Perkins vs Perkins

The parties to this action are husband and wife, married in Manila in 1914, and the wife has
entered suit for separate maintenance

This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, granting certain
amounts for maintenance and P1,000 for expenses for litigation

The order here complained of is for certain items of debts, advances, and living expenses
existing at the time of the order fixing the monthly allowance.

Appellant claims that appellee is estopped from any right to the motion to dismiss, by allowing
the bill of exceptions to be approved, by allowing the appellant to go to the expense of printing
the bill of exceptions and the expense and trouble of preparing and printing his brief, which was
filed on August 31, 1931, and on account of not raising the questions as to the right to appeal
until October 27, 1931, when appellee's brief was filed

Article 148 of the Civil Code reads in part:

"The obligation to give support may be enforced whenever the person having a right to claim it
requires such assistance for his or her maintenance; such allowance, however, shall only be paid
from the date of the filing of the complaint," and the character and the nature of the support is
defined in article 142. The pertinent portion thereof reads:

By support is understood all that is necessary for food, shelter, clothing and medical attendance,
according to the social standing of the family.

In the opinion of the court, some of the items are clearly without the rules laid down in the Code,
while others may be partly within the rules.

While the item known as the "Manila Hotel" is evidently allowable in part, being for ordinary
necessities of life, it covers a period both before and after the filing of the suit.
It is impossible, from the evidence of record, for this court to state how much should be allowed.
It is also noted that no allowance has as yet been made for the period from the filing of suit to the
date of allowance of temporary maintenance two months thereafter

It being impossible for this court to state the amount that should be allowed, the case must be
remanded for further proceedings in accord with the views herein expressed, and it is so ordered.

Pelayo vs Lauron

FACTS: On November 23, 1906, Arturo Pelayo, a physician, filed a complaint against
Marcelo and Juana Abella. He alleged that on October 13, 1906 at night, Pelayo was called to the
house of the defendants to assist their daughter-in-law who was about to give birth to a child.
Unfortunately, the daughter-in-law died as a consequence of said childbirth. Thus, the defendant
refuses to pay. The defendants argue that their daughter-in-law lived with her husband
independently and in a separate house without any relation, that her stay there was accidental and
due to fortuitous event.
 ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants should be held liable for the fees demanded by the
plaintiff upon rendering medical assistance to the defendants’ daughter-in-law.

RULING: No. The Court held that the rendering of medical assistance is one of the
obligations to which spouses are bound by mutual support, expressly determined by law and
readily demanded. Therefore, there was no obligation on the part of the in-laws but rather on the
part of the husband who is not a party.

According to Art 1089 CC, obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasi-
contracts, and by illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence
occurs

Obligations arising from law are not presumed, only those determined by laws are the
only demandable ones.

Thus, decision affirmed.

Sanchez vs Zulueta

FACTS: Petitioner are the wife and child of the defendant who refused to support the
plaintiff for the rearson that he has no means of subsistence despite being a recipient of a
monthly pension from the US Army, and has left them and has refused to let them live in his
house. Defendant on the other hand contends that it was the wife who left the conjugal home
because she committed adultery with one Macario Sanchez and with whom she bore a child with.
Wife wanted the court to compel the defendant to give them allowance by way of support
pendent lite. Trial court favored petitioner, hence this appeal

ISSUE: Are they entitled for support?

RULING: No. Adultery on the part of the wife is a valid defense against an action for
support. Consequently, as to the child, it is also a defense that it is the fruit of such adulterous
relation; thus, it would not be the child of the defendant, hence, not entitled to support. In this
case, the defense was established.

De Asis vs CA

FACTS: Vircel Andres as legal guardian of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, filed an action in
1988 for maintenance and support against the alleged father Manuel De Asis who failed to
provide support and maintenance despite repeated demands. Vircel later on withdrew the
complaint in 1989 for the reason that Manuel denied paternity of the said minor and due to such
denial, it seems useless to pursue the said action. They mutually agreed to move for the
dismissal of the complaint with the condition that Manuel will not pursue his counter claim.

However in 1995, Vircel filed a similar complaint against the alleged father, this time as
the minor’s legal guardian/mother. Manuel interposed maxim of res judicata for the dismissal of
the case. He maintained that since the obligation to give support is based on existence of
paternity between the child and putative parent, lack thereof negates the right to claim support.
 ISSUE:Whether the action for support is already barred.

HELD: The right to give support cannot be renounced nor can it be transmitted to a third
person. The original agreement between the parties to dismiss the initial complaint was in the
nature of a compromise regarding future support which is prohibited by law.
With respect to Manuel’s contention for the lack of filial relationship between him and
the child and agreement of Vircel in not pursuing the original claim, the Court held that existence
of lack of any filial relationship between parties was not a matter which the parties must decide
but should be decided by the Court itself.
While it is true that in order to claim support, filiation or paternity must be first shown
between the parties, but the presence or lack thereof must be judicially established and
declaration is vested in the Court. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the
parties. Hence, the first dismissal cannot bar the filing of another action asking for the same
relief (no force and effect). Furthermore, the defense of res judicata claimed by Manuel was
untenable since future support cannot be the subject of any compromise or waiver.

Rondina vs People

Facts: 1998, AAA 14 years of age, while sister was sleeping, she heard a noise, and later
found herself under Rondina. She was raped by Rondina and later on got pregnant. RTC
convicted Rondina and demanded him to give support to the offspring
Ruling: Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides for three different kinds of civil
liability that may be imposed on the offender: a) indemnification, b) acknowledgement of the
offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing, and c) in every case to support the
offspring. With the passage of the Family Code, the classification of acknowledged natural
children and natural children by legal fiction was eliminated and they now fall under the specie
of illegitimate children.Since parental authority is vested by Article 176 of the Family Code upon
the mother and considering that an offender sentenced to reclusion perpetua automatically loses
the power to exercise parental authority over his children, no further positive act is required of
the parent as the law itself provides for the childs status. Hence, [Victor] should only be ordered
to indemnify and support the victims child The amount [and terms] of support shall be
determined by the trial court after due notice and hearing in accordance with Article 201 FC

Gotardo vs Buling

Facts: Respondent is seeking child recognition and support from petitioner who is her ex-
fiancee. It was established that both parties were sweethearts in work at a bank. They started to
have a sexual relationship and lasted till the respondent got pregnant. When they found out that
respondent is pregnant, the petitioner proposed to respondent, but he later on backed out and left
respondent. Respondent sent demand letters but petitioner refused to answer. Hence, the
respondent filed a complaint for child recognition and support. Petitioner, however, denied being
the father of the child, averring that he had first sexual contact with the respondent in the first
week of August 1994, and she could have been pregnant for 3 month when he was informed of
the pregnancy on September 1994. The RTC, during the pending of the case, granted support
pendente lite, but later on denied the complaint for lack of evidence. CA set aside the RTC ruling
Ruling: Sustain the support. Respondent was able to establish a prima facie case that the
petitioner is the putative father of the child through testimony that she had been seually involved
only with one man. Petitioner, on the other hand, failed to prove his claims of infidelity. Since
filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation.
Perla vs Baring
Facts: Antonio Perla and Mirasol Baring were sweethearts and later on produced an
offspring. Petitioner promised to give support to respondent and child but he evaded her.
Because of this, she filed a complaint for support. During trial she presented Birth Certificate and
averred that the information in the birth certificate was supplied by her and the petitioner.
Ruling: Mirasol and Randy’s Complaint for support is based on Randy’s alleged
illegitimate filiation to Petitioner. The court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to
establish paternity. Respondents failed to prove illegitimate filiation. Birth certificate is not a
competent evidence to prove paternity. A Baptismal Certificate alone is not enough.

Lerma vs CA
FACTS: Petitioner Lerma and respondent Diaz are husband and wife. They married on
May 19, 1951. On August 22, 1969 petitioner filed a complaint for adultery against the
respondent and a certain Teodoro Ramirez

The respondent filed with the lower court, presided by Judge Leonor Ines Luciano, a
complaint against the petitioner for legal separation and/or separation of properties, custody of
their children 2 and support, with an urgent petition for support pendente lite for her and their
youngest son, Gregory, who was then and until now is in her custody. The respondent’s
complaint for legal separation is based on two grounds: concubinage and attempt against her life.
The petitioner filed his opposition to the respondent’s application for support pendente
lite, setting up as defense the adultery charge he had filed against the respondent.

Judge Luciano granted the respondent’s application for support pendente lite in an order
dated December 24, 1969, which she amended in an order dated February 15, 1970 to the
following effect: (1) the respondent was declared entitled to support pendente lite from the date
of the filing of the complaint; and (2) the amount of such monthly support was reduced from
P2,250.00 to P1,820.00.

ISSUE: Whether adultery is a good defense against the respondent’s claim for
support pendente lite.

HELD: The right to separate support or maintenance, even from the conjugal partnership
property, presupposes the existence of a justifiable cause for the spouse claiming such right to
live separately. This is implicit in Article 104 of the Civil Code, which states that after the filing
of the petition for legal separation the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other.

A petition in bad faith, such as that filed by one who is himself or herself guilty of an act
which constitutes a ground for legal separation at the instance of the other spouse, cannot be
considered as within the intendment of the law granting separate support. In fact under Article
303 of the same Code the obligation to give support shall cease “when the recipient, be he a
forced heir or not, has committed some act which gives rise to disinheritance;” and under Article
921 one of the causes for disinheriting a spouse is “when the spouse has given cause for legal
separation.” The loss of the substantive right to support in such a situation is incompatible with
any claim for support pendente lite.
Reyes vs Ines-Luciano

Manuel Reyes attacked his wife twice with the intent to kill. A complaint was filed on June 3,
1976: the first attempt on March was prevented by her father and the second attempt, wherein
she was already living separately from her husband, was stopped only because of her driver’s
intervention. She filed for legal separation on that ground and prayed for support pendente lite
for herself and her three children. The husband opposed the application for support on the ground
that the wife committed adultery with her physician. The respondent Judge Ines-Luciano of the
lower court granted the wife pendente lite. The husband filed a motion for reconsideration
reiterating that his wife is not entitled to receive such support during the pendency of the case,
and that even if she is entitled to it, the amount awarded was excessive. The judge reduced the
amount from P5000 to P4000 monthly. Husband filed a petition for certiorari in the CA to annul
the order granting alimony. CA dismissed the petition which made the husband appeal to the SC.

Issue:
Whether or not support can be administered during the pendency of an action.

Ruling:
Yes – provided that adultery is established by competent evidence. Mere allegations will not bar
her right to receive support pendente lite. Support can be administered during the pendency of
such cases. In determining the amount, it is not necessary to go into the merits of the case. It is
enough that the facts be established by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the
record. [The SC on July, 1978 ordered the alimony to be P1000/month from the period of June to
February 1979, after the trial, it was reverted to P4000/month based on the accepted findings of
the trial court that the husband could afford it because of his affluence and because it wasn’t
excessive

Mangonon vs Court of Appeals

Facts:
On 17 March 1994, petitioner Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then minor
children Rica and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support, with application
for support pendente lite with the RTC Makati. In said petition, it was alleged that on 16
February 1975, petitioner and respondent Federico Delgado were civilly married by then City
Court Judge Eleuterio Agudo in Legaspi City, Albay. At that time, petitioner was only 21 years
old while respondent Federico was only 19 years old. As the marriage was solemnized without
the required consent per Article 85 of the New Civil Code, it was annulled on 11 August 1975 by
the Quezon City Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.

On 25 March 1976, or within seven months after the annulment of their marriage,
petitioner gave birth to twins Rica and Rina. According to petitioner, she, with the assistance of
her second husband Danny Mangonon, raised her twin daughters as private respondents had
totally abandoned them. At the time of the institution of the petition, Rica and Rina were about to
enter college in the United States of America (USA) where petitioner, together with her
daughters and second husband, had moved to and finally settled in. Rica was admitted to the
University of Massachusetts (Amherst) while Rina was accepted by the Long Island University
and Western New England College. Despite their admissions to said universities, Rica and Rina
were, however, financially incapable of pursuing collegiate education because of the following:
i) The average annual cost for college education in the US is about US$22,000/year,
broken down as follows:
 Tuition Fees US$13,000.00
Room & Board 5,000.00
Books 1,000.00
Yearly Transportation &
Meal Allowance 3,000.00
Total US$ 22,000.00
Or a total of US$44,000.00, more or less, for both Rica and Rina

Issue:
Whether or not Federico is obliged to provide support

Ruling:
In this case, this Court believes that respondent Francisco could not avail himself of the
second option. From the records, we gleaned that prior to the commencement of this action, the
relationship between respondent Francisco, on one hand, and petitioner and her twin daughters,
on the other, was indeed quite pleasant. The correspondences exchanged among them expressed
profound feelings of thoughtfulness and concern for one another’s well-being. The photographs
presented by petitioner as part of her exhibits presented a seemingly typical family celebrating
kinship. All of these, however, are now things of the past. With the filing of this case, and the
allegations hurled at one another by the parties, the relationships among the parties had certainly
been affected. Particularly difficult for Rica and Rina must be the fact that those who they had
considered and claimed as family denied having any familial relationship with them. Given all
these, we could not see Rica and Rina moving back here in the Philippines in the company of
those who have disowned them.

Finally, as to the amount of support pendente lite, we take our bearings from the
provision of the law mandating the amount of support to be proportionate to the resources or
means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient. Guided by this principle, we hold
respondent Francisco liable for half of the amount of school expenses incurred by Rica and Rina
as support pendente lite. As established by petitioner, respondent Francisco has the financial
resources to pay this amount given his various business endeavors.

Spouses Prudencio and Filomena Lim vs. Ma. Cheryl S. Lim, et. al.

Facts: In 1979, Cheryl married Edward, son of petitioners. Cheryl bore Edward three children,
respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III. Cheryl, Edward and their children
resided at the house of petitioners in Forbes Park, Makati City, together with Edward’s ailing
grandmother, Chua Giak and her husband Mariano Lim (Mariano). Edward’s family business,
which provided him with a monthly salary of P6,000, shouldered the family expenses. Cheryl
had no steady source of income.

On October 14, 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing the children with
her (then all minors), after a violent confrontation with Edward whom she caught with the in-
house midwife of Chua Giak in what the trial court described "a very compromising situation."

Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and Mariano
(defendants) in RTC for support. RTC ordered Edward to provide monthly support of P6,000
pendente lite.
On January 31, 1996, RTC rendered judgment ordering Edward and petitioners to "jointly"
provide P40,000 monthly support to respondents, with Edward shouldering P6,000 and
petitioners the balance of P34,000 subject to Chua Giak’s subsidiary liability. The defendants
sought reconsideration, questioning their liability. RTC, while denying reconsideration, clarified
that petitioners and Chua Giak were held jointly liable with Edward because of the latter’s
“inability to give sufficient support”.

Petitioners appealed to the CA assailing, among others, their liability to support respondents.
Petitioners argued that while Edward’s income is insufficient, the law itself sanctions its effects
by providing that legal support should be "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family"
under Article 194 of the Civil Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 209 (The Family Code
of the Philippines).

On April 28, 2003, CA affirmed RTC. Parents and their legitimate children are obliged to
mutually support one another and this obligation extends down to the legitimate grandchildren
and great grandchildren. Should the person obliged to give support does not have sufficient
means to satisfy all claims, the other persons enumerated in Article 199 in its order shall provide
the necessary support. This is because the closer the relationship of the relatives, the stronger the
tie that binds them. Thus, the obligation to support is imposed first upon the shoulders of the
closer relatives and only in their default is the obligation moved to the next nearer relatives and
so on. CA denied motion for reconsideration.

Issue: WON petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide support to respondents.

Held: Yes. Petitioners are liable to provide support but only to their grandchildren. By
statutory and jurisprudential mandate, the liability of ascendants to provide legal support to their
descendants is beyond cavil. Petitioners themselves admit as much – they limit their petition to
the narrow question of when their liability is triggered, not if they are liable. Relying on
provisions found in Title IX of the Civil Code, as amended, on Parental Authority, petitioners
theorize that their liability is activated only upon default of parental authority, conceivably either
by its termination or suspension during the children’s minority. Because at the time respondents
sued for support, Cheryl and Edward exercised parental authority over their children, petitioners
submit that the obligation to support the latter’s offspring ends with them.

Grandchildren cannot demand support directly from their grandparents if they have parents
(ascendants of nearest degree) who are capable of supporting them. This is so because we have
to follow the order of support under Art. 199. There is no showing that private respondent
is without means to support his son; neither is there any evidence to prove that petitioner, as the
paternal grandmother, was willing to voluntarily provide for her grandson's legal support.

There is no question that Cheryl is unable to discharge her obligation to provide sufficient legal
support to her children, then all school-bound. It is also undisputed that the amount of support
Edward is able to give to respondents, P6,000 a month, is insufficient to meet respondents’ basic
needs. This inability of Edward and Cheryl to sufficiently provide for their children shifts a
portion of their obligation to the ascendants in the nearest degree, both in the paternal
(petitioners) and maternal lines, following the ordering in Article 199.1avvphi1

Petitioners’ partial concurrent obligation extends only to their descendants as this word is
commonly understood to refer to relatives, by blood of lower degree. As petitioners’
grandchildren by blood, only respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III belong
to this category. Indeed, Cheryl’s right to receive support from the Lim family extends only to
her husband Edward, arising from their marital bond. Cheryl’s share from the amount of monthly
support RTC awarded cannot be determined from the records. Thus, we are constrained to
remand the case to the trial court for this limited purpose.

As an alternative proposition, petitioners wish to avail of the option in Article 204 of the Civil
Code, as amended, and pray that they be allowed to fulfill their obligation by maintaining
respondents at petitioners’ Makati residence. The option is unavailable to petitioners. The
application of Article 204 which provides that the person obliged to give support shall have the
option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and
maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive support. The latter
alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto.

Canonizado vs Benitez

Petitioner file an action for support against her estranged husband, the private respondent. The
trial court granted the claim for their minor child Christina in the amount of 100 pesos monthly
but denied similar support for the petitioner on the ground that she was gainfully employed.

The petitioner questioned this decision in a petition for certiorari with this Court considered the
appealed decision a mere order resolving the petitioner’s motion for alimony pendent lite and
modified it by granting support both for the minor child and the petitioner in the monthly amount
of 100 pesos each. When the corresponding writ of execution was issued, the respondent filed an
action in the Court of First Instance to restrain the sale by public auction of certain properties
over which he claimed to have lost ownership. The trial court declared the supposed conveyance
of such properties to be simulated and ordered the Sheriff to proceed with the auction sale. The
decision became final when the appeal filed by the private respondent was later withdrawn. A
decision on the merits was promulgated by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court awarind
arrearages in support pendent lite to both the petitioner and her daughter plus current monthly
support for the latter at the rate of 150 pesos beginning Oct 1964.

HELD: art 303 the obligation to give support shall also cease x x x when the recipient may
engage in a trade profession or industry or has obtained work or has improved his fortune in such
a way that he no longer needs allowance for his subsistence x x x.

When any of the above circumstances occurs, the support stops since the recipient no longer
needs it for subsistence. It does not mean, however, that the obligation to give or the right to ask
for support also ceases permanently because the lack of a need for it may only be temporary.

Lacson vs Lacson

Facts:
The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson are legitimate daughters
of petitioner Edward V. Lacson and his wife, Lea Daban Lacson. Maowee was born on
December 4, 1974, while Maonaa, a little less than a year later. Not long after the birth of
Maonaa, petitioner left the conjugal home in Molo, Iloilo City, virtually forcing mother and
children to seek, apparently for financial reason, shelter somewhere else. For a month, they
stayed with Lea’s mother-in-law, Alicia Lacson, then with her (Lea’s) mother and then with her
brother Noel Daban. After some time, they rented an apartment only to return later to the house
of Lea’s mother. As the trial court aptly observed, the sisters and their mother, from 1976 to
1994, or for a period of eighteen (18) years, shuttled from one dwelling place to another not their
own.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is obliged to give support.

Ruling:
Petitioner admits being obliged, as father, to provide support to both respondents,
Maowee and Maonaa. It is his threshold submission, however, that he should not be made to pay
support in arrears, i.e., from 1976 to 1994, no previous extrajudicial, let alone judicial, demand
having been made by the respondents. He invokes the following provision of the Family Code to
complete his point:Article 203 – The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the
time the person who has a right to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be
paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand.

To petitioner, his obligation to pay under the afore quoted provision starts from the filing
of Civil Case No. 22185 in 1995, since only from that moment can it be said that an effective
demand for support was made upon him

Lim-lua vs Lua

Facts: September 3, 2003, petitioner Susan Lim Lua filed an action for the DONOM with
respondent Lua to RTC. She also prayed for support pendent lite for herself and her two
children; andsought the amount of 500k as monthly support citing respondent’s huge earnings
from salaries and dividends in several companies and business here and abroad. After due
hearing, RTC cited Art 203 of the FC stating that support is demandable from the time plaintiff
needed the said support but is payable only from the date of judicial demand, and thus also
granted support pendent lite of 250k (x7 corresponding to the 7 months that lapsed). Respondent
filed for MFR asserting that petitioner is not entitled to spousal support considering that she does
not maintain for herself a separate dwelling from their children and respondent has continued to
support the family for their sustenance and well-being in accordance with family’s social and
financial standing. However it was denied. CA nullified RTC’s ruling stating that the trial court
should have not completely disregarded the expenses incurred by respondent consisting of the
purchase and maintenance of the two cars, payment of tuition fees, travel expenses and the
groceries.

HELD: The SC declared that the petition is partly granted. As a matter of law, the amount
of support which those related by marriage and family relationship is generally obliged to give
such other shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the
recipient. Such support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance. In keeping witht eh
financial capacity of the family, the general rule is to the effect that when a father is required by
a divorce decree to pay to the mother, money for the support of their dependent children and the
unpaid and accrued installments become judgment in her favor, he cannot as a matter of law,
claim credit on the account of payments voluntarily made directly to the children. Here, the CA
should not have allowed all the expenses incurred by respondent to be credited against the
accrued support pendent lite.