THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

ROCKINGHAM, SS SUPERIOR COURT

DOCKET NO.
218-2018-CV-00090

PAUL MARAVELIAS

V.

JOHN J. COUGHLIN, et al.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS

AND PROHIBITION IN CASE NO.
473-2016-CV-00124

The Plaintiff, Paul Maravelias, hereby

laintiff

represents as follows:

1. Defendants

2. relies upon a preliminary 1/16/19 New Hampshire Supreme Court

Final Order in Christina DePamphilis v. Paul Maravelias (2018-0483). 1 Defendants argue the

1
Plaintiff does not concede the Supreme Court preliminary 1/16/19 Final Order subject to
modification and even entire rewriting in response to a pending Motion for Reconsideration is legally

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PAUL MARAVELIAS 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 Maravelias bar his claims in the instant Petition

by the operation of collateral estoppel.

3. Order, Plaintiff partially agrees with

Defendants only insofar as it appears difficult for Plaintiff to prevail on the third requested

prohibition action pertaining to the Defendants wrongful exercise of personal jurisdiction in

2018. Accordingly, in the interest of judicial economy, Plaintiff hereby ASSENTS to the

dismissal of this one claim II.(c) in Plaintiff s Petition.

4. other requested prohibition and

mandamus actions are without merit and should not be granted as specified hereunder.

ARGUMENT

The Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel Does Not Apply Where Maravelias Did Not Have a
Fair Opportunity to Litigate the Issues or Facts in Question, or Where Said Issues Are
Not Identical Between Different Actions

5. For collateral estoppel to apply, s pleaded must have had

a full and fair prior opportunity to litigate the issue or fact in question. Stewart v. Bader, 154

N.H. 75, 80 81 (2006). Further, the issue subject to estoppel must be identical in each action .

Simpson v. Calivas, 139 N.H. 1, 7, 650 A.2d 318, 323 (1994).

6. Here, Maravelias has not had the full and fair opportunity to adjudicate issues upon

which his remaining causes of action for prerogative writs to the trial court are based. Since his

opening pleading

viable for Defendants collateral estoppel arguments. In this Objection, Plaintiff proceeds with the
generous and hypothetical assumption that such a preliminary Order is, in fact, a valid final judgment for
the purposes of collateral estoppel and/or res judicata.

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PAUL MARAVELIAS 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
assuming the truth of his well-pleaded allegations does not permit dismissal as a matter of law.

Plaisted v. LaBrie, 165 N.H. 194, 195 (2013).

7. Defendant Maravelias develops this point in specific relation to each claim hereunder.

Prohibition Specific Findings of Fact Claim

8. Defendants invite the Court to embrace an inaccurately narrow purview of the

circumstances in which a writ of prohibition may lie. The purpose of the writ is to prevent

subordinate courts or other tribunals, officers or persons from usurping or exercising jurisdiction

with which they are not vested . Hillsborough v. Superior Court, 109 N.H. 333, 334, 251 A.2d

325, 326 (1969).

9. However, this language has not narrowed application of the writ to address solely

nominal jurisdictional disputes rather than any tribunal s excess of legal authority where no other

form of relief is available. See MacDonald, Gordon J.. Wiebusch on New Hampshire Civil

Practice and Procedure. United States of America, LexisNexis, 2014. at §38.48. For a writ of

prohibition to issue,

expected to abuse discretion or has exceeded or may be expected to exceed legal authority Id.

Even absent a clear breach of may lie

or officer from abusing its discretion in the exercise of the legal authority committed to it. Id.,

citing Powell v. Pappagianis, 108 N.H. 523 (1968). As a matter of rigorous definition, any issue

concerning breached/exceeded legal authority by a lower tribunal is a jurisdictional issue.

10. Here, Maravelias s Petition contains the well-pleaded allegation that Judge Coughlin has

engaged in a routine habit of issuing stalking protective order injunctions with zero supporting

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PAUL MARAVELIAS 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
specific factual findings. Exhibit A of said Petition is a legal document scrutinizing many such

examples from 2018 alone of Judge Coughlin s habitual breach of legal authority. It therefore

may be expected to continue, absent a prerogative writ.

11. Defendants note that, in Maravelias s underlying case, they did make many specific

factual findings to support its extension of the underlying civil stalking order (Motion at ¶15).

Defendants, however, made zero factual findings to support their further and separate finding

that Maravelias s conduct created reasonable fear for personal safety a finding not statutorily

obliged by the extension case, yet peppered-in sua sponte by Defendants. Such a finding could

potentially have extensive ramifications for a civil protective order defendant, for instance,

where a plaintiff in such a proceeding seeks a firearms prohibition term against a defendant.

12. Maravelias is without any adequate alternate relief as it pertains to this claim. The

Supreme Court s preliminary 1/16/19 Order does not address whatsoever the issue of Judge

Coughlin s routine omission of supporting factual findings for stalking orders (in general) and

for the reasonable fear finding (specifically) in Maravelias s underlying case.

13. Accordingly, Maravelias well-pleaded claim on its face for prohibition

action in this certain count, surviving the Motion to Dismiss.

Prohibition Unlawful Recording Restrictions Claim

14. Maravelias s claim for a writ of prohibition addressing this issue is not limited to whether

Defendants exceeded their legal authority by exercising to make a determination

as to whether the permit recording of a specific court hearing . (Motion at ¶21) Maravelias s

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PAUL MARAVELIAS 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
Petition additionally laments that, in making such discretionary limitations, Defendants wholly

neglected the procedural requirements therefor as stipulated in Dist. Div. R. 1.4(e) and (f).

15. To wit, in the underlying 2018 case, Defendants did not necessitate that the opposing

party demonstrate a compelling public interest that would be served by the sought recording

restriction, nor did Defendants comply with the law necessitating that any order prohibiting or

imposing restrictions beyond the terms of this rule upon the photographing, recording or

broadcasting of a court proceeding that is open to the public shall be supported by particularized

See Dist. Div. R. 1.4(f).

16. The Supreme Court s 1/16/19 Order does not address these aspects of Defendants

alleged unlawful conduct. It merely repeats in general terms that the controlling court rules

contemplate that, in certain situations, the lower tribunal has to issue recording

restrictions. The Supreme Court s Order does not negate nor even address that, in any such

instance, the rules explicitly require trial court judges to follow a certain process which Judge

Coughlin willfully refused to follow in the underlying case.

17. Accordingly, the Supreme Court s Order does not address the significant and identical

elements of this issue as to collaterally estop prohibition action on this count.

18. Accordingly, Maravelias well-pleaded claim on its face for prohibition

action in this certain count, surviving the Motion to Dismiss.

Mandamus Claim Relating to Defendants Unreasonable Delay to Rule and Alleged Self-
Interested Dilatory Practices Causing Irreparable Harm

19. Defendants are woefully misled to report that the Supreme Court s 1/16/19 Order does

or even possibly could address this alleged ongoing pattern of Defendants misconduct. The

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PAUL MARAVELIAS 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
newest turns in this count of Defendants misconduct among them, failing to rule upon

Maravelias s motion to modify the underlying protective order now two months after its filing

were presented to the Supreme Court nowhere in the recent appeal on the merits.

20. Maravelias s appeal on the merits to the Supreme Court substantially addressed the

summer 2018 extension of the underlying protective order only. It did not address this count of

Defendants misconduct in the instant mandamus action.

21. Defendants Motion to Dismiss inaccurately posits that their alleged failure to rule upon

Maravelias s pleadings is limited to his pleadings in the underlying extension of the protective

order matter, which has now been resolved by the New Hampshire Supreme Court . (Motion at

¶27) This is assertion is factually erroneous. As specifically enumerated in Maravelias s Petition,

the pleadings on which Defendants have negligently failed to rule are pleadings filed months

after the extension of the protective order and the incident notice of appeal thereon. 2

22. To wit, Defendants continue to entirely ignore Maravelias s 11/21/18 and 12/10/18

Motions in the underlying matter. By comparison, when Maravelias s opponent in the underlying

matter filed her Motion to Extend Duration of [the protective order] on 1/24/19, Defendants

granted it that very same day, whereas outstanding pleadings in the same matter

have been ignored now for over two months.

23. Accordingly, the Supreme Court s Order does not address the significant and identical

elements of this issue as to collaterally estop the claim for mandamus action on this count. In this

count, the 1/16/19 Supreme Court Order does not address this pattern of Defendants conduct at

all, which postdated Defendants June 2018 protective order extension underlying that appeal.

2
Although Maravelias smiss was filed before the extension and was arguably
the Supreme Court, his other subsequent late-2018 Motions hereunto totally ignored by
Defendants form the predominant substance of this claim for mandamus action.

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PAUL MARAVELIAS 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
Maravelias had no opportunity to litigate this issue in the Supreme Court as it did not exist until

after the appeal on the extension was initiated.

24. Maravelias has a clear right to be fully heard in a protective order case where

someone is trying to restrict his constitutional rights and has succeeded. See Code of Judicial

Conduct Canon 2 Rule 2.6. Maravelias has a right that judicial officers will comply with the

law, including the Code of Judicial Conduct , which includes the Responsibility to Decide . See

Id., Canon 1 Rule 1.1 and Canon 2 Rule 2.7.

25. As asserted in Maravelias s Petition, a writ of mandamus is used to compel a public

official to perform a ministerial act that the official has refused to perform Petition of

CIGNA Healthcare, Inc., 146 N.H. 683 (2001) (emphasis added).

26. Maravelias s Petition advances a claim to a clear right violated by Defendants continued

refusal to perform ministerial acts which they are required by law to perform. Maravelias is

without any alternate remedy; litigants cannot appeal trial court orders to the Supreme Court

which do not even exist due to a lower tribunal s or judicial officer s dereliction of duty.

27. A writ of mandamus is the only form of relief available when a lower tribunal negligently

abandons its duty to decide at marked expense to the constitutional rights of one of the parties,

as for Maravelias and consequentially does not ever produce any court orders at all by which

the normal appeal process could begin.

28. Accordingly, Maravelias well-pleaded claim on its face for mandamus

action in this certain count, surviving the Motion to Dismiss.

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PAUL MARAVELIAS 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
Mandamus Mandatory Recusal of Hon John. J. Coughlin

29. Defendants accurately note the Supreme Court s 1/16/19 Order declined to make a

finding that Judge Coughlin acted with bias, based off solely the materials submitted to the

Supreme Court in that appeal and at that point in time. This however has no preclusive effect on

the instant mandamus action. Plaintiff s Petition seeks to compel the recusal of Hon. John J.

Coughlin on the grounds of far more latitudinous acts and circumstances than those addressed

within Maravelias s appeal on the extension or the Supreme Court s 1/16/19 Order thereon.

30. The said Supreme Court appeal was initiated in response to Defendants June 2018

extension order multiple months before Defendant Hon. John J. Coughlin s aggravated recusal-

warranting alleged misconduct came to include, inter alia, ruling himself on Maravelias s

10/31/18 Motion to Set Aside Judgement alleging his own material misconduct when Maravelias

believed Judge Coughlin had retired.

31. This mandamus claim within Maravelias s Petition cannot be estopped by findings which

the Supreme Court never made. For collateral estoppel to bar this claim, the Supreme Court s

1/16/19 Order would need to allege that there is currently no person who might reasonably

question Judge Coughlin s impartiality if he continues presiding over this case, given the totality

of actions transpired since mid-2018 in the underlying Circuit Court case. See Code of Judicial

Conduct Canon 2 Rule 2.11.

32. To the contrary, the Supreme Court s Order only commented that, based on the limited

materials Maravelias had presented in his appeal to question Judge Coughlin s alleged bias at

that stage of the litigation, they decline to make such a finding. Accordingly, the Supreme

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PAUL MARAVELIAS 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
Court s 1/16/19 Order does not address the significant and identical elements of this issue as to

collaterally estop mandamus action on this count.

33. The assertion that Maravelias s identified rights in this count are not clear is without

merit. The object of mandamus is to compel the performance of official duty by the unwilling,

not by the willing. Goodell v. Woodbury, 71 N.H. 378 (1902). The writ has been used in the

past to compel a judge to self-recuse or at least certify his non-recusal exactly as

Maravelias s Petition seeks. Cf., Wiebusch, supra, at §38.32, ndamus as] remedy to compel

assertedly disqualified judge to recuse self or to certify his disqualification. 45 ALR2d 937.

[Library Reference] Here, Judge Coughlin has not taken any action whatsoever in response to

Maravelias s 11/21/18 Motion for Recusal and Reconsideration, neither to recuse himself

affirmatively nor to certify his formal denial of the motion for recusal. This constitutes further

judicial misconduct and reinforces Maravelias s allegations of partisan, self-interested dilatory

practices on the part of the Defendants. See supra, ¶19-27.

34. Maravelias s Petition identifies his clear right at play in this count, citing constitutional

provisions and the Code of Judicial Conduct, for which he has no adequate alternative relief.

Accordingly, Maravelias well-pleaded claim on its face for mandamus action

in this count, surviving the Motion to Dismiss.

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PAUL MARAVELIAS 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, undersigned Plaintiff Paul J. Maravelias respectfully requests this Honorable

Court:

I. Deny D Plaintiff s claims for writ of mandamus

relief;

II. Deny D Plaintiff s first two claims for writ of

prohibition relief, not including the prohibition action pleaded as Count #3 and
Prayer II.(c) in Plaintiff s Petition, the dismissal of which Plaintiff does not contest;

III. Grant Plaintiff s Petition for Writs of Prohibition and Mandamus in all four
remaining counts; and

IV. Grant such other relief as may be just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

PAUL J. MARAVELIAS,

in propria persona

/s/ Paul J. Maravelias Dated: February 11th, 2019

Paul J. Maravelias
34 Mockingbird Hill Rd
Windham, NH 03087
paul@paulmarv.com
603-475-3305

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PAUL MARAVELIAS 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Paul Maravelias, certify that a copy of the foregoing

was forwarded on this day via first-class mail to Nancy Smith, Esq., Senior Assistant Attorney
General, 33 Capitol Street, Concord, NH 03301, counsel for Defendants.

February 11th, 2019 ___________________________________

Paul J. Maravelias

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PAUL MARAVELIAS 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

ROCKINGHAM, SS. SUPERIOR COURT

Paul Maravelias

v.

John J. Coughlin, et al.

Docket No. 218-2019-CV-00090

MOTION TO DISMISS

The defendants, the Honorable John. J. Coughlin, Derry Circuit Court, and certain

allegedly “concerned judicial officer(s)” hereby move to dismiss the Petition for Writ of

Mandamus and Prohibition filed by the plaintiff, Paul Maravelias. In support thereof, the

defendants state as follows:

1. The plaintiff seeks a writ of prohibition against the Derry District Court and its

judicial officers, asking to remove allegedly unlawful recording restrictions on him in violation

of Circuit Court Rule 1.4, to prohibit judicial officers from issuing civil protective orders against

him without making specific factual findings, and to prohibit judicial officers generally from

issuing injunctions and extensions of those injunctions without personal jurisdiction over the

person’s subject to those injunctions. Pl.’s Petition at 22.

2. The plaintiff seeks a writ of mandamus against the Derry Circuit Court and its

judicial officers seeking to force a ruling on certain pleadings in a case, DePamphilis v.

Maravelias, 473-2016-CV-00124, in that court. Id.

3. The plaintiff also seeks a writ of mandamus to force Judge Coughlin to recuse

himself from all further proceedings concerning him or Christina DePamphilis. Id. at 22-23.
 4. The plaintiff is not entitled to any of the relief he seeks, nearly all of which has

already been dealt with on direct appeal from the underlying Derry Circuit Court matter,

DePamphilis v. Maravelias, 473-2016-CV-00124, and has been rejected by the New Hampshire

Supreme Court in an order dated January 16, 2019, DePamphilis v. Maravelias, Case No. 2018-

0483 (N.H.) (a copy of the order is attached hereto as Exhibit A). Therefore, to the extent that the

issues below where raised in his direct appeal, he is collaterally estopped from raising these

issues again and this motion to dismiss should be granted. For collateral estoppel to apply, three

basic conditions must be satisfied: (1) the issue subject to estoppel must be identical in each

action; (2) the first action must have resolved the issue finally on the merits; and (3) the party to

be estopped must have appeared as a party in the first action, or have been in privity with

someone who did so. “These conditions must be understood, in turn, as particular elements of the

more general requirement, that a party against whom estoppel is pleaded must have had a full

and fair prior opportunity to litigate the issue or fact in question.(citations omitted)” Stewart v.

Bader, 154 N.H. 75, 80–81 (2006). These conditions are met because the issues as explained

below are identical, the Supreme Court decision is final and the plaintiff is the same.

Standard of Review

5. In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must determine whether the allegations

in the plaintiff's pleadings are reasonably susceptible of a construction that would permit

recovery. Plaisted v. LaBrie, 165 N.H. 194, 195 (2013). The Court must assume that the

plaintiff's well-pleaded factual allegations are true and construe all reasonable inferences in the

light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Id. The Court does not, however, assume the truth of

statements that are merely conclusions of law. Ford v. N.H. Dep't of Transp., 163 N.H. 284, 288

(2012). The Court then “engage[s] in a threshold inquiry, testing the facts alleged in the
pleadings against the applicable law.” Signal Aviation Servs. v. City of Lebanon, 164 N.H. 578,

582 (2013).

Plaintiff’s Writ of Prohibition Requests

6. The issuance of a writ of prohibition is discretionary and lies to prevent

subordinate courts “‘from usurping or exercising jurisdiction with which they are not vested.’”

Manchester Ed. Ass’n v. Superior Court, 109 N.H. 513, 514 (1969) (quoting Hillsborough

County v. Superior Court, 109 N.H. 333, 334 (1969)).

7. The writ will issue “only when the right to relief is clear,” id. (quoting

Hillsborough County, 109 N.H. at 334), and only “[w]hen there is no other remedy,” State v.

Flynn, 123 N.H. 457. 462 (1983).

8. Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Claim. The plaintiff requests a writ of

prohibition issue to preclude the Derry Circuit Court from issuing protective order injunctions

against persons over whom the court lacks personal jurisdiction.

9. In its January 16, 2019 order, the New Hampshire Supreme Court rejected the

plaintiff’s argument related to personal jurisdiction for a protective order extension, concluding

that the plaintiff had waived personal jurisdiction by actively participating in the underlying

stalking matter. Exhibit A, DePamphilis v. Maravelias, Case No. 2018-0483, slip op. at 2 (N.H.

Jan. 16, 2019).

10. The plaintiff contends that a current extension request has been filed out of time

and therefore the Derry Circuit Court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction. Pl.’s Petition at 17-

18.
 11. If the plaintiff believes that the Derry Circuit Court is currently without personal

jurisdiction over him with respect to a new, pending matter, his remedy is to raise that issue in

the context of that matter and litigate it.

12. In short, the plaintiff has not shown that the Derry Circuit Court is acting, or has

acted, without any legal authority and cannot show that he lacks an adequate remedy at law—the

normal judicial and appellate process—to resolve the personal jurisdiction issue he alleges.

13. A writ of prohibition does not lie in such a circumstance.

14. Specific Findings of Fact Claim. The plaintiff also requests a writ of prohibition

to force Derry Circuit Court judges to make specific factual findings in connection with the

issuance of civil stalking protective orders. Pl.’s Petition at 22. He claims that the court has

failed to do so in the past and “is expected” to continue to do so in the future. Id. at 16-17. He

contends that this violates his Due Process rights. Id.

15. The New Hampshire Supreme Court’s order reflects that the district court made

many specific factual findings to support its extension of the underlying civil stalking order.

Exhibit A, DePamphilis v. Maravelias, Case No. 2018-0483, slip op. at 2 (N.H. Jan. 16, 2019) at

4-8.

16. The notion that the Derry Circuit Court judges are expected to not make specific

findings of fact in the future is speculative and without foundation.

17. Additionally, the failure to make specific factual findings in support of certain

rulings is not jurisdictional. It may be, at best, an error to be preserved in the underlying matter

to be raised on appeal in that matter.

18. Accordingly, a writ of prohibition does not lie in such a circumstance.

 19. Unlawful Recording Restrictions. The plaintiff asserts that the Derry Circuit

Court has in place allegedly unlawful recording restrictions on him in violation of Circuit Court

Rule 1.4.

20. The New Hampshire Supreme Court considered this claim, which the plaintiff

raised on appeal in the underlying civil stalking matter, and soundly rejected it. The New

Hampshire Supreme Court resolved the issue as follows:

We note, however, that to the extent the defendant suggests that he had an
absolute right to record video of the plaintiff under District Division Rule 1.4,
Rule 1.4 contemplates that the trial court may limit a party’s ability to record the
proceedings. See Dist. Div. R. 1.4(f); see also Dist. Div. R. 1.1 (trial court may
waive application of any rule for good cause and as justice may require). Here,
the trial court was well within its discretion to prohibit the defendant from
recording video images of the minor victim of his stalking, about whom he had
already threatened to publish ‘troves of reputationally damaging information and
assorted digital artifacts” online.

Exhibit A, DePamphilis v. Maravelias, Case No. 2018-0483, slip op. at 11.

21. The Derry Circuit Court clearly has discretion under its rules to assess the facts

and circumstances of a particular situation and make a determination based on that assessment as

to whether to permit recording of a specific court hearing. Making that discretionary assessment

and issuing an order accordingly is not reflective of the court acting without any legal authority

or in the absence of jurisdiction.

22. A writ of prohibition therefore does not lie in this circumstance either.

23. In sum, the plaintiff has not stated a claim sufficient to obtain a writ of prohibition

against any defendant, including the Derry Circuit Court.

B. Plaintiff’s Writ of Mandamus Requests

24. “A writ of mandamus is used to compel a public official to perform a ministerial

act that the official has refused to perform, or to vacate the result of a public official’s act that
was performed arbitrarily or in bad faith.” In re CIGNA, 146 N.H. at 687. A writ of mandamus

is only appropriate “where the petitioner has an apparent right to the requested relief and no other

remedy will fully and adequately afford relief.” Id; see also Rockhouse Mountain Property

Owner’s Ass’n v. Town of Conway, 127 N.H. 593, 602 (1986) (“Mandamus is an extraordinary

writ that may be addressed to a public official, ordering him to take action, and it may be issued

only when no other remedy is available and adequate.”).

25. Rulings on Pending Motions in Resolved Matter. The New Hampshire

Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff’s initial challenges that the circuit court did not rule on

certain arguments in certain pending motions, explaining that those arguments had not been fully

or adequately developed by the plaintiff. Exhibit A, DePamphilis v. Maravelias, Case No. 2018-

0483, slip op. at 8-11.

26. In any event, it is well-settled that a writ of mandamus will issue only where

“there is clear and apparent right to the relief requested and when no other adequate relief is

available.” Godfrey v. Godfrey, 111 N.H. 291, 292 (1971). The court “will not interfere with the

ordinary process of appeal unless there is a clear case of necessity.” Id.

27. To the extent the plaintiff has not obtained rulings on one or more of his pleadings

in the underlying extension of protective order matter, which has now been resolved by the New

Hampshire Supreme Court, his opportunity to have those issues addressed has expired.

28. There is no clear right to mandamus relief in such circumstances and any action

on the motions at this juncture would be futile.

29. Recusal of Judge Coughlin from All Further Proceedings. Finally, the

plaintiff seeks a writ of mandamus to require Judge Coughlin to recuse himself from all further

proceedings involving DePamphilis and himself. Pl.’s Petition at 20-22.

 30. The New Hampshire Supreme Court reviewed this issue and resolved it in a

manner unfavorable to the plaintiff.

31. Specifically, the New Hampshire Supreme Court stated:

We further note that, to the extent the defendant argues that the trial court was
biased, we have reviewed the record in this case, and can find no basis upon
which a reasonable person would have questioned Judge Coughlin’s impartiality,
or any evidence that any of the factors that would have per se disqualified Judge
Coughlin was present. See State v. Bader, 148 N.H. 265, 268-71 (2002). The
mere fact that the trial court issued decisions that were adverse to the defendant
does not establish judicial bias. See id. at 271.

Exhibit A, DePamphilis v. Maravelias, Case No. 2018-0483, slip op. at 11.

32. Moreover, recusal of a judge is an issue to be raised in the underlying matter. The

judge must then determine whether, under the relevant authorities and circumstances presented,

he or she must be recused. An incorrect recusal decision may be appealed to the New Hampshire

Supreme Court and remedied through that process. In short, recusal is not a ministerial function,

the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law to raise that issue, and the right to a recusal through a

writ of mandamus is not clear, particularly given the underlying facts of this case.

33. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s requests for mandamus relief should also be denied.

Conclusion.

34. The plaintiff’s complaint does not state a claim for a writ of prohibition or

mandamus. Additionally, most, if not all, of the matters the plaintiff raises have been reviewed

and resolved by the New Hampshire Supreme Court. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s complaint

should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

WHEREFORE, the defendants respectfully request that this Court issue an order:

A. Granting this Motion to Dismiss;

B. Dismissing all of the defendants from this case as parties; and

 C. Granting such further relief as the court deems just and equitable.

Respectfully submitted,

HONORABLE JOHN J. COUGHLIN, DERRY

CIRCUIT COURT, AND CONCERNED
JUDICIAL OFFICERS

By his attorney,
GORDON J. MACDONALD
ATTORNEY GENERAL

Date: February 1, 2019 /s/ Nancy Smith_____________

Nancy Smith, NH Bar ID # 9085
Senior Assistant Attorney General
New Hampshire Attorney General’s Office
33 Capitol Street
Concord, NH 03301
Phone: (603) 271-3650
nancy.smith@doj.nh.gov

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Motion to Dismiss was mailed on this 1st

day of February, 2019, to Paul Maravelias, via USPS to: 34 Mockingbird Hill Road, Windham,

NH 03087.

/s/ Nancy Smith_____________

Nancy Smith, NH Bar ID # 9085
Senior Assistant Attorney General