of the check and finally, issuing of the check. In Our
view, the respondent court's reliance on the presumption which
is only presumptive, is misplaced and unwarranted, there being
no sufficient reason to apply the same.
The defense contends that the prosecution, having presented
xerox copies only of the falsified documents, Exhs. "D" and "C",
fatted to prove the corpus delicti of the crime charged, citing the
case of U.S. vs. Gregorio:

In a criminal case for the falsification of a

document, it is indispensable that the judges and
the courts have before them the document alleged
to have been simulated, counterfeited or falsified,
in order that they may find, pursuant to the
evidence produced at the trial, whether or not the
crime of falsification was actually committed; in
the absence of the original document, it is
improper to conclude, with only a copy of the
said original in view, that there has been a
falsification of a document which was neither
found nor exhibited, because, in such a case, even
the existence of such original document may be
doubted.

The ill motives of the complainant in falsely accusing the

accused-appellant is easily discernible herein. The rule is
established that the absence of evidence as to an improper
motive actuating the offended party and the principal
prosecution witness tends to sustain the conclusion that no such
improper motive existed and that their testimonies are worthy of
full faith and credit. Conversely, where there is showing as to
improper motives, as in the case at bar, the testimony of
complainant Ducusin is unworthy of faith and credit and,
therefore, deserves scant consideration. And since the
prosecution theory is built or based on such testimony, the cause
of the prosecution collapses or falls with it.

G.R. No. 91797 August 7, 1992

WIDOWS & ORPHANS ASSOCIATION,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ORTIGAS & COMPANY
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, respondents.
FACTS:
On 27 August 1974, petitioner Widows' and Orphans
Association, Inc. ("Widora") instituted Land Registration Case
("LRC") No. Q-336 before Branch 4 of the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City (now Branch 83 of the Regional Trial
Court, same city).
Widora applied for original registration of title over a parcel of
land described in Plan LRC (SWO)-15352, alleging that said
property is covered by Titulo Propiedad No. 4136 dated 25
April 1984, supposedly issued in the name of one, deceased,
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban. The said land applied for was
situated at Malitlit-Ugong, Quezon City, with an area of 156
hectares.
On 13 October 1978, private respondent Ortigas & Co. Limited
Partnership, Inc. ("Ortigas") filed an opposition to the
application. This pleading was followed by a motion to dismiss
dated 23 October 1978.
In a supplementary report dated 14 November 1978, the
Commissioner of Land Registration informed the trial court
that the land sought to be registered was "identically the same"
as that covered by Lot 7 of Transfer Certificate of Title
("TCT") No. 77652 and of Lot 8 of TCT No. 77653, both of
which were issued and standing in the name of Ortigas.
In an order dated 20 April 1979, the trial court set the case for
hearing to enable Widora to prove its assertion that TCT Nos.
77652 and 77653 were not derived from the Original
Certificates of Title ("OCT") referred to on their faces (i.e.,
OCT Nos. 19, 336, 337 and 344) and to give Ortigas an
opportunity to show the contrary.
For nine (9) years, from 1979 until 1988, hearings were held
where the parties adduced evidence in support of their
respective contentions. 7
In an order dated 30 March 1988, the trial court denied Ortigas'
motion to dismiss, holding that its TCT's were apparently not
derived from the OCT's mentioned on their faces and did not
appear to have been based on an existing original decree of
registration.
Ortigas' motion for reconsideration having been denied, and the
trial court having set the case for hearing on the merits, Ortigas
filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction with the public respondent Court of
Appeals on 10 July 1989.
In a decision dated 27 November 1989, the Court of Appeals
gave due course to the petition and nullified the trial court's
order of 30 March 1988. It held that TCT Nos. 77652 and
77653 were derived from OCT No. 351, which in turn was
based on Decree of Registration No. 1425 issued in favor of
Ortigas' predecessor-in-interest in 1905, in G.L.R.O.
Record No. 917 which had been tried by the Land
Registration Court of Manila. The Court of Appeals
dismissed LRC No. Q-336 because the land subject thereof
was already registered in favor of Ortigas, with the result
that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, Widora
filed the present petition for review with the Court on 22
March 1990. In a decision dated 28 August 1991, the Court's
Third Division set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals
and reinstated the order of the trial court dated 30 March 1988.
The Court's Third Division held that the Court of Appeals erred
in making factual findings determinative of Widora's
application on the basis of "secondary evidence" offered by
Ortigas, in unilaterally correcting entries in the Ortigas Torrens
titles and held that the controversy regarding the authenticity of
said titles should be resolved in "full-blown" hearings before
the trial Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the SC-Third Division is correct in holding that
that the controversy regarding the authenticity of said titles
should be resolved in "full-blown" hearings before the trial
Court
Ruling:
No.
Decision dated 28 August 1991 is SET ASIDE; Widora's
Petition for Review in the instant case is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit. The court is hereby ORDERED to dismiss
immediately LRC Case No. Q-336.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reinstated.
The CA, in arriving at its conclusion that TCT Nos. 77652 and
77653 are proper derivatives of OCT No. 351, which in turn
had been issued pursuant to Decree No. 1425, the Court of
Appeals had relied on:
(a) a certified true copy of OCT No. 351;
(b) survey plans prepared by Ortigas' Geodetic Engineer, Mr.
Carlos Angeles, which were based on plottings of the
boundaries of parcels of land appearing in the Notice of Initial
Hearing in G.L.R.O. Record No. 917 and in the technical
description found in the body of OCT No. 351, and in TCT
Nos. 77652 and 77653; and
(c) the testimony of Engineer Angeles that these plottings
showed that the land covered by the TCTs was inside the larger
parcel of land covered by the OCT, which in turn was inside
the much larger parcel of land (The Hacienda de Mandaloyon)
adjudicated to Ortigas' predecessor-in-interest by Decree No.
1425 issued in G.L.R.O. Record No. 917.
The Court described the above evidence as "secondary" in
nature and noted that Ortigas did not establish the due
execution and subsequent loss of the original documents, as
required by the Rule on Secondary Evidence.
After careful re-examination of the evidence of record and
applicable rules of evidence, the Court considers that the
word "secondary evidence" was inaccurate. The copy of
OCT No. 351 offered by Ortigas was a certified true copy of
the original thereof found in the Registration Book of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal. The admissibility of such a copy
in court proceedings is an exception to the ordinary rule on
secondary evidence; such admissibility is in fact mandated by
Section 47 of Act No. 496 (The Land Registration Act). Under
the Land Registration Act which was in force at the time OCT
No. 351 was issued, the original thereof found in the
Registration Book of the Register of Deeds of Rizal was
an official transcript of Decree No. 1425, with respect to the
land covered by such decree situated in the Province of Rizal.
Thus, OCT No. 351 constitutes direct proof of the existence
of Decree No. 1425 upon which the Ortigas TCTs (Nos.
77652 and 77653) are based.
Further, the Court of Appeals was justified in relying upon the
plotting prepared by Engineer Carlos Angeles and his
testimony explaining the significance thereof, notwithstanding
the secondary nature of that plotting and testimony. The
authenticity and correctness of this survey plans and of
Engineer Angeles's explanation thereof had already been
judicially sustained in previously decided cases.
GR No. 80505 December 4, 1990
People vs Mario Tandoy
Facts:
 On May 27, 1986, at about 3:30 p.m. Lt. Salido, Jr. of
the Makati Police Station dispatched Pfc. Herino de la
Cruz, and Detectives Pablo R. Singayan, Nicanor
Candolesas, Luisito de la Cruz, Estanislao Dalumpines,
Antonio Manalastas and Virgilio Padua to conduct a
buy-bust operation at Solchuaga St., Barangay
Singkamas, Makati.
 Detective Singayan was to pose as the buyer while the
other members of the team strategically positioned
themselves. Soon, three men approached Singayan.
 One of them was the accused-appellant, who said
without preamble: "Pare, gusto mo bang umiskor?"
Singayan said yes. The exchange was made then and
there — two rolls/pieces of marijuana for one P10.00 and
two P5.00 bills marked ANU (meaning Anti-Narcotics
Unit).
 The team then moved in and arrested Tandoy.
Manalastas and Candolesas made a body search of the
accused-appellant and took from him the marked money,
as well as eight more rolls/foils of marijuana and crushed
leaves.
 Mario Tandoy was accused to have feloniously sold 8
pcs of dried marijuana flowering tops, 2 pcs dried
marijuana flowering tops and crushed dried marijuana
flowering tops which are prohibited drug, for and in
consideration of Php20.00.
 RTC convicted Mario Tandoy of the crime of violation
of Art. II, Sec. 4 of Rep. Act No. 6425 known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,
 The accused-appellant raises the following assignment
of errors in this appeal:
1. The Court a quo erred in finding accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged despite
lack of evidence to prove that he sold marijuana to the
poseur-buyer.
2. The Court a quo erred in admitting in evidence against
the accused Exh. "E-2-A" which is merely a xerox copy
of the P10.00 bill allegedly used as buy-bust money.
Issue: Will the best evidence rule apply and testimonial evidence
admissible where the document actually executed, or exists, or
in the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution?
Held: No.
 Accused: invokes the best evidence rule and questions
the admission by the trial court of the xerox copy only of
the marked P10.00 bill.
 OSG: correctly refuted the contention; appellant
erroneously thinks that said marked money is an ordinary
document falling under Sec. 2, Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules of Court which excludes the introduction of
secondary evidence except in the five (5) instances:
Ratio:
Best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the
document are the subject of inquiry. Where the issue is only as
to whether or not such document was actually executed, or
exists, or in the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its
execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial
evidence is admissible.
The marked money was presented by the prosecution
solely for the purpose of establishing its existence and not its
contents, other substitutionary evidence, like a xerox copy
thereof, is therefore admissible without the need of accounting
for the original.
The presentation at the trial of the "buy-bust money" was
not indispensable to the conviction of the accused-appellant
because the sale of the marijuana had been adequately proved by
the testimony of the police officers. So long as the marijuana
actually sold by the accused-appellant had been submitted as an
exhibit, the failure to produce the marked money itself would
not constitute a fatal omission.
The Appeal is Dismissed and the challenged decision is
Affirmed.
Security Bank v. Triumph Lumber
G.R. No. 126696 | January 21, 1999
Davide, Jr., C.J.
Nature:
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA
Facts:
1. Plaintiff is a depositor in good standing of
defendant bank under a current checking account.
2. Plaintiff claims that 3 checks all payable to cash and
all drawn against plaintiff’s aforementioned current
account were presented for encashment
a. Also claims that due to defendant bank’s
gross negligence and inexcusable negligence
in exercising ordinary diligence in verifying
from plaintiff the encashment of plaintiff’s
checks exceed a certain amounted in
determining the forgery of drawer’s
signatures, the aforesaid 3 checks were
encashed by unauthorized persons to the
damage and prejudice of the plaintiff
corporation
3. Plaintiff then requested the defendant to credit back
and restore to its account the value of the checks
which were wrongfully encashed
a. But despite due demand the defendant failed
to pay its liability
4. Plaintiff claims that per findings of the PC Crime
Laboratory, the signatures of Co Yok Teng and Yu
Chun Kit, the authorized signatories of plaintiff
were forged
5. Defendant bank claims that when the plaintiff
corporation opened savings account and current
account, the plaintiff provided the bank with the
requisite specimen signature cards which in effect
authorized defendant bank to honor withdrawals on
the basis of any 2 of 3 signatures affixed thereon,
specifically those of Mr. Dee Kong, Mr. Co Yok
Teng and Mr. Chun Yun Kit, the president,
treasurer and general manager of the corporation
a. Plaintiff executed an automatic transfer
agreement authorizing the bank to transfer
cleared funds from plaintiff’s savings
account to its current account at any time
whenever funds in the current account are
insufficient to meet withdrawals therefrom
or are below the stipulated minimum
balance
b. Also claims that the savings account pass
book and the check booklets were kept by
the plaintiff in its filing cabinet but on one
day, the plaintiff discovered that the door of
his office was forced open including that of
the filing cabinet where the check booklets
and other bank documents were being kept
by plaintiff
i. Such incident was not reported to the
police nor was there any advise
given to defendant bank
ii. That on the same day of the
discovery by plaintiff of the
burglary, said plaintiff nevertheless
made three separate deposits; and
later 3 checks were presented, all
 payable to cash, for encashment –
such was given due course
6. TRIAL COURT
a. Found no preponderance of evidence to
support respondent’s complaint
b. Respondent failed to show that the
signatures on the subject checks were forged
c. It did not present in court the originals of the
checks
d. Signatures on the checks were not compared
with the specimen signatures appearing on
the specimen signature cards
e. Respondent failed to present Mr. Co Yok
Teng, one of the signatories of the checks in
question, to deny the genuineness of the
signatures
f. Thus, the bank had exercised due care and
diligence in determining the authenticity of
the checks in question before they were
encashed
i. It was respondent that had been
negligent in the care and custody of
the corporate checks
7. COURT OF APPEALS
a. Reversed TC
b. It was not necessary for respondent to prove
that the signatures on the 3 checks in
question were forged because of the
admissions of the petitioner:
i. 14. Plaintiff was guilty of negligence
substantially contributing to the
unauthorized signatures or forgery of
the signatures on the checks
mentioned in the complaint.
ii. 15. The alleged forged signatures on
the checks were sufficiently adroit as
to escape detection even under the
officer’s scrutiny.
iii. 20.3 Anna P. Naval and Roberto N.
Gabutao verbally admitted that the
checks were forged.
iv. 21. Anna Naval and Roberto
Gabutao are now facing charges for
estafa thru Falsification of
Commercial Documents under
Criminal Case No. 30004 pending
with the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region,
sitting at Makati, Metro Manila.
c. Expert witness was able to examine the
signatures on the orginal checks and
compared them with the standard signatures
on the original checks and compared them
with the standard signatures of the
signatories
i. The photographic enlargements of
the questioned checks were in fact
taken from the original checks
d. Petitioner must be the one to bear the
consequences of its failure to detect the
forgery
 i. Petitioner was less that prudent in the
treatment of respondent’s account
Issue:
1. WON forgery was duly established. NO
2. WON there was proper identification of the
handwriting of the authorized signatories. NO
Held:
The Supreme Court granted the petition and reversed
the decision of the CA (reinstated TC).
1. The Court of Appeals also erred in holding that forgery
was duly established. First, Section 3, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court was not complied with by private
respondent. The Section explicitly provides that when
the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself. This is what is known as the “best
evidence” rule. The exceptions are as follows: 1. When
the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the
offeror; 2. When the original is in the custody or under
the control of the party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable
notice; 3. When the original consists of numerous
accounts or other documents which cannot be examined
in court without great loss of time, and the fact sought
to be established from them is only the general result of
the whole; and 4. When the original is a public record
in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office.
2. In this case, the originals of the alleged forged checks
had to be produced, since it was never shown that any
of these exceptions was present. What the private
respondent offered were mere photocopies of the
checks in question marked as Exhibits “A,” “B,” and
“C.” It never explained the reason why it could not
produce the originals of the checks.
3. It is true that the photocopies of the questioned checks
were all identified by private respondent’s witness Yu
Chun Kit during his direct testimony without objection
on the part of petitioner’s counsel. The latter even
cross-examined Yu Chun Kit, and, at the formal offer
of said exhibits, he objected to their admission solely on
the grounds that they were “irrelevant, immaterial and
self-serving.” The photocopies of the checks may
therefore be admitted for failure of petitioner to tender
an appropriate objection to their admission.
Nevertheless, their probative value is nil.
4. Then, too, the proper procedure in the investigation of a
disputed handwriting was not observed. The initial step
in such investigation is the introduction of the genuine
handwriting of the party sought to be charged with the
disputed writing, which is to serve as a standard of
comparison. The standard or the exemplar must
therefore be proved to be genuine.
5. In BA Finance v. Court of Appeals, we had the occasion
to rule that the genuineness of a standard writing may
be established by any of the following: (1) by the
admission of the person sought to be charged with the
disputed writing made at or for the purposes of the trial,
or by his testimony; (2) by witnesses who saw the
standards written or to whom or in whose hearing the
person sought to be charged acknowledged the writing
 thereof; (3) by evidence showing that the reputed writer
of the standard has acquiesced in or recognized the
same, or that it has been adopted and acted upon by him
in his business transactions or other concerns
6. Our review of the testimony of private respondent’s
expert witness, Crispina V. Tabo, fails to convince us
that she was a credible document examiner, despite
petitioner’s admission that she was. She was candid
enough to admit to the court that although she had
testified more or less three hundred times as an expert,
her findings were sustained by the courts in more or
less ten cases only.
7. Besides, under the circumstances obtaining in this case,
Tabo could by no yardstick be considered to have
adequate knowledge of the genuine signatures of the
parties whose signatures on the questioned checks were
claimed to be forged. That knowledge could be
obtained either by (a) seeing the person write some
other documents or signatures (ex visu scriptionis); (b)
seeing documents otherwise known to him to have been
written by the person in question (ex scriptis olim visis);
or (c) examining, in or out of court, for the express
purpose of obtaining such knowledge, the documents
said to have been written by the person in question (ex
comparatione scriptorum). Tabo could not be a witness
under the first and the second. She tried to be under the
third. But under the third, it is essential that (a) certain
specimens of handwriting were seen and considered by
her and (b) they were genuinely written by the person in
question. Now, as stated above, Tabo had no adequate
basis for concluding that the alleged specimen
signatures in the long bond paper were indeed the
signatures of the parties whose signatures in the checks
were claimed to have been forged. Moreover, we do not
think that the alleged specimens before her were
sufficient in number.
8. Given the fact that Mrs. Tabo’s testimony cannot
inspire a conclusion that she was an expert, it was error
to rely on her representation. It is settled that the
relative weight of the opinions of experts by and large
depends on the value of assistance and guidance they
furnish the court in the determination of the issue
involved.
9. At any rate, since the questioned checks, which were
payable to “cash,” appeared regular on their face and
the bank found nothing unusual in the transaction, as
the respondent usually issued checks in big amounts
made payable to cash or to a particular person or to a
company, the petitioner cannot be faulted in paying the
value of the disputed checks.